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Journal of Education Policy

ISSN: 0268-0939 (Print) 1464-5106 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tedp20

Understanding the roles of non-state actors in


global governance: evidence from the Global
Partnership for Education

Francine Menashy

To cite this article: Francine Menashy (2016) Understanding the roles of non-state actors in global
governance: evidence from the Global Partnership for Education, Journal of Education Policy, 31:1,
98-118, DOI: 10.1080/02680939.2015.1093176

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2015.1093176

Published online: 05 Oct 2015.

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Journal of Education Policy, 2016
VOL. 31, NO. 1, 98–118, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2015.1093176

Understanding the roles of non-state actors in global governance:


evidence from the Global Partnership for Education
Francine Menashy
Department of Leadership in Education, University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA, USA

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY


The study detailed in this paper examines the growing role of non-state Received 28 May 2014
actors in the transnational policy-making landscape through a case study Accepted 7 September 2015
of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) – a partnership of donor and KEYWORDS
developing country governments, multilateral organizations, civil society, Transnational public–
private companies and foundations, dedicated to increasing access to quality private partnership;
education worldwide. Conducted through a constructivist lens, this study global governance; Global
examines the roles of non-state GPE partners who collaborate as diverse Partnership for Education;
stakeholders within this single policy-making forum. Via a process-tracing civil society organizations;
analysis, including an examination of GPE meeting documents and interviews private foundations
with members of the GPE Board of Directors and Secretariat staff, I trace the
past and current roles of non-state partners within the GPE – in particular,
civil society, private foundations and private companies. I conclude that the
GPE has evolved into a forum in which civil society actors have become
relatively influential, while private sector foundations and companies have
for the most part been disengaged and made only a tangible impact.
These findings can be attributed to the differently constructed identities
of each group of actors. The study concludes that shared normative beliefs
and worldviews, which characterize epistemic communities, may be a key
element to cohesion, functioning, and thereby influence.

Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed two concurrent and related trends in the international develop-
ment arena: a rise in transnational coordination and a growing engagement of non-state sector actors.
The Global Partnership for Education (GPE) is indicative of these trends. Formerly the Education for
All Fast Track Initiative (FTI), and defined in this paper as a ‘transnational public-private partnership’,
the GPE is a partnership of donor and developing country governments, multilateral organizations,
civil society, private companies and foundations, dedicated to increasing access to quality education
worldwide. With a mission ‘to galvanize and coordinate a global effort to deliver a good quality
education to all girls and boys, prioritizing the poorest and most vulnerable’ (GPE 2014a), the GPE
supports nearly 60 developing countries that lack sufficient funds to provide quality basic education
for all children.
The study detailed in this paper examines the growing role of non-state actors in the transnational
policy-making landscape through a case study of the GPE. The GPE is a relatively new organization

CONTACT Francine Menashy francine.menashy@umb.edu


© 2015 Taylor & Francis
Journal of Education Policy 99

in education, but one that embodies current norms in international development, such as harmoni-
zation, coordination and partnership, and which includes some of the most important and influential
actors in the arena of aid to education. While the GPE is comprised of several partners, I propose that
a rigorous understanding of non-state actor participation is crucial, given some recent policy shifts
their involvement has triggered in education – an arena that has traditionally been envisaged as a
public sector responsibility.
This paper first provides a description and explanation of the rise of transnational public–private
partnerships from an international relations and global education policy perspective. I then explain
that this study is conducted through a constructivist lens and theoretically framed using the concepts of
epistemic communities and policy networks in order to ask how the roles of non-state actors have been
constructed within the GPE and with what results. In order to answer this research question, I employ
a methodological approach which involves a process-tracing analysis, including an examination of GPE
meeting documents between 2009 and 2014 and elite interviews with members of the GPE Board of
Directors constituencies and GPE Secretariat staff members. Based on these data, I trace the past and
current roles of non-state partners within the GPE, in particular, civil society, private foundations and
private companies. I conclude that the GPE has evolved into a forum in which civil society actors have
been constituted as relatively influential, while private sector foundations and companies have for the
most part been disengaged and made only a tangible impact. These findings can be attributed to the
differently constructed identities of each group of actors. For instance, the inclusion of private actors
in the GPE was based on inaccurate parallels between the health and education sectors, contributing
to an ambiguous identity.
In the current climate of increased collaboration in global policy spaces, and the associated growing
roles for non-state policy actors, this study offers a case study that details the ways in which groups of
actors do – or do not – function together as cohesive units. It concludes that shared normative beliefs
and worldviews, which characterize epistemic communities, may be a key element to cohesion, func-
tioning, and thereby influence. The findings from this research provide lessons to inform the formation
of transnational public–private partnerships through highlighting the uniqueness of education in
contrast to other social sectors. The study moreover expands understanding of relationships between
educational policy-makers and reasons for their influence (or lack thereof). It moreover extends the
current literature on epistemic communities and policy networks through a comparative examination
of how such groupings are exhibited in this transnational public–private partnership.

Transnational PPPs, civil society and private actors in global education


A recent and fairly rapid shift has occurred in international relations, where the dominant state-centric
model – one that has persisted for the past three centuries – has given way to an ostensibly non-hier-
archical form of governance. Emerging against the backdrop of globalization is what Ruggie describes
as ‘a fundamental reconstitution of the global public domain: away from one that equated the “public”
in international politics with states and the interstate realm, to one in which the very system of states
is becoming embedded in a broader, albeit still thin and partial, institutionalized arena’ (Ruggie 2004,
2). This global public domain has brought about the existence of global public policies, concerned
with the provision and financing of collective goods that impact cross-border populations (Kaul et al.
2003; Stone 2008). In the absence of a world government, other bodies have emerged to design such
policies, impacting a variety of social sectors worldwide. Although many international organizations
still include only government representatives, more dominant in recent years has been the rise of what
has been termed transnational public–private partnerships (PPPs), networks or communities of actors
not exclusive to governments, where the non-state sector plays a significant role in decision-making
on global public policies.
Transnational PPPs (also sometimes called multi-stakeholder partnerships) can therefore be under-
stood as representative of both globalization and the new rise of non-state, private actors claiming
authority on issues of global significance. This model of global governance is characterized by the
100 F. Menashy

inclusion of private corporations, non-profit foundations and civil society and enables a ‘space of
assembly’ where diverse actors can participate in decision-making (Stone 2008). Another key char-
acteristic of transnational PPPs is ‘an emphasis on non-hierarchical modes of steering’, wherein all
partners are said to be equal. Despite that power hierarchies undoubtedly manifest within PPPs,
these dynamics are not predefined nor static (Risse 2004, 292; Utting and Zammit 2009). As well,
by its nature, global governance embodies a deficit of democracy and democratic legitimacy, where
decisions are made ‘at best – on very limited explicit consent from the affected populations’ (Scholte
2002, 289). By embracing representatives from a variety of stakeholders, including the non-state sector,
transnational PPPs have attempted to counter this lack of legitimacy under the guise of participatory
democracy in decision-making.
In the early 2000s, the aid architecture – dominated by bilateral government donors – was widely
criticized as fragmented and uncoordinated and therefore inefficient. As well, the failure of states to
respond single-handedly to problems with global impacts justified partnerships between donors, with
the purpose of ‘harmonization’, triggering a rise in transnational coalitions, including PPPs (Severino
and Ray 2010; Savedoff 2012). Since this time, many such organizations have been designed to tackle
single-issue areas – such as vaccinations, water, the environment and education – and so are otherwise
known as ‘vertical organizations’. It is argued that the non-state sector is able to advocate for particular
policies within these issue areas from a normative standpoint, and therefore can help to create a more
ethical and just international coordinated aid regime (Stone 2008; Bezanson and Isenman 2012).
The concurrent trends of coordination and non-state participation clearly manifested within the
education sector, beginning most prominently in the 1990s with collaborative efforts to support uni-
versal access to primary education with the World Congress on Education for All (EFA). Although
spearheaded by international organizations (the World Bank, UNICEF and UNESCO), advocacy
around the EFA goals has since been taken up predominantly by non-governmental organizations,
who over time have become some of the most prominent voices in the movement. A new consensus
around global education norms, widely viewed as a new global compact on education, was also included
as the second Millennium Development Goal (MDG) (Chabbott 2003; Mundy 2012). The education
and development global governance arena has since been readily inclusive of non-state actor voices
as key advocates for EFA, where ‘global civil society’ actors in particular have been seen as critical in
such advocacy roles (Mundy and Murphy 2001; Mundy 2012).
Defined generally as non-governmental and non-corporate actors working towards particular
causes at the international level, global civil society has expanded dramatically in the past decades
(Mundy and Murphy 2001; Scholte 2002; Chandler 2004). Global civil society participants are argued
to enhance democracy within global governance as an advocacy voice for underrepresented groups,
and thereby increasing participatory democratic practices. By acting as a bridge between domestic/
local actors and the global realm, global civil society serves a variety of functions at the global policy
level: ‘… it gives stakeholders voice, bolsters public education, promotes debate, raises transparency,
and increases accountability – enhance the respect that citizens accord to global governance’ (Scholte
2002, 294). As a result, the overarching impact of global civil society participation within transnational
public policy-making domains is arguably advocacy and legitimacy.
In education, civil society actors have been central in the promotion of education as a humanitarian
act and consistent purveyors of rights-based approaches, offering a normative and moral element to
the promotion of education. Global civil society in education has become steadily more coordinated,
most notably via the Global Campaign for Education, a coalition of non-governmental organizations
set up in the late 1990s to promote EFA goals which has since evolved to include participation of
organizations in over 100 countries (Verger and Novelli 2012; Global Campaign for Education 2014).
Recently, CSO groups played a central role in the 2015 World Education Forum and in the design
of the educational Sustainable Development Goals, stressing such themes as rights, equity, inclusion
and lifelong learning (UN 2015).
Educational global civil society has not been free from criticism. Although many CSOs do operate as
grass-roots advocacy organizations, others are seen as indicative of overarching neoliberal forces, where
Journal of Education Policy 101

the rise of CSO influence coincides with a curtailing and delegitimization of the state. CSOs can thereby
be considered as a manifestation of privatization. The work of international civil society organizations are
moreover critiqued for, at times, ignoring local context when designing and implementing programmic
activities (Klees 2008; Steiner-Khamsi 2008). The nature of CSO action in education is therefore contextual.
Due to scope, this study does not focus on the broader impact of CSOs in national contexts, but as members
of the GPE governance and their collective role within this partnership.
Concurrent to this rise in global civil society has been the emergence of private corporate actors
within the international policy realm. Private business involvement in global policy comes in two
main forms. The first is integral to the business itself, often termed corporate social responsibility
programmes, which operates as a branch or department of a company and develops and implements
projects in social sectors. Motivations behind such ‘corporate social investments’ are often claimed to
be grounded in morality, but also explicitly aim to serve business interests and profits (van Fleet 2012;
Bhanji, Forthcoming). The second form of private sector participation is via corporate foundations,
founded by successful business leaders to operate as independent organizations, often completely
unattached to a company itself, except in sharing of a name. As non-profit entities, foundations aim
to address social issues, often globally (Bhanji, Forthcoming). But as well, an overarching justification
for private corporate participation within transnational PPPs – for both companies and foundations
– relates to the failure of states to finance and manage the provision of goods and services on a global
scale, where private actors can be viewed as filling a gap: ‘PPPs create win-win situations and strive for
the provision of collective goods through the pooling of resources, skills, and expertise’ (Schäferhoff,
Campe, and Kaan 2009, 452).
Private corporate participation in education policy and financing at the global level has been
prominent and growing (although, as will be discussed, much less so than in other sectors such as
health) (van Fleet 2012). In terms of private sector businesses, via various forms of ‘global corporate
social engagement’, business leaders have been playing increasingly prominent roles in setting policy
priorities and positing solutions to problems in a variety of educational settings (Ball 2012; Bhanji,
Forthcoming). As with civil society, coalitions of business actors have promoted educational goals
through, for instance, the Global Business Coalition for Education, which comprises corporate lead-
ers from over 20 companies, organizing high-level forums on global education, conducting research
and acting as a bridge between business and education sector actors (van Fleet 2012; Global Business
Coalition for Education 2013; Bhanji, Forthcoming).
Private foundations, such as the Open Society Foundation and the William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation, have targeted education grant-making globally under the auspices of non-profit philan-
thropy. Other philanthropies have focused in large part on national-level educational change and target
funding to both developed (such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in the USA) and developing
countries (such as the Azim Premji Foundation in India) (Bhanji 2008, Forthcoming; Srivastava and
Oh 2010; van Fleet 2012). Similar to the coalitions seen in business and civil society, in 2011 educa-
tional foundations formed the International Education Funders Group, an 'affinity network' of over
60 members (IEFG 2014). Both private foundations and corporations are now regular contributors
to conversations on global education and have contributed to oftentimes normatively based debates
on major issues. For example, Pearson Education publishes a report entitled The Learning Curve that
has focused on cross-national data on performance, school choice and accountability (Pearson 2012);
actors from corporations and foundations recently participated in an event on non-state school provi-
sion in developing countries at the Brookings Institution (Brookings 2015); and the World Economic
Forum’s Global Education Initiative includes a range of business actors and has addressed such themes
as public–private partnerships and technology in education (WEF 2012, 2015).

A constructivist approach to epistemic communities and policy networks


As a result of the parallel and growing engagement of both civil society and private actors at the
transnational level, what has emerged is a global policy domain where, as Ruggie puts it, ‘world civic
102 F. Menashy

politics meets private governance’ (2004, 19), characterized by ‘the dynamic interplay between civil
society actors and multinational corporations’ (2004, 1). Stone depicts this new domain as ‘a double
devolution; first, beyond the nation-state to global and regional domains; and second, a delegation of
authority to private networks and non-state actors’ (2008, 11). Education scholars have drawn attention
to how these trends have engendered a form of ‘network governance’, where educational challenges
are being addressed via collaborations, or partnerships, notably involving non-state actors (Ball 2010,
2012; Ball and Junemann 2012).
In the context of these growing networks and partnerships, theorists have attempted to label groups
that act together to spur change at the global policy level. International relations scholars have coined
the term ‘epistemic communities’ to identify ‘a network of actors’ that are primarily from the non-state
sector. The identities of epistemic communities embody a number of characteristics, including shared
beliefs around the causes of problems, shared notions concerning the validity of knowledge and ‘a
common policy enterprise – that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to
which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare
will be enhanced as a consequence’ (Haas 1992, 3).
A key characteristic of epistemic communities, and what largely distinguishes them from other
groups of actors, is that members share an identity comprised of a ‘set of normative and principled
beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members’ (Haas
1992, 3). The community represents ‘common normative commitments’ or ‘principled’ beliefs where
members are a ‘concrete collection of individuals who hold the same worldview’ (Haas 1992, 27).
Because of this normative element, scholars have pointed to a ‘solidarity of epistemic communities’
(Haas 1992, 20). Epistemic communities therefore draw from shared worldviews and solidarity around
normative understandings in order to influence policies (Adler and Haas 1992).
Although embodying similar characteristics, epistemic communities are distinct from other groups
of actors, namely, policy networks (Haas 1992). A policy network ‘consists of a group of actors who
share an interest in some policy area and who are linked by their direct and indirect contacts with one
another’ (Mintrom and Vergari 1998, 128). As Ball describes, policy networks involve ‘particular kinds
of social relationships, flows and movements. They constitute policy communities, usually based upon
shared conceptions of social problems and their solutions’ (2012, 5). Through collective mobilization,
policy actors collaboratively push as networks for solutions to policy problems. Within these networks
are governmental and non-state actors where ‘new voices and interests are represented in the policy
process, and new nodes of power and influence are constructed or invigorated’ (Ball 2010, 155).
Key actors within these networks are termed ‘policy entrepreneurs’ – those who act as advocates
for specific causes and hold particular leadership characteristics, along with a strong degree of social
and cultural capital (Ball 2012; Kingdon 2011). Kingdon describes policy entrepreneurship in the con-
text of endorsing particular agendas via policy networks (Kingdon 2011, 122). Mintrom and Vergari
similarly define ‘policy entrepreneurs as people who seek to promote policy innovations’ (1998, 130).
Policy networks are therefore characterized by shared ideas around social problems and a conception
of their role as offering innovative solutions to these policy problems.
Despite some shared common characteristics, epistemic communities are distinct from policy
networks. This distinction rests in large part on the notion of common principled or normative under-
standings, where the ‘normative component means that epistemic community members are not merely
policy entrepreneurs’ (Haas 1992, 20). Therefore, although policy networks reflect common views
about policy problems and solutions, this should not be confused with shared normative principles or
worldviews. In fact, policy networks, although providing an arena to collectively promote innovations
and solutions, sometimes contain ‘strange bedfellows’ (Ball 2012, 5–6).
In light of the growing roles of networks and communities that predominantly include non-state
actors and address problems at a global level, policy-making processes in education can now be char-
acterized and contextualized within an arena of ‘global education policy’ (Rizvi and Lingard 2010).
Global education policy is a complex and rapidly changing arena, where policies on public education,
its assessment, financing and delivery are being decided often within transnational public–private
Journal of Education Policy 103

arrangements (Rizvi and Lingard 2010; Ball 2012; Ball and Junemann 2012). As shown through this
study, those representing the non-state sector in transnational PPPs can be categorized as both epis-
temic communities and policy networks, as these groupings are each identifiable within the GPE.
The research presented in this paper envisages the GPE as a case of a transnational PPP that acts
as a space of assembly within the new global public domain for those concerned with education. The
GPE includes 19 seats on its Board of Directors from both donor and developing country governments,
multilateral agencies and the non-state sector. It is the latter – inclusive of civil society, foundations
and companies – that truly marks the GPE as a PPP, including as decision-makers in the partnership
the more traditional public sector and the newly entrusted non-state actors.
To adequately understand the role of these non-state partners, I propose that the GPE warrants
a constructivist analysis. As described by Finnemore and Sikkink, constructivism is a form of social
analysis that is rooted in claims concerning interactions and relationships between actors, which are
shaped by not simply material resources, but by ‘ideational factors’ or widely shared beliefs that ‘con-
struct the interests and identities of purposive actors’ (Ruggie 1998; Risse 2000; Finnemore and Sikkink
2001, 392–393). A constructivist lens highlights how actors, by not only material means, but also via
ideas, knowledge and their relationships to other actors, shape the processes by which decisions are
made. At the same time, the actors themselves are being shaped within such processes. A key element
to a constructivist analysis is the understanding of identity, where ‘identities are rooted in an actor’s
self-understandings (and are thus subjective) but also depend on whether that identity is recognized
by other actors’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 399). From a constructivist standpoint, international
actors’ identities are seen as constituted by the interaction of several factors, which are important to
identify, as actors’ identities affect how and the degree to which they impact actions (Ruggie 1998;
Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Keohane 2006).
In the context of the GPE, a constructivist analysis of non-state Board partners interrogates not only
their contributions to decision-making, but also how their roles and identities have been constructed
through their participation in the GPE. In understanding that actors’ identities are shaped by their
environments, a question that is often posed through a constructivist lens is: ‘How does this shaping
happen and with what results?’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 393). More specifically, this study asks:
How have the roles of the various non-state actors within the GPE been shaped and with what impacts?

Methodology
The GPE is examined in this paper as a case study of a transnational PPP. In order to understand the
role of non-state actors within the GPE, I examine the historical trajectory of civil society and private
sector involvement within its earlier incarnation as the Fast Track Initiative until the present GPE, via a
process-tracing analysis. Process-tracing occurs within a case study and ‘is an analytic tool for drawing
descriptive and causal inferences from diagnostic pieces of evidence – often understood as part of a
temporal sequence of events or phenomena’ (Bennett 2010; Collier 2011, 824). Described as a ‘within
case analysis’, process-tracing often targets policy-making and policy-makers (Tansey 2007; Vennesson
2008, 235). A process-tracing analysis allows for a constructivist examination of the GPE case, where
actor perspectives are considered integral to understanding the role of ideas, relationships and both
the historical and current contexts which contribute to the shaping of actor identity. By investigating
the key past events involving non-state actors, I aim to uncover how civil society and private partners
have been constructed to embody their current roles as members of the GPE Board of Directors.
Two data sources are examined in this study. First, an analysis has been conducted of several doc-
uments from GPE Board meetings. Meeting documents, including minutes of meetings, final meeting
reports, board presentations and final decisions, from 14 FTI or GPE Board meetings held between
2009 and 2014 are included in the analysis. Using NVivo qualitative research software, key documents
have been coded for relevant themes.
Second, given that process-tracing aims to understand particular events, viewpoints and processes,
the perspectives of key actors involved in such processes were garnered through ‘elite’ interviewing.
104 F. Menashy

Elite interviews provide first-hand accounts from ‘significant players’ or participants directly involved
in the historical events and circumstances associated with the case being studied (Aberbach and
Rockman 2002; Tansey 2007; Harvey 2011). The goal of elite interviewing within process-tracing is
not to arrive at generalizable conclusions from a random sample of respondents, but instead ‘to obtain
the testimony of individuals who were most closely involved in the process of interest’, and therefore
the number of elite interviews required are often relatively small (Tansey 2007, 767–768). Via pur-
posive sampling (Goldstein 2002; Tansey 2007), interviewees were explicitly selected based on their
current or past role within the GPE Board of Directors or interactions with non-state Board members
in GPE-related contexts. Respondents were selected on the basis of their intimate knowledge of GPE
history and processes, and considered to hold unique qualifications to substantiate, contextualize
and build on findings from the document analysis. The study draws from 19 in-depth interviews
conducted with past and current members of GPE Board constituencies who represent the non-state
sectors, including Civil Society Organizations and Private Sector/Foundations; members from other
constituencies; and past and current GPE Secretariat staff. Interviews took place between January of
2014 and March of 2015, and all interviews were transcribed and coded thematically to categorize
information and viewpoints, but also temporally, to better understand the timeline of events that led
to the current organizational structure of the GPE and the roles of its non-state partners. Due to the
very small pool of potential interviewees in order to retain anonymity, respondents are identified only
in general terms by either constituency or as GPE Secretariat staff members.

Tracing the inclusion of non-state actors: from the FTI to the GPE
In many ways, the GPE typifies a transnational public–private partnership, particularly when exam-
ining its governance. The Board of Directors consists of 19 voting members, each seat representing a
group of donor countries (6 seats), developing countries (6 seats), multilateral agencies (3 seats), and
most important for this study, civil society organizations (3 seats) and the private sector and founda-
tions (1 seat) (GPE 2012a, 2012d). Decision-making is therefore split (although not evenly) between
public and private sector actors. But unlike many other transnational PPPs, financing is predominantly
public, where the GPE Fund – a pooled fund from which disbursements are made to developing coun-
try governments – is financed mainly by Northern donor country partners of the GPE. This contrasts
with transnational PPPs primarily in the health sector, which are largely inclusive of private sector
financing, including both companies and foundations (Stenson 2010; Global Fund 2013).
Alongside the GPE Board of Directors, a number of smaller working groups (to focus on, for
instance, implementation of the Strategic Plan, evaluating governance, financial advisory, etc.) have
been established and all include non-state representatives. New committees have recently been formed,
charged with particular tasks including strategy and policy, governance, ethics and risk. Many of these
working groups and committees are not only inclusive of, but also led by, non-state Board actors
(Interview #1, CSO; Interview #11, Secretariat; GPE 2012d, 2014b).
In 2002, led by the World Bank, the Education for All FTI was launched and described as
a partnership between donor and developing countries to accelerate progress towards the MDG of universal
primary education. FTI is built on mutual commitments: (1) partner countries have agreed to give priority to
primary education and to develop sound national education plans, and (2) donors have agreed to increase support
in a transparent, coordinated manner. (World Bank 2005, 2)
The FTI included a Steering Committee which was primarily responsible for relaying operational direc-
tions to a Secretariat office, but was initially not a governing Board. In 2009, the Steering Committee
became a Board of Directors (Gartner 2010).
The FTI came under intense scrutiny in the late 2000s, and these criticisms led to a major restructur-
ing and rebranding into the current GPE. In large part, the restructuring responded to a 2010 external
review of the organization which cited several major shortcomings to its governance, including its
over-dependence on the World Bank and the dominance of donors on its Board: ‘The FTI began as a
donor initiative, and has essentially remained one, with partner countries having only limited voice’
Journal of Education Policy 105

(Cambridge Education, Mokoro, and Oxford Policy Management 2010, 83). A growing understand-
ing that developing country partners must be included at the Board table resulted, as did a push to
maintain a more arms-length relationship with the World Bank (Interview #9, Secretariat; Interview
#12, Secretariat).
The GPE Board eventually came to include four seats for non-state sector representatives. As
explained below, the inclusion of non-state actors within the new governance model of the then-FTI
was rooted in several factors, such as assumptions around the likelihood of private financial contri-
butions, prominent advocacy from key actors, as well as a desire to increase the legitimacy of the
organization, given the mounting critiques.

Civil society partners and the GPE


The FTI had long engaged with non-governmental organizations in its support to the Civil Society
Education Fund, where since 2008, local civil society actors have been aided through both material
resources and capacity building to engage in national education sector planning. As well, the FTI
included civil society representation on its Steering Committee (FTI 2009; Interview #3, CSO; Interview
#8, CSO; and Interview #9, Secretariat). Its in-country implementation and monitoring of funds has
also involved civil society groups through their participation in ‘Local Education Groups’ – collabo-
rative country-level forums comprised of local actors (GPE 2014c).
In 2011, the restructuring resulted in three constituencies for Civil Society Organizations. These
include larger and more globally focused Northern CSOs, whose function on the Board is widely seen
in an advocacy role, as a voice to challenge Northern governments and the rest of the GPE to respond
to the needs of developing countries on the ground (Interview #1, CSO; Interview #2, Private Sector/
Foundations; Interview #3, CSO; Interview #8, CSO; and Interview #9, Secretariat). The CSO South
constituency, representing developing country civil society organizations, works to speak for local-level
voices and advocate for financing in particular country-level contexts (Interview #3, CSO; Interview
#8, CSO; and Interview #9, Secretariat). The third CSO constituency is a representative for teachers and
considers itself to have a unique function in advocating for but also employing the expertise of teachers’
country-level knowledge and relationships with local governments. As an interviewee describes, the
CSO teachers constituency comprises members who hold a unique ‘employee-employer relationship
with the governments, who are the main clients of the GPE’ (Interview #7, CSO). This constituency
combines larger, Northern organizations and Southern teachers’ organizations (Interview #7, CSO;
Interview #9, Secretariat).
The CSO North and South representation was largely coordinated by the Global Campaign for
Education, which as earlier described acts as an international network of civil society education actors
working to promote Education for All, and which also acted as the key advocate leading to the inception
of the Civil Society Education Fund. The CSO for teachers was coordinated by Education International,
an organization representative of teachers unions worldwide. The CSO constituencies’ positions on
global education policy are seen as reflective of the mandates of the organizations which initiated their
design. For example, the CSO constituencies are viewed as advocates for increased country-level civil
society participation, support to the teaching profession and rights-based approaches to supporting
public education (Interview #3, CSO; Interview #7, CSO; Interview #10, Multilateral; and Interview
#14, Secretariat).
The voices of civil society early on were very strong in advocating a larger and distinctive role for
CSOs within a new constituency model. For example, as stated in a meeting document from 2010,
CSO actors reiterated that in the new Board arrangement: ‘Meetings or decision-making should not
proceed without the representation and voice from the civil society’ (GPE 2010a; 3). And over the
few years since the Fast Track Initiative’s redesign and rebranding into the GPE, and into the current
structure of the Board of Directors, CSO actors perceive their participation and degree of voice as
having increased tremendously and express that they have acquired a degree of power that they had
not sensed whilst involved with the FTI. For instance, as one civil society actor describes:
106 F. Menashy

When I started getting a little bit engaged in this, which was when it still was the FTI, I very much felt that civil
society was not recognized at all as a partner in the partnership … how the donors and the governors were the
focus, and civil society was just on the side, not really engaged or recognized as being a rightful partner in those
processes. (Interview #8, CSO)
Another interviewee concurs: ‘Probably starting about 2009, civil society made calls for the then FTI to
become more inclusive, more democratic, because there was some civil society participation, but it was
sort of one voice screaming in the wilderness …’ (Interview #7, CSO). However, ‘it has changed over
the years. When the FTI went into the GPE, they did change their view on civil society and they have
increasingly amended their approaches and their ways of working to incorporate civil society more
broadly …’ (Interview #8, CSO). The CSO constituencies have seen a notable change in the responses
amongst Board members to proposals concerning civil society participation in the South. For instance,
at a 2013 Board meeting (GPE 2013a), a member of a CSO constituency presented a ‘Civil Society
Engagement Strategy’, seeking to increase support to civil society participation within developing
countries. A respondent describes the reaction from the Board: ‘In fact it was really positive. There
was a huge difference from the other Board meetings in the last few years …’ (Interview #8, CSO).
Over a relatively short period of time, respondents expressed agreement that CSO proposals have
garnered serious and genuine attention and that their agency and capability to steer the discussion
on the Board – even relative to donor governments – has strengthened: ‘There’s a recognition of the
role that civil society plays. We’ve made a very constructive and influential contribution to the GPE’
(Interview #1, CSO).
Members of the CSO constituencies present themselves as engaged and coordinated, citing their
well-organized election processes, email lists and regular in-constituency phone meetings. It is agreed,
though, that CSO constituency members from developing countries often experience logistical chal-
lenges coordinating and oftentimes lack confidence to assert their voice. There have been explicit
efforts on the part of the Secretariat, however, to increase the Southern partners’ influence on the Board
(Interview #3, CSO; Interview #8, CSO; and Interview #9, Secretariat). Yet, overall, the civil society
actors express satisfaction with their experiences working together (Interview #1, CSO; Interview #3,
CSO; Interview #7, CSO; and Interview #8, CSO):
… before meetings and after meetings, providing reports, etc. We always have calls. I think that’s really contributed
a lot to our decision-making, and our ability to represent our peer organizations on the Board in a democratic
and transparent way. (Interview #1, CSO; also Interview #9, Secretariat)
And there is increased coordination across the three CSO constituencies: ‘they meet before the Board
meetings, they usually come early, and then they have time together as the three civil society Board
members’ (Interview #9, Secretariat).
Interviewees from civil society therefore expressed few criticisms of their own constituencies,
but instead cited broader issues with the GPE constituency model and operational approaches. The
respondents from CSOs overwhelmingly agree they have agency, a voice and an unexpected degree
of influence (Interview #1, CSO; Interview #3, CSO; Interview #7, CSO; and Interview #8, CSO): ‘I
would say in some respects we have one of the stronger voices on the Board’ (Interview #3, CSO). CSO
constituency members give the impression that they are aware of their function within the GPE, and
seem to have the ability to form consensus on issues within their own constituencies and in turn have
support in promoting particular perspectives and associated policies to the rest of the GPE Board.
Possible evidence that the CSO constituencies have worked well together has been a series of
successful recent proposals put forth to the Board that have been spearheaded by CSO actors. For
instance, as mentioned earlier, the Civil Society Engagement Strategy was met with a very positive
reaction and the Board has repeatedly renewed funding to the Civil Society Education Fund (Interview
#3, CSO; Interview #8, CSO; GPE 2014e). Another interviewee highlighted that one of the five key
objectives outlined in the 2012–2015 GPE Strategic Plan targets support to teachers and claimed
that ‘that strategic objective was brought by the teaching profession into the negotiations of those
strategic plans’ (Interview #7, CSO), citing a success on the part of the CSO teachers constituency to
steer the Strategy. And probably the issue area most rapidly elevated on the GPE agenda – support to
Journal of Education Policy 107

conflict-affected and fragile states – has been led in large part by the advocacy of civil society. Stated
first on the list of five objectives within the Strategic Plan (GPE 2012e), and with a growing number
of fragile countries garnering funding from the GPE Fund, this is referenced as a real success story
credited to the CSOs (Interview #3, CSO; Interview #4, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview #6,
Private Sector/Foundations; Private Sector/Foundations; and Interview #7, CSO). As one CSO Board
member describes:
We’ve been banging the drum for education, fragility, and conflict affected places for some time. I think that
without being too self-serving … [our Northern civil society organization] is regarded as having successfully
made the case for stronger focus on that. That was something which was very much internalized by the GPE.
(Interview #1, CSO)
The elevation of these issues on the GPE agenda is supported in a review of the meeting documents.
For instance, at every GPE Board meeting, since the restructuring, at least one presentation and/or
Board decision has been made in reference to supporting fragile and conflict-affected countries, and
all but two meetings have similarly included a decision or presentation on support to local civil society.
An apparent link can be seen between the sense of agency expressed by the CSO constituencies and
the confronting of issues of concern to them at GPE Board meetings.
While surely not free from difficulties, problematic features expressed about the CSO constituencies
rarely connected to uncertainty or lack of clarity concerning their roles or functions on the Board or
disagreements amongst their own members. As explained below, the same cannot be said for those
representing the Private Sector/Foundations within the GPE.

Private sector/foundation partners and the GPE


A set of circumstances quite different from those relating to CSOs led to the current Board status for the
Private Sector/Foundations. Up until the time of the restructuring, private foundations had very little
engagement with the FTI, whereas private companies were participants on the Steering Committee,
represented by a member of the World Economic Forum: ‘There was no space at all. Private founda-
tions had not been engaged at all’; however, the restructuring addressed this: ‘around that time I think
the role of private foundations in global education was becoming more recognized or appreciated, I
think there was a recognition that [foundations] were significant players that essentially needed to be
coordinated as well’ (Interview #6, Private Sector/Foundations). The late 2000s also saw increasing
partnerships between donor governments and foundations more generally, including several new con-
tracts (Interview #4, Private Sector/Foundations). And so when the decision was made to restructure
the FTI into the GPE and employ a constituency-based Board model, foundations were included in the
conversation. A small group of foundation representatives came together to gather a list of foundations
that were open to participating on the GPE Board as members of a ‘Private Foundation’ constituency.
At the same time, a representative from the World Economic Forum formulated a separate list of
private companies. A proposal was forwarded to form two separate seats, one for the foundations
and another for the companies. However, the new constituency model would in the end include only
one seat for the Private Sector/Foundations, combining both companies and foundations (Interview
#4, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview #6, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview #9, Secretariat;
and Interview #12, Secretariat).
A rationale for the inclusion of companies was rooted in a realization that corporate actors were
becoming increasingly involved in educational policy debates and commonly address global educa-
tional issues within their corporate social responsibility programmes. Engaging with companies was
seen as making strides to solidify a relationship with an increasingly important stakeholder in educa-
tion (Interview #2, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview #4, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview
#5, Private Sector/Foundations; and Interview #6, Private Sector/Foundations). As a Board member
describes: ‘I think it was in anticipation of the fact that there’s just a greater and greater emphasis on
the role of the private sector’ (Interview #10, Multilateral).
108 F. Menashy

But most notably, from very early on, the role of incorporating both foundations and companies
into the GPE was driven by a belief, based on experiences in the health sector, that private sector actors
would likely become a major financial resource in contributing to the GPE Fund.
To inform decision-making on the constituency model during the transition from the FTI to the
GPE, a working group was established to provide suggestions for the Board composition, presented
at a 2010 Board meeting. As stated in the meeting document: ‘The working group was informed by a
number of discussions and interviews with different FTI stakeholders as well as actors working with
other global (mainly health) initiatives’ and also presented was a consultancy report entitled ‘Strength
and Weaknesses in the Governance of Selected Global Health Initiatives’ (Stenson 2010; GPE 2010b,
1). Experiences from the health sector were therefore central in informing how the GPE Board would
be constituted. While the suggestions, informed in large part from experiences with the Global Fund
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and GAVI, covered several aspects to successful governance,
they included rationales for including non-state actors. Indicated in the suggestions was the potential
of private actors as donors: ‘Foundations also represent a relatively unrestricted source of funding for
special projects within FTI. If a model is chosen where Foundations does not have a constituency of
their own, they could possibly be included into the group of donors’ (GPE 2010b, 10). Although a
model that included private actors as donors did not come to fruition, the early ideals around private
financing were evident.
As one respondent describes, the actors within the Private Sector/Foundations constituency had
been often compared to health, where ‘they kept looking at what happened in health and saying “Well,
how do we get this constituency to be more non-traditional donors, actually to put money into GPE?”’
Another interviewee states simply that within the FTI/GPE ‘there has always been a little bit of health sector
envy’ (Interview #12, Secretariat). And yet, ‘We are not the health sector’ (Interview #4, Private Sector/
Foundations). As will be discussed in detail below, private participation is simply not of the same size, type
or level of engagement in education. The expectation that the private actors within the GPE would function
similar to those within transnational PPPs in the health sector was considered unrealistic.
However, as shown in meeting documents, and from the perception of interviewees, the GPE
Secretariat continues to view the Private Sector/Foundations constituency in an aspirational way, in
hopes that it might contribute to the GPE Fund. For instance, at a 2013 Board meeting, the Secretariat
introduced a broad strategy for the GPE’s future replenishment campaign, which included: ‘Central to
the strategy for a successful replenishment was the need to focus on financing from four core target
groups, namely traditional donors, developing country partners, emerging donors and the private
sector, including private foundations’ (GPE 2013d, 7). Interviewees concur that the Secretariat seemed
to be pushing for private sector contributions to the GPE Fund (Interview #1, CSO; Interview #4,
Private Sector/Foundations; Interview #5, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview #6, Private Sector/
Foundations; Interview #10, Multilateral; and Interview #11, Secretariat). As a Secretariat staff member
explains: ‘We’re under a great deal of pressure to show that we can raise non-traditional finance. That
means we have to raise finance from the private sector’ (Interview #19, Secretariat).
The following statements made in interviews by non-state Board members indicate an improba-
bility that the GPE Fund will ever receive substantial contributions from the private sector: ‘I struggle
to see them putting money into either the core cost of the Secretariat or the big pot of money that is
the GPE Fund’ (Interview #5, Private Sector/Foundations); ‘I don’t think there is any chance that’s
going to happen’ (Interview #2, Private Sector/Foundations); ‘The private sector, these companies
nor foundations, nobody is about to cut the check and put money into the GPE Fund’ (Interview #6,
Private Sector/Foundations).
At the GPE replenishment conference in June of 2014, two private foundations made a relatively
small pledge to the GPE Fund ($23 million), in contrast to some respondents’ predictions (GPE
2014d). However, no private companies have yet to make funding commitments. In response, media
commenters remarked that ‘GPE has failed yet again to convince businesses to pledge money to the
fund’ (Ravelo and Jones 2014). And interviewees expressed doubt, before and after the pledging con-
ference, that this will change.
Journal of Education Policy 109

Respondents explain that this doubt responds to the private sector priority of tracking investments:
‘It’s hard for a foundation to say, I’m going to give a dollar into a pooled fund, unless it’s for symbolic
reasons, because you’re accountable to your Board, and particularly with the new wave of founda-
tions, they are in it for very specific, trackable outcomes’ (Interview #4, Private Sector/Foundations).
And companies ‘are not funding initiatives like this’ but instead are seen to ‘invest in solutions and
… expect returns on things and want to see the results’ (Interview #2, Private Sector/Foundations).
A misalignment is therefore evident between the aspirations and the reality concerning private con-
tributions to GPE Fund. This mismatch between what is desired of the Private Sector/Foundations
constituency members and how they conceive of their role as partners within the GPE creates a great
deal of ambiguity.
Several interviewees expressed that the identity of the Private Sector/Foundations seat has always
lacked clarity. As early as 2011, the constituency felt the need to better define their role within the
context of the GPE Board and as non-funders. At the Copenhagen Pledging Conference in 2011, a
constituency member made a ‘Statement from Private Sector and Private Foundations’ that began with
the following: ‘I represent one of the board’s newest and most diverse constituencies: private sector
and private foundations. We don’t give funds directly to the GPE Fund, so you may be wondering why
we’re here’ (GPE 2011, 1). The Statement was made in part to educate those from the constituency
itself on how they could engage with the GPE even if not as funders: ‘Under the partnership it wasn’t
just whether you’re putting money into the Fund, it was what are you doing that is contributing to
these goals and objectives?’ (Interview #4, Private Sector/Foundations). The Statement indicates that
relatively early on within the restructured Board, the Private Sector/Foundations felt the need to clarify
their involvement in the GPE and to draw attention to their non-monetary contributions (Interview
#4, Private Sector/Foundations).
Yet, the lack of clarity persists and Private Sector/Foundations Board members feel they are con-
tinually questioning their role within the GPE: ‘What is the rationale for involving the private sector
in this in the first place, and what is it that the GPE as a partnership and the Secretariat want from
the private sector. You know, conversely, what does the private sector feel are the benefits and values
from being involved. I don’t think any of this has ever been fleshed out’ (Interview #2, Private Sector/
Foundations). Constituency members have seen themselves as needing to defend: ‘Why are you con-
tributing? Why are you at the table?’ and are ‘constantly having to explain what the value added is
…’ (Interview #4, Private Sector/Foundations). Interviewees describe the constituency members as
‘frustrated’ as they attempt to ‘find out ways to keep the business side interested, not just the foundation
side, the business side’ (Interview #7, Civil Society; also Interview #10, Multilateral). Private companies
in particular who see themselves as able to offer ideas and ‘solutions’ to educational problems have
not been substantively supported within the GPE to take on this role (Interview #2, Private Sector/
Foundations; Interview #11, Secretariat). As another respondent summarizes: ‘internally and also with
the GPE Secretariat they have yet to figure out how to best utilize the [Private Sector/Foundations]
constituency as a resource’ (Interview #6, Private Sector/Foundations).
Moreover, citing this lack of clarity, interviewees described a limited engagement in the GPE on the
part of the Private Sector/Foundations members, and the private sector companies in particular: ‘I think
that the private sector has not seen the benefit of engaging the GPE, why would they do that, what’s in
it for them?’ (Interview #5, Private Sector/Foundations). Similarly, another interviewee expressed that
‘the GPE still struggles so much to get the private sector as fully engaged as it would like’ (Interview
#12, Secretariat). A sign of this low commitment to the GPE is a limited interest in vying for leadership
of the constituency. While the Civil Society Board members highlight an organized election process
to fill their seats, on the Private Sector/Foundations side, ‘people aren’t necessarily beating down the
door’ (Interview #6, Private Sector/Foundations).
A further concern within the Private Sector/Foundations constituency, likely linked to the lack of clarity
as to its role, is what some have described as a considerable conflict between the foundations and com-
panies and the problematic nature of their sharing of a Board seat. Described as ‘strange bedfellows’ and
‘different organizational animals’, interviewees plainly see a difference between the two types of constituency
110 F. Menashy

members: ‘… just a totally different kettle of fish’ (Interview #2, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview #4,
Private Sector/Foundations). As one respondent elaborated: ‘Unfortunately private foundations and the
private sector [companies] in this, they come from two completely different angles. The private sector is
very much interested in okay how are we going to increase our profit margin? For even if it’s a corporate
social responsibility arm they’re not there because they’re just purely interested in education...’ (Interview
#6, Private Sector/Foundations). Companies are described as focused on ‘profit as bottom-line, versus
[foundations] where giving away is the bottom line’ (Interview #4, Private Sector/Foundations), and that
the constituency is ‘not a consolidated group, and they have very, very different interests’ (Interview #9,
Secretariat). As a result of such divergent objectives, there has been some past mistrust and tension within
the constituency (Interview #6, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview #9, Secretariat).
As one interviewee observes: ‘you can already see that there was both tension and a desire for
autonomy of those two combined constituencies, because they are quite different’ (Interview #1, CSO).
As an example, one issue cited as having a strong potential for tension concerns the recent rise in low-
cost private schools in developing countries, where some Private Sector/Foundations members would
like to see more engagement with the private sector at the country level and others describing GPE
support to low-cost private schools as deeply problematic (Interview #2, Private Sector/Foundations;
Interview #5, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview #6, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview #9,
Secretariat; Interview #11, Secretariat; and Interview #13, Secretariat). Moreover, the 2010 external
review of the FTI cited the debate on privatization as another barrier to private sector involvement as
funders: ‘Different views (and ideologies) around the role of private sector engagement in the delivery
of basic education seem to limit further discussions about the broader role of private entities (such
as e.g. foundations) in providing additional external financing’ (Cambridge Education, Mokoro, and
Oxford Policy Management 2010, 119–120).
At a 2012 Board meeting, the tension within the constituency led the following proposal: ‘The private
sector and private foundations constituency proposes a division of their combined seat into two: one
for private sector companies and one for private foundations’ (GPE 2012c, 3; also GPE 2012b). This
was followed by a 2013 discussion by the GPE’s Governance Working Group of potentially ‘dividing
the private sector/private foundations seat into two seats’ (GPE 2013c, 7). This proposed split can
also be traced to an earlier initiative to include the companies in a separate seat comprised of those
involved in the Global Business Coalition for Education, which although did not come to fruition
did lead to a sense that separation was plausible (Interview #4, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview
#6, Private Sector/Foundations; and Interview #9, Secretariat). As one interviewee recalls: ‘From [the
foundation] perspective … well that’s fabulous, please have your own seat and take the rest of your
private sector companies with you’ (Interview #6, Private Sector/Foundations).
The proposal to divide the seat, however, did not pass when put to the Board. One reason cited
is the desire to keep the size of the Board manageable (Interview #1, CSO; Interview #3, CSO).
Other reasons, however, highlight the ambiguity around the Private Sector/Foundations’ role
within the GPE. For instance, some Board members expressed dissatisfaction with expanding
the role of the constituency without committing resources to the GPE Fund: ‘I’m not sure that
the private sector deserves its own seat on the Board, per se. It’s a player, but simply in terms of
direct contributions to the mission of the GPE, its contributions continue to be very modest. They
haven’t had any financial contributions to GPE, and they haven’t necessarily mobilized a huge
amount of support for education to this day … It’s not a bad thing that they have a more modest
representation on the Board’ (Interview #1, CSO). In fact, some describe the Private Sector/
Foundations as too involved as Board-level decision-makers, and not in the role they ought to
play as funders: ‘the private sector is hugely important in education, but they should participate
through making contributions to the GPE Fund, basically … they should not be involved in setting
the agenda for education on the ground’ (Interview #8, CSO).
Another significant reason cited for the rejection of the proposal for separate Board seats is the
fact that the Private Sector/Foundations had yet to influence any particular policy directions within
the GPE:
Journal of Education Policy 111

We hadn’t really made an impact as a joint constituency because we were so busy looking at each other and
being suspicious, and what does that mean and why are these people here and … not really being as engaged and
energized and mobilized as a constituency to really make an impact on the GPE. It was almost like we haven’t
even justified our individual seat so why would we need two seats? (Interview #6, Private Sector/Foundations)
Another interviewee explains that the members of the constituency ‘function on paper but they really
didn’t come together as a very meaningful entity’ (Interview #12, Secretariat). The lack of engagement,
seen as rooted in a lack of clarity as to why or how to be engaged, led to few achievements as a constit-
uency. And the challenges encountered by those within the Private Sector/Foundations constituency
draw attention to broader issues with a constituency model. As a respondent describes: ‘I think the
marriage of the private sector and private foundations is really on the basis of its convenience and
size, rather than alignment of objective for the most part’ (Interview #5, Private Sector/Foundations).
At the time of writing, these issues persist and it remains to be seen how well the GPE will evolve
to better clarify the role and harness the private actors. It is important to note that the Private Sector/
Foundations Board members as well as the Secretariat are actively endeavouring to better determine
the constituency’s purpose within the GPE. For instance, the 2012–2015 Strategic Plan includes as a
goal to ‘strengthen the role of civil society and the private sector in the partnership’ (GPE 2012e, 2).
During a recent Board discussion on the Civil Society Engagement Strategy, it was stated that: ‘The
Private Sector/Private Foundation constituency welcomed the process established for the development
of the CSO strategy and suggested a similar process should be used for the imminent development of a
private sector engagement strategy’ (GPE 2013d, 27). Interviews indicate a widespread agreement that
such a strategy is necessary (Interview #1, CSO; Interview #2, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview
#5, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview #6, Private Sector/Foundations; and Interview #7, CSO).
The specifics of this Strategy remain to be seen, as will its impact on the engagement of the Private
Sector/Foundations constituency. Moreover, the Secretariat recently hired a staff member who spe-
cializes in private sector engagement. The GPE Secretariat therefore recognizes that challenges remain
concerning the involvement of private actors (GPE 2013b, 7; Interview #9, Secretariat; Interview #11,
Secretariat; and Interview #14, Secretariat).

Discussion
This study has aimed to show how the roles of non-state actors within the GPE have been shaped
and with what results. From tracing the history of participation and the current statuses of non-state
partners, the roles of civil society, private sector and private foundations members have each been
differently constructed resulting in varying degrees of influence.
The non-state constituencies within the GPE have evidently operated quite differently within the
partnership, resulting from differently constructed roles that have been brought to light from the
historical process-tracing conducted in this study. A constructivist analysis draws out two features of
the GPE and its non-state partners that can explain the lack of engagement of the private actors and
the more substantive participation of the civil society members. First is the faulty assumption that
health sector experiences ought to inform the design of education transnational public–private part-
nerships; and second, the notion of shared normative understandings as key to forming an epistemic
community, in contrast to a policy network.

Problematic mapping from the health sector


The impulse to map experiences from health-targeted transnational PPPs onto education seems sen-
sible on the surface, given that the two sectors have similar characteristics and needs. They are both
considered ‘social sectors’, traditionally publicly provided, in need of global governance because of their
cross-border impacts. Change to each sector often requires large-scale system-based reform, where
there has been decades of clear need for international aid. And despite the growing number of different
types of stakeholders involved at the global and national levels, both the health and education sectors
112 F. Menashy

have been historically critiqued for lack of harmonization and coordination, indicating a space for
the pooled funding and global governance offered through a multi-stakeholder environment (Frenk
and Moon 2013; Chabbott 2015; Mundy 2015; Sachs 2015). These similarities, however, extend only
so far. The participation of non-state actors in health sector PPPs has manifested very differently than
in the education sector.
Within transnational public–private partnerships in health, private actors have taken on far different
roles than those in education. Companies (most notably from the pharmaceutical and medical tech-
nology sectors) and large foundations have not only participated, but are seen as spearheading the cre-
ation and taken leadership roles in sustaining growth of transnational PPPs. They are moreover widely
seen as ‘anchor donors’ – key large-scale financial contributors to global pooled health funds. Private
sector foundations and their representatives have adopted strong advocacy roles, often becoming the
globally recognized public face for the partnerships (Doyle and Patel 2008; Brown 2010; Sachs 2015).
Civil society actors have arguably been invited to participate in health sector partnerships in order
to address deficits in democracy and to increase the legitimacy of global pooled funds. Within major
health-related partnerships, civil society actors were asked to participate after the creation of the funds,
but were not deeply involved in their formation. At the country level, CSOs are often conceptualized as
alternative service delivery providers, where the non-profit, non-state sector is seen as a key provider
of health services funded by such partnerships (Doyle and Patel 2008).
According to most measures, health sector partnerships have been more successful in raising
funds and delivering goods than education (Sachs 2015). And global education contributions made
by companies and foundations indeed do not nearly match those of the health sector. For example, in
its 2013 replenishment, of the 12,006.9 million US dollars pledged to the Global Fund, 627.9 million
was committed from the private sector (Global Fund 2013). Moreover, there are far more large-scale
multi-stakeholder partnerships focusing on health-related issues – including, for example, the Global
Fund, the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition, GAVI, the International Health Partnership and
the Roll Back Malaria Partnership – which include major representation of the private sector in both
policy-making and financing (Bezanson and Isenman 2012; Frenk and Moon 2013).
The ostensible success of global health initiatives relative to education can be attributed to, despite
surface similarities, some core differences between the two sectors. As Chabbott describes, there
are ‘clear, obviously deep differences in the science undergirding the health and education sectors’
(Chabbott 2015, 3). For instance, the units of analysis and generalizability of scientific findings differ
when applied to each sector. The health sector has developed globally standardized goals, such as
vaccinations and the delivery of specific medications and technologies. Such health-related goals
have been widely agreed upon by the scientific community, whereas there has been little consensus
within the education community on how to best provide and sustain quality education: ‘There is not,
nor will there ever be, a vaccine for learning’ (Chabbott 2015; Mundy 2015, 2). This lack of consensus
may result from the estimation that educational outcomes cannot be determined until 8–10 years
after the introduction of an intervention. In health, outcomes are far more easily trackable in the short
term. Because of the agreed upon and trackable goals, philanthropists have been seen as far more
inclined to support initiatives and fund research in health than in education (Kapilashrami and O’Brien
2012; Frenk and Moon 2013; Chabbott 2015; Mundy 2015; Interview #4, Private Sector/Foundations;
Interview #5, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview #12, Secretariat; and Interview #19, Secretariat).
And so, in part as a result of the different characteristics of the two sectors, the contribution of
non-state actors to health sector transnational PPPs has been very different from those in education. In
educational PPPs, private foundations are not anchor donors who act as global advocates. As has been
described, within the GPE, there is a resistance to funding and a lack of consensus within the private
sector on how to prioritize educational goals. CSOs in education seem to take on the key advocacy
roles adopted by private foundations in health, but are not readily seen as default service providers
(Interview #4, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview #9, Secretariat; and Interview #19, Secretariat).
The mapping of health sector experiences onto the GPE, and in particular the assumption of com-
mon roles played by the non-state actors, has therefore been problematic in engendering an ambiguous
Journal of Education Policy 113

identity for the private partners. The CSOs are conceptualized differently than in health as well, but
within the GPE have instead taken on education advocacy roles that the foundations have not.

An epistemic community in contrast to a policy network


The different roles of civil society and private actors can be attributed to how they function as groups
and the construction of their group identities. From this analysis, civil society organizations exhibit
solidarity around shared core normative understandings about education, and so can be characterized
as an epistemic community. For example, the CSOs evidently share common understandings around
the value of public education, the need to support countries experiencing fragility and the importance
of supporting the teaching force and unions. An overarching vision of education as a right underscores
much of the work being done by CSOs involved in the GPE, contributing to their shared identity as
advocates for particular causes (Interview #1, CSO; Interview #7, CSO; and Interview #9, Secretariat).
Members of the CSO North and CSO teachers, despite a lack of material contributions, have seemingly
advocated successfully for a variety of policy measures (support to conflict-affected and fragile contexts,
the teaching profession and civil society engagement). While it is difficult to link the same degrees of
success to the work of the CSO South constituency, interviews indicate that this constituency’s par-
ticipation has been limited due to logistical issues concerning coordination and communication, but
not lack of agreement, desire to engage or clarity as to the constituency’s role within the partnership.
For the CSO constituencies, the GPE is a forum where actors with less to offer materially have been
able to influence policy through other means, initiating conversations and advocating successfully
in several areas. Such achievements cannot be separated from the functioning of the constituencies
themselves, where mutual normative understanding and consensus have likely led to a greater capacity
to coordinate, formulate their own goals and unite to accomplish them.
It is important to note, as well, that CSO actors hold a unique relationship to the GPE, given that
members of the South constituency in particular receive support through the Civil Society Education
Fund. Civil society actors are plausibly more inclined to be involved because they are directly benefiting
from the GPE. In this way, the GPE has likely contributed to civil society engagement through incen-
tivizing their participation. As well, civil society organizations assist the GPE through participation
in Local Education Groups. In this sense, in the context of its relationship to the CSOs, the GPE has
to a degree created a ‘win–win’ (Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009).
It is likely, therefore, that civil society engagement with the GPE results in part from fiscally bene-
fitting from the partnership. However, according to interviews, this engagement is strengthened and
maintained because CSOs hold a collective identity drawn from shared views about education, the
purpose of civil society within the education sector and, more specifically, within the GPE. This study
has shown that the CSO constituencies have formed an epistemic community, based on common
worldviews and solidarity around normative commitments, with an aim to influence policy within
the GPE (Adler and Haas 1992).
In contrast, the private actors in the GPE can be characterized as a policy network, given their
shared conceptions of policy problems and their role as providers of innovative solutions. Interview
respondents from the Private Sector/Foundations constituency indicate that the members indeed
agree that their roles within the GPE ought to include their ability to offer innovations to address the
problems of access to and quality of education; they are readily self-identified as ‘solutions-oriented’
(Interview #11, Secretariat) and able to offer innovations that other GPE members cannot (Interview
#2, Private Sector/Foundations).
Also, within the Private Sector/Foundations constituency, certain members were identified by inter-
view respondents as holding the characteristics of policy entrepreneurs due to their active promotion
of particular issues within the constituency and the GPE (Interview #6, Private Sector/Foundations;
Interview #9, Secretariat; and Interview #19, Secretariat). The issue most commonly cited as being
promoted by these individuals is GPE support to low-cost private schools. A respondent described the
Secretariat as ‘being lobbied’ where ‘some of the private sector constituency would like to see GPE be
114 F. Menashy

much more vocal in supporting low-cost private schools’ (Interview #9, Secretariat). However, support
to private schools, as mentioned above, is vehemently opposed by other members of the constituency
(Interview #5, Private Sector/Foundations; Interview #6, Private Sector/Foundations; and Interview
#19, Secretariat). The issue of private schools is seen by members as an ideologically driven debate,
where different normative stances held within the same constituency are in direct opposition. Such
ideological conflicts contribute to the construction of a group identity that lacks cogency and unity.
A lack of shared normative beliefs impacts the constituency’s ability to operate as a whole. As one
respondent describes: ‘there’s no common understanding of what the private sector can contribute and
how’ (Interview #2, Private Sector/Foundations). The constituency indeed works together as a single
unit, and because it sees its role as offering solutions to commonly identified educational problems, it
can be considered a formal policy network. But the ‘strange bedfellows’ are absent a collective identity,
in particular because the combining of foundations and companies – entities with very different core
mandates – has resulted in a noticeable split in normative beliefs and worldviews. This is in part a
flaw in the design of the constituency, connected to the above-described roles private actors see for
themselves in contrast to what the GPE expects, rooted in the poorly conceived mapping of health
sector experiences. Unlike civil society, it appears inaccurate to describe the relationship between the
private partners and the GPE as a ‘win–win’ – private actors do not benefit fiscally from the GPE,
but are instead solicited to give; and the GPE reaps less than expected from the relatively disengaged
Private Sector/Foundations members.

Conclusion
The Private Sector/Foundations partners cite few accomplishments within the GPE and an absence of
clarity as to their role has persisted since the early days of the restructuring from the FTI. The ambig-
uous purpose of the constituency has led to a lack of engagement. Problematic as well has been the
internal conflict between foundations and companies, who see themselves as distinct actors aiming to
serve different purposes in the global education policy arena, and more specifically within the GPE. In
the absence of a common ground, the Private Sector/Foundations constituency has yet to effectively
push an agenda or give voice to any particular educational priority within the GPE. While the Civil
Society partners make up for their lack of material contributions through knowledge and advocacy,
the Private Sector/Foundations constituency has had only a tangible influence.
Interviewees readily characterize the Private Sector/Foundations constituency as vaguely defined.
A key factor shaping this poorly established identity was an early aspirational assumption that the
foundations and companies would serve a major financing function to the GPE Fund, based largely
on inaccurate parallels made between the health and education sectors. Moreover, the constituency
has experienced internal fragmentation, where motivations for involvement in the GPE specifically
(and also in education more generally) vary tremendously between the individual foundations and
companies. Instead of joining together to advocate for particular policy changes within the GPE, the
constituency has lacked the normative consensus needed to function together.
These findings result from the process-tracing conducted within this study, which has emphasized
causal process sequences over time and the construction of non-state actor participation in the GPE
as a historical process. The conclusions concerning how groups are defined (as epistemic communities
and policy networks) are more robustly made because the process by which these groups have been
constructed is better understood.
This study targets a single organization and so is not making steadfast general conclusions about the
nature of non-state participation in educational governance. For example, although within the GPE com-
panies and foundations have lacked engagement and consensus, within other collaborative forums pri-
vate actors appear to have effectively worked in unison to advocate for particular interventions, such as
within the World Economic Forum’s Global Education Initiative and the International Education Funders
Group (IEFG 2014; WEF 2015). However, the case of non-state actor participation in the GPE, and
understanding the construction of their identities in this context, still provides several insights into
Journal of Education Policy 115

the complex and changing nature of education and development in the context of global governance,
transnationalism and the increasingly significant presence of private actors in policy-making. First,
it offers some practical lessons in the formation of transnational PPPs. For instance, it stresses the
importance of understanding the uniqueness of education within the global governance arena, where
assumptions cannot be made equating experiences in other social sectors, such as health.
Recently, economist Jeffrey Sachs pronounced that ‘governments, philanthropists, and top compa-
nies … should pool resources to enable impoverished countries to scale up education’, given that ‘this
is how malaria, AIDS, and vaccine-preventable diseases have been battled successfully in the past 15
years’ (Sachs 2015). In the context of such high-profile calls to more forcefully emulate global health
sector partnerships in education, the findings of this study offer a crucial response.
As well, in light of increasing collaboration within the global education policy arena, this study explains
relationships between educational actors, including how they become engaged and function together, and
thereby can inform decisions on governance models within global public–private arrangements. Based on
the observations made in this research, collaborative educational relationships likely cannot be defined and
formed based solely on organizational characteristics or even common opinions around policy problems
and solutions. The case of the GPE makes clear that the interconnection and functionality of groups of
actors are strengthened by shared normative beliefs, and not structural features.
Second, through exposing the significance of shared worldviews and normative stances, this study
expands the understanding of policy actor influence in the context of the growing trend of networks and
collaboration in global policy-making. For instance, understanding the process that has contributed to the
construction of private actor identity within the GPE shows that although the private partners may collec-
tively create a formal network, the absence of shared visions and aims hinders a cohesive identity, which
in turn minimizes the ability to influence the direction of policy decision-making. This study therefore
extends the literature on epistemic communities and policy networks and their potential for impact through
a comparative examination of each group through the lens of this transnational public–private partnership.

Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Sarah Dryden-Peterson and Caroline Manion for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper and
to Alvine Sangang for her research assistance. All errors are entirely my own.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
This work was supported by a Joseph P. Healey Grant through the University of Massachusetts Boston and by a fellowship
with the National Academy of Education and the Spencer Foundation.

Notes on contributor
Francine Menashy is an assistant professor in the Department of Leadership in Education at the University of
Massachusetts Boston.

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