BLD EDUCATIONAL DIGESTS IN BQA FORMAT

#SAMPLELANGITO

POSSIBLE BAR QUESTIONS BASED ON ENBANC DECISIONS PENNED BY J. HERNANDO

(We call this BLD EDUCATIONAL DIGESTS IN BQA FORMAT)

This is the activity for August 30 to September 13, 2023. Check your online account in
barlawrefreshers.teachable.com, and strictly follow the program structure. Do not jump from one activity
to another, and never mix the program with other method of review. The program is designed to increase
your level from 1 to 10, so do not break the structure.

TITLE OF THE CASE

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 196199. December 07, 2021]
MANILA INTERNATIONAL PORTS TERMINAL, INC.,1 PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. No. 196252]
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. MANILA INTERNATIONAL PORTS TERMINAL,
INC., RESPONDENT.
DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

FOCUS OF CONCENTRATION

POLITICAL LAW, CIVIL LAW, TAXATION LAW AND REMEDIAL LAW

These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assail the September 22, 2010 Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80775 and its March 16, 2011 Resolution, that affirmed with
modification the April 30, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 15, in Civil
Case No. 86-37673, and denied the motion for reconsideration thereof, respectively. The RTC found the
revocation of Manila International Port Terminal, Inc.'s (MIPTI) franchise to operate the Manila
International Port Terminal Complex (MIPTC), among others, unconstitutional.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the September 22, 2010 Decision and the March 16, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80775 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION:
1) DECLARING Executive Order No. 30, issued on July 19, 1986, UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
2) DECLARING the takeover by Philippine Ports Authority of the properties of the Manila International
Ports Terminal, Inc. ILLEGAL;
3) ORDERING Philippine Ports Authority and its incumbent general manager:
a. To pay Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc. nominal damages of P1,000,000.00; and
b. To pay Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc. exemplary damages of P200,000.00 and attorney's
fees of P500,000.00 plus costs of suit; and
4) ORDERING Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc. to return the amount of P15,646,933.27,
representing the excess rentals, to Philippine Ports Authority.
The amounts due shall be subject to a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this
Decision until fully paid.

FACTS OF THE CASE

1. Defendant-Appellant Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is a government corporation created

under Presidential Decree No. 857, vested with authority, control and supervision over the
Manila International Port Terminal Complex (MIPTC) at North and South Harbors in Tondo,
Manila. Plaintiff-Appellee Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc. (MIPTI) is a private
domestic corporation engaged in port-related services.

2. On 06 January 1975, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree

No. 634 granting MIPTI a franchise to construct, operate and maintain modern container
terminals, bonded warehouses, storage depots, cold and refrigerated storage, cargo and transit
sheds, conveyor piers, docks, landing and berthing facilities, access roads, bridges, seawalls,
bulkheads and filling at North Harbor.

3. Then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) No. 30 revoking MIPTI's
franchise due to substantial violations of the MOA.
 a. Consequently, PPA sent a letter to MIPTI informing it of its plan to take over its business
and properties.

4. On 20 July 1986, PPA issued a permit to Metrostar Port and Allied Services, Inc.
(Metrostar), to render cargo-handling and other port-related services at North Harbor for a period
of one (1) year.

5. On 21 July 1986, PPA actually took over MIPTI's operations at the MIPTC and seized its
equipment. PPA thereafter placed Metrostar in control of the port operations at North Harbor and
in possession of the seized properties.

6. On 14 August 1986, PPA sent a letter to MIPTI's President informing him that it was
exercising its right to purchase the seized properties at book value pursuant to AO No. 10-81.
However, MIPTI refused the offer on the ground that the price was iniquitous. Thereafter, a
guarantee fund deposit was established in MIPTI's favor to secure the rental payments for the
use of the seized properties.

7. On 23 September 1986, MIPTI filed a civil action for damages against PPA, general
manager Solis and Metrostar before the RTC of Manila.

a. MIPTI alleged that PPA violated its rights to due process of law and non-impairment of
contract when it recommended the revocation of its franchise without first conducting an
investigation or inquiry on the alleged complaints of port users as well as its alleged contract
violations that since its franchise was a property right, there should be a notice and hearing
before the same could be suspended or revoked; and that PPA's transfer of the cargo-handling
operation to Metrostar and the latter's continued use of its seized properties were illegal.

b. For its part, PPA maintained that the cancellation of MIPTI's franchise was valid
because of services breach of its contractual undertaking which is detrimental to the
efficient operations at the MIPTC;

i. that it had the absolute right to take over the cargo-handling operations at the MIPTI in
the event of violation of the MOA's provisions;

ii. that, in recommending the cancellation of the franchise, it only protected

the interest of the public as being the State's agent in regulating port-
related services at the port areas;

iii. that it was not required to hold an investigation before recommending the
cancellation of the franchise as either Presidential Decree No. 1284 or the
MOA did not provide for it;

iv. that it did not arbitrarily take over MIPTI's business as it had the sole
control and authority over the MIPTC and the transfer of the cargo-
handling operations to Metrostar was only incidental to its regulatory
power; and

v. that it did not violate MIPTI's right to non-impairment of contract

considering that the franchise was always subject to revocation when
necessity demands.

8. Meanwhile, on 20 July 1987, Metrostar's permit to render port services expired. PPA
opted not to renew the permit and Metrostar subsequently ceased its operations.

a. Thereafter, MIPTI moved to drop Metrostar as party-defendant in the case on the ground
of the latter's non-existence and that PPA has no objections thereto.
 b. Incidentally, PCGG also filed an action for intervention claiming that MIPTI is under
sequestration proceedings, but later withdrew the same.

9. On 19 May 1988, a new contract was executed between PPA and International Container
Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) for the management, operation and development of the MIPTC at
North Harbor.

a. On 12 June 1988, ICTSI took over the custody and operation of the machineries and
equipment belonging to MIPTI; and on 17 July 1990, ICTSI deposited Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000.00) in favor of MIPTI representing rental payments for the use of MIPTI's properties.

10. On 13 July 1992, PPA filed a third-party complaint against ICTSI before the RTC praying
for reimbursement from the latter in the event the former is adjudged liable to MIPTI.

a. In response, ICTSI filed an answer on 13 November 1992, arguing that it is only

liable for the rental payments of the properties ceded to it by PPA which it had
actually used or rehabilitated, and that there was no privity of contract between it
and MIPTI to warrant the payment of the latter's claims.

11. MIPTI and PPA presented their documentary evidence in support of their respective
claims and defenses. After the principal parties' presentation of evidence, on 18 June 1997,
PPA and ICTSI jointly moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that they
had already executed a compromise agreement, which the trial court granted on 06 August
1997.

POSSIBLE BAR QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

(POLITICAL LAW QUESTION)

Can a franchise, once granted, be revoked by Congress? Yes.
In our jurisdiction, a franchise is broadly defined as a special privilege that is not demandable as a matter
of right, and when granted, is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress.
Broadly speaking, "a franchise is defined to be a special privilege to do certain things conferred by
government on an individual or corporation, and which does not belong to citizens generally of common
right." Insofar as the great powers of government are concerned, "[a] franchise is basically a legislative
grant of a special privilege to a person."
A "franchise [as] the privilege granted by the State through its legislative body x x x subject to regulation
by the State itself by virtue of its police power through its administrative agencies." On this score, Section
11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution further states that "for the operation of a public utility," no "such
franchise or right [shall] be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires."

Is (the grant of) franchise a property right? YES.

While a franchise is still characterized as a special privilege in the sense that the grant thereof is not a
demandable right, and that when granted, is subject to the amendment, alteration or repeal by
Congress, we have come to recognize franchise as a property right that cannot be revoked or forfeited
without due process of law.

(REMEDIAL LAW QUESTION – QUO WARRANTO)

Can a private individual collaterally attack a franchise? NO.
In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. National Telecommunications Commission, we did not allow a
collateral attack on a franchise since "[a] franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited
without due process of law:"
More importantly, PLDT's allegation partakes of a collateral attack on a franchise (Rep. Act No. 2090),
which is not allowed. A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due
process of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy
such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo
warranto, the right to assert which, as a rule, belongs to the State "upon complaint or otherwise"
(Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court), the reason being that the abuse of a franchise is a public
wrong and not a private injury. A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding
for the purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful exercise is
primarily a concern of Government.

May the court intervene with exercise of legislative prerogative (the granting / revocation of
franchise)? Generally, NO.
The grant of franchise is broad and plenary, and even courts do not ordinarily interfere with the exercise
of legislative prerogatives, this is not the case when there is a "a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and
unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative:"
On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless
evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early
where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative
prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire
into the wisdom of the law.

(POLITICAL LAW QUESTION)

What do you mean by due process of law?
The guaranty of due process of law is a constitutional safeguard against any arbitrariness on the part of
the Government, whether committed by the Legislature, the Executive, or the Judiciary. It is a protection
essential to every inhabitant of the country, for, as a commentator on Constitutional Law has vividly
written:
x x x If the law itself unreasonably deprives a person of his life, liberty, or property, he is denied the
protection of due process. If the enjoyment of his rights is conditioned on an unreasonable requirement,
due process is likewise violated. Whatsoever be the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or
merely a statute, its unjustified withholding would also be a violation of due process. Any government act
that militates against the ordinary norms of justice or fair play is considered an infraction of the great
guaranty of due process; and this is true whether the denial involves violation merely of the procedure
prescribed by the law or affects the very validity of the law itself.

What are the two components of due process?

There are two components of due process. The first, procedural due process, (due notice and opportunity
to be heard) pertains to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life,
liberty, or property; the second, substantive due process, to the justification for the denial or restriction
on life, liberty, or property.
While due process has no exact definition, the standard in determining whether a person was accorded
due process is whether the restriction on the person's life, liberty, or property is consistent with fairness,
reason, and justice, and free from caprice and arbitrariness.
This standard applies both to procedural and substantive due process. As applied to procedural due
process, the question to be asked is whether the person was given sufficient notice and opportunity to
be heard. On the other hand, as applied to substantive due process, the question is whether such
deprivation or restriction is necessary and fair to the affected parties.

Is publication of a legislative act (law) a necessary component of procedural due process? YES.
Publication is a necessary component of procedural due process to give as wide publicity as possible so
that all persons having an interest in the proceedings may be notified thereof. The requirement of
publication is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. It is imperative for it will be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgressions of a law or rule of which
he had no notice whatsoever.

In 1986, an EO 30 was issued by Pres. Aquino revoking MIPTI’s franchise to operate the South and
North Harbor (MICT) in Tondo, Manila. Thereafter, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) took over
the business operations, facilities and equipment of MIPTI, and in 1988, awarded to ICTSI the
contract for development, management and operation of the Manila International Container
Terminal (MICT). Later in 2003, the EO was declared unconstitutional. Should the effects of EO 30
be left undisturbed and respected since the law was in effect before it was declared
unconstitutional by the Regional Trial Court?
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection;
it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. An exception to the above rule,
however, is the doctrine of operative fact, which applies as a matter of equity and fair play. This
doctrine nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law or an executive act by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences that cannot always be ignored. It applies when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the
operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the
unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of
equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the
unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.
Moreover, as was pointed out in Araullo v. Aquino, the use of said doctrine "must be subjected to great
scrutiny and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or executive
act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to cases where extraordinary
circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the stringent conditions
that will permit its application."
In fine, We cannot sustain the validity of the acts committed prior to the declaration of EO 30's
unconstitutionality under the operative fact doctrine. It must be stressed that PD 634 and the MOA
expressly mandated the PPA to conduct an investigation and to properly show violations on the part of
MIPTI prior to making any recommendation to suspend or revoke MIPTI's franchise. Thus, PPA's
transgressions could not be solely anchored on EO 30.
In any event, the nullification of EO 30 will not result in injustice. There was no showing that reliance to
EO 30 had greatly prejudiced PPA. PPA's unlawful takeover thus entitles MIPTI to damages, which PPA
has to pay as legal consequences of its unlawful act. Moreover, neither were third parties affected by their
reliance on EO 30 revoking MIPTI's franchise. It will be recalled that both Metrostar and ICTSI had
eventually settled the cases filed against them.

(TAXATION LAW QUESTION – CAPITAL ASSET)

After the franchise of MIPTI had been revoked by EO 30 in 1986, the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA), took over the business operations, facilities and equipment of MIPTI, and awarded to
Metrostar and then to ICTSI the contract for development, management and operation of the
Manila International Container Terminal (MICT). From the time of the taking up to the 1992,
MIPTI received rentals for the use of the equipment and properties amounting to P35,000,000
from PPA, Metrostar and ICTSI. In the case for damages filed by MIPTI, the lower court awarded
P180,000,000 as compensatory damages based on the certification prepared by the officials of
MIPTI.
The CA, on appeal, found this amount bloated and was self-serving because it was merely based on
the certifications prepared by the officers of MIPTI. The CA opined that the best evidence should
be MIPTI's financial statement which took into account the properties' depreciation. What do you
mean by Depreciated Replacement Cost?
Depreciation should be factored in the determination of the replacement cost. In Republic v. Mupas, the
Court explained the depreciated replacement cost method employed in appraising a property, thus:
Depreciated replacement cost approach is the "method of valuation which provides the current cost of
replacing an asset with its modern equivalent asset less deductions for all physical deterioration and all
relevant forms of obsolescence and optimisation." Depreciated replacement cost is a method of appraising
assets that are usually not exposed to the open market. A general formula of this method is as follows:
Cost of constructing the building (s) (including fees)
Plus: Cost of the land (including fees)
= Total Costs
Less: Allowance for age and depreciation
= Depreciated Replacement Cost
Under this method, the appraiser assesses the current gross replacement of the assets, usually comprised
of the land and the building. If the asset is an improvement, the appraiser assesses the cost of its
replacement with a modern equivalent and deducts depreciation to reflect the differences between the
hypothetical modern equivalent and the actual asset. The appraiser has to "establish the size and
specification that the hypothetical buyer ideally requires at the date of valuation in order to provide the
same level of productive output or an equivalent service."

Is the CA correct in adopting the MIPTI’s own valuation of its properties (MIPTI’s financial
statement), which took into consideration the depreciation factor, in arriving at the replacement
cost?
YES. In this case, the CA adopted MIPTI's own valuation of its properties, which took into consideration
the amount of depreciation, in arriving at the replacement cost. Based on MIPTI's financial statement as
of December 31, 1986, the net value of its properties was pegged at P20,000,000.

(CIVIL LAW QUESTION – DAMAGES)

Thereafter, the CA, on appeal, awarded compensatory damages amounting to P20,000,000
representing the value of the assets of MIPTI. Is the CA correct?
NO. While the CA correctly determined the value of the properties to be P20,000,000, any rental payment
previously received by MIPTI should be deducted therefrom. This is because affixing the payment of fair
compensation as of the date of taking creates the legal fiction that MIPTI lost ownership over the seized
equipment as of such date. Not being the owner thereof, MIPTI would not be entitled to any form of
rentals for the use of the equipment in the interim.
Since the total amount of rentals (P35,000,000) exceeds P20,000,000 by P15,000,000, it follows
that the CA's award of P20,000,000 should be deleted. Further, as an equitable relief, MIPTI should
return the excess to the government through PPA. (HAHAHAHA abono pa)
After MIPTI unconstitutionally lost its franchise in 1986 by virtue of EO 30, it sued PPA for the
loss of unrealized profits from 1986 (the time of taking) to 2003 (the year where the 25-year
franchise supposed to end). What are the two kinds of actual and compensatory damages?
Under Articles 2199 and 2200 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in
satisfaction of or in recompense for loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice
and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory
damages:
(1) one is the loss of what a person already possesses, and
(2) the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him.
In the latter instance, the familiar rule is that damages consisting of unrealized profits, frequently referred
to as "ganacias frustradas" or "lucrum cessans," are not to be granted on the basis of mere speculation,
conjecture, or surmise, but rather by reference to some reasonably definite standard such as market
value, established experience, or direct inference from known circumstances.

The RTC, as affirmed by CA, ordered PPA to pay MIPTI unrealized profits after it determined that
the latter was unable to operate and earn income from its operations due to the unlawful takeover.
Are the two courts correct?
NO, they are wrong because the takeover was ordered by President Aquino and it was not undertaken by
PPA on its own authority. Given that the validity of EO 30 is presumed, PPA cannot be faulted for merely
enforcing it. Thus, it cannot be held liable for the profits MIPTI failed to obtain by reason of the said
enforcement.
Further, the RTC and the CA seem to have overlooked the fact that the property primarily involved in this
case is a franchise – not an ordinary contract – which may be repealed by Congress when public interest
so requires. This constitutional limitation negates MIPTI's expectation of profits to be earned in the future
considering that its franchise may be taken away by Congress even before its agreed-upon expiration.
Thus, while unrealized profits as part of actual or compensatory damages may normally be awarded to a
person for "failure to receive as benefit that which would have pertained to him [or her]," this does not
apply when the source of benefit is a franchise which continued subsistence is not guaranteed.
As We noted in a prior case, there can be no such thing as a vested right to expectation of future profits
which can be gained from possession of a franchise.
Concededly, the award of unrealized profits is not only anchored on the revocation of MIPTI's franchise,
but also on the seizure of MIPTI's private properties. However, there is no direct causation between
the ownership of such private properties and the receipt of future profits; the source of MIPTI's
profits is its services as a franchisee, not its ownership of the properties per se. This is highlighted by the
fact that the CA's award of unrealized profits is based on MIPTI's previous profits as franchisee or
operator in MIPTC, and is further based on the remaining duration of the franchise, i.e., until its
supposed expiration on January 16, 2003. Without direct causation, it cannot be concluded that MIPTI
would have in fact continued to earn profits had its properties not been seized by PPA.

In 1975, PD 634 as amended by PD 1284 was signed by then President Marcos, granted MIPTI a 25-
year franchise. In 1980, a MOA was then executed by PPA and MIPTI providing for the rules in the
operation and management of the MIPTC at North Harbor as well as detailing the rights and
obligations of the parties under the franchise. However, the franchise was revoked by EO 30 as
issued by then Pres. Corazon Aquino in 1986.
The said EO was declared unconstitutional because it violated the due process clause particularly
for lack of investigation whether MIPTI had violated any provisions in PD 1284, or any stipulations
in the MOA. On the day of the issuance of the EO, the PPA took over the business of MIPTI and all
equipment and properties of the latter were seized. Is MIPTI entitled to nominal damages?
As previously discussed, there was a violation of MIPTI's rights under Section 4(c) of PD 1284 and Section
14.01 of the MOA. This entitles MIPTI to nominal damages pursuant to Article 2221 of the Civil Code.
Indeed, nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the plaintiff
for any loss suffered by [the plaintiff]. Its award is thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss
but for the recognition and vindication of a right. Indeed, nominal damages are damages in name only
and not in fact. When granted by the courts, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but
simply a recognition of the existence of a technical injury. A violation of the plaintiff's right, even if only
technical, is sufficient to support an award of nominal damages. Conversely, so long as there is a showing
of a violation of the right of the plaintiff, an award of nominal damages is proper.
Given the value of the properties in this case, amounting to millions of pesos, We find the amount of
P1,000,000.00 to be reasonable.

In the awarding of damages, the RTC awarded interest on the actual damages reckoned from the
date of MIPTI’s filing of complaint on September 23, 1986. Explain the Rule on Payment of Legal
Interest.
In Nacar v. Gallery Frames (Nacar),131 the Court clarified and updated the rules on payment of legal
interest, to wit:
With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money
(UTANG), i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded. (So, dapat si C, the creditor ay nagdemanda praying for the legal interest on the
interest)
In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of
the Civil Code. (So, if there is no stipulated interest rate, the interest shall be the legal interest of 6% pero
dapat C sent a demand letter, or magdemanda siya praying for additional interest)
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money (HINDI UTANG like
damages), is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion
of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.
No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until
the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have
been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be
on the amount finally adjudged. (Ito ang applicable provision sa case at hand)
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the
rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per
annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit. (So sa decision, the amount to pay thereon shall earn legal interest
of 6% per annum until fully satisfied dahil magiging utang na pera na yung mga awarded na damages)

Is the RTC correct in awarding of legal interest from the date of filing of the complaint in
September 23, 1986?
NO, the RTC is wrong because No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
damages, except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty . PPA is
correct in pointing out that the accrued interest should be reckoned not from the date of filing of the
complaint but from the date of the RTC Decision on April 30, 2003 when the right to claim and the
amount of damages can be established with reasonable certainty.

The CA affirms that the PPA is liable to pay for exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of
suit. When is the penalty to pay for exemplary damages proper?
To warrant the award of exemplary damages, the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith and the
guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. The requirements of an award
of exemplary damages are:
(1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the
claimant's right to them has been established;
(2) that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of
compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; and
(3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent
manner.
We agree with both the RTC and the CA that PPA's arbitrary, hasty, and oppressive actions justify the
award of exemplary damages. PPA acted with undue haste and without conducting any investigation; it
did not even attempt to establish with certainty any violation on the part of MIPTI; neither did it grant
MIPTI any opportunity to counter the charges against it. All these were manifestations of bad faith
thereby warranting the award of exemplary damages.
When is the award of attorney’s fees proper?
It follows that the award of attorney's fees is in order. The power of the court to award attorney's fees
under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. Here, MIPTI was
compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect its rights. Moreover, there was
sufficient showing of bad faith on the part of PPA. We, thus, sustain the RTC's award of exemplary
damages and attorney's fees in the amounts of P200,000.00 and P500,000.00, respectively, as affirmed by
the CA.

POLITICAL LAW
Finally, MIPTI prays for reinstatement of its franchise. In this situation where the franchise period
had already expired in 2003, may the franchise be judicially reinstated?
NO, it can be reinstated because the franchise had already lapsed, and it is not within the province of the
COURT to make new contract for the parties.
In its April 30, 2003 Decision, the trial court had already resolved that the franchise cannot be reinstated
because it had already expired on January 16, 2003. We find the disquisition of the RTC on this issue
proper, viz.:
This Court however cannot grant plaintiff's prayer of returning to it the franchise to manage and operate
the Manila International Port Terminal Complex and the operation of cargo handling and port[-]related
services thereat. This has been rendered moot by the expiration of the franchise. It is not the province of
the Court to make a new contract for the parties. Anyway, plaintiff is compensated by the award of
damages for the injuries or loss it suffered by reason of the act of the defendant. "The fundamental
principle of the law o[n] damages is that one injured by a breach of contract or by a wrongful act or
negligent act or omission shall have a fair and just compensation, commensurate with the loss sustained
as a consequence of the defendant's acts.

TITLE OF THE CASE

EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 205172, June 15, 2021 ]
HERMINIO T. DISINI, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
HERNANDO, J.:

FOCUS OF CONCENTRATION
REMEDIAL LAW, CIVIL LAW AND POLITICAL LAW
DECISION

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the April 11, 2012 Decision and the October 24, 2012
Resolution3 of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0013 which declared as ill-gotten the commissions
received by Herminio T. Disini (Disini) relative to the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) project, and
ordered him to account for and reconvey the total amount of $50,562,500.00, with interest until fully
paid. In its assailed Resolution, the anti-graft court denied the Republic's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration and Disini's Partial Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Strike Out for lack of merit.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in PART. The assailed April 11, 2012 Decision and October 24,
2012 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0013 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The order to account and reconvey $50,562,500.00
is DELETED for lack of basis. Instead, petitioner is DIRECTED to PAY the Republic of the Philippines
temperate damages in the amount of One Billion Pesos (P1,000,000,000.00), and exemplary damages in
the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00). These monetary awards shall earn legal interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until their full satisfaction.

FACTS OF THE CASE

1. This case involves the recovery of ill-gotten wealth against Disini, a close associate of former
President Ferdinand Marcos (President Marcos), in relation to the BNPP project. The BNPP project
is a nuclear power plant project awarded to Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse)
and Burns & Roe, Inc. (B&R), as main contract6r and architect-engineer, respectively, in
1976. The BNPP remains inoperable to this day.

2. On July 23, 1987, the Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), filed a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages against Disini,
President Marcos and Imelda Marcos (Imelda), for amassing ill-gotten wealth during President Marcos'·
term. Among others, the Republic alleged that Disini received special concessions from President Marcos
in relation to the award of the BNPP contract to Westinghouse and B&R, for a scandalously exorbitant
amount. Allegedly, Disini received substantial commissions from Westinghouse and B&R for the award of
the contract and its execution.

3. During trial, only the Republic presented evidence since Disini was a party in default: after
summons to him remained unserved and after summons by publication against him was completed.

a. The Republic presented the following witnesses ex parte, namely: (a) Lourdes
Magno, Information Technology Officer III of the PCGG; (b) Rodolfo B. Jacob (Jacob),
former President of Herdis Group, Inc. (Herdis); (c) Danilo Richard V. Daniel, Director
IV of the PCGG Research Department; (d) Angelo Manahan (Manahan), former
Executive Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer of Herdis; (e) Rafael Sison,
forme'r member of the Board of Governors of the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP); (f) Cristina A. Beranilla, PCGG Legal Assistant; (g) Ricardo Paras III, Chief State
 Counsel; (h) Atty. Jesus P. Disini (Jesus), second cousin of Disini and former Senior Vice-
President of Herdis; and (i) Jesus Vergara (Vergara), former President of Asia
Industries, Inc. (AII). The Republic also presented the deposition of Rolando C. Gapud
(Gapud), former officer of Bancom Development Corporation, former President of the
Security Bank and Trust Company, and President Marcos and Imelda's financial advisor.
(Jacob, Manahan and Vergara lang ang tandaan ninyo)

b. However, Jesus' testimony was not given any probative value in view of his immunity
agreement with the Republic that his affidavits were to be used solely for the New Jersey·
District Court (NJDC) case and the International Court of Arbitration (ICA) proceedings
involving Westinghouse and B&R's claims against the Republic. This Court upheld the
said immunity agreement in Disini v. Sandiganbayan which clearly prohibited the
Republic from using him as a witness in any· claim brought by the Republic against
Herminio Disini."

c. The Republic also offered documentary evidence, such as Exhibits A to Z and series; AA
to ZZ and series; AAA to ZZZ and series; and AAAA to DDDD and series.

Version of the Republic:

4. The Republic claimed that Westinghouse solicited the influence of Disini, a known close associate
of President Marcos, to become its Special Sales Representative (SSR) to ensure its appointment as the
main contractor for the BNPP project, for a fee of 3% of the contract price as commission. The Republic
also alleged that Disini unduly took advantage of his close association with President Marcos to obtain
favorable terms for Westinghouse by requesting President Marcos to issue orders or directives to the
National Power Corporation (NPC) to accept Westinghouse's proposals in relation with the BNPP project.

5. Meanwhile, AII and Westinghouse entered into an agreement wherein the former would act as the
latter's SSR in the Philippines for a fee of $3,000,000. Thereafter, Power Contractors, Inc. (PCI); a
consortium was formed to undertake the civil and other related works of the BNPP project. PCI was 40%
owned by AII.

6. Thereafter, Disini, through his company Herdis, acquired AII's 40% interest in PCI to gain and
benefit from PCI's contract with Westinghouse. Also, he acquired AII to benefit from the latter's SSR
agreement with Westinghouse. The Republic claimed that all commissions due to AII was directly paid by
Westinghouse to Disini, through Herdis, and not to All which resulted in the latter's financial distress.

a. On the other hand, B&R had a written agreement with Technosphere Consultant Group, Inc.
(TCI), a company owned by Herdis. Pursuant to their agreement, TCI would receive a commission of 10%
of the contract price of B&R as the architect-engineer in the BNPP project. This commission was for the
services rendered by Disini in influencing President Marcos to award the BNPP project to B&R as
architect-engineer.

b. Both Westinghouse and B&R made their payments to Disini beginning 1976. However,
these commissions were not recorded in the books of Herdis, AII or TCL. Instead, they
were remitted by Westinghouse and B&R to a certain Rene Pasche in Switzerland who
deposited the money in Disini's Switzerland bank accounts. However, in· 1978,
Westinghouse started to remit the commissions through the International Corporate
Bank (Interbank) in the Philippines in which Disini and Jacob were the authorized
signatories. A substantial portion of the Interbank account was then deposited in the
overseas bank accounts in Switzerland under the account names "965 Summa" and "735
Phil" with Disini's wife, Pacencia, and Jacob as the authorized signatories.

Sandiganbayan Decision

7. On April 11, 2012, the Sandiganbayan rendered its assailed Decision declaring the commissions
in the amount of $50,562,500.00 received by Disini to be ill-gotten wealth and ordering him to account
for and reconvey the said amount to the Republic. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

a. WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING ILL-GOTTEN the

commissions received by defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI in connection with the Bataan Nuclear Power
Plant transaction. Defendant Disini is ordered to ACCOUNT for these commissions and to RECONVEY the
total amount of $50,562,500.00 he received by virtue of this transaction to the Plaintiff, with interest until
fully paid. Plaintiff's claims for actual, moral, temperate, nominal, exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and treble judicial costs are DISMISSED for not being established by a preponderance
of evidence.
8. Notably, only Disini was found liable by the Sandiganbayan of having amassed ill-gotten wealth
by way of substantial commissions totaling $50,562,500.00 which he received from Westinghouse and
B&R in connection with the BNPP project.

9. In ruling for the Republic, the Sandiganbayan relied on the testimonies of witnesses Manahan,
Vergara, and Jacob, all of whom were privy to the BNPP project. It held that the evidence presented by the
Republic established the following:

a. Disini, as the owner of Herdis and a known close associate and family friend of President Marcos,
served as an SSR of Westinghouse and B&R in exchange for substantial commissions totaling
$50,562,500.00. As Westinghouse and B&R's SSR, Disini used his personal and close association with
President Marcos to ensure that the BNPP project would be awarded to Westinghouse and B&R.

b. In arriving at the total amount of commissions received by Disini from Westinghouse and
B&R, the Sandiganbayan primarily relied on Exhibit E-9 (tandaan ninyo ito dahil dito sa
exhibit na ito iikot ang case), Disini's purported summary of the total commissions from
Westinghouse and B&R in relation to the BNPP project.

10. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan ruled that even if most of the documentary evidence were
photocopies with no probative value, the testimonies of Manahan, Vergara, Jacob and Sison constituted
preponderant evidence that:

a. (a) Disini and President Marcos were close associates, or relatives by affinity;

b. (b) President Marcos acquiesced to Disini's representation as the exclusive agent for
Westinghquse and B&R with respect to the BNPP project;

c. (c) Westinghouse and B&R agreed to pay commission to Disini for the latter to influence
President Marcos to award the contracts to them;

d. (d) Disini, did in fact, receive these commissions.

However, while the Sandiganbayan found Disini liable, it held that there was no evidence of
President Marcos' and Imelda's receipt of the commissions. Thus, they were not held liable.

11. Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The Republic argued that it
sufficiently proved that anomalous grants of loans and guarantees were given to the companies owned by
President Marcos and Disini through Presidential Decree (P.D.) Nos. 550 and 750; and Letter of
Instruction (LOI) Nos. 658 and 1132.

12. On the other hand, Disini opined that the Republic had no cause of action against him as there
was no contract or quasi-contract violated. Also, he alleged that witnesses Manahan, Vergara and Jacob
had no personal knowledge of the allegations in their affidavits. Specifically, he cited Manahan's
Transcripts of Stenographic Notes (TSN) in Criminal Case No. 28001-0239 filed before
the Sandiganbayan which showed his lack of personal knowledge on matters alleged in his affidavit.

13. On October 24, 2012, the Sandiganbayan denied both the Republic's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration and Disini's Partial Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Strike Out for lack of
merit. It ruled that Disini, having been declared in default, cannot present as evidence Manahan's TSN in
Criminal Case Nos. 28001-02 in a motion for reconsideration.

14. As to the Republic's motion for partial reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan held that it failed to
present credible evidence to prove the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by President Marcos, Imelda and
Disini based on P.D.s and LOI issued by President Marcos. The anti-graft court noted that the Republic
did not offer any evidence to prove the specific amounts of loans or other accommodations granted by
President Marcos to Disini.

15. As to Disini 's motion for partial reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan ruled that Jacob's testimony
proved that Disini indeed received commissions from Westinghouse and B&R for his services rendered
regarding the award of the BNPP project to them. Absent any countervailing evidence, Jacob's testimony
deserved probative weight despite the lack of documentary proof.
16. Hence, Disini filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Meanwhile, on
June 3, 2014, Disini died and was substituted in the suit by his heir Herminio Angel E. Disini, Jr.

POSSIBLE BAR QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

POLITICAL LAW QUESTION

Define ill-gotten wealth?
In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, ill-gotten wealth is defined as those "assets
and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives and close associates through or as a result of their improper or illegal use of government
funds or properties; or their having taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of powers,
influence or relationships, resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice
to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines."
In sum, in order to be considered as ill-gotten wealth, they must have:
(a) originated from the government; and
(b) been taken by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates by illegal
means.

May the commissions paid to Disini be considered as part of the ill-gotten wealth in spite of the
fact that they were paid by Westinghouse and B& R, which are private corporations? YES.
Evidently, the BNPP is· a government project the construction of which was awarded to Westinghouse as
the main contractor and B&R as the architect-engineer, allegedly through undue advantage of Disini's
influence and close association with President Marcos. In exchange, Disini allegedly received substantial
commissions based on 3% and 10% of the total contract price from Westinghouse and B&R, respectively.
Obviously, the payment of the alleged commissions would be coming from Westinghouse and B&R, which
are private corporations, and not directly from the government.
However, contrary to the contention of Disini, ill-gotten wealth also encompasses those that are derived
indirectly from government funds or properties through the use of power, influence, or relationship
resulting in unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the
Republic. The alleged subject commissions may not have been sourced directly from the public funds but
it is beyond cavil that Disini would not have amassed these commissions had he not exerted undue
influence on President Marcos.
Disini indirectly and unjustly enriched himself through his influence and close association with President
Marcos by ensuring that the BNPP project would be awarded to Westinghouse and B&R. Besides, his
alleged receipt of commissions from Westinghouse and B&R is clearly within the definition of ill-gotten
wealth under the PCGG Rules and Regulations, that is, the receipt, directly or indirectly, of any
commission from an entity in connection with any government contract or project.

REMEDIAL LAW QUESTION – RULE 45

Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the
review of pure questions of law. Rule 45 does not allow the review of questions of fact because the
Court is not a trier of facts. Differentiate question of law from question facts.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while a
question of fact exists when there is doubt as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test in
determining whether a question is one of law or of fact is whether the appellate court can resolve the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law. Any
question that invites evaluation of the whole evidence, as well as their relation to each other and to the
whole, is a question of fact and thus proscribed in a Rule 45 petition.
What are the exceptions?
The rule however has exceptions:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on mis-appreciation of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.
In the prosecution of alleged influencing President Marcos to award the contract to build Bataan
Nuclear Power Plant (BBP) and the alleged receipt of $50,562,500 by Disini as Special Sales
Representative (SSR), the Republic presented Exhibit E-9 which is a tabulation of commissions
prepared by and attached to Manahan’s affidavit (a witness) alleging the existence of two
contracts, (one is between White Westinghouse and Desini, and another is between B & R and
Desini) where the latter act as SSR for both private companies. Desini argues that
the Sandiganbayan simply cannot infer from or use the amounts indicated in Exhibit E-9 as there
was nothing in the said document which would suggest that the amounts represented the
commissions paid to him. No other evidence was presented to prove that actual payments were
made. Besides, the Republic did not offer as evidence the Westinghouse and B&R contracts which
would be the best evidence to prove the amount of commissions.
On the other hand, the Republic argued that Desini being a party in default is now estopped to
question the validity of Exhibit E-9 for this is tantamount to questioning that facts of the case
which is not allowed under Rule 45. Is the Republic correct? NO.
Here, Disini raised the issues on the authenticity of Exhibit E-9, the existence or absence of
Westinghouse and B&R contracts, and the actual receipt and amount of commissions from Westinghouse
and B & R. Clearly, these issues involve questions of facts. They relate to the probative weight of Exhibit
E-9, the existence of the Westinghouse and B&R contracts, and the commission agreements, and Disini's
receipt of the sum of $50,562,500.00. Precisely, these issues require a judicious review of all the evidence
presented in this case. Thus, these issues are not proper in a Rule 45 petition. Nevertheless, We find that
the circumstances in the instant case warrant the application of the exception rather than the general
rule.

The alleged commissions received by Disini as SSR, i.e., 3% and 10%, were supposedly based on
the total contract price of the Westinghouse and B&R contracts, respectively. However, Disini
avers that the records are bereft of any evidence as to the existence of these· contracts and' their
corresponding commission agreements. In fact, the Sandiganbayan anchored its decision as to
existence of these contracts and commission agreements on the testimonies of Vergara and Jacob
(witnesses for the Republic) who narrated how the BNPP contract was awarded to Westinghouse
and B&R and how Disini used his close personal relationship with President Marcos to obtain
substantial concessions.
What is Best Evidence Rule (now Original Document Rule) and what are its purpose?
Under the Best Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, to
wit:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in
the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under control of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The rule's purpose is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought before the court, to act as
an insurance against fraud and to protect against misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or
unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger set of writings.
(The exception) However, when the evidence sought to be. introduced concerns EXTERNAL FACTS, such
as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence
Rule cannot be invoked. In such case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without presenting
the original.

Disini argued that the Republic should have presented the SSR contracts as evidence of his
receipt of the $50,562,500 commissions. On the other hand, the Republic presented the affidavits
of both Vergara aand Jacob to prove the existence and execution of these contracts and the
corresponding commission agreements without inference as to the contents or terms.
In the present case, the Republic claims to have proved the existence of the Westinghouse and B&R
contracts in relation to the BNPP project as well as the existence of their corresponding commission
agreements with Disini.
We agree with the Republic. As to the proof of the existence of the Westinghouse and B&R contracts in
relation to the BNPP project as well as the existence of their corresponding commission agreements with
Disini, We hold that it was-sufficiently established by the testimonies of Vergara and Jacob. Despite the
non-presentation of the original contracts themselves, the Republic has duly proved their execution.
(Execution of contracts is an EXTERNAL FACT. Take note)
Vergara's and Jacob's affidavits satisfactorily' proved the due execution of the Westinghouse and B&R
contracts and their corresponding commission agreements with Disini. Vergara narrated in detail how
Disini was appointed as Westinghouse's SSR and how he exerted influence on President Marcos to
appoint it as the BNPP project main contractor. Also, Vergara clearly testified on how he arranged a
meeting between Disini and B&R for the former to also become the latter's SSR to President Marcos with
respect to the BNPP project.
These transactions with Westinghouse and B&R were corroborated by Jacob in his affidavit. As deduced
from Vergara's and Jacob's affidavits, the BNPP project was successfully awarded to Westinghouse as the
main contractor and to B&R as the architect-engineer because of Disini's influence and close association
with President Marcos. Certainly, the existence of the Westinghouse and B&Rs contracts had been duly
proved.
These testimonies sufficiently prove the existence of the Westinghouse and B&R contracts and their
corresponding commission agreements. Contrary to Disini's contention, the Best Evidence Rule is not
applicable in the present case. The Republic presented the affidavits of both Vergara and Jacob to prove
the existence and execution of these contracts (EXTERNAL FACTS) and the corresponding commission
agreements without inference as to the contents or terms thereof. Hence, We rule in favor of the Republic.

However, for Disini to be held liable to return and account for the commissions he allegedly
received, the Republic must prove by preponderance of evidence not only the existence of these
contracts and commission agreements but the receipt of these substantial commissions by Disini
from Westinghouse and B&R as well. What is preponderance of evidence?
Rule 133. Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party having
the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider

1. all the facts and circumstance of the case,

2. the witness’ manner of testifying,
a. their intelligence,
b. their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying,
c. the nature of the facts to which they testify,
d. the probability of their testimony,
e. their interest or want of interest, and
f. their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial.

The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number.
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of
credible evidence."

Did the Republic successfully prove the due execution of SSR contracts and the receipts of the
commission thereof? YES.
The evidence on record shows that Disini received commissions from Westinghouse and B&R despite the
non-presentation by the Republic of the Westinghouse and B&R contracts and their respective
commission agreements. The sworn testimonies and affidavits of Vergara and Jacob are categorical,
credible and corroborative, sufficiently proving that Disini, through Herdis and its subsidiaries, acquired
ill-gotten wealth in relation to the BNPP project.
Vergara testified as to Disini's participation in the BNPP project by facilitating the award of the BNPP
project to Westinghouse and B&R and through acquisition of companies involved in the BNPP project.
Vergara participated in the incorporation of PCI, a consortium which performed civil or constructional
work for te BNPP project. Thereafter, PCI, which was 40% owned by All, was subsequently acquired by
Disini. He also declared that Herdis acquired an insurance company and renamed it as Summa
Insurance, Inc. (SII) which provided insurance coverage for the BNPP project. Vergara claimed that these
companies, PCI and SII, gave lucrative compensation to Disini in view of his involvement in the BNPP
project.
Although Vergara testified that he had no personal knowledge as to the transfer of these commissions to
Disini, his testimonies and sworn affidavits are relevant in laying the foundation of Disini's receipt thereof
by categorically declaring the existence of these Westinghouse and B&R contracts and their respective
commission agreements and the time of accrual of these commissions. Also, Vergara demonstrated the
extent of Disini's participation in the BNPP project through his company Herdis and its subsidiaries, and
his further acquisition of other companies involved in the project. This reveals Disini's considerable
interest in a government project which he obviously attained due to his influence and close association
with President Marcos.
Consequently, a review of Jacob's affidavits, identified and duly authenticated by him, reveals that as
President of Herdis, he had personal knowledge of Herdis' transactions, especially with respect to the
BNPP project as well as other circumstances surrounding it. For a testimonial evidence to be believed, it
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself such that
common experience and observation of mankind lead to the inference of its probability under the
circumstances.
Jacob's credibility to testify on the matter of Disini's receipt of commissions stemmed from Disini's trust
and confidence in him as he was personally invited by Disini to work for his company Herdis.

The Republic offered merely photocopies of the bank documents to corroborate Jacob’s testimony
that indeed Desini received commissions from Westinghouse and B&R to his (Desini) overseas
personal bank accounts. Are photocopies admissible in evidence? NO.
NO. However, this does not affect the admissibility and probative value of Jacob's sworn statement and
the existence of the bank accounts and Disini's receipt of commissions, especially since these statements
came from a credible witness such as Jacob. To stress, when the evidence presented concerns the
existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without inference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule
cannot be invoked. Clearly, Jacob is credible to testify on matters regarding Disini's receipt of
commissions from Westinghouse and B&R and the manner of his participation as well as that of Herdis
and its subsidiaries. Hence, his testimony and sworn affidavits must be accorded probative value.
The evidence consisting of Exhibits "HHH," "HHH-TR" "III" "III-TR" "JJJ" and sub-markings,"JJJ-TR"
"KKK" and sub-markings "KKK-TR" "LLL" and sub-markings, "LLL-TR," "MMM," "MMM-TR," "NNN," "NNN-
TR," "NNN-1," "NNN-1 (TR)," "000," "000-TR," "PPP," "PPP(TR)," "QQQ" and sub-markings and their
respective translations, "RRR" and sub markings and their respective translations, "SSS" and sub-
markings and their respective translations, "TTT," "TTT(TR)," "UUU," "UUU(TR)," "VVV," and "VVV(TR)"
presented by the plaintiff were unauthenticated and not properly translated.
All the documents relating to these accounts were photocopies. As stated in the Rules of Court, for a
private document to be proven, due execution and authenticity must be proven. This was not fulfilled by
the plaintiff as what was presented were mere photocopies of supposed bank statements/records received
by the Philippine Embassy in Switzerland and those which a PCGG employee had received here in the
Philippines.
No evidence established why the originals of the documents could not be produced. At the very least, the
plaintiff should have presented the records as received by the Philippine Embassy. Furthermore, the
documentarv evidence given were also photocopies of the translations, which are done here in the
Philippines. There was no explanation as to why this was done. Thus, the translation of French and
German texts into English is unacceptable. There was no opportunity for the Court to scrutinize the
translations as the supposed translator was not even presented.
Additionally, majority of the other documentary evidence offered by the plaintiff are mere photocopies.
Some were even photocopies of photocopies, and bad copies at that.
Nonetheless, the absence of these documents is not fatal to the Republic's cause especially since the
testimonial evidence offered contained positive declarations of witnesses based on their personal
knowledge. We thus hold that the Republic has duly proved by preponderance of evidence through the
affidavits of Vergara and Jacob, the fact of receipt by Disini of these commissions from Westinghouse and
B&R.

Was the Republic able to prove Desini’s acquisition of ill-gotten wealth? YES.
In this case, Disini was declared in default and failed to adduce evidence in his behalf. However, the
Republic must still abide by the principles of due process which require that there be preponderant
evidence of Disini's acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. Hence, the Republic carries the heavy burden of proof
and must discharge such burden satisfactorily; otherwise, the action would fail.
Applying said principle, the factual circumstances established by the Republic through testimonial
evidence are sufficient and convincing enough to prove that Disini received substantial commissions from
Westinghouse and B&R in relation to the BNPP project despite lack of documentary proof of his receipt
thereof. It bears noting that these commissions were ill-gotten wealth acquired by Disini through illegal or
clever means to disguise and hide the illicit nature of its acquisition.
Hence, original copies of documentary evidence showing actual receipt by Disini of these commissions
would surely be arduous, if not impossible, to retrieve. In fact, Jacob affirmed that these commissions
were not even recorded in Herdis' company books which means that Disini intended to conceal receipt of
these commissions to avoid any trace of his illegal involvement with the BNPP project by leaving no proof
of receipt thereof by Herdis.
The narrations of Vergara and Jacob which duly established the existence of the Westinghouse and B&R
contracts and their corresponding commission agreements, and the transfer of these commissions to
Disini's overseas bank accounts, convince this Court that Disini indeed received substantial commissions
constituting ill-gotten wealth. In addition, the testimonies and sworn affidavits of Vergara and Jacob, as
President of AII and Herdis, respectively, deserve greater consideration since they had the opportunity to
personally witness these factual circumstances because of their respective positions in the companies
owned by Disini.
Also, the corroborative testimonies of Vergara and Jacob are worthy of belief as they are neither
improbable nor impossible. Both Vergara and Jacob have no reason to lie and would gain no benefit from
doing so.

Take note: Yung existence and execution of SSR contracts between Disini and Westinghouse and B
& R can be proven by parol evidence (testimonial evidence) provided the witnesses are credible and
their testimonies are credible it itself. Tandaan ninyo yan. But the content of the contracts cannot
be proven by parol evidence lang. DApat the Republic present the contract itself, a photocopy of
the contracts or any documents detailing the content of the contract. Kaya the second question is,
Magkano ba talaga ang kwartang (ill-gotten wealth) nakubra ni Disini as commissions?
Hence, We affirm the Sandiganbayan' s ruling that Disini acquired ill-gotten wealth by receiving
substantial commissions from Westinghouse and B&R in connection with the BNPP project by giving
credence to Jacob and Vergara's testimonial evidence and the exhibits offered as part of their testimonies
which are credible, categorical and corroborative. However, We cannot subscribe to the Sandiganbayan's
conclusion that Disini is liable to reconvey the amount of $50,562,500.
To prove the amount of the total commissions received by Disini, the best evidence would be the
Westinghouse and B&R contracts and their corresponding commission agreements, especially considering
the Republic's claim that the commissions received by Disini were based on 3% and 10% of the total
contract price of the Westinghouse and B&R contracts, respectively, which clearly requires an inquiry into
the specific terms and contents of the contracts. However, the Republic offered no justification as to their
non-presentation thereof. As to the secondary evidence, i.e. Exhibit E-9 and the affidavits of Manahan,
Vergara and Jacob, the Republic offered no explanation why they should fall under any of the exceptions
to the Best Evidence Rule.
The Sandiganbayan nevertheless accorded great weight to Exhibit E-9 or a tabulation of commissions
allegedly typewritten on Disini's stationery, which was attached to Manahan's affidavit, to arrive at the
amount of 50,562,500.00
Patently, Exhibit E-9 is a certified xerox copy. The Republic intends to prove the total amount of
Commissions received by Disini by presenting his typewritten tabulation of commissions on his
stationery. However, under the Best Evidence Rule, when the subject of inquiry is the content of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself subject to certain
exceptions. Here; the Republic failed to offer any plausible reason or justification why it presented a mere
photocopy instead of the original.

For the purposes of offering documents as evidence before the court, such as classified as public or
private.
Rule 132. Section 19. Classes of Documents. -For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.

What is the importance of classifying documents into public or private?

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as
evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has
been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the
formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in
court. In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private
person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition
or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or
the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner allowed
by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. (So ayun ang difference)
Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its admissibility as evidence. Public
documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness.
On the other hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are properly
authenticated. Clearly, Exhibit E-9 is a private document, thus it must be properly authenticated to be
admissible and given probative value.
How do you prove the execution and authenticity of a private document?
Section 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private document offered as authentic is received
in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

Clearly, Exhibit E-9 is a private document, thus it must be properly authenticated to be admissible
in evidence. Pero di ba hindi naman authenticated dahil naka-attached lang yun sa affidavit ni
Manahan. So, the next move of Disini is for the SAndiganbayan not to admit Exhibit E-9 as
evidence. The SB denied it. Kahit ang SC admitted Exhibit E-9 as evidence. Pero may twist, and
this is important under the Rules of Evidence.
Differentiate admissibility from probative value?
"[A]dmissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the
question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to
the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue." "Thus, a particular evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by
the rules of evidence."
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules on
evidence. Before any private document offered as authentic, such as Exhibit E-9, is received in evidence,
its due execution and authenticity must be proved by anyone who saw the document executed or written,
or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. "During authentication in
court, a witness positively testifies that a document presented as evidence is genuine and has been duly
executed or that the document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or under
duress."

So, anong naging decision ng SC? All affidavits of the witnesses are admitted (syempre dahil they
have sworn on them during the trial), and all documentary evidence, including Exhibit E-9, are
also admitted BUT ONLY AS PART OF THEIR TESTIMONY (Prang mema lang. Dahil nabanggit lang
nila in their testimony). Hahahaha
The documentary evidence presented by the plaintiff were only admitted as part of the testimony of the
witnesses. Therefore, these pieces of evidence do not have independent status. Its probative force depends
entirely on the credibility of the testimony of the witness who identified the documents. Nevertheless, the
contents of the document will be considered part of the narration of the witness.
A document admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated
therein. It merely forms part of the testimony of the witness and does not have an independent status. Its
probative force depends entirely on the credibility of the testimony of which it is a part of.
Thus, when the Sandiganbayan admitted Exhibit E-9 as part of Manahan's testimony, it was not
supposed to consider Exhibit E-9 as proof of the fact stated therein, i.e., the amount of commissions. The
Anti-Graft Tribunal was supposed to treat Exhibit E-9 only as part of Manahan's testimony. Contrary to
its express statement, the Sandiganbayan actually relied on Exhibit E-9 to determine the amount of
commissions.
(So, whatever amounts of commission therein that supposedly received by Disini have no probative value)

In his alternative defense, Disini assails the probative value of Exhibit E-9 when it presented for
the first time during the appeal that Manahan’s (the witness) deposition in a criminal case
disowned knowledge of Exhibit E-9. Is Disini allowed to present evidence? NO.
In response, the Republic argues that Disini is barred from invoking the deposition considering that he
was already declared in default. As a consequence of the default order, Disini had lost his standing in
court and can no longer present his own evidence.
"A party in default loses [its] right to present evidence, control the proceedings, and examine or cross-
examine witnesses." Such party has "no right to expect that [its] pleadings would be acted upon by the
court nor may be object to or refute evidence or motions filed against [it]."

What are the rights of a defaulted party like Disini?

However, while a party in default loses the right to present evidence, it retains the right to appeal as part
of the remedies available to a party in default. The grounds that may be raised in such an appeal are
restricted to any of the following:
Indeed, a defending party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default.
However, the grounds that may be raised in such an appeal are restricted to any of the following: first, the
failure of the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of the complaint; second, the decision is contrary
to law; and third, the amount of judgment is excessive or different in kind from that prayed for.

A party in default is precluded from raising any other ground in its appeal from the judgment by default
since, otherwise, it would then be allowed to adduce evidence in its defense, which right it had lost after it
was declared in default.
Here, when Disini was declared in default, he lost his right to present evidence. While he retained his
right to appeal, which he exercised when he filed the Petition, he was proscribed from pleading the
existence of the deposition in Criminal Case Nos. 28001-02. Thus, we do not find any error with
the Sandiganbayan's refusal to consider Manahan's deposition in Criminal Case Nos. 28001-02.
In the same vein, We reject Disini's invocation of the ICA award dated December 19, 1991 and the NJDC
decision dated July 15, 1993, which supposedly cleared him of bribery charges in relation to the
Westinghouse and B&R contracts. By introducing these new matters, Disini is effectively adducing
evidence in his defense, which right he had lost after he was declared in default.
(Hind na talaga pwede dahil if a defaulted party will be allowed to present new evidence during the MR or
appeal, the appellate will then put back the whole trial to the beginning hahahha. There will be pre-trial,
and trial anew hahahah. Walang katapusan)
Nevertheless, it should be noted that while a party in default loses its right to present evidence, the court
is still supposed to protect its right by rendering judgment in accordance with the evidence required by
law. It may not admit nor rely on incompetent evidence.
(So here the SC, excluded Exhibit E-9 probative value)

So, the Republic lost in term of the amount of ill-gotten wealth. And since the amount cannot be
determined, the SC applied the Law on Damages. Here, the amount of ill-gotten wealth (actual
damages) cannot exactly determined, the recourse for the plaintiff is to pray for temperate
damages and exemplary damages.
Despite the failure of the Republic to prove the total amount of commissions received by Disini, the Court
fully recognizes its right to recover the ill-gotten wealth. Disini is not at all entitled to these commissions
as he illegally acquired them through the use of his influence and close relationship with President
Marcos without rendering any service for the benefit of the Republic's BNPP project.
Nonetheless, since recovery thereof cannot be effected due to the absence of a definite amount, We deem
it proper to award the Republic temperate damages for the pecuniary loss and the Filipino people suffered
on account of Disini's illegal acquisitions of substantial commissions from Westinghouse and B&R, albeit
the amount thereof not being proven with certainty.
Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory
damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of: the case, be determined with certainty.
In assessing the amount of such damages, Article 2216 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2216. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or
exemplary damages, may be adjudicated. The assessment of such damages, except liquidated ones, is left
to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case.
Considering the relevant circumstances of this case, the amount of One Billion Pesos
(P1,000,000,000.00) as temperate damages is reasonable and justified. It bears stressing that this is not
just an ordinary civil action for recovery of property and damages. This is an action for recovery of ill-
gotten wealth which is imbued ·with public interest and concerns not only the government but every
Filipino citizen, then and now. As part of the healing process of this nation, the Freedom Constitution
specifically mandates the President to prioritize the recovery of these ill-gotten wealth. Hence, the loss or
injury suffered by every Filipino due to Disini's acquisition of ill-gotten wealth must be duly recognized
and compensated.

There is no doubt that Disini's receipt of substantial commissions from Westinghouse and B&R is illegal
and despicable which is no less than abhorred by our Freedom Constitution as its mandate includes
eradication of graft and corruption, punishment of those guilty thereof and recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
Verily, Disini's conduct should be corrected and deterred as his use of influence or power for his own
personal benefit to the detriment of the Republic caused substantial injury not only to public funds but to
the morale, trust and confidence of Filipinos in the government and its projects. Hence, this Court finds it
reasonable under the circumstances to award One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Finally, the monetary awards shall earn the legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality of
this Decision until their satisfaction.
Comment:
Eh ano naman kung gumamit ng influence ang isang SSR, eh di b yan nga ang trabaho ng mga ahente.
Also, the commission came from private companies di ba? If I were the law firm for Disini, I will ask for
accounting ng BNNP to know if there are missing fund. If meron, saan napunta? Also, let us just say
Disini used his influence to seal the contract, the contract ba entered into by the Republic is
disadvantageous to the government? Hindi ba unjust enrichment ang pagbayarin ka ng P1B eh wala
naming nawawalang pera sa fund ng government?

The ff enbanc cases penned by Hernando will ne uploaded in your account in OPE in
barlawrefreshers.teachable.com by August 1, 2023. Other non-enbanc cases will also be uploaded
around the same date.

TAXATION LAW

[G.R. No. 211299. June 28, 2022.]

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. CITY OF PASAY, represented by the CITY TREASURER
and the CITY ASSESSOR, respondent….

[ G.R. No. 198529, February 09, 2021 ]

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. CITY OF MUNTINLUPA AND NELIA A. BARLIS,
RESPONDENTS…

CRIMINAL LAW

[ G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021 ]LUISITO G. PULIDO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT …

COMMERCIAL LAW

NONE

POLITICAL LAW

[G.R. No. 211299. June 28, 2022.]

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. CITY OF PASAY, represented by the CITY TREASURER
and the CITY ASSESSOR, respondent…. (See the Case Under Civil Law)

[G.R. No. 196252, December 07, 2021]

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. MANILA INTERNATIONAL PORTS TERMINAL, INC.,
RESPONDENT. … (See the Case Under Civil Law)

[ G.R. No. 210314. October 12, 2021 ]

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT… 98

[ G.R. No. 205172, June 15, 2021 ]

HERMINIO T. DISINI, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT… SEE CIVIL
LAW… 110

[ G.R. No. 202897, August 06, 2019 ]

MAYNILAD WATER SERVICES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES ("DENR")… 141

[ G.R. No. 191946, December 10, 2019 ]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION REPRESENTED BY ANICIA MARASIGAN-DE LIMA AND CESAR D.
BUENAFLOR, PETITIONER, VS. ROGELIO L. BERAY, MELISSA T. ESPINA AND VIOLETA R. TADEO,
RESPONDENTS…. 173

[ G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020 ]

THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER, AND THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, REPRESENTED
BY ITS COMMISSIONER, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SILVINO T. PAMPILO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 26, SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY AND VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, RESPONDENTS … 183

[ G.R. No. 230185, July 07, 2020 ]

EDDA V. HENSON, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT… 198

[ A.M. No. RTJ-17-2486 [Formerly A.M. No. 17-02-45-RTC], September 08, 2020 ]
RE: INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE ALLEGED EXTORTION ACTIVITIES OF PRESIDING JUDGE
GODOFREDO B. ABUL, JR., BRANCH 4, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BUTUAN CITY, AGUSAN DEL
NORTE.. 205

[ G.R. No. 218304, December 09, 2020 ]

NINIA P. LUMAUAN, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT… 214

[ A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021 ]

Re: LETTER OF MRS. MA. CRISTINA ROCO CORONA REQUESTING THE GRANT OF RETIREMENT AND
OTHER BENEFITS TO THE LATE FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C. CORONA AND HER CLAIM FOR
SURVIVORSHIP PENSION AS HIS WIFE UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9946 … 223

[ G.R. No. 198529, February 09, 2021 ]

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. CITY OF MUNTINLUPA AND NELIA A. BARLIS,
RESPONDENTS… 241

LABOR LAW (1)

[ G.R. No. 201631, December 07, 2021 ]

ANGELINA DAYRIT, REPRESENTED BY JULIE E. DAYRIT, PETITIONER, VS. JOSE I. NORQUILLAS,
ROGELIO I. NORQUILLAS, ROMIE I. NORQUILLAS, HERDANNY I. NORQUILLAS, DANILO M.
NORQUILLAS, ANTHONY APUS, TECLO P. MUGOT, ALLAN A. OMPOC, JONI CLARIN, CANDELARIA
MEJORADA, LILIA O. TAGANAS, SYLVIA SABAYANON, ARSENIO CATIIL, VERONICO MAESTRE, AND
MARIO TAGAYLO, RESPONDENTS… 250

REMEDIAL LAW

[G.R. No. 211299. June 28, 2022.]

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. CITY OF PASAY, represented by the CITY TREASURER
and the CITY ASSESSOR, respondent…. (See the Case Under Civil Law)

[ G.R. No. 210314. October 12, 2021 ]

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT…
(SEE POLITICAL LAW)

[ G.R. No. 205172, June 15, 2021 ]

HERMINIO T. DISINI, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT… SEE CIVIL
LAW

[ G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020 ]

THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER, AND THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, REPRESENTED
BY ITS COMMISSIONER, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SILVINO T. PAMPILO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 26, SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY AND VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, RESPONDENTS… (See Political Law)

[G.R. No. 208379. March 29, 2022.]

LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE, CARIDAD R. VALDEHUESA, and NORMA L. LASALA, petitioners, * vs.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, THE NATIONAL TREASURER, BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE
DEALING & EXCHANGE CORPORATION, PHILIPPINE DEPOSITORY & TRUST CORP., PHILIPPINE
SECURITIES SETTLEMENT CORPORATION, PHILIPPINE DEALING SYSTEM HOLDINGS CORPORATION,
and VICENTE B. CASTILLO, respondents…