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Failure Analysis of Solid Rocket Apogee Motors: Prepared For
Failure Analysis of Solid Rocket Apogee Motors: Prepared For
Prepared for:
JET PROPULSION LABORATORY
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91103
September 1972
Final Report
Prepared for:
CONTRACT 953298
"This work was performed for the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology
sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under Contract NAS7-100."
i
ERRATA
p. 9, par. 3 "TW-479"
should read
"TE-479"
I'
ABSTRACT AND SUMMARY
iii
CONTENTS
TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. vi
CONCLUSIONS .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 3
TECHNICAL DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 5
Aft-End Problems . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 27
Flight Motor Instrumentation . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 28
Motor Contractor Assistance at Launch Preparation ..... 29
Margin Testing . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 29
Pressure and Zone Curing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Elastomeric Chamber Insulation . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 31
Ignitor and Initiator NDT . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 32
Safe/Arm Device Development . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 32
Spacecraft/Motor Interface Review . . . . . . . . . . 33
Analyses of Stretched Motors . . . ..... . . . . . . .. .33
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
iv
TABLES
v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CPFF Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee
GE General Electric
vi
INTRODUCTION
NASA and the Department of Defense had fully developed the technology,
materials, and documentation for designing, manufacturing, and testing this
class of motors; none of the flown designs pressed the state of the art,
even though they were high performance. The failures were also puzzling
and of concern because no patterns were apparent except that the observed
anomalies occurred after more than 4 seconds of burn.
1
process, and inspection steps that have proven useful in avoiding repeti-
tion of the failures. Design features to improve reliability were iden-
tified. Changes in procurement practices to improve reliability were
identified. Recommendations were ranked for their impact on reliability
and for their implementation cost and schedule.
2
CONCLUSIONS
3
5. A checklist of incurred failures and corrective actions
taken was prepared to summarize industry experience with
these high performance motors. The list should be equally
useful to the buyers and sellers of apogee motors.
4
TECHNICAL DISCUSSION
* Spacecraft contractors
Each selected motor was involved in an anomalous flight, and it was pre-
sumed that the flight failure review board had assembled all available
documentation and data and had assessed possible causes for the anomalies.
It was not intended to make a redetermination of the causes, but it was
hoped that this study could benefit from the documentation and detail
assembled by the failure review teams.
The FW-4S motor was selected to include the all-solid launch envi-
ronment of the Scout, and spin stabilization. The SVM-1 was selected
as representative of the lower size limit of apogee motors. The SVM-2
motor is mid-range in size and uses a composite motor case. The TE-364-3
is representative of large, spherical, titanium-case motors. Finally, the
TE-521 is representative of "stretched" spherical motors.
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6
* A range of length/diameter ratios
For each of the selected motors all available documents were sought--
from initial request for proposal or quotation through delivery of flight
motors and special tests subsequent to the anomalous flights. A parallel
JPL systems study was established to obtain and analyze spacecraft and
launch vehicle data pertinent to the selected flights.
The failure of review board for the FW-4S determined that breakup
of the graphite nozzle throat insert had occurred. A development program
resulted in an improved nozzle design and no similar problem has occurred
in 44 consecutive flights with this design.
The SVM-1 motor suffered an aft-end failure and nozzle loss resulting
from exposure of these motor parts to low temperatures well below the
designed-for environment. The failure was duplicated in ground static
tests, heaters were added to the spacecraft to maintain the design envi-
ronment,and users have added a nozzle low temperature exposure require-
ment to some qualification tests in later motor programs.
The limited data from the SVM-2, TE-364-3, and TE-521 flights did
not allow the failure review board to ascertain solid motor failure as
the cause, although such failures were one of the possible causes. These
flights did reinforce the frequently stated need for limited diagnostic
motor instrumentation on upper stage and apogee motors.
The FW-4 and TE-364 motors were designed, developed, and qualified
on fully funded Air Force and NASA programs, so their documentation was
found reasonably complete and available from the Defense Documentation
Center and NASA's Scientific and Technical Information Facility. The
JPL library was also of significant value for reports on these and re-
lated motors.
7
For the SVM-1, SVM-2, and TE-521 motors, the motor and spacecraft
contractors contributed most of the documentation in very evident co-
operation in the literature review phase of this study.
A complete set of documents was not available for any one of the
motors, but design and program similarities were sufficient for the com-
parisons being made. The kinds of documents obtained and reviewed are
shown in the following list:
* General reliability
* Materials research
* Propellant research
* Motor DDT&E
* Launch failures
8
Where some future program is dependent entirely on private funding,
there should be an opportunity for a spacecraft user to specify an
exemplary minimum document package that contains only test data and com-
mits the seller to use of his previously documented manufacturing and
quality maintenance practices.
The submitted failure modes and effects and analyses (FMEA) are
questionable in their conveyed reassurances in some instances. Uniform
emphasis is not given to equally likely failure causes, and the FMEAs
reflect each contractor's individual experience. A possible solution
to this documentation problem is offered subsequently in a generalized
failure modes and reactions tabulation that has lasting value as a check-
list of precautions that have or can be taken from initial design through
delivery.
The five selected motor programs were based on some earlier motor
developments, and these earlier programs were included to fully develop
the technology, design, and manufacture evolution. The TW-479 was
itstretched" to the TE-521 design; the FW-3 was "shortened" to the FW-4;
and the TE-360/364 Surveyor has gone through several modifications in-
cluding the TE-364-3, as examples.
9
* Delivery schedules (except for first inert motor or mockup)
are not tight.
* Case materials
* Grain configurations
10
Table 2
Design, Development,
and Qualification
Number Number Use of Flightweight Designs
Start of of First Latest Number Number Number
Motor Designations Date Months Firings Flight Flight Made Tested Flown Notes on Flights and Status
Aerojet
SVM1-1 (HS-303A)* 8/65 9 18 10/66 9/67 31 24 4 INTELSAT II S/C; 1 failure due to S/C
temp. excursion below spec. limits set
for motor; 3 successes since heaters
added to S/C
SVM-2* 2/67 12 20 9/68 7/70 28 20 8 INTELSAT III S/C; 1 failure with mode
not authenticated-motor anomaly implied;
2 no-test; 5 successes
SVM-4/4A 2/69 18 12 2/71 6/72 22 14 4 SVM-4 "stretched" to SVM-4A after 3 de-
velopment tests; INTELSAT IV S/C
4 successes
SVI -5 5/71 under- 7 3 -- Qualification to be completed 11/72;
way SMS S/C
JPL
JPL-SR-28-1/3 1/63 44 35 12/66 8/69 53 35 4 ATS S/C - B through E; 3 successes;
1 no-test; -3 titanium flight version;
-1 steel development testing
Thiokol
TE-M-479 5/66 9 6 7/68 -- 10 6 1 RAE S/C; 1 success
TE-M-521* 5/67 12 5 11/69 2/71 11 5 9 Skynet I S/C; 1 failure with mode not
authenticated-motor anomaly implied;
3 successes
TE-M-521-5 2/72 under- 2 -- -- 3 2 -- "Beefed-up" version of TE-521 for IMP-H
way and -J S/C
TE-I-616 6/72 under- 5 -- -- -- -- -- New program; ABM for CTS S/C
way
TE-M-360/364; 4/61 39 50 6/66 1/68 65 50 7 Surveyor S/C retro; 1 signal lost at
364-1 tailoff, 5 successes, 1 no-test
TE-N-364-3/2* 6/65 12 12 9/66 2/71 43 12 24 Upper stage Delta__--3 vehicles and
Burner II stage; 1 failure with mode not
authenticated, 22 successes; 1 no-test
TE-M-364-4 3/68 39 11 3/72 11 1 Upper stage Delta---4 vehicles; 1 success
United Technology
FI-3 11/62 8 2 -- -- -- Predecessor to FIV-4
FW-4 (SR57-UT-1)* 5/64 9 17 5/65 6/72 88 17 62 Scout and Delta upper stage; 1 failure
due to nozzle throat insert; 44 successes
since nozzle design change
FW -5 11/70 22 9 -- -- 13 -- Qualification to be completed 9/22;
first flight is 11/72 with TELESAT S/C
11
ABBREVIATIONS FOR TABLE 3
FRP Filament-ReinforcedPlastic
CTPB Carboxy-TerminatedPolybutadiene
PU Polyurethane
A-S-BN Asbestos-Silica-Buna-NRubber
PIP Polyisoprene
12
Table 3
SVMI-l(HS-303A)* 16.2 2,906 3,240 Neut. 465 193 27 18.0 15.9 FWG
SVM-2* 27.6 3,140 4,830 Regr. 509 350 41 22.3 35.0
SVM-4/4A 33.8 12,480 15,150 Regr. 929 1,557 123 36.7 60.3
SVM-5 37.3 5,060 7,230 Prog. 760 705 55 30.0 35.5
JPL
Thiokol
TE-M-479 18.6 2,380 2,775 Prog. 1,000 175 18 17.4 Sphere Titanium
TE-M-521* 19.1 3,720 4,470 850 273 24 38.6
TE-M-521-5 1 I I I I 275 25 3
TE-M-616 34.8 5,996 7,277 Neut. 590 800 59 27.3 48.7
TE-M-364 41.0 8,376 9,500 Prog. 570 1,315 138 37.0 Sphere D6AC
TE-M-364-1 40.2 8,930 10,000 Neut. 561 1,339 138
TE-M-364-3/2* 41.6 9,983 10,500 650 1,580 138
TE-M-364-4 42.7 15,100 16,870 707 2,465 168 68 Titanium
United Technology
JPL
Thiokol
TE-M-479 1.5 61 G-90 -15% 2-Pyro Aft Titanium 8-Pt Star CTPB 86 Premolded PIP
S/Boots
TE-M-521* 2.6 58 Slight
TE-M-521-5 I II
TE-M-616 2.1 42 Slight 1-Pyro Fore 88
TE-M-364 9.0 53 - 40% Al 86 A-S-Bn
TE-Ml-364-1 8.5 53 Al
TE-h-364-3/2 8.5 53 Titanium
TE-M-364-4 14.5 31 1 PIP
United Technology
FW-3 6.7 30 ATJ Slight Rocket Fore Steel Cylindrical PBAN 83.5 Premolded S-BN
w/Transverse
slot
FW-4(SR-57-UT-1)* 4.1 53 G-90 ITrA 84.5
FW-5 3.8 60 I Steel Cylindrical
13
- Day 1--SRI/JPL joint visit. Discussions with plant manage-
ment, reliability chief, motor program manager, chief design
engineer, quality assurance manager, and production manager.
Obtain contractor comments, reactions, additions, and modifi-
cations to audit scope. Plant tour.
* Motor design
- Igniter-case-adhesiveheat flow
* Motor manufacture
-Zone cure
- Pressure cure
14
- Mandrel installation and removal
- Availability of polymers
- Motor installation
- Igniter installation
- Motor instrumentation
* Motor characteristics
* Formulate
15
* Build motors
* Test
* Qualify
* Use.
* Spacecraft-imposed limitations
- Envelope dimensions
- Attach fittings
- Center of gravity
- Spin balance
- Initiator installations
- Magnetic properties
* Performance constraints
- Total impulse
- Thrust-time envelope
- Impulse adjustability
16
- Reproducibility
- Development schedule
- Development cost
- Delivery schedule
- Delivery cost
- Midprogram changes
* Environment
- Air shipment
- Rail/truck shipment
- Storage temperatures
- Storage life
* Propellant ingredients
- Ammonium perchlorate
- Aluminum powder
- Polymer
- Crosslinker
- Cure catalyst
- Plasticizer
- Processing aids
- Silica
17
- Carbon black
- Process solvents
- Cleaning solvents
- Glass filament
- Glass fabric
- Glass tape
- Molding compound
- Fiberglass case
- Molded insulation
- Sheet insulation
- Nozzle insert
· Igniter fabrication
- Safe/arm
- Initiator
· Motor assembly
- "0" rings
- Sealant
- Adhesive
- Nozzle closure.
* Inerts preparation
- Insulation molding
18
- Insulation application
- Filament winding
- Composite build-up
- Case manufacture
- Nozzle manufacture
- Case preparation
- Insulation bonding
- Liner preparation
- Liner application
- Propellant preparation
- Motor loading
- Propellant curing
- Mandrel removal
- Propellant trimming
- Motor balancing
- Nozzle alignment
* Quality assurance
- Inspection stations
- Chemical laboratory
- Packing
19
Comparisons to be Sought on the Selected Motors
* History
- Motor lineage
- Failure modes
* Manufacturing
- Extent of subcontracting
- Vendors
* Materials selection
- Elastomeric insulation
- Hard insulation
- Nozzle inserts
- Seals
- Propellant ingredients
- Liner ingredients
* Design
Audit Findings
20
The observed conditions of design, manufacture and inspection in
this 1972 audit represent real progress over the informal, but similar,
audit by the principal investigator in 1965-66, the era of inception of
most of the motors of current interest.
21,
* Minimum diagnostic instrumentation is needed on every upper
stage and apogee motor to supply data that can be used in
corrective actions to determine if the motor is the cause
of the spacecraft or vehicle failure.
22
The following tabulation (Table 4) of failure modes and reactions
includes only actual failures, failure causes, and corrective actions
that have been taken to prevent reoccurrence. These failures have been
observed at one or more levels of inspection and test from incoming
receipt through motor operation. The table does not include failures
that have been identified with environmental exposures or excursions
beyond those allowed for in the design ("Ex-Design") of the motors. It
does not attempt to attenuate the first effects of the failures by
estimating the final effects in terms of mission degradation or total
loss.
In this generalized form, many motor and component tests have been
reduced to a checklist for motor designers and manufacturers.
23
Table 4 Key
REACTIONS-INSPECTION 1 Chemical
2 Metallurgical
3 Tensile
4 Ultrasonic
5 Dye penetrant
6 Radiographic
7 Hydroproof
8 Bond strength
9 Dimensional
10 Visual
11 Ballistic
12 Batch formulation
13 On-site vendor surveillance
14 Materials certification
24
APOGEE AND UPPER STAGE SOLID ROCKET MOTOR FAILURE MODES AND REACTIONS
First Reactions
Failure Mode Agent Effect Design Process Inspection
Case, Titanium
Rupture 1. Wrong alloy, defective forging, defec- 1 3 4,5,6,7 7,9,10 2,3,4,5,6,
tive weld, improper heat treat, wrong 7,9,10,13,14
dimension
Structural failure of
nozzle or igniter boss 1,2 6
Skirt structural 4 6
failure
Case buckling 2,3,4 8
Case, Filament-Wound
Rupture 5. Wrong filament or resin composition or 1 3 1,2,3,4 1,2,4,6 1,3,4,6,7,
ratio; irregular filament indexing, 5,6,7,10 7,8,9,10 8,9,10,13,14
tension, or number of turns; curing
errors; moisture pickup by filament;
over-age resin formulation; poor bonds
at component interfaces
Case buckling 2,3,4 8
Structural failure of As in 5 above plus wrong alloy, defective 1,2 6 As above
nozzle or igniter boss forging, improper heat treat, wrong plus 2,5
dimension
Skirt structural
failure
Insulation, Case
I 4 6 l
Fracture, tear or 9. Wrong formulation; wrong lay up; 1,2,5 2 1,2,3,4 1,2,4,5,6, 1,3,4,8,9,
delaminate wrong cure or solvent removal cycle; 5,6,7 7,8,9,10 10,12,13,14
ozone, ultraviolet, or humidity ex-
posure; over-age formulations; wrong
surfaces preparation; wrong dimension;
wrong mold temperature distribution;
inadequate mold release
Excessive erosion or 2,3 4
heat transfer
Separation from case As in 9 above plus wrong case surface 1,2,5 2 As above
preparation plus 10
Fracture, tear, or 12. As in 9 above plus incomplete release 1,2,5 1 1,2,3,4, 1,2,4,5,6, 1,3,6,8,9,
delaminate from insulation and inadequate hinge 6,7,8 7,8,9,10 10,13,14
joint
Liner
Propellant Grain
Fracture 16. Wrong formulation, ingredient purity, 1,2,5 2,3,4,5, 2,5,6,7 1,3,6,9,10,
or form; overexposure to atmosphere; 6,7,8 8,10 11,12,14
over-age ingredients; mix, cast, and
cure cycle errors
Excessive shrinkage
Nonhomogeneity 1,2
25
Table 4 (Concluded)
First Reactions
Failure Mode Causes Agent Effect Design Process Inspection
Nozzle Throat
(Free-standing graphite)
Igniter
Main charge is analogous to a rocket motor and has the same subsystem and component failure modes and reactions PLUS
Abnormal pyrotechnic Wrong formulation and/or granulation, 1 9 or 10 2,3,6, 2,3,5,7, 9,10,11,
energy release wrong charge weight, overexposure to
7,11, 9,10 13,14
atmosphere, wrong charge consolidation
or packing geometry
Abnormal squib energy
release I 6,11,14
26
RECOMMENDATIONS
Aft-End Problems
27
This technique can cause cumulative damage and subsequent bond failure
if the motor designer is not forewarned of the test temperature extreme
and the maximum number of times the motor may be put through this cycle
for the several radiographic inspections that occur before flight.
None of the specific flights selected for this study carried direct
measurement capability for the solid rocket motors. The literature review
identified a few flights with the solid motor instrumented for external
temperatures, but no flights since 1965 that carried chamber pressure
measurement capability.
When the solid motor was the most reliable of the launch subsystems
and the limited number of telemetry channels were assigned on a priority
basis to diagnose otherareas of launch vehicle performance, it was per-
haps necessary to forego instrumentation of the solid motor. Subsequently,
it appears that solid rocket motor diagnostic measurement has been avoided
as an economy measure. The elimination of strain gauge installation re-
duces cost, and the elimination of the postflight data reduction makes a
more significant reduction; most vehicles now carry spare telemetry chan-
nels. In one instance the spacecraft designer eliminated a planned motor
strain gauge because of physical interference with an adjacent structural
component.
28
The rocket motor contractors have frequently expressed their desire
for flight diagnostic measurements from their motors to no avail, with
resultant compounding of the speculations of failure review boards.
Margin Testing
29
design requirements are adjusted upward in characteristics or dimension
by a design margin. In some instances such as motor cases, a test such
as hydroproof or hydroburst can establish the veracity of the margin and
integrity of the design of the component or subsystem. Seldom, if ever,
is it possible to demonstrate that a complete motor can perform to the
calculated limits in every respect.
The test plan can be developed at low cost, and its preparation is
underway. The cost of the actual testing and the testing schedule are
yet to be estimated.
The cost and schedule for this endeavor should approximate the sim-
ilar efforts at Lewis--somewhat less than one man-year expended during a
two year period to allow review and comment on drafts of the material
submitted.
30
Elastomeric Chamber Insulation
31
Next in sequence of implementation are two recommendations (Items 7
and 8) that are significant in cost and not likely to yield significant
improvement in reliability. A better case could be made for support of
Item 8 if the weight improvement of the new safe/arm could be used in
enhancing motor design margins relating to reliability.
Although the specific flights selected for this study had no failures
attributable to the igniter function, development work on NDT techniques
for assembled igniters will improve confidence in their reliability. Al-
ternatively, advantage might be taken of the limited performance life of
igniters, and their design might use transparent materials that allow
easier inspection.
32
The last two recommendations (Items 9 and 10) require moderate in-
vestment of cost and time for each new motor and new motor application.
The expected reliability improvement is in the avoidance of future fail-
ures resulting from unanticipated thermal gradients in the motor or mis-
match of tolerances between the motor and other spacecraft elements as
a result of motor pressurization or thermal growth during operation.
Proposals for new upper stage and apogee motors in some cases obtain
an increase in total impulse by adding a cylinder of uniform cross section
of motor case and propellant to the spherical or £/d < 1 design. It does
not appear in each instance that such designs can be straightforward ex-
trapolation because of end effects and differences in motor case wall
thicknesses. Therefore, sufficient new thermal and stress analyses should
be performed in these instances to ensure an adequate design.
33
APOGEE BOOST AND UPPER STAGE MOTOR USE
The 1975-80 use is less firm and is based on the combined projections
of several participants in this study with modification by recent announce-
ments in aerospace periodicals. The 1980-90 projections can only be con-
sidered as approximations because of the undeterminable impact of the
space shuttle program. They are given here to illustrate the durability
of demand for ABMs weighing about 1000 pounds and upper stage motors of
TE-364-4 size.
34
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35
BIBLIOGRAPHY
"Design, Test, and Documentation of the MARC 36A1, 1-KS-75 Spin Motor
for the Scout Vehicles," NASA CR-359, Contract No. NASI-3899 Task
18, Atlantic Research Corp., Alexandria, Virginia, N66-14156.
36
Dormal, A. F., "Thermal and Dynamic Investigation of the Hughes ATS
Spacecraft and Apogee Motor System at Simulated High Altitude (S/S
Synchronous Spacecraft Thermal Model S/N T-4)," AEDC-TR-66-170, Large
Rocket Facility, Arnold Engineering Development Center, Arnold Air
Force Station, Tennessee (October 1966), AD 800083.
"Failure Modes & Effects Analysis for Hughes Apogee HS 303A Rocket Motor,"
Report 8606-01-FM-1, Aerojet Solid Propulsion Co., Sacramento, Cali-
fornia (8 March 1966).
"Failure Mode and Effects Analysis on the TRW Apogee Motor (SVM-2),"
Enclosure 1, Aerojet Solid Propulsion Co., Sacramento, California.
"ISIS-A, Delta-65, Final Flight Report," TMX 64022, John F. Kennedy Space
Center, NASA, Unmanned Launch Operations, Lompoc, California
(14 August 1969),,X70-10908.
"Motor Log Book, QA/D Motor 24, TRW Apogee, Intelsat III," WO 2427-01,
Aerojet-General Corp., Sacramento, California.
Nagy, J. A., "Flight Performance Data from the Scout X-258 Rocket Motor,"
NASA TN D-2756, Goddard Space Flight Center, NASA, Greenbelt,
Maryland (May 1965), N65-23160.
38
"Scout Standard 5th Stage BE-3-A9 Rocket Motor Propulsion Unit Program,"
Final Report, CR-66773, Contract NASI-7102, Hercules Inc., Bacchus
Works, Magna, Utah, N69-26436.
"Test Firing and Failure Analysis Report For Hughes HS-303A Apogee Motor
A-26," Report 4731-01A-26, Aerojet-General Corporation, Sacramento,
California (14 December 1966).
39
Wood, J. F., Jr., and J. M. Pelton, "X258 Development Program Final
Report," ABL/R-57, Hercules Inc., Cumberland, Maryland (July 1965)
AD 470130.
40
B. Related Technology Developments
41
Hightower, J. 0. and J. D. Byrd, "Application and Improvement of Low
Pressure Molding and Low Temperature Curing Asbestos Filled Poly-
isoprene Insulation," Thiokol Chemical Corporation, Huntsville,
Alabama.
"Solid Rocket Motor Igniters, NASA Space Vehicle Design Criteria (Chemical
Propulsion)," NASA SP-8051 (March 1971), N71-30346.
42
Strand, Leon D., Low-Acceleration Solid Propellant Rocket Ignition
Study," Contract No. NAS 7-100, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena,
California.
"Transient Loads from Thrust Excitation, NASA Space Vehicle Design Criteria
(Structures)," NASA SP-8030 (February 1969), N71-24281.
43
C. Reliability Studies
44
"Qualification Testing," NASA Space Vehicle Design Criteria (Structures),
NASA SP-8044 (May 1970),N71-29045.
45
Appendix
46
inventory of unused and "space" motors might allow designation of some
for periods beyond that time. A more expensive alternative is to make
the additional investment for extra motors in each new motor program.
Since the spacecraft contractors have a justified parochial and rela-
tively short term interest, the government users should consider making
this investment early in the new motor development and qualification
programs.
Since space motor grain designs and the space launch environment do
not demand the ultimate in physical properties and there is no current
effort to extract higher ballistic performance from the solid propellant,
it is an opportune time to give attention to formulation changes that
would result in a lowered sensitivity to cure cycle conditions to reduce
the possibility of grain failures from physical properties outside of
the designed for range.
47
In-House House Materials and Fabrication
48
This recommendation was abandoned when it became apparent in the
discussions and audits that the participating motor contractors exercised
close control of subcontracting vendors and made decisions on the amount
of subcontracting on the basis of economics, rather than reliability.
49