MONTY’S SOLDIERS
THE BRITISH AND CANADIANS AGAINST
PANZERGRUPPE WEST IN NORMANDY
A CAMPAIGN GAME FOR SQUAD LEADER
INTRODUCTION
In Squad Leader, little attention has been focused on the British and Canadians in
the 1944 Normandy campaign. This is somewhat odd given the size and extreme
ferocity of the fighting. This six-scenario campaign game is an effort to remedy
that. The original Crescendo of Doom rulebook (1979) stated that the British
Army ”usually gave as good as they got” and that they ”fought the Germans to a
standstill” and could stand ”toe to toe” with the Wehrmacht. This might be true
on the defensive but how did they perform on the offensive against the best
German divisions? The 21st Army Group, comprising British and Canadian
forces and commanded by General Montgomery, has been severely criticized for
being inferior to the Germans in almost every respect despite the fact that they
achieved overwhelming success against arguably the densest concentration of
elite SS Panzer Divisions during the whole war and fighting in terrain that in
almost every way favoured defensive combat. Admittedly, they did this with
superiority in numbers and with a almost total air superiority. So why did the
British and Canadians fight the way they did and how can that be translated into
Squad Leader scenarios?
THE ”TOMMY”
Although always taking care to praise the performance of the British soldier in
public, general Montgomery’s real view of the fighting qualities of his troops was
much more pragmatic. After the battle of Alamein, he commented that the
problem with our lads is that they are not killers by nature. There was a general
opinion that the troops were not as tough as during World War One and that
morale was ”fragile”, especially in the infantry. Therefore, keeping losses at an
acceptable level was a key concern for Montgomery and his planners, and it
influenced the way the British fought as we shall see later. The relations between
soldiers and their commanders had also changed, as Montgomery was very well
aware of. Montgomery’s soldiers were ”citizen-soldiers” moulded in a capitalist
democratic society with little or no militarism evident in the day to day life before
the war. Troops could not simply be asked to obey orders without question
especially if it would lead to high casualties. Indeed, junior and middle-rank
officers were reluctant to issue such orders and officers had to work hard to earn
the trust of their soldiers. There was even an element of negotiation between the
officers and soldiers. This was in contrast to their more battle-hardened enemies,
especially in the Waffen-SS, who were often brutalised by three years if fighting
in the East and had been brought up in the highly militaristic system that was the
Third Reich. Montgomery knew this, and it influenced the way operations were
carried out.
The British Divisions landing in Normandy were a mix of veteran units from the
African and Italian campaigns and divisions that had spent years training in the
UK but never seen action. Performance varied during the campaign from highly
questionable or even at times poor to excellent depending on unit. The
performance of the 43rd Wessex Infantry, the 51st Scottish Infantry and the 11th
Armoured Division have generally been praised while the ”veteran” divisions,
among them the famous the 7th Armoured ”Desert Rats” performed unexpectedly
poorly especially it had been thrashed by Wittman’s Tigers and Panzer Lehr in
the famous battle for Villers-Bocage in June. It does not fight with
determination and has failed at every operation it has been given to do. It
cannot fight the Germans successfully was general Montgomery's own opinion
about the 51st Highland Division (another desert veteran unit) after its first
clashed with the Germans in Normandy. The performance of the Canadian
troops in Normandy, on the whole, can be described as between mediocre to
adequate although their importance in stopping the early German attacks
against the bridgehead on 7-9 June should not be overlooked. So, how does all
this translate into Squad Leader terms? It can be concluded that the German
morale was generally higher but not significantly so. So, in most scenarios, 4-5-
7 bolt-action rifle equipped British and Canadian squads will be equal to
regular Heer soldiers (4-6-7s) but inferior to the 5-4-8 and the 6-5-8 squads of
the Waffen-SS often encountered meaning that the SS will fight harder and
rally quicker just as their historical counterparts did. The inferiority in
firepower is entirely justified given the influx of automatic and semiautomatic
squad-level weapons in the German late-war infantry. The British receive a
sprinkle of 4-5-8 squads because, undoubtedly, many British and Canadian
soldiers fought just as hard as their enemies. On the leadership side at the junior
level, most officers were at least competent, if usually not quite up to the best
German standards, thus the Germans receive more -1- and -2 leaders reflecting
an edge in tactical skill and the impact of hard lessons learned from the Eastern
Front. Reflecting the German skill in camouflage and use of the Normandy
terrain, German units will often start the game concealed with some units
hidden.
METAL BEFORE FLESH
One of the most pressing concerns for the planners prior to Overlord was the
British extremely serious manpower shortage. It was clear that a limit in
establishment had been reached and that the British Army in North-West
Europe would be a shrinking force from the summer of 1944 onwards. Thus, in
order to keep casualties at an acceptable level, above all in the infantry,
firepower was to be utilized on a massive to ease the burden of the infantryman.
The already mentioned perception of ”fragile morale” in the infantry was
another factor to provide the infantry with as much artillery support as possible
to keep losses down. The British and Canadians going into battle in Normandy
therefore relied heavily on rolling artillery barrages. Indeed, infantry
commanders were taught to plan the attacks on the level of artillery available,
although the relative ineffectiveness of battalion-level support weapons was
also a factor. This doctrine of ”let metal do it rather than flesh” meant that
British infantry (and armour also) often halted even in front of minor German
resistance and began to call in artillery to ”do the job”. This obviously slowed
down the tempo of an attack and sometimes momentum was lost because of
this. One factor that however greatly decreased the effectiveness of British
artillery was the German in-depth defences, partly a lesson learned from the
Eastern Front. Often, the massive artillery bombardments only affected the first
German skirmish line while the main line of resistance deployed further back
was almost unaffected as were the counterattack reserves deployed even further
back. Early fireplans were much too shallow. Therefore, British armour and
infantry often broke through the first German line with relative ease but then
encountered a largely intact main defence line. In later Normandy operations
such as Bluecoat and Totalize, artillery fireplans were adjusted to cope with this
with at least partial success but in the first half of the Normandy campaign the
relative failure to suppress the German defences with artillery was a major
factor how the early operations often stalled in front of the main German
defence line often without achieving set objectives. Due to its flexibility and
ability to quickly deliver fire concentrations, British artillery however played a
very important role in breaking up German counterattacks, as did fire from
naval artillery. On the Squad Leader battlefield, then, the ”metal before flesh”
doctrine will not always manifest itself although the British player, on the
whole, will have much more artillery available than the Germans. In two
scenarios, the British / Canadian player will find himself without artillery
support entirely. On the other hand, the scenarios are designed that the German
player will be punished by artillery when launching counterattacks and he also
needs to be careful not to be crushed under super-heavy barrages from
battleships.
COMMAND AND OVER-CONTROL
Besides the doctrine of heavily relying on firepower, the most important other
factor that characterized how the 21st Army Group fought the Germans in
Normandy was its command and control philosophy. Here, the personality of
Montgomery himself strongly mirrored how they operated. Cautious and
intelligent, Montgomery lacked confidence in the ability of many of his
commanders but had high faith in his own competence. He exercised a very tight
control of operations and rarely gave his subordinates much freedom of action.
This way of operating filtered down the chain of command. Montgomery knew
well the tactical prowess and battlefield skills of his enemy and keeping tight
control of operations was also a way to minimize the risk of a morale-damaging
major defeat in the hands of the Germans (Villers-Bocage comes to mind here).
In Normandy, the British and Canadians thus operated under a command
philosophy what the Germans call Befehlstaktik meaning that subordinates at all
levels were extremely tightly controlled and were not supposed to take too many
initiatives of their own, if indeed any at all. Attacks were conducted in a rigid,
set-piece manner and planning tried to make sure that as little as possible could
go wrong. Subordinates, at all levels, were supposed to do only what they were
briefed to do.
British and Canadian troops thus often fought under a carefully-planned and
”timetable”-approach to battle. Officer training emphasized getting the planning
details right rather than exploiting the upcoming possibilities during an ongoing
battle with the quick decision making that would entail. This goes a long way in
understanding how British companies and battalions fought in Normandy. They
were usually better at achieving initial (limited) success than exploiting surprise
and German weaknesses once the battle had started because they were simply not
trained to do that. They often moved forward towards designated objectives and
dug-in at the first sign of a German counterattack. As both their contemporary
enemies and post-war historians have observed, they failed to exploit the tactical
advantage on many occasions letting the Germans fall back and regroup. There is
undoubtedly a lot of truth in this. That said, once in a dug-in defensive position,
with artillery support available, they were usually very difficult to defeat as the
Germans discovered time after time. Thus a pattern often repeated itself during
the Normandy battles: set-piece British attacks with ever-increasing material
superiority slowly pushed the Germans back but a breakthrough was very seldom
achieved (if it was it was rarely exploited). German counterattacks seldom
achieved anything of substance but to plug the gaps and forcing the British to
dig-in.
In game terms, taking the above into account, most of the scenarios are designed
with the British and Canadians advancing towards clearly defined geographical
objectives without too much room for manoeuvre. In a scenario or two, the
Befehlstaktik is manifested as Montgomery's all-seeing eye can be felt looking
over the shoulder of the British player (through scenario special rules) making
sure that he ”sticks to the plan”.
ARMOUR-INFANTRY COOPERATION (OR LACK THEREOF)
A week or so after D-Day, with the failure of seizing Caen quickly, the
Normandy campaign entered a phase of semi-stalemate where the British armour
divisions had to be used as heavy battering rams trying to wear down the
German defenders instead of fighting mobile battles in open terrain further east
as they had trained for. This was something they had not planned for and thus
new methods had to be developed to meet this challenge (in fairness the same
applied to the Germans as their best Panzer Divisions, lacking real strategic
direction, became sucked into battles of attrition in the bocage, hardly their
purpose). In theory, the need for closer infantry-tank cooperation after the initial
clashes was soon recognized but it was an entirely different matter of
implementing that successfully practically in battle against an enemy as
competent as the Germans. Tank-infantry cooperation had not been emphasized
during training in the UK simply because Montgomery and his planners did not
plan for to fight in the Normandy bocage. Also, it was certainly not helpful that
there existed a deeply-rooted sense of separatism between the infantry and tank
arm in the British Army and a very strong regimentalism in many units. Loyalty
was to the regiment, not to the division as in the German and American armies
and outsiders were seen with suspicion. The British Army has even been called
“essentially an army organised into separate and distinct tribes”. This, to be sure,
strengthened unit cohesion, but was also one explanation why larger-unit combined
arms operations were often not up to the German standards. It is difficult to give a
precise description how well tank-infantry operations worked because different
units fought differently as there were weak overall guidelines. The lack of firm
doctrine was not however only negative as units in the field were in effect given
considerable freedom to develop methods that worked after the initial clashes with
the Germans. To be sure, there were many flaws in combined operations, especially
in the first half of the campaign. Even though a lot of effort were made to improve
affairs, the British and Canadians did not achieve the high level of integration and
flexibility that the Germans managed in their Kampfgruppen. Tank-infantry
cooperation was in many cases outright poor with high losses and tactical defeats
as a consequence.
On many cases, there were no infantry to support the tanks where they needed it the
most, and the other way around was also true. On several occasions, tanks simply
stood in the distance and failed to support the infantry up close which lead to
higher losses in the infantry. Another factor that hindered effective cooperation
was the fact that units often sometimes shuffled around and rarely had time to work
together for longer periods of time. Another was infantry commanders’ poor
understanding of the capabilities of armour in battle and the tendency to expect too
much from tanks. That said, things improved and in the later operations, such as
Bluecoat, some units, including the Guards Armoured, the 11th Armoured and the
15th Scottish Infantry, had achieved a much higher level combined-arms operation
efficiency compared with the start of the campaign.
The flaws in combined-arms operations in the 21st Army Group are manifested in
several of the scenarios. In the Operation Goodwood scenario, the British player
attacks with tanks with no infantry support whatsoever whereas the Canadians will
find themselves entirely without sorely-needed armour support in the Verrierès
Ridge scenario. In other scenarios, although both infantry and tanks are on board,
they are kept separated for parts of the game no doubt to the frustration of the
British player. In the battle for Hill 112, the British tanks may even refuse to attack
further, leaving the infantry alone. The increasing skill in combined arms actions is
not overlooked however, as the last scenario depicts an action where lessons have
been learned and tanks and infantry attack in mutual support.
THE TIGER AND PANTHER-COMPLEX
The importance of the superior German heavy tanks in Normandy has been
exaggerated a lot in many accounts. In fact, most German tanks encountered was
equal or even inferior to the Allies but the presence of the “big cats” had a
significant effect on the morale of the British and Canadian tank crews (although
they made up only 30 per cent of the German armour in Normandy). The most
common German tank in Normandy was the Panzer IVH / J with a high-velocity
75mm L/48 gun (75L in Squad Leader terms) with a battlefield performance
similar to the Cromwell and Sherman. Another common vehicle was the StuG IIIG
assault gun with a similar gun and similar protection but with a lower silhouette.
The most dangerous German tank was the Panther with excellent frontal armour
(but vulnerable to flank attack) and a deadly 75mm /L70 gun (75LL) but only
about 600 saw action in Normandy, perhaps around 450 or so against the British
and Canadians. Finally, fewer than 200 Tigers were committed in Normandy and
their effect, on the whole, was more psychological than real. The most common
German anti-tank gun was the 75mm PaK 40 (75L gun in Squad Leader terms). To
defeat the thick armour plates of the Panthers and the Tigers, the armoured
divisions were issued with the excellent 17-Pounder Gun (76LL in game terms) in
the Sherman Firefly, usually one per platoon.
In game terms, the British player will face German high velocity 75L, 75LL ,88L
and even and 88LL guns that will be able to knock out any Allied tank, even the
heavily armed Churchill. The big killers of Allied tanks in Normandy were these
high-velocity guns, of which anti-tank guns claimed around a third and the rest
were tank-mounted guns. To defeat the heavy frontal armour of the Panther, he has
a number of 17-Pounders (76LL) although the most common gun is the 75mm
”flat” with a basic to kill number of 6. Unless he manages to come really close or
flank the enemy, the British player will experience a marked disadvantage in tank
duels against the Panthers and Tigers, just as was the case historically. The relative
rarity of the heavy German tanks means however that they only appear in one
scenario each.
The Panzerfaust came as a nasty surprise for the British tank crews in Normandy
but the effect of it was moderate as it hadn't been issued to German frontline troops
on such a lavish scale that it would be later during the autumn of 1944. It has been
estimated that the Panzerfaust only accounted for 6 per cent of the Allied tank
losses in Normandy (the PIAT accounted for a similar figure to German armour).
Note also that Panzerfaust range has been decreased compared to the Cross of Iron
rules as the designers back in 1978 got the Panzerfaust range wrong a little.
However, the effect of the weapon might have been bigger than numbers would
suggest because the mere knowledge that German infantry were Panzerfaust-armed
might have have meant that tank crews acted more cautious and even avoided
getting too close to the enemy. Taking the above into account, the Germans are
issued with relatively few (mostly one-hex range) Panzerfausts in the scenarios.
THE GERMANS
What about Montgomery’s well-respected enemy? Of course they had their
own problems, but many of the German weaknesses in Normandy existed on an
operational and strategic level rather than the tactical. Simply put, they excelled
in tactics (most of the time) but got the strategy terribly wrong. This is
obviously not a study of the German strategy in Normandy, but let’s just
conclude that it was terribly flawed and leave it at that. However, the inability
of the Westheer to do anything strategically decisive against the beachhead is
not necessarily manifested on the Squad Leader battlefield which depicts
companies fighting each other among the dirt roads, farms and hedgerows.
On the tactical Squad Leader battlefield, then,
the combination of late-war German military
hardware, thorough and often brutal training, a
good deal of pro-Nazi attitudes, deep-rooted
Preusso-German military professionalism, and
mission-type doctrines stressing initiative among
junior officers and NCO:s (Auftragstaktik) meant
that Monty’s men faced an enemy that, in many
cases, had an advantage over them in battle.
Perhaps partly as an echo from Clausewitz,
German officer training emphasized quick orders
and initiative and even opportunism much more
than their British counterparts which allowed
them to fight in a higher tempo than their foes
who, as we have seen, tended to stick to set plans
and timetables. The German well-developed
combined-arms concepts and the fact that
many soldiers were already brutalized from the savagery that was the Eastern
Front further added to the British difficulties facing the Germans. That said,
maybe, the German tactical superiority has been exaggerated in the post-war
discourse. The German divisions entering battle had been, above all, moulded
by the formative experience of fighting the Red Army for three years and they
took with them some of the habits from fighting on the Ukrainian steppes and
Belorussian forests and swamps (including the execution of prisoners). As has
been discussed already, one of the most important factors why their defences
were so firm was the deployment in great depth thus the Normandy battle
(operation Goodwood in particular) somewhat mirrored the battle of Kursk.
Among the German vices was a pattern of launching piecemeal battalion or
regimental-strength counterattacks all too often. This was noticeable already
from June 7 and onwards. Clearly they tried to apply tactics and methods that
worked fine on the Eastern Front’s more fluid battlefields against the Red
Army where the room for manoeuvre was bigger. In Normandy, however, the
”instant counterattack” approach seldom achieved much but just added to the
already high attrition rates (which favoured the Allies in the long run). Indeed,
both the British and Americans found out that if the could provoke the
Germans to counterattack, they would often inflict heavy losses on them. It is
noteworthy, for all their celebrated professionalism, that the Germans failed to
modify this often counter-productive tactical approach and it stands out as
maybe the biggest German tactical failure in Normandy. If the Germans had
launched fewer but larger and more deliberately planned counterattacks, they
would likely have been more successful although if it would change the
outcome of the campaign as a whole is unlikely given the German headaches
on the strategic level. Also, the staff work and coordination in the SS units
have been criticized, as well as a tendency to accept too high losses and an
over-recklessness in battle. Interestingly, it is often English-speaking
historians that have created the ”myth” of the premier Waffen-SS divisions
encountered by Monty’s men in Normandy, their superiority is seldom spoken
of in serious German accounts (in fact, sometimes they compare unfavourably
to Heer Divisons). Also, even though morale in the German combat units was
undoubtedly high at the start of the campaign, the ever-increasing Allied
material superiority became clearer and clearer for every Grenadier up to von
Rundstedt himself to see. The German divisions became increasingly
understrength and overworked as the campaign wore on and even the German
formations could only take so much punishment before starting to
disintegrating. Determination, even fanaticism, and skill alone couldn’t do
much against the growing material superiority of the enemy and that
realization grew as the campaign wore on with morale suffering accordingly.
One factor often overseen was that the German morale in the west in mid-
August was at a breaking point and that the Nazi system (still largely intact)
had to go to extreme measures to avoid a general collapse of the entire war
effort in the West after the Falaise Pocket. However, in game terms, the
German weaknesses do not boil down that much on the company-level actions
that the scenarios portray. On the Squad Leader battlefield, the German player
thus has many advantages. Thanks to 8-morale troops and generally good
leadership, his troops will fight harder than the enemy in most cases and in
line with Auftragstaktik, he will not have any “tactical restrictions”
whatsoever. The Panther and Tiger superiority will be felt. Cleverly positioned
AT-Guns will take a heavy toll of British armour. On the downside, he will
always fight numerically inferior and the threat of battleship guns and rolling
barrages will often hang over him.
CONCUSION
The boring artwork on the British counters in Crescendo of Doom shows Tommies
waiting for the tea to brew and they don’t seem overly interested in engaging the
Germans. This seems logical as a lot of the post-war literature about the 21st Army
Group in Normandy highlights the strengths of the Germans and the weaknesses of
the British and Canadians. The most critical studies often come from the British
themselves. More recent studies have offered a “revisionist” approach that, without
turning a blind eye to the failures and weaknesses, offer a more balanced view.
Historians such as John Buckley argues that Montgomery successfully fought a
campaign that used the British strengths to the utmost while minimizing the impacts
of their disadvantages. Despite being tasked to fight a campaign nobody had really
planned for (the Normandy breakout was supposed to come much quicker) the
British and Canadians adapted and eventually overcame the crème de la crème of
the Panzer force. The Tommy did stand his ground and the dreaded Waffen-SS elite
never fully recovered from the battles with Monty’s men.
NOTES ON THE SCENARIOS
I’ve tried to capture the ebb and flow of the campaign with a little artistic freedom
taken here and there. The scenarios have been playtested without using bypass
movement rules and with artillery rules from the basic game. The following rules
are in effect in all scenarios:
1. GERMAN MORTARS The Germans were skilful in the use of the 81mm
mortar and some estimates claim that 70% of the Allied infantry casualties was
caused by quick and accurate German mortar fire. To reflect this, whenever 81mm
mortars are used for indirect fire (on-board or off-board) the Spotting Round is
accurate on a die roll of 1-4 instead of the normal 1-2.
2. BRUSH Brush hexes are treated as wheatfields in all respects.
3. WATER Water hexes on board 17 are always ”shallow” and can thus be forded
(126.5). No vehicle may enter a water hex.
4. PANZERFAUST Roll for Panzerfausts as per 85.5 with the following
modification: 1: Panzerfaust 42B, 2-5: Panzerfaust 43A, 6: Panzerfaust 43B.
5. PIAT Use American bazooka counters to represent the PIAT if PIAT counters
are unavailable. PIAT range is 3, IFT firepower 8 and breakdown number is #10.
To Hit numbers are the same as for the bazooka. PIAT TO KILL numbers can be
found on the CoD Quick Reference Data Cards.
6. BRITISH SHERMANS The scenarios have been designed with the
Crescendo of Doom countermix which does not include American-made tanks in
British use. If players have access to the GI Anvil of Victory counters, British
Sherman Fireflies may substitute the A30 tank.
7. BOCAGE Treat all hedges as Bocage. Bocage is a one level LOS obstacle and
thus creates a one hex blind hex from firing from higher elevation. Same-level
LOS can be traced through a bocage hexside only if both the firing unit and the
target unit are adjacent to the bocage hexside.
7.1 Infantry fire through a bocage hexside must add +2.
7.2. All direct ordnance fire through bocage suffer HULL DOWN penalties
against vehicular targets or +2 against infantry targets.
7.3 There is no modification to fire from mortars and OBA.
7.4 It costs infantry 2 MF + COT to cross a bocage hexside.
7.5 Only fully tracked vehicles (not Bren carriers) may move through a bocage
hexside with a cost of 5 MP + COT. However, each vehicle vishing to cross a
bocage hexside must roll for bog before the hexside is crossed. On a die roll of 1-3
the vehicle may cross the bocage hex normally but on a die roll of 4-6 the vehicle
is immobilized. The vehicle may roll to free itself in each Rally Phase with a die
roll of 1-2 (after armor leader modification).
7.6 No ordnance, except light mortars, may be manhandled through a bocage
hexside.
CREDITS
Scenario Design and Research: Jan Lundin
Cover design: Jack Munchkin
Proof-Reading and general commentary: Mats Gahnström
Scenario #1 input: David Garvin
SOURCES:
Markus, Charles: Tommy Atkins at War Revisited: A Deeper Look at the British in
ASL (available for download on the MMP website)
Buckley, John (2004): British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944.
 1
STOPPING THE PANZERS
PUTOT-EN-BESSIN, NORMANDY, JUNE 8, 1944: There was a great deal of
confusion on the German side during the first days after the D-day landings on June 6.
Attacks against the beachhead had been launched on both the 6th and 7th but these were
too piecemeal and not very well coordinated although fighting had been fierce,
especially on the 7th. On the 8th, the bulk of the 12th SS Panzer Division was finally in
position together with elements of the Panzer Lehr Division. Their objective was clear:
drive through the coast. Opposing the Germans was the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division
with an equally clear objective: protect the beachhead.
Board Configuration:
BALANCE / VARIATION
Replace two Pzkw IVs with Panthers.

The SS are fanatic.

Lower the Victory Conditions criteria N

with two squads.
VICTORY CONDITIONS
Increase the Victory Conditions 19 16 17
The German player wins if he has at least ten unbroken squads west of
the road that leads from hex 17A5 to 17GG6 at game end. A mobile tank criteria with two squads.
with functioning main armament counts as two squads. A mobile Replace two AT-Guns with 76LL AT-Guns.
armoured car with functioning gun counts as one squad. The Canadian
player wins by avoiding the German victory conditions.
The Canadian player may designate two buildings on board 17 that are
two level buildings.
TURN RECORD CHART

1v
Canadian sets up first

German moves first

v 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 END

Elements, 12th SS Panzer Divison Hitlerjugend, set up on board 19 north of hexrow Y inclusive in a hex numbered two or less:

Panzer PSW
10-2 9-1 8-1 8-0 7-0 6-5-8 2-4-8 LMG HMG
Faust
Radio 81mm
c
Mortar c
234/2
PUMA
1 12 2 2 2 2
2 2
9-1 Elements, Panzer Lehr Division, set up on board 19 south of

c
Pzkw IV Armored hexrow Y in a hex numbered two or less:
H Leader
Panzer
9-1 7-0 5-4-8 4-6-7 HMG Schreck
4

2 3

Elements, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, set up anywhere on board 16 and on board 19 on a hex numbered 7 or more:

9-1 8-1 8-0 7-0 4-5-8 4-5-7 2-4-8 LMG MMG HMG PIAT Radio ?
2 4 8 5 3 2 2 8

-3 57L 76mm TURN 2: Enter along the west edge:

Sniper c
AT c
Mortar

3 2
A27M-
IV c 8-1 4-5-7 LMG PIAT

4 2
2

SPECIAL RULES:
1.1 Canadian off-board artillery consists of one module of 120mm and one
module with two fire missions from the battleship Rodney. Rodney fires with
36+ on the IFT with a -4 dice roll modification. Rodney may not fire smoke.
Fire from Rodney does not start fires.
1.2 The Canadian player may set up one leader + radio and one AT-Gun +
crew using Hidden Initial Placement (42).
1.3 German off-board artillery consists of one module of 105mm howitzers.
AFTERMATH: The German attack began at 06.30 and despite strong Canadian
resistance managed to break into the village of Putot-en-Bessin, inflicting
heavy Canadian losses. The overall German push was however stopped by
Canadian artillery, heavy machine guns and naval gun support. The SS fought
with an almost fanatical determination but coordination and staff work
sometimes failed. Later that day, a Canadian counterattack re-took the village
and the SS withdrew around midnight. Strategically, it was the last chance the
Germans had of destroying the British-Canadian bridgehead. The SS and
Canadians would however meet each other many times in the months to follow.
 2
THE SCOTTISH CORRIDOR
LE HAUT DU BOSC, NORMANDY, JUNE 26, 1944: On June 26, Operation
Epsom was launched as an ambitious set-piece offensive to cross the Odon river and
the high ground beyond. The inexperienced 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division would
lead the assault trying to open up a ”Scottish Corridor” for the British armour to
exploit. Supported by Churchill tanks from the equally inexperienced 31st Tank
Brigade, the attack was launched in fog, rain and soggy ground. At Le Haut Du Bosc,
the Scots ran into fierce resistance from SS Grenadiers who had allowed the British
artillery barrage to pass over their positions before opening fire. The Scots were forced
to attack without tank support because the tanks had been slowed down by minefields.
Board Configuration: BALANCE / VARIATION
Use StuG IIIs, Panthers or Pzkw

19
IVH:s instead of JagdPanzer IV.
Remove one squad from the German
starting force.
N Replace the 75L AT-Gun with a 75*
Infantry Gun.

17
Lower the number of hexes needed to
VICTORY CONDITIONS be captured by one.
To win, the British player must be the last to occupy with an unbroken infantry unit at Replace one 120mm pre-game barrage
least six of the following eleven hexes on board 17: I8, O6, P4, Q4, P2, R5, S6, S4, with 150mm.
U6, W3, W4. If five hexes are captured, game is a draw. All hexes are considered to
be in German control at the beginning of the scenario. The German player wins by
avoiding the British Victory Conditions.
TURN RECORD CHART

1v
British moves first
German sets up first
v 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 END

Elements, 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, set up on board 17 east of hexrow H:

9-2 9-1 7-0 6-5-8 2-4-8 LMG HMG Sniper Radio Panzer
-3 Schreck ? c
81mm
Mortar c
75L
AT c
Entrench

5 3 3 2 7
2
Recon Patrol setup in hex 19I2: TURN 4: Elements, 12th SS Panzer Division, enter along the east edge:

Jagd-
8-1 2-4-8 LMG c
Panzer
IV (75L)
c
SPW
251/1 c
SPW
251/9
9-1 8-1 8-0 6-5-8 LMG

3 2 10 5

Elements, 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division, set up set up west of hexrow G on board 17 and west of hexrow K on board
19. No unit may set up with LOS to a German unit.

51mm
c
8-0 7-0 Radio 76mm
9-2 9-1 4-5-7 2-4-7 4-5-8 LMG MMG HMG Mortar PIAT
Mortar

2 2 15 2 3 6 2 2 2 2

TURN 3: Elements, 31st 8-1

Tank Brigade, enter along
the west edge of board 17:
c
A22
VII
A22
c
VIII
Armored
Leader

4 2
SPECIAL RULES:
2.1 The German player may set up one leader + radio using Hidden Initial Placement (42).
2.2 Before the German set up, the British player must write down two hexes anywhere on
board 17 that are targeted for the pre-game ”rolling” artillery barrage. Before play begins, the
British player places two FFE counters on those two hexes and rolls for accuracy in the
normal manner but with any error in accuracy halved (round fractions down). Both FFEs
consists of 120mm, only HE may be used. This barrage is resolved normally and all results
apply (rubble, fire etc.).
2.3 British off-board artillery (other than outlined in 2.2) consists of one module of 150mm.
Radio Contact may not be established before Turn 4.
2.4 German off-board artillery is restricted to one fire mission of 81mm mortars.
2.5 Due to the heavy fog, all fire beyond three hexes must add +1 to the TO HIT or IFT dice
roll. All fire beyond six hexes must add +2.
2.6 British units may not move east of hexrow W on board 17 and hexrow K on board 19
unless forced to do so in the rout phase.
2.8 British tanks may not cross hexrow M on board 17 until turn 6.
2.9 Before play, the British player may designate one squad that
contains a bagpipe player that increased the morale of the friendly
units nearby (including the squad with the bagpipe player). During
Turns 1, all British units in the same hex or adjacent to that squad
become fanatic (26) provided the squad is unbroken.
AFTERMATH Making fair progress at first, the Scots’ attack soon
stalled as German reinforcements began to pour in. The inexperience
of both the tanks and infantry soon became apparent and cooperation
with the tanks was poor as the two formations had never worked
together before. Still, the Germans had to use their reserves piecemeal
to plug gaps thus undermining their ability to mount serious
counterattacks in the weeks to follow.
 3
HILL 112
HILL 112, NORMANDY, JULY 10, 1944: Under the fearsome general Thomas, the
43rd West Riding Infantry Division, known as the most over-trained division in the
British Army, launched yet another attack to seize the important Hill 112 in an
Operation codenamed ”Jupiter”. The attack, supported by Churchill tanks, began at
dawn on July 10. In the farms and woods around the hill, SS troops recently arrived
from the eastern front had dug in. Counterattack forces, including Tigers, awaited
further back. Despite losing three out of four company commanders in the attack force,
the British infantry steadily fought their way towards the crest of the hill.
Board Configuration:

16

18
N

19
17
VICTORY CONDITIONS Only hexrows R-GG are playable on boards 17, 16
To win, the British player must be the last to occupy all three level two hill hexes and 18. On board 19 only hexrows P-A are playable.
on board 18 (considered to be German-controlled at scenario start) with an BALANCE / VARIATION
unbroken squad or Churchill tank without loosing more than fourteen squads. If Exchange the Tigers for Panthers. Replace the 10-2 leader with a 10-3.
two level two hill hexes are occupied, game is a draw. The German player wins
by avoiding the British victory conditions. Lower game turns to 9.
TURN RECORD CHART

1v
British moves first
German sets up first
v 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 END

Elements, 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen, set up anywhere east of hexrow DD on board 17 and D on board 16:

Sniper Sniper Panzer

9-2 8-0 6-5-8 2-4-8 HMG
-3 -2
Radio Schreck
? c
81mm
Mortar
75L
AT c c
Entrench

3 3 2 4 2
Set up in hexes 19M8 and 19N7: TURN 2: Enter along the east edge: TURN 3: Elements 102nd SS
Heavy Panzer Batallion, enter
StuG IIIG Panzer along the east edge:
c
OR
PzkwIVH
8-1 6-5-8 LMG 9-2 6-5-8 LMG
Faust

2
2 4 c
Tiger I

(See Special Rule 3.6)

2

TURN 1: Elements, 4th Somerset Light Infantry, 43rd West Riding Infantry Division set up on any whole hex on board 17
west of hexrow Z inclusive:

51mm
10-2 9-1 8-1 8-0 7-0 6+1 4-5-7 6-3-8 4-5-8 LMG PIAT HMG Mortar Radio

2 16 2 5 5 2 2 2 2

TURN 1: Elements, 31st TURN 1: Enter 57L

Tank Brigade, enter along
the west edge of board 16:
c
Churchill
Crocodile c
A22
VIII
A22
c
VIIII
A22
X c on hex 17R4: c
BREN A
c
AT-Gun
2-3-7

2 5 2 4
SPECIAL RULES:
3.1 The German player may set up one leader + radio using Hidden Initial Placement (42).
3.2 Before the German set up, the British player must write down two whole
hexes anywhere on boards 17 or 16 that are targeted for his pre-game ”rolling” artillery
barrage. Before play begins, the British player places two FFE counters on those two hexes
and rolls for accuracy in the normal manner but with any error in accuracy halved (round
fractions down). Both FFEs consists of 120mm. Both smoke and HE may be used. Smoke
is removed at the beginning of the Turn 2 British Prep Fire Phase. This barrage is resolved
normally and all results apply (rubble, fire etc.).
3.3 British off-board artillery (other than outlined in 2.2) consists of one module of 150mm
and one module of naval fire support as per SSR 1.2 but with only one fire mission.
3.4 German off-board artillery is restricted to one module of 81mm mortars.
3.5 British tanks may not enter boards 17 and 19.
3.6 Before the game, the German player rolls a die. On 1-3 he receives Pzkw IVHs, on 4-6
he receives StuG IIIGs (75L).
2
2 2
3.7 If more than six Churchill tanks are destroyed, no British tanks may
move in an easterly direction for the rest of the scenario.
AFTERMATH The tank-supported infantry fought their way all up to
the crest but were stopped by SS Tigers and AT-Guns deployed on the
reverse slope of the hill. The Churchills suffered heavily and fell back
thus removing close support for the infantry as they attempted to clear
the southern slope. On July 10 alone, 39 Churchills were lost during
costly frontal assaults on strong defensive positions. Ultimately, the
British had to give up the efforts to take Hill 112. However, the German
stubborn defence and costly counter-actions had been very costly to
them as well and it was clear that they, in the long run, could not sustain
the heavy losses.
 4
DEATH RIDE OF BRITISH ARMOUR
NEAR BOURGEBOUS RIDGE, SOUTH OF CAEN, JULY 18, 1944: On July 18,
a three-division British armoured assault, Operation Goodwood, was unleashed with
the first objective to capture the tactically important Bourgebous Ridge. The attack
was made on a very narrow frontage. The first German outposts were easily overrun
but as the day went on, the British armour outpaced the infantry and artillery support
dwindled. In the afternoon, the British tank spearheads found themselves alone
without either artillery or infantry support as they encountered the main German
defence line.
Board Configuration:
BALANCE / VARIATION
Add a StuG III to the German order

19
of battle.
Add a Panzerschreck to the German

16
order of battle. N
Exchange the StuG IIIs with King
Tigers.
Allow the British player to exit his
VICTORY CONDITIONS tanks along the entire east edge.
To win, the British player must exit at least four tanks with functioning main
armament between hexes 16I1 – 16A6 (inclusive) and eliminate a combination of Lower the British tank exit
at least four German guns / assault guns. If three tanks are exited, game is a draw. requirements by one.
The German player wins by avoiding the British victory conditions.
TURN RECORD CHART
British moves first
v 1v 2 3 4 5 6 END

Elements, Kampfgruppe von Luck, 21st Panzer Division, set up south of the line 16GG9 – 19W1 (inclusive):

9-1 7-0 4-6-7 2-4-7

Panzer
faust
Radio ? c
75L
AT c
88L
AA

3 7 3 10 2 2
TURN 1: Enter between hexes 16I1 -16A6 (inclusive):

9-2
Armored StuG IIIG
Leader (75L) c
2

TURN 1: Elements, 11th Armored Division, enter between hexes 19A6 and 19I1 (inclusive):

9-1
c
A30
IV c
A27M-
c
A27M-
VIII c
A27L
CS
Armor
Leader

2 6 2 2

TURN 3: Enter anywhere along the west edge:

8-1
c
A27M-
VII
Armor
Leader

AFTERMATH: The massed British armour charge, inadequately backed by

SPECIAL RULES: infantry, air support and infantry, failed in front of the strong German defence line
4.1 German off-board artillery is restricted to one fire mission of 105mm with massive British tank losses as a result. It has been estimated that around no
howitzers. less than some 400 British tanks were knocked out during the operation, a third of
their frontline strength, although several tanks could later be salvaged and repaired.
4.2 The German player may set up one 75L AT-Gun and one leader + Still, German losses were still considerable Moreover, as German attention had
radio using Hidden Initial Placement (42). been focused stopping the British tanks the American operation further south,
Operation Cobra, was made easier.
 5
ASSAULT ON VERRIÈRES RIDGE
VERRIÈRES RIDGE, SOUTH OF CAEN, JULY 25 1944: The Verrières
Ridge dominated the route from Caen to Falaise The ridge was occupied by
battle-hardened German SS and Wehrmacht troops, who had fallen back from
Caen and entrenched to form a strong defensive position. During 19-24 June,
British and Canadian forces made several attempts to capture the ridge
resulting only in heavy losses for both sides during extremely heavy fighting.
On 25 July, Operation Spring was launched with the goal of finally seizing the
ridge, despite reports that the Germans had strengthened their position even
more. The Canadian Black Watch were scheduled to begin their attack at about
05:30 but things got wrong from the start. Two of the highest-ranking officers
were killed during the morning and the promised armour support failed to
arrive. Despite this, the decision was made for the attack to proceed.
Advancing on foot, over open ground, the Black Watch approached the ridge.

BALANCE / VARIATION Board Configuration:

Replace all SS units with German
army units (4-6-7 / 2-4-7).

16
Exchange the SPW 251/ 9 with a
PzJagIIM.
Lower the number of hexes needed to
VICTORY CONDITIONS N

18
be captured by one.
The Canadian player wins by being the last to occupy with an unbroken squad
Replace the 9-2 leader with a 10-2.
at least seven of the twelve following hexes on board 18: E8, I8, J3, K3, N6, P8,
Z8, Z7, Y7, X5, W4 and V3. All hexes are considered being in German control
at the start of the scenario, regardless if a German unit occupies it or not. If six
hexes are captured, game is a draw. The German player wins by avoiding the
Canadian victory conditions.
TURN RECORD CHART

1v
Canadian moves first (see special rule 5.1)
v
German sets up first
2 3 4 5 6 7 END

Elements, 272nd Infantry Division, set up on board 18 west of hexrow Q inclusive and on board 16 on a hex numbered 9 or 10 west
of hexrow Q inclusive:

9-1 8-1 8-0 4-6-7 2-4-7 LMG HMG Sniper Radio

-3
81mm
c
Mortar c
Entrench

5 3
Elements of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte, set up on board 18 east of hexrow
Q inclusive and on board 16 on a hex numbered 9 or 10 east of hexrow Q inclusive: TURN 2: Enter along the south edge
on / east of hexrow Q:
Sniper
c c
9-2 8-1 7-0 AA
6-5-8 2-4-8 MMG Entrench
c
-2 37L (8) SPW
251/9
5 2
3
TURN 3: Enter along the south edge on / west of hexrow Q:

8-1 8-3-8

Elements, Black Watch of Canada, 6th Infantry Brigade, set up on board 16 on a hex numbered 7 or lower:

8-0 Demo 51mm

9-2 9-1 8-1 7-0 4-5-7 6-3-8 4-5-8 LMG MMG HMG
Charge Mortar

2 2 2 15 3 6 6 2 3

SPECIAL RULES:
5.1 The 6-3-8 squads are assault engineers and may lay a total of two smoke
counters during the scenario. The German 8-3-8 squads may not lay smoke.
5.2 The Germans have one module of 81mm mortars available.
5.3 Due to the recent heavy rainfall which made the roads muddy, the cost for
entering a road hexside is one MP/MF for all units.
5.4 The SPW crew is SS.
5.5 Turn 1 begins with the Defensive Fire Phase. All Canadian units are
assumed to have moved and their firepower in the advance fire phase is halved
for moving firer.
AFTERMATH: At 09:30, as the Canadian infantry advanced up the ridge, they
were easy targets for the well-entrenched German machine gun nests, snipers and
mortars. To make matters worse, the Black Watch communications were knocked
out within minutes of the start of their assault. Very few members of the Black
Watch Regiment managed to make it to the crest of the ridge and those who did
were subjected to an even heavier bombardment as they ran into the counter-
attacking forces of the 272nd Infantry Division. Of the 325 men that left the
assembly area, 315 were killed, wounded or captured.
 6
AN UNEXPECTED SEIZURE
NORTH OF VIRE, AUGUST 2, 1944: On 31 July, the British 11th Armoured Division
exploited a German weakness when they discovered an unexpectedly undefended bridge behind
the German front, over the Souleuvre River. Reinforcing the opportunity quickly with Cromwell
tanks and accompanying infantry, the British forces advanced to eight kilometres short of Vire
by 2 August which was on the American side of the army boundary. German units reacted
quickly and tried to block the British advance east. There was confusion as to who had the rights
to use certain roads and the British found themselves intermingled with American units. Also,
Local French resistance, sensing liberation was near, took up arms and began to attack the hard-
pressed Germans.

VICTORY CONDITIONS
The Allied player wins by making sure there are no
unbroken German squads on or adjacent to the road Board Configuration
leading from hex 18I1 to 17GG6 OR from 18I1 to

17
17Y10 at game end and making sure that there are no
unbroken German squads on or adjacent to hex 18R5. If
only one victory condition is met, game is a draw. The
N

18
German player wins by avoiding the Allied victory
conditions.

BALANCE / VARIATION
Replace the Panthers with Jagdpanthers. Exchange three 6-6-6 squads to 8-4-7
and provide them with one flame-
Replace the 5-4-8 squads with 8-3-8s able thrower and two demolition charges.
to place a total of three some counters.
TURN RECORD CHART

1v
Allied Moves First
v
German sets up first
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 END

Elements, 3rd Fallschirmjäger Division, set up east (inclusive) of the line that goes from hex 18W1-17W4-17K10:

Panzer Panzer Sniper Sniper

9-2 9-1 8-1 8-0 5-4-8 4-6-7 HMG LMG Radio Schreck ?
Faust -3 -2

5 3 4 2 2 10
TURN 3: Elements, 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg, enter along the east edge:

c c
Entrench Roadblock
8-1 7-0 6-5-8 LMG
Panzer Armor
Faust Leader
10-2

c
Panther
c
SPW
G 251/1
3 4
2 2

TURN 1: Spearhead, 11th Armoured Division, enter between hexes 17GG5 and 17 Y10 (inclusive):

9-1 8-1 8-0 4-5-8 4-5-7 2-4-7 LMG Radio

LMG PIAT
c
A30
c
A27M
VII c
57L
AT-Gun c
Bren A

3 3 12 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2

TURN 1: Elements, US 29th Infantry Division, enter along the west edge south of hex GG5:
9-1 8-1 8-0 6-6-6 MMG BAZ
3 10 2 3
SPECIAL RULES:
6.1 The French resistance sets after the Germans and must be at least three
hexes away from a German unit. Use partisan counters and all partisan rules
apply (98). In the unlikely event that the French starts in the same hex as a
German sniper, both sides are considered to be in close combat at the start of
game.
6.2 British units may not move south of the road leading from 17GG5 to 18I1
(unless forced to do so in the rout phase). American units may not move north
of the same road. Both may use the road itself freely.
6.3 The Americans receive two random off-board artillery modules, the British
receive one module. Germans receive two fire missions of 81mm mortars.
6.4 If an unbroken American squad has LOS to any British squad at least
three hexes away at the start of the his Prep Fire Phase, there is a risk that the
American squad has mistaken it for Germans and friendly fire can occur. If the
above criteria is met, roll a single die. On 1-2, friendly fire occurs. The German
French
Resistance, set
Radio
up east of 3-3-6 ?
hexrow J per
special rule 6.1:
2 2
5
player may then designate which American stack in LOS of a British squad (if more
than one) that will open fire against a British stack (also of his choice) during that
Prep Fire Phase. The entire American stack must take part in the friendly fire
including MGs and leadership modifiers, if any. Friendly fire can only occur once
per phase and twice during the scenario. After Turn 4, Anglo-American liaison is
assumed to have been established and no friendly fire can occur after that.
AFTERMATH: With tanks and infantry in mutual support, the 11th Armoured
Division dashed south-eastwards. They crossed the boundary to the US forces and
there was some confusion when the British advanced into the sector of the advancing
US 29th Infantry Division. True to form, the Germans scrambled to plug the gap in
their line and managed to counterattack with a Kampfgruppe from the 10th SS Panzer
Division, eventually stopping the British. As with many other British actions,
German attention had been diverted from the American sector where the German
defences had begun to crumble. The entire Wehrmacht collapse in Normandy was
only two weeks away.