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Déjà vu and jamais vu

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 Déjà vu and jamais vu

Herman N. Sno

This chapter is concerned with two types of paramnesia: déjà vu and jamais vu.
Paramnesia, a term which is nowadays rarely used in medical practice (Berrios,
1995), refers to a group of memory anomalies associated with both non-patholog-
ical and pathological conditions (see Chapter 14, this volume). It is to be regretted
that current interest in memory dis orders tends to focus on memory loss (as in the
amnestie syndrome and dementia) to the detriment of the study of the paramne-
sias. Indeed, clinicians with little free time on their hands to keep up with the theo-
reticalliterature on memory disorders should be able to use the paramnesias as a
vantage point to study the processes of memory. After discussing divergent views
on, and describing some types of, 'paramnesia, this chapter will deal with the clin-
ical features of the déjà vu and jamais vu experiences.

Paramnesia

Paramnesia denotes false memory. The term derives from the Greek para-, meaning
from (the side), beside near, beyond, against, and -mnesis, meaning memory
(Campbell, 1996). The term paramnesia was coined by Emil Kraepelin (1887) in
analogy of terms such as paranoia, paraphasia and paraphrenia, as a general term
'to denote pseudoreminiscences or illusions and hallucinations of memory'
(Burnham, 1889). Following Iames Sully's book Illusions (1881), Kraepelin (1887)
differentiated between a total (völlige Erinnerungsfälschung) and a partial ('theil-
weise Erinnerungsverfälschung') form of paramnesia. The latter form is based on
distortions or elaborations of real events, the former emerges independent of any
real events of personal history. By comparison with perception disorders, the
partial farm corresponds with illusions and the total form with hallucinations.
Kraepelin (1887) divided the total form of paramnesia into the einfache (simple),
associirende (Berrios, 1995: 'evoked', Burnham, 1889: 'suggested or associating')
and identificirende(Berrios, 1995: 'identified'; Burnham, 1889: identifying) sub-
types. The first subtype includes spontaneous images that appear as memories; the
second includes present perceptions that evoke pseudomemories by association
338
339 Déjà vu and jamais vu

with something analogous or related in the past; and the third includes a new expe-
rience that appears as a photographic copy of a former one. The identifying subtype
corresponds with the phenomenon that is now generally known as the déjà vu
experience (Burnham, 1889; Sno & Linszen, 1990).
Since Kraepelin (1887), the international debate on paramnesia has been
obscured by divergent interpretations. In France, André Lalande (1893) and Paul
Lapie (1893) seemed to equate paramnesia with the déjà vu experience. More
recently, Henri Ey et al. (1978) described paramnesia as falsifications of the rnne-
monic performance resulting in an entanglement of the present with the past, and
of the perception of reality with imagination: 'Either the present is pathologically
associated with the past (fausse reconnaissances, impression de déjà vu),' or the
present is excessively dissociated from the past (illusion de Sosie ou de non-recon-
naissance;impression de jamais vu). Arnold Pick (1903) coined the term redupli-
cative paramnesia to delineate a delusional reduplication of place. It has been
recently suggested to extend Pick's concept to include the delusional reduplication
of time and person (Sno, 1994).
Haveloek Ellis (1911) also regarded paramnesia as 'the psychologist's name for a
hallucination of memory which ( ... ) is often termed by French authors "false ree-
ognition" or "sensation du déjà vu'", This famous English physician argued that the
déjà vu experience may be termed 'hypnagogic paramnesia', because it occurs in the
'ante-chamber of sleep, but not necessary before sleep' ( ... ) 'when a centrally
excited sensation of one order (dream image) is mistaken for a centrally excited
sensation of another order (memory)'. Banister and Zangwill (1941), in turn, sug-
gested 'restricted paramnesia' for experiences of familiaritywith a genuine founda-
tion in the past history of the individual and provoked by a less well-defined aspect
of a perceptual situation. This type of paramnesia would correspond to Kraepelin's
'evoked' or 'associating' subtype. Likewise, their definition of the déjà vu experi-
ence, . which Banister and Zangwill distinguished from restricted paramnesia,
would correspond to Kraepelin's 'identifying' subtype. CampbeIl's (1996) psychi-
atric dictionary makes use of a definition of paramnesia very similar to Ey's: dis-
turbance of memory in which real facts and fantasies are confused.
Reed (1979) has pointed out that a degree of distortion of recall, as opposed to
forgetting, is the crucial feature of paramnesia. Influenced by Sir Frederic Bartlett
(1932), the Canadian researcher sees paramnesia as illustrating well the fact that
recall is never the retrieval of inert mnestic representations but involves active
reconstruction. As examples, Reed (1979) reported a variety of everyday experi-
ences such as the 'I can't quite place him', the 'know the face but not the name', the
'time-gap', the 'fleeting-thought, the 'feeling of knowing', 'tip of the tongue', cryp-
tomnesia, 'checking, déjà vu and jamais vu phenomena. The first two correspond
well to the perceptual disturbance of prosopagnosia as described by Bodamer
340 H.N.Sno

(1947). One form of <time-gap' experience is also known as 'highway-hypnosis',

In the United States, Burnham (1889) distinguished, following Kraepelin's
classification, between the simple, suggested or associating, and identifying param-
nesia. In 1920, Alfred Gordon also used paramnesia as a synonym for the déjà vu
experience, in his own terms the illusion of 'the already seen', In 1944, Morton
Leeds described the 'illusion of déjà vu' as only one form of paramnesia. Of late,
Strauss (1995) has defined paramnesia as a falsification of memory by distortion of
recall, including fausse reconnaissance, retrospective falsification, confabulation,
déjà vu and jamais vu. (Parenthetically, the term fausse reconnaissance is generally
regarded as an alternative designation for the déjà vu experience (Sno & Linszen,
1990).) Retrospective falsification, in turn, corresponds to Kraepelin's partial par-
amnesia (1887). The various types of paramnesia and the corresponding descrip-
tions are summarized in Table 15.1.

Déjà vu experiences

Déjà vu is French for 'already seen', Déjà vu experiences have been defined as 'any
subjectively inappropriate impression of familiarity of a present experience with an
undefined past' (Neppe, 1983). Their study has attracted also creative writers and
accounts of déjà vu in novels and poems are consistent with clinical data (Sno et
al., 1992). With a frequency ranging from 30 to 96%, and apparently uninfluenced
by gender, déjà vu seems a common phenomenon (Sno & Linszen, 1990), particu-
lady amongst the young. It also seems associated with depersonalization (Sierra &
Berrios, 1997). Common features include: paroxysmal nature, accompanying feel-
ings of tension and secondary anxiety, ability to predict the events of the next few
moments (precognition) and inability to place the alleged original experience in a
specific point of the past. Occurring in any sensory modality, the experiences may
be viewed as positive paramnesie symptoms, involving inappropriate recognition
or recollection (Reed, 1972; Sno & Linszen, 1990).
The view has also been put forward that there are pathological and non-patho-
logical forms of déjà vu, and that they are generated by different mechanisms (Sno
& Linszen 1990). Phenomenological similarities between the forms, however,
suggest that the difference may only be quantitative and that it might be more
appropriate to talk about a minor and a major form (Arnaud, 1896). The minor
form is transient, paroxysmal and reality testing is only momentarily disturbed.
Every detail of the present experience is perceived as being identical to an alleged
experience in the past, while at the same time the subject is aware that this is impos-
sible. On the other hand, the major form is of prolonged duration and reality
testing is markedly impaired, though not absent as indicated by doubts about the
341 Déjà vu and jamais vu

Table 15.1. Types of paramnesia

Type of paramnesia Description Author

Partial paramnesia Partial falsification of real memories Kraepelin (1887)

Simple paramnesia Spontaneous images that appear as memories Kraepelin (1887)
Associating Present perceptions that evoke pseudo-memories Kraepelin (1887)
paramnesia by association with something analogous in the
past
1dentifying A new experience that appears as a photographic Kraepelin (1887)
paramnesla copy of a former one
Hypnagogic Phenomenon occurring in the hypnagogic period, Ellis (1911)
paramnesia when a centrally excited dream image is mistaken
for a centrally excited memory
Reduplicative Delusion of familiarity related to a reduplication Piek (1903),
paramnesia of time, place or person. Sno (1994)
Restricted E:cperiences of familiarity with a genuine Banister and
paramnesia foundation in the past, provoked by a less well- Zangwill (1941)
defined aspect of a present perceptual situation
Fausse False recognition (synonym for déjà vu experience) Strauss (1995)
reconnaissance
Retrospective Memory becomes unintentionally distorted by Strauss (1995)
falsification present emotional, cognitive and experiential state
Confabulation Unconscious filling of gaps in memory by imagined Strauss (1995)
or untrue experiences
Déjà vu experience Any subjectively inappropriate impression of Neppe (1983)
familiarity of a present experience with an
undefined past
Jamais vu experience Any subjectively inappropriate impression of non- Neppe (1983)
familiarity of a present experience with an undefined
past
'I can't quite place 1nability to identify a relatively well known person Reed (1979)
him' _ phenomenon
'Know the face, not Recognition and appropriate identification of Reed (1979)
thename'- another person, without remembering the name
phenomenon
'Time-gap' _ 1nability to recall a series of events during the Reed (1979)
experience previous seconds or minutes
342 H.N.Sno

Table 15.1 (cant.)

Type of paramnesia Description Author

'Fleeting-thought' - Feeling ofhaving grasped a new idea, achieved an Reed (1979)

experience insight or glimpsed a problem without being able to
identify it
Feeling ofknowing Conviction ofknowing an elusive issue and the Reed (1979)
inability to demonstrate the knowing
'Tip of the tongue' - Feeling of knowing an unrecalled item and ofbeing Reed (1979)
experience so close to recalling that it is 'on the tip of the
tongue'
Cryptomnesia Revival of an experience without the attributes of Reed (1979)
memory
Checking Behaviour undertaken to confirm that some action Reed (1979)
or task has been completed

appropriateness of the experience of familiarity. The present experience is per-

ceived as identical, but not necessarily-in every detail.
The cause of déjà vu has been associated with anxiety, dissociative mechanisms,
mood and personality disorders, schizophrenia and organic brain syndromes. In
non-psychopathological conditions, predisposing factors include emotional
trauma, exhaustion, psychomimetic drugs, fatigue, severe stress, hyperventilation
syndrome and illness (Sno & Linszen, 1990; Evans, 1995). Hughlings Iackson
(1888) suggested a link between some forms of forced reminiscence and a particu-
lar type of complex partial seizures (CPS), and since then the relationship between
déjà vu experiences and CPS has been confirmed experimentally. Electrical stimu-
lation of both the medial and later al temporal cortex have been shown to elicit the
reporting of déjà vu experiences (Mullan & Penfield, 1959; Halgren et al., 1978'
Bancaud et al., 1994). It should be stressed, however, that déjà vu experiences can
solely be interpreted as an indication of epilepsy when occurring in combination
with other psychiatrie or neurological symptoms (Sno & Linszen, 1990).
As to psychopathogenesis, many authors have viewed déjà vu experiences pri-
marily as a disturbance of memory (e.g. Sander, 1873; Osborn, 1884; Kraepelin.
1887; Burnham, 1889; Ribot, 1894; Ey et al., 1978; Yager & Gitlin, 1995).
Psychoanalytically oriented authors have do ne likewise by suggesting that dé-à
vu experiences have some relation to defence mechanisms, dreams and unco -
scious fantasies and wishes (e.g. Freud, 1901, 1914, 1936; Pötzl, 1926; Oberndor;
1941; Marcovitz, 1952; Arlow, 1959). The parapsychological interpretation h -
gone much further to imply that the déjà vu experience is based on reincamatioz
343 Déjà vu and jamais vu

i.e. on memories of a past life (Chari, 1962). Given his label 'sentiment of pre-exis-
tence' it seems likely that Arthur Ladbroke Wigan (1844), the first to focus medical
attention on the déjà vu experiences, also presumed such an association.
Non-mnestic hypotheses have also been put forward; for example, déjà vu expe-
riences have been linked to a disruption in the mechanisms that integrate the func-
tions of consciousness, identity and perception of the environment. In this re gard,
déjà vu experiences are classified in DSM-IV (APA, 1994) as dissociative phenom-
ena.

Jamais vu experiences

Jamais vu is French for 'never seen'. The jamais vu experience is generally regarded
as the opposite of the déjà vu experience (Reed, 1972, 1979; Neppe, 1983). The
inception of the term jamais vu is unclear. As with paramnesia, the debate on
jamais vu experiences has been obscured by divergent interpretations. Yager and
Gitlin (1995) assert that jamais vu experiences involve feelings that one has never
seen things which, in fact, one has. Vernon Neppe (1983) in turn defines jamais vu
experiences, in contrast to déjà vu experiences, as 'any subjectively inappropriate
impression of non-familiarity of a present experience with an undefined past'.
Reed (1979) has viewed the jamais vu experience as the classical example of recall
without recognition: 'Whereas cryptomnesia represents a failure to recognize
known ideas, jamais vu represents a failure to recognize regularly experienced per-
cepts'. Jamais vu experiences can occur in any sensory modality and may be viewed
as negative paramnesie symptoms, involving inappropriate non-recognition or
non-recollection (Reed, 1972; Neppe, 1983; Sno, 1994).Conceiving of jamais vu as
a disturbance of perception, George Devereux (1967) called it fausse non-recon-
naissance and suggested that it resulted from an immediate displacement of an ini-
tially correct perception and identification of reality by a mis- or non-identification
of the observed person or object.
Isidor Silbermann (1963), in turn, called the jamais vu experience the 'jamais
phenomenon' and characterized it as 'the erroneous reaction' 'I've never experi-
enced anything like that before'. In his opinion, the jamais phenomenon is the
result of fragmentation and can vary in intensity from a simple, easily correctable
phenomenon to a firmly fixed and unchangeable conviction. Illustrated by two
instances reported by Freud, Silbermann (1963) claims that jamais experiences
appear not only during waking hours but also in dreams. Gordon (1920) cites the
jamais vu experience as the 'illusion of the never seen' or 'agnosia, which he depiets
as an erroneous belief of a continuo us character based on a radical alteration of
judgment.
Psychoanalytically oriented authors re gard the jamais vu experience as a defence
344 H .. Sno

mechanism 'by which an event is torn out of the context of experience, removed
from consciousness, and rigidly warded off' (Silbermann, 1963; Devereux, 1967).
In keeping with this view, Rudolph Loewenstein (1957) referred to it as the experi-
en ce of jamais raconté; and ten years later Boesky (1969) suggested that the jamais
raconté experience was the reversal of déjà raconté. In the view of the latter, the
reversal of déjà raconté consists of a patient saying: 'There is something I've never
told you before ... : when in fact this particular information has already been
reported. Boesky (1969) believed that the reversal of déjà raconté was a manifesta-
tion of transference analogous to depersonalization and as an expression of an
effort by the ego to repudiate degraded and devalued self representations and
identifications which are rooted in the pre-genital history and narcissistic precur-
sors of castration anxiety.
As mentioned earlier, the jamais vu experience has been generaIly regarded as the
opposite of déjà vu, namely that it is ego-alien and negative and has the finality and
silence of never having happened (Silbermann, 1963). Boesky (1969) views the
reversal of déjà raconté as analogous to depersonalization and Myers and Grant
(1972) conceive of the jamais vu experience in general as an extreme degree of
depersonalization. These notions are in keeping with Freud's view (1914), that déjà
vu experiences can be considered as the 'positive' counterpart of depersonalization.
Neppe (1983) has suggested that in depersonalization the emphasis is on the person
itself, whereas the jamais vu experience is linked to situations or places. However,
this author argues that the jamais experience and depersonalization should be
regarded as distinct because of the relative specificity of the jamais vu experience
in complex partial seizures.
In epidemiological terms, jamais vu appears to be far less common than déjà vu
(Neppe, 1983) and according to Reed (1979) this may explain the fact that jamais
vu has not been weIl studied in the psychiatrie literature; in the opinion of this
author, the phenomenon does not occur among normal individuals other than in
a very fleeting manner (Reed, 1979). Others, however, have argued that the jamais
vu experience is common and can be triggered by fatigue, sub stance abuse, complex
partial seizures and other psychopathological states (Silbermann, 1963; Chari,
1964; Yager & Gitlin, 1995).

Summary

In summary, the most common paramnesias are déjà vu and jamais vu, with the
latter being the less frequent of the two. Once upon a time both were considered as
disorders of memory but currently other hypotheses are being entertained, for
example, these states are considered in DSM IV as being related to dissociation.
Psychodynamic interpretations have also been put forward. It is safe to state that
345 Déjà vu and jamais vu

both experiences can be seen in relation to some subtypes of complex partial sei-
zures. Beyond that, little is known about the psychopathology and neurobiology of
these fascinating phenomena.

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