CASES UNDER STAGES OF EXECUTION OF FELONIES

G.R. No. L-38325 February 24, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO GAJETAS, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic review of a death sentence imposed by the Court of First Instance of Romblon on Antonio Gajetas for the
crime of attempted rape with homicide.

The following facts as narrated by the trial court are admitted by the appellant in his brief, to wit:

The facts which are not in dispute are: Between 8 to 12 o'clock in the evening of January 6, 1972, Panchita Fosana Ramilo met
her death through foul means. At about the time of her demise inside her own house in sitio Canlumay, barrio Tumingad,
Odiongan, Romblon, only her two small daughters, the oldest aged 4 years and the youngest 1 year and 3 months, were her
companions. Her husband, Gerundio Ramilo, was then in Batangas, having left for said place on December 9, 1971. The
heinous deed was discovered at around 6 o'clock in the morning of January 7, 1972, when Miguel Ramilo, younger brother of
Gerundio, was about to pass the house of the latter after coming from a place situated uphill and beyond said house, where he
tethered his carabao to graze. Surprised at seeing bloodstains under the house, Miguel called out twice to his sister-in-law.
There was no response from her. Instead, Miguel heard the voice of his niece, Necy Ramilo, the oldest daughter of the
deceased, stating that her mother was already dead. He could not believe what he heard, so that he hurried upstairs and saw
Panchita sprawled on her belly on the floor of the bedroom. He dared not touch the deceased. He immediately left the house to
inform his wife and father about his discovery. Thereafter he proceeded to the municipal building to report the matter to the
authorities. Policeman Manuel Fabroa was immediately ordered to conduct an investigation at the scene of the killing. Fabroa
thus went to sitio Canlumay, accompanied by policemen Freddie Fojas and Miguel Ramilo. After reaching the site of the killing
he made a rough sketch of what he saw, which served as the basis of the final sketch marked Exh. B. He also saw strands of
hair, Exh. C. During his investigation, Fabroa learned from Necy that two persons went up the house the preceding night and
that one of the intruders was afflicted with a skin disease locally called 'garit.' Necy did not, however, name names.

From Canlumay the deceased was brought to the house of her sister, Patria Fetalvero, at sitio Mainit, where a post-mortem
examination was conducted by Dr. Julian Ornum in the afternoon of the same day, January 7th. This witness Identified the
certificate of death which he issued, marked Exh. A in the record, According to said document, the deceased died of
"Hemorrhage, due to Lacerated wounds on the right side of the neck." The reverse side of Exh. A shows the post-mortem
certificate stating that the late Panchita Fosana Ramilo sustained: 'Lacerated wound on the left deltoid muscles, measuring 1-1/2
inches long, one inch depth and 2 inches wide. Lacerated wound on the base of the right side of the head and upper part of the
neck measuring 5 inches long, one inch depth and I inch wide. Lacerated wound on the middle right side of the neck measuring
6 inches long and 2-1/ 2 inches depth and 1- 1/2 inches wide, cutting the cervical vertebrae, muscles and great vessels of the
right side of the neck.' He testified that the most fatal injury is that located on the right side of the neck; and that a bolo or a
scythe could have been used in inflicting the injuries above described. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-5; rollo, pp. 58-60.)

On January 11, 1972, a complaint for "Attempted Rape with Double Murder" was filed against Antonio Gajetas and Francisco
Gajetas in the Municipal Court of Odiongan, Romblon. After the preliminary investigation, first stage, was conducted Antonio and
Francisco were arrested. During the second stage of the preliminary investigation the accused entered pleas which were
recorded in Exhibit X as follows:

From the Municipal Jail the two accused ANTONIO GAJETAS and FRANCISCO GAJETAS were brought before this Honorable
Court for arraignment. Before this Honorable Court, they were assisted by their counsel who was appointed Counsel de Oficio.

The complaint was read and translated in the local dialect to the accused. They were asked and informed if they understand the
complaint as read and translated and each of them responded in the affirmative. They were then asked one by one to enter their
plea.
1. Accused Francisco Gajetas entered the plea of NOT GUILTY.

2. Accused Antonio Gajetas entered the following plea:

(a) He admit to have killed Panchita Fosana but there was no confederacy nor conspiracy in killing her;

(b) That there was no treachery nor premeditation in the commission of the offense;

(c) That he does not enter the plea of guilty to the Double Murder nor to the qualifying circumstances stated in the complaint.

That both accused waive their rights to the preliminary investigation (2nd stage) and respectfully request the Court to remand the
case to the Court of First Instance of Romblon for immediate trial on the merits.

Odiongan, Romblon, Jan. 22, 1972.

WITNESS TO THUMBMARK: His Thumbmark

(SGD.) ROGELIO FAJARITO FRANCISCO GAJETAS

Clerk

(SGD.) ANTONIO GAJETAS

Assisted by:

SGD NEMESIO F. GANAN

Counsel de Officio of both accused

When the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance, the following information was filed:

The undersigned, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Romblon, accuses ANTONIO GAJETAS and FRANCISCO GAJETAS of the
crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of January 1972, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at sitio Canlumay, barrio Tumingad,
municipality of Odiongan, province of Romblon. Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, The
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating with one another, by means of force and intimidation and with a scythe did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously embrace, attack and assault one Panchita Fosana Racamilo, a pregnant
woman, with intent of having carnal knowledge of her, against her will, thus commencing the commission of the felony of Rape
directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced that crime by reason of some
cause or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance.

That the accused did not succeed in their evil intent on account of the resistance offered by the offended party for which reason
and in that occasion, the accused attacked and assaulted her with that deadly weapon, inflicting upon her, mortal injuries in
different parts of her body that resulted in her death.

That the commission of the complex crime was attended with the aggravating circumstance that the offense was committed in
the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having given any provocation.

When arraigned on June 1, 1972, both accused pleaded not guilty. However, on June 21 in the same year, Antonio offered to
plead guilty provided that Francisco be excluded from the charge but the offer was not accept by the prosecution so trial was
held and thereafter the court rendered the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Antonio Gajetas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
attempted rape with homicide, and pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, sentences him to death
penalty, to indemnify the heirs of Panchita Fosana Ramilo in the amount of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment, and to
pay one-half of the costs.
The other accused, Francisco Gajetas, is hereby acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, with one-half of the costs charged de oficio, and his immediate release from custody hereby ordered.

The only eye-witness to the crime who was presented by the prosecution was Necy Ramilo, a 3 to 4-year old daughter of the
deceased. However, the evidence given by Necy was not given any weight by the trial court because, in its own words, "It is the
considered opinion of this Court that this witness of tender years cannot be relied upon to prove the guilt of the herein accused.
Firstly, there is no showing that this child witness understood the obligation of an oath; moreover, she was not sworn before she
testified. Secondly, and more important, she has committed contradictions during the cross-examination." Nonetheless, the trial
court convicted the accused on the basis of his extra-judicial confession which was corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti
despite the protestations of the accused that his confession was involuntary and he had an alibi.

The extra-judicial confession of Antonio consists of two pages. Page one is marked as Exhibit D and contains his signature on
the left hand margin while page 2 is marked as Exhibit D-1 and contains his signatures at the bottom and also on the left hand
margin. Reproduced in full, it reads as follows

STATEMENT OF ANTONIO GAJETAS TAKEN BY MSGT FORTUNATO T. TOME AT ODIONGAN, ROMBLON ON JANUARY 8,
1972 IN THE PRESENCE OF CPL PABLO FAMAITGA AS INTERPRETER:

QUESTION: You are being apprised your rights under the Constitution of the Philippines and after which you testify under oath
as follows. Do you understand?

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

Q: — Do you voluntarily submit yourself for investigation without fear of favor?

A: — Yes, sir.

Q: — State your name and other personal circumstances?

A: — Antonio Gajetas, 29 years of age, married, Grade II, farmer and a resident of Sitio Igcalape, Tumingad, Odiongan,
Romblon.

Q: — Why are you here in the Office of the Chief of Police at Odiongan, Romblon?

A: — I went here, sir.

Q: — Why did you come here?

A: — To surrender, sir.

Q: — Why are you surrendering?

A: — Because I have killed Pansing Fosana.

Q: — Why and where did you kill Pansing Fosana?

A: — Because she refused to submit to me her body and I killed her at the house in Sitio Canlumay, Tumingad, Odiongan,
Romblon.

Q: — When did you kill Pansing Fosana'?

A:— At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of January 6, 1972.

Q: — Who was your companion if any'?

A: — Francisco Gajetas

Q: — What is your relation with Francisco Gajetas?

A: — My younger brother, sir.

Q: — Will you explain to this investigator how did you kill Pancing Fosana?

A: — I went up the house together with my brother Paco and while inside the house I approached Pancing and asked from her
to have a sexual intercourse but she refused so that I embraced her and kissed her. She wanted to free herself from my hold
and right thereafter she ran to the window and took a bolo so that I rushed at her and took possession of the bolo. I then scythe
her on her right neck. She fell down on the floor. I observed her no longer moving and believed already dead so that we left her.

Q: — While you were kissing and asking for a sexual intercourse with Pancing Fosana, where was Francisco Gajetas'?

A: — At the door of the house.

Q: — What if any did Francisco Gajetas do when you scythe Pancing Fosana on her neck?

A: — Francisco Gajetas stabbed Pancing Fosana with a bolo hitting her on her left arm.

Q: — Showing to you a scythe with blood stains on it, what has this to do with the scythe you have used in killing Pancing
Rosana?

A: — That is the same scythe sir.

Q: — Who owned this scythe ?

A: — It is mine, sir.

Statement of Antonio Gajetas. cont'd.............................. Page —2 —

.......................................................................................................................................

Q: — What kind of trouser were you wearing when you killed Pancing Fosana?

A: — Khaki pants (burlington)

Q: — If that pants of yours be shown to you can still recognize it ?

A: — Yes, sir.

Q: — Showing to you a khaki burlington long pants with bloodstains on it, what has this to do with the pants you wore when you
killed Pancing Fosana'?

A: — Yes, sir.

Q: — Why did you kill Pancing Fosana after you were not able to have sexual intercourse with her inspite of the force you have
applied to her?

A: — I fear that if she is still alive, she will report the matter to her husband.

Q: — What was your plan before killing Pancing Fosana'!

A: — To abuse her only, sir.

Q: — Do you know that Pancing Fosana is a married woman and if so who is her husband?

A: — Yes, sir. Her husband is Gerondio Ramilo.

Q: — And why did you plan to abuse her when you have already known that she is a married woman'?

A: — Because the husband is not around, sir.

Q: — Do you want to tell us that before you left your house your intention was to go to the house of Pancing Fosana and abuse
her, I am right'?

A: — Yes, sir.

Q: — Who were in the house of Pancing Fosana aside from her that evening'?

A: — Her two (2) children.

Q: — Was there a light inside the house when when you killed Pancing Fosana'?

A: — Yes, sir, coming from the kerosene lamp.

Q: — While you were holding, embracing and kissing Pancing Fosana, what was Francisco Gajetas doing, if any'?

A: — He was just looking at us.

Q: — Where was he?

A: — At the door sir.

Q: — Were you able to have sexual intercourse with Pancing Fosana that evening and if so, for how many times?

A: — I was not able to have a sexual intercourse with her because she was moving.

Q: — After you scythe her and she fell down on the floor, did you not take advantage of her being injured already?

A: — No more, sir.

Q: — Are you willing to sign this statement of your free and voluntary will consisting of two (2) pages?

A: — Yes, sir.

(SGD) ANTONIO GAJETAS

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of January 1972 at Odiongan, Romblon.

(SGD.) Illegible

___________

To prove that his extra-judicial confession was extracted through violence and intimidation, Antonio testified that he and
Francisco were brought by Sgt. Fortunato Tome to the PC barracks in the afternoon of January 7, 1972, where they were
investigated; that when he and his brother refused to admit the crime, Tome struck him on the neck; that afterwards Tome
brought him to a corner where he was severely beaten and then he and his brother were ordered to dance naked on top of a
table and when they refused they were beaten with a 3-inch wide belt, hit with fist blows on the chest and kicked on several parts
of the body; that he was forced to drink one-half glass of gin mixed with one-half glass of salt; that he was also ordered to
swallow a lighted cigarette butt; that the beating continued so he told the PC that to avoid punishment he was willing to admit
having committed the crime although he was innocent; that he was then brought to the municipal building and lodged in its jail;
that when he was asked if he committed the crime and answered in the negative he was repeatedly beaten by Patrolmen
Manuel Fabroa and Freddie Fojas and five other persons who were drunk; that these atrocities caused him to admit the
commission of the crime; and that when he appeared before Municipal Judge Cezar Maravilla he could not complain because he
was being watched by Sgt. Tome.

On the defense of alibi, Antonio testified that in the evening of January 6, 1972, he was at home together with his seven children
and Francisco, that neither he nor Francisco left the house that night; that Francisco joined him in order to cut timber which was
their occupation. Francisco corroborated Antonio's testimony and additionally Renato Gajetas, Antonio's 10-year old son testified
that he, his father and brothers and his uncle Francisco did not leave the house in the evening of January 6, 1972.
Like the trial court, we cannot accept the claim of the appellant that his confession was not freely given and that he was
elsewhere when the crime was committed.

On the extra-judicial confession, both Sgt. Fortunato Tome and Pat. Manuel Fabroa testified that no force, intimidation or
violence was used in the taking of the confession. No less than a defense witness, Corporal Pablo Famatiga declared that the
accused gave their statements voluntarily. The relevant portion of his testimony is reproduced as follows:

Q. Did Antonio Gajetas and Francisco Gajetas voluntarily give their statements'?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why do you say that they voluntarily gave their statements?

A. When I was in the Office Sgt. Tome investigated and propounded the questions and they answered, "yes, sir."

Q. Did Sgt. Tome exert force or violence to extract the statements from Antonio Gajetas and Francisco Gajetas?

A. I have not seen or heard any threatening words or maltreatment.

Q. What about from the side of Antonio Gajetas and Francisco Gajetas did you not hear them making any complaints about the
way they are being investigated or treated by Sgt. Tome?

A. Nothing.

I am through with the witness.

(pp. 11-12, tsn., Nov. 13, 1972.)

Moreover, we have Exhibit X, reproduced supra, where the appellant admitted having killed the deceased Panchita Fosana
Ramilo. It has to be stressed that Exhibit X was signed by the appellant with the assistance of the counsel, Atty. Nemesio G.
Ganan who did not ask that his clients be medically examined if it were true that they were coerced in giving their confessions.
Then we have the appellant's offer to plead guilty provided that Francisco be dropped from the charge. And finally, the
confession of the appellant shows no signs of suspicious circumstances which tend to cast a shadow on its integrity. It is replete
with details which only the appellant could have supplied. All these circumstances belie the appellant's claim that his
extra-judicial confession was not given voluntarily.

As to the defense of alibi, it has to fail not only because it is contradicted by the appellant's confession which has been shown to
be voluntary but also because it was not impossible for him to have committed the crime. For as the trial court said: "There is
ample evidence to prove that the house of the deceased is only around 3-1/2 kilometers away from the house of Antonio
Gajetas, and that the distance can be negotiated in less than one hour by walking. 'There was therefore no physical impossibility
for the accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission (People vs. Manabat, 100 Phil. 603; People vs.
Limpo, L-13058, Jan. 28, 1961; People vs. Divinagracia, L-1061, Mar. 13, 1959; People vs. Raquel, 12 SCRA 441).

The killing of Panchita Fosana Ramilo by Antonio having been established only remains to be considered his claim that he did
not attempt to rape the deceased.

The appellant claims that the first requisite of an attempted felony, namely: That the offender commits overt acts to commence
the perpetration of the felony (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1961 ed., p. 90) was not present. He supports this claim by
stating:

The information merely states --- embrace, attack and assault one Panchita Fosana Ramilo, a pregnant woman, with intent of
having carnal knowledge of her against her will - - -Embracing is not an overt act that commences the perpetuation of rape or
intent to have carnal knowledge of the victim,

Even the purported extra-judicial confession exhibits "D" and D- 1 " only stated, — I approached Pancing and asked from her to
have a sexual intercourse but she refused so that I embraced her and kissed her --- Asking her to have a sexual intercourse is a
mere showing of a desire, a mental expression not within the realm of Criminal Law. Embracing and kissing are not overt acts
commencing the perpetration of rape. In order that the overt act may be considered as commencing the perpetration of a felony
there must be a direct relation and intimate connection between the overt act and the felony intented to be committed. If the
intention is to rape a woman the overt act may be putting the woman flat on bed or on the floor, or raising her dress, or forcibly
removing her panty if she had one or mounting on top of her, or touching delicate parts of her body or exposing his private part
or the like but not merely embracing and kissing because these are only unjust vexation or at most acts of lasciviousness which
are still far from and cannot be considered as overt acts commencing the perpetration of rape. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10; rollo,
pp. 64-65.)

The trial court did not err in considering appellant's act of embracing the victim with intent of having carnal knowledge of her
against her will as an overt act commencing the perpetration of the crime of rape. For, were it not for the resistance offered by
the victim, said act of the appellant would have naturally ended up with the consummation of his criminal objective of having
carnal knowledge of the victim against her will which he expressly admitted in his extrajudicial confession.

The offender's act need not be one of these mentioned by the appellant in order to be considered as an overt act commencing
the perpetration of the crime of rape when the criminal objective of having carnal knowledge of the victim against her will is
admitted or is sufficiently established and said act would naturally end up with the consummation of said criminal objective
unless frustrated by some external cause or by offender's voluntary desistance. Furthermore, even the mentioned acts would not
be considered as overt acts commencing the perpetration of the crime of rape when it is sufficiently established that the man had
no intention of having sexual intercourse with the woman without her consent. Of vital importance, therefore, is the criminal
objective in performing the act. Was there intent to commit rape? The evidence shows there was. Hence the trial court correctly
convicted the appellant of the crime of attempted rape with homicide.

WHEREFORE, finding appellant Antonio Gajetas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide,
the judgment under review is hereby affirmed in all respects. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180425 July 31, 2008

FELIX RAIT, Petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Court of
1 2
Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23276 dated January 26, 2006 and its Resolution dated October 10, 2007. The
3
Court of Appeals upheld the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 20, wherein petitioner
Felix Rait was convicted of attempted rape.

4
On November 18, 2003, AAA asked permission from her parents to go to her brother’s house in Nazareth Street to get her
athletic pants. When she was there, her brother requested her to buy cigarettes from a nearby store. While in the store,
petitioner Rait and one Janiter Pitago arrived. The two ordered beer and invited AAA to join them. She initially refused. However,
when Aurora Raez, another neighbor, joined them, AAA was forced to drink beer. After drinking a glass of beer, she became
drunk. When she was feeling weak, petitioner and his co-accused brought her out to 20th and 21st Streets where the petitioner
and his co-accused brought her to the side of the street and forcibly removed her pants and underwear. Petitioner then forcibly
inserted his finger into her vagina. AAA tried to shout for help but petitioner covered her mouth while Pitago held her feet.
5
Petitioner was on top of her and about to insert his penis into her vagina but she was able to kick both men and run away.

AAA then went to her brother’s house and related the incident to him. Her brother went out to find petitioner. When AAA’s brother
did find petitioner, he tried to beat petitioner with a stick but the latter ran away. AAA and her brother then went home to their
parents’ house in Tambo, Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City and told them what happened. At about 3:00 a.m. of November 19,
AAA was accompanied by her brother and stepmother to Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw to report the incident. They also went
to Bombo Radyo to appeal for help in apprehending petitioner. From there, they went to the Provincial Hospital for AAA to
6
undergo medical examination. They then proceeded to the police station where the incident was recorded on the police blotter
7
under Entry No. 8085.

On May 26, 1994, Rait and Pitago were charged in an Information, which reads:

That on or about November 19, 1993, at 2:00 o’clock in the morning, more or less (sic) at Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime
of Rape, directly by overt acts, on the person of a [17-year-old] minor, [AAA], by then and there (sic), with force and against the
latter’s will while she was in a state of intoxication, touching her breasts, removing her panty, holding her feet (by Janiter Pitago)
and lying on top of her (by Felix Rait), but did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Rape, by
reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous desistance, that in when (sic) offended party was able to kick them and
the two ran away.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 335 in relation to Article 6, of the Revised Penal Code.

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby finds the accused Felix Rait guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Attempted Rape.

The basic penalty for Attempted Rape under Article 335 is two degrees lower than Reclusion Perpetua or Prision Mayor in its full
extent. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is entitled to a penalty lower to (sic) Prision Mayor or that of
Prision Correccional in its full extent, (sic) hence, accused FELIX RAIT is sentenced to an Indeterminate Sentence of PRISION
CORRECCIONAL in its medium period as the minimum to PRISION MAYOR in its medium period as the maximum under the
same law.
The accused is entitled to his credit in full (sic) in his favor the period during which he was under preventive imprisonment
pending litigation.

Accused herein is further ordered to pay the complainant the sum of ₱20,000.00 pesos (sic) as indemnity for Attempted rape to
the complainant (sic); ₱5,000.00 pesos (sic) for actual damages and expenses and to pay the costs.

8
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner appealed the judgment to the CA-Cagayan de Oro. Petitioner alleged that the RTC erred in: (1) giving credence to the
prosecution witnesses despite their inconsistent, contradictory and incredible testimonies; (2) in not finding that petitioner was
implicated in the case by reason of spite and vengeance; and (3) in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
9
crime of attempted rape despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt.

10
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s ruling in all respects. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.

Petitioner now comes before this Court on the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT CONVICTING THE
PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED RAPE, DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH
THE LAW ON RAPE AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN [NOT DOWNGRADING] THE CRIME OF
11
ATTEMPTED RAPE TO ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS IF NOT THAT OF UNJUST VEXATION.

Petitioner argues that he should be acquitted of the crime of attempted rape. If he is to be found guilty of any offense, he puts
12
forward the theory that based on this Court’s ruling in Baleros, Jr. v. People, he should be convicted only of unjust vexation.

The petition is bereft of merit. We deny the Petition for Review.

First, the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive upon this Court. In this case, the
trial court found the acts imputed to petitioner to have been duly proven by the evidence beyond reasonable doubt. We are
bound by such finding.

On the strength of those proven facts, the next question is: what was the offense committed?

Petitioner argues that this Court’s ruling in Baleros is applicable to his case.

In Baleros, accused was convicted of attempted rape. The CA sustained the conviction. Upon review, this Court reversed the
conviction and found accused guilty of light coercion. The Court declared:

Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs. Lamahang,
stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense;
that which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and
consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the
purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous,
then what obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code.

There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case. The next
question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while
on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.

Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime,
more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense.

Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a
chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily
ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape
Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou,
let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate
intention, is anybody’s guess. The CA maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of
the complainant. Plodding on, the appellate court even anticipated the next step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim
had been rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA:

The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to come later. His sexual organ is not yet exposed
because his intended victim is still struggling. Where the intended victim is an educated woman already mature in age, it is very
unlikely that a rapist would be in his naked glory before even starting his attack on her. He has to make her lose her guard first,
or as in this case, her unconsciousness.

At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice disfavored under the rule on evidence in criminal
cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the premises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever.
The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth
soaked in chemical. And during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and
having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner
do not determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the
second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring an accused of
a crime the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, it cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark
of the inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the information against petitioner contains sufficient
details to enable him to make his defense. As aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege
malice, restraint or compulsion in information for unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of
restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not
productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person. The paramount question is
whether the offender’s act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is
directed. That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual
attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the
13
acts of petitioner.

We are not persuaded by petitioner’s argument. Several facts attendant to this case distinguish it from Baleros, enough to
convince us to arrive at a different conclusion.

Unlike in Baleros, the acts of petitioner clearly establish his intention to commence the act of rape. Petitioner had already
successfully removed the victim’s clothing and had inserted his finger into her vagina. It is not empty speculation to conclude that
these acts were preparatory to the act of raping her. Had it not been for the victim’s strong physical resistance, petitioner’s next
step would, logically, be having carnal knowledge of the victim. The acts are clearly "the first or some subsequent step in a direct
14
movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made."

Under Article 6, in relation to Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape
15
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

This Court has held that an overt or external act -

is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or
preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The
raison d’etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of
acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that
quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the
commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the
reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is
necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was
the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are
made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must
have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary
16
relation to the offense.

Thus, we find that petitioner was correctly convicted of attempted rape.

A final observation. We note that the trial court’s Decision sentenced petitioner to a prison term without specifying the period this
sentence covers. We will rectify this error even as we affirm petitioner’s conviction.

The penalty for attempted rape is prision mayor, or two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the penalty for consummated
rape. Petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence the minimum of which is in the range of prision correccional,
or within six months and one day to six years, and the maximum of which is prision mayor medium, or within eight years and one
day to ten years. In this case, the trial court sentenced petitioner to "an Indeterminate Sentence of PRISION CORRECCIONAL
in its medium period, as the minimum, to PRISION MAYOR in its medium period, as the maximum."

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23276 dated January 26,
2006 and its Resolution dated October 10, 2007 affirming petitioner’s conviction for ATTEMPTED RAPE are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of
prision correccional medium, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as its maximum. In all other respects, the
trial court’s Decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166441 October 8, 2014

NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. The
felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the
offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute
attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's vagina.

The Case

1
This appeal examines the decision promulgated on July 26, 2004, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction
for attempted rape of the petitioner by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union (RTC), and imposing on him the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10)
2
years of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordering him to pay moral damages of ₱20,000.00 to AAA, the victim.

Antecedents

The petitioner was charged in the RTC with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving different victims. At arraignment,
he pleaded not guiltyto the respective informations, to wit: Criminal Case No. 2388

Attempted Rape

That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, along the Bangar-Luna Road, Barangay
Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar,Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation commenced the
commission ofrape directly byovert acts, to wit: While private complainant AAA, an unmarried woman, fifteen (15) yearsold, was
sleeping inside the tentalong Bangar-Luna Road, the said accused remove her panty and underwear and lay on top of said AAA
embracing and touching her vagina and breast with intent of having carnal knowledge of her by means of force, and if the
accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the said AAA it was not because of his voluntary
desistance but because the said offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of said accused to the damage and
prejudice of said offended party.

3
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 2389

Acts of Lasciviousness

That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 3:00 o’clock in the morning, along the Bangar-Luna Road, Barangay
Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
4
the above-named accused with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touch the vagina of [BBB]
against the latter’s will and with no other purpose but to satisfy his lascivious desire to the damage and prejudice of said
offended party.

5
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Version of the Prosecution

 6
The CA summarized the version of the Prosecution as follows:

x x x [Petitioner] Norberto Bartolome and [his wife] Belinda Cruz were engaged in the selling of plastic wares and glass wares in
different municipalities around the country. On December 20, 1993, Norberto and Belinda employed AAA and BBB to help them
in selling their wares in Bangar, La Union which was then celebrating its fiesta. From Libsong East, Lingayen, Pangasinan to
Bangar, La Union, AAA and BBB boarded a passenger jeepney owned by Norberto. The young girls were accompanied by
Norberto, Belinda, Ruben Rodriguez (driver) and a sales boy by the name of "Jess".

Upon reaching Bangar, La Union, at around 8:00 in the evening of December 20, 1993, they parked in front of Maroon
enterprises. They brought out all the goods and wares for display. Two tents were fixed in order that they will have a place to
sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in order to get more goods to be sold.

On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, AAA and BBB went to sleep. Less thanan hour later, AAA was
awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching her private part. AAA
realized that she was divested of her clothing and that she was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she’ll be
killed. AAA tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She fought back and
kicked Norberto twice.

Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told her not totell the incident to her mother
otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but she failed to wake him up.

Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. AAA saw her
companion awake but her hands wereshaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside.

Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place that early morning. Later still, while they were on their
way to fetch water, AAA and BBB asked the people around where they can find the municipal building. An old woman pointed to
them the place.

In the evening of December 21, 1993, AAA and BBB went straight to the municipal hall where they met a policeman by the name
of "Sabas".

They told Sabas the sexual advances made to them by Norberto. Norberto was summoned to the police station where he
personally confronted his accusers. When Norberto’s wife, Belinda, arrived at the police station, an argument ensued between
them.

On December 22, 1993, at around 2:20 o’clock in the morning, the police investigator ordered the complainants to return at6:00
o’clock in the morning. Norberto and Belinda were still able to bring AAA and BBB home with them and worked for them until
December 30, 1994, after which they were sent back to Lingayen, Pangasinan.

On January 10, 1994, AAA and BBB went back to La Union and executed their respective sworn statements against Norberto.

Version of the Defense

7
The petitioner denied the criminal acts imputed to him. His version was presented in the assailed decision of the CA, as
follows:

In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a totally different version of the story. The accused maintains that it
was not possible for him to commit the crimes hurled against him. On the date of the alleged incident, there were many people
around who were preparing for the "simbang gabi". Considering the location of the tents, which were near the road and the
municipal hall, he could not possibly do the dastardly acts out in the open, not to mention the fact that once AAA and BBB would
scream, the policemen in the municipal hall could hear them. He believes that the reason why the complainants filed these
cases against him was solely for the purpose of extorting money from him.

Judgment of the RTC

After the joint trial of the two criminal cases, the RTC rendered its judgment on April 6, 2000 finding the petitioner guilty beyond
8
reasonable doubt of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388 and acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. 2389, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring the accused NORBERTO CRUZ Y
BARTOLOME guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of ATTEMPTED RAPE and ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS as
defined and penalized in Article 335 in relation with (sic) Article 6, par. 3 and Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code respectively.
With respect to the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS
PRISION MAYOR as Maximum and the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the victim AAA the amount of
₱20,000.00 as moral damages.

With regard to the crime ofACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) MONTHS ARRESTO MAYOR as Minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS
PRISION CORRECCIONAL as Maximum and the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the victim BBBthe amount
of ₱10,000.00 as moral damages.

The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused by reason of the two cases is counted in his favor.

9
SO ORDERED.

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the petitioner contended that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him of attempted rape despite the dubious
credibility of AAA, and of acts of lasciviousness despite the fact that BBB did not testify.

On July 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner for attempted rape in Criminal Case
No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of lasciviousness charged in Criminal Case No. 2389 due to the insufficiency of the
10
evidence, holding thusly:

In sum, the arguments of the accused-appellant are too puerile and inconsequential as to dent, even slightly, the overall integrity
and probative value of the prosecution's evidence insofar as AAA is concerned.

Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two (2) degrees"
prescribed by law for the consummated felony. In this case, the penalty for rape if it had been consummated would have been
reclusion perpetuapursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penalty Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The penalty two
degrees lower than reclusion perpetuais prision mayor.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be the medium period of prision mayorin the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty nextlower to
that prescribed for the offense which in this case is prision correccionalin any of its periods.

We also find that the trial court correctly assessed the amount of ₱20,000.00 by way of moral damages against the
accused-appellant. In a rape case, moral damages may be awarded without the need of proof or pleading since it is assumed
that the private complainant suffered moral injuries, more so, when the victim is aged 13 to 19.

Insofar as the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against BBB, the accused argues that there is not enough evidence to
support such accusation. BBB did not testify and neither her sworn statement was formally offered in evidence to support the
charge for acts of lasciviousness.

In this case, the evidence adducedby the prosecution is insufficient to substantiate the charge of acts of lasciviousness against
the accusedappellant. The basis of the complaint for acts of lasciviousness is the sworn statement of BBB to the effectthat the
accused-appellant likewise molested her by mashing her breast and touching her private part. However, she was not presented
to testify. While AAA claims that she personally saw the accused touching the private parts of BBB, there was no testimony to
11
the effect that suchlascivious acts were without the consent or against the will of BBB.
Issues

In this appeal, the petitioner posits that the CA’s decision was not in accord with law or with jurisprudence, particularly:

I. In giving credence to the incredulous and unbelievable testimony of the alleged victim; and

II. In convicting the accused notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt.

Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails the behavior and credibility of AAA. He argues that AAA still continued working for him
and his wife until December 30, 1994 despite the alleged attempted rape in the early morning of December 21, 1994, thereby
belying his commission of the crime against her; that he could not have undressed her without rousing her if she had gone to
sleep only an hour before, because her bra was locked at her back; that her testimony about his having been on top of her for
nearly an hour while they struggled was also inconceivable unless she either consented to his act and yielded to his lust, or the
incident did not happen at all, being the product only of her fertileimagination; that the record does not indicate if he himself was
also naked, or that his penis was poised to penetrate her; and that she and her mother demanded from him ₱80,000.00 as
12
settlement, under threat that she would file a case against him.

On the second issue, the petitioner assails the glaring inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA that cast doubt on her veracity.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is partly meritorious.

13
In an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court reviews only questions of law. No review of the findings of fact by
the CA is involved. As a consequence of thisrule, the Court accords the highest respect for the factual findings of the trial court,
its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies and the conclusions drawn from its
factual findings, particularly when they are affirmed by the CA. Judicial experience has shown, indeed, that the trial courts are in
the best position to decideissues of credibility of witnesses, having themselves heard and seen the witnesses and observed
firsthand their demeanor and deportment and the manner of testifying under exacting examination. As such, the contentionsof
the petitioner on the credibility of AAA as a witness for the State cannot beentertained. He thereby raises questions of fact that
are outside the scope of this appeal. Moreover, he thereby proposes to have the Court, which is not a trier of facts, review the
entire evidence adduced by the Prosecution and the Defense.

Conformably with this limitation, our review focuses only on determining the question of law of whether or not the petitioner’s
climbing on top of the undressed AAA such thatthey faced each other, with him mashing her breasts and touching her genitalia
with his hands, constituted attempted rape, the crime for which the RTC and the CA convicted and punished him. Based on the
information, supra, he committed such acts "with intent of having carnal knowledge ofher by means of force, and if the accused
did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance
but because the said offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of said accused to the damage and prejudice of
said offended party."

There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
14
cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Lamahang, the Court, speaking through the
eminent Justice Claro M.Recto, eruditely expounded on what overt acts would constitute anattempted felony, to wit:

It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a
particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading
directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation
to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. xxxx But it is not sufficient, for the
purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary
to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon
its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said
beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. x x x x.

"It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage iswanting, the nature of
the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts of
execution (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature, by the facts to which they are
related, by the circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith, they must show
without any doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor
as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent aswell as a punishable act, must not and cannot furnish grounds by
themselves for attempted or frustrated crimes. The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense
of which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertainedfrom the facts and therefore it is
necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instance of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of the
perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt
to exist, the offender must commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts performed
15
must be such that, withoutthe intent to commit an offense, they would be meaningless."

To ascertain whether the acts performed by the petitioner constituted attempted rape, we have to determine the law on rape in
effect on December 21, 1993, when the petitioner committed the crime he was convicted of. That law was Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provided as follows:

Article335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived ofreason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding
paragraphs shall be present.

xxxx

The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge isdefined simply as "theact of a
16
man having sexual bodily connections with a woman," which explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates the rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the peniscapable of consummating the sexual act touches
17 18
the external genitalia of the female. In People v. Campuhan, the Court has defined the extent of "touching" by the penis in
rape in the following terms:

[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight
brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be
sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeedtouched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be "touched"
bythe penis, are by their natural situsor location beneath the mons pubisor the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to
attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora
of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.

The pudendumor vulvais the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis,
labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubisis the rounded eminence that becomes
hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majoraor the outer lips of the female
organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair
follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands.
Directly beneath the labia majorais the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majoramust be entered for rape to be
consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. xxxx Thus, a grazing of the surface of the
female organ or touching the mons pubisof the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing
of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendumby the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. [Bold emphasis supplied]

19 20
It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita, the Court clarified that the ruling in People v. Eriñia whereby the offender was
declared guilty of frustrated rapebecause of lack of conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party,
was a stray decisionfor not having been reiterated in subsequent cases. As the evolving case law on rape stands, therefore,
rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the
Revised Penal Codeare that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and (2)
that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will. Obviously, the offender attains his purpose
from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his victim, because from that moment all the essential elements of the offense
21
have been accomplished, leaving nothing more to be done by him.

Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In this connection, the character of the overt actsfor purposes of the attempted
22
stage has been explained in People v. Lizada:

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more
than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense. The raison d’etrefor the law requiring a direct overtact is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the
accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his
declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a
commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed,
and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the
accused is.It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is
sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that
the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense. (Bold emphasis supplied)

In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having
carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires
the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt actswithout the offender performing all the acts of execution
that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a
causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent,
23
being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal law, that showing must be through his overt acts directly connected with
rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape withoutsuch overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short,
the State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt acts, should his criminalintent be carried to its complete
24
termination without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape, for, as succinctly put in People v.
25
Dominguez, Jr.: "The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement
of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption."

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing her
breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such
circumstances thatrape, and no other,was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and
lewd designs towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double interpretation,"
as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such that it was not permissible to directly infer from them the intention to
cause rape as the particular injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rapehad he been allowed by her to continue, and to
have sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to
26
him) could also be ultimate felony.
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape did not include equivocal
preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but the latter,
whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the preparatory
27
acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony. His preparatory acts could include his putting up of the
separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife
to leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to rape. As a
rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Codefor as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain
28
significance, because by their equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrator’s intent really was.

If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of lasciviousness?

It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender’sintent to lie with
29
the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness.
Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate.
The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the
30 31
external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.

Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is consummated whenthe following
essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of
either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the
32
offended party is deprived ofreason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years of age. In
that regard, lewdis defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that has relation to moral
33
impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.

The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on top of said AAA embracing and
touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina
and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the
position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts
reflected lewdness and lust for her.

The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any, unless
34
he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. A good illustration of this can be seen in People v. Bugarin, where the
accused was charged with attempted rape through an information alleging that he, by means of force and intimidation, "did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and
there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the undersigned [complainant], a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all against her
will, however, [he] did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Rape by reason of some
causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, undersigned complainant push[ed] him away." The accused was
held liable only for acts of lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape "is not apparent from the actdescribed," and the
intent to have sexual intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court also pointed out that
35
the "act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual intercourse."

Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being guilty of acts of lasciviousness, is punished with prision
correccional. In the absence of modifying circumstances, prision correccional is imposed in its medium period, which ranges
from two (2) years, four (4) months and one day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum of the penalty should come from arresto mayor, the penalty next lower than prision correccionalwhich ranges from
one (1) month to six (6) months. Accordingly, the Court fixes the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as
the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as the maximum.
In acts of lasciviousness, the victim suffers moral injuries because the offender violates her chastity by his lewdness. "Moral
1âwphi1

damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
36
they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission." Indeed, Article 2219, (3), of the Civil Code
37
expressly recognizes the right of the victim in acts of lasciviousness to recover moral damages. Towards that end, the Court,
38
upon its appreciation of the record, decrees that ₱30,000.00 is a reasonable award of moral damages. In addition, AAA was
39
entitled to recover civil indemnity of ₱20,000.00.

Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, the courts are vested with the discretion to impose interest as a part of the damages in
crimes and quasidelicts. In that regard, the moral damages of ₱20,000.00 shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from
40
the finality of this decision until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME guilty of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS, and, ACCORDINGLY, PENALIZES him with the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of arresto
mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as the maximum; ORDERS him to
pay moral damages of ₱30,000.00 and civil indemnity of ₱20,000.00 to the complainant, with interest of 6% per annum on such
awards reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 CASES UNDER PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
G.R. No. 225336, September 05, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AQUIL PILPA Y DIPAZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before this Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by the accused-appellant Aquil Pilpa y Dipaz (Pilpa) assailing the Decision2 dated
June 8, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05822, which affirmed the Decision3 dated September 26,
2012 of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 in Criminal Case No. 03-217857, finding Pilpa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder.

The Facts

An Information was filed against Pilpa for the murder of Dave Alde (Alde), the accusatory portion of which reads:

"That on or about August 23, 2003, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with others
whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence
upon the person of one DAVE ALDE Y BURAYAG, by then and there stabbing the latter with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the
chest, thereby inflicting upon the said DAVE ALDE Y BURAYAG mortal stab wound which was the direct and immediate cause of
his death thereafter.

Contrary to law.

The version of the prosecution, as summarized in its Appellee's Brief,5 is as follows:

On August 23, 2003, around 8:00 in the evening, prosecution eyewitness Barangay Tanod Leonila Abuel went to Quirino
Highway, Pandacan, as she was assigned by her officer in charge to look for a certain Reynan. When she arrived at the
highway, she saw a group of five persons which include Dave Alde (Alde for brevity), the victim, Carol (Carol Asis) and Eva
(Evangeline Abuel) and two other people the names of which she failed to remember. She approached the said group and asked
if they knew the whereabouts of Reynan to which Carol answered in the negative. While still talking to the group, another group
of five men, which included one named "JR" and appellant Aquil Pilpa (Pilpa for brevity) arrived. At this point, "JR" stabbed Alde
on the chest with a big knife while appellant was positioned at the back of Leonila. After "JR" stabbed Alde, appellant, who was a
mere arms-length away from Leonila, poised to thrust Alde as well. At this point, witness Leonila tried to intervene by
announcing her position as Barangay Tanod but appellant disregarded said intervention by uttering "wala kaming pakialam kahit
Barangay Tanod ka[.]" Witness Leonila sustained injuries as she attempted to parry the thrusts. Appellant's attempts to stab Alde
ultimately failed because "Choy[,]" a companion of Alde, was able to parry the thrusts. Leonila then ordered Alde to run away
which he was able to do despite his wounds, but appellant and his group gave chase. Thereafter, appellant and his group
scampered away.

Subsequently, Alde was brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be given timely medical attention.

While Alde was brought to the hospital, tanod Leonila, accompanied by the police, one of them, PO3 Benedict Cruz, caught up
appellant who was found in a house near the railroad. She identified appellant as one of the group. Appellant was then arrested
and brought to the hospital as it is the standard operating procedure to provide medical attention to suspects. When appellant
was brought to the hospital, the victim Alde positively identified appellant as one of those who stabbed him.

Dr. Nolan Alandino was the physician on duty at the emergency room when Alde was admitted. Alde underwent emergency
surgery due to the stab wounds inflicted on him. Dr. Alandino then referred Alde for further surgery. Alde underwent an operation
on both sides of the chest and repair was made on his heart. Such operation ended around 11:40 pm of the same day.
Unfortunately, twenty minutes after the operation, while in the recovery room, Alde went into cardiac arrest and succumbed to
death.6

On the other hand, the version of the defense, as summarized by the RTC, is as follows:

For his defense, accused alleged that on August 23, 2003 between 8:00 to 8:30 in the evening, he was at the billiard hall
operated by a certain Aling Cora located in front of their house. Pilpa played with companions whose names he did not know.
After few minutes of playing, he left the billiard hall at around 8:30 pm then went straight home to sleep. The accused lived
together with "JR" and the latter's two sisters and mother. Just when he was about to sleep, policemen arrived to arrest him and
"JR" Niepes. The policemen informed that JR stabbed somebody and because of this, [Pilpa] was brought to Police Station 10.
Incidentally, JR was not at home at the time of the (sic) arrest. Herein accused maintained that he was not in the place of
incident and denied that he was with alias JR when the stabbing incident happened. [Pilpa] further denied that he had
participation in the killing of the victim and stressed that he was not familiar with the identities of the witnesses presented by the
prosecution. Further, the accused clarified in court that he had no motive to attack or kill the victim as he did not even personally
know Dave Alde.7

Pilpa was arraigned on September 27, 2004, in which he pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged.8 Pre-trial and trial thereafter
ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, in its Decision dated September 26, 2012, the RTC convicted Pilpa of the crime of Murder. The
dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused AQUIL PILPA GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code qualified by treachery and
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA without eligibility of parole. They are ordered to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of the victim DAVE ALDE the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages
and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, he shall be given full credit for the
period of his preventive detention conformably to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.9 (Emphasis in the original)

The RTC found that the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses Leonila Abuel (Leonila), Evangeline Abuel
(Evangeline) and Carolina Asis (Carolina) deserved to be given greater evidentiary weight over the general denial by Pilpa that
he was not at the place of the incident at the time it took place. The RTC held that Pilpa was liable - although it was only the
certain "JR" who was able to inflict stab wounds on the victim - because there was conspiracy among the assailants of Alde.10
As conspiracy was present, the RTC ruled that all of the assailants were liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and
character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime perpetrated in furtherance of such conspiracy.11

The RTC also found that treachery attended the killing of Alde, hence Pilpa was liable for Murder instead of Homicide. The RTC
reasoned that "[t]he attack made by Aquil Pilpa and his group to the victim was so swift and unexpected affording the hapless
and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself."12

Aggrieved, Pilpa appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision dated June 8, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Pilpa, and held that (1) the prosecution
was able to sufficiently prove the elements of the crime charged; (2) conspiracy exists among Alde's assailants; and (3) the
element of treachery was present in the killing of Alde.
The CA held that conspiracy may be deduced from the conspirators' conduct before, during and after the commission of the
crime indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and community of interests - and that the facts of the present case reveal
such concerted action to achieve the purpose of killing Alde.13 The CA further held that treachery was present despite the fatal
assault being a frontal attack, because the said attack was sudden and unexpected and the victim was unarmed.14

The CA, however, modified the award of damages to be paid to the heirs of Alde. The CA added the amount of P15,000.00
representing additional actual damages because the heirs were able to show receipts with the said amount representing
expenses for the wake and burial of Alde.15

Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue

For resolution of this Court are the following issues submitted by Pilpa:

(1) Whether the CA erred in convicting Pilpa despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;16
(2) Whether the CA erred in convicting Pilpa despite the prosecution's failure to prove that conspiracy exists;17
(3) Whether the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.18

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partially meritorious. The Court affirms the conviction of Pilpa but for the crime of Homicide, instead of Murder, as
the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not present in the killing of Alde.

First and Second Issues: The existence of conspiracy and Pilpa's criminal liability

The first two issues, being interrelated, are discussed jointly.

In questioning his conviction, Pilpa harps on the fact that the evidence establishes that he attempted only to stab Alde after "JR"
had already stabbed him. He argues essentially that (1) the attempt to stab Alde was not a crime in itself, and (2) in any event,
the crime had already been consummated by "JR" alone at the time he made the said attempt. Pilpa further contends that this
attempt was not evidence that he was part of the conspiracy, if any, to kill Alde.

The arguments deserve scant consideration.

It is well-established that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.19 Conspiracy is the unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. There is
conspiracy if at the time of the commission of the offense, the acts of two or more accused show that they were animated by the
same criminal purpose and were united in their execution, or where the acts of the malefactors indicate a concurrence of
sentiments, a joint purpose and a concerted action.20
It is true that the elements of conspiracy must be proved by the same kind of proof � proof beyond reasonable doubt �
necessary to establish the physical acts constituting the crime itself.21 However, this is not to say that direct proof of such
conspiracy is always required. The existence of conspiracy need not, at all times, be established by direct evidence; nor is it
necessary to prove prior agreement between the accused to commit the crime charged.22 Indeed, conspiracy is very rarely
proved by direct evidence of an explicit agreement to commit the crime. Thus, the rule is well-settled that conspiracy may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, where such conduct reasonably
shows community of criminal purpose or design.23

In the present case, both the RTC and CA correctly inferred from the collective acts of the assailants that conspiracy exists
despite the absence of direct evidence to the effect. As the prosecution correctly argued:

To prove conspiracy, it is not needed that a meeting between the perpetrators be proven. Such conspiracy may be inferred from
the conduct before and immediately after the act of the people involved. The conduct of appellant and "JR" in approaching the
group of Alde, stabbing him and running after him, indubitably shows that they had agreed to kill him. After the incident,
appellant was also found to be in "JR"s home. It is contrary to human experience and logic to be present at the home of a friend
who had just stabbed another without being aware of such occurrence as appellant alleges.

xxxx

It cannot be disputed that the acts of appellant and "JR" were done with a common goal of achieving the death of Alde. Their act
of stabbing him cannot be interpreted to mean anything else other than they wanted to inflict him serious harm. Such acts of
stabbing done to achieve a common goal indicate concerted action and concurrence of sentiments which is adequate in proving
that a conspiracy exists.

xxxx

The fact that appellant was unable to actually stab Alde, not by his own volition but due to the parry of Alde's companion "Choy",
does not preclude the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy can rightly be inferred and proven by the acts of stabbing committed
by both appellant and "JR" jointly and concertedly. The existence of conspiracy renders appellant as a co-principal even if he
failed to actually stab Alde.

Appellant's lame attempt to refute the existence of conspiracy relying on the cases of People vs. Jorge and People vs. Iligan, et.
al. is misplaced because in those cases, the persons involved did not take part in the actual stabbing. In this case, appellant
himself took part in the stabbing. Furthermore, appellant's assertion that such crime was already consummated by "JR" and
therefore appellant can no longer be liable for conspiracy is untenable and without basis. The fact that "JR" was able to stab
Alde first does not mean that appellant who stabbed him next can be exculpated from conspiracy. Otherwise, every conspiracy
charge may be thwarted by the mere fact that one of the conspirators beat the others to the act.24 (Underscoring and additional
emphasis supplied; italics in the original)

To further establish his innocence, Pilpa relies on alibi and denial, and the imputation of ill-motive on the prosecution witnesses.
Pilpa reiterates that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of the incident, and the eyewitnesses' testimonies,
particularly those of Carolina and Evangeline, should not be accorded evidentiary weight as they were long-time friends of Alde.

Again, Pilpa's arguments fail to convince.

The Court has oft pronounced that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and
credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony
which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.25 Further,
the continuing case law is that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other
place when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime or its
immediate vicinity through clear and convincing evidence.26 These, Pilpa was unable to prove.
Long-time friendship, without more, is not sufficient to constitute ill-motive so as to taint an eyewitness' testimony. And even
assuming, without conceding, that the Court could not accord Carolina's and Evangeline's testimonies any evidentiary weight,
the result would nevertheless be the same. It bears to stress that Pilpa was positively identified, not just by Carolina and
Evangeline, but also by the barangay tanod Leonila and by the victim himself when the latter was in the hospital.27

In this connection, the Court quotes with approval the following ratiocination of the CA:

Appellant failed to show that the prosecution witnesses were prompted by any ill-motive to falsely testify or accuse him of a
crime as grave as murder. In fact, appellant admitted that it was only during the trial of the present case that he saw the witness
Leonila Abuel. Settled is the rule that where no evidence exists to show any convincing reason or improper motive for a witness
to falsely testify against an accused, the testimony deserves faith and credit.

In the face of the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses, appellant's denial and alibi vanish into thin air. Alibi and
denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained
the identity of the accused as in this case. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.28

Without doubt, therefore, Pilpa should be liable for the killing of Alde.

Third Issue: Existence of the Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery

In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that the qualifying circumstance was present, thereby making Pilpa
liable for Murder instead of Homicide. The CA held:

On the account of the eyewitnesses Leonila Abuel, Evangeline Abuel and Carolina Asis, appellant and his companions suddenly
appeared in front of the victim without any warning or provocation. JR stabbed the victim on his chest. Thereafter, appellant
aimed to stab the victim but somebody was able to parry his thrust. The sudden and unexpected attack deprived the
unsuspecting victim of any real chance to defend himself, ensuring the attack without risk to his assailants and without sufficient
provocation on the victim's part. Likewise, the means employed on the victim assured his assailants of no risk at all arising from
the defense that the victim might make. What is decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was
rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.

Thus, as correctly pointed out by the court a quo:

"The attack made by Aquil Pilpa and his group to the victim was so swift and unexpected affording the hapless and unsuspecting
victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself. Even if the victim was with his companions, the attackers were equipped with
bladed weapons and this ensures that the victim shall be without chance to keep himself safe from the violent and treacherous
acts of the accused[.]"29

On the other hand, Pilpa claims that the existence of treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence before the
same could be appreciated. He insists that "[i]n the absence of any convincing proof that the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the means by which they committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the Honorable Court must
resolve the doubt in favor of the accused."30

On this issue, the Court rules in favor of Pilpa.

It was error for both the RTC and the CA to conclude that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery
simply because the attack was "sudden," "unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation."31 It does not always follow
that because the attack is sudden and unexpected, it is tainted with treachery.32

As the Court held in People v. Santos,33 "[t]reachery, just like any other element of the crime committed, must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence � evidence sufficient to establish its existence beyond reasonable doubt. It is not to be
presumed or taken for granted from a mere statement that "the attack was sudden"[;] there must be a clear showing from the
narration of facts why the attack or assault is said to be "sudden."34
Stated differently, mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where the mode adopted by
the assailants does not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their
criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer.35 Specifically, it must clearly
appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to accomplishing the act
without risk to the aggressor.36

In the case at bar, the testimonies of Leonila, Evangeline, and Carolina reveal that the assailants attacked the victim while the
latter was having a seemingly random conversation with four friends in a public highway (Quirino Highway),37 and even in the
presence of a barangay tanod, who later joined the group. Under these circumstances, the Court finds it difficult to agree that the
assailants, including Pilpa, deliberately chose a particular mode of attack that purportedly ensured the execution of the criminal
purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. To repeat, the victim was with five
persons who could have helped him, as they had, in fact, helped him repel the attack. The Court thus fails to see how the mode
of attack chosen by the assailants supposedly guaranteed the execution of the criminal act without risk on their end. As the
Court similarly held in People v. Tumaob:38

x x x. The qualifying circumstance of treachery can not logically be appreciated because the accused did not make any
preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure the commission of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for
the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In addition, the attack itself was frontal. In People v. Tugbo, Jr.,40 the Court held that treachery was not present because the
attack was frontal, and hence, the victim had opportunity to defend himself. While a frontal attack, by itself, does not negate the
existence of treachery, when the same is considered along with the other circumstances as previously discussed, it already
creates a reasonable doubt in the existence of the qualifying circumstance. From the foregoing, the Court must perforce rule in
favor of Pilpa and not appreciate the said circumstance.

With the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime is therefore Homicide and not Murder. The penalty for
Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying circumstance, the
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is
prision mayor with a range of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.

Thus, Pilpa shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.41

Finally, in view of the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta,42 the damages awarded in the questioned Decision are hereby
modified to civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages of P50,000.00 each.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court DECLARES accused-appellant
Aquil Pilpa y Dipaz GUILTY of HOMICIDE, for which he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Dave Alde the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as temperate
damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187534 April 4, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DIMA MONTANIR, RONALD NORVA AND EDUARDO CHUA, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

1
For consideration of this Court is the Decision dated April 22, 2008 of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CR-HC No. 00499,
2
affirming with modification the Decision dated October 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch
171, finding Appellants Dima Montanir, Ronald Norva and Eduardo Chua, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The records bear the following factual antecedents:

Josie Herrera, Robert Uy, Alicia "a.k.a. Alice" Buenaflor, together with appellants Ronald Norva and Eduardo Chua, on
December 17, 1997, concocted a plan to kidnap Rafael Mendoza, and after several days of conducting surveillance on their
intended victim, on January 5, 1998, they decided to kidnap Rafael in Ali Mall, Cubao, Quezon City. However, the intended
kidnapping failed, because Rafael did not show up at the said place. On February 5, 1998, a second attempt was made, but they
encountered an accident before they could even execute their original plan.

Around 5:30 a.m. of February 17, 1998, Alicia called up Rosalina Reyes, a partner of Rafael, to tell her that she wanted to meet
her and Rafael at Jollibee, BBB, Valenzuela City to settle the former's loan of ₱350,000.00. She requested Rosalina to bring the
land title which she was given as collateral for the said loan.

Rosalina and Rafael arrived at Jollibee ahead of Alicia. Eventually, around 9:15 a.m. of the same date, Alicia showed up outside
the store aboard a car. She was with appellant Ronald Norva. Alicia motioned Rosalina and Rafael to approach the car, which
the two did as requested. While inside the vehicle, Alicia introduced appellant Ronald as her cousin. Later on, Alicia informed
Rosalina and Rafael that she would pay them at her place.

When the car passed by the street where Alicia's house was located, Rosalina asked the former where they were going. Alicia
answered that they had to drop by the house of her financier who agreed to redeem her title and substitute as her creditor.
Trusting Alicia, Rosalina and Rafael did not protest. They finally reached a house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City.

Thereafter, appellant Ronald alighted from the vehicle and talked to a man inside a store, later identified as Jonard Mangelin.
The gate of the house was then opened by appellant Dima. The car proceeded to the garage and Rosalina and Rafael were
asked to go inside the house. Rosalina followed Alicia, while Rafael trailed Rosalina as they entered through a kitchen door.
They passed by a man (Jessie Doe) who was washing his hands in the sink. While Rosalina was walking behind Alicia, she
suddenly heard a dull moan coupled with the sound of stomping feet. She looked back at the direction where the sounds came
from and saw Rafael being forcibly dragged inside a room. She decided to look for Rafael and on her way, she saw "Jessie Doe"
place his hand on Rafael's mouth and poke a gun at him. Rafael struggled to get free. Rosalina pleaded with "Jessie Doe" to
have pity on Rafael because of his existing heart ailment. Appellant Ronald rushed towards her, poked a gun at her mouth, tied
her to a bed and warned her not to make any noise. He told her that all they want is her money, upon which, Rosalina said that if
they really wanted money, they should untie Rafael, who then appeared to be on the verge of having a heart attack. Rosalina
was untied and she immediately rushed to Rafael and began pumping his chest. She asked Jonard, who had just entered the
room, to help her pump Rafael's chest while she applied CPR on the latter. Jonard did as told. While CPR was being
administered, appellant Dima started removing all of Rafael's personal belongings, which include his ring, wallet, watch and
other items inside his pocket, and passed them on to appellant Ronald.

Afterwards, appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to take Rosalina to another room. While inside the room where she was brought,
Rosalina begged Jonard to help her escape. Jonard was moved by Rosalina's plea and agreed to help her. During their
conversation, Jonard told Rosalina that two women had tipped them off as the kidnap victims. When asked who they were,
Jonard refused to reveal their identities.
Rosalina was transferred to the master's bedroom around 12:00 noon because certain female visitors arrived. After the visitors
left, Rosalina was returned to the room where she was previously taken. Rosalina asked Jonard about Rafael's condition, to
which he replied that Rafael would be brought to the hospital. A little later, at around 1 p.m., Jonard went to check on Rafael and
confirmed that he was still alive.

Around 2:00 p.m., Rosalina heard the sound of someone being pummelled. Feeling nervous, she asked Jonard the whereabouts
of Rafael and was told that he was brought to the hospital. But unknown to Rosalina, Rafael had just died and his body was
placed inside the trunk of a car.

Around 6:30 p.m., Rosalina was informed that she will be brought to another safe house. She was taken to a car and placed at
the back seat, together with Jonard and three other men, later identified as Larry, Jack and Boy. The driver of the car was
appellant Ronald. Appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to cover Rosalina's head with a jacket which Jonard did. As they were
about to leave, the man seated beside Ronald started to talk. Rosalina recognized the voice of Robert. She then lifted the jacket
covering her head and was able to confirm that the one talking was Robert. Rosalina cried, "Robert, Robert, why did you do this,
we did not do anything to you" and Robert responded, "Pasensiyahan na lang tayo."

By 10:00 p.m., they arrived at a certain house in Pandi, Bulacan where there was no electricity. Thus, they lit candles for
illumination. Rosalina found the house familiar and concluded that it was Alicia's. Rosalina was brought to a room on the second
floor and while inside the room, she was told by one of the men guarding her that one of the leaders wanted to talk to her. Per
the leader's instruction, the guard put out the candle light. The man then seated himself beside Rosalina and warned her against
escaping as they were a large and armed group. Rosalina recognized the voice as that of Robert's. Before he left the room,
Robert gave instructions to Jonard and the other men inside. Meanwhile, the group started digging a pit at the back of the same
house near the swimming pool.

Around 3:00 a.m. of the following day (February 18), the group buried Rafael's body in the pit. Thereafter, Robert instructed
appellant Ronald to tell Jonard that the latter should kill Rosalina, which Jonard refused to do. Nonetheless, Robert instructed
Jonard and the others to guard Rosalina well, as he himself would deal with her upon his return.

Rosalina heard the car leave around 5:00 a.m. of the same day. Sensing that Jonard was sympathetic to her, Rosalina begged
him again to help her escape for the sake of her children.

When electricity was restored around 8 p.m., one of the men guarding Rosalina turned off the light inside the room. The room
was only illuminated by a light coming from the hallway. Rosalina saw a person wearing a wig and sunglasses enter the room.
Rosalina recognized him as Robert. Trying to mimic a woman by modulating his voice, Robert told her that Rafael was in the
hospital and that he could still sign a check. He asked Rosalina the whereabouts of the other land titles and the identities of the
other financiers whom she knew. Rosalina replied in the negative. Robert angrily poked a gun at her and shouted, "That's
impossible," and then left the room. He gave instructions to his members and left.

At 9:00 p.m., Jonard went to Rosalina and told her about Robert's order to kill her, which caused the latter to panic and cry. She
then implored the help of Jonard for her escape. Afterwards, Jonard went to his companions Larry, Jack and Boy and told them
that he would help Rosalina escape. His companions immediately cocked their guns and an argument ensued. Rosalina talked
to them and begged them all to spare her life. One of Jonard's companions told Rosalina that if they would allow her to escape,
they too would get into trouble. Taking advantage of the situation, Rosalina suggested that all of them should escape. They all
agreed to escape in the early morning.

Around 5:00 a.m., Rosalina, Jonard, Larry, Jack and Boy left the safe house. They walked through a rice field for about 30
minutes and then boarded a jeepney bound for Balagtas, Bulacan. From Balagtas, they took a bus going to Cubao and arrived
at 7:30 a.m. Rosalina pawned her pieces of jewelry for ₱1,500.00 and gave the ₱1,000.00 to Larry, Jack and Boy. The three told
Jonard to stay with Rosalina so that she would have a witness and, in case Rosalina would further need their help, left their
address with Jonard.

When the three left, Rosalina immediately called Rafael's brother Tito, and related what happened to her and his brother. When
Tito asked Jonard which hospital Rafael was brought to, Jonard revealed to Rosalina that Rafael died at the safe house in
Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City. Rosalina called her lawyer, Atty. Teresita Agbi and asked her to meet them at Farmer's, Cubao.
When Atty. Agbi arrived, she accompanied them to the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) where an
investigation was conducted.
The following day, at 4:00 a.m., two groups from the DILG were formed to arrest Alicia, Josie, the appellants, and Robert. Alicia
and Josie were not at their homes, while appellants Ronald and Dima were arrested at the residence of Robert. While at the
DILG office, Rosalina positively identified appellants Ronald and Dima as her kidnappers. Meanwhile, Jonard accompanied the
police authorities to the safe house in Pandi, Bulacan and showed them where the body of Rafael was buried. The remains of
Rafael was later on exhumed.

Thereafter, two Informations were filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City (Branch 171), with the following allegations:

Criminal Case No. 123-V-98

That on or about the 17th day of February 1998 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then private person, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one ROSALINA REYES against her will and detained her, thereby depriving her of her
liberty for a period of two days.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. 124-V-98

That on or about the 17th day of February 1998 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then a private person, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one RAFAEL MENDOZA against his will and detained him, thereby depriving him
of his liberty and on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, Jonard and appellants Ronald, Dima and Eduardo, pleaded "not guilty" to the
crime charged. Robert Uy, Alice Buenaflor and Jessie Doe remained at-large during the trial of the case. Jonard was later on
discharged as a state witness. Afterwards, the trial on the merits ensued.

On October 28, 2004, the trial court rendered judgment against the appellants for the crime of kidnapping, the dispositive portion
of which, reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused DIMA MONTANIR, RONALD NORVA, and EDUARDO CHUA are hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and in accordance with Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, this Court hereby imposes the penalty of DEATH on accused NORVA and MONTANIR. As regards accused CHUA,
this Court hereby imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Further, accused Montanir, Norva and Chua are hereby held jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs of Mendoza the amount
of Php 71,000.00 in actual damages and Php 50,000.00 as moral damages.

As for accused JOSIE HERRERA, the Court hereby ACQUITS her on reasonable doubt of the charge of kidnapping.
Consequently, The Jail Warden of Valenzuela City Jail is hereby ordered to cause the immediate release of the said accused
from detention unless she is otherwise being detained for some other legal and lawful cause.

With regard to accused ALICE BUENAFLOR, ROBERT UY and one JESSIE DOE, let the cases against them be ARCHIVED
pending their apprehension. Meantime, let an alias warrant issue for their apprehension.

Considering the penalty imposed on accused MONTANIR, NORVA and CHUA, let the entire records of these cases be elevated
to the Court of Appeals for appropriate review of the judgment herein rendered.

SO ORDERED.

On automatic review, the CA affirmed the conviction with modification on the penalty imposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the impugned Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty of death
imposed on accused Montanir and Norva is hereby modified to reclusion perpetua to conform to and in accordance with
Republic Act No. 9346. Appellants Montanir, Norva and Chua are ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of ₱50,000.00
as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victims.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the present appeal.

In their respective Briefs, appellants raised the following assignment of errors:

DIMA MONTANIR:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT DIMA MONTANIR GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE.

EDUARDO CHUA:

I.

THE DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT CHUA A CONSPIRATOR TO THE COMMISSION OF
KIDNAPPING.

RONALD NORVA:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT RONALD NORVA GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE.

First of all, it must be emphasized that the crime committed by the appellants, as ruled by the trial court and affirmed by the CA,
is the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide. After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31,
1993 by Republic Act No. 7659, Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, now provides:

Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall
have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public
officer;

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim
or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts,
the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

3
As expounded in People v. Mercado:

4
In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for ransom and murder
committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found the accused guilty of
the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:

x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping with murder or
homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of the kidnapped
victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately resorted to but was
merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide
can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime
under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.

5
This Court further discussed the nature of the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide in People v. Larrañaga, thus:

A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special complex crimes under the
6 7 8
Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide, (2) robbery with rape, (3) kidnapping with serious physical injuries, (4)
9 10
kidnapping with murder or homicide, and (5) rape with homicide. In a special complex crime, the prosecution must
necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were made the
subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding
thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture
or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In
the cases at bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was
raped "on the occasion and in connection" with her detention and was killed "subsequent thereto and on the occasion thereof."
Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be convicted of the
special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape. It appearing from the overwhelming
11
evidence of the prosecution that there is a "direct relation, and intimate connection" between the kidnapping, killing and raping
of Marijoy, rape cannot be considered merely as an aggravating circumstance but as a component offense forming part of the
12 13
herein special complex crime. It bears reiterating that in People vs. Ramos, and People vs. Mercado, interpreting Article
267, we ruled that "where the person killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought
or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be
treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Article 267." The same
principle applies here. The kidnapping and serious illegal detention can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated
as separate crime but shall be punished as a special complex crime. At any rate, the technical designation of the crime is of no
consequence in the imposition of the penalty considering that kidnapping and serious illegal detention if complexed with either
homicide or rape, still, the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed.

In this particular case, the Information specifically alleges that the appellants wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped Rafael
Mendoza against his will and detained him, thereby depriving him of his liberty and on the occasion thereof, the death of the
victim resulted. The trial court, in its decision, particularly in the dispositive portion, merely stated that the appellants were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping, however, its mention of the phrase, in accordance with Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, this Court hereby imposes the penalty of DEATH on accused Norva and Montanir, clearly
refers to the crime committed as that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide. The appellants, therefore, were
correctly punished under the last paragraph of Article 267 as the evidence presented during the trial, in its entirety, undoubtedly
proves that the death of Rafael Mendoza, although of natural causes, occurred on the occasion of the kidnapping.

Delving on the arguments presented by the appellants in this Court, their corresponding briefs pose a single common argument
– the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime charged
against them. In particular, they questioned the inconsistent testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. According to them,
the said inconsistent statements from the witnesses, tarnish their credibility.

This Court finds otherwise.

14
The question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. For this reason, its observations and
15
conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal. This rule is variously stated thus: The trial court's assessment of the
credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or
16
unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered. Absent any showing
that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result
of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by appellate
17
courts.

Appellants claim that Jonard, a witness for the prosecution, stated in his Sinumpaang Salaysay that he was the one who
whispered to appellant Ronald to transfer Rosalina to another room so that the latter would have no idea that Rafael was in a
critical condition, but during trial, Jonard testified that it was Ronald who instructed him to transfer Rosalina to a different room.
Appellants also point out that in the same sworn statement, Jonard averred that he resided in Taguig since October, 1987, which
is contrary to what he testified in court that he resided in that same place since 1997. In addition, appellants further argue that in
her testimony, Rosalina declared that she was with four men seated at the back of the car when she was brought to Pandi,
Bulacan, however, Jonard, in his own testimony, stated that there were four of them including Rosalina seated at the back of the
car.

A close reading of the above inconsistencies asserted by the appellants show that the same refer only to minor details and
collateral matters and do not affect the veracity and weight of the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. What really
prevails is the consistency of the testimonies of the witnesses in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of
the appellants. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their
18 19
testimonies are not rehearsed. They are thus safeguards against memorized perjury.

Anent the inconsistencies of the contents of the affidavits and that of the testimonies in court, this Court has already ruled that
testimonies in court are given more weight than affidavits, thus:

x x x x Affidavits are not entirely reliable evidence in court due to their incompleteness and the inaccuracies that may have
20
attended their formulation. In general, such affidavits are not prepared by the affiants themselves but by another person (i.e.,
investigator) who may have used his own language in writing the statement or misunderstood the affiant or omitted material facts
in the hurry and impatience that usually attend the preparation of such affidavits. As this Court has often said:

An affidavit, "being taken ex-parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion, and
sometimes from want of suggestion and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected
collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all
21
that belongs to the subject."

We have too much experience of the great infirmity of affidavit evidence. When the witness is illiterate and ignorant, the
language presented to the court is not his; it is; and must be, the language of the person who prepares the affidavit; and it may
be, and too often is, the expression of that person's erroneous inference as to the meaning of the language used by the witness
himself; and however carefully the affidavit may be read over to the witness, he may not understand what is said in a language
so different from that which he is accustomed to use. Having expressed his meaning in his own language, and finding it
translated by a person on whom he relies, into language not his own, and which he does not perfectly understand, he is too apt
to acquiesce; and testimony not intended by him is brought before the court as his.' (2 Moore on Facts, sec. 952, p. 1105;
22
People v. Timbang, 74 Phil. 295, 299).

23
For this reason, affidavits have generally been considered inferior to testimony given in open court.

Incidentally, the CA was correct in stating that Jonard was able to explain and reconcile the minor discrepancies in his testimony
by saying that he whispered to appellant Ronald that Rafael was in a bad condition and afterwards, it was appellant Ronald who
instructed him to transfer Rosalina to another room, thus:

Atty. Basco:

Referring to the same statement, Mr. Witness, on page 20 of the TSN dated February 24, 1999 referring to the same statement,
Mr. Witness, in your statement here when asked:

Q. Then what happened, Mr. Witness, when you answered in the manner? And your answer was:

A Ronald Norva told me, "Pare, the old man is in bad condition, you better transfer Mrs. Reyes to another room so that she could
not see the condition of the old man."

Q So which is which Mr. Witness? It was you who gave order or instruction to Mr. Ronald Norva or it was he who gave
instruction?

Atty. Gabi: Can we have the translation of that statement?

Atty. Basco: That is a very inconsistent statement of the witness?

A: This is like this, ma'am.

Atty. Basco: Just answer my question. Which is which, Mr. Witness? Which is the truth, your salaysay or your testimony on
February 24 in open court?

A: The two are true, ma'am, because when I whispered to him that the old man was in a bad condition he gave me instruction to
24
transfer Mrs. Reyes to another room.

The same is true with his inconsistent statements regarding his time of residence in Taguig, thus:

Q Mr. Witness, you said in your Sinumpaang Salaysay of February 19, 1998 that you were residing in Taguig at Maharlika
Village sometime in October 1987? Do you confirm that?

Atty. Mendoza:

May we ask for the translations, Your Honor.

A No, sir, the actual year is 1997, not 1987.

Q So you are correcting your answer in your salaysay of February 19, 1998 under paragraph No. 13 wherein you answered:
"Ako po ay nakikitira sa kaibigan kong si Ting sa Muslim Area, Maharlika Village, Taguig, Metro Manila nuong buwan ng
Oktubre, 1987." You are changing the 1987 to 1997?

25
A The truth is 1997, sir.

Apellant Dima, in his Brief, insists that the prosecution was not able to establish his participation in the commission of the crime
because he was merely the house helper of the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela, when the kidnappers and the victims
arrived. In the same vein, appellant Ronald asserts that there was no convincing evidence presented by the prosecution that will
point to his clear participation in the crime because he was just the driver of the car that brought the victims to the place where
the latter were kept. Appellant Eduardo also insists that he was not a participant in the offense charged in the Information.
Basically, the appellants deny any participation in the kidnapping.

In convicting the appellants, the trial court, based on the evidence presented, naturally found the existence of conspiracy among
the perpetrators. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
26
and decide to commit it. Verily, when conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not
individual, that render all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations, the act of one being
27
deemed to be the act of the other or the others, in the commission of the felony. Each conspirator is responsible for everything
done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural
consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to
the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out
28
of the purpose intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in
conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with
29
intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and
30 31
substantively from that which they intended to commit. As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v. Andolscheck,
"when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and
membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them."

A scrutiny of the records show that the trial court did not err in finding conspiracy among the appellants, as they each played a
role in the commission of the crime. The trial court correctly found the denial of appellant Dima that he had knowledge of the
kidnapping, unbelievable. The appellant’s bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the
prosecution witnesses’ positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution
32
witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense. The trial court ruled:

As for accused Montanir, again, this Court finds the testimonies of prosecution witnesses more credible than his testimony
applying the same principle that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from a mouth of a credible witness but must be
credible in itself, such that the common experience and observation of mankind can show it as probable under the
circumstances.

Certainly, this Court is not convinced by accused Montanir's claim that he was at Ciudad Grande because he was a house boy of
accused Chua after he admitted the circumstances under which he has to live there a few days before the victims were brought
there.

To begin with, this Court does not buy accused Montanir's explanation that he transferred to Chua because he was looking for a
permanent job is hardly credible because he himself admitted that when he was brought by accused Uy to the residence of
accused Chua at Ciudad Grande, it was the understanding that it would be accused Uy who would be paying his salary. Why
would accused Uy pay the salary of accused Montanir if he was to work as a house boy of accused Chua? Evidently, the only
plausible reason why accused Uy would pay the salary of accused Montanir is because he was actually working for the former
and only posted in the house of accused Chua at Ciudad Grande to play his part in the execution of the planned kidnapping.
This conclusion is bolstered by accused Montanir's admission that he never even spoke with accused Chua during all those
times that he stayed at accused Chua's residence as in fact, he took orders from accused Uy.

Moreover, this Court finds it rather perplexing that accused Montanir would suddenly go back to the house of accused Uy on 19
February 1998 on the shallow reason that he had no companion at Ciudad Grande when precisely he said he was hired as a
33
caretaker thereat while the regular boy was on vacation.

The above conclusion was bolstered by the positive identification of the same appellant and his exact participation in the
execution of the crime, by the witnesses for the prosecution, thus:

WITNESS JONARD

Q Could you tell this Honorable Court what happened, Mr. Witness?
A When the four (4) entered after ten (10) minutes I heard like a commotion inside the house.

Q Then when you heard the commotion, Mr. Witness, what did you do?

A What I did was I went out of the store to peep thru the window near the lavatory.

Q And what did you see, Mr. Witness?

A I saw Jess and Dems poking a gun to (sic) Mr. Mendoza.

Q Then what happened, Mr. Witness, when they poked a gun?

34
A When they poked a gun and placed the hands of Mr. Mendoza at his back they forcibly entered the room.

WITNESS ROSALINA

Q And then what happened, Ms. Witness?

A And suddenly Jonard Mangelin entered.

Q And what happened?

A I pleaded to him to help me in pumping.

Q What did he do?

A And he helped me.

Q After helping you pumping Mr. Mendoza (sic), what happened to Mr. Mendoza?

A While we were pumping Mr. Mendoza's chest, Dima Montanir was busy removing the things of Mr. Mendoza.

Q When you said things to which are you referring to?

35
A His wallet, watch, ring and all the things in his pocket and gave it to Ronald Norva.

xxxx

A When we returned to the DILG, the persons arrested were already there and when I saw them I recognized them that they
were the ones.

Q Could you tell us the people whom you said were there?

A Dima Montanir.

Q Can you point to him?

(Witness pointing to a man inside the Courtroom, whom when asked his name, answered: Dima Montanir).

Q And who else, Ms. Witness?

A Ronald Norva.

Q Can you point to him also?

(Witness pointing to a man inside the Courtroom whom when asked his name, answered: Ronald Norva).

Q Then what happened, Ms. Witness, after you were able to recognize them?
 36
A I told that they were the ones.

In like manner, appellant Eduardo's denial that he participated in the offense charged does not outweigh the testimonies of the
witnesses positively identifying him as one of the culprits, thus:

WITNESS JONARD

Q Did you follow the instruction, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Why did you follow the instruction?

A Because they are my Boss.

Q When you said they are my Boss, to whom, Mr. Witness, are you referring to?

A Ronald Norva, Robert Uy, Eduardo Chua, Alice Buenaflor and Josie Herrera.

Q You mentioned the name of Josie Herrera, was she there at the vicinity?

A She was not there when the incident happened on February 17, 1998.

Q Why did you include the name of Josie Herrera as one of your bosses, Mr. Witness?

A Because, ma'am. On December 19, 1997 at the middle of that month, Josie Herrera tipped to the group that Mr. Rafael
Mendoza is a good victim because he has lots of money and engaged in a lending business.

Q Were you there when she tipped the person of Mr. Mendoza?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Where was this, Mr. Witness?

A At the house of Robert Uy.

Q Where was the house of Mr. Robert Uy, Mr. Witness?

A Candido Homes Subdivision, West Fairview, Quezon City.

Q That was on (sic) the middle of December, 1997?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Mr. Witness, if this Josie Herrera whom you have referred as one of your Bosses is around this courtroom, could you please
point to her?

(Witness pointing to a lady inside the Courtroom whom when asked her name, answered: Josie Herrera).

Q You also mentioned the name of Eduardo Chua as one of your bosses, why do you say so that he was one of your bosses?

A Because they were the ones planning how they could get Mr. Mendoza.

Q And who were these people planning, Mr. Witness?

A The five (5) of them, ma'am.

Q Who are these five (5), Mr. Witness?

A Robert Uy, Ronald, Alice, Josie Herrera and Eduardo Chua.

Q And where did this happen, Mr. Witness?

A When Josie Herrera tipped to the group on that December, the group made a surveillance to be familiarized with the face of
Mr. Mendoza and Mrs. Reyes.

Q And all the time, Mr. Witness, where was (sic) this happened when you said they were planning?

A At the house of Robert Uy.

Q Did the surveillance took (sic) place, Mr. Witness?

37
A Yes, ma'am.

xxxx

Q And where did you count the surveillance, Mr. Witness?

A Ali Mall, at Cubao, Quezon City.

Q And what was the result of your surveillance, Mr. Witness?

A They saw the victims Mr. Mendoza and Mrs. Reyes. Robert Uy pointed to the two (2) as our victims.

Q Aside from the planning and the surveillance, Mr. Witness, what else took place?

A On January 3, 1998 the first stage of the kidnapping will took (sic) place on January 5, 1998 because they want to make it
quick.

Q Was (sic) the kidnapping take place at that time, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q On January 5, 1998?

A No, ma'am, January 5, that was the first try to kidnap them when we went to Ali Mall but we were not able to see them.

Q You said that there was a first try, was there another try, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q When was that, Mr. Witness?

A On February 5, 1998.

Q What happened? Was that agreed upon by the group, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Who were these people in the group, Mr. Witness?

A Alice Buenaflor, Robert Uy, Ronald Norva, Eduardo Chua and Josie Herrera.

Q And did the kidnapping take place on the second try, Mr. Witness?

A We were not able to take them, ma'am.

Q Then what happened, Mr. Witness?

A On February 5, 1998, on our second try to kidnap them, we were not able to get them because in Ali Mall the car of Alice
Buenaflor was bumped by a taxi.

Q Was there another try after the February 5 try, Mr. Witness?

A On that February 5, when we were not able to take them; they changed the plan.

Q And who participated in the plan, Mr. Witness?

A Eduardo Chua, Robert Uy, Ronald, Alice Buenaflor and Josie Herrera.

Q Is she the same Josie Herrera whom you identified earlier, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Then what happened, Witness?

A After the second try, we were not able to take them, so the plan was changed.

Q What was the plan that was changed? What was the new plan?

38
A They were the ones who knew it. They were the ones planning and I was only being utilized by the syndicate.

It must always be remembered that between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand,
39
and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails.

It is also not disputed that the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela, where the victims were brought was owned by
appellant Eduardo. The trial court was also correct in dismissing the claim of appellant Eduardo that he merely lent his car to
Robert and allowed the latter to occupy his house because Robert had been so accommodating to him and had facilitated his
loan, thus:

Regarding the criminal liability of accused Chua, while it is conceded that the said accused was nowhere in the actual scene of
the incident, this Court nonetheless finds the said accused guilty of kidnapping as one of the conspirators to the commission of
the felony who participated by furnishing the vehicle used in abducting the victims and the house where they were held captive
and where Mendoza died.

Again, this Court applied the time-honored principle that evidence to be believed must come from the mouth of a credible
witness which accused Chua is not. Indeed, this Court finds no iota of truth on the protestation of accused Chua that he knew
nothing of accused Uy's plans. It is simply too good to be true that he allowed Mangelin and accused Montanir to stay at his
house to guard it and attend to his store while his caretakers were having a vacation. Neither could this Court find cogent reason
why accused Chua would allow accused Uy to use his vehicle and house totally oblivious of any plan/design or purpose of
accused Uy. Nor is it credible that accused Chua would allow accused Uy to use his vehicle just to follow up his loan application
and then after the same had been released he (accused Chua) did not come home either to Santa Maria, Bulacan or to Ciudad
Grande, instead, he went straight to the residence of accused Uy, waited for him until the wee hours of the morning of the
following day, 18 February 1998, only to tell accused Uy he was going home. 1avvphi1

It is also bewildering to this Court why immediately after receiving the money he borrowed, he would spend it in going to Davao
with his daughter on 18 February 1988, without any previous plan whatsoever and suspiciously, upon invitation of accused Uy
who had known by then that one of the victims, Mendoza, had died in the course of the kidnapping.

Truly, all of the foregoing facts when taken together with the testimonies of Mangelin and Montanir unequivocally indicate
40
accused Chua's complicity with the criminal design of accused Uy and dissolves the said accused's plea of innocence.

Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a common
41
design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design.
Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to
 42
collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the
consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result
43
that they are in contemplation of law, charged with intending the result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of
44
another conspirator even though such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit.

Considering the above disquisitions, there is no doubt that conspiracy existed in the perpetration of the crime. Thus, all of the
appellants, having been proven that they each took part in the accomplishment of the original design, are all equally liable for the
crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.

Lastly, this Court finds no error in the CA's modification of the penalty imposed by the trial court. The penalty imposed by the trial
45
court, which is Death is now reduced to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 22, 2008 of the Court Appeals, affirming with modification the Decision dated October
28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 171 is hereby AFFIRMED, with further MODIFICATION
that all the appellants herein are equally found GUILTY of the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38674 September 30, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALFREDO REGULAR and ARTURO DE LARA, defendants-appellants.

GUERRERO, J.:

Before this Court for automatic review is the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Seventh Judicial District in Pasig, Rizal,
which was promulgated in open court on April 22, 1974, sentencing the above-named accused Alfredo Regular and Arturo de
Lara to suffer the penalty of death for the killing of prisoner Felipe Ladoy and the penalty of imprisonment from reclusion
temporal minimum to reclusion temporal maximum for seriously wounding prisoner Emilio Esparza.

Here is one of those unfortunate cases that have arisen due to, among other factors, the wretched and deplorable condition of
prison life and confinement which have destroyed the sense and sanity of many of the inmates, goading them to violence, riots,
and even killing fellow prisoners. And thus, this Court had taken a considerate understanding of their plight, their misery and
despair in order that they may not be "reduced to the level of animals and convert a prison term into prolonged torture and slow
death." (See People vs. De los Santos, 14 SCRA 702; also People vs. Alicia, 95 SCRA 227; People vs. Garcia, 96 SCRA 497;
People vs. Abella, 93 SCRA 25; People VS. Dahil 90 SCRA 553).

The information dated August 5, 1972 filed against Alfredo Regular, Arturo de Lara and Clemente Valeriano, charges said
accused with murder and frustrated murder allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of November, 1970 in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while then confined at the said institution, conspiring,
confederating and acting together, with treachery and evident premeditation with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assaulted, attacked and stabbed with improvised deadly weapons, Felipe Ladoy, No. 50600P and
Emilio Esparza, No. 50092P, both sentenced prisoners serving prison sentences in the same institution, thereby inflicting upon
Felipe Ladoy, multiple stab wounds in the different parts of his body, which wounds necessarily produced the latter's death and
simultaneously inflicting upon Emilio Esparza stab wounds on the different parts of the body thus performing all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of murder nevertheless did not produce by reason of causes independent of
their will, that is by the timely and able defense by Esparza which prevented the consummation of the offense of murder.

Contrary to law.

1
One of the accused, prisoner Clemente Valeriano, bolted out of jail before he could be arraigned. During the arraignment of
the two remaining accused, Alfredo Regular and Arturo de Lara, held on August 7, 1972 and with the assistance of counsel de
oficio, Atty. Jose O. Galvan, the following transpired:

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Galvan

Your Honor, I have conferred with the accused Arturo de Lara and Alfredo Regular and after I have explained to them the
contents of the information and having advised them of the consequence of their act they both manifested that they are entering
a plea of guilty.

Court

Arraign the accused.

Atty. Galvan

The accused Valeriano is not here, your Honor.

(At this juncture, the Court Interpreter, after having read the information in tagalog (Pilipino) to the accused, they pleaded guilty.)
Court (Court addressing to accused de Lara)
Q Are you aware that the Court has no other alternative except to impose capital punishment upon you? The only thing that the
Court has to do for you is to recommend you from death to life?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q Since when did you sole-search (sic) about your pleading guilty?

A For a long time already, your Honor.

Q When was that?

A More than a year already, your Honor.

Q Are you a member of the Sigue-Sigue, Sputnik or any other gang?

A Sputnik, Sir.

Q You are from what province?

A Pampanga, Guagua Court (Addressing to accused Alfredo Regular)

Q Are you aware that by pleading guilty you will be punished in accordance with the law and that is death?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q That the only thing that the Court can do for you is to recommend you from death to life?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Since when did you have a sole-search (sic) of your pleading guilty?

A That was a long time ago, your Honor.

Immediately after the arraignment, the Court proceeded in open court to render sentence on the two accused, thus —

WHEREFORE, in view of the spontaneous and voluntary confession of guilt of the accused Alfredo Regular and Arturo de Lara,
the Court finds them guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder as defined in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
in relation to Art. 50 thereto, as charged in the information and hereby sentences them to the penalty of Death as far as the
crime of murder is concerned and to suffer the penalty of seventeen (1 7) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as
minimum to twenty (20) years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum for the crime of frustrated murder, to indemnify the heirs of
Felipe Ladoy the amount of P12,000.00; to pay the amount of P12,000.00 as moral damages and another P12,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and to pay their proportionate share of costs.

However, in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt made by the accused as
provided for, under paragraph 7, Art. 13 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court believes that the imposition of the death penalty
be commuted to reclusion perpetua.

Pursuant to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Flores, State Prosecutor Francisco M.
Guerrero is hereby ordered to present evidence to substantiate the charge of Murder and Frustrated Murder in order to
determine the degree of the culpability of the accused.

In compliance with the directive of the Court "to substantiate the charge of Murder and Frustrated Murder in order to determine
the degree of the culpability of the accused, " the prosecution presented four witnesses. Briefly, the prosecution evidence may
be related, thus:

At about 12:30 in the afternoon of November 16, 1970, prisoners Felipe Ladoy, member of Batang Cebu Gang and Emilio
Esparza, member of Batang Samar Gang, were gathering camote tops at the back of Building 4 of the New Bilibid Prisons.
While they were thus preoccupied, the two accused, Alfredo Regular and Arturo de Lara, together with Clemente Valeriano and
Reynaldo Castro, all members of the rival Sigue-sigue Sputnik Gang, suddenly stabbed Ladoy and Esparza, as a result of which
Ladoy died on the spot while Esparza, who was able to parry the thrust of his assailant, was immediately brought to the New
Bilibid Hospital for treatment of his injuries.

Upon investigation by the prison guards, it was learned that the assailants surreptitiously went out from Dormitory 4-D after
sawing the iron grills at the south end of Building 4. The day before, members of the Sigue-sigue Sputnik Gang were the targets
of darts thrown by the Visayan group composed of Batang Cebu and Batang Samar gangs. The alleged treacherous attack by
the rival group rankled in the minds of the Sigue-sigue members who planned immediate and swift reprisal to avenge the injuries
of their gangmates. Thus, armed with improvised bladed weapons, the assailants pounced upon the unsuspecting victims Ladoy
and Esparza) until the former died and the latter was seriously wounded.

After the stabbing spree, the malefactors returned to their respective dormitories. Later, prisoners Regular, de Lara and Castro
gave up and admitted the killing. They executed extrajudicial confessions acknowledging participation in the incident. In the
meantime, Esparza was treated by Dr. Argente Alejandro who found the following wounds in the different regions of the body:

1. Lacerated wound left shoulder, 3 inches long.

2. lacerated wound anterior aspect, left upper arm, 2 inches long.

3. Lacerated wound, lateral aspect, left upper arm, 2-½ inches long.

4. Two lacerated wounds at left chest, size 1 inch each.

5. Lacerated wound, medial aspect, upper arm, 1 inch long.

6. Lacerated wound, medial aspect, 1 inch long.

Ladoy's autopsy, conducted by Dr. Ibarrola proved that his death was caused by massive loss of blood resulting from multiple
stab wounds found in his body,

On the other hand, the evidence of the defense is as follows:

On the eve of November 15, 1970, while de Lara was in his brigade, he heard Rodulfo Patuga say to his gangmates, Valeriano
and Castro, "Babawi tayo. Abe Castro, Menting ito hindi na malalaman ng mga kasama natin itong pangyayaring ito at hindi
2
natin ipaaalam sa ating mga kasamahan,"

About past 12 o'clock noon, Noli Patuga saw Ladoy and Esparza gathering camote tops at the back of Building 4. The group
approached the victims stealthily. Valeriano stabbed Ladoy first. Patuga and Castro followed suit. Accused de Lara thrust his
improvised weapon into the body of Ladoy only once, upon the command of Patuga, but he did not know whether he hit the
victim.

Accused Alfredo Regular testified that he did not know either Ladoy or Esparza. On November 16, 1970, he alleged that he was
inside his brigade the whole day. During that day, according to this accused, no unusual incident happened inside the prison
walls. He stayed in his brigade up to the 18th of that month. He was called that day to the investigation section of the New Bilibid
Prison. He was investigated by one Ignacio Ferrer. He was made to sign a piece of paper, the contents of which he had not read.
He denied any participation in the killing of Ladoy and the wounding of Esparza. He claimed that he was maltreated by Ferrer so
that he would sign a piece of paper. The room in which he was brought was dark.He was boxed and was beaten with a rubber
stick and a big book.

On being confronted with the fact that de Lara mentioned him as one of those who killed Ladoy and wounded Esparza, Regular
alleged that de Lara implicated him because he bore a grudge against him. Regular alleged that when they were still free, the
girlfriend of de Lara transferred her affection to him. This, according to Regular, made de Lara angry vowing to revenge such
outrage.

After several hearings of these cases, the trial court imposed the same principal penalty it imposed during the arraignment. The
Court found three aggravating circumstances present in the commission of the crime, namely, treachery, evident premeditation,
and recidivism, necessitating the imposition of the appropriate penalties in the maximum period.
In his appeal, appellant Arturo de Lara assigned two errors committed by the trial court, to wit:

1. The lower court erred in holding that appellant Arturo de Lara employed treachery and evident premeditation in killing the
victim Felipe Ladoy and wounding prisoner Emilio Esparza.

2. The lower court erred in finding defendant-appellant Arturo de Lara guilty of the crime of murder and frustrated murder instead
of completely exempting him from any criminal liability on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Appellant Regular contends that the lower court erred in imposing the death penalty based on the allegations of treachery,
evident premeditation and recidivism, which were not fully supported by evidence. The appellants further maintain that they were
only acting in defense of their gangmates, hence the penalties imposed in both cases are not in accordance with law.

At the outset, it must be stated that the plea of guilty by the two accused were improvidently laid. During the arraignment, the
3
trial judge did not adhere strictly to the doctrine laid down in People vs. Apduhan where We postulated the guideline in cases
where there is a plea of guilty by the accused. In the instant case under review, We observe that the trial judge failed to explain
fully to the two accused the meaning and the far-reaching effect of their plea. It was not explained to them the meaning of the
term "treachery," an aggravating circumstance which qualified the crime to murder and frustrated murder respectively. Neither
did the judge explain the terms "evident premeditation" and "recidivism", both aggravating circumstances alleged in the
information which had legal significance and consequences not ordinarily understandable to a layman.

The trial judge asked the appellants whether they were aware that the court had no other alternative except to impose the capital
4
punishment on them without explaining why it had to be so. In People vs. Solacito. We had the occasion to say that, "(j)udges
are duty-bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his
plea and the import of an inevitable conviction."

The trial judge immediately rendered sentence in open court after the arraignment. As an afterthought or as a justification for the
imposition of the capital punishment, the trial judge conducted several hearings and called for presentation of evidence by the
prosecution.

The hearings subsequently held proved that the appellants' plea were not unconditional admissions of guilt and they were not of
such nature as to foreclose appellants' right to defend themselves. Their plea of guilt became ambiguous and qualified in the
light of what transpired during the presentation of evidence that followed.

5
In their extrajudicial confessions, both accused admitted their participation in the killing of Ladoy and the wounding of Esparza.

We have gone over thoroughly the extrajudicial confessions of the two accused. In these extrajudicial confessions, nothing is
said on how the crimes were committed. The only thing that these extrajudicial confessions had brought out of the two accused
is the fact that they had participated in the stabbing spree. In open court, the accused de Lara made explanatory statements on
how he became involved in the case, while the accused Regular completely repudiated his confession.

It is true, of course, that under the Rules and in the spirit of fair play, the whole of the confession must be put in evidence. An
6
extrajudicial confession may be accepted in its entirety or only a part thereof. To accept fragments of the confession which
limits or modifies the criminality of the accused and suppresses others which aggravates such behavior is utterly inconsistent
with justice.

Nevertheless, the aforecited rule admits of certain exceptions, for it is not absolute. There are instances, occasions and
circumstances which can make it justifiably imperative to believe or accept only a part of the confession and reject the rest. One
such instance is when an accused, in his testimony, makes some explanatory statements tending to mitigate his participation in
the crimes committed and the prosecution fails to rebut such testimony.

During the hearings that followed, the prosecution failed to prove that the two accused committed the crime charged in the
information with the attending aggravating circumstances alleged therein.
De Lara's testimony, which was unrebutted, showed that he was only invited to join the group, an invitation which he hesitantly
accepted. Thus, he testified:

xxx xxx xxx

Q The next day, November 16, 1970, where have you been throughout that day, rather, where were you during that day?

A Inside the brigade.

Q From what time did you stay there?

7
A Up to 1:00 o'clock.

Q Were you there when the incident happened?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Tell us what happened on that day?

A In the morning, Noli Patuga called up Clemente Valeriano, Reynaldo Castro and then they went to the "buyong".

Q Did they go to that "buyong" you are referring to?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Were you invited to join them?

8
A Yes, Sir.

There could be no treachery on the part of de Lara considering that he was only invited to join the group immediately before the
incident took place. He had no time to meditate, calculate and reflect in resolving to commit the crime imputed to him. In order
that treachery or alevosia may be considered as a qualifying circumstance that would change the nature of the crime or as an
aggravating circumstance that would augment the penalty, it must be shown that the treacherous acts were present and had
9
preceded the commencement of the attack which caused the injury complained of. There is treachery when the following
requisites concur: (1) the culprit employed means, methods or forms of execution which tends directly and specially to insure the
offender's safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party which means that no opportunity was
10 11
given the latter to do so." (2) that such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen.

The mere fact that the attack was sudden and unexpected does not of itself suffice for a binding of alevosia if the mode adopted
by the accused does not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their
12
criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that might be offered.

Neither can evident premeditation be appreciated against de Lara. While it is true that he heard of the plan to kill some members
of the rival gang the night before the incident took place, he was not part of the group who made the plan. He was just an
13
eavesdropper. He only knew that he was about to participate in the stabbing of Ladoy and Esparza just immediately before it
took place. Given such situation, it cannot be said that de Lara had sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution
to allow him to reflect the consequences of his act. On this, de Lara testified:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Tell us what happened on that day?

A In the morning, Noli Patuga called up Clemente Valeriano, Reynaldo Castro, and then, they went to the "buyong".

Q Did they go to the "buyong" you are referring to?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What about you, did you go with them?

A I went near them and told them I heard what they were talking about last night.

Q Were you invited to join them?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Did you accept their invitation?

A I was still thinking of it and Patuga told me not to think about it anymore because I'm already an "aburido".

Q So at last you joined the group?

14
A Yes, Sir.

It is clear from the foregoing statements that de Lara had no inkling that he would be joining the group before he was invited to
do so. There is reason to believe that he accepted the "invitation" with the knowledge that he had no other recourse but to join
them having eavesdropped the night before, knowing what his fellow prisoners and gangmates might do in case he refused to
join.

The illegal acts committed by others in the group could not be considered against de Lara because conspiracy had not been
clearly established. If there was any conspiracy at all, it was limited to Patuga, Valeriano and de Castro. The plan to kill any
member of the rival gang was hatched by these three men.

With regards to this, de Lara testified as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Q But the fact remains that you planned together with the others to avenge the alleged wrong doing that was made to your
game.

15
A I was not included in the plan, your Honor. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Q What time was the plan made by this Clemente and his companion?

A It was in the evening.

Q Were you there?

A No, Sir, Noli Patuga called the two. (Emphasis supplied)

Q How did you know that there was a plan to kin somebody?

A Because our kubol is near them.

Q Did you tell somebody about the plan?

A No, Sir.
Q How did you come to know about the plan of this Valeriano to kill somebody?

A I heard what they were talking about.

Q From whom did you hear?

A From Noli Patuga.

Q Will you tell us the exact words you hear as far as Noli Patuga is concerned?

A I hear him, "Abe Castro, Clemente Valeriano and Menting ito ay hindi na malalaman ng mga kasama natin itong nangyayaring
ito at hindi natin ipaalam sa ating mga kasamahan.

Q What did you do upon hearing these words?

A I just kept quiet.

Q What time did you hear those words?

A Past twelve in the evening.

Q That was November 15, 1970?

16
A Yes, Sir.

The evidence to prove the elements of conspiracy must be positive and convincing. Pursuant to this rule, it has been held in U.S.
17 18
vs. Magcomot and People vs. Caballero that neither joint nor simultaneous action per se is a sufficient indicium of
conspiracy; a common design must further be shown to have motivated such action.

From the testimonial evidence adduced above, it is clear that de Lara was not included in the plan to retaliate against the injuries
suffered by their gangmates in the hands of their rival gang who caught them unaware that Sunday before Ladoy was slain.

While it cannot be said that de Lara was acting under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, it is
reasonable to conclude that what happened was not entirely his own will and volition for he was more or less forced by his
gangmates to participate in the stabbing spree.

We come now to the other accused, Alfredo regular. It appears that during the taking of testimonial evidence, this accused
evaded answering questions relating to his participation in the killing of Ladoy and the wounding of Esparza. He claimed that on
November 18, 1970, a certain Ignacio Ferrer of the Investigation Section of the New Bilibid Prison brought him into a room
wherein he was investigated and was made to answer some questions. He further alleged that he was boxed and beaten. The
room which he was brought was dark, according to him, despite the fact that he was there from ten in the morning up to three in
the afternoon. Then he was made to sign a piece of paper without reading it so he does not know its contents. The paper he was
referring to turned out to be his confession. As to where he was on that fateful day, Regular testified, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Will you tell us where were you on that fateful day?

A Inside the brigade.

Q Did you remain through the day on November 16, 1970?

A I was inside, Sir.

Q While you were inside the brigade, did you observe any incident that happened?
 19
A None, Sir.

20
In People vs. Catalino, We held that, "(i)t would be unsound practice for the court to disregard the confession of an accused
simply because the accused repudiates it during the trial." It cannot be believed that the confession was coerced from Regular
considering that the confession is replete with details which can only be given by the person who had experienced the same or
21
had taken part in the execution of the acts narrated.

From the extrajudicial confession of both accused, it appears that Regular was not one of the men who planned the killing
incident. As mentioned earlier, the prisoners Valeriano, Patuga and de Castro engineered the stabbing spree and since Regular
was not a co-conspirator, the acts done by the three named prisoners cannot and would not prejudice the appellant.

The same aggravating circumstances, namely, treachery, evident premeditation and recidivism were imputed against Regular.
Treachery cannot be presumed. Like all other circumstances which aggravate or qualify the commission of the crime, the
existence of treachery must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to present evidence to
prove such allegation.

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed miserably to prove that the killing of Ladoy and the wounding of Esparza was attended
with treachery. There were no witnesses who saw how the stabbings were done. Nothing was mentioned in the extrajudicial
confessions of the accused as to the means, methods, or manner of execution of the crimes. This being the case, it cannot be
established by mere suppositions, drawn from circumstances prior to the aggression, that the accused had employed means
tending to insure the success of their dastardly act without any danger to his person. The circumstances specifying an offense or
aggravating the penalty thereof must be proved as conclusively as the act itself, mere presumptions being insufficient to
establish their presence according to law. No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not
22
and they cannot produce the effect of aggravating the crimes of the defendant.

The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation cannot also be appreciated against the accused Regular. It is a proven
fact that Regular was not with the group of Valeriano, Patuga and de Castro when the latter planned the retaliation for the
dart-attack made upon their gangmates.

The circumstances of deliberate premeditation exist only if it could be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there intervened a
period of time long enough in a judicial sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection thus enabling the conscience
23
of the accused to overcome the resolution of his will if he would only pay heed to its warning.

There is no proof that Regular had known of the plan to kill and/or stab any member of the rival gang. The records of the case
are scanty with regards to circumstances prior to the event. While it is true that de Lara, in his confession, alleged that Regular
was one of the men who sawed the iron grills in the window of their brigade, this part of his confession was repudiated by him in
open court. He testified that he implicated Regular because he had a grudge against him for taking away his girlfriend while they
were still free." Regular's own confession do not narrate the events prior to the killing. While this Court is convinced that Regular
participated in the stabbing spree, It is not convinced that he did it with treachery and evident premeditation simply because the
prosecution had failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that indeed the commission of these crimes were attended by the
alleged aggravating circumstances. In the absence of treachery and premeditation, the crimes committed by the two accused
are homicide and frustrated homicide.

24
Both accused are quasi-recidivists. De Lara was serving sentence for robbery while Regular was serving sentence for
25
robbery and theft. In accordance with Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, they shall be punished by the maximum period
of the penalty prescribed for the new felonies which are homicide and frustrated homicide. Although they entered a voluntary
plea of guilty, they are not entitled to the benefits of this ordinary mitigating circumstance because the imposition of the
maximum penalty under Article 160, Revised Penal Code is mandatory. (People vs. Bautista, et al., 65 SCRA 460). The penalty
for homicide is reclusion temporal (Art. 249, R.P.C.) and that for frustrated homicide is one degree lower, (Art. 50, R.P.C.)
although the courts, in view of the facts of the case, may impose upon the accused a penalty lower by one degree than that
which should be imposed under the provisions of Art. 50. (Art. 250, R.P.C.).

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court is hereby MODIFIED. Both accused, Alfredo
Regular and Arturo de Lara, are hereby found guilty of homicide and frustrated homicide and each is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty consisting of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum for the killing of Ladoy. Each is also sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional as minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum for
the stabbing of Esparza. All awards for damages are affirmed without modification Both accused must bear the proportionate
share of the costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78853 November 8, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ROEL PUNZALAN, JOSE BESIDA @ "JOSE VESIDOR", MARIETA MENDOZA and DOMINGO MENDOZA,
accused-appellants.

FELICIANO, J.:

The accused, Marieta Mendoza, appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 30, San
Pablo City, convicting her of the crime of robbery with homicide and imposing on her the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The appellant, together with Roel Punzalan, Jose Besida, and Domingo Mendoza, were charged in Criminal Case No. 4578-SP
in an information which read as follows:

That on or about July 11, 1986 at Poblacion, Alaminos, Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
MARIETA MENDOZA, in conspiracy with her husband DOMINGO MENDOZA and ROEL PUNZALAN and JOSE BESIDA alias
"Jose Vecido" who are also still at large and whose case is still pending in the Municipal Trial Court, except Domingo V.
Mendoza, were all employed as domestic helpers in the house of Judge Conrado Fule an Mrs. Lourdes Fule located in aforesaid
municipality, while conveniently provided with bladed weapons, taking advantage of night time with treachery and evident
premeditation, with abused of superior strength, in disregard of the respect due the offended party and dwelling, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, forcibly entered the bedroom of Mrs. Lourdes Fule where the latter was
sleeping and once inside therein, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously jointly attack assault and
stab Mrs. Lourdes Fule with the weapons they were provided, inflicting upon the latters mortal stab wounds on different parts of
her body which caused her instantaneous death and on the same occasion and by reason thereof, with intent to gain, ransacked
the bedroom of the victim, Mrs. Lourdes Fule and did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, take steal and carry
away cash money in the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS and assorted pieces of jewelry worth ONE MILLION
SIX HUNDRED THIRTY SIX THOUSAND (P1,636,000.00) PESOS, belonging to the victim Lourdes Fule, to the damage and
prejudice of the victim and the surviving heirs, in the amount of ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED FORTY SIX THOUSAND
(P1,646,000.00) PESOS, representing the total amount unlawfully taken and carried away and damages by reason of the death
of aforenamed victim.

Contrary to law. 1

Appellant's co-accused have remained at large up to the present time. Consequently, the prosecution of the case proceeded
only against appellant; the case was archived by the trial court with respect to her co-accused. 2

Appellant proceeded to trial after entering a plea of not guilty on 7 May 1986. 3 On 17 September 1986, after the prosecution
had presented four (4) of its six (6) witnesses, Judge Benedicto Paz inhibited himself on the ground that his landlady was the
sister-in-law of the victim. 4 The case was then re-raffled to the sala of Judge Salvador P. de Guzman Jr. From there the case
was re-raffled again to another sala because Judge de Guzman could not maintain a weekly schedule of trial hearings for the
case. 5 The case was eventually assigned to the sala of Judge J. Ausberto Jaramillo, Jr., who tried the case to completion and
wrote the judgment of conviction dated 22 May 1987. 6

The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds accused Marieta Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide punishable from reclusion perpetua to death aggravated by the circumstances of dwelling, in
disregard of the respect due to the offended party, abuse of superior strength, evident premeditation, nighttime and abuse of
confidence without any mitigating circumstance, and hereby sentences her to the applicable penalty of death. Fortunately, for
accused Marieta Mendoza, however, the death penalty has to be reduced to life imprisonment in accordance with Article III,
Section 19(1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Accused Marieta Mendoza shall indemnify the heirs of Mrs. Lourdes Fule the sum of P30,000 as civil liability for her death and
shall also indemnify them the peso equivalent of the US$5,000, P70,000 and P1,500,000.00 representing the stolen items,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED. 7

The facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:

The accused Marieta is married to accused Domingo Mendoza. Since two years prior to the incident in question, the former, was
employed on an off-and-on basis with the family of the Fules until the time when the daughter of the family cook Nieves Garcia
Santos left when accused Marieta became a permanent househelp. Accused Marieta's primary duty was to attend to the needs
of Mrs. Lourdes Fule who was then 66 years old, sick with hypertension. To be able to promptly administer to the needs of her
mistress, the accused Marieta was made to sleep immediately outside the door of her mistress so that medicines could be given
to her as the need arises. The accused Roel Punzalan was one of the houseboys of the Fules since about 4 to 5 months prior to
the incident while accused Jose Besida alias "Jose Vecidor" was hired two months prior, at the instance and effort of accused
Domingo Mendoza. A week prior to the incident all the accused plotted to rob Mrs. Fule who had a collection of jewelries and
certain amount of cash.

On 9 July 1985 accused Domingo Mendoza arrived at 9:00 a.m. and stayed at the servants' quarters of the Fule compound
located at corner Del Pilar and Rizal Avenue, Alaminos, Laguna. He was seen in close huddle with the other said accused. He
spent the night until the next day of July 10, 1985 (sic). After the master of the house, Judge Conrado Fule left for Manila at
about 4:00 p.m. all the accused were seen to be in secret and close conversation. Accused Domingo Mendoza was heard to
have uttered "Ituloy na natin wala si Judge Fule". Accused Domingo Mendoza left at 6:30 p.m. that day. At about 7:30 p.m.
Gregorio Fule had supper at his mother's house while being served by Nieves Garcia Santos and accused Marieta. After eating,
mother and son were talking about their health while the son was fixing the betamax unit. After fixing the betamax, the son,
Gregorio Fule left his mother watching a betamax tape together with the accused Marieta, Roel Punzalan, Jose Besida, a child
of Marieta and Nieves Garcia Santos. At about 11:30 p.m. of July 10, 1985, accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida went out of
the house for their servants' quarters while the victim, Lourdes Fule and accused Marieta locked up all the doors to the house. At
12:30 a.m. of July 11, 1985 accused Marieta was seen at the door of the servant's quarters calling (sutsot) for Roel Punzalan
and Jose Besida after which the three of the accused went up to the house. Accused Marieta Mendoza knocked on the door of
the victim and woke her up on some pretext. When the door was opened by the victim, accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida
went rushing in and inflicted the injuries and stab wounds on the victim. They put cloth on her mouth to prevent her from making
an outcry. When the victim was still lying on her bed bleeding to death, the accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida ransacked
her drawers and scooped up the jewelries and cash money. At this juncture, accused Domingo Mendoza was waiting in a parked
jeep outside the Fule compound. While all these were going on accused Marieta did not do anything to help the victim. She did
not also prevent the killing of the victim. When the crime was consummated, the accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida told
accused Marieta that they would meet at Del Remedio, changed their bloodied clothes at the staircase and under the oliva (sic)
tree on the ground of the Fule compound.

At 6:00 a.m. of July 11, 1985, accused Marieta woke up June Murillo, another houseboy and Nieves Garcia Santos without
telling any of them about anything unusual that transpired previously or what had happened to the victim. Murillo started cleaning
the Fule compound until he noticed that the front iron gate of the Fule compound was open. He reported this to accused Marieta
and Nieves Garcia Santos and the three of them went up to the adjoining house of Gregorio Fule to report the matter. Accused
Marieta informed Gregorio Fule that "Napasukan tayo ng magnanakaw". Murillo was instructed to fetch the police. Gregorio Fule
saw the bloodstained clothing near the oliva (sic) tree and other personal items on the stairs leading to her mothers room. When
he went up, he saw the sleeping mat, pillow and blanket of the accused Marieta immediately outside the door of her mother's
room and when he was already inside he saw [his] mother already covered with blood, blood was all over the room, in pillows,
boxes, etc. The drawer where the valuables were kept was open emptied of the $5,000.00, P70,000.00 cash and P1.5 million
worth of assorted jewelries. He went out of his mother's room and confronted accused Marieta on what happened. Accused
Marieta responded that she knew nothing allegedly because "Tulog na tulog po ako". The police arrived and an investigation
was conducted. Accused Marieta was initially treated as a possible witness until later on when she was suspected of having an
involvement in the crime. 8

Appellant Marieta Mendoza narrated in court a different story. Her story, as set out in her Brief, was the following:
She "had been working as a housemaid of Mrs. Lourdes Fule for five (5) years at the time the incident happened although not on
a continuous basis. There was (sic) times when she was borrowed by Mrs. Fule's daughter, Marilou. On the first week of July,
1985, she was with Marilou but on the second week thereof, she was with Mrs. Fule. On the night of July 10, 1985, after all the
members of the household had taken their supper and after fixing the kitchen, Marieta joined Mrs. Fule in watching a television
program together with two children, one of whom was her son. Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida also came and joined them.
After a while, she noticed Jose Besida went to the kitchen and inside her room. She did not notice Roel Punzalan left (sic) the
place where they were watching television. The doors were then all open including the door at the room of Mrs. Fule and the
door at her room. They have finished watching television at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of July 10, 1985 after which Mrs.
Fule and she locked all the doors. She was the one who put up the mosquito net on the bed of Mrs. Fule and she did not notice
anybody inside the room. She slept with her son outside the room of Mrs. Fule, around three meters from the door of Mrs. Fule's
room outside of the white mark, shown in Exhibit "F-1". When lying down, the cabinet in her room was at her right side and so
with the way leading to the comfort room. At her left side was the aparador and the room where rice and iron (sic) clothes are
kept. The door of the room of Mrs. Fule has a lock both inside and outside. Until the time she went to sleep, she did not notice
Besida went out of the room. Mrs. Fule's schedule of taking her medicine was after each meal, thus she does not have to wake
up Mrs. Fule for the medicines.

At around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of July 11, 1985, Marieta was awakened by sounds of moaning from Mrs. Fule but when
she stood up, she was blocked by Roel Punzalan and was told to just lie down or else she will be killed at the same time poking
something at her back which she presumed to be a bladed instrument because it pierced through her skin. Because of the
threat, Marieta just lay down facing the cabinet. After around three minutes, Punzalan went out of the room but she did not
notice whether he was carrying something or whether his shirt had bloodstain. After three minutes, another person passed by
and because of fear for her life, she just lay down facing sidewise towards the cabinet with her back against the passage from
the door of the room of Mrs. Fule to the other door. It was about 2:15 to 2:30 o'clock in the morning that these two persons went
out of the room of Mrs. Fule and her room. The door of the room of Mrs. Fule was slightly open and she saw scattered things but
she did not see Mrs. Fule. From the time she was ordered to lie dawn by Punzalan, she did not sleep, she just lay down. Much
as she wanted to inform the other occupants of the house, she was not able to do so because of fear that Punzalan might still be
in the house, so she waited until around 6:00 o'clock in the morning. She crawled going to Nieves Santos and inquired about
Roel Punzalan whom she saw at the room of Mrs. Fule. She told Nieves that she heard Mrs. Fule moaning and that she saw
Roel Punzalan in the room of Mrs. Fule at around 2:00 o'clock that morning. Upon knowing that Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida
were not there, she and Nieves together with Jun Murillo went to Gregorio Fule who is just living in the house adjacent to the
house of Judge Fule. When they told Gregorio that Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida were no longer there, they were told by
Gregorio to call a (sic) police and Gregorio went directly to the room of his mother. Until such time, she had no knowledge of
what actually happened to Mrs. Fule because the first thing she did in the morning was to inquire from Nieves Santos the
whereabouts of Punzalan because of what she had witnessed a few hours ago and later she was told by Gregorio to report the
incident to the police.

Marieta further testified that her husband, Domingo visited her days before the incident. They talked about the children and his
drinking and nothing else. When Judge Fule left for Manila on July 10, 1985, Domingo was no longer there having left that day at
around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. She did not notice her husband talked (sic) with Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida. She knew
nothing of the plans of Punzalan and Besida. Neither did she knew (sic) of the presence of these jewelries and money inside the
room of Mrs. Fule.

Marieta was investigated several times. The first statement was in her own handwriting which was dictated to her by Ma Ading
(Nieves Santos' nickname) and Francisco Fule (Gregorio's brother) with a threat to kill every member of her family if shell make
a mistake. Another statement was in typewritten form prepared by the police when she was interrogated at the police station on
July 11, 1985 (Exh."H"). She did not fully understand every question asked of her by the police officer. She signed said
statement because she was told that there was nothing wrong in signing said statement. On July 15, 1985, another statement
was prepared at the police station of Alaminos, Laguna with her signature appearing thereon (Exh. "C"). 9

Appellant, in her Brief, made the following assignment of errors:

The trial court gravely erred in giving much weight and credence to the evidence for the prosecution and in disregarding totally
the evidence for the defense.

II
The trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant as a conspirator granting without admitting that conspiracy existed in
the commission of the offense.

III

The trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged in the
information.

IV

The trial court gravely erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, abuse of superior strength, disregard of
the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age or sex, dwelling and evident premeditation. 10

Appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to establish that she was a conspirator in respect of the robbery or the slaying.

To this end, she seeks to impugn the credibility of some prosecution witnesses who gave testimony indicating her adherence to
the plan of robbing the victim. She points out that since the Judge who had observed the demeanor of witnesses Nieves Santos
and Pepito Hernandez in court was not the same Judge who wrote the decision under review, the Supreme Court is not bound
by the latter judge's findings on the credibility of these witnesses.

The general rule is that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and will not lightly be
disturbed by an appellate court. The underlying reason for this rule is that the trial judge had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while testifying, an advantage not enjoyed by an appellate court. Appellant's contention has merit in the
sense that the Court cannot rely solely on the aforestated rule with respect to the two witnesses mentioned, (Nieves Santos and
Pepito Hernandez) and must make its own evaluation of the testimony of these witnesses. 11

But the Court must also emphasize that the circumstance pointed out by appellant, taken alone, does not render erroneous the
trial court's reliance upon the testimony given by Santos and Hernandez. 12 The continuity of a court and the efficacy of its
proceedings are not affected by interruptions in the service of the judge(s) presiding over it. 13 In this case, the Judge who wrote
the decision had presided over the latter half of the trial. 14

Appellant contends that the trial court should not have found Nieves Santos and Pepito Hernandez as credible witnesses,
considering that both were employees of the victim's husband and considering further that their sworn statements tending to
incriminate the appellant were submitted to the Fiscal's Office only three (3) months after the commission of the crime. Appellant
suggests that Judge Fule exercised considerable influence over these two witnesses.

It may well be true that Judge Fule had asked and persuaded Santos and Hernandez to testify for the prosecution. However, this
Court is not prepared to believe, for that reason alone, that Judge Fule led those two witnesses to testify falsely against
appellant. There simply is no basis for such an insinuation.

The fact that witnesses Nieves Santos and Pepito Hernandez were brought to the Fiscal's Office by counsel of the heirs of the
victim three (3) months after the killing of the victim, does not by itself impair their credibility. An obvious explanation for this
delay, if delay it was, is that it took sometime before those two (2) individuals overcame their natural reluctance to become
involved in the investigation of a brutal crime and to testify in court when co-accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida were, and
are, still at large.

Appellant then contends that the testimony of Santos and Hernandez was incredible in itself. Appellant's claim is that it was
improbable that Pepito Hernandez saw Domingo Mendoza (husband of appellant Marieta) in front of Fule's house at 4:30 A.M.
on 11 July 1985 because this would place him (Domingo Mendoza) approximately 2 1/2 hours behind the time when Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida left the room of the victim. It does not seem to the Court necessary to deal with this contention. That
particular statement of Hernandez is not directly relevant to the establishment of Marieta's culpability. Whether or not Domingo
Mendoza had furnished the getaway vehicle for Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida, does not impact upon other evidence on record
tending to show that Marieta had indeed conspired to rob the victim.

Marieta impugns the testimony of Nieves Santos as improbable. Marieta claims, first, that it is unlikely that Nieves had chanced
upon and heard a discussion among the several accused relating to a plan to perpetrate the robbery during the absence of
Judge Fule, considering that the accused would, (if they were true conspirators) have taken great pains to conceal their criminal
plan from a third party who might denounce them. Secondly, Marieta questions why Nieves Santos was able to hear and recall
only incriminating remarks from the alleged discussion. Finally, Marieta asks why, if Nieves Santos had indeed seen her
(Marieta) summon Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida from the servants' quarters an hour or so before the crime was committed,
Nieves found nothing unusual in such summons and chose casually to go back to sleep.

Once more, we consider that it is unnecessary to deal with these speculative arguments in any detail. We do not think it
impossible that Nieves Santos should have overheard only fragments of a discussion among the co-accused who, presumably,
were not interested in broadcasting their intentions to the whole world. The summons by Marieta of her co-accused did not alarm
Nieves Santos who thought that the house boys had been called for by the victim. That Nieves Santos did not volunteer to get
up and help in whatever chore may have been needed to be done for Mrs. Fule, does not appear unusual at all when one recalls
that Nieves Santos was a cook rather than a house-girl or an all-purpose domestic servant. Further, the acts and words that
Nieves Santos testified she had seen and overheard do not appear unambiguous indications of some evil intent or act. Only
after the discovery of the bloody killing of Mrs. Fule and the taking away of valuable jewelry in addition to cash, did those acts
and words appear significant.

Appellant next seeks to assail the testimony of prosecution witness Gregorio Fule, son of Judge Fule and the victim Mrs.
Lourdes Fule. Marieta contends it was unnatural that Gregorio Fule had failed to mention having discovered some pieces of
jewelry belonging to his mother in or under appellant's pillow on her sleeping mat in the corridor immediately outside Mrs. Fule's
bedroom on the morning that he found his mother's body. Gregorio Fule first made written mention of such pieces of jewelry
three months after the killing and robbery. Marieta also contends that Gregorio contradicted himself when he stated in court that
he had placed the jewelry he accidentally found on the floor outside the bedroom in a bank vault, considering that Gregorio also
testified that Judge Fule had refused to permit the opening of Mrs. Fule's or the family's vault or safety deposit box in the
Prudential Bank branch in Alaminos. Marieta asks why, if she was indeed involved in the crime, she would conceal the fruits
thereof in a place so open to discovery.

Once more, we do not think these arguments significantly affect the testimony of Gregorio Fule. An ordinary person suddenly
confronted with the bloodly corpse of his mother would be so shocked and disoriented, as Gregorio Fule was, as to forget or
overlooked confronting appellant Marieta about the stray pieces of jewelry on the floor near her sleeping mat. That he had
executed his statement referring, among other things, to such stray pieces of jewelry only three (3) months later does not
necessarily imply that he had merely fabricated such statement. Moreover, whether or not the said pieces of jewelry were in fact
placed by Gregorio Fule in the bank vault (possibly in a vault of the Rural Bank of Alaminos, whose offices were on the first floor
of Judge Fule's house) has no necessary bearing on the truth or falsity of his statement concerning his inadvertent discovery of
such stray pieces of jewelry on the floor. As for the supposed improbability of Marieta ineffectually hiding those pieces of jewelry
in or near her pillow, it seems sufficient to note that she may well have been unable to think of a more secure hiding place for the
stray pieces of jewelry on the spur of the moment that brutal and bloody night. In any case, Judge Jaramillo who wrote the
decision of the trial court had in fact observed witness Gregorio Fule as he testified in court and Judge Jaramillo found his
testimony worthy of credence.

Since there was no direct evidence that appellant Marieta had actually participated in the physical assault and stabbing of the
victim Mrs. Lourdes Fule, her conviction rests upon the conclusion of the trial court that she had participated in a conspiracy to
commit the robbery in the course of which the homicide had occurred. The factors which lead the trial court to this conclusion are
set out in repetitive detail in the following portion of the trial court's decision:

It is undisputed that accused Marieta was already aware that Lourdes Fule was moaning that fateful night and had glimpsed
inside the victim's room seeing scattered things. But she did not do anything to assist her or prevent her killing. Neither did the
accused Marieta relate what she witnessed that night to Nieves Garcia Santos and Gregorio Fule. Her suppression of such
information is highly auspicious, to say the least.

Her claim that Roel Punzalan prevented her from entering the room of the deceased is unbelievable. If it was really true that
Roel Punzalan blocked her way at the door and ordered her to lie down otherwise she would be killed, accused Marieta could
have rushed out of her room and summoned help. Her excuse that she was allegedly paralyzed by her fear is not worthy of
credence because of her allegation that from 2:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. she was awake lying down on her sleeping mat while the
victim was already dead or perhaps bleeding to death. No person who is only three (3) meters away from the body of another, a
victim of foul play could have the nerve to stay alone at night for four hours. An innocent person under such circumstances
would have not lasted five (5) minutes staying in that room for four (4) hours without doing anything. The fact that accused
Marieta was able to show how coldblooded she is and suggested her complicity. She knew Mrs. Lourdes Fule moaned that night
and could have reasonably thought that she was hurt and needed help. But when Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida left the
victim's room, she did not even bother to check and see why her mistress was moaning so strong enough to have awakened
her. Moreover, the fact that she suppressed the information about what happened to her mistress to Nieves Santos and Gregorio
Fule was obviously intended to feign innocence. But if she was really innocent and was not a co-conspirator, she could have
easily told Nieves Santos and Gregorio Fule what happened to her mistress at the first opportunity. At that particular time Jose
Besida and Roel Punzalan were already gone and the members of the Fule family were there to offer her protection. She had
nothing to fear from Jose Besida and Roel Punzalan since they were already gone. Instead, she only told Gregorio Fule that
"Napasukan tayo ng magnanakaw" when they reported to him about the open front iron gate.

If it was also true that while watching TV she saw Jose Besida enter her room leading to the victim's room, her failure to report
this to the victim, to Gregorio Fule or others leads one to believe that she was part of the conspiracy and lends support to the
existence of a criminal plan.

xxx xxx xxx

[S]he was not tied or bound by the other two accused, if the accused Marieta was not a conspirator, since she was an eye
witness to the heinous crime she could have been killed by the said two accused to eliminate an eye witness. Or, at least they
could have tied and gagged her to immobilize her to give them ample time to escape in the darkness of the night. She was not
hurt by them. The fact that she was not tied, gagged, hurt or killed by accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida militates against
her claim of innocence.

The room of the victim is such that no one can enter inside without passing through accused Marieta. The victim had jewelries
and cash inside her room, for which reason she would not just open her door to anybody especially in the middle of the night.
Anyone planning to rob her must contend with the presence of accused Marieta who slept outside the room of the victim. Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida could not have consummated the crime without the involvement and indispensable cooperation of
accused Marieta. If she was not involved or a co-conspirator she would have been eliminated first, immobilized or neutralized
before the other accused could break-in the door of the victim. It is significant to note that the door of the victim can not be
opened by a false key from the outside. It could only be opened from the inside by releasing or sliding the iron bolt which is
installed inside. The fact that the victim's door was not forcibly opened shows that the victim opened the door herself. The victim
would not have opened for accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida who were relatively newly hired househelpers. But she
would have opened the door for accused Marieta, her sort of nursemaid and security.

xxx xxx xxx

She could not explain how come Roel Punzalan was found inside the room of the victim inspire of the fact that she, together with
the victim, closed and locked all the door prior to retiring to bed. The only persons that night in the house were the victim and
accused Marieta. The victim could not have opened the doors leading to her room. The accused Marieta admitted that the victim
never allowed any of the househelpers to enter the house at night. Accused Marieta expressed ignorance on how the other
accused were able to enter the room of the victim. All these circumstances put together definitely established the guilt of the
accused Marieta. 15

Examining the above excerpt, the elements consisting either of affirmative acts or failure to act which led the court to conclude
that appellant had acted in concert with Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida, may be summarized as follows:

1. She had participated in the discussion among her husband Domingo Mendoza, Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida in the
afternoon before the robbery and the killing, when Domingo Mendoza had declared that the time to carry out their plan had
arrived with Judge Fule gone;

2. Marieta had unlocked doors and summoned Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida from the servants' quarters and brought them
inside Judge Fule's house an hour or so before the robbery and the killing were committed;

3. Appellant Marieta had, by her own testimony, seen Jose Besida enter her room leading to Mrs. Fule's room while Mrs. Fule
and others were watching a video film, but failed to report that fact to Mrs. Fule or to anyone else in the household then watching
the video film;

4. After hearing the moaning of Mr. Fule through the open bedroom door and after she was aware that Roel Punzalan and
another person had left Mrs. Fule's room in the corridor in which Marieta slept, she, per her own testimony, stayed in the floor for
four hours without attempting to find out what had happened to Mrs. Fule and without attempting to awaken Nieves Santos or
any body else and to raise the alarm;

5. Marieta had not been harmed in any way by Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida although she obviously recognized them; they
had not even tied or gagged her to prevent her from raising an alarm.

We believe that the above multiple factors, when considered together, lead to the conclusion, constituting moral certainty, that
appellant Marieta had acted in concert with Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida at least in respect of the robbery. It is possible that
the conspiracy did not originally extend to the killing of Mrs. Fule, and that such killing was resorted on the spur of the moment to
counter unexpected resistance on the part of Mrs. Fule or to prevent any outcry on her part. The general rule, however, is that
where conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all and that the extent of
the specific participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary, each being held liable for the criminal deed(s)
executed by another or others. 16

Appellant insists that she was unaware of any plan to rob the victim and that the fact that she did not flee with her co-accused
shows that she had not joined the conspiracy.

The simple refusal or failure to flee with her co-accused does not, by itself, necessarily imply that she had never conspired to rob
the victim. Taking the totality of the evidence presented against appellant Marieta in the light most favorable to her, her failure to
flee may be considered as indication that she had been shocked that what had begun as a plan to rob Mrs. Fule of her jewelry
and money culminated in her brutal slaying, and that appellant Marieta sought to disavow the conspiracy to rob which she had
initially joined. So viewed, the ultimate issue may be seen to be whether her "disavowal" or disengagement through failure or
refusal to flee was sufficient to extinguish or negate criminal liability for the robbery and the killing.

We believe and so hold that such "disavowal" through failure to flee was not sufficient to discharge appellant Marieta from
liability for the robbery and the killing. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his
co-conspirators; he merges his will into the common felonious intent. A person who embraces a criminal conspiracy is properly
held to have cast his lot with his fellow conspirators and to have taken his chances that things may go awry and that the
offended party may resist or third persons may get killed in the course of implementing the basic criminal design. To free himself
from such criminal liability, the law requires some overt act on the part of the conspirator, to seek to prevent commission of the
second or related felony or to abandon or dissociate himself from the conspiracy to commit the initial felony. 17

In the instant case, while the failure to flee may perhaps be regarded as a negative overt act, such "disavowal" came too late,
having manifested itself after, and not before or during, the consummation of the robbery and the slaying. In legal contemplation,
there was no longer a conspiracy to be repudiated nor an unlawful killing which could have been prevented since the conspiracy
and the killing had already materialized. The locus penitentiae, i.e., appellant's opportunity to purge herself of criminal liability,
had already passed. Appellant insists that her life was threatened by Roel Punzalan who poked into her back what she believed
was a sharp instrument, when she discovered the robbery and assault being carried out. She says that that circumstance
effectively prevented her from doing anything to forestall or prevent the perpetration of the crime. The difficulty with this defense
is not merely that there is nothing to support it except Marieta's own word. That word, when taken in the context of all the other
circumstances, especially her failure to raise the alarm long after the doers of the crime had left, is simply insufficient to nullify
the prosecution's case. Appellant's word was not believed by the trial judge. Judge Jaramillo, who was presiding when the
defense presented its case and who wrote the decision with the benefit of observing her demeanor in court, 18 was unable to
accept appellant's statement that she had been coerced into silence by Roel Punzalan. There is no basis in the record for setting
aside this conclusion on the part of the trial judge, a conclusion to which we must accord appropriate deference.

We turn to the appreciation of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Marieta
assails the finding by the trial court of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. However, the record shows not only
the time when the accused determined or at least last conferred on the commission of the crime, but also acts which manifestly
indicated that the appellant and her co-accused had clung to their determination to commit the crime. An interval of seven (7) or
eight (8) hours had taken place between the meeting of the co-accused and Marieta's summoning of Roel Punzalan and Jose
Besida into the Fule house, an interval of time sufficient to allow appellant and her co-conspirators to reflect upon the
consequences of their acts.

Nocturnity was correctly appreciated because it was purposely sought by the conspirators to afford impunity and to facilitate both
the execution of the crime and their escape. 19 They not only timed the robbery to coincide with the absence of Judge Fule; they
also chose to strike late that night to ensure that the victim would be alone in her bedroom and unable to resist or to flee.
Abuse of superior strength was similarly correctly appreciated. There was great variance in the relative physical condition of the
assailants and of the victim: two adult males as against an old lady suffering from hypertension; the assailants were armed with
bladed and blunt instruments while the victim was alone and unarmed and in no position to defend herself; and the great
violence inflicted upon the victim, as indicated by the number and location of her wounds, all indicate the presence of the
circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

Upon the other hand, disregard of age, rank, or sex was incorrectly appreciated by the trial court. This circumstance was
absorbed in abuse of superior strength. Moreover, disregard of age, rank, or sex is relevant only in crimes against persons; the
instant case involves robbery with homicide, a felony classified as a crime against property, the homicide being regarded as
incidental to the robbery. 20

Dwelling should also have been disregarded because the accused (except Domingo Mendoza) all resided in the servants'
quarter of Mrs. Fule's residence. The servants' quarter may be assimilated to the victim's house, the former being an appendage
of, or attachment to, the latter.

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when, by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed. Article 63 paragraph 2 of the same Code provides, among other things, that when there is
at least one aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty is death. Since death is not
an enforceable penalty under our Constitution, the appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated 22 May 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the civil indemnity for the
victim's death is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in line with recent jurisprudence of the Court. 21

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989

AMADO C. ARIAS, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

G.R. No. 82512 December 19, 1989

CRESENCIO D. DATA, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The facts of this case are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino which follows this majority opinion.
The dissent substantially reiterates the draft report prepared by Justice Griño-Aquino as a working basis for the Court's
deliberations when the case was being discussed and for the subsequent votes of concurrence or dissent on the action
proposed by the report.

There is no dispute over the events which transpired. The division of the Court is on the conclusions to be drawn from those
events and the facts insofar as the two petitioners are concerned. The majority is of the view that Messrs. Arias and Data should
be acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. The Court feels that the quantum of evidence needed to convict petitioners Arias
and Data beyond reasonable doubt, as co-conspirators in the conspiracy to cause undue injury to the Government through the
irregular disbursement and expenditure of public funds, has not been satisfied.

1
In acquitting the petitioners, the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General who, in 80 pages of his consolidated manifestation
and motion, recommended that Messrs. Arias and Data be acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio. Earlier,
Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Eleuterio F. Guerrero had also recommended the dropping of Arias from the information before
it was filed.

There is no question about the need to ferret out and convict public officers whose acts have made the bidding out and
construction of public works and highways synonymous with graft or criminal inefficiency in the public eye. However, the remedy
is not to indict and jail every person who may have ordered the project, who signed a document incident to its construction, or
who had a hand somewhere in its implementation. The careless use of the conspiracy theory may sweep into jail even innocent
persons who may have been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds who engineered the defraudation.

Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman, agency head,
and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from disbursements which they have approved. The
department head or chief auditor would be guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials and
employees who acted upon or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be premised on a more knowing, personal,
and deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy.

The records show that the six accused persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of land purchased by the
Bureau of Public Works for the Mangahan Floodway Project. The project was intended to ease the perennial floods in Marikina
and Pasig, Metro Manila.

The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of "riceland" in Rosario, Pasig which had been assessed at P5.00
a square meter in 1973 were sold as residential land" in 1978 for P80.00 a square meter. The land for the floodway was acquired
through negotiated purchase,

We agree with the Solicitor-General that the assessor's tax valuation of P5.00 per square meter of land in Rosario, Pasig, Metro
Manila is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis for conviction.

Herein lies the first error of the trial court.

It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with conspiracy in the falsification of public documents or preparation of
spurious supporting papers. The charge is causing undue injury to the Government and giving a private party unwarranted
benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.

The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government purchase of land in Pasig, Rizal for P80.00 a square meter instead of
the P5.00 value per square meter appearing in the tax declarations and fixed by the municipal assessor, not by the landowner.

The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per square meter value fixed by
the assessor in the tax declarations was the correct market value of the Mangahan property and if the Government purchased
the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows that it must have suffered undue injury.

The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is erroneous:

1. No undue injury was caused to the Government

a. The P80.00 per square rneter acquisition cost is just fair and reasonable.

It bears stress that the Agleham property was acquired through negotiated purchase. It was, therefor, nothing more than an
ordinary contract of sale where the purchase price had to be arrived at by agreement between the parties and could never be left
to the discretion of one of the contracting parties (Article 1473, New Civil Code). For it is the essence of a contract of sale that
there must be a meeting of the minds between the seller and the buyer upon the thing which is the object of the contract and
upon the price (Article 1475, New Civil Code). Necessarily, the parties have to negotiate the reasonableness of the price, taking
into consideration such other factors as location, potentials, surroundings and capabilities. After taking the foregoing premises
into consideration, the parties have, thus, arrived at the amount of P80.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable price for
the Agleham property.

It bears stress that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that the true and fair market value in 1978 of the Agleham
property was indeed P5.00 per square meter only as stated by the assessor in the tax declaration (Exhibit W). On the contrary,
the prosecution's principal witness Pedro Ocol, the Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, admitted that the purchase price of
P80.00 per square meter paid for the Agleham property as stated in the Deed of Sale (Exhibit G) is reasonable (tsn, August
19,1983, p. 20) and fair (Ibid, p. 76); that 'the value of lands within the town of Pasig ranges from P80.00 to P500.00' (Ibid, p.
21); that the Agleham property is "around 300 meters" from Ortigas Avenue, "adjacent to the existing Leongson [Liamson]
Subdivision ... and near Eastland Garment Building" (Ibid, pp. 12-13); that said property is surrounded by factories, commercial
establishments and residential subdivisions (Ibid, pp. 73-74); that the P5.00 per square meter assessed valuation of the
Agleham property appearing on the tax declaration (Exhibit W) was based on actual use only (lbid, pp. 26-27), it being the
uniform rate for all ricefields in Pasig irrespective of their locations (Ibid, pp. 72-74) and did not take into account the existence of
many factories and subdivisions in the area (Ibid., pp. 25-27, 72-74), and that the assessed value is different from and always
lower than the actual market value (Ibid, pp. 22-23). (At pp. 256-259, Rollo)

A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at in the course of expropriation proceedings.

In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (149 SCRA 305, 310 [1987]) we struck down the martial law decree that pegged
just compensation in eminent domain cases to the assessed value stated by a landowner in his tax declaration or fixed by the
municipal assessor, whichever is lower. Other factors must be considered. These factors must be determined by a court of
justice and not by municipal employees.

In the instant case, the assessor's low evaluation, in the fixing of which the landowner had no participation, was used for a
purpose infinitely more weighty than mere expropriation of land. It forms the basis for a criminal conviction.

The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square meter for land in Pasig in 1978 would be a fair evaluation. The
value must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a competent court. We are certain, however, that it cannot be
P5.00 a square meter. Hence, the decision, insofar as it says that the "correct" valuation is P5.00 per square meter and on that
basis convicted that petitioners of causing undue injury, damage, and prejudice to the Government because of gross overpricing,
is grounded on shaky foundations.

There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal conviction where no proof adduced during orderly proceedings has been
presented and accepted.
The Court's decision, however, is based on a more basic reason. Herein lies the principal error of the respondent court.

We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-dishonest or negligent
subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction
simply because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate
the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing, his signature as the final approving authority.

There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the negotiated sale were falsified. A key tax
declaration had a typewritten number instead of being machine-numbered. The registration stampmark was antedated and the
land reclassified as residential instead of ricefield. But were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in the falsification and the
subsequent charge of causing undue in injury and damage to the Government?

We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures, and questioned
persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all vouchers presented for his
signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent 'on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a department
secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill,
question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served and
otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added
reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or
commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of document , letters and supporting
paper that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.

There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and
conviction.

Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government?

Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property started in 1977. The deed of
sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the Republic on June 8, 1978. In other words, the transaction had
already been consummated before his arrival. The pre-audit, incident to payment of the purchase, was conducted in the first
week of October, 1978. Arias points out that apart from his signature linking him to the signature on the voucher, there is no
evidence transaction. On the contrary, the other co-accused testified they did not know him personally and none approached him
to follow up the payment.

Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him to investigate . gate the smallest detains of the transaction?

Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already worth P80.00 a square meter
at the time, no warning bell of intuition would have sounded an inner alarm. Land along Ortigas Avenue on the way to Pasig is
now worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 a square meter. The falsification of the tax declaration by changing "riceland" to
"residential' was done before Arias was assigned to Pasig besides, there is no such thing as "riceland" in inner Metro Manila.
Some lots in outlying or easily flooded areas may still be planted to rice or kangkong but this is only until the place is dedicated
to its real purpose which is commercial, industrial, or residential. If the Sandiganbayan is going to send somebody to jail for six
years, the decision should be based on firmer foundation.

The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept the documents from October, 1978 to June 23, 1982. Arias explained that the rules of
the Commission on Audit require auditors to keep these d documents and under no circumstance to relinquish custody to other
persons. Arias was auditor of the Bureau of Public Works in Pasig up to September 1, 1981. The seven months delay in the
formal turnover of custody to the new auditor was explained by prosecution witness Julito Pesayco, who succeeded him as
auditor and who took over the custody of records in that office.

The main reason for the judgment of conviction, for the finding of undue injury and damage to the Government is the alleged
gross overprice for the land purchased for the floodway project. Assuming that P80.00 is indeed exorbitant, petitioner Arias cites
his testimony as follows:

Q In conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the reasonableness of the price of the property?
A In this case, the price has been stated, the transaction had been consummated and the corresponding Transfer Certificate of
little had been issued and transferred to the government of the Philippines. The auditors have no more leeway to return the
papers and then question the purchase price.

Q Is it not a procedure in your office that before payment is given by the government to private individuals there should be a
pre-audit of the papers and the corresponding checks issued to the vendor?

A Correct, Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of transaction there is.

Q Yes, but in this particular case, the papers were transferred to the government without paying the price Did you not consider
that rather odd or unusual? (TSN, page 17, April 27,1987).

A No, Your Honor.

Q Why not?

A Because in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is a condition that no payments will be made unless the
corresponding title in the payment of the Republic is committed is made.

Q In this case you said that the title is already in the name of the government?

A Yes, Your Honor. The only thing we do is to determine whether there is an appropriation set aside to cover the said
specification. As of the price it is under the sole authority of the proper officer making the sale.

Q My point is this. Did you not consider it unusual for a piece of property to be bought by the government; the sale was
consummated; the title was issued in favor of the government without the price being paid first to the seller?

A No, Your Honor. In all cases usually, payments made by the government comes later than the transfer.

Q That is usual procedure utilized in road right of way transaction?

A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27,1987).

Q And of course as auditor, 'watch-dog' of the government there is also that function you are also called upon by going over the
papers . . . (TSN, page 22, April 27,1987). I ... vouchers called upon to determine whether there is any irregularity as at all in this
particular transaction, is it not?

A Yes, Ma'am.

Q And that was in fact the reason why you scrutinized also, not only the tax declaration but also the certification by Mr. Jose and
Mr. Cruz?

A As what do you mean of the certification, ma'am?

Q Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in relation to PD No. 296, A They are not required documents that an auditor must see.
(TSN, page 23, April 27,1987).

and continuing:

A ... The questioning of the purchase price is now beyond the authority of the auditor because it is inasmuch as the amount
involved is beyond his counter-signing authority. (TSN, page 35, April 27, 1987). (At pp. 15-16, Petition. Underlinings supplied by
petitioner)

The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of petitioner Data as follows:

As regards petitioner Data's alleged participation, the evidence on record shows that as the then District Engineer of the Pasig
Engineering District he created a committee, headed by Engr. Priscillo Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso Mendoza,
Ladislao Cruz, Pedro Hucom and Carlos Jose, all employees of the district office, as members, specifically to handle the
Mangahan Floodway Project, gather and verify documents, conduct surveys, negotiate with the owners for the sale of their lots,
process claims and prepare the necessary documents; he did not take any direct and active part in the acquisition of land for the
Mangahan floodway; it was the committee which determined the authenticity of the documents presented to them for processing
and on the basis thereof prepared the corresponding deed of sale; thereafter, the committee submitted the deed of sale together
with the supporting documents to petitioner Data for signing; on the basis of the supporting certified documents which appeared
regular and complete on their face, petitioner Data, as head of the office and the signing authority at that level, merely signed but
did not approve the deed of sale (Exhibit G) as the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works; he
thereafter transmitted the signed deed of sale with its supporting documents to Director Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works
who in turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of Public Works; the deed of sale was approved by the Asst.
Secretary of Public Works after a review and re-examination thereof at that level; after the approval of the deed of sale by the
higher authorities the covering voucher for payment thereof was prepared which petitioner Data signed; petitioner Data did not
know Gutierrez and had never met her during the processing and payment of her claims (tsn, February 26, 1987, pp. 10-14,
16-24, 31-32). (At pp. 267-268, Rollo.)

On the alleged conspiracy, the Solicitor General argues:

It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution likewise has not shown any positive and convincing evidence of conspiracy
between the petitioners and their co-accused. There was no direct finding of conspiracy. Respondent Court's inference on the
alleged existence of conspiracy merely upon the purported 'pre-assigned roles (of the accused) in the commission of the
(alleged) illegal acts in question is not supported by any evidence on record. Nowhere in the seventy- eight (78) page Decision
was there any specific allusion to some or even one instance which would link either petitioner Arias or Data to their co-accused
in the planning, preparation and/or perpetration, if any, of the purported fraud and falsifications alleged in the information That
petitioners Data and Arias happened to be officials of the Pasig District Engineering Office who signed the deed of sale and
passed on pre-audit the general voucher covering the subject sale, respectively, does hot raise any presumption or inference,
that they were part of the alleged plan to defraud the Government, as indeed there was none. It should be remembered that, as
aboveshown, there was no undue injury caused to the Government as the negotiated purchase of the Agleham property was
made at the fair and reasonable price of P80.00 per square meter.

That there were erasures and superimpositions of the words and figures of the purchase price in the deed of sale from
P1,546,240.00 to P1,520,320.00 does not prove conspiracy. It may be noted that there was a reduction in the affected area from
the estimated 19,328 square meters to 19,004 square meters as approved by the Land Registration Commission, which resulted
in the corresponding reduction in the purchase price from P1,546,240.00 to Pl,520,320.00. The erasures in the deed of sale
were simple corrections that even benefited the Government.

Moreover, contrary to the respondent Court's suspicion, there was nothing irregular in the use of the unapproved survey
plan/technical description in the deed of sale because the approval of the survey plan/ technical description was not a
prerequisite to the approval of the deed of sale. What is important is that before any payment is made by the Government under
the deed of sale the title of the seller must have already been cancelled and another one issued to the Government incorporating
therein the technical description as approved by the Land Registration Commission, as what obtained in the instant case. (At pp.
273-275, Rollo)

We agree with the counsel for the People. There is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the petitioners, Amado C.
Arias and Cresencio D. Data, beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate evidence on record is not sufficient to sustain a
conviction.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicts and sentences petitioners Amado C. Arias
and Cresencio D. Data is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioners Arias and Data are acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

July 19, 2016

G.R. No. 220598

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 220953

BENIGNO B. AGUAS, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

We resolve the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately brought to assail and annul the resolutions issued on April 6,
1 2
2015 and September 10, 2015, whereby the Sandiganbayan respectively denied their demurrer to evidence, and their
motions for reconsideration, asserting such denials to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Antecedents

On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA); Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Officer Benigno Aguas; PCSO General Manager and Vice Chairman
Rosario C. Uriarte; PCSO Chairman of the Board of Directors Sergio 0. Valencia; Members of the PCSO Board of Directors,
namely: Manuel L. Morato, Jose R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero, and Ma. Fatima A.S. Valdes; Commission on Audit (COA)
Chairman Reynaldo A. Villar; and COA Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit Nilda B. Plaras with plunder. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-O 174 and assigned to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan.

The information reads:

The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Gratl Investigation and Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuse GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO O. VALENCIA, MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R.
TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA A.S. V ALOES, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and NILDA
B. PLARAS, of the crime of PLUNDER, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659, committed, as follows:

That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA MA CAP A GAL-ARROYO, then the President of the
Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then General Manager and Vice Chairman, SERGIO O. VALENCIA, then Chairman of the
Board of Directors, MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA A.S. V ALOES, then
members of the Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then Budget and Accounts Manager, all of the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS, then Head of
Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of the Commission on Audit, all public officers committing the offense in
relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire. Directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of
THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS
(PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or
means, described as follows:
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be
accessed and withdrawn at any time with minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or transferring
the proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious
expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;

(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-mentioned amount from the
Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession
and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and

(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, in several instances,
to unjustly enrich themselves in the aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

By the end of October 2012, the Sandiganbayan already acquired jurisdiction over GMA, Valencia, Morato and Aguas. Plaras,
on the other hand, was able to secure a temporary restraining order (TRO) from this Court in Plaras v. Sandiganbayan docketed
as G.R. Nos. 203693-94. Insofar as Roquero is concerned, the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction as to him by the early part
of 2013. Uriarte and Valdes remained at large.

Thereafter, several of the accused separately filed their respective petitions for bail. On June 6, 2013, the Sandiganbayan
granted the petitions for bail of Valencia, Morato and Roquero upon finding that the evidence of guilt against them was not
4
strong. In the case of petitioners GMA and Aguas, the Sandiganbayan, through the resolution dated November 5, 2013, denied
5
their petitions for bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong. The motions for reconsideration filed by
6
GMA and Aguas were denied by the Sandiganbayan on February 19, 2014. Accordingly, GMA assailed the denial of her
petition for bail in this Court, but her challenge has remained pending and unresolved todate.

Personal jurisdiction over Taruc and Villar was acquired by the Sandiganbayan in 2014. Thereafter, said accused sought to be
7 8
granted bail, and their motions were granted on different dates, specifically on March 31, 2014 and May 9, 2014, respectively.

The case proceeded to trial, at which the State presented Atty. Aleta Tolentino as its main witness against all the accused. The
Sandiganbayan rendered the following summary of her testimony and evidence in its resolution dated November 5, 2013
denying the petitions for bail of GMA and Aguas, to wit:

She is a certified public accountant and a lawyer. She is a member of the Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountants and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. She has been a CPA for 30 years and a lawyer for 20 years. She has practiced
accountancy and law. She became accounting manager of several companies. She has also taught subjects in University of
Santo Tomas, Manuel L. Quezon University, Adamson University and the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School. She currently
teaches Economics, Taxation and Land Reform.

Presently, she is a Member of the Board of Directors of the PCSO. The Board appointed her as Chairman of an Audit
Committee. The audit review proceeded when she reviewed the COA Annual Reports of the PCSO for 2006 2007 2008 and
2009 (Exhibits "D" "E" "F" and "G" respectively), and the annual financial statements contained therein for the years 2005 to
2009. The reports were given to them by the COA. These are transmitted to the PCSO annually after the subject year of audit.

One of her major findings was that the former management of the PCSO was commingling the charity fund, the prize fund and
the operating fund. By commingling she means that the funds were maintained in only one main account. This violates Section 6
of Republic Act 1169 (PCSO Charter) and generally accepted accounting principles.

The Audit Committee also found out that there was excessive disbursement of the Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF).
There were also excessive disbursements for advertising expenses. The internal audit department was also merged with the
budget and accounting department, which is a violation of internal audit rules.
There was excessive disbursement of the CIF because the PCSO was given only P10 million in 2002, i.e. P5 million for the
Office of the Chairman and P5 million for the Office of the General Manager. Such allocation was based on the letters of then
Chairman Lopez (Exh. "I") and then General Manager Golpeo (Exh. "J"), asking for P5 million intelligence fund each. Both were
dated February 21, 2000, and sent to then President Estrada, who approved them. This allocation should have been the basis
for the original allocation of the CIF in the PCSO, but there were several subsequent requests made by the General Manager
during the time of, and which were approved by, former President Arroyo.

The allocation in excess of P10 million was in violation of the PCSO Charter. PCSO did not have a budget for this. They were
working on a deficit from 2004 to 2009. The charter allows only 15% of the revenue as operating fund, which was already
exceeded. The financial statements indicate that they were operating on a deficit in the years 2006 to 2009.

It is within the power of the General Manager to ask for additional funds from the President, but there should be a budget for it.
The CIF should come from the operating fund, such that, when there is no more operating fund, the other funds cannot be used.

The funds were maintained in a commingled main account and PCSO did not have a registry of budget utilization. The excess
was not taken from the operating fund, but from the prize fund and the charity fund.

In 2005, the deficit was P916 million; in 2006, Pl,000,078,683.23. One of the causes of the deficit for 2006 was the CIF expense
of P215 million, which was in excess of the approved allocation of P10 million. The net cash provided by operating expenses in
2006 is negative, which means that there were more expenses than what was received.

In the 2007 COA report, it was found that there was still no deposit to the prize and charity funds. The COA made a
recommendation regarding the deposits in one main account. There were also excessive disbursements of CIF amounting to
P77,478,705.

She received a copy of the PCSO corporate operating budget (COB) for the year 2008 in 2010 because she was already a
member of its Board of Directors. The 2008 approved COB has a comparative analysis of the actual budget for 2007 (Exh. "K").
It is stated there that the budget for CTF in 2007 is only P25,480,550. But the financial statements reflect P77 million. The
budget was prepared and signed by then PCSO General Manager Rosario Uriarte. It had accompanying Board Resolution No.
305, Series of 2008, which was approved by then Chairperson Valencia, and board members Valdes, Morato, Domingo, and
attested to by Board Secretary Atty. Ronald T. Reyes.

In the 2008 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to the prize and charity funds, adverted in the 2007 COA
report. There was already a recommendation by the COA to separate the deposits or funds in 2007. But the COA noted that this
was not followed. The financial statements show the Confidential and the Extra-Ordinary Miscellaneous Expenses account is
P38,293,137, which is more than the P10 million that was approved.

In the Comparative Income Statement (Exh. "K"), the 2008 Confidential/Intelligence Expense budget was approved for P28
million. The Confidential and Extra-Ordinary Miscellaneous Expenses is the account being used for confidential and intelligence
expenses. The amount in the financial statements is over the budgeted amount of P28 million. Further, the real disbursement is
more than that, based on a summary of expenditures she had asked the treasurer to prepare.

In the Comparative Income Statement for 2009 Budget against the 2008 Actual Budget (Exh. "L"), the budget for CIF and
expenses was P60 million.

In the 2009 COA report, it was noted that there was still no deposit to the prize and charity funds, despite the instruction or
recommendation of COA. The funds were still deposited in one account. The COA observation in 2007 states that there is
juggling or commingling of funds.

After she had concluded the audit review, she reported her findings to the Board of Directors in one of their executive meetings.
The Board instructed her to go in-depth in the investigation of the disbursements of CIF.

The Audit Committee also asked Aguas why there were disbursements in excess of P10 million. He explained that there were
board resolutions confirming additional CIF which were approved by former President Arroyo. Aguas mentioned this in one of
their meetings with the directors and corporate secretary. The board secretary, Atty. Ed Araullo, gave them the records of those
resolutions.
In the records that Araullo submitted to her, it appears that Uriarte would ask for additional CIF, by letter and President Arroyo
approves it by affixing her signature on that same letter-request. There were seven letters or memoranda to then President
Arroyo, with the subject "Request for Intelligence Fund."

She then asked their Treasurer, Mercy Hinayon, to give her a summary of all the disbursements from CIF from 2007 to 2010.
The total of all the amounts in the summaries for three years is P365,997,915.

After receiving the summaries of the disbursed checks, she asked Hinayon to give her the checks or copies thereof. She also
asked Dorothy Robles, Budget and Accounting Manager, to give her the corresponding vouchers. Only two original checks were
given to her, as the rest were with the bank. She asked her to request certified true copies of the checks.

They were then called to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, which was then investigating the operation of PCSO, including the
CIF. She was invited as a resource speaker in an invitation from Chairman Teofisto Guingona III (Exh. "DD"). Before the hearing,
the Committee Chairman went to the PCSO and got some documents regarding the subject matter being investigated. Araullo
was tasked to prepare all the documents needed by the Committee. These documents included the CIF summary of
disbursements, letters of Uriarte and the approval of the former president.

She attended whenever there were committee hearings. Among those who also attended were the incoming members if the
PCSO Board Directors and the directors. Accused Valencia and Aguas were also present in some hearings as resources
speakers. They were invited in connection with the past disbursements of PCSO related to advertising expenses, CIF, vehicles
for the bishops, and the commingling of funds.

The proceedings in the Committee were recorded and she secured a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes from the Office
of the Blue Ribbon Committee. In the proceeding on June 7, 2011 (Exh. ''EE"), Uriarte testified. The witness was about two to
three meters away from Uriarte when the latter testified, and using a microphone.

According to the witness, Uriarte testified that all the confidential intelligence projects she had proposed were approved by
President Arroyo; all the requests she gave to the President were approved and signed by the latter personally in her (Uriarte's)
presence; and all the documents pertaining to the CIF were submitted to President Arroyo. On the other hand, Valencia and
Taruc said they did not know about the projects. Statements before the Committee are under oath.

After the Committee hearings, she then referred to the laws and regulations involved to check whether the disbursements were
in accordance with law. One of the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee was to verify compliance with the laws.

She considered the following laws: R.A. 1169, as amended (PCSO Charter); P.D. 1445 (COA Code); LOI 1282; COA Circular
92-385, as amended by Circular 2003-002, which provides the procedure for approval of disbursements and liquidation of
confidential intelligence funds. She made a handwritten flowchart (Exh. "II") of the allocations/disbursements/liquidation and
audit of the CIF, based on LOI 1282 and the COA Circulars. A digital presentation of this flowchart was made available.

The first step is the provision or allotment of a budget because no CIF fund can be disbursed without the allocation. This is
provided in the second whereas clause of Circular 92-385. For GOCCs, applying Circular 2003-002, there must be allocation or
budget for the CIF and it should be specifically in the corporate operating budget or would be taken from savings authorized by
special provisions.

This was not followed in the PCSO CIF disbursement in 2008. The disbursement for that year was P86,555,060. The CIF budget
for that year was only P28 million, and there were no savings because they were on deficit. This was also not followed for the
year 2009. The CIF disbursement for that year was P139,420,875. But the CIF budget was only P60 million, and there was also
no savings, as they were in deficit. For the year 2010, the total disbursement, as of June 2010, was P141,021,980. The budget
was only P60 million.

The requirements in the disbursement of the CIF are the budget and the approval of the President. If the budget is correct, the
President will approve the disbursement or release of the CIF. In this case, the President approved the release of the fund
without a budget and savings. Also, the President approved the same in violation of LOI 1282, because there were no detailed
specific project proposals and specifications accompanying the request for additional CIF. The requests for the year 2008, 2009
and 2010 were uniform and just enumerated the purposes, not projects. They did not contain what was required in the LOI.
The purpose of this requirement is stated in the LOI itself. The request for allocations must contain full details and specific
purposes for which the fund will be used. A detailed presentation is made to avoid duplication of expenditures, as what had
happened in the past, because of a lack of centralized planning and organization or intelligence fund.

There was no reason for each additional intelligence fund that was approved by then President Arroyo.

The third step is the designation of the disbursing officer. In this case, the Board of Directors designated Uriarte as Special
Disbursing Officer (SDO) for the portion of the CIF that she withdrew. For the portion withdrawn by Valencia, there was no
special disbursing officer designated on record.

The designation of Uriarte was in violation of internal control which is the responsibility of the department head, as required by
Section 3 of Circular 2003-002. When she went through copies of the checks and disbursement vouchers submitted to her, she
found out that Uriarte was both the SDO and the authorized officer to sign the vouchers and checks. She was also the payee of
the checks. All the checks withdrawn by Uriarte were paid to her and she was also the signatory of the checks.

Aside from Uriarte, Valencia also disbursed funds in the CIF. For the funds withdrawn by Valencia, he was also the authorized
officer to sign the vouchers and checks. He was also the payee of the checks.

The confidential funds were withdrawn through cash advance. She identified the vouchers and checks pertaining to the
disbursements made by Uriarte and Valencia in 2008, 2009 and 2010.

The checks of Uriarte and Valencia had the treasurer as cosignatory. The treasurer who signed depends on when the checks
were issued

She knows the signatures of Uriarte, Valencia and Aguas because they have their signatures on the records.

Uriarte and Valencia signed the vouchers to certify to the necessity and legality of the vouchers; they also signed to approve the
same, signify they are "okay" for payment and claim the amount certified and approved as payee. Gloria P. Araullo signed as
releasing officer, giving the checks to the claimants.

Accused Aguas signed the vouchers to certify that there are adequate funds and budgetary allotment, that the expenditures
were properly certified and supported by documents, and that the previous cash advances were liquidated and accounted for.
This certification means that the cash advance voucher can be released. This is because the COA rule on cash advance is that
before any subsequent cash advance is released, the previous cash advance must be liquidated first. This certification allowed
the requesting party and payee to get the cash advance from the voucher. Without this certification, Uriarte and Valencia could
not have been able to get the cash advance. Otherwise, it was a violation of P.D. 1445 (Government Auditing Code).

The third box in the flowchart is the designation of the SDO. Board Resolutions No. 217, Series of2009 (Exh."M"), No. 2356,
Series of 2009 (Exh."N"), and No. 029, Series of 2010 (Exh. "O"), resolved to designate Uriarte as SDO for the CIF. These
resolutions were signed and approved by Valencia, Taruc, Valdes, Uriarte, Roquero and Morato. The witness is familiar with
these persons' signature because their signatures appear on PCSO official records.

Valencia designated himself as SDO upon the recommendation of COA Auditor Plaras. There was no board resolution for this
4
designation. There was just a certification dated February 2, 2009 (Exh. "Z "). This certification was signed by Valencia himself
and designates himself as the SDO since he is personally taking care of the funds which are to be handled with utmost
confidentiality. The witness is familiar with Valencia's signature because it appears on PCSO official documents. Under COA
rules, the Board of Directors has authority to designate the SDO. The chairman could not do this by himself.

Plaras wrote a letter dated December 15, 2008 to Valencia. It appears in the letter that to substantiate the liquidation report,
Plaras told Valencia to designate himself as SDO because there was no disbursing officer. It was the suggestion of Plaras.
Plaras is the head of the CIF Unit under then COA Chairman Villar. Liquidation vouchers and supporting papers were submitted
to them, with corresponding fidelity bond.

COA Circulars 92-385 and 2003-002 indicate that to disburse CIF, one must be a special disbursing officer or SDO. All
disbursing officers of the government must have fidelity bonds. The bond is to protect the government from and answer for
misappropriation that the disbursing officer may do. The bond amount required is the same as the amount that may be disbursed
by the officer. It is based on total accountability and not determined by the head of the agency as a matter of discretion. The
head determines the accountability which will be the basis of the bond amount.

The Charter states that the head of the agency is the Board of Directors, headed by the Chairman. But now, under the
Governance of Government Corporation law, it is the general manager.

Plaras should have disallowed or suspended the cash advances because there was no fidelity bond and the disbursing officer
was not authorized. There was no bond put up for Valencia. The records show that the bond for Uriarte was only for the amount
5
of Pl.5 million. This is shown in a letter dated August 23, 2010, to COA Chairman Villar through Plaras from Aguas (Exh. "B "),
with an attachment from the Bureau of Treasury, dated March 2, 2009. It appears there that the bond for Uriarte for the CIF
covering the period February 2009 to February 2010 was only Pl.5 million.

Aguas submitted this fidelity bond certification, which was received on August 24, 2010, late, because under the COA Circulars,
it should have been submitted when the disbursing officer was designated. It should have been submitted to COA because a
disbursing officer cannot get cash advances if they do not have a fidelity bond.

Once an SDO is designated, the specimen signature must be submitted to COA, together with the fidelity bond and the
signatories for the cash advances.

The approval of the President pertains to the release of the budget, not its allocation. She thinks the action of the Board was
done because there was no budget. The Board's confirmation was needed because it was in excess of the budget that was
approved. They were trying to give a color of legality to them approval of the CIF in excess of the approved corporate operating
budget. The Board approval was required for the amount to be released, which amount was approved in excess of the allotted
budget for the year. The President cannot approve an additional amount, unless there is an appropriation or a provision saying a
particular savings will be used for the CIF. The approvals here were all in excess of the approved budget.

Cash advances can be given on a per project basis for CIF. For one to get a cash advance, one must state what the project is as
to that cash advance. No subsequent cash advance should be given, until previous cash advances have been liquidated and
accounted for. If it is a continuing project, monthly liquidation reports must be given. The difference in liquidation process
between CIF and regular cash advances is that for CIF, the liquidation goes to the Chair and not to the resident auditor of the
agency or the GOCC. All of the liquidation papers should go to the COA Chair, given on a monthly basis.

In this case, the vouchers themselves are couched generally and just say cash advance from CIF of the Chairman or from the
GM's office in accordance with her duties. There is no particular project indicated for the cash advance. Also, the requirement
that prior advances be liquidated first for subsequent advances to be given was not followed. The witness prepared a summary
5
of the cash advances withdrawn by the two disbursing officers covering the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 (Exh. "D "). The basis
for this summary is the record submitted to them by Aguas, which were supposedly submitted to COA. It shows that there were
subsequent cash advances, even if a prior advance has not yet been liquidated. Valencia submitted liquidation reports to Villar,
which consists of a letter, certification and schedule of cash advances, and liquidation reports. One is dated July 24, 2008 (Exh.
5 5
"G ") and another is dated February 13, 2009 (Exh. "H ").

5
When she secured Exhibit "G ", together with the attached documents, she did not find any supporting documents despite the
5
statement in Exhibit "G " that the supporting details of the expenses that were incurred from the fund can be made available, if
required. Aguas, the person who processed the cash advances said he did not have the details or suppmiing details of
documents of the expenditures.

Normally, when liquidating CIF, the certification of the head of the agency is necessary. If there were vouchers or receipts
involved, then all these should be attached to the liquidation report. There should also be an accomplishment report which
should be done on a monthly basis. All of these should be enclosed in a sealed envelope and sent to the Chairman of the COA,
although the agency concerned must retain a photocopy of the documents. The report should have a cover/transmittal letter
itemizing the documents, as well as liquidation vouchers and other supporting papers. If the liquidation voucher and the
supporting papers are in order, then the COA Chairman or his representative shall issue a credit memorandum. Supporting
papers consist of receipts and sales invoices. The head of the agency would have to certify that those were all actually incurred
and are legal. In this case, there were no supporting documents submitted with respect to Valencia's cash advances in 2008.
Only the certifications by the SDO were submitted. These certifications stated that he has the documents in his custody and they
can be made available, if and when necessary.

When she reviewed the CIF, she asked Aguas to produce the supporting documents which were indicated in Valencia's
certification and Aguas's own certification in the cash advance vouchers, where he also certified that the documents supporting
the cash advance were in their possession and that there was proper liquidation. Aguas replied that he did not have them.

She identified the letter of Uriarte to Villar dated July 24, 2008 as well as a transmittal letter by Uriarte for August 1, 2008, a
certification and schedule of cash advances and an undetailed liquidation report. Among the attachments is Board Resolution
305, a copy of the COB for 2008, a document for the second half of 2008, a document dated April 2, 2009, and a document for
liquidation of P2,295,000. She also identified another letter for P50 million, dated February 13, 2009, attached to the transmittal
letter. There is a certification attached to those two letters amounting to P2,295,000. Also attached is the schedule of cash
advances by Aguas and a liquidation report where Aguas certified that the supporting documents are complete and proper
although the supporting documents and papers are not attached to the liquidation report, only the general statement. These
documents were submitted to them by Aguas.

5 5 5 5
She was shown the four liquidation reports (Exhibits "M ", "N ", "0 " and "P ") attached to the transmittal letter and was asked
whether they were properly and legally accomplished. She replied that they were couched in general terms and the voucher for
which the cash advance was liquidated is not indicated and only the voucher number is specified. She adds that the form of the
liquidation is correct, but the details are not there and neither are the supporting papers.

The liquidation report was dated July 24, 2008, but it was submitted only on August 1, 2008 to COA, and it supposedly covered
the cash advances of Uriarte from January to May 2008. This is stated in her summary of liquidation that was earlier marked.
There were no supporting papers stated on or attached to the liquidation report.

She identified a set of documents to liquidate the cash advances from the CIF for the second semester of 2008 by Uriarte. The
transmittal letter of Uriarte was received by the COA on April 2, 2009. Upon inquiry with Aguas, he said that he did not have any
of the supporting papers that he supposedly had according to the certification. According to him, they are with Uriarte. Uriarte, on
the other hand, said, during the Senate hearing, that she gave them to President Arroyo.

When Plaras wrote Valencia on December 15, 2008, Aguas wrote back on behalf of Valencia, who had designated himself as
SDO. However, their designations, or in what capacity they signed the voucher are not stated. Among the attachments is also a
5
memorandum dated April 2, 2008 (Exhibit "P "), containing the signature of Arroyo, indicating her approval to the utilization of
funds. Another memorandum, dated August 13, 2008, indicating the approval of Arroyo was also attached to the transmittal
letter of Aguas on April 4, 2009. These two memoranda bear the reasons for the cash advances, couched in general terms. The
reasons were donated medicines that were sold and authorized expenditures on endowment fund. The reasons stated in the
memoranda are practically the same. Uriarte did not submit any accomplishment reports regarding the intelligence fund. Aguas
submitted an accomplishment report, but the accomplishments were not indicated in definite fashion or with specificity.

The witness narrated, based on her Summary of Liquidation Reports in 2009, that the total cash advance made by Uriarte was
P132,760,096. Arroyo approved P90 million for release. P10 million in January 2009 and April 27, 2009, and then P50 million in
May 6, 2009.In July 2, 2009, P10 million or a total of P70 million. In October 2009, P20 million or a total of P90 million. The
amount that was cash advanced by Valencia was P5,660,779. Therefore, the total cash advances by these two officials were
P138,420,875, but all of these were never liquidated in 2009. Uriarte and Valencia only submitted a liquidation voucher and a
report to COA on April I2, 2010. For the January 22, 2009 disbursements, the date of the liquidation voucher was June 30, 2009,
but it was submitted to COA on April 12, 2010. Witness identified the transmittal letter for P28 million by Uriarte, dated October
19, 2009, which was received by the COA only on April 12, 2010, with an accompanying certification from Uriarte as to some of
the documents from which the witness's Summary of Liquidation was based.

The cash advances made by Uriarte and Valencia violated par. I, Sec. 4 and Sec. 84 of P.D. I445 and par. 2, III, COA Circular
No. 92-385.

Since these cash advances were in excess of the appropriation, in effect, they were disbursed without any appropriation. These
cash advances were also made without any specific project, in violation of par. 2 of COA Circular No. 92-385. In this case, the
cash advances were not for a specific project. The vouchers only indicate the source of the fund. The vouchers did not specify
specific projects.
The total cash advances for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 to accused Uriarte and Valencia is more than P366,000,000.
Valencia cash advanced PI 3.3 million. The rest was made by Uriarte.

The memoranda to President Arroyo stated only the problems encountered by the PCSO. These problems, as stated in each
memorandum, included donated medicines sometimes ending up in store for sale, unofficial use of ambulances, rise of
expenditures of endowment fund, lotto sweepstakes scams, fixers for programs of the PCSO, and other fraudulent schemes. No
projects were mentioned.

As regards the sixth step - the credit notice, the same was not validly issued by the COA. The credit notice is a settlement or an
action made by the COA Auditors and is given once the Chairman, in the case of CIF Fund, finds that the liquidation report and
all the supporting papers are in order. In this case, the supporting papers and the liquidation report were not in order, hence, the
credit notice should not have been issued. Further, the credit notice has to follow a specific form. The COA Chairman or his
representative can: 1) settle the cash advance when everything is in order; 2) suspend the settlement if there are deficiencies
and then ask for submission of the deficiencies; or 3) out rightly disallow it in case said cash advances are illegal, irregular or
unconscionable, extravagant or excessive. Instead of following this form, the COA issued a document dated January 10, 2011,
which stated that there is an irregular use of the price fund and the charity fund for CIF Fund. The document bears an annotation
which says, "wait for transmittal, draft" among others. The document was not signed by Plaras, who was the Head of the
Confidential and Intelligence Fund Unit under COA Chairman Villar. Instead, she instructed her staff to "please ask Aguas to
submit the supplemental budget." This document was not delivered to PCSO General Manager J.M. Roxas. They instead
received another letter dated January 13, 2011 which was almost identical to the first document, except it was signed by Plaras,
and the finding of the irregular use of the prize fund and the charity fund was omitted. Instead, the work "various" was substituted
and then the amount of P137,5000,000. Therefore, instead of the earlier finding of irregularity, suddenly, the COA issued a credit
notice as regards the total of P140,000,000. The credit notice also did not specify that the transaction had been audited,
indicating that no audit was made.

A letter dated May 11, 2009 from the COA and signed by Plaras, states that the credit notice is hereby issued. Thus, it is
equivalent to the credit notice, although it did not come in the required form. It merely stated that the credit notice is issued for
P29,700,000, without specifying for which vouchers and for which project the credit notice was being given. It merely says "First
Semester of 2008". In other words, it is a "global" credit notice that she issued and it did not state that she made an audit.

Another letter, dated July 14, 2010 and signed by Plaras, supposedly covers all the cash advances in 2009, but only up to the
amount of P116,386,800. It also did not state that an audit was made.

There were no supporting papers attached to the voucher, and the certification issued is not in conformity with the required
certification by COA Circular 2003-002. The certification dated July 24, 2008 by Valencia was not in conformity with the
certification required by COA. The required form should specify the project for which the certification was being issued, and file
code of the specific project. The certification dated July 24, 2008, however, just specified that it was to certify that the P2 million
from the 2008 CIF Fund was incurred by the undersigned, in the exercise of his functions as PCSO Chairman for the various
projects, projects and activities related to the operation of the office, and there was no specific project or program or file code of
the intelligence fund, as required by COA. Furthermore, the certification also did not contain the last paragraph as required by
COA. Instead, the following was stated in the certification: "He further certifies that the details and supporting documents and
papers on these highly confidential missions and assignments are in our custody and kept in our confidential file which can be
made available if circumstances so demand." No details or supporting documents were reviewed by the witness, and though she
personally asked Aguas, the latter said that he did not have the supporting papers, and they were not in the official files of the
PCSO. Two people should have custody of the papers, namely, The Chairman of COA and the PCSO or its Special Disbursing
Officer. The witness asked Aguas because Valencia was not there, and also because Aguas was the one who made the
certification and was in-charge of accounting. The vouchers, supposedly certified by Aguas, as Budget and Accounting
Department Manager, each time cash advances were issued, stated that the supporting documents are complete, so the witness
went to him to procure the documents.

A certification dated February 13, 2009, stating that P2,857,000 was incurred by Valencia in the exercise of his function as
PCSO Chairman, related to the operations of his office without the specific intelligence project. In the same document, there is a
certification similar to one in the earlier voucher. No details of this certification were submitted by Aguas.

Another certification dated July 24, 2008 was presented, and it also did not specify the intelligence and confidential project, and
it did not contain any certification that the amount was disbursed legally or that no benefits was given to any person. Similarly,
the fourth paragraph of the same document states that Uriarte certified that details and supporting papers of the cash advance
that she made of P27,700,000 are "kept in their confidential" (sic). The same were not in the PCSO official records.

The certification dated October 19, 2009 for the amount of P2,498,300, was submitted to the witness by Aguas. It also did not
conform to the COA requirements, as it also did not specify the use of the cash advance, did not contain any certification that the
cash advance was incurred for legal purposes, or that no benefits to other people were paid out of it. Again, no supporting
documents were found and none were given by Aguas. Similarly, a certification dated February 8, 2010 for the amount of
P2,394,654 was presented, and it also does not conform with the COA circular, as it only stated that the amount was spent or
incurred by Valencia for projects covering the period of July 1 to December 31, 2009 to exercise his function as PCSO
Chairman, thus no particular intelligence fund or project was stated. As in the other certifications, though it was stated that the
details were in the confidential file, it appeared that these were not in the possession of PCSO. Another certification dated
October 19, 2009 submitted by Uriarte was examined by the witness in the course of her audit, and found that it also did not
conform to the requirements, as it only stated that the P25 million and P10 million intelligence and confidential fund dated
January 29, 2009 and April 27, 2009 were used in the exercise of her function as PCSO Vice Chairman and General Manager.

All the documents were furnished by Aguas during the course of the audit of the financial transactions of PCSO. Other
documents given by Aguas include a letter by Valencia to COA Chairman Villar, which was attached to the letter dated July 24,
2008. For the Certification issued by Valencia for P2,857,000, there was also a certification attached dated February 13, 2009.
5
As to Exhibit "J ", together with the certification, there was a letter but no other documents were submitted. Similarly, as to
6 6
Exhibit "M ", it was attached to a letter dated October 19, 2009 and was submitted to the witness by Aguas. Exhibit "N " was
attached to the letter of Valencia dated February 8, 2010, the October 19, 2009 certification was attached to the October 19,
2009 letter to Chairman Villar.

The certification dated June 29, 2010, signed by Valencia in the amount of P2,075,000, also does not conform with the COA
requirement as it only specifies that the fund was disbursed by Valencia under his office for various programs in the exercise of
his function as Chairman. Though there was a certification that the supporting papers were kept in the office, these papers were
not found in the records of the PCSO and Aguas did not have any of the records. The certification was attached to the letter of
Valencia to Villar dated June 29, 2010.

In the certification dated June 29, 2010 signed by Uriarte in the amount of P137 ,500,000, the witness also said that the
certification did not conform to the COA Circular because it only stated that the amount was disbursed from a special intelligence
fund, authorized and approved by the President under the disposition of the Office of the Vice Chairman. Despite the statement
certifying that there were documents for the audit, no documents were provided and the same were not in the official files of
PCSO . The certification was attached to a letter by Uriarte dated July 1, 2010 addressed to Villar.

In the certification dated October 19, 2009 signed by Uriarte in the amount of P2,500,000, the witness made the same finding
that it also did not conform to the COA Circular, as it did not specify the project for which the cash advance was obtained and
there were also no records in the PCSO. It was attached to the letter dated October 19, 2009.

Finally, in the certification dated February 9, 2010 signed by Uriarte in the amount of P73,993,846, the witness likewise found
that it did not conform with the requirements of the COA, as all it said was the amount was used for the exercise of the functions
of the PCSO Chairman and General Manager. The documents related to this were also not in the PCSO records and Aguas did
not submit the same. It was attached to a letter dated February 8, 2010 from Uriarte to Villar.

There are two kinds of audit on disbursements of government funds: pre-audit and post-audit. Both are defined in COA Circular
2009-002. Pre-audit is the examination of documents supporting the transaction, before these are paid for and recorded. The
auditor determines whether: (1) the proposed expenditure was in compliance with the appropriate law, specific statutory authority
or regulations; (2) sufficient funds are available to enable payment of the claim; (3) the proposed expenditure is not illegal,
irregular, extravagant, unconscionable or unnecessary, and (4) the transaction is approved by the proper authority and duly
supported by authentic underlying evidence. On the other hand, the post-audit requirement is the process where the COA or the
auditor will have to do exactly what was done in the pre-audit, and in addition, the auditor must supplement what she did by
tracing the transaction under audit to the books of accounts, and that the transaction is all recorded in the books of accounts.
The auditor, in post-audit, also makes the final determination of whether the transaction was not illegal, irregular, extravagant,
excessive, unconscionable or unnecessary.
In this case, no audit was conducted. In a letter dated May 11, 2009 signed by Plaras, it was stated that a credit advice was
given. However, the letter did not conform to the requirements or form of a credit notice. Such form was in COA Circular
2003-002, and should specify the liquidation report number, the amount, check numbers, and the action taken by the auditor.
The auditor should also include a certification that these have been audited. In this instance, no certification that the transaction
was audited was given by Plaras. Other similar letters did not conform with the COA Circular. All transactions of the government
must be subject to audit in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Nevertheless, the requirements for audit are the
same.

The effect of the issuance of the credit notice by the COA was that the agency will take it up in the books and credit the cash
advance. This is the seventh step in the flowchart. Once there is a cash advance, the liability of the officers who obtained the
cash advance would be recorded in the books. The credit notice, when received, would indicate that the account was settled.
The agency will credit the receivable or the cash advance, and remove from the books as a liability of the person liable for the
cash advance. The effect of this was that the financial liabilities of Uriarte and Valencia were removed from the books, but they
could still be subject to criminal liability based on Sec. 10 of COA Circular 91-368 (Government Accounting and Auditing
Manuals, Vol. 1, implementing P.O. 1445), which states: "The settlement of an account whether or not on appeal has been made
within the statutory period is no bar to criminal prosecution against persons liable." From the 2008 COA Annual Audited
Financial Statements of PCSO, it was seen that the procedure was not followed because the liability of the officers was already
credited even before the credit notice was received. In the financial statements, it was stated that the amount due from officers
and employees, which should include the cash advances obtained by Uriarte and Valencia, were not included because the
amount stated therein was P35 million, while the total vouchers of Uriarte and Valencia was P86 million.

The witness also related that she traced the records of the CIF fund (since such was no longer stated as a receivable), and
reviewed whether it was recorded as an expense in 2008. She found out that the recorded CIF fund expense, as recorded in the
corporate operating budget as actually disbursed, was only P21,102,000. As such, she confronted her accountants and asked
them "Saan tinago itong amount na to?" The personnel in the accounting office said that the balance of the P86 million or the
additional P21 million was not recorded in the operating fund budget because they used the prize fund and charity fund as
instructed by Aguas. Journal Entry Voucher No. 8121443 dated December 31, 2008, signed by Elmer Camba, Aguas (Head of
the Accounting Department), and Hutch Balleras (one of the staff in the Accounting Department), showed that this procedure
was done.

The contents of the Journal Entry Voucher are as follows:

(a) Accounts and Explanation: Due to other funds. This means that the amount of P63,750,000 was credited as confidential
expense from the operating fund. The amount was then removed from the operating fund, and it was passed on to other funds.

(b) PF Miscellaneous, Account No. 424-1-L P41,250,000 and CF Miscellaneous for 424-2-G for P22,500,000. PF Miscellaneous
means Prize Fund Miscellaneous and CF stands for Charity Fund Miscellaneous. This means that funds used to release the
cash advances to Uriarte and Valencia were from the prize fund and charity.

Attached to the Journal Entry Voucher was a document which reads "Allocation of Confidential and Intelligence Fund Expenses",
and was the basis of Camba in doing the Journal Entry Voucher. In the same document, there was a written annotation dated
12-31-2008 which reads that the adjustment of CIF, CF and IF, beneficiary of the fund is CF and PF and signed by Aguas.

The year 2009 was a similar case, as the witness traced the recording of the credit notice at the end of 2009, and despite the
absence of the credit notice, the Accounting Department removed from the books of PCSO the liability of Uriarte and Valencia,
corresponding to the cash advances obtained in 2009. She based this finding on the COA Annual Audit Report on the PCSO for
the year ended December 31, 2009. It was stated in the Audit Report that the total liability due from officers and employees was
only P87,747,280 and it was less than the total cash advances of Uriarte and Valencia, which was P138 million. As a result, the
witness checked the corresponding entry for the expenses in the corporate operating budget and found out that the same was
understated. The CIF expenses were only P24,968,300, as against the actual amount per vouchers, which was P138,420,875.
Upon checking with the Accounting Department, the department showed her another Journal Entry Voucher No. 9121157, dated
December 29, 2009, where the personnel removed immediately the expense and recorded it as expense for the prize fund and
charity fund by the end of December 31.

The contents of the Journal Entry Voucher, especially the notation "due from'', means the accountability of those who had cash
advance was instead credited. It was removed, and the amount was P106 million. The entry was confidential expense for
P15,958,020 and then the due to other funds was P90,428,780. The explanation for "424" was found in the middle part, stating:
"424-1-L" of miscellaneous prize fund was used in the amount of P58,502,740 and the charity fund was used in the amount of
P31, 916,040. The total amount of the receivables from Uriarte and Valencia that was removed was P106,386,800 and
P90,428,780 respectively which came from the prize fund and charity fund.

The witness reported the discrepancy because there were violations of R.A. 1169, Sec. 6, which provides for the different funds
of PCSO namely: prize fund (55% of the net receipts), charity fund (30% of the net receipts), and operating fund (15% ). The
proceeds of the lotto and sweepstakes ticket sales provide the money for these different funds, removing first the printing cost
and the net proceeds (98%) is divided among the three funds mentioned. The prize fund is the fund set aside to be used to pay
the prizes for the winnings in the lotto or sweepstakes draws, whether they are jackpot or consolation prizes. Incentives to the
lotto operators or horse owners are also drawn from this fund, as all of the expenses connected to the winnings of the draw. On
the other hand, the charity fund is reserved for charity programs approved by the board of PCSO, and constitutes hospital and
medical assistance to individuals, or to help facilities and other charities of national character. Operating expenses are charged
to the expenses to operate, personnel services, and MOOE. One kind of fund cannot be used for another kind, as they become
a trust fund which should only be used for the purpose for which it was authorized, not even with the approval of the board.

The amounts obtained from the charity fund and prize fund for 2008 was P63,750,000, and in 2009 P90,428,780. The Board of
Directors was given a copy of the COA Audit Reports for years 2008 and 2009. The Board of Directors for both years was
composed of: Chairman Valencia, and Board Members Morato, Roquero, Taruc and Valdez. Uriarte was the Vice Chairman of
the Board of Directors. The witness did not know whether the Board checked the COA reports, but there was no action on their
part, and neither did they question the correctness of the statements. They also had the Audit Committee (which was composed
of members of the board) at that time, and one of the duties of the Audit Committee was to verify the balances.

The witness identified the documents referring to the confirmation by the Board of Directors of PCSO of the CIF. Board
Resolution No. 217, approved on February 18, 2009, confirms the CIF approved by the President. It did not state which CIF they
were approving. They also assigned Uriarte as the Special Disbursing Officer of the CIF, but it did say for what year. The
signatories to the same Board Resolution were Valencia, Taruc, Valdes, Uriarte, Roquero and Morato. The same were the
witness's findings for Board Resolution No. 2356 S. 2009, approved on December 9, 2009. As for Board Resolution No. 29, S.
2010, approved on January 6, 2010, the Board confirmed the fund approved by the President for 2010, though the approval of
the President was only received on August 13, 2010 as shown in the Memorandum dated January 4. In effect, the Board was
aware of the requests, and because they ratified the cash advances, they agreed to the act of obtaining the same.

Apart from the President violating LOI 1282, the witness also observed that the President directly dealt with the PCSO, although
the President, by Executive Order No. 383 dated November 14, 2004, and Executive Order No. 455 dated August 22, 2005,
transferred the direct control and supervision of the PCSO to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and
later to the Department of Health (DOH). A project should first be approved by the Supervising and Controlling Secretary of the
Secretary of Health; that the President had transferred her direct control and supervision, and lost the same. The witness said
her basis was administrative procedure. In this regard, President Aquino now has transferred the control and supervision of the
PCSO back to the Office of the President through Executive Order No. 14, S. 2010, dated November 19, 2010.

Uriarte should not have gone directly to the President to ask for the latter's approval for allocation. Nonetheless, the release of
9
the CIF must still be approved by the President.

10
The State also presented evidence consisting in the testimonies of officers coming from different law enforcement agencies to
corroborate Tolentino's testimony to the effect that the PCSO had not requested from their respective offices any intelligence
operations contrary to the liquidation report submitted by Uriarte and Aguas.

To complete the evidence for the Prosecution, Atty. Anamarie Villaluz Gonzales, Office-in-Charge and Department Manager of
the Human Resources of PCSO; Flerida Africa Jimenez, Head of the Intelligence and Confidential Fund Audit Unit of the COA;
and Noel Clemente, Director of COA were presented as additional witnesses.

After the Prosecution rested its case, GMA, Aguas, Valencia, Morato, Taruc V, Roquero and Villar separately filed their
demurrers to evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them.

On April 6, 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence of Morato, Roquero, Taruc and Villar, and dismissed the
charge against them. It held that said accused who were members of the PCSO Board of Directors were not shown to have
diverted any PCSO funds to themselves, or to have raided the public treasury by conveying and transferring into their
possession and control any money or funds from PCSO account; that as to Villar, there had been no clear showing that his
designation of Plaras had been tainted with any criminal design; and that the fact that Plaras had signed "by authority" of Villar
as the COA Chairman could not criminally bind him in the absence of any showing of conspiracy.

However, the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers of GMA, Aguas and Valencia, holding that there was sufficient evidence
showing that they had conspired to commit plunder; and that the Prosecution had sufficiently established a case of malversation
against Valencia, pertinently saying:

Demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring
challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court then ascertains whether there is a
competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

xxxx

Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally
justify the judicial or official action demanded to accord to circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the evidence
must prove (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of paiiicipation therein by the accused (Gutib v. CA, 110
SCAD 743, 312 SCRA 365 [1999]).

xxx xxx xxx

A. Demurrer filed by Arroyo and Aguas:

It must be remembered that in Our November 5, 2013 Resolution, We found strong evidence of guilt against Arroyo and
Aguas, only as to the second predicate act charged in the Information, which reads:

(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-mentioned amount from the
Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and/or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession
and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures.

In the November 5, 2013 Resolution, We said:

It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the enumeration of the possible predicate acts in the
commission of plunder did not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or unjust enrichment with respect to
raids on the public treasury, as a means to commit plunder. It would, therefore, appear that a "raid on the public treasury" is
consummated where all the acts necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. Thus a "raid on the public
treasury" can be said to have been achieved thru the pillaging or looting of public coffers either through misuse, misappropriation
or conversion, without need of establishing gain or profit to the raider. Otherwise stated, once a "raider" gets material
possession of a government asset through improper means and has free disposal of the same, the raid or pillage is
completed. x x x

xxxx

Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF funds, which is obviously a government asset, will amount to a raid on the
public treasury, and therefore fall into the category of ill-gotten wealth.

xxxx

xxx It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was granted authority by Arroyo to use additional CIF funds during the period
2008-2010. Uriarte was able [to] accumulate during that period CIF funds in the total amount of P.352,681,646. This was
through a series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF funds from the PCSO coffers, as evidenced by the disbursement
vouchers and checks issued and encashed by her, through her authorized representative.

These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF funds evidently characterize the series of withdrawals by and releases
to Uriarte as "raids" on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public treasury. These were, in every sense, "pillage," as
Uriarte looted government funds and appears to have not been able to account for it. The monies came into her
possession and, admittedly, she disbursed it for purposes other than what these were intended for, thus, amounting to "misuse"
of the same. Therefore, the additional CIF funds are ill-gotten, as defined by R.A. 7080, the PCGG rules, and Republic v.
Sandiganbayan. The encashment of the checks, which named her as the "payee," gave Uriarte material possession of
the CIF funds which she disposed of at will.

As to the determination whether the threshold amount of P50million was met by the prosecution's evidence, the Court believes
this to have been established. Even if the computation is limited only to the cash advances/releases made by accused Uriarte
alone AFTER Arroyo had approved her requests and the PCSO Board approved CIF budget and the "regular" P5million CIF
budget accorded to the PCSO Chairman and Vice Chairman are NOT taken into account, still the total cash advances through
accused Uriarte's series of withdrawals will total P189,681,646. This amount surpasses the P50million threshold.

The evidence shows that for the year 2010 alone, Uriarte asked for P150 million additional CIF funds, and Arroyo granted such
request and authorized its use. From January 8, 2010 up to June 18, 2010, Uriarte made a series of eleven (11) cash advances
in the total amount of P138,223,490. According to Uriarte's testimony before the Senate, the main purpose for these cash
advances was for the "roll-out" of the small town lottery program. However, the accomplishment report submitted by Aguas
shows that P137,500,000 was spent on non-related PCSO activities, such as "bomb threat, kidnapping, terrorism and bilateral
and security relations." All the cash advances made by Uriarte in 2010 were made in violation of LOI 1282, and COA Circulars
2003-002 and 92-385. These were thus improper use of the additional Cff funds amounting to raids on the PCSO coffers and
were ill-gotten because Uriarte had encashed the checks and came into possession of the monies, which she had complete
freedom to dispose of but was not able to properly account for.

These findings of the Court clearly point out the commission by Uriarte of the crime of Plunder under the second predicate
act charged in the Information. As to Arroyo's participation, the Court stated in its November 5, 2013 Resolution that:

The evidence shows that Arroyo approved not only Uriarte's request for additional CIF funds in 2008-2010, but also authorized
the latter to use such funds. Arroyo's "OK" notation and signature on Uriartc's letter-requests signified unqualified
approval of Uriarte's request to use the additional CIF funds because the last paragraph of Uriarte's requests uniformly
ended with this phrase: "With the use of intelligence fund, PCSO can protect its image and integrity of its operations.

The letter-request of Uriarte in 2010 was more explicit because it categorically asked for: "The approval on the use of the fifty
percent of the PR Fund as PCSO Intelligence Fund will greatly help PCSO in the disbursement of funds to immediately address
urgent issues."

Arroyo cannot, therefore, successfully argue that what she approved were only the request for the grant or allocation of
additional CIF funds, because Arroyo's "OK" notation was unqualified and, therefore, covered also the request to use
11
such funds, through releases of the same in favor of Uriarte.

The Sandiganbayan later also denied the respective Motions for Reconsideration of GMA and Aguas, observing that:

In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank account or was used to acquire real or personal
properties or used for any other purpose to personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a plunderer had already
illegally amassed, acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more of government funds and just decided to keep it in his vault and
never used such funds for any purpose to benefit him, would that not be plunder? Or, if immediately right after such amassing,
the monies went up in flames or recovered by the police, negating any opportunity for the person to actually benefit, would that
not still be plunder? Surely, in such cases, a plunder charge could still prosper and the argument that the fact of personal benefit
should still be evidence-based must fail.

Also, accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the fact of amassing the ill-gotten wealth, and that the "overt act" of
approving the disbursement is not the "overt act" contemplated by law. She further stresses that there was no proof of
conspiracy between accused Arroyo and her co-accused and that the Prosecution was unable to prove their case against
accused Arroyo. What accused Arroyo forgets is that although she did not actually commit any "overt act" of illegally
amassing CIF funds, her act of approving not only the additional CIF funds but also their releases, aided and abetted
accused Uriarte's successful raids on the public treasury. Accused Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a coconspirator of
Uriarte who accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act is not indispensable when a
12
conspirator is the mastermind.
Considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the demurrers to evidence of GMA and Aguas, they have come to the Court on
certiorari to assail and set aside said denial, claiming that the denial was with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

Issues

GMA pleads that the denial of her demurrer to evidence was in patent and flagrant violation of Republic Act No. 7080, the law on
plunder, and was consequently arbitrary and oppressive, not only in grave abuse of discretion but rendered without jurisdiction
because:

First Ground

On the basis of the above Resolutions, the Sandiganbayan has denied petitioner Arroyo's Demurrer to Evidence and
considering the reasons for doing so, would find petitioner Arroyo guilty of the offense of plunder under Republic Act
No. 7080 as charged in the Information notwithstanding the following:

a. While the gravamen, indeed corpus delicti of the offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080, and as charged in the
Information, is that the public officer ... "amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)", the Sandiganbayan Resolutions extirpate this vital element of the offense of
plunder;

b. In point of fact, not a single exhibit of the 637 exhibits offered by the prosecution nor a single testimony of the 21
witnesses of the prosecution was offered by the prosecution to prove that petitioner amassed, accumulated or
acquired even a single peso of the alleged ill-gotten wealth amounting to P365,997,915.00 or any part of that amount
alleged in the Information;

c. Implicitly confirming the above, and aggravating its error, on the basis solely of petitioner Arroyo's authorization of
the release of the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, the Sandiganbayan ruled that she has
committed the offense of plunder under R.A. No. 7080 for the reason that her release of CIF funds to the PCSO amount
to a violation of Sec. l(d) [11 of R.A. No. 7080 which reads, as follows:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

which, "did not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or un.just enrichment with respect to raids on
the public treasury", thereby disregarding the gravamen or the corpus delicti of the offense of plunder under R.A. No.
7080.

Second Ground

Worsening the above error of the Sandiganbayan, the Resolutions, with absolutely no justification in law or in the
evidence, purportedly as the "mastermind" of a conspiracy, and without performing any overt act, would impute to
petitioner Arroyo the "series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF funds from the PCSO coffers" by Uriarte as
"raids on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public treasury" and "in every sense, 'pillage' as Uriarte looted
government funds and appears to have not been able to account for it". Parenthetically, Uriarte has not been arrested,
was not arraigned and did not participate in the trial of the case.

Third Ground

That as an obvious consequence of the above, denial of petitioner Arroyo's Demurrer To Evidence for the reasons
stated in the Sandiganbayan Resolutions, amounting no less to convicting her on the basis of a disjointed reading of
the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080, aggravated by the extirpation in the process of its "corpus delicti" -
the amassing, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth, hence, of a crime that docs not exist in law and
consequently a blatant deprivation of liberty without due process of law.

Fourth Ground
The Information alleges that the ten (10) persons accused in Crim. Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174, namely: Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Rosario C. Uriarte, Sergio 0. Valencia, Manuel L. Morato, Jose R. Taruc V, Raymundo T. Roquero,
[M]a. Fatima A.S. Valdes, Benigno B. Aguas, Reynaldo A. Villar and Nilda B. Plaras" ... all public officers committing the
offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions,
authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or a
series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means, described as follows ... " or each of them, P36,599,791.50
which would not qualify the offense charged as "plunder" under R.A. No. 7080 against all ten (10) accused together, for
which reason the Information docs not charge the offense of plunder and, as a consequence, all proceedings thereafter
13
held under the Information arc void.

On his part, Aguas contends that:

A. In light of the factual setting described above and the evidence offered and admitted, docs proof beyond reasonable
doubt exist to warrant a holding that Prosecution proved the guilt of the accused such that there is legal reason to
deny Petitioner's Demurrer'?

B. Did the Prosecution's offered evidence squarely and properly support the allegations in the Information'?

PETITIONER STRONGLY SUBMITS THAT PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
14
DOUBT THE EXISTENCE OF THE CORE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.

On the other hand, the Prosecution insists that the petitions for certiorari should be dismissed upon the following grounds,
namely:

A. CERTIORARI IS NOT THE PROPER REMEDY FROM AN ORDER OR RESOLUTION DENYING DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE.

B. THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE THE SANDIGANBAYAN MERELY INTERPRETED WHAT
CONSTITUTES PLUNDER UNDER LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT OF FACTS OF THE CASE. IT DID NOT
JUDICIALLY LEGISLATE A "NEW" OFFENSE.

1. ACTUAL PERSONAL GAIN, BENEFIT OR ENRICHMENT IS NOT AN ELEMENT OF PLUNDER UNDER R.A. No. 7080.

2. EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT ARROYO, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, CONSPIRED WITH HER CO-ACCUSED
AND PARTICIPATED IN THE COMPLEX, ILLEGAL SCHEME WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO IN HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF
PESOS, WHICH CONSTITUTES PLUNDER.

3. ARROYO IS NOT SIMILARLY SITUATED WITH ACCUSED PCSO BOARD MEMBERS AND CANNOT THUS DEMAND
THAT THE SANDIGANBA YAN DISMISS THE PLUNDER CASE AGAINST HER.

C. ARROYO'S BELATED, COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE INFORMATION CHARGING HER AND CO-ACCUSED FOR
PLUNDER IS HIGHLY IMPROPER, ESPECIALLY AT THIS LA TE STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING.

1. THE FACTS CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE ARE CLEARLY ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.

2. ARROYO'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO SB-12-CRM-0174

PROVES THAT SHE HAS ALWAYS KNOWN AND UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE ACCUSATIONS
AGAINST HER.

D. ARROYO IS NOT ENTITLED TO A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BECAUSE THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN
15
SB-12-CRM-0174 CANNOT BE ENJOINED.
Based on the submissions of the parties, the Court synthesizes the decisive issues to be considered and resolved, as follows:

Procedural Issue:

1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence.

Substantive Issues:

1. Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte;

2. Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of plunder:

a. Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of not less than
P50,000,000.00?

b. Was the predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information proved by the Prosecution?

Ruling of the Court

The consolidated petitions for certiorari are meritorious.

I.
The Court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction
to correct grave abuse of discretion

The Prosecution insists that the petition for certiorari of GMA was improper to challenge the denial of her demurrer to evidence;
that she also thereby failed to show that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying her
demurrer to evidence; and that, on the contrary, the Sandiganbayan only interpreted what constituted plunder under the law and
jurisprudence in light of the established facts, and did not legislate a new offense, by extensively discussing how she had
16
connived with her co-accused to commit plunder.

The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because the Sandiganbayan, as shall shortly be
demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because
17
of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall
not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the
denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the
proper recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the
18
conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the
19
writ of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so –

x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the court that authority is not
wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of our
superintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case 'as the
ends of justice may require.' So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to
20
do substantial justice.

The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a
result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII
the following provision:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the
convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion
whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the
demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was
21
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse
of discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to
22
sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict.

II.
The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove
the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to
23
commit it. In this jurisdiction, conspiracy is either a crime in itself or a mere means to commit a crime.

24
As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime, and prescribes a penalty for it. The exception is
exemplified in Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal to commit treason), Article 136 (conspiracy and proposal to commit coup
d'etat, rebellion or insurrection) and Article 141 (conspiracy to commit sedition) of the Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy is
a means to commit a crime, it is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the conspirators, or their
community of criminal design must be alleged and competently shown.

25
We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious one. Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or
acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active
26
participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Hence,
conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence.

In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form, which requires proof of an actual
agreement among all the co-conspirators to commit the crime. However, conspiracies are not always shown to have been
expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when two or more
persons are shown to have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so
that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of
27
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner of the
commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably
28
pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest.

But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to have performed at least an overt act in
pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator,
and each may only be held responsible for the results of his own acts. In this connection, the character of the overt act has been
29
explained in People v. Lizada:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more
than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a
concrete offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of
the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so,
irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one
which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of
the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one
can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step
towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards
the commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for
completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of
Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. (Bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis)

In her case, GMA points out that all that the State showed was her having affixed her unqualified "OK" on the requests for the
additional CIFs by Uriarte. She argues that such act was not even an overt act of plunder because it had no immediate and
necessary relation to plunder by virtue of her approval not being per se illegal or irregular. However, the Sandiganbayan, in
denying the Motions for Reconsideration of GMA and Aguas vis-a-vis the denial of the demurrers, observed that:

xxxx accused Arroyo insists that there was no proof of the fact of amassing the ill-gotten wealth, and that the "overt act" of
approving the disbursement is not the "overt act" contemplated by Jaw. She further stresses that there was no proof of
conspiracy between accused Arroyo and her co-accused and that the Prosecution was unable to prove their case against
accused Arroyo. What accused Arroyo forgets is that although she did not actually commit any "overt act" of illegally amassing
CIF funds, her act of approving not only the additional CIF funds but also their releases, aided and abetted accused Uriarte's
successful raids on the public treasury. Accused Arroyo is therefore rightly charged as a co-conspirator of Uriarte who
accumulated the CIF funds. Moreover, the performance of an overt act is not indispensable when a conspirator is the
30
mastermind.

It is in this regard that the Sandigabayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction. To start
with, its conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of plunder was plainly conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering
that the information did not aver at all that she had been the mastermind; hence, the Sandigabayan thereby acted capriciously
and arbitrarily. In the second place, the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her handwritten unqualified "OK" as an overt act of
plunder was absolutely unwarranted considering that such act was a common legal and valid practice of signifying approval of a
fund release by the President. Indeed, pursuant to People v. Lizada, supra, an act or conduct becomes an overt act of a crime
only when it evinces a causal relation to the intended crime because the act or conduct will not be an overt act of the crime if it
does not have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.

31
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, the Court recognized two nuances of appreciating conspiracy as a means to commit a crime,
the wheel conspiracy and the chain conspiracy.

The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other
persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event that the
spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in the instances when each spoke is
32
unconcerned with the success of the other spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.

An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy involved was the conspiracy alleged in the information
for plunder filed against former President Estrada and his co-conspirators. Former President Estrada was the hub while the
spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the overall conspiracy,
i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

33
On the other hand, the American case of Kotteakos v. United States illustrates a wheel conspiracy where multiple
conspiracies were established instead of one single conspiracy. There, Simon Brown, the hub, assisted 31 independent
individuals to obtain separate fraudulent loans from the US Government. Although all the defendants were engaged in the same
type of illegal activity, there was no common purpose or overall plan among them, and they were not liable for involvement in a
single conspiracy. Each loan was an end in itself, separate from all others, although all were alike in having similar illegal
objects. Except for Brown, the common figure, no conspirator was interested in whether any loan except his own went through.
Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there existed 32 separate conspiracies involving Brown rather than one common
34
conspiracy.

The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan exists when there is successive communication and cooperation
in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
35
retailer, and then retailer and consumer.

36
This involves individuals linked together in a vertical chain to achieve a criminal objective. Illustrative of chain conspiracy was
37
that involved in United States v. Bruno, of the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. There, 88 defendants were indicted
for a conspiracy to import, sell, and possess narcotics. This case involved several smugglers who had brought narcotics to
retailers who, in turn, had sold the narcotics to operatives in Texas and Louisiana for distribution to addicts. The US Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that what transpired was a single chain conspiracy in which the smugglers knew that the
middlemen must sell to retailers for distribution to addicts, and the retailers knew that the middle men must purchase drugs from
smugglers. As reasoned by the court, "the conspirators at one end of the chain knew that the unlawful business would not and
could not, stop with their buyers; and those at the other end knew that it had not begun with their sellers." Each conspirator knew
that "the success of that part with which he was immediately concerned was dependent upon success of the whole." This
means, therefore, that "every member of the conspiracy was liable for every illegal transaction carried out by other members of
38
the conspiracy in Texas and in Louisiana."

Once the State proved the conspiracy as a means to commit a crime, each co-conspirator is as criminally liable as the others, for
the act of one is the act of all. A co-conspirator does not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither does he have
39
to know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal act. Otherwise, the criminal liability of
each accused is individual and independent.

The Prosecution insisted that a conspiracy existed among GMA, Uriarte, Valencia and the Members of the PCSO Board of
Directors, Aguas, Villar and Plaras. The Sandiganbayan agreed with the Prosecution as to the conspirators involved, declaring
that GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte had conspired and committed plunder.

A review of the records of the case compels us to reject the Sandiganbayan's declaration in light of the information filed against
the petitioners, and the foregoing exposition on the nature, forms and extent of conspiracy. On the contrary, the Prosecution did
not sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder
among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that
the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel
conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.

This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.

In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) states:

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. – Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree
of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall
be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [As
Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]

Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:

Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:

xxxx

d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of
Section two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed, acquired or accumulated
ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is committed by any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50,000,000.00 through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for
plunder against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members of her
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons. In other words, the allegation of
the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be
identified in either manner. Of course, implied conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly
alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution.

40
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where the Court explained the nature of the conspiracy charge
and the necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the amassment, accumulation and acquisition was made, thus:

There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national economy" is made
up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common
purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonality - to help the former
President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the
different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each
accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise
tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such
sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their
individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. [bold underscoring supplied for emphasis]
Here, considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing, accumulating and/or acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating
P365,997,915.00, it would be improbable that the crime charged was plunder if none of them was alleged to be the main
plunderer. As such, each of the 10 accused would account for the aliquot amount of only P36,599,791.50, or exactly 1/10 of the
alleged aggregate ill-gotten wealth, which is far below the threshold value of ill-gotten wealth required for plunder.

41
We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan to the effect that an information alleging conspiracy is
sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1) with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such
as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a
person of common understanding would know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the accused to
competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the
information as to the allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be
prosecuted under R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not only
necessary because the law required such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the
accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring the various
elements of the crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the accused to suitably prepare their defense
42
because they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense charged.

For sure, even the Sandiganbayan was at a loss in this respect. Despite the silence of the information on who the main
plunderer or the mastermind was, the Sandiganbayan readily condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10, 2015 as
the mastermind despite the absence of the specific allegation in the information to that effect. Even worse, there was no
evidence that substantiated such sweeping generalization.

In fine, the Prosecution's failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the State against the
petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.

Nevertheless, the Prosecution insists that GMA, Uriarte and Aguas committed acts showing the existence of an implied
conspiracy among themselves, thereby making all of them the main plunderers. On this score, the Prosecution points out that
the sole overt act of GMA to become a part of the conspiracy was her approval via the marginal note of "OK" of all the requests
made by Uriarte for the use of additional intelligence fund. The Prosecution stresses that by approving Uriaiie's requests in that
manner, GMA violated the following:

a. Letter of Instruction 1282, which required requests for additional confidential and intelligence funds (CIFs) to be accompanied
with detailed, specific project proposals and specifications; and

b. COA Circular No. 92-385, which allowed the President to approve the release of additional CIFs only if there was an existing
budget to cover the request.

The insistence of the Prosecution is unwarranted. GMA's approval of Uriarte's requests for additional CIFs did not make her part
of any design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass, accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth. Absent the specific
allegation in the information to that effect, and competent proof thereon, GMA' s approval of Uriarte' s requests, even if
unqualified, could not make her part of any criminal conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime considering that her
approval was not by any means irregular or illegal.

The Prosecution takes GMA to task for approving Uriarte's request despite the requests failing to provide "the full detail [ ofJ the
specific purposes for which said funds shall be spent and shall explain the circumstances giving rise to the necessity for the
expenditure and the particular aims to be accomplished." It posits that the requests were not specific enough, contrary to what is
required by LOI 1282.

LOI 1282 reads:

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION No. 1282

To: All Ministries and Offices Concerned

In recent years intelligence funds appropriated for the various ministries and certain offices have been, as reports reaching me
indicate, spent with less than full regard for secrecy and prudence. On the one hand, there have been far too many leakages of
information on expenditures of said funds; and on the other hand, where secrecy has been observed, the President himself was
often left unaware of how these funds had been utilized.

Effective immediately, all requests for the allocation or release of intelligence funds shall indicate in full detail the specific
purposes for which said funds shall be spent and shall explain the circumstances giving rise to the necessity for the expenditure
and the particular aims to be accomplished.

The requests and the detailed explanations shall be submitted to the President personally.

It is imperative that such detailed presentations be made to the President in order to avoid such duplication of expenditures as
has taken place in the past because of the lack of centralized planning and organized disposition of intelligence funds.

Full compliance herewith is desired.

Manila, January 12, 1983.

(Sgd.) FERDINANDE. MARCOS

President of the Philippines

However, an examination of Uriarte' s several requests indicates their compliance with LOI No. 1282. The requests, similarly
worded, furnished: (a) the full details of the specific purposes for which the funds would be spent; (b) the explanations of the
circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the expenditure; and (c) the particular aims to be accomplished.

The specific purposes and circumstances for the necessity of the expenditures were laid down as follows:

In dispensing its mandate, PCSO has been constantly encountering a number of fraudulent schemes and nefarious activities on
a continuing basis which affect the integrity of our operations, to wit:

1. Donated medicines sometimes end up in drug stores for sale even if they were labeled "Donated by PCSO- Not for Sale";

2. Unwarranted or unofficial use of ambulances by beneficiarydonees;

3. Unauthorized expenditures of endowment fund for charity patients and organizations;

4. Lotto and sweepstakes scams victimizing innocent people of winning the jackpot and selling tampered tickets as winning
tickets;

5. Fixers for the different programs of PCSO such as Ambulance Donation Project, Endowment Fund Program and Individual
Medical Assistance Program;

43
6. Other fraudulent schemes and activities which put the PCSO in bad light.

A reading of the requests also reveals that the additional CIFs requested were to be used to protect PCSO's image and the
integrity of its operations. The Court thus cannot share the Prosecution's dismissiveness of the requests for not being compliant
with LOI No. 1282. According to its terms, LOI No. 1282 did not detail any qualification as to how specific the requests should be
made. Hence, we should not make any other pronouncement than to rule that Uriarte's requests were compliant with LOI No.
1282.

COA Circular No. 92-385 required that additional request for CIFs would be approved only when there was available budget. In
this regard, the Prosecution suggests that there was no longer any budget when GMA approved Uriarte's requests because the
budget had earmarked intelligence funds that had already been maxed out and used. The suggestion is not acceptable,
however, considering that the funds of the PCSO were comingled into one account as early as 2007. Consequently, although
only 15% of PCSO's revenues was appropriated to an operation fund from which the CIF could be sourced, the remaining 85%
of PCSO's revenues, already co-mingled with the operating fund, could still sustain the additional requests. In short, there was
available budget from which to draw the additional requests for CIFs.
It is notable that the COA, although frowning upon PCSO's co-mingling of funds, did not rule such co-mingling as illegal. As
such, sourcing the requested additional CIFs from one account was far from illegal.

Lastly, the Prosecution's effort to show irregularities as badges of bad faith has led it to claim that GMA had known that Uriarte
would raid the public treasury, and would misuse the amounts disbursed. This knowledge was imputed to GMA by virtue of her
power of control over PCSO.

The Prosecution seems to be relying on the doctrine of command responsibility to impute the actions of subordinate officers to
GMA as the superior officer. The reliance is misplaced, for incriminating GMA under those terms was legally unacceptable and
incomprehensible. The application of the doctrine of command responsibility is limited, and cannot be true for all litigations. The
44
Court ruled in Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo that command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders for
crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict. The doctrine has also found application in civil actions for human rights abuses. But this case involves neither
a probe of GMA' s actions as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor of a human rights issue. As
such, it is legally improper to impute the actions of Uriarte to GMA in the absence of any conspiracy between them.

On the part of Aguas, the Sandiganbayan pronounced him to be as much a member of the implied conspiracy as GMA was, and
detailed his participation in this manner:

In all of the disbursement vouchers covering the cash advances/releases to Uriarte of the CIF funds, Aguas certified that:

CERTIFIED: Adequate available funds/budgetary allotment in the amount of P___________ ; expenditure properly certified;
supported by documents marked (X) per checklist and back hereof; account codes proper; previous cash advance
liquidated/accounted for.

These certifications, after close scrutiny, were not true because: 1.) there were no documents which lent support to the cash
advances on a per project basis. The particulars of payment simply read: "To draw cash advance form the CIF Fund of the Office
of the Vice-Chairman and General Manager". No particular purpose or project was specified contrary to the requirement under
COA Circular 2003-002 that cash advances must be on a per project basis. Without specifics on the project covered by each
cash advance. Aguas could not certify that supporting documents existed simply because he would not know what project was
being funded by the cash advances; and 2.) There were no previous liquidations made of prior cash advances when Aguas
made the certifications. COA circular 2003-002 required that cash advances be liquidated within one (1) month from the date the
purpose of the cash advance was accomplished. If the completion of the projects mentioned were for more than one month, a
monthly progress liquidation report was necessary. In the case of Uriarte' s cash advances certified to by Aguas, the liquidation
made was wholesale, i.e. these were done on a semi-annual basis without a monthly liquidation or at least a monthly liquidation
progress report. How then could Aguas correctly certify that previous liquidations were accounted for? Aguas's certification also
violated Sec. 89 of P.D. 1445 which states:

Limitations on cash advance. No cash advance shall be given unless for a legally authorized specific purpose. A cash advance
shall be reported on and liquidated as soon as the purpose for which it was given has been served. No additional cash advance
shall be allowed to any official or employee unless the previous cash advance given to him is first settled or a proper accounting
thereof is made.

There is a great presumption of guilt against Aguas, as his action aided and abetted Uriarte's being able to draw these irregular
CIF funds in contravention of the rules on CIF funds. Without Aguas's certification, the disbursement vouchers could not have
been processed for payment. Accordingly, the certification that there were supporting documents and prior liquidation paved the
way for Uriarte to acquire ill-gotten wealth by raiding the public coffers of the PCSO.

By just taking cognizance of the series and number of cash advances and the staggering amounts involved, Aguas should have
been alerted that something was greatly amiss and that Uriarte was up to something. If Aguas was not into the scheme, it would
have been easy for him to refuse to sign the certification, but he did not. The conspiracy "gravamen" is therefore present in the
case of Aguas. Moreover, Aguas's attempt to cover-up Uriarte's misuse of these CIF funds in his accomplishment report only
contributed to unmasking the actual activities for which these funds were utilized. Aguas' s accomplishment report, which was
conformed to by Uriarte, made it self-evidence that the bulk of the CIF funds in 2009 and 2010 were allegedly spend for
45
non-PCSO related activities, e.g. bomb threats, kidnapping, terrorism, and others.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan concluded that Aguas became a part of the implied conspiracy when he signed the disbursement
vouchers despite the absence of certain legal requirements, and issued certain certifications to the effect that the budgetary
allotment/funds for cash advance to be withdrawn were available; that the expenditures were supported by documents; and that
the previous cash advances had been liquidated or accounted for.

We opine and declare, however, that Aguas' certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers were insufficient bases
to conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime. Without GMA's participation, he could not
release any money because there was then no budget available for the additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have
committed did not amount to plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.

Under the circumstances, the Sandiganbayan's finding on the existence of the conspiracy to commit plunder was unsustainable.
It then becomes unavoidable for the Court to rule that because the Prosecution failed to properly allege the elements of the
crime, as well as to prove that any implied conspiracy to commit plunder or any other crime existed among GMA, Aguas and
Uriarte there was no conspiracy to commit plunder among them. As a result, GMA and Aguas could be criminally responsible
only for their own respective actions, if any.

III.
No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring
ill-gotten wealth of at least P50 Million
was adduced against GMA and Aguas

The Sandiganbayan sustained the sufficiency of the evidence to convict the petitioners for plunder on the basis that the
Prosecution established all the elements of plunder.

After a review of the records, we find and rule that the Prosecution had no case for plunder against the petitioners.

To successfully mount a criminal prosecution for plunder, the State must allege and establish the following elements, namely:

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in connivance with members of her family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

2. That the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or
criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits
from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of
its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial
or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of
the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least
46
P50,000,000.00.

The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at not less than
P50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.

As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at least
P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that matter, had
amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise,
presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA
or Aguas, or Uriarte.
The absolute lack of evidence on this material but defining and decisive aspect of the criminal prosecution was explicitly noted in
the concurring and partial dissenting opinion of Justice Rodolfo A. Ponferrada of the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

Here the evidence of the prosecution failed to show the existence of the crime of plunder as no evidence was presented that any
of the accused, accumulated and/or acquired ill-gotten wealth. In fact, the principal witness of the prosecution when asked, said
that she does not know the existence or whereabouts of the alleged ill-gotten wealth, to wit:

Q: Of course, you don't know where is this ill-gotten wealth are (sic) now?

47
A: Yes, Your Honors. We don't know whether they saved it, squandered it or what? We don't know, Your Honor. [bold
emphasis supplied]

After Atty. Tolentino, as the Prosecution's main witness, conceded lack of any knowledge of the amassing, accumulating or
acquiring of ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00, nothing more remained of the criminal prosecution for plunder. Hence,
the Sandiganbayan should have granted the demurrers of GMA and Aguas, and dismissed the criminal action against them.

IV.
The Prosecution failed to prove the
predicate act of raiding the public treasury

The Sandiganbayan observed that the Prosecution established the predicate act of raiding the public treasury, to wit:

Secondly, the terms "unjust enrichment," "benefit," and "pecuniary benefit" are only mentioned in the predicate acts mentioned in
par. 2, 5 and 6 of Section 1 (d) of the Plunder Law. Paragraph 1 of the same section where "raids on the public treasury" is
mentioned did not mention "unjust enrichment" or "personal benefit". Lastly, the predicate act covering "raids on the public
treasury" is lumped up with the phrases misappropriation, conversion, misuse and malversation of public funds. Thus, once
public funds, as in the case of CIF funds, are illegally accumulated, amassed or acquired. To the tune of PSO Million or more,
there will be no need to establish any motive to gain, or much more establish where the money eventually ended up. As stated in
Our Resolution dated November 5, 2013:

It should be noted that in both R.A. No. 7080 and the PCGG rules, the enumeration of the possible predicate acts in the
commission of plunder did not associate or require the concept of personal gain/benefit or unjust enrichment with respect to
raids on the public treasury, as a means to commit plunder. It would, therefore, appear that a "raid on the public treasury" is
consummated where all the acts necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. Thus a "raid on the public
treasury" can be said to have been achieved thru the pillaging or looting of public coffers either through misuse, misappropriation
or conversion, without need of establishing gain or profit to the "raider" gets material possession of a government asset through
improper means and has free disposal of the same, the raid or pillage is completed.

xxxx

Clearly, the improper acquisition and illegal use of CIF funds, which is obviously a government asset, will amount to a raid on the
public treasury, and therefore fall into the category of ill-gotten wealth.

xxxx

x x x It is not disputed that Uriarte asked for and was granted authority by Arroyo to use additional CIF funds during the period
2008 - 2010. Uriarte was able to accumulate during that period CIF funds in the total amount of P352,681,646. This was through
a series of withdrawals as cash advances of the CIF funds from the PCSO coffers, as evidenced by the disbursement vouchers
and checks issued and encashed by her, through her authorized representatives.

These flagrant violations of the rules on the use of CIF funds evidently characterize the series of withdrawals by and releases to
Uriarte as "raids" on the PCSO coffers, which is part of the public treasury. These were, in every sense, "pillage," as Uriarte
looted government funds and appears to have not been able to account for it. The monies came into her possession and,
admittedly, she disbursed it for purposes other than what these were intended for, thus amounting to "misuse" of the same. xxx

In this case, to require proof that monies went to a plunderer's bank account or was used to acquire real or personal properties
or used for any other purpose to personally benefit the plunderer, is absurd. Suppose a plunderer had already amassed,
acquired or accumulated P50 Million or more of government funds and just decide to keep it in his vault and never used such
funds for any purpose to benefit him, would that not be plunder? Or, if immediately right after such amassing, the monies went
up in flames or recovered by the police, negating any opportunity for the purpose to actually benefit, would that not still be
plunder? Surely, in such cases, a plunder charge could still prosper and the argument that the fact of personal benefit should still
48
be evidence-based must fail.

The Sandiganbayan contended that in order to prove the predicate act of raids of the public treasury, the Prosecution need not
establish that the public officer had benefited from such act; and that what was necessary was proving that the public officer had
raided the public coffers. In support of this, it referred to the records of the deliberations of Congress to buttress its observation.

We do not share the Sandiganbayan' s contention.

The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080, which provides:

Section I .Definition of Terms. - x x x

xxxx

d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of
Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;

xxxx

To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying words:
misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This process is conformable with the maxim of statutory
construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is
found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or
49
phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter.

To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own; to misappropriate means to own,
50
to take something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good, substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforeseeably,
51
or not as intended;" and malversation occurs when "any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
52
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially." The
common thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on
the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the
public treasury similarly requires such use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending
that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of
noscitur a sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.

The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as a requirement for plunder. In not requiring
personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted the following exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada, viz.:

Senator Emile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or person who conspired or knowingly benefited". One does
not have to conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is that he "knowingly benefited". A candidate for the Senate for
instance, who received a political contribution from a plunderer, knowing that the contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he
knowingly benefited from the plunder, would he also suffer the penalty, Mr. President, for life imprisonment?
Senator Tañada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and part ofline 5, on page 3.
But, in a way, Mr. President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out these questions, I believe that under the examples he
has given, the Court will have to ...

Senator Emile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree with the plunderer to plunder the country but because she
is a dutiful wife or a faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to the spouse. And, of course, she enjoys the
benefits out of the plunder. Would the Gentleman now impute to her or him the crime of plunder simply because she or he
knowingly benefited out of the fruits of the plunder and, therefore, he must suffer or he must suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment?

The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee amendment.

Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines l to 4 and part of line 5 were stricken out in the Committee amendment. But, as I said,
the eamples of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading the Record. And, I believe that in those examples, the Court
will have just to take into consideration all the other circumstances prevailing in the case and the evidence that will be submitted.

53
The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been stricken off."

The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that what was removed from the coverage of the
bill and the final version that eventually became the law was a person who was not the main plunderer or a co-conspirator, but
one who personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The requirement of personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer
or his co-conspirators by virtue of their plunder was not removed.

As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that GMA and Aguas had
personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the public treasury
beyond reasonable doubt.

V.
Summation

In view of the foregoing, the Court inevitably concludes that the Sandiganbayan completely ignored the failure of the information
to sufficiently charge conspiracy to commit plunder against the petitioners; and ignored the lack of evidence establishing the
corpus delicti of amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of at least P50,000,000.00
through any or all of the predicate crimes. The Sandiganbayan thereby acted capriciously, thus gravely abusing its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

54
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to
55
be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in Criminal
Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the petitioners'
respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention
of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 CASES UNDER ACCOMPLICES
G.R. No. 181084 June 16, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
1
BARTOLOME TAMPUS and IDA MONTESCLAROS, Defendants.
IDA MONTESCLAROS, Appellant.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

2
On appeal is the decision of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00215.
3
The Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City in Criminal Case No.
013324-L, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros (Ida) guilty as an accomplice in the commission of rape.

The present appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 013324-L charging Bartolome Tampus (Tampus) and
4
Ida as conspirators in the rape of ABC on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m.; and (2) Criminal Case No. 013325-L charging Tampus of
raping ABC on April 4, 1995 at 1:00 a.m.

5
The Information in each case reads as follows:

6
CRIM. CASE NO. 013324-L

That on the 1st day of April 1995, at about 4:30 o’clock [sic] in the afternoon, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Bartolome Tampus, taking advantage that [ABC] was in deep slumber due to
drunkenness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic] the latter, who was at that
time thirteen (13) years old, against her will, in conspiracy with the accused Ida Montesclaros who gave permission to Bartolome
Tampus to rape [ABC].

CONTRARY TO LAW.

7
CRIM. CASE NO. 013325-L

8
That on the 3rd day of April, 1995, at about 1:00 o’clock [sic] dawn, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a wooden club (poras), by means of threat and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic] [ABC], who was at that time thirteen (13)
years old, against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Ida worked as a
waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in Mabini, Cebu City. On February 19, 1995, Ida and ABC started to rent a room in a house
owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. On April 1, 1995, about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified that she was in the house with Ida and
9 10
Tampus who were both drinking beer at that time. They forced her to drink beer and after consuming three and one-half (3 ½)
11
glasses of beer, she became intoxicated and very sleepy. While ABC was lying on the floor of their room, she overheard
12 13
Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be allowed to "remedyo" or have sexual intercourse with her. Appellant Ida
agreed and instructed Tampus to leave as soon as he finished having sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went to work,
leaving Tampus alone with ABC. ABC fell asleep and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose
and rolled down to her knees. She suffered pain in her head, thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina, and noticed that her panties and
 14
short pants were stained with blood which was coming from her vagina. When her mother arrived home from work the
15
following morning, she kept on crying but appellant Ida ignored her.

ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the room since her mother was at work at the beer
16 17
house. Tampus went inside their room and threatened to kill her if she would report the previous sexual assault to anyone.
He then forcibly removed her panties. ABC shouted but Tampus covered her mouth and again threatened to kill her if she
18
shouted. He undressed himself, spread ABC’s legs, put saliva on his right hand and he applied this to her vagina; he then
19
inserted his penis into ABC’s vagina and made a push and pull movement. After consummating the sexual act, he left the
20
house. When ABC told appellant Ida about the incident, the latter again ignored her.

On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC sought the help of her aunt, Nellie Montesclaros (Nellie). She told
21
Nellie about the rape and that her mother sold her. ABC, together with Nellie and Norma Andales, a traffic enforcer, reported
the incident of rape to the police. On May 9, 1995, Nestor A. Sator , M.D. (Dr. Sator), head of the Medico-Legal Branch of the
Philippine National Crime Laboratory Services, Regional Unit 7, conducted a physical examination of ABC and issued a
22
Medico-Legal Report. Dr. Sator testified that the result of his examination of ABC revealed a deep healed laceration at the
seven (7) o’clock position and a shallow healed laceration at the one (1) o’clock position on ABC’s hymen.

On September 22, 1995, ABC filed two Complaints. She accused Tampus of taking advantage of her by having carnal
knowledge of her, against her will, while she was intoxicated and sleeping on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m. She declared in her
Complaint that this was done in conspiracy with accused Ida who gave permission to Tampus to rape her. And again, she stated
that on April 3, 1995, she was threatened with a wooden club by Tampus, who then succeeded in having sexual intercourse with
her, against her will.

Tampus denied raping ABC on April 1, 1995. He claimed that at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995, he left the house to go to the public
market of Lapu-lapu City. When he arrived home at 6:00 p.m., ABC and Ida were not there as they usually go to the beer house
23
at 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m. He denied forcing ABC to drink beer. He also denied asking Ida to allow him to have sexual
24
intercourse with ABC. Appellant Ida also testified that she and ABC left for the beer house at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995 and
25
they came back at 6:00 a.m. the following day. She said that she always brought her daughter to the beer house with her and
26
there was never an instance when she left her daughter alone in the house. She denied forcing ABC to drink beer at 4:30 p.m.
27
of April 1, 1995, and she denied giving permission to Tampus to have sexual intercourse with ABC.

Tampus also denied raping ABC on April 4, 1995. He testified that he arrived at the Barangay Tanod Headquarters between 7:00
28
p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of April 3, 1995 and that his actual duty time shift was from midnight to 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995.
Guillermo Berdin (Berdin), a defense witness, testified that on April 3, 1995, Tampus reported for duty at the police outpost at
8:00 p.m. and left at 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995, as reflected in the attendance logbook. However, on cross-examination, Berdin
could not tell whether the signature appearing on the logbook really belonged to Tampus. It was noted by the trial court that the
29
handwriting used by Tampus in the logbook entry on April 2, 1995 is different from his handwriting appearing on April 3, 1995.
It was also revealed that the house of Tampus is just 500 meters away or just a three-minute walk from the barangay tanod
30
outpost and that the barangay tanod on duty could leave the outpost unnoticed or without permission.

31
Agustos B. Costas, M.D. (Dr. Costas), the Head of the Department of Psychiatry of the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical
32
Center, issued a Medical Certification, which showed that appellant Ida was treated as an outpatient at the Vicente Sotto
Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry Department from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995 and was provisionally diagnosed
with Schizophrenia, paranoid type.

The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of rape, as principal in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal Case No.
013325-L. Appellant Ida was found guilty as an accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L. The trial court appreciated in Ida’s
favor the mitigating circumstance of illness which would diminish the exercise of will-power without depriving her of the
 33
consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s
decision states, viz.:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused Bartolome Tampus GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of two counts of rape, as principals [sic], in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal Case No.
013325-L and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in each of the aforementioned cases.

The Court also finds accused Ida Montesclaros GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as an accomplice in Criminal Case
No. 013324-L, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years, and
eight (8) months of Reclusion Temporal.

Both accused are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in
Criminal Case No. 013324-L.

With costs against the accused.

34
SO ORDERED.

35
Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused Tampus died on November 16, 2000 and his appeal
36
was dismissed by the Third Division of this Court. Thus, the appeal before the Court of Appeals dealt only with that of
appellant Ida. The appellate court gave credence to the testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial court’s decision with
modification. It appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she was
completely deprived of intelligence on April 1, 1995. On the basis of the medical report and the testimony of the attending
physician, Ida’s schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals to have diminished the exercise
of her will-power though it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts. The dispositive portion of the decision of the
Court of Appeals states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellant Ida Montesclaros is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the commission of rape and hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Further, she is ORDERED to pay moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
37
(Php 50,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of twenty-five thousand pesos (Php 25,000.00).

We find the findings of the lower courts to be well-taken.

The finding of guilt of Ida as an accomplice in the rape of ABC is dependent on proving the guilt of the principal accused. Upon
examination of the records of the case, we agree with the ruling of the trial and appellate courts that the testimony of ABC is
clear and straightforward, and is sufficient to conclude that Tampus is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the rape of
ABC, in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, as well as to convict appellant Ida as an accomplice in the same criminal case.

The findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, appellate courts will not overturn said findings
unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will
38
alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said
39
findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.

The trial court has carefully scrutinized the testimony of complainant ABC and has given full faith and credence to her testimony.
Both the trial and appellate courts found that the rape of ABC by Tampus on April 1, 1995 has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. Indeed, it is highly inconceivable for a young girl to impute the crime of rape, implicate her own mother in such
a vile act, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial if she has not been a victim of rape and was
40
impelled to seek justice for the defilement of her person. Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full credit.

Tampus was positively identified by ABC as the person who had carnal knowledge of her against her will on April 1, 1995. The
denial of Tampus cannot prevail over the positive and direct identification by the victim, ABC. Although ABC was asleep and
unconscious at the time the sexual debasement was committed by Tampus, circumstantial evidence established beyond doubt
that it is Tampus who raped ABC. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
41
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In cases like the one at bar, the Court takes into consideration the events that
42
transpired before and after the victim lost consciousness in order to establish the commission of the act of coitus.

The trial court correctly determined, thus:

The prosecution has clearly established by its evidence that accused Bartolome Tampus had carnal knowledge of [ABC] on April
1, 1995 under the circumstance set forth in Article 335 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that is, when the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.

xxxx

The Court cannot accept accused Bartolome Tampus’ defense of denial and alibi. His denial pales in effect against the positive
evidence given by [ABC] that he ravished her [on] two occasions.

xxxx

It is true that in the first incident on April 1, 1995, [ABC] did not see Tampus lie down with her. What she saw was the aftermath
of her deflowering upon waking up. Nevertheless, the Court has taken note of the following circumstances: (1) The drinking
session where the complainant was forced to drink beer by both accused; (2) The conversation between the two accused when
accused Tampus requested accused Ida Montesclaros, and was granted by the latter, permission to have sexual intercourse
with the complainant; (3) Accused Tampus and the complainant were the only persons left in the house when Ida Montesclaros
went to work after acceding to the request of Tampus; (4) The bloodstained pants, the pain and blood in complainant’s vagina
and the pain in her head, groin and buttocks; (5) The threat made by accused Tampus on the complainant in the dawn of April 4,
1995 that he would kill her if she would tell about the previous incident on April 1, 1995; and (6) The second incident of rape that
immediately ensued. These circumstances form a chain that points to accused Bartolome Tampus as the person who had carnal
43
knowledge of [ABC] when she was asleep in an inebriated condition.

After establishing the guilt of Tampus as principal, the trial court then determined the guilt of Ida. Although Ida was charged as a
conspirator, the trial court found her liable as an accomplice. The trial court ruled that her act of forcing or intimidating ABC to
drink beer and then acceding to the request of co-accused Tampus to be allowed to have sexual intercourse with ABC did not
44
prove their conspiracy. Hence, it held that, "[u]ndoubtedly, Ida Montesclaros participated in the commission of the crime by
45
previous acts but her participation, not being indispensable, was not that of a principal. She is liable as an accomplice."

In her appeal, appellant Ida argued that it is against human nature for a mother to allow her daughter to be raped. She
maintained that there was no instance when she left ABC alone in the house. The Court of Appeals dismissed appellant Ida’s
appeal as it also gave credence to the testimony of ABC.

In her appeal brief filed before this Court, Ida raises the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BARTOLOME TAMPUS OF THE CRIMES OF RAPE DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING IDA MONTESCLAROS AS ACCOMPLICE TO THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE
46
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

We affirm the trial and appellate courts in ruling that Ida is liable as an accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC.
Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in the execution of the
47
offense by previous or simultaneous acts. The following requisites must be proved in order that a person can be considered an
accomplice:

(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his
purpose;

(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,

48
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the execution of the rape by Tampus when prior to the act of rape by
Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer and she agreed to Tampus’ request for him to have sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida’s
acts show that she had knowledge of and even gave her permission to the plan of Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her
daughter. 1avvphi1

During the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Atty. Paulito Cabrera, of witness ABC, she testified that:

Q Before this date, April 1, 1995, did you already usually drink beer?

A No, sir.

Q So, you are telling the Honorable Court that it was only on April 1, 1995 that you first drank beer?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you say, you were forced to drink beer?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who forced you to drink beer in that afternoon of April 1, 1995?

49
A Bartolome Tampus and "Nanay", my mother.

xxxx

Q By the way, your mother proposed to you to drink beer?

A Yes, sir.

Q Before you concede to her proposition, did you not complain that you had not been used to drinking beer and then, why
suddenly, she would let you drink beer at that time?

A No, sir.

Q Did you not tell her that, "I am not used to drinking beer, so, I would not drink beer"?

A Because the beer was mixed with Coke.

Q So, you mean that you also agreed to drink beer at that time?

A I just agreed to the proposal of my mother.

Q But you never voiced any complaint or any refusal to her at that time?

A No, sir because I was afraid that she might maltreat me.
Q At that time when she proposed to you to drink beer, was she already threatening to maltreat you if you would not drink that
beer?

A Not yet.

Q And how were you able to conclude that she might maltreat you if you would not drink that beer that she proposed for you to
drink?

A Because "Nanay" stared at me sharply and she had a wooden stick prepared.

Q Are you sure that she was doing that while she was offering the glass of beer to you?

50
A Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q While you were drinking beer, your mother and Bartolome went out of the house and you overheard Bartolome asking or
proposing to your mother that he would have sexual intercourse with you which you term in the Visayan dialect "remedyo",
Bartolome would want to have a "remedyo" with you. When [sic], particular moment did you allegedly hear this statement, while
you were drinking beer or after you had finished drinking beer?

51
A When I was already lying on the floor of the room we were renting.

xxxx

Q And, of course, as you have stated now, it was you, you were quite sure that it was you who was being referred by Bartolome
Tampus when he said to your mother in the Visayan dialect that "gusto siya moremedyo nimo", he wants to have sexual
intercourse with you?

A Yes, sir, but I don’t know the meaning of "remedyo".

Q At that time, you did not know the meaning of "remedyo"?

52
A Not yet, sir.

xxxx

Q Was that the very first time that you ever heard of the word "remedyo"?

53
A Yes, sir

xxxx

Q And when your mother came back from work at about 7:00 o’clock [sic] in the morning of April 2, 1995, did you not also bother
to tell her of what you suspected that something serious or bad had happened to you in the previous day?

A Because she already knew, sir.

Q How did you know that she already knew?

54 55
A Because I heard her telling Omeng, "After you have sexual intercourse with her, leave her immediately!"

xxxx
Q Considering that you never knew what is the meaning of the word, "remedyo", when your mother arrived in the morning of
April 2, 1995, did you not confront your mother, did you not tell her that, "Is this what you mean by "remedyo", as what you had
agreed with Bartolome Tampus that he would do something to my genitals?

56
A No sir, because when she arrived, she kept on laughing.

All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of ABC shows
that there was community of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had knowledge of and assented to
Tampus’ intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to drink beer, and when ABC was already
drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with her express consent to Tampus’ plan to have sexual
intercourse with her daughter.

It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be indispensable to the commission
of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The evidence shows that the acts of
cooperation by Ida are not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First, because it was both Ida and Tampus who
forced ABC to drink beer, and second because Tampus already had the intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he
could have consummated the act even without Ida’s consent.

The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual commission of rape by Tampus. They both forced ABC to drink beer; when
ABC was already drunk, Tampus asked Ida if he could have sexual intercourse with ABC and Ida gave her consent; and lastly,
Ida left ABC alone with Tampus so that he proceed with his plan to rape ABC.

Circumstances affecting the liability of the Appellant as an Accomplice

We agree with both the trial and appellate courts in their appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of illness as would diminish
the exercise of willpower of Ida without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised
Penal Code.

Dr. Costas testified that Ida was provisionally treated for schizophrenia a few months before the incident, from November 11,
1994 to January 12, 1995. Based on his expert opinion, Ida was not totally deprived of intelligence at the time of the incident;
but, she may have poor judgment. On Direct Examination of Dr. Costas by City Prosecutor Celso V. Espinosa, he testified as
follows:

Q Doctor, taking into consideration your diagnosis, as you said, is provisional, would you say that the patient [sic] totally deprived
of intelligence or reason?

A Not totally.

Q She will be conscious of her acts?

A She may be, that is possible, for certain cause.

Q And there will be loss of intelligence?

A There could be.

Q Now, Doctor, she is charged her [sic] as one of the principals in the commission of the crime of rape for having given her
daughter to be sexually abused by her co-accused, allegedly convinced by her co-accused on the first day of April, 1995. Now, if
she was then under treatment, Doctor, from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995, would you say, Doctor, that having taken
this diagnosis for [sic] schizophrenic patient, at the time, after January 12, 1995, she must have acted with discernment?

A It is possible because you are this kind of mental illness even with the treatment, and even without any medication, it may be
what we called spontaneous, really it will get back.

Q At that time it will loss the intelligence? [sic]

A I think because it might be back, the treatment should be yearly.

Q Doctor, in your opinion, since our office is very much concern [sic] on this, if a person is totally deprived of intelligence, he has
still discernment, she is unconscious of her act, she or he may be exempted from any criminal liability, please tell, Doctor, in your
personal opinion for the purpose of this proceedings she may be acting with discernment and with certain degree of intelligence?

A It is possible but I think of a mother feeding her own daughter to somebody, I think there is a motive, she wants to gain
financial or material things from the daughter if no material gain, then perhaps it was borne out of her illness. This is my
57
opinion.

xxxx

Q Doctor, is this schizophrenic person can distinguish the right or wrong? [sic]

A If they are in the [sic] state of illness, judgment is impaired to discern between right or wrong.

Q In the case of this particular accused, what would you say at the state of her ailment?

A When she was brought to the hospital, Your Honor, I think, although the mother alleged that the sickness could be more than
one year duration, it is in acute stage because she was allegedly destroying everything in the house according to the mother, so
58
she was in acute stage.

On cross-examination by Atty. Paulito Cabrera, Dr. Costas testified thus:

Q Would you say, Doctor, that that particular ailment of Ida Montesclaros affected her sense of judgment?

A I think, so.

Q And that being scizophronic [sic] somehow, it has, while in that stage, the patient lost contact with reality?

A Yes, that is possible.

Q In your opinion, Doctor, granting, for the sake of argument, the alleged accusation against her is true, being an expert on
scizophrania, could you tell the Honorable Court as a mother, who would allegedly do such an offense to her daughter, is it still in
her sound mind or proper mental sane [sic]?

A I think, as I said, one thing to be considered is the motivation if she want [sic] to gain some material things, if not, it is because
of her judgment.

Q If she would not gain anything from allowing her daughter allegedly to be rubbished by another person, then there must be
something wrong?

A There must be something wrong and it came up from scizpphrania.

59
A It is the judgment, in the case of the schizophrenic.

We have previously held that Schizophrenia may be considered mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the exercise of the
60
willpower of the accused. In this case, the testimony of Dr. Costas shows that even though Ida was diagnosed with
schizophrenia, she was not totally deprived of intelligence but her judgment was affected. Thus, on the basis of the Medical
Certification that Ida suffered from and was treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to the incident, and on the testimony of
Dr. Costas, Ida’s schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the exercise of her willpower although it did not deprive
her of the consciousness of her acts.

We note that in the case at bar, the undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABC—who was 13 years old at the time of the
incident—could have been considered as a special qualifying circumstance which would have increased the imposable penalty
to death, under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:

ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties. —

xxxx

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;

xxxx

Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of the offender to the victim, either as the victim’s parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent
of the victim, must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order for them to serve as qualifying circumstances
61
under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.

In the case at bar, although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the accused as the latter's
daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, and even though this was proven during trial and not refuted by the
accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance that would serve to increase the penalty of the offender.
Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing
62
court proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, every
Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be
63
considered in the imposition of the penalty. Since in the case at bar, the Information in Criminal Case No. 013324-L did not
state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida may
only be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In any event,
Republic Act No. 9346, entitled an "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into
law on June 24, 2006 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.

Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant

The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision ordered Tampus and Ida "jointly and severally, to indemnify the offended party,
64
[ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-L." The Court of Appeals, however, did not award any civil
indemnity to ABC, and only awarded moral and exemplary damages. We deem it necessary and proper to award ABC civil
indemnity of P50,000.00. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape. This is distinct from moral
damages awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually
65
suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award.

Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim in simple rape cases is entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
66
ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, Tampus’ civil indemnity ex delicto has been extinguished by
67
reason of his death before the final judgment, in accordance with Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the amount of
civil indemnity which remains for accomplice Ida to pay is put at issue.

It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is liable when they have different degrees of
responsibility in the commission of the crime and, consequently, differing degrees of liability. When a crime is committed by
many, each one has a distinct part in the commission of the crime and though all the persons who took part in the commission of
the crime are liable, the liability is not equally shared among them. Hence, an accused may be liable either as principal,
accomplice or accessory.

The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature and degree of his participation in the
commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for a particular crime is imposed upon the principal
68
in a consummated felony. The accomplice is only given the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the law for the
69 70
crime committed and an accessory is given the penalty lower by two degrees. However, a felon is not only criminally liable,
 71
he is likewise civilly liable. Apart from the penalty of imprisonment imposed on him, he is also ordered to indemnify the victim
and to make whole the damage caused by his act or omission through the payment of civil indemnity and damages.

Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. Although, unlike criminal liability—in which the Revised Penal
Code specifically states the corresponding penalty imposed on the principal, accomplice and accessory—the share of each
accused in the civil liability is not specified in the Revised Penal Code. The courts have the discretion to determine the
apportionment of the civil indemnity which the principal, accomplice and accessory are respectively liable for, without guidelines
with respect to the basis of the allotment.

Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[i]f there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall
determine the amount for which each must respond." Notwithstanding the determination of the respective liability of the
principals, accomplices and accessories within their respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily liable for the amount of civil
liability adjudged in the other classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[t]he principals, accomplices, and
accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and
72
subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable."

As courts are given a free hand in determining the apportionment of civil liability, previous decisions dealing with this matter have
been grossly inconsistent.

73 74 75 76 77
In People v. Galapin, People v. Continente, United States v. Lasada, People v. Mobe, People v. Irinea, People v.
78 79 80 81 82 83
Rillorta, People v. Cagalingan, People v. Villanueva, People v. Magno, People v. del Rosario, People v. Yrat,
84 85
People v. Saul, and People v. Tamayo, the principal and accomplice were ordered to pay jointly and severally the entire
86
amount of the civil indemnity awarded to the victim. In People v. Sotto, the accomplice was ordered to pay half of the amount
87
of civil indemnity imposed by the trial court, while the principal was liable for the other half. In People v. Toring, the principal,
accomplice and the accessory were made jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity.

In the cases mentioned above, the principal and accomplice were made to pay equal shares of the civil indemnity. This makes
the accomplice who had less participation in the commission of the crime equally liable with the principal for the civil indemnity.
The degree of their participation in the crime was not taken into account in the apportionment of the amount of the civil
indemnity. This is contrary to the principle behind the treble division of persons criminally responsible for felonies, i.e., that the
liability must be commensurate with the degree of participation of the accused in the crime committed. In such a situation, the
accomplice who just cooperated in the execution of the offense but whose participation is not indispensable to the commission of
the crime is made to pay the same amount of civil indemnity as the principal by direct participation who took a direct part in the
execution of the criminal act. It is an injustice when the penalty and liability imposed are not commensurate to the actual
responsibility of the offender; for criminal responsibility is individual and not collective, and each of the participants should be
88
liable only for the acts actually committed by him. The proportion of this individual liability must be graduated not only
according to the nature of the crime committed and the circumstances attending it, but also the degree and nature of
participation of the individual offender.

89 90 91 92 93
In Garces v. People, People v. Flores, People v. Barbosa, People v. Ragundiaz, People v. Bato, and People v.
94
Garalde, the accomplice was held to be solidarily liable with the principal for only one-half (1/2) of the amount adjudged as civil
indemnity. In Garces, the accomplice was held solidarily liable for half of the civil indemnity ex delicto but was made to pay the
moral damages of P50,000.00 separately from the principal. In Flores, Ragundiaz, Bato, and Garalde, the accomplice was held
solidarily liable for half of the combined amounts of the civil indemnity ex delicto and moral damages. In Ragundiaz, the
accomplice was also made solidarily liable with the principal for half of the actual damages, and in Garalde the accomplice was
also held solidarily liable with the principal for half of the exemplary damages, aside from the civil and moral damages.

In these cases, the accomplice was made jointly and severally liable with the principal for only half of the amount of the civil
indemnity and moral damages, only for purposes of the enforcement of the payment of civil indemnity to the offended party.
When the liability in solidum has been enforced, as when payment has been made, the person by whom payment has been
95
made shall have a right of action against the other persons liable for the amount of their respective shares. As against each
other, whoever made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share that corresponds to each, with interest for the
 96
payment already made. In these cases, therefore, payment is made by either the principal or the accomplice, the one who
made the payment to the victim could demand payment of the part of the debt corresponding to his co-debtor. If for example the
principal paid the victim the entire amount of the civil indemnity, he could go against the accomplice for one-fourth (1/4) of the
total amount of civil indemnity and damages. The principal was primarily liable for only one-half (1/2) of the total amount of civil
indemnity and he was solidarily liable with the accomplice for the other half. Since the principal paid for the half which the
accomplice is solidarily liable with, he could claim one-half (1/2) of that amount from the accomplice. Thus, the principal would
have become ultimately liable for three-fourths (3/4) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and damages, while the accomplice
would have become liable for one-fourth (1/4) of such amount.

97 98 99 100
In People v. Cortes, People v. Budol, People v. Nulla, and People v. Madali, the principal was ordered to pay twice the
share of the accomplice in the civil indemnity. In Nulla, the Court determined the respective amounts for which the principal,
accomplice and accessory were liable for. The principal was ordered to pay P20,000.00, the accomplice was ordered to pay
P10,000.00, and the accessory was ordered to pay P2,000.00. Unlike the cases cited above where the principal and accomplice
were held solidarily liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity or half of it, in Nulla, the court particularly determined the
amount for which each shall respond. This is consistent with Article 109 and Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code, which
require that the courts should determine the amount for which the principals, accomplices and accessories must respond to and
upon specifying this amount, the principals are solidarily liable within their class for their quota, the accomplices are solidarily
liable among themselves for their quota and the accessories are solidarily liable for their quota. If any one of the classes is
unable to pay for its respective quota, it becomes subsidiarily liable for the quota of the other classes, which shall be enforced
101
first against the property of the principals; next, against that of the accomplices; and lastly, against that of the accessories.

There are also cases where the principal was ordered to pay more than double the amount that the accomplice is liable for. In
102
Lumiguis v. People, the civil liability of P6,000.00 was apportioned as follows: the sole principal was primarily liable for
P3,000.00, the four accomplices were primarily liable in solidum among themselves for the other half of the indemnity, or
P3,000.00. Thus, each accomplice was answerable for one-fourth (1/4) of P3,000.00 or one-eighth (1/8) of the entire amount of
civil indemnity, which is P750.00.

103
Similarly in People v. Bantagan, the principal was required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P500.00.
In case of his insolvency, his three accomplices should be jointly and severally liable. The three accomplices were jointly and
severally liable for the other P500 and in case of their insolvency the principal was secondarily liable for such amount.

104
In People v. Castillo, the accomplice was ordered to pay one-fourth (1/4) of the amount of the civil indemnity, while the
principal was liable for the remaining three-fourths (3/4).

105
In People v. Cariaga, the total amount of indemnity and damages due to the heirs of the victim amounted to P601,000.00.
The sole accomplice was ordered to pay P101,000.00 which is roughly one-sixth (1/6) of the entire civil indemnity, while the two
principals were ordered to pay the rest of the indemnity and damages amounting to P500,000.00.

The cases cited above demonstrate the ad hoc method by which the ratio of shares of the civil indemnity and damages among
the principal, accomplice and accessory is determined. Though the responsibility to decide the respective shares of persons
liable for a felony is left to the courts, this does not mean that this amount can be decided arbitrarily or upon conjecture. The
power of the courts to grant indemnity and damages demands factual, legal and equitable justification, and cannot be left to
speculation and caprice.

The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the moral and actual damages, should be apportioned among the persons
who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degree of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual
participation in the criminal act. Salvador Viada, an authority in criminal law, is of the opinion that there are no fixed rules which
are applicable in all cases in order to determine the apportionment of civil liability among two or more persons civilly liable for a
felony, either because there are different degrees of culpability of offenders, or because of the inequality of their financial
106
capabilities. On this note, he states in his commentaries on the 1870 Penal Code of Spain that the law should leave the
107
determination of the amount of respective liabilities to the discretion of the courts. The courts have the competence to
determine the exact participation of the principal, accomplice, and accessory in the commission of the crime relative to the other
classes because they are able to directly consider the evidence presented and the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses.

We must stress, however, that the courts’ discretion should not be untrammelled and must be guided by the principle behind
differing liabilities for persons with varying roles in the commission of the crime. The person with greater participation in the
commission of the crime should have a greater share in the civil liability than those who played a minor role in the crime or those
who had no participation in the crime but merely profited from its effects. Each principal should shoulder a greater share in the
total amount of indemnity and damages than every accomplice, and each accomplice should also be liable for a greater amount
as against every accessory. Care should also be taken in considering the number of principals versus that of accomplices and
accessories. If for instance, there are four principals and only one accomplice and the total of the civil indemnity and damages is
P6,000.00, the court cannot assign two-thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the principals and one-third (1/3) to the
accomplice. Even though the principals, as a class, have a greater share in the liability as against the accomplice-- since
one-third (1/3) of P6,000.00 is P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00 is P4,000.00-- when the civil liability of every
person is computed, the share of the accomplice ends up to be greater than that of each principal. This is so because the
two-thirds (2/3) share of the principals—or P4,000.00—is still divided among all the four principals, and thus every principal is
liable for only P1,000.00.

In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the principal for the entire amount of the civil
indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does not take into account
the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Tampus, versus the accomplice, Ida. Ida’s previous
acts of cooperation include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her
daughter. But even without these acts, Tampus could have still raped ABC. It was Tampus, the principal by direct participation,
who should have the greater liability, not only in terms of criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110
of the Revised Penal Code states that the apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every class for which members
of such class are solidarily liable within their respective class, and they are only subsidiarily liable for the share of the other
classes. The Revised Penal Code does not provide for solidary liability among the different classes, as was held by the trial court
in the case at bar.lavvphi1

Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation of the principal and accomplice, the principal, Tampus, should be
liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida should be ordered to
pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil indemnity for simple rape was correctly set at P50,000.00 and moral damages at
P50,000.00. The total amount of damages to be divided between Tampus and Ida is P100,000.00, where Tampus is liable for
P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and Ida is liable for P33,333.33 (which is one-third [1/3] of P100,000.00).
This is broken down into civil indemnity of P16,666.67 and moral damages of P16,666.67. However, since the principal, Tampus,
died while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity ex delicto is extinguished by reason of his
108
death before the final judgment. His share in the civil indemnity and damages cannot be passed over to the accomplice, Ida,
because Tampus’ share of the civil liability has been extinguished. And even if Tampus were alive upon the promulgation of this
decision, Ida would only have been subsidiarily liable for his share of the civil indemnity of P66,666.67. However, since Tampus’
civil liability ex delicto is extinguished, Ida’s subsidiary liability with respect to this amount is also eliminated, following the
principle that the accessory follows the principal. Tampus’ obligation to pay P66,666.67 — his quota of the civil indemnity — is
the principal obligation, for which Ida is only subsidiarily liable. Upon the extinguishment of the principal obligation, there is no
longer any accessory obligation which could attach to it; thus, the subsidiary liability of Ida is also extinguished.

On the matter of exemplary damages, we find that exemplary damages were incorrectly awarded by the Court of Appeals.

In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on the offender as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed
109
with one or more aggravating circumstances. Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective
damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
110
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. Exemplary damages may be
111
awarded only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in the information and proved during the trial.

In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance was appreciated against Ida. Although, the minority of the victim
coupled with the fact that the offender is the parent of the victim could have served to qualify the crime of rape, the presence of
these concurring circumstances cannot justify the award of exemplary damages since the relationship of the offender, Ida, to the
 112
victim, ABC, was not alleged in the Information. The minority of the rape victim and her relationship with the offender must
both be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order to be appreciated as an aggravating/qualifying
113
circumstance. While the information in the instant case alleged that ABC was a minor during the incident, there was no
allegation that Ida was her parent. Since the relationship between ABC and appellant was not duly established, the award of
exemplary damages is not warranted.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00215, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of rape and sentencing
her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is ORDERED
to pay civil indemnity in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67), and
moral damages in the amount of sixteen thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67). The
award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

G.R. No. 172707 October 1, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y
KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y
MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

1
Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision dated 28 June 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
2
No. 00863, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated 16
October 1998, finding accused-appellants Halil Gambao y Esmail, Eddie Karim y Uso, Edwin Dukilman y Suboh, Tony Abao y
Sula, Raul Udal y Kagui, Teng Mandao y Haron, Theng Dilangalen y Nanding, Jaman Macalinbol y Katol, Monette Ronas y
Ampil, Nora Evad y Mulok and Thian Perpenian y Rafon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom as defined
and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659.

3
The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were charged under the criminal information which reads:

Criminal Case No. 98-0928

For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659

That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 o’clock in the evening at No. 118 FB Harrison Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named-accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping
themselves together, did then and there by force and intimidation, and the use of high powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, carry away and deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty against her will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in
fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for her release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱400,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Lucia L. Chan in the said amount and such other amounts as may be awarded to
her under the provisions of the Civil Code.

4
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case:

Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish deliveries, which were shipped by her suppliers
from the provinces. Sometime in the afternoon of 11 August 1998, two persons, one of whom was identified as Theng Dilangalen
(Dilangalen), went to Chan’s residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport alleged to have been
mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said passport, the two left. The next morning,
Dilangalen, together with another companion identified as Tony Abao (Abao), returned looking for Chan but were told that she
was out. When the two returned in the afternoon, Chan informed them that the fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered
instead to accompany them to the airport to retrieve the box of fish allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao
5
declined and told Chan that they would be back later that evening.

Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned to Chan’s residence that evening. Chan’s
6
houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by the stairs. Thereat, the unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed his gun
7
at Chan’s son, Levy Chan (Levy), and the house companions. As the unidentified man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy
tried to stop the man by grabbing his mother’s feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen pointed his gun at Levy’s head forcing the latter to
8 9
release his grip on Chan’s feet. Levy thereafter proceeded to the Pasay Police Headquarters to report the incident.
 10
Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for about two hours, the group stopped at a certain house.
Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman) warned Chan not to shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth. Chan was
11
ordered to go with two women, later identified in court by Chan as appellants Monette Ronas (Ronas) and Nora Evad
12
(Evad). Chan was brought inside a house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and Jaman
13 14
Macalinbol (Macalinbol). Ronas and Evad threatened Chan that she would be killed unless she paid 20 Million Pesos.

On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the "Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for about ten
minutes, the van stopped and the group alighted. Chan was brought to a room on the second floor of the house. Inside the room
15
were three persons whom Chan identified in court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao (Gambao). Another
16
woman, later identified as Thian Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived. At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, a man who was later
17
identified as Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the room with a handgun and asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?"
Another man, whom Chan identified in court as Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed Chan
18
that he was sent by their boss to ask her how much money she has. Chan was instructed to talk to her son through a cell
19
phone and she gave instructions to her son to get the ₱75, 000.00 she kept in her cabinet. The group then talked to Chan’s
son and negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his mother’s release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to deliver
20
₱400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue.

Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao (Inspector Mancao), who were assigned at the Pasay City
area to conduct the investigation regarding the kidnapping, were informed that the abductors called and demanded for ransom in
21
exchange for Chan’s release. During their surveillance the following day, Inspectors Ouano and Mancao observed a Red
Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the victim’s residence. The inspectors observed that the occupants of the
taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of the house. The inspectors and their team tailed the taxicab until Pansol, Calamba,
Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth Resort and stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team saw in the
cottage was the victim, they sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to conduct a rescue
22
operation.

On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received information that the abductors acceded to a
₱400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon learning of
the information, the team immediately and strategically positioned themselves around the vicinity of the restaurant. At about 2:00
am, a light blue "Tamaraw FX" van with 4 people on board arrived. The four took the ransom money and headed towards the
South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance team successfully intercepted the van and arrested the 4 men, later identified in
23
court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The team was also able to recover the ₱400,000.00 ransom.

At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the police team assaulted Cottage No. 1, resulting in the safe rescue of
Chan and the apprehension of seven of her abductors, later identified in court as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao,
24
Perpenian, Evad and Ronas.

During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son testified, Karim manifested his desire to change his earlier plea
of "not guilty" to "guilty." The presiding judge then explained the consequences of a change of plea, stating: "It would mean the
moment you withdraw your previous pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the court of course, after receiving evidence, as
in fact it has received the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will [outrightly] sentence you to the penalty provided by law after the
prosecution shall have finished the presentation of its evidence. Now that I have explained to you the consequences of your
25
entering a plea of guilty, are you still desirous of entering a plea of ‘guilty’?" Eddie Karim answered, "Yes." On hearing this
clarification, the other appellants likewise manifested, through their counsel who had earlier conferred with them and explained
to each of them the consequences of a change of plea, their desire to change the pleas they entered. The trial court separately
asked each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they
26
understood the consequence of changing their pleas. All of them answered in the affirmative. Similarly, Dukilman manifested
27
his desire to change his plea and assured the trial court that he understood the consequences of such change of plea.
 28
Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty, the trial court directed the prosecution to
present evidence, which it did.

On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom. Hence, they appealed to the CA.

In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO,
EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y HARON, THENG
DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that
each of them is ordered to pay jointly and severally the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of moral damages.

It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the
29
crime, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to
this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.

30
In a Resolution dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. The issues raised by
the accused-appellants in their respective briefs, supplemental briefs and manifestations will be discussed collectively.

Insufficiency of Evidence

Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this Court believe that the witness, Chan, was not able to positively
identify them because of her failing eyesight due to old age.

This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial court and the CA found Chan’s testimony credible and
straightforward. During her testimony, she positively identified the accused-appellants. If she had not met them before, she could
not have positively identified them in open court. In fact, the participation of these accused-appellants was further established
through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses.

Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine.
For this reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal. They are conclusive and binding unless
shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not
31 32
been considered. In People v. Tañedo, this Court had occasion to reiterate the ruling that findings of fact of the trial court
pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great respect since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while
33
they testified in court. It can be observed that the briefs submitted by the accused-appellants are replete with generalities and
wanting in relevant particulars. It is for this reason that we are giving full credence to the findings of the trial court regarding the
credibility of witness Chan.

Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her conviction is insufficient. We also find her argument bereft of merit.

The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as one of the seven people apprehended when they conducted the
34
rescue operation at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning of 14 August 1998, and the positive identification of Perpenian by Chan
constituted adequate evidence working against her defense of denial.

Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-appellants proffered was denial. It is established jurisprudence that
denial cannot prevail over the witnesses’ positive identification of the accused-appellants, more so where the defense did not
present convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to have been present at the crime scene at the time of the
35
commission of the crime.
The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the relevant testimonies of witnesses and the absence of evidence
other than mere denial proffered by the defense lead this Court to give due weight to the findings of the lower courts.

Improvident Plea

As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, the penalty for kidnapping for ransom is
36
death. A review of the records shows that on 7 October 1998, the accused-appellants withdrew their plea of "not guilty" and
were re-arraigned. They subsequently entered pleas of "guilty" to the crime of kidnapping for ransom, a capital offense. This
37
Court, in People v. Oden, laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The trial
court is mandated:

(1)

to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,

(2)

to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and

(3)

38
to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.

The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest
form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid
improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might be admitting his guilt before
the court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of his
39
plea. Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in determining the
40
propriety or impropriety of the plea.

Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and informed judgement.
The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. This Court
41
finds no cogent reason for deviating from the guidelines provided by jurisprudence and thus, adopts the same:

Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have held that the
following guidelines should be observed:

Ascertain from the accused himself

(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;

(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and

(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility
that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from
malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge’s intimidating robes.

Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused
the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.

Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational
background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve
such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because
of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to
ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the
admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.

Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the
basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the
precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.

All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.

The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate
the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.

42
It is evident from the records that the aforesaid rules have not been fully complied with. The questions propounded by the trial
court judge failed to ensure that accused-appellants fully understood the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is readily
43
apparent from the records that Karim had the mistaken assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty
and that both the judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty pursuant to
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim was not warned by the trial court judge that in cases where the penalty is single and
indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court judge’s
seemingly annoyed statement that a conditional plea is not allowed, as provided below, is inadequate:

Atty. Ferrer:

Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something before the trial. For accused Eddie Karim we manifest and petition this
court that he be allowed to be re-arraigned Your Honor please, considering that he will plead guilty as charged but the imposable
penalty is lowered, Your Honor.

Court:

You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the law says. You plead guilty, no condition attached. Conditional plea
is not allowed.

Atty. Ferrer:

Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is already repenting

Court:

Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there should be no condition attached. We cannot make that condition
44
and dictate to the court the penalty.

Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenian’s, were improvidently made, this Court will still not set aside the condemnatory
judgment. Despite the trial court judge’s shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on accused-appellants’ culpability.

As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the cases are remanded for further
proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to
convict the accused, as it did in this case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the
45
guilty plea but on evidence proving the commission of the offense charged. The manner by which the plea of guilty is made,
whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the
46
commission of the crime by the accused.

Contrary to accused-appellants’ assertions, they were convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of their plea of guilty, but on
47
the strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the trial court. The prosecution
was able to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants and their degrees of culpability beyond reasonable doubt.
Degree of Culpability

Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs that conspiracy, insofar as they were concerned,
was not convincingly established. Dukilman hinges his argument on the fact that he was not one of those arrested during the
48
rescue operation based on the testimony of Inspector Ouano. On the other hand, Ronas and Evad base their argument on the
fact that they had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom money.

We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at the cottage during the rescue operation, the
testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established that he was one of the four people apprehended when the police
49
intercepted the "Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols Tollgate. Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently
50
established that Ronas and Evad were two of those who were arrested during the rescue operation. This Court has held
before that to be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act
51
or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Once conspiracy is
shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
52
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. Moreover, Chan positively identified the accused-appellants and placed all
of them at the crime scenes.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a
felony and decide to commit it. It has been a long standing opinion of this Court that proof of the conspiracy need not rest on
direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of
53
the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. The testimonies,
when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the accused-appellants and how they were all united in its execution from
beginning to end. There were testimonies proving that (1) before the incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming back to
the victim’s house; (2) during the kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the accused
appellants were those present when the ransom money was recovered and when the rescue operation was conducted.

Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was
established beyond reasonable doubt based on the proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators.

54
In Perpenian’s Supplemental Brief, she directs this Court’s attention to the manifestation made by the prosecution regarding
55
their disinterest in prosecuting, insofar as she was concerned. However, pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Judge
56
Mogul, once the information is filed, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests
within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the courts; more so in this case, where no Motion to Dismiss was
filed by the prosecution.

57
The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave inconsistent answers and lied several times under oath during the trial.
Perpenian lied about substantial details such as her real name, age, address and the fact that she saw Chan at the Elizabeth
Resort. When asked why she lied several times, Perpenian claimed she was scared to be included or identified with the other
accused-appellants. The lying and the fear of being identified with people whom she knew had done wrong are indicative of
discernment. She knew, therefore, that there was an ongoing crime being committed at the resort while she was there. It is
apparent that she was fully aware of the consequences of the unlawful act.

58
As reflected in the records, the prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient evidence to hold her responsible as a principal.
59
Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution had was the testimony of Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998 Perpenian
entered the room where the victim was detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding stories unrelated to the
kidnapping, this Court opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as an accomplice to the
crime.

60
Jurisprudence is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in order that a
person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of
the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution by previous
or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and
(3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal liability. Assuming arguendo that she just came
1âwphi1

to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the
principals when she saw Chan being guarded in the room. A rational person would have suspected something was wrong and
would have reported such incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to add to that, she even spent the
night at the cottage. It has been held before that being present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed will
61
make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed. It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s
presence and company were not indispensable and essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is
62 63
only liable as an accomplice. Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. Clemente, et al., where it was stressed
that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.

Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and considering the evidence presented by the
prosecution, linking accused-appellants’ participation in the crime, no doubt can be entertained as to their guilt. The CA
convicted the accused-appellants of kidnapping for ransom and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death, applying the
provisions of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this Court finds accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable
64
doubt as principals to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, we modify the penalty
imposed by the trial court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

65
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of R.A. No. 9344, a
determination of whether she acted with or without discernment is necessary. Considering that Perpenian acted with
discernment when she was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, her minority should be appreciated not as
an exempting circumstance, but as a privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.

66
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law shall still be applied even if
he/she is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from the aforesaid provision, because under Article 40
67
of R.A. No. 9344, the suspension of sentence can be availed of only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. This leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce judgement. Perpenian is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court has ruled that death as
utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant
68
to R.A. No. 9346, the penalty imposed by law on accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping for ransom is
69
Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one degree lower than what the principals would bear (Reclusion Perpetua). Applying Article
68 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
law for accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that
prescribed by law (Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty,
which is one degree lower than the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range of Prision Correccional; and the
maximum penalty shall be within the minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent any aggravating circumstance and there being
one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision
Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.

As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility in accordance with Section 51 of
70
R.A. 9344, this Court held in People v. Jacinto that the age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of
the judgment is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. This
Court, however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that Perpenian’s actual served term has already
exceeded the imposable penalty for her offense. For such reason, she may be immediately released from detention.

71
We note that in the Order dated 9 October 1998, the trial court admitted the documentary evidence offered by the counsel for
the defense proving that the real name of Thian Perpenian is Larina Perpenian.
In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this case, he is relieved of all personal and pecuniary penalties attendant
72 73
to the crime, his death having occurred before rendition of final judgement.

74
There is prevailing jurisprudence, on civil liabilities arising from the commission of kidnapping for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The persons convicted were held
liable for ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity and damages, where, as in this case, the penalty for the crime
75
committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346:

1. ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. ₱100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and

3. ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.

These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages where death is the penalty warranted by the facts but is not
imposable under present law.

76
The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros is instructive on the apportionment of civil liabilities among all the
accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the
commission of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation. Hence,
each principal accused-appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages than Perpenian
who was adjudged as only an accomplice.

Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation, all of them shall be liable for the total amount of
₱300,000.00 divided among the principals who shall be liable for ₱288,000.00 (or ₱32,000.00 each) and Perpenian who shall be
liable for ₱12,000.00. This is broken down into ₱10,666.67 civil indemnity, ₱10,666.67 moral damages and ₱10,666.67
exemplary damages for each principal; and ₱4,000.00 civil indemnity, ₱4,000.00 moral damages and ₱4,000.00 exemplary
damages for the lone accomplice.

WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR–H.C. No. 00863 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH,
TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE
RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of kidnapping
for ransom and sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole. Accused-appellant THIAN
PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision
Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellants are ordered to
indemnify the victim in the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages apportioned in the following manner: the principals to the crime shall jointly and severally pay the victim the
total amount of ₱288,000.00 while the accomplice shall pay the victim ₱12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of the Revised Penal
Code on several and subsidiary liability.

The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to immediately release THIAN PERPENIAN A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN
due to her having fully served the penalty imposed on her, unless her further detention is warranted for any other lawful causes.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the Correctional Institute for Women by
personal service. The Director of the Correctional Institute for Women shall submit to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt
of a copy of the decision, the action he has taken thereon.

SO ORDERED.