Compiled Cases For 09.26.23

9/24/23, 11:25 AM G.R. No.
L-38325
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38325 February 24, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO GAJETAS, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of a death sentence imposed by the Court of First Instance of Romblon on Antonio
Gajetas for the crime of attempted rape with homicide.
The following facts as narrated by the trial court are admitted by the appellant in his brief, to wit:
The facts which are not in dispute are: Between 8 to 12 o'clock in the evening of January 6, 1972,
Panchita Fosana Ramilo met her death through foul means. At about the time of her demise inside her
own house in sitio Canlumay, barrio Tumingad, Odiongan, Romblon, only her two small daughters, the
oldest aged 4 years and the youngest 1 year and 3 months, were her companions. Her husband,
Gerundio Ramilo, was then in Batangas, having left for said place on December 9, 1971. The heinous
deed was discovered at around 6 o'clock in the morning of January 7, 1972, when Miguel Ramilo,
younger brother of Gerundio, was about to pass the house of the latter after coming from a place
situated uphill and beyond said house, where he tethered his carabao to graze. Surprised at seeing
bloodstains under the house, Miguel called out twice to his sister-in-law. There was no response from
her. Instead, Miguel heard the voice of his niece, Necy Ramilo, the oldest daughter of the deceased,
stating that her mother was already dead. He could not believe what he heard, so that he hurried
upstairs and saw Panchita sprawled on her belly on the floor of the bedroom. He dared not touch the
deceased. He immediately left the house to inform his wife and father about his discovery. Thereafter he
proceeded to the municipal building to report the matter to the authorities. Policeman Manuel Fabroa
was immediately ordered to conduct an investigation at the scene of the killing. Fabroa thus went to sitio
Canlumay, accompanied by policemen Freddie Fojas and Miguel Ramilo. After reaching the site of the
killing he made a rough sketch of what he saw, which served as the basis of the final sketch marked
Exh. B. He also saw strands of hair, Exh. C. During his investigation, Fabroa learned from Necy that two
persons went up the house the preceding night and that one of the intruders was afflicted with a skin
disease locally called 'garit.' Necy did not, however, name names.
From Canlumay the deceased was brought to the house of her sister, Patria Fetalvero, at sitio Mainit,
where a post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr. Julian Ornum in the afternoon of the same day,
January 7th. This witness Identified the certificate of death which he issued, marked Exh. A in the
record, According to said document, the deceased died of "Hemorrhage, due to Lacerated wounds on
the right side of the neck." The reverse side of Exh. A shows the post-mortem certificate stating that the
late Panchita Fosana Ramilo sustained: 'Lacerated wound on the left deltoid muscles, measuring 1-1/2
inches long, one inch depth and 2 inches wide. Lacerated wound on the base of the right side of the
head and upper part of the neck measuring 5 inches long, one inch depth and I inch wide. Lacerated
wound on the middle right side of the neck measuring 6 inches long and 2-1/ 2 inches depth and 1- 1/2
inches wide, cutting the cervical vertebrae, muscles and great vessels of the right side of the neck.' He
testified that the most fatal injury is that located on the right side of the neck; and that a bolo or a scythe
could have been used in inflicting the injuries above described. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-5; rollo, pp. 58-
60.)
On January 11, 1972, a complaint for "Attempted Rape with Double Murder" was filed against Antonio Gajetas and
Francisco Gajetas in the Municipal Court of Odiongan, Romblon. After the preliminary investigation, first stage, was
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conducted Antonio and Francisco were arrested. During the second stage of the preliminary investigation the
accused entered pleas which were recorded in Exhibit X as follows:
From the Municipal Jail the two accused ANTONIO GAJETAS and FRANCISCO GAJETAS were
brought before this Honorable Court for arraignment. Before this Honorable Court, they were assisted
by their counsel who was appointed Counsel de Oficio.
The complaint was read and translated in the local dialect to the accused. They were asked and
informed if they understand the complaint as read and translated and each of them responded in the
affirmative. They were then asked one by one to enter their plea.
1. Accused Francisco Gajetas entered the plea of NOT GUILTY.
2. Accused Antonio Gajetas entered the following plea:
(a) He admit to have killed Panchita Fosana but there was no confederacy nor conspiracy in killing her;
(b) That there was no treachery nor premeditation in the commission of the offense;
(c) That he does not enter the plea of guilty to the Double Murder nor to the qualifying circumstances
stated in the complaint.
That both accused waive their rights to the preliminary investigation (2nd stage) and respectfully request
the Court to remand the case to the Court of First Instance of Romblon for immediate trial on the merits.
Odiongan, Romblon, Jan. 22, 1972.
WITNESS TO THUMBMARK: His Thumbmark
(SGD.) ROGELIO FAJARITO FRANCISCO GAJETAS
Clerk
(SGD.) ANTONIO GAJETAS
Assisted by:
SGD NEMESIO F. GANAN
Counsel de Officio of both accused
When the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance, the following information was filed:
The undersigned, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Romblon, accuses ANTONIO GAJETAS and
FRANCISCO GAJETAS of the crime of Attempted Rape with Homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of January 1972, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at sitio Canlumay,
barrio Tumingad, municipality of Odiongan, province of Romblon. Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, The above-named accused, conspiring, confederating with one another, by
means of force and intimidation and with a scythe did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
embrace, attack and assault one Panchita Fosana Racamilo, a pregnant woman, with intent of having
carnal knowledge of her, against her will, thus commencing the commission of the felony of Rape
directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced that
crime by reason of some cause or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance.
That the accused did not succeed in their evil intent on account of the resistance offered by the offended
party for which reason and in that occasion, the accused attacked and assaulted her with that deadly
weapon, inflicting upon her, mortal injuries in different parts of her body that resulted in her death.
That the commission of the complex crime was attended with the aggravating circumstance that the
offense was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having given any provocation.
When arraigned on June 1, 1972, both accused pleaded not guilty. However, on June 21 in the same year, Antonio
offered to plead guilty provided that Francisco be excluded from the charge but the offer was not accept by the
prosecution so trial was held and thereafter the court rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Antonio Gajetas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of attempted rape with homicide, and pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
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as amended, sentences him to death penalty, to indemnify the heirs of Panchita Fosana Ramilo in the
amount of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay one-half of the costs.
The other accused, Francisco Gajetas, is hereby acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, with one-half of the costs charged de oficio, and his immediate release from
custody hereby ordered.
The only eye-witness to the crime who was presented by the prosecution was Necy Ramilo, a 3 to 4-year old
daughter of the deceased. However, the evidence given by Necy was not given any weight by the trial court because,
in its own words, "It is the considered opinion of this Court that this witness of tender years cannot be relied upon to
prove the guilt of the herein accused. Firstly, there is no showing that this child witness understood the obligation of
an oath; moreover, she was not sworn before she testified. Secondly, and more important, she has committed
contradictions during the cross-examination." Nonetheless, the trial court convicted the accused on the basis of his
extra-judicial confession which was corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti despite the protestations of the
accused that his confession was involuntary and he had an alibi.
The extra-judicial confession of Antonio consists of two pages. Page one is marked as Exhibit D and contains his
signature on the left hand margin while page 2 is marked as Exhibit D-1 and contains his signatures at the bottom
and also on the left hand margin. Reproduced in full, it reads as follows
STATEMENT OF ANTONIO GAJETAS TAKEN BY MSGT FORTUNATO T. TOME AT ODIONGAN,

ROMBLON ON JANUARY 8, 1972 IN THE PRESENCE OF CPL PABLO FAMAITGA AS
INTERPRETER:
QUESTION: You are being apprised your rights under the Constitution of the Philippines
and after which you testify under oath as follows. Do you understand?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
Q: — Do you voluntarily submit yourself for investigation without fear of favor?
A: — Yes, sir.
Q: — State your name and other personal circumstances?
A: — Antonio Gajetas, 29 years of age, married, Grade II, farmer and a resident of Sitio
Igcalape, Tumingad, Odiongan, Romblon.
Q: — Why are you here in the Office of the Chief of Police at Odiongan, Romblon?
A: — I went here, sir.
Q: — Why did you come here?
A: — To surrender, sir.
Q: — Why are you surrendering?
A: — Because I have killed Pansing Fosana.
Q: — Why and where did you kill Pansing Fosana?
A: — Because she refused to submit to me her body and I killed her at the house in Sitio
Canlumay, Tumingad, Odiongan, Romblon.
Q: — When did you kill Pansing Fosana'?
A:— At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of January 6, 1972.
Q: — Who was your companion if any'?
A: — Francisco Gajetas
Q: — What is your relation with Francisco Gajetas?
A: — My younger brother, sir.
Q: — Will you explain to this investigator how did you kill Pancing Fosana?
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A: — I went up the house together with my brother Paco and while inside the house I
approached Pancing and asked from her to have a sexual intercourse but she refused so
that I embraced her and kissed her. She wanted to free herself from my hold and right
thereafter she ran to the window and took a bolo so that I rushed at her and took
possession of the bolo. I then scythe her on her right neck. She fell down on the floor. I
observed her no longer moving and believed already dead so that we left her.
Q: — While you were kissing and asking for a sexual intercourse with Pancing Fosana,
where was Francisco Gajetas'?
A: — At the door of the house.
Q: — What if any did Francisco Gajetas do when you scythe Pancing Fosana on her neck?
A: — Francisco Gajetas stabbed Pancing Fosana with a bolo hitting her on her left arm.
Q: — Showing to you a scythe with blood stains on it, what has this to do with the scythe
you have used in killing Pancing Rosana?
A: — That is the same scythe sir.
Q: — Who owned this scythe ?
A: — It is mine, sir.
Statement of Antonio Gajetas. cont'd.............................. Page —2 —
.......................................................................................................................................
Q: — What kind of trouser were you wearing when you killed Pancing Fosana?
A: — Khaki pants (burlington)
Q: — If that pants of yours be shown to you can still recognize it ?
A: — Yes, sir.
Q: — Showing to you a khaki burlington long pants with bloodstains on it, what has this to
do with the pants you wore when you killed Pancing Fosana'?
A: — Yes, sir.
Q: — Why did you kill Pancing Fosana after you were not able to have sexual intercourse
with her inspite of the force you have applied to her?
A: — I fear that if she is still alive, she will report the matter to her husband.
Q: — What was your plan before killing Pancing Fosana'!
A: — To abuse her only, sir.
Q: — Do you know that Pancing Fosana is a married woman and if so who is her
husband?
A: — Yes, sir. Her husband is Gerondio Ramilo.
Q: — And why did you plan to abuse her when you have already known that she is a
married woman'?
A: — Because the husband is not around, sir.
Q: — Do you want to tell us that before you left your house your intention was to go to the
house of Pancing Fosana and abuse her, I am right'?
A: — Yes, sir.
Q: — Who were in the house of Pancing Fosana aside from her that evening'?
A: — Her two (2) children.
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Q: — Was there a light inside the house when when you killed Pancing Fosana'?
A: — Yes, sir, coming from the kerosene lamp.
Q: — While you were holding, embracing and kissing Pancing Fosana, what was Francisco
Gajetas doing, if any'?
A: — He was just looking at us.
Q: — Where was he?
A: — At the door sir.
Q: — Were you able to have sexual intercourse with Pancing Fosana that evening and if
so, for how many times?
A: — I was not able to have a sexual intercourse with her because she was moving.
Q: — After you scythe her and she fell down on the floor, did you not take advantage of her
being injured already?
A: — No more, sir.
Q: — Are you willing to sign this statement of your free and voluntary will consisting of two
(2) pages?
A: — Yes, sir.
(SGD) ANTONIO GAJETAS
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of January 1972 at Odiongan, Romblon.
(SGD.)
Illegible
___________
To prove that his extra-judicial confession was extracted through violence and intimidation, Antonio testified that he
and Francisco were brought by Sgt. Fortunato Tome to the PC barracks in the afternoon of January 7, 1972, where
they were investigated; that when he and his brother refused to admit the crime, Tome struck him on the neck; that
afterwards Tome brought him to a corner where he was severely beaten and then he and his brother were ordered to
dance naked on top of a table and when they refused they were beaten with a 3-inch wide belt, hit with fist blows on
the chest and kicked on several parts of the body; that he was forced to drink one-half glass of gin mixed with one-
half glass of salt; that he was also ordered to swallow a lighted cigarette butt; that the beating continued so he told
the PC that to avoid punishment he was willing to admit having committed the crime although he was innocent; that
he was then brought to the municipal building and lodged in its jail; that when he was asked if he committed the
crime and answered in the negative he was repeatedly beaten by Patrolmen Manuel Fabroa and Freddie Fojas and
five other persons who were drunk; that these atrocities caused him to admit the commission of the crime; and that
when he appeared before Municipal Judge Cezar Maravilla he could not complain because he was being watched by
Sgt. Tome.
On the defense of alibi, Antonio testified that in the evening of January 6, 1972, he was at home together with his
seven children and Francisco, that neither he nor Francisco left the house that night; that Francisco joined him in
order to cut timber which was their occupation. Francisco corroborated Antonio's testimony and additionally Renato
Gajetas, Antonio's 10-year old son testified that he, his father and brothers and his uncle Francisco did not leave the
house in the evening of January 6, 1972.
Like the trial court, we cannot accept the claim of the appellant that his confession was not freely given and that he
was elsewhere when the crime was committed.
On the extra-judicial confession, both Sgt. Fortunato Tome and Pat. Manuel Fabroa testified that no force,
intimidation or violence was used in the taking of the confession. No less than a defense witness, Corporal Pablo
Famatiga declared that the accused gave their statements voluntarily. The relevant portion of his testimony is
reproduced as follows:
Q. Did Antonio Gajetas and Francisco Gajetas voluntarily give their statements'?
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. Why do you say that they voluntarily gave their statements?
A. When I was in the Office Sgt. Tome investigated and propounded the questions and they
answered, "yes, sir."
Q. Did Sgt. Tome exert force or violence to extract the statements from Antonio Gajetas
and Francisco Gajetas?
A. I have not seen or heard any threatening words or maltreatment.
Q. What about from the side of Antonio Gajetas and Francisco Gajetas did you not hear
them making any complaints about the way they are being investigated or treated by Sgt.
Tome?
A. Nothing.
I am through with the witness.
(pp. 11-12, tsn., Nov. 13, 1972.)
Moreover, we have Exhibit X, reproduced supra, where the appellant admitted having killed the deceased Panchita
Fosana Ramilo. It has to be stressed that Exhibit X was signed by the appellant with the assistance of the counsel,
Atty. Nemesio G. Ganan who did not ask that his clients be medically examined if it were true that they were coerced
in giving their confessions. Then we have the appellant's offer to plead guilty provided that Francisco be dropped
from the charge. And finally, the confession of the appellant shows no signs of suspicious circumstances which tend
to cast a shadow on its integrity. It is replete with details which only the appellant could have supplied. All these
circumstances belie the appellant's claim that his extra-judicial confession was not given voluntarily.
As to the defense of alibi, it has to fail not only because it is contradicted by the appellant's confession which has
been shown to be voluntary but also because it was not impossible for him to have committed the crime. For as the
trial court said: "There is ample evidence to prove that the house of the deceased is only around 3-1/2 kilometers
away from the house of Antonio Gajetas, and that the distance can be negotiated in less than one hour by walking.
'There was therefore no physical impossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission (People vs. Manabat, 100 Phil. 603; People vs. Limpo, L-13058, Jan. 28, 1961; People vs. Divinagracia,
L-1061, Mar. 13, 1959; People vs. Raquel, 12 SCRA 441).
The killing of Panchita Fosana Ramilo by Antonio having been established only remains to be considered his claim
that he did not attempt to rape the deceased.
The appellant claims that the first requisite of an attempted felony, namely: That the offender commits overt acts to
commence the perpetration of the felony (Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1961 ed., p. 90) was not present. He
supports this claim by stating:
The information merely states --- embrace, attack and assault one Panchita Fosana Ramilo, a pregnant
woman, with intent of having carnal knowledge of her against her will - - -Embracing is not an overt act
that commences the perpetuation of rape or intent to have carnal knowledge of the victim,
Even the purported extra-judicial confession exhibits "D" and D- 1 " only stated, — I approached
Pancing and asked from her to have a sexual intercourse but she refused so that I embraced her and
kissed her --- Asking her to have a sexual intercourse is a mere showing of a desire, a mental
expression not within the realm of Criminal Law. Embracing and kissing are not overt acts commencing
the perpetration of rape. In order that the overt act may be considered as commencing the perpetration
of a felony there must be a direct relation and intimate connection between the overt act and the felony
intented to be committed. If the intention is to rape a woman the overt act may be putting the woman flat
on bed or on the floor, or raising her dress, or forcibly removing her panty if she had one or mounting on
top of her, or touching delicate parts of her body or exposing his private part or the like but not merely
embracing and kissing because these are only unjust vexation or at most acts of lasciviousness which
are still far from and cannot be considered as overt acts commencing the perpetration of rape.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 64-65.)
The trial court did not err in considering appellant's act of embracing the victim with intent of having carnal knowledge
of her against her will as an overt act commencing the perpetration of the crime of rape. For, were it not for the
resistance offered by the victim, said act of the appellant would have naturally ended up with the consummation of
his criminal objective of having carnal knowledge of the victim against her will which he expressly admitted in his
extrajudicial confession.
The offender's act need not be one of these mentioned by the appellant in order to be considered as an overt act
commencing the perpetration of the crime of rape when the criminal objective of having carnal knowledge of the
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victim against her will is admitted or is sufficiently established and said act would naturally end up with the
consummation of said criminal objective unless frustrated by some external cause or by offender's voluntary
desistance. Furthermore, even the mentioned acts would not be considered as overt acts commencing the
perpetration of the crime of rape when it is sufficiently established that the man had no intention of having sexual
intercourse with the woman without her consent. Of vital importance, therefore, is the criminal objective in performing
the act. Was there intent to commit rape? The evidence shows there was. Hence the trial court correctly convicted
the appellant of the crime of attempted rape with homicide.
WHEREFORE, finding appellant Antonio Gajetas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape
with Homicide, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed in all respects. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I grant the accused the benefit of the doubt. His extrajudicial confession constitutes the only basis for his conviction
and his statements therein indicate that he spontaneously desisted from his intent to abuse her for even after he had
felled her with a scythe and she had fallen down on the floor he "did not take advantage of her being injured already"
(at page 8, main opinion). He should therefore be convicted only for the simple crime of homicide (not the complex
one of attempted rape with homicide) and sentenced accordingly with the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Act.
Separate Opinions
Fernando, C.J. concurs.
Separate Opinions
Fernando, C.J., concurs.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
9/24/23, 11:25 AM G.R. No. L-38325
9/24/23, 11:26 AM G.R. No. 180425

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 180425 July 31, 2008
FELIX RAIT, Petitioner,

vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. CR No. 23276 dated January 26, 2006 and its Resolution2 dated
October 10, 2007. The Court of Appeals upheld the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 20, wherein petitioner Felix Rait was convicted of attempted rape.
On November 18, 2003, AAA4 asked permission from her parents to go to her brother’s house in Nazareth Street to
get her athletic pants. When she was there, her brother requested her to buy cigarettes from a nearby store. While
in the store, petitioner Rait and one Janiter Pitago arrived. The two ordered beer and invited AAA to join them. She
initially refused. However, when Aurora Raez, another neighbor, joined them, AAA was forced to drink beer. After
drinking a glass of beer, she became drunk. When she was feeling weak, petitioner and his co-accused brought her
out to 20th and 21st Streets where the petitioner and his co-accused brought her to the side of the street and
forcibly removed her pants and underwear. Petitioner then forcibly inserted his finger into her vagina. AAA tried to
shout for help but petitioner covered her mouth while Pitago held her feet. Petitioner was on top of her and about to
insert his penis into her vagina but she was able to kick both men and run away.5
AAA then went to her brother’s house and related the incident to him. Her brother went out to find petitioner. When
AAA’s brother did find petitioner, he tried to beat petitioner with a stick but the latter ran away. AAA and her brother
then went home to their parents’ house in Tambo, Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City and told them what happened.
At about 3:00 a.m. of November 19, AAA was accompanied by her brother and stepmother to Operation Kahusay ug
Kalinaw to report the incident. They also went to Bombo Radyo to appeal for help in apprehending petitioner. From
there, they went to the Provincial Hospital for AAA to undergo medical examination.6 They then proceeded to the
police station where the incident was recorded on the police blotter under Entry No. 8085.7
On May 26, 1994, Rait and Pitago were charged in an Information, which reads:
That on or about November 19, 1993, at 2:00 o’clock in the morning, more or less (sic) at Nazareth, Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously
commence the commission of the crime of Rape, directly by overt acts, on the person of a [17-year-old] minor,
[AAA], by then and there (sic), with force and against the latter’s will while she was in a state of intoxication,
touching her breasts, removing her panty, holding her feet (by Janiter Pitago) and lying on top of her (by Felix Rait),
but did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Rape, by reason of some cause other
than his own spontaneous desistance, that in when (sic) offended party was able to kick them and the two ran away.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 335 in relation to Article 6, of the Revised Penal Code.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby finds the accused Felix Rait guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Attempted Rape.
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The basic penalty for Attempted Rape under Article 335 is two degrees lower than Reclusion Perpetua or Prision
Mayor in its full extent. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is entitled to a penalty lower to (sic)
Prision Mayor or that of Prision Correccional in its full extent, (sic) hence, accused FELIX RAIT is sentenced to an
Indeterminate Sentence of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its medium period as the minimum to PRISION MAYOR in
its medium period as the maximum under the same law.
The accused is entitled to his credit in full (sic) in his favor the period during which he was under preventive
imprisonment pending litigation.
Accused herein is further ordered to pay the complainant the sum of ₱20,000.00 pesos (sic) as indemnity for
Attempted rape to the complainant (sic); ₱5,000.00 pesos (sic) for actual damages and expenses and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner appealed the judgment to the CA-Cagayan de Oro. Petitioner alleged that the RTC erred in: (1) giving
credence to the prosecution witnesses despite their inconsistent, contradictory and incredible testimonies; (2) in not
finding that petitioner was implicated in the case by reason of spite and vengeance; and (3) in finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted rape despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt.9
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s ruling in all respects.10 Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
Petitioner now comes before this Court on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
CONVICTING THE PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED RAPE, DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW ON RAPE AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN [NOT

DOWNGRADING] THE CRIME OF ATTEMPTED RAPE TO ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS IF NOT THAT OF
UNJUST VEXATION.11
Petitioner argues that he should be acquitted of the crime of attempted rape. If he is to be found guilty of any
offense, he puts forward the theory that based on this Court’s ruling in Baleros, Jr. v. People,12 he should be
convicted only of unjust vexation.
The petition is bereft of merit. We deny the Petition for Review.
First, the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive upon this Court. In this
case, the trial court found the acts imputed to petitioner to have been duly proven by the evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. We are bound by such finding.
On the strength of those proven facts, the next question is: what was the offense committed?
Petitioner argues that this Court’s ruling in Baleros is applicable to his case.
In Baleros, accused was convicted of attempted rape. The CA sustained the conviction. Upon review, this Court
reversed the conviction and found accused guilty of light coercion. The Court declared:
Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs.
Lamahang, stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical connection to a
particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the
perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical
and natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not
certain, meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to
commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code.
There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case.
The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a
chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following
its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator,
will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
9/24/23, 11:26 AM G.R. No. 180425
Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of
pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will
logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act
indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and
that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner
wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s guess. The CA
maintained that if the petitioner had no intention to rape, he would not have lain on top of the complainant. Plodding
on, the appellate court even anticipated the next step that the petitioner would have taken if the victim had been
rendered unconscious. Wrote the CA:
The shedding of the clothes, both of the attacker and his victim, will have to come later. His sexual organ is not yet
exposed because his intended victim is still struggling. Where the intended victim is an educated woman already
mature in age, it is very unlikely that a rapist would be in his naked glory before even starting his attack on her. He
has to make her lose her guard first, or as in this case, her unconsciousness.
At bottom then, the appellate court indulges in plain speculation, a practice disfavored under the rule on evidence in
criminal cases. For, mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to establish the guilt of
an accused beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the premises, of any wrongdoing
whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation that he forcefully covered the face of
Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her
face of the chemical-soaked cloth and having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily,
while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they
constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring an accused of a crime the right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation, it cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts
for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the information against petitioner contains sufficient details to
enable him to make his defense. As aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege
malice, restraint or compulsion in information for unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the
element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct
which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent
person. The paramount question is whether the offender’s act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or
disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while
relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted
rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.13
We are not persuaded by petitioner’s argument. Several facts attendant to this case distinguish it from Baleros,
enough to convince us to arrive at a different conclusion.
Unlike in Baleros, the acts of petitioner clearly establish his intention to commence the act of rape. Petitioner had
already successfully removed the victim’s clothing and had inserted his finger into her vagina. It is not empty
speculation to conclude that these acts were preparatory to the act of raping her. Had it not been for the victim’s
strong physical resistance, petitioner’s next step would, logically, be having carnal knowledge of the victim. The acts
are clearly "the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparations are made."14
Under Article 6, in relation to Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender
commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.15
This Court has held that an overt or external act -
is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere
planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily
ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d’etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases,
the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is
necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the
act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or
before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the
equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the
overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the
9/24/23, 11:26 AM G.R. No. 180425
"first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations
are made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the
attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an
immediate and necessary relation to the offense.16
Thus, we find that petitioner was correctly convicted of attempted rape.
A final observation. We note that the trial court’s Decision sentenced petitioner to a prison term without specifying
the period this sentence covers. We will rectify this error even as we affirm petitioner’s conviction.
The penalty for attempted rape is prision mayor, or two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the penalty for
consummated rape. Petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate sentence the minimum of which is in the
range of prision correccional, or within six months and one day to six years, and the maximum of which is prision
mayor medium, or within eight years and one day to ten years. In this case, the trial court sentenced petitioner to
"an Indeterminate Sentence of PRISION CORRECCIONAL in its medium period, as the minimum, to PRISION
MAYOR in its medium period, as the maximum."
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23276 dated
January 26, 2006 and its Resolution dated October 10, 2007 affirming petitioner’s conviction for ATTEMPTED RAPE
are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of two (2) years,
four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor
medium, as its maximum. In all other respects, the trial court’s Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E RTI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and
Ramon R. Garcia, concurring; rollo, pp. 36-43.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Elihu
A. Ybañez, concurring; id. at 44-45.
9/24/23, 11:26 AM G.R. No. 180425
3 Penned by Judge Alejandro M. Velez, id. at 66-77.
4
Per Republic Act No. 9262, the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 and Republic
Act No. 7610, the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
See People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419.
5 RTC Decision, rollo, p. 67.
6 Id. at 67-68.
7
Id. at 69.
8 Id. at 77.
9 Id. at 38.
10
Id. at 42.
11 Id. at 20.
12 G.R. No. 138033, February 22, 2006, 483 SCRA 10.
13
Baleros v. People, id. at 27-30. (Citations omitted).
14 People v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 152589 & 152758, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 328, 334, citing People v.
Lizada, 396 SCRA 62, 95 (2003).
15 People v. Campuhan, 385 Phil. 912, 927 (2000).
16
People v. Lizada, supra note 14, at 94-95. (Citations omitted).
9/24/23, 11:27 AM G.R. No. 166441

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166441 October 8, 2014
NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does not.
Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on top
of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to
penetrate the female's vagina.
The Case
This appeal examines the decision promulgated on July 26, 2004,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
conviction for attempted rape of the petitioner by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union (RTC),
and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordering him to pay moral damages
of ₱20,000.00 to AAA,2 the victim.
Antecedents
The petitioner was charged in the RTC with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving different victims. At
arraignment, he pleaded not guiltyto the respective informations, to wit: Criminal Case No. 2388
Attempted Rape
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, along the Bangar-Luna
Road, Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar,Province of La Union, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by
means of force and intimidation commenced the commission ofrape directly byovert acts, to wit: While private
complainant AAA, an unmarried woman, fifteen (15) yearsold, was sleeping inside the tentalong Bangar-Luna Road,
the said accused remove her panty and underwear and lay on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina
and breast with intent of having carnal knowledge of her by means of force, and if the accused did not accomplish
his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance but
because the said offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of said accused to the damage and
prejudice of said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 2389

Acts of Lasciviousness
That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 3:00 o’clock in the morning, along the Bangar-Luna
Road, Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously touch the vagina of [BBB]4 against the latter’s will and with no other purpose but to satisfy
his lascivious desire to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/oct2014/gr_166441_2014.html 1/9
9/24/23, 11:27 AM G.R. No. 166441
5
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Version of the Prosecution
The CA summarized the version of the Prosecution as follows:6
x x x [Petitioner] Norberto Bartolome and [his wife] Belinda Cruz were engaged in the selling of plastic wares and
glass wares in different municipalities around the country. On December 20, 1993, Norberto and Belinda employed
AAA and BBB to help them in selling their wares in Bangar, La Union which was then celebrating its fiesta. From
Libsong East, Lingayen, Pangasinan to Bangar, La Union, AAA and BBB boarded a passenger jeepney owned by
Norberto. The young girls were accompanied by Norberto, Belinda, Ruben Rodriguez (driver) and a sales boy by the
name of "Jess".
Upon reaching Bangar, La Union, at around 8:00 in the evening of December 20, 1993, they parked in front of
Maroon enterprises. They brought out all the goods and wares for display. Two tents were fixed in order that they will
have a place to sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in order to get more goods to be sold.
On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, AAA and BBB went to sleep. Less thanan hour later,
AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching
her private part. AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and that she was totally naked. Norberto ordered
her not to scream or she’ll be killed. AAA tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas
fell on deaf ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice.
Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told her not totell the incident to
her mother otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but she
failed to wake him up.
Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. AAA saw
her companion awake but her hands wereshaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside.
Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place that early morning. Later still, while they
were on their way to fetch water, AAA and BBB asked the people around where they can find the municipal building.
An old woman pointed to them the place.
In the evening of December 21, 1993, AAA and BBB went straight to the municipal hall where they met a policeman
by the name of "Sabas".
They told Sabas the sexual advances made to them by Norberto. Norberto was summoned to the police station
where he personally confronted his accusers. When Norberto’s wife, Belinda, arrived at the police station, an
argument ensued between them.
On December 22, 1993, at around 2:20 o’clock in the morning, the police investigator ordered the complainants to
return at6:00 o’clock in the morning. Norberto and Belinda were still able to bring AAA and BBB home with them and
worked for them until December 30, 1994, after which they were sent back to Lingayen, Pangasinan.
On January 10, 1994, AAA and BBB went back to La Union and executed their respective sworn statements against
Norberto.
Version of the Defense
The petitioner denied the criminal acts imputed to him. His version was presented in the assailed decision of the
CA,7 as follows:
In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a totally different version of the story. The accused
maintains that it was not possible for him to commit the crimes hurled against him. On the date of the alleged
incident, there were many people around who were preparing for the "simbang gabi". Considering the location of the
tents, which were near the road and the municipal hall, he could not possibly do the dastardly acts out in the open,
not to mention the fact that once AAA and BBB would scream, the policemen in the municipal hall could hear them.
He believes that the reason why the complainants filed these cases against him was solely for the purpose of
extorting money from him.
Judgment of the RTC
After the joint trial of the two criminal cases, the RTC rendered its judgment on April 6, 2000 finding the petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388 and acts of lasciviousness in Criminal
Case No. 2389,8 to wit:
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WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring the accused NORBERTO
CRUZ Y BARTOLOME guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of ATTEMPTED RAPE and ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS as defined and penalized in Article 335 in relation with (sic) Article 6, par. 3 and Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code respectively. With respect to the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE, the Court hereby sentences
the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS
PRISION CORRECCIONAL as Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS PRISION MAYOR as Maximum and the accessory
penalties provided for by law and to pay the victim AAA the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages.
With regard to the crime ofACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) MONTHS ARRESTO MAYOR as Minimum to FOUR (4)
YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as Maximum and the accessory penalties provided for
by law, and to pay the victim BBBthe amount of ₱10,000.00 as moral damages.
The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused by reason of the two cases is counted in his favor.
SO ORDERED.9
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner contended that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him of attempted rape despite the
dubious credibility of AAA, and of acts of lasciviousness despite the fact that BBB did not testify.
On July 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner for attempted rape in
Criminal Case No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of lasciviousness charged in Criminal Case No. 2389 due to
the insufficiency of the evidence,10 holding thusly:
In sum, the arguments of the accused-appellant are too puerile and inconsequential as to dent, even slightly, the
overall integrity and probative value of the prosecution's evidence insofar as AAA is concerned.
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two (2)
degrees" prescribed by law for the consummated felony. In this case, the penalty for rape if it had been
consummated would have been reclusion perpetuapursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penalty Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetuais prision mayor.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be the medium period of prision
mayorin the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance and the minimum shall be within the range of
the penalty nextlower to that prescribed for the offense which in this case is prision correccionalin any of its periods.
We also find that the trial court correctly assessed the amount of ₱20,000.00 by way of moral damages against the
accused-appellant. In a rape case, moral damages may be awarded without the need of proof or pleading since it is
assumed that the private complainant suffered moral injuries, more so, when the victim is aged 13 to 19.
Insofar as the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against BBB, the accused argues that there is not enough
evidence to support such accusation. BBB did not testify and neither her sworn statement was formally offered in
evidence to support the charge for acts of lasciviousness.
In this case, the evidence adducedby the prosecution is insufficient to substantiate the charge of acts of
lasciviousness against the accusedappellant. The basis of the complaint for acts of lasciviousness is the sworn
statement of BBB to the effectthat the accused-appellant likewise molested her by mashing her breast and touching
her private part. However, she was not presented to testify. While AAA claims that she personally saw the accused
touching the private parts of BBB, there was no testimony to the effect that suchlascivious acts were without the
consent or against the will of BBB.11
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner posits that the CA’s decision was not in accord with law or with jurisprudence,
particularly:
I. In giving credence to the incredulous and unbelievable testimony of the alleged victim; and
II. In convicting the accused notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt.
Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails the behavior and credibility of AAA. He argues that AAA still continued
working for him and his wife until December 30, 1994 despite the alleged attempted rape in the early morning of
December 21, 1994, thereby belying his commission of the crime against her; that he could not have undressed her
without rousing her if she had gone to sleep only an hour before, because her bra was locked at her back; that her
testimony about his having been on top of her for nearly an hour while they struggled was also inconceivable unless
9/24/23, 11:27 AM G.R. No. 166441
she either consented to his act and yielded to his lust, or the incident did not happen at all, being the product only of
her fertileimagination; that the record does not indicate if he himself was also naked, or that his penis was poised to
penetrate her; and that she and her mother demanded from him ₱80,000.00 as settlement, under threat that she
would file a case against him.12
On the second issue, the petitioner assails the glaring inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA that cast doubt on her
veracity.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
In an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,13 the Court reviews only questions of law. No review of the
findings of fact by the CA is involved. As a consequence of thisrule, the Court accords the highest respect for the
factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their
testimonies and the conclusions drawn from its factual findings, particularly when they are affirmed by the CA.
Judicial experience has shown, indeed, that the trial courts are in the best position to decideissues of credibility of
witnesses, having themselves heard and seen the witnesses and observed firsthand their demeanor and
deportment and the manner of testifying under exacting examination. As such, the contentionsof the petitioner on
the credibility of AAA as a witness for the State cannot beentertained. He thereby raises questions of fact that are
outside the scope of this appeal. Moreover, he thereby proposes to have the Court, which is not a trier of facts,
review the entire evidence adduced by the Prosecution and the Defense.
Conformably with this limitation, our review focuses only on determining the question of law of whether or not the
petitioner’s climbing on top of the undressed AAA such thatthey faced each other, with him mashing her breasts and
touching her genitalia with his hands, constituted attempted rape, the crime for which the RTC and the CA convicted
and punished him. Based on the information, supra, he committed such acts "with intent of having carnal knowledge
ofher by means of force, and if the accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the
said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance but because the said offended party succeeded in resisting
the criminal attempt of said accused to the damage and prejudice of said offended party."
There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance. In People v.
Lamahang,14 the Court, speaking through the eminent Justice Claro M.Recto, eruditely expounded on what overt
acts would constitute anattempted felony, to wit:
It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical
relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of
the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate
offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of
the Penal Code. xxxx But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively
performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the
logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into
one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if
carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by
the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. x x x x.
"It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage iswanting,
the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the
nature of the acts of execution (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their very
nature, by the facts to which they are related, by the circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the
things connected therewith, they must show without any doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime.
Acts susceptible of double interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent
aswell as a punishable act, must not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for attempted or frustrated crimes.
The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciation and the offense of which said facts are supposed
to produce must be direct; the intention must be ascertainedfrom the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to
avoid regrettable instance of injustice, that the mind be able to directly infer from them the intention of the
perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This must have been the intention of the legislator in requiring that in order
for an attempt to exist, the offender must commence the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, that is to
say, that the acts performed must be such that, withoutthe intent to commit an offense, they would be
meaningless."15
To ascertain whether the acts performed by the petitioner constituted attempted rape, we have to determine the law
on rape in effect on December 21, 1993, when the petitioner committed the crime he was convicted of. That law was
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provided as follows:
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Article335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived ofreason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the
two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
xxxx
The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge isdefined simply as
"theact of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman,"16 which explains why the slightest penetration of
the female genitalia consummates the rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the peniscapable of
consummating the sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.17 In People v. Campuhan,18 the Court has
defined the extent of "touching" by the penis in rape in the following terms:
[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs,
a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeedtouched the labias or slid into the female organ,
and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the
labias, which are required to be "touched" bythe penis, are by their natural situsor location beneath the mons
pubisor the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the
surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape.
The pudendumor vulvais the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g.,
mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubisis the
rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the
labia majoraor the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The
skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin
which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majorais the labia minora.
Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majoramust be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the
penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. xxxx Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching
the mons pubisof the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the
slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendumby the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. [Bold emphasis supplied]
It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita,19 the Court clarified that the ruling in People v. Eriñia20 whereby the offender
was declared guilty of frustrated rapebecause of lack of conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of
the offended party, was a stray decisionfor not having been reiterated in subsequent cases. As the evolving case
law on rape stands, therefore, rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of
a frustrated felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Codeare that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the
perpetrator’s will. Obviously, the offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his
victim, because from that moment all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished, leaving
nothing more to be done by him.21
Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In this connection, the character of the overt actsfor purposes of
the attempted stage has been explained in People v. Lizada:22
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular
crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural
course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d’etrefor the law requiring a direct overtact is that,
in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be
equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must
be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime,
or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so
long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is.It is necessary
that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was
the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the
preparations are made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary,
however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts
must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. (Bold emphasis supplied)
9/24/23, 11:27 AM G.R. No. 166441
In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution
of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its
attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt actswithout the
offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts
performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear
showing of his intent to lie with the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal
law,23 that showing must be through his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for
attempted rape withoutsuch overt acts demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to establish
attempted rape, must show that his overt acts, should his criminalintent be carried to its complete termination
without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would ripen into rape,24 for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez,
Jr.:25 "The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of
the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into the vagina, before the interruption."
The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands and
mashing her breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring
from such circumstances thatrape, and no other,was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so,
despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or
"susceptible of double interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such that it was not
permissible to directly infer from them the intention to cause rape as the particular injury. Verily, his felony would not
exclusively be rapehad he been allowed by her to continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other
felony like simple seduction (if he should employ deceit to have her yield to him)26 could also be ultimate felony.
We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape did not include
equivocal preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly connected to rape as the intended
crime, but the latter, whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his
perpetration of the preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony.27 His
preparatory acts could include his putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and
the other for himself and his assistant, and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more
wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no direct connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable
under the Revised Penal Codefor as long as they remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their
equivocality no one could determine with certainty what the perpetrator’s intent really was.28
If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of lasciviousness?
It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the
offender’sintent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not
required in acts of lasciviousness.29 Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by
the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the
penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female.30 Without such showing,
only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed.31
Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is consummated whenthe
following essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon
another person of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or
intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is deprived ofreason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the
offended party is under 12 years of age.32 In that regard, lewdis defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it
signifies that form of immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.33
The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on top of said AAA
embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the information being competently and
satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape.
His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of
evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any
inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.
The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if
any, unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. A good illustration of this can be seen in People v.
Bugarin,34 where the accused was charged with attempted rape through an information alleging that he, by means
of force and intimidation, "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the
crime of Rape directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the undersigned
[complainant], a minor, and about to lay on top of her, all against her will, however, [he] did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own
spontaneous desistance, that is, undersigned complainant push[ed] him away." The accused was held liable only for
acts of lasciviousness because the intent to commit rape "is not apparent from the actdescribed," and the intent to
have sexual intercourse with her was not inferable from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court also pointed out
that the "act imputed to him cannot be considered a preparatory act to sexual intercourse."35
9/24/23, 11:27 AM G.R. No. 166441
Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being guilty of acts of lasciviousness, is punished
with prision correccional. In the absence of modifying circumstances, prision correccional is imposed in its medium
period, which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months and one day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty should come from arresto mayor, the penalty next
lower than prision correccionalwhich ranges from one (1) month to six (6) months. Accordingly, the Court fixes the
indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and
one day of prision correccional, as the maximum.
In acts of lasciviousness, the victim suffers moral injuries because the offender violates her chastity by his
lewdness. "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
1âwphi1
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for
omission."36 Indeed, Article 2219, (3), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the right of the victim in acts of
lasciviousness to recover moral damages.37 Towards that end, the Court, upon its appreciation of the record,
decrees that ₱30,000.00 is a reasonable award of moral damages.38 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil
indemnity of ₱20,000.00.39
Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, the courts are vested with the discretion to impose interest as a part of the
damages in crimes and quasidelicts. In that regard, the moral damages of ₱20,000.00 shall earn interest of 6% per
annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.40
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME guilty of ACTS
OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, and, ACCORDINGLY, PENALIZES him with the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months
of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as the
maximum; ORDERS him to pay moral damages of ₱30,000.00 and civil indemnity of ₱20,000.00 to the complainant,
with interest of 6% per annum on such awards reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and
DIRECTS him to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 38-49; penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. Delos Santos (deceased), and concurred in by
Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (retired) and Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a Member of
the Court).
2
The real name of the offended party is withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act); Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004); and A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC effective November 15, 2004
(Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children). See also People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693,
September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 421-423.
3
Rollo, p. 51.
9/24/23, 11:27 AM G.R. No. 166441
4
The real name of the offended party is alsowithheld for the reason stated in note 2.
5
Rollo, pp. 51-52.
6
Supra note 1, at 39-41.
7
Supra note 1, at 41.
8
Rollo, pp. 51-58.
9
Id. at 57-58.
10
Supra note 1.
11
Id. at 47-49.
12
Id. at 19-23.
13
Section 1 of Rule 45, Rules of Courtstates:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.—A party desiring to appeal by certiorarifrom a
judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a
writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which
must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion
filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
14
61 Phil. 703 (1935).
15
Id. at 705-707.
16
People v. Orita,G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990, 184 SCRA 105, 113, citing Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth
Edition, p. 193.
17
People v. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-876, November 16, 2001, 369 SCRA 179, 202.
18
G.R. Nos. 129433, March 30, 2000, 329 SCRA 270, 280-282.
19
Supra note 16.
20
50 Phil. 998 (1927).
21
Id. at 114.
22
G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62, 94-95.
23
I Feria & Gregorio, Comments on the Revised Penal Code, First Edition (1958), Central Book Supply, Inc.,
Manila, p. 29., to wit:
An act is defined as any bodily movement or a process whereby an individual puts his organism into
motion. In order to produce some change or effect in the external world, it being unnecessary that the
same be actually produced as the possibility of its production is sufficient. Mere thoughts and ideas, no
matter how immoral or heinous they may be, cannot constitute a felony because the act must be
external, and internal acts are beyond the sphere of criminal law.
24
Id. at 78-79.
25
G.R. No. 180914, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 134, 158.
26
Article 338 of the Revised Penal Codedefines simple seduction as the seduction of a woman who is single
or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under eighteen years of age, committed by means of deceit.
27
People v. Lizada, supra note 22 at 95.
28
I Feria & Gregorio, supra note 23, at 78-79, which opines that equivocal preparatory acts remain
unpunished unless the Revised Penal Codepenalizes them (e.g., conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony
in certain cases (Article 8, Revised Penal Code); mere possession with intent to use of instruments or
9/24/23, 11:27 AM G.R. No. 166441
implements adaptable for the commission of counterfeiting (Article 176, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code);
and possession of picklocks or similar tools adapted to the commission of robbery (Article 304, Revised Penal
Code).
29
People v. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 152589 and 152758, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 328, 333.
30
People v. Jalosjos, supra, note 17.
31
People v. Dadulla,G.R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 432, 443; citing People v. Collado, G.R.
Nos. 135667-70, March 1, 2001, 353 SCRA 381, 392.
32
People v. Lizada, supra note 22 at 93.
33
Id. at 94.
34
G.R. Nos. 110817-22, June 13, 1997, 273 SCRA 384, 401.
35
Id.
36
Article 2217, Civil Code.
37
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxxx
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
xxxx
38
People v. Dominguez, Jr., supra, note 25, at 164-165.
39
Id.
40
People v. Maglente, GR. No. 201445, November 27, 2013, 711SCRA142, 161; People v. Domingo, G.R.
No. 184343, March 2, 2009, 580 SCRA 436, 459.
9/24/23, 11:29 AM E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly
839 Phil. 1011
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 225336. September 05, 2018 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
AQUIL PILPA Y DIPAZ, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
Before this Court is an ordinary appeal[1] filed by the accused-appellant Aquil Pilpa y
Dipaz (Pilpa) assailing the Decision[2] dated June 8, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05822, which affirmed the Decision[3] dated September 26, 2012 of
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 18 in Criminal Case No. 03-217857,
finding Pilpa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.
The Facts
An Information was filed against Pilpa for the murder of Dave Alde (Alde), the accusatory
portion of which reads:
"That on or about August 23, 2003, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, identities
and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence
upon the person of one DAVE ALDE Y BURAYAG, by then and there
stabbing the latter with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the chest, thereby
inflicting upon the said DAVE ALDE Y BURAYAG mortal stab wound which
was the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
Contrary to law."[4]
The version of the prosecution, as summarized in its Appellee's Brief,[5] is as follows:
On August 23, 2003, around 8:00 in the evening, prosecution eyewitness

Barangay Tanod Leonila Abuel went to Quirino Highway, Pandacan, as she
was assigned by her officer in charge to look for a certain Reynan. When she
arrived at the highway, she saw a group of five persons which include Dave
Alde (Alde for brevity), the victim, Carol (Carol Asis) and Eva (Evangeline
Abuel) and two other people the names of which she failed to remember. She
approached the said group and asked if they knew the whereabouts of Reynan
https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/64640 1/11
to which Carol answered in the negative. While still talking to the group,
another group of five men, which included one named "JR" and appellant
Aquil Pilpa (Pilpa for brevity) arrived. At this point, "JR" stabbed Alde on the
chest with a big knife while appellant was positioned at the back of Leonila.
After "JR" stabbed Alde, appellant, who was a mere arms-length away from
Leonila, poised to thrust Alde as well. At this point, witness Leonila tried to
intervene by announcing her position as Barangay Tanod but appellant
disregarded said intervention by uttering "wala kaming pakialam kahit
Barangay Tanod ka[.]" Witness Leonila sustained injuries as she attempted to
parry the thrusts. Appellant's attempts to stab Alde ultimately failed because
"Choy[,]" a companion of Alde, was able to parry the thrusts. Leonila then
ordered Alde to run away which he was able to do despite his wounds, but
appellant and his group gave chase. Thereafter, appellant and his group
scampered away.
Subsequently, Alde was brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be given timely

medical attention.
While Alde was brought to the hospital, tanod Leonila, accompanied by the
police, one of them, PO3 Benedict Cruz, caught up appellant who was found in
a house near the railroad. She identified appellant as one of the group.
Appellant was then arrested and brought to the hospital as it is the standard
operating procedure to provide medical attention to suspects. When appellant
was brought to the hospital, the victim Alde positively identified appellant as
one of those who stabbed him.
Dr. Nolan Alandino was the physician on duty at the emergency room when
Alde was admitted. Alde underwent emergency surgery due to the stab wounds
inflicted on him. Dr. Alandino then referred Alde for further surgery. Alde
underwent an operation on both sides of the chest and repair was made on his
heart. Such operation ended around 11:40 pm of the same day. Unfortunately,
twenty minutes after the operation, while in the recovery room, Alde went into
cardiac arrest and succumbed to death.[6]
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as summarized by the RTC, is as follows:
For his defense, accused alleged that on August 23, 2003 between 8:00 to 8:30
in the evening, he was at the billiard hall operated by a certain Aling Cora
located in front of their house. Pilpa played with companions whose names he
did not know. After few minutes of playing, he left the billiard hall at around
8:30 pm then went straight home to sleep. The accused lived together with
"JR" and the latter's two sisters and mother. Just when he was about to sleep,
policemen arrived to arrest him and "JR" Niepes. The policemen informed that
JR stabbed somebody and because of this, [Pilpa] was brought to Police
Station 10. Incidentally, JR was not at home at the time of the (sic) arrest.
Herein accused maintained that he was not in the place of incident and denied
that he was with alias JR when the stabbing incident happened. [Pilpa] further
denied that he had participation in the killing of the victim and stressed that he
was not familiar with the identities of the witnesses presented by the
prosecution. Further, the accused clarified in court that he had no motive to
attack or kill the victim as he did not even personally know Dave Alde.[7]
Pilpa was arraigned on September 27, 2004, in which he pleaded "not guilty" to the crime
charged.[8] Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, in its Decision dated September 26, 2012, the RTC convicted
Pilpa of the crime of Murder. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding

accused AQUIL PILPA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
qualified by treachery and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA without eligibility of parole. They are ordered to
indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim DAVE ALDE the sum of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages. Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, he
shall be given full credit for the period of his preventive detention conformably
to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[9] (Emphasis in the original)
The RTC found that the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses Leonila Abuel
(Leonila), Evangeline Abuel (Evangeline) and Carolina Asis (Carolina) deserved to be
given greater evidentiary weight over the general denial by Pilpa that he was not at the
place of the incident at the time it took place. The RTC held that Pilpa was liable -
although it was only the certain "JR" who was able to inflict stab wounds on the victim -
because there was conspiracy among the assailants of Alde.[10] As conspiracy was present,
the RTC ruled that all of the assailants were liable as co-principals regardless of the extent
and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime
perpetrated in furtherance of such conspiracy.[11]
The RTC also found that treachery attended the killing of Alde, hence Pilpa was liable for
Murder instead of Homicide. The RTC reasoned that "[t]he attack made by Aquil Pilpa
and his group to the victim was so swift and unexpected affording the hapless and
unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or defend himself."[12]
Aggrieved, Pilpa appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In the assailed Decision dated June 8, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of
Pilpa, and held that (1) the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the elements of the
crime charged; (2) conspiracy exists among Alde's assailants; and (3) the element of
treachery was present in the killing of Alde.
The CA held that conspiracy may be deduced from the conspirators' conduct before,
during and after the commission of the crime indicative of a joint purpose, concerted
action and community of interests - and that the facts of the present case reveal such
concerted action to achieve the purpose of killing Alde.[13] The CA further held that
treachery was present despite the fatal assault being a frontal attack, because the said
attack was sudden and unexpected and the victim was unarmed.[14]
The CA, however, modified the award of damages to be paid to the heirs of Alde. The CA
added the amount of P15,000.00 representing additional actual damages because the heirs
were able to show receipts with the said amount representing expenses for the wake and
burial of Alde.[15]
Hence, the instant appeal.
Issue
For resolution of this Court are the following issues submitted by Pilpa:
(1) Whether the CA erred in convicting Pilpa despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt;[16]
(2) Whether the CA erred in convicting Pilpa despite the prosecution's failure to prove that
conspiracy exists;[17]
(3) Whether the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.[18]
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partially meritorious. The Court affirms the conviction of Pilpa but for the
crime of Homicide, instead of Murder, as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
present in the killing of Alde.
First and Second Issues: The existence of conspiracy and Pilpa's criminal liability
The first two issues, being interrelated, are discussed jointly.
In questioning his conviction, Pilpa harps on the fact that the evidence establishes that he
attempted only to stab Alde after "JR" had already stabbed him. He argues essentially that
(1) the attempt to stab Alde was not a crime in itself, and (2) in any event, the crime had
already been consummated by "JR" alone at the time he made the said attempt. Pilpa
further contends that this attempt was not evidence that he was part of the conspiracy, if
any, to kill Alde.
The arguments deserve scant consideration.
It is well-established that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[19] Conspiracy
is the unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime. There is conspiracy if
at the time of the commission of the offense, the acts of two or more accused show that
they were animated by the same criminal purpose and were united in their execution, or
where the acts of the malefactors indicate a concurrence of sentiments, a joint purpose and
a concerted action.[20]
It is true that the elements of conspiracy must be proved by the same kind of proof —
proof beyond reasonable doubt — necessary to establish the physical acts constituting the
crime itself.[21] However, this is not to say that direct proof of such conspiracy is always
required. The existence of conspiracy need not, at all times, be established by direct
evidence; nor is it necessary to prove prior agreement between the accused to commit the
crime charged.[22] Indeed, conspiracy is very rarely proved by direct evidence of an
explicit agreement to commit the crime. Thus, the rule is well-settled that conspiracy may
be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime, where such conduct reasonably shows community of criminal purpose or design.
[23]
In the present case, both the RTC and CA correctly inferred from the collective acts of the
assailants that conspiracy exists despite the absence of direct evidence to the effect. As the
prosecution correctly argued:
To prove conspiracy, it is not needed that a meeting between the perpetrators

be proven. Such conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct before and
immediately after the act of the people involved. The conduct of appellant
and "JR" in approaching the group of Alde, stabbing him and running
after him, indubitably shows that they had agreed to kill him. After the
incident, appellant was also found to be in "JR"s home. It is contrary to
human experience and logic to be present at the home of a friend who had
just stabbed another without being aware of such occurrence as appellant
alleges.
xxxx
It cannot be disputed that the acts of appellant and "JR" were done with a
common goal of achieving the death of Alde. Their act of stabbing him cannot
be interpreted to mean anything else other than they wanted to inflict him
serious harm. Such acts of stabbing done to achieve a common goal indicate
concerted action and concurrence of sentiments which is adequate in proving
that a conspiracy exists.
xxxx
The fact that appellant was unable to actually stab Alde, not by his own
volition but due to the parry of Alde's companion "Choy", does not
preclude the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy can rightly be inferred
and proven by the acts of stabbing committed by both appellant and "JR"
jointly and concertedly. The existence of conspiracy renders appellant as a

co-principal even if he failed to actually stab Alde.
Appellant's lame attempt to refute the existence of conspiracy relying on the

cases of People vs. Jorge and People vs. Iligan, et. al. is misplaced because in
those cases, the persons involved did not take part in the actual stabbing. In
this case, appellant himself took part in the stabbing. Furthermore,
appellant's assertion that such crime was already consummated by "JR"
and therefore appellant can no longer be liable for conspiracy is untenable
and without basis. The fact that "JR" was able to stab Alde first does not
mean that appellant who stabbed him next can be exculpated from
conspiracy. Otherwise, every conspiracy charge may be thwarted by the
mere fact that one of the conspirators beat the others to the act.[24]
(Underscoring and additional emphasis supplied; italics in the original)
To further establish his innocence, Pilpa relies on alibi and denial, and the imputation of
ill-motive on the prosecution witnesses. Pilpa reiterates that he was not at the scene of the
crime at the time of the incident, and the eyewitnesses' testimonies, particularly those of
Carolina and Evangeline, should not be accorded evidentiary weight as they were long-
time friends of Alde.
Again, Pilpa's arguments fail to convince.
The Court has oft pronounced that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness
that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has
a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail.[25] Further, the continuing case law is that for the defense of
alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place when the
crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime or its immediate vicinity through clear and convincing evidence.[26] These,
Pilpa was unable to prove.
Long-time friendship, without more, is not sufficient to constitute ill-motive so as to taint

an eyewitness' testimony. And even assuming, without conceding, that the Court could not
accord Carolina's and Evangeline's testimonies any evidentiary weight, the result would
nevertheless be the same. It bears to stress that Pilpa was positively identified, not just by
Carolina and Evangeline, but also by the barangay tanod Leonila and by the victim
himself when the latter was in the hospital.[27]
In this connection, the Court quotes with approval the following ratiocination of the CA:
Appellant failed to show that the prosecution witnesses were prompted by any
ill-motive to falsely testify or accuse him of a crime as grave as murder. In fact,
appellant admitted that it was only during the trial of the present case that he
saw the witness Leonila Abuel. Settled is the rule that where no evidence exists
to show any convincing reason or improper motive for a witness to falsely
testify against an accused, the testimony deserves faith and credit.
In the face of the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses,

appellant's denial and alibi vanish into thin air. Alibi and denial are inherently
weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently
and positively ascertained the identity of the accused as in this case. It is also
axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.[28]
Without doubt, therefore, Pilpa should be liable for the killing of Alde.
Third Issue: Existence of the Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery
In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that the qualifying
circumstance was present, thereby making Pilpa liable for Murder instead of Homicide.
The CA held:
On the account of the eyewitnesses Leonila Abuel, Evangeline Abuel and

Carolina Asis, appellant and his companions suddenly appeared in front of the
victim without any warning or provocation. JR stabbed the victim on his chest.
Thereafter, appellant aimed to stab the victim but somebody was able to parry
his thrust. The sudden and unexpected attack deprived the unsuspecting victim
of any real chance to defend himself, ensuring the attack without risk to his
assailants and without sufficient provocation on the victim's part. Likewise, the
means employed on the victim assured his assailants of no risk at all arising
from the defense that the victim might make. What is decisive is that the attack
was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable
to retaliate.
Thus, as correctly pointed out by the court a quo:
"The attack made by Aquil Pilpa and his group to the victim was so
swift and unexpected affording the hapless and unsuspecting victim
no opportunity to resist or defend himself. Even if the victim was
with his companions, the attackers were equipped with bladed
weapons and this ensures that the victim shall be without chance to
keep himself safe from the violent and treacherous acts of the
accused[.]"[29]
On the other hand, Pilpa claims that the existence of treachery must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence before the same could be appreciated. He insists that "[i]n the
absence of any convincing proof that the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the
means by which they committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the Honorable
Court must resolve the doubt in favor of the accused."[30]
On this issue, the Court rules in favor of Pilpa.
It was error for both the RTC and the CA to conclude that the killing was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of treachery simply because the attack was "sudden,"
"unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation."[31] It does not always follow
that because the attack is sudden and unexpected, it is tainted with treachery.[32]
As the Court held in People v. Santos,[33] "[t]reachery, just like any other element of the
crime committed, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence — evidence sufficient
to establish its existence beyond reasonable doubt. It is not to be presumed or taken for
granted from a mere statement that "the attack was sudden"[;] there must be a clear
showing from the narration of facts why the attack or assault is said to be "sudden."[34]
Stated differently, mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is
present, where the mode adopted by the assailants does not positively tend to prove that
they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose
without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer.[35]
Specifically, it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor
was deliberately chosen with a view to accomplishing the act without risk to the
aggressor.[36]
In the case at bar, the testimonies of Leonila, Evangeline, and Carolina reveal that the
assailants attacked the victim while the latter was having a seemingly random
conversation with four friends in a public highway (Quirino Highway),[37] and even in
the presence of a barangay tanod, who later joined the group. Under these circumstances,
the Court finds it difficult to agree that the assailants, including Pilpa, deliberately chose a
particular mode of attack that purportedly ensured the execution of the criminal purpose
without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer. To
repeat, the victim was with five persons who could have helped him, as they had, in fact,
helped him repel the attack. The Court thus fails to see how the mode of attack chosen by
the assailants supposedly guaranteed the execution of the criminal act without risk on their
end. As the Court similarly held in People v. Tumaob:[38]
x x x. The qualifying circumstance of treachery can not logically be

appreciated because the accused did not make any preparation to kill the
deceased in such a manner as to insure the commission of the crime or to
make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or
retaliate.[39] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In addition, the attack itself was frontal. In People v. Tugbo, Jr.,[40] the Court held that
treachery was not present because the attack was frontal, and hence, the victim had
opportunity to defend himself. While a frontal attack, by itself, does not negate the
existence of treachery, when the same is considered along with the other circumstances as
previously discussed, it already creates a reasonable doubt in the existence of the
qualifying circumstance. From the foregoing, the Court must perforce rule in favor of
Pilpa and not appreciate the said circumstance.
With the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime is therefore
Homicide and not Murder. The penalty for Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion temporal. In the absence of any modifying circumstance, the
penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the penalty next lower in degree is prision mayor with a range of six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years.
Thus, Pilpa shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.[41]
Finally, in view of the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta,[42] the damages awarded in the
questioned Decision are hereby modified to civil indemnity, moral damages, and
temperate damages of P50,000.00 each.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The Court DECLARES accused-appellant Aquil Pilpa y Dipaz GUILTY of
HOMICIDE, for which he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is further ordered to pay
the heirs of Dave Alde the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages, and Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as temperate damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the
legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, A. Reyes, Jr., and J. Reyes, Jr.,* JJ., concur.
* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 2587 dated August 28, 2018.
[1] See Notice of Appeal dated July 8, 2015, rollo, pp. 15-16.
[2] Rollo, pp. 2-14. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon with Associate
Justices Rodil V. Zalameda and Pedro B. Corales, concurring.
[3] CA rollo, pp. 48-59. Penned by Presiding Judge Carolina Icasiano-Sison.
[4] Rollo, p. 3.
[5] CA rollo, pp. 74-91.
[6] Id. at 79-80.
[7] Id. at 52.
[8] Rollo, p. 3.
[9] CA rollo, p. 59.
[10] Id. at 55.
[11] Id. at 55-56.
[12] Id. at 58.
[13] Rollo, p. 7.
[14] Id. at 11.
[15] Id. at 13.
[16] Id. at 6.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at 7.
[19] Silon v. Court of Appeals, 281 Phil. 536, 541 (1991).
[20] People v. Aquino, 390 Phil. 1176, 1184-1185 (2000).
[21] People v. Taborada, 284-A Phil. 736, 742 (1992).
[22] Id.
[23] Id. at 743.
[24] CA rollo, pp. 87-89.
[25] People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519, 527 (2013).
[26] People v. Desalisa, 451 Phil. 869, 876 (2003).
[27] Rollo, p. 4.
[28] Id. at 12.
[29] Id. at 11-12.
[30] CA rollo, pp. 43-44.
[31] Rollo, p. 11; id. at 50, 58.
[32] People v. Sabanal, 254 Phil. 433, 436 (1989).
[33] 175 Phil. 113 (1978).
[34] Id. at 122.
[35] People v. Delgado, 77 Phil. 11, 15-16 (1946).
[36] People v. Bacho, 253 Phil. 451, 458 (1989).
[37] CA rollo, pp. 49-50.
[38] 83 Phil. 738 (1949).
[39] Id. at 742.
[40] 273 Phil. 346, 352 (1991).
[41] People v. Duavis, 678 Phil. 166, 179 (2011).
[42] 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
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9/24/23, 11:30 AM G.R. No. 187534

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 187534 April 4, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DIMA MONTANIR, RONALD NORVA AND EDUARDO CHUA, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For consideration of this Court is the Decision1 dated April 22, 2008 of the Court Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CR-HC
No. 00499, affirming with modification the Decision2 dated October 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Valenzuela City, Branch 171, finding Appellants Dima Montanir, Ronald Norva and Eduardo Chua, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The records bear the following factual antecedents:
Josie Herrera, Robert Uy, Alicia "a.k.a. Alice" Buenaflor, together with appellants Ronald Norva and Eduardo Chua,
on December 17, 1997, concocted a plan to kidnap Rafael Mendoza, and after several days of conducting
surveillance on their intended victim, on January 5, 1998, they decided to kidnap Rafael in Ali Mall, Cubao, Quezon
City. However, the intended kidnapping failed, because Rafael did not show up at the said place. On February 5,
1998, a second attempt was made, but they encountered an accident before they could even execute their original
plan.
Around 5:30 a.m. of February 17, 1998, Alicia called up Rosalina Reyes, a partner of Rafael, to tell her that she
wanted to meet her and Rafael at Jollibee, BBB, Valenzuela City to settle the former's loan of ₱350,000.00. She
requested Rosalina to bring the land title which she was given as collateral for the said loan.
Rosalina and Rafael arrived at Jollibee ahead of Alicia. Eventually, around 9:15 a.m. of the same date, Alicia
showed up outside the store aboard a car. She was with appellant Ronald Norva. Alicia motioned Rosalina and
Rafael to approach the car, which the two did as requested. While inside the vehicle, Alicia introduced appellant
Ronald as her cousin. Later on, Alicia informed Rosalina and Rafael that she would pay them at her place.
When the car passed by the street where Alicia's house was located, Rosalina asked the former where they were
going. Alicia answered that they had to drop by the house of her financier who agreed to redeem her title and
substitute as her creditor. Trusting Alicia, Rosalina and Rafael did not protest. They finally reached a house in
Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City.
Thereafter, appellant Ronald alighted from the vehicle and talked to a man inside a store, later identified as Jonard
Mangelin. The gate of the house was then opened by appellant Dima. The car proceeded to the garage and
Rosalina and Rafael were asked to go inside the house. Rosalina followed Alicia, while Rafael trailed Rosalina as
they entered through a kitchen door. They passed by a man (Jessie Doe) who was washing his hands in the sink.
While Rosalina was walking behind Alicia, she suddenly heard a dull moan coupled with the sound of stomping feet.
She looked back at the direction where the sounds came from and saw Rafael being forcibly dragged inside a room.
She decided to look for Rafael and on her way, she saw "Jessie Doe" place his hand on Rafael's mouth and poke a
gun at him. Rafael struggled to get free. Rosalina pleaded with "Jessie Doe" to have pity on Rafael because of his
existing heart ailment. Appellant Ronald rushed towards her, poked a gun at her mouth, tied her to a bed and
warned her not to make any noise. He told her that all they want is her money, upon which, Rosalina said that if they
really wanted money, they should untie Rafael, who then appeared to be on the verge of having a heart attack.
Rosalina was untied and she immediately rushed to Rafael and began pumping his chest. She asked Jonard, who
had just entered the room, to help her pump Rafael's chest while she applied CPR on the latter. Jonard did as told.
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While CPR was being administered, appellant Dima started removing all of Rafael's personal belongings, which
include his ring, wallet, watch and other items inside his pocket, and passed them on to appellant Ronald.
Afterwards, appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to take Rosalina to another room. While inside the room where she
was brought, Rosalina begged Jonard to help her escape. Jonard was moved by Rosalina's plea and agreed to help
her. During their conversation, Jonard told Rosalina that two women had tipped them off as the kidnap victims.
When asked who they were, Jonard refused to reveal their identities.
Rosalina was transferred to the master's bedroom around 12:00 noon because certain female visitors arrived. After
the visitors left, Rosalina was returned to the room where she was previously taken. Rosalina asked Jonard about
Rafael's condition, to which he replied that Rafael would be brought to the hospital. A little later, at around 1 p.m.,
Jonard went to check on Rafael and confirmed that he was still alive.
Around 2:00 p.m., Rosalina heard the sound of someone being pummelled. Feeling nervous, she asked Jonard the
whereabouts of Rafael and was told that he was brought to the hospital. But unknown to Rosalina, Rafael had just
died and his body was placed inside the trunk of a car.
Around 6:30 p.m., Rosalina was informed that she will be brought to another safe house. She was taken to a car
and placed at the back seat, together with Jonard and three other men, later identified as Larry, Jack and Boy. The
driver of the car was appellant Ronald. Appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to cover Rosalina's head with a jacket
which Jonard did. As they were about to leave, the man seated beside Ronald started to talk. Rosalina recognized
the voice of Robert. She then lifted the jacket covering her head and was able to confirm that the one talking was
Robert. Rosalina cried, "Robert, Robert, why did you do this, we did not do anything to you" and Robert responded,
"Pasensiyahan na lang tayo."
By 10:00 p.m., they arrived at a certain house in Pandi, Bulacan where there was no electricity. Thus, they lit
candles for illumination. Rosalina found the house familiar and concluded that it was Alicia's. Rosalina was brought
to a room on the second floor and while inside the room, she was told by one of the men guarding her that one of
the leaders wanted to talk to her. Per the leader's instruction, the guard put out the candle light. The man then
seated himself beside Rosalina and warned her against escaping as they were a large and armed group. Rosalina
recognized the voice as that of Robert's. Before he left the room, Robert gave instructions to Jonard and the other
men inside. Meanwhile, the group started digging a pit at the back of the same house near the swimming pool.
Around 3:00 a.m. of the following day (February 18), the group buried Rafael's body in the pit. Thereafter, Robert
instructed appellant Ronald to tell Jonard that the latter should kill Rosalina, which Jonard refused to do.
Nonetheless, Robert instructed Jonard and the others to guard Rosalina well, as he himself would deal with her
upon his return.
Rosalina heard the car leave around 5:00 a.m. of the same day. Sensing that Jonard was sympathetic to her,
Rosalina begged him again to help her escape for the sake of her children.
When electricity was restored around 8 p.m., one of the men guarding Rosalina turned off the light inside the room.
The room was only illuminated by a light coming from the hallway. Rosalina saw a person wearing a wig and
sunglasses enter the room. Rosalina recognized him as Robert. Trying to mimic a woman by modulating his voice,
Robert told her that Rafael was in the hospital and that he could still sign a check. He asked Rosalina the
whereabouts of the other land titles and the identities of the other financiers whom she knew. Rosalina replied in the
negative. Robert angrily poked a gun at her and shouted, "That's impossible," and then left the room. He gave
instructions to his members and left.
At 9:00 p.m., Jonard went to Rosalina and told her about Robert's order to kill her, which caused the latter to panic
and cry. She then implored the help of Jonard for her escape. Afterwards, Jonard went to his companions Larry,
Jack and Boy and told them that he would help Rosalina escape. His companions immediately cocked their guns
and an argument ensued. Rosalina talked to them and begged them all to spare her life. One of Jonard's
companions told Rosalina that if they would allow her to escape, they too would get into trouble. Taking advantage
of the situation, Rosalina suggested that all of them should escape. They all agreed to escape in the early morning.
Around 5:00 a.m., Rosalina, Jonard, Larry, Jack and Boy left the safe house. They walked through a rice field for
about 30 minutes and then boarded a jeepney bound for Balagtas, Bulacan. From Balagtas, they took a bus going
to Cubao and arrived at 7:30 a.m. Rosalina pawned her pieces of jewelry for ₱1,500.00 and gave the ₱1,000.00 to
Larry, Jack and Boy. The three told Jonard to stay with Rosalina so that she would have a witness and, in case
Rosalina would further need their help, left their address with Jonard.
When the three left, Rosalina immediately called Rafael's brother Tito, and related what happened to her and his
brother. When Tito asked Jonard which hospital Rafael was brought to, Jonard revealed to Rosalina that Rafael died
at the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City. Rosalina called her lawyer, Atty. Teresita Agbi and asked her
to meet them at Farmer's, Cubao. When Atty. Agbi arrived, she accompanied them to the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) where an investigation was conducted.
9/24/23, 11:30 AM G.R. No. 187534
The following day, at 4:00 a.m., two groups from the DILG were formed to arrest Alicia, Josie, the appellants, and
Robert. Alicia and Josie were not at their homes, while appellants Ronald and Dima were arrested at the residence
of Robert. While at the DILG office, Rosalina positively identified appellants Ronald and Dima as her kidnappers.
Meanwhile, Jonard accompanied the police authorities to the safe house in Pandi, Bulacan and showed them where
the body of Rafael was buried. The remains of Rafael was later on exhumed.
Thereafter, two Informations were filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City (Branch 171), with the following allegations:
Criminal Case No. 123-V-98
That on or about the 17th day of February 1998 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then
private person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one ROSALINA REYES against her will
and detained her, thereby depriving her of her liberty for a period of two days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 124-V-98
That on or about the 17th day of February 1998 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then a
private person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap one RAFAEL MENDOZA against his will
and detained him, thereby depriving him of his liberty and on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel, Jonard and appellants Ronald, Dima and Eduardo, pleaded "not
guilty" to the crime charged. Robert Uy, Alice Buenaflor and Jessie Doe remained at-large during the trial of the
case. Jonard was later on discharged as a state witness. Afterwards, the trial on the merits ensued.
On October 28, 2004, the trial court rendered judgment against the appellants for the crime of kidnapping, the
dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, accused DIMA MONTANIR, RONALD NORVA, and EDUARDO CHUA are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and in accordance with Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, this Court hereby imposes the penalty of DEATH on accused NORVA and
MONTANIR. As regards accused CHUA, this Court hereby imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Further, accused Montanir, Norva and Chua are hereby held jointly and severally liable to pay the heirs of Mendoza
the amount of Php 71,000.00 in actual damages and Php 50,000.00 as moral damages.
As for accused JOSIE HERRERA, the Court hereby ACQUITS her on reasonable doubt of the charge of kidnapping.
Consequently, The Jail Warden of Valenzuela City Jail is hereby ordered to cause the immediate release of the said
accused from detention unless she is otherwise being detained for some other legal and lawful cause.
With regard to accused ALICE BUENAFLOR, ROBERT UY and one JESSIE DOE, let the cases against them be
ARCHIVED pending their apprehension. Meantime, let an alias warrant issue for their apprehension.
Considering the penalty imposed on accused MONTANIR, NORVA and CHUA, let the entire records of these cases
be elevated to the Court of Appeals for appropriate review of the judgment herein rendered.
SO ORDERED.
On automatic review, the CA affirmed the conviction with modification on the penalty imposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the impugned Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
penalty of death imposed on accused Montanir and Norva is hereby modified to reclusion perpetua to conform to
and in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346. Appellants Montanir, Norva and Chua are ordered to pay jointly and
severally the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victims.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present appeal.
In their respective Briefs, appellants raised the following assignment of errors:
9/24/23, 11:30 AM G.R. No. 187534
DIMA MONTANIR:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT DIMA MONTANIR GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.
EDUARDO CHUA:
I.
THE DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE EVIDENCE.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT CHUA A CONSPIRATOR TO THE
COMMISSION OF KIDNAPPING.
RONALD NORVA:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT AND
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT RONALD NORVA GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT WEAKNESS OF THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.
First of all, it must be emphasized that the crime committed by the appellants, as ruled by the trial court and affirmed
by the CA, is the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide. After the amendment of the Revised Penal
Code on December 31, 1993 by Republic Act No. 7659, Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, now provides:
Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if
threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer;
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.
As expounded in People v. Mercado:3
In People v. Ramos,4 the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for ransom and
murder committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found the
accused guilty of the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph of
Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
9/24/23, 11:30 AM G.R. No. 187534
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of 'special complex crime' of kidnapping with
murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the
killing of the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was
not deliberately resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person
kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or
was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art.
48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last
paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659.
This Court further discussed the nature of the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide in People v.
Larrañaga,5 thus:
A discussion on the nature of special complex crime is imperative. Where the law provides a single penalty for
two or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Some of the special
complex crimes under the Revised Penal Code are (1) robbery with homicide,6 (2) robbery with rape,7 (3)
kidnapping with serious physical injuries,8 (4) kidnapping with murder or homicide,9 and (5) rape with homicide.10 In
a special complex crime, the prosecution must necessarily prove each of the component offenses with the same
precision that would be necessary if they were made the subject of separate complaints. As earlier mentioned, R.A.
No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed
or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. In the cases at
bar, particularly Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the Information specifically alleges that the victim Marijoy was raped
"on the occasion and in connection" with her detention and was killed "subsequent thereto and on the occasion
thereof." Considering that the prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses, appellants should be
convicted of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape. It
appearing from the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that there is a "direct relation, and intimate
connection"11 between the kidnapping, killing and raping of Marijoy, rape cannot be considered merely as an
aggravating circumstance but as a component offense forming part of the herein special complex crime. It bears
reiterating that in People vs. Ramos,12 and People vs. Mercado,13 interpreting Article 267, we ruled that "where the
person killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an
afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Article 267." The
same principle applies here. The kidnapping and serious illegal detention can no longer be complexed under Article
48, nor be treated as separate crime but shall be punished as a special complex crime. At any rate, the technical
designation of the crime is of no consequence in the imposition of the penalty considering that kidnapping
and serious illegal detention if complexed with either homicide or rape, still, the maximum penalty of death
shall be imposed.
In this particular case, the Information specifically alleges that the appellants wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnapped Rafael Mendoza against his will and detained him, thereby depriving him of his liberty and on the
occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted. The trial court, in its decision, particularly in the dispositive
portion, merely stated that the appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping,
however, its mention of the phrase, in accordance with Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, this
Court hereby imposes the penalty of DEATH on accused Norva and Montanir, clearly refers to the crime committed
as that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping with Homicide. The appellants, therefore, were correctly
punished under the last paragraph of Article 267 as the evidence presented during the trial, in its entirety,
undoubtedly proves that the death of Rafael Mendoza, although of natural causes, occurred on the occasion of the
kidnapping.
Delving on the arguments presented by the appellants in this Court, their corresponding briefs pose a single
common argument – the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that they
committed the crime charged against them. In particular, they questioned the inconsistent testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution. According to them, the said inconsistent statements from the witnesses, tarnish their
credibility.
This Court finds otherwise.
The question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine.14 For this reason, its observations
and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal.15 This rule is variously stated thus: The trial court's
assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight. It is conclusive and binding unless shown to be
tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not
been considered.16 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment
of the credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by appellate courts.17
9/24/23, 11:30 AM G.R. No. 187534
Appellants claim that Jonard, a witness for the prosecution, stated in his Sinumpaang Salaysay that he was the one
who whispered to appellant Ronald to transfer Rosalina to another room so that the latter would have no idea that
Rafael was in a critical condition, but during trial, Jonard testified that it was Ronald who instructed him to transfer
Rosalina to a different room. Appellants also point out that in the same sworn statement, Jonard averred that he
resided in Taguig since October, 1987, which is contrary to what he testified in court that he resided in that same
place since 1997. In addition, appellants further argue that in her testimony, Rosalina declared that she was with
four men seated at the back of the car when she was brought to Pandi, Bulacan, however, Jonard, in his own
testimony, stated that there were four of them including Rosalina seated at the back of the car.
A close reading of the above inconsistencies asserted by the appellants show that the same refer only to minor
details and collateral matters and do not affect the veracity and weight of the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution. What really prevails is the consistency of the testimonies of the witnesses in relating the principal
occurrence and positive identification of the appellants. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed.18 They are thus safeguards against
memorized perjury.19
Anent the inconsistencies of the contents of the affidavits and that of the testimonies in court, this Court has already
ruled that testimonies in court are given more weight than affidavits, thus:
x x x x Affidavits are not entirely reliable evidence in court due to their incompleteness and the inaccuracies that may
have attended their formulation.20 In general, such affidavits are not prepared by the affiants themselves but by
another person (i.e., investigator) who may have used his own language in writing the statement or misunderstood
the affiant or omitted material facts in the hurry and impatience that usually attend the preparation of such affidavits.
As this Court has often said:
An affidavit, "being taken ex-parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from
partial suggestion, and sometimes from want of suggestion and inquiries, without the aid of which the
witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the
first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject."21
We have too much experience of the great infirmity of affidavit evidence. When the witness is illiterate and ignorant,
the language presented to the court is not his; it is; and must be, the language of the person who prepares the
affidavit; and it may be, and too often is, the expression of that person's erroneous inference as to the meaning of
the language used by the witness himself; and however carefully the affidavit may be read over to the witness, he
may not understand what is said in a language so different from that which he is accustomed to use. Having
expressed his meaning in his own language, and finding it translated by a person on whom he relies, into language
not his own, and which he does not perfectly understand, he is too apt to acquiesce; and testimony not intended by
him is brought before the court as his.' (2 Moore on Facts, sec. 952, p. 1105; People v. Timbang, 74 Phil. 295,
299).22
For this reason, affidavits have generally been considered inferior to testimony given in open court.23
Incidentally, the CA was correct in stating that Jonard was able to explain and reconcile the minor discrepancies in
his testimony by saying that he whispered to appellant Ronald that Rafael was in a bad condition and afterwards, it
was appellant Ronald who instructed him to transfer Rosalina to another room, thus:
Atty. Basco:
Referring to the same statement, Mr. Witness, on page 20 of the TSN dated February 24, 1999 referring to the same
statement, Mr. Witness, in your statement here when asked:
Q. Then what happened, Mr. Witness, when you answered in the manner? And your answer was:
A Ronald Norva told me, "Pare, the old man is in bad condition, you better transfer Mrs. Reyes to another room so
that she could not see the condition of the old man."
Q So which is which Mr. Witness? It was you who gave order or instruction to Mr. Ronald Norva or it was he who
gave instruction?
Atty. Gabi: Can we have the translation of that statement?
Atty. Basco: That is a very inconsistent statement of the witness?
A: This is like this, ma'am.
9/24/23, 11:30 AM G.R. No. 187534
Atty. Basco: Just answer my question. Which is which, Mr. Witness? Which is the truth, your salaysay or your
testimony on February 24 in open court?
A: The two are true, ma'am, because when I whispered to him that the old man was in a bad condition he
gave me instruction to transfer Mrs. Reyes to another room.24
The same is true with his inconsistent statements regarding his time of residence in Taguig, thus:
Q Mr. Witness, you said in your Sinumpaang Salaysay of February 19, 1998 that you were residing in Taguig at
Maharlika Village sometime in October 1987? Do you confirm that?
Atty. Mendoza:
May we ask for the translations, Your Honor.
A No, sir, the actual year is 1997, not 1987.
Q So you are correcting your answer in your salaysay of February 19, 1998 under paragraph No. 13 wherein you
answered: "Ako po ay nakikitira sa kaibigan kong si Ting sa Muslim Area, Maharlika Village, Taguig, Metro Manila
nuong buwan ng Oktubre, 1987." You are changing the 1987 to 1997?
A The truth is 1997, sir.25
Apellant Dima, in his Brief, insists that the prosecution was not able to establish his participation in the commission
of the crime because he was merely the house helper of the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela, when the
kidnappers and the victims arrived. In the same vein, appellant Ronald asserts that there was no convincing
evidence presented by the prosecution that will point to his clear participation in the crime because he was just the
driver of the car that brought the victims to the place where the latter were kept. Appellant Eduardo also insists that
he was not a participant in the offense charged in the Information. Basically, the appellants deny any participation in
the kidnapping.
In convicting the appellants, the trial court, based on the evidence presented, naturally found the existence of
conspiracy among the perpetrators. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.26 Verily, when conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the
conspirators is collective, not individual, that render all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their
respective participations, the act of one being deemed to be the act of the other or the others, in the commission of
the felony.27 Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in
the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not
intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a
particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the
purpose intended.28 Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely
engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of
law, chargeable with intending that result.29 Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator
unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit.30 As Judge Learned
Hand put it in United States v. Andolscheck,31 "when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite
outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes
as he understands them."
A scrutiny of the records show that the trial court did not err in finding conspiracy among the appellants, as they
each played a role in the commission of the crime. The trial court correctly found the denial of appellant Dima that
he had knowledge of the kidnapping, unbelievable. The appellant’s bare denial is a weak defense that becomes
even weaker in the face of the prosecution witnesses’ positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater
weight to the positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense.32 The trial
court ruled:
As for accused Montanir, again, this Court finds the testimonies of prosecution witnesses more credible than his
testimony applying the same principle that evidence to be believed must not only proceed from a mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself, such that the common experience and observation of mankind can show it as
probable under the circumstances.
Certainly, this Court is not convinced by accused Montanir's claim that he was at Ciudad Grande because he was a
house boy of accused Chua after he admitted the circumstances under which he has to live there a few days before
the victims were brought there.
9/24/23, 11:30 AM G.R. No. 187534
To begin with, this Court does not buy accused Montanir's explanation that he transferred to Chua because he was
looking for a permanent job is hardly credible because he himself admitted that when he was brought by accused
Uy to the residence of accused Chua at Ciudad Grande, it was the understanding that it would be accused Uy who
would be paying his salary. Why would accused Uy pay the salary of accused Montanir if he was to work as a house
boy of accused Chua? Evidently, the only plausible reason why accused Uy would pay the salary of accused
Montanir is because he was actually working for the former and only posted in the house of accused Chua at
Ciudad Grande to play his part in the execution of the planned kidnapping. This conclusion is bolstered by accused
Montanir's admission that he never even spoke with accused Chua during all those times that he stayed at accused
Chua's residence as in fact, he took orders from accused Uy.
Moreover, this Court finds it rather perplexing that accused Montanir would suddenly go back to the house of
accused Uy on 19 February 1998 on the shallow reason that he had no companion at Ciudad Grande when
precisely he said he was hired as a caretaker thereat while the regular boy was on vacation.33
The above conclusion was bolstered by the positive identification of the same appellant and his exact participation in
the execution of the crime, by the witnesses for the prosecution, thus:
WITNESS JONARD
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court what happened, Mr. Witness?
A When the four (4) entered after ten (10) minutes I heard like a commotion inside the house.
Q Then when you heard the commotion, Mr. Witness, what did you do?
A What I did was I went out of the store to peep thru the window near the lavatory.
Q And what did you see, Mr. Witness?
A I saw Jess and Dems poking a gun to (sic) Mr. Mendoza.
Q Then what happened, Mr. Witness, when they poked a gun?
A When they poked a gun and placed the hands of Mr. Mendoza at his back they forcibly entered the room.34
WITNESS ROSALINA
Q And then what happened, Ms. Witness?
A And suddenly Jonard Mangelin entered.
Q And what happened?
A I pleaded to him to help me in pumping.
Q What did he do?
A And he helped me.
Q After helping you pumping Mr. Mendoza (sic), what happened to Mr. Mendoza?
A While we were pumping Mr. Mendoza's chest, Dima Montanir was busy removing the things of Mr.
Mendoza.
Q When you said things to which are you referring to?
A His wallet, watch, ring and all the things in his pocket and gave it to Ronald Norva.35
xxxx
A When we returned to the DILG, the persons arrested were already there and when I saw them I recognized them
that they were the ones.
Q Could you tell us the people whom you said were there?
A Dima Montanir.
Q Can you point to him?
9/24/23, 11:30 AM G.R. No. 187534
(Witness pointing to a man inside the Courtroom, whom when asked his name, answered: Dima Montanir).
Q And who else, Ms. Witness?
A Ronald Norva.
Q Can you point to him also?
(Witness pointing to a man inside the Courtroom whom when asked his name, answered: Ronald Norva).
Q Then what happened, Ms. Witness, after you were able to recognize them?
A I told that they were the ones.36
In like manner, appellant Eduardo's denial that he participated in the offense charged does not outweigh the
testimonies of the witnesses positively identifying him as one of the culprits, thus:
WITNESS JONARD
Q Did you follow the instruction, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Why did you follow the instruction?
A Because they are my Boss.
Q When you said they are my Boss, to whom, Mr. Witness, are you referring to?
A Ronald Norva, Robert Uy, Eduardo Chua, Alice Buenaflor and Josie Herrera.
Q You mentioned the name of Josie Herrera, was she there at the vicinity?
A She was not there when the incident happened on February 17, 1998.
Q Why did you include the name of Josie Herrera as one of your bosses, Mr. Witness?
A Because, ma'am. On December 19, 1997 at the middle of that month, Josie Herrera tipped to the group that Mr.
Rafael Mendoza is a good victim because he has lots of money and engaged in a lending business.
Q Were you there when she tipped the person of Mr. Mendoza?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Where was this, Mr. Witness?
A At the house of Robert Uy.
Q Where was the house of Mr. Robert Uy, Mr. Witness?
A Candido Homes Subdivision, West Fairview, Quezon City.
Q That was on (sic) the middle of December, 1997?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Mr. Witness, if this Josie Herrera whom you have referred as one of your Bosses is around this courtroom, could
you please point to her?
(Witness pointing to a lady inside the Courtroom whom when asked her name, answered: Josie Herrera).
Q You also mentioned the name of Eduardo Chua as one of your bosses, why do you say so that he was
one of your bosses?
A Because they were the ones planning how they could get Mr. Mendoza.
Q And who were these people planning, Mr. Witness?
A The five (5) of them, ma'am.
9/24/23, 11:30 AM G.R. No. 187534
Q Who are these five (5), Mr. Witness?
A Robert Uy, Ronald, Alice, Josie Herrera and Eduardo Chua.
Q And where did this happen, Mr. Witness?
A When Josie Herrera tipped to the group on that December, the group made a surveillance to be familiarized with
the face of Mr. Mendoza and Mrs. Reyes.
Q And all the time, Mr. Witness, where was (sic) this happened when you said they were planning?
A At the house of Robert Uy.
Q Did the surveillance took (sic) place, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.37
xxxx
Q And where did you count the surveillance, Mr. Witness?
A Ali Mall, at Cubao, Quezon City.
Q And what was the result of your surveillance, Mr. Witness?
A They saw the victims Mr. Mendoza and Mrs. Reyes. Robert Uy pointed to the two (2) as our victims.
Q Aside from the planning and the surveillance, Mr. Witness, what else took place?
A On January 3, 1998 the first stage of the kidnapping will took (sic) place on January 5, 1998 because they want to
make it quick.
Q Was (sic) the kidnapping take place at that time, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q On January 5, 1998?
A No, ma'am, January 5, that was the first try to kidnap them when we went to Ali Mall but we were not able to see
them.
Q You said that there was a first try, was there another try, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q When was that, Mr. Witness?
A On February 5, 1998.
Q What happened? Was that agreed upon by the group, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Who were these people in the group, Mr. Witness?
A Alice Buenaflor, Robert Uy, Ronald Norva, Eduardo Chua and Josie Herrera.
Q And did the kidnapping take place on the second try, Mr. Witness?
A We were not able to take them, ma'am.
Q Then what happened, Mr. Witness?
A On February 5, 1998, on our second try to kidnap them, we were not able to get them because in Ali Mall the car
of Alice Buenaflor was bumped by a taxi.
Q Was there another try after the February 5 try, Mr. Witness?
A On that February 5, when we were not able to take them; they changed the plan.
9/24/23, 11:30 AM G.R. No. 187534
Q And who participated in the plan, Mr. Witness?
A Eduardo Chua, Robert Uy, Ronald, Alice Buenaflor and Josie Herrera.
Q Is she the same Josie Herrera whom you identified earlier, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Then what happened, Witness?
A After the second try, we were not able to take them, so the plan was changed.
Q What was the plan that was changed? What was the new plan?
A They were the ones who knew it. They were the ones planning and I was only being utilized by the syndicate.38
It must always be remembered that between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the
one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails.39
It is also not disputed that the safe house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela, where the victims were brought was owned
by appellant Eduardo. The trial court was also correct in dismissing the claim of appellant Eduardo that he merely
lent his car to Robert and allowed the latter to occupy his house because Robert had been so accommodating to
him and had facilitated his loan, thus:
Regarding the criminal liability of accused Chua, while it is conceded that the said accused was nowhere in the
actual scene of the incident, this Court nonetheless finds the said accused guilty of kidnapping as one of the
conspirators to the commission of the felony who participated by furnishing the vehicle used in abducting the victims
and the house where they were held captive and where Mendoza died.
Again, this Court applied the time-honored principle that evidence to be believed must come from the mouth of a
credible witness which accused Chua is not. Indeed, this Court finds no iota of truth on the protestation of accused
Chua that he knew nothing of accused Uy's plans. It is simply too good to be true that he allowed Mangelin and
accused Montanir to stay at his house to guard it and attend to his store while his caretakers were having a
vacation. Neither could this Court find cogent reason why accused Chua would allow accused Uy to use his vehicle
and house totally oblivious of any plan/design or purpose of accused Uy. Nor is it credible that accused Chua would
allow accused Uy to use his vehicle just to follow up his loan application and then after the same had been released
he (accused Chua) did not come home either to Santa Maria, Bulacan or to Ciudad Grande, instead, he went
straight to the residence of accused Uy, waited for him until the wee hours of the morning of the following day, 18
February 1998, only to tell accused Uy he was going home. 1avvphi1
It is also bewildering to this Court why immediately after receiving the money he borrowed, he would spend it in
going to Davao with his daughter on 18 February 1988, without any previous plan whatsoever and suspiciously,
upon invitation of accused Uy who had known by then that one of the victims, Mendoza, had died in the course of
the kidnapping.
Truly, all of the foregoing facts when taken together with the testimonies of Mangelin and Montanir unequivocally
indicate accused Chua's complicity with the criminal design of accused Uy and dissolves the said accused's plea of
innocence.40
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution
of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the
original design.41 Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of
conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended.42
Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy
which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result that they are in contemplation of law, charged with
intending the result.43 Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another conspirator even though such act
differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to commit.44
Considering the above disquisitions, there is no doubt that conspiracy existed in the perpetration of the crime. Thus,
all of the appellants, having been proven that they each took part in the accomplishment of the original design, are
all equally liable for the crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.
Lastly, this Court finds no error in the CA's modification of the penalty imposed by the trial court. The penalty
imposed by the trial court, which is Death is now reduced to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Republic Act No.
9346.45
9/24/23, 11:30 AM G.R. No. 187534
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 22, 2008 of the Court Appeals, affirming with modification the Decision
dated October 28, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City, Branch 171 is hereby AFFIRMED, with
further MODIFICATION that all the appellants herein are equally found GUILTY of the special complex crime of
Kidnapping with Homicide.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO*

Associate Justice
ATTE STATI O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Eduardo Antonio B. Nachura, per Special
Order No. 978, dated March 30, 2011.
1 Penned by Associate Justice Agustin S. Dizon, with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Celia
C. Librea-Leagogo, concurring; rollo pp. 2-23.
2 CA rollo, pp. 64-88.
3
400 Phil. 37, 82-83 (2000). (Emphasis supplied.)
4 G.R. No. 118570, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 618.
5 G.R. Nos. 138874-75, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 530, 580-581. (Emphasis supplied.)
6
Art. 294, par. 1.
7 Art. 294, par. 2.
8 Art. 267, par. 3.
9
Art. 267, last par.
9/24/23, 11:30 AM G.R. No. 187534
10 Art. 335.
11
People v. Adriano, G.R. Nos. L-25975-77, January 22, 1980.
12 Supra note 4.
13 Supra note 3.
14
People v. Mercado, supra note 13, at 71, citing People v. Dianos, 297 SCRA 191 (1998).
15 Id., citing People v. Manuel, 298 SCRA 184 (1998).
16 Id., citing People v. Lozano, 296 SCRA 403 (1998).
17
Id., citing People v. Abangin, 297 SCRA 655 (1998).
18 Id. at 73-74.
19 Id., citing People v. Cleopas, 384 Phil. 286 (2000).
20
Id. at 75, citing People v. Rivera, 295 SCRA 99, 109 (1998).
21 Id., citing People v. Resagaya, 153 Phil. 634, 643 (1973) and People v. Alcantara, 144 Phil. 623, 633
(1970). (Emphasis supplied.)
22 Id. at 74, citing People v. Geguira, 384 SCRA 540 (2000).
23
Id. at 75-76, citing People v. Agbayani, 348 Phil. 341, 367 (1998), citing People v. Marcelo, 223 SCRA 24,
36 (1993) and People v. Enciso, 223 SCRA 675, 686 (1993).
24 TSN, June 22, 1999, p. 37. (Emphasis supplied.)
25 TSN, June 30, 1999, pp. 3-4. (Emphasis supplied.)
26
People v. Castro, 434 Phil. 206, 221 (2002).
27 Id.
28
People v. Bisda, 454 Phil. 194, 218 (2003).
29 Id., citing Ingram v. United States, 259 F. 2d. 886 (1958).
30 Id., citing Pring v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 185 (1985).
31
Id., citing 142 F. 2d. 503 (1944).
32 People v. Kulais, et al., 354 Phil. 565 592 (1998), citing People v. Angeles, 218 SCRA 352, (1993); People
v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64, (1993); People v. Mendoza, 210 SCRA 517, (1992); People v. Bausing, 199 SCRA
355, (1991); People v. Bacatcat, 188 SCRA 175, (1990).
33 CA rollo, pp. 130-131.
34
TSN, February 24, 1999, pp. 12-13. (Emphasis supplied.)
35 TSN, July 7, 1998, pp. 21-22. (Emphasis supplied.)
36 TSN dated July 20, 1998, pp. 19-20. (Emphasis supplied.)
37
TSN, February 24, 1999, pp. 35-38. (Emphasis supplied.)
38 Id. at 38-41. (Emphasis supplied.)
9/24/23, 11:30 AM G.R. No. 187534
39 People v. Waggay, G.R. No. 98154, February 9, 1993, 218 SCRA 742, 749; People v. Andasa, G.R. No.
101022, February 27, 1992, 206 SCRA 636.
40
CA rollo, p. 195.
41 People v. Pagalasan, 452 Phil. 341, 364 (2003), citing 15A Corpus Juris Secundum, Conspiracy, p. 828.
42 Id.
43
Id. at 364-365, citing Ingram v. United States, supra note 29.
44 Id. at 365, citing Pring v. Court of Appeals, supra note 30.
45 AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES.
9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. L-38674

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38674 September 30, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALFREDO REGULAR and ARTURO DE LARA, defendants-appellants.
GUERRERO, J.:
Before this Court for automatic review is the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Seventh Judicial District in
Pasig, Rizal, which was promulgated in open court on April 22, 1974, sentencing the above-named accused Alfredo
Regular and Arturo de Lara to suffer the penalty of death for the killing of prisoner Felipe Ladoy and the penalty of
imprisonment from reclusion temporal minimum to reclusion temporal maximum for seriously wounding prisoner
Emilio Esparza.
Here is one of those unfortunate cases that have arisen due to, among other factors, the wretched and deplorable
condition of prison life and confinement which have destroyed the sense and sanity of many of the inmates, goading
them to violence, riots, and even killing fellow prisoners. And thus, this Court had taken a considerate understanding
of their plight, their misery and despair in order that they may not be "reduced to the level of animals and convert a
prison term into prolonged torture and slow death." (See People vs. De los Santos, 14 SCRA 702; also People vs.
Alicia, 95 SCRA 227; People vs. Garcia, 96 SCRA 497; People vs. Abella, 93 SCRA 25; People VS. Dahil 90 SCRA
553).
The information dated August 5, 1972 filed against Alfredo Regular, Arturo de Lara and Clemente Valeriano, charges
said accused with murder and frustrated murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of November, 1970 in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while then
confined at the said institution, conspiring, confederating and acting together, with treachery and
evident premeditation with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assaulted,
attacked and stabbed with improvised deadly weapons, Felipe Ladoy, No. 50600P and Emilio Esparza,
No. 50092P, both sentenced prisoners serving prison sentences in the same institution, thereby
inflicting upon Felipe Ladoy, multiple stab wounds in the different parts of his body, which wounds
necessarily produced the latter's death and simultaneously inflicting upon Emilio Esparza stab wounds
on the different parts of the body thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced
the crime of murder nevertheless did not produce by reason of causes independent of their will, that is
by the timely and able defense by Esparza which prevented the consummation of the offense of
murder.
Contrary to law.
One of the accused, prisoner Clemente Valeriano, bolted out of jail before he could be arraigned. 1 During the
arraignment of the two remaining accused, Alfredo Regular and Arturo de Lara, held on August 7, 1972 and with the
assistance of counsel de oficio, Atty. Jose O. Galvan, the following transpired:
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Galvan
Your Honor, I have conferred with the accused Arturo de Lara and Alfredo Regular and
after I have explained to them the contents of the information and having advised them of
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9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. L-38674
the consequence of their act they both manifested that they are entering a plea of guilty.
Court
Arraign the accused.
Atty. Galvan
The accused Valeriano is not here, your Honor.
(At this juncture, the Court Interpreter, after having read the information in tagalog
(Pilipino) to the accused, they pleaded guilty.) Court (Court addressing to accused de
Lara)
Q Are you aware that the Court has no other alternative except to impose capital
punishment upon you? The only thing that the Court has to do for you is to recommend
you from death to life?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q Since when did you sole-search (sic) about your pleading guilty?
A For a long time already, your Honor.
Q When was that?
A More than a year already, your Honor.
Q Are you a member of the Sigue-Sigue, Sputnik or any other gang?
A Sputnik, Sir.
Q You are from what province?
A Pampanga, Guagua Court (Addressing to accused Alfredo Regular)
Q Are you aware that by pleading guilty you will be punished in accordance with the law
and that is death?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q That the only thing that the Court can do for you is to recommend you from death to
life?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Since when did you have a sole-search (sic) of your pleading guilty?
A That was a long time ago, your Honor.
Immediately after the arraignment, the Court proceeded in open court to render sentence on the two accused, thus
—
WHEREFORE, in view of the spontaneous and voluntary confession of guilt of the accused Alfredo
Regular and Arturo de Lara, the Court finds them guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of
Murder as defined in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art. 50 thereto, as charged in
the information and hereby sentences them to the penalty of Death as far as the crime of murder is
concerned and to suffer the penalty of seventeen (1 7) years and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as
minimum to twenty (20) years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum for the crime of frustrated murder, to
indemnify the heirs of Felipe Ladoy the amount of P12,000.00; to pay the amount of P12,000.00 as
moral damages and another P12,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay their proportionate share
of costs.
However, in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession of guilt made
by the accused as provided for, under paragraph 7, Art. 13 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court
believes that the imposition of the death penalty be commuted to reclusion perpetua.
Pursuant to the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Flores, State
Prosecutor Francisco M. Guerrero is hereby ordered to present evidence to substantiate the charge of
9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. L-38674
Murder and Frustrated Murder in order to determine the degree of the culpability of the accused.
In compliance with the directive of the Court "to substantiate the charge of Murder and Frustrated Murder in order to
determine the degree of the culpability of the accused, " the prosecution presented four witnesses. Briefly, the
prosecution evidence may be related, thus:
At about 12:30 in the afternoon of November 16, 1970, prisoners Felipe Ladoy, member of Batang Cebu Gang and
Emilio Esparza, member of Batang Samar Gang, were gathering camote tops at the back of Building 4 of the New
Bilibid Prisons. While they were thus preoccupied, the two accused, Alfredo Regular and Arturo de Lara, together
with Clemente Valeriano and Reynaldo Castro, all members of the rival Sigue-sigue Sputnik Gang, suddenly
stabbed Ladoy and Esparza, as a result of which Ladoy died on the spot while Esparza, who was able to parry the
thrust of his assailant, was immediately brought to the New Bilibid Hospital for treatment of his injuries.
Upon investigation by the prison guards, it was learned that the assailants surreptitiously went out from Dormitory 4-
D after sawing the iron grills at the south end of Building 4. The day before, members of the Sigue-sigue Sputnik
Gang were the targets of darts thrown by the Visayan group composed of Batang Cebu and Batang Samar gangs.
The alleged treacherous attack by the rival group rankled in the minds of the Sigue-sigue members who planned
immediate and swift reprisal to avenge the injuries of their gangmates. Thus, armed with improvised bladed
weapons, the assailants pounced upon the unsuspecting victims Ladoy and Esparza) until the former died and the
latter was seriously wounded.
After the stabbing spree, the malefactors returned to their respective dormitories. Later, prisoners Regular, de Lara
and Castro gave up and admitted the killing. They executed extrajudicial confessions acknowledging participation in
the incident. In the meantime, Esparza was treated by Dr. Argente Alejandro who found the following wounds in the
different regions of the body:
1. Lacerated wound left shoulder, 3 inches long.
2. lacerated wound anterior aspect, left upper arm, 2 inches long.
3. Lacerated wound, lateral aspect, left upper arm, 2-½ inches long.
4. Two lacerated wounds at left chest, size 1 inch each.
5. Lacerated wound, medial aspect, upper arm, 1 inch long.
6. Lacerated wound, medial aspect, 1 inch long.
Ladoy's autopsy, conducted by Dr. Ibarrola proved that his death was caused by massive loss of blood resulting
from multiple stab wounds found in his body,
On the other hand, the evidence of the defense is as follows:
On the eve of November 15, 1970, while de Lara was in his brigade, he heard Rodulfo Patuga say to his
gangmates, Valeriano and Castro, "Babawi tayo. Abe Castro, Menting ito hindi na malalaman ng mga kasama natin
itong pangyayaring ito at hindi natin ipaaalam sa ating mga kasamahan," 2
About past 12 o'clock noon, Noli Patuga saw Ladoy and Esparza gathering camote tops at the back of Building 4.
The group approached the victims stealthily. Valeriano stabbed Ladoy first. Patuga and Castro followed suit.
Accused de Lara thrust his improvised weapon into the body of Ladoy only once, upon the command of Patuga, but
he did not know whether he hit the victim.
Accused Alfredo Regular testified that he did not know either Ladoy or Esparza. On November 16, 1970, he alleged
that he was inside his brigade the whole day. During that day, according to this accused, no unusual incident
happened inside the prison walls. He stayed in his brigade up to the 18th of that month. He was called that day to
the investigation section of the New Bilibid Prison. He was investigated by one Ignacio Ferrer. He was made to sign
a piece of paper, the contents of which he had not read. He denied any participation in the killing of Ladoy and the
wounding of Esparza. He claimed that he was maltreated by Ferrer so that he would sign a piece of paper. The
room in which he was brought was dark.He was boxed and was beaten with a rubber stick and a big book.
On being confronted with the fact that de Lara mentioned him as one of those who killed Ladoy and wounded
Esparza, Regular alleged that de Lara implicated him because he bore a grudge against him. Regular alleged that
when they were still free, the girlfriend of de Lara transferred her affection to him. This, according to Regular, made
de Lara angry vowing to revenge such outrage.
After several hearings of these cases, the trial court imposed the same principal penalty it imposed during the
arraignment. The Court found three aggravating circumstances present in the commission of the crime, namely,
9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. L-38674
treachery, evident premeditation, and recidivism, necessitating the imposition of the appropriate penalties in the
maximum period.
In his appeal, appellant Arturo de Lara assigned two errors committed by the trial court, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that appellant Arturo de Lara employed treachery and evident premeditation in
killing the victim Felipe Ladoy and wounding prisoner Emilio Esparza.
2. The lower court erred in finding defendant-appellant Arturo de Lara guilty of the crime of murder and frustrated
murder instead of completely exempting him from any criminal liability on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Appellant Regular contends that the lower court erred in imposing the death penalty based on the allegations of
treachery, evident premeditation and recidivism, which were not fully supported by evidence. The appellants further
maintain that they were only acting in defense of their gangmates, hence the penalties imposed in both cases are
not in accordance with law.
At the outset, it must be stated that the plea of guilty by the two accused were improvidently laid. During the
arraignment, the trial judge did not adhere strictly to the doctrine laid down in People vs. Apduhan 3 where We
postulated the guideline in cases where there is a plea of guilty by the accused. In the instant case under review,
We observe that the trial judge failed to explain fully to the two accused the meaning and the far-reaching effect of
their plea. It was not explained to them the meaning of the term "treachery," an aggravating circumstance which
qualified the crime to murder and frustrated murder respectively. Neither did the judge explain the terms "evident
premeditation" and "recidivism", both aggravating circumstances alleged in the information which had legal
significance and consequences not ordinarily understandable to a layman.
The trial judge asked the appellants whether they were aware that the court had no other alternative except to
impose the capital punishment on them without explaining why it had to be so. In People vs. Solacito. 4 We had the
occasion to say that, "(j)udges are duty-bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads
guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction."
The trial judge immediately rendered sentence in open court after the arraignment. As an afterthought or as a
justification for the imposition of the capital punishment, the trial judge conducted several hearings and called for
presentation of evidence by the prosecution.
The hearings subsequently held proved that the appellants' plea were not unconditional admissions of guilt and they
were not of such nature as to foreclose appellants' right to defend themselves. Their plea of guilt became
ambiguous and qualified in the light of what transpired during the presentation of evidence that followed.
In their extrajudicial confessions, both accused admitted their participation in the killing of Ladoy and the wounding
of Esparza. 5
We have gone over thoroughly the extrajudicial confessions of the two accused. In these extrajudicial confessions,
nothing is said on how the crimes were committed. The only thing that these extrajudicial confessions had brought
out of the two accused is the fact that they had participated in the stabbing spree. In open court, the accused de
Lara made explanatory statements on how he became involved in the case, while the accused Regular completely
repudiated his confession.
It is true, of course, that under the Rules and in the spirit of fair play, the whole of the confession must be put in
evidence. An extrajudicial confession may be accepted in its entirety or only a part thereof. 6 To accept fragments of
the confession which limits or modifies the criminality of the accused and suppresses others which aggravates such
behavior is utterly inconsistent with justice.
Nevertheless, the aforecited rule admits of certain exceptions, for it is not absolute. There are instances, occasions
and circumstances which can make it justifiably imperative to believe or accept only a part of the confession and
reject the rest. One such instance is when an accused, in his testimony, makes some explanatory statements
tending to mitigate his participation in the crimes committed and the prosecution fails to rebut such testimony.
During the hearings that followed, the prosecution failed to prove that the two accused committed the crime charged
in the information with the attending aggravating circumstances alleged therein.
De Lara's testimony, which was unrebutted, showed that he was only invited to join the group, an invitation which he
hesitantly accepted. Thus, he testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q The next day, November 16, 1970, where have you been throughout that day, rather,
where were you during that day?
9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. L-38674
A Inside the brigade.
Q From what time did you stay there?
A Up to 1:00 o'clock. 7
Q Were you there when the incident happened?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Tell us what happened on that day?
A In the morning, Noli Patuga called up Clemente Valeriano, Reynaldo Castro and then
they went to the "buyong".
Q Did they go to that "buyong" you are referring to?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Were you invited to join them?
A Yes, Sir. 8
There could be no treachery on the part of de Lara considering that he was only invited to join the group
immediately before the incident took place. He had no time to meditate, calculate and reflect in resolving to commit
the crime imputed to him. In order that treachery or alevosia may be considered as a qualifying circumstance that
would change the nature of the crime or as an aggravating circumstance that would augment the penalty, it must be
shown that the treacherous acts were present and had preceded the commencement of the attack which caused the
injury complained of. 9 There is treachery when the following requisites concur: (1) the culprit employed means,
methods or forms of execution which tends directly and specially to insure the offender's safety from any defensive
or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party which means that no opportunity was given the latter to do so." 10
(2) that such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen. 11
The mere fact that the attack was sudden and unexpected does not of itself suffice for a binding of alevosia if the
mode adopted by the accused does not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the
accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that might be
offered. 12
Neither can evident premeditation be appreciated against de Lara. While it is true that he heard of the plan to kill
some members of the rival gang the night before the incident took place, he was not part of the group who made the
plan. He was just an
eavesdropper. 13 He only knew that he was about to participate in the stabbing of Ladoy and Esparza just
immediately before it took place. Given such situation, it cannot be said that de Lara had sufficient lapse of time
between determination and execution to allow him to reflect the consequences of his act. On this, de Lara testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Tell us what happened on that day?
A In the morning, Noli Patuga called up Clemente Valeriano, Reynaldo Castro, and then,
they went to the "buyong".
Q Did they go to the "buyong" you are referring to?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What about you, did you go with them?
A I went near them and told them I heard what they were talking about last night.
Q Were you invited to join them?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Did you accept their invitation?
A I was still thinking of it and Patuga told me not to think about it anymore because I'm
already an "aburido".
9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. L-38674
Q So at last you joined the group?
A Yes, Sir. 14
It is clear from the foregoing statements that de Lara had no inkling that he would be joining the group before he
was invited to do so. There is reason to believe that he accepted the "invitation" with the knowledge that he had no
other recourse but to join them having eavesdropped the night before, knowing what his fellow prisoners and
gangmates might do in case he refused to join.
The illegal acts committed by others in the group could not be considered against de Lara because conspiracy had
not been clearly established. If there was any conspiracy at all, it was limited to Patuga, Valeriano and de Castro.
The plan to kill any member of the rival gang was hatched by these three men.
With regards to this, de Lara testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Q But the fact remains that you planned together with the others to avenge the alleged
wrong doing that was made to your game.
A I was not included in the plan, your Honor. 15 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What time was the plan made by this Clemente and his companion?
A It was in the evening.
Q Were you there?
A No, Sir, Noli Patuga called the two. (Emphasis supplied)
Q How did you know that there was a plan to kin somebody?
A Because our kubol is near them.
Q Did you tell somebody about the plan?
A No, Sir.
Q How did you come to know about the plan of this Valeriano to kill somebody?
A I heard what they were talking about.
Q From whom did you hear?
A From Noli Patuga.
Q Will you tell us the exact words you hear as far as Noli Patuga is concerned?
A I hear him, "Abe Castro, Clemente Valeriano and Menting ito ay hindi na malalaman ng
mga kasama natin itong nangyayaring ito at hindi natin ipaalam sa ating mga kasamahan.
Q What did you do upon hearing these words?
A I just kept quiet.
Q What time did you hear those words?
A Past twelve in the evening.
Q That was November 15, 1970?
A Yes, Sir. 16
The evidence to prove the elements of conspiracy must be positive and convincing. Pursuant to this rule, it has been
held in U.S. vs. Magcomot 17 and People vs. Caballero 18 that neither joint nor simultaneous action per se is a
sufficient indicium of conspiracy; a common design must further be shown to have motivated such action.
9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. L-38674
From the testimonial evidence adduced above, it is clear that de Lara was not included in the plan to retaliate
against the injuries suffered by their gangmates in the hands of their rival gang who caught them unaware that
Sunday before Ladoy was slain.
While it cannot be said that de Lara was acting under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury,
it is reasonable to conclude that what happened was not entirely his own will and volition for he was more or less
forced by his gangmates to participate in the stabbing spree.
We come now to the other accused, Alfredo regular. It appears that during the taking of testimonial evidence, this
accused evaded answering questions relating to his participation in the killing of Ladoy and the wounding of
Esparza. He claimed that on November 18, 1970, a certain Ignacio Ferrer of the Investigation Section of the New
Bilibid Prison brought him into a room wherein he was investigated and was made to answer some questions. He
further alleged that he was boxed and beaten. The room which he was brought was dark, according to him, despite
the fact that he was there from ten in the morning up to three in the afternoon. Then he was made to sign a piece of
paper without reading it so he does not know its contents. The paper he was referring to turned out to be his
confession. As to where he was on that fateful day, Regular testified, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you tell us where were you on that fateful day?
A Inside the brigade.
Q Did you remain through the day on November 16, 1970?
A I was inside, Sir.
Q While you were inside the brigade, did you observe any incident that happened?
A None, Sir. 19
In People vs. Catalino, 20 We held that, "(i)t would be unsound practice for the court to disregard the confession of
an accused simply because the accused repudiates it during the trial." It cannot be believed that the confession was
coerced from Regular considering that the confession is replete with details which can only be given by the person
who had experienced the same or had taken part in the execution of the acts narrated. 21
From the extrajudicial confession of both accused, it appears that Regular was not one of the men who planned the
killing incident. As mentioned earlier, the prisoners Valeriano, Patuga and de Castro engineered the stabbing spree
and since Regular was not a co-conspirator, the acts done by the three named prisoners cannot and would not
prejudice the appellant.
The same aggravating circumstances, namely, treachery, evident premeditation and recidivism were imputed
against Regular. Treachery cannot be presumed. Like all other circumstances which aggravate or qualify the
commission of the crime, the existence of treachery must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is incumbent upon
the prosecution to present evidence to prove such allegation.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed miserably to prove that the killing of Ladoy and the wounding of Esparza
was attended with treachery. There were no witnesses who saw how the stabbings were done. Nothing was
mentioned in the extrajudicial confessions of the accused as to the means, methods, or manner of execution of the
crimes. This being the case, it cannot be established by mere suppositions, drawn from circumstances prior to the
aggression, that the accused had employed means tending to insure the success of their dastardly act without any
danger to his person. The circumstances specifying an offense or aggravating the penalty thereof must be proved
as conclusively as the act itself, mere presumptions being insufficient to establish their presence according to law.
No matter how truthful these suppositions or presumptions may seem, they must not and they cannot produce the
effect of aggravating the crimes of the defendant. 22
The aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation cannot also be appreciated against the accused Regular. It
is a proven fact that Regular was not with the group of Valeriano, Patuga and de Castro when the latter planned the
retaliation for the dart-attack made upon their gangmates.
The circumstances of deliberate premeditation exist only if it could be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there
intervened a period of time long enough in a judicial sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection thus
enabling the conscience of the accused to overcome the resolution of his will if he would only pay heed to its
warning. 23
There is no proof that Regular had known of the plan to kill and/or stab any member of the rival gang. The records of
the case are scanty with regards to circumstances prior to the event. While it is true that de Lara, in his confession,
9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. L-38674
alleged that Regular was one of the men who sawed the iron grills in the window of their brigade, this part of his
confession was repudiated by him in open court. He testified that he implicated Regular because he had a grudge
against him for taking away his girlfriend while they were still free." Regular's own confession do not narrate the
events prior to the killing. While this Court is convinced that Regular participated in the stabbing spree, It is not
convinced that he did it with treachery and evident premeditation simply because the prosecution had failed to
establish beyond reasonable doubt that indeed the commission of these crimes were attended by the alleged
aggravating circumstances. In the absence of treachery and premeditation, the crimes committed by the two
accused are homicide and frustrated homicide.
Both accused are quasi-recidivists. De Lara was serving sentence for robbery 24 while Regular was serving
sentence for robbery and theft. 25 In accordance with Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, they shall be punished
by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the new felonies which are homicide and frustrated homicide.
Although they entered a voluntary plea of guilty, they are not entitled to the benefits of this ordinary mitigating
circumstance because the imposition of the maximum penalty under Article 160, Revised Penal Code is mandatory.
(People vs. Bautista, et al., 65 SCRA 460). The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal (Art. 249, R.P.C.) and that
for frustrated homicide is one degree lower, (Art. 50, R.P.C.) although the courts, in view of the facts of the case,
may impose upon the accused a penalty lower by one degree than that which should be imposed under the
provisions of Art. 50. (Art. 250, R.P.C.).
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court is hereby MODIFIED. Both
accused, Alfredo Regular and Arturo de Lara, are hereby found guilty of homicide and frustrated homicide and each
is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty consisting of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum for the killing of Ladoy. Each is also sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional as
minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum for the stabbing of Esparza. All awards for damages are
affirmed without modification Both accused must bear the proportionate share of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
Aquino, J., concur in the result.
Melencio-Herrera, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 T.S.N., January 19, 1972, p. 16.
2 T.S.N.,March 21, 1974,p.48.
3 24 SCRA 798.
4 L-29209, August 25,1969, 29 SCRA 61.
5 Exhibits "E" and "F".
6 People vs. Solano, 6 SCRA 60.
7 T.S.N., March 10, 1974, p. 10.
8 T.S.N., March 29, 1974, p. 11.
9 U.S. vs, Balagtas, 19 Phil. 114; People vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 385; People vs. Peje 99 Phil. 1052;
People vs. Leal, 40 SCRA 550.
10 People vs. Casalma, 18 SCRA 812; People vs- Ramos, 10 SCRA 1109: People vs. Samonte, 68
SCRA 70.
11 People vs. Dadis, 18 SCRA 669; People vs. Clemente, 21 SCRA 261.
12 People vs. Flores, 43 SCRA 342. 13 T.S.N.,March 29, 1974, pp.47-48.
14 T.S.N.,March 29, 1974, p.ll, supra.
9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. L-38674
15 T.S.N.,March 29, 1974, p.47.
16 T.S.N., March 29, 1974, p. 47.
17 13 Phil. 386.
18 53 Phil. 585.
19 T.S.N., March 29, 1974, pp. 60-61.
20 22 SCRA 109.
21 People vs. Tuazon, 6 SCRA 350; People vs. Pagulayan, 8 SCRA 619; People vs. Castro, 11 SCRA
699; People vs. Beraldes 91 SCRA 125; People vs. Tancinco, 93 SCRA 575.
22 U. S. vs. Perdon 4 Phil. 141.
23 People vs. Torrejas, 43 SCRA 158; People vs. Canial 46 SCRA 634; People vs. Tingson, 47 SCRA
243; People vs. Palacpac, 49 SCRA 442; People vs. Renegade, 57 SCRA 275; People vs. Manangan,
59 SCRA 31; People vs. Tumang 60 SCRA 303. "4 t.s.n., March 29, 1974, p. 47.
25 T.S.N.,March 29, 1974,p.42.

9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. 78853

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 78853 November 8, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROEL PUNZALAN, JOSE BESIDA @ "JOSE VESIDOR", MARIETA MENDOZA and DOMINGO MENDOZA,
accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellants.
FELICIANO, J.:
The accused, Marieta Mendoza, appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 30, San Pablo City, convicting her of the crime of robbery with homicide and imposing on her the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
The appellant, together with Roel Punzalan, Jose Besida, and Domingo Mendoza, were charged in Criminal Case
No. 4578-SP in an information which read as follows:
That on or about July 11, 1986 at Poblacion, Alaminos, Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused MARIETA MENDOZA, in conspiracy with her husband DOMINGO MENDOZA and ROEL
PUNZALAN and JOSE BESIDA alias "Jose Vecido" who are also still at large and whose case is still pending
in the Municipal Trial Court, except Domingo V. Mendoza, were all employed as domestic helpers in the
house of Judge Conrado Fule an Mrs. Lourdes Fule located in aforesaid municipality, while conveniently
provided with bladed weapons, taking advantage of night time with treachery and evident premeditation, with
abused of superior strength, in disregard of the respect due the offended party and dwelling, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, forcibly entered the bedroom of Mrs. Lourdes Fule where the
latter was sleeping and once inside therein, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously jointly attack assault and stab Mrs. Lourdes Fule with the weapons they were provided, inflicting
upon the latters mortal stab wounds on different parts of her body which caused her instantaneous death and
on the same occasion and by reason thereof, with intent to gain, ransacked the bedroom of the victim, Mrs.
Lourdes Fule and did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, take steal and carry away cash
money in the sum of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS and assorted pieces of jewelry worth ONE
MILLION SIX HUNDRED THIRTY SIX THOUSAND (P1,636,000.00) PESOS, belonging to the victim Lourdes
Fule, to the damage and prejudice of the victim and the surviving heirs, in the amount of ONE MILLION SIX
HUNDRED FORTY SIX THOUSAND (P1,646,000.00) PESOS, representing the total amount unlawfully taken
and carried away and damages by reason of the death of aforenamed victim.
Contrary to law. 1
Appellant's co-accused have remained at large up to the present time. Consequently, the prosecution of the case proceeded only against appellant; the case was archived by the
trial court with respect to her co-accused. 2
Appellant proceeded to trial after entering a plea of not guilty on 7 May 1986. 3
On 17 September 1986, after the prosecution had presented four
(4) of its six (6) witnesses, Judge Benedicto Paz inhibited himself on the ground that his landlady was the sister-in-
law of the victim. 4 The case was then re-raffled to the sala of Judge Salvador P. de Guzman Jr. From there the case
was re-raffled again to another sala because Judge de Guzman could not maintain a weekly schedule of trial
hearings for the case. 5 The case was eventually assigned to the sala of Judge J. Ausberto Jaramillo, Jr., who tried
the case to completion and wrote the judgment of conviction dated 22 May 1987. 6
The dispositive portion of the decision states:

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/nov1991/gr_78853_1991.html 1/8
9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. 78853
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds accused Marieta Mendoza guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide punishable from reclusion perpetua to death
aggravated by the circumstances of dwelling, in disregard of the respect due to the offended party, abuse of
superior strength, evident premeditation, nighttime and abuse of confidence without any mitigating
circumstance, and hereby sentences her to the applicable penalty of death. Fortunately, for accused Marieta
Mendoza, however, the death penalty has to be reduced to life imprisonment in accordance with Article III,
Section 19(1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Accused Marieta Mendoza shall indemnify the heirs of Mrs. Lourdes Fule the sum of P30,000 as civil liability
for her death and shall also indemnify them the peso equivalent of the US$5,000, P70,000 and
P1,500,000.00 representing the stolen items, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
pay the costs of the proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED. 7
The facts of the case as found by the trial court are as follows:
The accused Marieta is married to accused Domingo Mendoza. Since two years prior to the incident in
question, the former, was employed on an off-and-on basis with the family of the Fules until the time when the
daughter of the family cook Nieves Garcia Santos left when accused Marieta became a permanent
househelp. Accused Marieta's primary duty was to attend to the needs of Mrs. Lourdes Fule who was then 66
years old, sick with hypertension. To be able to promptly administer to the needs of her mistress, the accused
Marieta was made to sleep immediately outside the door of her mistress so that medicines could be given to
her as the need arises. The accused Roel Punzalan was one of the houseboys of the Fules since about 4 to 5
months prior to the incident while accused Jose Besida alias "Jose Vecidor" was hired two months prior, at
the instance and effort of accused Domingo Mendoza. A week prior to the incident all the accused plotted to
rob Mrs. Fule who had a collection of jewelries and certain amount of cash.
On 9 July 1985 accused Domingo Mendoza arrived at 9:00 a.m. and stayed at the servants' quarters of the
Fule compound located at corner Del Pilar and Rizal Avenue, Alaminos, Laguna. He was seen in close huddle
with the other said accused. He spent the night until the next day of July 10, 1985 (sic). After the master of the
house, Judge Conrado Fule left for Manila at about 4:00 p.m. all the accused were seen to be in secret and
close conversation. Accused Domingo Mendoza was heard to have uttered "Ituloy na natin wala si Judge
Fule". Accused Domingo Mendoza left at 6:30 p.m. that day. At about 7:30 p.m. Gregorio Fule had supper at
his mother's house while being served by Nieves Garcia Santos and accused Marieta. After eating, mother
and son were talking about their health while the son was fixing the betamax unit. After fixing the betamax,
the son, Gregorio Fule left his mother watching a betamax tape together with the accused Marieta, Roel
Punzalan, Jose Besida, a child of Marieta and Nieves Garcia Santos. At about 11:30 p.m. of July 10, 1985,
accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida went out of the house for their servants' quarters while the victim,
Lourdes Fule and accused Marieta locked up all the doors to the house. At 12:30 a.m. of July 11, 1985
accused Marieta was seen at the door of the servant's quarters calling (sutsot) for Roel Punzalan and Jose
Besida after which the three of the accused went up to the house. Accused Marieta Mendoza knocked on the
door of the victim and woke her up on some pretext. When the door was opened by the victim, accused Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida went rushing in and inflicted the injuries and stab wounds on the victim. They put
cloth on her mouth to prevent her from making an outcry. When the victim was still lying on her bed bleeding
to death, the accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida ransacked her drawers and scooped up the jewelries
and cash money. At this juncture, accused Domingo Mendoza was waiting in a parked jeep outside the Fule
compound. While all these were going on accused Marieta did not do anything to help the victim. She did not
also prevent the killing of the victim. When the crime was consummated, the accused Roel Punzalan and
Jose Besida told accused Marieta that they would meet at Del Remedio, changed their bloodied clothes at the
staircase and under the oliva (sic) tree on the ground of the Fule compound.
At 6:00 a.m. of July 11, 1985, accused Marieta woke up June Murillo, another houseboy and Nieves Garcia Santos without telling any of them about anything unusual that
transpired previously or what had happened to the victim. Murillo started cleaning the Fule compound until he noticed that the front iron gate of the Fule compound was
open. He reported this to accused Marieta and Nieves Garcia Santos and the three of them went up to the adjoining house of Gregorio Fule to report the matter. Accused
Marieta informed Gregorio Fule that "Napasukan tayo ng magnanakaw". Murillo was instructed to fetch the police. Gregorio Fule saw the bloodstained clothing near the
oliva (sic) tree and other personal items on the stairs leading to her mothers room. When he went up, he saw the sleeping mat, pillow and blanket of the accused Marieta
immediately outside the door of her mother's room and when he was already inside he saw [his] mother already covered with blood, blood was all over the room, in
pillows, boxes, etc. The drawer where the valuables were kept was open emptied of the $5,000.00, P70,000.00 cash and P1.5 million worth of assorted jewelries. He went
out of his mother's room and confronted accused Marieta on what happened. Accused Marieta responded that she knew nothing allegedly because "Tulog na tulog po
ako". The police arrived and an investigation was conducted. Accused Marieta was initially treated as a possible witness until later on when she was suspected of having
an involvement in the crime. 8
Appellant Marieta Mendoza narrated in court a different story. Her story, as set out in her Brief, was the following:
She "had been working as a housemaid of Mrs. Lourdes Fule for five (5) years at the time the incident
happened although not on a continuous basis. There was (sic) times when she was borrowed by Mrs. Fule's
daughter, Marilou. On the first week of July, 1985, she was with Marilou but on the second week thereof, she
9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. 78853
was with Mrs. Fule. On the night of July 10, 1985, after all the members of the household had taken their
supper and after fixing the kitchen, Marieta joined Mrs. Fule in watching a television program together with
two children, one of whom was her son. Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida also came and joined them. After a
while, she noticed Jose Besida went to the kitchen and inside her room. She did not notice Roel Punzalan left
(sic) the place where they were watching television. The doors were then all open including the door at the
room of Mrs. Fule and the door at her room. They have finished watching television at around 11:00 o'clock in
the evening of July 10, 1985 after which Mrs. Fule and she locked all the doors. She was the one who put up
the mosquito net on the bed of Mrs. Fule and she did not notice anybody inside the room. She slept with her
son outside the room of Mrs. Fule, around three meters from the door of Mrs. Fule's room outside of the white
mark, shown in Exhibit "F-1". When lying down, the cabinet in her room was at her right side and so with the
way leading to the comfort room. At her left side was the aparador and the room where rice and iron (sic)
clothes are kept. The door of the room of Mrs. Fule has a lock both inside and outside. Until the time she went
to sleep, she did not notice Besida went out of the room. Mrs. Fule's schedule of taking her medicine was
after each meal, thus she does not have to wake up Mrs. Fule for the medicines.
At around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of July 11, 1985, Marieta was awakened by sounds of moaning from
Mrs. Fule but when she stood up, she was blocked by Roel Punzalan and was told to just lie down or else she
will be killed at the same time poking something at her back which she presumed to be a bladed instrument
because it pierced through her skin. Because of the threat, Marieta just lay down facing the cabinet. After
around three minutes, Punzalan went out of the room but she did not notice whether he was carrying
something or whether his shirt had bloodstain. After three minutes, another person passed by and because of
fear for her life, she just lay down facing sidewise towards the cabinet with her back against the passage from
the door of the room of Mrs. Fule to the other door. It was about 2:15 to 2:30 o'clock in the morning that these
two persons went out of the room of Mrs. Fule and her room. The door of the room of Mrs. Fule was slightly
open and she saw scattered things but she did not see Mrs. Fule. From the time she was ordered to lie dawn
by Punzalan, she did not sleep, she just lay down. Much as she wanted to inform the other occupants of the
house, she was not able to do so because of fear that Punzalan might still be in the house, so she waited until
around 6:00 o'clock in the morning. She crawled going to Nieves Santos and inquired about Roel Punzalan
whom she saw at the room of Mrs. Fule. She told Nieves that she heard Mrs. Fule moaning and that she saw
Roel Punzalan in the room of Mrs. Fule at around 2:00 o'clock that morning. Upon knowing that Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida were not there, she and Nieves together with Jun Murillo went to Gregorio Fule
who is just living in the house adjacent to the house of Judge Fule. When they told Gregorio that Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida were no longer there, they were told by Gregorio to call a (sic) police and Gregorio
went directly to the room of his mother. Until such time, she had no knowledge of what actually happened to
Mrs. Fule because the first thing she did in the morning was to inquire from Nieves Santos the whereabouts
of Punzalan because of what she had witnessed a few hours ago and later she was told by Gregorio to report
the incident to the police.
Marieta further testified that her husband, Domingo visited her days before the incident. They talked about the
children and his drinking and nothing else. When Judge Fule left for Manila on July 10, 1985, Domingo was
no longer there having left that day at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. She did not notice her husband
talked (sic) with Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida. She knew nothing of the plans of Punzalan and Besida.
Neither did she knew (sic) of the presence of these jewelries and money inside the room of Mrs. Fule.
Marieta was investigated several times. The first statement was in her own handwriting which was dictated to her by Ma Ading (Nieves Santos' nickname) and Francisco
Fule (Gregorio's brother) with a threat to kill every member of her family if shell make a mistake. Another statement was in typewritten form prepared by the police when
she was interrogated at the police station on July 11, 1985 (Exh."H"). She did not fully understand every question asked of her by the police officer. She signed said
statement because she was told that there was nothing wrong in signing said statement. On July 15, 1985, another statement was prepared at the police station of
Alaminos, Laguna with her signature appearing thereon (Exh. "C"). 9
Appellant, in her Brief, made the following assignment of errors:
The trial court gravely erred in giving much weight and credence to the evidence for the prosecution and in
disregarding totally the evidence for the defense.
II
The trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant as a conspirator granting without admitting that
conspiracy existed in the commission of the offense.
III
The trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as
charged in the information.
IV
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The trial court gravely erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, abuse of superior strength, disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his rank, age or sex, dwelling and evident premeditation. 10
Appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to establish that she was a conspirator in respect of the robbery or
the slaying.
To this end, she seeks to impugn the credibility of some prosecution witnesses who gave testimony indicating her
adherence to the plan of robbing the victim. She points out that since the Judge who had observed the demeanor of
witnesses Nieves Santos and Pepito Hernandez in court was not the same Judge who wrote the decision under
review, the Supreme Court is not bound by the latter judge's findings on the credibility of these witnesses.
The general rule is that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and will not lightly be disturbed by an appellate court. The underlying
reason for this rule is that the trial judge had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying, an advantage not enjoyed by an appellate court. Appellant's
contention has merit in the sense that the Court cannot rely solely on the aforestated rule with respect to the two witnesses mentioned, (Nieves Santos and Pepito Hernandez) and
must make its own evaluation of the testimony of these witnesses. 11
But the Court must also emphasize that the circumstance pointed out by appellant, taken alone, does not render erroneous the trial court's reliance upon the testimony given by
Santos and Hernandez. 12
The continuity of a court and the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected by interruptions in the
service of the judge(s) presiding over it. 13 In this case, the Judge who wrote the decision had presided over the
latter half of the trial. 14
Appellant contends that the trial court should not have found Nieves Santos and Pepito Hernandez as credible
witnesses, considering that both were employees of the victim's husband and considering further that their sworn
statements tending to incriminate the appellant were submitted to the Fiscal's Office only three (3) months after the
commission of the crime. Appellant suggests that Judge Fule exercised considerable influence over these two
witnesses.
It may well be true that Judge Fule had asked and persuaded Santos and Hernandez to testify for the prosecution.
However, this Court is not prepared to believe, for that reason alone, that Judge Fule led those two witnesses to
testify falsely against appellant. There simply is no basis for such an insinuation.
The fact that witnesses Nieves Santos and Pepito Hernandez were brought to the Fiscal's Office by counsel of the
heirs of the victim three (3) months after the killing of the victim, does not by itself impair their credibility. An obvious
explanation for this delay, if delay it was, is that it took sometime before those two (2) individuals overcame their
natural reluctance to become involved in the investigation of a brutal crime and to testify in court when co-accused
Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida were, and are, still at large.
Appellant then contends that the testimony of Santos and Hernandez was incredible in itself. Appellant's claim is
that it was improbable that Pepito Hernandez saw Domingo Mendoza (husband of appellant Marieta) in front of
Fule's house at 4:30 A.M. on 11 July 1985 because this would place him (Domingo Mendoza) approximately 2 1/2
hours behind the time when Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida left the room of the victim. It does not seem to the
Court necessary to deal with this contention. That particular statement of Hernandez is not directly relevant to the
establishment of Marieta's culpability. Whether or not Domingo Mendoza had furnished the getaway vehicle for Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida, does not impact upon other evidence on record tending to show that Marieta had indeed
conspired to rob the victim.
Marieta impugns the testimony of Nieves Santos as improbable. Marieta claims, first, that it is unlikely that Nieves
had chanced upon and heard a discussion among the several accused relating to a plan to perpetrate the robbery
during the absence of Judge Fule, considering that the accused would, (if they were true conspirators) have taken
great pains to conceal their criminal plan from a third party who might denounce them. Secondly, Marieta questions
why Nieves Santos was able to hear and recall only incriminating remarks from the alleged discussion. Finally,
Marieta asks why, if Nieves Santos had indeed seen her (Marieta) summon Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida from
the servants' quarters an hour or so before the crime was committed, Nieves found nothing unusual in such
summons and chose casually to go back to sleep.
Once more, we consider that it is unnecessary to deal with these speculative arguments in any detail. We do not
think it impossible that Nieves Santos should have overheard only fragments of a discussion among the co-accused
who, presumably, were not interested in broadcasting their intentions to the whole world. The summons by Marieta
of her co-accused did not alarm Nieves Santos who thought that the house boys had been called for by the victim.
That Nieves Santos did not volunteer to get up and help in whatever chore may have been needed to be done for
Mrs. Fule, does not appear unusual at all when one recalls that Nieves Santos was a cook rather than a house-girl
or an all-purpose domestic servant. Further, the acts and words that Nieves Santos testified she had seen and
overheard do not appear unambiguous indications of some evil intent or act. Only after the discovery of the bloody
killing of Mrs. Fule and the taking away of valuable jewelry in addition to cash, did those acts and words appear
significant.
Appellant next seeks to assail the testimony of prosecution witness Gregorio Fule, son of Judge Fule and the victim
Mrs. Lourdes Fule. Marieta contends it was unnatural that Gregorio Fule had failed to mention having discovered
some pieces of jewelry belonging to his mother in or under appellant's pillow on her sleeping mat in the corridor
immediately outside Mrs. Fule's bedroom on the morning that he found his mother's body. Gregorio Fule first made
9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. 78853
written mention of such pieces of jewelry three months after the killing and robbery. Marieta also contends that
Gregorio contradicted himself when he stated in court that he had placed the jewelry he accidentally found on the
floor outside the bedroom in a bank vault, considering that Gregorio also testified that Judge Fule had refused to
permit the opening of Mrs. Fule's or the family's vault or safety deposit box in the Prudential Bank branch in
Alaminos. Marieta asks why, if she was indeed involved in the crime, she would conceal the fruits thereof in a place
so open to discovery.
Once more, we do not think these arguments significantly affect the testimony of Gregorio Fule. An ordinary person
suddenly confronted with the bloodly corpse of his mother would be so shocked and disoriented, as Gregorio Fule
was, as to forget or overlooked confronting appellant Marieta about the stray pieces of jewelry on the floor near her
sleeping mat. That he had executed his statement referring, among other things, to such stray pieces of jewelry only
three (3) months later does not necessarily imply that he had merely fabricated such statement. Moreover, whether
or not the said pieces of jewelry were in fact placed by Gregorio Fule in the bank vault (possibly in a vault of the
Rural Bank of Alaminos, whose offices were on the first floor of Judge Fule's house) has no necessary bearing on
the truth or falsity of his statement concerning his inadvertent discovery of such stray pieces of jewelry on the floor.
As for the supposed improbability of Marieta ineffectually hiding those pieces of jewelry in or near her pillow, it
seems sufficient to note that she may well have been unable to think of a more secure hiding place for the stray
pieces of jewelry on the spur of the moment that brutal and bloody night. In any case, Judge Jaramillo who wrote the
decision of the trial court had in fact observed witness Gregorio Fule as he testified in court and Judge Jaramillo
found his testimony worthy of credence.
Since there was no direct evidence that appellant Marieta had actually participated in the physical assault and
stabbing of the victim Mrs. Lourdes Fule, her conviction rests upon the conclusion of the trial court that she had
participated in a conspiracy to commit the robbery in the course of which the homicide had occurred. The factors
which lead the trial court to this conclusion are set out in repetitive detail in the following portion of the trial court's
decision:
It is undisputed that accused Marieta was already aware that Lourdes Fule was moaning that fateful night and
had glimpsed inside the victim's room seeing scattered things. But she did not do anything to assist her or
prevent her killing. Neither did the accused Marieta relate what she witnessed that night to Nieves Garcia
Santos and Gregorio Fule. Her suppression of such information is highly auspicious, to say the least.
Her claim that Roel Punzalan prevented her from entering the room of the deceased is unbelievable. If it was
really true that Roel Punzalan blocked her way at the door and ordered her to lie down otherwise she would
be killed, accused Marieta could have rushed out of her room and summoned help. Her excuse that she was
allegedly paralyzed by her fear is not worthy of credence because of her allegation that from 2:00 a.m. to 6:00
a.m. she was awake lying down on her sleeping mat while the victim was already dead or perhaps bleeding to
death. No person who is only three (3) meters away from the body of another, a victim of foul play could have
the nerve to stay alone at night for four hours. An innocent person under such circumstances would have not
lasted five (5) minutes staying in that room for four (4) hours without doing anything. The fact that accused
Marieta was able to show how coldblooded she is and suggested her complicity. She knew Mrs. Lourdes Fule
moaned that night and could have reasonably thought that she was hurt and needed help. But when Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida left the victim's room, she did not even bother to check and see why her mistress
was moaning so strong enough to have awakened her. Moreover, the fact that she suppressed the
information about what happened to her mistress to Nieves Santos and Gregorio Fule was obviously intended
to feign innocence. But if she was really innocent and was not a co-conspirator, she could have easily told
Nieves Santos and Gregorio Fule what happened to her mistress at the first opportunity. At that particular time
Jose Besida and Roel Punzalan were already gone and the members of the Fule family were there to offer
her protection. She had nothing to fear from Jose Besida and Roel Punzalan since they were already gone.
Instead, she only told Gregorio Fule that "Napasukan tayo ng magnanakaw" when they reported to him about
the open front iron gate.
If it was also true that while watching TV she saw Jose Besida enter her room leading to the victim's room,
her failure to report this to the victim, to Gregorio Fule or others leads one to believe that she was part of the
conspiracy and lends support to the existence of a criminal plan.
xxx xxx xxx
[S]he was not tied or bound by the other two accused, if the accused Marieta was not a conspirator, since she
was an eye witness to the heinous crime she could have been killed by the said two accused to eliminate an
eye witness. Or, at least they could have tied and gagged her to immobilize her to give them ample time to
escape in the darkness of the night. She was not hurt by them. The fact that she was not tied, gagged, hurt or
killed by accused Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida militates against her claim of innocence.
The room of the victim is such that no one can enter inside without passing through accused Marieta. The
victim had jewelries and cash inside her room, for which reason she would not just open her door to anybody
especially in the middle of the night. Anyone planning to rob her must contend with the presence of accused
9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. 78853
Marieta who slept outside the room of the victim. Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida could not have
consummated the crime without the involvement and indispensable cooperation of accused Marieta. If she
was not involved or a co-conspirator she would have been eliminated first, immobilized or neutralized before
the other accused could break-in the door of the victim. It is significant to note that the door of the victim can
not be opened by a false key from the outside. It could only be opened from the inside by releasing or sliding
the iron bolt which is installed inside. The fact that the victim's door was not forcibly opened shows that the
victim opened the door herself. The victim would not have opened for accused Roel Punzalan and Jose
Besida who were relatively newly hired househelpers. But she would have opened the door for accused
Marieta, her sort of nursemaid and security.
xxx xxx xxx

She could not explain how come Roel Punzalan was found inside the room of the victim inspire of the fact that she, together with the victim, closed and locked all the door
prior to retiring to bed. The only persons that night in the house were the victim and accused Marieta. The victim could not have opened the doors leading to her room. The
accused Marieta admitted that the victim never allowed any of the househelpers to enter the house at night. Accused Marieta expressed ignorance on how the other
accused were able to enter the room of the victim. All these circumstances put together definitely established the guilt of the accused Marieta. 15
Examining the above excerpt, the elements consisting either of affirmative acts or failure to act which led the court to
conclude that appellant had acted in concert with Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida, may be summarized as follows:
1. She had participated in the discussion among her husband Domingo Mendoza, Roel Punzalan and Jose
Besida in the afternoon before the robbery and the killing, when Domingo Mendoza had declared that the
time to carry out their plan had arrived with Judge Fule gone;
2. Marieta had unlocked doors and summoned Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida from the servants' quarters
and brought them inside Judge Fule's house an hour or so before the robbery and the killing were committed;
3. Appellant Marieta had, by her own testimony, seen Jose Besida enter her room leading to Mrs. Fule's room
while Mrs. Fule and others were watching a video film, but failed to report that fact to Mrs. Fule or to anyone
else in the household then watching the video film;
4. After hearing the moaning of Mr. Fule through the open bedroom door and after she was aware that Roel
Punzalan and another person had left Mrs. Fule's room in the corridor in which Marieta slept, she, per her
own testimony, stayed in the floor for four hours without attempting to find out what had happened to Mrs.
Fule and without attempting to awaken Nieves Santos or any body else and to raise the alarm;
5. Marieta had not been harmed in any way by Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida although she obviously
recognized them; they had not even tied or gagged her to prevent her from raising an alarm.
We believe that the above multiple factors, when considered together, lead to the conclusion, constituting moral certainty, that appellant Marieta had acted in concert with Roel
Punzalan and Jose Besida at least in respect of the robbery. It is possible that the conspiracy did not originally extend to the killing of Mrs. Fule, and that such killing was resorted on
the spur of the moment to counter unexpected resistance on the part of Mrs. Fule or to prevent any outcry on her part. The general rule, however, is that where conspiracy or action
in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all and that the extent of the specific participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary,
each being held liable for the criminal deed(s) executed by another or others. 16
Appellant insists that she was unaware of any plan to rob the victim and that the fact that she did not flee with her
co-accused shows that she had not joined the conspiracy.
The simple refusal or failure to flee with her co-accused does not, by itself, necessarily imply that she had never
conspired to rob the victim. Taking the totality of the evidence presented against appellant Marieta in the light most
favorable to her, her failure to flee may be considered as indication that she had been shocked that what had begun
as a plan to rob Mrs. Fule of her jewelry and money culminated in her brutal slaying, and that appellant Marieta
sought to disavow the conspiracy to rob which she had initially joined. So viewed, the ultimate issue may be seen to
be whether her "disavowal" or disengagement through failure or refusal to flee was sufficient to extinguish or negate
criminal liability for the robbery and the killing.
We believe and so hold that such "disavowal" through failure to flee was not sufficient to discharge appellant Marieta from liability for the robbery and the killing. One who joins a
criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators; he merges his will into the common felonious intent. A person who embraces a criminal
conspiracy is properly held to have cast his lot with his fellow conspirators and to have taken his chances that things may go awry and that the offended party may resist or third
persons may get killed in the course of implementing the basic criminal design. To free himself from such criminal liability, the law requires some overt act on the part of the
conspirator, to seek to prevent commission of the second or related felony or to abandon or dissociate himself from the conspiracy to commit the initial felony. 17
In the instant case, while the failure to flee may perhaps be regarded as a negative overt act, such "disavowal" came too late, having manifested itself after, and not before or during,
the consummation of the robbery and the slaying. In legal contemplation, there was no longer a conspiracy to be repudiated nor an unlawful killing which could have been prevented
since the conspiracy and the killing had already materialized. The locus penitentiae, i.e., appellant's opportunity to purge herself of criminal liability, had already passed. Appellant
insists that her life was threatened by Roel Punzalan who poked into her back what she believed was a sharp instrument, when she discovered the robbery and assault being carried
out. She says that that circumstance effectively prevented her from doing anything to forestall or prevent the perpetration of the crime. The difficulty with this defense is not merely
that there is nothing to support it except Marieta's own word. That word, when taken in the context of all the other circumstances, especially her failure to raise the alarm long after
the doers of the crime had left, is simply insufficient to nullify the prosecution's case. Appellant's word was not believed by the trial judge. Judge Jaramillo, who was presiding when
the defense presented its case and who wrote the decision with the benefit of observing her demeanor in court, 18
was unable to accept appellant's
statement that she had been coerced into silence by Roel Punzalan. There is no basis in the record for setting aside
this conclusion on the part of the trial judge, a conclusion to which we must accord appropriate deference.
We turn to the appreciation of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime.
Marieta assails the finding by the trial court of the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. However, the
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record shows not only the time when the accused determined or at least last conferred on the commission of the
crime, but also acts which manifestly indicated that the appellant and her co-accused had clung to their
determination to commit the crime. An interval of seven (7) or eight (8) hours had taken place between the meeting
of the co-accused and Marieta's summoning of Roel Punzalan and Jose Besida into the Fule house, an interval of
time sufficient to allow appellant and her co-conspirators to reflect upon the consequences of their acts.
Nocturnity was correctly appreciated because it was purposely sought by the conspirators to afford impunity and to
facilitate both the execution of the crime and their escape. 19 They not only timed the robbery to coincide with the
absence of Judge Fule; they also chose to strike late that night to ensure that the victim would be alone in her
bedroom and unable to resist or to flee.
Abuse of superior strength was similarly correctly appreciated. There was great variance in the relative physical
condition of the assailants and of the victim: two adult males as against an old lady suffering from hypertension; the
assailants were armed with bladed and blunt instruments while the victim was alone and unarmed and in no position
to defend herself; and the great violence inflicted upon the victim, as indicated by the number and location of her
wounds, all indicate the presence of the circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
Upon the other hand, disregard of age, rank, or sex was incorrectly appreciated by the trial court. This circumstance
was absorbed in abuse of superior strength. Moreover, disregard of age, rank, or sex is relevant only in crimes
against persons; the instant case involves robbery with homicide, a felony classified as a crime against property, the
homicide being regarded as incidental to the robbery. 20
Dwelling should also have been disregarded because the accused (except Domingo Mendoza) all resided in the
servants' quarter of Mrs. Fule's residence. The servants' quarter may be assimilated to the victim's house, the
former being an appendage of, or attachment to, the latter.
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when, by reason or on the occasion of
the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed. Article 63 paragraph 2 of the same Code provides,
among other things, that when there is at least one aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the
crime, the imposable penalty is death. Since death is not an enforceable penalty under our Constitution, the
appropriate penalty is reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated 22 May 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the civil indemnity for the victim's death is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in line
with recent jurisprudence of the Court. 21
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, CJ., Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,concur.
# Footnotes
1 Information, Record, pp. 23-24.
2 Record, p. 197.
3 Id., p. 54.
4 Id., p. 92.
5 Id., p. 100.
6 Id., pp. 114 and 122.
7 Id., p. 190.
8 Decision, Record, pp. 180-184; Rollo, pp. 51-55.
9 Appellant's Brief, Rollo, pp. 118-121.
10 Id., Rollo, p. 107.
11 People v. Aldeguer, 184 SCRA 1, 6 (1990).
12 People v. Callado, G.R. No. 88631, 30 April 1991, p. 16.
13 Ayco v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 84770, 18 March 1991, pp. 8-9.
9/24/23, 11:31 AM G.R. No. 78853
14 People v. Montante, 192 SCRA 483, 487-488 (1990).
15 Decision, Rollo, pp. 22-27.
16 People v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 92658, 30 April 1991, pp. 4-8; People v. Nunag, G.R. No. 92570, 29 April
1991, p. 10; People v. Bartulay, 192 SCRA 621, 629 (1990); People v. Gupo, 190 SCRA 7, 18 (1990): People
v. Veronas, 179 SCRA 423, 427 (1989).
17 People v. Salvador, 163 SCRA 574, 580-582 (1988); People v. Bazar, 162 SCRA 609, 617 (1988); People
v. Escober, 157 SCRA 541, 567 (1988); People v. Pelagio, 20 SCRA 153, 159-160 (1967).
18 Record, p. 178; TSN of Appellant, pp. 469 and 571.
19 People v. Ga, G.R. No. 49831, 27 June 1990.
20 People v. Pagcol, 79 SCRA 570-577 (1978); People v. Nabduna, 142 SCRA 446, 458 (1986); People v.
Ga, supra; People v. Callado, G.R No. 88631, 30 April (1991), pp. 19-20.
21 Lozano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90870, 5 February 1991.

Unchecked Article
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 81563

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81563 December 19, 1989
AMADO C. ARIAS, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 82512 December 19, 1989
CRESENCIO D. DATA, petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
Paredes Law Office for petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The facts of this case are stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino which follows this
majority opinion. The dissent substantially reiterates the draft report prepared by Justice Griño-Aquino as a working
basis for the Court's deliberations when the case was being discussed and for the subsequent votes of concurrence
or dissent on the action proposed by the report.
There is no dispute over the events which transpired. The division of the Court is on the conclusions to be drawn
from those events and the facts insofar as the two petitioners are concerned. The majority is of the view that
Messrs. Arias and Data should be acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt. The Court feels that the quantum of
evidence needed to convict petitioners Arias and Data beyond reasonable doubt, as co-conspirators in the
conspiracy to cause undue injury to the Government through the irregular disbursement and expenditure of public
funds, has not been satisfied.
In acquitting the petitioners, the Court agrees with the Solicitor-General 1 who, in 80 pages of his consolidated
manifestation and motion, recommended that Messrs. Arias and Data be acquitted of the crime charged, with costs
de oficio. Earlier, Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Eleuterio F. Guerrero had also recommended the dropping of
Arias from the information before it was filed.
There is no question about the need to ferret out and convict public officers whose acts have made the bidding out
and construction of public works and highways synonymous with graft or criminal inefficiency in the public eye.
However, the remedy is not to indict and jail every person who may have ordered the project, who signed a
document incident to its construction, or who had a hand somewhere in its implementation. The careless use of the
conspiracy theory may sweep into jail even innocent persons who may have been made unwitting tools by the
criminal minds who engineered the defraudation.
Under the Sandiganbayan's decision in this case, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman,
agency head, and all chief auditors would be equally culpable for every crime arising from disbursements which they
have approved. The department head or chief auditor would be guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the last
of a long line of officials and employees who acted upon or affixed their signatures to a transaction. Guilt must be
premised on a more knowing, personal, and deliberate participation of each individual who is charged with others as
part of a conspiracy.
The records show that the six accused persons were convicted in connection with the overpricing of land purchased
by the Bureau of Public Works for the Mangahan Floodway Project. The project was intended to ease the perennial
floods in Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/dec1989/gr_81563_1989.html 1/16
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 81563
The accused were prosecuted because 19,004 square meters of "riceland" in Rosario, Pasig which had been
assessed at P5.00 a square meter in 1973 were sold as residential land" in 1978 for P80.00 a square meter. The
land for the floodway was acquired through negotiated purchase,
We agree with the Solicitor-General that the assessor's tax valuation of P5.00 per square meter of land in Rosario,
Pasig, Metro Manila is completely unrealistic and arbitrary as the basis for conviction.
Herein lies the first error of the trial court.
It must be stressed that the petitioners are not charged with conspiracy in the falsification of public documents or
preparation of spurious supporting papers. The charge is causing undue injury to the Government and giving a
private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence.
The alleged undue injury in a nutshell is the Government purchase of land in Pasig, Rizal for P80.00 a square meter
instead of the P5.00 value per square meter appearing in the tax declarations and fixed by the municipal assessor,
not by the landowner.
The Sandiganbayan, without any clear factual basis for doing so has assumed that the P5.00 per square meter
value fixed by the assessor in the tax declarations was the correct market value of the Mangahan property and if the
Government purchased the land for P80.00 a square meter, it follows that it must have suffered undue injury.
The Solicitor General explains why this conclusion is erroneous:
1. No undue injury was caused to the Government
a. The P80.00 per square rneter acquisition cost is just fair and reasonable.
It bears stress that the Agleham property was acquired through negotiated purchase. It was, therefor,
nothing more than an ordinary contract of sale where the purchase price had to be arrived at by
agreement between the parties and could never be left to the discretion of one of the contracting
parties (Article 1473, New Civil Code). For it is the essence of a contract of sale that there must be a
meeting of the minds between the seller and the buyer upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price (Article 1475, New Civil Code). Necessarily, the parties have to negotiate
the reasonableness of the price, taking into consideration such other factors as location, potentials,
surroundings and capabilities. After taking the foregoing premises into consideration, the parties have,
thus, arrived at the amount of P80.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable price for the
Agleham property.
It bears stress that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove that the true and fair market
value in 1978 of the Agleham property was indeed P5.00 per square meter only as stated by the
assessor in the tax declaration (Exhibit W). On the contrary, the prosecution's principal witness Pedro
Ocol, the Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, admitted that the purchase price of P80.00 per square
meter paid for the Agleham property as stated in the Deed of Sale (Exhibit G) is reasonable (tsn,
August 19,1983, p. 20) and fair (Ibid, p. 76); that 'the value of lands within the town of Pasig ranges
from P80.00 to P500.00' (Ibid, p. 21); that the Agleham property is "around 300 meters" from Ortigas
Avenue, "adjacent to the existing Leongson [Liamson] Subdivision ... and near Eastland Garment
Building" (Ibid, pp. 12-13); that said property is surrounded by factories, commercial establishments
and residential subdivisions (Ibid, pp. 73-74); that the P5.00 per square meter assessed valuation of
the Agleham property appearing on the tax declaration (Exhibit W) was based on actual use only (lbid,
pp. 26-27), it being the uniform rate for all ricefields in Pasig irrespective of their locations (Ibid, pp. 72-
74) and did not take into account the existence of many factories and subdivisions in the area (Ibid., pp.
25-27, 72-74), and that the assessed value is different from and always lower than the actual market
value (Ibid, pp. 22-23). (At pp. 256-259, Rollo)
A negotiated purchase may usually entail a higher buying price than one arrived at in the course of expropriation
proceedings.
In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay (149 SCRA 305, 310 [1987]) we struck down the martial law decree
that pegged just compensation in eminent domain cases to the assessed value stated by a landowner in his tax
declaration or fixed by the municipal assessor, whichever is lower. Other factors must be considered. These factors
must be determined by a court of justice and not by municipal employees.
In the instant case, the assessor's low evaluation, in the fixing of which the landowner had no participation, was
used for a purpose infinitely more weighty than mere expropriation of land. It forms the basis for a criminal
conviction.
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 81563
The Court is not prepared to say that P80.00 to P500.00 a square meter for land in Pasig in 1978 would be a fair
evaluation. The value must be determined in eminent domain proceedings by a competent court. We are certain,
however, that it cannot be P5.00 a square meter. Hence, the decision, insofar as it says that the "correct" valuation
is P5.00 per square meter and on that basis convicted that petitioners of causing undue injury, damage, and
prejudice to the Government because of gross overpricing, is grounded on shaky foundations.
There can be no overpricing for purposes of a criminal conviction where no proof adduced during orderly
proceedings has been presented and accepted.
The Court's decision, however, is based on a more basic reason. Herein lies the principal error of the respondent
court.
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-dishonest or negligent
subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence is suddenly swept into a
conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every
step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing, his
signature as the final approving authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that documents used in the negotiated sale were falsified. A key
tax declaration had a typewritten number instead of being machine-numbered. The registration stampmark was
antedated and the land reclassified as residential instead of ricefield. But were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in
the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing undue in injury and damage to the Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received procedures,
and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all
vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely
to a reasonable extent 'on their subordinates and on the good faith of those prepare bids, purchase supplies, or
enter into negotiations. If a department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected
to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon,
inquire whether the correct amount of food was served and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement
voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each
voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the
volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of document , letters and supporting paper that routinely
pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.
There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher to sustain a conspiracy
charge and conviction.
Was petitioner Arias part of the planning, preparation, and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the
government?
Arias joined the Pasig office on July 19, 1978. The negotiations for the purchase of the property started in 1977. The
deed of sale was executed on April 20, 1978. Title was transferred to the Republic on June 8, 1978. In other words,
the transaction had already been consummated before his arrival. The pre-audit, incident to payment of the
purchase, was conducted in the first week of October, 1978. Arias points out that apart from his signature linking him
to the signature on the voucher, there is no evidence transaction. On the contrary, the other co-accused testified
they did not know him personally and none approached him to follow up the payment.
Should the big amount of P1,520,320.00 have caused him to investigate . gate the smallest detains of the
transaction?
Yes, if the land was really worth only P5.00 a square meter. However, if land in Pasig was already worth P80.00 a
square meter at the time, no warning bell of intuition would have sounded an inner alarm. Land along Ortigas
Avenue on the way to Pasig is now worth P20,000.00 to P30,000.00 a square meter. The falsification of the tax
declaration by changing "riceland" to "residential' was done before Arias was assigned to Pasig besides, there is no
such thing as "riceland" in inner Metro Manila. Some lots in outlying or easily flooded areas may still be planted to
rice or kangkong but this is only until the place is dedicated to its real purpose which is commercial, industrial, or
residential. If the Sandiganbayan is going to send somebody to jail for six years, the decision should be based on
firmer foundation.
The Sandiganbayan asked why Arias kept the documents from October, 1978 to June 23, 1982. Arias explained that
the rules of the Commission on Audit require auditors to keep these d documents and under no circumstance to
relinquish custody to other persons. Arias was auditor of the Bureau of Public Works in Pasig up to September 1,
1981. The seven months delay in the formal turnover of custody to the new auditor was explained by prosecution
witness Julito Pesayco, who succeeded him as auditor and who took over the custody of records in that office.
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 81563
The main reason for the judgment of conviction, for the finding of undue injury and damage to the Government is the
alleged gross overprice for the land purchased for the floodway project. Assuming that P80.00 is indeed exorbitant,
petitioner Arias cites his testimony as follows:
Q In conducting the pre-audit, did you determine the reasonableness of the price of the
property?
A In this case, the price has been stated, the transaction had been consummated and the
corresponding Transfer Certificate of little had been issued and transferred to the
government of the Philippines. The auditors have no more leeway to return the papers
and then question the purchase price.
Q Is it not a procedure in your office that before payment is given by the government to
private individuals there should be a pre-audit of the papers and the corresponding checks
issued to the vendor?
A Correct, Your Honor, but it depends on the kind of transaction there is.
Q Yes, but in this particular case, the papers were transferred to the government without
paying the price Did you not consider that rather odd or unusual? (TSN, page 17, April
27,1987).
A No, Your Honor.
Q Why not?
A Because in the Deed of Sale as being noted there, there is a condition that no payments
will be made unless the corresponding title in the payment of the Republic is committed is
made.
Q In this case you said that the title is already in the name of the government?
A Yes, Your Honor. The only thing we do is to determine whether there is an appropriation
set aside to cover the said specification. As of the price it is under the sole authority of the
proper officer making the sale.
Q My point is this. Did you not consider it unusual for a piece of property to be bought by
the government; the sale was consummated; the title was issued in favor of the
government without the price being paid first to the seller?
A No, Your Honor. In all cases usually, payments made by the government comes later
than the transfer.
Q That is usual procedure utilized in road right of way transaction?
A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, p. 18, April 27,1987).
Q And of course as auditor, 'watch-dog' of the government there is also that function you
are also called upon by going over the papers . . . (TSN, page 22, April 27,1987). I ...
vouchers called upon to determine whether there is any irregularity as at all in this
particular transaction, is it not?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q And that was in fact the reason why you scrutinized also, not only the tax declaration
but also the certification by Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz?
A As what do you mean of the certification, ma'am?
Q Certification of Mr. Jose and Mr. Cruz in relation to PD No. 296, A They are not required
documents that an auditor must see. (TSN, page 23, April 27,1987).
and continuing:
A ... The questioning of the purchase price is now beyond the authority of the auditor
because it is inasmuch as the amount involved is beyond his counter-signing authority.
(TSN, page 35, April 27, 1987). (At pp. 15-16, Petition. Underlinings supplied by petitioner)
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 81563
The Solicitor General summarizes the participation of petitioner Data as follows:
As regards petitioner Data's alleged participation, the evidence on record shows that as the then
District Engineer of the Pasig Engineering District he created a committee, headed by Engr. Priscillo
Fernando with Ricardo Asuncion, Alfonso Mendoza, Ladislao Cruz, Pedro Hucom and Carlos Jose, all
employees of the district office, as members, specifically to handle the Mangahan Floodway Project,
gather and verify documents, conduct surveys, negotiate with the owners for the sale of their lots,
process claims and prepare the necessary documents; he did not take any direct and active part in the
acquisition of land for the Mangahan floodway; it was the committee which determined the authenticity
of the documents presented to them for processing and on the basis thereof prepared the
corresponding deed of sale; thereafter, the committee submitted the deed of sale together with the
supporting documents to petitioner Data for signing; on the basis of the supporting certified documents
which appeared regular and complete on their face, petitioner Data, as head of the office and the
signing authority at that level, merely signed but did not approve the deed of sale (Exhibit G) as the
approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works; he thereafter transmitted the
signed deed of sale with its supporting documents to Director Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who
in turn recommended approval thereof by the Secretary of Public Works; the deed of sale was
approved by the Asst. Secretary of Public Works after a review and re-examination thereof at that level;
after the approval of the deed of sale by the higher authorities the covering voucher for payment
thereof was prepared which petitioner Data signed; petitioner Data did not know Gutierrez and had
never met her during the processing and payment of her claims (tsn, February 26, 1987, pp. 10-14, 16-
24, 31-32). (At pp. 267-268, Rollo.)
On the alleged conspiracy, the Solicitor General argues:
It is respectfully submitted that the prosecution likewise has not shown any positive and convincing
evidence of conspiracy between the petitioners and their co-accused. There was no direct finding of
conspiracy. Respondent Court's inference on the alleged existence of conspiracy merely upon the
purported 'pre-assigned roles (of the accused) in the commission of the (alleged) illegal acts in question
is not supported by any evidence on record. Nowhere in the seventy- eight (78) page Decision was
there any specific allusion to some or even one instance which would link either petitioner Arias or Data
to their co-accused in the planning, preparation and/or perpetration, if any, of the purported fraud and
falsifications alleged in the information That petitioners Data and Arias happened to be officials of the
Pasig District Engineering Office who signed the deed of sale and passed on pre-audit the general
voucher covering the subject sale, respectively, does hot raise any presumption or inference, that they
were part of the alleged plan to defraud the Government, as indeed there was none. It should be
remembered that, as aboveshown, there was no undue injury caused to the Government as the
negotiated purchase of the Agleham property was made at the fair and reasonable price of P80.00 per
square meter.
That there were erasures and superimpositions of the words and figures of the purchase price in the
deed of sale from P1,546,240.00 to P1,520,320.00 does not prove conspiracy. It may be noted that
there was a reduction in the affected area from the estimated 19,328 square meters to 19,004 square
meters as approved by the Land Registration Commission, which resulted in the corresponding
reduction in the purchase price from P1,546,240.00 to Pl,520,320.00. The erasures in the deed of sale
were simple corrections that even benefited the Government.
Moreover, contrary to the respondent Court's suspicion, there was nothing irregular in the use of the
unapproved survey plan/technical description in the deed of sale because the approval of the survey
plan/ technical description was not a prerequisite to the approval of the deed of sale. What is important
is that before any payment is made by the Government under the deed of sale the title of the seller
must have already been cancelled and another one issued to the Government incorporating therein the
technical description as approved by the Land Registration Commission, as what obtained in the
instant case. (At pp. 273-275, Rollo)
We agree with the counsel for the People. There is no adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the petitioners,
Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, beyond reasonable doubt. The inadequate evidence on record is not
sufficient to sustain a conviction.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan insofar as it convicts and sentences petitioners
Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data is hereby SET ASIDE. Petitioners Arias and Data are acquitted on grounds
of reasonable doubt. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 81563
Separate Opinions
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error
in convicting the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, of having violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the
Government as right of way for its Mangahan Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of the Anti-
Graft Law reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxxxxxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
The amended information against them, to which they pleaded not guilty, alleged:
That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to October 1978, in Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and with the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Cresencio D. Data, being then
the district Engineer of the province of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, and as such, headed and
supervised the acquisition of private lands for the right-of-way of the Mangahan Floodway Project of the
Government at Sitio Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused Priscillo G. Fernando, then the
Supervising Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted
as assistant of accused Cresencio D. Data in the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Ladislao G.
Cruz, then the Senior Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works,
who was charged with the acquisition of lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused
Carlos L. Jose then the Instrumentman of the office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public
Works who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Claudio H. Arcaya, then
the Administrative Officer I of the Rizal District Engineer's Office, Ministry of Public Works who passed
upon all papers and documents pertaining to private lands acquired by the Government for the
Mangahan Floodway Project; and accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal Engineering
District, Pasig, Metro Manila, who passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition as well as the
payment of lands needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project all taking advantage of their public and
official positions, and conspiring, confederating and confabulating with accused Natividad C. Gutierrez,
the attorney-in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, who is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at
Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0097, with accused
Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. -Jose and Claudio Arias, acting with evident bad faith, while accused
Cresencio D. Data, Priscillo G. Fernando and Amado C. Arias, acting with manifest partiality in the
discharge of their official public and/or administrative functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously cause undue injury, damage and prejudice to the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines by causing, allowing and/or approving the illegal and irregular disbursement and
expenditure of public funds in favor of and in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham in the amount of
P1,520,320.00 under General Voucher No. 8-047, supported by a certification, dated September 14,
1978, which was purportedly issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, and certified xerox copies of
Tax Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-0091 1, both in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham, and an
alleged owner's copy of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, said
supporting documents having been falsified by the accused to make it appear that the land mentioned
in the above-stated supporting papers is a residential land with a market value of P80.00 per square
meter and that 19,004 square meters thereof were transferred in the name of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines under Tax Declaration No. 49948, when in truth and in fact, the afore-stated
land is actually a riceland with a true and actual market value of P5.00 per square meter only and Tax
Declaration No. 49948 was truly and officially registered in the names of spouses Moises Javillonar and
Sofia San Andres, not in the name of the Government, and refers to a parcel of land at Sagad, Pasig,
Metro Manila; that the foregoing falsities were committed by the accused to conceal the fact that the
true and actual pace of the 19,004 square meters of land of Benjamin P. Agleham, which was acquired
in behalf of the Government by way of negotiated purchase by the accused officials herein for the right
of way of the Mangahan Floodway project at an overprice of P1,520,320.00 was P92,020.00 only; and
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 81563
finally, upon receipt of the overpriced amount, the accused misappropriated, converted and misapplied
the excess of the true and actual value of the above-mentioned land, i.e., P1,428,300.00 for their own
personal needs, uses and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of
P1,428,300.00. (pp. 2931, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Priscillo Fernando did not face trial for he has remained at large, his present whereabouts being unknown (p. 48,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 75, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563).
In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial floods affecting
the towns of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The project would traverse the northern and southern portions of
Ortigas Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila (Exhibits A and A-1). An announcement was published in leading
newspapers advising affected property owners to file their applications for payment at the District Engineer's Office
(p. 29, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 56, Ibid.).
The implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District headed by
the District Engineer, Cresencio Data. He formed a committee composed of Supervising Civil Engineer Priscillo
Fernando, as over-all in charge, Alfonso Mendoza and Pedro Hucom for acquisition of improvements, and
Instrumentman Carlos Jose for surveys (p. 26, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 53, Ibid.). The team was tasked to notify
lot owners affected by the project of the impending expropriation of their properties and to receive and process
applications for payment.
The reclassification of all lands around the Mangahan Floodway Project was suspended in 1975 by order of the
President (p. 45, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 72, Ibid.). Implementing that order, a memorandum was sent to Data
on August 27,1976, by Public Works Director Desiderio Anolin, directing that all affected lands covered by the
Mangahan Floodway Project shall be excluded from reevaluation and reassessment (Annex A, Exh. DD, Counter-
Affidavit of Data, p. 70, Sandiganbayan Decision, P. 97, Ibid).
Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion of a 30,169-square-meter riceland in Pasig registered in
the name of Benjamin Agleham under Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 issued on May 5, 1977 (Exh. H). The
land was previously owned by Andrea Arabit and Evaristo Gutierrez, parents of the accused Natividad Gutierrez.
After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare land in 1973 from the Gutierrez spouses, he had it subdivided into three (3)
lots under plan (LRC) Psd-278456 which was approved by the Land Registration Commission on June 1, 1978
(Entry No. 27399/12071, Exh. H). Lot 1, with an area of 19,004 square meters, is the portion that Agleham, through
Natividad Gutierrez, sold to the Government in 1978 for the Mangahan Floodway Project.
On December 15, 1973, Agleham's property, classified as a "ricefield" with an area of 3.2 hectares, was declared for
taxation under Tax Declaration No. 28246 (Exh-Y). Its assessed value was P4,800 or P0.15 per square meter (p. 10,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 37, Ibid.). On February 27, 1978, another Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. Y-1) was
issued for the same ricefield" with a revised area of 30,169 square meters. The declared market value was
P150,850 (or P5 per square meter), and the assessed value was P60,340.
Ten months later, or on December 15, 1978, Tax Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced by Tax
Declaration No. A018- 00911 (Exh. Y-2) wherein the market value of the same "ricefield," jumped to P301,690 (P10
per square meter). Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680. The description and value of the property, according
to Pedro Ocol, the assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, was based on the actual use of the property (riceland) not
on its potential use (p. 13, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 40, Ibid.). The valuation was based on a compilation of sales
given to the Municipal Assessor's office by the Register of Deeds, from which transactions the Assessor obtained
the average valuation of the properties in the same vicinity (p. 14, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 41, Ibid.).
Among those who filed an application for payment (Exhs. FF and FF-1) at the District Engineer's Office was the
accused, Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed on February
24,1978 by Benjamin Agleham in her favor (Exhs. C and C-1). She submitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax
Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B) bearing a false date: December 15,1973 (instead of February 27, 1978) and
describing Agleham's 30,169-square-meter property as "residential" (instead of riceland), with a fair market value of
P2,413,520 or P80 per square meter (instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter). Its assessed value appeared to
be P724,056 (instead of P60,340). Gutierrez submitted Agleham's Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 (Exh. H-1),
the technical description of the property, and a xerox copy of a "Sworn Statement of the True Current and Fair
Market Value of Real Property" required under P.D. No. 76 (Exh. 1). The xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895
was supposedly certified by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Alfredo Prudencio.
The documents supporting Agleham's claim were "examined" by the Administrative Officer, accused Claudio Arcaya,
who, after initiating them, turned them over to accused Ladislao G. Cruz, A Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot 1 (19,004
square meters valued at P80 per square meter) was prepared by Cruz who also initialed the supporting documents
and transmitted them to District Engr. Data.
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On April 20,1978, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhs. G and G-1) was signed by Data and Gutierrez (as attorney-in-
fact of Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the papers to Director Desiderio Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who
recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works the approval of the Deed of Sale (Exh. G-1). Afterwards,
the documents were returned to Data's office for the transfer of title to the Government. On June 8, 1978, the sale
was registered and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12071 (Exh. T) was issued in the name of the Government.
General Voucher (Exh. S) No. 85-2-7809-52 dated "9/29/78" for the amount of P1,520,320 bore fourth certifications
of. (1) Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G. Fernando as Supervising Civil Engineer II; (3) Cresencio Data
as District Engineer II and (4) Cesar V. Franco as Project Acting Accountant (p. 56, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 83,
Ibid.).
On October 23, 1978, the voucher and its supporting documents were pre-audited and approved for payment by the
accused, Amado C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering District. The next day, October 24, 1978, sixteen (16) PNB
checks with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, inclusive (Exhs. X to X-1 5), for the total sum of Pl,520,320.00 were
issued to Gutierrez as payment for Agleham's 19,004-square-meter lot.
In October, 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on the gross overpricing of
Agleham's property. During the investigation, sworn statements were taken from Alfredo Prudencio, Municipal
Treasurer of Pasig (Exh. AA), Pedro Ocol, Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig (Exh. BB), and the accused
Claudio Arcaya (Exh. EE). Prudencio denied having issued or signed the certification dated September 14,1978
(Exh. J), attesting that Agleham's property covered by Tax Declaration No. 47895 had a market value of P2,413,520
and that the taxes had been paid from 1975 to 1978. Prudencio also impugned the initial (purporting to be that of his
subordinate Ruben Gatchalian, Chief of the Land Tax Division) that was affixed below Prudencio's typewritten name
in Exhibit J. Both Prudencio and Gatchalian disowned the typewritten certification. They declared that such
certifications are usually issued by their office on mimeographed forms (Exh. J-1).
Assistant Municipal Assessor Pedro Ocol produced and Identified the original or genuine Tax Declaration No. 47895
dated February 27, 1978, and a certified copy thereof (Exh. Y-1). Therein, Agleham's property of 30,169 square
meters was classified as a "ricefield" and appraised at P5 per square meter, with an assessed value of P60,340 and
a market value of PI 50,850. Ocol testified that the supposed xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B),
which Gutierrez submitted as one of the supporting documents of the general voucher (Exh. S), was fake, because
of the following tell-tale signs:
(1) the tax declaration number was typewritten, not machine numbered as in the genuine tax declaration, Exhibit Y;
(2) the stampmark of registration was antedated to December 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the correct date
February 27, 1978-- in the genuine tax declaration;
(3) the classification of the property was "residential," instead of "ricefield" which is its classification in the genuine
document; and
(4) the lot was over priced at P80 per square meter in the fake tax declaration, instead of the appraised value of only
P5 per square meter appearing in the genuine declaration.
Also found to be fake was Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exhs. K and K-
1). The genuine Tax Declaration No. 49948 (Exhs. U and V-2) was actually filed on October 18, 1978 in the names
of the spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia Andres, for their 598-square-meters' residential property with a declared
market value of P51,630.
The Agleham deed of sale was pre-audited by the auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, Amado Arias, who
approved the payment of Pl,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning the fact that the amount of the purchase price
therein had been altered, i.e., "snow-flaked (sic) and later superimposed by the amount of P1,520,320 in words and
figures" (p. 71, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 98, Ibid.), nor checking the veracity of the supporting documents listed
at the back of the General Voucher (Exh. S), numbering fifteen (15) in all, among which were:
(1) the fake Tax Declaration No. 47895 showing that the value of the land was P80 per square meter (Exh. B);
(2) fake Tax Declaration No. 49948 In the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exh. K)
(3) the forged certification of Municipal Treasurer Prudencio that the fair market value of 'the land was P100 per
square meter (Exh. J);
(4) a false certification (Exh. D) dated September 19, 1978 signed by accused Cruz, Jose, and Fernando, certifying
that the Agleham property was upon ocular inspection by them, found to be "residential;"
(5) a falsely dated certification where the original date was erased and a false date (February 15, 1978) was
superimposed (Exh.E), issued by Engr. Fernando pursuant to DPWTC Circular No. 557, certifying that he had
examined the real estate tax receipts of the Agleham property for the last three (3) years;
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(6) the technical description of the land (Exhs. F and F-1) attached to the deed of sale dated April 20, 1978 was not
an approved technical description for the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic Engineer Cipriano C. Caro was
verified and approved by the Land Registration Commission on May 28,1978 only. There were "substantial
variations" noted by the Sandiganbayan between the approved technical description and the technical description of
the land in the deed of sale (p. 61, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 88, Ibid.);
(7) the special power of attorney dated February 24, 1978, supposedly given to Gutierrez by Agleham (Exhs. C, C-1)
bore a fictitious residence certificate Agleham (p. 64, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 91, Ibid.); and
(8) the fake Sworn Statement on the Current and Fair Market Value of Real Properties (Exh. Z) dated October 1,
1973, contained a forged signature of Agleham, presumably made by Gutierrez herself The Sandiganbayan
observed that Agleham's supposed signature "appears to be identical to accused Gutierrez' signatures in the
General Voucher (Exh. S), in the release and Quitclaim which she signed in favor of Agleham on July 20, 1983 (Exh.
CC), and in her affidavits (Exhs. FF and FF-1)." (pp. 64-65, Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 91-92, Ibid.).
After payment of the Agleham claim, all the supporting documents were kept by Arias. Even after he had been
replaced by Julito Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, he did not turn over
the documents to Pesayco. It was only on June 23, 1982, after this case had been filed in the Sandiganbayan and
the trial had begun, that Arias delivered them to Pesayco (Exh. T-1).
After a trial lasting nearly six years, the Sandiganbayan rendered a 78-page decision on November 16, 1987, whose
dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Natividad G. Gutierrez, Cresencio D.

Data, Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H. Arcaya and Amado C. Arias GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as ascended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby sentences each of them to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for THREE (3) YEARS, as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS, as
maximum; to further suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; to indemnify jointly and
severally, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P1,425,300, and to pay
their proportional costs of this action. (p. 104, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Both Arias and Data appealed.
Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan's decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his contention that the
court's findings that he conspired with his co-accused and that he was grossly negligent are based on
misapprehension of facts, speculation, surmise, and conjecture.
Data's main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of the committee of Prescillo
Fernando iii which he did not take an active part, and that the price which the government paid for it was
reasonable. Hence, it uttered no jury in the transaction.
In his consolidated brief or comment for the State, the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of the petitioners
because the Agleham property was allegedly not grossly overpriced.
After deliberating on the petitions in these cases, we find no error in the decision under review. The Sandiganbayan
did not err in finding that the petitioners conspired with their co-accused to cause injury to the Government and to
unduly favor the lot owner, Agleham.
A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proven by a
number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances (People vs. Maralit, G.R. No. 71143, Sept. 19,1988; People
vs. Roca, G.R. No. 77779, June 27, 1988).
This case presents a conspiracy of silence and inaction where chiefs of office who should have been vigilant to
protect the interest of the Government in the purchase of Agleham's two-hectare riceland, accepted as gospel truth
the certifications of their subordinates, and approved without question the million-peso purchase which, by the
standards prevailing in 1976-78, should have pricked their curiosity and prompted them to make inquiries and to
verify the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval. The petitioners kept silent when they should
have asked questions they looked the other way when they should have probed deep into the transaction.
Since it was too much of a coincidence that both petitioners were negligent at the same time over the same
transaction, the Sandiganbayan was justified in concluding that they connived and conspired to act in that manner to
approve the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the land and defraud the Government.
We cannot accept Arias' excuse that because the deed of sale had been signed and the property transferred to the
Government which received a title in its name, there was nothing else for him to do but approve the voucher for
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 81563
payment. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures of government funds.
The auditorial function of an auditor, as a representative of the Commission on Audit, comprises three aspects: (1)
examination; (2) audit: and (3) settlement of the accounts, funds, financial transactions and resources of the
agencies under their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43, Government Auditing Code of the Phil.). Examination, as
applied to auditing, means "to probe records, or inspect securities or other documents; review procedures, and
question persons, all for the purpose of arriving at an opinion of accuracy, propriety, sufficiency, and the like." (State
Audit Code of the Philippines, Annotated by Tantuico, 1982 Ed., p. 57.)
Arias admitted that he did not check or verify the papers supporting the general voucher that was submitted to him
for payment of Pl,520,320 to Agleham or his attorney-in-fact, Natividad Gutierrez. Arias did not question any person
for the purpose of determining the accuracy and integrity of the documents submitted to him and the
reasonableness of the price that the Government was paying for the less than two-hectare riceland. We reject his
casuistic explanation that since his subordinates had passed upon the transaction, he could assume that it was
lawful and regular for, if he would be a mere rubber stamp for his subordinates, his position as auditor would be
useless and unnecessary.
We make the same observation concerning District Engineer Cresencio Data who claims innocence because he
allegedly did not take any direct and active participation in the acquisition of the Agleham property, throwing the
blame on the committee which he created, composed of Fernando, Asuncion, Mendoza, Cruz, Hucom and Jose that
negotiated with the property owners for the purchase of properties on the path of the Mangahan Floodway Project.
He in effect would hide under the skirt of the committee which he himself selected and to which he delegated the
task that was assigned to his office to identify the lots that would be traversed by the floodway project, gather and
verify documents, make surveys, negotiate with the owners for the price, prepare the deeds of sale, and process
claims for payment. By appointing the committee, he did not cease to be responsible for the implementation of the
project. Under the principle of command responsibility, he was responsible for the manner in which the committee
performed its tasks for it was he who in fact signed the deed of sale prepared by the committee. By signing the deed
of sale and certifications prepared for his signature by his committee, he in effect, made their acts his own. He is,
therefore, equally guilty with those members of the committee (Fernando, Cruz and Jose) who accepted the fake tax
declarations and made false certifications regarding the use and value of the Agleham property.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that Data signed, but did not approve, the deed of sale of Agleham's property
because the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works. It should not be overlooked,
however, that Data's signature on the deed of sale was equivalent to an attestation that the transaction was fair,
honest and legal. It was he who was charged with the task of implementing the Mangahan Floodway Project within
his engineering district.
We find no merit in the Solicitor General's argument that the Agleham riceland was not overpriced because the price
of P80 per square meter fixed in the deed of sale was reasonable, hence, the petitioners are not guilty of having
caused undue injury and prejudice to the Government, nor of having given unwarranted benefits to the property
owner and/or his attorney-in-fact, Gutierrez. He further argues that the valuation in the owner's genuine tax
declaration may not be used as a standard in determining the fair market value of the property because PD Nos. 76
and 464 (making it mandatory in expropriation cases to fix the price at the value of the property as declared by the
owner, or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower), were declared null and void by this Court in the case
of Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, and other related cases.
That argument is not well taken because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (before they were nullified) applied to the
expropriation of property for public use. The acquisition of Agleham's riceland was not done by expropriation but
through a negotiated sale. In the course of the negotiations, there was absolutely no allegation nor proof that the
price of P80 per square meter was its fair market value in 1978, i.e., eleven (11) years ago. What the accused did
was to prove the value of the land through fake tax declarations (Exhs. B, F, K), false certifications (Exhs. J, D and
E) and a forged sworn statement on the current and fair market value of the real property (Exh. Z) submitted by the
accused in support of the deed of sale. Because fraudulent documents were used, it may not be said that the State
agreed to pay the price on the basis of its fairness, for the Government was in fact deceived concerning the
reasonable value of the land.
When Ocol testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable valuation for the Agleham's land, he did not clarify that was
also its reasonable value in 1975, before real estate values in Pasig soared as a result of the implementation of the
Mangahan Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol's testimony was insufficient to rebut the valuation in Agleham's genuine
1978 Tax Declaration No. 47895 that the fair valuation of the riceland then was only P5 per square meter. A Tax
Declaration is a guide or indicator of the reasonable value of the property (EPZA vs. Dulay, supra).
The petitioner's partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be inferred from their having deliberately closed their eyes to
the defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if not deliberate omission, to
check, the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval. Since partiality is a mental state or
predilection, in the absence of direct evidence, it may be proved by the attendant circumstance instances.
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 81563
WHEREFORE, I vote to affirm in toto the decision of the Sandiganbayan in SB Crim. Case No. 2010, with costs
against the petitioners, Amado Arias and Cresencio Data.
Feliciano, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
The lone issue in these consolidated petitions for review is whether the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error
in convicting the petitioners, Amado C. Arias and Cresencio D. Data, of having violated Section 3, paragraph (e), of
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the scandalous overpricing of land purchased by the
Government as right of way for its Mangahan Floodway Project in Pasig, Rizal. The pertinent provision of the Anti-
Graft Law reads as follows:
SEC. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers-In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing law. the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxxxxxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
The amended information against them, to which they pleaded not guilty, alleged:
That on or about the period covering April, 1978 to October 1978, in Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and with the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Cresencio D. Data, being then
the district Engineer of the province of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works, and as such, headed and
supervised the acquisition of private lands for the right-of-way of the Mangahan Floodway Project of the
Government at Sitio Mangahan, Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila; accused Priscillo G. Fernando, then the
Supervising Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works who acted
as assistant of accused Cresencio D. Data in the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Ladislao G.
Cruz, then the Senior Engineer of the Office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public Works,
who was charged with the acquisition of lots needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused
Carlos L. Jose then the Instrumentman of the office of the District Engineer of Rizal, Ministry of Public
Works who acted as the surveyor of the Mangahan Floodway Project; accused Claudio H. Arcaya, then
the Administrative Officer I of the Rizal District Engineer's Office, Ministry of Public Works who passed
upon all papers and documents pertaining to private lands acquired by the Government for the
Mangahan Floodway Project; and accused Amado C. Arias, then the Auditor of Rizal Engineering
District, Pasig, Metro Manila, who passed upon and approved in audit the acquisition as well as the
payment of lands needed for the Mangahan Floodway Project all taking advantage of their public and
official positions, and conspiring, confederating and confabulating with accused Natividad C. Gutierrez,
the attorney-in-fact of Benjamin Agleham, who is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated at
Rosario, Pasig, Metro Manila and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0097, with accused
Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. -Jose and Claudio Arias, acting with evident bad faith, while accused
Cresencio D. Data, Priscillo G. Fernando and Amado C. Arias, acting with manifest partiality in the
discharge of their official public and/or administrative functions, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously cause undue injury, damage and prejudice to the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines by causing, allowing and/or approving the illegal and irregular disbursement and
expenditure of public funds in favor of and in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham in the amount of
P1,520,320.00 under General Voucher No. 8-047, supported by a certification, dated September 14,
1978, which was purportedly issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, and certified xerox copies of
Tax Declarations Nos. 47895 and A-018-0091 1, both in the name of Benjamin P. Agleham, and an
alleged owner's copy of Tax Declaration No. 49948, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, said
supporting documents having been falsified by the accused to make it appear that the land mentioned
in the above-stated supporting papers is a residential land with a market value of P80.00 per square
meter and that 19,004 square meters thereof were transferred in the name of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines under Tax Declaration No. 49948, when in truth and in fact, the afore-stated
land is actually a riceland with a true and actual market value of P5.00 per square meter only and Tax
Declaration No. 49948 was truly and officially registered in the names of spouses Moises Javillonar and
Sofia San Andres, not in the name of the Government, and refers to a parcel of land at Sagad, Pasig,
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 81563
Metro Manila; that the foregoing falsities were committed by the accused to conceal the fact that the
true and actual pace of the 19,004 square meters of land of Benjamin P. Agleham, which was acquired
in behalf of the Government by way of negotiated purchase by the accused officials herein for the right
of way of the Mangahan Floodway project at an overprice of P1,520,320.00 was P92,020.00 only; and
finally, upon receipt of the overpriced amount, the accused misappropriated, converted and misapplied
the excess of the true and actual value of the above-mentioned land, i.e., P1,428,300.00 for their own
personal needs, uses and benefits, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount of
P1,428,300.00. (pp. 2931, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Priscillo Fernando did not face trial for he has remained at large, his present whereabouts being unknown (p. 48,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 75, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563).
In 1975, the Bureau of Public Works initiated the Mangahan Floodway Project to ease the perennial floods affecting
the towns of Marikina and Pasig, Metro Manila. The project would traverse the northern and southern portions of
Ortigas Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila (Exhibits A and A-1). An announcement was published in leading
newspapers advising affected property owners to file their applications for payment at the District Engineer's Office
(p. 29, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 56, Ibid.).
The implementation of the Mangahan Floodway Project was entrusted to the Pasig Engineering District headed by
the District Engineer, Cresencio Data. He formed a committee composed of Supervising Civil Engineer Priscillo
Fernando, as over-all in charge, Alfonso Mendoza and Pedro Hucom for acquisition of improvements, and
Instrumentman Carlos Jose for surveys (p. 26, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 53, Ibid.). The team was tasked to notify
lot owners affected by the project of the impending expropriation of their properties and to receive and process
applications for payment.
The reclassification of all lands around the Mangahan Floodway Project was suspended in 1975 by order of the
President (p. 45, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 72, Ibid.). Implementing that order, a memorandum was sent to Data
on August 27,1976, by Public Works Director Desiderio Anolin, directing that all affected lands covered by the
Mangahan Floodway Project shall be excluded from reevaluation and reassessment (Annex A, Exh. DD, Counter-
Affidavit of Data, p. 70, Sandiganbayan Decision, P. 97, Ibid).
Among the lots affected was a 19,004-square-meter portion of a 30,169-square-meter riceland in Pasig registered in
the name of Benjamin Agleham under Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 issued on May 5, 1977 (Exh. H). The
land was previously owned by Andrea Arabit and Evaristo Gutierrez, parents of the accused Natividad Gutierrez.
After Agleham acquired the 3-hectare land in 1973 from the Gutierrez spouses, he had it subdivided into three (3)
lots under plan (LRC) Psd-278456 which was approved by the Land Registration Commission on June 1, 1978
(Entry No. 27399/12071, Exh. H). Lot 1, with an area of 19,004 square meters, is the portion that Agleham, through
Natividad Gutierrez, sold to the Government in 1978 for the Mangahan Floodway Project.
On December 15, 1973, Agleham's property, classified as a "ricefield" with an area of 3.2 hectares, was declared for
taxation under Tax Declaration No. 28246 (Exh-Y). Its assessed value was P4,800 or P0.15 per square meter (p. 10,
Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 37, Ibid.). On February 27, 1978, another Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. Y-1) was
issued for the same ricefield" with a revised area of 30,169 square meters. The declared market value was
P150,850 (or P5 per square meter), and the assessed value was P60,340.
Ten months later, or on December 15, 1978, Tax Declaration No. 47895 was cancelled and replaced by Tax
Declaration No. A018- 00911 (Exh. Y-2) wherein the market value of the same "ricefield," jumped to P301,690 (P10
per square meter). Its assessed value was fixed at P120,680. The description and value of the property, according
to Pedro Ocol, the assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig, was based on the actual use of the property (riceland) not
on its potential use (p. 13, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 40, Ibid.). The valuation was based on a compilation of sales
given to the Municipal Assessor's office by the Register of Deeds, from which transactions the Assessor obtained
the average valuation of the properties in the same vicinity (p. 14, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 41, Ibid.).
Among those who filed an application for payment (Exhs. FF and FF-1) at the District Engineer's Office was the
accused, Natividad Gutierrez, who was armed with a Special Power of Attorney allegedly executed on February
24,1978 by Benjamin Agleham in her favor (Exhs. C and C-1). She submitted a falsified xerox copy of Tax
Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B) bearing a false date: December 15,1973 (instead of February 27, 1978) and
describing Agleham's 30,169-square-meter property as "residential" (instead of riceland), with a fair market value of
P2,413,520 or P80 per square meter (instead of P150,845 at P5 per square meter). Its assessed value appeared to
be P724,056 (instead of P60,340). Gutierrez submitted Agleham's Original Certificate of Title No. 0097 (Exh. H-1),
the technical description of the property, and a xerox copy of a "Sworn Statement of the True Current and Fair
Market Value of Real Property" required under P.D. No. 76 (Exh. 1). The xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895
was supposedly certified by the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Alfredo Prudencio.
The documents supporting Agleham's claim were "examined" by the Administrative Officer, accused Claudio Arcaya,
who, after initiating them, turned them over to accused Ladislao G. Cruz, A Deed of Absolute Sale for Lot 1 (19,004
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 81563
square meters valued at P80 per square meter) was prepared by Cruz who also initialed the supporting documents
and transmitted them to District Engr. Data.
On April 20,1978, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhs. G and G-1) was signed by Data and Gutierrez (as attorney-in-
fact of Agleham). Thereafter, Data sent the papers to Director Desiderio Anolin of the Bureau of Public Works who
recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Public Works the approval of the Deed of Sale (Exh. G-1). Afterwards,
the documents were returned to Data's office for the transfer of title to the Government. On June 8, 1978, the sale
was registered and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12071 (Exh. T) was issued in the name of the Government.
General Voucher (Exh. S) No. 85-2-7809-52 dated "9/29/78" for the amount of P1,520,320 bore fourth certifications
of. (1) Cruz as Senior Civil Engineer; (2) Priscillo G. Fernando as Supervising Civil Engineer II; (3) Cresencio Data
as District Engineer II and (4) Cesar V. Franco as Project Acting Accountant (p. 56, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 83,
Ibid.).
On October 23, 1978, the voucher and its supporting documents were pre-audited and approved for payment by the
accused, Amado C. Arias, as auditor of the Engineering District. The next day, October 24, 1978, sixteen (16) PNB
checks with Serial Nos. 188532 to 188547, inclusive (Exhs. X to X-1 5), for the total sum of Pl,520,320.00 were
issued to Gutierrez as payment for Agleham's 19,004-square-meter lot.
In October, 1979, an investigation was conducted by the Ministry of National Defense on the gross overpricing of
Agleham's property. During the investigation, sworn statements were taken from Alfredo Prudencio, Municipal
Treasurer of Pasig (Exh. AA), Pedro Ocol, Assistant Municipal Assessor of Pasig (Exh. BB), and the accused
Claudio Arcaya (Exh. EE). Prudencio denied having issued or signed the certification dated September 14,1978
(Exh. J), attesting that Agleham's property covered by Tax Declaration No. 47895 had a market value of P2,413,520
and that the taxes had been paid from 1975 to 1978. Prudencio also impugned the initial (purporting to be that of his
subordinate Ruben Gatchalian, Chief of the Land Tax Division) that was affixed below Prudencio's typewritten name
in Exhibit J. Both Prudencio and Gatchalian disowned the typewritten certification. They declared that such
certifications are usually issued by their office on mimeographed forms (Exh. J-1).
Assistant Municipal Assessor Pedro Ocol produced and Identified the original or genuine Tax Declaration No. 47895
dated February 27, 1978, and a certified copy thereof (Exh. Y-1). Therein, Agleham's property of 30,169 square
meters was classified as a "ricefield" and appraised at P5 per square meter, with an assessed value of P60,340 and
a market value of PI 50,850. Ocol testified that the supposed xerox copy of Tax Declaration No. 47895 (Exh. B),
which Gutierrez submitted as one of the supporting documents of the general voucher (Exh. S), was fake, because
of the following tell-tale signs:
(1) the tax declaration number was typewritten, not machine numbered as in the genuine tax declaration, Exhibit Y;
(2) the stampmark of registration was antedated to December 15, 1973 in the fake, instead of the correct date
February 27, 1978-- in the genuine tax declaration;
(3) the classification of the property was "residential," instead of "ricefield" which is its classification in the genuine
document; and
(4) the lot was over priced at P80 per square meter in the fake tax declaration, instead of the appraised value of only
P5 per square meter appearing in the genuine declaration.
Also found to be fake was Tax Declaration No. 49948 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exhs. K and K-
1). The genuine Tax Declaration No. 49948 (Exhs. U and V-2) was actually filed on October 18, 1978 in the names
of the spouses Moises Javillonar and Sofia Andres, for their 598-square-meters' residential property with a declared
market value of P51,630.
The Agleham deed of sale was pre-audited by the auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, Amado Arias, who
approved the payment of Pl,520,320 to Gutierrez without questioning the fact that the amount of the purchase price
therein had been altered, i.e., "snow-flaked (sic) and later superimposed by the amount of P1,520,320 in words and
figures" (p. 71, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 98, Ibid.), nor checking the veracity of the supporting documents listed
at the back of the General Voucher (Exh. S), numbering fifteen (15) in all, among which were:
(1) the fake Tax Declaration No. 47895 showing that the value of the land was P80 per square meter (Exh. B);
(2) fake Tax Declaration No. 49948 In the name of the Republic of the Philippines (Exh. K)
(3) the forged certification of Municipal Treasurer Prudencio that the fair market value of 'the land was P100 per
square meter (Exh. J);
(4) a false certification (Exh. D) dated September 19, 1978 signed by accused Cruz, Jose, and Fernando, certifying
that the Agleham property was upon ocular inspection by them, found to be "residential;"
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 81563
(5) a falsely dated certification where the original date was erased and a false date (February 15, 1978) was
superimposed (Exh.E), issued by Engr. Fernando pursuant to DPWTC Circular No. 557, certifying that he had
examined the real estate tax receipts of the Agleham property for the last three (3) years;
(6) the technical description of the land (Exhs. F and F-1) attached to the deed of sale dated April 20, 1978 was not
an approved technical description for the subdivision survey executed by Geodetic Engineer Cipriano C. Caro was
verified and approved by the Land Registration Commission on May 28,1978 only. There were "substantial
variations" noted by the Sandiganbayan between the approved technical description and the technical description of
the land in the deed of sale (p. 61, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 88, Ibid.);
(7) the special power of attorney dated February 24, 1978, supposedly given to Gutierrez by Agleham (Exhs. C, C-1)
bore a fictitious residence certificate Agleham (p. 64, Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 91, Ibid.); and
(8) the fake Sworn Statement on the Current and Fair Market Value of Real Properties (Exh. Z) dated October 1,
1973, contained a forged signature of Agleham, presumably made by Gutierrez herself The Sandiganbayan
observed that Agleham's supposed signature "appears to be Identical to accused Gutierrez' signatures in the
General Voucher (Exh. S), in the release and Quitclaim which she signed in favor of Agleham on July 20, 1983 (Exh.
CC), and in her affidavits (Exhs. FF and FF-1)." (pp. 64-65, Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 91-92, Ibid.).
After payment of the Agleham claim, all the supporting documents were kept by Arias. Even after he had been
replaced by Julito Pesayco on September 1, 1981, as auditor of the Rizal Engineering District, he did not turn over
the documents to Pesayco. It was only on June 23, 1982, after this case had been filed in the Sandiganbayan and
the trial had begun, that Arias delivered them to Pesayco (Exh. T-1).
After a trial lasting nearly six years, the Sandiganbayan rendered a 78-page decision on November 16, 1987, whose
dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Natividad G. Gutierrez, Cresencio D.

Data, Ladislao G. Cruz, Carlos L. Jose, Claudio H. Arcaya and Amado C. Arias GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as ascended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby sentences each of them to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for THREE (3) YEARS, as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS, as
maximum; to further suffer perpetual disqualification from public office; to indemnify jointly and
severally, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of P1,425,300, and to pay
their proportional costs of this action. (p. 104, Rollo of G.R. No. 81563.)
Both Arias and Data appealed.
Arias anchors his petition for review of the Sandiganbayan's decision (G.R. No. 81563) on his contention that the
court's findings that he conspired with his co-accused and that he was grossly negligent are based on
misapprehension of facts, speculation, surmise, and conjecture.
Data's main defense is that the acquisition of the Agleham property was the work of the committee of Prescillo
Fernando iii which he did not take an active part, and that the price which the government paid for it was
reasonable. Hence, it uttered no jury in the transaction.
In his consolidated brief or comment for the State, the Solicitor General recommends the acquittal of the petitioners
because the Agleham property was allegedly not grossly overpriced.
After deliberating on the petitions in these cases, we find no error in the decision under review. The Sandiganbayan
did not err in finding that the petitioners conspired with their co-accused to cause injury to the Government and to
unduly favor the lot owner, Agleham.
A conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proven by a
number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances (People vs. Maralit, G.R. No. 71143, Sept. 19,1988; People
vs. Roca, G.R. No. 77779, June 27, 1988).
This case presents a conspiracy of silence and inaction where chiefs of office who should have been vigilant to
protect the interest of the Government in the purchase of Agleham's two-hectare riceland, accepted as gospel truth
the certifications of their subordinates, and approved without question the million-peso purchase which, by the
standards prevailing in 1976-78, should have pricked their curiosity and prompted them to make inquiries and to
verify the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval. The petitioners kept silent when they should
have asked questions they looked the other way when they should have probed deep into the transaction.
Since it was too much of a coincidence that both petitioners were negligent at the same time over the same
transaction, the Sandiganbayan was justified in concluding that they connived and conspired to act in that manner to
approve the illegal transaction which would favor the seller of the land and defraud the Government.
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 81563
We cannot accept Arias' excuse that because the deed of sale had been signed and the property transferred to the
Government which received a title in its name, there was nothing else for him to do but approve the voucher for
payment. The primary function of an auditor is to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenditures of government funds.
The auditorial function of an auditor, as a representative of the Commission on Audit, comprises three aspects: (1)
examination; (2) audit: and (3) settlement of the accounts, funds, financial transactions and resources of the
agencies under their respective audit jurisdiction (Sec. 43, Government Auditing Code of the Phil.). Examination, as
applied to auditing, means "to probe records, or inspect securities or other documents; review procedures, and
question persons, all for the purpose of arriving at an opinion of accuracy, propriety, sufficiency, and the like." (State
Audit Code of the Philippines, Annotated by Tantuico, 1982 Ed., p. 57.)
Arias admitted that he did not check or verify the papers supporting the general voucher that was submitted to him
for payment of Pl,520,320 to Agleham or his attorney-in-fact, Natividad Gutierrez. Arias did not question any person
for the purpose of determining the accuracy and integrity of the documents submitted to him and the
reasonableness of the price that the Government was paying for the less than two-hectare riceland. We reject his
casuistic explanation that since his subordinates had passed upon the transaction, he could assume that it was
lawful and regular for, if he would be a mere rubber stamp for his subordinates, his position as auditor would be
useless and unnecessary.
We make the same observation concerning District Engineer Cresencio Data who claims innocence because he
allegedly did not take any direct and active participation in the acquisition of the Agleham property, throwing the
blame on the committee which he created, composed of Fernando, Asuncion, Mendoza, Cruz, Hucom and Jose that
negotiated with the property owners for the purchase of properties on the path of the Mangahan Floodway Project.
He in effect would hide under the skirt of the committee which he himself selected and to which he delegated the
task that was assigned to his office to Identify the lots that would be traversed by the floodway project, gather and
verify documents, make surveys, negotiate with the owners for the price, prepare the deeds of sale, and process
claims for payment. By appointing the committee, he did not cease to be responsible for the implementation of the
project. Under the principle of command responsibility, he was responsible for the manner in which the committee
performed its tasks for it was he who in fact signed the deed of sale prepared by the committee. By signing the deed
of sale and certifications prepared for his signature by his committee, he in effect, made their acts his own. He is,
therefore, equally guilty with those members of the committee (Fernando, Cruz and Jose) who accepted the fake tax
declarations and made false certifications regarding the use and value of the Agleham property.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that Data signed, but did not approve, the deed of sale of Agleham's property
because the approval thereof was the prerogative of the Secretary of Public Works. It should not be overlooked,
however, that Data's signature on the deed of sale was equivalent to an attestation that the transaction was fair,
honest and legal. It was he who was charged with the task of implementing the Mangahan Floodway Project within
his engineering district.
We find no merit in the Solicitor General's argument that the Agleham riceland was not overpriced because the price
of P80 per square meter fixed in the deed of sale was reasonable, hence, the petitioners are not guilty of having
caused undue injury and prejudice to the Government, nor of having given unwarranted benefits to the property
owner and/or his attorney-in-fact, Gutierrez. He further argues that the valuation in the owner's genuine tax
declaration may not be used as a standard in determining the fair market value of the property because PD Nos. 76
and 464 (making it mandatory in expropriation cases to fix the price at the value of the property as declared by the
owner, or as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower), were declared null and void by this Court in the case
of Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, and other related cases.
That argument is not well taken because PD Nos. 76 and 464 (before they were nullified) applied to the
expropriation of property for public use. The acquisition of Agleham's riceland was not done by expropriation but
through a negotiated sale. In the course of the negotiations, there was absolutely no allegation nor proof that the
price of P80 per square meter was its fair market value in 1978, i.e., eleven (11) years ago. What the accused did
was to prove the value of the land through fake tax declarations (Exhs. B, F, K), false certifications (Exhs. J, D and
E) and a forged sworn statement on the current and fair market value of the real property (Exh. Z) submitted by the
accused in support of the deed of sale. Because fraudulent documents were used, it may not be said that the State
agreed to pay the price on the basis of its fairness, for the Government was in fact deceived concerning the
reasonable value of the land.
When Ocol testified in 1983 that P80 was a reasonable valuation for the Agleham's land, he did not clarify that was
also its reasonable value in 1975, before real estate values in Pasig soared as a result of the implementation of the
Mangahan Floodway Project. Hence, Ocol's testimony was insufficient to rebut the valuation in Agleham's genuine
1978 Tax Declaration No. 47895 that the fair valuation of the riceland then was only P5 per square meter. A Tax
Declaration is a guide or indicator of the reasonable value of the property (EPZA vs. Dulay, supra).
The petitioner's partiality for Agleham/Gutierrez may be inferred from their having deliberately closed their eyes to
the defects and irregularities of the transaction in his favor and their seeming neglect, if not deliberate omission, to
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 81563
check, the authenticity of the documents presented to them for approval. Since partiality is a mental state or
predilection, in the absence of direct evidence, it may be proved by the attendant circumstance instances.
WHEREFORE, I vote to affirm in toto the decision of the Sandiganbayan in SB Crim. Case No. 2010, with costs
against the petitioners, Amado Arias and Cresencio Data.
Feliciano, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 The Solicitor General was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Zoilo A. Andi and Solicitor Luis F.
Simon.
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 220598
G.R. No. 220598, April 18, 2017,

♦ Decision, Bersamin, [J]
♦ Dissenting Opinion, Leonen, [J]
EN BANC
April 18, 2017
G.R. No. 220598
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN, (First Division), Respondents
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN,, J.:
On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS
the petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the
petitioners GLORIAMACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNOAGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the
immediate release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 1
On August 3, 2016, the State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, has moved for the reconsideration of the
decision, submitting that:
I. THIS HONORABLE COURT'S GIVING DUE COURSE TO A CERTIORARI ACTION ASSAILING AN

INTERLOCUTORY ORDER DENYING DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE VIOLA TES RULE 119, SECTION 23 OF THE
RULES OF COURT, WHICH PROVIDES THAT AN ORDER DENYING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHALL
NOT BE REVIEWABLE BY APPEAL OR BY CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERRORS WHICH AMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OR
DEPRIVATION OF THE STATE'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
A. THE DECISION REQUIRES ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE PROSECUTION OF PLUNDER, VIZ.

IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN PLUNDERER AND PERSONAL BENEFIT TO HIM/HER, BOTH OF
WHICH ARE NOT PROVIDED IN THE TEXT OF REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) NO. 7080.
B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION WAS NOT FULLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE CONFIDENTIAL/INTELLIGENCE
FUND (CIF) DISBURSEMENT PROCESS, QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE OF CO-MINGLING OF FUNDS
AND AGUAS' REPORTS TO THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) THAT BULK OF THE
PHP365,997,915.00 WITHDRAWN FROM THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE'S (PCSO)
CIF WERE DIVERTED TO THE ARROYO-HEADED OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 220598
C. ARROYO AND AGUAS, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION, IN CONSPIRACY WITH THEIR

COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174, COMMITTED PLUNDER VIA· A COMPLEX ILLEGAL SCHEME
WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO IN HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF PESOS.
D. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER WERE NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PEOPLE SHOWS, BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT ARROYO, AGUAS AND THEIR COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174 ARE
GUILTY OF MALVERSATION.2
In contrast, the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively barred the consideration and granting of the
motion for reconsideration of the State because doing so would amount to the re-prosecution or revival of the
charge against them despite their acquittal, and would thereby violate the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy.
Petitioner Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) points out that the State miserably failed to prove the corpus delicti
of plunder; that the Court correctly required the identification of the main plunderer as well as personal benefit on the
part of the raider of the public treasury to enable the successful prosecution of the crime of plunder; that the State
did not prove the conspiracy that justified her inclusion in the charge; that to sustain the case for malversation
against her, in lieu of plunder, would violate her right to be informed of the accusation against her because the
information did not necessarily include the crime of malversation; and that even if the information did so, the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy already barred the re-opening of the case for that purpose.
Petitioner Benigno B. Aguas echoes the contentions of Arroyo in urging the Com1 to deny the motion for
reconsideration.
In reply, the State avers that the prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply because it was denied its day in
court, thereby rendering the decision void; that the Court should re-examine the facts and pieces of evidence in
order to find the petitioners guilty as charged; and that the allegations of the information sufficiently included all that
was necessary to fully inform the petitioners of the accusations against them.
Ruling of the Court
The Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit.
To start with, the State argues' that the consolidated petitions for certiorari were improper remedies in light of
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibiting the review of the denial of their demurrer prior to the
judgment in the case either by appeal or by certiorari; that the Court has thereby limited its own power, which should
necessarily prevent the giving of due course to the petitions for certiorari, as well as the undoing of the order
denying the petitioners' demurrer to evidence; that the proper remedy under the Rules of Court was for the
petitioners to proceed to trial and to present their evidence-in-chief thereat; and that even if there had been grave
abuse of discretion attending the denial, the Court's certiorari powers should be exercised only upon the petitioners'
compliance with the stringent requirements of Rule 65, particularly with the requirement that there be no plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which they did not establish.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, pertinently provides:
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. – xxx
xxxx
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not
be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (n)
The argument of the State, which is really a repetition of its earlier submission, was squarely resolved in the
decision, as follows:
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions for certiorari because the Sandiganbayan, as shall
shortly be demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial
court because of the availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, Section 23, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." It is not an
insuperable obstacle to this action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the petitioners was an
interlocutory order that did not terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was to
go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal the conviction, and assign the denial as among
the errors to be reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ of certiorari may issue should not
be limited, because to do so -
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 220598
x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is the discretion of the com1 that authority
is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of
oursuperintending control over other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular
case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other courts of justice the duty to correct errors of
jurisdiction as a result of capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by expressly
incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII the following provision:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of
procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the
bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is
committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to
evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial
was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court
was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite the
absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the
absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict.3
We reiterate the foregoing resolution, and stress that the prohibition contained in Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court is not an insuperable obstacle to the review by the Court of the denial of the demurrer to evidence through
certiorari. We have had many rulings to that effect in the past. For instance, in Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan,4the Court
expressly ruled that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy to assail the denial of the demurrer to evidence
that was tainted with grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
Secondly, the State submits that its right to due process was violated because the decision imposed additional
elements for plunder that neither ' Republic Act No. 7080 nor jurisprudence had theretofore required, i.e., the
identification of the main plunderer, and personal benefit on the part of the accused committing the predicate crime
of raid on the public treasury. The State complains that it was not given the opportunity to establish such additional
elements; that the imposition of new elements fu1iher amounted to judicial legislation in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers; that the Court nitpicked on the different infirmities of the information despite the issue
revolving only around the sufficiency of the evidence; and that it established all the elements of plunder beyond
reasonable doubt.
The State cites the plain meaning rule to highlight that the crime of plunder did not require personal benefit on the
part of the raider of the public treasury. It insists that the definition of raids on the public treasury, conformably with
the plain meaning rule, is the taking of public money through fraudulent or unlawful means, and such definition does
not require enjoyment or personal benefit on the part of plunderer or on the part of any of his co-conspirators for
them to be convicted for plunder.
The submissions of the State are unfounded.
The requirements for the identification of the main plunderer and for personal benefit in the predicate act of raids on
the public treasury have been written in R.A. No. 7080 itself as well as embedded in pertinent jurisprudence. This
we made clear in the decision, as follows:
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy to
commit plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied
agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by
express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.
This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law)
states:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder: Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 220598
described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(₱50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and
the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes
and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State. [As Amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]
Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:
Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
xxxx
d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or

implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official positi0n, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed,
acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is committed by any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00 through a combination or series of overt
criminal acts as described in Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder
against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be
members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordim1tes or other
persons. In other words, the allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information
was appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either manner. Of course, implied
conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact must be properly alleged and duly proven by
the Prosecution.
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where the Court explained the nature of the
conspiracy charge and the necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the amassment, accumulation and
acquisition was made, thus:
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different
parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal
acts have a commonality - to help the former President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the
conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive
protection money from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each
accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such
sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them,
by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 220598
5
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada. [bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis]
Indeed, because plunder is a crime that only a public official can commit by amassing, accumulating, or acquiring ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00, the identification in the information
of such public official as the main plunderer among the several individuals thus charged is logically necessary under
the law itself. In particular reference to Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174, the individuals charged therein -
including the petitioners - were 10 public officials; hence, it was only proper to identify the main plunderer or
plunderers among the 10 accused who herself or himself had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth
with the total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.
The phrase raids on the public treasury as used in Section 1 (d) of R. A. No. 7080 is itself ambiguous. In order to
ascertain the objective meaning of the phrase, the act of raiding the public treasury cannot be divided into parts.
This is to differentiate the predicate act of raids on the public treasury from other offenses involving property, like
robbery, theft, or estafa. Considering that R.A. No. 7080 does not expressly define this predicate act, the Court has
necessarily resorted to statutory construction. In so doing, the Court did not adopt the State's submission that
personal benefit on the part of the accused need not be alleged and shown because doing so would have defeated
the clear intent of the law itself,6 which was to punish the amassing, accumulating, or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱150,000,000.00 by any combination or series of acts of
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.
As the decision has observed, the rules of statutory construction as well as the deliberations of Congress indicated
the intent of Congress to require personal benefit for the predicate act of raids on the public treasury, viz.:
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080, which provides:
Section l .Definition of Terms. – xxx
xxxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, prope1iy, business enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
xxxx
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the
accompanying words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds. This process
is conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct
construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various
meanings may be made by considering the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or
with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other
words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or restricted by the latter.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own; to misappropriate
means to own, to take something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good, substance, privilege, or right used
improperly, unforcsccably, or not as intended;" and malversation occurs when "any public officer who, by reason of
the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially." The common thread that binds all the four terms together is that the
public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four
other terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such
use of the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation
and gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a
sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.7
The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations removed personal benefit as a requirement for plunder. In not
requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted the following exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator
Tafiada, viz.:
Senator Enrile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or person who conspired or knowingly
benefited". One does not have to conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is that he "knowingly
benefited". A candidate for the Senate for instance, who received a political contribution from a plunderer, knowing
that the contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he knowingly benefited from the plunder, would he also suffer the
penalty, Mr. President, for life imprisonment?
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 220598
Senator Tafiada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5,
on page 3. But, in a way, Mr. President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out these questions, I believe that
under the examples he has given, the Court will have to...
Senator Enrile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree with the plunderer to plunder the country but
because she is a dutiful wife or a faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to the spouse. And, of
course, she enjoys the benefits out of the plunder. Would the Gentleman now impute to her or him the crime of
plunder simply because she or he knowingly benefited out of the fruits of the plunder and, therefore, he must suffer
or he must suffer the penalty of life imprisonment?
The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee amendment.
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5 were stricken out in the Committee amendment.
But, as I said, the examples of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading the Record. And, I believe that in
those examples, the Court will have just to take into consideration all the other circumstances prevailing in the case
and the evidence that will be submitted.
The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been stricken off."
The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal, therefore, that what was removed from the
coverage of the bill and the final version that eventually became the law was a person who was not the main
plunderer or a co-conspirator, but one who personally benefited from the plunderers' action. The requirement of
personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-conspirators by virtue of their plunder was not removed.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that GMA and
Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on
the public treasury beyond reasonable doubt. 8
Thirdly, the State contends that the Court did not appreciate the totality of its evidence, particularly the different
irregularities committed in the disbursement of the PCSO funds, i.e., the commingling of funds, the non-compliance
with LOI No. 1282, and the unilateral approval of the disbursements. Such totality, coupled with the fact of the
petitioners' indispensable cooperation in the pilfering of public funds, showed the existence of the conspiracy to
commit plunder among all of the accused.
The contention lacks basis.
As can be readily seen from the decision, the Court expressly granted the petitioners' respective demurrers to
evidence and dismissed the plunder case against them for insufficiency of evidence because:
x x x the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the
demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for
plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict. 9
Such disposition of the Court fully took into consideration all the evidence adduced against the petitioners. We need
not rehash our review of the evidence thus adduced, for it is enough simply to stress that the Prosecution failed to
establish the corpus delicti of plunder - that any or all of the accused public officials, particularly petitioner Arroyo,
had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least
₱50,000,000.00.
Fourthly, in accenting certain inadequacies of the allegations of the information, the Court did not engage in
purposeless nitpicking, and did not digress from the primary task of determining the sufficiency of the evidence
presented by the State against the petitioners. What the Court thereby intended to achieve was to highlight what
would have been relevant in the proper prosecution of plunder and thus enable itself to discern and determine
whether the evidence of guilt was sufficient or not. In fact, the Court categorically clarified that in discussing the
essential need for the identification of the main plunderer it was not harping on the sufficiency of the information, but
was only enabling itself to search for and to find the relevant proof that unequivocally showed petitioner Arroyo as
the "mastermind" - which was how the Sandiganbayan had characterized her participation - in the context of the
implied conspiracy alleged in the information. But the search came to naught, for the information contained nothing
that averred her commission of the overt act necessary to implicate her in the supposed conspiracy to commit the
crime of plunder. Indeed, the Court assiduously searched for but did not find the sufficient incriminatory evidence
against the petitioners. Hence, the Sandiganbayan capriciously and oppressively denied their demurrers to
evidence.
Fifthly, the State posits that it established at least a case for malversation against the petitioners.
Malversation is defined and punished under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads thusly:
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 220598
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any public officer who, by
reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take
or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of
such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two
hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the
amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than
twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a
fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable,
upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use. (As amended by RA 1060).
The elements of malversation are that: (a) the offender is an accountable public officer; (b) he/she is responsible for
the misappropriation of public funds or property through intent or negligence; and (c) he/she has custody of and
received such funds and property by reason of his/her office. 10
The information in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-017411 avers:
The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuse GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO O. VALENCIA,
MANUEL L. MORATO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS. VALDES, BENIGNO B.
AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and NILDA B. PLARAS, of the crime of PLUNDER, as defined by, and penalized
under Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, committed, as follows:
That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, then the
President of the Philippines, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then General Manager and Vice Chairman, SERGIO 0.
VALENCIA, then Chairman of the Board of Directors, MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T.
ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS. VALDES, then members of the Board of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then Budget
and Accounts Manager, all of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then
Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS, then Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of the
Commission on Audit, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking
undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving,
conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally 'amass,,
accumulate and/or acquire directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTEEN
PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or
similar schemes or means, described as follows:
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its Confidential/Intelligence
Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing,
and/or illegally conveying or transferring the proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also
in several instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-mentioned
amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and or unlawfully transferring or
conveying the same into their possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and
fictitious expenditures; and
(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, in
several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 220598
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In thereby averring the predicate act of malversation, the State did not sufficiently allege the aforementioned
essential elements of malversation in the information. The omission from the information of factual details
descriptive of the aforementioned elements of malversation highlighted the insufficiency of the allegations.
Consequently, the State's position is entirely unfounded.
Lastly, the petitioners insist that the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the State can
amount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because their acquittal under the
decision was a prior jeopardy within the context of Section 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, to
wit:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a
law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.
The insistence of the petitioners is fully warranted. Indeed, the consideration and granting of the motion for
reconsideration of the State will amount to the violation of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
The Court's consequential dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-12- CRM-0174 as to the petitioners for insufficiency of
evidence amounted to their acquittal of the crime of plunder charged against them. In People v. Tan, 12the Court
shows why:
In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Com1 explained the general rule that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates
as an acquittal and is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is ''filed after tile prosecution had rested
its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of
the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the
grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double
jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
xxxx
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court stated that the
only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:
... The only instance when double ,jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous
acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 13
The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense bars not only a
new and independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had attached. 14 As such,
every acquittal becomes final immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment.
With the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's motion for reconsideration in this case would violate
the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because it would effectively reopen the prosecution and
subject the petitioners to a second jeopardy despite their acquittal.
It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides to the
accused three related protections, specifically: protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal; protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and protection against
multiple punishments for the same offense. 15The rationale for the three protections is expounded in United States v.
Wilson: 16
The interests underlying these three protections arc quite similar. When a defendant has been once
convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality require that he not be
subjected to the possibility of further punishment by being again tried or sentenced for the same offense.
Ex pa rte Lange, 18 Wall 163 (1874); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). When a defendant has been acquitted
of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to make repeated attempts to
convict him,
"thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal, and compelling him to live in a continuing
state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that, even though innocent, he may be
found guilty."
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 220598
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957).
The policy of avoiding multiple trials has been regarded as so important that exceptions to the principle
have been only grudgingly allowed. Initially, a new trial was thought to be unavailable after appeal, whether
requested by the prosecution or the defendant. See United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (No. 15,204) (CCD
Mass. 1834) (Story, J.). It was not until 1896 that it was made clear that a defendant could seek a new trial
after conviction, even though the Government enjoyed no similar right. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662.
(Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
I join J. Leonen’s Dissent

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
I join J. Leonen's Dissent

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Please see concurring and

BIENVENIDO L. REYES Dissenting opinion in the main case
Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
I dissent. See separate opinion

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
I join the dissent of J. Leonen

SAMUEL R. MARTIREZ
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S,. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
NOEL G. TIJAM
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Rollo (G.R. No. 220953), Vol. III, p. 1866.
2
Rollo (G.R. No. 220598), Vol. VI, pp. 4158- 4159.
9/24/23, 11:32 AM G.R. No. 220598
3
Rollo (G.R. No. 220953), Vol. III, pp. 1846-1847; bold underscoring is supplied for emphasis.
4
G.R. Nos. 175930-31, February 11, 2008, 544 SCRA 324, 336.
5
Rollo (G.R. No. 220593). Vol. III, pp. 1851-1854.
6
See Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection, G.R. No. 170735, December 17, 2007, 540
SCRA 456, 472.
7
Bold underscoring is added for emphasis.
8
Rollo (G.R. No. 220953), Vol. 111, pp. 1863-1865.
9
Id. at 1847.
10
Regalado, Criminal Law Conspectus, 1st Edition, 2000, National Book Store, Inc., p. 424.
11
Rollo (G.R. No. 220598), Vol. I, pp. 305-307-A.
12
G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 388.
13
Id. at 395-397 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).
14
Republic v. Court of Appeals, No. L-41115, September 11, 1982, 116 SCRA 505, 556; People v. Pomeroy,
97 Phil 927 (1955); People v. Bringas, 70 Phil 528; People v. Yelo, 83 Phil. 618.
15
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 US 711, 717 (1969).
16
420 US 332, 343 (1975).
9/24/23, 11:33 AM G.R. No. 181084

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 181084 June 16, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BARTOLOME TAMPUS1 and IDA MONTESCLAROS, Defendants.
IDA MONTESCLAROS, Appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal is the decision2 of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00215. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
City in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros (Ida) guilty as an accomplice in the
commission of rape.
The present appeal stems from two criminal cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 013324-L charging Bartolome Tampus
(Tampus) and Ida as conspirators in the rape of ABC4 on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m.; and (2) Criminal Case No.
013325-L charging Tampus of raping ABC on April 4, 1995 at 1:00 a.m.
The Information5 in each case reads as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. 013324-L6
That on the 1st day of April 1995, at about 4:30 o’clock [sic] in the afternoon, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines,
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Bartolome Tampus, taking advantage that [ABC] was in deep
slumber due to drunkenness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic]
the latter, who was at that time thirteen (13) years old, against her will, in conspiracy with the accused Ida
Montesclaros who gave permission to Bartolome Tampus to rape [ABC].
CONTRARY TO LAW.
CRIM. CASE NO. 013325-L7
That on the 3rd day of April, 1995,8 at about 1:00 o’clock [sic] dawn, in Looc, Lapulapu City, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a wooden club (poras), by means of
threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with [sic]
[ABC], who was at that time thirteen (13) years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The offended party, ABC, is the daughter of appellant Ida, and was 13 years old at the time of the incident. Ida
worked as a waitress in Bayanihan Beer House in Mabini, Cebu City. On February 19, 1995, Ida and ABC started to
rent a room in a house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. On April 1, 1995, about 4:30 p.m., ABC testified that
she was in the house with Ida and Tampus9 who were both drinking beer at that time. They forced her to drink
beer10 and after consuming three and one-half (3 ½) glasses of beer, she became intoxicated and very sleepy.11
While ABC was lying on the floor of their room, she overheard Tampus requesting her mother, Ida, that he be
allowed to "remedyo"12 or have sexual intercourse with her.13 Appellant Ida agreed and instructed Tampus to leave
as soon as he finished having sexual intercourse with ABC. Ida then went to work, leaving Tampus alone with ABC.
ABC fell asleep and when she woke up, she noticed that the garter of her panties was loose and rolled down to her
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9/24/23, 11:33 AM G.R. No. 181084
knees. She suffered pain in her head, thighs, buttocks, groin and vagina, and noticed that her panties and short
pants were stained with blood which was coming from her vagina.14 When her mother arrived home from work the
following morning, she kept on crying but appellant Ida ignored her.15
ABC testified that on April 4, 1995 around 1:00 a.m., she was left alone in the room since her mother was at work at
the beer house.16 Tampus went inside their room and threatened to kill her if she would report the previous sexual
assault to anyone.17 He then forcibly removed her panties. ABC shouted but Tampus covered her mouth and again
threatened to kill her if she shouted.18 He undressed himself, spread ABC’s legs, put saliva on his right hand and he
applied this to her vagina; he then inserted his penis into ABC’s vagina and made a push and pull movement.19
After consummating the sexual act, he left the house. When ABC told appellant Ida about the incident, the latter
again ignored her.20
On May 4, 1995, after being maltreated by her mother, ABC sought the help of her aunt, Nellie Montesclaros
(Nellie). She told Nellie about the rape and that her mother sold her.21 ABC, together with Nellie and Norma
Andales, a traffic enforcer, reported the incident of rape to the police. On May 9, 1995, Nestor A. Sator , M.D. (Dr.
Sator), head of the Medico-Legal Branch of the Philippine National Crime Laboratory Services, Regional Unit 7,
conducted a physical examination of ABC and issued a Medico-Legal Report.22 Dr. Sator testified that the result of
his examination of ABC revealed a deep healed laceration at the seven (7) o’clock position and a shallow healed
laceration at the one (1) o’clock position on ABC’s hymen.
On September 22, 1995, ABC filed two Complaints. She accused Tampus of taking advantage of her by having
carnal knowledge of her, against her will, while she was intoxicated and sleeping on April 1, 1995 at 4:30 p.m. She
declared in her Complaint that this was done in conspiracy with accused Ida who gave permission to Tampus to
rape her. And again, she stated that on April 3, 1995, she was threatened with a wooden club by Tampus, who then
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, against her will.
Tampus denied raping ABC on April 1, 1995. He claimed that at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995, he left the house to go to
the public market of Lapu-lapu City. When he arrived home at 6:00 p.m., ABC and Ida were not there as they usually
go to the beer house at 4:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m.23 He denied forcing ABC to drink beer. He also denied asking Ida to
allow him to have sexual intercourse with ABC.24 Appellant Ida also testified that she and ABC left for the beer
house at 4:00 p.m. of April 1, 1995 and they came back at 6:00 a.m. the following day.25 She said that she always
brought her daughter to the beer house with her and there was never an instance when she left her daughter alone
in the house.26 She denied forcing ABC to drink beer at 4:30 p.m. of April 1, 1995, and she denied giving permission
to Tampus to have sexual intercourse with ABC.27
Tampus also denied raping ABC on April 4, 1995. He testified that he arrived at the Barangay Tanod Headquarters
between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. of April 3, 199528 and that his actual duty time shift was from midnight to 5:00 a.m.
of April 4, 1995. Guillermo Berdin (Berdin), a defense witness, testified that on April 3, 1995, Tampus reported for
duty at the police outpost at 8:00 p.m. and left at 5:00 a.m. of April 4, 1995, as reflected in the attendance logbook.
However, on cross-examination, Berdin could not tell whether the signature appearing on the logbook really
belonged to Tampus. It was noted by the trial court that the handwriting used by Tampus in the logbook entry on
April 2, 1995 is different from his handwriting appearing on April 3, 1995.29 It was also revealed that the house of
Tampus is just 500 meters away or just a three-minute walk from the barangay tanod outpost and that the barangay
tanod on duty could leave the outpost unnoticed or without permission.30
Agustos B. Costas, M.D.31 (Dr. Costas), the Head of the Department of Psychiatry of the Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center, issued a Medical Certification,32 which showed that appellant Ida was treated as an outpatient at
the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center Psychiatry Department from November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995
and was provisionally diagnosed with Schizophrenia, paranoid type.
The trial court convicted Tampus of two counts of rape, as principal in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and Criminal
Case No. 013325-L. Appellant Ida was found guilty as an accomplice in Criminal Case No. 013324-L. The trial court
appreciated in Ida’s favor the mitigating circumstance of illness which would diminish the exercise of will-power
without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.33 The
dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision states, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds accused Bartolome Tampus GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of two counts of rape, as principals [sic], in Criminal Case No. 013324-L and
Criminal Case No. 013325-L and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in each of the
aforementioned cases.
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The Court also finds accused Ida Montesclaros GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as an accomplice in
Criminal Case No. 013324-L, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to fourteen (14) years, and eight (8) months of Reclusion Temporal.
Both accused are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the offended party, [ABC], the sum of
P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-L.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 34
Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, accused Tampus died on November 16, 200035 and
his appeal was dismissed by the Third Division of this Court.36 Thus, the appeal before the Court of Appeals dealt
only with that of appellant Ida. The appellate court gave credence to the testimony of ABC and affirmed the trial
court’s decision with modification. It appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that
Ida failed to prove that she was completely deprived of intelligence on April 1, 1995. On the basis of the medical
report and the testimony of the attending physician, Ida’s schizophrenia was determined by both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her will-power though it did not deprive her of the
consciousness of her acts. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the commission of
rape and hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Further, she is ORDERED to pay
moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (Php 50,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of
twenty-five thousand pesos (Php 25,000.00).37
We find the findings of the lower courts to be well-taken.
The finding of guilt of Ida as an accomplice in the rape of ABC is dependent on proving the guilt of the principal
accused. Upon examination of the records of the case, we agree with the ruling of the trial and appellate courts that
the testimony of ABC is clear and straightforward, and is sufficient to conclude that Tampus is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal in the rape of ABC, in Criminal Case No. 013324-L, as well as to convict appellant Ida
as an accomplice in the same criminal case.
The findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect and, generally, appellate courts will not overturn said
findings unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case.38 The rule finds an even more
stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.39
The trial court has carefully scrutinized the testimony of complainant ABC and has given full faith and credence to
her testimony. Both the trial and appellate courts found that the rape of ABC by Tampus on April 1, 1995 has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, it is highly inconceivable for a young girl to impute the crime of rape,
implicate her own mother in such a vile act, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public
trial if she has not been a victim of rape and was impelled to seek justice for the defilement of her person.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full credit.40
Tampus was positively identified by ABC as the person who had carnal knowledge of her against her will on April 1,
1995. The denial of Tampus cannot prevail over the positive and direct identification by the victim, ABC. Although
ABC was asleep and unconscious at the time the sexual debasement was committed by Tampus, circumstantial
evidence established beyond doubt that it is Tampus who raped ABC. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.41 In cases like the one at bar, the Court takes into consideration the events that transpired before and after
the victim lost consciousness in order to establish the commission of the act of coitus.42
The trial court correctly determined, thus:
The prosecution has clearly established by its evidence that accused Bartolome Tampus had carnal knowledge of
[ABC] on April 1, 1995 under the circumstance set forth in Article 335 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
that is, when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.
xxxx
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The Court cannot accept accused Bartolome Tampus’ defense of denial and alibi. His denial pales in effect against
the positive evidence given by [ABC] that he ravished her [on] two occasions.
xxxx
It is true that in the first incident on April 1, 1995, [ABC] did not see Tampus lie down with her. What she saw was the
aftermath of her deflowering upon waking up. Nevertheless, the Court has taken note of the following
circumstances: (1) The drinking session where the complainant was forced to drink beer by both accused; (2) The
conversation between the two accused when accused Tampus requested accused Ida Montesclaros, and was
granted by the latter, permission to have sexual intercourse with the complainant; (3) Accused Tampus and the
complainant were the only persons left in the house when Ida Montesclaros went to work after acceding to the
request of Tampus; (4) The bloodstained pants, the pain and blood in complainant’s vagina and the pain in her head,
groin and buttocks; (5) The threat made by accused Tampus on the complainant in the dawn of April 4, 1995 that he
would kill her if she would tell about the previous incident on April 1, 1995; and (6) The second incident of rape that
immediately ensued. These circumstances form a chain that points to accused Bartolome Tampus as the person
who had carnal knowledge of [ABC] when she was asleep in an inebriated condition. 43
After establishing the guilt of Tampus as principal, the trial court then determined the guilt of Ida. Although Ida was
charged as a conspirator, the trial court found her liable as an accomplice. The trial court ruled that her act of forcing
or intimidating ABC to drink beer and then acceding to the request of co-accused Tampus to be allowed to have
sexual intercourse with ABC did not prove their conspiracy.44 Hence, it held that, "[u]ndoubtedly, Ida Montesclaros
participated in the commission of the crime by previous acts but her participation, not being indispensable, was not
that of a principal. She is liable as an accomplice."45
In her appeal, appellant Ida argued that it is against human nature for a mother to allow her daughter to be raped.
She maintained that there was no instance when she left ABC alone in the house. The Court of Appeals dismissed
appellant Ida’s appeal as it also gave credence to the testimony of ABC.
In her appeal brief filed before this Court, Ida raises the following assignment of errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BARTOLOME TAMPUS OF THE CRIMES OF
RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING IDA MONTESCLAROS AS ACCOMPLICE TO THE CRIME OF
RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.46
We affirm the trial and appellate courts in ruling that Ida is liable as an accomplice in the rape of her daughter, ABC.
Accomplices are persons who, not being included in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.47 The following requisites must be proved in order that a
person can be considered an accomplice:
(a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs
with the latter in his purpose;
(b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and,
(c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged
as accomplice.48
The testimony of ABC establishes that Ida cooperated in the execution of the rape by Tampus when prior to the act
of rape by Tampus, she forced ABC to drink beer and she agreed to Tampus’ request for him to have sexual
intercourse with ABC. Ida’s acts show that she had knowledge of and even gave her permission to the plan of
Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. 1avvphi1
During the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Atty. Paulito Cabrera, of witness ABC, she testified that:
Q Before this date, April 1, 1995, did you already usually drink beer?
A No, sir.
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Q So, you are telling the Honorable Court that it was only on April 1, 1995 that you first drank beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you say, you were forced to drink beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who forced you to drink beer in that afternoon of April 1, 1995?
A Bartolome Tampus and "Nanay", my mother.49
xxxx
Q By the way, your mother proposed to you to drink beer?
A Yes, sir.
Q Before you concede to her proposition, did you not complain that you had not been used to drinking beer
and then, why suddenly, she would let you drink beer at that time?
A No, sir.
Q Did you not tell her that, "I am not used to drinking beer, so, I would not drink beer"?
A Because the beer was mixed with Coke.
Q So, you mean that you also agreed to drink beer at that time?
A I just agreed to the proposal of my mother.
Q But you never voiced any complaint or any refusal to her at that time?
A No, sir because I was afraid that she might maltreat me.
Q At that time when she proposed to you to drink beer, was she already threatening to maltreat you if you
would not drink that beer?
A Not yet.
Q And how were you able to conclude that she might maltreat you if you would not drink that beer that she
proposed for you to drink?
A Because "Nanay" stared at me sharply and she had a wooden stick prepared.
Q Are you sure that she was doing that while she was offering the glass of beer to you?
A Yes, sir.50
xxxx
Q While you were drinking beer, your mother and Bartolome went out of the house and you overheard
Bartolome asking or proposing to your mother that he would have sexual intercourse with you which you term
in the Visayan dialect "remedyo", Bartolome would want to have a "remedyo" with you. When [sic], particular
moment did you allegedly hear this statement, while you were drinking beer or after you had finished drinking
beer?
A When I was already lying on the floor of the room we were renting.51
xxxx
Q And, of course, as you have stated now, it was you, you were quite sure that it was you who was being
referred by Bartolome Tampus when he said to your mother in the Visayan dialect that "gusto siya
moremedyo nimo", he wants to have sexual intercourse with you?
A Yes, sir, but I don’t know the meaning of "remedyo".
Q At that time, you did not know the meaning of "remedyo"?
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A Not yet, sir.52
xxxx
Q Was that the very first time that you ever heard of the word "remedyo"?
A Yes, sir53
xxxx
Q And when your mother came back from work at about 7:00 o’clock [sic] in the morning of April 2, 1995, did
you not also bother to tell her of what you suspected that something serious or bad had happened to you in
the previous day?
A Because she already knew, sir.
Q How did you know that she already knew?
A Because I heard her telling Omeng,54 "After you have sexual intercourse with her, leave her
immediately!"55
xxxx
Q Considering that you never knew what is the meaning of the word, "remedyo", when your mother arrived in
the morning of April 2, 1995, did you not confront your mother, did you not tell her that, "Is this what you mean
by "remedyo", as what you had agreed with Bartolome Tampus that he would do something to my genitals?
A No sir, because when she arrived, she kept on laughing.56
All the requisites concur in order to find Ida guilty as an accomplice to Tampus in the rape of ABC. The testimony of
ABC shows that there was community of design between Ida and Tampus to commit the rape of ABC. Ida had
knowledge of and assented to Tampus’ intention to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. She forced ABC to
drink beer, and when ABC was already drunk, she left ABC alone with Tampus, with the knowledge and even with
her express consent to Tampus’ plan to have sexual intercourse with her daughter.
It is settled jurisprudence that the previous acts of cooperation by the accomplice should not be indispensable to the
commission of the crime; otherwise, she would be liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation. The evidence
shows that the acts of cooperation by Ida are not indispensable to the commission of rape by Tampus. First,
because it was both Ida and Tampus who forced ABC to drink beer, and second because Tampus already had the
intention to have sexual intercourse with ABC and he could have consummated the act even without Ida’s consent.
The acts of Ida are closely related to the eventual commission of rape by Tampus. They both forced ABC to drink
beer; when ABC was already drunk, Tampus asked Ida if he could have sexual intercourse with ABC and Ida gave
her consent; and lastly, Ida left ABC alone with Tampus so that he proceed with his plan to rape ABC.
Circumstances affecting the liability of the Appellant as an Accomplice
We agree with both the trial and appellate courts in their appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of illness as
would diminish the exercise of willpower of Ida without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to
Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code.
Dr. Costas testified that Ida was provisionally treated for schizophrenia a few months before the incident, from
November 11, 1994 to January 12, 1995. Based on his expert opinion, Ida was not totally deprived of intelligence at
the time of the incident; but, she may have poor judgment. On Direct Examination of Dr. Costas by City Prosecutor
Celso V. Espinosa, he testified as follows:
Q Doctor, taking into consideration your diagnosis, as you said, is provisional, would you say that the patient
[sic] totally deprived of intelligence or reason?
A Not totally.
Q She will be conscious of her acts?
A She may be, that is possible, for certain cause.
Q And there will be loss of intelligence?
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A There could be.
Q Now, Doctor, she is charged her [sic] as one of the principals in the commission of the crime of rape for
having given her daughter to be sexually abused by her co-accused, allegedly convinced by her co-accused
on the first day of April, 1995. Now, if she was then under treatment, Doctor, from November 11, 1994 to
January 12, 1995, would you say, Doctor, that having taken this diagnosis for [sic] schizophrenic patient, at
the time, after January 12, 1995, she must have acted with discernment?
A It is possible because you are this kind of mental illness even with the treatment, and even without any
medication, it may be what we called spontaneous, really it will get back.
Q At that time it will loss the intelligence? [sic]
A I think because it might be back, the treatment should be yearly.
Q Doctor, in your opinion, since our office is very much concern [sic] on this, if a person is totally deprived of
intelligence, he has still discernment, she is unconscious of her act, she or he may be exempted from any
criminal liability, please tell, Doctor, in your personal opinion for the purpose of this proceedings she may be
acting with discernment and with certain degree of intelligence?
A It is possible but I think of a mother feeding her own daughter to somebody, I think there is a motive, she
wants to gain financial or material things from the daughter if no material gain, then perhaps it was borne out
of her illness. This is my opinion.57
xxxx
Q Doctor, is this schizophrenic person can distinguish the right or wrong? [sic]
A If they are in the [sic] state of illness, judgment is impaired to discern between right or wrong.
Q In the case of this particular accused, what would you say at the state of her ailment?
A When she was brought to the hospital, Your Honor, I think, although the mother alleged that the sickness
could be more than one year duration, it is in acute stage because she was allegedly destroying everything in
the house according to the mother, so she was in acute stage.58
On cross-examination by Atty. Paulito Cabrera, Dr. Costas testified thus:
Q Would you say, Doctor, that that particular ailment of Ida Montesclaros affected her sense of judgment?
A I think, so.
Q And that being scizophronic [sic] somehow, it has, while in that stage, the patient lost contact with reality?
A Yes, that is possible.
Q In your opinion, Doctor, granting, for the sake of argument, the alleged accusation against her is true, being
an expert on scizophrania, could you tell the Honorable Court as a mother, who would allegedly do such an
offense to her daughter, is it still in her sound mind or proper mental sane [sic]?
A I think, as I said, one thing to be considered is the motivation if she want [sic] to gain some material things,
if not, it is because of her judgment.
Q If she would not gain anything from allowing her daughter allegedly to be rubbished by another person,
then there must be something wrong?
A There must be something wrong and it came up from scizpphrania.
A It is the judgment, in the case of the schizophrenic.59
We have previously held that Schizophrenia may be considered mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the
exercise of the willpower of the accused.60 In this case, the testimony of Dr. Costas shows that even though Ida was
diagnosed with schizophrenia, she was not totally deprived of intelligence but her judgment was affected. Thus, on
the basis of the Medical Certification that Ida suffered from and was treated for schizophrenia a few months prior to
the incident, and on the testimony of Dr. Costas, Ida’s schizophrenia could be considered to have diminished the
exercise of her willpower although it did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.
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We note that in the case at bar, the undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABC—who was 13 years old at the time
of the incident—could have been considered as a special qualifying circumstance which would have increased the
imposable penalty to death, under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
ARTICLE 266-B. Penalties. —
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim;
xxxx
Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of the offender to the victim, either as the victim’s parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim, must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order for
them to serve as qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.61
In the case at bar, although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the accused as
the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, and even though this was proven during trial and
not refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered as a special qualifying circumstance that would serve to
increase the penalty of the offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive
effect following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage,62 every Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating
circumstances attending the commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty.63
Since in the case at bar, the Information in Criminal Case No. 013324-L did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC,
this circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida may only be convicted as an
accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua. In any event, Republic Act No.
9346, entitled an "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law
on June 24, 2006 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
Civil indemnity imposed against the appellant
The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision ordered Tampus and Ida "jointly and severally, to indemnify the
offended party, [ABC], the sum of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 013324-L."64 The Court of Appeals, however,
did not award any civil indemnity to ABC, and only awarded moral and exemplary damages. We deem it necessary
and proper to award ABC civil indemnity of P50,000.00. Civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon finding of the
fact of rape. This is distinct from moral damages awarded upon such finding without need of further proof, because it
is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling the victim to such award.65
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim in simple rape cases is entitled to an award of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity ex delicto and another P50,000.00 as moral damages. 66 However, Tampus’ civil indemnity ex delicto
has been extinguished by reason of his death before the final judgment, in accordance with Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code.67 Thus, the amount of civil indemnity which remains for accomplice Ida to pay is put at issue.
It becomes relevant to determine the particular amount for which each accused is liable when they have different
degrees of responsibility in the commission of the crime and, consequently, differing degrees of liability. When a
crime is committed by many, each one has a distinct part in the commission of the crime and though all the persons
who took part in the commission of the crime are liable, the liability is not equally shared among them. Hence, an
accused may be liable either as principal, accomplice or accessory.
The particular liability that each accused is responsible for depends on the nature and degree of his participation in
the commission of the crime. The penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for a particular crime is imposed
upon the principal in a consummated felony.68 The accomplice is only given the penalty next lower in degree than
that prescribed by the law for the crime committed69 and an accessory is given the penalty lower by two degrees.70
However, a felon is not only criminally liable, he is likewise civilly liable. 71 Apart from the penalty of imprisonment
imposed on him, he is also ordered to indemnify the victim and to make whole the damage caused by his act or
omission through the payment of civil indemnity and damages.
Civil liability arising from the crime is shared by all the accused. Although, unlike criminal liability—in which the
Revised Penal Code specifically states the corresponding penalty imposed on the principal, accomplice and
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accessory—the share of each accused in the civil liability is not specified in the Revised Penal Code. The courts
have the discretion to determine the apportionment of the civil indemnity which the principal, accomplice and
accessory are respectively liable for, without guidelines with respect to the basis of the allotment.
Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[i]f there are two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the
courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond." Notwithstanding the determination of the
respective liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories within their respective class, they shall also be
subsidiarily liable for the amount of civil liability adjudged in the other classes. Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that "[t]he principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable
severally (in solidum) among themselves for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable."72
As courts are given a free hand in determining the apportionment of civil liability, previous decisions dealing with this
matter have been grossly inconsistent.
In People v. Galapin,73 People v. Continente,74 United States v. Lasada,75 People v. Mobe,76 People v. Irinea,77
People v. Rillorta,78 People v. Cagalingan,79 People v. Villanueva,80 People v. Magno,81 People v. del Rosario,82
People v. Yrat,83 People v. Saul,84 and People v. Tamayo,85 the principal and accomplice were ordered to pay
jointly and severally the entire amount of the civil indemnity awarded to the victim. In People v. Sotto,86 the
accomplice was ordered to pay half of the amount of civil indemnity imposed by the trial court, while the principal
was liable for the other half. In People v. Toring,87 the principal, accomplice and the accessory were made jointly
and severally liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity.
In the cases mentioned above, the principal and accomplice were made to pay equal shares of the civil indemnity.
This makes the accomplice who had less participation in the commission of the crime equally liable with the principal
for the civil indemnity. The degree of their participation in the crime was not taken into account in the apportionment
of the amount of the civil indemnity. This is contrary to the principle behind the treble division of persons criminally
responsible for felonies, i.e., that the liability must be commensurate with the degree of participation of the accused
in the crime committed. In such a situation, the accomplice who just cooperated in the execution of the offense but
whose participation is not indispensable to the commission of the crime is made to pay the same amount of civil
indemnity as the principal by direct participation who took a direct part in the execution of the criminal act. It is an
injustice when the penalty and liability imposed are not commensurate to the actual responsibility of the offender; for
criminal responsibility is individual and not collective, and each of the participants should be liable only for the acts
actually committed by him.88 The proportion of this individual liability must be graduated not only according to the
nature of the crime committed and the circumstances attending it, but also the degree and nature of participation of
the individual offender.
In Garces v. People,89 People v. Flores,90 People v. Barbosa,91 People v. Ragundiaz,92 People v. Bato,93 and
People v. Garalde,94 the accomplice was held to be solidarily liable with the principal for only one-half (1/2) of the
amount adjudged as civil indemnity. In Garces, the accomplice was held solidarily liable for half of the civil indemnity
ex delicto but was made to pay the moral damages of P50,000.00 separately from the principal. In Flores,
Ragundiaz, Bato, and Garalde, the accomplice was held solidarily liable for half of the combined amounts of the civil
indemnity ex delicto and moral damages. In Ragundiaz, the accomplice was also made solidarily liable with the
principal for half of the actual damages, and in Garalde the accomplice was also held solidarily liable with the
principal for half of the exemplary damages, aside from the civil and moral damages.
In these cases, the accomplice was made jointly and severally liable with the principal for only half of the amount of
the civil indemnity and moral damages, only for purposes of the enforcement of the payment of civil indemnity to the
offended party. When the liability in solidum has been enforced, as when payment has been made, the person by
whom payment has been made shall have a right of action against the other persons liable for the amount of their
respective shares.95 As against each other, whoever made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the
share that corresponds to each, with interest for the payment already made.96 In these cases, therefore, payment is
made by either the principal or the accomplice, the one who made the payment to the victim could demand payment
of the part of the debt corresponding to his co-debtor. If for example the principal paid the victim the entire amount of
the civil indemnity, he could go against the accomplice for one-fourth (1/4) of the total amount of civil indemnity and
damages. The principal was primarily liable for only one-half (1/2) of the total amount of civil indemnity and he was
solidarily liable with the accomplice for the other half. Since the principal paid for the half which the accomplice is
solidarily liable with, he could claim one-half (1/2) of that amount from the accomplice. Thus, the principal would
have become ultimately liable for three-fourths (3/4) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and damages, while
the accomplice would have become liable for one-fourth (1/4) of such amount.
In People v. Cortes,97 People v. Budol,98 People v. Nulla,99 and People v. Madali,100 the principal was ordered to
pay twice the share of the accomplice in the civil indemnity. In Nulla, the Court determined the respective amounts
for which the principal, accomplice and accessory were liable for. The principal was ordered to pay P20,000.00, the
accomplice was ordered to pay P10,000.00, and the accessory was ordered to pay P2,000.00. Unlike the cases
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cited above where the principal and accomplice were held solidarily liable for the entire amount of the civil indemnity
or half of it, in Nulla, the court particularly determined the amount for which each shall respond. This is consistent
with Article 109 and Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code, which require that the courts should determine the
amount for which the principals, accomplices and accessories must respond to and upon specifying this amount, the
principals are solidarily liable within their class for their quota, the accomplices are solidarily liable among
themselves for their quota and the accessories are solidarily liable for their quota. If any one of the classes is unable
to pay for its respective quota, it becomes subsidiarily liable for the quota of the other classes, which shall be
enforced first against the property of the principals; next, against that of the accomplices; and lastly, against that of
the accessories.101
There are also cases where the principal was ordered to pay more than double the amount that the accomplice is
liable for. In Lumiguis v. People,102 the civil liability of P6,000.00 was apportioned as follows: the sole principal was
primarily liable for P3,000.00, the four accomplices were primarily liable in solidum among themselves for the other
half of the indemnity, or P3,000.00. Thus, each accomplice was answerable for one-fourth (1/4) of P3,000.00 or one-
eighth (1/8) of the entire amount of civil indemnity, which is P750.00.
Similarly in People v. Bantagan,103 the principal was required to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount
of P500.00. In case of his insolvency, his three accomplices should be jointly and severally liable. The three
accomplices were jointly and severally liable for the other P500 and in case of their insolvency the principal was
secondarily liable for such amount.
In People v. Castillo,104 the accomplice was ordered to pay one-fourth (1/4) of the amount of the civil indemnity,
while the principal was liable for the remaining three-fourths (3/4).
In People v. Cariaga,105 the total amount of indemnity and damages due to the heirs of the victim amounted to
P601,000.00. The sole accomplice was ordered to pay P101,000.00 which is roughly one-sixth (1/6) of the entire
civil indemnity, while the two principals were ordered to pay the rest of the indemnity and damages amounting to
P500,000.00.
The cases cited above demonstrate the ad hoc method by which the ratio of shares of the civil indemnity and
damages among the principal, accomplice and accessory is determined. Though the responsibility to decide the
respective shares of persons liable for a felony is left to the courts, this does not mean that this amount can be
decided arbitrarily or upon conjecture. The power of the courts to grant indemnity and damages demands factual,
legal and equitable justification, and cannot be left to speculation and caprice.
The entire amount of the civil indemnity, together with the moral and actual damages, should be apportioned among
the persons who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degree of their liability, respective
responsibilities and actual participation in the criminal act. Salvador Viada, an authority in criminal law, is of the
opinion that there are no fixed rules which are applicable in all cases in order to determine the apportionment of civil
liability among two or more persons civilly liable for a felony, either because there are different degrees of culpability
of offenders, or because of the inequality of their financial capabilities.106 On this note, he states in his
commentaries on the 1870 Penal Code of Spain that the law should leave the determination of the amount of
respective liabilities to the discretion of the courts.107 The courts have the competence to determine the exact
participation of the principal, accomplice, and accessory in the commission of the crime relative to the other classes
because they are able to directly consider the evidence presented and the unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses.
We must stress, however, that the courts’ discretion should not be untrammelled and must be guided by the
principle behind differing liabilities for persons with varying roles in the commission of the crime. The person with
greater participation in the commission of the crime should have a greater share in the civil liability than those who
played a minor role in the crime or those who had no participation in the crime but merely profited from its effects.
Each principal should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages than every
accomplice, and each accomplice should also be liable for a greater amount as against every accessory. Care
should also be taken in considering the number of principals versus that of accomplices and accessories. If for
instance, there are four principals and only one accomplice and the total of the civil indemnity and damages is
P6,000.00, the court cannot assign two-thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the principals and one-third
(1/3) to the accomplice. Even though the principals, as a class, have a greater share in the liability as against the
accomplice-- since one-third (1/3) of P6,000.00 is P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00 is P4,000.00--
when the civil liability of every person is computed, the share of the accomplice ends up to be greater than that of
each principal. This is so because the two-thirds (2/3) share of the principals—or P4,000.00—is still divided among
all the four principals, and thus every principal is liable for only P1,000.00.
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the accomplice is solidarily liable with the principal for the entire amount
of the civil indemnity of P50,000.00. This is an erroneous apportionment of the civil indemnity. First, because it does
not take into account the difference in the nature and degree of participation between the principal, Tampus, versus
9/24/23, 11:33 AM G.R. No. 181084
the accomplice, Ida. Ida’s previous acts of cooperation include her acts of forcing ABC to drink beer and permitting
Tampus to have sexual intercourse with her daughter. But even without these acts, Tampus could have still raped
ABC. It was Tampus, the principal by direct participation, who should have the greater liability, not only in terms of
criminal liability, but also with respect to civil liability. Second, Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code states that the
apportionment should provide for a quota amount for every class for which members of such class are solidarily
liable within their respective class, and they are only subsidiarily liable for the share of the other classes. The
Revised Penal Code does not provide for solidary liability among the different classes, as was held by the trial court
in the case at bar. lavvphi1
Thus, taking into consideration the difference in participation of the principal and accomplice, the principal, Tampus,
should be liable for two-thirds (2/3) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and moral damages and appellant Ida
should be ordered to pay one-third (1/3) of the amount. Civil indemnity for simple rape was correctly set at
P50,000.00 and moral damages at P50,000.00. The total amount of damages to be divided between Tampus and
Ida is P100,000.00, where Tampus is liable for P66,666.67 (which is two-thirds [2/3] of P100,000.00) and Ida is
liable for P33,333.33 (which is one-third [1/3] of P100,000.00). This is broken down into civil indemnity of
P16,666.67 and moral damages of P16,666.67. However, since the principal, Tampus, died while the case was
pending in the Court of Appeals, his liability for civil indemnity ex delicto is extinguished by reason of his death
before the final judgment.108 His share in the civil indemnity and damages cannot be passed over to the
accomplice, Ida, because Tampus’ share of the civil liability has been extinguished. And even if Tampus were alive
upon the promulgation of this decision, Ida would only have been subsidiarily liable for his share of the civil
indemnity of P66,666.67. However, since Tampus’ civil liability ex delicto is extinguished, Ida’s subsidiary liability
with respect to this amount is also eliminated, following the principle that the accessory follows the principal.
Tampus’ obligation to pay P66,666.67 — his quota of the civil indemnity — is the principal obligation, for which Ida is
only subsidiarily liable. Upon the extinguishment of the principal obligation, there is no longer any accessory
obligation which could attach to it; thus, the subsidiary liability of Ida is also extinguished.
On the matter of exemplary damages, we find that exemplary damages were incorrectly awarded by the Court of
Appeals.
In criminal cases, exemplary damages are imposed on the offender as part of the civil liability when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.109 Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages,
exemplary or corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication
of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous
conduct.110 Exemplary damages may be awarded only when one or more aggravating circumstances are alleged in
the information and proved during the trial.111
In the case at bar, no qualifying or aggravating circumstance was appreciated against Ida. Although, the minority of
the victim coupled with the fact that the offender is the parent of the victim could have served to qualify the crime of
rape, the presence of these concurring circumstances cannot justify the award of exemplary damages since the
relationship of the offender, Ida, to the victim, ABC, was not alleged in the Information.112 The minority of the rape
victim and her relationship with the offender must both be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in
order to be appreciated as an aggravating/qualifying circumstance.113 While the information in the instant case
alleged that ABC was a minor during the incident, there was no allegation that Ida was her parent. Since the
relationship between ABC and appellant was not duly established, the award of exemplary damages is not
warranted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, dated September 29, 2006, in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00215, finding appellant Ida Montesclaros guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of
rape and sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellant Ida Montesclaros is ORDERED to pay civil indemnity in the amount of sixteen thousand,
six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67), and moral damages in the amount of sixteen
thousand, six hundred sixty-six pesos and sixty-seven centavos (P16,666.67). The award of exemplary damages is
DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
9/24/23, 11:33 AM G.R. No. 181084
RENATO C. CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Deceased.
2
Rollo, pp. 4-24.
3 CA rollo, pp. 24-36.
4 Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004" and its implementing rules, the real name of the victim, together with the real names of
her immediate family members, is withheld and fictitious initials instead are used to represent her, to protect
her privacy. (People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 419, 421-426.)
Section 44 of R.A. No. 9262 provides:
SECTION 44. Confidentiality. — All records pertaining to cases of violence against women and their
children including those in the barangay shall be confidential and all public officers and employees and
public or private clinics to hospitals shall respect the right to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or
causes to be published, in any format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business
address, employer, or other identifying information of a victim or an immediate family member, without
the latter's consent, shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.
xxxx
5
In the Records of this case, the Information is labelled as the Complaint.
6 Original Records, vol. 2, pp. 1-3.
7 Id. at vol. 2, pp. 1-2.
8
On March 22, 1996, the prosecution filed a motion for leave of court to file an amended complaint stating
that the incident of rape happened at one o’clock of dawn of April 4, 1995, and not one o’clock of dawn of
April 3, 1995. Finding the motion meritorious, the motion was granted by the RTC in its March 28, 1996 Order;
see Original Records, vol. 2, pp. 26-27.
9 TSN, February 28, 1996, pp. 11-12.
10 Id. at p. 13.
11
Id.
12 "Remedyo" is a Visayan term for sexual intercourse; see rollo, p. 5.
13 TSN, February 28, 1996, p. 14.
14
Id. at pp. 14-15.
15 Id. at p. 16.
9/24/23, 11:33 AM G.R. No. 181084
16 Id at p. 17.
17
Id. at p. 18.
18 Id. at p. 20.
19 Id. at pp. 21-22.
20
Id. at p. 23.
21 TSN, March 19, 1996, p. 43.
22 Original Records, vol. 1, p. 6.
23
TSN, August 8, 1996, p. 7.
24 Id. at p. 8.
25 TSN, October 22, 1996, pp. 5-6.
26
Id. at p. 6.
27 Id. at p. 7.
28 TSN, August 27, 1996, pp. 15-16.
29
CA rollo, p. 30.
30 Id.
31 Dr. Costas is a graduate of South Western University in 1965. He is the head of the Psychiatry Department
of Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center and has been working with the same institution, at the time he
testified, for more than 12 years; TSN, September 28, 1998, p. 6.
32
Original Records, vol. 1, p. 66.
33 ARTICLE 13. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.—The following are mitigating circumstances:
xxxx
(9) Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without
however depriving him of consciousness of his acts.
34
CA rollo, pp. 35-36.
35 Certificate of Death; CA rollo, p. 57.
36 Id. at p. 70.
37
Rollo, p. 23.
38 People v. Manuel Aguilar, G.R. No. 177749, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 509, 522; People v. Blancaflor,
466 Phil. 86, 96 (2004).
39 People v. Cabugatan, G.R. No. 172019, February 12, 2007, 515 SCRA 537, 547.
40
People v. Patricio Pioquinto, G.R. No. 168326, April 11, 2007, 520 SCRA 712, 720; People v. Alvero, G.R.
Nos. 134536-38, April 5, 2000, 329 SCRA 737, 753.
41 Rules Of Court, Rule 133, Sec. 4.
42 People v. Villanueva, 459 Phil. 856, 867-868 (2003).
9/24/23, 11:33 AM G.R. No. 181084
43 CA rollo, pp. 32-33.
44
Id. at p. 35.
45 Id.
46 CA rollo, p. 73.
47
Revised Penal Code, Art. 18.
48 People v. Roche, G.R. No. 115182, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 91, 113-144.
49 TSN, March 19, 1996, pp. 8-9.
50
Id. at pp. 9-11.
51 Id. at pp. 11-12.
52 Id. at p. 13.
53
Id. at p. 14.
54 Omeng is short for the name of the accused, Bartolome Tampus.
55 TSN, March 19, 1996, p. 19.
56
Id. at p. 20.
57 TSN, September 29, 1998, pp. 10-11.
58 Id. at pp. 12-13.
59
Id. at pp. 15-16.
60 People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 172697, September 25, 2007, 534 SCRA 147, 154; People v. Pambid, G.R.
No. 124453, March 15, 2000, 328 SCRA 158; People v. Banez, G.R. No. 125849, January 20, 1999, 301
SCRA 248, 262.
61
People v. Opong, G.R. No. 177822, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 706, 729; People v. Ching, G.R. No.
177150, 22 November 2007, 538 SCRA 117, 131.
62 People v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 135919, May 9, 2003, 403 SCRA 153, 164.
63 Rule 110, SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and
not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
64
CA rollo, p. 36.
65 People v. Calongui, G.R. No. 170566, March 3, 2006, 484 SCRA 76, 88.
66 People v. Alberto Mahinay, G.R. No. 179190, January 20, 2009; People v. Restituto Valenzuela, G.R. No.
182057, February 6, 2009; People v. Richard Sulima, G.R. No. 183702, February 10, 2009; People v. Elmer
Baldo, G.R. No. 175238, February 24, 2009; People v. Agustin Abellera, G.R. No. 166617, July 3, 2007, 526
SCRA 329.
9/24/23, 11:33 AM G.R. No. 181084
67 Revised Penal Code, Art. 89.
ART. 89. HOW CRIMINAL LIABILITY IS TOTALLY EXTINGUISHED.—Criminal liability is totally

extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx
68
71
73 G.R. No. 124215, July 31, 1998, 293 SCRA 474.
74
G.R. Nos. 100801-02, August 25, 2000, 339 SCRA 1.
75 21 Phil. 647 (1912).
76 G.R. No. L-1292, May 24, 1948, 81 SCRA 58.
77
G.R. Nos. L-44410-11, August 5, 1988, 164 SCRA 121.
78 G.R. No. 57415, December 15, 1989,180 SCRA 102.
79 G.R. No. 79168, August 3, 1990, 188 SCRA 313.
80
G.R. No. 110613, March 26, 1997, 270 SCRA 456.
81 G.R. No. 134535, January 19, 2000, 322 SCRA 494.
82 G.R. Nos. 107297-98, December 19, 2000, 348 SCRA 603.
83
G.R. No. 130415, October 11, 2001, 367 SCRA 154.
84 G.R. No. 124809, December 19, 2001, 372 SCRA 636.
85
G.R. No. 138608, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 540.
86 G.R. Nos. 106083-84, March 29, 1996, 255 SCRA 344.
87 G.R. No. 56358, October 26, 1990, 191 SCRA 38.
88
United States v. Magcomot, 13 Phil. 386, 390 (1909).
89 G.R. No. 173858, July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 827.
90 Phil. 532, 552 (2000).
91
G.R. No. L-39779, November 7, 1978, 86 SCRA 217.
92 G.R. No. 124977, June 22, 2000, 334 SCRA 193.
93 G.R. No. 127843, December 15, 2000, 348 SCRA 253.
94
G.R. No. 173055, April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 327.
9/24/23, 11:33 AM G.R. No. 181084
96
Civil Code, Art. 1217.
97 55 Phil. 143, 150 (2000).
98 227 Phil. 225 (1986).
99
G.R. No. L-69346, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 471.
100 G.R. Nos. 67803-04, July 30, 1990, 188 SCRA 69.
101 Revised Penal Code, Article 110.
102
G.R. No. L-20338, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 842, 847.
103 54 Phil. 834 (1930).
104 G.R. No. 32864, March 8, 1989, 171 SCRA 30.
105
G.R. No. 135029, September 12, 2003, 411 SCRA 40.
106 Salvador Viada, Codigo Penal Reformado De 1870, Con Las Variaciones Introducias En El Mismo,
Comentado 4th ed. 1890, Tomo I, p. 549.
The Spanish text provides, viz.,:
Pues bien, cuando tal ocurra, como quiera que no cabe determinar reglas fijas que resuelvan todos los
casos, ora por ser distintos los grados de culpabilidad de los delincuentes, ora por la desigualdad de
sus fortunas, ha creído conveniente la Ley dejar la resolución de cada caso al prudente arbitrio de los
Tribunales, determinado que éstos señalaran la cuota de que deba responder cada uno de los que en
el hecho participación ó intervención tuveiron.
107 Id.
108
Supra, note 67.
109 Civil Code, Art. 2230.
110People v. Orilla, G.R. Nos. 148939-40, February 13, 2004, 422 SCRA 620, 643, citing People v. Catubig,
G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621.
111
People v. Opong, G.R. No. 177822, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 706; People v. Cachapero, G.R. No.
153008, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 744, 758, citing Talay v. Court of Appeals, 446 Phil. 256, 278-279 (2003);
People v. Villanueva, 440 Phil. 409, 425 (2002); People v. Catubig, 416 Phil. 102, 119 (2001).
112 Rules of Court, Rule 110, SEC. 8.
113
People v. Ching, G.R. No. 177150, 22 November 2007, 538 SCRA 117, 131.
9/24/23, 11:33 AM G.R. No. 172707

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 172707 October 1, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL
UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y
AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision1 dated 28 June 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
City, Branch 109 dated 16 October 1998, finding accused-appellants Halil Gambao y Esmail, Eddie Karim y Uso,
Edwin Dukilman y Suboh, Tony Abao y Sula, Raul Udal y Kagui, Teng Mandao y Haron, Theng Dilangalen y
Nanding, Jaman Macalinbol y Katol, Monette Ronas y Ampil, Nora Evad y Mulok and Thian Perpenian y Rafon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659.
The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were charged under the criminal information3 which
reads:
Criminal Case No. 98-0928
For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659
That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 o’clock in the evening at No. 118 FB Harrison Pasay City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named-accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another and grouping themselves together, did then and there by force and intimidation, and the use of high
powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty
against her will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a condition for her
release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱400,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Lucia
L. Chan in the said amount and such other amounts as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil
Code.
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case:4
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish deliveries, which were shipped by
her suppliers from the provinces. Sometime in the afternoon of 11 August 1998, two persons, one of whom was
identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to Chan’s residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire
about a certain passport alleged to have been mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her. Unable
to locate said passport, the two left. The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion identified as
Tony Abao (Abao), returned looking for Chan but were told that she was out. When the two returned in the
afternoon, Chan informed them that the fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead to accompany them to
the airport to retrieve the box of fish allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao declined and told Chan
that they would be back later that evening.5
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned to Chan’s residence that
evening. Chan’s houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by the stairs.6 Thereat, the unidentified companion
9/24/23, 11:33 AM G.R. No. 172707
of Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chan’s son, Levy Chan (Levy), and the house companions.7 As the unidentified
man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy tried to stop the man by grabbing his mother’s feet. Seeing this,
Dilangalen pointed his gun at Levy’s head forcing the latter to release his grip on Chan’s feet.8 Levy thereafter
proceeded to the Pasay Police Headquarters to report the incident.9
Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van.10 After travelling for about two hours, the group stopped at a certain
house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman) warned Chan not to shout as he had his gun pointed at her
mouth. Chan was ordered to go with two women,11 later identified in court by Chan as appellants Monette Ronas
(Ronas) and Nora Evad (Evad).12 Chan was brought inside a house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded
by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol).13 Ronas and Evad threatened Chan that she would
be killed unless she paid 20 Million Pesos.14
On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the "Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling
for about ten minutes, the van stopped and the group alighted. Chan was brought to a room on the second floor of
the house. Inside the room were three persons whom Chan identified in court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and
Halil Gambao (Gambao).15 Another woman, later identified as Thian Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived.16 At about
9:00 o’clock in the evening, a man who was later identified as Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the room with a
handgun and asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa pulis?"17 Another man, whom Chan identified in court as
Eddie Karim (Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed Chan that he was sent by their boss to ask
her how much money she has.18 Chan was instructed to talk to her son through a cell phone and she gave
instructions to her son to get the ₱75, 000.00 she kept in her cabinet.19 The group then talked to Chan’s son and
negotiated the ransom amount in exchange for his mother’s release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to deliver
₱400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue.20
Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao (Inspector Mancao), who were assigned at the
Pasay City area to conduct the investigation regarding the kidnapping, were informed that the abductors called and
demanded for ransom in exchange for Chan’s release.21 During their surveillance the following day, Inspectors
Ouano and Mancao observed a Red Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the victim’s residence. The
inspectors observed that the occupants of the taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of the house. The
inspectors and their team tailed the taxicab until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth Resort
and stopped in front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team saw in the cottage was the victim, they
sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to conduct a rescue operation.22
On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received information that the abductors acceded to a
₱400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon
learning of the information, the team immediately and strategically positioned themselves around the vicinity of the
restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a light blue "Tamaraw FX" van with 4 people on board arrived. The four took the
ransom money and headed towards the South Luzon Expressway. The surveillance team successfully intercepted
the van and arrested the 4 men, later identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The team was also
able to recover the ₱400,000.00 ransom.23
At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the police team assaulted Cottage No. 1, resulting in the safe
rescue of Chan and the apprehension of seven of her abductors, later identified in court as Dilangalen, Udal,
Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and Ronas.24
During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son testified, Karim manifested his desire to change his
earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The presiding judge then explained the consequences of a change of plea,
stating: "It would mean the moment you withdraw your previous pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the
court of course, after receiving evidence, as in fact it has received the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will
[outrightly] sentence you to the penalty provided by law after the prosecution shall have finished the presentation of
its evidence. Now that I have explained to you the consequences of your entering a plea of guilty, are you still
desirous of entering a plea of ‘guilty’?" Eddie Karim answered, "Yes."25 On hearing this clarification, the other
appellants likewise manifested, through their counsel who had earlier conferred with them and explained to each of
them the consequences of a change of plea, their desire to change the pleas they entered. The trial court separately
asked each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if
they understood the consequence of changing their pleas. All of them answered in the affirmative.26 Similarly,
Dukilman manifested his desire to change his plea and assured the trial court that he understood the consequences
of such change of plea.27 Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty,28 the
trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence, which it did.
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao,
Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom. Hence, they appealed to the CA.
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In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE
KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y
HARON, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and
NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them the supreme
penalty of death is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that each of them is ordered to pay jointly and severally the
victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of moral damages.
It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON was only 17 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.29
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified
the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.
In a Resolution30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs. The
issues raised by the accused-appellants in their respective briefs, supplemental briefs and manifestations will be
discussed collectively.
Insufficiency of Evidence
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this Court believe that the witness, Chan, was not able to
positively identify them because of her failing eyesight due to old age.
This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial court and the CA found Chan’s testimony credible and
straightforward. During her testimony, she positively identified the accused-appellants. If she had not met them
before, she could not have positively identified them in open court. In fact, the participation of these accused-
appellants was further established through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses.
Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court
to determine. For this reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great respect on appeal. They are
conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered.31 In People v. Tañedo,32 this Court had occasion to
reiterate the ruling that findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of witnesses command great
respect since it had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they testified in court.33 It can be observed that
the briefs submitted by the accused-appellants are replete with generalities and wanting in relevant particulars. It is
for this reason that we are giving full credence to the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of witness
Chan.
Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her conviction is insufficient. We also find her argument bereft of
merit.
The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as one of the seven people apprehended when they
conducted the rescue operation at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning of 14 August 1998,34 and the positive
identification of Perpenian by Chan constituted adequate evidence working against her defense of denial.
Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-appellants proffered was denial. It is established
jurisprudence that denial cannot prevail over the witnesses’ positive identification of the accused-appellants, more
so where the defense did not present convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to have been
present at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime.35
The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the relevant testimonies of witnesses and the absence
of evidence other than mere denial proffered by the defense lead this Court to give due weight to the findings of the
lower courts.
Improvident Plea
As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, the penalty for kidnapping for
ransom is death. A review of the records36 shows that on 7 October 1998, the accused-appellants withdrew their
plea of "not guilty" and were re-arraigned. They subsequently entered pleas of "guilty" to the crime of kidnapping for
ransom, a capital offense. This Court, in People v. Oden,37 laid down the duties of the trial court when the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense. The trial court is mandated:
(1)
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to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of
guilt,
(2)
to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and
(3)
to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.38
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its
severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial
purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he
might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having fully understood the
meaning, significance and consequence of his plea.39 Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would
aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.40
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was based on a free and
informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea. This Court finds no cogent reason for deviating from the guidelines provided by
jurisprudence41 and thus, adopts the same:
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have
held that the following guidelines should be observed:
Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations;
and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule
out the possibility that the accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual
threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge’s intimidating robes.
Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the
accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and
educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of
guilty.
Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he
will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon
bad advice or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express
remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken impressions
because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the
aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase punishment.
Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him the elements of the crime
which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right
to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.
The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required
to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.
It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have not been fully complied with. The questions
propounded by the trial court judge failed to ensure that accused-appellants fully understood the consequences of
their plea. In fact, it is readily apparent from the records43 that Karim had the mistaken assumption that his plea of
guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and that both the judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that such
plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim was not warned by
the trial court judge that in cases where the penalty is single and indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by
9/24/23, 11:33 AM G.R. No. 172707
either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court judge’s seemingly annoyed statement that a
conditional plea is not allowed, as provided below, is inadequate:
Atty. Ferrer:
Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something before the trial. For accused Eddie Karim we manifest and
petition this court that he be allowed to be re-arraigned Your Honor please, considering that he will plead guilty as
charged but the imposable penalty is lowered, Your Honor.
Court:
You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the law says. You plead guilty, no condition attached.
Conditional plea is not allowed.
Atty. Ferrer:
Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is already repenting
Court:
Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there should be no condition attached. We cannot make
that condition and dictate to the court the penalty. 44
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenian’s, were improvidently made, this Court will still not set aside the
condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court judge’s shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on accused-
appellants’ culpability.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the cases are remanded for
further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and
credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did in this case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the commission of the offense charged.45 The
manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the
conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the accused.46
Contrary to accused-appellants’ assertions, they were convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of their plea of
guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the trial
court.47 The prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants and their degrees of culpability
beyond reasonable doubt.
Degree of Culpability
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs that conspiracy, insofar as they were
concerned, was not convincingly established. Dukilman hinges his argument on the fact that he was not one of
those arrested during the rescue operation based on the testimony of Inspector Ouano.48 On the other hand, Ronas
and Evad base their argument on the fact that they had no participation whatsoever in the negotiation for the
ransom money.
We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at the cottage during the rescue
operation, the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established that he was one of the four people
apprehended when the police intercepted the "Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols Tollgate.49 Likewise, the testimony of
Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently established that Ronas and Evad were two of those who were arrested during
the rescue operation.50 This Court has held before that to be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail
of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by
the others in the execution of the conspiracy.51 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals.52 Moreover, Chan positively identified the accused-appellants and placed all of them at
the crime scenes.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It has been a long standing opinion of this Court that proof of the
conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties
before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to
the commission of the offense.53 The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the
accused-appellants and how they were all united in its execution from beginning to end. There were testimonies
proving that (1) before the incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming back to the victim’s house; (2) during
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the kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the accused appellants were
those present when the ransom money was recovered and when the rescue operation was conducted.
Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and
Evad was established beyond reasonable doubt based on the proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act of one
is the act of all the conspirators.
In Perpenian’s Supplemental Brief,54 she directs this Court’s attention to the manifestation made by the prosecution
regarding their disinterest in prosecuting, insofar as she was concerned.55 However, pursuant to the ruling of this
Court in Crespo v. Judge Mogul,56 once the information is filed, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal
or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the courts; more so
in this case, where no Motion to Dismiss was filed by the prosecution.
The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave inconsistent answers and lied several times under oath
during the trial.57 Perpenian lied about substantial details such as her real name, age, address and the fact that she
saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked why she lied several times, Perpenian claimed she was scared to
be included or identified with the other accused-appellants. The lying and the fear of being identified with people
whom she knew had done wrong are indicative of discernment. She knew, therefore, that there was an ongoing
crime being committed at the resort while she was there. It is apparent that she was fully aware of the
consequences of the unlawful act.
As reflected in the records,58 the prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient evidence to hold her responsible as a
principal. Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution had was the testimony59 of Chan to the effect that on 13
August 1998 Perpenian entered the room where the victim was detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas
regarding stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as a co-
principal, but rather only as an accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in
order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be community of design; that is
knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that
he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid
in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts done by the
principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal liability. Assuming arguendo that she
1âwphi1
just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the
criminal design of the principals when she saw Chan being guarded in the room. A rational person would have
suspected something was wrong and would have reported such incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to
keep quiet; and to add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held before that being present
and giving moral support when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in the
crime committed.61 It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s presence and company were not indispensable
and essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only liable as an accomplice.62
Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People v. Clemente, et al.,63 where it was stressed that in case of
doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and considering the evidence presented by
the prosecution, linking accused-appellants’ participation in the crime, no doubt can be entertained as to their guilt.
The CA convicted the accused-appellants of kidnapping for ransom and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of
death, applying the provisions of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this Court finds accused-
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However, pursuant to
R.A. No. 9346,64 we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua,
without eligibility for parole.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of R.A. No.
9344,65 a determination of whether she acted with or without discernment is necessary. Considering that Perpenian
acted with discernment when she was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, her minority should
be appreciated not as an exempting circumstance, but as a privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68
of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,66 the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law shall still be
applied even if he/she is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt.
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Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from the aforesaid provision, because
under Article 40 of R.A. No. 9344,67 the suspension of sentence can be availed of only until the child in conflict with
the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. This leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce
judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom. Since this Court has ruled that death as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer
form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,68 the penalty imposed by law on
accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping for ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one
degree lower than what the principals would bear (Reclusion Perpetua).69 Applying Article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code, the imposable penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law for
accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than
that prescribed by law (Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty, which is one degree lower than the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the range of
Prision Correccional; and the maximum penalty shall be within the minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent any
aggravating circumstance and there being one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate
sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of
Prision Mayor, as maximum.
As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility in accordance with
Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in People v. Jacinto70 that the age of the child in conflict with the law at the
time of the promulgation of the judgment is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense
when he/she was still of tender age. This Court, however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in view of
the fact that Perpenian’s actual served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for her offense. For such
reason, she may be immediately released from detention.
We note that in the Order71 dated 9 October 1998, the trial court admitted the documentary evidence offered by the
counsel for the defense proving that the real name of Thian Perpenian is Larina Perpenian.
In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this case, he is relieved of all personal and pecuniary
penalties attendant to the crime, his death72 having occurred before rendition of final judgement.73
There is prevailing jurisprudence,74 on civil liabilities arising from the commission of kidnapping for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The persons
convicted were held liable for ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity and damages, where, as in this case, the penalty for
the crime committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346:75
1. ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. ₱100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof;
and
3. ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.
These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages where death is the penalty warranted by the facts but
is not imposable under present law.
The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros76 is instructive on the apportionment of civil liabilities among all
the accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among all those who
cooperated in the commission of the crime according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and
actual participation. Hence, each principal accused-appellant should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of
indemnity and damages than Perpenian who was adjudged as only an accomplice.
Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation, all of them shall be liable for the total amount
of ₱300,000.00 divided among the principals who shall be liable for ₱288,000.00 (or ₱32,000.00 each) and
Perpenian who shall be liable for ₱12,000.00. This is broken down into ₱10,666.67 civil indemnity, ₱10,666.67
moral damages and ₱10,666.67 exemplary damages for each principal; and ₱4,000.00 civil indemnity, ₱4,000.00
moral damages and ₱4,000.00 exemplary damages for the lone accomplice.
WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR–H.C. No. 00863 is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO,
EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING,
JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
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Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole. Accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA
PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellants are ordered to
indemnify the victim in the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages apportioned in the following manner: the principals to the crime shall jointly
and severally pay the victim the total amount of ₱288,000.00 while the accomplice shall pay the victim ₱12,000.00,
subject to Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code on several and subsidiary liability.
The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to immediately release THIAN PERPENIAN A.K.A. LARINA
PERPENIAN due to her having fully served the penalty imposed on her, unless her further detention is warranted for
any other lawful causes.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of the Correctional Institute for
Women by personal service. The Director of the Correctional Institute for Women shall submit to this Court, within
five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the decision, the action he has taken thereon.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

(No part)
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
(On Official Leave)

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

(on sick leave) (on official leave)

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
9/24/23, 11:33 AM G.R. No. 172707
1 CA rollo, pp. 419-438; Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos with Associate Justices
Eugenio S. Labitoria and Arturo D. Brion (now a member of this Court) concurring.
2
Records, Vol. I, pp. 282-301.
3 Id. at 53.
4 CA rollo, pp. 179-186.
5
TSN, 6 October 1998, pp. 2-5
6 Id. at 6.
7 Id.
8
Id. at 7.
9 Id. at 8.
10 TSN, 5 October 1998, p. 10.
11
Id. at 13.
12 Id. at 15.
13 Id. at 15-16.
14
Id. at 17.
15 Id. at 19-21.
16 Id. at 33.
17
Id. at 22.
18 Id. at 23.
19
Id. at 25.
20 Id. at 26-27.
21 TSN, 7 October 1998, p.12.
22
Id. at 14-16.
23 TSN, 8 October 1998, pp. 4-6.
24 TSN, 7 October 1998, pp. 17-18.
25
Id. at 2-3.
26 Id. at 2-5.
27 Id. at 5-6.
28
Id. at 7-10.
29 CA rollo, pp. 436-437.
30 Rollo, pp. 23-24.
31
People v. Montanir, et al., G.R. No. 187534, 4 April 2011, 647 SCRA 170, 185-186.
9/24/23, 11:33 AM G.R. No. 172707
32 334 Phil. 31, 36 (1997).
33
People v. Yanson-Dumancas, 378 Phil. 341, 364 (1999) citing People v. Tañedo, 334 Phil. 31, 36 (1997).
34 TSN, 7 October 1998, pp. 17-18.
35 People v. Salcedo, G.R. No. 186523, 22 June 2011 652 SCRA 635, 644 citing Lumanog v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 182555, 7 September 2010, 630 SCRA 42, 130-131.
36
TSN, 7 October 1998, pp. 1-10.
37 471 Phil. 638 (2004).
38 Id. at 648.
39
People v. Ernas, 455 Phil. 829, 838 (2003).
40 People v. Pastor, 428 Phil. 976, 993 (2002).
41 Id. at 986-987.
42
TSN, 7 October 1998, pp. 2-10.
43 Id. at 2.
44 Id.
45
People v. Pastor, supra note 40 at 997.
46 People v. Oden, supra note 37 at 649.
47 People v. Ceredon, G. R. No. 167179, 28 January 2008, 542 SCRA 550, 568.
48
TSN, 7 October 1998, pp. 17-18.
49 TSN, 8 October 1998, pp. 4-6.
50
TSN, 7 October 1998, pp. 17-18.
51 People v. Basao, G.R. No. 189820, 10 October 2012, 683 SCRA 529, 546.
52 Id.
53
People v. De Chavez, G.R. No. 188105, 23 April 2010, 619 SCRA 464, 478.
54 CA rollo, pp. 330- 357.
55 TSN, 7 October 1998, pp. 6-7.
56
235 Phil. 465, 476 (1987).
57 TSN, 8 October 1998, pp. 28-30.
58 TSN, 7 October 1998, p. 5.
59
Id.
60 People v. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38, 49 (1922).
61 People v. Toling, 180 Phil. 305, 321-322 (1979).
62
People v. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515, 534 (1955).
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63 128 Phil. 268, 278-279 (1967).
64
An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.
65 An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Council Under the Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefore and for Other
Purposes.
66 Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at
the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under
suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still
be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement
of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various chcumstances of the child, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law.
67
Sec. 40 in relation to Sec. 38 of RA No. 9344.
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the
child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years (emphasis supplied).
68 People v. Bon, 536 Phil. 897, 940 (2006).
69 Article 52 Revised Penal Code.
70
G.R. No. 182239, 16 March 2011, 645 SCRA 590, 625.
71 Records, Vol. I, p. 200.
72 Rollo, pp. 84 and 96.
73
People v. Jose, 163 Phil. 264, 273 (1976); Article 89 Revised Penal Code.
74 People v. Tadah, G.R. No. 186226, 1 February 2012, 664 SCRA 744, 748; People v. Basao et al, G.R. No.
189820, 10 October 2012, 683 SCRA 529, 551.
75 An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.
76
G.R. No. 181084, 16 June 2009, 589 SCRA 320, 345.

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9/24/23, 11:25 AM G.R. No.

Today is Sunday, September 24, 2023

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-38325 February 24, 1981

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

1. Accused Francisco Gajetas entered the plea of NOT GUILTY.

2. Accused Antonio Gajetas entered the following plea:

Odiongan, Romblon, Jan. 22, 1972.

WITNESS TO THUMBMARK: His Thumbmark

(SGD.) ROGELIO FAJARITO FRANCISCO GAJETAS

(SGD.) ANTONIO GAJETAS

SGD NEMESIO F. GANAN

Counsel de Officio of both accused

STATEMENT OF ANTONIO GAJETAS TAKEN BY MSGT FORTUNATO T. TOME AT ODIONGAN,

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

Q: — Do you voluntarily submit yourself for investigation without fear of favor?

Q: — State your name and other personal circumstances?

A: — I went here, sir.

Q: — Why did you come here?

Q: — Why are you surrendering?

A: — Because I have killed Pansing Fosana.

Q: — Why and where did you kill Pansing Fosana?

Q: — When did you kill Pansing Fosana'?

A:— At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of January 6, 1972.

Q: — Who was your companion if any'?

Q: — What is your relation with Francisco Gajetas?

A: — My younger brother, sir.

A: — At the door of the house.

A: — That is the same scythe sir.

Q: — Who owned this scythe ?

Statement of Antonio Gajetas. cont'd.............................. Page —2 —

A: — Khaki pants (burlington)

Q: — If that pants of yours be shown to you can still recognize it ?

Q: — What was your plan before killing Pancing Fosana'!

A: — To abuse her only, sir.

A: — Yes, sir. Her husband is Gerondio Ramilo.

A: — Because the husband is not around, sir.

A: — Her two (2) children.

A: — Yes, sir, coming from the kerosene lamp.

A: — He was just looking at us.

Q: — Where was he?

A: — At the door sir.

(SGD) ANTONIO GAJETAS

A. I have not seen or heard any threatening words or maltreatment.

I am through with the witness.

(pp. 11-12, tsn., Nov. 13, 1972.)

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

Fernando, C.J. concurs.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

Fernando, C.J., concurs.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Sunday, September 24, 2023

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 180425 July 31, 2008

FELIX RAIT, Petitioner,

Petitioner now comes before this Court on the following grounds: