STATCON MIDTERM CASE DIGEST

Tanada v. Yulo G.R. No.43575 (1935)

Topic. Purpose of construction: Limitation on the power of courts to construe

Case. Action of quo warranto to clarify Judge Tañada’s position

Facts. 1911, Dec.: Tanada appointed justice of peace in Alabat, Tayabas by Governor-General with consent of
Philippine Commission

1931, Nov.: Act No. 3899 providing 65 y.o. as retirement age of judges approved

1933, Jan.: date for cessation from office as per Act No. 3899

1934, Sept.: Tanada transferred to Perez, Tayabas but same position

1935, Oct.: Tanada reached 65 years of age

1935: DOJ, through CFI Judge, ordered

Tanada to surrender office

Issue: (1) Does Act. No. 3899 apply to Tanada? -No

(2) Does the transfer denote a new appointment? -No

Ratio: (1) Tanada has not reached 65 when the Act was approved. The law provides that judges who are already 65
years old upon the time the Act No. 3899 takes effect should surrender their offices. In this case, Tanada was only
64 when said Act gained approval. Although Tanada did reach 65 later, such is immaterial as the law only includes
those who have reached said date on approval and not after its approval.

(2) The transfer is not a new appointment because it does not meet the elements of an appointment. Appointments
necessarily has two things: appointment by Governor-General and consent of Philippine Senate. Transfer only needs
the word of the Governor-General. As applied to Tanada, his transfer is not an appointment because his second
reassignment did not have the consent of Philippine Senate. As well, by definition, transfer is the enlargement or
change of jurisdiction grounded on the original appointment. It being grounded on the original appointment, no new
appointment is necessary.

Doctrine: The relevant statutory doctrine for this case can be seen in Ratio 1. Defense argues that the relevant
provision is “defective and does not convey the legislative intent.” Later, it was learned that the defense was actually
seeking for the insertion of a phrase in the provision which would then explicitly disqualify Tanada from office. To
address this argument, the court differentiates between liberal construction, which the court is allowed to do, and
judicial legislation, which is beyond the court’s jurisdiction. Liberal construction allows courts to find out the true
meaning of a provision through legislative intent. Judicial legislation, meanwhile, is when the court adds certain
elements/words in a provision that has been omitted. In short, the defense sought judicial legislation, an act which
courts cannot do.

DE CASTRO vs. JBC

PHILIPPINE SCOUT VETERANS SECURITY & INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC. vs. NLRC
PEOPLE vs. SANTOS

GROUP 2

Lhuiller v. British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010

People v Sandiganbayan, G.R. 188165, December 11, 2013

GROUP 3

LAMBINO vs. COMELEC

ESTRADA vs. CASEDA

KIDA vs. SENATE

GROUP 4

PEOPLE vs. GUILERMO MANANTAN

REPUBLIC vs. YAHON

HAGAD vs. GOZO-DADDLE

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION vs. JANIOLA

NATIONAL POWER CORP. vs. ANGAS

GROUP 5

VILLEGAS vs. SUBIDO

GAERLAN JR. vs. CATUBIG

JG SUMMIT HOLDING INC. vs. CA

PALANCA vs. CA

CITY GOVERNMENT OF SAN PABLO vs. HON. BIENVENIDO V. REYES