Maha El Kaisy-Friemuth The Human and the Prophe Jabbar’s Theology tin ‘Abd al- Trustworthy biographical details ofthe life of ‘Abd al-Jabbar are difficult to ascer. tain; his name probably was Abu al-Hasan ‘Abd al-Jabbar Ibn Ahmad al-Hama. Ahanl.* He was born in the region of Hamadhan probably about 932 AD. He started his theological studies in Isfahan under the Ash‘arite school, but in Ba-ra he was soon impressed by the Mu'tazilite teaching, the most important Islamic rational school of the time, and studied their sciences under the famous theologian Ab Ishaq Ibn ‘Ayyash (d. 970 AD). He also studied in Baghdad under the Mu‘tazi- lite theologian Abu ‘Abdullah al-Ba-ri (4.977 AD). The famous wazir al-Sahib Ibn ‘Abbad appointed ‘Abd al-Jabbar as the chief judge of Rayy at about 972 AD. He remained in this office until the death of al-Sahib in 997 AD, afterwards devot- ing himself to teaching and writing until his death at Rayy in 1024, or 1025 AD? ‘Abd alJabbar had a long productive life, Ibn al-Murtada mentions in Tabagat al-Mu ‘tazila’ about 27 different titles of his*, but ‘Abd al-Karim “Uthman’s research Produced 69 titles all attributed to ‘Abd al-Jabbar However, Brockelman, ‘Uthman Points out, has identified the existence of only 9 works and mentions the where- abouts of their manuscripts. ‘Abd al-Jabbar followed the theology of the Bi asrian school which was distinct from that of the Baghdadi school.” The most important work of ‘Abd al-Jabbar is Article Note: Parts of this article is from my book, God and Humans in Islamic ‘Thought, London: Routledge, 2006, 1J.R. TM, Peters, God's Created Speech, Brill, 1976, p. 8, 2 Ibid see also A. ‘Uthman, Sharh al-U+t al Khamsa, Cairo, 1996, PP. 13-16, 3 Thn al-Murtada, Ahmed lbn Yahya, Tabagat al-Mu'tazila, edited by Susanna Diwald-Wilzer, Beirut, 1961, 4 Peters, Created Speech, p. 10, 5 ‘Uthman, Shark, pp. 20-23, 6 Ibid, p. 20, 7 A, Dhanani, The Physical Theory of Kalam, Brill, One who directed attention to humans’ responsibility for AD), however, Wasil Ibn ‘Ata’ (4, 748 AD) and ‘Amr Ibn ofal-Bavn are considered the real founder ofthe Mutazi time of Caliph Haran al-Rashid (t. 786-809 AD), https://dol.org/10.1515/9783110588576.012 1994, p. 9. Dhanani explains that the first their acts was Al-Hasan a-Batl (d. 728 “Ubayd (4. 761 AD), who were students lite school. Nevertheless, only from the Dhanani explains, did they become a wellnown‘The Human ané the Prophet in ‘Abd alJabbar's Theology — 227 alMughnt. This consists of twenty volumes, sixteen of which were found in Yemen in 1951. Peters explains that ‘Abd alJabbar dictated this work over a period of twenty years between 972 and 992 AD.* Al-Mughni is the earliest detailed docu- sent which we possess about theology of Bastian Mu'tazilite theology. Although, ‘abd al-Jabbar in AlLMughni does not introduce a theology of his own but rather compiles a theology of the Bastian school’, he presents excellent arguments which prove different issues and express his own interpretation and conviction. In Al-Mughnt XI ‘Abd alJabbar discusses the problem of the human nature. He presents here the different theories which analyse the essence of human nature which the the Bastian Mu'tazilites and their opponents held. This paper ‘will present and evaluate ‘Abd al-Jabbat’s discussion around the nature of the human then moves to discuss the feature of revealed knowledge and the prophet as the higher form of humanity. The human nature accor g to ‘Abd al-Jabbar Bodies according to ‘Abd al-Jabbar consist of parts, the smallest of which is the atom which cannot be further divided."® These parts come together through certain qualities, which come successively to inhere in the atom, and are called accidents. Both atoms and accidents need a creator because atoms come together to constitute a body and separate to denote its perishing through different acci- dents which ‘Abd al-Jabbar calls akwdn:" convergence, jjtima’, separation, neither of them. His opinions are loser tothe philosopher than to the theologian, as we will attempt to show inthis chapter. See, A. Badawi, Madhahib al-Itdmiyyin Beirut, 1983, p.201 8 Ibi 9 Peters, Created Speech, p. 15. Peers refer here to ‘Abd aljabb's own statement against one ofhis opponents, “Maybe some will say: what this book contains is only a compilation of what ‘was known from the other books. (In answer): The question isnot a he assumes; i you study I, there is no doubt that in every chapter oft nothing i eft out: there is] a wide-spread colletion and a miscellaneous compilation, the explanation of the correct issue and the waming against sophism, (the argument of the opponents), the study ofthe coniion ofthe indication andthe definition of those things upon which the point and the correct issues are built”, See also Al Mughni, XX part two, p. 225 10 However, l-Nazzim (d, 836/845 AD) and other theologians from the Baghdadi school con- sider thatthe atom can be infinitely divided, giving rise tothe concept ofthe eternity of the world, See, AlAshiari, Magalatal-stamiyyin, ed, H. Ritter, Wiesbaden, 1980, . 304, 141 ‘Abd alabbas, al Maja’ fl ak-Mubitbi-alTaktf, ed J.J. Houben, Beit, 1965, pp. 34-45. In {his section ‘Abd al Jabbar explains thoroughly the meaning of akwdn, and proves its existence as determinant mana which indicates movement and immobility inthe bodies. After this he uses28 — aha El Kalsy-Friemuth paraka, and mobi ste. COnVETBENCE Makes the ich movements and separation explains the body's p, through immobility. These four accidents demonstrate iB the body cama sternally existent, for ifit were SO would not be poss 10 perish whi the consequence of separations and all its parts woul id aways remain open, pecause an eternal being has that eternity ‘within itself which can never perch pee abd alabbar believe cat the existent Deings 1” under three concep, atoms (bodies); accidents which explain all activities ofthe body and God whose edatene contains neither atoms nor accidents. Howes! before engaging ou. selves in the discussion around the nature of the human, itis appropriate here tp ‘examine the sources of ‘the above theory: The argument around the human as a composite of soul and body or atoms and actgents tard already in the Greek tradition. The atomist Greek scent, ‘1d consists of atoms, which were existed ete. Dimokritus, believed that the wor ; wally, Russell explains that although the atomists believed that each event mus rave a cause and al things are bound tothe natural laws, they falled ( explain the reason for the coming together ofthe atomsin order tostart forming the world, It seems, Russell points out, that they asserted the purposeless starting point of the world through mere chance, however once the atoms come together to form bodies and things, natural laws govern the chain of causes, Aristotle criticised this theory by showing its lack in explaining the source of movement ime, space or the human soul.” Epicures, who was contemporary 0 Aristotle and defender of the atomist theory, explained that everything consist of atoms also movement, time and the human sou! showing thatits possible to relate all movements ofthe ‘world to a mechanical origin." ‘Badawi considers that the early Mur‘tazilite Abd al-Hudhayl was one of the ‘earliest to adopt the theory of atoms and accidents and was influenced probably by the ancient Greek atomists. However, Badawi mentions here also the possi: bility that Aba al-Hudhayl could have got his information about the theory of iftrdg, movernent, come together throu Trovement and immobility, which denote convergence and separation, to prove that the atoms ‘come together to constitute a body because ofthe existence ofthese aspects mata which come to inhere in them and cause the existence ofa body He explain this proof ina simpler manner {in‘Uthman, Shar, pp. 96-104 42 ‘Abd al Jabbar, Mutt, pp. 50-67 In along chapter ‘Abd al Jabbar describes these four ac ‘Gents akwdn and explains how we are able to observe thelr function, Then he considers the meaning of created and etera in orderto prove thatthe accidents and the body must be crated. 45 Russel, B, Tarik al-Falsafaal-Gharbiyya, a-Haly'aal-Magriyyaal~Amma ilkitab, 2010, vo. 1 pp. 125-139, 14 Tid.from the Indians who were living in Basta which was an international port time, because the Indian school Vishka also adopted this theory. However ines more to the view that Abi al-Hudhayl probably knew the theory of atoms from the translations of Greek books which was taking place at this time."* However, Abd al-Hudhay! did not consider that the world consists only of atoms putalso of accidents and divine power, Atoms for him have the only two qualities ofexistence and occupying space. Therefore itis impossible, for Aba al-Hudhayl, that atoms alone could explain the origin ofthe world. AIL qualities such as move- ments, immobility, heat, cold ete cannot be atoms but another constituent. He talled these qualities accidents and gave them the quality of being inhering in the atoms. Thus accidents do not occupy space and therefore can only exist inan atom. Both atoms and accidents are created through divine power, accidents are created either in each minutes like the accident of speech or for a longer: duration asthe accidents of ability, life, knowledge or will. According to ‘Abd al Jabbar, humans, like all created things, consist of parts or atoms and accidents. Many theologians, of this period, have referred to the atom as a substance jawhar, but ‘Abd alJabbar uses also the word substance to refer to the body.’ Peters explains that atom and substance in ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s cosmology have many similarities; they both are seen as existent and occupying space, and both are bearers of accidents.”” Substance, however, can consist of more than one atom; it also explains the element of permanence, Peters points out, which relates things to their species and genus."* Accidents, in contrast, exist only in a substance or atom and express the elements of change which occur to the substance. This means that the changes which happen remain within the permanent feature ofthe substance; though some accidents do not remain long, the basic features of the body always stay the same. Accidents are of two kinds perceptible and imperceptible. The first kind consists of colours, taste, odours, atoms at the he incli 15 A. Badawi, Madhahib, pp. 183-184, 16 Al-Asha'ni says that AbO al-Hudhayl and Mu’ammer seem to regard the substance jawhar as the atom because they consider it to be not further divisible and therefore a single substance and ‘cannot be a body but it forms one atom of the body. Ab ‘All al-Jubba’T also follows this theory (Ashh’arl, Magalat, p. 307). But since ‘Abd al-Jabbar refers to the body as a jawhar then we can conclude that he considers the jawhar to consist of more than one atom. See Peters, Created ‘Speech, p. 121, 122, See also Dhanani, Physical Theory, pp. 55-57 17 Badawi, Madhdahib, pp. 183-184, 18 Peters, Created Speech, pp. 119-121. Peters considers that the use of substance has a meta- physical rather than a physical meaning, It explains the independent existence which denotes permanence and shows the ability to exhibit other qualities. It denotes the atom in its productive form,: |. The second is divided into accidents, which warmth, coldness, Leeaheromant people acquit. Life, perception, ability ee oe eptible accidents and come only from God, while know. Se es od ne like, are acquired by each person, sr tect et ti eh sera pete Pain can be cused by another. Thus al actives of humans are explained through the inerence ofthe different accidents at diffe. a °H Tob aan, therefore, humans are composite beings who are observed as acting units They are living through the accident of life, which is classed as an accident inherent inthe whole body lke ability and knowledge. Life entails the accident of perception and denotes the living as those who ean perceive warmth, coldness and pan. Sight, taste and hearing are accidents, ‘Abdal-Jabhrexplaing, which inere only in certain part ofthe body anda defect in an organ can oceuy without stopping the accident of living, ‘The soul for ‘Abd alJabbar, in contrast, snot inherent in the body but itis ‘afie the breath which we inhale, Soul, “Ri in Arabic comes, according to ths author, from riyah wind and the term. nafs, which also designates the soul, comes from nafas, the ait we breathe. Ths, therefore, refers tothe at which we inhale and causes life to continue? JinererPaining the nature ofthe human according to Abd alfabbar we tum hereto explore the theory ofhis opponents who believe inthe duality of the soul and body, The human soul according to the philosophers and the Baghdadi Mu‘tazilites The second theory of explaining the essential nature of the human is that of the Philosophers and Some of the Baghdadi Mu'tazilites, They relate the Movement of the world toa divine intellect and to a divine soul, This theory has its origin in the thought of Aristotle and his commentators, The world moves and becomes active due toa divine i totle calls the Prime Immo oo which Aris- vable Mover, This intellect, however, explains only the sens, 19 Ibid, pp, 123-125, 20 Ibid, p. 125, 21 ‘Abd alJabbar, Al-Mughnt, XI, pp. 304-305,first movement of the world and its present form. hand, consist of matter and form, ence of things but also their potent the other hand, explains their act All things for him, on the other the matter explains not only the material exist- ality and possibility of existence. The form, on tivities and shape; it actualises the potentiality of existence and forms together with the matter the thing in the form it existe The form however in the Aristotelian thinking is the power, which explains the existence and the activities of things. Aristotle considered the human soul to he a high type of the form, which exists only in connection with matter (body). For him, as Rahman explains, the soul is “an immanent principle which organises the body and gives its specific character and makes it what it is” 2? He attributed also rational knowledge to the soul and held, like Plato, that the body is a mere instrument employed by the soul. At the same time he limited the existence of the soul to the existence of the body. This forces the conclusion, Rahman points out, that he had an inconsistent view of the relationship of soul to the body because if the soul is a substance, which is superior to the body, then its existence should not be restricted to the body. The principle of the soul as immaterial and separable from the body was mainly the centre of Plotinus’ psychological teaching. But for him, as Rahman noticed, the crucial point was mainly to define the ‘soul-body relationship in order to fight against other groups who considered the soul as the inseparable form of the body.” Goodman explains that Plotinus argued that the body cannot think and therefore its relationship to the soul is merely instrumental. Al-Farabi (d. 950 AD.) considered, following Aristotle, that the activities of all living being are related to the powers of the soul, al-Nafs. There are three kinds of souls in the psychology of al-Farabi: the eternal soul of God which has no beginning and no relation to matter, the eternal souls of the angels which has a beginning but also separated from matter ‘ql muférig, and finally the earthly soul which exists in matter and can only be eternal through possession of ‘knowledge, The earthly souls are also of three kinds: the vegetable soul which explains the nourishing of the thing and its growth, the animal soul which is responsible for all emotions and desires, and finally the rational soul which can be only attributed to humans. The function of the human soul, however, includes the activities of both the vegetable and the animal soul, but it presents the possibility for humans to reach the level angelic souls, The human soul controls all the functions of the body and uses it as its own instrument, which relates the soul to the other beings 22 Rahman, Psychology, p. 4 23 Ibid. v.5.Cn ya EI Kalsy-Friemutl 22 — -parabt has only one hope is tO control the soul for al-Faral . .f the soul to contemplate the ead the rational part of desires of the body Se Tor al-Farabl, and also for Ibn Sina after him has @ divine Sa snich hopes only for its eternal life in the divine immaterial mystical Fun world.* ae ‘be very much influenced also by the argu. A gt een esos eye ment which explains" he platonic concept ofthe soul. This concept was firs oh Ree ta sof the Orfism (Orfius) tradition before Plato, however, avseas the one who clearly related the origin of the world and of the soul toa aor power, though he believed in the existence of apre-existent mater which aerrnced in forming the world. In both plays Titatius and Vidon, Plato concen- oted on the concept ofthe human soul. In the former he explains thatthe human Soul originated in the divine world and its role is to acquire knowledge in this ‘world through its memory ofits pre-existence time. The latter play discussed the Tetum of the soul to the divine world after its separation from the body.” 'ALNazzam, an early theologian from the Baghdadi Mu'tazilites, regards the human soul as light which is spread in the body and causes all its activities. The soul has ability, will, life, and knowledge in its own merit. This means that the human soul for him does not depend on knowledge or ability from outside but, similar to Plato's concept of the soul, it has knowledge, ability, and the other qual- ities within itself. This argument, however, did not convince the Muslim theologi- ans, al-mutakallimiin, who did not see a logical ground for this claim.” For them the body has a great importance for it will have eternal life in the paradise, as the Quran declares. After giving a summary of the holder of the substantiality of the human soul ‘we move now to examine ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s argument against this theory. inthe earthly world. THe ‘Abd al-Jabbar’s Criticism of the Duality of the Soul and Body ‘Abd alJabbar argues in Al-Mughnt XI a igainst the theologians of the Bagh such as Hisham Ibn al-Hakam, Bishr Ibn al:Mu‘tamir and Nazgam who nai 25 Fakhry, M.,al-Farabi: the founder of islamic itonism, Oxfor i tic Neoplat a 26 Russel, B, Tarikh al-Falsafa al-Gharbiyya, pp. 29-246 ieeeanaiatdnncaes 27 Goodman, Avicenna, p. 154, ;nat behind each visible person exists an invisible soul which is the power initiat- ingall activities. The soul is the eternal element, they believe, which remains after the death iS the body; it is the determinant, ma‘nd, which causes the actuality of ine body.” (O° The arguments of ‘Abd alJabbar against the Baghdadi theologians run as follows: First of all ‘Abd alJabbar explains that whatever is neither proved by neces- sary knowledge nor by the methods of acquisition cannot be known. He presents ‘abu Hashim al-Jubbd’?’s argument that ifthe soul were to inhere in all parts of the pody, then it would be like a dress we wear, which we experience immediately. ‘This, however, is not the case with the soul, ‘Abd al-jabbar also asks how, if the invisible being is other than the visible one, can we prove this invisible exists when all its activities are identical with the activity of the visible person??? In this part of the argument ‘Abd al-Jabbar attempts to demonstrate the difficulty of acquiring knowledge of the soul asa determinant, ma‘ni, of the body. He also argues against Nazzam who considers that the soul is a substance which has knowledge, life and ability in itself, i-dhatiha. Nazzdm also maintains that the soul is the life which flows in the body and causes its activity. ‘Abd alJab- bar's argument here construct his main concept, for him God and humans func- tion in basically different way, God is able, knowing, perceiving, existent within Himself nothing comes from outside Himself; this is the explanation of what the Mu‘tazilite calls linafsihi within Himself, Humans in contrast function only through determinant ma‘nd which come from outside the human either from God or from the outside environment, as explained above. Thus humans according to the Mutakallimin theologians cannot have any activities from within itself they are always in need of knowledge ability, life, perception and so on which they receive from outside and influence their different states. ‘Abd al-Jabbar argues that if the soul were a substance in which knowledge and ability are inherent, then it would be not possible for these to be inherent in the body because a sub- stance (the soul) cannot be inherent in other substances; however, if it were an accident then it would not accept other accidents such as knowledge and ability because accidents are not inherent in each other, Also the possibility that the soul 28 Ibid, pp. 310-311. 29 His opponents explain that the reason for the identification between the activity of the soul and ofthe body is that the soul is inherent in all parts ofthe body and initiates its activities. But ‘Abd al-Jabbar explains that f living isa substance ina person which is able to know and perceive then it should be more likely to be able to know the reality ofthe bodily structure and organs of the person himself, which is the nearest to the internal living soul; yet we know that no-one has ‘the ability to see or describe his own bodily organs. PN acould inate activity per seis impossible in ‘Abd al Jebb's opinion forthe ony being who acts through Himself is God. Activites which are initiated through essence sifat nafsiyya, however, would not be restricted by an limitations Which ‘means thatthe person should have ll knowledge and become omnipotent, ‘whieh {s not observable of humans.” ‘Abd al-Jabbar argues also against the concept of the human. intellect as a sub. Stance awhar which initiate the human intellectual activities. He devotes a. chapter in A-Mughnt X1 to discussing the meaning of the word ‘aq. ‘Aql for him does not simply means intellect or rationality; itis rather a certain know Which is known necessarily and immediately and it qualifies the person ty Someone rationally responsible” who is able to reflect and acquite knowledge = ‘Aglhereis not also used to mean a certain place or organ or substance in the body, as itis among the Arab philosophers. ‘Abd al-Jabbar argues here that if ‘aqlwerea substance, it would accept all kinds of accidents which means that the substance ‘aql can accept knowledge and ignorance. In this case we cannot attribute maty. nity to everyone who possesses ‘aq, for it can mean both knowledge and igno. rance.” ‘Abd alJabbar also argues against the concept of ‘aql as a power existing in the body. He explains that if by power is meant the ability to achieve certain Knowledge, then there must be people who are attributed with rational maturity, ‘agil, only because they possess this ability, but who lack knowledge, because ability must precede the act of knowing.™ As a conclusion ‘agl for ‘Abd al-Jabbar is the accident of certain knowledge which exists in most people and enables them to reflect and acquire science. His reference to its ‘agl should be considered 30 Another proof ‘Abd al-Jabbar presents here that ifthe souiis a separate substance which hag its own knowledge, power and perception then it can see and hear things in the case of the defee. tion ofits organs, but we know that the blind cannot see and the deaf cannot hear, Its also clear that each sense-organ is responsible for one kind of perception but ifthe soul in the body had perception not through an accident but within itself then it would be possible to use one organ for several kind of perception, which to ‘Abd al-jabbar is absurd. See Al-Mughnt XI, pp. 339-341, 31 Here ‘Abd al-Jabbar explains the idea of kamal al-‘agi which is one of the qualification of being ‘mukallaf. He says that al-‘aglis certain reliable knowledge which happens in a person without use of the senses or acquired knowledge. The word ‘ag! comes from ye'gil al-néqa, which means to hinder the camel from moving. It is used here metaphorically, ‘Abd al Jabbar explains, and refers to knowledge which is basic and does not change, like the basic knowledge of ethical rules or the knowledge of basic general rules which are always true, A-Mughni, XI, pp. 379-80 and p. 386. see also peters, God's created speech, p. 83. 32 ‘Abd alJabbar, ALMughni, XI, p. 375, 33 Ibid, p. 376-377. 34 ‘Abd alJabbar, AlMughni, XL, p. 379.‘The Human and the Prophet in ‘Abd alabbsr’s Theology — 235 here as conventional usage, which, as he explains, calls all mature persons viaala’ ‘Thus the living person has “life through which the person become living, ayy, he i not living by means of the soul nor is he living by means of blood or bodily structure, though he needs all of them." ‘Abd al-Jabbar regards humans as a composite unity of parts which bear different accidents, some of which are permanent, such as life and basic per- ception, others changeable and denoting the particular state of each moment. put although the composite being is always in a passive position of accepting the different accidents, they are considered to have the will and ability to act in accordance with their desires. It seems here, however, that this unity is not justi- fied since ‘Abd al-Jabbar does not tell us how composite beings can decide about the different accidents which they might receive, since there is no rational being inside them to make such decisions. In addition if the person is mainly a compos- ite of atoms and different accidents, why do people differ in their decisions, since changes happen through the same kind of accidents of knowledge or conviction? Itseems to us here that the absence of a rational soul inside the human body con- tradicts ‘Abd al-Jabbar's concept of humans as free agents who are responsible for knowing God and performing good acts, since it lacks a rational soul able to govern the whole body and make such decisions. He, while rejecting the duality of body and soul, adopts another duality: atoms and accidents. Accidents in his theology replace the soul in tracing the capacities of humans but they do not present the rational unity which the soul presents, It seems to us that the Mu'tazilites and many other Muslim theologians realised the danger of supposing that human activities are related to a rational spiritual being, as this would have influenced their whole theological system. For the rational soul, as explained by the philosophers, must have qualities which are similar to God’s, such as being immaterial, indivisible and one. With these qualities the soul cannot be satisfied by the promised rewards which concentrate onthe pleasures of the body. The hope of the soul, as we have seen in bn Sina and al-Ghazali, is meeting God and having eternal life in observing Him. Ina sense the human soul may become like an angel, whose existence and hope differ totally from those of humans. Thus belief in the substantiality of the rational soul raises humanity to a divine condition which has mystical implications and hints at the unimportance of the body in the life to come. 35 Ibid, pp. 379-387, 36 ‘Abd al-jabbat, AL-Mugini, XI, p. 338. roand the feature of the rophet a Prop 4 prophecy connected with his rational theology a's concent that rational discourse, though states in the cen in x demon ris, however, perfected through the work of prope a Co Jed knowledge ae complemen and reveal rts that rational : aa uma wih ll means of Perfect Perception ort sd al ab the fist place of the Mu‘tazil In this sense he asset ‘each other and providing word rational knowledge we can test thatthe world has a creator rrerator has several atributes Only through this way we can undesi, aa ator cares forhscreatures and has 2 Pian {0 benefit them inthis won, e. ae aie ie penefits the creator has placed two impositions, whicy ‘Abd abJabbar calls takif‘qlt and taklf shar qs the atonal obligations which we can reach through our ration, capacity, while takffshar'Tis revealed through the different prophets, hn order that the human understands and realizes his/her role in the wor God provides them with all possible assistances: _allbodily instruments which lead to rational reflection, nazar. 2. providing uff as a special assistance and an additional guidance, Under the fist point locate Abd al Jabbar the rational obligation taktif‘aqt whi the second assistance isthe ground for revealed obligations, aklifshar’, ‘The rational obligation i based onthe concept of nazar. Since God provi the human wit al boy instruments which give him/her the capacity oence and reach results about the wordandits creator, He demands from theme wee and act according o rational oret. This obligation is compulsory fora mee and is called takiff ‘agit. *Y forall humans The revealed law on the other hand isa part 7 the human with speciic die ite ete cre alone ede whichis not accesible trough rational eerion nin? Know Alda Jabbar discusses theimportance of revealed kn jowledge underhis mainifthe messages were attainable by rational knowledge there would be no need to end them. ‘Abd al Jabbar’s task here is to prove that the revealed message, though itis accepted rationally, contains things which our rational knowledge cannot teach.” He argues that the importance of revealed knowledge lies in the detailed information which it gives about some acts; itis concerned with the details of performing certain acts and refraining from others al-f1 wa al-tark. These details ray not be known through necessary knowledge because necessary knowledge provides general and total information mujmal, whereas detailed knowledge is heeded about the performing of certain acts and refraining from others." ‘The content of revealed knowledge, as of all kinds of knowledge, must have a rational ground which proves its claims because a commandment to “Abd ‘aLJabbar is obligatory not only because it is from God but because of its content, Thus revealed knowledge must follow the same fundamental basis of rational knowledge. However, ‘Abd al-Jabbar believes that revealed messages do present new information which cannot be acquired only as parts of rational knowledge. This section, therefore, will examine the importance and the content of revealed knowledge as ‘Abd al-Jabbar sees them. ‘After showing that these revealed truths cannot be known through necessary knowledge, he turns to examine whether it is possible to obtain them through acquired knowledge. He starts his discussion by explaining that acquired knowl- edge can only extend to things which can be known rationally, but other kinds of information must be gained through other methods, including details of future events ‘ilm al-ghayb or certain acts which the creator demands from His creatures such as worship, or allowing the slaughter of animal for the benefit of human needs.?? Thus, ‘Abd al-Jabbar confirms that there are kinds of truth which may not be known either by necessary immediate nor acquired knowledge. Our minds, for example, can only insist that we should thank and worship God but cannot provide the detail of this worship.“ Revealed knowledge discloses also the characteristics of some specific acts, including motivating, af'al da‘iya, which stimulates performance of the rational obligations, such as prayers which motivate good actions."* The importance of revealed knowledge, therefore, lies in three points: 1. it is the only way to know God's revealed law, shari‘a, which disclose details of some acts and the reason for 37 ‘Abd al-Jabbar, Al-Mughnt, XV, p. 24. 38 ‘Abd al-Jabbar, Al-Mughni, XV, pp. 23-26. 39 Ibid, p. 26. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid, pp. 26-28.However, Abd alJabbar is in agreement with many other groups that th ophet Muhammed was illiterate and did not perform poetry. This is» par of hi rgument for the inimitability of the Qur’an in Al-Mughnt 16." ee In fact Abd al-Jabbar does not only omit the participation of the prophet in the formation of the Qur'an, he also does not consider him better than the mufessern: se Sg dy La 5 Sg 8 ape ny Dn oN e Teves ees MJ stats the prophet also must be accompanied with a miracle or several miracles. ‘These miracles could be performed by the prophet through God's power to break the norm but also could be God's immediate performance to demon- strate the prophecy of His prophet.*® However, elsewhere he insists that the miraculous act comes only through, pivine power and therefore the performer does not play an important role. ‘Whether the Quan from the prophet or from Jebril or from God directly, does not make great difference, for Abd al-Jabbat. Importantis that the Qur’én is inimitable, reveals divine power and indicates the prophecy of Muhammed ibn Abé Allah, Although the Mu'tazila dealt with miracles in a very cautions way, Abd alJabbar seems to follow his own conviction in this subject. In his both books Tz al-Qur’an and Tathbit Data’ al-Nebwwa he mentions many miracles of the prophet and accept them all on the basis of consensus and continuous transmis- sion tawdtur. His interest here seems to be a protest against some of the Baghdadi Mu'tazila who reject the miracles of the prophet altogether. Thus revelation has the role of confirming what is rationally known; of dis- closing the character of some acts which motivate us to perform out obligations; and finally of introducing some acts which can only be known through revelation, suchas the details of worship, Revealed knowledge, for Abd al-abbar, is anexten- jon of rational taklifand cannot have an independent role for we must prove first that it comes from God. As a result, ‘Abd al-Jabbar claims that both rational and revealed knowledge are obligatory, Both rational and revealed knowledge func- tion very closely together in such a way that the absence of one of them causes us cither to misunderstand and misinterpret revelation or to go without the divine assistance which makes it possible (easier) to perform our rational obligations. 46 Abd al-Jabbar, AlMughni, XV, pp. 9-14. 47 Abd al-Jabbar, AlMughni, XV,I p. 369. 48 Abd al-Jabbar, Al-Mughni, XV, pp. 14-18.7 God's ethical prescriptions for the Mu'tazilites, e ere law pi ba can rationally apprehend, thus disclosing wi ni points out he n Hourani poi nd revelation. The theology of ‘Abd al-Jabbay ané humanity do not go beyon the harmony the Mu'tazilites, then, is based revealed and the rational, whic! betwee aed on the reliability of both sources of knowle deta ‘hare both guaranteed by God. Bibliography ‘Abd al-Jabbar, Ab al-Hasan, Al-majm' ff al-Mubit bi-al-Takiff, ed. J. |. 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