Relations between China and Bangladesh: A Strategic Partner?

Introduction:

China and Bangladesh had a tense relationship during and after Bangladesh's independence movement,
but many Bangladeshis today consider China an "all-weather buddy." China has been a reliable partner to
Bangladesh, increasing economic, military, and strategic ties while seeking a strategic presence in South
Asia and exploiting Bangladesh's natural resources.

This paper discusses Sino-Bangladesh relations and their implications for India.

A concise historical summary of China-Bangladesh relations:

China-Bangladesh relations span almost two millennia. In 1038 AD, outstanding Bangladeshi monk and
scholar Atisha Dipankar Srigyan came to Tibet and established Buddhism during the Great Buddhist Pala
Empire (750-1174 AD) (Zhang, 2010). This religion has expanded over East Asia, including ancient
China, since then. Chinese intellectuals, monks, and travelers often visited Bangladesh, and their writings
emphasized bilateral relations (Jashim., 2011). These expeditions boosted relations between the nations.
Bangladesh was East Pakistan when Pakistan achieved independence from Britain. Premier Zhou Enlai of
China visited Bangladesh, then East Pakistan, in 1950, and Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the
future founder of Bangladesh, visited China in 1953 and 1957. Buddhists visited Atish Dipankar's tomb in
China in 1963. (Jashim., 2011).

China did not back them during the 1971 liberation war because it did not want the partition of Pakistan,
but it requested that Pakistan's military authorities find a political solution to the East Pakistan issue. They
were also barred from torturing East Pakistanis (Ibne, 2010). (Ibne, 2010). China never acknowledged
Bangladesh after independence. The developing nation was denied UN membership. Before 1975, the
countries had no diplomatic connections. China accepted Bangladesh in October 1975, overcoming their
objections. Sino-Bangladesh relations have improved. China helps Bangladesh in several businesses but
stays out of politics.

High-level visits have strengthened China-Bangladesh relations since 1976. China-Bangladesh relations
are warming. Thus, China can develop long, positive partnerships with any nation.

Ziaur Rahman first visited America in 1977. In 1978, Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiannian first visited
independent Bangladesh. President Hussain Mohammad Ershad visited China five times (Zeitlin, 2005).
Indian observers believe the Bangladeshi ruling Generals visited Beijing instead of New Delhi due to
their anti-Indian prejudice (Bhardwaj, 2003). Bilateral visits continued despite Indian misgivings. In
1989, Chinese Premier Li Pend visited Bangladesh and signed a visa exemption and economic deal. Sino-
Bangladeshi ties were unaffected by Bangladesh's 1990s democracy. Sheikh Hasina's Awami League
(A.L.) and Begum Khaleda Zia's BNP have reigned for two decades. Both maintain China policy.

Khaleda Zia visited China in June 1991. China hosted Sheikh Hasina in 1996. Wen Jiabao visited
Bangladesh in January 2002, while then-prime minister Khaleda Zia visited China in December 2002 to
become a SAARC observer. 2010 marked 35 years of bilateral relations. Next decade, Bangladeshi
lawmakers maintain good relations with China. Sheikh Hasina visited India two months before her March
2010 5-day China tour. (2010). Bangladesh requested Chinese assistance for a deep seaport, the Kunming
Project, and other projects during this visit. Khaleda Zia visited China from December 19–23, 2010, to
discuss mutual concerns. Bangladesh's political leadership's trips to China have helped it assert its
autonomous South Asian identity free of India's shadow (Prashant, 2010). These tours are reciprocal as
trade between the nations expands.

XI Jinping's first visit to Bangladesh in 30 years boosted relations. China's state media dubbed the visit a
diplomatic milestone (Takendra, 2016). This visit will strengthen strategic and economical ties between
the states. China's neutrality benefits the relationship. China-Bangladesh ties increased after Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina visited China in 2019. China's dependence on Bangladesh made Hasina's visit
notable. 2016 saw China-Bangladesh alliance. (2019). On April 27, 2021, Chinese state councillor and
minister of national defense Wei Fenghe visited Bangladesh and pledged to expand military relations
(Xinhua. 2021).

China, the world's largest developing nation, has raised Asian exporters' living standards (Kabir, 2017).
Bangladesh has grown rapidly and may work with China.

Military-defense relations:

China supplies Bangladesh's military weaponry and training. China-2002 Bangladesh's defense accord
suited Bangladesh's needs. Bangladesh's first foreign agreement formalized defense contracts. It described
training, maintenance, and industry collaboration. China's intention to befriend India's immediate
neighbor after befriending Pakistan was considered as an insurance policy for Bangladesh. India worried
China's strategic position in Bangladesh on its eastern border (Kapila, 2003). Bangladesh received police
equipment from the Bangladeshi Ministry of Home Affairs and Chinese Ministry of Public Security in
March 2006 (People's Daily, 2006).

In May 2006, Cao Gangchuan met with Bangladesh Army commander. Cao stressed, "China and
Bangladesh cooperate globally. China and Bangladesh will maintain regional and global stability" (2006).
China has made 84 formal visits to Bangladesh since 1974, compared to 60 or 70 to India, underlining its
military importance. Beijing-Dhaka trust grows. Bangladesh bought 82% of China's weaponry using
credit and soft loans from 2009 to 2014. (2014). According to a 2020 Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute study, Bangladesh was China's second-largest military equipment customer from 2016
to 2020, buying approximately 20% of China's total shipments. 70% of Bangladesh's major arms imports
are Chinese (Wezeman, Kuimova and Wezeman, 2020). Tanks, rescue vehicles, radars, ships, missiles,
and defense systems cost $546 million in 2009–2011. (2013).

2016 China sold Bangladesh two diesel-electric submarines for $16 million. (2014). Bangladesh wants
China's inexpensive weaponry and credit. Police cooperate on security. In 2018, the two nations struck
agreements for law enforcement training and national police guns and ammo (Bangladesh Protidin, 2018).

Dhaka's ability to balance China and India and gain technical advantages is shown by this extraordinary
security cooperation in India's direct zone of influence. Two competing opinions demonstrate China's
rising influence in Bangladesh. China starts a "shadow war" by upgrading Bangladesh's military and
naval facilities to face the US and India in the Indian Ocean (IOR). China values access over bases.
Bangladesh's commercial and military accords allow China to access the world's busiest sea waterways.
China lacks strategic IOR access. Bangladesh balanced India and China. "Bangladesh's lean toward China
must be understood in light of the psychological threat it (Bangladesh) faces from India," said one Indian
expert (Pattanaik, S., 2006). Bangladesh is protected by China. China trains Bangladeshi Army soldiers
alongside the Chinese military.

The IPSC characterizes China's naval modernization of Bangladesh a "Ghost War" against the US and
Indian Ocean. China-Bangladesh relations scared India (Shikha, 2014). Bangladesh is using Chinese
opportunities despite Indian misgivings. "Bangladesh and China are time-tested allies and dependable
strategic cooperation partners," Bangladesh's president declared during Wei Fenghe's visit to Dhaka in
2021. 2021).

China's infrastructural development project in Bangladesh:

Xi Jinping visited Bangladesh on October 14, 2016. This visit affects Sino-Bangladesh relations and
China's South Asia engagement. Bangladesh-China relations began in 1976. Xi Jinping and Sheikh
Hasina struck 27 billion-dollar accords. In 2016, the Chinese president upgraded "a comprehensive
relationship of collaboration" to "a strategic partnership of cooperation" in Dhaka (Bangladesh Protidin,
2017). President Xi's 2016 visit to Dhaka and the Belt and Road Initiative's launch transformed Sino-
Bangladesh relations (BRI). India, a regional power, is upset by Bangladesh's BRI support. Bangladesh's
geopolitical position and infrastructure development goals shape its relationship with China (Arefin,
Rashid and Habib, 2019). Thus, China's Bangladesh infrastructure development must be analyzed.

China overtook India as Bangladesh's largest commercial partner in 2015. (2008). China's economic and
infrastructure aid to Bangladesh has boosted its engagement. Dhaka appreciates Beijing's aid. China-
Bangladesh ties improved after Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's July 2019 visit to China.

To enhance Dhaka's dependence on Beijing, China must fund Bangladesh's infrastructure. Padma Rail
Link is China's biggest Bangladeshi project. Bangladesh and China sponsor the BDT 40,000 crore project.

Chinese investments in Bangladesh include Payra Deep Sea Port. Patuakhali's Bay of Bengal Payra port.
The port may cost 11–15 billion dollars. Many observers say China's involvement in this project is
unsurprising given its strategic location and closeness to its Indian Ocean marine outposts. Bangladesh's
growth should benefit from the initiative (Agarwal and Islam, 2015). China entered Chittagong and
Mongla in 2019. China will build Mongla Port. China proposed a Sonadia deep seaport. Environmental
concerns canceled the project. As many Bangladeshi observers believed, it wasn't canceled due to India's
concerns or Bangladesh's wish to balance the two Asian Neighboring Giants (Kabir, 2017).

China's promise to Bangladesh to control and rehabilitate India's Teesta is significant for India. The USD
1 billion project will use 85% Chinese funding to create river embarkations near India. China is funding
85 percent of the USD 3.3 billion construction of eight Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridges, a sewage
treatment plant, an under-river tunnel, business zones, Sylhet Airport, and roads (Salam, Bhuiyan and
Nitu, 2020). Chinese businesses seek to develop and run Dhaka-Chittagong high-speed train (Dabas,
2017). China joined Bangladesh's IT and stock markets (Karim and Liton, 2016).

Shanghai and Shenzhen owned 25% of Bangladesh's primary stock exchange. It outbid India 56%.
(2017). China prioritizes digital strategy. Alipay owns 20% of Bangladesh's largest mobile financial
services firm Bkash. China-Bangladesh IT cooperation. Bangladesh's Info-Sarker national infrastructure
network phase 3 received $1 billion from China. China helped build phase 2. Bangladesh sought Chinese
financing to strengthen its communications network for the digital connection project to overcome rural-
urban gaps. Huawei will support the same project with 5G.

A Chinese business offered creating a metro train line in Chattagram, an eastern port city in Bangladesh,
and reclaiming seabed to develop a 60-square-kilometer "Smart City" in exchange for the latter. 20-
kilometer, $2.2 billion Chattogram Train Station-airport metro. The corporation will cover everything,
including the metro feasibility study (Hasan, Adhikary and Roy, 2022). Critics doubted. Jahangirnagar
University Professor Anu Mohammad said, "If another country or corporate manages part of our country,
we should address wider problems. Drop it " (Hasan, Adhikary, and Roy, 2022).

Electricity

China developed Bangladeshi coal-fired power plants. It cooperatively built Bangladesh's largest power
station at 30% of the cost (Prasain, 2021). Three of 12 proposed US$4.5 billion 1,320-megawatt dual-fuel
power plants are nearing construction (Xinhua, 2019). China is building renewable energy projects.
Bangladesh will establish a 400-million-dollar 500-megawatt renewable energy facility with a Chinese
business by 2023. (Raju, 2019). China is upgrading its essential electricity grid. China is sponsoring USD
1.32 billion in the Power Grid Network Reinforcement Project and USD 2.04 billion in power system
network extension and strengthening to help Bangladesh intelligently operate its power Grid.

China wants to build an oil pipeline from Bangladesh, but India won't join BRI (Islam, 2013). China is
strategically important in Bangladesh. Chevron sold China three Bangladeshi natural gas deposits in
2017. These three fields supply about 50% of Bangladesh's gas. China is helping Bangladesh develop a
220 kilometer pipeline and a docking site for direct oil unloading at Chittagong Refinery. Chinese oil will
be transported here. "China likes Bangladesh for its vast natural gas deposits; Bangladesh's geographical
closeness to Myanmar makes these reserves pipeline-accessible to China," says India (Niazi, 2005).

Safety

Public health before COVID-19 was cooperative. A 2013 Chinese military hospital ship helped
Chittagong. (2013). In 2015, China handed the health and family planning ministry $4,1 million in
equipment. (2015). Since the outbreak, it has supplied government and private organizations with testing
kits, protective suits, and other equipment (Chinese Embassy, 2020). In June 2020, Bangladesh received a
medical team to manage pandemic response (Financial Express, 2020). Alibaba gave Bangladesh testing
equipment and masks in April 2020. 2020 Chinese Embassy. China-sponsored Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank gave Bangladesh $350 million to battle the pandemic (Reuters, 2020).
Co-funding a Sinovac vaccine clinical research postponed the two governments' immunization deal in
2020. Beijing delivered 1.1 million Sinopharm vaccination doses in two batches, but no one noticed
(Sujan, 2020). According to insiders, Bangladesh is exploring co-manufacturing Sinovac, which would fit
China's wealth-producing image and assist Bangladesh move into higher-value industries (Dhaka
Tribune, 2021).

Exchange

China offers scholarships and educational exchanges to Bangladeshi youngsters. Foreign-student

Bangladeshis like it. Xi's 2016 visit yielded a 600-scholarship MOU (Prothom Alo, 2015). Beijing has
created Confucius Institutes in local universities and offered Bangladeshi students summer courses in
China and excursions to the Confucius Institute headquarters (Prothom Alo, 2015). Chinese enterprises
are involved. CHEC, a Chinese SOE with a substantial presence in South Asia, has provided scholarships,
new facilities, and educational supplies to Chittagong high school students (Financial Express, 2019).

Bangladesh's China policy has encountered challenges despite fast involvement. Dhaka is concerned
about Rohingya refugees from Myanmar. Despite guarantees, Bangladesh believes geopolitics has
prevented China from settling the matter. It thinks China can sway Myanmar. Bangladesh's foreign
minister met with China's Asian affairs envoy, Sun Guoxiang, in 2017. (Bangladesh Protidin, 2017). To
calm Bangladesh, China has sent Rohingya relief. They covered refugee rice in June 2019. (Ahmed,
2019).

China-funded Bangladesh infrastructure

Xi Jinping visited Bangladesh on October 14, 2016. This trip will affect China's growing involvement in
South Asia and relations with Bangladesh. Bangladesh-China relations began in 1976. Hasina and Jinping
signed 27 billion-dollar deals. The Chinese president's 2016 visit to Dhaka formalized "a comprehensive
partnership of collaboration," later elevated to "strategic" (Bangladesh Protidin, 2017). President Xi's
2016 Belt and Road Initiative visit to Dhaka impacted Sino-Bangladesh relations (BRI). India, a major
player in Bangladesh's foreign policy, especially in its region, has criticized Bangladesh's positive BRI
response. Due to its strategic location, Bangladesh desires infrastructure development from China (Arefin,
Rashid and Habib, 2019). Thus, China's Bangladesh infrastructure development must be analyzed.

In the first half of 2015, China became Bangladesh's largest commercial partner, surpassing India. (2008).
China's economic and infrastructure aid to Bangladesh has improved relations. Beijing's aid pleases
developing Dhaka. Sheikh Hasina visited China in July 2019 to improve military, commercial, and
infrastructure ties.
China must enter Bangladesh's infrastructure development industry to increase Dhaka's dependence on
Beijing. China's Padma Rail Link Project is one of Bangladesh's largest. The Exim Bank of China and
Bangladesh will fund the project with BDT 40,000 crores.

Another major Bangladeshi Chinese project is Payra Deep Sea Port. Patuakhali's Bay of Bengal port is
Payra. The port will cost $11–15 billion. Analysts expect China to join this project due to its strategic
location and proximity to its Indian Ocean bases. It should help Bangladeshi growth notwithstanding its
relevance (Agarwal and Islam, 2015). In 2019, Bangladesh opened its largest seaports, Chittagong and
Mongla, to China. China will build Mongla Port. China's Sonadia deep seaport plan indicated its interest.
Environmental concerns prevented the project. Many Bangladeshis believed the event was canceled due
to India's anxieties and Bangladesh's desire to balance these two Asian heavyweights (Kabir, 2017).

India's strategic challenge is China's pledge to Bangladesh to control and repair the Teesta river.
Construction of embarkations along the river towards India will cost USD 1 billion, with 85% coming
from a Chinese loan. Eight Bangladesh-China Friendship Bridges, a sewage treatment plant, an under-
river tunnel, economic zones, Sylhet Airport building, and several roads are part of the massive Chinese
outreach, anticipated to cost USD 3.3 billion and sponsored by China 85 percent (Salam, Bhuiyan and
Nitu, 2020). The Dhaka-Chittagong high-speed train project also interests Chinese companies (Dabas,
2017). China invests in Bangladesh's stock market and IT (Karim and Liton, 2016).

Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets acquired Bangladesh's biggest stock exchange. It outbid India by
56%. (Bangaldesh Protidin, 2017). China prioritizes digital. Alipay owns 20% of Bangladesh's mobile
financial leader Bkash. China-Bangladesh ICT ties are extensive. The third phase of Info-Sarker
established a national infrastructure network for Bangladesh with $1 billion in Chinese funding. China
built Phase 2. Bangladesh wanted Chinese funding to improve its communications infrastructure for the
digital connection initiative. Huawei will support 5G.

A Chinese company wants to build a metro rail line and a "Smart City" on 60 square kilometres of
reclaimed land in Chattagram, a port city in eastern Bangladesh. The 20-kilometer, four-year Chattogram
Train Station-airport line will cost $2.2 billion. The corporation will pay for everything, including the
mandatory metropolitan feasibility study (Hasan, Adhikary and Roy, 2022). Commentators questioned
this. Anu Mohammad, Jahangirnagar University lecturer, "If another nation or corporation can control
part of our country, we must raise deeper questions. Abandon this plan " (Hasan, Adhikary, and Roy,
2022).

Electricity

Bangladesh has multiple Chinese coal-fired power facilities. It co-built Bangladesh's largest power plant,
contributing 30% of the cost (Prasain, 2021). Three 1,320-megawatt dual-fuel power stations (costing
$4.5 billion) are under development out of 12 proposed (Xinhua, 2019). China supports renewable energy
projects. Bangladesh and a Chinese business would build a 500-megawatt renewable energy facility by
2023 for $400 million. (Raju, 2019). China's electrical grid is a strategic issue. The Chinese government's
USD 1.32 billion Power Grid Network Reinforcement Project and USD 2.04 billion Power System
Network Growth and Strengthening Project aim to intelligently operate Bangladesh's power Grid.

China wants to build an oil pipeline from Bangladesh, but India won't join BRI (Islam, 2013). China stays
in Bangladesh strategically. Chevron sold China three Bangladeshi natural gas deposits in 2017. These
three fields supply about half Bangladesh's natural gas. China is helping Bangladesh build a 220
kilometer pipeline and one mooring station for Chittagong Refinery direct oil unloading. The Chinese will
ship oil from here to mainland stockpiles. One Indian source states, "China wants Bangladesh because of
its enormous natural gas deposits; Bangladesh's geographical closeness to Myanmar makes these reserves
pipeline-accessible to China" (Niazi, 2005).

Public Health Workforce

Public health before COVID-19 was cooperative. A Chinese naval hospital ship assisted Chittagong in
2013. (2013). China contributed the Ministry of Health and Family Planning $4,1 million in medical
equipment in 2015. (2015). Since the outbreak, it has offered governments and businesses testing kits,
protective suits, and other equipment (Chinese Embassy, 2020). Medical experts were despatched to
Bangladesh in June 2020 to manage pandemic reaction (Financial Express, 2020). Alibaba gave
Bangladesh testing equipment and masks in April 2020. 2020 Chinese Embassy. 2020. China-sponsored
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank gave Bangladesh $350 million to fight the pandemic (Reuters,
2020).

The two governments disagreed in 2020 over funding a clinical trial of the Chinese Sinovac vaccine, the
focus of their immunization agreement. Beijing donated 1.1 million Sinopharm vaccines in two payments,
but the problem seems to have been neglected (Sujan, 2020). Bangladesh may co-manufacture Sinovac.
China's rising status as a wealth creator will help Bangladesh diversify its economy (Dhaka Tribune,
2021).

Need for Sea/Ocean

China relies on seaborne energy trade. Energy powers China's economy and nation-building (Len, 2015).
The Indian Ocean and marine canals provide important energy. China purchases 80% of West Asian and
African energy through the Indian Ocean before approaching the Strait of Malacca (Len, 2015). Power
hunger will keep China dependent on the Indian Ocean. China is expanding infrastructure around the
Indian Ocean despite Beijing's fears about India's supremacy.

Chinese Indian Ocean strategy produced language disputes. The "Maritime Silk Road" conceals Beijing's
military ambitions (MSR). The MSR, along with the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), is the
marine component of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) concept, which aims to revitalize China's business
links with Asia and Europe by connecting ports and other infrastructure (Aoyama, 2016). China's
opponents call the MSR project a "string of pearls," while Beijing maintains it's economic (Brewster,
2017). Bangladesh's northern Bay of Bengal location aids China's Indian Ocean naval strategy. Beijing's
"String of Pearls" strategy employs Chittagong and Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, as alternate pearls. China's
ability to combat Beijing's formidable Indian Ocean opponents would improve if it were stationed in
either of these Bangladeshi coastal regions.

Strategic Interest

The geostrategic significance of the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean is of great concern to China. The
Indian Ocean, the third-largest ocean in the world, is 73,44 million square kilometers in size and separates
Asia, Antarctica, Africa, and Oceania. Unquestionably, it has become the most important communication
corridor between Asia, Europe, Africa, and Oceania (Jiacheng, 2017). It facilitates a quarter of worldwide
maritime commerce. Therefore, the Indian Ocean is a crucial zone for global power competition.
Strategically, the Indian Ocean is essential for China's trade, investment, and energy security. China
appreciates Bangladesh's geostrategic location and proximity to India, its South Asian foe. Bangladesh is
the gateway to South and Southeast Asia due to its location at the beginning of the Indian Ocean-
connected Bay of Bengal and its proximity to Myanmar and India. Bangladesh is the focal point of the
Bay of Bengal due to a number of variables, and China has a range of interests there, as stated below.

Whether China's rise leads to great power competition or cooperative outcomes, geopolitical and security
concerns are pervasive in its foreign policy. Due to China's goal of economic development - a motivation
that interacts with the necessity for access to land and sea areas, natural resources, and energy - China's
geopolitics are of the utmost importance.

Bangladesh features largely in China's geopolitical calculations as its economy continues to grow, and
Bangladesh also features prominently in China's geopolitical aspirations (Halim, 1996). Bangladesh's
traditional security protection is provided by China (Scott, 2012). By building a military blockade along
the Siliguri corridor, China may attempt to cut off India's northeast from the rest of the country. And
China's success would depend critically on India denying military access (Mohsin, 1992).

Strategic Importance
China is extremely concerned about the geostrategic importance of the Bay of Bengal and the Indian
Ocean. The Indian Ocean, the world's third-largest ocean, has a surface area of 73,44 million square
kilometers and separates Asia, Antarctica, Africa, and Oceania. It has become the most significant
communication corridor between Asia, Europe, Africa, and Oceania (Jiacheng, 2017). It facilitates one-
fourth of worldwide maritime trade. The Indian Ocean is therefore an important region for global power
rivalry. The Indian Ocean is strategically vital for China's trade, investment, and energy security. China
values Bangladesh's geostrategic location and proximity to its South Asian rival, India. Due to its location
at the beginning of the Indian Ocean-connected Bay of Bengal and its proximity to Myanmar and India,
Bangladesh serves as the gateway to South and Southeast Asia. Due to a number of causes, Bangladesh is
the focal center of the Bay of Bengal, and China has diverse interests there, as shown below.

Whether China's rise results in hegemonic competition or cooperation, geopolitical and security concerns
permeate its foreign policy. China's global politics are of the utmost importance as a result of the
country's pursuit of economic development, which necessitates access to land and sea regions, natural
resources, and energy.

Bangladesh figures substantially in China's geopolitical calculations as its economy continues to expand,
and Bangladesh also figures strongly in China's geopolitical ambitions (Halim, 1996). China provides
Bangladesh's conventional security protection (Scott, 2012). China could establish military blockades in
the Siliguri corridor in an effort to cut off India's northeast from the rest of the country. The success of
China would depend on India's rejection to permit a military corridor (Mohsin, 1992).

Bangladesh's expansion and China's economic links have expanded trade since the early 1990s. China is
Pakistan's second-largest investor in Bangladesh. Bangladesh imports mostly from China. China will
duty-free 97% of Bangladeshi exports by 2020. 2002 saw Bangladesh-China trade. Bangladesh purchased
64,2 million dollars from China and exported 19 million (Ihtesham and Mahabubur, 2005).

In 2004, Bangladesh's trade volume climbed 43.5% to 1.96 billion US dollars, while China's exports to
Bangladesh rose 42.8% to 1.91 billion. China was Bangladesh's largest importer in 2005. (2005). 2005–
2006 China-Bangladesh trade totaled 495.5 million USD. (2006).

2008 bilateral trade increased $4.58 billion. In 2008, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs visited
Bangladesh and donated six million takas for development and five million as a present (Harun, 2010).
2010–2011 bilateral trade exceeded $7–8 billion. (2012). Many analysts say Bangladesh's financial
relationship with China has two phases: before and after Beijing's "One Belt One Road" project. Sino-
Bangladesh barely spent $250 million in Bangladesh between 1977 and 2010. (Ramachandran). Since
BRI, China is Bangladesh's major trading partner and investor. Some believed China's rapid growth in
Bangladesh was a prelude to dominating the Indian market with Chinese goods (Chakma, 2019).
Economists suggest curbing China-Bangladesh trade. China abolished Bangladeshi export tariffs (Islam,
Ailian and Jie, 2018). Dhaka-Beijing specialists think a free trade treaty will fix the trade gap. According
to Chinese professor Cheng Min, the China-Bangladesh free trade treaty can reduce the bilateral trade
deficit by exempting more Bangladeshi items from taxes (Hasib, 2019). China and Bangladesh are
building a free trade zone to boost relations and reduce trade gap. Bangladesh's China trade imbalance
will drop $15 billion (Singh, 2019).

China-Bangladesh economic friction

Deficit: Bangladesh-China trade has changed. China is Bangladesh's all-weather ally (The Daily Star,
2005). Despite expanding trade, the two countries share a substantial trade deficit. 2009 Bangladesh-
China exports totaled $140 million. China duty-freed 84 products January 1, 2006. Despite efforts to
decrease the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) deficit, it launched a regulatory purchasing mission
to enhance Bangladeshi imports to China (Bangladesh Embassy, 2009). It didn't reduce the trade deficit.
China-Bangladesh trade deficits rose 19% between 2015-2016 and 2017-2018, worrying Bangladesh.
Bangladesh Bank (2019). Bangladesh-China trade deficit was USD 16.27 billion in 2019, rising 16-fold
from two decades earlier (The Daily Star, 2019).

Partnerships

Bangladesh and China have flourished since the early 1990s, increasing business links. China's second-
largest South Asian investor after Pakistan is Bangladesh. Bangladesh trades most with China. China will
exclude 97% of Bangladeshi exports by 2020. 2020. 2002 saw Bangladesh-China trade. Bangladesh
exported $19.1 million and imported 64,2 million from China (Ihtesham and Mahabubur, 2005).

China's exports to Bangladesh climbed 42.8% to $1.91 billion USD and trading 43.5% to $2.04 billion
USD in 2004. In 2005, China overtook India as Bangladesh's leading importer (The Daily Star., 2005).
2005–2006 China-Bangladesh trade totaled 495.5 million USD. (2006).

2008 bilateral trade grew 4.58 billion USD. The Chinese foreign minister handed Bangladesh a five-
million-taka present and six-million-taka development money in 2008. (Harun, 2010). 2010–2011
bilateral commerce was $7–8 billion. (2012). Before and after Beijing's "One Belt One Road" project,
many experts split Bangladesh-China financial ties. Sino-Bangladesh only spent $250 million in
Bangladesh since 1977. Shown (Ramachandran, 2019). China is Bangladesh's largest trading partner and
investor since BRI began. Some think China's fast response in Bangladesh was a test run before Beijing
completely exploited the Indian market and entrenched Chinese products as the dominant force (Chakma,
2019).

Experts believe curbing China-Bangladesh commerce will improve relations. China exempts Bangladeshi
exports (Islam, Ailian and Jie, 2018). Dhaka and Beijing experts say free trade agreements reduce trade
imbalances. "The China-Bangladesh free-trade deal can restrict more Bangladeshi ingredients from taxes,
considerably cutting the bilateral trade deficit between Bangladesh and China," argues China economy
specialist Cheng Min (Hasib, 2019). China and Bangladesh are developing a free trade zone to boost
relations and cut their trade gap. Bangladesh wants to close its $15 billion China trade gap (Singh, 2019).

Imbalance:

Recently, Bangladesh-China trade has changed considerably. Most Bangladeshis trust China (The Daily
Star, 2005). The trade gap is large despite increased commerce. China imported only $140 million from
Bangladesh in 2009. On January 1, 2006, China allowed 84 duty-free imports. China is increasing
Bangladeshi imports through regulated purchase despite its APTA deficit reduction aims (Bangladesh
Embassy, 2009). This didn't lower the trade imbalance. China-Bangladesh trade surpluses of 19% in
2015-2016 and 2017-2018 worry Bangladesh. Bangladesh Bank (2019). Bangladesh-trade China's deficit
was USD 16.27 billion in 2019, up 16 times over 20 years (The Daily Star, 2019).
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