1. Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, GR.

108292, 10 September 1993

FACTS

Three civil cases for recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcos family were filed before the
Sandiganbayan. These were later subjected to compromise agreements between the Republic
and Roberto Benedicto. Cases were brought in both US and Switzerland to recover the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcos family, and the same were subject of the compromise agreements here
present. These three compromise agreements were presented before the Sandiganbayan and
was allowed by the same.

However, the Republic later contested the validity of the third agreement while at the same time
proposing to renegotiate the same, on the ground that it was obtained through fraud and that
some provisions therein are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, and public
policy. The Sandiganbayan rejected the Republic’s assertions, hence this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the third compromise agreement may be avoided.

HELD

No. The Sandiganbayan stated in its decision that the contract on its face does not appear to be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy and that it was entered into
freely and voluntarily by the parties. There is no intimidation of vitiated consent on the part of the
PCGG. On its findings that the compromise agreement was entered into the parties freely,
voluntarily, and with full understanding of its consequences, respondent court stated that the
agreement is conclusive and binding upon it.

2. SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. RAMON GARCIA, G. R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990
FACTS

The Roppongi Property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement, as part of the indemnification to the Filipino
people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during WWII. The Roppongi
property became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to another
site when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to
provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time.
After many years, the Aquino administration advanced the sale of the reparation properties,
which included the Roppongi lot. This move was opposed on the ground that the Roppongi
property is public in character. For their part, the proponents of the sale raised that Japanese
law should apply, following the doctrine of lex loci rei sitae.

ISSUE

Whether or not the conflict of law rule on lex loci rei sitae should apply.

HELD

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation
exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or
ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the
formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation
and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private International Law, 1981
ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to
conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law
should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the
property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to
validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to
effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex
situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties
procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In
discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the
foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional
limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly
owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in belaboring whether or not this opinion is
correct. Why should we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no showing
that it can be sold?
3. Zalamea vs. CA, G.R. No. 104235, Nov. 18, 1993

FACTS

The Zalamea spouses and their daughter purchased 3 airline tickets from the Manila agent of
respondent TransWorld Airlines (TWA) for a flight to New York to Los Angeles. The tickets of
the spouses were purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full-fare
ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations. Once in New York, however, they
found that their flight back to Manila was overbooked, as a result of which they had to be wait-
listed. Out of those waitlisted, the ones with full-fare tickets were preferred. Thus, only the
Zalamea husband, who was holding his daughter’s ticket, was able to get on board while his
wife and daughter had to wait for the next flight. However, it turned out this next flight was
likewise overbooked, forcing the Zalameas to purchase tickets from another airlines. Later, they
sued TWA for breach of contract in the Philippines.

ISSUE

Whether or not TWA is liable for breach of contract

HELD

SC held in the affirmative. Overbooking of flight amounts to fraud or bad faith, entitling plaintiff to
an award of moral damages because of bad faith attending the breach of contract. The holding
that overbooking was allowed under US Federal regulations was found erroneous because: (1)
this regulation was not proved and our courts cannot judicially notice of it, and (2) even if such
regulation was proven, the rule of lex loci contractus negated its application. According to this
rule, the law of the place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court
where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such
State by the defendant airline. Since tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the
applicable law in this case would be Philippine law. Under our jurisprudence, overbooking of
flight is bad faith. Moreover, the hierarchy of tickets practiced by TWA was evidence of its self-
interest over that of its passengers, which SC held to be improper considering the public interest
involved in a contract of carriage.
4. UNITED AIRLINES, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 124110, April 20, 2001

FACTS

Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila,
three “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets from himself, his wife and his minor son, Mychal, to visit the cities
of Washington DC, Chicago and Los Angeles. All flights had been confirmed previously by
United Airlines. Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport,
Aniceto changed their itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was issued tickets
with corresponding boarding passes with the words: “Check-in-required.” They were then set to
leave but were denied boarding because the flight was overbooked.

The CA ruled that private respondents’ failure to comply with the check-in requirement will not
defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with applying the laws of the
USA, relying on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales of the USA.

ISSUE

WON the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.

HELD

No. According to the doctrine of “lex loci contractus”, the law of the place where a contract is
made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity, obligation and interpretation
shall govern. This has been said to be the rule even though the place where the contract was
made is different from the place where it is to be performed. Hence, the court should apply the
law of the place where the airline ticket was issued, where the passengers are residents and
nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Therefore,
although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were
purchased through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in D.C.,
however, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by
the parties in Manila.
5. Korea Technologies Co. Ltd vs Lerma, GR No. 143581 January 7, 2008

FACTS

Petitioner Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. (KOGIES) is a Korean corporation which is engaged in
the supply and installation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Cylinder manufacturing plants,
while private respondent Pacific General Steel Manufacturing Corp. (PGSMC) is a domestic
corporation. On March 5, 1997, PGSMC and KOGIES executed a Contract whereby KOGIES
would set up an LPG Cylinder Manufacturing Plant in Carmona, Cavite. The contract was
executed in the Philippines.

On April 7, 1997, the parties executed, in Korea, an Amendment for Contract No. KLP-970301
dated March 5, 1997 amending the terms of payment. The contract and its amendment
stipulated that KOGIES will ship the machinery and facilities necessary for manufacturing LPG
cylinders for which PGSMC would pay USD 1,224,000. KOGIES would install and initiate the
operation of the plant for which PGSMC bound itself to pay USD 306,000 upon the plants
production of the 11-kg. LPG cylinder samples. Thus, the total contract price amounted to USD
1,530,000.

On October 14, 1997, PGSMC entered into a Contract of Lease with Worth Properties, Inc.
(Worth) for use of Worths 5,079-square meter property with a 4,032-square meter warehouse
building to house the LPG manufacturing plant. The monthly rental was PhP 322,560
commencing on January 1, 1998 with a 10% annual increment clause. Subsequently, the
machineries, equipment, and facilities for the manufacture of LPG cylinders were shipped,
delivered, and installed in the Carmona plant.

PGSMC paid KOGIES USD 1,224,000. However, gleaned from the Certificate executed by the
parties on January 22, 1998, after the installation of the plant, the initial operation could not be
conducted as PGSMC encountered financial difficulties affecting the supply of materials, thus
forcing the parties to agree that KOGIES would be deemed to have completely complied with
the terms and conditions of the March 5, 1997 contract.

For the remaining balance of USD306,000 for the installation and initial operation of the plant,
PGSMC issued two postdated checks: (1) BPI Check No. 0316412 dated January 30, 1998 for
PhP 4,500,000; and (2) BPI Check No. 0316413 dated March 30, 1998 for PhP 4,500,000.
When KOGIES deposited the checks, these were dishonored for the reason PAYMENT
STOPPED. Thus, on May 8, 1998, KOGIES sent a demand letter to PGSMC threatening
criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in case of nonpayment.

On the same date, the wife of PGSMCs President faxed a letter dated May 7, 1998 to KOGIES
President who was then staying at a Makati City hotel. She complained that not only did
KOGIES deliver a different brand of hydraulic press from that agreed upon but it had not
delivered several equipment parts already paid for.

ISSUE

Whether or not the arbitration clause in the contract of the parties should govern.

HELD
Yes. Established in this jurisdiction is the rule that the law of the place where the contract is
made governs. Lex loci contractus. The contract in this case was perfected here in the
Philippines. Therefore, our laws ought to govern. Nonetheless, Art. 2044 of the Civil Code
sanctions the validity of mutually agreed arbitral clause or the finality and binding effect of an
arbitral award. Art. 2044 provides, any stipulation that the arbitrators award or decision shall be
final, is valid, without prejudice to Articles 2038, 2039 and 2040.

The arbitration clause was mutually and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties. It has not been
shown to be contrary to any law, or against morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
There has been no showing that the parties have not dealt with each other on equal footing. We
find no reason why the arbitration clause should not be respected and complied with by both
parties. In Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd., we held that submission to arbitration is a contract
and that a clause in a contract providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be
referred to arbitration is a contract. Again in Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals, we
likewise ruled that [t]he provision to submit to arbitration any dispute arising therefrom and the
relationship of the parties is part of that contract and is itself a contract.

Having said that the instant arbitration clause is not against public policy, we come to the
question on what governs an arbitration clause specifying that in case of any dispute arising
from the contract, an arbitral panel will be constituted in a foreign country and the arbitration
rules of the foreign country would govern and its award shall be final and binding.

Thus, it can be gleaned that the concept of a final and binding arbitral award is similar to
judgments or awards given by some of our quasi-judicial bodies, like the National Labor
Relations Commission and Mines Adjudication Board, whose final judgments are stipulated to
be final and binding, but not immediately executory in the sense that they may still be judicially
reviewed, upon the instance of any party. Therefore, the final foreign arbitral awards are
similarly situated in that they need first to be confirmed by the RTC.
6. Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon del Mundo Dacasin, GR. 168785, February 5, 2010

FACTS

Herald Dacasin, an American and Sharon Dacasin, a Filipino were married. Sometime later,
Sharon sought and obtained a divorce from Illinois Court. The same dissolved the marriage and
awarded Sharon custody of Stephanie, their sole daughter. It retained jurisdiction over the case
for enforcement purposes. Herald and Sharon executed in Manila a contract for the joint
custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate
disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an
order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts.

Herald sued Stephanie in RTC of Makati for violation of the contract. She exercised sole
custody over Stephanie. However, Sharon sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction of the court because Illinois Court still retained jurisdiction. Trial court sustained
respondent’s motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner sought
reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained the trial court denied
reconsideration.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner’s suit and enforce the
agreement on the joint custody of the parties’ child.

RULING

Trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is
void. However, factual and equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioner’s suit
and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of Stephanie’s custody. Subject matter
jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law
vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.

In the matter of Illinois Court's jurisdiction, the action lies beyond the zone of it’s so-called
"retained jurisdiction." Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the "various provisions" of
the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement on joint child custody. However, the trial
court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary to law. No child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother. The Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint
custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old
contravenes Philippine law.

The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law
provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together. The Mother has also repudiated
the agreement by not sharing custody.
7. Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. Vs. Eusebio Construction, Inc., G.R.
No. 140047, July 13, 2004

FACTS

On November 8, 1980, State Organization of Buildings, Ministry of Housing, and Construction,

Baghdad, Iraq, awarded the construction of the Institute of Physical Therapy–Medical
Rehabilitation Center, Phase II, in Baghdad, Iraq, to Ajyal Trading and Contracting Company, a
firm duly licensed with the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce.

On March 7, 1981, in behalf of Spouses Eduardo and Iluminada Santos, 3-Plex International,
Inc a local contractor engaged in construction business, entered into a joint venture agreement
with Ajyal. However, since it was not accredited under the Philippine Overseas Construction
Board, it had to assign and transfer all its right to VPECI and entered into an agreement that the
execution of the project will be under their joint management. To comply with the requirements
of performance bond, 3-Plex and VPECI applied for the issuance of a guarantee with
PhilGuarantee, a government financial institution empowered to issue guarantees for qualified
Filipino contractors to secure the performance of approved service contracts abroad.
Subsequently, letters of guarantee were issued by Philguarantee to the Rafidain Bank of
Baghdad. Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait was engaged to provide a counter-guarantee to Rafidain Bank,
but it required a similar counter-guarantee in its favor from the PhilGuarantee. The Surety Bond
was later amended to increase the amount of coverage and to change the bank in whose favor
the petitioner's guarantee was issued, from Rafidain Bank to Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait. SOB and
the joint venture VPECI and Ajyal executed the service contract for the construction of the
project. However, they were not able to start the project on schedule because of that surety
bond was also extended and the Advance Payment Guarantee was extended three times more
until it was cancelled for reimbursement.

On 26 October 1986, Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait sent a telex call to the petitioner demanding full
payment of its performance bond counter-guarantee. VPECI advised the PhilGuarantee not to
pay Al Ahli Bank because efforts were being exerted for the amicable settlement of the Project.
VPECI received another telex message from Al Ahli Bank stating that it had already paid to
Rafidain Bank but VPEIC insisted on not paying however Central Bank authorized the
remittance to Al Ahli Bank. PhilGuarantee informed VPECI that it would remit payment to Al Ahli
Bank, and reiterated the joint and solidary obligation of the respondents to reimburse the
PhilGuarantee for the advances made on its counter-guarantee but they failed to pay so a case
was filed.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Philippine laws or Iraq’s laws should be applied in determining VPECI's
failure to pay in the performance of its obligations under the service contract.

HELD

Yes. In this case, the laws of Iraq bear important link to the contract, since one of the parties is
the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Consequently, the problem of
whether respondent VPECI evaded its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq.
However, those foreign laws of Iraq were not properly alleged and prove. Under the doctrine of
processual presumption, where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved,
the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Further, the Supreme Court held that
the petitioner guarantor should have waited for the natural course of guaranty. Petitioner as a
guarantor cannot be compelled to pay the creditor SOB unless the property of the debtor VPECI
has been exhausted and all legal remedies against the said debtor have been resorted to by the
creditor. It could also set up compensation as regards what the creditor SOB may owe the
principal debtor VPECI. In this case, however, the petitioner has clearly waived these rights and
remedies by making the payment of an obligation that was yet to be shown to be rightfully due
the creditor and demandable of the principal debtor.
8. Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868 June 8, 2006

FACTS

2 American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted daughter. The wife
died and left a will where she left her entire estate to her husband. 2 years after the wife's death,
the husband married a Candelaria. 4 years after, Richard died and left a will where he left his
entire estate to Candelaria except for some of his shares in a company which he left to his
adopted daughter. Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken on
their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife's
estate. The will was also admitted in a court in her native land (Maryland).

ISSUE

Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is
situated

HELD

Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated. However,
since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by her
national law. The national law of the person who made the will shall regulate whose succession
is in consideration whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the country where the
property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's properties may be found in the Philippines,
however the successional rights over those properties are governed by the national law of the
testator.
9. Palaganas vs. Palaganas, GR. 169144 26 January 2011

FACTS

This case is about the probate before Philippine court a will executed by Ruperta C. Palaganas,
a foreigner although it has not been probated in its place of execution.

Respondent filled with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the probate of Ruperta’ s will
and for his appointment as the special administrator of her estate. However, petitioners oppose
on the petition arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S.
cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

ISSUE

Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines
although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

HELD

Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same
have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can
be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an
alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in
his country.

In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the
decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate
may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state
that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the
estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to
have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known
to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the
property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will
has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional
facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the
province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
estate he left in such province.7 The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already
been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.
10. Perez v CA G.R. No. 162580; 01/27/2006

FACTS

Private respondent Tristan Catindig married Lily Gomez-Catindig twice. The marriage produced
4 children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems. Upon the advice of a
mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. On April 24, 1984,
Tristan and Lily executed Special Power of Attorney (SPA) addressed to the Judge of First Civil
Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce
action under its laws.

On April 30, 1984, Private Respondents Catindig filed joint petition for dissolution of conjugal
partnership with RTC of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in the Dominican Republic
ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily. On July 14, 1984, Respondent Tristan
married petitioner Elmar O. Perez, in Virginia, USA, and lived as husband and wife until Oct.
2001, which produced one offspring.

During their cohabitation, Petitioner learned that divorce decree issued by the court in the
Dominican Republic was not recognized in the Philippines, and Petitioner’s marriage to Tristan
was deemed void under Philippine Law. On Aug. 31, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Lily with RTC Quezon City.

ISSUE

WON Divorce action in the Dominican Republic dissolved the Co-Respondents’ Marriage.

HELD

No, divorce did not dissolve marriage. Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The Divorce
decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage
bond between them. It is basic that “Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.” (Art. 15). Regardless of where Philippine citizen is, he or she will be
governed by Philippine laws. With respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her
status, condition and legal capacity.

Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad, initiates a
petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in
getting the same, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.
11. PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc v. NLRC (December 14, 2006)

FACTS

In April 1996, Rusel was employed as seaman by PCL Shipping Philippines for and in behalf of
its foreign principal, U-Ming Marine. Rusel thereby joined the vessel MV Cemtex for 12 months
with a basic monthly salary of US$400.00, living allowance of US$140.00, fixed overtime rate of
US$120.00 per month, vacation leave with pay of US$40.00 per month and special allowance of
US$175.00.

On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he slipped, and as a
consequence thereof, he suffered a broken/sprained ankle on his left foot. A request for medical
examination was flatly denied by the captain of the vessel. On August 13, 1996, feeling an
unbearable pain in his ankle, Rusel jumped off the vessel using a life jacket and swam to shore.
He was brought to a hospital where he was confined for 8 days. On August 22, 1996, a vessel's
agent fetched Rusel from the hospital and was required to board a plane bound for the
Philippines. On September 26, 1996, Rusel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment
of wages, overtime pay, claim for medical benefits, sick leave pay and damages against PCL
Shipping and U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. In their answer, the
latter alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by jumping off the vessel.

Labor Arbiter held that respondent is liable for the unjust repatriation of the complainant. NLRC
affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not respondent was guilty of desertion to justify his dismissal.

2. Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford
protection to labor apply to Filipino employees working abroad.

HELD

1. No. For a seaman to be considered as guilty of desertion, it is essential that there be

evidence to prove that if he leaves the ship or vessel in which he had engaged to perform a
voyage, he has the clear intention of abandoning his duty and of not returning to the ship or
vessel. In the present case, however, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to
show that when private respondent jumped ship, he no longer had the intention of returning.
The fact alone that he jumped off the ship where he was stationed, swam to shore and sought
medical assistance for the injury he sustained is not a sufficient basis for petitioners to conclude
that he had the intention of deserting his post.

2. Yes, it does. Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the
charges against him and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him
opportunity to air his side. However, petitioners contend that the twin requirements of notice and
hearing applies strictly only when the employment is within the Philippines and that these need
not be strictly observed in cases of international maritime or overseas employment.

The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which
afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or
abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is
made) governs in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of
Employment entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent was executed here
in the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with its implementing rules and regulations and other
laws affecting labor apply in this case. Accordingly, as to the requirement of notice and hearing
in the case of a seafarer, the Court has already ruled in a number of cases that before a
seaman can be dismissed and discharged from the vessel, it is required that he be given a
written notice regarding the charges against him and that he be afforded a formal investigation
where he could defend himself personally or through a representative. Hence, the employer
should strictly comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing without regard to the
nature and situs of employment or the nationality of the employer. Petitioners failed to comply
with these twin requirements.

Wherefore, the petition is partly granted. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated December 18,
2001 and Resolution dated April 10, 2002 are affirmed with modification to the effect that the
award of US$1620.00 representing private respondent's three months salary is reduced to
US$1200.00. The award of US$550.00 representing private respondent's living allowance,
overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance for two months is deleted and in lieu thereof,
an award of US$710.00 is granted representing private respondent's living allowance, special
allowance and vacation leave with pay for the same period.
12. Llorente Vs CA, G.R. No. 124371

FACTS

Lorenzo Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy and a naturalized American
Citizen. Lorenzo married petitioner Paula Llorente on 1937. Before the Pacific war, Lorenzo
departed for the US and Paula stayed in their home in Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.
Lorenzo visited her on 1945 and discovered that Paula was living with his brother, Ceferino, and
was pregnant. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula. He returned to the US and filed for divorce with
the Superior Court of California. The Superior Court issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce
which became final in 1952.

On 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia who had no knowledge of his previous marriage. They lived
together and produced 3 children. Lorenzo executed a Will and Testament and bequeathed all
his property to Alicia and their children. Lorenzo filed a petition for the probate and allowance of
his last will and testament wherein he moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of
his estate. Before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo Died.

Paula filed a petition of letters of administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Alicia filed as
well. The trial court denied Alicia’s petition and ruled that the divorce decree granted to Lorenzo
was void and inapplicable in the Philippines making their marriage void. Trial court appointed
Paula as administrator. Alicia filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Alicia Appealed
and appelatte court affirmed trial court’s decision with modification. Trial court declared Alicia as
co-owner of the properties she and Lorenzo acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.
Paula moved for reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE

1) Whether or not Lorenzo’s divorce abroad should be recognized in the Philippines?

2) Who is entitled to inherit from the Late Lorenzo Llorente?

HELD

1) Yes, the divorce decree obtained abroad should be recognized in the Philippines. It is
undisputed by Paula that Lorenzo became an American Citizen in 1943. When he obtained the
divorce decree in 1952, he is no longer a Filipino Citizen. The Philippine laws relating to family
rights, duties and status no longer applies to Lorenzo since he is no longer a Filipino Citizen.
Therefore, the divorce decree should be recognized.

2) "ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they areexecuted. "When the acts referred
to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution."
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is
glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status, condition and legal
capacity."

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved
by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.
13. GERBERT CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN STO. TOMAS G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

FACTS

Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on Nov. 2000. On, Jan. 18 2005, he married a Filipina named Daisylyn Sto.
Tomas. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after
their wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise her wife but
was shocked to discover that Daisylyn was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and was granted.

Two years after, Gerbert fell in love with another Filipina. In his desire to marry his new Filipina
fiancée, Gerbert went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce
decree on their marriage certificate. Despite its registration, an NSO official informed Gerbert
that their marriage still exists under Philippine Law; and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must be judicially recognized by a Philippine court.

Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage
as dissolved, with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition and requested for the same prayer.

RTC denied Gerbert’s petition contending that Art. 26 (2) applies only to Filipinos and not to
aliens. Gerbert appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.

ISSUE

Whether the registration of the foreign divorce decree was properly made.

HELD

Supreme Court held in the negative. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that “no entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order.” The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule
108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must
be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry.
14. SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO
Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, G.R. No. 171914

FACTS

ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with
his first wife Eugenia Zaballero-Luna, where they begot seven (7) children. On January 12,
1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and
Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo,
Dominican Republic. On the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time
with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived
together as husband and wife until 1987. Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law
firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the
managing partner. On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased the 6th
Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project. Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved
and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the same was still registered in
common. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit
would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with
Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The
said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son
of the first marriage. The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as
well as the law books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed
by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN. The complaint alleged that the subject
properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD through their joint efforts.The RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the
aforementioned facts, disposing thusly: (a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium
unit is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;(b)
Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit (c) Plaintiff
is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit and
defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements
have been made for transport and storage.

ISSUE

Whether or not the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had
validly dissolved the first marriage

HELD
Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia subsisted up to the time of his death.

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by
virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on
July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.

From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code,16
even if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of
defective marital unions under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As
such, the remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of
nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily
obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which
subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution,
which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal
and family life.20 The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of
the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that
the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse,
or upon a ground expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage
between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be
given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
15. Fujiki vs Marinay G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

FACTS

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”

The decision of the lower courts (RTC): dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and
the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

ISSUES

1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.

3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

HELD

1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC
that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage “does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.” While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy
is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of
the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

2. Yes, the recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.”Rule 108, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

3. Yes, there is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition
of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already
tried and decided under foreign law.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family
rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a
party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide
whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationali expressed in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither
inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.
16. Bayot vs Bayot GR 163979, 7 November 2008

FACTS

Respondent Vicente and Petitioner Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de
San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship have
soured sometime in 1996, they initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. On
March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological
incapacity.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered
in the Dominican Republic.

2. Whether or not the judgment of divorce is valid.

HELD

1. No. There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained
her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an
effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative
of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli
is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there;
and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American passport and as aptly found by the
CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself as an American
citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth
certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention
may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment in which she stated being an American citizen.
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was
not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of
divorce from the Dominican Republic.

2. Yes. The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be
recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national
law of the alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen
when she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of
the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign
court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
17. Ando vs. Department of Foreign Affairs, August 27, 2014 G.R. No. 195432

FACTS

On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in a civil

wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga.

On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly granted under
Japanese laws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with petitioner. A copy of the Divorce
Certificate duly issued by the Consulate-General of Japan and duly authenticated by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila. Said Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the
Office of the Civil Registry of Manila.

Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by such she
reverted to her single status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September 2005 in a
civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga.

In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December 2005. Recently,
petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her surname with her
husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the Department of Foreign Affairs that the same
cannot be issued to her until she can prove by competent court decision that her marriage with
her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.

ISSUE

Whether or not the first marriage is lawfully annulled by virtue of a divorce decree making the
second marriage valid.

HELD

No. In Garcia v. Recio, the court ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree
and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven and like any other fact.10

While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court
actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief, the court was still unable to grant the prayer
of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented
on record of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the
divorce decree under that national law. Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce
can only be made upon her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and
the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.

18. Medina vs. Koike

FACTS

Medina was married to Koike on on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. Their union bore
two children. On June 14, 2012, Medina and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for
divorce before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced on
even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the Official
Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.

Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage on file with
the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry.

At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition. On the other hand, Medina presented
several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/Certificate of Acceptance of
Divorce” and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike" etc. RTC denied Medina's petition, ruling that
the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity to
obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented were
successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of
proving the national law of her husband, particularly the existence of the law on divorce.
Medina’s testimony was insufficient since she was not presented a qualified expert witness nor
was shown to have.

ISSUE

Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.

RULING:

At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence,
our courts cannot grant it. Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Medina
and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially
factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC.

The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these
matters are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions. In this
regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law
should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.