PROPERTY AND LAND LAW

WEEK 04

CASE DIGESTS

JAN MARK G. RASTICA

Case 01. Municipality of Cavite v. Hilaria Rojas

G.R. No. 9069, March 31, 1915

Facts:

A piece of land was leased to Rojas some 70 or 80 square meters of Plaza Soledad by The
Municipal Council of Cavite, on condition that she pay rent quarterly in advance and that
she will vacate the land within 60 days after being notified.

The defendant has already erected a house in that piece of land which has been assessed
to be worth P3,000. The Municipality of Cavite wanted Rojas to vacate the area as they
invoke the municipality’s exclusive right, control and administration over it.

Rojas would not vacate the property as she has been fulfilling the obligation of paying
rent regularly for the previous months. The former also sought that the municipality would
indemnify her for the expenses.

According to the lease by the two parties, the defendant could only be ordered to vacate
the property leased when the plaintiff municipality needed it for decoration or public use.

Issue:

Whether or not the contract of lease between the Municipality of Cavite and Rojas is valid

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court held that the contract whereby the municipality of Cavite leased
to Hilaria Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no force or effect,
because it is contrary to the law and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract.
The court also held that on the hypothesis that the said lease is null and void in accordance
with the provisions of article 1303 of the Civil Code, the defendant must restore and
deliver possession of the land described in the complaint to the municipality of Cavite,
which in its turn must restore to the said defendant all the sums it may have received from
her in the nature of rentals just as soon as she restores the land improperly leased.
Case 02. Valiao et.a. lv.Republic

GR No. 170757, November 28, 2011

Facts:

On August 11, 1987, petitioners filed with the RTC an application for registration of a
parcel of land situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.

On June 20, 1988, private oppositors filed their Motion to Dismiss the application on the
following grounds:

(1) the land applied for has not been declared alienable and disposable;

(2) res judicata has set in to bar the application for registration; and

(3) the application has no factual or legal basis.

On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration.

On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss.

Trial thereafter ensued.

In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that they acquired the
subject property in 1947, upon the death of their uncle Basilio who purchased the land
from a certain Fermin Payogao, as stated on an entirely handwritten Deed of Sale in
Spanish language dated May 19, 1916. Basilio possessed the land in question from May
19, 1916 until his death in 1947. Basilio's possession was open, continuous, peaceful,
adverse, notorious, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death,
the applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966, when oppositor Zafra
unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of their property, which compelled them to
file complaints of Grave Coercion and Qualified Theft against Zafra.

The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted petitioners' application for
registration of the subject property. Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and
the Republic, through Assistant Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin, filed an appeal with the CA,
which reversed the trial court's findings in its Decision dated June 23, 2005. Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Hence, the present
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the piece of land in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court held that under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, petitioners need to prove
that: (1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under
a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.

No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land in question has
been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In the absence of
incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is already classified as
alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public domain.
Verily, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the
land subject thereof is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
Case 03. Maneclang, et al. v. IAC
G.R. No. 66575, September 30, 1986

Facts:
Petitioner Adriano Maneclang et. al. filed a complaint for quieting of title over a certain
fishpond located within four parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio
Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and the annulment of Resolutions Nos. 38 and 95 of
the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan.

The trial court dismissed the complaint upon finding that said property is a creek
constituting a tributary of the Agno River; therefore, public in nature and not subject to
private appropriation.

Petitioner appealed to Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed the decision of the
trial court.

Petitioner filed petition for review on certiorari. Before the respondent could make a
comment, the parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting to the Court a
Compromise Agreement praying that judgment be rendered recognizing the ownership
of petitioners over the land of the body of water found within their titled property.

Issue:
Whether or not the creek can be subject to Compromise Agreement of the parties.

Ruling:

No. The creek cannot be subject to Compromise Agreement of the parties.

The Supreme Court held that stipulations contained in the Compromise Agreement
partake of the nature of an adjudication of ownership in favor of herein petitioners of the
fishpond in dispute, which, as clearly found by the lower and appellate courts, was
originally a creek forming a tributary of the Agno River. A creek is defined as a recess of
arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea, is a
property belonging to the public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, and as a public water, it cannot be
registered under the Torrens System in the name of any individual.

Considering that neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National
Irrigation Administration which prevented the water from flowing in and out of the subject
fishpond, nor its conversion into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a
property of the public domain, the Court finds the Compromise Agreement null and void
and of no legal effect, the same being contrary to law and public policy.
Case 04. City of Manila v. Ins. Gov’t.
10 Phil.327

Facts:
Petitioner City of Manila filed a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
registration of certain parcel or tract of land situated in Paco, Manila.

It alleged that it was the absolute owner of the said land; that said land was assessed by
the City of Manila in the sum of $1,780, US currency; that there existed no liens of whatever
character against the said land; that the land was unoccupied; that the said city obtained
title to the said land by reason of being the successor to all the rights and actions of the
old city of Manila (ayutamiento de Manila), to which said property formerly
belonged.

The Insular Government, through the Solicitor General, presented the opposition to the
registration of the said land contending that the land in question is the property of the
Government of the United States under the control of the Insular Government, among
others.

Petitioner Geronimo Morales also presented opposition to the registration contending

that there is included in the same a part of a building lot belonging to her, among others.

One of the examiners of titles of the Court of Land Registration made a report to the
judge that the Title of City of Manila is defective and cannot be registered for the following
reasons: (1) The application is not accompanied by any document relative to its alleged
ownership, but sets forth that said city, as the successor in rights and interest of the former
Ayutamiento de Manila, the owner of the land described in the petition, (2) No records of
any act or contract opposing the claim, and (3) City of Manila must show ownership to
acquire title to the land.

The trial court denied the registration of land claimed by Geronimo Morales and granted
the registration of the rest of said described property.

The Attornety-General, representing the respondent, made an assignment of error that

nothing in the record which justifies the conclusion of the judgment of the court below,
to the effect that the land in question is owned by the city of Manila

Issue:
Whether or not the City of Manila is the owner of the said property.

RULING:
No. the City of Manila is not the owner of the said property.

The Supreme Court held that the mere renting of property and receiving the rent therefor
cannot, of themselves, in the absence of other proof, support a claim of ownership of such
property.

The only proof presented during the trial by the petitioner which tended in any way to
support its claim was that in the year 1894 and thereafter the old city of Manila
(ayuntamiento de Manila) rented said land and received the rent therefor, and that the
present city of Manila succeeded to the rights of said old city. No proof was offered by
the plaintiff, documentary or other, to show in any way by what right said old city
exercised this right of control over said property.

The petitioner herein not having presented proof showing that the land in question had
been granted to it by the former sovereign in these Islands, and not having shown that it
was entitled to said by virtue of some law of the present sovereign of these Islands, the
Court of Land Registration was not empowered to grant the registration of said in favor
of said petitioner.
Case 05. Santos V. Moreno
Facts:

The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned vast track of marshland in the municipality of
Macabebe, Pampanga province. Called Hacienda San Esteban, it was administered and
managed by the Ayala y Cia. From the year 1860 to about the year 1924 Ayala y Cia.,
devoted the hacienda to the planting and cultivation of nipa palms from which it gathered
nipa sap or "tuba." It operated a distillery plant in barrio San Esteban to turn nipa tuba
into potable alcohol, which was in turn manufactured into liquor.
Accessibility through the nipa palms deep into the hacienda posed as a problem. Ayala y
Cia., therefore dug canals leading towards the hacienda's interior where most of them
interlinked with each other. The canals facilitated the gathering of tuba and the guarding
and patrolling of the hacienda by security guards called "arundines." By the gradual
process of erosion these canals acquired the characteristics and dimensions of rivers.
In 1924 Ayala y Cia shifted from the business of alcohol production to bangus culture. It
converted Hacienda San Esteban from a forest of nipa groves to a web of fishponds. To
do so, it cut down the nipa palm, constructed dikes and closed the canals criss-crossing
the hacienda.

Sometime in 1925 or 1926 Ayala y Cia., sold a portion of Hacienda San Esteban to Roman
Santos who also transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. In so doing, he closed and
built dikes across Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiñorang Silab, Pepangebunan, Bulacus,
Nigui and Nasi.

The closing of the man-made canals in Hacienda San Esteban drew complaints from
residents of the surrounding communities. Claiming that the closing of the canals caused
floods during the rainy season, and that it deprived them of their means of transportation
and fishing grounds, said residents demanded re-opening of those canals.
Subsequently, Mayor Lazaro Yambao of Macabebe, accompanied by policemen and some
residents went to Hacienda San Esteban and opened the closure dikes at Sapang
Malauling Maragul Nigui and Quiñorang Silab.
Whereupon, Roman Santos filed Civil Case No. 4488 in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga which preliminarily enjoined Mayor Yambao and others from demolishing the
dikes across the canals. The municipal officials of Macabebe countered by filing a
complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 4527) in the same court. The Pampanga Court of
First Instance rendered judgment in both cases against Roman Santos who immediately
elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Do the streams involved in this case belong to the public domain or to the owner of
Hacienda San Esteban according to law and the evidence submitted to the Department
of Public Works and Communications?

Ruling:
A private person may take possession of a watercourse if he constructed the same within
his property.
One and all, the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by Roman Santos in the
administrative proceedings supports the conclusion of the lower court that the streams
involved in this case were originally man-made canals constructed by the former owners
of Hacienda San Esteban and that said streams were not held open for public use. This
same conclusion was reached 27 years earlier by an investigator of the Bureau of Public
Works whose report and recommendations were approved by the Director of Public
Works and submitted to the Secretary of Commerce and Communications.
The streams in question were artificially made, hence of private ownership.
Pursuant to Article 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, and Article 408(5)
of the Spanish Civil Code, channels of creeks and brooks belong to the owners of estates
over which they flow. The channels, therefore, of the streams in question, which may be
classified creeks, belong to the owners of Hacienda San Esteban.

With the exception of Sapang Cansusu, being a natural stream and a continuation of the
Cansusu River, admittedly a public stream, belongs to the public domain. Its closure
therefore by the predecessors of Roman Santos was illegal.
All the other streams, being artificial and devoted exclusively for the use of the hacienda
owner and his personnel, are declared of private ownership. Hence, the dams across them
should not he ordered demolished as public nuisances.
Case 06. Laurel V Garcia

Facts:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their
representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179
square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan scheduled on
February 21, 1990. The Supreme Court granted the prayer for a temporary restraining
order, in favor of the petitioner, effective February 20, 1990.
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May
9, 1956.
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the Filipino
people in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and suffered during the
Japanese military occupation, for the suffering of widows and orphans who lost their loved
ones and kindred, for the homes and other properties lost by countless Filipinos during
the war.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been
pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the
Roppongi lot.

Issue:
Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine
Government?
Ruling:
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is
dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of
procurement, which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government.

There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that
the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social
group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is
intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
Case 07. De Villongco, et.al vs. Florencio Moreno

Facts:

Senator Rogelio de la Rosa complained with the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications against several fishpond owners in Macabebe, Pampanga, among whom
is petitioner herein. de Villongco. The complaint charges that de Villongco has
appropriated a portion of the coastal waters of Pampanga, converting portions of the
coastal areas into fishponds. The Secretary then reached a decision ordering the
demolition of the constructions.

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of First Instance of Rizal which declared that
petitioner had Secretary of Public Works and Communications was in error in ordering
the demolition of the dikes and other constructions of the petitioner, on the ground that
said dikes and other constructions fall under the exception mentioned in Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2056.

The court ruled in favor of petitioner stating that the requisites for exemption are present:
first, that the constructions or works in question were constructed in good faith before
the areas were declared communal fishing grounds; second, that said constructions or
works would not impede the free passage of any navigable river or stream; and lastly, that
the same would not cause inundations of agricultural areas.
Issue:

Whether the petitioner is indeed covered by the exemption.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court held held that the encroached area is a part of the waterways,
taking into account that the Manila Bay area, especially those bordering the fishponds in
the provinces of Pampanga, Bulacan and Rizal especially used by fishermen and fishpond
owners to bring in their catch to market. It is considered therefore as a public property,
not susceptible to appropriation by any private individual, not only because it belongs to
the State but also because it is used as a waterway.

The error of the court below lies in the fact that it considered the coast sea as falling under
the exception of Section 2. But an examination of Section 2 shows that coastal waters or
public waterways are not included in the exception. Only those works constructed on
communal fishing grounds are exempted; constructions on coastal waters or public
waterways are not subject to the exception. Aside from that fact, no inundation or free
passage of any navigable river can take place on the coastal waters or waterways, so
coastal waters are not subject to the exception. The exception, apparently, applies only to
constructions on navigable rivers, when these constructions do not impede or obstruct
the passage of the river and when they do not cause inundation of agricultural areas.
Coastal waters are not within the contemplation of the exception because there is no
navigable river or stream in coastal waters and neither may there be an inundation therein.

Hence, the petition against the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was
dismissed.
Case 08. Cebu Oxygen vs. Bercilles

Facts:

In 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, declared the terminal
portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road. Subsequently, the
City Council passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the
land through a public bidding.

Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co. was awarded the land as the highest bidder. City Council
of Cebu executed a deed of absolute sale.

Cebu Oxygen then filed an application for the registration of title, which the CFI of Cebu
dismissed. The dismissal was upon the motion of the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu,
who argued that the property sought to be registered was a public road intended for
public use and so considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the
commerce of man.
Issue:

Whether the declaration of a road as abandoned by the City Council of Cebu had the
effect of turning the same into a patrimonial property of the City.
Ruling:

Yes. The declaration of the road as abandoned by the City of Council of Cebu means such
road has been withdrawn from public use. Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides
that "Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."

Further, the City Charter of Cebu City specifically says that the subject property “may be
used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City
may be lawfully used or conveyed.” The power of the City Council of Cebu to make such
a declaration is found in its Charter. The statute clearly says that the City of Cebu is
empowered to close a city road or street. This was also justified by the Court’s decision in
Favis v City of Baguio, where the Court held that “appellant may not challenge the city
council's act of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead end from public use
and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. These are acts well within the ambit
of the power to close a city street. The city council, it would seem to us, is the authority
competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use.”
Case 09. Benjamin Rabuco, et al. vs. Hon. Antonio J. Villegas, et al., G.R. No. L-24661,
February 28, 1974, consolidated G.R. No. L-24915 and G.R. No. L-24916

FACTS:

Case L-24916 involves petitioners' appeal to the Court of Appeals 4 from the decision of
the Manila court of first instance dismissing their petition for injunction and mandamus
to enjoin the demolition of their houses and the ejectment from the public lots in question
and to direct respondent administrator of the Land Authority (now Secretary of Agrarian
Reform) to implement the provisions of Republic Act 3120 for the subdivision and sale on
installment basis of the subdivided lots to them as the tenants and bona fide occupants
thereof, and instead ordering their ejectment.

Case L-24915 involves petitioners' independent petition for injunction filed directly with
the Court of Appeals January 29, 1965 5 to forestall the demolition overnight of their
houses pursuant to the order of demolition set for January 30, 1965 at 8 a.m. issued by
respondents city officials pending the elevation of their appeal. The appellate court gave
due course thereto and issued the writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for.

Case L-24661 for the continuation and maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by the Court of Appeals for preservation of the status quo was filed by
petitioners directly with this Court on June 21, 1965, pending transmittal of the records of
Cases L-24915 and L-24916 to this Court as certified by the Court of Appeals which
declared itself without jurisdiction over the principal and decisive issue of constitutionality
of Republic Act 3120.

In the early morning of April 19, 1970, a large fire of undetermined origin gutted the
Malate area including the lot on which petitioners had built their homes and dwellings.
Respondents city officials then took over the lot and kept petitioners from reconstructing
or repairing their burned dwellings. At petitioners' instance, the Court issued on June 17,
1970 a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents city officials "from performing
any act constituting an interference in or disturbance of herein petitioners' possession of
Lot No. 21-B, Block No. 610, of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila" as safeguarded
them under the Court's subsisting preliminary injunction of August 17, 1965.

In Republic Act 3120, Congress converted the lot in question together with another lot in
San Andres, Malate "which are reserved as communal property" into "disposable or
alienable lands of the State to be placed under the administration and disposal of the
Land Tenure Administration" for subdivision into small lots not exceeding 120 square
meters per lot for sale on installment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants
thereof 6 and expressly prohibited ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes under
section 2 of the Act as quoted in the appellate court's certification resolution,
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 3120 is constitutional.

RULING:

Yes, the Court therein reaffirmed the established general rule that "regardless of the
source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those
acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in
trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or
proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the
legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the
performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or
instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration.
Case 10. LEVY D. MACASIANO vs. HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO

G.R. No. 97764 / 212 SCRA 464 (August 10, 1992)

Facts:

On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990
which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and
Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a
flea market thereon under certain terms and conditions. On August 8, 1990, respondent
municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement
whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the
aforementioned streets. On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP
Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and
confiscation of these stalls. Petitioner wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag giving the
latter ten days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be
dismantled. Hence, respondents filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition
and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which the
petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. The trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 s.
1990. Hence, this petition was filed by the petitioner thru the Office of the Solicitor General
alleging grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the trial judge in issuing the assailed order.

Issue: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of

Parañaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for
flea markets is valid.

Ruling:

No, the resolution issued by the municipal council of Parañaque authorizing the lease and
use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is not valid. The property
of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz,
Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local roads used for public service
and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of
the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are
under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority
whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is
vested upon them by Congress. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle
that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public
in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the
local government unit to private persons.
Case 11. Republic v. Court of Appeals

GR No. 100709, November 14, 1997

Facts:

Sometime in December, 1972, respondent Morato filed a Free Patent Application on a

parcel of land situated at Pinagtalleran, Calauag, Quezon. The patent was approved and
the Register of Deeds of Quezon at Lucena City with Original Certificate of Title No. P-
17789. Both the free patent and the title specifically mandate that the land shall not be
alienated nor encumbered within five years from the date of the issuance of the patent.

Thereafter, it was established that the subject land is a portion of the Calauag Bay, five (5)
to six (6) feet deep under water during high tide and two (2) feet deep at low tide, and
not suitable to vegetation. On November 5, 1978, petitioner filed an amended complaint
against respondents Morato, spouses Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan, and the Register
of Deeds of Quezon for the cancellation of title and reversion of a parcel of land to the
public domain, subject of a free patent in favor of respondent Morato, on the grounds
that the land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged and leased within the five-year
prohibitory period.

Issue:

Whether or not that the questioned land is part of a disposable public land and not a
foreshore land.

Ruling:

When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property
became foreshore land and passed to the realm of the public domain. In fact, the Court
in Government vs. Cabangis annulled the registration of land subject of cadastral
proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land. In another case, the
Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no
jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject land in
this case, being foreshore land, should therefore be returned to the public domain.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. This Court hereby REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
assailed Decision of Respondent Court and ORDERS the CANCELLATION of Free Patent
No. (IV-3) 275 issued to Respondent Morato and the subsequent Original Certificate of
Title No. P-17789. The subject land therefore REVERTS to the State.
Case 12. Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga

GR No. L-24440, March 28, 1968

Facts:

When Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga

into Zamboanga City. Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of
Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the
assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between the two new ones.

This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte to file a complaint entitled

"Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga del Norte against defendants-appellants Zamboanga City, the Secretary
of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue praying the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act 3039 for depriving plaintiff province of property
without due process and just compensation.

Issue:

Whether RA 3039 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it deprives Zamboanga del

Norte of its private properties.

Ruling:

No. The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings
thereon in question. For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over
the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself
is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in
its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute
control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived
of it without due process and payment of just compensation. Applying the norm obtaining
under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50
properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest
remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the
property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public
education, public health, etc.

The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations
than along that of Civil Law. Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold that municipal
property held and devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary private
property. As ordinary private properties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can
even be acquired thru adverse possession. Lastly, the classification of properties other
than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the Civil
Code — is "... without prejudice to the provisions of special laws." For purpose of this
article, the principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be
considered as "special laws". Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for
distinctly governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code classification
in this particular case.
Case 13.

Chavez

Chavez vs Public Estates Authority

"Reclamation in Manila Bay"

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.

PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

respondents.

Facts:

A contract was signed to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay.

The contract also included the construction of Phase I and Phase II of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road.

The contract was between the government, through the Commissioner of Public
Highways

and Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP).

The contract was signed on November 20, 1973.

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1084 creating PEA.

PEA was tasked "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and

"to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."

On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085

transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay"

under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum

directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP,

so that "All future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA."

Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement.

>>>Enters the time of President Corazon Aquino<<<

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517,

granting and transferring to PEA

"the parcels of land so reclaimed under the MCCRRP

containing a total area (1,915,894) square meters."

>>>Issuance of Certificate of Titles for the "Freedom Islands"<<<

Subsequently, on April 9, 1988,

the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque

issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA,

covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands"

located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.

The Freedom Islands have a total land area of (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841
hectares.

>>>Joint venture between PEA and AMARI, time of President Ramos<<<

On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private
corporation

to develop the Freedom Islands.

The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas
surrounding these islands.

PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation WITHOUT PUBLIC BIDDING.

On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the
JVA.

On June 8, 1995,then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben
Torres, approved the JVA.
>>>Here comes the Senate: JVA, "grandmother of all scams"; "under the JVA are
lands of the PUBLIC DOMAIN"<<<

On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege
speech in the Senate anddenounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams."

Then, an investigation was conducted.

Among the conclusions of their report are:

(Senate Committee Report No. 560)

(1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of
the public domain

which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA
cannot alienate these lands;

(2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and

(3) the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative

Order No. 365

creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate
Committee Report No. 560.

The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.

On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today

published reports that there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI

under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos.

>>>Cases filed against the JVA<<<

On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a case seeking to nullify the
JVA.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer,
filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.

Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of
the reclaimed lands to AMARI.

Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA,

invoking the constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public

concern.

Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of

Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution

prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.

Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties
of the State that are of public dominion.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject lands are of public domain.

Whether or not the subject lands are alienable.

Wehther or not the subjects lands can be sold to a private corporation.

Ruling:

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands,

now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA,

are alienable lands of the public domain.

PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations.

PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.

The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain

until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer
needed for public service.
The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed
these submerged areas.

Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the
only natural resources the government can alienate.

In their present state, the 592.15 hectares ofsubmerged areas are inalienable and outside
the commerce of man.

Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands,

such transfer is void for being contrary to the Constitution.

Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares
of still submerged areas of Manila Bay,

such transfer is void for being contrary to the Constitution.

The Court must perform its duty to defend anduphold the Constitution,

and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

Fallo:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation

are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture

Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

Doctrines:

The Regalian Doctrine

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the
Regalian doctrine

which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands

Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act,

which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals.

CA No. 141 continues to this day as the general law governing

the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.

Various proceeding laws echoed the same principles.

The rationale behind this State policy is obvious.

Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes

retain their inherent potential as areas for public service.

This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these
lands to private parties.

The State always reserved these lands for some future public service.

The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are

"owned by the State," and except for alienable agricultural landsof the public domain,
natural resources cannot be alienated.

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution

banning private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.

Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations

to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease.

As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the lease to private
corporations

of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No.
141.
Case 14.

Villarico vs Sarmiento

“STAIRWAY TO HIGHWAY – RIGHT OF WAY”

“ANDOKS & MARITES CARINDERIA”

TEOFILO C. VILLARICO, petitioner,

vs.

VIVENCIO SARMIENTO, SPOUSES BESSIE SARMIENTO-DEL MUNDO & BETH DEL

MUNDO, ANDOK’SLITSON CORPORATION and MARITES’ CARINDERIA, respondents.

FACTS:

Teofilo C. Villarico, petitioner, is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Parañaque City, Metro
Manila

with an area of sixty-six (66) square meters

and covered by TCT No. 95453.

Petitioner’s lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of land
belonging to the government.

As this highway was elevated by four (4) meters and therefore higher than the adjoining
areas,

the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) constructed STAIRWAYS at

several portions of this strip of public land to enable the people to have access to the
highway.

The respondents built on and occupied the said government land sometime in 1991.

The Sarmientos had a building constructed on a portion of said government land.

In November that same year, a part thereof was occupied by Andok’s Litson Corporation
and Marites’ Carinderia.

In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30

square meter portion of the same area owned by the government. The property was
registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430 in the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City.

In 1995, petitioner filed with the RTC, a complaint against respondents.

He alleged inter alia that respondents’ structures on the government land closed his
"right of way" to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue; and encroached on a portion of his lot
covered by T.C.T. No. 74430.

According to the respondents, they have been issued licenses and permits by Parañaque
City to construct their buildings on the area; and that petitioner has no right over the
subject property as it belongs to the government.

The trial court found that petitioner has never been in possession of any portion of the
public land in question. On the contrary, the defendants are the ones who have been in
actual possession of the area. According to the trial court, petitioner was not deprived of
his "right of way" as he could use the Kapitan Tinoy Street as passageway to the
highway.

CA affirmed in toto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner can claim his right of way over the strip of public land
separating his lot from the highway.

RULING:

No, the petitioner has no exclusive right over the strip of public land as it is for
public use.

Public use means that it is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the
indefinite public. The strip of lot on which the stairways were built is for the use of the
people as passageway to the highway. Consequently, it is a property of public dominion.

Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be
alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be
acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and
execution; and (4) cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.

Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a property of public
dominion, it cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of
herein petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is by mere tolerance of the government
through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he cannot claim
any right of possession over it. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which
provides:

"ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be
the object of possession."
Neither of the petitioner and respondents have the better right of possession over the
subject lot.

However, the petitioner is entitled to the portion of his lot covered by TCT No. 74430
which was built upon and occupied by the defendants.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 7, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54883 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
the sense that neither petitioner nor respondents have a right of possession over the
disputed lot where the stairways were built as it is a property of public dominion. Costs
against petitioner.
Case 15. Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013

Doctrine:

Regalian Doctrine. According to this doctrine, land of the public domain is considered
owned by the State, and any possession and occupation of such land must comply with
certain requirements in order to be eligible for registration. The Court clarified that the
land subject to registration must have already been classified as agricultural land of the
public domain in order for the provision to apply, and the classification or reclassification
must have been made on or before. Without satisfying the requisite possession and
occupation criteria, the land cannot be automatically converted to private property even
upon subsequent declaration as alienable and disposable.

Facts:

The case of Malabanan v Republic of the Philippines revolves around the land registration
of a parcel of land in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite. The case was filed in 1998 by Mario
Malabanan, who claimed his right to the land through adverse possession. Malabanan
argued that he had possessed and occupied the land in a manner required by law for the
confirmation of imperfect title. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) approved his application,
but it was appealed by the Office of the Solicitor General to the Court of Appeals (CA),
which reversed the decision and dismissed the registration application. The Supreme
Court denied the appeal, stating that Malabanan had failed to provide sufficient evidence
to support his claim of possession.

In the motions for reconsideration, the petitioners argued that the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable should be sufficient to convert it into patrimonial
property of the State. They relied on previous rulings to support their argument that the
property had been converted into private property through prescription, and that the ten-
year period prescribed under the Civil Code applied in their favor. They also claimed that
the property was already in their possession for almost 16 years when the application for
registration was filed.

However, the Supreme Court did not accept these arguments. It stated that the petitioners
failed to establish sufficient evidence of possession and occupation of the land since June
12, 1945 or earlier, which was a requirement for the registration of land under the Public
Land Act and the Property Registration Decree. Without satisfying this requisite period of
possession and occupation, the land could not be considered as private property, even
with the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. The land remained
ineligible for registration, unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

Overall, the case involved the denial of the motions for reconsideration by both parties,
after the Supreme Court had already denied the appeal and reversed the decision of the
Court of Appeals. The court found that the petitioner had failed to provide sufficient
evidence of possession and occupation of the land, hence dismissing the registration
application and clarifying the limitations on the alienation of public land.

Issue:
Whether Mario Malabanan had provided sufficient evidence to support his claim of
possession of a parcel of land in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite through adverse
possession.

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and
dismissed the application for land registration. The Office of the Solicitor General
appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The Court
of Appeals held that the possession of the land prior to its classification as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential in determining the period of possession.

The Supreme Court denied the appeal and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA), which reversed the original judgment approving the land registration application.
The Court stated that Mario Malabanan, the applicant claiming adverse possession of the
land, failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his claim. Therefore, the Supreme
Court denied the motions for reconsideration filed by both parties.

The ruling clarified the classifications of land in relation to land registration laws in the
Philippines and emphasized the limitations on the alienation of public land. The Court
interpreted the law as written and stated that the fixed date of June 12, 1945, is the
reckoning point for the requisite possession and occupation for perfecting title under the
Public Land Act.

The ruling also addressed arguments made by the petitioners, including the controlling
doctrine in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit, which stated that possession
of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be
considered in the calculation of the period of possession. However, the Court found that
the legislative intent focused on the date of June 12, 1945, as the starting point for
possession and occupation

In conclusion, the Supreme Court ruling denied the appeal, upheld the decision of the
Court of Appeals, and clarified the classifications of land and limitations on the alienation
of public land in the Philippines.
Case 16. Republic vs. Santos III

GR No. 160453, November 12, 2013

Doctrine:

The Regalian doctrine presumes that all lands not clearly belonging to private ownership
are owned by the State. It states that no public land can be acquired by private individuals
without a grant, either express or implied, from the government. The burden of proof lies
on the individual claiming ownership of public land to show a title from the State.
According to the doctrine, occupation of public land, no matter how long, cannot ripen
into ownership and be registered as a title. The case referenced the Regalian doctrine in
relation to the ownership of the land claimed by the individuals, stating that without a
showing of a title from the State, the land belonged to the State and not the claimants.

Facts:

The Republic of the Philippines appealed a decision to grant the application of two
individuals to register Lot 4998-B, claiming ownership of the land based on the belief that
it was an accretion formed alongside a river bank over 30 years.

The Republic argued that the land did not meet the criteria for accretion and actually
belonged to the State, as it was previously part of the dried-up Paranaque River.

The case hinged on whether the land could be legally described as an accretion or not.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), ruling that
the applicants had continuously and adversely occupied the land for over 30 years and
met the requirements for land registration.

The Republic filed an appeal, claiming that the applicants' evidence contradicted their
claim of accretion, that the land's registration was not justified under the Civil Code, and
that there was a lack of formal evidence of the land's alienability and disposability.

The Republic argued that the lower courts erred in their findings and that the land should
not be granted to the applicants.

The Court was tasked with reviewing the findings of the lower courts and determining if
the applicants met the requirements for land registration under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529.

The Court found that the findings of the lower courts were grounded on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures, and that their inference about the continuous possession of the
land was manifestly mistaken. Therefore, the Court reviewed the findings of the lower
courts.

The Court stated that the applicants' continuous possession of the land, payment of realty
taxes, and approval of a subdivision plan supported their claim of ownership, and there
was no evidence to disprove this. The Court concluded that the applicants had met all the
requirements and were entitled to the land's registration.

Issue:

Whether the land claimed by the two individuals should be registered as their own based
on the concept of accretion, or if it actually belongs to the state as it was previously a part
of the dried-up Paranaque River.
Ruling:

The land in question does not meet the criteria for accretion, and therefore, it belongs to
the state. The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to grant the application
for land registration of Lot 4998-B to two individuals. They argued that the land was not
formed through accretion but was previously a part of the dried-up Paranaque River. The
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's pronouncement that the land belonged to the
applicants as an accretion, based on Article 457 of the Civil Code. However, the Supreme
Court found that the applicants' evidence did not establish accretion, but rather the drying
up of the river. Therefore, the court granted the appeal and determined that the land
belonged to the state, and the respondents had no legal right of ownership.

The court ruled that the respondents had no legal right of ownership over the land. This
decision was based on the fact that the land had not been formed through gradual filling
up of soil through the current of a river, which is the legal definition of accretion.
Additionally, the court stated that even if the respondents had possessed the land for
more than thirty years, they did not acquire it by prescription or any other means without
proof that the land had been declared as alienable and disposable by the government.
The court emphasized that river beds are considered part of the public dominion and
cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared as alienable and
disposable by the government. As there was no evidence of such declaration, the court
concluded that the land still belonged to the state.
17. Navy Officers' Village Association, Inc. (Novai), Petitioner,
V. Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

G.R. No. 177168, August 03, 2015

Facts:

On 1965, a certain portion of land was declared for “AFP Officer’s Village” for disposal. A
month later, a part of the land was declared to be for the VFP as a site for rehabilitation,
etc.

On November 15, 1991, the property was the subject of a Deed of Sale between the
Republic of the Philippines, and petitioner NOVAI. The deed of sale was subsequently
registered and from which TCT No. T-15387 was issued in NOVAI’s name.

Republic wants the title cancelled on the ground that, among others, the land covered by
NOVAIs title is part of a military reservation

RTC: In favor of NOVAI, contending that (a) the land is already alienable and
disposable (b) the subject deed of sale should be presumed valid on its face, as it was
executed with all the formalities of a notarial certification; (c) notwithstanding the claims
of forgery, the signature of Dir. Palad on the deed of sale appeared genuine and
authentic; and (d) NOVAI's title to the property had attained indefeasibility since the
Republic's action for cancellation of title was filed close to two (2) years from the
issuance of the title.

CA: Reversed, inalienable land as the petitioner failed to prove the positive act of the
government

Issue:

Whether or not the land is already alienable and disposable and hence, can be
registered.

Held:

No. It is settled that the land falls under those which are reserved for public use in CA 141.
In a limited sense, parcels of land classified as reservations for public or quasi-public uses
under Section 9 (d) of C.A. No. 141 are still non-alienable and non-disposable, even
though they are, by the general classification under Section 6, alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. By specific declaration under Section 88, in relation with
Section 8 and Section 83, these lands classified as reservations are non-alienable and non-
disposable.

From the perspective of the general Civil Code provisions on Property, lands which are
intended for public use or public service such as reservations for public or quasi-public
uses are property of the public dominion and remain to be so as long as they remain
reserved.
Applying to the case at bar, Proclamation No. 478 was issued after Proclamation No. 461.
Hence, while Proclamation No. 461 withdrew a certain area or parcel of land from the Fort
Andres Bonifacio Military Reservation (FBMR) and made the covered area available for
disposition in favor of the AFPOVAI, Proclamation No. 478 subsequently withdrew the
property from the total disposable portion and reserved it for the use of the Veterans
Rehabilitation and Medical Training Center (VRMTC).
18. City of Lapu-Lapu, Petitioner,
Vs. Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), Respondent.

G.R. No. 184203, November 26, 2014

G.R. No. 187583

Facts:

City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the Treasurer, demanded an amount of P32, 912,
350.08 from PEZA for real property taxes from 1992 to 1998 on its properties located in
the Mactan Economic Zone citing sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code of
1991 that withdrew the real property tax exemptions previously granted to or presently
enjoyed by all persons. The city pointed out that there is no provision in the Special
Economic Zone Act of 1995 exempting PEZA from payment of real property taxes, unlike
Section 21 of the Presidential Decree No. 66 that explicitly provided for EPZA’s exemption.
And since there is no legal provision explicitly exempting the PEZA from payment of real
property taxes, it argued that it can tax PEZA. The City made subsequent demands.

PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, praying
that the trial court declare that it exempts from payment of real property taxes. The case
was raffled. The petition was answered by the City maintaining that PEZA is liable for real
property taxes.

The trial court ruled that the City had no authority to tax PEZA characterizing it as an
agency of the National Government. It also granted the petition for declaratory relief and
declared it exempt from payment of real property taxes.

The city filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. It was then appealed to the
Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed. It filed again a motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether or not the PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes.

Ruling:

Yes. PEZA is exempt from payment of real property taxes because it is an instrumentality
of the national government.

Real property taxes are annual taxes levied on real property such as lands, buildings,
machinery, and other improvements not otherwise specifically exempted under the Local
Government Code. Real property taxes are ad valorem, with the amount charged based
on a fixed proportion of the value of the property. Under the law, provinces, cities, and
municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area have the power to levy real property
taxes within their respective territories.

The general rule is that real properties are subject to real property taxes. The exceptions
to the rule are provided in the Local Government Code. Under Section 133(o), local
government units have no power to levy taxes of any kind on the national government,
its agencies and instrumentalities and local government units.

Under the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the PEZA was established primarily to
perform the governmental function of operating, administering, managing, and
developing special economic zones to attract investments and provide opportunities for
preferential use of Filipino labor. Under its charter, the PEZA was created a body corporate
endowed with some corporate powers. However, it was not organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation. Nothing in the PEZA’s charter provides that the PEZA’s capital is divided
into shares. The PEZA also has no members who shall share in the PEZA’s profits. It does
not compete with other economic zone authorities in the country and the government
may even subsidize the PEZA’s operations.

PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government. Furthermore, the lands owned by

the PEZA are real properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines. The City of Lapu-
Lapu and the Province of Bataan cannot collect real property taxes from the PEZA.
19. Republic v. Aboitiz

Facts:

Luis Miguel Aboitiz filed for an Application for Registration of Land Title of a parcel of
land located in Talisay City, Cebu with an area of 1,245 sqm. He presented evidence to
prove his claim including a certification from DENR and CENRO that the property was
alienable and disposable since 1957 and it was not covered by any subsisting public land
application.

RTC Cebu granted the application, but the Republic appealed the ruling before the Court
of Appeals where the CA reversed the RTC’s decision and dismiss Aboitiz application for
land registration. The CA ruled that it was only from the date of declaration of such lands
as alienable and disposable that the period for counting the statutory requirement of
possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier would commence. Possession prior to the date
of declaration of the lands alienability was not included. The CA observed that the subject
property was declared as alienable and disposable only in 1957, so the application clearly
did not meet the requirements of possession needed under PD 1529 which must be since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Aboitiz averred that although the land was classified as alienable and disposable only in
1957, the tax declarations from 1963 to 1994 (31 years) converted the land into private
property by way of acquisitive prescription; and although tax declarations and real
property tax payments were not by themselves conclusive evidence of ownership of land,
they were nevertheless good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner. CA
amended its own decision and granted the application of Aboitiz.

Issue:

Whether or not Aboitiz is entitled to the registration of the property under PD 1529?

Ruling:

No. PD 1529 as amended by PD 1073, applicants for land title registration must establish
and prove that:

(1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain;

(2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and

(3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The absence of any one requisite renders the application for registration substantially
defective.

Under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and
operate against the State, the classification of ' land as alienable and disposable alone is
not sufficient. The applicant must be able to show that the State, in addition to the said
classification, expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a
proclamation issued, by the President that the subject land is no longer retained for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the land
remains to be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by
virtue of prescription.
20. Alolino v. Flores

Facts:

Alolino is the registered owner of 2 contiguous parcels of in Taguig. He initially

constructed a bungalow-type house on the property. In 1980, he added a second floor
and extended his two-storey house up to the edge of his property. There are terraces on
both floors.

Spouses Flores constructed their house/sarisari store on the vacant municipal and barrio
road immediately adjoining the rear perimeter wall of Alolino's house. The structure is
only about two 2-3 inches away from the back of Alolino's house, covering five windows
and the exit door which deprived Alolino of the light and ventilation he had previously
enjoyed and prevented his ingress and egress to the municipal road through the rear door
of his house. Alolino demanded that the respondent spouses remove their structure but
Flores refused claiming that the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig has reclassified the road
as residential lot and even constructed a second floor to serve as a residence of for their
daughter.

Alolina filed a complaint against the Flores where the RTC rendered judgement ordering
Flores to remove their illegal structure obstructing Alolino's right to light and view. CA
reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit holding that:

(1) that Alolino had not acquired an easement of light and view because he never
gave a formal prohibition against Flores

(2) that Alolino was also at fault, having built his fyouse up to the edge of the
property line in violation of the National Building Code

(3) that Alolino had not acquired an easement of right of way to the barrio Road;
and

(4) that the respondents' house was not a public nuisance because it did not
endanger the safety of its immediate surroundings.

Issue:

Whether or not the barrio road was reclassified as residential road

Ruling:

No, the court finds no merit in Flores’s contention that the Local Government of Taguig
had already withdrawn the subject barrio road from public use and reclassified it as a
residential lot. A barrio road is designated for the use of the general public who are
entitled to free and unobstructed passage thereon. Permanent obstructions on these
roads, such as the respondents' illegally constructed house, are injurious to public welfare
and convenience. The occupation and use of private individuals of public places devoted
to public use constitute public and private nuisances and nuisance per se.