THE GOVERNMENT ADVISOR 411

The Government Advisor: John H. Herz and

the Office of Strategic Services
Frank Schale

Introduction

For John Herz fascism was a comfortable salvation from all problems of modern society
since it destroyed the basics of civilization through efficiency and the fiat of power. On
that score mankind either needed to accept the victory of a ruthless elite or fight for the
continuity of civilization. For those who escaped from Nazi Germany it was a decision
without hesitation: the false performance of the totalitarian dictatorship ultimately needed
to be proved by the complete military defeat of National Socialism. The presence of fascist
danger demolished virtually all political and theoretical conflicts between the émigrés. The
former, solely academic interests in politics transformed into militant commitment. For this
very reason, in 1943 John Herz gave back a fellowship from the Social Science Research
Center, and moreover refused an appointment to Yale University. In order to defend the
fundamental cultural values of civilization and fight for his second home, which had saved
him from the Final Solution, he entered the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
The OSS was a child of World War II: the entry of the US military into the war required
the coordination of logistic and strategic information between the Allies. While the
United Kingdom already had the Secret Intelligence Service to do this, such a body was
absent in the USA. In order to fill this gap, the Office of the Coordinator of Information
was founded in 1941 and turned into the OSS the following year. In anticipation of the
competing interests of this and other departments, OSS leader William Donovan con-
ceived the OSS as an overseas intelligence service without operative authority. Thus the
main initial focus was on the scientific subsection, the Research and Analysis Branch
(R&A), whose staff was mainly drawn from the East Coast universities. This gave rise
not only to the liberal orientation of the R&A but also to mockery of ‘the Campus’ by
other established agencies.1
The Military Order of 13 June 1942 brought about changes to the internal structure
of the OSS; it was to take on operative duties in addition to the intelligence services it
already provided. In addition, the Order clearly directed that the OSS was responsible to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.2 The R&A was not intended to be a brains trust for US military
policy, but rather it was to research political, psychological, sociological and economic
information for military purposes.3 The concrete duties of the R&A involved the analysis
of the situation in enemy states, about which numerous R&A reports were produced. From
1944 onwards, the Civil Affairs Guides and the ‘Civil Affairs Handbook Germany’ were
issued – the latter running to several volumes. The aim of these was to facilitate planning
for the occupation and postwar policies, although this – much to the disappointment of
the analysts – never happened.4 A third area of responsibility lay in supporting the War
Crimes Trials by means of independently produced War Crimes Studies.
The reports, guides and handbooks cannot be conclusively ascribed to one individual
author, since they were often collective efforts, and under the control of superior agencies

International Relations Copyright © 2008 SAGE Publications

Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore and Washington DC, Vol 22(4): 411–418
[DOI: 10.1177/0047117808097306]
Downloaded from ire.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on May 22, 2015
412 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 22(4)

which had the authority to order changes. However, the studies in which John Herz was
involved can be identified by means of a document among the John Herz Papers held at
the State University of New York at Albany. It should nevertheless be noted that the final
titles were sometimes changed, so that exact identification is difficult. In this article I
will introduce selected administrative, international and criminal law studies by Herz to
illustrate the position of the Central European Section of the R&A as regards the Allied
policy on Germany.5 An initial misunderstanding – one which the analysts themselves to
some extent fell prey to – needs to be pointed out: the R&A was a service agency whose
task was to analyse and interpret empirical data from Germany. Contrary to the beliefs
of the academics – Herz later spoke self-deprecatingly of the concept of Platonic Utopia
and the Philosopher Kings6 – they did not have the authority to issue recommendations
for action. Yet the realization of his own ideals was not Herz’s main aim; rather it was –
in addition to securing relief from his own financial plight – a pragmatic contribution to
the destruction of National Socialism.7

The analysis of National Socialism

Although his first theoretical interpretation of fascism8 differed from that of Franz L.
Neumann (1900–54), who with his standard work Behemoth had advanced to the position
of ‘recognized intellectual leader’9 of the R&A, Herz still agreed with Neumann’s
overall evaluation of Nazi Germany.10 In the face of the émigrés’ common objective, the
liberation of Europe from fascism, the analysts’ political and scientific attitudes were of
lesser importance. Herz did not have to share the Neumann group’s political goals – in
particular its strong leaning towards the social democratic labour movement – in order to
share a common position opposing the existing interpretations of fascism.
There were basically two opposing interpretations which the specialists challenged:
the first was the Outlaw Theory represented within the US administration, in particular by
the War Department under Henry Stimson. According to this theory, Nazi Germany was
under the control of an irresponsible, criminal leadership clique which had succeeded in
seducing the German population. Nazi Germany was seen as a military opponent, fascism
itself as a kind of industrial accident.11
The opposite position was defended by Henry Morgenthau at the Department of
the Treasury and by the diplomat Robert Vansittart in Great Britain. Even though their
positions were only superficially similar and often misinterpreted as simple hatred of
Germany,12 they both made a specific German tradition responsible for the rise of National
Socialism. The R&A analysts saw that the German fixation with authority facilitated
the destruction of the Weimar Republic, but they refused to project this finding onto the
entire German population. In contrast to Vansittart’s theory and quite in line with the
Outlaw Theory, they emphasized that there was a clear division between ruler and ruled,
even in Germany, and that therefore all theories involving collective responsibility must
be invalid.
This conciliatory position is clearly seen in the representation of political culture in
the ‘Civil Affairs Handbook: Government and Administration’, produced by Herz and the
émigré political scientist Otto Kirchheimer (1905–65). Their description of the German
concept of state emphasizes authoritarianism, which played a large part in the downfall
of the first German democracy:

Downloaded from ire.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on May 22, 2015
 THE GOVERNMENT ADVISOR 413

It has been a fundamental trait of German ideology, whether rightist or leftist, always
to remain state-oriented. The image of a free society, with democracy conceived
mainly as the guarantee of unfettered individual liberty to develop as one pleased,
is alien to German ways of thinking.13

This judgment was nevertheless qualified, for it was constitutional defects and political
decisions that contributed to the failure of the Weimar Republic: the strong position of
the Reichspresident vis-à-vis parliament, which was weakened further by the plebiscitary
elements of the constitution; the contradictory basic law section of the constitution;
unstable governments; party-political patronage of public office; and the strong position
of ministerial bureaucracy.14
Although these defects were the result of a political culture fixed on authority, and
the authors of the handbook certainly saw the difference between Western and German
constitutional traditions, this difference was not sufficient to place the German political
culture under general suspicion. In addition the relentless persecution of the opposition,
the destruction of the rest of the democratic order, and the consolidation of the trades
unions and German states under National Socialism all go far beyond a mere conservative
concept of state and quintessentially aim at the destruction of the state.15 Germany was not
ruled by a centralized authoritarian political system; numerous state and party authorities
competed for and cooperated within overlapping areas of competence. In summary, it
can be said that the R&A trod a middle path between Vansittartism and Outlaw Theory,
whereby this balancing act was directed specifically at the Allies’ future policies on
Germany.

Plans for a military government

Dealing with the correct interpretation of fascism was not merely an academic problem;
on the contrary, it had an influence on practical issues such as how postwar Germany
should be administered and how soon the Germans should be given a say in their own
government. If German fascism was merely dictatorship by a band of criminals, it
would in principle be possible to cooperate with all conscientious, law-abiding groups,
whereby preference would be given to the group which could topple Hitler and take
control of Germany most quickly and efficiently. Therefore, the War Department and
the operative units of the OSS pleaded for a ‘soft peace’ and aligned themselves with the
military and industrialists who had rejected National Socialism.16 Conversely, the State
Department preferred a longer-term transformation of the political system, which required
the assumption of civil duties by the military. The highest demand, the dissolution
of Germany, is known to have come from the Department of the Treasury under
Morgenthau.17
The central position of the R&A could also be seen here: while on the one hand it
insisted on a short-term military solution to operative problems, on the other hand it
required the destruction of the social roots of National Socialism and the complete democ-
ratization of Germany. A new social order within Germany was seen as the only means
of eliminating Nazism. A decisive reason for the rejection of an immediate handover of
political responsibility to the Germans was the view that the political and administrative
powers were scarcely operative as a result of political corruption, overlapping areas
of responsibility of various official and quasi-official agencies, and the thinning of the

Downloaded from ire.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on May 22, 2015
414 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 22(4)

administrative apparatus during the war. Denazification could not be achieved with
the existing political apparatus. The Civil Affairs Guide, ‘Police and Public Safety in
Germany’, authored by Neumann, Herz and Kirchheimer, revealed how complicated
democratic reconstruction would be. The authors sketched a possible scenario in which the
Germans’ catastrophic living conditions would lead to militant demonstrations organized
by underground Gestapo and SS splinter groups. The police would not be able to curb
these because ‘the German police are thoroughly dominated by SS and Gestapo’.18 For
this reason the guide pleaded for the dissolution of all higher police authorities and the
arrest of all Gestapo, security police and SS members. For a limited period, all police
activities should be conducted by the Allies in order to develop a denazified auxiliary
police force in cooperation with antifascist volunteers and police officers from the Weimar
Republic days.
In their guide ‘Adaptation of the Administrative Machinery on the Local Level in
Germany’, Herz and Kirchheimer sum up the military occupation policy succinctly in the
following sentence: ‘Military Government should bear in mind that any decision made
for or against technical-administrative streamlining would at the same time be a political
decision.’19 The Allies should change the existing regional structure of the country as
little as possible and leave the decision regarding a new order to a subsequent German
government. Although the Allies would have to take on political responsibility in the
short term, the authors recommended that after thorough denazification local elections
should be held, which ‘would form the vantage-point for future reform of German
political life’.20
This dilemma, between political self-limitation on the part of the Allies and the
denazification of the Germans, repeated itself at the judicial level. The Civil Affairs
Guide ‘The Abrogation of Nazi Laws in the Early Period of Military Government’ called
upon the Allies to annul all racist laws and to denazify the judiciary. The elimination
of National Socialist statutes included the repeal of all laws which limited civil and
political freedoms, which in turn meant an early involvement of the German population
in political matters.21 On the one hand, the analysts pressed for a short period of Allied
occupation and a speedy handover of administrative tasks to the Germans. On the other
hand, they emphasized the extent of nazification and the potential for unrest in postwar
Germany, as a result of which the military government would be forced to take charge
of administrative activities. The Allied control of the administration would be limited to
the objective of bringing about democracy from the bottom upwards. The United States
should on no account be allowed to cooperate with the Nazi elite in matters of supplies
and logistics, although such people would be available as purely technical staff after the
defeat. Whether or not such a differentiated approach was practicable is debatable, for
if the Allies were to be responsible for securing law and order, they could soon have no
alternative but to cooperate with former local functionaries on these matters.

War trials

A significant premise of the R&A position lay in the assumption – soon to prove problem-
atic – that the Allies would take a back seat politically. Behind the requirement that the
Allies should concentrate on denazification and administrative duties stood the fear that a
conflict between the victors would lead to the division of Germany. The analyses pointed
out their differing strategic goals and political ideologies, but at the same time gave the

Downloaded from ire.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on May 22, 2015
 THE GOVERNMENT ADVISOR 415

impression that there were no fundamental inconsistencies. Political divisions among the
Allies would simply hinder denazification.
For this reason the Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Conference held on 30 October 1943
welcomed the ‘Statement on Atrocities’, in which the Allies committed themselves to
the policy that all war criminals:
will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order
that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries
and of free governments which will be erected therein.22
The analysts approved the declaration because it put forward a unified judicial approach on
the part of the Allies and demonstrated to the Germans the inaccuracy of Nazi propaganda
portraying the collective persecution of all Germans.23 It is revealing that the report deals
with expected judicial problems. Thus the authors welcomed the Allies’ plan that all war
criminals who committed crimes on foreign territory should answer for them before an
international court, as well as a court in the country where the crime was committed.
This allowed the potential defence strategy on the legal basis of ‘nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine lege’ (no crime, no penalty without law) to be circumvented. However, the
authors warned against concentrating solely on war crimes and pleaded for judicial policy
guidelines for the prosecution of Nazi crimes committed on German territory.24
A discussion of the war trials needed to determine who was to conduct the proceedings
and on what basis a verdict was to be reached. It is clear from the reports that although
the trials were initially to be undertaken by the Allies because of the breakdown of the
German judiciary, they should gradually be taken over by the Germans – a suggestion
which was later to prove problematic. The investigations focused on the problem that
the crimes committed by the Axis powers were barely covered by existing martial or
international law, as a result of which an extension of international law was being sought
under the auspices of the United Nations. A straightforward judicial prosecution of the
war crimes was rejected by the analysts on the grounds that this would accord National
Socialism an unjustified legal and constitutional character.
In Herz’s report ‘Leadership Principle and Criminal Responsibility’, National Socialism
is interpreted as a form of leadership in which all judicial limitations are absent. National
Socialism, which was not a state, much less a constitutional state, derived its authority
from the Führer Principle, that is, the imaginary responsible cooperation between leader
and subordinates. In order to prevent the posthumous advancement of National Socialism
to constitutional statehood,25 and to avoid protracted legal proceedings, Herz called for
an alternative strategy. National Socialism should be slain with its own weapon – the
leadership ideology.26 If National Socialism is accorded a measure of responsibility which
reflects its political structure and its own ideological maxims, the Führer Principle forms
the key to the legal prosecution of those politically responsible. The offence committed
by a subordinate is not only his crime, but also that of the authorizing and executive
administration.
The aim of this strategy was, on the one hand, to prevent a general condemnation
of the German population and, on the other, to call to account those who had exercised
political decision-making and executive powers by means of legal process, the scope
of which should exceed the established channels of international law.27 It was therefore
consistent of the R&A to produce lists for the chief prosecutor which named persons as
National Socialists on account of their function within the political system.28 In contrast
to this original, and from the judicial perspective controversial, approach,29 the Nuremberg

Downloaded from ire.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on May 22, 2015
416 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 22(4)

trials with their documentary efforts appear as the introduction to the Allies’ unsuccessful
denazification policy.
There are a variety of reasons for the fact that the OSS was accorded only minimal
importance during the war trials. The OSS reports were useful background studies for
Robert Jackson and the Office of the US Chief Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis
Criminality (OCC) but their contribution to the prosecution of crimes was limited,30
since the war trials were to be individual proceedings based on eyewitness accounts
and documentary evidence. For Jackson, the OSS was no more than a useful ancillary
service for the production of documents for the prosecution. Herz, who was a member
of the advisory staff of the US prosecution counsel in Nuremberg, and interrogated
Reichsinnenminister Wilhelm Frick in this capacity, describes this vividly in his
autobiography when he comments that the all-American ‘officers and gentlemen’ would
not allow young Jewish upstarts from central Europe to look over their shoulders during
their work.31 There was also personal tension between Donovan and Jackson regarding
disagreement between the OSS and OCC over areas of competence, as well as the question
of whether one could enter into agreements with former elites, as Donovan wanted to
do.32 A final cause can be found in the dissolution of the OSS after Truman’s decision
in 1945 not to create a ‘Gestapo’. The secret service and operative decisions were taken
over by the War Department, whereas the research department was to be integrated with
the State Department.
The report ‘The Present Status of Denazification in West Germany and Berlin’,
which was issued by the State Department in 1948 and can be attributed to Herz, clearly
reflects disappointment over the denazification policy. The course of action taken by the
Western Allies, whereby proceedings were first brought against lower echelons of the
regime and only later against the higher ones, was soon thwarted by the rapid handover
of the denazification process to the Germans, who judged most of the accused to be mere
hangers-on. Since the Allies surrendered control of the proceedings, the German author-
ities – assuming the accused fell under none of the numerous amnesties – reached ever
milder verdicts, a development which prejudiced the later criminal prosecution especially
of leading National Socialists. The latter were indeed removed from their positions of
office, but middle-ranking officers and those who had held no senior posts in the Nazi
hierarchy, but had nevertheless fulfilled key administrative, economic, educational
or cultural functions in the Third Reich, remained largely untouched. Thus the grim
prognosis put forward in the reports was that the renazification of Germany was still a
threat which could frustrate the democratic reconstruction of Germany, torpedo faith in
the rightfulness of denazification, endanger security and develop into further grounds for
alienation between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union.

Returning to university

Although Herz later considered the fear of renazification as exaggerated,33 he still indicated
the growing alienation of émigrés within the US administration. The R&A with its
intermediary position did not determine postwar planning or the war trials – although that
had never been its mandate. The commitment of the émigrés in the US administration was
based on the duty to defend their second home and defeat fascism. Whereas the Jewish-
German intellectuals were rattled by the horror of the Shoah that was uncovered after the

Downloaded from ire.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on May 22, 2015
 THE GOVERNMENT ADVISOR 417

war, their American colleagues went back to normal, following their careers in the rise
of cold war. Filled with bitterness Herz wrote to his family about the Nuremberg trial:
‘Dozens of American lawyers preparing the indictment, yet no one shows understanding
for the historic far-reaching implications of the case.’34
As denazification came to be at odds with the US occupation policy, and the climate
of public opinion started to change – the State Department was in the limelight owing
to the attacks from Senator McCarthy – left-liberal émigrés such as Herz had to decide.
Either they accepted that denazification would not be as profound as they had hoped,
or they ended their cooperation and returned to campus. All that was left was acerbated
frustration: ‘Denazification, which began with a bang, has since died with a whimper.’35
While they could identify with the principal aim of destroying fascism, the resulting cold
war was the final challenge for the left-wing liberal analysts. ‘We discovered that our
reports soon more or less landed in the waste-paper basket’,36 commented Herz. Affected
by that melancholy reminiscence, Herz, like many others, returned to university life in
1948. It can certainly be seen from the individual perspective as the search for the complex
identity of an ‘American of German-Jewish origin’.37
However, the question of the contradictory nature of the R&A analyses remains.
Thorough denazification and the reconstruction of Germany would have led to political
conflicts which the Allies were supposed to prevent; the R&A recommendations stated
that the Allies were to concentrate on securing law and order. This would be consistent
with Herz’s hope of achieving his own positive goals only if the involvement of democratic
powers met with the compliant acceptance of other groups of society – an expecta-
tion which even the Jewish-German intellectuals who survived the Nazis themselves
found questionable.

Notes

1 Robin W. Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War 1939–1961 (New York: Quill, 1988),
p. 60.
2 See Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence
Agency (Frederick: Aletheia Books, 1981), p. 428.
3 See Petra Marquardt-Bigman, Amerikanische Geheimdienstanalysen über Deutschland 1942–1949
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), pp. 53–66.
4 ‘Interview with John Herz’, in Alfons Söllner, Zur Archäologie der Demokratie in Deutschland,
vol. 2 (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1986), p. 39.
5 Although Herz produced several papers on Austria, I am focusing here on selected studies of Germany.
See Siegfried Beer, ‘Research and Analysis about Austria 1941–1949: American Intelligence Studies
on the Reconstruction of Central Europe’, in Thomas Fröschl (ed.), Nordamerikastudien: Historische
und literaturwissenschaftliche Forschungen aus österreichischen Universitäten zu den Vereinigten
Staaten und Kanada (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 2000), pp. 192–210.
6 John H. Herz, ‘Otto Kirchheimer – Leben und Werk’, in Wolfgang Luthardt and Alfons Söllner
(eds), Verfassungsstaat, Souveränität, Pluralismus: Otto Kirchheimer zum Gedächtnis (Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989), p. 16.
7 John H. Herz, Vom Überleben: Wie ein Weltbild entstand (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1984), p. 135.
8 See John H. Herz, ‘Alternative Proposals to Democracy: Naziism [sic]’, Journal of Negro Education
10(3), 1941, pp. 353–67.
9 Eugene Anderson, History of the Research and Analysis Branch in the Office of Strategic Services,
in NA, RG 226, R&A-History (Political Group), p. 76, quoted in Barry Katz, Foreign Intelligence:
Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services 1942–1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1989), p. 34. The records of the OSS/R&A are collected in the National Archives
and Records Administration in Record Group 226.6.

Downloaded from ire.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on May 22, 2015
418 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 22(4)

10 See ‘Interview with John Herz’, in Söllner, Zur Archäologie, p. 37; ‘Interview with John Herz’, in
Rainer Erd (ed.), Reform und Resignation: Gespräche über Franz L. Neumann (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1985), p. 153.
11 See Peter Reichel, ‘Zwischen Dämonisierung und Verharmlosung’, in Axel Schildt and Arnold
Sywottek (eds), Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre
(Bonn: Dietz, 1993), pp. 679–92.
12 See Jörg Später, Vansittart: Britische Debatten über Deutsche und Nazis 1902–1945 (Göttingen:
Wallstein-Verlag, 2003); Bernd Greiner, Die Morgenthau-Legende: Zur Geschichte eines umstrittenen
Plans (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995).
13 R&A 1323, ‘Army Service Forces Manual: Civil Affairs Handbook’, Section 2: ‘Government and
Administration’ (10 March 1944), p. 2.
14 See R&A 1323, ‘Government and Administration’, pp. 12–23.
15 See R&A 1323, ‘Government and Administration’, p. 32.
16 See Marquardt-Bigman, Amerikanische Geheimdienstanalysen, pp. 96–118; Thomas Koch,
‘Der amerikanische Geheimdienst OSS (Office of Strategic Services) und die Widerstandsbewegungen’,
in Gerhard Schulz (ed.), Geheimdienste und politische Widerstandsbewegungen im Zweiten Weltkrieg
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1982), pp. 84–7.
17 See Felicitas Hentschke, Demokratisierung als Ziel der amerikanischen Besatzungspolitik in
Deutschland und Japan 1943–1947 (Münster: Lit, 2001), pp. 67–82.
18 R&A 1655.2, ‘Police and Public Safety in Germany’ (22 July 1944), p. 2.
19 R&A 1655.14, ‘Adaptation of the Administrative Machinery on the Regional Level in Germany’
(22 July 1944), p. 3.
20 R&A 1655.15, ‘Adaptation of the Administrative Machinery on the Local Level in Germany’
(22 July 1944), p. 2.
21 See R&A 1655.7, ‘The Abrogation of German Criminal Justice under Military Government’
(preliminary draft, n.d.), p. 16.
22 The Moscow Conference, October 1943, available at: www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/moscow.
htm (accessed 20 August 2008).
23 See: R&A 1482, ‘Statement of Atrocities’, Moscow Tripartite Conference (4 November 1943).
24 See ‘Statement of Atrocities’, p. 3. The optimism expressed in this report shrank as the divergence
between the Allied viewpoints increased. Major sources of difference were the liberation of the
first concentration camps and the fact that the Western Allies – as opposed to the Soviet Union
and European governments in exile – had made no plans for necessary legislation and legal
proceedings for war trials. (See R&A 3114.2, ‘Problems Concerning the Treatment of War Criminals’
[26 September 1944].)
25 See: R&A 3113.3, ‘Principal Nazi Organizations involved in War Crimes and their Policy-making
Officials: Legislative Agencies involved in War Crimes’ (28 August 1945), pp. 14–15.
26 See R&A 3110, ‘Leadership and Criminal Responsibility’ (18 July 1945), p. 14.
27 This position, held by the R&A Central European Section, was, however, shared by a limited
number of people in the OSS. See Michael Salter, Nazi War Crimes, US Intelligence and Selective
Prosecution at Nuremberg. Controversies Regarding the Role of the Office of Strategic Services
(Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), pp. 259–69, 298–306.
28 R&A 2577.2, ‘Problems Concerning the Treatment of War Criminals: List of Potential War Criminals
Under Proposed US Policy Directives’ (30 September 1944).
29 See Otto Kirchheimer, Politische Justiz: Verwendung juristischer Verfahrensmöglichkeiten zu
politischen Zwecken (Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1965), pp. 473–500.
30 See Salter, Nazi War Crimes, pp. 259–69; Michael Salter, ‘The Visibility of the Holocaust: Franz
Neumann and the Nuremberg Trials’, in Robert Fine and Charles Turner (eds), Social Theory after
the Holocaust (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000), pp. 197–218; Ernst Stiefel, Deutsche
Juristen im amerikanischen Exil: 1933–1950 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1991), pp. 181–8.
31 Herz, Vom Überleben, pp. 140ff.
32 See Salter, Nazi War Crimes, pp. 369–428.
33 ‘Interview with John Herz’, in Erd, Reform und Resignation, p. 165.
34 John H. Herz cited in Ernst Stiefel, Deutsche Juristen im amerikanischen Exil, p. 187.
35 John H. Herz, ‘The Fiasco of Denazification’, Political Science Quarterly, 63(4), 1948, pp. 569–94,
at p. 569.
36 ‘Interview with John Herz’, in Erd, Reform und Resignation, p. 168.
37 Herz, Vom Überleben, p. 153.

Downloaded from ire.sagepub.com at Bobst Library, New York University on May 22, 2015