CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND COURT TESTIMONY

I. LAW ENFORCEMENT

Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizure

1. Concept of Privacy
2. Concept of Search

Section 2 Art 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION (BILL OF RIGHTS) “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”

Requisites of valid warrant

1. It must be issued upon probable cause;

2. The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge himself;

3. The determination of the existence of probable cause must be made after examination by the judge of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; and

4. The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The difference between the determination of probable cause of a prosecutor and the determination of probable
cause of a judge:
 (1) Prosecutor - determines whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty and should be held for
trial. Probable cause is used for filing of information.
(2) The Judge - determines if a warrant of arrest should be issued to place the accused in immediate custody so as not to
frustrate the ends of justice.

Knock and Announce Principle

Generally, officers implementing a search warrant must:

1. Announce their presence;

2. Identify themselves to the accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession of the premises to be
searched.
3. Show them the search warrant; and

People vs. Huang Zhen Hua, GR No. 139301, September 29, 2004
The constitutional proscription against unreasonable search and seizure applies to Filipino citizens, as well as to aliens
temporarily residing in the country. Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when:

(a) a party whose premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it;
(b) when such person in the premises already knew of the identity of the officers and of their authority and persons;
(c) when the officers are justified in the honest belief that there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and
(d) when those in the premises, aware of the presence of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at
the door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers to believe that an escape or the destruction of evidence is
being attempted.

In order to just ify a no-knock entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing
their presen ce, under the particula r circu mstan ces, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the
effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence.

1. Exclusionary Rule (Fruits of the Poisonous Tree)

- It refers to the exclusion of evidence illegally obtained.

2. Effects of unreasonable searches and seizures

- An unlawful search will result in the exclusion from admission as evidence of

that which was obtained from such unlawful search and seizure. Further, an
unlawful search and seizure may justify: the use of self-help in the form of
resistance to such unlawful search and seizure; the criminal prosecution of the
searching officer; civil damages against such officer; and disciplinary action
against the officer by his administrative officers.

Warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible in instances of:

(1) search of moving vehicles,

(2) seizure in plain view,

(3) customs searches,

(4) waiver or consent searches,

(5) stop and frisk situations and;

(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.

The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests,
to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners.

Search of a moving vehicle

People vs. Balingan, 58 SCAD 861, 241 SCRA 277
A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."

SEIZURE IN PLAIN VIEW

PEOPLE VS BOLASA

Where the police officers upon the tip of an informant and without search warrant peeped to the window and they saw a man a
woman packing marijuana, officer had no personal knowledge that accused committed actually committing attempting to
commit. No personal knowledge that at the time of arrest nor reasonable ground that accused committed it. Neither accused
escaped from prison, hence, the arrest was not valid.

Searches at checkpoints

People vs. Usana, 323 SCRA 754, January28, 2000

HELD: No, those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists are allowed.

For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. It appearing that
Escao consented the police officer to open the truck and the blue bag, thus, it is a valid warrantless search. PO3 Suba admitted that
they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the
passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without
opening the car's doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search.

Customs search
Papa vs. Mago, No. L-27360, February 28, 1968
TARRIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE explicitly does not require warrants for custom officers to board and search vessels, beasts, or
persons suspected of introducing contraband merchandise into the PH. However, the SC held that the search of dwelling
houses, even for the enforcement of Customs Laws, requires warrant.

Roldan vs. Arca, No. L-25434, July 25, 1975

Tariff and Customs Code authorized any official or person exercising police authority under the provisions of the Code, to search
and seize any vessel or air craft as well as any trunk, package, bag or envelope on board and to search any person on
board for any breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws. The vessel can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured; same exception should apply to
seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws.

Reasonable Sea rch

1. Search incidental to a lawful arrest

Rule 126, Section 12. A person arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything that proves the commission of the
offense. It follows that the search can only be made within the area of control of the arrested person, and within the
time of the arrest.
Guidelines in the conduct of bus searches and similar public vehicles

Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 03, 2018

The bus is public transportation, and is open to the public. The expectation of privacy in relation to the constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is not the same as that in a person's dwelling. The constitutional immunity against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right, which may be waived. However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it
is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. In this case, petitioner consented to
the baggage inspection done by SCAA Buco. When SCAA Buco asked if he could open petitioner's bag, petitioner answered "yes,
just open it" based on petitioner's own testimony.

While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of the bus owner in the following
three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the
passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow fot an inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no different
from an airplane that is forced to land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger
on board. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or
luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by government agents or private security personnel as though the person
boarded the bus at the terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where State agents
can board the vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggages.

In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and the search of the bus while
in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it
must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing, if not
altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second, neither can the search
result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances,
the fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar groups should
be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be contined to ensuring public safety. Fourth , as to the
evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place
to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused. The guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither
are they applicable to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only one or
a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by any other person until the passengers on board
alight from the vehicle.

WAIVER / CONSENT SEARCHES - Airport Search

People v. O’C o ch la in , G .R . No . 2 29 0 71, December 10, 2018

Airport screening is a constitutionally reasonable administrative search. An airport search remains a valid administrative search
only so long as the scope of the administrative search exception is not exceeded; "once a search is conducted for a criminal
investigatory purpose, it can no longer be justified under an administrative search rationale." Having been obtained through a valid
warrantless search, the sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence against him. Corollorily, his subsequent arrest, although
likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of an illegal drug in his person in
flagrante delicto.

Stop and Frisk Rule

As one of the exceptions to the rules against warrantless search and seizures, the stop and frisk rule is generally
recognized as a PROTECTIVE SEIZURE AND SEARCH FOR WEAPONS or a LIMITED PROTECTIVE
SEARCH OF OUTER CLOTHING FOR WEAPONS. A genuine reason must exist in light of the police officer’s
EXPERIENCE AND SURROUNDING CONDITIONS, to warrant the belief that the person may be stopped
and frisked.

Under this Rule, a police officer who observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that a criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behaviour, he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries.

Malacat vs. CA, 283 SCRA 159, December 12, 1997

HELD: While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop-and-frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion will not validate
a "stop and frisk." A "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause;

(2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally
be used against the police officer.

Search incidental to a lawful arrest (2016, 2015 BAR)

People vs. Chua Ho San, 307 SCRA 432 (1999)
RULING: The facts, such as report received by the police, entry of Chua in the Philippines, actuation of Chua before his arrest,
the bag containing shabu, etc., in the case did not constitute as probable cause and thus, do not justify warrantless arrest. The
search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a
search can be made, the process cannot be reversed. From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing expedition.

People vs. Tudtud, 412 SCRA 142 (2003)

A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant. The arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have PROBABLE CAUSE to make the
arrest at the outset of the search.

The following instances are not deemed "unreasonable" even in the absence of a warrant:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view". The elements are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit
of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent;
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

Nolasco vs. Pano (1987)

A warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. If the evidence is illegally
obtained it may be returned unless it’s a contraband.

EXCEPT: When warrant does not specify what subversive books and instructions are. There is an absence to the searching team as
to what items must be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles should be seized.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search
warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE.

People vs Leila Johnson These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures, hence an implied or consented search.

People vs. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, January 22, 1999

"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable
cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." In the absence of actual belief, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts.

NOTE: In determining whether a search was validly made, one must ask 2 questions. First, was there a valid warrant of arrest?
If not, was the search incidental to a lawful warrantless arrest falling under Sec. 5 of Rule 113?
Exigent and emergency circumstances

People vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (1994)

HELD: The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts
but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than
for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the
exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.

Search by private persons

People vs. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)

HELD: The search made by a private individual is valid. The constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure
refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government and does not
require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen. In this case, the evidence was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention of State authorities.

Availabilit y of right to alien

People vs. Chua Ho San, 307 SCRA 432 (1999) The scope of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is
available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not. It is fundamental, however, that to constitute a
waiver, it must first appear that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Drug, alcohol and blood t ests (2016)

SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board, GR No. 157870, November 3, 2008
As to Pimentel Petition: Unconstitutional. Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally
impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates,
a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of
the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade,
or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

As to SJS Pet ition: Constitutional. The drug test prescribed for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private
employees, while mandatory, is a RANDOM AND SUSPISCIONLESS and is valid for the following reasons: (1) schools and
their administrators stand in LOCO PARENTIS with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco
parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as may
reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission
that are fair, just, and non- discriminatory. Employees have also been considered as having a REDUCED EXPECTATION
PRIVACY.

As to Laserna Petition : Unconstitutional. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate
a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.

Saturnino C. Ocampo vs. Hon. Ephrem S. Abando, G.R. No. 176830, February 11, 2014
As long as efforts to reach the respondent were made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the
preliminary investigation remains valid. Here, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the name
respondents at their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process.

Stonehill vs. Diokno, No. L-19550, June 19, 1967

The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime.
But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Adm inist rative warrants of arrest

Qua Chee Gan vs. The Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1963)

Deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two ways:

1. By order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and

2. By the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of
Commonwealth Act No. 613.

The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of
deportation is valid only when there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the
President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly, during the investigation, it is
not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President
Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in
the executive order of President Roxas.

 The power to deport alien is an act of State. It is a police measure against an alien whose continued
presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.
An act of State is an act done by the political departments and not subject to judicial review.

WARRANTLESS ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS

Section 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

Rule 112 Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. – When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant
involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without
need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or
unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper
court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this
Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provision of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his
counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.

After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days
from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as
provided in this Rule.

Requisites for Valid Arrest

In flagrante delicto

People vs. Molina, 352 SCRA 174, February 19, 2001

HELD: A “reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and
within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause to justify the arrest. It is
necessary that two requisites concur: [1] the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he had just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer. It matters not that the accused responded, “Boss, if possible, we will settle this”, as such response is an
equivocal statement which, standing alone, will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante arrest.

WARRANTLESS ARRESTS; Continuing offense

Umil vs. Ramos, GR No. 79731, July 9, 1990
Ruling: The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in
the nature of continuing crimes. The Court reiterates that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a subversive
is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect.

Arrest in hot pursuit

*Presence of arresting officer is not necessary

*Less than an hour

Pestilos vs. Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, 10 November 2014;

Ruling: Yes, the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged mauling; Atty. Generoso
positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost
in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not
deny their participation in the incident with him, although they narrated a different version of what transpired. With
these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than
one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the
petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. Personal knowledge of a crime just committed does not
require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent
commission of the crime is patent and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.

NOTE: It is not proper to say that the arresting police officer had probable cause; there are only two (2) types of probable
cause – executive (by the prosecutor) and judicial (by the judge).

Rights of Suspects Under Custodial Investigation / Miranda Rights (2019)

1. When rights available

Custodial investigation commences when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but a
person is SINGLED OUT AS A SUSPECT and is taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person which TENDS TO ELICIT ADMISSION.

The guarantees of Sec. 12(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person
while under custodial investigation. Such rights are the following:

- Any person under the investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of a counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of a counsel.
- No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary or incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited;
- Any admission or confession obtained in violation of Sec 12 and 17 of the Bill of Rights shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

Mere administrative investigations are not considered as covered by Section 12 which is limited to criminal investigations.
Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage.

Police line-up
People vs. Pepino, G.R. No. 174471, 12 January 2016

ISSUE: Whether the identification of the accused in the police lineup is admissible?
RULING: Yes, out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect
alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined
up for the purpose.
Luz vs. People, 667 SCRA 421 (2012)
Roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should not be considered custodial
interrogation nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the
motorist and the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. There being no valid arrest, the warrantless
search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.

NOTE: First, flagging down of a motorist for violation of traffic regulation is NOT an arrest. Hence, there is no need to
recite the Miranda warnings (Miranda rights are read to the accused in a custodial investigation). Second, a search incidental to a
valid warrantless arrest is applicable ONLY where there was a valid warrantless arrest. The absence of the latter makes the
subsequent search void, and anything that was seized in said search is considered inadmissible, being a “fruit of the poisonous
tree.”

Rights included
Miranda Doctrine
2. Requisites
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (Section 12,
Article III)
1. Kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions
(1) Those which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, which are dealt with
in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and;
(2) Those which are given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same Section

People vs. Obrero, 332 SCRA 190, May 17, 2000

RULING: No, accused-appellant was assisted by Atty. De los Reyes, who, though presumably competent, cannot be considered
an “independent counsel”. It is required that the suspect in custodial interrogation must be given the following warnings: (1) he
must be informed of his right to remain silent; (2) he must be warned that anything he says can and will be used against him;
and (3) he must be told that he has a right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.
Right to counsel
People vs. Viduya, 189 SCRA 403 (1990)

An assistant fiscal, or a fiscal for that matter, cannot exercise the function of defense counsel even during custodial
investigation. What the Constitution requires is the presence of competent and independent counsel, one who will effectively
undertake his client's defense without any intervening conflict of interest. Moreover, the answer of the accused
("Nandiyan naman po si Fiscal kaya hindi ko na kailangan ng abogado") is a palpable indication that she did not fully
understand her in-custody rights, hence it cannot be said that she knowingly and intelligently waived those rights.

3. Admissibility - “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree”

Once the primary source (“the tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (“the fruit”) derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally
obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence, because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints al
evidence subsequently obtained.

1. Waiver Of Rights

a. Confession given to media

People vs. Endino

RULING: Yes, the interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and
publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given
to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public.

b. Confession given to Municipal Mayor

People vs. Andan, 269 SCRA 95, GR No. 116437, March 3, 1997

RULING: It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local police and may arguably be
deemed a law enforcement officer. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a
private meeting.
Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions.

Giving urine samples (2018)

 RA 9165 allows the conduct of urine tests only for persons arrested for acts prohibited under said law and
not for any other unlawful acts, otherwise, the urine test result as confirmatory violates the rights to
privacy and against self-incrimination.

Gutang vs. People, 335 SCRA 479 (2000)

RULING: Yes, what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from
the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material to ascertain physical attributes determinable
by simple observation and not to unearth undisclosed facts. An accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or
measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done without
going against the proscription against testimonial compulsion.

NOTE: The right against self- incrimination covers testimonial compulsion and acts which require (1) intelligence, and (2)
attention. Purely mechanical acts, i.e. taking of pregnancy test, or STD test, or wearing of shorts are not included.

Admissibility of other evidence obtained

Ho Wai Pang vs. People, G.R. 176229 (2011)
The right under custodial investigation only prohibits as evidence, confessions and admissions of the accused as against himself.
The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue are not otherwise excluded by law or rules, and are not
affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. Verily, in determining the guilt of the petitioner and his
co-accused, the trial court based its Decision on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the
confiscated shabu.

Rights of the Accused

1. Criminal Due Process

No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

2. Right to Bail
Se ction 1, Rule 114, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his
appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate
surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance.

Government of the USA vs. Purganan, GR No. 148571, September 24, 2002
RULING: The right to bail applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It
does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal. Jimenez should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the
extradition court. The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings.

Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia, Jr., GR No. 153675, April 19, 2007
RULING: Yes, bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that he will
not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a flight
risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.

Quantum of proof in granting bail in e xtradition cases

As a rule prospective extradites are entitled to notice and hearing only when the case is filed in court and not during the
process of evaluation.

Deportation
Go vs. Ramos, GR No. 167569, September 4, 2009
ISSUE: Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed?
RULING: Yes, once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The
term "court" in this context includes quasi- judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement,
like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for
deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no
power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.

Bail is not available to Military

Comendador vs. De Villa, GR No. 93177, August 2, 1991
RULING: The right to bail invoked by the respondents is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. The accused officers cannot say they have been discriminated against because they are
not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians due to threat to the national security.

When bail a ma tter of right – Sect ion 4, Rule 114, Rules on Criminal Procedure
a. Before or after conviction by the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, and
b. Before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. (Sec. 4, Rule
114)

Under SC Issuance:
c. Before final conviction by all children in conflict with the law for an offense not punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment.

People vs. Valdez, G.R. Nos. 216007- 09, December 2015

RULING: Valdez is entitled to bail because the evidence of guilt is not strong. The term "punishable" should refer to
prescribed, not imposable, penalty.

Juan Ponce Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015

NOTE: The phrases used by the Supreme Court, in granting Enrile’s motion to fix bail, were: (1) regardless of the offense
charged, whether punishable by death, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua; and (2) regardless of the merits of the case, or
whether the evidence of guilt is strong or not.

Because of this case, there are now THREE (3) instances wherein bail is a matter of right, in addition to the two stated in Rule
114, the third one being: (3) the continued incarceration of the accused poses danger to his life.

Recto v. People, G.R. No. 236461, December 05, 2018

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing Recto’s petition for certiorari?
RULING: All persons charged with a criminal offense have the right to bail. However, persons charged with an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua cannot avail of this right if the evidence of guilt is strong. In the present case, Recto was charged with
Murder – an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the RTC was acting within its powers or jurisdiction when it denied
Recto’s initial petition for bail. However, after the prosecution had rested its case, Recto filed a Motion to Fix Bail on the ground
that bail had become a matter of right as the evidence presented by the prosecution could only convict Recto of Homicide, not
murder. This Motion was denied by the RTC, and this is where the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, and the CA thus
erred in upholding the RTC’s Order denying the Motion to Fix Bail.

3. Presumption of innocence
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Section 14, Article
III)

Equipoise Rule – Corpus vs. People, GR No. 74259, February 14, 1991

RULING: The equipoise rule is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the
constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise
here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims
of persecution and conspiracy.

Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Duty – People v. Supat, G.R. No. 217027, June 06, 2018
RULING: The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty could not prevail over the stronger
presumption of innocence favoring the accused. Otherwise, the constitutional guarantee of the accused being presumed
innocent would be held subordinate to a mere rule of evidence allocating the burden of evidence. Here, the presumption of
regularity cannot stand because of the buy-bust team's blatant disregard of the established procedures under Section 21 of RA
9165.

4. Right to be heard
5. Assistance of a counsel
6. Right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation

Quimvel vs. People, G.R. No. 214497,18 April 2017

RULING: What determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts
stated in the Information or Complaint, not the caption or preamble thereof nor the specification of the provision
of law alleged to have been violated, being conclusions of law. Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the acts
of lasciviousness on a child who is neither exploited in prostitution nor subjected to "other sexual abuse."

7. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial

Speedy trial vs. Spe ed y disposit ion of cases; application

A speedy trial is one free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
elapse without the party having his case tried. Accused is entitled to dismissal, equivalent to an acquittal, if trial is
unreasonably delayed. R.A. No. 8493 is a means of enforcing the right of the accused to a speedy trial. The spirit of the law is
that the accused must go on record in the attitude of demanding a trial or resisting delay. If he does not do this, he must be
held, in law, to have waived the privilege.

Speedy disposition of cases is embodied in Section 16, Article III. This right is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings, but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including
judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Thus, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all his officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice.

“All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.”
(Section 16, Article III)

First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is
the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy
disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial.

Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This
Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard
to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution. The period taken
for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether
there has been inordinate delay.

Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the given time periods
contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the
Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given
time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay. If the defense has the burden of
proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter
lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.

Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in
the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the complexity of the issues and the
volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the
amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when
the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be
gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and
substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.

Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it
can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked.

In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant
court.

Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused
must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Otherwise, they are deemed to
have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.

Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 2018 (Leonen, J)
RULING: The right to speedy disposition of cases is most commonly invoked in fact-finding investigations and preliminary
investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman since neither of these proceedings form part of the actual criminal prosecution.
The Constitution itself mandates the Office of the Ombudsman to "act promptly" on complaints filed before it. Neither the
Constitution nor Republic Act No. 6770 provide for a specific period within which to measure promptness. Neither do they provide
for criteria within which to determine what could already be considered as delay in the disposition of complaints. Thus, judicial
interpretation became necessary to determine what could be considered "prompt" and what length of time could amount to
unreasonable or "inordinate delay."

8. Right to meet the witnesses face to face (Confrontation Clause) The right to cross-examine complainant and
witnesses. The Testimony of a witness who has not submitted himself to cross-examination is not admissible in
evidence. The affidavits of the witnesses who are not present during the trial – thus are not subject to cross-
examination are inadmissible because they are hearsay.

Writ of Habeas Corpus

The writ of habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the
detainee at a designated time and place, and to show the cause of his detention.

Rule 102, Sec 1 states that it extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

Go vs. Ramos, GR No. 167569, September 4,2009

RULING: A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ
cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application. Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued.

9. Compulsory Process

Right to secure attendance

Right to Production of other evidence.

10. Trials in Absentia

Requisites: a. Accused failed to appear for trial despite postponement and notice b. Failure to appear is
unjustified c. After arraignment

Freedom of Political Be liefs (po lit ical prisoners)

No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. (Section 18(1), Article III)

O. Right to speedy disposition of cases

P. Right Against Cruel, Degrading and Inhuman Punishment
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard
or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. (Section 19, Article III)

Q. Right Against Imprisonment for Debt or Non- Payment of a Poll Tax

No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. (Section 20, Article II)

R. Double-Jeopardy (2019)

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. (Section 21, Article
III)

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) AFTER ARRAIGNMENT, (d)
A VALID PLEA HAVING ENTERED, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise TERMINATED WITHOUT THE
EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED EXCEPT WHEN THE DISMISSAL EVEN WITH EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE
ACCUSED IS BASED ON A VIOLATION ON HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL.

Two kinds
1. Same “Offense”
2. Same Act

Lamera vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 186 (1991)

RULING: Where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of
them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other (BP 22 and estafa).

1. Requisites
NOTE: Under the first kind of double jeopardy (for the same offense), the following must be considered:

First, the first jeopardy must have attached. The requisites are the following:

1. There is a valid complaint/information charging the accused with an offense;

2. The same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
3. The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded; and
4. Accused was previously acquitted, convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

As to the fourth (4th) requisite, dismissal, even with the express consent of the accused, will have the effect of first jeopardy, if
the:
1. Dismissal was due to the insufficiency of evidence (i.e. accused filed a demurrer to evidence, and the same was granted by
the court); and
2. Accused’s right to speedy trial was violated (the dismissal of the case will have the effect of acquittal).

Second, once the first jeopardy has validly attached, the subsequent filing of an information for an offense:

1. Identical;
2. Frustrated;
3. Attempted;
4. Necessarily included; or
5. Necessarily includes the first offense, there is double jeopardy. Double jeopardy for the same act, on the other hand, only
requires that so long as the same act is punishable by law and an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal of one, shall constitute as
bar to another prosecution for the same act.
2. Limitations
Ivler vs. Modesto-San Pedro, 635 SCRA191, G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
RULING: Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. The MTC erroneously ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an
entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof
of an additional fact which the other does not."
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right
under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Reckless imprudence is a single crime, it’s consequence on persons and property are
material only to determine the penalty.

Do ct rine of Supe rven ing Event / Supervening Fact Doctrine

The accused may still be prosecuted for another offense if a subsequent development changes the character
of the first indictment under which he may have already been charged or convicted.

Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character
of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense," the accused
cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

MRs and appe als

An acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where double
jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process. (certiorari)

Lejano vs. People, GR No. 176389, January 18, 2011

RULING: A reconsideration of a judgment of acquittal places the accused under double jeopardy. On occasions, a motion for
reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But the grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the
accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the
State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. Here, what the complainant actually questions is
the Court’s appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses’ credibility. He ascribes grave error on the
Court’s finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to the evidence of the defense.
In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such a
re-evaluation. This is not constitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et al’s conviction. The
judgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be disturbed.

S. Freedom Against Involuntary Servitude Relate with Art. II, Sec. 4

No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted. (Section 18(2), Article III)

The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the
State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military
or civil service. (Section 4, Article II)

NOTE: The latter provision serves as an exception to Section 18, Article III.