(Studies in The History of Religions 91) Samkaracgasarya - Malkovsky, Bradley J - The Role of Divine Grace in The Soteriology of Śamkargasāc Asarya (2001, Brill) - Libgen - Li

THE ROLE OF DIVINE GRACE IN THE SOTERIOLOGY OF
“A‚KAR$C$RYA
NUMEN BOOK SERIES
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY
OF RELIGIONS
edited by
W.J. HANEGRAAFF
VOLUME XCI
THE ROLE OF DIVINE GRACE
IN THE
SOTERIOLOGY OF “A‚KAR$C$RYA
BY
BRADLEY J. MALKOVSKY
BRILL
LEIDEN • BOSTON • KÖLN
2001
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Malkovsky, Bradley J.
The role of divine grace in the soteriology of “aÒkar§c§rya /
Bradley J. Malkovsky.
p. cm. — (Numen book series. ; v. 91)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 9004120440 (cloth : alk. paper)
1. “aÒkar§c§rya —Views on salvation. 2. Salvation (Hinduism).
I. Title. II. Series: Studies in the history of religions ; 91.
B133.S5M34 2001
294.5’22—dc21 00-069761
CIP
Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

Malkovsky, Bradley J.:
The role of divine grace in the soteriology of “aÒkar§c§rya / by Bradley J.
Malkovsky. – Leiden ; Boston ; Köln : Brill, 2001
(Studies in the history of religions ; Vol. 91)
ISBN 90–04–12044–0
ISSN 0169-8834
ISBN 90 04 12044 0
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CONTENTS
Introduction .................................................................................. xi
I. •AÁKARA’S LIFE AND WORK

A. Birth and Death Dates .......................................................... 1
B. Biography ................................................................................ 8
C. Authorship .............................................................................. 15
1. Canon ................................................................................ 15
2. Authorship of the Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya ............................ 20
a. Bàdaràya»a’s Brahma-Sùtra .......................................... 21
b. •aákara and Tradition .............................................. 27
c. The “Protocommentator” ............................................ 28
d. The Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya and the Upade≤asàhasrì ........ 33
II. EPISTEMOLOGY
A. The Means of Knowledge .................................................... 37
B. Reason and ≤ruti .................................................................... 40
C. Higher and Lower Knowledge .............................................. 42
III. METAPHYSICS
A. The Two Meanings of Non-Duality (advaita) ...................... 45
1. Monistic Interpretations of advaita .................................... 46
2. Realist Interpretations of advaita ...................................... 47
B. The Absolute .......................................................................... 50
1. The Traditional Post-•aákara Advaita
Interpretation .................................................................... 50
2. A Revised Theory of the brahman-ì≤vara Relation .......... 52
a. The nirgu»a brahman ...................................................... 52
b. The sagu»a brahman ...................................................... 53
c. ì≤vara .............................................................................. 55
3. •aákara’s Vaiß»avism ...................................................... 57
C. Causation ................................................................................ 60
D. Creation .................................................................................. 63
E. The Limiting Adjuncts (upàdhis) ............................................ 64
F. The Individual Soul ( jìva) .................................................... 66
vi 
IV. SOTERIOLOGY
A. Bondage ................................................................................ 69
1. The Experience of Suffering and Bondage .................. 69
2. Superimposition (adhyàsa) the Cause of Bondage .......... 71
3. Transmigratory Existence (saásàra) ................................ 74
B. Liberation .............................................................................. 76
1. The Nature of Liberation .............................................. 76
2. Immediate and Gradual Liberation .............................. 77
3. The jìvanmukta .................................................................. 78
C. The Path to Liberation ........................................................ 79
1. Prerequisites for Beginning the Path ............................ 79
a. Discrimination (viveka) ................................................ 79
b. Dispassion (vairàgya) .................................................... 80
c. Attainment of Tranquility etc.
(≤amadamàdisàdhanasampat) ............................................ 80
d. Longing for Liberation (mumukßutva) .......................... 81
2. Renunciation (sannyàsa) .................................................... 81
3. The Role of the Spiritual Guide .................................. 82
4. Scripture .......................................................................... 83
a. The Great Sayings (mahàvàkyas) ................................ 84
b. The Exegetical Triple-Method .................................. 85
i. Hearing (≤rava»a) .................................................. 86
ii. Reasoning (manana) .............................................. 86
iii. Meditation (nididhyàsana) ...................................... 87
5. Effort ................................................................................ 87
V. GRACE IN PRE-•AÁKARA VEDÀNTA

A. Upanißads ................................................................................ 89
B. Bhagavad-Gìtà .......................................................................... 97
C. Brahma-Sùtra .......................................................................... 100
D. Bhart‰prapañca ...................................................................... 103
E. Gau∂apàdìyakàrikàs .................................................................. 107
F. Paramàrthasàra ........................................................................ 110
G. Nimbàrka’s Vedànta-Pàrijàta-Saurabha .................................... 116
VI. MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ROLE

OF GRACE IN •AÁKARA’S THOUGHT
A. The Omission of Grace ...................................................... 135
1. Sengaku Mayeda ............................................................ 135
 vii
2. Karl Potter ...................................................................... 136

B. •aákara Opposes the Notion of Grace .............................. 137
1. Troy Wilson Organ ........................................................ 137
2. Bede Griffiths .................................................................. 138
3. Suzanne Siauve .............................................................. 139
4. Georges Thibaut ............................................................ 141
C. •aákara Provisionally Upholds the Notion of Grace ...... 141
1. Jadunath Sinha ................................................................ 142
2. T. M. P. Mahadevan .................................................... 143
3. A. G. Krishna Warrier .................................................. 144
4. Paul Deussen .................................................................. 145
D. •aákara Affirms the Reality of Grace .............................. 147
1. Kokileswar Sastri ............................................................ 147
2. V. H. Date ...................................................................... 149
3. Paul Hacker .................................................................... 151
4. Richard De Smet ............................................................ 153
5. Michael von Brück ........................................................ 157
E. Summary ................................................................................ 158
VII. •AÁKARA’S TERMS FOR GRACE AND

SYNONYMS OF GRACE
A. prasàda .................................................................................... 161
B. anugraha .................................................................................. 162
C. dayà ........................................................................................ 163
D. k‰pà ........................................................................................ 163
E. karu»a ...................................................................................... 164
F. anukro≤a .................................................................................. 164
VIII. THE NOTION OF GRACE IN •AÁKARA’S

BRAHMA-SÙTRA-BHÀÍYA
A. Exegetical Method ................................................................ 165
B. Textual Analysis .................................................................... 166
1. BrSùBh I.1.5 .................................................................... 166
2. BrSùBh I.1.20 .................................................................. 173
3. BrSùBh I.1.28 .................................................................. 181
4. BrSùBh I.2.7 .................................................................... 183
5. BrSùBh I.2.13 .................................................................. 189
6. BrSùBh I.2.24 .................................................................. 193
7. BrSùBh I.2.29 .................................................................. 196
viii 
8. BrSùBh I.3.30 ................................................................ 202

9. BrSùBh II.1.21–23 ........................................................ 208
10. BrSùBh II.1.34 .............................................................. 214
11. BrSùBh II.2.37–41 ........................................................ 222
12. BrSùBh II.2.42 .............................................................. 230
13. BrSùBh II.3.29 .............................................................. 234
14. BrSùBh II.3.41 .............................................................. 236
15. BrSùBh II.3.42 .............................................................. 242
16. BrSùBh II.4.20 .............................................................. 247
17. BrSùBh III.1.4 .............................................................. 249
18. BrSùBh III.2.5 .............................................................. 252
19. BrSùBh III.2.24 ............................................................ 262
20. BrSùBh III.2.38 ............................................................ 266
21. BrSùBh III.2.41 ............................................................ 267
22. BrSùBh III.3.32 ............................................................ 271
23. BrSùBh III.4.38 ............................................................ 274
24. BrSùBh IV.1.2 .............................................................. 277
25. BrSùBh IV.2.17 ............................................................ 280
C. Summary of •aákara’s Teaching on Grace ...................... 284
IX. THE NOTION OF GRACE IN •AÁKARA’S

OTHER WRITINGS
A. •aákara’s Upanißad Commentaries ...................................... 289
1. B‰hadàra»yaka-Upanißad-Bhàßya ........................................ 289
a. brahman-àtman-ìßvara-antaryàmi .................................... 289
b. The Teacher and Scripture .................................... 291
c. The Gods .................................................................. 293
2. Chàndogya-Upanißad-Bhàßya .............................................. 296
a. brahman-àtman-Om-“Providence” .............................. 296
b. The Teacher ............................................................ 300
c. The Gods .................................................................. 301
3. Taittirìya-Upanißad-Bhàßya ................................................ 302
a. brahman-ì≤vara-Om ...................................................... 303
b. The Teacher ............................................................ 306
c. The Gods .................................................................. 306
d. Prayer ........................................................................ 307
e. Practices .................................................................... 308
4. Ì≤a-Upanißad-Bhàßya ........................................................ 308
5. Kena-Upanißad-Bhàßya ...................................................... 311
 ix
6. Aitareya-Upanißad-Bhàßya .................................................. 313

a. ì≤vara .............................................................................. 313
7. Pra≤na-Upanißad-Bhàßya .................................................... 315
8. Ka†ha-Upanißad-Bhàßya .................................................... 317
a. àtman-ì≤vara ................................................................ 317
9. Mu»∂aka-Upanißad-Bhàßya ................................................ 326
a. àtman .......................................................................... 326
b. The Teacher ............................................................ 328
c. jñànaprasàda ................................................................ 330
B.•aákara’s Bhagavad-Gìtà-Bhàßya .............................................. 332
1. K‰ß»a/Viß»u/Nàràya»a/Vàsudeva Identical with
brahman-àtman .................................................................. 333
2. •aákara’s Vaiß»avite Sectarianism .............................. 334
3. The Incarnation of K‰ß»a ............................................ 336
4. The Grace of Lord K‰ß»a/Viß»u/
Nàràya»a/Vàsudeva ...................................................... 344
a. Passages Where •aákara Adds Nothing to the
Text .......................................................................... 345
b. Passages Where •aákara Expands on the Text .. 346
c. Passages Where •aákara Introduces the Topic
of Grace Altogether ................................................ 354
5. The Grace of the Teacher and of Scripture .............. 359
6. The Compassion of the Liberated Devotee ................ 363
C. •aákara’s Upade≤asàhasrì ...................................................... 363
1. caitanya-àtman .................................................................. 364
2. The Teacher .................................................................. 365
3. Scripture ........................................................................ 368
4. The Continuity of Knowledge .................................... 369
5. The Compassion of •aákara ...................................... 370
D. Mà»∂ùkya-Upanißad-Bhàßya with Gau∂apàda-Kàrikà-Bhàßya ... 371
X. SUMMARY: THE ROLE OF DIVINE GRACE

IN •AÁKARA’S SOTERIOLOGY
A.False Assessments of •aákara’s Views on Grace ................ 378
B.Human Liberation Through Divine Grace .......................... 381
C.Impartial Grace, Human Freedom and the Law
of Karma .............................................................................. 382
x 
D. The Grace of the Teacher and of Scripture .................... 387

E. The sàdhana of the sàdhaka .................................................. 390
F. The Problem of the Upade≤asàhasrì .................................... 393
G. The Place of •aákara’s Teaching on Grace in Vedàntic
History ................................................................................ 396
1. •aákara’s Unity with Early Vedànta .......................... 396
2. Where •aákara Differs from Early Vedànta .............. 398
H. Concluding Assessment ........................................................ 400
Bibliography ................................................................................ 403
Index .......................................................................................... 421

INTRODUCTION
The topic of this study is the role that divine grace plays in the sote-
riology of •aákara1 (ca. 700 C.E.), Hindu Vedànta’s most famous
and influential figure. More precisely, my book is a reinterpretation
of •aákara’s teaching on soteriology. It seeks to establish that divine
grace and personalism play an important role on the path leading
to enlightenment and liberation. Secondarily the book treats the rela-
tion of •aákara’s understanding of divine grace to the views on
grace of other important early Hindu thinkers.
There is much disagreement among twentieth century scholars on
what role, if any, divine grace plays in •aákara’s soteriology. The
majority of scholars take the view that •aákara’s thought allows no
place for grace on the path that leads to enlightenment and libera-
tion. They see •aákara’s system of non-duality as in necessary oppo-
sition to all theologies and spiritualities of grace, personalism and
love. These same scholars generally refer to •aákara’s Absolute (brah-
man) as “impersonal.” I believe my research shows that such assess-
ments are incorrect. •aákara not only regards divine grace as
indispensable for liberation; he also in effect treats the ultimate real-
ity as eminently personal.2 I come to these conclusions on the basis
of the exegesis of •aákara’s own words as found in his commen-
taries on the Brahma-Sùtra, the Upanißads and the Bhagavad-Gìtà and
in his independent treatise the Upade≤asàhasrì.
No one has ever before attempted to enquire in a systematic way
what role divine grace plays on the path to liberation in the thought
of •aákara. Nearly every other facet of •aákara’s thought has been
investigated, but not that of divine grace. Even those few scholars
who might acknowledge a place for grace in •aákara tend to pre-
sent their positions in an undeveloped and unsystematic fashion. In
short, then, grace appears to be the overlooked feature of this spir-
itual master’s doctrine of liberation. To show that grace and divine
personalism are central to •aákara’s soteriology requires a thorough
1
Also called •aákaràcàrya (“•aákara the Teacher”).
2
See in this regard my “The Personhood of •aákara’s Para Brahman,” The Journal
of Religion 77 (1997):541–562.
xii 
examination of all •aákara’s authentic writings. It is on the basis

of such exegesis that I am able to establish what I believe is a solid
systematic theology of grace. My findings not only revise the tradi-
tional understanding of •aákara, but they also open up future
possibilities of constructive comparative studies that engage •aákara
with thinkers outside his Advaita tradition, in particular with theists.
This study on grace causes us to substantially revise our under-
standing of the nature and activity of brahman, the supreme reality.
It also causes us to reconsider what is involved in •aákara’s par-
ticular soteriology of enlightenment.
In this book we learn in more precise ways how •aákara is like
and unlike other Hindu thinkers of his time and before him on the
issues of soteriology and grace, where he is indebted to thinkers prior
to him and where his own original contribution lies. Thus •aákara’s
teachings are compared with Àdi≤eßa (6th c. C.E.), Nimbàrka (recent
research puts him in the early 6th c. C.E. or earlier) and others. I
believe it can be shown that •aákara must be much more closely
connected to older Vedànta traditions than has thus far been rec-
ognized, if his work is to be properly understood. My book there-
fore contributes to our understanding of the most difficult period of
Vedàntic history, i.e. the era between the conclusion of the Upanißads
(ca. 200 B.C.E.) and the arrival of •aákara (ca. 700 C.E.), a period
about which too little is known.
We see •aákara struggling with notions of grace that are not easy
to reconcile. Sometimes grace has more personalist-dialogical con-
tours for him, sometimes it appears to lack these. The key to resolv-
ing this tension is Vaiß»avism. We get a sense here that the indologist
Paul Hacker was right: •aákara’s doctrine of non-duality emerged
in the context of Vaiß»avism, although most scholars have seen
•aákara as originally from a •aivite background. His teaching on
grace contains specifically Vaiß»avite elements. •aákara’s system rep-
resents the welding of theistic and non-dualistic visions of life. Thus
in reading •aákara closely we end up with a broader understand-
ing of the mystery of divine activity and a greater sense of the impor-
tance of Vaiß»avite religion in •aákara’s own life.3
3
Discussion among scholars continues today in regard to the question as to
whether •aákara was a Vaiß»avite. Most recently Gerhard Oberhammer, Der “Innere
Lenker” (Antaryàmi): Geschichte eines Theologems (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1998), pp. 17–18, believes to have found further evi-
dence in support of •aákara’s alleged Vaiß»avism.
 xiii
In many ways this volume carries on the work of Paul Hacker

(1913–79) and Richard De Smet (1916–97), indologists who made
substantial contributions to a reassessment of •aákara’s doctrine in
the second half of the twentieth century. Hacker uncovered the per-
sonalist element in •aákara, whereas De Smet argued persuasively
for a realist rather than an illusionistic understanding of the world
in •aákara’s Advaita system. I have incorporated the work of both
these men in my writings on •aákara. These two laid the founda-
tion for an eventual deeper appreciation of the nature and function
of grace in •aákara’s thought. My work underscores •aákara’s per-
sonalism to a greater degree than that of either Hacker or De Smet.
Because this is a long work I think it may be helpful here to
describe its content chapter by chapter.
Chapter 1: “•aákara’s Life and Work” gives a summary of what
both modern and traditional scholarship have revealed about the life
of •aákara, his birth and death dates, the extent of his literary
canon, and his attitude as a thinker and writer to the Vedàntic tra-
dition that preceded him. This chapter shows the necessity of mov-
ing beyond •aákara’s primary work, the commentary (bhàßya) on the
Brahma-Sùtra, in order to determine •aákara’s most original and
authentic teaching. I believe it is indispensable nowadays that any
work claiming new insights about •aákara should be conversant in
both traditional and revisionist approaches to his works.
Chapter 2: “Epistemology” summarizes the various means of knowl-
edge in •aákara’s system, giving primary importance to the role of
revealed scripture (≤ruti ) and of reason for knowledge of the supreme
reality. It also underscores the distinction between lower and higher
knowledge. This discussion of epistemology serves to clarify the cen-
trality of higher knowledge in •aákara’s understanding of liberation.
Chapter 3: “Metaphysics” presents the fundamentals of •aákara’s
ontology, so as to show how one might come to two very different
appraisals of •aákara’s non-duality (advaita). Non-duality could mean
monism, i.e. that the world is ultimately an illusion, an interpreta-
tion that the majority of •aákara scholars subscribe to. But it might
also legitimately be an expression of ontological realism, as others
have suggested: the world is real, but its reality is relative and deriv-
ative from the power of brahman, the Absolute. It is in the context
of ontological realism, not illusionism, that •aákara’s affirmations of
divine grace can be taken most seriously. In this chapter I also
attempt to sort out confusions among scholars about whether the
xiv 
personal lord (ì≤vara), the giver of grace, is to be more closely identified

with the higher brahman without attributes (nirgu»a) or with the lower
brahman with attributes (sagu»a). I conclude that •aákara tends to
identify the grace-giving Lord with the highest reality.
Chapter 4: “Soteriology” summarizes what is most important and
standard in •aákara’s understanding of bondage, the causes of
bondage, and the remedy for bondage, namely the higher intuitive
knowledge of brahman and the path that must first be traversed in
preparation for the dawn of enlightenment. The role of both teacher
and student are covered in some detail. This chapter ultimately shows
the logic and persuasiveness of interpreting •aákara without refer-
ence to divine grace. It is only later in the study that I show how
•aákara does integrate a place for grace in his soteriology.
Chapter 5: “Grace in Pre-•aákara Vedànta” sums up 1) teach-
ings on grace found in the sacred writings that are the foundation
of •aákara’s own system, i.e. the Upanißads, the Bhagavad-Gìtà, and
the Brahma-Sùtra, and 2) teachings of grace in other writings from
traditions of Vedànta that preceded •aákara that he may or may
not have known, i.e. the works of Bhart‰prapañca, the Kàrikàs of
Gau∂apàda, the Paramàrthasàra of Àdi≤eßa, and the Vedànta-Pàrijàta-
Saurabha of Nimbàrka. One of the things I do in this chapter is sum-
marize the important findings (not generally known) of Joseph
Satyanand that Nimbàrka precedes Saákara by almost two cen-
turies—not postdates him by hundreds of years—and that •aákara
knew Nimbàrka’s VPS when composing his own commentary on the
Brahma-Sùtra.4 But the general purpose of the chapter will be to deter-
mine, as far as possible on the basis of the limited data available,
where pre-•aákara Vedànta stood on the issue of grace. It might
then be possible to establish later how •aákara’s understanding of
grace corresponds with the tradition or traditions prior to him, and
how, if at all, •aákara diverges with tradition in his appraisal of
the reality and operation of grace.
Chapter 6: “Modern Interpretations of the Role of Grace in
•aákara’s Thought” provides a survey of various modern positions
4
See Joseph Satyanand, Nimbàrka: A Pre-•aákara Vedàntin and His Philosophy
(Christnagar-Varanasi: Vishwa Jyoti Gurukul, 1994). This is a revision of the author’s
dissertation submitted to the University of Poona in 1983. His guide was Dr. S. D.
Joshi, the then Director of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit. Satyanand
has also expressed his debt to Dr. Richard De Smet for his contribution in guid-
ing the thesis.
 xv
on •aákara’s view of grace, ranging from 1) silence on the subject

in the works of leading authorities to 2) an outright rejection of grace
by •aákara to 3) a merely provisional acceptance of grace on
•aákara’s part that he believes will ultimately be cancelled out in
enlightenment to 4) a clear affirmation of grace as a reality seriously
propounded by •aákara. This chapter helps to underscore the need
of a thorough study to resolve the dispute.
Chapter 7: “•aákara’s Terms for Grace and Synonyms of Grace”
finally leads the reader to •aákara himself. This chapter, though
very brief, offers standard definitions for words denoting grace and
mercy. We get a sense of the subtlety and richness of Sanskrit terms
and also learn for the first time how independent •aákara is in
choosing to affirm the divine compassion (anukro≤a).
Chapter 8: “The Notion of Grace in •aákara’s Brahma-Sùtra-
Bhàßya” investigates exegetically what •aákara has to say about grace
in his most important work. Here I examine in detail •aákara’s
most pertinent sùtra commentaries on grace, comparing them with
the commentaries of Nimbàrka and Bhàskara on the same verses.
This allows for very concrete conclusions about what grace means for
•aákara and how his thinking on the subject differs from other Vedàn-
tins. This is the longest chapter and is the heart of the study. Each
individual sùtra commentary receives an exegetical analysis followed
by a point-by-point summary and conclusion. The evidence gleaned
from the various sùtras in their totality is then summarized system-
atically at the end of the chapter as a kind of first conclusion about the
role of grace in •aákara’s soteriology and its operation. The Brahma-
Sùtra-Bhàßya is alone treated in this chapter because many scholars
refer only to it when treating •aákara’s teaching. So it is important
to show that a theology of grace can be derived already from this
one book, even if the other works of •aákara were to be omitted.
Chapter 9: “The Notion of Grace in •aákara’s Other Writings”
examines the other authentic works in exactly the same manner as
was done with the Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya. •aákara’s commentaries on
the principal Upanißads and the Bhagavad-Gìtà are exegetically explored
as is the independent work Upade≤asàhasrì. Here the theological findings
of the previous chapter are confirmed and expanded. We learn the
importance of proceeding beyond the Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya if we are
to gain an accurate assessment of •aákara’s theology of grace.
Chapter 10: “Summary: The Role of Divine Grace in •aákara’s
Soteriology.” It is here that the discoveries from all of •aákara’s
xvi 
writings are tied together and summarized in a final conclusion. I

attempt to formulate what I believe •aákara understands the role
of divine grace to be on the path leading to liberation. The rela-
tion of human freedom to divine freedom is discussed; here we learn
that •aákara has not one but two theologies of freedom, and that
he has not resolved the tension between them, although both share
important elements. This is the place where •aákara’s alleged
Vaiß»avism is again affirmed for its importance in understanding the
Advaitic master. This chapter also shows the compatibility of liber-
ation-through-knowledge with liberation-through-grace. The first is
always primary in •aákara’s thought, yet the second turns out to
be indispensable. Finally, I attempt to show the place of •aákara’s
teaching on grace in early Vedàntic history, pointing out where he
converges with others and where he differs from them, at times set-
ting out on an independent path.
On a more personal note I would like to express my gratitude to

those people, both living and dead, who in one way or another have
made this work possible. I begin my litany of thanks with Professor
R. N. Dandekar, whose good word to the Centre of Advanced Study
in Sanskrit at the University of Poona in 1983 made possible my
association with that faculty from 1984–1989. I am also grateful to
Sister Sara Grant, R.S.C.J., of the Christa Prema Seva Ashram in
Pune for her constant encouragement and for my first in-depth expo-
sure to the teaching and spirit of •aákara’s Advaita. The reader of
the present study cannot fail to notice my indebtedness in virtually
every chapter to Professor Richard De Smet, S.J., of the Jnana-
Deepa-Vidyapeeth in Pune, whose keen mind, vast erudition of both
the Hindu and Christian traditions, and gentle assistance opened up
for me new avenues of insight about •aákara. The subtleties of De
Smet’s interpretation of •aákara are at times nearly as challenging
as those of the great àcàrya himself.5
5
For more on De Smet see my “Introduction: The Life and Work of Richard
V. De Smet, S.J.,” New Perspectives on Advaita Vedànta: Essays in Commemoration of Richard
De Smet, S.J., ed. Bradley J. Malkovsky (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 1–17. A bibliography
of De Smet’s more than four hundred writings can be found at the conclusion of
the book. All the essays in New Perspectives are on •aákara. It is a tribute to the
high regard that De Smet enjoyed in India that in the planning stage of the vol-
ume one well-known Hindu philosopher suggested to me that all the essays ought
perhaps deal with the contribution of De Smet himself to Advaita studies.
 xvii
To Peter M. Butler of the Butler Foundation in Minnesota I offer

my heartfelt thanks for the multi-year grant that made possible my
long sojourn in India. To Professor Kilian McDonnell, O.S.B., and
Sister Dolores Schuh, C.H.M., both of the Institute for Ecumenical
and Cultural Research in Collegeville, Minnesota, enough thanks
cannot be expressed for their untiring encouragement, countless let-
ters to India, and financial gifts, when it appeared that my work
would have to be cut short. To Professor Walter Kasper of the
Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity in Rome, my orig-
inal dissertation guide at the University of Tübingen, and to Professor
Emeritus Herbert Haag, also of Tübingen, now living in Lucern,
Switzerland, I likewise extend my “Schönen Dank” for their encour-
agement and financial aid in hard times. I also offer my sincere
appreciation to Professor Peter Hünermann of the Department of
Catholic Theology, University of Tübingen, for having graciously
accepted me as a student and guided my work to completion. The
present study is a revision of my dissertation submitted to the De-
partment of Catholic Theology at the University of Tübingen in
1993. My readers were from both the Department of Theology and
Department of Indology and Comparative Religion. The only major
alteration to this study for the purpose of publication was the omis-
sion of the final chapter, which had compared the basics of •aákara’s
theology, especially his theology of grace, with standard Christian
doctrine. The volume is therefore now purely indological rather than
a study in comparative theology.
Finally, to my wife Mariam, who I met and married in India, the
mother of Brian, Joseph, and Karina, let me now publicly declare
not only my gratitude, but also wonderment, at her great patience,
sacrifice, compassion, and grace.
CHAPTER ONE
•AÁKARA’S LIFE AND WORK
A. B  D D
From the end of the nineteenth century until now, with but few
exceptions, historians of religion have held that •aákara lived from
788–820 C.E. These dates were first proposed by K. B. Pathak of
India in 1882, who was successful in convincing other scholars of
their correctness.1 As evidence in his support, Pathak published what
he believed was a very ancient manuscript, one that he himself had
found. The beginning of this manuscript was dedicated to a “•aákara”
who was stated to have lived between 710 and 742 of the •aka era.
These dates were then converted by Pathak to 788 and 820 of the
modern Western calendar.2 Unfortunately, Pathak’s manuscript could
not have been composed before the second half of the sixteenth cen-
tury, because of its references to the Ràmànuja and Madhva sects as
well as to the mostly legendary ‘biographical’ •a«karadigvijaya of Madhava.3
In addition, contradictions between this manuscript and other well-
attested historical facts have contributed to the discrediting of Pathak’s
position.4
Although it is true that more and more scholars are inclined to
reject the 788–820 hypothesis, the great majority continue to uphold
it, for want of a more accurate dating. Determining the exact dates
of •aákara’s birth and death has proved to be an impossible task.
As Nakamura suggests, “to state exactly what year •a«kara was born
and what year he died may well never be possible.5
1
Indian Antiquary XI (1882): 174–175. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (Bombay:
Blackie & Son, 1983) II:447, makes no mention of Pathak and ascribes the 788–820
dating to Max Müller and Arthur A. Macdonell.
2
See the Discussion on Pathak’s theory in Nakamura, A History of Early Vedànta
Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983) 48–51.
3
See David N. Lorenzen, “•a»kara,” Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan,
1987) 13:64, who places the composition of the •a»karadigvijaya between 1650 and
1800, but adds that it might have been rewritten around the middle of the nine-
teenth century.
4
Nakamura 50–51.
5
Nakamura 63.
2  
Despite the impossibility of determining exact year dates, reliable

criteria do exist for a fairly accurate, although not exact, position-
ing of •aákara in Indian history, and Nakamura himself is one of
the more important proponents of a new dating. In 1950 he made
the radical proposal of moving •aákara back almost a full century,
offering 700–750 C.E. as a rough estimate.6 Nakamura soon found
support from such reputable scholars as L. Renou in France and
D. H. H. Ingalls in the United States, the latter of whom not only
confirmed but also refined Nakamura’s argument.7
Nakamura resummarized his argument in a work on the history
of early Vedànta philosophy, a book that has greatly added to the
store of information which had hitherto been made available to
Indian and Western scholars on this important but very difficult
period of Indian thought.8 Nakamura’s approach may be briefly sum-
marized as follows: It is possible to roughly estimate when •aákara
lived on the basis of the chronological relationship to him of other
thinkers whose dates are better established than his own.
The first fairly certain date cited by Nakamura is 841 C.E., the
year when the philosopher Vàcaspati-mi≤ra, an Indian who wrote
important commentaries on the foundational texts of various systems
of Indian thought, composed his Nyàyasùcìnibandha.9 Vàcaspati, in his
colophon to this work, notes 898 as the year of composition, which
becomes our 841 C.E.10 Now Vàcaspati later also wrote, probably
sometime before or around the year 650 C.E., a commentary on
•aákara’s BrSùBh, called the Bhàmatì, and in this commentary
Vàcaspati appears to attack the teachings of Padmapàda, one of the
four immediate disciples of •aákara who we know today by name.11
6
See Sengaku Mayeda, who reports this in A Thousand Teachings (Tokyo: University
of Tokyo) 3.
7
Nakamura 88, note 2. For Renou see Journal Asiatique CCXLIII (1955), no. 2,
249–251. Ingalls’ summary and acceptance of Nakamura’s theory can be found in
“•aákara’s Arguments Against the Buddhists,” Philosophy East and West 3 (1953–54):292,
note 2.
8
Nakamura, History. It is Nakamura’s distinction not to have limited himself to
Sanskrit texts in researching the development of early Vedàntic thought, but to
have made extensive use of Pali, Prakrit, Tibetan and Chinese sources as well.
Nakamura’s arguments for the new dating of •aákara are on pp. 65–88.
9
Nakamura 65. The Nyàyasùcìnibandha is itself not a commentary, but an index
to Vàcaspati’s Nyàya-vàrttika.
10
See James Haughton Woods, The Yoga-System of Patañjali (Delhi: Motilal
Banardidass, 1983) xxiii.
11
The others are Sure≤vara, To†aka and Hastàmalaka. Vàcaspati does not explic-
•Á’    3
Thus the following historical sequence can be drawn: •aákara, fol-

lowed a generation12 later by Padmapàda at his peak, followed at
least a generation later by Vàcaspati who criticizes Padmapàda. Of
course, one could raise the objection that Padmapàda, •aákara’s
disciple, need not have been a full generation younger than •aákara.
Tradition is adamant that •aákara was a very young man, perhaps
even a boy, when he made his first converts. It is possible, there-
fore, to imagine that •aákara’s immediate disciples were roughly of
his own age, or even older.
In any case, Nakamura gives a second reason for placing •aákara
at least two generations before Vàcaspati.13 In his Bhàmatì, Vàcaspati
not only attacks •aákara’s pupil Padmapàda, but also Bhàskara,
another important Vedàntin thinker. And since Bhàskara himself
directed a scathing attack on •aákara, he must have been either
contemporaneous with •aákara or posterior to him. Nakamura gen-
erally assumes throughout his deliberations that an attack on a philoso-
pher presupposes that philosopher’s anteriority. Thus he feels justified
in placing •aákara prior to Bhàskara. As further evidence, he notes
the remark of Yàmuna in the eleventh century that the scholar •rìvat-
sàáka lived sometime between •aákara and Bhàskara.14 •aákara
and Bhàskara could not therefore have lived at the same time. And
since Nakamura feels that Bhàskara’s dates can be reliably computed
to be around 750–800 C.E.,15 he places •aákara prior to the year
750, and concludes with the general dating of 700–750 C.E.
Building on Nakamura’s theory and argumentation, Ingalls has
noted that Bhàskara, who we have seen lived sometime after •aákara
and sometime prior to Vàcaspati, appears to refute doctrines which
are peculiar to •aákara’s disciples Padmapàda and Sure≤vara, but
itly mention Padmapàda in his Bhàmatì, but Amalànanda in his Vedàntakalpataru,

which is a thirteenth century commentary on the Bhàmatì, states that Vàcaspati’s
refutation is directed against Padmapàda. See Nakamura 66. One may nonetheless
entertain doubts as to the reliability of a testimony made four hundred years after
the composition of the Bhàmatì.
12
Nakamura, 66, somewhat arbitarily defines a generation as about thirty years.
13
Nakamura 66.
14
Nakamura 67.
15
Nakamura, 66–67, notes that Prabhàcandra, a Jain philosopher who attacks
Bhàskara, lived around the year 800 C.E.; consequently, Bhàskara must have lived
somewhat prior to that. Nakamura is reluctant to move Bhàskara very far back
into the eighth century, however, because of other thinkers who are certainly prior
to him.
4  
which are not found in •aákara’s works.16 He therefore suggests

that Bhàskara could not have been contemporary with •aákara, but
must have been separated from him by a full two generations. In
other words, Ingalls provides further evidence in support of Nakamura’s
view that •aákara preceded Bhàskara, in fact by two generations
or more.17 Consequently, the order of chronology must now read:
•aákara, followed by Padmapàda and Sure≤vara, followed by Bhàskara,
followed by Vàcaspati. As we saw above, Ingalls supports Nakamura’s
700–750 dating of •aákara.
In support of his position that •aákara must have lived prior to
750 C.E. Nakamura also notes that the Jain scholar Vidyànanda
lived sometime during the latter half of the eighth century. Vidyànanda
quotes Sure≤vara, who was probably a generation after •aákara.
Thus •aákara must have preceded Vidyànanda by two generations.18
The question remaining to be answered is: What evidence exists
for the earliest possible dating of •aákara? Nakamura points out
that •aákara, in his independent treatise Upade≤asàhasrì I.18.141–142,
quotes the famous Buddhist thinker Dharmakìrti, who was certainly
active as a logician from 634–673 C.E., and perhaps even sometime
before and after these dates.19 Dharmakìrti thus represents the ear-
liest possible limit that can be given to •aákara’s lifetime.
In addition, •aákara was apparently also acquainted with the
thought of the Mìmàásà philosopher Kumàrila, whose active period
Nakamura reckons to have been about 650–700 C.E.20 Tradition re-
ports that •aákara not only was familiar with Kumàrila’s thought,
but that Kumàrila was also •aákara’s senior contemporary, who sent
his pupil Ma»∂anami≤ra to •aákara on his behalf to openly debate
16
Ingalls 292–293, including notes 2 and 4. The reference is to Padmapàda’s
assertion that ignorance (avidyà) is unreal and to Sure≤vara’s belief that the locus of
avidyà must be the individual soul rather than the supreme self. •aákara himself
leaves this last question unanswered, and he never refers to avidyà as unreal, as
does Padmapàda.
17
Ingalls 293, note 4, adds: “I formerly believed that tradition might be correct
in making Bhàskara a contemporary of •aákara. But the above facts make it fairly
clear that he was at least two generations later.”
18
Nakamura 72–74.
19
Nakamura 75–78.
20
Nakamura 79–87. Nakamura’s argument here is extremely complex and not
devoid of questionable assumptions, such as reckoning an average age difference of
twenty years between master and pupil (84), or in concluding that Kumàrila, who
was familiar with Kàlidàsa’s writings, must have lived later than 500 C.E., since
Kàlidàsa expired in either 460 or 470 C.E.
•Á’    5
with him.21 Since Ma»∂ana was a disciple of Kumàrila, Nakamura

places him somewhat earlier and argues that Ma»∂ana lived from
670–720.22 Later •aákara’s disciple Sure≤vara attacks Ma»∂ana’s
heretical teachings in his subcommentary (vàrttika) on •aákara’s
B‰UpBh. Nakamura thus puts Sure≤vara two generations after •aákara.
And since he assigns Sure≤vara the dates 710–770 he once again
concludes that Sure≤vara’s master •aákara preceded him in time
and would have lived around 700–750 C.E.23
Other major scholars position •aákara slightly earlier than does
Nakamura. Karl Potter, for instance, believes that •aákara lived “in
the late seventh and early eighth centuries,” on the basis of his read-
ing of a study done by Allen Thrasher.24 Thrasher sets Ma»∂ana’s
dates at 660–720 C.E., i.e. roughly at the same time that Nakamura
does.25 Since Ma»∂ana and •aákara engaged in debate and since,
according to Potter, “no firm evidence forces us to date •aákara
any later than mid-seventh century,” Potter is inclined to believe
that •aákara’s life began at least a generation prior to 700 C.E. He
does, however, add that he does not favor placing •aákara prior to
21
See Potter, Advaita Vedànta up to •aákara and His Pupils (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1981) 16–17; Mayeda 4.
22
Nakamura 85, 87.
23
Nakamura 87. Nakamura’s method is, in this instance, a bit vague, as he nei-
ther puts •aákara a full twenty years prior to his pupil Sure≤vara as would be
expected (see note 20) nor a good thirty years earlier, were •aákara to be reck-
oned one generation earlier than Sure≤vara (see note 12). This point is in itself not
of any great importance, as it does not alter •aákara’s chronological location in
the history of Indian thought to any significant degree. However, Nakamura’s
methodology is sometimes symptomatic of other recent attempts that have been
made to properly situate •aákara historically, in that a good deal of conjecture is
often necessary to arrive at a desired conclusion. The method used by S. L. Pandey,
Pre-•aákara Advaita Philosophy (Allahabad: Darshan Peeth, 1983) 69, represents an
especially extreme case in this regard, as, for example, it is necessary for him to
compute Gau∂apàda’s life-span at 125 years, and to have him expire when •aákara
is about ten years of age (for which there is not the least shred of historical evi-
dence), in order to substantiate his own theory as to when •aákara lived. On the
basis of such premises as these, Pandey confidently concludes that •aákara’s birth
year was 605 C.E. and the year of his death 637 C.E. This latter date is arrived
at through an unquestioning acceptance of the Vedàntic tradition, which declares
that •aákara lived a mere thirty-two years, an assertion that appears doubtful to
some, in view of the quantity of writings attributed to •aákara. See Nakamura 49,
and Potter 14–15.
24
Potter, Advaita 116. As far as I am aware, Thrasher’s The Advaita of Ma»∂ana
Mi≤ra’s Brahmasiddhi (Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard, 1972) remains the standard work on
Ma»∂ana. See also the same author’s “The Dates of Ma»∂ana Mi≤ra and •aákara,”
WZKSOA 23 (1979):117–139.
25
Nakamura, 87, had given Ma»∂ana’s dates as 670–720 C.E.
6  
the middle of the seventh century, because of the dating of Kumàrila

and Dharmakìrti at that time.26
It is worth noting that already in 1882, the same year that Pathak
proposed the 788–820 dating, Sir R. G. Bhandarkar suggested 680
C.E. as the date of •aákara’s birth, thus making Bhandarkar a pre-
cursor of the most recent scholarly reckonings.27
We may now finally consider whether the Advaitin philosopher
Gau∂apàda will be of help in determining •aákara’s dates. A fre-
quent argument put forth by the more traditional of •aákara schol-
ars is that Gau∂apàda was the direct teacher of •aákara’s teacher
Govinda.28 If we are able to determine when Gau∂apàda lived, it is
argued, we may place •aákara roughly two generations after him.
Now there is some disagreement regarding Gau∂apàda’s dates. Potter
puts him in the sixth century C.E. and gives 600 C.E. as a tenta-
tive date of Gau∂apàda’s death.29 By contrast, Mayeda proposes the
dates 640–690 C.E.30 Regardless of who is right or who is closer to
the real dates, the question remains as to whether it is justified to
make Gau∂apàda the teacher of Govinda, and thereby the “grand-
teacher” of •aákara. What is the evidence in favor of such a view?
The designation of Gau∂apàda as the teacher of •aákara’s teacher,
Govinda, is based primarily on •aákara’s Gau∂apàdakàrikàbhàßya IV.100
and his Upade≤asàhasrì I.18.2, in which he respectively uses the expres-
26
Potter, Advaita 116. In view of Potter’s acceptance of the authority of Thrasher’s
study on Ma»∂ana, it is surprising that Potter, 19, offers 680–750 C.E. as Ma»∂ana’s
dates rather than Thrasher’s 660–720 C.E. Potter furnishes no grounds for the
twenty-years difference.
27
This is reported by Radhakrishnan, 447, who adds that Bhandarkar “is even
inclined to go a few years earlier.”
28
Potter, Advaita 14, notes that the traditions which make Gau∂apàda the direct
teacher of Govinda “are embellished with interesting stories but can in no way be
authenticated at this time.” He adds, further, “We know nothing at all about Govinda
except that he was •aákara’s teacher. He apparently wrote little or nothing.”
R. N. Dandekar, “Vedànta,” Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1987),
15:209, clearly discounts the possibility of Govinda studying directly under Gau∂apàda
when he writes, “Gau∂apàda is traditionally believed to have been the teacher of
•a«kara’s teacher Govinda, although there is clear evidence that he must have lived
at least three centuries before •a«kara.” Dandekar accepts the 788–820 dating and
places Gau∂apàda somewhere in the “fifth to sixth century.”
Mayeda, 4, drawing on Nakamura, sets Govinda’s dates at 670–720 C.E. In con-
trast to what Potter writes, Mayeda, 8, note 10, further reports that Govinda, accord-
ing to tradition, did write three works, none of which are extant. They were
commentaries on the ChUp and the BrSù, as well as a treatise called the Yogatàràvali.
29
Potter 18.
30
Mayeda 4.
•Á’    7
sions “paramaguru” and “guror garìyase” both of which may be translated

as “teacher of (my) teacher,” an apparent reference to Gau∂apàda.31
Gau∂apàda himself is never explicitly mentioned in these works. It
has been pointed out by a number of modern scholars that the two
phrases just mentioned need not indicate any kind of close tempo-
ral proximity between •aákara and Gau∂apàda, indeed if Gau∂apàda
is the intended referent at all. Paramaguru need not mean “teacher’s
teacher;” it can also be translated as “supreme teacher (of advaita)”32
or “supreme preceptor.”33 That is to say, whether the expression
refers implicitly to Gau∂apàda or not, it is impossible to determine
whether Gau∂apàda was Govinda’s teacher or whether he preceded
him by several generations, of which there is some historical evi-
dence.34 Likewise the expression guror garìyase, “teacher of the teacher,”
may justifiably be rendered as “extremely great teacher,” “he who is
greater than a (mere) guru,” “he who is dearer than a guru,” or “highly
venerable guru,”35 and thus need not refer to any particular individ-
ual such as Gau∂apàda, as attested by later glosses on the Upade≤a-
sàhasrì.36 It is therefore not possible to determine •aákara’s dates
through recourse to the life of Gau∂apàda.37
We may therefore summarize all that has been said by first of all
concluding that •aákara lived posterior to Dharmakìrti and ante-
rior to Vàcaspati. But that only succeeds in placing •aákara some-
time in the broad period between the mid-seventh and mid-ninth
centuries. We have also seen, however, evidence of some philoso-
phers criticizing the views of others who stand in varying degrees of
31
See Potter 12, 103, 603, note 22; Mayeda 196, note 2.
32
So S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, “Some Observations on the Mà»∂ùkya Kàrikàs,”
Collected Papers, ed. T. M. P. Mahadevan (Madras: University of Madras, 1961) 270.
33
Mayeda 8, note 11.
34
William Cenkner, A Tradition of Teachers, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983) 31,
citing M. T. Sahasrabudhe, A Survey of the Pre-•a«kara Advaita Vedànta (Poona: University
of Poona, 1968), 207, mentions a lineage of teachers preceding •aákara, which
enumerates four àcàryas between Gau∂apàda and Govinda.
35
The last four phrases are from Thomas E. Wood, The Mà»∂ùkya Upanißad and
the Àgama •àstra: An Investigation into the Meaning of the Vedànta (Monograph No. 8 of
the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy) (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1990), 130.
36
Mayeda 8, note 11, and 196, note 2.
37
The traditionalist argument that •aákara’s expression paramaguru in the GKBh
IV.100 refers to Gau∂apàda is further weakened by the controversy surrounding
the authorship of this work, which may have been falsely attributed to •aákara.
See Potter 116, 308–310.
8  
proximity to •aákara, which suggests that •aákara must be placed

two or more generations prior to Vàcaspati. The dating of Kumàrila,
and especially of Ma»∂ana, who are contemporaries of •aákara,
serves to confirm the correctness of pushing •aákara several gen-
erations back before Vàcaspati. •aákara very likely lived around the
turn of the seventh to eighth centuries. Whether he lived the thirty-
two years ascribed to him by tradition is unknown, certainly not
impossible. Probably the most accurate designation of when •aá-
kara lived would be to declare that he “flourished” around the year
700 C.E.38
Calculating exactly when •aákara might have lived is not an
insignificant issue. In fact, in the words of Sengaku Mayeda, “Setting
the date of •a»kara’s birth is probably one of the most controver-
sial problems in the history of Indian philosophy,” not only because
of •aákara’s importance as an individual thinker, but also because
it throws light on a “correct understanding of one of the most impor-
tant and critical periods of the history of Indian thought.39 From the
time of the conclusion of the principal Upanißads (ca. 300/200 B.C.E.)
to •aákara probably a thousand years pass, and during that time
very little is known.40 By properly positioning •aákara in relation
to the few names, writings and teachings which have been preserved
from that time period a more accurate assessment of the develop-
ment of Vedàntic thought can be made. In addition, it may be pos-
sible to more clearly determine who may or may not have exerted
an impact on •aákara’s thinking. I shall return to this problem in
some detail below, when I discuss the role of grace in the broad
pre-•aákara Vedànta tradition.
B. B
From the western viewpoint it is paradoxical that so little is known

with certainty about the most famous philosopher and theologian in
38
See K. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Bibliography (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1979) 127, who dates •aákara as “fl. 710.”
I believe that Tilmann Vetter, Studien zur Lehre und Entwicklung •a«karas (Vienna:
Gerold in Komm., 1979) 11, is excessively cautious in concluding, “•a«kara muss
zwischen 650 und 800 n. Chr. gelebt haben. Genaueres lässt sich m.E. beim heuti-
gen Stand der Forschung nicht sagen.”
39
Mayeda 3.
40
See Nakamura 89, 127.
•Á’    9
the history of India. ‘Though much has been handed down by Indian
tradition about the life of •aákara, the accounts are at least as much
hagiographical as they are biographical. They tend to postdate
•aákara by hundreds of years41 and are, for the most part, legend-
ary in style and content.42 For that reason, although such stories pro-
vide important clues and facts about •aákara’s life, their value is
limited. A dearth of solid information about important historical
figures is, of course, typical of the ancient Indian attitude; it is well
known that until modern times there was little Indian interest in the
historical or in a chronological record of historical events.43
41
According to Karl Potter, “•aákaràcàrya: The Myth and the Man,” JAAR
Thematic Studies 48 (1982), 122, the hagiographical accounts that constitute the pri-
mary source for •aákara’s biography postdate him by “at least 600–700 years.”
42
Mayeda, 3, wryly remarks: “There are many works which profess to be biogra-
phies of •a«kara.” (My emphasis.) He names sixteen traditional biographers and
their works, the most important being Vidyàra»ya’s fourteenth century •a«kara-
digvijaya. These biographies, Mayeda notes, “are filled with legendary stories and
incredible anecdotes, some of which are mutually contradictory.” (See 3 and 7,
note 1.)
On this point there is a consensus of the more critical of the modern •aákara
scholars. “The life and times of •aákara are shrouded in legend,” writes R. Puli-
gandla, Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1975) 207. “No
other Indian philosopher has been celebrated in so many legends,” says Potter
14. C. Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983)
292, calls the traditional biographies “a hopeless mixture of legend and history.”
Nonetheless, these authors do believe that the basic contours of •aákara’s life can
be reasonably known.
M. Winternitz, History of Indian Literature (Calcutta 1927), 524, by contrast, is too
pessimistic when he says, “The fame of •aákara as a great saint has resulted in
the condition that the actual happenings of his life are entirely forgotten and there
have sprung up luxurious legends about his name . . . All these legends from the
point of view of history are outright devoid of any worth.”
E. Deutsch and J. A. B. van Buitenen, A Source Book of Advaita Vedànta (Honolulu:
University Press of Hawaii, 1971) 122–123, in their otherwise scholarly introduc-
tion to the history and teachings of Advaita, surprisingly do not mention the neces-
sity of sifting historical fact from fiction and legend, and are content with a presentation
of the life of •aákara that primarily reflects the traditional accounts.
43
Contrast has often been made, particularly by Western scholars, between the
linear goal-oriented concept of history characteristic of the Western world and the
Semitic religions on the one hand, and the cyclical understanding of time typical
of the religions of India on the other with its implicit rejection of attributing any
ultimate significance to historical events. What may ultimately lie behind these two
conceptions of time are varying experiences of being. See here the remarkable essay
by M. Eliade, “Religious Symbolism and the Modern Man’s Anxiety,” Myths, Dreams
and Mysteries (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 242, who writes: “The ‘wrong
action’ as the Hindus call it, is not that of living in Time, but of believing that
nothing exists outside Time. One is devoured by Time, by History, not because
one lives in them, but because one thinks them real and, in consequence, one for-
gets or undervalues eternity.” (Emphasis given by Eliade.)
10  
In the following, I will attempt to present a summary of what is

most reliable concerning the life of •aákara, basing my information
on the summaries of scholars who have read and weighed the evi-
dence made available in the traditional hagiographical accounts.44
There is considerable agreement, first of all, among modern biog-
raphers that •aákara was born in the village of Kaladi in what is
the Malabar region of present-day Kerala, which lies to the far south
of India.45 It is also assumed that •aákara’s parents were Brahmins
of the Nambùdri sect, and that •aákara’s father, •ivaguru, died
when •aákara was still quite young. At this point legend appears
to mingle with historical fact in the account of •aákara’s wresting
permission from his mother to renounce the world and become a
monk, through the incident of his near-death experience in the jaws
of a crocodile. Since death was apparently imminent, •aákara’s
mother, who until that time had resisted her son’s intention of embrac-
ing monasticism, was forced to yield permission for “emergency
renunciation,” a promise •aákara held her to subsequent to his mi-
raculous escape.46 At that time •aákara is supposed to have been
about eight years old.47
There is no reliable indication as to how much time passed before
•aákara set off by foot in search of a spiritual teacher. At any rate,
it is likely that he eventually arrived on the banks of the Narmadà
River in the area known today as Tamil Nadu. There he met
Govinda, at whose feet he received traditional Vedic instruction.48 If
44
See e.g. Mayeda 3–10; Potter 14–18, 116–119; Radhakrishnan, 447–450. As
to •aákara’s intellectual biography, in as much as it differs from the traditional
accounts, see below the modern theories of D. H. H. Ingalls and P. Hacker.
45
Ànandagiri is the lone dissenter among the traditional biographers in that he
places •aákara’s birthplace in Cidambaram in Tamil Nadu. See Potter, Advaita
117.
It is perhaps of some interest to note that the founders of the major Vedàntic
schools, e.g. •aákara, Ràmànuja, Madhva, Nimbàrka and Vallabha, all hailed from
the southern regions of India and were of Dravidian stock.
46
Deutsch/van Buitenen 122. Tradition gives as the reason for the opposition
which •aákara initially faced from his mother the fact that as a saányàsin (monk)
he would disqualify himself from being able to perform her funeral rites. Nevertheless,
he is said to have promised his mother that he would one day return to perform
her last rites, even as a monk, and that he did indeed keep his promise. Somewhat
dramatically, Radhakrishnan, 448, declares, “In open defiance of the rules which
govern the order of Saññyàsins, •aákara performed the funeral rites of his mother,
and thus incurred the serious opposition of his community.” Potter, Advaita 117,
however, suggests that there might not have existed any hard and fast rule regard-
ing the performance of last rites by a saányàsin.
47
Potter, Advaita 117.
48
Radhakrishnan 448, states that •aákara was eight years old when he began
•Á’    11
the accounts are true which attest that •aákara lived a mere thirty-
two years, then it is likely that already at a very young age, as a
student of Govinda, •aákara established himself as a prodigy of
intelligence and spirituality. It was apparently from Govinda that
•aákara was introduced to the basic teachings of Advaita Vedànta.49
How long •aákara continued under the tutelage of Govinda is
unknown, but tradition is fairly united that he was still a youth
when he completed his training and set off by foot to the north, to
Kà≤ì (present-day Vàrà»asì).50 At Kà≤ì, “a city celebrated for learning
and spirituality,”51 •aákara is said to have enjoyed the patronage
of the local king and to have begun his career as a public debater
and teacher.52 It was here that •aákara attracted his first disciple,
Padmapàda who later wrote a famous commentary on the first
four aphorisms (sùtras) of •aákara’s BrSùBh.53 ‘Two other disciples,
Hastàmalaka and To†aka, are also supposed to have joined •aákara
at this time.54 From this point onwards the traditional accounts
diverge. According to one source, •aákara stayed long enough in
Kà≤ì to do most of his debating and converting as well as a good
deal of his writing.55 By another account •aákara went on pilgrim-
age with Padmapàda to Badrinath in the Himalayas, where he stayed
four years, completing his major works before the age of sixteen.
Thereupon he is said to have returned to Kà≤ì to resume his pub-
lic teaching.56
An unknown length of time passes before another important incident
in the life of •aákara takes place: •aákara’s debate with Ma»∂ana
Mi≤ra in Prayàga (modern Allahabad).57 According to tradition, while
his studies under Govinda. Deutsch/van Buitenen, 122, report that it was Govinda
who formally initiated •aákara into saányàsa. On Govinda, see note 28.
49
Radhakrishnan 448.
50
Puligandla, 207–208, seems to imply that only after attaining enlightenment
“at a very early age” did •aákara embark on his peripatetic life-style. Deutsch/van
Buitenen, 122, indicate that •aákara took up the life of a wandering teacher at
the behest of Govinda.
51
Mayeda 4.
52
See Deutsch/van Buitenen 122; Potter 117.
53
There is good reason to believe that Padmapàda’s Pañcapàdikà in its original
form extended beyond the fourth sùtra, and may have even been a complete com-
mentary on •aákara’s BrSùBh.
54
Potter, Advaita 16.
55
Deutsch/van Buitenen 122.
56
57
Potter, Advaita 117, states that this was not until several more years had passed.
Mayeda, 5, contends that •aákara shunned cities as places to teach, because
Buddhism, Jainism and hedonism were still strong enough there to greatly inhibit
12  
in Prayàga •aákara sought out Kumàrila Bhà††a, after whom one

of the two principle schools of Mìmàásà was named,58 presumably
to enter into debate with him. But Kumàrila, now advanced in age,
sent •aákara to his pupil Ma»∂ana, to debate on his behalf.59
According to the terms of the debate between •aákara and Ma»∂ana
the defeated philosopher would become the disciple of the victor.
After a long and heated exchange •aákara defeated Ma»∂ana60 and
converted him to Advaita Vedànta.61
the acceptance of his message. He believes instead that •aákara preferred his lis-
teners to be saányàsins and village intellectuals. Mayeda’s theory seems to be refuted
by the fact that some of the best known incidents of •aákara’s life as a debater
are reported to have taken place in the cities of Kà≤ì (Vàrà»asì) and Prayàga
(Allahabad).
58
The other school was named after Pràbhàkara. See Sharma 212.
59
Though Ma»∂ana was the pupil of Kumàrila, tradition and some modern
scholars make them both senior contemporaries of •aákara. See Nakamura 87–88;
Mayeda 3–4; Potter 17; Deutsch/van Buitenen 229.
60
One of the most colorful stories concerning the life of •aákara, as presented
in the hagiographical literature, surrounds the debate with Ma»∂ana in Prayàga. It
is reported that after Ma»∂ana was defeated, his formal submission to •aákara was
delayed by his wife, Bhàratì, who intervened to present the monk •aákara with a
new challenge. As Potter, Advaita 117, summarizes, Bhàratì “temporarily embar-
rassed •aákara by pointing out to him that he was woefully inexperienced in worldly
ways, specifically in first-hand knowledge of sex.” •aákara, not about to yield to
even such a reproach as this, asked and was granted a temporary leave from the
debate so as to acquire the necessary experience and knowledge. He is then said
to have mastered kàma≤àstra, “the science of passion (16)”, not with his own body,
but by entering the body of a deceased king. Thereupon •aákara returned to the
debate to defeat Bhàratì and her husband, both of whom became •aákara’s dis-
ciples. According to Radhakrishnan, 448, the name of the king whose body •aákara
entered was Amaruka. For Radhakrishnan this tale, which he apparently accepts
as literally true, “shows that •aákara was an adept in yogic practices.” Potter, 16
and 117, makes no mention of the king being dead (“occupied the body of an
amorous king”); the implication is that •aákara and Amaruka coinhabited the same
body. On the possibility of two souls simultaneously inhabiting the same body, at
least temporarily, see •aákara on BrSùBh III.1.26–27.
61
As •aákara’s new pupil, Ma»∂ana is traditionally said to have taken the name
Sure≤vara, i.e. to have become one of the four disciples of •aákara known today
by name. See note 11. However, the fact that virtually nothing is known with cer-
tainty about the life of Sure≤vara makes it difficult to conclude one way or the
other whether Ma»∂ana and Sure≤vara are identical. In spite of the fact that so
little is known about the life of Sure≤vara, some modern scholars have advanced
strong arguments against the Ma»∂ana-Sure≤vara identification by focusing on their
doctrinal differences as revealed in their works. Sharma, 290–291, gives a summary
of these differences. If, then Ma»∂ana did not become •aákara’s disciple Sure≤vara,
it is more likely that Ma»∂ana was an Advaita philosopher in his own right, and,
as we have seen, a contemporary of •aákara. Ma»∂ana’s brand of Advaita was
influenced by the Mìmàásàka idea of the efficacy of ritual action as a direct cause
of liberation, a principle bitterly opposed by Sure≤vara and •aákara. This at least
•Á’    13
After his debate with Ma»∂ana •aákara is said to have travelled

extensively throughout India to propagate his doctrine. Determined
that the correct Vedànta teachings should survive for future genera-
tions, •aákara established great monasteries (ma†ha-s) of learning in
each of the four directions: •‰»geri in the south, Dwàrkà in the west,
Badrinath in the north, and Purì in the east.62 •aákara’s plan proved
to be enormously successful; not only did the ma†has contribute towards
makes it difficult to ascribe •aákara-discipleship to Ma»∂ana. Ma»∂ana also

composed several Mìmàásàka treatises prior to authoring his Advaitic work, the
Brahmasiddhi. The fact of his conversion from Mìmàásà to Advaita may in fact have
something to do with the story of his defeat in Prayàga at the hands of •aákara,
but it does not necessarily mean that he became •aákara’s disciple.
Another point worth considering in this context is the assertion made by
K. Kunjunni Raja (“On the Date of •aákaràcàrya and Allied Problems,” ALB
XXIV, parts 3–4, 1960, 142–143, quoted by Mayeda, 5): “During the age of
•aákara and for some centuries following it, Ma»∂ana’s authority on questions
relating to Advaita was recognized to be at least as high and important as that of
•aákara himself.” Similarly Potter, Advaita 17, remarks: “There is some reason to
think that for several centuries following •aákara’s and Ma»∂ana’s lifetimes it was
Ma»∂ana who was viewed by other schools as the major figure in Advaita.” If this
is true, it is possible to speculate that the Ma»∂ana-Sure≤vara identification was a
fabrication made by a later generation of •aákara’s followers with the intent of
absorbing Ma»∂ana’s teaching into a more acceptable brand of Advaita. It would
be an indication of the high repute that Ma»∂ana enjoyed and the fact that his
teaching was perceived as a threat to •aákara-Advaita, that this attempt at absorp-
tion was deemed necessary at all.
R. Balasubramaniam, “Identity of Ma»∂anami≤ra,” JAOS 82 (1962):522–532, has
sought to reconcile tradition with modern scholarship by postulating the novel the-
ory that Ma»∂ana was a Mìmàásàka who later became an Advaitin independently
of •aákara—his Brahmasiddhi would indicate this stage of his development—, but
was then converted by •aákara to •aákara’s specific brand of Advaitic doctrine.
From the time of his conversion to •aákara’s teaching Ma»∂ana took the new
name “Sure≤vara,” under which he composed his further works.
Sharma, 292, seems to subscribe to this or a similar theory, and concludes that
the householder Ma»∂ana, now converted from a Mìmàásà-influenced Advaita to
•aákara’s Advaita philosophy, took the name Sure≤vara upon becoming a saányàsin.
As to the real possibility of such a remarkable development, Sharma remarks, “There
is room for the evolution of the ideas of a man and more so when he comes under
the spell of a great personality.”
62
See Potter Advaita 16, 118; Cenkner x, 109–112. It is possible that •aákara
also founded a fifth ma†ha at Conjeevaram (old Kàñci), in Tamil Nadu; at any rate
it has a long tradition as an important center of Advaita. See Potter 17.
Cenkner, who has done an important study on the ma†has, states, x, that “The
controversy whether there were four or five ma†has founded by •a«kara continues
and does not appear near resolution.”
Mayeda, 6, believes that •aákara might have been influenced by the Buddhist
vihàra monastic system in founding monasteries of his own.
14  
making his philosophy the dominant one in India,63 but the ma†has
themselves continue to flourish even today, thirteen centuries after
•aákara, despite occasional breaks in the teaching lineage.64
There is little if anything else about •aákara’s life that can be
accepted with much certainty. His death, however, is generally agreed
to have occurred in Kedàrnàtha in the Himalayas. But even here, the
circumstances surrounding his death do not appear entirely reliable.65
As a monk, mystic, saint, theologian, philosopher, reformer and
organizer •aákara’s impact on the history of Indian thought and
religion cannot be overemphasized. That •aákara is the reference
point for the philosophizing of both his followers as well as his detrac-
tors can be seen in the words of two contemporary Indian philosopher-
historians. According to P. T. Raju, “Every subsequent philosopher,
whether or not he was a Vedàntin, had to reckon with the views of
•a«kara.”66 And S. Radhakrishnan points out: “The up-holders of other
views generally support their positions by refuting those of •aákara.”67
That •aákara was not only a profound thinker, but also a monk
of saintly character, and a man of deep religious experience, may
be gathered from the testimony of one of his first disciples, Padmapàda,
who declared: “He has given up all pomp and power, and true rea-
soning has chosen to abide with him forever, becoming part and
parcel of him. He is calm and serene, having rooted out the mighty
kàla, time, the all-destroyer. He has no obstructions anywhere.”68
63
Mayeda 6; Lorenzen 64; Deutsch/van Buitenen 123.
64
See Cenkner, 108–134, for a discussion of the history of these monasteries and
their ministry today.
65
Ànandagiri (see note 45) again dissents from the generally accepted view, nam-
ing Kàñci as the place of •aákara’s death. See Potter, Advaita 118.
Deutsch/van Buitenen, 123, declare that •aákara died of an “intestinal dis-
order” at the age of either thirty-two or thirty-eight. Potter, Advaita 16, relates the
account of an enemy philosopher, Abhinavagupta, cursing •aákara with an “ulcerous
disease,” as the cause of •aákara’s death. He adds that •aákara’s faithful disci-
ple, Padmapàda, caused the curse to rebound back on Abhinavagupta, bringing
about the latter’s own death, but not before •aákara was afflicted by the disease,
to which he eventually succumbed.
B. Walker, Hindu World (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968) II: 349, draw-
ing on other sources, asserts that •aákara died at the age of fifty or even eighty-
five.
66
Raju, Structural Depths of Indian Thought (Delhi: South Asian Publishers, 1985)
383.
67
Radhakrishnan II:451.
68
Padmapàda, Pañcapàdikà, quoted by Cenkner, 87, who does not give the verse
number.
•Á’    15
C. A
1. Canon
A good deal of research during the past five decades has gone into
determining the genuine works of •aákara.69 The Advaita tradition
that claims •aákara as its most eloquent spokesperson attributes to
him an enormous number of works, over four hundred, according
to Cenkner.70 These writings range from voluminous commentaries
on sacred texts to independent treatises of various length to much
shorter devotional hymns (stotras) and poetry. Potter suggests that for
•aákara to have authored all these works he would have needed to
compose every hour of his short life of thirty-two years.71 Yet what
perhaps throws most doubt on the authenticity of the corpus as a
whole is not so much its sheer volume as its inner linguistic and
doctrinal inconsistencies. For example, despite the possibility of a
doctrinal development within •aákara’s thought, it is unlikely that
•aákara would have embraced such contradictory doctrines as real-
ism and acosmism or alternated his devotion between Viß»u and
•iva as the highest deity.72 Rather, many of the works attributed to
•aákara must be regarded today as spurious.
Given the unlikely possibility that all the works ascribed to •aákara
could be his, the problem remained for mid-twentieth century schol-
ars to determine what criteria would constitute the authenticity of a
work. On one point all scholars were generally agreed: The •aákara
whose authorship was to be investigated was, by definition, the
•aákara who composed the BrSùBh,73 which is probably the most
important work in the history of Advaita Vedànta.74 The BrSùBh
would, in some way, have to constitute the standard of literary and
69
Especially valuable have been the writings of Paul Hacker and Sengaku Mayeda.
See the bibliography.
70
Cenkner 90. Trevor Leggett, The Chapter of the Self (London and Henley:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978) 15, agrees with this number and adds, “Perhaps
a quarter of this great body of works has been translated into English.”
Mayeda, 6, gives the number of alleged writings as over three hundred.
71
Potter, Advaita 14–15. As noted above (note 63), tradition ascribes to •aákara
a life-span of only thirty-two years, but he may in fact have lived longer.
72
•aákara appears to favor worship of Viß»u in the BrSùBh, whereas most of
the devotional hymns attributed to him extol the grace of •iva.
73
See Potter, Advaita 15.
74
Deutsch/van Buitenen, 150, remark that “•amkara’s Brahmasùtrabhàßya is the
16  
doctrinal orthodoxy. All other works ascribed to •aákara would have

to be measured against this commentary75 in terms of philosophical
or theological content, meaning of certain key terms, word frequency,
and style, for their authenticity to be established. But what did this
mean exactly? Which words and teachings ought to be regarded as
the standard by which to judge other works?
These questions found an answer in 1950 with Paul Hacker’s
“Eigentümlichkeiten der Lehre und Terminologie •a«karas: Avidyà,
Nàmarùpa, Màyà, Ì≤vara,” an essay which for the first time set
down reliable criteria for determining the authenticity or spurious-
ness of any given work attributed to •aákara.76 On the basis of a
detailed analysis of •aákara’s use of the terms avidyà (ignorance),
nàmarùpa (name and forms), màyà (marvelous power), and ì≤vara (Lord),
as well as the frequency with which •aákara employed these words,
Hacker was able to distinguish what was unique in •aákara’s BrSùBh
not only in comparison with the later Advaitic tradition, but also in
comparison with •aákara’s contemporaries and immediate disciples.77
This essay, certainly one of the most important critical studies done
foundational work of classical Advaita Vedànta.” This is as true today as it was in

the past, according to Potter, 119, who declares the BrSùBh to be “the single most
influential philosophical text in India today.”
75
Mayeda 6.
76
In: Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 100 (1950):246–286, reprinted
in Paul Hacker: Kleine Schriften, ed. Lambert Schmithausen (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner
Verlag, 1978), 69–109. In the following I will adhere to the numbering of the
Schmithausen edition of Kleine Schriften (KS) and refer to this essay as “Eigen.” John
Taber has recently translated Eigen. As “Distinctive Features of the Doctrine and
Terminology of •a«kara: Avidyà, Nàmarùpa, Màyà, Ì≤vara,” which appears in
Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Vedànta, ed. Wilhelm
Halbfass (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 57–100.
Hacker, Eigen. 69, note 3, indicates that Käthe Märschner’s Zur Verfasserfrage des
dem •a«karàcàrya zugeschriebenen B‰hadàra»yakopanißadbhàßya (Berlin-Charlottenburg: Alfred
Lindner Verlag, 1933) is the first work known to him that systematically investigates
the question of the genuineness of any of •aákara’s works. Yet the fact remains
that it was not until Hacker that indologists had any sure criteria by which to con-
duct future investigations of •aákara’s works in general.
77
Padmapàda and Sure≤vara, for example, understand avidyà differently from
•aákara. Some of the discrepancies between •aákara and post-•aákara Advaita
are summarized in Anthony Alston, “•aákara in East and West Today,” New
Perspectives on Advaita Vedànta, ed. Bradley J. Malkovsky (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 84–108.
In his Untersuchungen über Texte des frühen Advaitavàda (Mainz: Akademie der Wis-
senschaften und der Literatur, 1951) 1933, note 1, published a year after Eigen.,
Hacker remarked that he was not aware of any commentary on •aákara’s BrSùBh
from within the Advaita tradition that reflected well •aákara’s thought: “Übrigens
sind alle mir zugänglichen Kommentare zum SBh keine guten Erläuterungsschriften.
Der beste ist in dieser Beziehung noch Vàcaspatis Bhàmatì, doch benützt dieser
zur Erklärung von Lehren des Bhàßya manchmal Lehren anderer Advaitins, und
•Á’    17
on •aákara in the twentieth century, inaugurated a new phase of

•aákara research that many Western indologists and Japanese schol-
ars found impossible to igmore.78
Despite this application of the historical-critical method to •aákara’s
writings by Hacker and other scholars, disagreements concerning the
authenticity of some important texts remain. Potter, for example,
remarks that this method “does not give completely unambiguous
results; in particular, the Gìtàbhàßya and Gau∂apàdakàrikàbhàßya, whose
authenticity has been questioned by some scholars, show both sim-
ilarities and differences with the Brahmasùtrabhàßya.”79
This last remark is of special importance for the present study,
because the BhGBh ascribed to •aákara contains more material on
the subject of divine grace than does any other of •aákara’s writ-
ings. However, despite some doubts raised by scholars against its
genuineness, the BhGBh has passed authenticity tests put to it by
Mayeda and others.80 The evidence thus seems to be in favor of
accepting it as a genuine •aákara work. Yet because of the reser-
vations against the Gìtà-Bhàßya still held by some scholars today, I
feel that it is not justifiable to build a case either for or against a
certain •aákaran understanding of grace based primarily upon the
data collected in this writing. I do in fact accept the authenticity of
the BhGBh, but my analysis of the references to grace there will not
be in isolation from what •aákara says in his other writings, par-
ticularly in the BrSùBh.
vieles lässt er unerklärt. Ànandagiri lehnt sich eng an Padmapàda (und Prakà≤àtman)
an, Govindànanda ebenso eng an Ànandagiri . . .
78
Unfortunately, Hacker’s method for determining authenticity has found but lit-
tle reception in India. This is due in large part because Eigen. and many other
important Hacker writings were until recently available only in German, but it is
also due to the devastating blow that Hacker’s method has inflicted on the author-
ity of the post-•aákara Advaita tradition, which regards itself as a faithful trans-
mitter of •aákara’s thought. The Advaita tradition after •aákara sees itself, if not
directly reflecting the master’s teaching, as at least a legitimate logical development
and extension of the mind of •aákara. It is this claim that Hacker’s work tends
to call into question.
Perhaps the strongest presentation in recent literature for reading •aákara’s works
in light of traditional exegesis, i.e. through the lens of •aákara’s commentators, is
by Francis X. Clooney, S.J., Theology After Vedànta (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993).
Clooney’s overall scholarly work is distinctive in that he is expert in both tradi-
tional and modern critical methods.
79
80
See Mayeda, “The Authenticity of the Bhagavadgìtàbhàßya Ascribed to •a«kara,”
WZKSOA 9 (1965):155–197. Potter summarizes the evidence surrounding the BhGBh
authenticity debate in Advaita 294–195.
18  
By contrast the GKBh has practically nothing to say about divine

grace or mercy, but its authenticity has been more called into ques-
tion than that of the BhGBh.81 Although indologists of high repute
have attempted to prove that the GKBh is a genuine work of •aákara,
Potter finds that “a good many of the favorable arguments smack
of special pleading intended to explain away what is used by their
opponents as reasons for suspecting the ascription.”82 Nonetheless, I
will not disregard the teaching of this work when attempting to ascer-
tain •aákara’s stance on the reality of grace. All major works ascribed
to •aákara that have not been conclusively disproved as such must
come under analysis.
Some of the most important works ascribed to •aákara which
quite clearly do not meet the requirements of authenticity are the
more than three hundred devotional hymns (stotras) with the possi-
ble exception of one or two.83 These songs of praise, although abound-
ing in references to grace, must be excluded from examination,
because they are plainly spurious.
Although •aákara frequently refers to the •vestà≤vatara Upanißad in
his BrSùBh and elsewhere, the •vUpBh attributed to him is not
authentic, either.84 In addition to other evidence against its authen-
81
See Potter, Advaita 308–310.
82
Potter, Advaita 309–310. Potter points out that Jacobi, Suryanarayana Sastri,
Belvalkar and De Smet doubt the authenticity of the GKBh, whereas Vetter, Hacker
and Mayeda do not. It is worth noting that the latter three interpret •aákara in
an acosmic illusionistic sense, quite in keeping with the teaching of the GKBh,
whereas at least Jacobi and De Smet do not. It is therefore possible that in each
case the decision to accept or reject the authenticity of the GKBh was strongly
based on the kind of ontology that each interpreter felt •aákara’s BrSùBh repre-
sented.
83
T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Hymns of •a«kara (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986),
has written a wonderful commentary on some of the best known stotras ascribed to
•aákara, and accepts their authenticity as a fact. Robert E. Gussner, “A Stylometric
Study of the Authorship of Seventeen Sanskrit Hymns Attributed to •a«kara,”
Journal of the American Oriental Society 96 (1976):259–267, has provided the most com-
pelling arguments against the authenticity of these writings. In so doing, he has lim-
ited himself to an examination of the seventeen hymns which he felt enjoyed the
best chance of being proven genuine. He concluded that fifteen of these seventeen
were certainly spurious, while his verdict on the other two was inconclusive.
Leggett, 15, counts the number of hymns ascribed to •aákara as two hundred
twenty instead of Gussner’s three hundred.
84
The text is translated by Swami Gambhirananda and appears as •vetà≤vatara
Upanißad. With the Commentary of •a«karàcàrya. (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1986).
Potter, Advaita 345, merely notes that the •vUpBh and some other Upanißadic
commentaries “appear to be erroneously ascribed to •aákara.” He does not include
it in his list of examined writings attributed—falsely or not—to •aákara.
•Á’    19
ticity, the •vUpBh accepts the •vUp’s identification of Rudra-•iva

with the Absolute, whereas •aákara tends to identify Viß»u with the
highest brahman.85 Consequently, the •vUpBh, which repeatedly extols
the value of the grace of •iva, must be eliminated from the scope
of exegetical investigation.
Two important independent works, the Vivekacù∂àma»i (VC)86 and
the Àtmabodha (AB),87 were also composed by authors other than
•aákara. The first of these contains many more references to grace
than does the second.88 Neither contributes to our understanding of
what •aákara believed grace to be.
There is a growing consensus among the more critical contem-
porary •aákara scholars that the •aákara canon compiled by Hacker
in 1968 is the most reliable one, although some of Hacker’s inclu-
sions and omissions may be argued against. Hacker’s list is as fol-
lows: the Upad, the BrSùBh, the commentaries on the BhG, and
on ten Upanißads. The Upanißads upon which •aákara commented
are the B‰hadàra»yaka, Chàndogya, Taittirìya, Aitareya, Ì≤a, Ka†ha, Kena
(two commentaries: the Pada and Vàkya), Mu»∂aka, Pra≤na and Mà»∂ùkya
(together with the Gau∂apàdìyakàrikà). In addition to these, Hacker
argues for the authenticity of two lesser-known works: the Yoga-
Sùtra-Bhàßya-Vivara»am (YSBhV) and the very small and little-known
85
See Hacker, “Relations of Early Advaitins to Vaiß»avism,” KS 205–212, and
“•a«karàcàrya and •a«karabhagavatpàda,” KS 58.
86
See Vivekacù∂àma»i of •rì •a«karàcàrya. Translated by Swami Madhavananda
(Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1982) and the more famous English translation by
Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood, Shankara’s Crest-Jewel of Discrimination
(New York: Mentor, New American, 1970).
Gussner’s “•a«kara’s Crest Jewel of Discrimination: A Stylometric Approach to
the Question of Authorship,” Journal of Indian Philosophy 4 (1977):265–278, is the
most important essay to date discounting •aákara’s authorship of the VC. Gussner,
265, places the VC “in time, word-frequency, and concept between •a«kara and
later Vedàntic stotras (hymns).” (Emphasis by Gussner.)
87
See Self-Knowledge of •rì •a«karàcàrya. Translated by Swami Nikhilananada
(Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1987).
88
Aside from the usual objection that the VC represents an ontology foreign to
•aákara’s thought, I believe there is another reason for discrediting this work’s
claim of authenticity. The frequency of passages that proclaim the importance of
grace at the beginning of this writing is very un-•aákaran. See verses 3, 28, 33,
35, 39, 40, 42. In addition, although it has long been the teaching of the wider
Vedànta tradition that the very desire for liberation is a grace given by God,
•aákara never formally declares this in any of his writings, although it is the explicit
teaching of VC 3. This does not mean that •aákara would have denied such a
doctrine, only that this teaching is conspicuously absent in his references to grace
in all his other writings.
20  
Adhyàtmapatala-Vivara»am (APV).89 The latter two are subcommentaries

on other works and are rarely quoted by •aákara scholars. Probably
only because of Hacker is the APV included in the •aákara canon
of other indologists, let alone referred to at all.90 The YSBhV, on
the other hand, is a better known work, which has attracted the
attention of a sizeable number of scholars seeking to determine its
authenticity. No final verdict has yet been reached on this point.91
Though the YSBhV is not, strictly speaking, an Advaitic work, it
does contain hints of Advaitic teaching.92 In addition, it contains an
extended section on the Lord (ì≤vara) and not a few references to
grace. By contrast, the APV makes no mention of grace at all.
In this study on grace I will examine most of the writings in
Hacker’s canon, leaving aside those works that enjoy a lesser claim
to authenticity.
2. Authorship of the Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya
As noted above, the BrSùBh is normally regarded as •aákara’s most

important work and the yardstick by which the authenticity of other
writings attributed to him may be measured. In addition, the Vedànta
tradition teaches that the BrSùBh is the work of •aákara alone and
that the BrSù itself (the text •aákara commented on) is, in its extant
form, the product of a single man named Bàdaràya»a. In what fol-
lows I will show how all these views have been questioned by mod-
ern scholars, leaving the interpreter of •aákara’s thought to doubt
89
Trevor Leggett has translated all of the APV and the first two parts of the
YSBhV. See the bibliography.
90
See e.g. Dandekar, 210, whose •aákara canon is identical to Hacker’s.
91
Along with Hacker, other important modern scholars have found reason to at
least provisionally accept the YSBhV as a genuine work of •aákara, most notable
among them Trevor Leggett, Sengaku Mayeda, Hajime Nakamura, Gerhard Ober-
hammer, and Tilmann Vetter. Strong arguments against the authenticity of the
YSBhV have been recently offered by T. S. Rukmani.
92
Hacker, “•a«kara der Yogin und •a«kara der Advaitin,” KS 213–241, has
suggested that •aákara was originally a follower of Patañjala Yoga, and only later
accepted the teaching of Advaita. The YSBhV would thus represent •aákara’s early
pre-Advaitic phase. Nakamura and Mayeda reject Hacker’s hypothesis of a two-
stage development of •aákara’s thought into a Yogic and an Advaitic period, point-
ing out that there is no strong reason for doubting that •aákara the Advaitin might
have written a commentary on a Yogic text. Nakamura notes that a number of
passages in the YSBhV do in fact show an Advaitic influence. For a brief sum-
mary of this discussion, see Leggett, •a«kara on the Yoga-sùtra-s (Vol. I: Samadhi )
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981) xviii–xix.
•Á’    21
the reliability of ascertaining •aákara’s teaching on the basis of the

BrSùBh alone.
a. Bàdaràya»a’s Brahma-Sùtra
In order to fully appreciate the nature of •aákara’s BrSùBh it is
first necessary to ascertain the nature of the BrSù itself, assess its
place in Vedàntic thought, and, finally, to consider the literary and
philosophical problems surrounding it.
The BrSù, also known as the Vedànta-Sùtra and the •arìraka-Sùtra,
is a compilation of aphorisms (sùtra-s) that were intended to con-
cisely summarize and clarify the basic teachings of the Upanißads.93
The author or final redactor of the BrSù has traditionally been
viewed to be Bàdaràya»a,94 a position that will be discussed in some
detail below. There is much disagreement among scholars as to when
Bàdaràya»a lived.95 In any case he is an ancient author.
The importance of the BrSù for the Vedàntic tradition cam hardly
be overestimated. Together with two other texts or collections of
93
See S. Radhakrishnan, The Brahma Sùtra (London: George Allen & Unwin,
1971) 23–24; Nakamura, 438.
94
See Radhakrishnan, Brahma Sùtra 22; B. N. K. Sharma, The Brahmasùtras and
Their Principal Commentaries (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1986) 1:1; V. S. Ghate,
The Vedànta (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1981) 40; T. M. P.
Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism (Bombay: Chetana, 1984) 38, 140; S. C. Chatterjee
and D. M. Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Calcutta: University of Calcutta,
1960) 348; Puligandla 207; Raju 377; Pandey 16; Cenkner 29; K. M. Sen, Hinduism
(Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1961) 82.
95
Ingalls, “•aákara’s Arguments Against the Buddhists,” Philosophy East and West
3 (1953–54):299, declares that the BrSù could have been composed no later than
the time of Christ. Radhakrishnan, Brahma Sùtra 22, sets the date of the BrSù’s
composition at about the second century B.C.E., but acknowledges Jacobi’s attempt
to locate the work in the time period between 200 and 400 C.E. Pandey, 27, like-
wise places the BrSù at about 200 B.C.E. Dandekar, 209, puts the BrSù in the
third to second century B.C.E. Mahadevan, Outlines 140, makes the work even more
ancient, citing 400 B.C.E. as the probable date of composition. Cenkner, 29, who
tends to accept Indian tradition as authoritative in most issues of controversy, claims
the fourth century B.C.E. as the correct date. Raju, 104, is even more extreme,
declaring “the 4th or the 5th century B.C.” as the accurate dating.
By contrast, R. Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis,
1981) 106, holds the BrSù to have been composed in the fourth century C.E.
Potter, Advaita 10, aptly summarizes the discrepancies surrounding the dating of
the BrSù with the remark: “The date of the Brahmasùtras is not closely identified—
the best scholarly guesses put it a century or two before or after Christ.” It must
be added here that Potter drew his conclusions two years prior to the appearance
in English of Nakamura’s History (see note 2), which has thrown new light on the
dating of the BrSù, to which I shall return below.
22  
texts, i.e. the Upanißads and the Bhagavad-Gìtà, the BrSù belongs to
the triple canon or triple foundation ( prasthànatraya) of the many
Vedàntic schools of thought. Though the BrSù is not regarded as
revealed scripture, as are the Upanißads and the Gìtà,96 it is “looked
upon as being nearly as important in its own right as the others
are.”97 The reasons for this are clear. Not only is it the purpose of
the BrSù to give final clarity to the true meaning of the Upanißads;
it has also served historically as a springboard by which philosoph-
ically different schools within the broader Vedàntic tradition have
been able to clearly differentiate themselves. Commentators on the
BrSù such as •aákara, Ràmànuja and Madhva have used this text
as an opportunity to present their respective ontologies of non-dual-
ism (advaita), qualified non-dualism (vi≤iß†àdvaita) and simple dualism
(dvaita). S. Mayeda notes that Indian history has given rise to at least
“49 different commentaries on the BS which were composed from
various philosophic standpoints.”98
That the BrSù has been able to be interpreted in so many different
ways is an indication that it has not succeeded in accomplishing its
original task, namely to clarify once and for all Vedàntic doctrine.
In the words of M. Hiriyanna, an important modern Indian philoso-
pher: “It is greatly to be regretted that the Sùtra is not clear in its
teaching. In fact it is, in its cryptic form, more ambiguous than the
Upanishads or the Gìtà; and this has led to several interpretations
being put upon it.”99 S. Radhakrishnan concurs: “The Sùtra of Bàda-
ràya»a reflects the indecision and vagueness characteristic of the
Upanißads, whose teachings it attempts to set forth, and harbours
within it many seeds of doubt and indecision.”100
The reason for the obscurity so often encountered in the BrSù is
the fact of its being sùtra literature; Indian sùtra literature in general
is characterized by the quest for absolute brevity.101 Terseness is
96
Panikkar, 106, notes that the Upanißads and the Bhagavad Gìtà are “both sacred
texts, the former being a formal part of the ≤ruti and the latter considered equally
as ‘revealed’.”
97
Nakamura 438.
98
Mayeda, Thousand Teachings 16, note 19.
99
M. Hiriyanna, Essentials of Indian Philosophy (Bombay: Blackie & Son, 1978)
151–152.
100
Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, II:444. Nakamura, 438, notes that “the thought
of the Brahma-sùtra . . . does not always coincide with the doctrines in the Upanißads
and Bhagavad-gìtà.”
101
Not only the basics of Sanskrit grammar have been passed down from antiq-
•Á’    23
prized above all else.102 The sùtrakàra, i.e. the final redactor or author
of a collection of sùtras, normally prefers to articulate a given teach-
ing in as few words as possible, so that fragments of meaning rather
than complete sentences find their way into the body of sùtra liter-
ature. The purpose of brevity is to assist memorization. But because
of its brevity, a given sùtra cam only be understood from its con-
text; missing words must often be supplied from previous sùtras.103
Even after this has been done, the sùtra often remains unintelligible
without the help of a commentary. V. S. Ghate concludes that
because sùtras require commentaries, “there is thus the greatest scope
for the ingenuity of the commentator, who can accordingly find in
them whatever ideas he wants them to convey.”104 Thus the great
variety of commentaries on the BrSù.
Late twentieth century scholarship on the BrSù, especially the con-
tribution of H. Nakamura, has brought to light the need to reeval-
uate the date and authorship of this work. As noted above,105 it is
generally assumed that Bàdaràya»a is the author of the BrSù. But
according to Nakamura this amounts to no more than an ancient
legend.106 As evidence of this, Nakamura notes that in the BrSù the
theories of the thinker Bàdaràya»a are referred to in the third per-
son.107 Now, in itself, as Nakamura himself concedes, this does not
prove that Bàdaràya»a and the sùtrakàra are different persons, because
Indian history provides examples of authors referring to themselves
in the third person. However, these examples are mostly taken from
the modern period, whereas it is difficult to prove this form of lit-
erary usage in antiquity.108
uity in the form of sùtras, but philosophical schools other than Vedànta have also
attempted to preserve the essence of their doctrines in sùtra form. See e.g. the Yoga-
Sùtras, the Mìmàásà-Sùtras etc.
102
James R. Ballantyne, noted nineteenth century British Sanskritist, has remarked
in his commentary on sùtra 5 of Varadaràja’s Laghukaumudì (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1981, 2; originally published 1849): “According to the author of the Mahàbhàßya,
or Great Commentary, ‘the grammarians esteem the abbreviation of half a short
vowel as equivalent to the birth of a son.’ ” See also Ghate, 42.
103
See Ghate, 41–42.
104
Ghate 41.
105
See above and note 94.
106
See Nakamura, 405–406, who further remarks that the Skanda-Purà»a refers
to K‰ß»a as the author of the BrSù.
107
Nakamura 406.
108
Nakamura 408, note 14.
24  
In support of his theory that Bàdaràya»a is not the author of the

BrSù Nakamura proceeds to offer as further evidence the following:
1) The sùtrakàra refers to the theory of Bàdaràya»a in III.2.40 as
confirming his own opinion as given in III.2.38–39.109 2) The author
of the BrSù, in turn, does not hesitate to uphold the theories of
Bàdaràya»a, as for example in III.4.8.110 3) Finally, there are instances
in which the theories of Bàdaràya»a and the sùtrakàra do not coin-
cide.111 As examples, Nakamura notes that
Bàdaràya»a respects the life of the one who leaves home to become
a wandering mendicant, while the Sùtra-author rather encouraged med-
itation on Brahman while performing the rituals as a lay householder.
Again, Bàdaràya»a admitted a twofold Brahman, as the supreme and
as the effect, but the theory of the twofold Brahman is not taught in
the words of the Sùtra-author himself. Consequently, in such a case,
the Sùtra-author, it seems, might have quoted the theory of Bàdaràya»a
as merely one of the heretical doctrines. Again, concerning the attrib-
utes of the individual self which has been liberated, the theory of
Bàdaràya»a is merely listed as one theory even where the heretical
theories are being enumerated (IV.4.5–7), and judging by all appear-
ances, the fundamental relation with the thought of the Sùtra-author
seems to be very flimsy indeed.112
As a whole, however, the views of Bàdaràya»a and the sùtrakàra
largely agree, so much so that Nakamura sees Bàdaràya»a as “the
Vedànta thinker upon whom the author of the Brahma-sùtra relied
the most.”113 This fact alone would go far in explaining the even-
tual identification of the two men.
In any case, as important as Bàdaràya»a’s views were for the
author of the BrSù, there is virtually nothing that is known about
the man.114 His name is mentioned in a few instances in ancient
Indian literature, to which Nakamura allows a certain degree of his-
torical reliability. Basing himself on a geneology that places Bàdaràya»a
three generations after Jaimini, another ancient thinker, and taking
it as evident that Bàdaràya»a lived prior to the time of the compi-
109
Nakamura 406.
110
Nakamura 406.
111
Nakamura 406.
112
Nakamura 423. For a more detailed development of these ideas see also
414–424.
113
Nakamura 406.
114
According to Potter, Advaita 10, “We know nothing of Bàdaràya»a, not even
his date or place of origin.”
•Á’    25
lation of the Mìmàásà-Sùtra,115 Nakamura places Bàdaràya»a in the

first century B.C.E.116
Nakamura’s dating of Bàdaràya»a harmonizes well with attempts
of Indian scholars to locate the compilation of the BrSù at a very
early date.117 However, the Indian dating works only if Bàdaràya»a
is the author of the BrSù, an assumption that, in my view, Nakamura
has effectively disproved.
Nakamura sets the date of the compilation of the BrSù in its pre-
sent form at roughly 400–450 C.E.118 He does this on the basis of
the BrSù’s rejection of Buddhist Vijñànavàda theories in sùtras
II.2.28–32. The Vijñànavàda was spread throughout India by Vasu-
bandhu, who lived around 320–400 C.E.; consequently, the BrSù
must have appeared thereafter.119 The 450 C.E. upper limit has been
set by Nakamura after determining the dates of early commentaries
on the BrSù.120 But as he himself points out, the greater portion of
the BrSù was already in existence long before the final compilation
in the fifth century C.E.121 It is likely that the BrSù emerged over
a period of about seven hundred years.122
As noted above, the BrSù is regarded as a summary of the basic
teachings of the Upanißads. But it is much more than that. The BrSù
gradually emerged in response to four problems, only one of which
was the need to summarize the central Vedaàntic teachings. At the
115
In contrast to Indian tradition, Nakamura does not hold Jaimini to be the
author of the Mìmàásà-Sùtra. For his arguments see 390–391.
116
Nakamura 407.
117
See note 95.
118
Nakamura 436. Mayeda, Thousand Teachings 12, accepts these dates.
119
Nakamura 435–436.
120
Nakamura 436.
121
Nakamura 436. Ingalls, “•aákara’s Arguments” 299, notes that Jacobi’s well-
known attempt (“The Dates of the Philosophical Sùtras of the Brahmans,” Journal
of the American Oriental Society 31 (1911):1–29) to date the BrSù several centuries after
Christ on the basis of his examination of sùtras II.28–32 rests “on very shaky ground.”
He believes these five sùtras to be a seventh century addition having little or noth-
ing to do with the more general compilation of the BrSù. He writes: “No other
section of the Brahma-sùtra is under such strong suspicion of being an insertion.
Except for these five sùtras, I can see no reason for placing the Brahma-sùtra later
than the time of Christ.” Thus Nakamura and Ingalls agree that sùtras II.28–32
represent the finishing touch of the BrSù, but they differ in so far as Ingalls sees
these sùtras as an isolated seventh century addition, whereas Nakamura regards them
as part of a larger final compilation of the BrSù, which took place in the fifth cen-
tury C.E.
122
See Mayeda, Thousand Teachings 12, who draws on Nakamura for this infor-
mation.
26  
same time, apparently contradictory Upanißadic passages needed to

be synthesized and unified. And since the Upanißads are frequently
couched in myth or symbolic language, the exact meaning of par-
ticularly difficult passages needed to be clarified, also. And, finally,
after the true meaning of the Upanißads was discerned and the cor-
rect Vedàntic teachings enunciated, it was necessary to effectively
attack the heterodox teachings of the Sà«khyas, Buddhists etc. All
of these concerns contributed to the gradual development of that
writing known as the BrSù.123
The most central doctrinal problem which the Vedànta tradition
sought to answer during the long literary process by which the BrSù
was compiled was this: What is the ontological relation between the
brahman, the Source, and the àtman or individual self ?124 How do the
many within the phenomenal world relate to the underlying har-
mony of the One?125 On other points the various schools within the
larger Vedàntic tradition did agree, such as in accepting the self ’s
eternity or in making the acquisition of a higher knowledge ( jñàna)
necessary for the soul’s liberation (mokßa, mukti ).126
Despite •aákara’s interpretation of the BrSù along non-dualist
lines, scholars today are generally agreed that the sùtrakàra attempts
to answer the question of brahman and àtman by advocating a
“difference-and-non-difference” (bhedàbheda) ontology.127 According to
this view, brahman in some sense changes or becomes the world with-
out losing its self-identity.128 By contrast, •aákara denies that brahman
ever undergoes any kind of transformation or change, and he tries
to interpret the sùtrakàra in this way, but his detractors feel that
•aákara is far from the spirit and teaching of the text he is com-
menting on.129
123
See Nakamura 429–434.
124
Mayeda, Thousand Teachings 12.
125
See Ghate 46.
126
Hiriyanna 152.
127
Panikkar 107; Nakamura 500–503; Mayeda, Thousand Teachings 13.
128
See P. N. Srinivasachari, The Philosophy of Bhedàbheda (Madras: Adyar Library
and Research Center, 1972), vii, 152–153.
129
See e.g. the writings of P. M. Modi, who frequently attacks •aákara for dis-
torting the basic intent not only of passages from the BrSù, but from other texts
as well.
•Á’    27
b. •aákara and Tradition

As R. De Smet130 and others have pointed out, •aákara is not so
much a philosopher, whose method would depend on experience
and reason alone, as he is a theologian or ≤rutivàdin, i.e. one who
accepts revelation and scripture (Vedas) as the final authority in all
religious matters. It is not therefore surprising that •aákara would
highly esteem the Vedàntic tradition of which he was a part, since
it is the tradition that faithfully attempts to preserve and pass on the
basic truths of revelation. In his reverence for tradition, •aákara
was not unlike any other Indian thinker or writer of his time. Ac-
cording to Ingalls, it was very normal for Indian thinkers to articulate
their insights in commentaries on ancient texts rather than in inde-
pendent treatises, so that the reader could be persuaded of the con-
tinuity between what the commentator was now saying and what
the tradition had said before.131
We must realize that of all •aákara wrote only a part was his origi-
nal contribution, although that part may have been very original indeed.
Anyone who has worked with Vedànta philosophy will have been
impressed by the reverence with which older works are treated. When
they become canonical like the Upanißads they are accepted in toto.
But even when they are of less sanctity they are repeated so far as
they do not disagree violently with the repeater’s views. If they dis-
agree just a bit, he would rather interpret than change. Much of
•aákara’s commentaries must be simply repeated from what teachers
had written down before him.132
Scholars are presently attempting to discern the degree to which
•aákara’s writings are original and independent of tradition. But to
do that, it is necessary to determine which school or schools of
exegetical interpretation •aákara is to be identified with. As noted
above, the traditional biographies assert that •aákara was an Advaitin
from an early age, having learned its principles from his first, and
perhaps only, teacher, Govinda.133 Hacker, on the other hand, believes
130
De Smet, The Theological Method of •a«kara (Diss. Rome: Pontifical Gregorian
University, 1953). This study will be published for the first time in 2001 by the
University of Notre Dame Press, U.S.A.
131
Ingalls, “The Study of •aákaràcàrya,” Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research
Institute 33 (1952):3, 8.
132
Ingalls, “Study” 8. Mayeda, Thousand Teachings 6, points out that “in India it
is not originality but fidelity to tradition which is the great virtue.”
133
See above.
28  
that •aákara was first a Patañjala Yogin, who only later turned to
the teaching of Advaita.134 A number of other authors take still a
different view, holding that •aákara converted to Advaita from a
Bhedàbheda tradition,135 perhaps under the influence of the GK.136
In addition, •aákara exhibits a strong theistic interest, making it
reasonable to assume that one or another devotional sect influenced
his thinking.137 It is not impossible to assume, as R. N. Dandekar
has pointed out, that all of these traditions had an impact on •aákara’s
thought.138 In other words, Patañjala Yoga, Bhedàbheda and theism
nay all have influenced •aákara’s particular interpretation of Advaita.
Whether, as Mayeda and Nakamura assume, •aákara is almost
entirely lacking in original ideas, is certainly debatable.139 In any
case, where •aákara writes as a traditionalist, he shows himself
uniquely skillful in expanding on, synthesizing and buttressing the
arguments and teachings of old.140 In addition, most scholars appear
to agree that •aákara was not opposed to correcting traditional
teachings with insights of his own,141 as in rejecting Bhedàbheda
interpretations of scripture with the more valid Advaita exegesis.142
•aákara, then, followed tradition wherever possible, and corrected
it whenever impelled to do so by his own convictions.
c. The “Protocommentator”
We have noted above that the authenticity of any given work attrib-
uted to •aákara must stand the test of a comparison with the BrSùBh
on questions of doctrine and articulation.143 •aákara is by definition
the author of this most important Advaitic work. One might there-
fore conclude, as did P. Deussen, that •aákara’s BrSùBh “gives a
substantially complete and sufficient picture of his system,”144 releas-
134
See above, note 92.
135
Nakamura 459.
136
Ingalls, “Study” 12–13.
137
On •aákara’s likely Vaiß»avite leanings, see below III.B.3.
138
Dandekar 210.
139
See Mayeda, Thousand Teachings, 6 and 10, note 34, in which he refers to
Nakamura.
140
See Ingalls, “Study” 12.
141
E.g. Ingalls, “Study” 3.
142
It is especially in his exegesis of the B‰Up that •aákara’s rejection of the
Bhedàbheda is most apparent. Cf. Ingalls, “•aákara’s Arguments” 294.
143
See above.
144
Deussen, The System of the Vedànta (Chicago: Open Court, 1912, 37.
•Á’    29
ing the modern interpreter from the necessity of examining •aákara’s

other works, to discern what is essential to the àcarya’s thought.
A significant number of twentieth century scholars would take issue
with Deussen’s remark, among them N. K. Devaraja, who points
out “the relative neglect of •a»kara’s Upanisadic commentaries,”
without which •aákara’s system remains incomplete.145 Concentrating
on the BrSùBh alone to find the real •aákara is regarded by many
as a mistake.
Approximately fifty years ago D. H. H. Ingalls and P. Hacker also
cautioned against attempting to understand •aákara from the BrSùBh
alone, but for other reasons.146 These two scholars, quite independently
of each other, concluded that •aákara must have drawn on an
already existing commentary on the BrSù when writing his own
bhàßya. Indeed, Ingalls goes so far as to assert that
the major part of •aákara’s commentary on the Brahma-sùtra is not
original with •aákara but is repeated from what commentators had
written in the past. What we have in the Brahma-sùtra-bhàßya is the
accumulated philosophy of a millenium. It is true there are original
elements, some of them very important, and, as I hope to show, these
elements can sometimes be recognized as original, but it is tradition
that forms the mainstay.147
Ingalls singles out one anonymous pre-•aákaran commentator in
particular, to whom, he feels, •aákara was most indebted in writ-
ing his commentary on the BrSù. According to Ingalls, some of
•aákara’s later followers, as well as Bhàskara, who has written what
is generally believed to be the oldest commentary on the BrSù after
•aákara,148 occasionally refer to an earlier commentator, known as
145
Devaraja, An Introduction to •a«kara’s Theory of Knowledge, 2nd rev. ed. (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1972), 24. Regarding the Upanißad bhàßyas, the author adds,
24–25: “These commentaries, particularly the ones on the B‰hadàra»yaka, the Chàndogya,
the Taittirìya and the Pra≤na, are rich in metaphysical and epistemological material.
Some of •a«kara’s most remarkable utterances concerning knowledge may be found
in the bhàßyas on the Taittirìya and Pra≤na Upanißads.”
146
For what follows see Hacker, Vivàrta (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1953)
26; Ingalls, “Study” 9–11, and “•aákara’s Arguments” 291–295.
147
Ingalls, “•aákara’s Arguments” 291–292. Ingalls’ and Hacker’s conclusion
that •aákara drew on other sources in writing his BrSùBh does not nullify Hacker’s
thesis that •aákara has a unique understanding of avidyà, nàmarùpa, màyà and ì≤vara,
by which it is possible to determine the authenticity of other alleged •aákaran
works.
148
Bhàskara’s dating is controversial. A summary is provided by Klaus Rüping,
Studien zur Frühgeschichte der Vedànta-Philosophie (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1977)
30  
the v‰ttikàra, and remark that •aákara sometimes departs from the
views of this v‰ttikàra.149 This early writer, whose personal history is
unknown, Ingalls calls the “Protocommentator.”150 A comparison of
the commentaries of •aákara and Bhàskara on the BrSù reveals
that both •aákara and Bhàskara are drawing on the Protocommentator
when writing their own bhàßyas. The Protocommentator’s bhàßya, then,
provided both •aákara and Bhàskara the general framework within
which they argued their own particular views.
Both Ingalls and Hacker note the similarities between •aákara
and Bhàskara in their respective BrSùBhs. They find it remarkable
that thinkers with views so strongly opposed would formulate most
of their BrSùBh in much the same way. Ingalls rules out the possi-
bility that Bhàskara often borrowed from •aákara when writing his
own BrSùBh, “for •aákara was his archenemy.”151 Ingalls concludes
that where •aákara and Bhàskara disagree, •aákara is departing
from the Protocommentator; where they agree, the views of their
common source can be detected.152 Thus, it is possible to determine
in •aákara’s BrSùBh much of what had been handed down to him
by tradition. What remains is either original to •aákara or goes
back “to some other Vedànta tradition.”153
One of the consequences to be drawn from this theory is that if
•aákara’s original contribution to his BrSùBh is to be reduced to
the degree that Ingalls believes it should, then there is good reason
to examine •aákara’s other writings to supplement what he says in
his main work. Indeed, Ingalls believes that •aákara’s B‰UpBh bet-
ter reflects •aákara’s mind than does even the BrSùBh. He calls
•aákara’s B‰UpBh “a far more original piece of writing” than his
BrSùBh. He goes on: “In commenting on the Brahma-sùtra •aákara
is very careful not to depart from tradition. On the other hand, in
commenting on the B‰hadàra»yaka it appears to be his intention to
I:12–20. Nakamura, 67, places Bhàskara at about 750–800 C.E. Chapter 5, sec-
tion G below will dispute the claim that •aákara’s and Bhàskara’s commentaries
on the BrSù are the oldest ones available today.
149
Ingalls “Study” 10; “•aákara’s Arguments” 293.
150
Hacker does not refer to a particular author, but rather to a single source
(“Quelle”). He does not use Ingalls’s “Protocommentator” term.
151
Ingalls, “•aákara’s Arguments” 293.
152
Ingalls, “•aákara’s Argument” 294.
153
•Á’    31
break with tradition.”154 The particular tradition that Ingalls believes

•aákara breaks from in his B‰UpBh is the Bhedàbheda.155
K. Rüping has responded to Ingalls’ and Hacker’s Protocommentary
theory in an important study on Bhàskara.156 He attempts to pro-
vide evidence that Bhàskara did, in fact, draw heavily on •aákara
when composing his BrSùBh, and that •aákara and Bhàskara, how-
ever much they might have been influenced by traditional views
when composing their works, did not draw on a so-called “Protocom-
mentator” or on an ancient bhàßya on the BrSù.
Rüping adopts the thesis of J. A. B. van Buitenen that •aákara
and Bhàskara drew on “orally transmitted school traditions, which
might differ from place to place” rather than on a “fixed text.”157
Rüping adds that if Ingalls’ theory were correct, Bhaskara the bhedàb-
hedavàdin would necessarily quote longer passages from the Protoco-
mmentary, itself a Bhedàbheda work, than does •aákara. The fact
that Bhàskara does not, in fact, do this is an indication that no such
Protocommentary ever existed.158
Furthermore, against Ingalls, Rüping remarks his inability to locate
a single instance in which Bhàskara explicitly refers to a BrSùBh
Protocommentary.159 On one sùtra alone, I.4.26, Bhàskara does refer
to an author he is drawing on, but it is to a commentator on the
ChUp, not a BrSù bhàßyakàra.160 In all the other passages noted by
Ingalls, in which •aákara and Bhàskara allegedly draw on a proto
commentary, Rüping believes to have proven that Bhàskara directly
borrowed from •aákara.161
And finally, as to Ingalls’ contention that later Advaitins refer
explicitly to a Protocommentator, upon whom •aákara depended,
Rüping does not find the evidence compelling. The later commen-
tators on •aákara’s BrSùBh I.1.25 do not make mention of a v‰ttikàra
154
155
Ingalls, “•aákara’s Argument” 294–295.
156
See Rüping 3, 21–68.
157
Van Buitenen, translator of: Yamuna, Àgamapràmà»ya or Treatise on the Validity
of Pàñcaràtra (Madras 1971), 18. Cited by Rüping, Studien, 25.
158
I shall show below in the section on Nimbàrka (5.G.) that Rüping’s last objec-
tion can be easily refuted on the following grounds: •aákara will often strengthen,
refine and expand on an older Bhedàbheda argument to give it its most powerful
expression before finally demolishing it.
159
This is BrSùBh I.4.25 according to •aákara’s numbering.
160
Rüping 39.
161
Rüping 38.
32  
at all, although Ingalls makes this his primary piece of evidence.

Rüping expresses his bewilderment as to what Ingalls is referring to
here.162 Later commentators such as Govindànanda and Ànandagiri,
when commenting on BrSùBh I.2.23, do make mention of a v‰ttik‰nmata
or a v‰ttikàramata, but again, it is not clear what they mean, and they
do not distinctly state whether this anonymous author influenced
•aákara. Vàcaspati, the earliest commentator on •aákara’s BrSùBh,
is even less clear with his paramata (“a different opinion”).163
For the sake of fairness Rüping notes an important passage over-
looked by Ingalls that might have supported his argument: In his
commentary on •aákara’s BrSùBh I.1.31 Vàcaspati mentions v‰ttik‰tàm
twice.164 But this term could be a polite plural form or a regular
plural. Yet even if v‰ttik‰tàm could be shown to be a singular and to
designate a particular author upon whom •aákara based the greater
part of his BrSùBh, then it is baffling, writes Rüping, that Vàcaspati
would refer to this author only in the context of a single sùtra. It is
thus possible that the various later commentators on •aákara refer
to a number of ancient thinkers by the term v‰ttikàra or its synonyms.
In any case, a good three centuries separate •aákara from his ear-
liest commentators, making it very difficult to gauge the degree of
reliability which Vàcaspati and others ought to receive today.165
Rüping speculates that Bhàskara, when writing his BrSùBh, had
no other texts before him than •aákara’s BrSùBh and two ChUp
commentaries.166 He was thus very dependent on his archenemy when
composing a commentary defending Bhedàbheda against •aákara’s
assault. Further, since •aákara enjoyed such high prestige by Bhàskara’s
lifetime, it would not be surprising that Bhàskara would choose to
attack •aákara head-on by writing an anti-commentary to •aákara’s
BrSùBh.167
I do not feel that either the arguments of Ingalls-Hacker or of
Ruping are conclusive. It is impossible to know with certainty whether
•aákara was greatly indebted to a single Protocommentator when
composing his most famous and influential work. If he was, the cen-
trality of the BrSùBh is greatly lessened in regard to determining
162
Rüping 42.
163
Rüping 42–43.
164
Rüping 43.
165
For Rüping’s analysis of this sùtra see 43–48.
166
Rüping 67.
167
Rüping 67.
•Á’    33
what is particular to •aákara on religious issues. •aákara’s other

genuine works grow in importance to the degree that •aákara’s own
creative effort in the BrSùBh is reduced.
Furthermore, if Ingalls is correct that much of the BrSùBh can
be distinguished between what is genuinely •aákaran and what is
merely the articulation of a past tradition, then it may be possible
to come to some insight as to what the pre-•aákaran tradition,
which had commented on the BrSù, had to say about grace, and
to also discern how •aákara responded to that position. In other
words, it would be possible to apply the Protocommentator theory
to passages on grace in •aákara’s and Bhàskara’s BrSùBh, in order
to learn where •aákara might have added to or subtracted from
earlier articulations on divine grace.
Of course, if Ingalls and Hacker are wrong, then either 1) there
is no way to determine to what extent •aákara is influenced by the
oral (and possibly written) traditions before him when he composed
the BrSùBh. In that event, it would be impossible to determine
whether all or none or some of •aákara’s statements on grace are
inherited from the past. 2) Or again, if the Ingalls-Hacker theory is
incorrect, it would be easier to accept the testimony of the greater
part of the •aákara Advaita tradition, and assume that the BrSùBh
is, by and large, in almost all its articulations, the reflection of the
mind of •aákara. ‘This would mean that all the statements on grace
in •aákara’s BrSùBh are there, because •aákara himself felt that
they should be there.
Since, however, it is impossible to know to what degree •aákara
is influenced by the tradition before him when writing his BrSùBh,
in other words, since Ingalls might be correct, it seems to me unavoid-
able that •aákara’s other works be examined to see what they yield
on the issue of grace.
d. The Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya and the Upade≤asàhasrì

The authenticity of the Upad has been convincingly argued by Se-
ngaku Mayeda, who is the world’s leading authority on the work.168
The Upad is the only independent non-commentatorial treatise which
has so far passed Hacker’s method of authenticity. As such, the work
168
See Mayeda, •a«kara’s Upade≤asàhasrì (Toyko: Hokuseido, 1973); Thousand
Teachings (1979).
34  
enjoys the reputation of being an indispensable aid for penetrating

the mind of •aákara, for in contrast to all his other writings, •aákara
was not bound to choose his subject matter by a sacred text he was
writing on, when he composed the Upad. This, of course, is in
marked contrast to the BrSùBh, where •aákara was greatly influenced
by one or more Vedàntic oral traditions, and quite possibly by an
extensive Protocommentary, in writing his bhàßya.169 The Upad, by
contrast, shows little, if any, evidence of •aákara closely following
the views of someone prior to him. The work seems to be the artic-
ulation of an independent-minded •aákara.
What, then, should be the status of the Upad in relation to the
BrSùBh? Should the Upad be regarded as the most important of
the two works when determining the authenticity of other •aákaran
writings? Should the Upad be considered the more reliable work for
disclosing what is truly important in •aákara’s thought? Although
it is true that the Upad had to first pass the test of comparison with
the BrSùBh for it to enjoy any authority at all, what value are we
to give to it after it has been proved authentic? Are we allowed to
evaluate the BrSùBh in the light of the BrSùBh to determine what
is genuinely •aákaran in the former work? May we summarize
•aákara’s position on any given issue by referring to the Upad
alone?
Mayeda has, indeed, attempted to summarize •aákara’s ethical
views in a short essay that draws almost exclusively on the Upad.170
One can hardly avoid drawing the conclusion that for Mayeda the
Upad is a much more reliable work for understanding •aákara than
is the BrSùBh. Why not, then, base a study of •aákara’s position
on grace solely on the Upad?
In his comparison of •aákara’s BrSùBh and Upad Mayeda has
noted that alongside the general doctrinal and linguistic agreement
of these works, there are also significant differences.171 The two works,
for example, are not in harmony in their usage of such technical
terms as avidyàvasthà (the state of ignorance) and avidyàvißaya (the
sphere of ignorance).172 There are other discrepancies as well, but
169
See the previous section.
170
Mayeda, “•a«kara’s View of Ethics,” Philosophy East and West, ed H. D. Lewis
(Bombay: Blackie & Son, 1976) 192–207.
171
Mayeda, •a«kara’s Upade≤asàhasrì, 56–57.
172
Mayeda, •a«kara’s Upade≤asàhasrì, 26.
•Á’    35
for the purpose of this study, it is worthwhile to point out the dis-
crepancy in the frequency of the word ì≤vara (Lord) as used in the
BrSùBh and the Upad. Although the concept is the same in both
cases, the term ì≤vara is largely absent in the Upad.173 This is in strik-
ing contrast to the BrSùBh, where •aákara is almost zealous in his
use of the word.174
In addition, the Upad does not contain a single passage, either in
its metrical portion ( padyabandha) or in the prose section (gadyabandha),
which could be even remotely construed to refer to the grace of the
Lord (ì≤vara).175 By contrast, the BrSùBh contains some very impor-
tant statements on the Lord’s grace that are crucial to the present
study. I shall examine these passages later to try to determine whether
they are •aákara’s own views or rather are inherited from some
other source.176 As for now, the contradiction should be noted: In
his most important work, which is a commentary, •aákara has much
to say about ì≤vara and grace, whereas in his only independent trea-
tise •aákara is fairly silent about the Lord and his grace.
Mayeda suggests that the term ì≤vara is used much less frequently
in the Upad than in the BrSùBh, because the former is a much
shorter work than the latter.177 This explanation may, in fact, partly
account for the relative scarcity of the word ì≤vara in the Upad, but
it hardly seems likely that the Upad’s length alone would explain
•aákara’s total silence on ì≤vara’s grace. There must have been other
reasons to explain this silence, but we may only speculate as to what
they might be.
There are many things about the Upad that we do not know. For
example, it is not known how the Upad relates chronologically to
•aákara’s other works. Does the Upad represent a certain stage of
•aákara’s intellectual development? May we speak of a development
at all? Is it possible that the Upad represents a pre-grace period of
•aákara’s thought, or perhaps a post-grace period? Should we regard
the Upad as a kind of exhaustive catechism of everything •aákara
believed important or may we assume that some important issues
are not addressed by him at all in the Upad? The fact that the
173
Mayeda, •a«kara’s Upade≤asàhasrì, 38, states that ì≤vara is used only eight times
in the Upad.
174
Mayeda, •a«kara’s Upade≤asàhasrì, 38–39, 57, 62–63.
175
See below, Chapter IX.C.
176
See Chapter VIII below.
177
Mayeda, •a«kara’s Upade≤asàhasrì, 62.
36  
Upad is probably a compendium of short writings taking up partic-

ular questions and themes that needed answering may leave one
wondering, too, what other problems •aákara might have addressed,
had the situation presented itself. There remains, finally, the ques-
tion of what both •aákara and his contemporary readers took for
granted, i.e. of what was not subject to debate. What was generally
accepted by them could not be expected to receive am explicit and
systematic articulation and defense. Is it possible that grace was one
such issue?
By way of summary it may be said that the authenticity of the
Upad provides an even stronger argument against the restrictive use
of the BrSùBh in establishing •aákara’s teaching than does the
Ingalls-Hacker theory of a Protocommentary. While it is certain that
the Upad, an independent treatise, is the work of •aákara, it is less
than clear as to whether •aákara did, indeed, compose his BrSùBh,
or at least the major portion of it, without drawing heavily on some
other Vedàntic work.
CHAPTER TWO
EPISTEMOLOGY
A. T M  K
•aákara is not as clear as the later Advaitic tradition as to just how

many sources of means of knowledge ( pramà»a-s) exist.1 In his MuUpBh
he speaks of four pramà»as,2 while in his B‰UpBh he names five.3
Later Advaita admits six valid means of knowledge.4 The five valid
sources of knowledge recognized by •aákara are perception ( pratyakßa),
comparison (upamàna), inference (anumàna), postulation (arthàpatti ) and
testimony or scripture (≤abda).5 To these, later Advaita adds non-per-
ception (anupalabdhi ). These six are identical with the pramà»as accepted
by the Kumàrila school of Mìmàásà, which is also known as one
of the schools of the Pùrva, or Prior, Mìmàásà.6 Vedànta, because
it builds on the Prior Mìmàásà, and in some ways considers itself
to be a continuation of it,7 is also known as the Uttara, or Later,
Mìmàásà. Thus, both Mìmàásàs tend to acknowledge the same
means of knowledge.
Pratyakßa, or perception, is usually taken to mean immediate sense
perception, but •aákara uses the term in a broader sense. Pratyakßa
means not only the contact of the five senses with their object, but
also “the intuition obtained through yogic practices, or, at another
level, the ultimate intuition (sàkßàtkàra) which terminates Brahmajijñàsa,”8
the desire to know brahman, the Absolute. In other words, it is that
1
P. T. Raju, Structural Depths of Indian Thought (Delhi: South Asian Publishers,
1985), 383; H. Nakamura, “Conflict Between Traditionalism and Rationalism: A
Problem With •aákara,” Philosophy East and West 12 (1962):161.
2
MuUpBh I.2.12.
3
B‰UpBh III.3.1.
4
Raju 383.
5
Nakamura 161.
6
Nakamura 161.
7
Raju 383.
8
Richard De. Smet, The Theological Method of •aákara (Diss. ad Lauream) (Rome:
Pontifical Gregorian University, 1953) 295. This study will be published for the first
time in 2001 by the University of Notre Dame Press, U.S.A.
38  
source which gives knowledge without the aid of inference or scrip-

tural testimony.
Upamàna, or comparison, unlike its Western counterpart, is not a
deliberative process.9 Instead of connecting, for example, the simi-
larity of a cow to an ox through a syllogism, the similarity between
the two is immediately and spontaneously recognized by the mind
without the aid of reflective thought. Upamàna, in other words, is
not inferred.10 It is, however, not to be equated with pratyakßa, because
memory may be involved.
Anumàna, syllogistic inference or syllogistic reasoning, is very much
the same as Aristotle’s syllogism, although inference has a generally
more comprehensive application in Western epistemology than in
India.11 Advaitic thought has adopted from the Nyàya philosophy
the understanding that anumàna consists of “the process of reason-
ing which enables us to pass from claims of present perceptions or
non-perceptions to claims of the existence or nonexistence of things
not perceived at the time.”12 It is thus a non-perceptual source of
knowledge.13
Postulation, arthàpatti, is “the presumption of a fact from another
fact.”14 It is the “necessary supposition of an unperceived fact which
alone can explain . . . an apparent conflict.”15 The classic example
used by Indian logicians is that of a man who continues to gain
weight, although he fasts in the daytime. According to arthàpatti, the
obvious and necessary explanation for the increase in the man’s
weight is that the man is eating at night.16 Thus, that which is not
directly perceived must be presumed to exist, in order for a con-
tradiction to be resolved. Arthàpatti is, despite its similarity with infer-
ence, is not to be equated with anumàna, “because there is no invariable
concomitance (vyàpti) between fatness and eating at night, so that we
cannot say that whenever there is fatness there is eating at night, as
9
See Raju 43; De Smet 300. See also S. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, An
Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1960), 319–321.
10
Raju 43.
11
Raju 42.
12
R. Puligandla, Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1975),
175.
13
Chatterjee/Datta 318.
14
De Smet 307.
15
Chatterjee/Datta 325 and 46. I have formulated this quotation by drawing on
articulations from both pages. The emphasis is given by Chatterjee/Datta.
16
See Chatterjee/Datta 46–47, 325–326; De Smet 307.
 39
we can say that wherever there is smoke there is fire.”17 To grasp

this fact, we must recall the restrictive use of the word “inference”
by Indian thinkers, as opposed to the broader Western understand-
ing. Still, there is much about arthàpatti that could make one doubt
its reliability as a pramà»a, or certain source of knowledge. Although
it bequeaths upon the thinker a sense of certitude, arthàpatti may
appear to some as an unproven (though highly likely) articulation of
a hypothesis, which may eventually be proved wrong. As regards the
standard example of the man gaining weight: May there not be other
reasons to explain the increase in weight than that the man eats at
night? Of course, if other possible explanations are acknowledged,
then we are not, strictly speaking, dealing with arthàpatti.
The final pramà»a recognized by •aákara, testimony (≤abda), was
divided by Mìmàásàkas into two kinds: personal ( paurußeya) and
impersonal (apaurußeya).18 Personal testimony, whether verbal or writ-
ten, has its source in a human person. By contrast, impersonal tes-
timony is of non-human origin, and thus alone of the two enjoys an
infallible authority.19 It is the testimony of a specifically non-human
origin which most concerns •aákara, because it is the source of the
revealed Vedas or scripture (≤ruti).20 Although the Mìmàásàkas rec-
ognized the non-human origin of ≤ruti, they refused to attriute ≤ruti’s
origin to a single creator, since they accepted only the reality of a
plurality of gods.21 Instead they advocated the eternality of the Vedas
without a divine source.22
•aákara, by contrast, is quite clear that brahman or the àtman is
the source of ≤ruti.23 “Brahman,” writes •aákara, “is the source, i.e.
the cause, of the great body of scripture . . . which lamplike illumines
all things and is itself omniscient, as it were.” (BrSùBh I.1.1)24 Indeed,
≤ruti is the expression of the consciousness of the Self (àtman).25 •ruti’s
17
18
19
De Smet 175.
20
The most comprehensive article I have found on the function and scope of
scripture in •aákara’s thought is Sara Grant’s “•a«kara’s Conception of •ruti as
a Pramà»a,” Research Seminar on Non-Biblical Scriptures, ed. D. S. Amalorpavadass
(Bangalore: National Biblical, Catechetical and Liturgical Centre, 1974):340–359.
21
See Raju 47; Chatterjee/Datta 322.
22
23
Grant 345–346.
24
Quoted by Grant 345. See also BrSùBh I.1.3.
25
TaiUpBh II.3.1. See De Smet 184; Grant 345.
40  
indispensability for liberation is underscored by •aákara time and

again, since it alone provides the knowledge about transcendental
matters that leads to liberation.26 The other pramà»as are incapable
of mediating the higher knowledge.27
As Mayeda has pointed out, •aákara often takes for granted the
various means of knowledge. Nowhere does he offer a systematic
presentation or defense of his epistemology.28 It is clear that •aákara’s
interests and methods are more theological-soteriological than philo-
sophical.29 One may also conclude that •aákara’s epistemology is
based on arguments that are “strikingly realistic and not idealistic.”30
•aákara, in fact, argued powerfully against the Vijñànavàda, for whom
there was no ontological difference between knowledge and the objects
of knowledge.31 For •aákara, extra-mental objects do exist apart
from the knower, and they are known through the pramà»as.32
B. R  •RUTI
Though reason (tarka) and argumentation ( yukti ) play a major role

on the path •aákara prescribes for the ascent to ultimate truth, it is
clear that •aákara sets strict limitations on the range of their applic-
ability.33 Reason may be called into service to support the claims of
scriptural testimony (≤ruti ), but reason may never contradict the
revealed truths of scripture.34 Left to itself, reason is inconclusive;
26
See II.B below.
27
Grant 344–345, 349.
28
S. Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979) 47.
See also John Taber, “Reason, Revelation and Idealism in •a«kara’s Vedànta,”
Journal of Indian Philosophy 9 (1981):290, who remarks that “a theory of knowledge
(is) conspicuously lacking in •a«kara’s philosophy.”
29
See De Smet, The Theological Method of •aákara.
30
Mayeda 47.
31
Mayeda 47; D. H. H. Ingalls, “•aákara’s Arguments Against the Buddhists,”
Philosophy East and West 3 (1953–54):291–306.
32
Mayeda 47. Mayeda is quick to assert, however, that •aákara remains essentially
an illusionist even when his epistemology appears to presuppose a realistic view of
the world. Others, however, take a different view of •aákara’s ontology. See Chapter
III on Metaphysics as well as section II.C on “Higher and Lower Knowledge.”
33
On the role of reason in •aákara’s thought see, along with Nakamura 153–161
(note 1) and Taber 283–307 (note 28), Wilhelm Halbfass, “Human Reason and
Vedic Revelation in Advaita Vedànta,” Tradition and Reflection (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1991), 131–204.
34
An illumining comparison of •aákara and Aquinas on this point is made by
Taber 288–291.
 41
that is to say, without the guidance of ≤ruti reason is incapable of

reliably discerning religious truths, whether they pertain to the realm
of temporal means and ends, e.g. of the process of karma and rein-
carnation,35 or to the salvific truth of non-duality and the path to
non-dual realization. For •aákara the disputes between the “reasoners,”
the Tàrkikas, is endless, each brilliantly defended position forced
inevitably to make way for an even more excellent—but opposite—
argument.36 In this there is no final ascertainment of truth. Thus the
necessity to subordinate mere human opinion to the revealed ≤ruti.
Though reason may not contradict the revealed truths of ≤ruti, it
is also true that ≤ruti’s authority is limited to mediating knowledge
of supersensuous realities. It may not contradict what is obviously
known through direct perception. As •aákara states in BhGBh
XVIII.66:
The validity of the Vedas holds good only with regard to to matters
concerning the relation between ends and means of Agnihotra etc.,
which are not known through such valid means of knowledge as direct
perception; but not with regard to objects of direct perception etc.
because the validity of the Vedas lies in revealing what is beyond direct
perception. . . Surely, even a hundred Vedic texts cannot become valid
if they assert that fire is cold or non-luminous! Should a Vedic text
say that fire is cold or non-luminous, even then one has to assume
that the intended meaning of the text is different, for otherwise (its)
validity cannot be maintained; but one should not assume its mean-
ing in a way that might contradict some other valid means of knowl-
edge or contradict its own statement.37
Thus, while the authorities of ≤ruti and pratyakßa reign supreme in
their own respective spheres, the position of reason is more ambiva-
lent. Though reason may be used in support of ≤ruti •aákara con-
demns even those who intend to prove the truth of ≤ruti by using
reason independently of ≤ruti’s testimony.38 On the other hand, as
Halbfass points out, it is true that for •aákara ≤ruti itself employs
reason and argumentation in the proclamation of its message.39 The
value of reason is given additional weight in BrSùBh II.1.11 where
35
See Halbfass 152–153.
36
Taber 287. See BrSùBh II.1.11, also II.1.6.
37
BhGBh XVIII.66. Gambhirananda (= G.) tr. 757–758. •aákara takes up this
theme again in B‰UpBh III.9.28.7, once more using the example of fire.
38
See B‰UpBh I.1.1, introduction and Halbfass 138.
39
Halbfass 181–182.
42  
•aákara sees one of its functions as mediating disputes between

conflicting textual interpretations.40
In matters of the highest importance, i.e. spiritual liberation, it is
clear that ≤ruti is the only reliable source of knowledge. Brahman,
which is to be known, is finally an unthinkable and transempirical
reality. Therefore •aákara cites a sm‰ti passage that succinctly warns
against excessive reliance on reason: “Entities that are beyond thought
are not be approach through logic.”41 The failure to heed such a
warning may indicate not only lack of insight but also a spiritual
attitude gravely in need of correction. In the words of Wilhelm
Halbfass: “In claiming its own methods and criteria, human reason
displays an anthropocentric attitude of self-confidence and arrogance
that is incompatible with that receptivity and openness which is a
condition of liberating knowledge.”42
C. H  L K
•aákara upholds a double-level theory of truth, by which the wis-

dom of non-dual experience is regarded as a higher knowledge ( parà
vidyà) and the normal everyday experience of non-unitive non-mys-
tical awareness is regarded as bringing forth lower knowledge (aparà
vidyà). This two-fold distinction of knowledge is derived from MuUp
I.1.4–6 and is employed by •aákara to emphasize the radical
difference between what is normally taken to be true, i.e. what is
only apparently true, and what is the real state of affairs concern-
ing both existence in the world and transempirical being. The higher
wisdom43 corresponds to a higher plane of vision or point of view
( paramàrtha-avasthà) whereas the lower knowledge accords with the
normal or inferior way of seeing (vyavahàra-avasthà).44
What is noteworthy here is that one cannot simultaneously belong
to both spheres of seeing. The higher sublates,45 subrates,46 or can-
40
G. tr. 321. See Taber 292.
41
BrSùBh II.1.6. G.tr. 314. See also Grant 348–349.
42
Halbfass 179.
43
See S. Radhakrishnan, “Higher Wisdom and Lower Knowledge,” Indian Philosophy
(Bombay: Blackie & Son, 1983) II:518–520.
44
See Mayeda 233, note 80.
45
“Sublation” is the most common term used in English to describe the Advaitic
notion of the process whereby one truth is replaced by another.
46
See Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedànta (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980), 15.
 43
cels47 the lower awareness totally. The lower truth is a relative one
only, in which means and ends and subjects and objects are mis-
takenly perceived as ultimately real. This truth is automatically can-
celled out in the experience of the non-dualistic intuitive vision of
brahman.48
There is some disagreement among •aákara’s interpreters as to
the ontological nature of the appearance cancelled by the non-dual-
istic consciousness. Is not only ignorance, but the world itself sub-
lated by the ocean of pure consciousness that is brahman? Or is it
rather more correct to say that a wrong perception of the world as
absolutely real has been replaced by a correct awareness of the world
as a limited, dependent entity which is transparent to, manifestive
of brahman, that is of a contingent reality that is non-dual with its
source? Such questions must finally revert back to one’s particular
interpretation of •aákara’s ontology.49
What is in any case clear is that there is one reality that is non-
sublatable, unable to be “contradicted by a new experience,”50 and
this of course is brahman-àtman. The knowledge of brahman brings a
total and permanent annihilation of ignorance, and reveals itself
thereby as the highest value. In •aákara’s words, such an aware-
ness cannot be objected to as erroneous, “because, firstly, it is seen
to have for its result the cessation of ignorance, and because, sec-
ondly, there is no other kind of knowledge by which it could be
sublated.”51 In the unified non-dual intuition of reality all desires are
fulfilled; there is nothing more to be gained or sought after. “And
the knower of Brahman has already attained all desires; he cannot,
for that very reason have any more desires.”52 Thus the knoweldge
of brahman not only brings liberation from ignorance, desire and
bondage, but it also bequeaths upon the knower a state of serenity
and joy when the arduous journey from nescience to enlightenment
has been definitively terminated and fulfilled.
It is crucial to the distinction between higher and lower knowledge
47
T. R. V. Murti, “The Concept of Appearance,” Studies in Indian Thought, ed.
Harold G. Coward (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 94.
48
Cf. Jacob Kattackal, Religion and Ethics in Advaita (Kottayam, India: C.M.S.
Press, 1985), 74.
49
On •aákara’s ontology see Chapter III.
50
Deutsch 15.
51
BrSùBh II.1.14. Thibaut (= Th.) tr. II:326. See also Puligandla 308, note 51.
52
B‰UpBh II.4.1, introduction. Madhavananda tr. 242.
44  
that the vyavahàra-avasthà be characterized by subject-object duality,

i.e. by a succession of replaceable mental or extra-mental objects
perceived by a separate knower. By contrast, the paramàrtha-avasthà
is characterized by pure consciousness itself as the non-dual ground
of all knowing. Only in the latter case can the Absolute be regarded
as one’s àtman rather than as an other. The supreme reality, pure
consciousness, is known indirectly and incompletely in every act of
knowing, but is normally confused with the objects which it illu-
mines. It is, further, incapable of being known as object, because it
is itself the foundational consciousness through which all things are
necessarily known and illumined. All things are known in its ‘light,’
as it were, but it is not itself normally known or seen as such, except
perhaps dimly in each act of knowing, as the ‘horizon’ or presup-
position of all knowing. There is no point ‘outside’ this conscious-
ness by which it could be known. It is itself the absolute knower.
For it to be known, the distinction between subject and object must
itself be overcome, so that its self-luminosity can be made mani-
fest in the absence of a subject who would make it into an object.
Rather in the non-dual consciousness the unity of all subjectivity is
unveiled in the supreme àtman.
Does this mean that all distinctions are dissolved in such a unity?
It is probable that the majority of •aákara’s interpreters would
answer that this is the case, yet it is also possible that the highest
mode of knowing involves a participation of finite consciousness in
the àtman’s own consciousness without all distinctions becoming oblit-
erated. The jìva, or embodied soul, only discovers the truth of its
being in the revelation that it is permeated and animated by the
supreme self.53
53
On the jìva, see below III.F.
CHAPTER THREE
METAPHYSICS
In the present chapter I offer the two most common—but in them-

selves irreconcilable—interpretations of •aákara’s teaching on non-
duality (advaita) and also present a summary of the àcàrya’s teaching
on the nature and ontological status of the Absolute, both in its so-
called “impersonal” dimension (brahman) and in its more “personal”
side (ì≤vara). In addition, I clarify •aákara’s position on the world
( jagat) the individual embodied soul ( jìva), and his theory of causa-
tion. It will be seen that •aákara’s teaching on a number of these
points can be interpreted in quite various, even contradictory, ways.
A. T T M  N-D (ADVAITA)
David Loy, in an important study on comparative religion, has

remarked, “No concept is more important in Asian philosophical
and religious thought than nonduality . . ., and none is more ambigu-
ous.”1 This statement is certainly applicable to •aákara, and for at
least two reasons. First, •aákara’s advaitavàda has been and contin-
ues to be the dominant metaphysical position taken by Hindu philoso-
phers, a fact which partially confirms Loy’s assertion regarding the
centrality of non-dualistic thought in Asia. Second, the adherents of
•aákara’s Advaita system do not themselves agree as to the precise
meaning of the term.
Advaita is etymologically the negation of all duality (a-dvaita). But
what is the duality that •aákara negates? His followers differ on
this point; their opinions range from the minority realist position to
the majority acosmic illusionist interpretations of the universe. In what
follows I will briefly summarize some representative positions before
drawing a few conclusions regarding •aákara’s authentic teaching.
The recurrent issue about which •aákara’s interpreters disagree
is the perception or non-perception of the world in the higher Advaitic
1
D. Loy, Nonduality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 17.
46  
awareness. Is everything that is not the ultimate reality, not brahman,

dissolved in the Advaitic consciousness, unmasked as illusory, or is
it merely a false perception of a real world which is eliminated? Is
the world “there,” because the human mind, under the spell of
ignorance (avidyà), brings it forth, as it were, as a feat of the imag-
ination, or does it exist extramentally although its nature is falsely
comprehended?
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan is one of the few interpreters of •aákara
who has openly acknowledged the difficulty involved in coming to
grips with •aákara on this point. He writes:
The question is, are the appearances beyond which we have to pen-
etrate to the truly real, actual states of the real, though possessing only
a derivative and secondary sort of being, or are they simply the ideas
with which the finite mind of man conceives the true reality in accor-
dance with its own nature? . . . There are some passages in •aákara
which lead us to think that he intended to regard the world as a mere
human presentation of the genuinely real, and others where he is
inclined to make the world of experience objective and independent
of the finite individual.2
1. Monistic Interpretations of Advaita
Probably the majority of •aákara’s interpreters regard him as a

monist, for whom brahman alone exists. For them the world appears
to exist only to the ignorant, to those who have not attained Self-
realization. Such unrealized souls have not yet transcended the dual-
ity of subject and object, individual and world, devotee and God,
and attained to the realization of the qualityless (nirgu»a) brahman, the
sole Being (sat), which is also pure and changeless consciousness (cit).
For Paul Deussen, •aákara’s teaching entails “the identity of the
soul with Brahman, and denies all plurality, and therefore the valid-
ity of the ideas of the creation and existence of the world . . .”3
M. Hiriyanna likewise describes •aákara in monistic terms:
Brahman is the sole reality, and it appears both as the objective uni-
verse and as the individual subject. The former is an illusory mani-
festation of Brahman, while the latter is Brahman itself appearing under
the limitations which form part of that illusory universe.4
2
S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (Bombay: Blackie & Son, 1983), II: 586–587.
3
P. Deussen, The System of the Vedànta (Delhi: Oriental Reprint, 1979), 459.
4
M. Hiriyanna, Essentials of Indian Philosophy (Bombay: Blackie & Son, 1973), 158.
 47
According to Surendranath Dasgupta,

The Upanißads held that reality or truth was one, and there was “no
many” anywhere, and •a«kara explained it by adding that the “many”
was merely an illusion, and hence did not exist in reality and was
bound to disappear when the truth was known. The world-appearance
is maya (illusion). This is what •a«kara emphasizes in expounding his
constructive system of the Upanißad doctrine.5
Similarly, T. M. P. Mahadevan remarks:
•a«kara puts the entire philosophy of Advaita in half a verse where
he says: Brahman is real: the world is an illusory appearance; the indi-
vidual soul ( jìva) is Brahman alone, not other. The non-duality of Brah-
man, the non-reality of the world, and the non-difference of the soul
from Brahman—these constitute the teaching of Advaita.6
2. Realist Interpretations of Advaita
Such world-negating interpretations of •aákara could easily be mul-

tiplied.7 Yet there are a number of scholars—certainly in the minor-
ity—who hold that •aákara’s advaitavàda need not be understood in
this sense. One of the strongest affirmations of Advaitic “realism” in
•aákara has been propounded by D. M. Datta, who rejects the nor-
mal interpretation of the world given by the monists:
Much misapprehension centres, again, around the notion of contra-
diction or negation. Generally the Bàdha or negation of the world of
ordinary experience, as advocated by •aákara, is understood to mean
dissolution into nothing. We often hear of the world vanishing alto-
gether after Sàkßàt-kàra. Nothing is farther from the intention of •aákara
than such an interpretation. If, what once exists passes into nothing
and something previously non-existent springs into existence, then
•aákara has to embrace asat-kàryavàda, which he openly contradicts.
5
S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988),
I:442.
6
T. M. P. Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism (Bombay: Chetana, 1984), 141.
Emphasis by Mahadevan, who gives no source for this alleged quotation of •aákara.
7
See for example Eliot Deutsch’s important study, Advaita Vedànta: A Philosophical
Reconstruction (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1969). Deutsch, too, quotes the
famous aphorism: “Brahman is real, the world is illusory, the self is not-different
from Brahman” (47), and also neglects to offer a literary source. In point of fact,
this phrase—normally attributed to •aákara is from the Bàlabodhinì, a spurious
work authored by a Pseudo-•aákara. See Richard Brooks, “The meaning of ‘real’
in Advaita Vedànta,” Philosophy East and West 19 (1969):385.
48  
In fact, however, •aákara again and again speaks of the world as

being brahmabhùta or transformed into Brahman after Sàkßàt-kàra. The
Jagat, or the differentiated world of ordinary experience (stands)
transfigured, as the manifestation of Brahman when attention is diverted
from multiplicity to the unity of the whole universe and the ordinary
judgment is revised in the light of the new experience of intuition of
the one. So the negation of the world, as conceived by •aákara, is
more a transformation, re-organisation and revaluation than wholesale
annihilation.8
Thus, according to Datta, in the state of non-dual awareness the
world is not negated but rather perceived to be in brahman. This is
not a mere theoretical knowing, but a mystical seeing. Realists and
monists seem to be agreed on this point at least: In sàkßàt-kàra the
old perception of the world is gone. But they do not always agree
as to whether the “disappearance” of the old world is to be under-
stood in an epistemological sense only (a new perception of the world
replaces the old one) or in an ontological sense (the world’s very
being is illusory and is unmasked as such).
How might one make a decision as to whether •aákara is a real-
ist or an acosmic illusionist? According to Richard De Smet, who
takes a realist approach to •aákara, we must properly understand
the àcàrya’s use of language. Since •aákara’s point of reference in
speaking about finite existents is the infinite brahman, it is clear that
his language, which is implicitly comparative and value-oriented, will
frequently employ negation in describing the universe and everything
in it. Thus in comparison with absolute Being (Sat) it is more proper
to speak of a limited existent as non-Being (a-Sat), not having the
qualities of brahman) rather than non-existent (Asat).9 The original
Sanskrit, of course, knows no distinction between capital and lower
case letters.
Richard Brooks appears to concur with this realist view. He points
out that •aákara uses the word “unreal” (asat; in De Smet’s termi-
nology a-Sat) in three different senses:
8
D. M. Datta, “Some Realistic Aspects of the Philosophy of •aákara,” Recent
Indian Philosophy, ed. Kalidas Bhattacharya (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1963),
I:344–345.
9
See R. De Smet, “Forward Steps in •a«kara Research,” Darshana International
26 (1987):44–45.
 49
He frequently applies the word “unreal” to everything other than

Brahman. On other occasions, he will include the commonly perceived
world within the denotation of the word “real,” reserving the word
“unreal” for dreams, hallucinations, “rope-snakes,” and the like. And
then again, he will sometimes use the word “unreal” synonymously
with “nonexperienceable”, giving as illustrations the examples so com-
mon in all Indian philosophy: “hare’s horn,” “sky-flower,” or “barren
woman’s son.”10
Such an argument underscores the possibility of giving a realistic
interpretation to •aákara’s ontology, because •aákara will use the
word “unreal” of something which might, in fact, be regarded as
relatively real.
But what of •aákara’s so-called teaching of màyà? Does not his
use of the term support an illusionistic interpretation of his thought,
as the post-•aákara Advaita tradition claims? Studies by Paul Hacker
and De Smet have revealed the relative infrequency of the term
màyà when compared with more central terms like avidyà and ajñàna.11
It is therefore incorrect to label •aákara’s teaching màyàvàda, since
màyà does not play such a prominent role as with later Advaitins.
Also, •aákara’s application of the word màyà, even when used in
the sense of magic or deceit, and therefore of something illusory,
speaks of a false perception due to ignorance in the beholder rather
than the denial of a really existing ordinary world of common expe-
rience. As De Smet remarks, “When the viewer overcomes his igno-
rance, his illusion vanishes in the sense that his interpretation of the
facts is replaced by the authentic one, not in the sense that he would
now deny the genuine existence of those facts. What is contradicted
by true knowledge is not the particular kind of real existence proper
to the world, but only the independence and absoluteness attributed
to it by the ignorant.”12
Jacob Kattackal, another contemporary scholar of Advaita, gives
a similar interpretation of the illusion that must be overcome by true
knowledge: “Due to man’s innate inability to perceive the unity
through diversity, man looks upon the diversities of nàma-rùpa, the
effect ( jagat) as absolutely separate and different (anya, bhinna) from
10
Brooks 392.
11
Hacker, Eigen. 94–95; De Smet, “Màyà or Ajñàna?,” Indian Philosophical Annual
2 (1966):220.
12
De Smet, “Màyà or Ajñàna?” 221.
50  
Brahman.”13 Again, in the realist view it is not the world that disappears
but false perception.
•aákara himself seems to advocate such a view of enlightenment
when he declares that if the world were annihilated through the
knowledge of brahman, it would already have been destroyed by the
first person to have attained liberation.14 The implication is that
the world’s obvious continued existence indicates the falsity of an
illusionistic rendering of Advaita.15
What conclusions can be drawn from this discussion? First, one
can find passages in •aákara’s writings that may be used in sup-
port of either a realist or illusionistic interpretation of his ontology.
The most convincing assessment will be one that is capable of accom-
modating both types of assertions. Second, it is important that one
attempt a reading of •aákara independently of the later tradition
before deciding what kind of ontology •aákara’s teaching represents.
Third, despite the arguments and counter-arguments presented by
disputants, it must be said that little, if any, progress has been made
toward a general consensus today.
B. T A
1. The Traditional Post-•aákara Advaita Interpretation
•aákara’s most important term for the Absolute is brahman, a word

that emerges already in the °g Veda as “an established term doubt-
less with a long history.”16 In its highest sense as used by the Upanißads
brahman is regarded as the great mystery of life, altogether tran-
scending human understanding (MuUp II.2.1; KenaUp II.3).17 Jan
Gonda, referring to the use of the word brahman by quite different
Hindu theologians of the past, remarks, “Indian thinkers recognize
that the supreme source of creation and the essence of reality can
never be completely defined or comprehended by the human mind.”18
13
Jacob Kattackal, Religion and Ethics in Advaita (Kottayam, India: C. M. S. Press,
1985), 68.
14
BrSùBh III.2.21. See also Anantanand Rambachan, “The Value of the World
as the Mystery of God in Advaita Vedanta,” Journal of Dharma 14 (1989):296.
15
For a further discussion of màyà, see below, 8.C.2 (on BrSùBh I.1.20).
16
Jan Gonda, Notes on Brahman (Utrecht: J. L. Beyers, 1950), 3.
17
Gonda 16.
18
Gonda 13.
 51
•aákara’s theology and soteriology center on the necessity of know-

ing brahman as one’s very àtman or Self. But before one can exis-
tentially know brahman one must first learn what its nature is as
revealed by scripture (≤ruti). The approach to a proper theoretical
understanding of the Absolute involves a discussion of brahman’s pos-
sible attributes, or gu»as, and the resulting distinction between the
so-called brahman without attributes (nirgu»a) and the brahman with
attributes (sagu»a). Such a distinction is normally viewed as sufficient
for grasping the nature of the Absolute in •aákara’s thought. It is
usually concluded that only brahman in the highest sense, i.e. brah-
man devoid of all attributes, is truly the Absolute. However, Paul
Hacker has shown the necessity of including the term ì≤vara (“the
Lord”) in such a discussion, in order to determine the nature of the
supreme reality for •aákara.19
Hacker’s research, as shall be seen, calls into question the post-
•aákara Advaitic tradition’s clear separation and ontological subor-
dination of ì≤vara to the nirgu»a brahman. Such a conception of ì≤vara,
according to R. Panikkar, in which the Lord is relegated to a lower
level of being, is the position taken not by •aákara himself, but by
“his followers,” who
were so keen to preserve the absolute purity and transcendence of
Brahman and its total uncontamination by the World, that they placed
Ì≤vara in the realm of màyà, since it is he who is concerned with the
creation of the World and hence gets involved in the cosmic play . . .
The Ì≤vara of the •a«kara school is in fact almost completely turned
towards the phenomenal order. He can still be called God, but is no
longer identifiable with the Absolute, with Brahman. The divergence
between Brahman and Ì≤vara is overstressed in order to save the
absolute purity of the former.20
It is not uncommon to hear Advaitins declare that the “personal
Lord” or “personal God” or “creator God” is in •aákara’s thought
an illusory reality created by ignorance (avidyà) or màyà. The supreme
impersonal brahman without qualities appears through the influence
of màyà as the lower personal ì≤vara, the sagu»a brahman.21 In fact,
19
Eigen. 99–109.
20
R. Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism, rev. and enl. ed. (Maryknoll: Orbis,
1981), 151, 158–159.
21
See for example Hiriyanna 163; Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian
Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 252.
52  
according to this teaching, three correlaries appear simultaneously

with the dualistic avidyà-consciousness: the world, the personal Lord
of the world, and the embodied soul living in the world. But in real-
ity, only the nirgu»a brahman exists. For monistic Advaita, true insight
into reality does not admit relation of any kind. In enlightenment
the personal God is annihilated as are the world and the souls over
which God would rule.
2. A Revised Theory of the brahman-ì≤vara Relation
As just noted, Paul Hacker has made a major contribution to a

revised understanding of •aákara’s notion of the Absolute.22 In the
following discussion I shall be drawing primarily on Hacker’s pio-
neering essay, but other thinkers will also have their say in delin-
eating a more accurate summary of •aákara’s position.
a. The nirgu»a brahman

To say that brahman is without attributes or gu»as is to affirm its per-
fection, fullness, simplicity, and self-sufficiency.
A gu»a is a quality or endowment which a substance has and which
is really distinct from that substance. Any subject which has such
endowments is called sagu»a; its internal unity is not perfect but com-
posed of two elements, the substance and its gu»as. On the contrary,
a subject devoid of such endowments is nirgu»a, and its internal unity
is simplicity itself. With regard to any perfection we may feel bound
to attribute to a nirgu»a subject, we must say that it is that perfection
and not that it has it.23
For example, the Upanißadic texts that refer to the Absolute as nirgu»a
either deny attribution “or state that Brahman is reality, knowledge,
bliss, etc.” The sagu»a texts, by contrast, are anthropomorphic and
less correct conceptually.24
This is certainly true for •aákara, who sees that the Absolute
devoid of attributes, activities and relations more adequately desig-
nates brahman’s essence than a definition that links it to the world.
22
See note 19.
23
R. De Smet, “Ancient Religious Speculation,” in R. Antoine et al., Religious
Hinduism (Allahabad: St. Paul Publications, 1964), 45.
24
De Smet, “Ancient Religious Speculation” 46.
 53
Thus the Lord’s creatorship, rulership, and omnipresence do not so

much tell us who or what brahman is by essence as make clear what
brahman is in relation to the world. As Jan Gonda states,
•a«kara . . . defends the doctrine of a Brahman devoid of all qualities;
when the ancient texts describe it as the reality, the pure conscious-
ness, and the infinite, they do not speak of qualities belonging to
Brahman, but of concepts that are identical in meaning, referring to
the same undifferentiated identical principle, which is absolutely with-
out qualities.25
The highest brahman, however, though without gu»as, is not regarded
by •aákara as an empty void. He recognizes a positive content to
the term. This recognition is derived from the testimony of the
revealed ≤ruti. In particular, •aákara highlights the teaching of TaiUp
II.1: “Brahman is truth, knowledge, and infinite.”26 But even these
words are not to be taken in their primary sense, but are to be
applied to the supreme reality stripped of any finite connotation:
The description of Brahman even as infinite, real, consciousness, though
more accurate than accidental descriptions, cannot directly convey the
idea of Brahman. It only serves to direct the mind towards Brahman
by denying of it finiteness, unreality and unconsciousness.27
Thus, the highest reality is, but its essence is neither this nor that
(neti neti ). Nothing can qualify the absolute unicity and fullness of
that perfect Being, of that eternal changeless Godhead.28
b. The sagu»a brahman

The sagu»a brahman, the brahman endowed with attributes, is a difficult
concept in •aákara’s thought, because it has more than one mean-
ing. However, in all instances, the sagu»a brahman does signify an
important difference from the nirgu»a brahman: It lacks the complete
transcendence and independence of the latter, since it does not
25
Gonda 12.
26
Satyaá jñànamanantaá brahma. Eight Upanißads: With the Commentary of •a«karàcàrya
(= EU) (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1982), I:286–287.
27
S. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Calcutta:
University of Calcutta, 1960), 391. See also •aákara’s bhàßya on TaiUp II.1, EU
I:287–305.
28
P. Fallon, “God in Hinduism: Brahman, Paramàtman and Bhagavàn,” Religious
Hinduism (see note 23), 76.
54  
designate brahman in its aspect of ontological fullness, self-sufficiency

and independence, but rather in association with something else.
The term apara or lower brahman is frequently used interchange-
ably with the sagu»a brahman and has different senses for •aákara.29
It is the Absolute that is either conceived (1) as possessing innu-
merable auspicious qualities (sa-gu»a) not yet purified of their limit-
ing content by negation and analogy; (2) as having relations with
the phenomenal world that might be mistaken as defining its nature
or essence, for example, Lord, cause, illuminer; or (3) as receiving
deliberate attribution of mundane qualities and forms by aspirants
to liberation for the purpose of pious meditation (upàsanà), for exam-
ple, “With a beard bright as gold.”30 While the third way of con-
ceiving brahman is the one most easily recognized by philosophical
theologians as exhibiting inadequate language about the divine, it
nonetheless serves a useful purpose in leading the mind “upward”
to a greater appreciation of the divine nature, however preliminary
and rudimentary this understanding may be.
Although the relations of the divine to the world as Lord and
cause may appear to ontologically add something to the divine essence,
they in fact do not. The relations are true, but are also, more pre-
cisely, logical rather than ontological, because they are not intrinsic
to brahman.31 Thus, this brahman as “the Lord, the Illuminer, the
Witness, the Goal, etc.”32 is the highest brahman as seen in reference
to the world, as not yet indicated in its essence. Brahman defined in
itself as “reality, knowledge, infinite” (TaiUp II.1) is its svarùpalakßa»a,
or essential definition, whereas brahman defined in reference to some-
thing else results in an accidental definition, or ta†asthalakßa»a. In as
much as the ta†asthalakßa»a is taken as brahman’s essential definition it
is misleading.33 For we have seen that the essential definition of brah-
man is nirgu»a, as being without relation or attributes. In short, the
29
For much of what follows see Bradley Malkovsky, “The Personhood of •aákara’s
Para Brahman,” The Journal of Religion 77 (1997):541–562, here 545.
30
ChUp I.6.6. See •aákara’s commentary on this and BrSùBh I.1.20. As Paul
Hacker has noted, only as sagu»a, i.e. with concrete characteristics, can the nirgu»a
brahman be meditated on and made present to the imagination. See Eigen. 106–107.
31
De Smet, “Forward Steps” 39.
32
De Smet, “Forward Steps” 39.
33
M. Hiriyanna, “Definition of Brahman,” Journal of the Ganganatha Jha Research
Institute 2 (1945):287–292. Karl Potter, Advaita Vedànta up to •aákara and His Pupils
(Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), 75, states that this two-fold definition derives ter-
minologically from Padmapàda.
 55
sagu»a brahman sometimes indicates the nirgu»a brahman in its true

relation to the world, but if the former is misconstrued as defining
the essence of the highest reality, then it must be regarded as false.
For Advaitic thought, at least, the essential definition of the Absolute
is to be found in the context of its ontological independence from
the world.
c. ì≤vara
As remarked earlier, most Advaitins interpret •aákara as teaching
that ì≤vara, the “personal Lord,” is an imaginary reality superimposed
upon the highest brahman. As an imaginary reality it, or he (sa˙), is
usually equated with the sagu»a brahman.34 Through ignorance (avidyà)
or illusion (màyà) the supreme impersonal brahman is said to appear
as the personal Lord (ì≤vara). This ì≤vara, when made identical to the
apara or sagu»a brahman, is a mere conceptual abstraction, “only a
thought-product,”35 and is therefore ontologically unreal. By contrast,
the nirgu»a brahman, the brahman which cannot be properly expressed,
is the sole reality, all else being illusory. By interpreting •aákara as
equating ì≤vara with the sagu»a brahman, traditional Advaitins assert
that ì≤vara’s status is finally illusory. “The idea of God is valid only
so long as the world lasts. Sub specie aeternitatis God has no reality;
but sub specie temporis he is as real as the world.”36
Important here for the discussion of ì≤vara are the concrete results
of Paul Hacker’s painstaking investigation of the way •aákara uses
the term ì≤vara in his BrSùBh.37 Hacker has shown that •aákara
does not abide by a clear distinction between a higher nirgu»a brah-
man and a lower personal ì≤vara, a Lord one might expect to be in
all cases synonymous with the sagu»a brahman. In the majority of
cases, in fact, ì≤vara is used synonymously and interchangeably with
the term nirgu»a brahman and its synonym paraá brahman.38 Nor will
•aákara shy away from attributing activities to the nirgu»a brahman
that one would expect to have ascribed only to a personal Lord, for
example when he names the para brahman as the cause of the world
34
See for example P. T. Raju, Structural Depths of Indian Thought (Delhi: South
Asian Publishers, 1985), 395.
35
Raju 395.
36
Raju 395.
37
Eigen. 99–109.
38
Eigen. 107–109.
56  
(BrSùBh II.1.1). Sometimes, it is true, ì≤vara is made synonymous

with the sagu»a brahman, especially when used in meditation practice,
but such instances are in the minority by comparison with the ì≤vara-
nirgu»a brahman equation.39 It is therefore important each time to note
the precise context in which •aákara uses the term ì≤vara. One might
draw from this fact the conclusion that •aákara generally regarded
the absolutely simple transcendent Godhead as personal. Hacker does
not go so far as to assert this. But Hacker did not see •aákara can-
celing out the reality of ì≤vara or simply relegating ì≤vara to a lower
(vyavahàra) plane of existence. He sums up •aákara’s position on the
ì≤vara-brahman relation as follows: “Ì≤vara is for •aákara a concept
that hovers curiously between Paraá and Aparaá Brahma. Most of
the time it is the former, rarely the latter, and in some cases one
does not hazard a judgement: Here fervent theism has combined
with reflective monism to enter an illogical but all the more vibrant
union. How far •aákara goes in this identification is made espe-
cially clear by the fact that even with the Parame≤vara (IV,4,19 K
978,8) he distinguishes two forms (rùpa), the one sagu»a, the other
nirgu»a—exactly as with Brahman (I,1,11 K 213,7 and IV,3,14 K
964, 12–13).”40
In addition to Hacker’s findings, as will be shown below,41 it is
worth noting that in BrSùBh I.2.13 and III.2.6 •aákara makes the
referent of the mahàvàkya “That thou art” (tat tvam asi ) not brahman-
àtman as might be expected, but rather ì≤vara or parame≤vara (supreme
Lord). In some of his other writings, too, •aákara equates brahman-
àtman with ì≤vara-parame≤vara, for example in B‰UpBh III.7.3, IV.4.15;
ChUpBh I.1.1, V.8.1; KeUpBh III.1–2; KaUpBh II.2.13; and BhGBh
XI.36.
39
Eigen. 106–107.
40
Eigen. 109. My translation. The original reads: “Ì≤vara ist bei S. ein Begriff,
der merkwürdig in der Schwebe steht zwischen Paraá und Aparaá Brahma. Meist
ist er das erstere, selten das letztere, und in manchen Fällen wagt man keine
Entscheidung: da ist der gefühlsmässige Theismus mit dem gedanklichen Monismus
eine unlogische, dafür aber um so lebendigere Vereinigung eingegangen. Wie weit
bei •. die Identifizierung mit dem Paraá Brahma geht, erhellt besonders deutlich
heraus, dass er auch beim Parame≤vara (IV,4,19. K 978,8) zwei Gestalten (rùpa)
unterscheidet, die eine sagu»a, die andere nirgu»a—ganz wie beim Brahman (I,1,11
K 213, 7 und IV,3,14 K 964, 12–13).” “K” is Kàshì Sanskrit Series no. 71 (Benares,
1931), the edition of •aákara’s BrSùBh used by Hacker. The first number after
“K” is the page number, the second refers to the line.
41
Cf. especially III.B.3 and VI.D.3.
 57
That •aákara accords to ìsvara a greater importance than does

the tradition after him is supported by the fact that •aákara uses
the term much more frequently than does later Advaita, beginning
even with •aákara’s own immediate disciples.42 But •aákara offers
no definitions that would sufficiently clarify the relation of ì≤vara to
brahman.43 From a certain perspective this should come as no sur-
prise, for in contrast to later Advaita •aákara’s work is characterized,
according to Hacker, by a “terminological inexactness” (termino-
logische Ungenauigkeit) and “an aversion to definitions and an aloof
unconcern for conceptual systematic thought” (eine Abneigung gegen
Definitionen und eine souveräne Sorglosigkeit gegenüber begrifflicher
Systematik), so much so that any writings attributed to •aákara
which bear the mark of rigorous conceptual defining ought to be
regarded with suspicion.44 Hacker goes on to suggest that •aákara
might have inherited his loose and untroubled language for the
Absolute from his Vedàntic predecessors.45
One may not agree with Hacker’s designation of •aákara’s meta-
physics as monistic, but the implications of his research for •aákara’s
conception of the Absolute is clear: On the basis of •aákara’s own
linguistic usage the relegation of ì≤vara to an inferior ontological plane
is no longer justifiable. Ì≤vara-parame≤vara is the Absolute, just as the
nirgu»a brahman is the Absolute. This, of course, will give rise to still
further implications when we later examine •aákara’s passages on
divine grace and enquire as to their meaning.
3. •aákara’s Vaiß»avism
It is again to Paul Hacker we must turn to find the most reliable

evidence as to •aákara’s possible preferred sectarian allegiance. In
focusing on the testimony of the BrSùBh we leave aside the many
hymns of praise (stotras) to Viß»u and •iva attributed to •aákara,
because their authorship is at best unsettled.46
In a seminal essay from 1965, “Relations of Early Advaitins to
Vaiß»avism,”47 Hacker noted that although •aákara does not directly
42
Eigen. 108.
43
Eigen. 108.
44
Eigen. 108. My translation.
45
Eigen. 108.
46
See above, I.C.1.
47
This essay originally appeared in Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens
58  
profess faith in any particular deity,48 it is innacurate to ascribe to

him the view of espousing the equality of all Hindu religions, an
interpretation which he labels a contemporary “myth.”49 There are,
in fact, a good many indications in •aákara’s BrSùBh and in his
commentaries on the Upanißads which reveal that the theism that
forms such a strong component of his religious thought must be
regarded “as a constituent of his personal life, had a concrete shape,
conditioned by the family in which he was born or by his environ-
ment or by devotional practice, though it was not directly reflected
in his writings.”50 In particular, the clues •aákara gives in his major
writings indicate “a familiarity with the Vaiß»ava religion, caused
either by origin, environment, or other circumstances.”51
By contrast, far from being a devotee of the Lord •iva or being
indifferent to •aivite thinking, •aákara treats the •aivite theology
of his time with contempt. “As to the contemporary theology of
•aivism, it is well known that it is rejected without qualification in
the polemical part of •a«kara’s SBh (2, 2, 3741).”52
This is never the case with Vaiß»avite theology. •aákara’s criticism
of Vaiß»avite Pàñcaràtra theology in BrSùBh II.2.42 does not take
aim at the system as a whole, but only at the particular Pàñcaràtrin
interpretation of vyùha (extension, emanation).53 As Hacker points out,
It is true that •a«kara rejects the theology of the Vaiß»ava system of
Pàñcaràtra, but it is worthy of note that his criticism is not so unqualified
here as in the case of •aiva theology. He controverts only the vyùha
theory of the Pàñcaràtrins but expressly approves of a considerable
part of their system. He admits that in some respects, e.g. in the doc-
trine of God being the material as well as the efficient cause of the
world, this system agrees with his Vedànta . . . I think it cannot be
overlooked that a marked sympathy for the Vaiß»ava religion speaks
from these words. This sympathy even goes beyond what might be
9 (1965):147–154 and is reprinted in Paul Hacker: Kleine Schriften (= KS), ed. Lambert
Schmithausen (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1978), 205–212. I follow here the
numbering of the KS edition. Hacker remarks that the main points of this article
go back to 1949; this was one year before the appearance of Eigen.
48
“Relations” 206. •aákara prefers rather to use the general term ì≤vara or
parame≤vara.
49
“Relations” 210.
50
51
52
“Relations” 206–207. “SBh” is Hacker’s abbreviation for BrSùBh.
53
“Relations” 209. See Walter G. Neevel, Yàmuna’s Vedànta and Pàñcaràtra: Integrating
the Classical and the Popular (Missola, Montana: Scholars Press, 1977), 19–20, 173–182.
 59
expected from the point of view of strict advaitism. For not only does
•a«kara stress that the doctrine of God or the Brahman being the
material as well as the efficient cause is common to both his system
and that of Vaiß»avism, but he even identifies the Highest Self as
taught by the Advaita system with a figure of mythology, namely with
Nàràya»a, the Bhagavàn, who is the highest deity of Vaiß»avism, and
he expressly approves of Vaiß»ava practices of worship, and devo-
tion . . . But no trace of a similar sympathy for •aiva doctrines or prac-
tices is discernible in the SBh.54
In addition to •aákara’s testimony in BrSùBh 11.2.42, Hacker has
brought to our attention •aákara’s occasional use of the Vaiß»avite
symbol of the ≤àlagràma stone (BrSùBh I.2.7, I.2.14, I.3.14) and
•aákara’s reference to “the superimposition of the spiritual vision
of Viß»u on idols (pratimà)” (BrSùBh III.3.9, IV.1.3, IV.1.5).55 A
predilection for Vaiß»avism is also evidenced in •aákara’s bhàßyas
on TaiUp 1.6.1, 1.8.1; MuUp 11.1.4; PrUp V.2; B‰Up 1.1.1, V.1.1;
ChUp VI.16.3, VII.l.4, VIII.1.1, GKBh IV.1.56
Although Vaiß»avism might have exerted considerable influence
on •aákara’s devotional life, there is no indication for Hacker that
this religion was formative of the àcàrya’s philosophy. •aákara, he
writes in an earlier essay, “stemmed from a Vaiß»ava environment
and treated Vaiß»ava views with more toleration than those of the
•aivas. But his philosophy includes no specifically Vaiß»ava views . . .”57
However, other authoritative contemporary scholars offer the opin-
ion that Vaiß»avism had a greater impact on •aákara’s philosophy
(or theology) than Hacker concedes. One of these, Hajime Nakamura,
suggests that •aákara, who quotes the Viß»u Purà»a in his ChUpBh
and BhGBh, might have utilized certain distinctions from this work:
The Viß»upurà»a (V.1) refers to the twofold brahman and the twofold
knowledge corresponding to it (dve vidye), i.e. higher and lower knowl-
edge, and also mentions a branch of learning which enquires into the
distinction between the individual self and the great self. It is probable
54
“Relations” 209–210. For more on the influence of Vaiß»avism on •aákara
see Jacqueline Hirst, “The Place of Bhakti in •a«kara’s Vedànta,” Love Divine, ed.
Karel Werner (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1993).
55
56
57
“•a«karàcàrya and •a«karabhagavatpàda. Preliminary remarks concerning the
authorship problem,” KS 58. This essay originally appeared in New Indian Antiguary
9 (1947):175–186. Since Hacker in “Relations” does not appear to have revised the
view just quoted from the earlier essay, I regard it as still valid in his later work.
60  
that the Viß»upurà»a exercised some influence upon formation of

•a«kara’s thought since he quotes it in his works.58
W. G. Neevel has, in addition, located a passage in •aákara’s BhGBh
in which •aákara appears to deliberately use the “characteristically
Pàñcaràtrika enumeration” of the six gu»as which describe the Lord
Viß»u, also called Nàràya»a, who becomes the avatar K‰ß»a.59 The
terms jñàna (knowledge), ai≤varya (lordliness), ≤akti (power), bala (strength),
vìrya (immutability) and tejas (splendor) that •aákara lists in his intro-
duction to his BhGBh as descriptive of Viß»u are also to be found
in Viß»u Purà»a VI.5.79, but in a different sequence.60 Neevel con-
cludes that •aákara had a quite favorable view of Pàñcaràtra,
although he was certainly himself not a Pàñcaràtrin. In any case,
•aákara’s deliberate use of a certain order of divine attributes does
reveal his deep acquaintance with Vaiß»avism.
Sengaku Mayeda, who is indebted to Hacker in his use of method,
states succinctly of •aákara, “It can be ascertained from his works
that he had some faith in, or was favorable to, Vaiß»avism.”61 The
distinction is significant. Did •aákara merely acknowledge the truth
and utility of Vaiß»avite doctrine and practice for others or did he
himself place faith in the mercy of Viß»u? He gives no explicit and
direct answer to this question anywhere in his authentic works.
C. C
The illusionistic interpreters of •aákara’s Advaita will understand-

ably treat •aákara’s teaching of causation as a relative truth. Here,
only on the vyavahàrika plane of limited perception, in which the true
nature of brahman is not perceived, is it meaningful to discuss what
the causation of brahman must entail if brahman’s unity and tran-
scendence are to be maintained.
In articulating •aákara’s doctrine of causation, his followers fre-
58
H. Nakamura, A History of Early Vedànta Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1983), 340–341. See also 344 note 33 where Nakamura cites Viß»upurà»a 11.8.96
but does not give the exact references to •aákara’s ChUpBh and BhGBh. Incidentally,
S. L. Pandey, who makes no mention of the Viß»upurà»a, does note that •aákara
drew on the Màrka»∂eya Purà»a in his BrSùBh, but does not give citations. See Pre-
•aákara Advaita Philosophy (Allahabad: Darshan Peeth, 1983), 86.
59
Neevel 20. Emphasis given by Neevel.
60
Neevel 20 and 222 note 19.
61
S. Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979), 4.
 61
quently resort to a terminological shift in order to safeguard brah-

man’s non-involvement with the world. Instead of the causation of
brahman, there is talk of ì≤vara’s causative agency; this shift serves to
underscore the fact that the highest brahman in actuality brings noth-
ing into being but also emphasizes that the illusory ì≤vara is the onto-
logical correlate of an equally illusory world. However, as we shall
see later in the examination of •aákara’s BrSùBh, •aákara makes
no clear distinction between brahman and ì≤vara even when dealing
with causation.62
In what follows I shall assume that the bringing forth of a lim-
ited and dependent reality ( jagat) in no way compromises the truth
of •aákara’s advaitavàda. The world neither adds nor subtracts from
the Being of brahman. Further, the brahman whose causation is to be
discussed is the highest reality, but it is the highest reality not regarded
in itself, but in its relation to the world. It may thus be taken as
either brahman or ì≤vara. Needless to say, the meaningfulness of cau-
sation-talk need not be reduced to erroneous awareness.
If brahman is to be truly transcendent, the sole absolute reality,
besides which nothing else can exist except as an effect of brahman,
it is clear that brahman must be the one total cause of all that exists
in every respect. This means that brahman is neither a mere efficient,
directing or fashioning cause (nimitta-kàra»a) nor a mere reality-giv-
ing cause (upàdàna-kàra»a), but rather both at once. Brahman is “the
absolutely complete power” ( paripùr»a≤aktikaá) (BrSùBh II.1.24).63 This
is why, as we have seen in the previous section, •aákara finds much
that is correct in Pàñcaràtra teaching, for the followers of this sect,
too, teach the unity of the nimitta and upàdàna kàra»as.
Brahman’s function as the upàdàna kàra»a has given rise to much
misunderstanding. The term is normally translated as “material cause;”
since brahman is in every way the source of the world, it would seem
only logical that in as far as the world is real it must be a trans-
formation of brahman itself. The notion that the effect is the modification
or transformation of the cause is labelled the pari»àma-vàda. The
pari»àma-vàda explains well the observable transformations that occur
in the ordinary world of experience (gold into jewelry, clay into pots),
62
See below on II.2.38 and 41.
63
Brahmasùtra with •a«karabhàßya (= MB) (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, no date),
210, line 20. Translation by Georges Thibaut (= Th. Tr.), Vedànta-Sùtras with the
Commentary by •a«karàcàrya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988), I:347.
62  
but the question must be raised whether such a view of causation

can apply to the partless and purely spiritual brahman. For •aákara
the answer is obviously no. Nor does brahman affect change on self-
existent matter; such a view would imply the very dualism •aákara
wishes so tenaciously to refute.
The post-•aákara Advaita tradition has frequently drawn the con-
clusion that since a pari»àma or transformation of brahman is ulti-
mately to be refuted, causation itself must be illusory (vivarta). Thus
while it is true that a real world could only have its source in brah-
man and not in itself (otherwise the error of dualism would arise),
any change in brahman deemed necessary to account for the world’s
existence must likewise be ruled out on the grounds that it would
compromise the simplicity, partlessness and perfect fullness of the
Absolute. Therefore, from the lower or vyavahàrika viewpoint it is
correct to locate the world’s source in the eternal self-existent brah-
man, but from the higher or paramàrthika standpoint all causation and
contingent realities are contradicted and cancelled out.
However, as Richard De Smet has suggested, the upàdàna kàra»a,
the so-called “material cause,” of the world need not itself undergo
transformation to bring forth contingent, dependent realities. It is of
course clear that if brahman is the world’s upàdàna kàra»a, brahman
cannot be regarded as itself material, for “how can the pure Cit be
a material cause?”64 De Smet chooses instead to render upàdàna kàra»a
as “reality-providing cause,”65 so as to avoid the false conclusion that
to bequeath a limited reality its very existence and materiality is to
imply a self-modification on the part of the cause. While this may
be true of observable causation within our world, it is equally true
that “no analogy from experience can equate divine creation.”66 As
a “reality-providing cause” brahman bestows “a fullness of the reality
to be communicated to the effect,”67 without itself becoming altered
to any degree. Thus both De Smet and the post-•aákara Advaitic
tradition agree that •aákara upholds the doctrine of satkàryavàda, i.e.
64
R. De Smet, “Love Versus Identity,” Indian Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1980):525.
65
See, for example, “Origin: Creation and Emanation,” Indian Theological Studies
15 (1978):271.
66
De Smet, “Love Versus Identity” 521.
67
De Smet, “The Philosophers’ Transition from Atheism to Theism in India
from the Fourth to the Eleventh Century A. D.,” Challenges of Societies in Transition,
ed. M. Barnabas et al. (Delhi: Macmillan, 1978), 326.
 63
that effects pre-exist in their cause,68 i.e. that “forms do not and can-
not have any reality of their own.”69 They disagree, however, as to
whether the emergence of a real, though limited, world is reconcil-
able with •aákara’s view of brahman.70
D. C
The Vedàntic philosophical traditions not only do not explicitly

acknowledge a creation out of nothing, but tend to regard such a
notion as erroneous doctrine, because logically the world must be
taken to be either an illusion, a transformation of the Absolute, or
self-existent.71 Of all the Vedàntins it is perhaps •aákara who comes
closest to the Semitic teaching of creation, if the views of •aákara’s
realist interpreters have any validity.
However, one must be reminded that for •aákara everything is
ordered to liberating knowledge of brahman, and any ontology of the
world that compromises the true transcendent nature of brahman and
thereby prevents brahman from being known (since enlightenment pre-
supposes right doctrine) must be subjected to analysis and thereby
refuted. Only in that context is discussion of the world’s ontology
meaningful for •aákara. In itself discussion concerning the how and
why of the world’s manifestation is meaningless; what is more impor-
tant is to recognize that ≤ruti speaks of such things for the sole pur-
pose of leading the spiritual aspirant to full realization of brahman.
•aákara’s primary intention, according to Anam Charan Swain, is
to seek “how this world is to be overcome and not how it is to be
explained . . . His accounts of creation are meant for teaching the
knowledge of Brahman.”72
A citation from •aákara’s BrSùBh may help to illustrate this claim.
68
See Noel Sheth, “•a«kara on How Effects Pre-exist in Their Cause,” International
Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1967): 298–304 and R. Puligandla, Fundamentals of Indian
Philosophy (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1975), 215–216.
69
Puligandla 216.
70
For a more extensive discussion of brahman’s possible causation see Malkovsky,
“Personhood,” 549–550, 558–559.
71
As is well known, the first view is represented by the greater number of
Advaitins, the second by followers of Ràmànuja’s Vi≤iß†àdvaita, and the third by
Madhva’s dualists or Dvaitavàdins.
72
A. C. Swain, “•aákara’s Attitude Towards the Accounts of Creation,” Vedànta
Kesari 56 (1969):231.
64  
In I.4.14 •aákara notes the many different—sometimes apparently

conflicting—accounts of ≤ruti concerning the world’s creation. Does
this mean that sacred scripture is without authority, since it has no
unified view? Not so, answers •aákara:
It cannot be said that the conflict of statements concerning the world
affects the statements concerning the cause, i.e. Brahman, in which all
the Vedànta texts are seen to agree . . . And, to consider the matter
more thoroughly, a conflict of statements regarding the world would
not even matter greatly, since the creation of the world and similar
topics are not at all what Scripture wishes to teach. For we neither
observe nor are told by Scripture that the welfare of man depends on
those matters in any way; nor have we the right to assume such a
thing; because we conclude . . . that the passages about the creation
and the like form only subordinate members of passages treating of
Brahman. That all the passages setting forth the creation and so on
subserve the purpose of teaching Brahman, Scripture itself declares . . .
We, moreover, understand that by means of comparisons such as that
of the clay (Kh.Up. VI,1,4) the creation is described merely for the
purpose of teaching us that the effect is not really different from the
cause.73
In other words, the purpose of the creation accounts is to make
known the supreme reality, brahman, or, to be more exact, to instruct
the reader “that Brahman is the Self of everything.”74
E. T L A (UPÀDHIS)
In the various translations of •aákara’s writings one often comes

across the unusual expression “limiting adjunct,” which is a transla-
tion of the Sanskrit upàdhi, meaning “that which is put in the place
of another thing, a substitute, substitution; anything which may be
taken for or has the mere name or appearance of another thing,
appearance, phantom, disguise (said to be applied to certain forms
or properties considered as disguises of the spirit).”75 This term is
central to •aákara’s thought, although •aákara’s interpreters do not
agree on the ontology it implies. Agreement, however, does prevail
73
Th. tr. I:266–267.
74
BrSùBh II.1.33. Th. tr. I:357. On the meaning of the creation accounts accord-
ing to •aákara, see also A. J. Alston, •aákara on the Creation (A •aákara Source-Book,
Vol. II) (London: Shanti Sadan, 1980) 185–198.
75
Monier-Wiliams, Monier (= MW), Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Delhi: Munshiram
Manoharlal, 1091) 219, col. 2.
 65
on one point, at least: To call something an upàdhi of brahman-àtman

is to explain that a property or relation is attributed as an intrinsic
gu»a or vi≤eßa»a of the Absolute which serves to limit it in some way.
By recognizing that the world is a mere upàdhi or limiting adjunct
of brahman one is prevented from confusing the transcendent and
contingent orders, from taking the world of appearance in all its
limitations as identical to brahman, as if brahman were essentially lim-
ited or conditioned. To see the world as the upàdhi of brahman is to
see plurality as concealing the underlying unity and transcendence
of brahman, which, as has been pointed out, undergoes no change
whatever in bringing forth its effects.
For •aákara, then, on the one hand, to insist that the world is
an upàdhi of brahman makes clear the close connection of the world
to its source; the world is unthinkable without its sustaining cause.
Yet on the other hand the close connection between the two results
in a universal confusion among the ignorant as to the true nature
of brahman and the true nature of the world. In terms of causation,
brahman appears to the unenlightened to be essentially limited by the
world of effects upon which it itself acts. The ignorant do not know
brahman as the perfectly transcendent immutable Absolute, but rather
hold brahman to be by essence in relation to others, e.g. as creator,
Lord, inner cause, inner ruler, witness. But in fact such relations are
“extrinsic denominators” (upàdhis) of brahman, which, while correctly
indicating the true relation of brahman to the world, do not indicate
what the Absolute is by its very nature.76 They are what Thomas
Aquinas would call merely “logical relationships.”77
Similarly, because all things are upàdhis of brahman, it appears to
the ignorant that brahman is diversified and divided, appearing as
many selves or individual souls.78 The One appears to have under-
gone transformation and become the many, become limited. In this
sense, then, “The upàdhi is the principle of individuation.”79 In as
far as upàdhis, by their very nature, appear to limit and diversify the
absolutely simple brahman, they are a product of avidyà or ignorance.
76
R. De Smet, “Spiritual Values of Advaita Vedànta and Social Life,” Indian
Philosophical Annual 18 (1985–86):10–12. See also B‰UpBh III.8.12 and AiUpBh II.1.,
introduction.
77
De Smet, “Spiritual Values” 11–12.
78
See Natalia Isayeva, Shankara and Indian Philosophy (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1993) 157–158.
79
R. P. Singh, “•a«kara and Bhàskara,” Philosophical Quarterly 29 (1956):77.
66  
This has led some acosmic interpreters of •aákara to conclude that

•aákara denies contingent reality outright, when in fact the prob-
lem lies in confusing the contingent and absolute orders of reality.
In the words of R. P. Singh:
•a«kara . . . speaks of avidyà as the upàdhi of the individual self. One
form in which avidyà operates as the upàdhi is known as adhyàsa,
identification of the self with the limiting adjuncts. This avidyà is the
main upàdhi of the jìva . . . The upàdhis are not as real as Brahman,
because they have their being in and through Brahman. From the
point of view of the jìva, the upàdhis are said to be avidyà because
they serve to veil the jìva’s true nature.80
F. T I S ( JÌVA)
For •aákara and the Upanißads the innermost self ( pratyagàtman) or

source of the human person is the transcendent brahman-àtman and
therefore by nature unaffected by any of the movements and changes
of saásàra and the material universe. The highest àtman is, then,
entirely devoid of both suffering and worldly enjoyment nor is it an
agent involved in the karmic sphere of action and reaction. In the
words of Sengaku Mayeda, the Self is “by nature actionless, tran-
scendentally changeless, without desire, and free from transmigratory
existence.”81 It is neither enjoyer-experiencer (bhokt‰) nor doer (kart‰),
but pure consciousness.
In contrast to this àtman that is brahman, there is the individual
àtman, the human person, the jìva or jìvàtman, who is a conglomer-
ate of the àtman, of the gross body that disintegrates at death, of the
subtle body that transmigrates until final liberation, of life force
(prà»a), of the five senses, of mind or inner sense (anta˙kàra»a, bud-
dhi, manas, ahamkàra) etc.82 All these together comprise the suffering
and enjoying embodied soul that normally believes itself to be dis-
tant from the Absolute, not realizing its own real nature as àtman.83
Nor does the jìva realize that the integration of all its faculties is
made possible by the self-luminous àtman, although the àtman as such
80
Singh 77. See BrSùBh I.1.5, II.1.13.
81
“•a«kara’s View of Ethics,” Philosophy East and West, ed. H. D. Lewis (Bombay:
Blackie & Son, 1976), 192.
82
See Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings 28–29; R. De Smet, “Is the Concept of
‘Person’ Congenial to •a«kara Vedànta?,” Indian Philosophical Annual 8 (1972):202.
83
Mayeda, “•a«kara’s View of Ethics” 192.
 67
(being essentially inactive) is not the agent of all the jìva’s activities
and experiencing.84
The source of the jìva’s action is rather the ego (aham, ahaákart‰),
which is itself the reflection (àbhàsa) of the àtman. As a reflection, it
is similar to the àtman in having consciousness and freedom, yet its
being and capacities are weak and finite when compared to its pro-
totype.85 Thus it must ultimately turn to the supreme Self to dis-
cover its own meaning and final goal. Yet the jìva does enjoy a real
autonomy and is therefore a kart‰ and bhokt‰.86 But it is unable to be
anything without the immanent paramàtman permeating its being and
activity.
The jìva generally takes itself to be in essence nothing but its bod-
ily-mental conglomerate, as its attention is normally turned outward
to the body and worldly sense-objects. Kokileswar Sastri summarizes
well this illusory aspect of the jìva:
The finite self is ordinarily regarded as a self-contained entity existing
on its own account. It is merely a bundle of passive feelings and states,
and possesses a fund of impulses and passions which constitute the
source of its physical and mental movements or activities. It is con-
tinuous with, and a part of, the external nature which has equipped
it with its organs of sense and the nervous system. When the organs
of sense come in contact with the external environment . . ., the latter
evokes certain states and activities in the former, and these actions and
reactions constitute the self. This is the actual empirical self. According
to •a«kara, it is not the real self . . . (This self ) is a slave of impulses
and instincts which move in him and sway him hither and thither;
these impulses move him to act in the direction of their guidance. He
has no eye to look to the other path.87
The jìva is, moreover, self-centered, “imagining itself as the absolute
centre of the light it diffuses.”88 For the jìva to find fulfillment it must
lose itself in the fullness of its true center, which is the supreme
self.89 It must rid itself of false notions of “I” and “mine” and of
false identification with its changing mental states. In short it must
84
De Smet, “Concept of ‘Person’ ” 202.
85
De Smet, “Concept of ‘Person’ ” 202. See BrSùBh II.3.50; B‰UpBh IV.3.7;
ChUpBh VI.3.2; BhGBh XVIII.50.
86
De Smet, “Concept of ‘Person’ ” 202–203.
87
K. Sastri, An Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy, rev. and enl. second ed. (Calcutta:
University of Calcutta, 1926), 79–80, 81. Emphasis by Sastri.
88
89
68  
experientially realize its non-duality with its innermost àtman if its

suffering is to be overcome.
A passage from •aákara’s ChUpBh VI.3.2 illustrates how the
close connection between the jìva and the àtman is the very source
of the jìva’s confusion:
An individual soul is merely a reflection (àbhàsa) of the Deity (devatà).
It arises from (Its) contact with the subtle elements in the form of intel-
lect etc. It is like a reflection of a person, seeming to have entered
into a mirror, and like (the reflection of ) the sun etc. in water etc.
The contact of the Deity possessed of inscrutable and infinite power,
with the intellect etc. is (in the form of ) a reflection of consciousness.
This becomes the cause of multifarious and conflicting ideas such as,
“I am happy”, “I am sorrowful”, “I am ignorant”, etc. owing to the
nonrealisation of the true nature of the Deity. Since the Deity has
entered merely as a reflection in the form of an individual soul, there-
fore It does not Itself become connected with physical happiness, sor-
row, etc. As a person, the sun, and others entering into a mirror,
water, etc. merely through their reflections, are not touched by the
defects of the mirror, water, etc. so also the Deity is not.90
As to the avidyà that prevents the soul from realizing its true nature,
•aákara neither declares it to belong to brahman nor to the jìva, since
the true, though indirect, referent of the jìva’s “I” is the ever-pure
paramàtman.91 This suggests the mysteriousness of the jìva’s identity.
On the one hand, as •aákara points out in BrSùBh III.2.21, it is
the jìva who is the addressee of the scriptures, presumably as one in
need of enlightenment; on the other hand, •aákara states that the
jìva is beyond injunction, for its real nature is brahman itself.92 If the
individual soul were an illusion, he goes on to say, then there would
remain no one who would “obtain release.”93 Conversely, to say that
the jìva is brahman rules out the possibility of laying upon it com-
mands, since it is essentially perfect, without suffering and without
agentship. It thus appears that enlightenment alone, transcendental
wisdom, unveils and clarifies the true nature of the jìva, whereas the
vyavahàrika point of view is incapable of revealing the jìva to itself.
90
G. tr. 431.
91
On the problem of the locus of avidyà see Daniel H. H. Ingalls, “•aákara on
the Question: Whose is avidyà?,” Philosophy East and West 3 (1953–54):69–72; Mayeda,
A Thousand Teachings 79–82; Potter 80. See also BrSùBh III.2.21, IV.1.3; B‰UpBh
I.4.10, IV.1.6; ChUpBh VIII.12.1; BhGBh XIII.2.
92
See Th. tr. II:164.
93
Th. tr. II:164.
CHAPTER FOUR
SOTERIOLOGY
In what follows I present the basic contours of •aákara’s soteriol-

ogy, leaving aside for now the role of divine grace on the path
•aákara prescribes for liberation. How grace fits into •aákara’s
understanding of the process that leads to enlightenment will be the
subject of Chapters VIII, IX and X. For now I focus on what is
most frequently recognized as central to •aákara’s soteriology: the
four adhikàras, sannyàsa, the enlightened guru, the mahàvàkyas, the three
stages of ≤rava»a, manana and nididhyàsana, the explanation of adhyàsa
as the source of the jìva’s bondage, and the absolute necessity of the
parà vidyà for overcoming all suffering and realizing one’s eternal lib-
erated state.
Not surprising, in view of •aákara’s general lack of interest in
presenting a comprehensive treatise on any given topic, the àcàrya
nowhere presents a complete summary of his soteriology, although
his major concerns emerge recurrently throughout his works.
A. B
1. The Experience of Suffering and Bondage
•aákara likens the human condition to a man adrift in an infinite

ocean of suffering. He never tires of stressing to his readers the es-
sential painfulness of life. Some of his passages on suffering are
quite vivid in their depiction of life’s ills, even bordering on the
dramatic:
The world . . . is like a vast ocean, that is filled with the water of sor-
row arising from ignorance, desire, and action; that is infested with
huge sea-animals in the form of acute disease, and age, and death;
that has no end and limit and provides no resting place; that affords
only momentary respite through the little joy arising from the contact
of senses and objects; that is full of the high waves in the shape of
hundreds of evil, stirred up by the gale of hankering for the objects
of the five senses; that resounds with the noise of cries and shrieks of
70  
“alas! alas!” issuing from the beings condemned to various hells like
Maharaurava. . . .1
We see here that •aákara describes both physical evil as well as
the mental anguish that results from the inordinate desire to possess
and enjoy finite earthly objects. Elsewhere, speaking quite clearly as
a renunciate and celibate, •aákara notes that one of the greatest of
temptations is the attraction of a beautiful woman.2
•aákara generally equates life in the body with bodily affliction;
the body’s pleasures are always short-lived, giving way again and
again to renewed and inescapable suffering. The human being unfor-
tunately does not normally learn from its experiences of frustration
and disappointment to recognize the pattern and causes of its repeated
pain; it grows weary as it allows itself to be tossed about from one
psychological state to another. The jìva does not recognize that the
causes of its suffering are ignorance, desire, and action. It falsely
derives its identity from its bodily state, not realizing the changeless
àtman within.
As seen from the above passage, •aákara does not rest content
to list the kinds of suffering or their intensity; he intertwines his neg-
ative description of the world with the causes of evil and suffering.
The following quotation from the ChUpBh gives another example
of this. Here again suffering is described, but •aákara more clearly
teaches that the cause of the jìva’s misery is its identification with its
changing mental and physical states as well as with those persons
and objects which it holds most dear. In this passage it is important
to note the many ways in which the sense of “I” and “my” are
falsely used:
When a person is stolen from Existence which is the real Self of the
universe, by thieves such as merit and demerit, he is made to enter
into this forest of a body constituted of fire, water and food; full of
air, bile, phlegm, blood, fat, flesh, bone, marrow, semen, worms, urine,
and stool; subject to various types of miseries arising from opposites
like heat, cold, etc. His eyes are bound with the cloth of delusion, he
being tied with many thirsts for various kinds of seen and unseen things
like wife, son, friend, animals, kinsmen, etc. Being enmeshed by hun-
dred and thousand snares of misery, he goes on shouting, ‘I am his
1
AiUpBh I.2.1. Swami Gambhirananda trans., Eight Upanißads: With the Commentary
of •a«karàcàrya (= EU), 2 vols. (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1982), II:28.
2
KaUpBh II.2.8. Tr. EU I:191. See also Swami Gambhirananda, trans., Chàndogya
Upanißad With the Commentary of •a«karàcàrya (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1983), VIII.10.1.
 71
son, these are my friends, I am happy, I am in misery, I am deluded,

I am wise, I am virtuous, I have friends, I am born, I am dead, I am
emaciated, I am a sinner, my son has died, my wealth is lost; alas! I
am undone, how shall I live, what will be my lot, what relief is there
for me?3
•aákara’s solution is for the suffering and fearing jìva to sit at the
feet of a realized master and learn—at first theoretically, and then
by intuitive experience—the truth about its real identity and the rea-
son for its confusion. This truth is initially difficult to understand,
but will eventually be grasped and so lead the jìva from confusion
and despair to the serenity of wisdom that comes with Self-knowl-
edge. This great truth is that of adhyàsa, or superimposition.
2. Superimposition (adhyàsa) the Cause of Bondage
“ ‘Superimposition,’ ” wrote T. M. P. Mahadevan in his final work

on non-duality, “is the central concept in •a«kara’s Advaita.”4
Mahadevan’s assertion is borne out by the fact that •aákara’s dis-
cussion of adhyàsa forms the heart of his introduction to the BrSùBh.
While only a few pages in length, the introduction is one of the
most important passages in Advaitic literature. Here •aákara actu-
ally defines adhyàsa, calling it “the appearance, in the form of a mem-
ory, of something previously experienced in some other place (sm‰tirùpa˙
paratra pùrvad‰ß†àvabhàsa˙).”5
In simpler terms, superimposition is “erroneous cognition (mithyàjñàna),
illusory appearance (avabhàsa),” further, “the coupling of the true and
the untrue, the real and the unreal.”6 It “consists in attributing qual-
ities not immediately presented to consciousness to a thing that is
immediately given to consciousness.”7 Probably the most famous illus-
tration of this point made by •aákara8 and the Advaitic tradition
is that of the rope and the snake. One sees a rope at dusk and mis-
takes it for a snake. The rope is specifically mistaken for a snake,
3
ChUpBh VI.14.2. G. tr. 48.
4
T. M. P. Mahadevan, Superimposition in Advaita Vedànta (Delhi: Sterling, 1985), 1.
5
Brahmasùtra with •a«karabhàßya. Works of •a«karàcàrya in Original Sanskrit (= MB),
Vol. III (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, no date), 1, line 17. Karl Potter, Advaita Vedànta
up to •aákara and His Pupils (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981), 69.
6
Mahadevan 1.
7
R. Puligandla, Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy (Nashville: Abingdon, 1975), 219.
8
See e.g. BrSùBh I.1.4, I.3.19, I.4.6, II.1.9 etc.
72  
because one has the knowledge of a snake from memory. In the act
of false cognition one does not perceive an object as something
unknown or waiting to be clarified, but rather as something known.
In the same instant that the object is inadequately perceived it is
also given the characteristics of something else. Yet the entire oper-
ation of false cognition brings with it a certitude that can only be
removed or sublated when the true identity of the object perceived
is adequately experienced.
This rope-snake analogy serves to explain the confusion about the
jìva’s true identity, according to Karl Potter: “In particular, says
•aákara, we are prone to superimpose the properties of the object
of awareness on its subject, and vice versa. That is, we identify our-
self qua seat of consciousness with ourself qua body, mind, memory,
etc., all of which are objects, not subjects, and so have at least one
property that the self qua subject cannot have. It is this primary
superimposition that constitutes ignorance (avidyà), and it is this con-
fusion in particular that needs to be eradicated through knowledge
(vidyà).”9
Thus because of adhyàsa we do not know that the àtman, our true
self, the real referent of the word “I,” is characterized by eternity,
infinity, immutability, completeness, pure consciousness, quiescence,
desirelessness etc.10 Instead we identify ourselves not only with our
body, our mind (and their changing states), but also with the activ-
ities and projects by which we are linked to our environment and
to other jìvas. We see ourselves as incomplete doers and enjoyers,
seeking fulfillment through interaction with the material world. As
•aákara writes: “Nor does anybody act by means of a body on
which the nature of the Self is not superimposed . . . In this way
there goes on this natural beginning—and endless superimposition,
which appears in the form of wrong conception, is the cause of indi-
vidual souls appearing as agents and enjoyers (of the results of their
actions), and is observed by every one.”11
When •aákara declares, therefore, that the source of the jìva’s
sorrow is ignorance, desire, and action, we must recognize that of
these three, ignorance is the primary and ultimate cause of suffering,
9
Potter 69.
10
See S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (Bombay: Blackie & Son, 1983), II:477.
11
BrSùBh, Introduction. Th. tr. I:7, 9.
 73
it being synonymous with superimposition.12 Desire and action are

derivative causes of the jìva’s repeated bondage to ignorance, and
they presuppose the reality of erroneous identification (adhyàsa). Shortly
after the long passage quoted from AiUpBh I.2.1 in the previous
section, •aákara restates his position more systematically and clearly
gives primacy to ignorance over action and desire as the ultimate
reason for the jìva’s bondage: “As long as one does not realize thus
this Self that has been described, so long does one accept the lim-
iting adjunct, possessed of the external and impermanent vision, as
one’s Self; and considering through ignorance the attributes of the
limiting adjuncts as one’s own, one transmigrates under the influence
of ignorance, desire, and action, by rotating again and again through
the regions of the gods, animals, and men, that range from Brahma
to a clump of grass.13
As we have seen, •aákara’s interpreters have frequently taught
that the entire world of karma-saásàra is itself a mental construct
superimposed upon the being of the immutable brahman. Such ide-
alists suggest that the universe of multiplicity is the product of adhyàsa
and that its ontological foundation is removed with the destruction
of avidyà. In short, avidyà or adhyàsa is seen to bring about an illu-
sory reality that we call the world. However, other thinkers inter-
pret •aákara differently: It is not that adhyàsa brings forth the world
but rather that ignorance falsely construes the world, just as a rope
is mistaken for a snake. According to the interpretation of R. De
Smet, “In avidyà, we mis-apprehend things and persons as independ-
ent subsistents and the Brahman as changing and appearing in man-
ifold forms.”14 With the dawning of wisdom what is known is the
unity of all reality in brahman rather than the destruction of the world.
Many theoretical questions remain concerning the origination and
locus of avidyà. If, as the acosmic interpreters of •aákara hold, brah-
man alone exists, then how is it possible that the eternal avidyà could
ever exist without brahman being its locus? Such an ontology would
sully the perfect being of the Absolute, besides absolutizing avidyà
itself. If, on the other hand, the source of eternal avidyà were to be
located in the jìva, would that not put the jìva on an equal onto-
logical footing with brahman? If avidyà were materialized, as has been
12
See Sengaku Mayeda, •a«kara’s Upade≤asàhasrì (Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1973), 24.
13
Introduction to AiUpBh II.1.1. Tr. EU II:55.
14
“Forward Steps in •a«kara Research,” Darshana International 26 (1987):42–43.
74  
held by the post-•aákara tradition, then a new dualism would emerge:

that of unoriginated matter and unoriginated brahman.
•aákara himself, in contrast to the tradition after him, is exclu-
sively concerned with the practical aspect of avidyà-discourse: How
is avidyà to be eradicated? He takes no pains to describe avidyà, and
rests content to vaguely label it “natural” (naisargika); he certainly
does not regard it as a material principle.15 To the question “Whose
is avidyà?,” •aákara is decidedly indifferent, treating the issue as
pointless, suggesting that metaphysical speculation is of little value
for a true seeker of enlightenment.16
For •aákara, then, avidyà appears to be shrouded in mystery, and
therefore somewhat functionally parallels the Christian problem of
the origin and existence of sin and evil, acknowledged by theolo-
gians as the mysterium iniguitatis.17
3. Transmigratory Existence (saásàra)
In the previous long quote from the AiUpBh •aákara asserted that
the soul that transmigrates or reincarnates through the heavenly and
earthly realms does so because it lacked the liberating knowledge of
its true nature as àtman. Such a teaching makes clear that the evil
wrought by avidyà is not only the jìva’s present experience of self-
alienation, fear, despair, insatiable desire, all too fleeting pleasures
etc., but also the fact of continued rebirth. In contrast with some
modern Western interpretations, reincarnation has been traditionally
viewed by the great majority of Hindus as a great evil. In a dia-
logue in Upad II.1.12 between a disciple and enlightened master,
the disciple declares that it is precisely transmigration that he seeks
to overcome through knowledge of brahman. He is weary of existence
in time:
15
Eigen. 78. On discrepancies between •aákara and post-•aákara Advaita on
the question of avidyà see Anthony J. Alston, “•aákara in East and West Today,”
New Perspectives in Advaita Vedànta, ed. Bradley J. Malkovsky (Leiden: Brill, 2000),
91–108.
16
See Eigen. 78–79 and Daniel H. H. Ingalls, “•aákara on the Question: Whose
is avidyà?,” Philosophy East and West 3 (1953–54):69–72. See also BrSùBh IV.1.3;
B‰UpBh IV.1.6; BhGBh XIII.2; ChUpBh VIII.12.1.
17
Mayeda makes this point in “•a«kara’s View of Ethics,” Philosophy East and
West, ed. H. D. Lewis (Bombay: Blackie & Son, 1976), 192.
 75
I have entered this body as a bird enters a nest, by force of the merit
and demerit accumulated by myself. Again and again by force of the
merit and demerit, when this body perishes, I shall enter another body
as a bird enters another nest when its previous one has been destroyed.
Thus I am in beginningless transmigratory existence. I have been aban-
doning (old) bodies which have been obtained one after another in
the spheres of gods, animals, men, and hells by force of my own kar-
man and I have been getting other new bodies over and over again.
I am forced by my own karman to rotate in the incessant cycle of birth
and death as in a waterwheel. I have obtained this body in the course
of time. I am tired of this rotation in the wheel of transmigratory exis-
tence, so I have come to you, Your Holiness, in order to end the rota-
tion in the wheel of transmigratory existence.18
The process of reincarnation is unwittingly sustained by the igno-
rant jìva in a cycle of desire and action leading to the experience of
their results as either pleasurable or painful, either in the present
lifetime or in a future one. This two-fold experience in turn tends
to reinforce in the mind of the jìva the necessity of a certain course
of worldly action by which future pleasure is to be gained and future
pain is to be avoided. All the while the jìva is unaware that action
cannot solve the problem, because action is the problem. The jìva
does not know that it is by nature eternally liberated, because as the
àtman it is distinct from the body, the mind, the ego and their crav-
ings and actions. Sengaku Mayeda has carefully analyzed •aákara’s
understanding of this wheel of causation and effect (saásàra) and
summarized it clearly as follows:
The saásàra which Sankara conceives consists in the following cycle:
(1) karmans as the result of actions in the previous existence—(2) one’s
connection with the body—(3) experience of pleasure and pain—(4)
passion and aversion (= doßa, Upad. II.1,7)—(5) actions (kriyà)—(6) dharma
and adharma. In other words saásàra is the continuously recurring
process of the performance of actions (karman or kriyà) and experience
of their fruits.19
What Mayeda, in his excellent analysis, has neglected to explain is
that according to the teaching of •aákara, unlike much of Buddhist
thought, this process does not occur automatically. For •aákara
18
Tr. Sengaku Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press,
1979), 214–215.
19
“Àdi-•a«kàràcarya’s Teaching on the Means to Mokßa: Jñàna and Karman,”
Journal of Oriental Research 34–35 (1964–65, 1965–66):67–68. See also A Thousand
Teachings 71 and •aákara’s bhàßya on TaiUp I.11.4. Tr. EU I:278–279.
76  
one’s actions and desires and their resulting merit (dharma) and demerit
(adharma) do not, of themselves, account for a future pleasurable and
painful recompense, especially when that recompense occurs in a
future life. The guarantor of such reward and punishment, the one
who links appropriately present action with future result, is the Lord
(ì≤vara). We shall return to the Lord’s role in the saásàric process
later in this work.20
B. L
1. The Nature of Liberation
For •aákara and the entire Advaita Vedànta tradition liberation

(mokßa, mukti ) brings about no essential change in the knower, who
is àtman. Bondage itself is an illusion,21 belonging to no one, although,
obviously, on the vyahàrika plane it is taken for real. Ignorance is “a
kind of deep slumber in which the transmigrating souls sleep with-
out any consciousness of their true nature.”22 Consequently, libera-
tion is an awakening to one’s eternal nature. In actuality, the soul
“is not afflicted at all.”23 Liberation is therefore not something to be
achieved, as if one did not already possess it.24 It is in fact identi-
cal with brahman.25 Since the jìva is essentially àtman, liberation is
nothing more than the cessation of avidyà or adhyàsa, the removal of
false notions.26
When Self-realization, or the experienced unity of brahman and
àtman, occurs, “the knots of the heart are untied and all doubts are
resolved,”27 transmigration is destroyed,28 “all ideas of duality, involv-
ing action, accessories, etc.” are removed,29 “self-identification with
the body etc. ceases,30 fearlessness is attained,31 one realizes the death-
20
See, e.g., BrSùBh II.1.34.
21
See BrSùBh I.1.5, II.2.10, III.2.29.
22
BrSùBh I.4.3. G. tr. 249.
23
BrSùBh II.2.10. G. tr. 382.
24
BrSùBh I.1.4.
25
BrSùBh I.1.4.
26
BrSùBh I.1.1, II.1.4.
27
MuUp II.2.8, quoted by •aákara in BrSùBh I.1.4. G. tr. 30.
28
BrSùBh I.1.1.
29
BrSùBh I.1.4. G. tr. 23.
30
BrSùBh. I.1.4. G. tr. 40.
31
BrSùBh I.1.19.
 77
less state,32 sin is ineffective,33 one passes beyond earthly happiness

and sorrow,34 all questions are put to rest by the “fullest conviction”
of the Self,35 “the transmigratoriness of the individual is removed as
also the creatorship of Brahman,”36 both virtue and vice are elimi-
nated.37 Liberation is, in short, “the realization that ‘I am the Self
which is one and is characterized as consciousness and freedom from
all sorrow’.”38
2. Immediate and Gradual Liberation
•aákara teaches that avidyà may be entirely destroyed upon hear-

ing for the first time a Great Saying (mahàvàkya) of ≤ruti such as “That
thou art” (tat tvam asi ) and perfectly grasping its import.39 To fully
understand a Great Saying is to awaken to both the illusory nature
of one’s conventional self-understanding and to the true nature of
àtman. However, ≤ruti is powerless to eradicate ignorance in one who
does not understand the meaning of the terms “that” and “thou” as
used in tat tvam asi. Such people are beset by “ignorance, doubt, and
confusion.”40
When a mahàvàkya is not fully comprehended (and, of course, pro-
vided the listener is bent on the experience of enlightenment through
the help of the Upanißads) •aákara prescribes repetition of the Great
Saying along with accompanying reasoning as to its meaning, so as
to progressively remove “ignorance, doubt, and confusion.” In addi-
tion he recommends a symbol meditation by which various phe-
nomena such as mind, sense-organs etc. are superimposed on brahman
and then discarded, so as to lead the mind to an ever greater aware-
ness of the unity of brahman. Through the constant focusing of
the mind on tat tvam asi with the help of reasoning and symbol
32
BrSùBh I.1.28.
33
BrSùBh I.2.15.
34
BrSùBh I.3.40.
35
36
37
BrSùBh III.3.26.
38
BrSùBh IV.1.2. G. tr. 817.
39
See BrSùBh IV.1.2.
40
BrSùBh IV.1.2. G. tr. 816, 817. I shall return to the mahàvàkyas below. See
IV.C.4.a. For an important recent discussion of tat tvam asi see Julius J. Lipner,
“The Self of Being and the Being of Self: •aákara on ‘That You Are’ (tat tvam
asi ), in Malkovsky, New Perspectives on Advaita Vedànta, 51–69.
78  
meditation, there results a progressive dawning of comprehension.

In this sense one may speak of a gradual liberation in •aákara, as
obstacles to understanding are removed one by one. However, it
does appear that the full and final grasping of the mahàvàkya must
be qualitatively different than the so-called gradual liberation, because
in the former instance all notional truths about brahman have been
transcended in the intuition (anubhava) of unity itself. Here there is
a permanent elevation to a higher state of consciousness in which
no return to the vyavahàrika awareness is possible, since all duality
has been sublated once and for all.
3. The jìvanmukta
For one who has realized the true nature of the Self even while liv-
ing in the body ( jìvanmukta) it is not unwarranted to speak of the
attainment of the highest liberation, as avidyà is now totally destroyed.41
The sage awaits no greater awareness of joy after death since brah-
man itself is now fully attained. Though the enlightened one contin-
ues to act, his actions no longer bind him, since he is without desire
for results and therefore generates no more karma. He no longer
knows himself as a doer (kart‰) or enjoyer (bhokt‰), but as the per-
fectly quiescent and joyful supreme consciousness. All that now
remains is the shedding of the body at death. For the present the
liberated one (mukta) remains in time without being bound by time.
His life in the body continues only so long as his pràrabdha-karma,
i.e. the results of past deeds that have already begun to take effect
in his present life, have worked themselves out until their exhaus-
tion. All other forms of karma have been destroyed.
•aákara likens the continued bodily existence of the realized sage
under the effects of pràrabdha-karma to a potter’s wheel that contin-
ues to rotate for a short while even after its work is completed.42
Similarly, the realized person patiently and serenely fulfills the final
obligations of the deeds of his past lives until the time is ripe for
the death of the body, a body which he once considered part of his
identity. Where does the knower of brahman now go? Nowhere; now
identified with the omnipresent brahman, he has no physical or spa-
tial path to follow.43
41
See BrSùBh IV.1.13–15, III.3.32.
42
See BrSùBh IV.1.15.
43
See BrSùBh IV.2.13–14.
 79
C. T P  L
1. Prerequisites for Beginning the Path
Before the seeker (sàdhaka) of liberation can expect to proceed with

success on the quest to know brahman (brahmajijñàsà), he44 must first
be in possession of certain spiritual, ethical and psychological qual-
ities or conditions (adhikàra). The most well-known list of require-
ments given by •aákara is found in BrSùBh I.1.1, but in Upad
II.1.2, 4, I.13.27, I.16.72, I.17.52, 85, and 86 he also speaks of con-
ditions required for the proper study of his teaching.45 I shall focus
my attention here on the more famous list from the BrSù.
William Cenkner has noted that the four adhikàras on •aákara’s
list are causative of each other, and he implies that they are arranged
in a definite order.46 T. M. P. Mahadevan declares this outright:
“Of the four qualifications each earlier one leads to the next.”47 This
may be true; at the very least one could agree with Anantanand
Rambachan that the four conditions form a “close interrelationship”
and that “the acquisition of one often presupposes and implies the
other.”48 The four prerequisites for beginning the path leading to
liberation now follow in their order of appearance in BrSùBh I.1.1.49
a. Discrimination (viveka)
The seeker of final release must be able to distinguish between the
real and the unreal (nityànityavastuviveka). It means being able to rec-
ognize the essential transitory nature of things and thereby to real-
ize their inability to give permanent satisfaction. It is the recognition
of the illusory nature of the world in contrast to the true reality of
brahman.50
44
•aákara does not appear to have admitted women to discipleship. See William
Cenkner, A Tradition of Teachers: •a«kara and the Jagadgurus Today (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1983), 50.
45
See Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings 227 note 1.
46
Cenkner 51.
47
Mahadevan 64.
48
See A. Rambachan, Accomplishing the Accomplished: The Vedas as a Source of Valid
Knowledge in •a«kara (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 88.
49
The text is found in MB 5, lines 5–6.
50
See Mahadevan 63. Mahadevan’s commentary on the four adhikàras in •aákara’s
BrSùBh is based on the Vivekacù∂àma»i, a work of a later Pseudo-•aákara.
80  
b. Dispassion (vairàgya)
After recognizing the radical insufficiency of anything but brahman,
the seeker of final liberation ought exercise dispassion or “the re-
nunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit (of one’s actions) both
here and hereafter” (ihàmutràrthabhogaviràga).51 It is, in the words of
T. M. P. Mahadevan, “the disgust for the seeing, hearing etc. of . . .
non-eternal things.”52 Here “the discriminatory mind is turned away
from the world of sense-objects.”53 The seeker becomes “nonattached
to present and future experiences.”54
c. Attainment of Tranquility etc. (≤amadamàdisàdhanasampat)

•aákara recommends here the cultivation of certain virtues and
habits conducive to liberation. He mentions only two explicitly, i.e.
tranquility or calmness (≤ama) and self-control or restraint (dama), but
implicitly includes others (“etc.” àdi ), as well. The post-•aákara
Advaita tradition has interpreted this “etc.” to mean withdrawal
(uparàti ), perhaps the withdrawal of the senses from the sense-objects
or even the renunciation of all cultic acts and duties; fortitude or
forbearance (titìkßà), i.e. patience in suffering and sorrow; concen-
tration or one-pointedness of mind (samàdhàna), i.e the focusing of
the mind on brahman; and faith (≤raddhà), not as trust in the divine
mercy, but rather “faith in the teachings of scripture and preceptor,
being firmly convinced of their truth.”55
All but the latter virtue, i.e. faith, are found in B‰Up IV.4.23,
where either the same terms are used or their synonyms. It is likely
that •aákara had B‰Up IV.4.23 in mind when drawing up his abbre-
viated list of virtues in BrSùBh I.1.1 and Upad II.1.2.56 It is per-
haps of some interest to note that in the latter verse •aákara requires
of the would-be disciple “tranquility (≤ama), self-control (dama), com-
passion (dàyà), and so forth (àdi ).”57 It is striking that •aákara chooses
to include compassion as one of his most central qualities. It is pos-
51
Th. tr. I:12.
52
Mahadevan 63.
53
Cenkner 51.
54
Potter 36.
55
Mahadevan 64. See Rambachan 90–91.
56
See Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings 227 note 4.
57
See Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings 211 and •a«kara’s Upade≤asàhasrì 191.
 81
sible that he is alluding to B‰UpBh V.2.3, which recommends “self-

control, charity and compassion.”58
d. Longing for Liberation (mumukßutva)

It is the longing for final release that makes possible the fortitude
required of the sàdhaka to persevere on the correct path to the end.
He must desire to know brahman above every other desire, and give
himself fully to his goal. •aákara does not believe that the intense
desire for liberation can be activated at will by any person. Only a
special kind of jìva, one equipped with the appropriate natural ten-
dencies, is capable of such longing. In the introduction to the KenaUp
•aákara writes: “The longing for the knowledge of the indwelling
Self arises only in that desireless man of pure mind who has renounced
all transitory, external means and ends by virtue of the emergence
of a special kind of tendency (in his mind) created by works done
in this life or in previous ones.”59
2. Renunciation (sannyàsa)
One of the requirements (adhikàra) laid down by •aákara in the

Upad for the attainment of liberation is the the abandonment of
“desire for sons, wealth and worlds” and the consequent embrace
of the “state of a paramahaása wandering ascetic.”60 Of the four tradi-
tional Hindu stages of life (student, householder, forest dweller, renun-
ciate), •aákara asserts in BrSùBh III.4.20 that it is the last one, the
ascetic alone who is capable of remaining absorbed in brahman, since
he alone has controlled his senses and renounced all societal oblig-
ations and duties.61 Elsewhere he states that “sorrow comes only to
those who have the belief of having friends and sons, but not to
those, e.g. monks and others who have no such belief.”62 Through
the practice of celibacy (brahmacàrya) passion is controlled; in such a
58
See Madhavananda tr. 565.
59
Tr. Eu I:34.
60
Upad II.1.2. Mayeda tr., A Thousand Teachings 211. See B‰Up III.5.1. Mayeda
describes the paramahaása monk as one who “always stays under a tree, in an unin-
habited house, or in a burial place. He begs alms from persons of all castes. He
regards all as Àtman.” See A Thousand Teachings 227 note 3.
61
See G. tr. 776.
62
82  
one liberating knowledge can more easily arise.63 The monk is to be

childlike (bàlya); “without showing himself off by parading his wis-
dom, learning, virtuousness, etc., he should be free from pride, con-
ceit, etc. like a child.”64
3. The Role of the Spiritual Guide
•aákara uses a great many terms for teacher or guide; of these the
most frequent are àcàrya and guru.65 His reverence for the spiritual
guide is easily apparent: The teacher is like a boat that is capable
of carrying the seekers of brahman across the ocean of saásàra.66 He
is able to do this by virtue of himself being liberated, already estab-
lished in brahman. From his higher level of awareness he is capable
of evaluating the elegibility and readiness of those who come to him
to profit from his instruction. His teaching is not his own; he sim-
ply mediates to the unenlightened the instruction passed on before
him from age to age by his Vedàntic tradition that is itself the
embodiment of the truth of the revealed Upanißads. He helps make
possible the eruption of the disciple’s innate knowledge of brahman
by clearing away obstacles to its realization. The teacher is above
all a knower of doctrine and scripture and is capable of making its
subtleties clear by means of reason. In fact, William Cenkner sees
the dependence of the disciple on the teacher rooted more in the
latter’s ability to reason than in his experience of brahman.67
The main task of the guru is to make known the truth of scrip-
ture, in particular those passages that speak of the unity of brahman-
àtman.68 According to Cenkner, “Scripture and the teacher function
together as a single cause for •ankara; the teacher in the Vedànta
is differentiated from other teachers by the close identification with
scripture. Teacher and scripture are an integral unit, because the
former embodies the latter and the latter articulates the former. The
guru dwells in Brahman because he is versed in scripture, and he
63
See BrSùBh III.4.35.
64
BrSùBh III.4.50. G. tr. 807.
65
See Cenkner 33 note 4, who on 29–59 offers a very instructive and fairly
detailed summary of the role and nature of the teacher in •aákara’s soteriology.
I am especially indebted to him for what follows.
66
See B‰UpBh I.4.9.
67
Cenkner 33.
68
See Upad II.1.6.
 83
is knowledgeable in scripture because he dwells in Brahman. The

guru is the living embodiment of the highest truths of the scripture
because he is one with Brahman.”69
It is not too much, then, asserts V. H. Date, to regard the guru
as “the intermediary between man and God, or what is the same
thing, between the soul and the Brahman.” Accordingly he believes
that “the Guru occupies in •aákara the place which Jesus Christ
occupies in Christianity.”70
•aákara’s longest description of the function and nature of the
ideal teacher is revealed in Upad II.1.6. What is most noticeable in
this passage is the high moral character of a true teacher: “And the
teacher is able to consider the pros and cons (of an argument), is
endowed with understanding, memory, tranquility, self-control, com-
passion, favor and the like; he is versed in the traditional doctrine;
not attached to any enjoyments, visible or invisible, he has aban-
doned all the rituals and their requisites; a knower of Brahman, he
is established in Brahman; he leads a blameless life, free from faults
such as deceit, pride, trickery, wickedness, fraud, jealousy, falsehood,
egotism, self-interest, and so forth; with the only purpose of helping
others he wishes to make use of knowledge.”71
Later in this chapter we shall examine the role of the teacher in
guiding the seeker through the triple-process of hearing, reasoning
and meditating on scripture.72
4. Scripture
I have described above the absolute reliability of ≤ruti in religious

matters and the inability of reason of itself to infer the highest truth.73
But ≤ruti is not homogeneous in value; it is in fact composed of two
very different kinds of religious discourse, the karmakà»∂a and the
jñànakà»∂a, which are oriented to quite disparate goals.74 The first
set of ≤ruti-statements, the karmakà»∂a, is injunctive, enjoining espe-
cially ritual action for the acquisition of certain benefits. This kà»∂a
embodies the knowledge of the link between present action and future
69
Cenkner 34.
70
V. H. Date, Vedànta Explained (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1973), II:457.
71
Mayeda tr., A Thousand Teachings 212. On this passage, see below IX.C.2.
72
See IV.C.4.b.
73
See II.B.
74
See the discussion by Potter 46–53.
84  
result and is therefore reliable in prescribing proper sacrifices etc.

for the procurement of goods seen to be advantageous to the still
ignorant jìva. The second section of scripture, the jñànakà»∂a, con-
sisting mainly of the Upanißads, is not injunctive, but rather declar-
ative, informing the listener of the nature of brahman and of the unity
of all reality. It is this latter portion of the scriptures, the jñànakà»∂a,
that most concerns •aákara, for it is through this knowledge-sec-
tion that the jìva is awakened to its true nature and becomes liber-
ated. Since both kà»∂as deal with supersensuous realities, they “tell
us something we did not know before and could not know other-
wise.”75 Yet for the purpose of liberation the karmakà»∂a is clearly
subsidiary to the jñànakà»∂a.
For •aákara, the purpose of all the Upanißads is to undo the
superimposition (adhyàsa) that is the source of the jìva’s bondage.76
The discriminative knowledge of the Self from the non-Self is made
possible through ≤ruti,77 after ≤ruti has aroused in the jìva the curios-
ity to know the inscrutable Absolute.78 In speaking of the knowledge-
portion of ≤ruti, •aákara distinguishes the two basic declarative
statements it makes throughout: “For the Vedànta-passages have a
two-fold purport; some of them aim at setting forth the nature of
the highest Self, some at teaching the unity of the individual soul
with the highest Self.”79
a. The Great Sayings (mahàvàkyas)

The highest wisdom of the Upanißads, the essence of the revealed
≤ruti, is most fully embodied in a small number of cryptic sentences
called the mahàvàkyas. The most well-known examples are “That thou
art,”80 “I am brahman,”81 “This Self is brahman,”82 “All this is but brah-
man.”83 The perfect comprehension of any one of the mahàvàkyas
leads to the liberating intuitive vision of non-duality. The one appar-
75
Potter 53.
76
See BrSùBh, Introduction.
77
See BrSùBh I.3.19.
78
See BrSùBh I.4.5.
79
BrSùBh I.3.25. Th. tr. I:198.
80
ChUp VI.8.7.
81
B‰Up I.4.10.
82
B‰Up II.5.19. These last three mahàvàkyas are listed together by •aákara in
BrSùBh I.1.4.
83
MuUp II.2.11. See BrSùBh II.1.14.
 85
ently given preference by •aákara, the one he quotes more fre-

quently than any other, is the first: “That thou art.”84 I have noted
above •aákara’s belief that a single hearing of a mahàvàkya may be
causative of the removal of avidyà, given the proper mental disposi-
tion. In a passage not directly related to the comprehension of a
mahàvàkya, •aákara indicates that it is not so much a keen intellect
that is required of the listener, but a pure mind, if religious truth is
to be grasped: “It is well-known that although the word heard may
be the same, still its understanding occurs according to the purity
or the impurity of the hearer’s mind.”85
To one unprepared to grasp its truth, the sentence tat tvam asi
appears to mean that the jìva with all its limitations is identical with
the perfectly pure and transcendent brahman.86 Since such a view is
errant, the hearer must therefore gain the power of discrimination
to understand the true meaning of “this” and “that.” He must learn
that the referent of tat is the Absolute, and that the referent of tvam
is not the normal understanding of “thou,” but rather the hearer’s
inmost àtman. Ordinary meanings must therefore be replaced by
implied meanings.87
It is not the intention of a mahàvàkya to make a “positive descrip-
tion of reality,”88 for brahman cannot be objectified or properly
expressed, but only indirectly designated. Thus the mahàvàkyas are
not “intellectual formulas” about brahman, but rather embodiments
of the highest experience of unity. 89 Their meaning can only be
unlocked or decoded after the seeker undertakes the triple-process
of hearing, reflection and meditation on them, under the guidance
of a liberated guru.
b. The Exegetical Triple-Method

The purpose of the three-fold process of hearing (≤rava»a), reasoning
(manana) and meditation (nididhyàsana) is to grasp the meaning of
84
See BrSùBh I.1.4, I.1.6, I.1.7, I.1.8, I.2.6, I.3.19 etc. See also Mayeda, A
Thousand Teachings 50, who declares that for •aákara “the huge bulk of the Vedas
is equated with a single sentence, ‘tat tvam asi’ (Thou art That).”
85
ChUpBh VIII.9.2. G. tr. 636.
86
See R. De Smet, “Spiritual Values of Advaita Vedànta and Social Life,” Indian
Philosophical Annual 18 (1985–86):7.
87
See Rambachan 77.
88
Potter 54.
89
Date II:468.
86  
scripture, in particular the meaning of the mahàvàkyas. This triple-

method does not originate with •aákara, but is derived from B‰Up
II.4.5. Here Yàjñavalkya declares to his wife Maitreyi: “The Self,
my dear Maitreyi, should be realised (drß†avya˙)—should be heard of
(≤rotavyo), reflected on (mantivyo) and meditated upon (nididhyàsitavyo).
By the realisation of the Self, my dear, through hearing, reflection
and meditation, all this is known.”90
I shall now briefly examine each of these three steps as employed
in •aákara’s system.
i. Hearing (≤rava»a)
The disciple begins by listening to scripture as expounded by the
guru, memorizing the texts, arriving at an initial understanding of
their meaning. This means, too, that the seeker must listen atten-
tively to the basic teachings as codified in the Advaita system.91
•rava»a, when applied to the mahàvàkyas, can also be mentally chal-
lenging. According to R. De Smet, this first stage is characterized
by “a complex process of purification and elevation: the terms of
the mahàvàkyas that refer to the Self have to be purified of all their
empirical and finite connotations and their radical denotation (svàrtha)
thus purified has to be elevated to the supreme degree. Thus one
attains their supreme sense ( paramàrtha) beyond any superimposition.”92
ii. Reasoning (manana)
The second step, rational reflection on the truth presented in ≤rava»a,
is undertaken for the purpose of conviction.93 With the help of the
teacher the student sees the rationality of teachings that, paradoxi-
cally, could not have been known through reason alone, but only
revealed by ≤ruti. In this stage rival views of heterodox schools are
refuted. All doubts about Advaitic doctrine are put to rest and the
jìva attains the mental calm necessary to undertake a sustained effort
in the following stage.
90
Madhavananda text and tr. 246–247.
91
See Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedànta (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980),
106, and Jacob Kattackal, Religion and Ethics in Advaita (Kottayam, India: C. M. S.
Press, 1985), 122.
92
“Radhakrishnan’s Second Presentation of •a«kara’s Teaching,” Prajñà 34
(1989):86.
93
See Kattackal 122; Deutsch 107.
 87
iii. Meditation (nididhyàsana)

This next phase is not discursive reflection on doctrine so as to attain
faith (≤raddhà) but is unbroken concentration on the fact of brahman-
àtman with the conviction that non-duality is true.94 It is, further,
“the silent sitting without manana or ‘running around’ of the discur-
sive mind, simply allowing the key sentence of scripture to sink into
and take possession of one’s whole being, until suddenly the great
awakening comes from within.”95 This stage prepares for the culmi-
nation of the entire process of deliberation on brahman (brahmajijñàsà),
which is the blissful intuitive realization of non-duality.96 Since the
content of this experience is inseparable from the teaching revealed
by ≤ruti, it is clear that meditation undertaken without the prior
acceptance of scriptural truth cannot lead to the desired awareness
of advaita.97
5. Effort
The central tenet of •aákara’s soteriology is that knowledge (vidyà,

jñàna) alone is capable of destroying avidyà and overcoming suffering.
All else is subservient to this one truth.98 Accordingly, no effort or
action undertaken, even with the best of intentions, is capable of
eradicating avidyà. The great trap of all action is that one tends to
identify oneself with it and to regard oneself essentially as a doer
(kart‰) rather than to know oneself as the actionless àtman. Nonetheless,
•aákara does prescribe certain actions in so far as they indirectly
aid the emergence of the liberating vidyà. In this chapter we have
seen that •aákara enjoins reflection and meditation, which are them-
selves actions. In addition, in Upad I.17.22–24, he recommends var-
ious ethical-ascetic practices that do not, strictly speaking, cause
knowledge, but which do contribute to the purification of the mind,
if performed with the proper inner disposition.99 When the mind is
sufficiently purified of egotism, desire and the sense of agentship,
94
See Cenkner 22; Kattackal 122.
95
Sara Grant, “Christian Theologizing and the Challenge of Advaita,” Theologizing
in India, ed. M. Amaladoss et al. (Bangalore: Theological Publications in India,
1981), 77.
96
See Deutsch 109; Kattackal 122–123.
97
See Grant 76.
98
See Mayeda, “Àdi-•a«karàcàrya’s Teaching on the Means to Mokßa.”
99
See Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings 88.
88  
when it assimilates to itself the teachings of ≤ruti, only then has the
foundation been laid for the emergence of the higher vidyà. As
•aákara himself declares: “There is actually no difference between
being liberated and not being liberated. For, indeed, the self is always
the same. However, ignorance about it is removed by the knowl-
edge that arises from the teachings of the scripture. But until one
receives that knowledge an effort toward realizing mokßa is valid.”100
100
B‰UpBh IV.4.6. Tr. by John Taber, Transformative Philosophy: A Study of •a«kara,
Fichte and Heidegger (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983) 25. Emphasis by
Taber, who in this work, 6–26, provides an excellent analysis of karma and jñàna
in •aákara.
CHAPTER FIVE
GRACE IN PRE-•AÁKARA VEDÀNTA
The purpose of the present chapter is to broadly sketch what the

pre-•aákara Vedàntic tradition has to say about divine grace. The
focus here will initially be on the testimony of sacred texts (Upanißads,
Bhagavad-Gìtà, Gau∂apàda’s Mà»∂ùkyakàrikà, the Brahma-Sùtra), but then
I will point out the necessity of summarizing texts of lesser author-
ity, such as Àdi≤eßa’s Paramàrthasàra and Nimbàrka’s Vedànta-Parijàta-
Saurabha. I do not claim to give a complete summary of the literature
on grace prior to •aákara; indeed that is a task that could be a
lengthy study in itself. My goal here is to point out what were prob-
ably some of the most important documents dealing with grace that
•aákara might have had before him when composing his own works.
Ultimately I hope to determine to what extent •aákara’s under-
standing of grace (if he accepts grace at all) corresponds to what
had been written and believed prior to him by other Vedàntins, and
to what degree •aákara revises what he has received, either by
reducing the scope of grace, by expanding its role, or by modifying
its sense.
A. G   Uß
The long history of Hindu spirituality has given rise to more than
two hundred Upanißads, but the most authoritative of these, which
are also the most ancient, number thirteen, or perhaps eighteen.1
Most scholars locate the date of composition of these Upanißads at
about the ninth century to the third or second century B.C.E.2
The Upanißads do not present their ontology in a systematic fashion,
1
See R. E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, 2nd rev. ed. (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1984) and S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanißads (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1989), who lists eighteen Upanißads. H. Nakamura, A History of
Early Vedànta (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 42, produces the same list as does
Hume.
2
Nakamura 42, however, places the composition of the Mà»∂ùkya Upanißad as
late as the first two centuries C.E.
90  
and it is possible to detect three main currents of thought expressed

in them that appear contradictory when read without the help of a
higher synthesis. When read in isolation from other passages one
may find texts in the Upanißads which suggest that brahman, the ulti-
mate ground of existence, is the sole reality and that the world is
an illusion. One may also read verses that appear to represent a
pantheistic view of the universe. And, finally, some Upanißadic utter-
ances seem to teach a sort of theism, in which brahman is a world-
governing transcendent Lord.3
The Upanißads are basically oriented to soteriology, yet they have
explicitly little to say about the need for divine grace to attain lib-
erating knowledge. The B‰hadàra»yka and Chàndogya Upanißads, which
are the oldest, longest and most authoritative of the scriptures, are
generally silent on grace, as are the other Upanißads of the pre-
Buddhist era, i.e. the Aitareya, Kaußìtaki, Taittirìya, Kena and Ì≤a. At the
most one finds such passages as the following:
Verily, he is the great unborn Self who is this (person) consisting of
knowledge among the senses. In the space within the heart lies the
controller of all, the lord of all, the ruler of all. He does not become
greater by good works nor smaller by evil works. He is the bridge that
serves as the boundary to keep the different worlds apart. (B‰Up
IV.4.22).
This one, truly, indeed causes him whom he wishes to lead up from
these worlds to perform good actions. This one, indeed, also causes
him whom he wishes to lead downward, to perform bad action. He
is the protector of the world, he is the sovereign of the world, he is
the lord of all. He is my self, this one should know. (KauUp III.8).
The face of truth is covered with a golden disc. Unveil it, O Pùßan,
so that I who love the truth may see it. O Pùßan, the sole seer, O
Controller, O Sun, offspring of Prajà-pati, spread forth your rays and
gather up your radiant light that I may behold you of loveliest form.
Whosoever is that person (yonder) that also am I. May this life enter
into the immortal breath; then may this body end in ashes. O Intelligence,
remember, remember what has been done. Remember, O Intelligence,
what has been done, remember.
O Agni, lead us, along the auspicious path to prosperity, O God, who
knowest all our deeds. Take away from us deceitful sins. We shall offer
many prayers unto thee. (B‰Up V.15.1–3; Ì≤aUp 15–18).4
3
See S. N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1988), I:50.
4
All translations by Radhakrishnan, Principal Upanißads.
  -≤á à 91
The first passage, from the B‰hadàra»yka Upanißad, speaks of àtman as

the controller, ruler and Lord of all beings, but there is no mention
of liberating grace. The second passage, from the Kaußìtaki Upanißad,
declares the Lord not only as the world’s controller, but also as its
protector. It affirms that it is through the Lord that the jìva per-
forms good actions and is exalted. However, this passage is at best
ambivalent regarding the Lord’s grace, for the Lord is also taught
to be the cause of the jìva’s evil actions and its descent to lower
worlds. In fact, it is difficult to affirm grace of any kind in this pas-
sage, because the Lord’s causality in relation to the jìvas is manipu-
lative and predeterministic.
The third passage, from the B‰hadàra»yka and Ì≤a Upanißads, artic-
ulates a request for divine mercy at death, so that the highest truth
may be made known and final liberation achieved. However, the
prayer is directed explicitly to Pùßan and Agni, gods of the sun and
fire respectively, who represent divine providence, protection and
peace.5 The highest Lord is not himself directly invoked, yet it is
clear that the Lord is the ultimate object of the prayer.
By and large, the emphasis for the Upanißads of this early period
was on human effort rather than on divine mercy or grace for the
gaining of liberation. Yet, as William Cenkner has pointed out, grace
is often enough implied in the early Upanißads, but it is the grace
of the teacher (guru) that is alluded to rather than the grace of brah-
man itself.6 In the Upanißads the teacher is regarded as one who has
reached the goal of liberation and is therefore the living embodi-
ment of absolute truth. The guru has attained enlightenment through
the Vedic tradition, and it is therefore his function to mediate the
wisdom and experience of the tradition to his disciples. The teacher
fulfils his role first of all intellectually as an exegete and skilled the-
ologian. But he also functions as a spiritual father who administers
to the aspirant by giving him personal direction and by setting an
inspiring example of compassion and serenity. Since the teacher is
himself immersed in the knowledge of brahman, is one with brahman,
is indispensable for the attainment of liberation, the grace of the
teacher is regarded as also the grace of the highest reality. The
5
See Raimundo Panikkar, The Vedic Experience (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1977), 190, 797.
6
See W. Cenkner, A Tradition of Teachers: •a«kara and the Jagadgurus Today (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), 18.
92  
notion of the spiritual teacher as the mediator of divine grace was

retained throughout the later Upanißadic periods and continues
through the present day.7
It is only in the so-called “middle period” (fourth century B.C.E.)
of Upanißadic composition that the grace of brahman or of the high-
est Lord is reflected on as central to soteriology, without explicit ref-
erence to the teacher.8 Here there is a greater realization that brahman,
the ground of being, is personal, or at least has a personal “side.”9
Thus, the Ka†ha, Mu»∂aka and •vetà≤vatara Upanißads, all of which
belong to the middle period, offer the first clear affirmation in the
body of Upanißadic literature that the grace of the Absolute is nec-
essary if liberation is to be achieved. The sayings of the Ka†ha and
Mu»∂aka Upanißads on grace, however, are few, whereas the •vetà≤vatara
Upanißad abounds in references to grace. The most important allu-
sions to grace in the Ka†ha and Mu»∂aka Upanißads are the following:
Smaller than the small, greater than the great,
the àtman is hidden in the core of every creature.
One free from desire and thus free from grief
sees the greatness of the àtman by the grace of the Ordainer. (KaUp
1.2.20).
This àtman is not attained by instruction
or by intelligence or by learning.
By him whom he chooses is the àtman attained.
To him the àtman reveals his own being. (KaUp 1.2.23; MuUp III.2.3).
Eye cannot see him, nor words reveal him;
by the senses, austerity, or works he is not known.
When the mind is cleansed by the grace of wisdom,
he is seen by contemplation—the One without parts. (MuUp III.1.8).10
The first passage, Ka†ha Upanißad I.2.20, has sometimes been called
the first clear instance of grace in the Upanißads.11 However, the words
dhàtu˙ prasàdàt, “by the grace of the Ordainer (or creator God),” are
7
See the discussion on the teacher in the Upanißads in Cenkner 8–19.
8
See Cenkner 18.
9
See the discussion on the link between brahman and the personal Lord in the
Upanißads in R. Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism, rev. ed. (London: Darton,
Longman & Todd, 1981), 134–137.
10
All translations by Panikkar, Vedic Experience.
11
See, for example, Bh. Kumarappa, The Hindu Conception of the Deity (Delhi: Inter-
India Publications, 1979), 48; Mariasusai Dhavamony, Love of God According to •aiva
Siddhànta (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 64.
  -≤á à 93
in some texts made to read dhàtu-prasàdàt, “through the tranquillity

of the mind and the senses.”12 In both readings the difficulty of com-
ing to know the àtman is first stressed. One must be free of all crav-
ing for earthly gain and free from strife if the àtman is to be known.
It is at this point that the translations diverge. If one reads dhàtu˙
prasàdàt, then the meaning is that the the Self dwelling in the cave
(guhà) of the heart is known through the grace of God, who may or
may not be identified with that same Self. If, on the other hand,
one reads dhàtu-prasàdàt, then the meaning is that knowledge of the
Self can only occur when the mind and senses are made sufficiently
tranquil. That the mind must be brought to stillness is something
that few proponents of grace would dispute; the question is simply
whether the present text assumes a tranquil state of the mind while
nonetheless teaching the necessity of divine grace. Modern interpreters
are divided on the issue; R. Panikkar reads KaUp I.2.20 as an in-
stance of grace,13 whereas S. Radhakrishnan does not. Radhakrishnan
feels, however, that •vetàßvatara Upanißad III.20, which is a variation
and a development of the present passage and which includes the
words dhàtu˙ prasàdàt, clearly articulates a teaching of divine grace,
but he does not feel that to be the intention of the writer of the
Ka†ha Upanißad verse.14 We shall see later how •aákara interprets
this verse.
In the second passage, Ka†ha Upanißad I.2.23 (adopted in Mu»∂aka
Upanißad III.2.3), a teaching of grace is clearly articulated without
the word grace itself being used. Again, the difficulty of knowing the
Self is the context of the teaching. The àtman is not really known if
knowledge is only theoretical; an intellectual approach alone will not
do. Revelation, self-disclosure of the Self, is required. Though it is
true that for the reception of this grace certain prerequisites are laid
down in the next verse (v. 24)—tranquillity, concentration, moral
purity—the attainment of the Self remains nonetheless a gift of the
Self. This gracious self-revelation is expressed in the word “elects”
or “chooses” (v‰»ute). If the purifed aspirant is not “chosen,” libera-
tion will not come. Ka†ha Upanißad I.2.23 therefore appears to teach
a doctrine of elective grace. Without a gracious self-disclosure of the
Absolute no amount of human preparation or effort will avail to
12
On this point see Radhakrishnan 617–618; Dhavamony 63–65; Panikkar 570.
13
Panikkar 566, 570.
14
Radhakrishan 617–618.
94  
attain emancipation. Perhaps one could go so far as to declare:

“Supreme though He is, He still does not favour every being; He
is to be attained only by those whom He chooses.”15
In Mundaka Upanißad III.1.8 the Absolute, the “One,” is declared
to be beyond the reach of the senses; words alone are incapable of
unveiling him, nor do asceticism and works suffice. What is needed
is a total cleansing of the mind, the grace of knowledge ( jñàna-
prasàdena), and meditation. Since here grace is placed alongside two
other factors, it does not appear that the present ≤ruti verse makes
grace as central as in Ka†ha Upanißad I.2.3/Mu»∂aka Upanißad III.2.3.
In fact, this verse may not refer to divine grace at all. Although
Panikkar translates jñàna-prasàdena as “by the grace of wisdom,”16
Radhakrishnan renders the phrase “by the light of knowledge,”17
Hume18 and Dhavamony19 “by the peace of knowledge.” Except for
Radhakrishnan, all translators do agree that some kind of grace is
involved, although no divine subject is given. The knowledge which
is given does not appear to be, strictly speaking, the result of human
effort, yet no clear assertion is made as to the dispenser of knowl-
edge, if indeed such a dispenser is even implied.
Thus, the only passage examined so far in the Upanißads that
unequivocally supports the centrality and absolute necessity of divine
grace is Ka†ha Upanißad I.2.23.
By contrast the entire •vetà≤vatara Upanißad is centered on the need
for divine grace to attain the highest goal, which is liberation from
pain and rebirth. The Lord who dispenses grace in this work is
Rudra-•iva, who is identified with the supreme brahman. In this
Upanißad the Lord is not only the cause of the world’s existence,
but is also its protector and guide.20 Devotion, or bhakti, expresses
the proper attitude of the devotee to this God of grace. Let us now
look at some key passages on divine grace from this Upanißad:
In this vast brahma-wheel, which enlivens all things,
in which all rest, the soul flutters about
15
Sanjukta Gupta, “From Bhakti to Prapatti—The Theory of Grace in the
Pañcaràtra System,” Sanskrit and World Culture, SCHR. OR. 18 (Berlin 1986), 537.
16
Vedic Experience 667. See 663 for commentary.
17
Radhakrishnan 688.
18
Hume 375.
19
Dhavamony 64.
20
Radhakrishnan 707.
  -≤á à 95
thinking that the self in him and the Mover (the Lord) are different.
Then, when blessed by him, he gains eternal life. (I.6)21
Here the divine gift appears to be the removal of the illusion of sep-
aration between the devotee and the Lord.
Subtler than the subtle, greater than the great
is the Self that is set in the cave of the (heart) of the creature.
One beholds Him as being actionless and becomes freed from sorrow,
when through the grace of the Creator (dhàtu˙ prasàdàn) he sees the
Lord and His majesty. (III.20)
This verse is a slight variation of Ka†ha Upanißad I.2.20, which has
been discussed above. Note that in contrast to the Ka†ha verse the
Lord (ì≤a) is explicitly mentioned here.
“You are unborn;” with this thought someone in fear approaches you.
O Rudra, may your face which is gracious (dakßi»am) protect me for
ever. (IV.21)
Rudra, hurt us not in my child or grandchild, hurt us not in my life,
hurt us not in my cattle, hurt us not in my horses.
Slay not our heroes in your wrath for we call on you always with
oblations. (IV.22)
The author of this Upanißad knows both the mercy and the terror
of the Lord. The Lord functions as saviour, but he may also be
experienced as unpredictable and aloof, never tender. In the view
of Jan Gonda, the ascetic listeners to whom this book is directed
“are supposed to have in their relations with God almost no per-
sonal interests outside the victory over death, or the final release of
all fetters.”22 Yet liberation is achieved by means of devotion to both
the teacher and the Lord23 as well as by the normal means of yoga
and meditation.
He is the maker of all, the knower of all, the self-caused, the knower,
the author of time, the possessor of qualities, the knower of every-
thing, the ruler of nature and of the spirit, the lord of qualities, the
cause of worldly existence, and of liberation, of continuance and of
bondage. (VI.16)
Here we read that the Lord is the cause of both liberation as well
as of the bondage that makes liberation necessary. This understanding
21
All •vUp translations by Radhakrishnan.
22
Viß»uism and •ivaism. A Comparison (London: Athlone Press, 1970), 23.
23
Gonda 21.
96  
of the Lord attributes to him causation for all that happens in the
world, while paradoxically it also affirms the reality of human freedom.
In the words of R. Panikkar, commenting on Rudra, the Lord of
this Upanißad: “He embraces the whole universe, and the Man who
recognizes him as sole God is liberated and saved. Salvation is not
achieved by human effort alone, nor is it a spontaneous act of divine
grace, as later theologies declare, but it is rather a unique act in
which “God” and “Man”—for we cannot dispense with these two
at this stage—coincide. To recognize the Lord is to be saved, certainly;
but, in order to recognize him, not only do I have to be united with
him but also he has to disclose himself to me, so that it has little
meaning to discuss at this point whence the initiative comes.”24
The closing verses of the •vetà≤vatara Upanißad provide the final ref-
erences to divine grace and human devotion:
By the power of austerity, and the grace of God (deva-prasàda), the wise
•vetà≤vatara in proper manner spoke about Brahman, the Supreme,
the pure, to the advanced ascetics, what is pleasing to the company
of seers. (VI.21)
These subjects which have been declared shine forth to the high-souled
one who has the highest devotion for God and for his spiritual teacher
as God.
Yea they shine forth to the high-souled one. (VI.22)
It is through his effort and through the grace of God that the author
of these stanzas, •vetà≤vatara, has become wise and inspired. To
perceive and assimilate these deep truths revealed through the grace
of God the aspirant must also first possess an attitude of deep devo-
tion to both God and the teacher.25
Although the •vetà≤vatara is the most important Upanißad on divine
grace, •aákara does not comment on it. Perhaps •aákara’s devotion
to Viß»u and his aversion to •aivism prevent him from doing so.26
24
Vedic Experience 154–155.
25
See Dhavamony 67.
26
See Paul Hacker, “Relations of Early Advaitins to Vaiß»avism,” Paul Hacker:
Kleine Schriften, ed. Lambert Schmithausen (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1978),
205–212.
  -≤á à 97
B. G   B-Gìà
As is well known, the Bhagavad-Gìtà (third to second century B.C.E.)

is the most popular work of Hindu religious literature. Its anony-
mous author, the Gìtàkàra, succeeded in reconciling the quite dis-
parate teachings and values of the leading philosophies of his age.
These included the ancient Brahmanic affirmation of ritualism and
caste distinction, the Upanißadic discovery of the divine ground (brah-
man-àtman), the Sà«khya doctrine of a plurality of souls ( purußas), the
ascetic discipline of yoga, the devotionalism of the Nàràya»a-Viß»u
and and Vàsudeva-K‰ß»a cults, and even the Buddhist advocation
of monastic renunciation and concomitant rejection of Brahmanic
legalism.27
The central problem facing the Gìtàkàra was reconciling the grow-
ing renunciation of all worldly involvement and activity in the name
of spiritual liberation with the responsibilities and obligations of
worldly activity required for the preservation of a society founded
on ancient sacred law. Thus the Bhagavad-Gìtà was conceived in a
time of great crisis.28
The Gìtàkàra’s solution was to propose a model of human activ-
ity that would not only bring the aspirant to the desired goal of lib-
eration, but would also maintain the order and structure of society.
What the Gìtà recommends therefore is an activity inspired by total
selflessness and an utter disregard for personal earthly reward. In
fulfilling one’s duties without regard for reward (nißkàma karma) one
freed oneself from the bondage to worldly means and ends.29
Such a lofty ideal of action could only be attained through the
27
See R. De Smet, “Gìtà in Time and Beyond Time,” The Bhagavad Gìtà and the
Bible, ed. B. R. Kulkarni (Delhi: Unity Books, 1972), 2–8.
28
Klaus Klostermaier, A Survey of Hinduism (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1989), 105, parallels the crisis out of which the Bhagavad-Gìtà emerged with
our own contemporary crisis and confusion, in which “there are no longer com-
monly accepted values and standards.”
29
See R. De Smet, “A Copernican Reversal: The Gìtàkàra’s Reformulation of
Karma,” Philosophy East and West 27 (1977): 53–63. See also S. N. Dasgupta,
Hindu Mysticism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 119: “We have, therefore, in the
Gìtà a new solution of how a man may attain his highest liberation. He may remain
a member of society and perform his alloted duties provided he has the right sort
of moral elevation, has fixed his mind on God, has dissociated himself from all
attachment, and, by self-surrender and self-abnegation, has devoted himself to God.
It is faith in the special grace of God to those who have surrendered themselves
to Him that forms the essence of the Gìtà.”
98  
help of the Lord. Through K‰ß»a the embodied form (avatàra) of the
one transcendent God, the author of the Gìtà teaches that the Lord
is himself the paradigm of perfect action, which human persons are
called to emulate. The Lord himself acts at all times for the good
of the world without ever being bound by desire or the results of
action.30 Action is therefore not to be shunned, but to be embraced,
provided that it is inspired by the right motives.
It is in this context that the doctrine of grace is articulated. As
R. N. Dandekar points out, “The doctrine of grace forms an inte-
gral part of the teaching of the Bhagavad-Gìtà.”31 Now, although a
teaching of divine grace had been clearly articulated prior to the
Gìtà in the •vetà≤vatara Upanißad, and although the usefulness of
devotion to God had already been articulated, the Gìtà represented
a further stage in the development of Hindu spirituality. In the words
of R. De Smet, “It was clear that man should love God with his
whole heart but it was not yet clear whether God personally loved
him.”32 The Gìtà clearly affirms the love of God for his creatures:
Those who are centered on me and full of me accede to my own
mode of being. In whatever way they surrender to me, in that same
way do I return their love. (IV.10–11)
To (a man of exclusive devotion) I am exceedingly dear and he is
dear to me. (VII.17)
And now again give ear to this my highest word, of all the most mys-
terious: ‘I love you well.’ Therefore will I tell you your salvation: Bear
me in mind, love me and worship me, sacrifice, prostrate yourself to
me: so will you come to me, I promise you truly, for you are dear to
me. Give up all things of law, turn to me, your only refuge. I will
deliver you from all evils, have no fear. (XVIII. 64–66)33
These verses seem to indicate that the highest Lord offers his love
as a response to the devotee’s prior bhakti, or devotional love. But
the entire context of the Gìtà makes clear that it is through the
Lord’s initiating action that true devotion is possible at all. This ini-
tiating action encompasses more than K‰ß»a’s bold new proclamation,
which, if heeded, leads to a greater self-understanding and then to
30
See BhG III.21–24, IV.13–14, IX.9.
31
Insights Into Hinduism (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1979) 143.
32
“Dynamics of Hinduism and Hindu-Christian Dialogue,” Communio 15 (1988):
439.
33
All Gìtà translations by De Smet, “Dynamics,” 440.
  -≤á à 99
conversion. In accord with the witness of the Upanißads, the Gìtà

teaches the immanent presence of the divine in all beings, who is
regarded as the ultimate impeller of human actions. However, the
assertion of God as an inner agent ought not be interpreted as deny-
ing human free will. Both the action of God in the creature as well
a real creaturely agency are affirmed in the Gìtà. Thus, in speaking
of the Lord in the Bhagavad-Gìtà, R. De Smet notes:
In particular, he is the changeless Source of all change, the originat-
ing Principle of all creaturely actions. Hence, no creature is the absolute
author of its own actions, whatever be the individual way in which it
channelizes the divine influx. The Lord is the true Agent, the crea-
ture the mere occasion (nimitta-màtram: XI,33); and this, not only because
his prak‰ti constrains all (XVIII,59) while he supervises it (IX,10), but
because “in the region of the heart of all contingent beings dwells the
Lord, twirling them hither and thither by his uncanny power (màyà)
(like puppets) mounted on a machine” (XVIII,61). This easily misun-
derstood statement does not aim at denying these beings’ freedom—
does not K‰ß»a appeal to Arjuna’s freedom, especially in XVIII,63,
and is not the whole Gìtà a schooling to freedom?—but at setting
forth forcefully the vertical dimension of creaturely action by which it
is rooted in God’s own action.34
Therefore, although “the relationship between grace and freedom is
not explored in depth by the Gìtàkàra,” De Smet holds that empha-
sis is given by this sacred writer to the sovereignty of transforming
grace. He cites two passages in support of this:
To these men who are ever integrated and commune with Me in love
I give (dadàmi) that buddhiyoga by which they may draw nigh to Me.
Out of compassion (anukampà-’rtham) for those same men, I, standing
(within them) in (my) mode of being as their Àtman (àtma-bhàva-stha),
dispel with the shining lamp of wisdom the darkness born from igno-
rance. (X.10–11)
Let (the man who has gained my highest bhakti through buddhi-yoga) do
all manner of works continually, putting his trust in Me; by my grace
(mat-prasàdàt) he will attain to an eternal, changeless state. (XVIII.56)35
The goal of the aspirant, then, is to live according to his true nature,
which is always at one with the perfectly pure though hidden divine
actor. According to Eliot Deutsch and Lee Siegel,
34
“Copernican Reversal.” 58.
35
De Smet quote and Gìtà translations in “Copernican Reversal” 62.
100  
The aim of human life in the Bhagavadgìtà is to attain a self-realiza-

tion that ‘I’ am not a separate, autonomous actor but that ‘I’ am at
one with a divine reality, and that my ultimate freedom comes from
bringing my actions into accord with that reality . . . ‘I’ can become
a true actor only when my actions get grounded in a divine will.36
The possibility of salvation through loving surrender is offered by
the Lord to all, irrespective of background or caste, for the Lord is
the “friend of all beings.” (V.29) K‰ß»a declares in IX.23–24 that
he even accepts the sacrifices offered in faith but errantly to other
gods, since he alone is Lord. The universality of divine grace is
declared most clearly by K‰ß»a in IX.32: “Those who make me their
haven, even if they be of vile birth, whether women, Vaishyas or
even Shudras, surely reach the highest goal.”37
The Bhagavad-Gìtà, then, affirms the efficacy and necessity of both
human devotion—a devotion that is freely offered—and divine grace
for the attainment of the highest liberation. The Lord is the divine
friend of all beings who declares his love for all creatures and there-
fore makes possible the creature’s own reciprocation of love. Through
the Lord’s grace and love the creature is inspired to respond in ado-
ration and sacrifice, thus rooting out all impurities that prevent the
actualization of the devotee’s true nature. For the Bhagavad-Gìtà, then,
the highest Being is eminently personal, transcending even an imper-
sonal brahman.38
C. G   B-Sù39
The Brahma-Sùtra, whose final redaction probably occurred sometime

between 400–450 C.E.,40 attempts to codify and systematize the
teachings of the Upanißads within the context of an ontological stance
called “difference-and-non-difference” (bhedàbhedavàda)41 According to
this view, brahman undergoes self-transformation in bringing forth the
world, but without losing its identity as self-existent eternal source.
The anonymous final redactor of the Brahma-Sùtra makes mention
36
“Bhagavadgìtà,” Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1987), II:126.
37
See De Smet, “Dynamics” 441.
38
See Deutsch and Siegel 126.
39
For a detailed introduction to the Brahma-Sùtra see above I.C.2.a.
40
See Hajime Nakamura, A History of Early Vedànta Philosophy: Part I (Delhi: Motilal
41
  -≤á à 101
of the positions of a number of ancient Vedàntic thinkers, includ-

ing Kàrß»àjini, Kà≤ak‰tsna, Àtreya, Au∂ulomi, À≤marathya, Bàdari,
and Bàdaràya»a, whose works have all been lost. The Brahma-Sùtra
is therefore significant for the historian, because it represents an
important Vedàntic link between the age of the Upanißads and those
early Vedàntic writers (•aákara, Bhàskara) who had the good for-
tune of having at least one of their works preserved in its entirety.
Keeping in mind, then, that the Brahma-Sùtra provides a glimpse
of Vedàntic thought after an interval of at least six hundred years—
since the time when the Bhagavad-Gìtà and some of the latest prin-
cipal Upanißads were composed—it is striking how little is said about
divine grace in this work. There are very few passages that explic-
itly make mention of grace, although there are others that may be
read to hint at grace, depending on one’s point of view and exege-
sis. Of course, this lack of discussion on grace is entirely consistent
with the purpose of the Brahma-Sùtra: to reflect not on the Bhagavad-
Gìtà, but on the Upanißads, whose interest in grace is notably lack-
ing, except in a few passages in the Ka†ha and Mu»∂aka Upanißads
and more centrally and frequently in the •vetaà≤vatara Upanißad. In
addition, the Brahma-Sùtra is largely based on the Chàndogya Upanißad,42
which has practically nothing to say about divine mercy or favor.43
Thus, the silence of the Brahma-Sùtra on grace should not be taken
as a rejection of grace; rather, grace may have been taken for granted
by the Vedàntic traditions that contributed to the making of the
Brahma-Sùtra. If there were any conflicts about grace among the var-
ious Vedàntic schools leading up to the time of the Brahma-Sùtra they
are not reflected in the text itself. The existence of grace was not
an issue for debate for the Sùtrakàra.
We may now look at the few brief texts in the Brahma-Sùtra that
either directly or indirectly refer to grace. A fuller treatment of these
individual sùtras is given in Chapter VIII, in which •aákara’s com-
mentary on the Brahma-Sùtra is analyzed.
Sùtras II.1.21–23 respond to the objection that if brahman and the
individual soul are identical, then brahman is not only subject to the
misery of the world, but would also be liable to such faults as not
doing at all times what is beneficial (hita). The Sùtrakàra replies that
42
43
R. Panikkar, Unknown Christ 49 note 4, would, however, see ChUp III.15.3 as
an instance of grace.
102  
brahman is not, after all, strictly identical with the jìva.44 Only sùtra
21 need be quoted here.
On account of the mention of another (the individual soul as non-
different from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) faults like
not doing what is beneficial to others and the like.45
Sùtras II.1.34–36 likewise respond to the problem of evil. Although
no mention of grace is made, the Sùtrakàra does affirm that the activ-
ity of brahman to the jìvas contains no trace of evil.
Inequality and cruelty cannot (be attributed to Brahman) for (his activ-
ity) has regard to (the works of souls); besides the same (Scripture)
shows. (II.1.34)46
Both liberation and bondage are attributed to the highest reality in
sùtra III.2.5, but the word grace itself is not mentioned:
But by meditation on the Highest, that which is hidden (viz. the sim-
ilarity of the Lord and the soul becomes manifest), for from him (the
Lord) are its (the soul’s) bondage and freedom.47
For some, this may be a troubling passage, because of its declara-
tion that the Lord is the cause of bondage, but the later Vedàntic
commentators will not see this sùtra as in any way compromising
the Lord’s goodness.
Sùtras III.2.38–41, in opposition to Jaimini, who believed that the
actions of jìvas brought about their own future results automatically
(sùtra 40), declare the Lord, and none other, to be the giver of the
fruits of all the jìva’s actions, whether good or evil. It should be
noted that Bàdaràya»a, who is referred to in the third person, is
cited as upholding the correct, or siddhànta, view.
From him the fruit, for that is reasonable. (III.2.38)
Bàdaràya»a, however, thinks the former (i.e. the Lord) (to be the cause
of the fruits of actions) since he is designated as the cause (of the
actions themselves). (III.2.41)48
44
See the summary by V. S. Ghate, The Vedànta (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute, 1991), 74–75.
45
Radhakrishanan tr., The Brahma Sùtra (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960), 354.
46
Radhakrishnan, Brahma Sùtra 363.
47
Radhakrishnan, Brahma Sùtra 445.
48
Radhakrishnan, Brahma Sùtra 465, 467.
  -≤á à 103
Sùtra IV.2.17 describes the fate of the soul at the death of the body.
The soul withdraws into the heart, and, if in possession of knowl-
edge of brahman, passes out the “hundred and first,” i.e. a special
nerve in the head, upwards to the sun, and then to the world of
brahman. This description is drawn by the Sùtrakàra from B‰hadàra»yaka
Upanißad IV.4.1–2 and Chàndogya Upanißad VIII.6.6. What is note-
worthy is that the Sùtrakàra describes this difficult passing out of the
body through a special nerve as accomplished through the favor (anu-
graha) of him who resides in the heart, a reference to brahman. However,
the authors of the two Upanißad passages that provide the basis for
this sùtra do not make mention of grace at all, either directly or
indirectly.
Sùtra IV.2.17 reads as follows:
There occurs an illumination of the top of its abode; having the door
illumined by that, owing to the efficacy of knowledge and owing to
the appropriateness of the constant meditation about the way which
is a part of that, under the favour of Him who resides in the heart,
through that which is the hundred and first.49
Thus there are only a small number of passages in the Brahma-Sùtra
that may be regarded as supporting the notion of a beneficial divine
activity, and only one of these, IV.2.17, mentions grace or favor
(anugraha) explicitly. Sùtra III.2.5 adds that both bondage and liber-
ation are from the Lord.
D. G  B°
Bhart‰prapañca is an early pre-•aákara Vedàntin who, like the final

compiler of the Brahma-Sùtra, may be regarded as a Bhedàbhedavàdin.50
I include him in this chapter, because he is one of the few ancient
Vedàntic writers whose teachings are fairly accurately known, because
of explicit reference to them by other ancient authors. That Bhart‰pra-
pañca wrote a commentary on the B‰hadàra»yka Upanißad even longer
than •aákara’s is well known. •aákara himself refers to this work
in his own bhàßya on the same Upanißad, although he opposes
49
See G. tr., •aákara’s BrSùBh 864.
50
On Bhart‰prapañca see especially M. Hiriyanna, “Bhart‰-Prapañca: An Old
Vedàntin,” Indian Philosophical Studies I (Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1957), 79–94.
104  
Bhart‰prapañca’s teaching.51 However, none of Bhart‰prapañca’s

works are still extant. His teaching can only be discerned, as
M. Hiriyanna has shown, by piecing together the various fragments
attributed to him by other philosophers.52
Klaus Rüping has pointed out that Hiriyanna’s essay summarizing
Bhart‰prapañca’s teaching needs to be both corrected and expanded.
Hiriyanna apparently overlooked the fact that Bhart‰prapañca, in
addition to presenting his brand of Bhedàbhedavàda, was intent on
combatting “radical monistic-illusionistic Vedànta teachings.”53 However,
Rüping does not address the question as to whether Bhart‰prapañca
knew the Gau∂apàdìyakàrikàs, an illusionistic work. Thus he draws no
conclusion as to the possible date of Bhart‰prapañca.54
From the few fragments of Bhart‰prapañca’s teachings that have
survived, the following bear on the subject of divine activity and
grace:
1) Bhart‰prapañca accepts the Upanißadic notion of antaryàmin (see
B‰Up III.7), which Hiriyanna describes as “the spiritual princi-
ple controlling everything from within.”55 Bhart‰prapañca inter-
estingly refers to the antaryàmin at times as the “Lord” (ì≤vara).56
However, he adds that it is only due to ignorance that the Self
is attributed the quality of controllership.57
2) Bhart‰prapañca embraces a way of salvation called the “com-
bined-path view” ( jñànakarmasamuccayavàda).58 Accordingly, libera-
tion is attained through the combination of knowledge and action.
•aákara differs from Bhart‰prapañca by making knowledge alone
51
See Klaus Rüping, Studien zur Frühgeschichte der Vedànta-Philosophie I (Wiesbaden:
Franz Steiner Verlag, 1977), 1–2.
52
See note 50.
53
Rüping 2.
54
Jose Pereira, Hindu Theology: A Reader (Garden City, New York: Image Books,
1976), 239, places Bhart‰prapañca in the fifth century C. E. Pereira’s book, 252–259,
reprints in English the fragments from Bhart‰prapañca’s commentary on the B‰Up
as compiled by M. Hiriyanna and published as “Fragments of Bhart‰-Prapañca,”
Proceedings and Transactions of the Third (All India) Oriental Conference (Madras, 1925),
438–450.
55
Hiriyanna, “Bhart‰-Prapañca” 82.
56
57
See Karl Potter, Advaita Vedànta up to •aákara and His Pupils (Delhi: Motilal
58
See Potter 50–51.
  -≤á à 105
the means to liberation. Action for him contributes to liberation

only indirectly or remotely.59
Bhart‰prapañca prescribes a two-stage ascent to liberation. In order
to attain virakti, or detachment, which is a prerequisite for libera-
tion, the practitioner (sàdhaka) should strive to identify himself, through
the practice of Upanißadic meditation (upàsanà), with Sùtra or
Hira»yagarbha, who is viewed by Bhart‰prapañca as a lower form
of brahman.60 Such meditation is done in conjunction with the per-
formance of daily rites and duties, called nityakarmans. There is no
mention here that the bhakti involved in such upàsanà calls forth a
divine gracious response.61 Nevertheless, such practice is said to lead
to apavarga, or escape from saásàra. Here the jìva is no longer bound
by the world and will no longer be reborn. Yet this is only a pre-
liminary stage of liberation; the jìva is still not yet entirely free of its
ignorance.62
To eliminate avidyà, a second combination (samuccaya) of action
and knowledge is required, whose sense, according to Hiriyanna, is
far from clear.63 In this second step, meditation on Hira»yagarbha
is replaced by meditation on the higher brahman. Action of one kind
or another is still performed, but a greater detachment in regard to
the results of action is now possible, since one has found success in
identifying oneself with the divine Hira»yagarbha. The result of this
second effort is the attainment of oneness with the higher brahman,
the elimination of all ignorance, and therefore the achievement of
liberation.
An important factor differentiating •aákara from Bhart‰prapañca
is the role of scripture (≤ruti ) in the process leading to liberation. For
•aákara, the hearing of a mahàvàkya (such as “That thou art”) under
the right conditions, i.e. a mind perfectly conformed to Vedic truth,
can lead to immediate realization. For Bhart‰prapañca, the hearing
and understanding of scripture is essential for the attainment of
liberation, but in itself is not enough. Meditation even after the
59
See Hiriyanna, “Bhart‰-Prapañca” 87.
60
See Hiriyanna, “Bhart‰-Prapañca” 88; Potter 50.
61
P. N. Srinivasachari, The Philosophy of Bhedàbheda (Madras: Adyar Liberary and
Research Centre, 1972), 154, interprets Bhart‰prapañca as meaning that “the seeker
after mukti should first meditate with bhakti on Hira»yagarbha,” but neither Hiriyanna
nor Potter mention bhakti in this context.
62
See Hiriyanna, “Bhart‰-Prapañca” 88.
63
See Hiriyanna, “Bhart‰-Prapañca” 88–89.
106  
correct understanding of scripture is equally important and is actu-

ally a cause of liberation. Bhart‰prapañca finds that Upanißadic injunc-
tions to meditate on the àtman more important than the declarative
mahàvàkyas.64
What is noteworthy in this discussion of Bhart‰prapañca’s double-
samuccaya is that there is no talk of grace. Neither Hira»yagarbha
nor the higher brahman is said to graciously inspire or respond to the
sàdhaka’s effort.
3) Hiriyanna, however, independently of his description of Bhart‰pra-
pañca’s soteriology, or path to liberation, with its co-emphasis on
knowledge and action, does refer to the latter’s belief in grace
( prasàda). Hinyanna refers to grace as being “of some biograph-
ical interest” concerning our knowledge of Bhart‰prapañca, but
does not make it central to the Bhedàbhedavàdin’s soteriology.65
According to Sure≤vara, Bhart‰prapañca was a devotee of Agni-
vai≤vànara. Hiriyanna notes that Agni-vai≤vànara is “merely the
personification of tejas—the first creation,” and for that reason,
he points out, Bhart‰prapañca incurs the ridicule of •aákara’s
disciple Sure≤vara.66
Hiriyanna further notes that in the B‰hadàra»yaka Upanißad Agni-
vai≤vànara and Hira»yagarbha are one and the same. We have seen
that in Bhart‰prapañca’s soteriology meditation on Hira»yagarbha
was a necessary step towards attainment of liberation. Since Sure≤vara
in his Vàrttika remarks that Bhart‰prapañca is supposed to have
received a boon (vara) through the grace ( prasàda) of Agni, it is likely
that bhakti played some kind of role for Bhart‰prapañca, at least in
the preliminary stage of the quest for liberation. 67 It is therefore
thinkable that grace functioned in some way in Bhart‰prapañca’s
thought. However, just how central grace was to his thought is impos-
sible to say. The emphasis in Bhart‰prapañca, from the records about
him that remain, is on jñàna and karma, and not on grace, in contrast
to some later Vedàntins. Furthermore, none of the extant fragments
of Bhart‰prapañca’s teaching link salvific grace to the higher brahman.
64
See Hiriyanna, “Bhart‰-Prapañca” 89–90. As an example of an Upanißadic
command to meditate Hiriyanna offers B‰Up I.4.15: “One should meditate only
upon the world of the Self ” (àtmànam eva lokam-upàsìta).
65
66
67
  -≤á à 107
E. G   GAUÎAPÀDÌYAKÀRIKÀS
The Gau∂apàdìyakàrikàs (GK) are a collection of concise doctrinal

statements (kàrikàs) attributed to the author Gau∂apàda, who, accord-
ing to Advaitic tradition, was the teacher of •aákara’s teacher
Govinda.68 The authoritative status of the GK, especially of the first
of its four books, is the subject of an on-going dispute. Some schol-
ars see the initial book of the GK as equal in authority to the
Mà»∂ùkya Upanißad, the ≤ruti to which the GK is appended.69 Others
hold the entire book to be of lesser authority than the Upanißads,
although nonetheless worthy of veneration because of its message.
The GK is a difficult work to date, because even if •aákara were
to be accurately located in Indian history—itself a daunting task—
and therefore provide the historian with an upper limit for deter-
mining when Gau∂apàda must have lived, there is no compelling
reason to believe that Gau∂apàda indeed lived only two generations
prior to •aákara.70 Also, the Gau∂apàda alleged to be the author
of the GK need not have been the only author of the work. The
strong Buddhist influence on books II to IV of the GK have led
some scholars to conclude that Book I was the original work and
that all else came later. Perhaps the most reliable evidence for deter-
mining the date of the GK is offered by another pre-•aákara Vedàntic
work, the Paramàrthasàra, which shall be discussed in the next sec-
tion of this chapter. Since the Paramàrthasàra could not have been
written after 550 C.E.,71 and since it linguistically borrows from the
GK, it is clear that the GK must have been written some time prior
to the middle of the sixth century C.E.72
Doctrinally the GK is “the first extant piece of literature that can
be safely classified as exclusively Advaitic.”73 The kind of advaita rep-
resented in this work is monistic-illusionistic, strongly influenced by
Buddhism while retaining its Vedàntic foundation.74 That •aákara
68
On the chronological relation between •aákara and Gau∂apàda, see I.A.
above.
69
See Potter’s excellent discussion, 103–105.
70
See I.A. above.
71
See Rüping 2.
72
See Henry Danielson, The Essence of Supreme Truth (Paramàrthasàra) (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1980), 1–2.
73
Potter 103.
74
See Rüping 2.
108  
actually wrote a commentary on this work, as tradition alleges, has

been called into question by the fact that a careful reading of the
bhàßya on the GK reveals discrepancies between it and other acknowl-
edged •aákaran writings.75
There are a few verses in the GK that seem to suggest that grace
or mercy or benevolence may be attributable to the Absolute, but
we must be careful not to attribute too great an emphasis to these
declarations, because the author’s doctrine of non-origination or non-
causation (ajàtivàda) does not seem to allow any ontological status to
the ‘recipients’ of salvation beyond that of mere appearance or illu-
sion.76 However, some scholars do conclude that the GK’s soteriol-
ogy does imply some kind of relation of the One, the turya, to the
beings in bondage in the phenomenal world.77 Further, as Potter
notes, a great many interpretations of the GK’s ontology and teach-
ing on causation are perhaps possible.78 Thus the verses I shall now
briefly refer to do not easily reveal their meaning.
After denying the various theories of origination or creation held
by other schools in the first nine kàrikàs, the author of the GK
declares in kàrikà I.10:
The inexhaustible non-dual One is the ordainer (ì≤àna˙)—the Lord
(prabhu˙)—in the matter of eradicating all sorrows. This effulgent Turiya
is held to be the all-pervasive source of all entities.79
The writer of this kàrikà appears to draw on Mà»∂ùkya Upanißad 6,
which had spoken of the one Self as the Lord of all (sarve≤vara˙) and
the inner controller (antaryàmi ), and also on Mà»∂ùkya 7 and 12,
which had referred to the supreme Self as benign (≤ivam). The word
prabhu˙, Lord, is an old Vedic term that the author of the GK
appears to use because of the word prabhava˙, “origin”, in Mà»∂ùkya
6. GK 10, if read in an illusionistic sense, would appear to indicate
that the supreme non-dual reality is the source of all the phenom-
enal entities that are cancelled out in the ultimate state of aware-
ness. Further, this same turya or turiya is the cause of the negation
of all creaturely suffering (sarvadu˙khànàm).
75
See I.C.1 above.
76
See the discussion by Caterina Conio, The Philosophy of Mà»∂ùkya Kàrikà (Varanasi:
Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1971), 49–54, and Potter 63–68.
77
See Conio 54.
78
See Potter 67–69.
79
G. tr. in EU II:212.
  -≤á à 109
Mà»∂ùkya 8 had declared the sacred syllable Om to denote the

Self, the turiya. GK I.28 identifies Om with the Lord residing in the
hearts of all; GK I.29 states again that the supreme reality is aus-
picious or benign (≤iva):
One should know Om to be God (ì≤vara) seated in the hearts of all.
Meditating on the all-pervasive Om, the intelligent man grieves no
more. (GK I.28)
The Om, without measures and possessed of infinite dimension, is the
auspicious (≤iva˙) entity where all duality ceases. He by whom Om is
known is the real sage, and not so is any other man. (GK 1.29)80
As mentioned above, Books II to IV of the GK appear to be strongly
influenced by Buddhist illusionism. After repeated assertions in Book
II that the world is purely an illusion, the author of II.32 thus
concludes:
There is no dissolution, no origination, none in bondage, none striv-
ing or aspiring for salvation, and none liberated. This is the highest
truth.81
For that reason it is impossible to interpret the declaration of GK
11.33 that non-duality is auspicious (advayatà ≤ivà) as an affirmation
of the Turya’s grace.82
Kàrikàs III.38–47 prescribe complete mental control as the means
to identification with the quiescent highest Self. There is no talk of
grace.
In GK IV.1–2 the author, although not expressing in any way
his indebtedness to the highest reality for the truth he has received,
does declare his gratefulness both to the realized teacher as well to
the spiritual method (aspar≤a-yoga˙) that has brought him insight.
Further, this method brings bliss (sukha˙) to all beings and is regarded
as beneficial (hita˙), presumably because it is the path to liberation:
I bow down to the One who is the chief among all persons, who has
known fully the souls resembling (infinite) sky, through his knowledge
that is comparable to space and is non-different from the object of
knowledge. (GK IV.1)83
80
EU II:230–231.
81
EU II:256.
82
See EU II:261.
83
EU II:325. Gambhirananda capitalizes “One,” because of the commentator of
this verse (officially •aákara) who sees the Lord Nàràya»a as the true object of the
disciple’s salutations “under the garb of this salutation to the teacher.” (326).
110  
I bow down to that Yoga that is well known as free from relation-
ships, joyful (sukha˙) to all beings, beneficial (hita˙), free from dispute,
non-contradictory, and set forth in the scriptures. (GK IV.2)84
GK IV.10O, the final verse of this work, goes yet farther and, accord-
ing to Gambhirananda, declares homage to the highest reality itself:
After realizing that State (of Reality) that is inscrutable, profound, birth-
less, uniform, holy (vi≤àradam), and non-dual we make our obeisance
to It to the best of our ability.85
In conclusion, let us note first of all in the GK the omission of any
reference to the major post-Upanißadic deities Viß»u and •iva, as
well as to any of the Vedic gods. Second, there is no clear affirmation
of divine grace in the GK, particularly if the work is seen as a unity,
i.e. if Book I is read in the context of the ontology of Books II–IV.
The homage that is paid to the supreme reality in the final kàrikà
of this work is made in full awareness of the illusory status of the
devotee and thus of the grace that is negated when all relation is
repudiated.
However, if Book I of the GK is taken as an independent elab-
oration on the Mà»∂ùkya Upanißad, then the references to the Lord
eradicating all suffering in I.10 and to his being benign (≤iva˙) in
I.29 take on a more realistic sense.
F. G   PARAMÀRTHASÀRA
The Paramàrthasàra (“The Essence of Supreme Truth;” henceforth

PS) is a small early Vedàntic work consisting of only eighty-seven
verses, which was apparently composed by a single author named
Àdi≤eßa. Because PS 83 is quoted in the Yuktidìpikà, a Sà«khya work
dating from the mid-sixth century C.E., the PS must have been com-
posed prior to that, probably in the early years of the same century.86
The PS shows strong traces of four religious movements: Advaita
Vedànta, Bhedabheda Vedànta, Sà»khya, and Vaiß»avite theism, but
also a minor Buddhist influence. For that reason the PS has been
84
EU II:326.
85
EU II:402.
86
See Danielson 1–2. Both Danielson and Rüping, 2, draw attention to E. Frau-
wallner’s Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie I (Salzburg, 1953), 287, which points out
the connection between the PS and the Yuktidìpikà.
  -≤á à 111
variously characterized as “Sàákhya Advaita,”87 as “representing a

transition from the Sà«khya to Advaita Vedànta,”88 as being a
“Viß»uite-theistic work,”89 and, more recently, as being an example
of “Vi≤iß†àdvaita” or “Bhedàbhedàdvaita.”90 The latter designation
presumably indicates that the teachings of advaita and bhedàbheda pre-
dominate in the PS and that further they exist “side by side in this
particular form of Vedànta,”91 without priority being given to either.
The PS, in its attempt to integrate the doctrines of heterogene-
ous schools of thought, is not entirely successful in articulating a
unified metaphysics. In the words of S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, if
the PS were to be regarded as an authentic advaitic work, then it
would be of “some period before Advaita Vedànta was clearly and
fully formulated.”92 For example, he says, the PS “seems undecided
as to the unity or plurality of jìvas.93 In addition, the world is declared
to be both different and non-different from brahman-Viß»u, and yet
the world is also regarded as an illusion.94 Perhaps Àdi≤eßa’s incon-
sistencies can be attributed to his greater concern for soteriology
than for metaphysics.95 This would bring his overriding intention
close to that of •aákara.
The soteriological problems addressed by the PS are those of other
Vedàntic schools: how to account for the fact of bondage, what needs
to be done to attain the liberating knowledge of one’s true Self, how
to describe the relation between the jìvas, the world and brahman.
A central tenet of the PS is expressed in verse 32:
God (deva˙) deludes himself, as it were, by his own Magic (màyà), which
consists of plurality (dvaita), and thus perceives himself as the (individ-
ual) soul (purußa) present in the heart.96
This mysterious delusion of the Absolute, then, leads to the creation
of an illusory world in which beings experience themselves as in
87
S. L. Pandey, Pre-•aákara Advaita Philosophy (Allahabad: Darshan Peeth, 1983), 55.
88
S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, The Paramàrthasàra of Àdi •eßa (Bombay: Karnatak
Publishing House, 1941), ix.
89
Rüping 2.
90
Danielson uses both these labels in his Introduction 7.
91
Victor A. van Bijlert, review of H. Danielson’s edition of The Essence of Supreme
Truth (Paramàrthasàra), Philosophy East and West 33 (1983):99–100.
92
Sastri x.
93
Sastri ix.
94
See Danielson 2–4.
95
See Danielson 5.
96
Danielson tr. 23.
112  
bondage. Though it is true that knowledge of their true nature will

annihilate the suffering of the individual jìvas, a greater truth is the
realization that both bondage and liberation are themselves illusory,
since all beings are in essence the supreme reality:
That which is permanently devoid of destruction (and) growth, being
killed (and) killing, bondage (and) liberation, is Supreme Reality
(paramàrthatattva). All that is different from it is untrue (an‰ta). (PS 69)97
Of course, the first question that could be raised in this context con-
cerns the locus of avidyà: Is it in brahman or is it in the jìva? This is
one of the central questions of the later Advaita tradition. Perhaps
this is one of the problems Sastri has in mind when he notes the
PS’s “uncertainties on some controversial points in the history of
Advaita.”98 Because of the word iva, “as it were,” in verse 32, the
author of the PS does not go so far as to clearly affirm delusion
and ignorance in brahman. In various verses of the PS the identity
of the world and brahman is both affirmed and denied, as is the
world’s ontological reality. Danielson is therefore correct in giving
equal weight in the PS to Bhedàbhedavàda and Advaitavàda.
Keeping in mind, then, the difficulties in understanding this illu-
sionistic brand of difference-and-non-difference, we need to address
the question of the role of grace in this work. Here we note the fre-
quent reference to the God Viß»u, an indication of the PS’s strong
theistic interest. The author of the PS makes àtman-brahman, the
supreme reality of the Upanißads, identical with Viß»u, who is named
in PS 1, 33, 56, 74, 86. The PS also uses other Viß»uite names for
the Absolute, such as Vàsudeva (vv. 29, 30), Upendra (v. 9), and
Nàràya»a (v. 67). This fact suggests that the Bhagavad-Gìtà was one
of the sources used by the author of the PS, but leaves open the
question as to why the same author would combine the teachings
of the Gìtà with the advaita of Gau∂apàda.99 Despite the similarities
on several points between the PS and the GK,100 especially that of
illusionism, there is a striking contrast between the GK’s silence on
any named deity and the PS’s repeated reference to the Lord Viß»u.101
97
Danielson tr. 33.
98
Sastri xiii.
99
See van Bijlert 100.
100
See Sastri viii–x.
101
In additin to the names of Viß»u just cited, the PS uses the non-sectarian
  -≤á à 113
I shall now briefly examine those passages that refer to the Lord.
The PS begins with an invocation to Viß»u and a listing of such
attributes as could only be posited of a supreme reality:
I take refuge in Thee alone, who art Viß»u: superior to the supreme
Primordial Matter (prak‰ti), without beginning, one, multifariously pre-
sent in the hearts, the support of everything immanent in everything
mobile and immobile. (PS 1)102
In verses 3–7 the student seeking liberation has presented the guru
with a list of questions concerning the mysteries of suffering, karma,
liberation and identity, with the hope that the teacher’s doctrine will
lead him across the ocean of transmigration. The teacher begins by
warning the disciple that the teaching he is about to receive is difficult
to understand. But before expounding his doctrine, the teacher first
offers obeisance to Viß»u. The implication is that it is through Viß»u
that the guru has come to understand the lofty teaching he is about
to impart. The teacher says:
I shall propound this “Essence of Supreme Truth” (Paramàrthasàra),
after making obeisance to that Upendra (= Viß»u), by whom this unreal
world was made from Primordial Matter as something seemingly real.
(PS 9)
The teacher proceeds to explain the nature of brahman-àtman and its
relation to the world and to all beings. He notes that people are
confused as to what is truly the changeless Absolute and what are
the various modifications of the Self (PS 26). To attribute plurality
to the Self is ignorance. One must rather see that the Self is one,
that it is the Self of everything, and that it is Viß»u alone:
This is “darkness,” viz., (for) the fact of being the Self (to be wrongly
attributed) to what is not the Self. Deluded by (this) error, people do
not recognize Vàsudeva (= Viß»u) as the Self of everything. (PS 29)
The following verse explains that Viß»u is the cause of both the
world’s manifestation and reabsorption into its Source:
After having extended himself through infinite varieties, viz., breath,
etc., like (a feat of ) magic, Vàsudeva, by his own sovereignty, reab-
sorbs (everything) as if playing. (PS 30)
terms deva˙ (God) in v. 32, ì≤vara (Lord) in v. 34, parame≤vara (supreme Lord) in v.
64, and bhagavàn (Lord) in v. 66.
102
All PS translations are henceforth from Danielson.
114  
Two verses later (v. 32) the author presents his teaching of the self-
delusion of God (deva˙), quoted above, as the reason for the world’s
manifestation. This, again, is a self-delusion “as it were” (iva), which
harmonizes well with the “playing” of v. 30.
PS 33, in accord with the previous verse, points out that “creation”
(s‰ß†i˙) is due to Viß»u’s màyà. PS 34 adds that the Lord (ì≤vara) mis-
takenly appears to change since the mind (manas), which is confused
with the Lord, changes from state to state. In PS 56 this same màyà is
declared to have issued from the very nature (svabhàvabhùtà) of Viß»u.
PS 58 and 59 had instructed the disciple to meditate on the true
nature of brahman, so as to become one with it and thereby overcome
delusion and sorrow. In a parallel verse the author of the PS notes
almost the same result of the disciple’s eventual self-realization, but
this time in terms of the supreme Lord ( parame≤vara), obviously a ref-
erence to Viß»u:
This all is only the Self. Only when one realizes (this Self ) as both
having and not having parts, does one become free from the impenetrable
darkness of Delusion (moha), and become Supreme Lord (parame≤vara)
at the same time. (PS 64)
PS 66 appears to draw on BhG IV.11: “According to the manner in
which they approach Me, I favour (bhajàmi ) them in that very man-
ner. O son of Prtha, human beings follow My path in every way.”103
The author of the PS declares:
By whichever appearance (bhàva) the Lord, who has all forms, is med-
itated upon, that appearance he adopts, as he is like a jewel (fulfilling
all) wishes. (PS 66)
Sastri notes that the jewel referred to, cintàma»i, is “a fabulous gem
reputed to fulfil all the desires of its possessor.”104 It is possible that
the avatàra teaching is meant here, according to which the Lord
Viß»u descends to earth and takes on various creaturely forms for
the welfare of creation, but it is likely that the author of the PS does
not limit himself to these, since the Lord “has all forms” anyway.
The meaning of the Lord adopting forms he already has is not clear;
perhaps this is the author’s way of stating that the Lord makes him-
103
Translation by Gambhirananda, Bhagavadgìtà. With the Commentary of •a«karàcàrya
(Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1984), 182–183. See Danielson 68, note 226, who adds
GK II. 29 as a possible source of PS 66.
104
Sastri 32.
  -≤á à 115
self accessible to the devotee through whatever form the devotee

chooses to meditate upon.105
In the following verse the PS repeats the teaching of v. 64, which
had declared that realization leads to becoming the supreme Lord:
By recognizing Nàràya»a (= Viß»u), who is the cause of emanation,
subsistence, and dissolution, as (one’s) Self, everyone becomes omni-
scient, all-pervasive, (and) Lord of everything. (PS 67)
Thus the author of the PS teaches that Self-realization leads to the
disciple becoming (one with) brahman (PS 58), parame≤vara (PS 64),
and ì≤vara (PS 67). Clearly the terms are synonymous. It is striking
that •aákara, who refutes a bhedàbheda ontology, will often make the
same three terms synonymous, in quite the same way that the PS
does.106
In PS 72 realization is linked to the attainment of the supreme
Self, who is synonymous with Viß»u:
When the fetter of ignorance (ajñàna) is broken, the host of doubts cut,
(not only impure, but also) pure (action) destroyed, and the seed of
rebirth burned, one goes to the Supreme Self (paramàtman), to Hari
(= Viß»u).
PS 74 repeats the teaching about the world being the product of
Viß»u’s màyà, the recognition of which leads to liberation.
The last verse dealing with the Lord is PS 86. Here the “supreme
place (or state) of Viß»u” (Ka†ha Upanißad 1.3.9) is declared to be the
goal of the religious quest:
Having (again) obtained the human state after a long time, (and) con-
centrating (again) on (mystic) Union, (that) Great One (thereupon)
reaches that supreme place of Viß»u, which is divine and immortal.
This supreme abode ( padam) of Viß»u ought not be understood in
terms of a spacial realm set apart from the phenomenal world, for
PS 73 had declared that liberation (mokßa) rules out a going any-
where. And had not the author of the PS declared the supreme real-
ity with which one merged to be omnipresent (PS 1, 19) and the
world to be illusory (PS 9)?
What may we conclude, then, about the role of grace in the PS?
105
See the second half of Sastri’s translation of PS 66: “He takes on those respec-
tive forms like the cintamani gem and reaches (the worshipper).”
106
See Eigen. 102, 106.
116  
First, what is quite noticeable in the PS when it is compared with

the BhG, a work upon which the PS appears to draw in its alle-
giance to the God Viß»u, is that, unlike the BhG, the PS does not
utter a single word about divine grace. Nor are any words for devo-
tion such as bhakti to be found in the PS.107 Perhaps the only verse
in the entire PS in which the Lord is affirmed to actively do some-
thing to assist the struggling aspirant is PS 66, which had stated that
the Lord responds to the devotee by adopting appropriate forms.
Sastri interprets this verse as meaning that the Lord, taking on par-
ticular forms, dispenses grace to the devotee who seeks him in con-
templation.108 Danielson, however, makes no mention of grace, although
he finds bhakti to be implicit in the entire work, even if the word
itself is never used.109
It is perhaps possible to read grace into PS 1, which speaks of
taking refuge in Viß»u, or into PS 9, which implies that the esoteric
teaching of the PS has been received and made understandable by
Viß»u. Nonetheless, the soteriological emphasis in the PS is on med-
itation and the salvific knowledge that results from this meditation.110
The author of the PS does not go so far as to openly declare that
such knowledge is graciously given by the Lord Viß»u.
That the author of the PS drew on the BhG without plainly adopt-
ing its clear stance on grace or uttering any words of “intense feel-
ings for God, which is so typical of bhakti,”111 is certainly surprising.
It is possible that the author of the PS is more strongly influenced
by the illusionism of the GK than even by the teachings of the BhG,
and is therefore reluctant to attribute an ontologically real beneficial
activity on the part of Viß»u towards a world which it has difficulty
affirming as being anything other than imaginary, despite the PS’s
occasional bhedàbhedavàda.
G. G  Nà’ VEDÀNTA-PÀRIJÀTA-SAURABHA
Nimbàrka, another Bhedàbheda Vedàntin, is almost unanimously

reckoned to have lived sometime between the eleventh to fourteenth
107
See van Bijlert 100.
108
See Sastri xii.
109
See Danielson 7–8.
110
See Sastri xiii.
111
Van Bijlert 100.
  -≤á à 117
centuries.112 But in addition to this view that makes Nimbàrka a

Vedàntin of the late medieval period, a more radical proposal has
recently been put forward by Joseph Satyanand, who places Nim-
bàrka at about 475–525 C.E., i.e. at least six centuries prior to the
dates normally given by historians of Vedànta.113 Even apart from
Satyanand’s new dating, the traditional dates given to Nimbàrka
were already striking in their degree of divergence, more so than
the chronological uncertainties connected with other Vedàntins, includ-
ing •aákara and Bhàskara. Satyanand’s theory, probably a correct
one, is very much in accord with the view of some of Nimbàrka’s
followers, who hold that their founder pre-dates all other Vedàntins
whose works are still in existence, including •aákara.114 If Satyanand
is correct, then Nimbàrka’s Vedànta-Pàrijàta-Saurabha (“The Fragrance
of the Heavenly Flower of the Vedànta;” henceforth VPS)115 would
represent the earliest extant commentary on the Brahma-Sùtra, pre-
dating •aákara’s bhàßya on the Brahma-Sùtra by a good two cen-
turies. Since, in my view, Satyanand’s theory is supported by the
most compelling evidence for an accurate dating which has thus far
been offered, and because this same theory is little known, it is nec-
essary here to summarize some of Satyanand’s arguments and attempt
to determine how scholars could have erred by such a large margin
112
Roma Bose, Vedànta-Pàrijàta-Saurabha of Nimbàrka and Vedànta-Kaustubha of •rìnivàsa,
III (Calcutta: Royal Asiastic Society of Bengal, 1943) 17, states that Nimbàrka could
not have flourished before the thirteenth century C.E. Ghate, The Vedànta, 19, draw-
ing on R. G. Bhandarkar, puts Nimbàrka in the twelfth century, offering 1162 as
his death date. Nakamura, History, 438, has Nimbàrka live a full century, giving
1062–1162 as the correct dates. P. T. Raju, Structural Depths of Indian Thought (Delhi:
South Asian Publishers, 1985) 506, asserts that Nimbàrka lived in the thirteenth
century, as does Radhakrishnan, Brahma Sùtra, 78, who places Nimbàrka in its lat-
ter half. R. N. Dandekar, “Vedànta,” Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan,
1987), 15:213 suggests that Nimbarka flourished in the mid-fourteenth century.
113
Joseph Satyanand’s Nimbàrka: A Pre-•aákara Vedàntin and His Philosophy (Christnagar-
Varanasi: Vishwa Jyoti Gurukul, 1994) is a revision of Nimbàrka and His Philosophy
(Ph.D. Thesis, Poona: University of Poona, Centre for the Advanced Study of
Sanskrit, 1983). This work is basically a study of Nimbàrka’s VPS, containing much
exegetical work, but also summarizes Nimbàrka’s metaphysics and soteriology. In
addition, Satyanand examines the evidence and arguments in favor of making
Nimbàrka either a medieval thinker or a very early Vedàntin. Satyanand’s thesis
was guided by both S. D. Joshi of the Centre for Advanced Studies in Sanskrit at
the University of Poona and R. De Smet of the Jñàna-Deepa-Vidyapeeth, also of
Poona.
114
See Satyanand 166–167.
115
See Bose III:8, who translates the VPS as “The Odour of the Heavenly Flower
of the Vedànta.”
118  
in placing Nimbàrka in the medieval period. After that, I shall exam-

ine Nimbàrka’s position on divine grace.
Since Nimbàrka’s present-day followers are worshippers of Ràdhà-
K‰ß»a, it is generally assumed that Nimbàrka himself was a devo-
tee of the same divine pair.116 And because devotion to Ràdhà does
not appear to have emerged in Indian spirituality until after the
tenth century C.E., it would appear that Nimbàrka could not have
lived prior to that time.117 Further, three devotional works, the
Ràdhàß†akam, the K‰ß»àß†akam, and the Pràta˙ Samara»astotram, all of
which are addressed to Ràdhà and K‰ß»a, are attributed to Nimbàrka
by some of his later followers. These works would seem to offer fur-
ther evidence in support of dating Nimbàrka in the late medieval
period. Indeed, none of the earliest Vedàntin commentators refer to
these three writings; they thus appear to be very late.118
However, it is difficult to attribute these three works to the Nimbàrka
who composed the VPS, for the VPS itself makes no mention of
Ràdhà and K‰ß»a, a surprising fact in view of Nimbàrka’s alleged
devotion to these two. By contrast, Nimbàrka’s preferred deity was
Ràmàkànta.119 Thus, the argument that would make Nimbàrka a
late medieval Vedàntin on the basis of his supposed devotion to
Ràdhà and K‰ß»a appears to be without a solid foundation. It would
appear, then, that any literary work devoted to Ràdhà and K‰ß»a
and attributed to Nimbàrka ought to be regarded as spurious, since
Nimbàrka in fact regarded himself as a devotee of Ràmàkànta.
As to other alleged works of Nimbàrka, the most authoritative
Nimbàrka canon prior to Satyanand’s study includes four works, one
of which is, of course, the VPS. The other three are:
1) The Vedànta-Kàmadhenu, also known as the Da≤a≤loki (hereafter DS);
2) The Mantrarahasyaßoda≤ì (hereafter MRS);
3) The Prapannakalpavalì (hereafter PK).120
In the same way that •aákara’s commentary on the Brahma-Sùtra
becomes the standard by which to ascertain the authenticity of other
works ascribed to the great àcàrya, Satyanand makes the VPS the
norm by which the DS, MRS and PK are to be tested for their
116
See Satyanand 30.
117
See Satyanand 34.
118
119
See Satyanand 49.
120
See Satyanand 48.
  -≤á à 119
own authenticity.121 For the following reasons, among others, Satyanand

concludes that the VPS alone is a genuine work of Nimbàrka, all
other writings having emerged centuries after the VPS:122
1) Neither Nimbàrka nor the earliest commentator on Nimbàrka’s
VPS, •rìnivàsa, make mention of any other works by the author
of the VPS.123 However, such an argument is not conclusive; it
may only indicate that the VPS was the first of many works writ-
ten by Nimbàrka or that Nimbàrka did not feel the need to refer
to any of his other works when composing the VPS. •rìnivàsa,
too, might not have been aware of other works that Nimbàrka
had in fact written. That is why, in contrast to the argument
offered here, Satyanand’s main arguments against the authentic-
ity of the DS, MRS and PK are not based on a questionable
argumentum ex silentio, but rather on a comparison of the teachings
of the DS, MRS and PK with the doctrines contained in the
VPS; i.e. Satyanand’s focus is on internal rather than on exter-
nal evidence.
2) The PK, consisting of only twenty-four verses, makes prapatti, an
extreme doctrine of bhakti and grace, the “unique means of sal-
vation.124 Prapatti, or total surrender of the self to a gracious God,
is defined by Satyanand as the attitude of “absolute dependence
of the devotee on the Lord for everything and at every moment,
surrendering oneself completely to the mercy of the Lord.”125 The
disciple, recognizing his utter helplessness to actively bring about
his own liberation, is to give up all other sàdhanas, or spiritual
paths, and throw himself entirely upon the mercy of the Lord
embodied in the guru, with faith that the Lord will protect him.
The PK teaches that the Lord is ever-ready to graciously respond
to the devotee’s surrender.126 Now, although the teaching of the
121
See Satyanand 46.
122
Satyanand, 54, does not rule out that Nimbàrka may have written commen-
taries on the Bhagavad-Gìtà and on some of the Upanißads, but these works are not
available today. They are, however, Satyanand notes, referred to by later Nimbàrka
followers, thus giving some support to this hypothesis. Nonetheless, one would expect
Satyanand to have exercised greater caution in citing the Nimbàrka tradition, since
he has gone to such length to destroy many of its other cherished assumptions.
123
See Satyanand 55.
124
Satyanand 51.
125
Satyanand 49. See PK 4.
126
Satyanand 49–50 and PK 4, 5, 10–14, 24.
120  
PK may be harmonized with the VPS, since the latter work, too,
accepts both the grace of the Lord and the importance of the
guru, the PK represents a teaching of grace that is much more
central and developed than that of the VPS. For the author of
the VPS, the disciple’s approach to the guru is only “a prelimi-
nary factor,” reminiscent of the ancient Upanißadic tradition; it
is not a separate means to liberation, as is the case with the
PK.127 Rather, the Saurabhakàra, i.e. the author of the VPS, makes
knowledge (vidyà) the sole means for the realization of brahman,
and hence, for the attainment of liberation. In this conception,
divine grace ( prasàda) is only accessory to the dawning of liber-
ating awareness; what is more important than grace, according
to Satyanand, is the practice of meditation (dhyàna) that leads to
knowledge.128 Later I shall examine more carefully Nimbàrka’s
understanding of grace.
3) For the same reason that Satyanand rejects the authenticity of
the PK, he also determines the MRS to be a spurious work.
What is central to the MRS, a composition of sixteen verses, is
again a much more developed notion of both divine grace and
the mediatorship of the guru than found anywhere in the pages
of the VPS. In fact, total surrender to one’s guru, or gurùpasatti,
is regarded by Satyanand to be a development beyond the sub-
mission advocated by the PK: “Here one surrenders himself com-
pletely, not directly to the Lord, but to one’s own guru.”129 This
is an idea foreign to the VPS.
4) Furthermore, the notions of prapatti and gurùpasatti, in addition to
being doctrinally more developed than the teaching of grace in
the VPS, appear to have emerged chronologically late, probably
due to the influence of the theology of Ràmànuja (eleventh cen-
tury C.E.) and the traditions that followed him.130 This argument
strengthens Satyanand’s theory that the Saurabhakàra, who he
believes to have lived at the turn of the fifth to the sixth century
C.E., could not have authored the PK or the MRS.
5) In addition to all that has been said thus far, Satyanand points
out one other doctrinal difference separating the VPS from the
127
Satyanand 51.
128
See Satyanand 51 and VPS III.2.24–26.
129
Satyanand 50. See MRS 8, 13, 15.
130
See Satyanand 51.
  -≤á à 121
PK and the MRS. Whereas the Saurabhakàra bars the ≤ùdras, or

people of the lowest caste, from the possibility of liberating knowl-
edge, the PK and the MRS do not appear to exclude any group
from the paths of prapatti and gurùpasatti.131
6) The final work of the standard four-work Nimbàrka canon, the
DS, consists of only ten verses. As with the two previous works
considered, the doctrinal differences between the DS and the VPS
are striking. The DS advocates prapatti, and the highest brahman,
to whom devotion is to be offered, is K‰ß»a-Ràdhà rather than
Ràmàkànta Purußottama, who is also referred to as Vàsudeva.132
The bhakti advocated by the DS is centered on the love ( prema)
of the devotee towards K‰ß»a and Ràdhà.133 This, again, is a
notion not to be found in such a degree of explicitness anywhere
in the VPS.
Thus, the only extant work attributable to Nimbàrka, the author of
the VPS, is the VPS alone. Chronologically, then, all that can be
said so far to accurately position the VPS is the likelihood that it
predates the emergence of developed teachings on grace ( prapatti,
gurùpasatti), doctrines that appear to be post-Ràmànuja (eleventh cen-
tury C.E.) in origin.
What specific arguments does Satyanand bring forth to situate the
VPS at the beginning of the sixth century C.E., i.e. to pre-date
•aákara by two hundred years? Satyanand’s reasoned discussion is
long and detailed. As with my summary of Nimbàrka’s canon, I shall
limit myself in the present discussion of Nimbàrka’s chronological
relation to •aákara to a summary emphasizing Satyanand’s most
important arguments.
First, it is remarkable that Nimbàrka, alleged to be a late medieval
Vedàntin, is so unlike all the other major Vedàntin commentators
before him in that he does not make any “attempt at refuting or
maligning any other school of Vedànta philosophy,”134 although he
“does indeed criticise and refute the doctrines of the non-vedic schools
like Sàákhya, •àkta, etc.”135 Most remarkable of all, Nimbàrka
does not appear to be aware of the existence of •aákara, the most
131
See Satyanand 52 and VPS I.3.34–39.
132
See Satyanand 52–53 and DS 4, 5, 9.
133
See Satyanand 53 and DS 9.
134
Satyanand 25.
135
Satyanand 309 n. 1.
122  
well-known of Vedàntins, who is the frequent object of the scathing

attacks of all the important post-•aákara Vedàntins, such as Bhàskara
and Ràmànuja, and whose metaphysical positions, like Nimbàrka’s
own, may be regarded as particular forms of a general Bhedàhaheda
approach to reality.136 In other words, one would expect Nimbàrka,
like other bhedàbhedavàdins of the Vedànta tradition, to openly attack
•aákara and his Advaitic doctrines, so as to better defend and but-
tress his own position. But Nimbàrka does not even allude to the
Advaita teachings of •aákara. “The most striking aspect of the
Saurabha is that it is completely unaware of any of the •aákarite
theories.”137
It is well-known that •aákara is antagonistic to the Bhedàbheda
point of view. Keeping this in mind, Satyanand lays down two fea-
tures that would inevitably characterize a pre-•aákaran Vedàntic
commentary:
A pre-•aákara bhàßya has, therefore, a two fold characteristic. First of
all, a pre-•aákara bhàßyakàra is unaware of the points that •aákara
raises against his doctrines. Secondly, a pre-•aákara bhàßyakàra is also
unaware of the typical •aákarite doctrines such as Brahma Vivartavàda,
Avidyàvàda, Pratibiábavàda etc. against which he is unable to raise any
objections, since he is anterior to •aákara. Among the extant v‰ttis on
Brahmasùtras the Saurabha alone has this double characteristic.138
In addition to its apparent ignorance of •aákara and post-•aákara
Vedàntic developments, the VPS is characterized by a stark brevity
which comments on the aphorisms of the Brahma-Sùtra using only “a
few words in simple language and style.”139 It would therefore not
be unreasonable to conclude that the VPS predates all other extant
Vedàntic commentaries on the Brahma-Sùtra and that its author was
the “earliest and the most ancient commentator among them”.140
However, this theory in itself is not without problems. It so far lacks
all evidence that any early Vedàntic thinker was aware of the VPS.
Is there in fact any evidence that the VPS was known prior to the
late medieval period of Vedàntic history? Are there any certain
grounds for concluding that the VPS is a pre-•aákara work?
136
See Bose III:180–200.
137
Satyanand 74.
138
Satyanand 81.
139
Satyanand 25.
140
Satyanand 118.
  -≤á à 123
It is at this point that Satyanand draws his most important con-

clusion. By comparing •aákara’s commentary on the Brahma-Sùtra
with that of Nimbàrka (the VPS), Satyanand concludes that the VPS
not only preceded •aákara’s bhàßya, but that •aákara in fact knew
the VPS and drew on it when composing his own work.141 Satyanand
demonstrates that •aákara, although not quoting extensively from
the VPS, does provide frequent instances in which he is either quot-
ing almost verbatim from the VPS, or is at least referring back to
or else incorporating a teaching from the VPS into his articulation
of the opposing Bhedàbheda view. In short, the pùrvapakßin, i.e. the
imaginary and anonymous opponent who •aákara sets out to refute
in his philosophical debates, is often Nimbàrka, although Nimbàrka
is never mentioned by name nor the VPS that Nimbàrka authored.142
Satyanand concedes that at times the Bhedàbheda pùrvapakßin who
•aákara attempts to contradict may in fact represent a broad tra-
dition of Bhedàbheda views rather than the position of a solitary
thinker. In such cases it is impossible to conclude whether •aákara
is drawing exclusively, or at all, on the VPS.143 However, at times
the language and arguments used by •aákara to articulate the
Bhedàbheda position are sufficiently close to what is articulated in
the VPS to make that work the likely basis of what •aákara wishes
to say in his commentary on a good many sùtras. The following is
a list of some of the more important instances in which •aákara’s
Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya seems to parallel Nimbàrka’s VPS, either through
a direct quotation or through a reference to the latter’s teaching:144
•aákara’s BrSùBh Nimbàrka’s VPS

I.1.25 = I.1.26
I.1.32 = I.1.32
II.2.40 = II.2.38–39
II.3.19–27 = II.3.19–27
III.2.11 = III.2.27–28
III.3.13 = III.3.13–14
III.3.16 = III.3.16
IV.2.1–14 = IV.2.1–13
IV.3.7–16 = IV.3.6–15
141
142
143
See Satyanand 80.
144
See Satyanand 81, 90, 96, 107, 110–116, 335 note 56, 336 note 56.
124  
In addition, Satyanand believes that Bhàskara, in his commentary

on the Brahma-Sùtra, “is aware of the position of the Saurabhakàra on
a number of issues,” citing Bhàskara’s bhàßya on I.1.31, 1.2.15, II.3.29,
and II.3.31.145 Thus, the VPS would be one of the sources which
both •aákara and Bhàskara had at their disposal when composing
their respective commentaries on the Brahma-Sùtra.
Satyanand provides further evidence in support of his theory that
•aákara drew on the VPS when discussing Bhedàbheda doctrine.
First, along with the many instances in which •aákara’s bhàßya shows
a “striking similarity” with the VPS both in language and the exam-
ples used for argument, •aákara also refers to the same scriptural
texts in favor of the Bhedàbheda view as does Nimbàrka.146 In addi-
tion, •aákara attempts to present the opposing view of the bhedàb-
hedavàdin as powerfully as possible before demolishing it on the basis
of his advaitavàda. Therefore, although he sometimes uses Nimbàrka’s
VPS as the basis upon which he presents the Bhedàbheda vieiw,
•aákara finds it occasionally necessary to present stronger scriptural
texts in support of Nimbàrka’s position than Nimbàrka himself is
able to bring forth: “•aákara takes note of all the Scriptural texts
that Nimbàrka has put forward in his defense although some of them
are not strong enough and could be neglected. Therefore he even
goes to the extent of supplying the pùrvapakßin with more proper and
accurate ≤ruti texts.”147
•aákara’s prowess as a dialectician is also evident in the manner
in which he strengthens Nimbàrka’s philosophical arguments in favor
of the Bhedàbheda view of reality, again, before setting out to dis-
mantle those same arguments. Satyanand correctly assumes that if
two texts, such as •aákara’s BrSùBh and Nimbàrka’s VPS, are at
all causally related, then the more developed of the two arguments
on the same topic, in this case on the Bhedàbhedavàda, would rep-
resent the more recent of the two texts. That is to say, •aákara
expands on Nimbàrka’s teaching, but the reverse cannot be true:148
“Although •aákara does not quote verbatim from the Saurabha, he
shows that he is quite familiar with the doctrinal tenets identical with
those of the Saurabha. In this connection it is worth noting that a
145
146
Satyanand 81, 83, 88.
147
Satyanand 88.
148
See Satyanand 88.
  -≤á à 125
bhàßyakara of •aákara’s calibre and ingenuity often tends to refine

and systematize the views of the pùrvapakßin thereby making the
pùrvapakßin’s views clearer. In such cases even though we may not
find in the •aákarabhàßya verbatim quotations from the pùrvapakßin still
his ideas are clearly presented by •aákara.”149
Nimbàrka’s commentary is always shorter than that of •aákara,
and cannot be a summary of what •aákara has said.150 Rather the
reverse is true. For if Nimbàrka were summarizing •aákara, says
Satyanand, he could “ill afford to miss the more refined vocabulary,
the logical clarity, the academic excellence and the scholarly per-
spective of the original work. He can never leave aside the more
convincing and powerful illustrations as well as the apt scriptural
texts of the one he is summarizing.”151
I find Satyanand’s arguments persuasive in their logical clarity. If
he has convincingly shown, then, that the VPS is a pre-•aákara
bhàßya on the Brahma-Sùtra, the question remains as to how early the
VPS should be dated. Here Satyanand presents arguments which
are a good deal more speculative and hypothetical than what he
had said in support of his thesis that •aákara knew and used the
VPS, yet they are plausible in their own right.
To begin with, Nimbàrka, in II.2.42–45, attacks the ancient
•àktavàda, the worship of “an exclusively female principle as the
Supreme deity,” but he criticizes this doctrine in its more developed
form. Since a doctrinally developed •akta teaching did not emerge
until the end of the fifth century C.E., Satyanand concludes that
Nimbàrka could not have lived prior to this time.152
In addition, Nimbàrka, in his refutation of the Sà«khya position,
does not appear to be aware of Ì≤varak‰ß»a’s Sà«khyakàrikàs, whose
composition Satyanand places in the sixth century C.E.153 Nimbàrka,
then, must have lived sometime during or after the emergence of a
developed •aktavàda (late fifth century C.E.) and prior to Ì≤varak‰ß»a
(sixth century C.E.). However, many would dispute Satyanand’s late
placing of Ì≤varak‰ß»a. R. Puligandla154 and C. Sharma,155 for example,
149
Satyanand 81.
150
See Satyanand 88.
151
Satyanand 88.
152
See Satyanand 159, 165.
153
154
Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy (Nashville: Abingon Press, 1975), 114.
155
A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 150.
126  
assign the author of the Sà«khyakàrikàs to the fifth century C.E., while
P. T. Raju puts him in the third century C.E.156 Thus, it appears
to be a hazardous undertaking to attempting to locate Nimbàrka
chronologically by recourse to Ì≤varak‰ß»a.
However, Satyanand points out the theological similarity between
the VPS and the Paramàrthasàra (PS), which he correctly dates as
early sixth century C.E.157 Noting the teaching in both works of an
underdeveloped Vaiß»avite bhakti (a bhakti of meditation rather than
of ardent devotion) coupled with the doctrine of liberation through
jñàna alone, Satyanand is led to conclude that the VPS and the PS
were roughly contemporaneous, meaning that the VPS must have
been composed around the early sixth century C.E. at the latest.158
In conclusion, Satyanand’s theory of the VPS as a pre-•aákara
commentary on the Brahma-Sùtra is quite compelling. It does indeed
appear that •aákara, and quite possibly Bhàskara, knew this work
when composing their own bhàßyas on the Brahma-Sùtra. Satyanand,
then, has made a major contribution to Vedàntic studies. He has
not only shown that Nimbàrka was not a Vedàntin of the late
medieval period, but he has also shed important light on the most
difficult period of Vedàntic thought, i.e. the period between the com-
position of the principal Upanißads and the commentaries of •aákara.
For now one more bit of evidence has been added to the puzzle
tracing the development of early Vedànta and its link with Vaiß»avism.
Furthermore, by placing Nimbàrka prior to •aákara, and by show-
ing that •aákara knew Nimbàrka’s theology, a new criterium has
been added to our method of determining what is original to •aákara’s
thought and what has been inherited by him from the past.
Where Satyanand’s method appears to be on shaky ground is in
his attempt to precisely date Nimbàrka by reference to •àktism,
Sà«khya, and the PS. Probably the most that can be said is that
the VPS was composed sometime between the emergence of the
completed Brahma-Sùtra and the arrival of •aákara. However, an
even more precise dating might be made possible by reference to
Gau∂apàda, an earlier Advaitin than •aákara. Since the Gau∂apàdìya-
kàrikàs were composed in the early sixth century C.E., and since, as
Satyanand has pointed out, the VPS does not appear to be aware
156
Structural Depths 304.
157
See Satyanand 166.
158
See Satyanand 166.
  -≤á à 127
of advaitic doctrine,159 Gau∂apàda rather than •aákara would appear

to present the most logical limit for the latest possible dating of the
VPS. Thus, by means of reference to Gau∂apàda rather than through
recourse to •àktism, Sà«khya, and the PS, Satyanand’s dates are
confirmed to be generally accurate.
In attempting to summarize Nimbàrka’s position on grace, I believe,
in contrast to Satyanand, that the VPS reflects a more developed
and explicit teaching than does the PS. We recall that the PS never
expressly mentions any word for grace, although it otherwise draws
heavily on the BhG.160 The VPS, on the other hand, more than
once explicitly affirms the reality of grace. I shall now examine in
some detail what Nimbàrka has to say about divine grace.
In his remarks on the very first sùtra (VPS I.1.1), Nimbàrka offers
a list of prerequisites that make a person eligible for brahmajijñàsà,
the systematic search to know brahman. Among these are a knowl-
edge of religious duties and the results that arise from these duties,
the ability to be able to distinguish what is transitory from what is
lasting, the desire for both the grace of the Lord (bhagavatprasàda)
and the vision (dar≤ana) of him, and “whole-hearted devotion for the
holy spiritual teacher” (≤rìgurubhakti).161 Although Nimbàrka surpasses
the author of the PS by explicitly referring to divine grace ( prasàda),
he grants grace no particular status in his long list of prerequisites;
it is simply one of the many requirements that he recommends. Thus
Nimbàrka does not appear in his opening sùtra to establish an agenda
that would make grace the central theme for his commentary on
the Brahma-Sùtra.
As noted above, Nimbàrka’s iß†a-devatà (preferred deity) is Ràmàkànta
Purußottama or Vàsudeva Ràmàkànta Purußottama.162 Such a choice
places Nimbàrka squarely within the sphere of Vaiß»avite religion,
yet for the most part, as Satyanand notes, the VPS is generally
devoid of Vaiß»avite sectarianism. Neither the vyùhavàda nor a doc-
trine of avatars are ever mentioned in the VPS and do not appear
to be accepted by Nimbàrka.163 The VPS is almostly completely free
of Vaiß»avite terms, and its theology exemplifies a less developed
159
See Satyanand 74.
160
See V.G. above.
161
See VPS I.1.1, p. 1, lines 7–14 and Bose I:1–2.
162
163
128  
Vaiß»avite brand than do the theologies of later Vaiß»avites.164

Normally Nimbàrka will designate the supreme Reality in its tran-
scendental form brahman, thus revealing Nimbàrka’s primary indebt-
edness to the Upanißadic tradition, but Nimbàrka will also identify
brahman with Lord Vàsudeva, also called Ràmàkànta Purußottama, a
sign that Nimbàrka has also inherited his spirituality from Bhàgavata
Vaiß»avism.165
Like •aákara, Nimbàrka distinguishes the supreme reality in itself
from the supreme reality in relation to the cosmos. When speaking
of the former, Nimbàrka is want to use the term brahman, yet this
same brahman is identified with •rì Purußottama or Bhagavad Vàsudeva
in as far as brahman is regarded as having a relation to the phe-
nomenal world, presumably as cause of the world’s existence. As the
most interior reality of the individual jìva Nimbàrka designates the
highest reality paramàtman or antaryàmin, both of which are Upanißadic
terms.166 But again, all of these names or terms refer ultimately to
the same divine reality. In regard to divine grace in VPS I.1.1, we
recall that Nimbàrka refers to the Lord (bhagavàn), and not to brahman,
as the dispenser of grace.
Yet, as with •aákara, Nimbàrka sometimes does not abide by a
clear-cut distinction between a non-relational brahman and a relational
Lord or bhagavàn. In VPS I.1.4, for example, Nimbàrka attributes to
brahman the tasks of regulating all works, and of giving the fruits of
the creature’s works, when one might expect him to ascribe this
function to the bhagavàn.167 Thus brahman is seen to dispense reward
and punishment to the jìva in accord with the jìva’s ethical action.
In VPS I.3.20 Nimbàrka further declares that the liberation of the
jìva, expressed in the words “manifestation of the real nature of the
soul,” is caused by the supreme Self ( paramàtman).168 Nimbàrka does
not, however, explain how this is.
In his bhàßya on III.2.5 Nimbàrka affirms what the sùtrakàra has
already declared: Both bondage and liberation are from the highest
reality. Nimbàrka designates the supreme reality in this case to be
the “highest Lord” ( parame≤vara), but he does not, in fact, make the
164
165
166
See Satyanand 26.
167
See VPS I.1.4, p. 17, lines 20–21 and Bose I:32.
168
See VPS I.3.20, p. 94, lines 1–2 and Bose I:172.
  -≤á à 129
Lord culpable for the soul’s bondage, by which the soul’s true nature
is hidden. Rather, the supreme Lord only acts in response to the
prior actions of the soul. It is only in this sense that the Lord is
responsible for the soul remaining in bondage. The implication here
is that the Lord’s liberating action is in some sense deserved by the
soul’s earlier preparatory behavior. But Nimbàrka does not mention
the word grace explicitly in his commentary on this sùtra.169
In VPS III.2.24 the Sùtrakàra teaches that the realization of brah-
man occurs in perfect meditation; Nimbàrka maintains the necessity
of meditation (dhyàna), but adds that “loving devotion” (bhaktiyoga) is
equally necessary.170 Satyanand understands this to mean that brah-
man is revealed to one who meditates with loving devotional medi-
tation.171 In other words, in contrast to later developed bhakti teaching,
devotion alone does not suffice for Nimbàrka as the proper action
required of the aspirant to reach the highest spiritual goal; it is rather
meditation that is the key, but it must be a meditation that is imbued
with the quality of devotion. In his bhàßya Nimbàrka quotes Mu»∂aka
Upanißad III.1.8, which teaches that brahman is perceived “brahmajñà-
naprasàdena,” a passage Bose chooses to translate as “through the
clarification of the knowledge of Brahman.”172 The word prasàda, of
course, is also a standard word for grace, but it need not mean grace
in every context.173
In the following sùtra bhàßya, VPS III.2.25, Nimbàrka again empha-
sizes the need of meditation without reference to grace, when he
declares, “The sense is that the direct vision of Brahman results from
the incessant repetition of the sàdhanas or the means consisting
in perfect meditation.”174 Satyanand correctly comments that the
Saurabha “does not speak of bhakti as an independent means of
liberation.175
In sùtras III.2.39–41 Nimbàrka repeats the standard Vedàntic teach-
ing that rewards are connected to earlier actions by the supreme
ruler of the universe and not by some principle inherent in the
actions themselves. In sùtra 41 Nimbàrka designates this reality the
169
See VPS III.2.5, p. 274, line 22 to p. 275, line 1 and Bose II:513.
170
See VPS III.2.24, p. 288, line 2 and Bose II:545.
171
See Satyanand 274.
172
See VPS III.2.24, p. 288, line 2 and Bose II:545–546.
173
See VII.A below.
174
See VPS III.2.25, p. 288, lines 22–23 and Bose II:547.
175
Satyanand 275.
130  
supreme Self ( paramàtman), whereas in I.1.4 he called it brahman.176

Nimbàrka returns to the issue of divine action as a factor, or per-
haps the factor, leading to liberation in VPS III.4.8. There he says
that the highest human goal ( purußàrtha) arises from the “Lord of all”
(sarve≤vara), in accord with the teachings of the Upanißads.177 As always,
Nimbàrka remains enigmatic when linking the Lord’s activity to
human liberation, as he does not further elaborate on the operation
of grace or the prerequisites for its reception.
In VPS IV.2.16, the last sùtra referred to here in the context of
a gracious divine action, the sùtrakàra states that the dying person,
favored (anug‰hìta˙) by One dwelling in the heart, and because of the
power of his (the jìva’s) knowledge, is able to find the door leading
out of the body through the hundred and first vein. Nimbàrka under-
stands this gracious One to be the parame≤vara, who is pleased with
the jìva’s knowledge acquired through meditation. Nimbàrka quotes
the anug‰hìta˙ of the Sùtrakàra in his bhàßya, but does not substan-
tially add to our understanding of grace in his commentary.178
We may summarize Nimbàrka’s thoughts on grace as follows:
1) Nimbàrka explicitly refers to divine grace or favor in VPS I.1.1
( prasàda) and IV.2.16 (anug‰hìta˙). Only the first of these two
affirmations is made independently of the text Nimbàrka is com-
menting on, and it is important because it appears at the begin-
ning of his work. On the other hand, its importance is somewhat
relativized by the fact that grace appears as one of many factors
required for liberation to be attained.
Nimbàrka’s affirmation of divine favor in IV.2.16 contrasts with I.1.1,
because in IV.2.16 the bhàßyakara is indebted to the theology and
language of the sùtrakàra. Because the sùtra mentions divine favor,
Nimbàrka does too. However, Nimbàrka shows his independence in
IV.2.16 by declaring the gracious One residing in the heart to be
the parame≤vara; in I.1.1 Nimbàrka had attributed grace to bhagavàn,
who he identifies as Vàsudeva Ràmàkànta Purußottama. In both
instances, then, in which Nimbàrka explicitly mentions grace or favor,
the giver of grace is said to be the “Lord” or the “supreme Lord,”
not brahman.
176
See VPS III.2.39–41, p. 297 and Bose II:571–573.
177
See VPS III.4.8, p. 357, lines 14–18 and Bose II:719–720.
178
See VPS IV.2.1, p. 406, lines 15–22 and Bose II:827.
  -≤á à 131
2) Nimbàrka alludes to grace directly or indirectly, without using

the word as such, in I.1.4, I.3.20, III.2.5, III.2.24, III.2.39–41,
and III.4.8.
In I.1.4 and III.2.39–41 Nimbàrka makes brahman and the paramàtman
respectively responsible for the future retribution of present and past
human action, but he does not refer to liberation in this connection.
In I.3.20 Nimbàrka makes the paramàtman the cause of the jìva’s
liberation. By yet another contrast, Nimbàrka declares the cause of
the soul’s liberation in III.2.5 to be the parame≤vara. In III.2.24 the
same author states that meditation on brahman with loving devotion
is necessary for liberation, but does not go so far as to declare brah-
man to be a dispenser of grace. In III.4.8 Nimbàrka teaches that lib-
eration arises from the “Lord of all” (sarve≤vara).
Thus, leaving aside the issue of actions and the finite results of
actions (I.1.4, III.2.39–41), we note that Nimbàrka attributes liberating
causative activity to bhagavàn (= Vàsudeva Ràmàkànta Purußottama),
to the paramàtman, to the parame≤vara, to the sarve≤vara, and perhaps
to brahman. All of these terms, used in the context of a gracious
action, appear to be synonymous and interchangeable.
3) There are instances, too, in which Nimbàrka appears to stress
the efficacy of meditation to the point of making it even more
central to liberation than divine grace. We note here VPS III.2.25,
in which Nimbàrka had attributed liberating awareness to the
practice of perfect meditation. In addition, Satyanand sees III.4.50
as an instance of this same doctrine. Nimbàrka had stated that
in the absence of obstructions, knowledge arises.179 Satyanand
interprets this to mean, “As a result of prolonged meditation on
the self and the Brahman, the salvific knowledge (vidyà) will arise
in this life if . . . no obstacles are present,” but he does not make
it clear why this articulation of Nimbàrka should refer explicitly
and solely to meditation.180
4) Thus the question remains as to the link between human medi-
tation and divine grace. Satyanand himself is not clear on this
point. On the one hand he interprets Nimbàrka as teaching that
meditation “directly generates on the upàsaka the awareness of his
179
See VPS III.4.50, p. 381, lines 23–25 and Bose II:775.
180
Satyanand 273.
132  
own bhedàbheda relation with Brahman.”181 He adds that Nimbàrka

“insists on vidyà as the only means of mokßa.”182 On the other
hand Satyanand emphasizes that “the prasàda of the bhagavàn seems
to be the ultimate cause of the liberation of the soul. For the
final enlightenment is a gratuitous gift from the Lord.”183
However, Satyanand is finally able to adequately harmonize the cen-
trality of both meditation and grace when he summarizes: “The
salvific jñàna, due to which the jìva realizes its bhedàbheda relation with
Brahman, is ultimately a gift ( prasàda) of Brahman. The jìva merits
this prasàda through its constant meditation on Brahman.”184 Thus,
although it is perhaps more correct, keeping to Nimbàrka’s own lin-
guistic usage, to attribute to the parame≤vara rather than to brahman
gracious activity, Satyanand probably is correct in concluding that
liberating grace is something that the devoted meditator earns by
virtue of a constant spiritual practice and longing. Satyanand con-
tinues: “Seeing the earnestness and commitment of the upàsaka the
Lord finally enlightens him and reveals the door of salvation to him.
Departing through it the upàsaka attains Brahman Himself.”185 This
understanding, however, raises the question as to whether the tran-
scendence and sovereignty of the supreme Lord are thereby jeopar-
dized. Nimbàrka does not take up this issue anywhere in his VPS.
Of all the pre-•aákara writings on grace from the Vedàntic tra-
dition, Nimbàrka’s VPS is clearly the most important for determin-
ing the originality of •aákara’s thought on grace. To be sure, we
have seen how the Paramàrthasàra exhibits many similarities to •aákara’s
bhàßya on the Brahma-Sùtra: The PS has a strong, though not exclu-
sive, interest in Advaita; it makes brahman, parame≤vara and ì≤vara syn-
onymous terms; it identifies Viß»u with brahman-àtman. But the PS
never explicitly mentions divine grace, and, more importantly, there
is no clear evidence that •aákara knew this work.
With Nimbàrka’s VPS, on the other hand, the evidence is strong
that •aákara not only knew this work, but even made Nimbàrka
at times the anonymous pùrvapakßin he sets out to refute in his Brahma-
Sutra-Bhàßya. Furthermore, in contrast to the PS, Nimbàrka’s VPS
181
Satyanand 270–271.
182
Satyanand 275.
183
Satyanand 276.
184
Satyanand 287. My emphasis of the word “merit.”
185
Satyanand 276.
  -≤á à 133
clearly states that liberation is the gracious work of the supreme real-
ity, even if this action is conceived as a response to the aspirant’s
meditation and devotion. Nimbàrka clearly believes in divine grace. In
addition, Vaiß»avism enters into the VPS, as it does in •aákara’s com-
mentary, for Nimbàrka identifies Vàsudeva Ràmàkànta Purußottama
with brahman. Most helpful of all for the investigator of •aákara’s
authentic doctrine is not merely the fact that •aákara knew the
VPS, but that both he and Nimbàrka commented on the same work.
This fact makes a direct comparison of their understandings of grace
possible as we juxtapose their commentaries on the individual apho-
risms of the Brahma-Sùtra.
We must avoid the temptation, however, of attempting to distill a
theology of grace of such important thinkers as Nimbàrka and •aákara
from a single one of their works. Nimbàrka probably wrote other
works in addition to the VPS that are unfortunately not available
today, and, of course, many other writings of •aákara, in addition
to his BrSùBh, are extant, some of which yield further valuable infor-
mation on how •aákara understood divine grace. But as far as in-
struments for determining •aákara’s originality on the subject of
grace go, Nimbàrka’s VPS is easily the most useful. I will therefore
refer to it often in my examination of •aákara’s BrSùBh later in
this work.186
186
See Chapter VIII below.
CHAPTER SIX
MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ROLE OF GRACE

IN •AÁKARA’S THOUGHT
As with •aákara’s ontology, •aákara’s teaching on grace leaves itself

open to a variety of conflicting claims and interpretations. It is per-
haps here more than anywhere else that the uncertainties in •aákara
scholarship are revealed. In the following I will offer a survey of
four approaches of modern scholars to the issue of divine grace in
•aákara’s writings, positions that include both an affirmation and a
denial of grace’s reality.
A. T O  G
Two of the most important books summarizing the teachings of

•aákara to appear in recent decades are Sengaku Mayeda’s A
Thousand Teachings (1979) and Karl Potter’s Advaita Vedànta up to •aákara
and His Pupils (1981).1
1. Sengaku Mayeda
Although Mayeda gives an otherwise fine summary of •aákara’s

soteriology in Chapter IV: “Transmigration and Final Release,” he
neglects to refer to the role divine grace might play in •aákara’s
understanding of the path to liberation. Mayeda’s discussion centers
primarily on an analysis of ignorance (avidyà) and its removal through
knowledge (vidyà). That Mayeda omits all discussion of divine grace
is understandable, however, in as far as he restricts himself in his
soteriological reflections to the teaching of •aákara as revealed in
•aákara’s only authentic independent treatise, the Upade≤asàhasrì. In
this work •aákara refers prasàda, anugraha, and dayà to the spiritual
1
Sengaku Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings. The Upade≤asàhasrì of •a«kara (Tokyo:
University of Tokyo Press, 1979); Karl Potter, Advaita Vedanta up to •aákara and His
Pupils (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981).
136  
guide, but never explicitly to the Absolute, at least in a soteriologi-

cal sense.2 However, in his discussion of the identity of àtman and
brahman in Chapter III of this same work, Mayeda does not hesitate
to refer beyond the Upade≤asàhasrì to •aákara’s most famous work,
the Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya.3 Thus, it would not have been out of place
for Mayeda to have at least mentioned those passages in the Brahma-
Sùtra-Bhàßya where •aákara explicitly links the dawning of salvific
knowledge to divine grace.
2. Karl Potter
Potter, in a way similar to Mayeda, summarizes •aákara’s position

on bondage and liberation without referring to •aákara’s articula-
tions on grace.4 The focus of Potter’s considerations is the inability
of anything but knowledge to destroy bondage. Potter goes into great
detail describing the positions of Pùrvamìmàásà, Bhedàbhedavàda,
and Ma»∂ana Mi≤ra’s brand of Advaita, all of which in one form
or another profess the efficacy of action to directly contribute to the
liberated state. Against these teachings Potter attempts to show the
position of •aákara, who declares the sole cause of the removal of
avidyà to be knowledge. The psychological foundation, or the proper
disposition for the realization of the Self, is laid by adhering to the
four requirements named by •aákara in Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya I.1.1:
distinguishing the eternal from the temporal, being non-attached to
normal experience, acquiring moral virtues, and intensely desiring
liberation.5 Potter seems to imply that liberating knowledge dawns
of itself, given the proper mental, karmic and moral preparation.
Mayeda and Potter are not alone in summarizing •aákara’s sote-
riology without reference to grace.6 Such authors are correct in point-
ing to knowledge as the key to understanding •aákara’s sotenology.
•aákara never tires of making liberation through enlightenment alone the
2
See Mayeda 69–97. The terms prasàda, anugraha, dayà and others are discussed
below in Chapter VII. On the use of these terms in Upad II.1.6 and II.2.74 see
the discussion in Chapter IX below.
3
See Mayeda 18–68.
4
See Potter 22–45.
5
See Potter 36.
6
See, for example, T. M. P. Mahadevan, Outlines of Hinduism (Bombay: Chetana,
1984), 141–150, especially 148–149; Swami Prabhavananda, The Spiritual Heritage of
India (Hollywood, California: Vedànta Press, 1969), 279–298; Eliot Deutsch, Advaita
Vedànta (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1971), 103–110.
    •Á’  137
central axiom of his teaching. In so doing, •aákara combats all

other soteriological claims that might in any way relativize the sim-
ple truth that bondage is eradicated through the unveiling of the
àtman and its identity with brahman, or would mistakenly claim that
the supreme insight is in any sense a product of human effort. It is
against these erroneous teachings that •aákara presents his doctrine.
However, because of •aákara’s repeated insistence on the absolute
value of vidyà, one may overlook •aákara’s utterances on divine
grace altogether and thereby fail to see the possible link between
grace and salvific knowledge. One might even conclude from •aákara’s
emphasis on knowledge that knowledge and grace are therefore in-
imical to each other in his system. That is the position of the next
group of •aákara’s commentators.
B. •á O  N  G
1. Troy Wilson Organ
For Troy Wilson Organ, a well-known Western interpreter of Indian,

especially Hindu thought, neither divine grace nor human devotion
(bhakti ) to God play a role in human liberation, as understood by
•aákara. Organ correctly interprets •aákara as locating the source
of human bondage in avidyà, and he proceeds from there, rightly or
wrongly, to assert that both bondage and liberation are human-
caused. All that needs to be done, Organ implies, is for the jìva,
through its own effort, to awaken to the reality of the undifferentiated
brahman, as revealed through the Upanißads. Thus neither human
bondage nor human liberation are linked causally in any way to the
divine. Organ writes of •aákara’s soteriology: “Since bondage is a
self-creation, then liberation is also a self-creation. The doctrine of
divine grace was therefore rejected. A god cannot do for a person
what he must do for himself. Bhakti màrga is to be rejected as an
ingredient in liberation. There is no divine prasàda.”7
In other words, Organ interprets •aákara as propounding a sote-
riology that apparently leaves everything to human effort. However,
Organ relativizes the centrality of human effort in another passage,
7
Troy Wilson Organ, Hinduism: Its Historical Development (Woodbury, New York:
Barron’s, 1974), 267.
138  
although he continues to deny that grace is a factor in liberation:

“Liberation is only the awakening to the fact that the innermost self
is identical with Brahman. Nothing happens which makes one liber-
ated; nothing comes into being that was not already. One only real-
izes what has always been. This is why •aákara consistently denied
that liberation is accomplished through works, through moral im-
provement, or through a divine gift. No reality changes. All that takes
place is the forsaking of an accidental self caused by ignorance.”8
It is true, as Organ maintains, that for •aákara liberation does
not result in an ontological change or transformation on the part of
the one who is liberated. Liberation is the removal of that which
obstructs the vision of what is eternally true; it is not the addition
of something to an eternally constant nature. However, it must be
noted that Organ does not cite any passages in which •aákara might
articulate an anti-grace soteriology. This is not surprising, for in fact
•aákara nowhere contrasts divine grace with liberating knowledge.
Rather, •aákara contrasts human action and its results with vidyà
or jñàna.
2. Bede Griffiths
In a similar vein, though less forcefully, Bede Griffiths, a monk,

scholar, and one of the foremost twentieth century Christian inter-
preters of Hindu Vedànta living in India, states that •aákara rejected
a teaching of divine grace, in contrast to other Vedàntins, such as
Ràmànuja.9 As evidence for this rejection, Griffiths turns to •aákara’s
bhàßya on Ka†ha Upanißad I.2.23. This ≤ruti verse had declared:
This Self (àtman) is not to be obtained by instruction,
Nor by intellect, nor by much learning.
He is to be obtained only by the one whom he chooses;
To such a one that Self reveals his own person.10
Since this passage teaches that liberating Self-knowledge is ultimately
given to a particular jìva as a result of a divine choice, one may
8
Organ 268.
9
See “Hinduism,” New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: McGraw Hill, 1967),
6:1123–1136.
10
Translation by R. E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, 2nd rev. ed. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 350.
    •Á’  139
regard it as upholding a grace of election. One is therefore liber-

ated only if elected by the àtman to receive the highest knowledge.
Griffiths remarks that •aákara translates Ka†ha Upanißad I.2.23
differently so as to deny its obvious affirmation of grace, but he does
not indicate in what way •aákara has actually revised the ≤ruti text.11
Yet it is true that •aákara reinterprets this text in a way to exclude
elective grace, but it is perhaps questionable to conclude, as Griffiths
does, that •aákara’s bhàßya on Ka†ha Upanißad I.2.23 should be read
as an indication of •aákara’s more general rejection of grace:12
“Although it was characteristic of •aákara to translate this passage
differently, since he rejected the doctrine of grace, it was eagerly accepted
by those who worshipped a personal god.”13
In short, Griffiths sees •aákara as rejecting both divine grace and
the worship of a personal God. He does not say why he makes such
an assertion or what passages from •aákara he might be referring
to. As will be shown below, it is true that •aákara’s reinterpreta-
tion of Ka†ha Upanißad I.2.23 can be read as excluding the idea of
grace altogether, but it need not be interpreted as such. Rather than
wholly rejecting every form of grace, it may be that •aákara is
intent on refuting one particular doctrine of grace alone. That is
why it is necessary to read all of •aákara’s articulations on grace;
focusing on a single passage may not yield an accurate or compre-
hensive enough reflection of •aákara’s position.
3. Suzanne Siauve
Suzanne Siauve, a scholar specializing in other forms of Vedànta

than •aákara’s Advaita, has likewise written that •aákara’s soteri-
ology excludes grace, in favor of human effort. She points out that
•aákara’s system has one very important trait in common with clas-
sical Yoga, despite the fact that the goal of •aákara’s Advaita, a
“total loss of self in the Supreme Reality,” differs from Yoga’s nar-
cissistic “isolation.” In both •aákara’s Advaita and in classical Yoga,
she says, “the yogi is liberated by his own knowledge alone, finding
11
See Griffiths 1129. A good exegetical discussion on •aákara’s reinterpretation
of KaUp I.2.23 is provided by Mariasusai Dhavamony, Love of God According to •aiva
Siddhànta (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 65–66.
12
See the discussion on this passage in IX.A.8 below.
13
Griffiths 1129. My emphasis.
140  
through it his true essence of pure spirituality, and he frees himself

by his own strength alone, without being indebted in any way to
grace.”14
Siauve notes the protest of later love-oriented Vaiß»ava schools,
who “object to what we should call the pelagianism of Yoga—the
fact that the yogi expects everything from human effort and noth-
ing from divine grace.”15
In a different essay Siauve suggests a provisional role for divine
grace in •aákara’s system. Although the ultimate goal of the spiri-
tual quest is the realization of “the illusory character of all plural-
ity,” i.e. the existential awareness that “plurality, which cannot exist
over against God and cannot be identical with God, does not exist,”16
there does nonetheless seem to be room at the beginning of the path
to liberation for devotion and belief in divine grace. Siauve writes:
“Perhaps at the beginning of his quest, the aspirant to salvation con-
secrates his devotion to the representation of a personal God; per-
haps he calls on God’s grace; but these conceptions must be left
behind, and it is to knowledge alone, not to divine grace, that the
being owes its deliverance.”17
Thus in both essays Siauve declares the impossibility of harmo-
nizing •aákara’s notion of salvation through knowledge with a teach-
ing of divine grace, even if faith in such grace were to be conceded
at an early stage of the spiritual quest. For in Siauve’s interpreta-
tion of •aákara there exists ultimately only brahman, the One, with-
out relation of any kind; thus nothing exists to which brahman could
have a relation. Siauve therefore concludes with an undisguised scorn
for •aákara’s position, especially in as far as •aákara would con-
cede some role for love and grace at a preliminary stage of the quest
for liberation: “Now love either is or is not a true relation; to admit
it provisionally is to deny it. A relation of love and grace with an
illusory God is the most intolerable of frauds, for a God who is not
can do nothing for us, and love can love only what is.”18
14
Suzanne Siauve, “Yoga and Interiority,” Cistercian Studies 9 (1974):193–194.
15
Siauve 194.
16
Suzanne Siauve, “Experience and Love of God in the Vaishnava Vedànta,”
Cistercian Studies 9 (1974):130–131.
17
Siauve, “Experience” 131.
18
Siauve, “Experience” 131.
    •Á’  141
4. Georges Thibaut
In language and tone similar to Siauve’s, Georges Thibaut, in his

introductory essay on Vedàntic thought, rejects what he believes to
be •aákara’s “distinction between an absolute Brahman inaccessi-
ble to all human wants and sympathies, and a shadowy Lord whose
very conception depends on the illusory principle of Màyà.” Thibaut
insinuates that •aákara’s “shadowy Lord” is neither able nor will-
ing “to lend a gracious ear to the supplication of the worshipper.”19
Thus for a number of •aákara’s modern interpreters •aákara is
not merely silent on the subject of grace, but actually opposes the
notion that grace is ontologically real. Siauve, however, does come
close to the view of the next group of •aákara’s commentators,
when she acknowledges that grace is a provisional reality in •aákara’s
soteriology. However, this next group does not go so far as to ridicule
•aákara’s position, as do Siauve and Thibaut; in fact, •aákara is
sometimes praised here for incorporating faith in divine grace into
his system, even if that grace is ultimately illusory.
C. •á P U  N  G
According to a number of modern writers, •aákara affirms the

efficacy of divine grace as a means to liberation, but only as a truth
that will be ultimately cancelled out and superseded by a higher
awareness of the monistic nature of reality. In monism there is no
room for grace, since nothing exists except the nirgu»a brahman. Yet
the aspirant to liberation may legitimately call on the grace of God
as an aid to self-realization. There are two reasons for this. First,
both ≤ruti and sm‰ti refer to divine grace, and •aákara does not hes-
itate to affirm it as well. Second, until the non-dualistic vision dawns,
a belief in divine grace, however dualistic, may serve as a stepping-
stone to the higher consciousness. That is to say, a yearning for
divine grace as well as devotion to God (bhakti ) may bring about a
quietening and one-pointedness of mind, both of which are indis-
pensable prerequisites for the breakthrough to the higher state of
19
Georges Thibaut, Vedànta-Sùtras with the Commentary of •a«karàcàrya (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1988), I:cxxvii–cxxviii.
142  
consciousness. Yet ultimately speaking no grace can ever be granted

since no being exists who could be its recipient.
Such interpreters of •aákara tend to share the view that it is
ì≤vara, the so-called “personal” Lord, sometimes translated as “God,”
who is the would-be dispenser of grace, and that, further, this Absolute-
in-relation must ultimately disappear before the higher truth of the
existence of a non-relational “higher” Absolute (brahman). Let us now
look at some of the authors who take this position.
1. Jadunath Sinha
Jadunath Sinha, an historian of Indian philosophy and religion, sum-

marizes •aákara’s position on grace as follows:
Religious consciousness of God is transcended by philosophical con-
sciousness of the Absolute. Religion is empirical, relative and dualis-
tic. It involves avidyà. But it leads to mystic experience of Identity, in
which all distinction and relativity are extinguished . . .
•aákara believes in the grace of God. Devotion to him brings his
grace. But it does not lead to liberation. It aids the production of
higher knowledge (vidyà), which directly leads to release. Man has to
work out his own salvation. Nothing but his true insight can bring
about his release. Grace implies the reality of God and the jìva. Both
are mere appearances. They are not metaphysically real. So prayer
and grace of God have no ultimate significance. Worship of personal
God leads to attainment of heaven and gradual release (kramamukti).
But integral experience leads to embodied release here and now (sady-
omukti).20
Sinha correctly cites Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya III.2.5 as evidence that
•aákara affirms the reality of grace, but he does not, or better, is
not able, to provide any passages that support his contention that
grace is linked only to the attainment of “heaven,” and never to the
highest human goal, which is liberation. In fact, the only passage
on grace to which Sinha refers, Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya III.2.5, actually
affirms a link between divine grace and final human liberation, in
contrast to Sinha’s claim.21 •aákara nowhere declares the inefficacy
of divine grace to bring the aspirant to liberation to his or her goal.
20
Jadunath Sinha, A History of Indian Philosophy (Calcutta: Sinha Publishing House,
1956), II:306.
21
See the discussion on this passage in VIII.B.18 below.
    •Á’  143
2. T. M. P. Mahadevan
A similar notion is propounded by T. M. P. Mahadevan, one of the

leading Indian interpreters of •aákara in the twentieth century. In
his final work on Advaita, Superimposition in Advaita Vedànta,22 Mahadevan
summarizes what he sees to be the essence of Advaitic teaching, both
in •aákara and in the post-•aákara tradition: “The quintessential
teaching of Advaita is: Brahman the Absolute which is the same as
Àtman the Self, alone is real; the world of plurality is an illusory
appearance superimposed by nescience on Brahman; the so-called indi-
vidual soul, the jìva, is the same as Brahman, and no other.”23
Mahadevan then goes on to elucidate the teaching of •aákara on
the nirgu»a brahman, i.e. the brahman devoid of attributes, which leads
him into a discussion on the means to the attainment of the nirgu»a
brahman:
In itself, it is unconditioned, formless, eternal and immutable, it is non-
dual, as there is no reality besides it. It is devoid of all kinds of dif-
ferences, internal or external. As apparently, conditioned by nescience
it is called sagu»a-Brahman or Ì≤vara, who is the cause of the origina-
tion; sustenation and dissolution of the world. He is both the efficient
and material cause. He is the object of knowledge for (the) individual
soul which, by his grace, gains knowledge which liberates it from indi-
viduality, and makes it realise its true identity as the supreme Self.24
That is to say, on the level of ignorance there is the appearance of
the operation of grace, but the perception of this operation rests on
what Mahadevan describes as “the false cognition of difference
between Ì≤vara and the jìva created by non-discrimination.”25 Thus,
plurality and distinctions exist on the lower plane of awareness, but
are absent in the highest level of consciousness. “Before the rise of
Self-knowledge, the empirical world and its phenomena are admit-
ted to be real, though apparently, just as dream appears real prior
to awakening.”26 Grace, then, considered from the standpoint of the
highest truth, is illusory, not real.
22
T. M. P. Mahadevan, Superimposition in Advaita Vedànta (Delhi: Sterling Publishers,
1985).
23
Mahadevan 18.
24
Mahadevan 18–19.
25
Mahadevan 19.
26
Mahadevan 20.
144  
3. A. G. Krishna Warrier
A. G. Krishna Warrier, in his God in Advaita, attempts to rehabili-

tate the status of ì≤vara or the sagu»a brahman to its rightful central
role in •aákara’s soteriology as dispenser of grace and Lord of the
world.27 Warrier is to be commended in recognizing “the relative
neglect in current estimates of the decisive role God plays in Saákara’s
philosophy.”28 He finds Rudolf Otto a laudable exception to main-
stream twentieth century distortion of the importance of ì≤vara.29 He
reads Otto as affirming that •aákara’s “Advaita philosophy in its
sub-structure represents theism of a high type.”30 What is of special
interest to the present study is Warrier’s remark that he rediscov-
ered the centrality of sagu»a brahman in •aákara’s thought through
a careful reading of •aákara’s Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya, in particular
•aákara’s commentary on sùtras II.3.41 and III.2.5.31 These sùtras
contain •aákara’s two most important affirmations of grace in his
entire commentary on the Brahma-Sùtra.
Despite Warrier’s insistence on the decisive role of the grace-
giving sagu»a brahman for bringing the devotee to the knowledge of
his or her innate divinity, Warrier’s brahman with attributes is finally
only a mental construction “qualified by certain names and forms
for facilitating contemplation . . . to facilitate progress to the Absolute.”32
Ì≤vara’s existence is affirmed from a mere “human viewpoint . . .
which, in Advaita, continues to be valid and, indeed, the only pos-
sible one till the realization of the Absolute.”33
Whether this is a correct interpretation of ì≤vara according to
•aákara is certainly debatable as is the simple equation of ì≤vara
with the sagu»a brahman. What is, however, certainly praiseworthy in
Warrier’s conception and only rarely stressed by •aákara’s inter-
preters, both past and present, is •aákara’s sanctioning of medita-
tion on the sagu»a brahman as a stepping-stone to a higher intuition
of the formless nirgu»a brahman. Here the sagu»a brahman is not regarded
27
See A. G. Krishna Warrier, God in Advaita (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced
Study, 1977).
28
Warrier vii.
29
See Warrier vii. The reference is to Otto’s Mysticism East and West.
30
Warrier vii.
31
See Warrier vii.
32
Warrier 50.
33
Warrier 50. My emphasis.
    •Á’  145
as a mere erroneous cognition of the Absolute that serves no value

at all and is simply to be negated.
4. Paul Deussen
With Paul Deussen’s The System of the Vedànta we are confronted with
the most elaborate exposition of •aákara’s Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya in
the nineteenth century and at the same time one of the earliest
reflections on •aákara’s understanding of grace.34 Deussen asks the
question, “How is the knowledge that leads to liberation, that is, the
recognition of the Brahman, produced in men?”35 Citing numerous
passages from •aákara, Deussen rules out the possibility that salvific
knowledge is produced by human effort, or by worship of the divine.
Even the scriptures have only the function of helping to clear away
false notions of brahman, but do not strictly speaking cause the knowl-
edge of brahman to dawn. Thus we are left with the affirmation of
•aákara himself that the dawn of liberating knowledge is caused by
the grace of the Lord (ì≤vara).36 Here, too, as with Warrier, Deussen
refers to Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya II.3.41 and III.2.5.37
However, Deussen points out that liberated awareness is of a non-
dual nature. The brahman that is revealed is in no sense an object.
Any appraisal of the reality of divine grace, then, must be done with
the understanding that liberated consciousness excludes any percep-
tion of divine-human relations. Thus, Deussen is constrained to con-
clude: “Under these circumstances, according to the mode of expression
of the exoteric, theological teaching, in which the philosophy of our
system is framed, the birth of knowledge and the liberation con-
nected with it appears as a grace of God (literally: of the Lord ì≤vara).”38
That is to say, for a system which does not ultimately acknowl-
edge a distinction of subject and object, the attainment of liberation
can only appear as due to the grace of God. It is on the level of
what appears to be true, as opposed to what is absolutely the case,
that “exoteric, theological teaching” is undertaken. Deussen further
remarks that “in the conception of grace (as in general in the whole
34
See Paul Deussen, The System of the Vedànta (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing
Company, 1912).
35
Deussen 85.
36
See Deussen 85–86.
37
See Deussen 86–87.
38
Deussen 86. My emphasis of the word “appears.”
146  
apprehension of Brahman as Ì≤vara) we have to do only with an exo-

teric personification which is not to be taken strictly. . . .”39 This is
a clear indication that for Deussen not only grace, but ì≤vara him-
self is a mere appearance, i.e. something imaginary and therefore
less than brahman itself.
Again, in summarizing the main teachings of •aákara in the
Appendix of his work, Deussen makes it clear that however exalted
and central to •aákara’s system the notion of ì≤vara may be regarded,
ì≤vara remains ultimately a lower mental personification of the higher
brahman: “The personification of Brahman as Ì≤vara, Lord, Ruler, to
whom is opposed the world as that which is to be ruled, is expressly
limited to the standpoint rooted in Ignorance of worldly action, which
has no reality in the highest sense.”40
Only in this context is it possible to state that “it is Ì≤vara by whose
permission Saásàra, and by whose grace ( prasàda, anugraha) the sav-
ing knowledge is conditioned.”41
Deussen’s next quote, the final reference to grace in his monu-
mental work, best summarizes his position. Here Deussen wrestles
with the necessity of speaking of grace to account for the fact of lib-
eration as well as the contradiction involved in expressing the action
of what is ultimately the non-dual Mystery in dualistic, i.e. subject-
object, or relational terms: “Whether the Àtman is known depends
like the knowledge of every object on whether it shows itself to us,
and therefore on itself. For this reason in the lower knowledge, which
contrasts the Àtman to ourselves and worships him as a personal
God, knowledge appears as dependent on the grace of God; but in
the higher knowledge, as the Àtman is in reality not an object, we
cannot enquire further after the cause which makes it known to us.”42
Such a dilemma must surely exist for any interpretation of •aákara
that would interpret his advaitavàda (doctrine of non-duality) as a sys-
tem of monism. This is not, however, to deny the fact that even in
a non-monistic interpretation of •aákara the operation of grace
remains a mysterious and perhaps ultimately inexpressible reality.
Yet a monistic reading of •aákara faces a greater challenge than
39
Deussen 86 note 51.
40
Deussen 459.
41
Deussen 459.
42
Deussen 475.
    •Á’  147
does a non-monistic reading in being forced to grapple with •aákara’s

affirmation that the dawn of liberating knowledge is effected through
the grace of the Lord.
The next group of interpreters do not regard •aákara as a monist,
and therefore are able to affirm the reality of divine grace without
compromising •aákara’s non-dualistic metaphysics.
D. •á A  R  G
1. Kokileswar Sastri
Writing in 1926, years before other interpreters would affirm a role

for divine grace in •aákara’s soteriology, Kokileswar Sastri listed
what he called the “moral virtues” that •aákara made “useful” for
the attainment of liberation.43 It is in connection with this list that
Sastri notes the place of divine grace.
Sastri, summarizing •aákara’s position, notes that humans are
normally subject to ràga-dveßa, i.e. attraction and aversion to all the
sense objects of life. These very normal tendencies, however, which
lead the mind to see reality as fragmented instead of as a unitary
whole, must be restrained if the mind is to be purified and made
passive for the realization of the higher Self.44 Through the cultiva-
tion of these virtues—a process which normally takes place over a
long period of time—all that which is inimical to true knowledge,
e.g. “pride, hypocrisy, ignorance, cruelty, insincerity, impatience,”
are rooted out and the mind is thereby brought to a proper dispo-
sition for liberation’.45
What are the most important of these “moral virtues?” Among
others, Sastri names compassion (karu»a), complacency (mudità),46
indifference (upekßa).47 In addition, drawing on •aákara’s Bhagavad-
Giìtà-Bhàßya XIII.7–11 and XVI.1–3, Sastri includes other virtues,
such as
43
See Kokileswar Sastri, An Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy (Calcutta: University
of Calcutta, 1926), 213–226.
44
See Sastri 214–215.
45
Sastri 217.
46
Mudità is perhaps better rendered as “satisfaction” or “contentment.”
47
See Sastri 218–219.
148  
doing no injury to any living being, and not being affected when oth-
ers have done any injury; inner purity consisting in the removal from
the mind of the stain of attachment and other passions . . . constant
equanimity consisting in not being jubilant over attaining the desirable
and in not attaining the undesirable . . . abandonment of deception,
dissimulation, falsehood and the like, in all our practical transactions . . .
concentration through the subjugation of the senses; constant steadi-
ness of our attitude . . . suppression of anger arising when reviled or
beaten; compassion to those in suffering; absence of fickleness.48
As a category all its own, Sastri adds to the above list, “The sur-
render of the self to the supreme self (i.e., Brahman) and medita-
tion on His Swarùpa. A man cannot hope to be Mukta, unless
Brahman’s grace falls upon him, unless He helps him graciously in
the task.”49
The passage Sastri has loosely summarized or paraphrased is by
his own indication •aákara’s Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya II.3.41. Although
•aákara refers to the grace of the Lord (ì≤vara) in the passage referred
to by Sastri, Sastri himself attributes this grace to the supreme Self
or brahman, obviously in this case the “higher,” not the “lower” brah-
man. We shall see later in this study that such an interpretation of
the activity of the highest brahman is quite in keeping with •aákara’s
own soteriological position, as revealed in his Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya,
but that such an explicit attribution of grace to the highest brahman
does not harmonize well with •aákara’s own formulations.
In any case, Sastri believes •aákara to teach the usefulness, per-
haps even necessity of mind purification through the practice of the
moral virtues, but he also makes it clear that such a thorough
purification of itself is inadequate to bring about the ultimate desired
result, which is liberation. •aákara teaches that without divine grace
final liberation is not possible. In addition to Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya
II.3.41, Sastri refers to III.2.5 and III.2.24 of the same commentary,
as well as to •aákara’s commentary on the Bhagavad-Gìtà X.11 and
XVIII.62 to support his interpretation.50
48
Sastri 219–220.
49
Sastri 221–222. “Swarùpa” means “own form” or nature.
50
See Sastri 222 note 1.
    •Á’  149
2. V. H. Date
At the conclusion of his very readable two-volume paraphrase of

•aákara’s Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya V. H. Date offers an insightful analy-
sis of •aákara’s ontology and the role that devotion plays in his
soteriology.51 It is in this context that Date speaks of grace.
Date notes first of all, that both action (karma) and prolonged highly
focused meditation (upàsanà) serve to facilitate the rise of knowledge
( jñàna) in the aspirant by contributing to his or her gradual ethical
and spiritual transformation.52 “The karma and the upàsanàs are the
means of not only leading us from darkness, death, and ignorance,
to light, life, and knowledge, but are also the means of sustaining
us on the path of the Spirit.”53
Nevertheless, Date will never go so far as to say that action and
meditation actually cause knowledge to appear; rather he regards
them as indirect causes of liberation. That is to say—and it is here
that Date begins to speak of grace: “Now, jñàna as an accomplished
fact is certainly independent of karma or upàsanà; nay it is itself the
support of all things including them; but the emergence of jñàna in
a particular man, though not impossible for the grace of God, appears even
from the view-point of •aákara to depend both on karma and
upàsanà.”54
Thus Date favors a gradual transformation of the jìva which leads
finally to an “instantaneous” awakening of the self to the Self.55 What
is noteworthy is that Date sees the whole lengthy process that leads
to liberation as dispensable. The emergence of liberating jñàna could
just as well result from divine grace alone, but instead is in fact
made dependent on action and meditation.
However, an operation of grace is not just a theoretical possibil-
ity for •aákara, according to Date; it does indeed play a role in
the liberation of the jìva. It is one more component in the libera-
tion process. As the soul progresses in devotion and knowledge of
God and gradually approaches its final goal, it “comes increasingly
51
See V. H. Date, Vedànta Explained (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1973),
II:447–545.
52
See Date II:522–525.
53
Date II:525.
54
Date II:521–522. My emphasis.
55
Date II:532.
150  
under the influence of the Absolute or Pure Consciousness, . . .”56

Both a limited knowledge of God as well as devotion to God are,
according to Date, “necessary to . . . win the grace of God.”57 Thus
for Date the Absolute itself dispenses grace to the devotee, and the
devotee experiences this grace more and more on the path to Self-
realization.
More precisely, the sàdhaka or aspirant encounters the grace of
God in the liberated spiritual master. The spiritual master, by virtue
of his own salvific realization of brahman, has become the “concrete,
personified, sagu»a incarnation or Avatàra of Brahman,” thereby
possessing “saving power.”58 Thus to “win the grace of God” is to
“win the grace of the Guru.”59 Since the liberated teacher is the
embodiment of the sagu»a brahman, and because the sagu»a brahman
and the nirgu»a brahman are finally one, to please the guru is to please
the nirgu»a brahman. The grace of this brahman “comes” to the disci-
ple “through the Guru.”60 Put in this way (“through”), a distinction
still remains between the spiritual guide and the highest brahman.
It is primarily through the guru’s guidance and instruction that the
disciple encounters the grace of brahman.61 But, too, devotion to the
guru will also serve to purify the mind of the devotee; here the guru
is seen as the embodiment of grace and the indirect cause of the
devotee’s transformation. What is not clear in Date’s interpretation
is the meaning of “winning the grace of the Guru.” It is certainly
not a phrase used by •aákara himself. Does Date mean that the
guru may withhold various “graces” until the proper time? In any
case, writes Date, “Devotion and regard shown to the Guru will
have their own fruit of winning his grace oft and on, and thus of
accelerating the spiritual progress, from theism to mysticism, from
sagu»a to nirgu»a, and from devotion to knowledge.”62
Thus for Date the guru, and by implication the guru’s grace, are
made “the pivot of the Vedàntic knowledge.”63 Before the devotee, in
the form of a human vessel, is the pure consciousness that is brahman.
56
Date II:533.
57
Date II:533.
58
Date II:535.
59
See Date II:522, 533, 536.
60
Date II:537–538.
61
62
Date II:536.
63
Date II:537.
    •Á’  151
Devotion to the guru and the giving of the guru’s grace serve finally
to change the disciple himself into a guru,64 in as much as this grace
is somehow causative of the emergence of the salvific jñàna.
3. Paul Hacker
Paul Hacker, German indologist and theologian, is certainly one of

the most recognized of •aákara specialists in the modern era, above
all because of his painstaking exegetical research of •aákara’s Brahma-
Sùtra-Bhàßya.65 Hacker never devoted an entire essay to •aákara’s
statements on grace, but in “Eigen.” he did make a number of
important points that contribute greatly to our understanding of the
reality of grace in •aákara’s thought. In what follows, all references
in brackets are to •aákara’s Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya.
According to Hacker, in as far as the Lord is recognized by
•aákara to be distinct from the individual soul and to be in rela-
tion to or “opposite” (gegenüberstehend ) it, the Lord is the guide or
director (antaryàmin) of the soul (I.2.20).66 That is to say, in all of the
soul’s dealings (Handeln) it is the Lord who is the “inner impelling
agent” (der immanente antreibende Agens; hetu-kart‰). (II.3.41) Yet in impel-
ling the soul to do such and such, the Lord is simply taking into
consideration the soul’s good and evil intentions (das gute oder böse
Wollen). (II.3.42) Thus on the one hand •aákara appears to deny the
soul’s freedom to determine its own fate, while on the other hand
he seems to indicate that the soul’s ultimate destiny is in its own
hands. It is because of the latter assertion that the Lord cannot be
held accountable for an inequality or cruelty of fate. (II.1.34)67 But
Hacker does not explain how the jìva’s real freedom and the Lord’s
real influence that acts on the jìva work together. He does, however,
further note that the retribution (Vergeltung) of good and evil action
is the work of the Lord. (III.2.39, III.2.41)68 This implies that the
Lord responds to the jìva’s free acts.
64
See Date II:457.
65
See “Eigentümlichkeiten dr Lehre und Terminologie •a«kara: Avidyà, Nàmarùpa,
Màyà, Ì≤vara,” Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 100
(1950):246–286 (henceforth Eigen.), reprinted in Paul Hacker: Kleine Schriften (hence-
forth KS), ed. Lambert Schmithausen (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1978),
69–109. In the following I will adhere to the KS page numbering of Eigen.
66
Eigen. 105.
67
See Eigen. 105.
68
See Eigen. 105.
152  
After having said all of this, Hacker notes that a distinction between
a ruler (Herrscher) and one who is ruled (Beherrschter), such as has been
exhibited in the above discussion, reflects finally a dualistic point of
view, and ought therefore be regarded as a position from within the
lower or practical state of awareness (vyàvahàriky avasthà). (III.2.38)
Ultimately for •aákara the embodied soul and the Lord are regarded
in their essence to be “identical” (identisch).69 Since Hacker tends to
interpret Advaita in terms of strict identity and •aákara’s ontology
in terms of monism, we might expect him to draw the conclusion
that grace is ultimately illusory for •aákara, as was the position of
Sinha, Mahadevan, and Warrier above.70
It is here that Hacker draws attention to a fact that is normally
overlooked by •aákara’s interpreters. On the subject of ì≤vara and
ì≤vara’s grace •aákara takes a position that is permeated with para-
dox and considerably lacking in a systematic and clear distinction
between dualism and non-dualism. When •aákara speaks of ì≤vara
and ì≤vara’s grace he frequently does not adhere to the schema that
would confine God’s influence on the soul to the dualistic stand-
point. After having first suggested that the distinction of Lord and
jìva is dissolved in a higher “identity,” Hacker writes, “But this iden-
tity is sometimes used as the very proof of God’s activity in the soul,
(an activity) which ought to contradict it and which presupposes a
difference! (Aber diese Identität wird manchmal gerade zur Begründung des
Wirkens Gottes in der Seele, das ihr doch eigentlich widerspricht und eine
Verschiedenheit voraussetzt, herangezogen!)”71
For Hacker, •aákara’s ì≤vara-conception is “not at all systematized
and schematized, and this distinguishes it from the ì≤vara-theory of
later Advaitins.”72 Thus, on the basis of •aákara’s own utterances
that combine the reality of divine action on the soul with a meta-
physics of identity, Hacker takes up the issue of divine grace. He
writes: “God’s directing activity on the soul consists especially in His
collaboration (Mitwirkung) in (bringing about) salvation (Erlösung) . . .
Through His grace arises the knowledge that leads to salvation.
(II.3.41) . . . Through God’s grace ( prasàda) knowledge that God and
the soul are identical dawns (avirbhavati ) on a small number of the
69
Eigen. 105.
70
See VI.C.
71
Eigen. 105.
72
Eigen. 105.
    •Á’  153
perfected (saásiddha), who have exerted themselves and meditated

(abhi-dhyà) on the Parame≤vara.”73
Hacker then quotes •aákara on III.2.5: “For that reason bondage
and salvation occur at the behest (heto˙) of God. From the ignorance
of the Lord’s true nature comes bondage, but from knowledge of
his nature comes salvation.” Hacker therefore concludes: “Here the
illusory aspect of ì≤vara is forgotten entirely; knowledge of God, effected
through God’s grace, is the revelation of His identity with the soul;
personal piety and impersonal mysticism have been fused into one.”74
In addition Hacker notes that ì≤vara in •aákara’s Brahma-Sùtra-
Bhàßya is at times used synonymously with both the highest brahman
and the sagu»am brahman. For example in II.3.41, one of the two
most important passages in which •aákara affirms the reality of
divine grace, ì≤vara and paramàtman are used interchangeably and syn-
onymously. Similarly ì≤vara and paraá brahman are at times made syn-
onymous, especially in a soteriological context. In IV.1.3 •aákara
declares that the Upanißadic “Great Saying” (mahàvàkya) “I am brahman”
(aham brahmàsmi ) teaches ì≤vara to be the àtman. •aákara goes so far
as to state that “I am ì≤vara” (aham ì≤vara˙), instead of “I am brahman,”
to be the content of the salvific knowledge.75
4. Richard De Smet
Richard De Smet, one of the twentieth century’s leading participants

in the philosophical encounter in India between Vedàntic thought
and Christian faith, and a specialist in •aákara’s Advaita Vedànta,
has, in his voluminous writings, made frequent reference to the role
of grace in •aákara’s thought. However, these references are scat-
tered and usually offered without much elaboration, appearing in
the context of other topics which are the real subject of De Smet’s
sustained reflection. His most helpful remarks on grace in •aákara’s
thought can be found in his essay “Contemplation in •aákara and
Ràmànuja.”76 I shall restrict my summary of De Smet’s position to
this essay.
73
Eigen. 105. I have added “bringing about” for greater clarity.
74
Eigen. 106.
75
Eigen. 106.
76
R. De Smet, “Contemplation in Shankara and Ràmànuja,” Prayer and Contemplation,
ed. C. M. Vadakkekara (Bangalore: Asian Trading, 1980), 209–220.
154  
De Smet, in his summary of •aákara’s view of the path to enlight-

enment, begins by noting the close link between the appropriation
of the theoretical knowledge of àtman-brahman and the existential expe-
rience of that same reality. Theoretical truth, although never ade-
quately corresponding to the reality of the Absolute itself, is used as
a springboard to liberation, by which the theoretical is converted
into living experience.77 Because “experiential enlightenment . . . can-
not be entered into at will and without preparation,” the seeker of
liberation must follow the three-step Upanißadic path of ≤rava»a,
manana, and nididhyàsana, each step accompanied by faith in the truth
of the Vedàntic teaching.78
What role might divine grace have in this process that leads from
“the exegetical mastering of the upanishadic texts” (≤rava»a) to “the
rational establishing of their doctrine beyond all doubts and objec-
tions” (manana) to a final stage (nididhyaàsana) of “yoga-like concentra-
tion which is to give birth to vijñàna,” a stage characterized also by
“calm and ‘stability’ ”?79 De Smet interprets •aákara as teaching
that “the whole process of brahma-jijñàsà is initiated and constantly
sustained by divine grace” and not limited to “the external grace of
the guru.”80 De Smet distinguishes here between an external grace,
i.e. the availability of the guru and ≤ruti, and an inner grace, the
enlightening presence of “the inner Teacher, the indwelling àtman,
uttering no words, sending forth no special inspiration, but simply
self-effulgent at the center of the mind.”81
Especially descriptive of the grace of the indwelling àtman, accord-
ing to De Smet, is •aákara’s commentary on the Bhagavad-Gìtà X.11.
Here •aákara writes:
Out of mercy, anxious as to how they may attain bliss, I dwell in their
internal organ (anta˙-kàra»a), which is the abode of the Àtman, and
destroy the darkness of ignorance—i.e., that illusory knowledge which
is caused by the absence of discrimination—by the lamp of wisdom,
the lamp of discrimination, which is fed by the oil of devotion (bhakti-
prasàda), fanned by the wind of earnest meditation on Me, furnished
77
In support of the close link between jñàna (theoretical knowledge) and vijñàna
(knowledge through experience of the object itself ) De Smet offers •aákara’s BhGBh
III.41, VI.8, VII.2, IX.1.
78
De Smet 209–210. On this triple-stage process see IV.C.4.b above.
79
De Smet 209–210.
80
De Smet 212–213.
81
De Smet 212–214.
    •Á’  155
with the wick of right intuition, purified by the cultivation of chastity

and other virtues, held in an internal organ completely detached from
all worldly concerns, placed in the wind-sheltered nook of that manas
which is withdrawn from all sense-objects and untainted by attach-
ment and aversion, and shining with the light of right knowledge gen-
erated by the constant practice of concentration and contemplation.82
To this passage on internal grace, which professes the avidyà-destroy-
ing presence of the indwelling àtman, De Smet adds two important
articulations of •aákara affirming that liberating knowledge is gener-
ated through the grace of the Lord. The first is the familiar BrSùBh
II.3.41. Here, writes De Smet, •aákara “does not refuse” to accept
the teaching that the highest knowledge is caused by the grace of
the Lord, because, in •aákara’s own words, “scripture teaches it.”83
De Smet appears to imply that •aákara somewhat hesitantly affirms
the pivotal role of grace in II.3.41, and that he is somewhat con-
strained to do so by the revealed scripture. The second passage cited
by De Smet in which •aákara derives the dawn of enlightenment
from an inner divine grace is BhGBh II.39: Liberation comes “by
the attainment of knowledge caused by the grace of the Lord.”84
Here De Smet makes no mention that •aákara is under any com-
pulsion to affirm grace.
De Smet thus presents a balanced picture of grace in •aákara,
by noting that at times •aákara accepts the reality of grace, while
at other times he appears hesitant to affirm it. In addition, De Smet
notes two instances in which •aákara seems to reject grace alto-
gether. In his commenentaries on Ka†ha Upanißad I.2.23 and Mu»∂aka
Upanißad III.2.3, ≤ruti verses “which speak clearly of divine election
and grace,” we find that •aákara “explains them in such a way as
to eliminate any affirmation of divine grace.” De Smet speculates
that •aákara’s reason for rejecting grace in these passages may be
“because he finds the language of grace anthropomorphic and tend-
ing towards a dualism of parallel entities, viz., God, grace and man.”85
That is to say, •aákara’s problem here is not with the reality of
divine grace as such, but with its dualistic articulation. However, it
82
De Smet 213.
83
De Smet 213.
84
De Smet 213–214.
85
De Smet 213.
156  
is possible that •aákara interprets these passages as he does for an

entirely different reason, as I intend to show later in this work.86
In speaking of the role that external grace plays in •aákara’s sys-
tem, De Smet comments:
In conceiving of divine grace •aákara remains faithful to the primary
type of grace in India. This is not the favour of a powerful monarch
to one of his subjects but the guru’s compassionate communication of
knowledge to his ignorant pupil.87
As noted above, external grace is to be located in ≤ruti, too, a form
of knowledge
which is, as it were, the externalized Consciousness of the Àtman . . .
To those who are qualified for it, the human gurus give access to it
so that it functions as the external divine grace in the form of Word
(Shabda). Under its teaching, the mind is turned inward and focused
on its very Source, the self-effulgent Cit. Thus comes about the con-
junction of the divine external grace, the Shabda, with the self-subsis-
tent inner grace, the Cid-Àtman, and saving Knowledge (Vidyà) blazes
forth.88
In his reflections, then, De Smet has shown that divine grace is at
work in the entire process of brahma-jijñàsà, both externally in the
guru and the ≤ruti, and inwardly, in the presence of the divine light
to the mind in all its discriminations and advances in truth. Divine
grace culminates in the final blissful and salvific manifestation of the
àtman, a self-disclosure beyond the reach of what is attainable through
the sàdhaka’s long intellectual, moral and spiritual preparation. At the
same time that he notes the importance of divine grace in •aákara’s
soteriology, De Smet brings attention to other statements of •aákara
that appear to deny grace. De Smet explains this denial as indica-
tive of the inadequacy of human language to express the reality of
grace in a non-dual context. The question remains open, however,
as to whether •aákara’s disparate remarks on grace may be har-
monized through a different resolution.
86
See IX.A.8 and 9 below.
87
De Smet 214.
88
De Smet 214.
    •Á’  157
5. Michael von Brück
In an important work attempting to elucidate the significance of

Advaitic experience for the Christian teaching of God, Michael von
Brück, a German scholar who has spent many years in India, focuses
his attention on the teachings of the Upanißads and on •aákara in
order to discern authentic Indian non-dualistic teaching.89 Von Brück
dedicates a small section of his book to the role that grace and
prayer play in the soteriology of Advaita.90
Von Brück begins his reflections on grace with the following asser-
tion: The question as to whether the transformative experience of
Advaita “comes from divine grace or from human activity” is a false
one. Such an alternative implies a dualism that Advaita rejects.
Advaita teaches rather that the empirical and the Absolute are not
two.91 It does not appear here that von Brück is denying the legit-
imacy of determining what role divine grace might play in a non-
dualistic framework; rather he is denying the legitimacy of attending
to the question of divine grace in isolation from the reality of human
endeavor. Because of the non-dual character of reality, the divine
and human spheres of freedom cannot be neatly separated.
Yet Advaitins are compelled by experience and tradition to speak
of the breakthrough to knowledge of the highest Self in terms of a
revelation of the àtman, a knowledge that is unattainable to normal
human capacities. “Knowledge comes from a unified mind and from
contemplation. But the experience itself is described as a raptus, as
something coming to us from without.”92
For this reason there is justification in speaking about divine grace
in a non-dual context. The Upanißads themselves, e.g. Ka†ha Upanißad
I.2.20 and 23, •vetà≤vatara Upanißad III.20, VI.21, describe “the expe-
rience of jñàna as the experience of grace,” for “grace is the pre-
supposition for non-dual knowledge.”93
89
See Michael von Brück, The Unity of Reality: God, God-Experience, and Meditation
in the Hindu-Christian Dialogue (New York: Paulist, 1991).
90
See von Brück 62–64.
91
Von Brück 62. Emphasis given by him.
92
Von Brück 62. The author draws on MuUp III.2.3 and III.1.8 in support of
his view. Emphasis given by von Brück.
93
Von Brück 62.
158  
All that von Brück has said so far about grace he believes to apply
to •aákara. What is essential for •aákara, he writes, “is a longing
for God’s revelation, and this comes from trust in his grace. This
longing expresses itself in and is strengthened by prayer.”94 He refers
here to •aákara’s commentary on Mu»∂aka Upanißad III.2.3. This is
the only passage from •aákara dealing with grace that von Bruck
offers.
To speak of “trusting in God’s grace,” however, as von Brück
does, is not a phrase •aákara himself uses. Rather •aákara urges
the necessity of trusting and submitting to the authority of the teacher
and of scripture. This does not deny, of course, •aákara’s affirmation
that the emergence of liberating knowledge is in some sense caused
by the grace of the Lord. However, von Brück is correct in show-
ing that prayer, and not simply meditation, plays a role in •aákara’s
soteriology.
E. S
In summary of this chapter two points need to be made. First,

although four models of interpreting the role of grace in •aákara
have been offered, i.e. omission, rejection, provisional affirmation,
and outright acceptance, it is the second and third of these that rep-
resent the views of the great majority of scholars. Most interpreters
of •aákara hold him to teach either that grace is opposed to the
very idea of non-duality, or else that grace has a very limited, at
most preliminary, and ultimately illusory function in •aákara’s under-
standing of how liberation is attained. Those who affirm the reality
of grace, however exegetically well grounded in their position they
may be, are certainly in the minority.
Second, as can be seen from the various positions described, both
Hindus and Christians (and others as well) are represented in this
survey, and their views cover a broad spectrum. Their interpreta-
tions reveal that there is neither a specifically Hindu nor Christian
understanding of what grace means in •aákara’s system. There are
Hindus and Christians who believe that grace plays no role, or only
a minor role, in •aákara’s thought, and there are others from both
religions who feel that without grace •aákara’s system is incomplete
94
Von Brück 9.
    •Á’  159
and open to misunderstanding. However, in the third group of inter-

preters, those who provisionally uphold the reality of grace, Hindu
scholars do predominate, while in the last group, in which grace is
more clearly affirmed, the majority of •aákara’s interpreters are
Christian.
CHAPTER SEVEN
•AÁKARA’S TERMS FOR GRACE AND SYNONYMS

OF GRACE
Though the Sanskrit words for grace and its synonyms are many,
the terms •aákara chooses to use are few. The three most preferred
terms are prasàda (grace, gift), anugraha (favor, grace), and the adjec-
tives kàru»ika (merciful) or paramakàru»ika (supremely merciful). I shall
now briefly discuss these words in addition to some others.
A. Pà
Prasàda is one of the two most important Sanskrit words used by

Indian philosophy and religion to express the reality of grace. The
other is anugraha.1 Prasàda is derived from the root sad, to sit or sink
down,2 or pra-sad, “to fall into the power of; to settle down, grow
clear and bright, become placid or tranquil; to become satisfied or
pleased or glad, be gracious or kind.”3
As a noun, prasàda has a double-meaning; it may signify on the
one hand the qualities of “clearness, brightness, purity, calmness,
tranquillity, absence of excitement,” but it may also mean “serenity
of disposition, good humour, graciousness, kindness, kind behaviour,
favour, aid, mediation.”4 Thus the state of deep tranquillity and clar-
ity, perhaps even transparency to the transcendent, is linked to a
state of being graced. In passing beyond mind, by first bringing the
mind into a state of deep calm, one enters into an even higher state
of inner tranquility and freedom, finally into a state of transcen-
dence. The condition of being in a deep peace, then, appears to be
inseparable from the use of the word prasàda, whether it be attrib-
uted to its giver or to its recipient.
1
See Olivier Lacombe, L’absolu selon le Vedànta. Les notions de Brahman et d’Àtman
dans les systemes de Çankara et Râmânoudja (Paris 1937), 268.
2
Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1981,
henceforth MW), 1138, col. 2.
3
MW 696, col. 3.
4
MW 696, col. 3 to 697, col. 1.
162  
In any event, as O. Lacombe points out, prasàda “signifies . . . a

condition of transluminous peace which constitutes the fundamental
religious experience in the Indian tradition.” The term, he says,
denotes a participation in the tranquil light of the Absolute, which
is seen as essentially benevolent and gracious.5 As Georg Feuerstein
has pointed out, “It is easy to see why the word prasàda should have
acquired the meaning of ‘grace,’ since mental tranquility is a pre-
condition for one’s entrance into higher states of consciousness. This
event is often experienced as being given ‘from above,’ that is, as
an act of grace.”6 J. Gonda reminds us that the word prasàda, nor-
mally translated simplistically as “grace,” for instance in •veta≤vatara
Upanißad III.20, “originally meant at least the cheerful, dispassionate,
perfect tranquillity and the benevolence of the personal highest Being.”7
Gonda notes that in the epic Mahàbhàrata prasàda similarly means “a
serene, dispassionate and therefore amiable gracious benevolence.”8
Because grace and peace, but also clarity, are so intimately asso-
ciated in this one word prasàda, it is sometimes difficult to decide
how to translate it into a single English word. Does the compound
jñàna-prasàda of Mu»∂aka Upanißad III.1.8 mean “the peace of knowl-
edge” or “the grace of knowledge?” The same is true of the use of
prasàda in the Bhagavad-Gìtà. In II.64, 65 and XVIII.37 prasàda seems
to mean tranquillity, whereas in XVIII.56, 62, and 73 the same
word most likely refers primarily to divine grace.9 The context of
the individual passages will have to be the final determiner. The
same is true wherever •aákara uses the word prasàda.
B. A
Anugraha is derived from anu-grah, meaning “to follow in taking or

plundering; to support; to uphold; to receive, welcome; to treat with
kindness, favour, oblige.”10 The root grah means “to take or seize;”
5
Lacombe 268.
6
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Yoga (New York: Paragon House, 1990), 270.
7
Jan Gonda, Die Religionen Indiens I, 2nd rev. and expanded ed. (Stuttgart 1978),
205.
8
Gonda I:244–245.
9
See Mariasusai Dhavamony, Love of God According to •aiva Siddhànta (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1971), 64.
10
MW 32, col. 1.
•Á’    163
thus anugraha indicates the notion of “an unconditional initiative.”11

Monier-Williams defines anugraha as “favour, kindness, showing fa-
vour, conferring benefits, promoting or furthering a good object;
assistance.”12
Thus, in regard to divine grace, anugraha signifies the kindness of
God in taking possession of the individual soul and of bequeathing
upon it some benefit, either a limited good, or the highest good,
which is liberation. The opposite of anugraha would be nigraha, or
God’s “power of obstruction by means of which he keeps man bound
down to saásàra.”13 Although anugraha includes the notion of a divine
initiative, somewhat in contrast to prasàda’s sense of a sharing of the
divine peace and light, it too, like prasàda, is most often translated
as “grace” by modern authors.
C. Dà
Dayà, from the root day, meaning “to divide, impart, allot; to par-
take, possess; to take part in, sympathize with, have pity on,” means
“sympathy, compassion, pity.”14 R. Panikkar defines dayà as “mercy,
compassion; both that which is to be practiced by Men and, later,
in the sense of God’s mercy.”15 To this he adds, “Dayà is mercy
that is prompted by a sense of compassion and sympathy. The later
words for grace, anugraha and prasàda, have altogether different
implications.”16
D. K°à
K‰pà, from kp, “to mourn, long for; to lament, implore; to grieve,
lament; to pity,” means “pity, tenderness, compassion.”17 Shankara
makes k‰pà a synonym of dayà in BhGBh XVI.2: “ ‘Kindness’ is pity
towards the suffering (dayà k‰pà bhùteßu du˙˚hiteßu).”18
11
Lacombe 268.
12
MW 32, col. 1.
13
R. N. Dandekar, Insights Into Hinduism (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1979), 143.
14
MW 469, col. 3.
15
R. Panikkar, The Vedic Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 875.
16
Panikkar 485. Panikkar defines anugraha as “divine grace” (870) and prasàda as
“divine grace, benevolence, serenity” (886). He notes that both terms are non-Vedic.
17
MW 305, col. 1.
18
GP 381, line 19. W. tr. 513.
164  
E. K»
From k‰̄, “to pour out, scatter, throw, cast, disperse,”19 or k‰̄, “to do,
make, perform, accomplish, cause, effect, prepare, undertake; to do
anything for the advantage or injury of another,”20 karu»a means
“pity, compassion; the sentiment of compassion.”21 As noted above,
•aákara tends to use the adjectival derivatives of karu»a.
F. A≤
This noun, meaning “tenderness, compassion,” is derived from the

root anu-kru≤, “to shout at,”22 “to cry out, shriek, yell, bawl, call out;
to lament,” in the Mahàbhàrata as “to lament, weep.”23 As we shall
see below,24 •àmkara employs the word, either in its nominal or
verbal form, only in his BhGBh, although the Gìtàkàra does not use
the term even once.
All of these terms emphasize the qualities of divine graciousness
and condescension perhaps even more than the actual gifts that are
given by God.25
19
MW 308, col. 2.
20
MW 300, col. 3 to 301, col. 3.
21
MW 255, cols. 2–3.
22
MW 31, col. 3.
23
MW 322, col. 2.
24
See IX.B.4.c below.
25
See Paul de Letter, The Christian and Hindu Concept of Grace (Calcutta: The Little
Flower Press, 1958), 3–4.
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE NOTION OF GRACE IN •AÁKARA’S

BRAHMA-SÙTRA-BHÀÍYA
As noted in the Introduction, in examining •aákara’s texts one must

inevitably begin with the BrSùBh, because the •aákara we are inter-
ested in knowing is the one who wrote at least this work.1 Too, the
post-•aákara Advaita tradition has tended to give greater impor-
tance to this writing than to any other in determining •aákara’s
teaching. The claim made by Daniel H. H. Ingalls and Paul Hacker
regarding a “Proto-Commentator” upon which •aákara based a
good deal of his own bhàßya, a claim which would greatly relativize
the importance of this work, has not been proved and has been seri-
ously challenged by Klaus Rüping.2 Thus •aákara’s BrSùBh, at least
for now, retains its traditional status and primacy for any investiga-
tion into the thought of the àcàrya.
A. E M
I shall proceed as follows. In evaluating •aákara’s position on divine

grace in his BrSùBh I shall examine those sùtras that appear espe-
cially valuable in uncovering his thought. It will be seen that a fairly
thorough analysis of the entire commentary on a given sùtra is gen-
erally necessary to properly understand •aákara’s frequently brief
and all too cryptic statements on grace. Except for a few instances
in which •aákara’s bhàßya on a group of sùtras (rather than on an
individual aphorism) constitutes the focus of this investigation, I shall
begin my analysis of a particular sùtra by first giving a fairly literal
reading of the sùtra upon which •aákara will comment, signaled by
the words, “The sùtra reads . . .”
Following that, I offer a translation or paraphrase of the same
sùtra, but this time along the lines of •aákara’s interpretation of it,
1
See Karl Potter, Advaita Vedànta up to •aákara and His Pupils (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1981).
2
See the discussion in I.C.1 above.
166  
as revealed in his commentary: “For •aákara this sùtra has the sense
of. . . .” This procedure, I hope, will make clearer •aákara’s own
particular interpretation of the sùtra, the distinctiveness of which will
become even more apparent when •aákara’s views are compared
and contrasted with those of Nimbàrka and Bhàskara, two other
early commentators, later in the discussion of each sùtra. Finally, I
offer a summary of •aákara’s position at the conclusion of each dis-
cussion, a procedure which is an absolute necessity in view of the
sometimes complex and painstaking analysis and exegesis which are
required of •aákara’s texts.
Throughout my discussion I will draw on the translations of a
number of scholars, seeking always to make use of the one I feel is
not merely most readable but also most faithfully reflects the origi-
nal Sanskrit as well as the sense •aákara intended it to have. Occa-
sionally I will alter the translation for the purpose of greater accuracy.
B. T A
1. BrSùBh I.1.5
The sùtra reads: “Because of seeing (matter which is) not founded
on the Scripture is not (the cause).”3
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “The Pradhàna of the
Sàákhyas is not the cause of the universe, because it is not men-
tioned in the Upanißads, which fact is clear from the fact of seeing
(or thinking).”4
This sùtra, the fifth in the BrSù, provides •aákara with the oppor-
tunity to introduce the notion of divine grace for the first time,
although the sùtra itself would hardly seem to provide •aákara with
such an opportunity, since it does not make even an indirect refer-
ence to favor or grace. The link between this sùtra and •aákara’s
reference to grace in his commentary are the notions of causation
and agency. The topic has been raised: What is the source of the
universe? The sùtrakàra and •aákara compare the answer of the
3
Translation by S. Radhakrishnan, The Brahma Sùtra (London: George Allen &
Unwin, 1971), 251. Henceforth “BS.”
4
Translation by Swami Gambhirananda, Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya of •a«karàcàrya
(Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1977), 47. Henceforth “G. tr.”
  BRAHMA-SÙTRA-BHÀÍYA 167
Sàákhya dualists with that of the Vedàntins, both of whom take

their stand on the authority of the Upanißads. The answer of the
Sàákhyas, i.e. that pradhàna, the primordial, eternal, material and
unconscious principle, is the cause of the universe, is refuted by the
sùtrakara on scriptural grounds and by •aákara on both scriptural
grounds and on the authority of reason.
The scriptural argument runs as follows: Pradhàna, the material
and insentient principle of the Sàákhyas, cannot be the cause of the
universe, because scripture, in particular ChUp VI.2.3, states that
the source of the universe first visualizes5 the future creation before
actually creating it. Now visualizing or seeing or thinking6 is obvi-
ously an activity of a conscious entity, and thus excludes the insen-
tient pradhàna. This real principle of creation was revealed two verses
earlier in ChUp VI.2.1 to be sat, Existence, Being. As further scrip-
tural proof that the source of the universe first visualizes before cre-
ating and is therefore a conscious principle, •aákara cites AiUp
I.1.1–2, which identifies this source as the àtman, or Self. He also
quotes PrUp VI.3–4, which names the purußa, the cosmic person, as
the creator of the world. Finally, •aákara himself chooses a different
word altogether to designate this conscious source; it is sarvajña-ì≤vara,
the all-knowing Lord.7 He states that all Upanißadic verses that declare
the cause of the world to be the omniscient Lord may be cited here
against the Sàákhyas.8
At this point •aákara abandons his purely scriptural arguments
and turns to logic to show the inherent contradictions implied in the
Sàákhya position.
5
See G. tr. 47.
6
All are valid translations of ìkßate. See G. tr. 47.
7
For the Sanskrit see Brahma-Sùtra With •a«karabhàßya. Works of •a«karàcàrya in
Original Sanskrit, Vol. III (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, no date), 25, line 10. Henceforth
“MB.”
8
See G. tr. 48. At this point it is worthwhile to quote a long passage by V. H.
Date, Vedànta Explained (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1973), II:512, on the impor-
tance of •aákara’s commentary on BrSu I.1.5 and its relevance for the brahman-
ì≤vara discussion: “One has merely to open the commentary of •aákara on 1,1,5
and be convinced for himself, even if it be against great authorities, about two
points, viz., that the cause of the world, as repeatedly told by •aákara is the
nirupàdhika Brahman alone and that the word ‘Ì≤vara’ has been put unambigu-
ously as a substitute for Brahman. Thinking that the Sàákhya might mean by
Brahman only Purußa in combination with whom Pradhàna evolves, •aákara appears
to have deliberately used the word ‘mukhyam’ (chief ) to qualify the word ‘Brahman’,
so that there should be no possibility of assuming any Sagu»a aspect of Brahman
as the cause of the world. In the non-dual Brahman, says •aákara, even if there
168  
The Sàákhyas assert that the presence of the constituent sattva,

i.e. purity, goodness,9 in the composite pradhàna ensures, in their view,
that knowledge, or consciousness, does indeed characterize their mate-
rial principle, since knowledge presupposes sattva. Against this •aákara
argues that the presence of the other two ingredients making up
pradhàna, namely rajas, i.e. activity, change, passion,10 and tamas, i.e.
darkness,11 indicates that pradhàna must, at most, be characterized as
having but little knowledge rather than as possessing omniscience.
Besides, •aákara further argues, for there to be a real knowing in
pradhàna, a witnessing and illumining consciousness must be the pre-
requisite. When the Sàákhyas argue that adept practitioners of yoga
acquire omniscience by virtue of the sattva that predominates in them,
•aákara answers that it is because these yogins are first of all con-
scious subjects that they are capable of knowledge, although it is by
increasing their sattva that they become omniscient. Thus, the exam-
ple of the yogins cannot be cited to support the contention that a
purely material principle can possess consciousness. Hence, it can-
not be pradhàna that the Upanißads refer to as the source of the uni-
verse.12
A new stage of argumentation is then initiated by •aákara’s imag-
inary Sàákhya opponent, who revises his original position and now
postulates that pradhàna is able to visualize by virtue of the presence
to it of a witnessing principle. Just as fire is able to impart the action
of burning to a lump of iron, so, too, can pradhàna take on the qual-
ity of consciousness, because of the presence to it of a witnessing
principle. •aákara’s answer is quite simple. If indeed, he says, prad-
hàna’s power to visualize were ultimately attributable to a conscious
entity that causes pradhàna to see, then we would be back at the cor-
rect Vedàntic position, which is also very logical, namely that it is
the all-knowing primary brahman itself that is the cause of the uni-
verse,13 since pradhàna would be dependent upon it.
is nothing to be thought about prior to creation, thought will never be foreign to

the nature of Brahman, just as the light that shines will not be foreign to the Sun
even if there be no objects to be illumined.”
9
See Monier-Williams, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, 1135, col. 2. Henceforth “MW.”
10
See MW 863, col. 2.
11
See MW 438, col. 1.
12
See G. tr. 48–49.
13
sarvajñaá mukhyaá brahma jagata˙ kàra»am iti. MB 26, lines 20–21.
It is important to note here that •aákara, who had earlier declared

sarvajña-ì≤vara to be the cause of the world, now states that cause to
be the highest brahman (mukhyaá brahma). It is obvious that in this
context the words are used interchangeably and are synonymous.
With the introduction of the term brahman into the debate, •aákara
now makes some important points regarding the nature of brahman’s
agency. The Sàákhya dualist objects that if brahman be omniscient,
then it cannot be independent or free from its knowing. What the
objector apparently means is this: For there to be knowledge and
acts of knowing, there must be objects of knowledge to which the
knower is bound in its act of knowing. For to know is to know some
object. If it be the case that brahman is eternally omniscient, then
brahman is eternally bound to objects distinct from itself, and is thus
not sovereign and free, its activity being always dependent upon
something apart from itself. Furthermore, brahman would have to be
in a state of constant change, were its acts of knowing to be depen-
dent upon the multifarious changing objects, which it knows. Again,
for brahman to know, it would have to be engaged in some action,
and would then require some material accessory or instrument. But
since the Vedàntins hold that brahman is immaterial, it is impossible
for it to be an agent.14
To this •aákara replies: Brahman knows all things at all times and
there is never a time when it is lacking in knowledge of anything.15
In fact, brahman is by nature knowledge; it is Knowledge itself, not
requiring an external object for it to know. Since it is independent
of all objects, brahman is sovereign and free in its act of knowing.
But how to illustrate this fact? •aákara says that brahman’s agency
as knower independent of all objects is comparable to the activity
of the sun.16 The sun shines and gives heat by its nature, even if no
objects are present to receive that light and heat. In the same way
brahman knows, or is pure knowledge, by nature even in the absence
of objects of knowledge. Thus brahman’s agency does not result in
any change in itself. And, of course, being eternal consciousness and
14
See G. tr. 49.
15
See the translation by George Thibaut, Part I of the Vedànta-Sùtras with the
Commentary by •a«karàcàrya, Vol. 34 of Sacred Books of the East (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1988), 49. Both Part I and Part II of the Vedànta-Sùtras (= Vol. 38, 1981)
will henceforth be referred to as “Th. Tr.”
16
•aákara will again return to the analogy of the sun to illustrate the divine
agentship—in this case the activity of the Self—in ChUpBh VIII.12.5.
170  
knowledge by nature, brahman does not require any extraneous instru-

ments for it to know.
•aákara, ever ready to accommodate himself to the objections of
his opponents, allows for the sake of argument that prior to creation
brahman’s activity of knowing required some object or objects of know-
ing.17 What would those objects be? In •aákara’s own words: “What
then is that object to which the knowledge of the Lord (ì≤vara) can
refer previously to the origin of the world?—Name and form (nàmarùpe),
we reply, which can be defined neither as being identical with brah-
man nor as different from it (tattvànyatvàbhyàmanirvacanìye), unevolved
but about to be evolved.”18
This is the heart of •aákara’s doctrine of non-duality. The uni-
verse is not identical with brahman, since it is an entirely dependent
reality, and neither is it separate from brahman, because it owes its
entire existence to brahman and not to some material principle apart
from brahman. Brahman is the total cause of the universe that exists
in a state of potentiality in the divine mind prior to its manifesta-
tion in space and time.19
Having stated that name and form are known by brahman in their
unmanifested state, •aákara points out that yogins, too, enjoy a sim-
ilar state of knowing, although not equal to that of brahman: “For,
if, as the adherents of the Yoga-sâstra assume, the Yogins have a
perceptive knowledge ( pratyakßaá jñànam) of the past and future through
the favour ( prasàdat) of the Lord; in what terms shall we have to
speak of the eternal cognition (nitvajñànam) of the ever pure Lord him-
self (nityasiddhasye≤varasya), whose objects are the creation, subsistence,
and dissolution of the world (s‰ß†isthitisamáh‰tivißayaá)!”20
17
We recall that the Upanißads had stated that the source of the world visual-
izes before creating. See note 4 above.
18
MB 27, lines 11–13. Th. tr. I:50. See here the useful paraphrase by Date I:35:
“And if at all the ‘seeing’ should grammatically require some object to be seen, it
will be no other than the very names and forms of this world which were before
creation present in the bosom of the Brahman as ideas to be seen or thought of.”
19
See here R. De Smet, “Origin: Creation and Emanation,” Indian Theological
Studies 15 (1978):266–279.
20
Th. tr. I:50. MB 27, lines 13–16 reads: yatprasàdàddhi yoginàmapyatìtànàgatavißayaá
pratyakßaá jñànamicchanti yoga≤àstravida˙, kimu vaktavyaá tasya nityasiddhaye≤varasya s‰ß†isthi-
tisaáh‰tivißayaá nityajñànaá bhavatìti.
G.’s tr., BrSùBh• 50, reads: “It goes without saying that the eternally pure God
is ever possessed of the knowledge of creation, continuance, and dissolution; for it
is held by the adepts in the Yoga scriptures that the Yogins get their direct knowl-
edge about the past and the future out of His grace.”
What is to be noted here is that •aákara, who in his previous

sentence on nàma-rùpa had spoken of brahman, chooses here to make
a statement about ì≤vara. That is, of course, typical of him, as he is
want to use the two terms synonymously.21 It is also worth noting
that although •aákara had been dealing with the opponents of the
Sàákhya school, he now chooses to allude to the scriptures of the
Yoga school, most probably to Patañjali’s Yoga-Sùtra.22 Why has
•aákara done this and why has he introduced the notion of grace
at this point?
It is important to recall the immediate context of this last quota-
tion from •aákara; he has abruptly introduced the topic of the omni-
science of those who have become perfect in the discipline of yoga,
in order to show that knowledge is only possible in a conscious sub-
ject, as opposed to an immaterial principle such as pradhàna.23 Further-
more •aákara notes that the yogins’ omniscience is to be attributed
to the grace of ì≤vara, on the testimony of yoga-practitioners them-
selves. That is to say, the yogins’ supernatural ability to know what
is in the past and future is something that is derived from ì≤vara and
does not fall within the range of their own powers. Now up until
this point •aákara’s Sàákhya opponent had not himself, for the
sake of buttressing any of his own arguments, brought up the subject
of yogins and omniscience at all, although it is possible that •aákara,
in his discussions and debates with Sàákhya opponents, had in fact
encountered such teaching. That is, of course, something that we
cannot be sure of today.
As is well known, the metaphysical systems of the classical Yoga
and Sàákhya schools were virtually identical; they were only distin-
guishable by Yoga’s acceptance and Sàákhya’s rejection of ì≤vara. It
is not clear whether Sàákhya was originally atheistic or theistic, but
by •aákara’s time it would appear that Sàákhya did not accept the
21
See Paul Hacker, “Eigentümlichkeiten der Lehre und Terminologie •a«karas:
Avidyà, Namarùpa, Màyà, Ì≤vara,” in Paul Hacker: Kleine Schriften, ed. Lambert
Schmithausen (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1978), 104. Henceforth I shall
refer to this essay as “Eigen.” and to the Schmithausen edition as “KS.”
22
We recall here the possibility that the •aákara who authored the BrSùBh was
also the author of a sub-commentary on the Yoga-Sùtra. See I.C.1. above.
As has been pointed out by T. Leggett and others, the •aákara who commented
on the Yoga-Sùtra stressed the role of ì≤vara and his grace much more than did
Vyàsa, the original commentator on the Yoga-Sùtra, and certainly more than Patañjali
himself with his cryptic utterances.
23
See above.
172  
notion of ì≤vara.24 Most historians of religion agree that only later,

primarily with Vijñànabhikßu (late 16th century C.E.), was an attempt
made to kindle or rekindle theistic belief.25 Nevertheless, in BrSùBh
II.2.37, •aákara refers to a belief in ì≤vara shared by both the Sàá-
khya and Yoga systems.26 He, unfortunately, does not indicate what
Sàákhya source he is drawing on. In the present sùtra, I.1.5, •aákara
assumes that reference to the Yogic ì≤vara will find acknowledgement
by his Sàákhya opponent, and he does not hesitate to cite ì≤vara as
the source of the yogins’ exalted knowledge.
Does •aákara feel free to introduce the subject of what the yogins
believe about ì≤vara, because the Sàákhyas and yogins are otherwise
so close in their metaphysical thinking? Or is it because ì≤vara and
his grace are personally of importance to •aákara? While it is clear
that though the ì≤vara of the Yoga-Sùtra, not being the creator of the
universe, is not, strictly speaking, identical with the ì≤vara of •aákara’s
system, it is true that in both systems ì≤vara is eternally omniscient.
It would have been enough for •aákara to mention the yogins’
belief in ì≤vara’s omniscience to support his own argument that brah-
man is certainly capable of knowing eternally all things both past and
future, including the unmanifest nàmarùpa. Be that as it may, •aákara
goes beyond the mere affirmation of ì≤vara’s omniscience, and draws
attention to the yogins’ claim that the omniscience of adepts in their
discipline is a result of ì≤vara’s grace. It is clearly unnecessary for
•aákara to mention this. Is this •aákara’s own personal belief ? It
is impossible to say here, since the point at issue in this passage is
not whether ì≤vara does or does not dispense grace, but rather whether
he is omniscient and has objects of knowledge even prior to cre-
ation. Yet the fact that •aákara, in his rebuttal of the Sàákhya
position, does opt to bring up the notion of divine grace, may be
an indication that he personally supports the idea. From the present
passage, this affirmation would simply mean that if indeed •aákara
accepts the notion of a special knowledge for yogins, this knowledge
is entirely the result of ì≤vara’s grace and not of human effort. However,
since this knowledge of the past and future is only a knowledge of
mundane things, the inference cannot, at least not yet, be drawn,
24
R. Puligandla, Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy (Nashville: Abingdon, 1975), 130,
declares Sàákhya to have been originally atheistic, while C. Sharma, A Critical Survey
of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 149 and 164, maintains that
in its beginning Sàákhya represented a form of theism.
25
See Puligandla 131; Sharma 149, 165.
26
See Th. tr. I:434.
that ì≤vara dispenses salvific knowledge. Whether or not that infer-

ence can be drawn from the Yoga-Sùtra is another matter altogether.
Let us now bring out the main points of •aákara’s commentary
on this sùtra in regard to the ideas of divine agency and grace:
1) •aákara unexpectedly brings up the topic of divine grace, although
the sùtra he is commenting on does not seem to call for it.
2) Ì≤vara is used as a synonym of the highest brahman.
3) The primary (mukhyaá) brahman’s or ì≤vara’s agency, in this case
its knowing, does not result in any change in itself.
4) Brahman-ì≤vara is the total cause of the world, not requiring any
instrument or accessory other than itself.
5) •aákara appears to uphold that the supernatural knowledge of
yogins is brought about by divine grace, although the question
remains unanswered as to whether, in •aákara’s personal view,
liberating salvific knowledge is itself also caused by the grace of
brahman or ì≤vara.
Nimbàrka, when commenting on this passage (VPS I.1.5), is content
to cite the scriptural argument that •aákara will restate in a more
developed form approximately two centuries later, namely that the
Sàákhyas’ pradhàna cannot be the cause of the world, since scrip-
ture asserts the cause of the world to be sentient, something prad-
hàna is not. Nimbàrka makes no reference to grace at all.27
Bhàskara, too, makes no mention of ì≤vara or ì≤vara’s grace.28
2. BrSùBh I.1.20
The sùtra reads: “The person within (appearing within the sun and
the eye is the highest God) because his qualities are mentioned.”29
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “The one within (the sun
and the eye (is the highest Lord), on account of his qualities being
declared.30
27
See Brahma-sùtra with •rì Nimbàrkabhàßya, ed. H. Sanshodhitam, Kashi Sanskrit
Series 66 (Benares: Vidya Vilas Press, 1989) 23, lines 2–4 (henceforth “VPS”) and
Roma Bose, trans. Vedànta-Pàrijàta-Saurabha of Nimbàrka and Vedànta-Kaustubha of •rìnivàsa
(Commentaries on the Brahma-Sùtras), Vol. I and II (Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society of
Bengal, 1940–1941), I:41 (henceforth “Bose tr.”).
28
See Brahmasùtra with a Commentary by Bhàskaràcàrya, ed. V. P. Dvivedin, Chow-
khamba Sanskrit Series 209 (Benares: Vidya Vilas Press, 1915), I.1.5, p. 21 (hence-
forth “BhBrSùBh”).
29
BS tr. 251.
30
Th. tr. I:77.
174  
This sùtra deals with the proper interpretation of ChUp I.6.6–7 and
I.7.5. In these three verses it is declared, among other things, that
there is a being or person ( purußa˙), effulgent as gold (hira»maya˙),
with golden beard and golden hair, radiant to the very tips of his
nails, with eyes as bright as a red lotus, who is seen within the sun
and seen within the eye. At the same time this being is said to have
risen above all evils or sins (sarvebhya˙ pàpmabhya˙ udita˙) and to be
the very Vedas.
The opponent ( pùrvapakßin) takes the view that the being spoken
of must be a limited individual transmigrating soul, because the
ChUp refers to a definite form and features. Furthermore because
this being is said to be found in a special place such as the sun or
the eye it cannot designate the highest Lord, who is revealed by the
Upanißads as dwelling in his own glory and as being omnipresent.
•aákara argues that this being is in fact the eternally perfect high-
est Lord (nityasiddha˙ parame≤vara)31 and not some individual soul of
great auspiciousness, as some would think. He is able to assert this
on the grounds that such qualities as being sinless and being the
essence of the Vedas are predicable only of the supreme Lord, the
Self of all,32 and not of some limited being. •aákara says that
the highest Lord is to be regarded as the essence of the Vedas, be-
cause, being the cause of all, he is to be regarded as the Self of all.33
After having shown the being in the sun and the eye to be the
highest Lord, •aákara must now clarify the difficult sense of these
passages from the ChUp. He says:
To the objection that the statements about bodily shape contained in
the clauses, “With a beard bright as gold,” etc., cannot refer to the
highest Lord, we reply that the highest Lord also may, when he pleases,
assume a bodily shape formed of Màyà, in order to gratify thereby
his devout worshippers (syàtparame≤varasyapìcchàv≤ànmàyàmayaá rùpaá sàd-
hakànugrahàrtham).34 Thus Sm‰ti also says, “That thou seest me, O Nàrada,
is the Màyà emitted by me; do not then look on me as endowed with
31
MB 44, line 7.
32
See BrSùBh• 80.
33
See Th. tr. I:79. MB 45, lines 7–8, reads: aà ca parame≤varasypopapadyate, sar-
vakàra»atvàtsarvàtmakatvopapatte˙.
34
G. tr., 80–81, reads: “. . . . for the sake of favouring the aspirants.”
Hacker, Eigen. 94, paraphrases: “Zur Begnadung eines Verehrers kann der
Parame≤vara eine ‘aus Màyà bestehende Gestalt’ annehmen.” Date’s loose transla-
tion I:55, runs: “. . . we have to remark thjat God may assume, on account of his
Màyà, any form for the sake of showing his grace to his devotees.”
the qualities of all beings.” We have further to note that expressions

such as, “That which is,without sound, without touch, without form,
without decay,”35 are made use of where instruction is given about the
nature of the highest Lord in so far as he is devoid of all qualities;
while passages such as the following one, “He to whom belong all
works, all desires, all sweet odours and tastes” (Kh. Up. III,14,2),36
which represent the highest Lord as the object of devotion, speak of
him, who is the cause of everything, as possessing some of the quali-
ties of his effects. Analogously he may be spoken of, in the passage
under discussion, as having a beard bright as gold and so on. With
reference to the objection that the highest Lord cannot be meant
because an abode is spoken of, we remark that, for the purposes of
devout meditation, a special abode may be assigned to Brahman,
although it abides in its own glory only; for as Brahman is like ether,
all-pervading, it may be viewed as being within the Self of all beings. . . .
From all this it follows that the being which Scripture states to be
within the eye and the sun is the highest Lord.37
It is a well known teaching of •aákara that the Absolute in itself
is devoid of all qualities, and can only be spoken about in terms of
the negation of all limiting attributes, such as in the verse from the
KaUp cited here. This Absolute-in-itself is sometimes called by
•aákara the nirgu»a brahman; the Advaitic tradition after •aákara
has tended to strongly distinguish the nirgu»a brahman from ì≤vara or
parame≤vara (the supreme Lord) and to equate the latter with the
sagu»a aspect of brahman, thus subordinating ì≤vara to the nirgu»a brah-
man. As much as this theory commends itself with its neatly defined
terminology, •aákara himself, in practice, does not tend to make
such sharp distinctions as his later followers do.38 One example is
the present sùtra; where one might expect •aákara to attribute to
the nirgu»a or nirvi≤eßana brahman the negation of all qualities, as well
35
Quotation from KaUp I.3.15.
36
“Kh. Up.” is an alternative abbreviation to ChUp.
37
Th. tr. I:80–81. MB 45, lines 16–26, and 46, lines 1–2 reads: yattùktaá
hira»ya≤ma≤rutvàdirùpa≤rava»aá parame≤vare nopapadyata iti, atra brùma˙—syàtparame≤varasyàpìc-
chàva≤ànmàyàmayaá rùpaá sàdhakànugrahàrtham. ‘màyà hyeßa mayà s‰ß†a yanmàá pa≤yasi
nàrada. sarvabhùtagu»eryuktaá maivaá màm jñàtumarhasi.’ iti smara»àt. apica yatra tu niras-
tasarvavi≤eßaá parame≤varaá rùpamupadi≤yate, bhavati tatra ≤àstram—‘a≤abdamspar≤amarùpa-
mavyayajm’ ityaàdi. sarvakàra»atvàttu vikàradharmairapi kai≤cidvi≤iß†a˙ parame≤vara upàsyatvena
nirdi≤yate —‘sarvakarmà sarvakàma˙ sarvagandha˙ sarvarasa˙’ (Ch. 3.14.2) ityàdinà. tatha
hira»ya≤ma≤rutvàdinirde≤o’pi bhavißyati. yadapyàdhàra≤rava»ànna parame≤vara iti, atrocyate —
svamahimapratiß†hasyàpyàdhàravi≤eßopade≤a upàsanàrtho bhavißyati, sarvagatatavàdbrahma»o vyoma-
vatsarvàntaratvopapatte˙ . . . tasmàtparame≤vara evàkßyàdityayorantarupadi≤yate.
38
See here the excellent remarks by Hacker, Eigen. 107–109, some of which are
reproduced in translation in III.B.2.c above.
176  
as the supporting quotations from the sm‰ti and the ≤ruti, he refers
instead here to the highest Lord, the parame≤vara. He thus conceives
the highest Lord, when regarded in himself in his real nature, as
being beyond all limitations and without form. Of course, •aákara
does not hesitate to attribute to parame≤vara the positive quality of
sinlessness, as we have seen above.
Now this same Lord, who is in himself formless, can assume any
earthly form for the sake of showing grace to spiritual aspirants. It
is unlikely that •aákara is referring exclusively to the avatàra teach-
ing of Vaiß»avism, for the ChUp description of a dazzling being
with golden hair and beard dwelling within the sun and the eye
would not seem to fit any of the divine descents, of which Ràma
and K‰ß»a are the most famous. •aákara does not say just how the
devotee is favored by seeing a form of the Lord, but he does men-
tion in the latter half of the long quotation just cited the practice
of having an object or image to meditate on that serves to repre-
sent in its way the formless invisible parame≤vara. Now in this kind
of meditation, called upàsanà, the devotee himself may choose or cre-
ate the object he wishes to meditate on, while in •aákara’s decla-
ration on grace it is the Lord himself who acts to choose which form
to assume for the sake of favoring the devotee, possibly also for the
purpose of meditation. Yet it may be that the Lord’s purpose in tak-
ing a form is more for emulation than meditation, i.e. ì≤vara dis-
penses grace by providing the devotee with a tangible object of
devotion and love to inspire and console him or her with his glory
manifested in an earthly image, and to encourage the devotee to
follow the example set by him.39 Or perhaps, as •aákara explains
in his gloss on the avatàra doctrine of the Bhagavad-Gìtà, both in the
introduction and throughout his commentary,40 the devotee is granted
the grace of being the recipient of the highest wisdom as directly
transmitted by the Lord in his capacity as teacher and world sav-
iour. However one may interpret the how and why of the Lord’s
dispensation of grace, it is important to keep in mind that any earthly
39
E. Lott, Vedàntic Approaches to God (London: Macmillan, 1980), 154, notes, con-
cerning •aákara’s doctrine of divine descent: “An incarnate appearance of the Lord
encourages emulation in his followers. Loyal devotion will result in the sincere
attempt to follow the Lord’s example . . . In this way each person will engage in
the social action required of him by his birth, but carrying out his duties in a spirit
of worship, with his mind centred on his Lord.”
40
See IX.B.3 below.
seeing of the Lord in a visible form would, in itself, represent for

•aákara a merely provisional and insufficient stage of knowledge
when measured against the ultimate goal of the jìva, namely the mys-
tical realization of the non-duality of the Lord and the devotee.41
Ultimately, the seeing of the Lord in a created form must give way
to the insight that, in reality, the Lord is not an entity apart from
the center of one’s being, the àtman. The àtman can never be an
object of the jìva’s perception, not only because it is a supersensu-
ous reality, but, more importantly, because it is the hidden Seer of
the limited seeker himself. What •aákara always stresses in the final
analysis is the unity of the Seer and the seen, of one’s most interior
Self and brahman.
•aákara states that the highest Lord assumes “màyàmayaá rùpaá.”
Just exactly what •aákara means by this is difficult to infer. Does
màyà refer to some material principle out of which the Lord shapes
a form? De Smet has pointed out that it is only •aákara’s follow-
ers who use màyà in this sense.42 •aákara himself does not expressly
espouse any theory of màyà; various ideas flow together in his use
of the term,43 including such connotations as deception, magic, and
the marvelous or miraculous power of the Lord.44 It is this latter
meaning that apparently gives the most sense to the passage under
scrutiny. Although at least one important translator chooses to ren-
der màyàmayaá rùpaá in a purely materialistic sense as “a bodily
shape formed of Màyà,”45 thus conforming with the established post-
•aákara tradition, there are other voices, such as Hacker’s, which
41
Lott 153 writes similarly on this point, except that he describes this ultimate
knowledge as the insight of the devotee’s “identity with the supreme Self ” instead
of a realization of their non-duality.
42
R. De Smet, “Màyà or Ajñàna?,” Indian Philosophical Annual 2 (1966):222, writes:
“Unlike later Advaitins, •a«kara refuses to identify màyà with an alleged material
out of which illusory existences would be woven.” See also Hacker, Eigen. 93.
43
See Hacker, Eigen. 92, who states that •aákara “entwickelt ja gar keine
Theorie der Màyà.”
44
See De Smet, “Màyà or Ajñàna?” 220–223, and Hacker, Eigen. 91–94.
45
Th. tr. I:80.
See here G. tr. 80, whose “forms created at His will out of Màyà” appears to
leave open the possibility that màyà may be understood in a non-material sense. In
actual fact, however, Gambhirananda, in footnote 95 of p. 50—the context is sùtra
I.1.5 examined above—makes it quite clear that for him •aákara’s use of màyà
has the sense of an original primeval matter, which he calls “Brahman’s limiting
adjunct.” This subtle matter would apparently lie dormant until transformed by
brahman into creation.
178  
point out that the literal translation “a form consisting of màyà”46

ought not conceal the fact that the power of the Lord Viß»u is
alluded to here. In about half of all the instances in the BrSùBh
where •aákara uses the word màyà, notes Hacker, he uses it in this
very positive theistic sense as opposed to the more negative mean-
ing of something merely illusory or deceptive.47 •aákara’s probable
sense of màyà in BrSùBh I.1.20 as Viß»u’s miraculous power does
not, of course, totally exclude the notion that the object that has
been acted upon or created through màyà is in some sense illusory.48
•aákara reminds the reader that the Lord is not in fact to be
regarded as endowed with the qualities of some earthly created being.
De Smet perhaps comes closest to the inscrutable mystery that
•aákara merely proclaims but does not elaborate on when he says,
in reference to BrSù I.1.20, “. . . the highest Lord is said to be màyà-
mayaá rùpaá, one whose form is full of creative power.”49 What is
miraculous here is that the highest àtman can be regarded as being
in itself inactive while at the same time enjoying an unlimited power
to act or create at will or to assume an earthly form in total sov-
ereignty.50 In making this affirmation, however, •aákara gives no
clue as to the ontological status of the form or forms that the Lord
assumes, nor does he attempt to differentiate these forms from any
other objects within the universe.51
In his commentary on this sùtra •aákara does not explain the
meaning of the phrases “seen in the sun” and “seen in the eye,”
since his primary intention is to prove that the ChUp refers here to
the highest Lord and that this same Lord disposes over the power
to assume any form for the sake of his devotees. But in his com-
mentary on ChUp I.6. 6–7 and I.7.5 •aákara does offer some
clarifications. Though he has nothing in particular to say about the
significance of the sun in which the Lord is said to be seen, his com-
mentary both preceding and following the words “inside the sun”
46
“. . . eine ‘aus Màyà bestehende Gestalt.’ ” Eigen. 94.
47
See Eigen. 94.
48
See Eigen. 94–95.
49
De Smet, “Màyà or Ajñàna?” 223.
50
Both Hacker, Eigen. 94, and De Smet, “Màyà or Ajñàna?” 223, refer to
•aákara’s commentary on BrSù II.2.7 in pointing this out. De Smet appears to
draw on Hacker in his refl ections on màyà, but draws more comprehensive con-
clusions than does the latter.
51
•aákara goes into greater detail about the nature of the Lord’s body in a
divine descent in his introduction to the BhG. See also Lott 155–156.
(anta˙ àditye) deal with the notion of the golden One (hira»maya˙).
•aákara sums up this passage by stating, “So the meaning is (that
He is) luminous.”52
As for the idea of the luminous One being seen in the eye, •aákara
states that this Person, this àtman, “is seen by persons who have
closed their eyes (to worldly things), who have concentration of mind
and depend on such spiritual disciplines as celibacy etc.”53 That is
to say, one must renounce attachment to the external world and
focus one’s mind and energies within. •aákara further notes in BrSù
1.2.13 that the eye is an appropriate place to (symbolically) locate
the Lord, because it is “presented as a place untarnished by any
blemish” in ChUp 4.15.1, just as the Lord in other Upanißadic verses
is presented as being free of all blemishes and sins.54 •aákara con-
cludes the special topic (adhikara»a) of the Person seen in the eye
(BrSùBh I.2.13–17) with the remark that the kind of seeing referred
to here whose “object” is the Lord is, of course, the mystical real-
ization whose prerequisite is knowledge of scripture,55 or, as Gamb-
hirananda paraphrases, “the vision of the enlightened man.”56
We may now sum up some of the salient points of •aákara’s
bhàßya on this sùtra, especially in as far as they bear on the subject
of divine grace:
1) As in sùtra 1.1.5, •aákara brings up the topic of grace indepen-
dently of the sacred text he is commenting on.
2) The dispenser of grace is the parame≤vara, the highest Lord, who
is formless, devoid of all limitations and even all qualities, a teach-
ing one might expect to be said only of the nirgu»a brahman. Clearly,
in this sùtra at least, the two are identical. Thus, for •aákara,
the Absolute is to be regarded as gracious in nature.
3) The parame≤vara gratifies or shows grace to spiritual seekers by
presenting himself with a màyà-form, presumably for the sake of
52
G. tr. 53 of Shankara’s ChUpBh I.6.6. See Swami Gambhirananda, trans.,
Chàndogya Upanißad With the Commentary of •a«karàcàrya (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama,
1983).
53
G. tr. 53. Ten Principal Upanißads with •a«karabhàßya. Works of •a«karàcàrya in
Original Sanskrit, Vol. I (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987, henceforth “TPU”), 370,
lines 22–23, reads: “. . . d‰≤yate niv‰ttacakßubhi˙ samàhitacetobhi˙ brahmacaryàdisàdhanàpekßai˙.
When reading ChUpBh I.7.5 it is necessary to refer back to I.6.6 to understand
the sense of “seen within the eye.” See G. tr. of the ChUpBh, p. 58 note 1.
54
See G. tr. 127.
55
See MB 79, line 3.
56
BrSùBh I.2.17, p. 133 of G. tr.
180  
adoration, emulation, and meditation. In doing this, the Lord acts

freely, “as he pleases,” in all sovereignty.
4) Màyà in this text most likely refers to the miraculous power of
the Lord Viß»u, who is thus indirectly made synonymous with
the parame≤vara and the nirgu»a or nirvi≤eßana brahman.
5) •aákara does not elaborate on the ontological status of the forms
that the Lord assumes, but he is careful to teach that the parame≤vara
is not to be regarded in reality as possessing the limited earthly
qualities which he manifests in his earthly forms. That is to say,
the Lord transcends all the positive qualities manifested in his
effects.
6) Although the Lord infinitely transcends the visible universe and
all that can be humanly conceived of him, scripture allows for
the attribution of positive limiting qualities (sagu»a) to him for the
sake of meditation and purification of the mind.57
According to Nimbàrka’s numeration this is sùtra 1.1.21.58 Nimbàrka
states that the sùtra refers to the highest àtman ( paramàtman), because
of the special qualities attributed to the being within the sun and
the eye, such as “freedom from sins,”59 “being the Self of all,” etc.
He also states that this àtman “is to be worshipped by one desiring
salvation” (mumukßudhyeyo),60 but he makes no mention of the Lord’s
grace.
Despite Bose’s contention that Bhàskara makes no reference to
grace in his BrSùBh,61 Bhàskara does, in fact, in 1.1.20,62 the very
57
This ì≤vara, or brahman with qualities, is also called by •aákara the lower brah-
man (aparaá brahma). Hacker, in the final paragraph of Eigen. 109, relates the lower
brahman with the higher brahman by observing meditation as the link between the
two: “Das Niedere Brahman ist ja eigentlich kein Wesen für sich—nur ganz selten
tritt es als solches auf . . .—; es ist überhaupt sozusagen nur zum Zwecke der
Verehrung da . . . Es wird, so könnten wir beinahe sagen, nur vom meditierenden
Subjekt in der Vorstellung geschaffen. Was aber in dieser Meditation verehrt wird,
das ist das eine Brahman, das Höchste, das bloss deswegen nur als ein Niederes
verehrt werden kann, weil es ohne Gu»as nicht vorstellbar ist. Darum kann •. auch
aus inneren Gründen an den Stellen, wo er von Verehrung spricht, ì≤vara, parame≤vara,
brahman, paraá brahma, aparaá brahma und paramàtman wahlweise gebrauchen. Sie sind
seiner Auffassung nach in ihrem realen Grunde ja ein und dasselbe.” Emphasis
given by Hacker.
58
See VPS 34, lines 18–20 and Bose tr. I:67.
59
Both Nimbarka and •aákara use this argument.
60
Perhaps “desired” or “ardently sought after” would be better here than Bose’s
“worshipped.”
61
See Bose III:186, 200.
62
See BhBrSùBh I.1.20, pp. 29–30, especially 29, lines 24–27.
sùtra we have been presently examining, affirm the grace of the

parame≤vara in nearly the same language as does •aákara. He speaks
of the Lord’s omnipotence (sarva≤akti ) bringing about màyàmayaá rùpaá
out of grace for the devotee (upàsakànugrahàya). It is certainly possi-
ble that either •aákara and Bhàskara are here drawing together on
a supposed “Proto-commentator”, as Ingalls assumes,63 or, perhaps
even more likely, Rüping is correct in making Bhàskara generally
dependent on •aákara, whenever their formulations converge.
3. BrSùBh I.1.28
The sùtra reads: “Prà»a64 on account of connection.”65

For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “Prà»a (breath) is Brahman,
that being understood from a connected consideration (of the pas-
sages referring to prà»a).”66
In chapter III of the Kaußìtaki Upanißad 67 a dialogue is recorded

between the god Indra and the man Pratardana, who has just returned
victorious from battle. In the course of this conversation the topic
of prà»a emerges, and is spoken of in various contexts. At times prà»a
seems to refer to ordinary breath, at other times to an individual
soul, still again to the god Indra himself, and, finally, to the high-
est brahman ( paraá brahma). What is then the proper meaning of prà»a
in this Upanißad?
•aákara answers that brahman is meant by the word prà»a, and
most of the rest of his commentary on this sùtra is given to citing
various reasons to support this, including a list of scriptural passages
that he uses to illumine the individual verses of KauUp III. We need
not deal with all of •aákara’s arguments in detail. As to his first
argument, suffice it to say that when prà»a is referred to by Indra
as the highest human end or good (manußyàya hitatamaá) •aákara
declares that this68 can in fact only apply to the knowledge of the
63
See I.C.2.c above.
64
Prà»a may be translated either as “breath,” “life,” “life-breath,” “life force,”
or “vital force.”
65
BS tr. 266.
66
Th. tr. I:97.
67
Since •aákara has not written a commentary on this Upanißad, we must limit
ourselves to his bhàßya on the BrSù to discern his teaching.
68
•aákara interprets manußyàya hitatamaá, that which is best for the human being,
in the technical religious sense as paramaá purußàrthaá, the supreme human goal.
See MB 57, lines 11–12.
182  
supreme Self ( paramàtmajñàna), and cites •vUp III.8 in support.69

Prà»a thus denotes brahman.
Again MuUp II.2.870 is cited by •aákara to clarify the meaning
of KauUp III.1, by showing that it is only brahman that can be
referred to as that which, when known, gives rise to the annihila-
tion of the effects of all previous actions accomplished, both good
and evil. •aákara also states that the intelligence, bliss, agelessness
and immortality ascribed to prà»a in KauUp III.2,3 and 8 apply
most fully to brahman, but he does not feel it necessary to offer scrip-
tural support for this.
It is, however, •aákara’s final argument that prà»a means brah-
man that is of most interest to our study. He once again draws atten-
tion to KauUp III.8, which had stated prà»a, now also called prajñàtman,
to be bliss, ageless and immortal. This passage goes on to add: “He
does not become greater (bhùyas) with good action, nor indeed lesser
(kanìyas) with bad action. This one, truly, indeed, causes him whom
he wishes to lead up from these worlds, to perform good action.
This one, also, indeed, causes him whom he wishes to lead down-
ward, to perform bad action. He is the world-protector (loka-pala).
He is the world-sovereign (lokàdhipati ). He is the lord of all.”71 Now,
says •aákara, this can only be comprehensible if it is taken to refer
to the supreme brahman ( parasmin brahman). •aákara does not give an
interpretation of these last words quoted from the Upanißad; he does
not state whether his own theology is in total agreement with what
is stated there, or whether he would qualify in any way the appar-
ently deterministic, even frivolous, conception of the deity presented
in this verse. He merely asserts that if this verse is to make any
sense, then it must be taken to refer to the supreme brahman, and
not to something lesser. Hence prà»a means brahman.
It is worthwhile to understand just what is being taught by KauUp
III.8. It is one’s deeds that determine the station of one’s next life.
By performing good deeds in the present life the jìva rises, as it were,
to a higher level of existence in its next birth, while evil deeds, on
the other hand, lead to an inferior birth. Yet the jìva’s destiny does
69
•vUp III.8 reads: “Knowing Him alone one goes beyond death; there is no
other path to go by.” G. tr., BrSùBh of •aákara 99.
70
•aákara quotes only the second half of MuUp II.2.8: “All works perish when
he has been beheld who is the higher and the lower.” Th. tr. I:98.
71
R. E. Hume tr., The Thirteen Principal Upanishads (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1984), 328.
not appear to be decided by its own free will to choose good or

evil. In this verse it is the Self,72 or, as •aákara says, the supreme
brahman that causes the jìva to perform good or evil, and is thus
solely responsible for the fate of all creatures. As such, brahman is
the ruler, protector and Lord of the universe. No reason is given to
explain why brahman would favor some by causing them to perform
good deeds, while apparently impelling others to accomplish what
could only be detrimental to them.
Thus, until •aákara speaks further on the subject, we may draw
the preliminary conclusion that he conceives of the supreme brahman
as totally controlling the will and the destinies of all creatures, whom
it would cause to act for their welfare or downfall. As we shall see,
•aákara does, in fact, consider this passage from the KauUp impor-
tant enough to quote it repeatedly later in his BrSùBh, when he
deals with and attempts to provide an answer to the problems of
theodicy and the inequality of suffering in the world.
For Nimbàrka this is sùtra I.1.29. Nimbàrka states that prà»a refers
to the supreme Self ( paramàtma), because of the qualities of being
the greatest good (hitatamatva), limitlessness (anantatva), etc. He does
not make mention of grace, nor does he bring up KauUp III.8 and
the subject of divine predestination.73
Bhàskara, like Nimbàrka, makes no mention of KauUp III.8 in
his commentary.74
4. BrSùBh I.2.7
The sùtra reads: “On account of the smallness of the abode and on
account of its being designated as such, not so. If this be the objec-
tion, not so, for this is so for the sake of contemplation and (is) anal-
ogous to space.75
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “If it be objected that
the supreme Self is not taught here, because of the smallness of the
abode and because of its being referred to as such, then we say: No,
72
KauUp III.8 ends with the declaration: “ ‘He is my self (àtman)’—this one
should know.” Hume tr. 328.
73
See VPS I.1.29, p. 42, lines 16–17 and Bose tr. I:81.
74
See BhBrSùBh I.1.28, p. 34, lines 1–17.
75
G. tr., BrSùBh• 115.
184  
for this is done for the sake of contemplation, as is seen in the case
of space.76
The problem which the sùtrakàra addresses, and after him •aákara,
concerns the way the supreme Self is present within the manifested
universe. •aákara also states the problem in terms of the presence
of the omniscient Lord and of brahman; in his bhàßya on this sùtra the
supreme Self, the omniscient Lord, and brahman are all synonymous.
The pùrvapakßin objects that passages such as ChUp III.14.3, “This
is my Self within the heart,” and “subtler than a grain of paddy or
barley,”77 cannot refer to the omnipresent supreme Self (sarvagata˙
paramàtma), because of spacial limitation, but must instead refer to
the “embodied soul of the size of the tip of a goading rod” (≤àrìra
evàràgramàtro jìva),78 i.e. of a very minute size.79
•aákara answers that in regards to something that is omnipresent
it is possible to speak of its presence in limited spaces, just as a king
ruling over the whole world is also the king of individual locations
within it. Thus there is no reason to rule out the omnipresent Lord
or brahman as being signified in this Upanißad verse.
The opponent would then like to know what sense there is in the
assertion that the omnipresent Lord occupies a limited space and is
minute. •aákara replies: For the sake of being so meditated on
(nicàyyatvàdevamiti ).80 He continues: “That Lord, who is characterized
by subtleness and other qualities, is taught to be meditated on there
in the lotus of the heart, just as (the Lord) Hari is in the ≤àlagràma
stone. A certain state of the intellect catches a glimpse of Him there.
The Lord, though omnipresent, becomes gracious when meditated
on there.”81
76
G. tr. 115.
77
G. tr. 115.
78
MB 67, line 19. G. tr., BrSùBh• 115–116. The image is taken by •aákara
from •vUp V.8.
79
•aákara, in his commentary on ChUp III.14.3, points out the error in infer-
ring from this passage that “the Self is atomic in size.” See G. tr., ChUpBh 213.
80
MB 68, line 1.
81
This reading combines the tr. of G., BrSùBh• 116, with Hacker, “Relations
of Early Advaitins to Vaiß»avism,” KS 207, with slight alterations. I have substi-
tuted the word “Lord” for “God,” in keeping with the usual translation of ì≤vara
in this study. The text, MB 68, lines 1–4, reads: evama»ìyastvàdigu»aga»opeta i≤varas-
tatra h‰dayapu»∂arìke nicàyyo draß†avya upadi≤yate. yathà ≤àlagràme hari˙. tatràsya buddhivi-
jñànaá gràhakam. sarvagato’pì≤varastatropàsyamàna˙ prasìdati.
Hacker has pointed out that •aákara, instead of referring to a

particular deity, could just as well have said something in general
about the use of symbols and images in relation to deities in order
to illustrate what is meant by meditating on the Lord in the lotus
of the heart. Instead, by choosing the example of Hari, a name of
Viß»u, and the ≤àlagràma stone, he reveals his own special familiar-
ity with, and perhaps preference for, the Vaiß»avite religion.82 In
BrSùBh II.2.42 •aákara’s “marked sympathy for the Vaiß»ava reli-
gion” and its practices becomes even more apparent.83 Reference to
the ≤àlagràma stone can also be found in two other places in •aákara’s
BrSùBh, in I.2.14 and I.3.14, and in some of his other works as
well.84
But before we turn to •aákara’s comments on this subject a brief
general introduction to the ≤àlagràma stone is first necessary.85 The
≤àlagràma stone is regarded by followers of the Vaiß»avite religion as
a symbol or representation of the Lord Viß»u. There are many such
stones in existence, and nowadays they are widely found in the houses
of Lord Viß»u’s devotees. Important religious ceremonies are often
performed in the presence of a ≤àlagràma stone, because of the belief
in the blessing that it bestows on those present.86 The existence of
such stone symbols goes back far into Indian antiquity, but it is the
Purà»as which are apparently the first ancient books to testify to
their origin and value, though the individual traditions recorded there
differ from one another. According to more than one account, these
stones were created by the Lord Viß»u himself for the sake of being
worshipped there by his devotees, as a sign of his favor.87 Though
each individual stone is unique, eighteen88 or thirty89 classes are gen-
erally recognized. They are small, round, of various colors, and
smoothly polished by the waters of the river Ga»∂akì, which flows
from Nepal into the Ganges.90 The special reason for their being
82
See Hacker, “Relations of Early Advaitins to Vaiß»avism,” KS 207–208.
83
Hacker, “Relations” 209. See the discussion below on this particular sùtra.
84
See e.g. B‰UpBh V.1.2, where it is indirectly alluded to.
85
The following remarks are based on R. K. Siddhantashastree, Vaiß»avism Through
the Ages (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1985), 16–49, and P. Sudhi, Symbols of Art,
Religion and Philosophy (Delhi: Intellectual Publishing, 1988), 150–176.
86
See Siddhantashastree 23.
87
See Siddhantashastree 19, 22.
88
89
See Sudhi 156.
90
See Sudhi 157. This river is associated with the •àlagràma mountain; hence
186  
regarded as representative of the Lord Viß»u is noted by Sudhi, who

remarks: “Each . . . has a hole, through which are visible several inte-
rior spiral grooves, resembling the Cakra or discus of Viß»u.”91 Although
some classes of stones may be reverently meditated on for the sake
of acquiring some earthly gain, others are suitable purely for achiev-
ing spiritual progress or even final liberation.92 After intense con-
centration, all wandering of the mind may be controlled, the external
world is shut out, and an extraordinary state of consciousness may
be reached or a special intuition may be made.93 As •aákara writes:
“A certain state of the intellect catches a glimpse of Him there.”94
•aákara is almost certainly referring to a special insight that is made
as a result of this kind of meditation, obviously an insight about the
nature or presence of Viß»u, but he does not elaborate. The artic-
ulation is cryptic.
Following this comes the very important remark: “The Lord,
though omnipresent, becomes gracious when meditated on there.”
The implication is that the insight attained through meditation has
been vouchsafed through the grace of the Lord Unfortunately, how-
ever, the matter is not entirely clear, as the word prasìdati, which is
a derivative of the root pra-sad, from which the word prasàda, grace,
also comes, may be interpreted as “is pleased.”95 The first alterna-
tive, “becomes gracious” or “becomes favourably disposed,” suggests
a sense of the Lord actively granting the favor of a rare intuition
the stone’s name. Sudhi, 156, however, gives several interpretations of the •àla-
gràma location, one being simply “the place where Viß»u is believed to be always
present.” See Mahàbhàrata Àra»yaka 3.82.106e.
91
Sudhi 157.
92
93
See Sudhi 153, 155.
94
See above.
95
See e.g. Th. tr. I:114. Similarly there is Swami Madhavananda’s translation
from •aákara’s B‰UpBh V.1.1, p. 562, which reads: “Because Brahman is pleased
( prasìdati ) with one who uses Om as an aid.” See Swami Madhavananda, trans.,
The B‰hadàra»yaka Upanißad With the Commentary of •a«karàcàrya (Calcutta: Advaita
Ashrama, 1965). For the original see TPU 954, line 22.
Gambhirananda, who has translated prasìdati in the present sùtra as “becomes
gracious,” translates the same word in KaUp II.3.13 as “becomes favourably dis-
posed.” See Eight Upanißads: With the Commentary of •a«karàcàrya (Calcutta: Advaita
Ashrama, 1982; henceforth “EU”), I:211. In his bhàßya on KaUp II.3.13, •aákara
explains prasìdati as abhimukhìbhavati, literally “turns His face towards.” See MW 67,
col. 2, on this last term. Gambhirananda, EU I:212, translates abhimukhìbhavati as
“becomes favourably disposed for revealing Itself.” See TPU 102, lines 25–26. The
reference here is to the Self.
as a response to the activity of the devotee reverently meditating on

the ≤àlagràma stone. The second alternative, “is pleased”, likewise a
response to the devotee’s meditation, seems rather to convey merely
the idea of the Lord taking satisfaction in the meditator’s devotion;
without, however, implying, as a result, the granting of a special
favor. It is impossible to determine which meaning comes closest to
•aákara’s intention. What is indisputable, however, is that meditat-
ing on the Lord as dwelling in the lotus of the heart is comparable
to meditating on the Lord Viß»u in the ≤àlagràma stone. In both
instances •aákara speaks of a gracious divine reaction, either on the
part of Viß»u, of the Self or of the omnipresent Lord.
In BrSùBh 1.2.14 •aákara returns to the example of meditating
on the ≤àlagràma stone, and elaborates further. He says:
Though Brahman is without name and form, such things are seen to
be ascribed to It in, “His name is Ut” (ChUp 1.6.7), “His beard is
golden” (ChUp I.6.6), and so on. And it has been already said that
though Brahman is without qualities (nirgu»am), still for the sake of
meditation (upàsanàrthaá), It is presented in those respective places as
a qualified entity, possessed of the characteristics associated with name
and form. It has also been stated that even for the omnipresent Brahman
it is nothing incongruous to have certain special places for meditation
like the •àlagràma (stone symbol) for Viß»u.96
It is clear from this passage that the nirgu»a brahman of which •aákara
speaks is equivalent to the Self and omnipresent Lord of BrSùBh
I.2.7 above. Hence, Hacker can remark on I.2.7:
Here the ≤àlagràma, which is a Vaiß»ava symbol, is referred to as
comparable to the heart in which the supreme God is perceptible
according to the sùtra. Hari is not compared with the Lower Brahman,
which is constituted by a superimposition of illusory qualities on the
Supreme, but with the transcendent Highest Self, who cannot become
the object of meditation unless contemplated under a symbol.97
That is to say, the supreme reality, variously named the highest Self,
the omniscient Lord, the nirgu»a brahman, etc. is in itself unknowable,
beyond the reach of human thought and imagination. For it to
become the object of meditation, it must be regarded as taking on
those positive characteristics of the symbols that are seen or made
96
Gambhirananda tr., BrSùBh•, p. 128. Cf. MB, p. 76, lines 4–8.
97
Hacker, “Relations” 207. See similar remarks by the same author in Eigen.
106–107 and 109.
188  
to represent it. That brahman can be meditated on under a symbol

at all, says •aákara, is analogous to the situation of space. There
is no place where brahman is not, since it is omnipresent, just as space
is all-pervasive. Space can be regarded in a limited sense as consti-
tuting a minute area, for example the eye of a needle.98 Thus a large
thing may be described as small.99 But, of course, spatiality cannot
apply to the purely spiritual brahman. Its dwelling in a limited abode
or being minute are ascribed to it only for the sake of meditation,
but do not apply to it “in any real sense” (na pàramàrthikam).100 It is
important to bear in mind after all this that meditation, for •aákara,
does not lead to final liberation.101 It produces only limited results,
such as purifying the mind of what is less true concerning the high-
est reality or by helping the mind to become calm. It cannot replace
the necessity of hearing and grasping the truth of the Great Sayings
(mahà-vàkya), nor can it, of itself, cause liberation to occur.
To summarize some of the principal points of •aákara’s com-
mentary on BrSùBh I.2.7:
1) Once again, •aákara introduces the topic of grace or gracious-
ness without being impelled to do so by the text under consid-
eration
2) Grace or graciousness is explicitly ascribed to the omniscient Lord,
who is synonymous with the supreme Self and with brahman, the
latter being further identified by BrSùBh I.2.14 as the brahman
without qualties (nirgu»am), who is omnipresent.
3) •aákara introduces the example of reverently meditating on Hari,
or Viß»u, through the symbol of the ≤àlagràma stone, for the sake
of illustrating the sense of meditating on the Self in the lotus of
the heart. After comparing the two objects of meditation he states
that it is the Lord (ì≤vara) who responds graciously, presumably in
both instances. By failing to specifically mention Hari or Viß»u
in this regard, the conclusion may be drawn that, in •aákara’s
mind, Viß»u devotees who reverently meditate on their sectarian
God and receive some kind of divine response are in fact com-
muning with the non-sectarian ì≤vara.102
98
See MB, p. 68, line 5.
99
See V.S. Ghate, The Vedànta (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,
1981), 57.
100
G. tr., BrSùBh• 116. See MB 68, line 6.
101
See Eigen. 106.
102
See Nakamura, A History of Early Vedànta Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
4) It is not clear whether prasìdati has the sense of “becomes gra-

cious”, meaning becoming favorably disposed to reveal itself, as,
for example, in a special intuition or insight into the nature of
the divine reality that •aákara speaks of, or whether, on the other
hand, it may simply mean “is pleased”, thereby signifying the
pleasure the Lord takes in the devotion of his ardent worshipper.
What, however, seems incontrovertible is •aákara’s affirmation
of some kind of divine response in reaction to the activity of the
devotee.
5) Assuming that the Lord’s graciousness is demonstrated in the
granting of some special insight into his nature, •aákara does
not attempt to evaluate the content of such a private revelation.
He neither appraises it according to the duality (dvaita) he dis-
dains nor according to the non-duality (a-dvaita) he upholds What
is remarkable is that he appears to assert the reality of the Lord’s
gracious response to his devotee even while declaring the limita-
tions and ultimate inadequacy of all symbols to attain to the Ab-
solute, whether or not they be used for the sake of meditation.
Nimbàrka, in his commentary on sùtra I.2.7, states, as does •aákara,
that the aphorism under question relates to ChUp III.14.3, and that
the object of meditation is brahman. But, unlike •aákara, he does
not refer to the ≤àlagràma stone, to Viß»u or to a divine gracious
response of any kind.103
Bhàskara, in this same sùtra, refers to the omnipresent supreme
Self (sarvagata˙ paramàtma), but makes no mention of the ≤àlagràma
stone or of the Lord’s grace.104
5. BrSùBh 1.2.13
The sùtra reads: “The One inside, for that is appropriate.”105

For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “The person within (the
eye) (is Brahman) on account of the agreement (of the attributes of
that person with the nature of Brahman).”106
1983), 240–241, who points out that ì≤vara, in contrast to Viß»u, is for •aákara a
non-sectarian, even philosophical, concept.
103
See VPS 52, lines 22–24 and Bose I:100–101.
104
105
See BrSùBh• 126 and BS 276 translations.
106
Th. tr. I:123.
190  
In the analysis of BrSùBh I.1.20 above107 which dealt with the purußa
seen in the sun and the eye, we referred ahead to the present sùtra,
because in it •aákara declares the appropriateness of symbolically
locating the Lord in the eye, the eye remaining unblemished by any
impurity it comes into contact with.108
The present sùtra returns to the task of proving that the Person
in the eye is the Self, or, as •aákara states, that it is the supreme
Lord ( parame≤vara). In the first place, •aákara notes, Self-hood (àtmat-
vaá)109 in its primary (mukhyaá) sense must be taken as designating
the supreme Lord and not anything less.110
What is perhaps even more noteworthy than •aákara explicitly
identifying the Self with the parame≤vara is the ≤ruti text he draws on
to support his position; it is nothing less than the mahà-vàkya: “He
is the Self. That thou art.” (ChUp VI.8.7)111
Following this powerful statement, •aákara adds that immortality
and fearlessness are frequently declared of him or it112 by scripture.
107
See VIII.B.2.
108
See ChUp IV.15.1: “The One, the Person ( purußa) seen in the eye, is the Self.
This One is immortal, fearless; this One is Brahman. Accordingly, if clarified but-
ter or water be poured on it (i.e. the eye), it flows down to the eyelids.” BrSùBh• 126.
109
•aákara is referring back to the word “Self ” as it appears in ChUp IV.15.1.
110
MB 75, line 11, reads: àtmatvaá tàvanmukhyayà v‰ttyà parame≤vara upapadyate.
A comparison of Thibaut’s with Gambhirananda’s translation reveals a remark-
able discrepancy. Thibaut I:124, reads: “The quality of being the Self, in the first
place, belongs to the highest Lord in its primary (non-figurative or non-derived)
sense . . .” This is an accurate translation, which keeps to the original Sanskrit.
By contrast, we read in Gambhirananda’s translation, BrSùBh• 127: “. . . the
fact of being the Self applies to Brahman in the primary sense . . .” I have italicized
Brahman for emphasis. It is clear from this rendering that Gambhirananda cannot
agree to equate the supreme Lord with the highest Self, and thus refuses to allow
•aákara to speak for himself. This translator is obviously in agreement with post-
•aákara Advaita in his interpretation of •aákara.
In his commentary on this same verse in his ChUpBh, however, •aákara is not
as bold as in his interpretation of BrSùBh I.2.13. In ChUpBh IV.15.1 •aákara
leaves the words “Self ” and “brahman” just as they are in the ≤ruti verse, and does
not introduce the terms ì≤vara or parame≤vara into the discussion, nor does he refer
to any of the Great Sayings (mahàvàkya). See TPU 460, line 20, to 461, line 3, as
well as G.’s tr. of •aákara’s ChUpBh, 294–295.
111
MB 75, lines 11–12, reads: “sa àtmà tattvamasi” iti ≤rute˙. It is this citation of
a Great Saying which probably made it most difficult for Gambhirananda to iden-
tify the Self linguistically with anything but brahman.
112
The original text, MB 75, line 12, does not include a pronoun. Thibaut I:125,
inserts the word “him,” obviously a reference to the highest Lord of the previous
sentence, while Gambhirananda, BrSùBh• 127, as might be expected, again inserts
the word “brahman.”
Next •aákara makes the remark about the appropriateness of the

eye as a symbol of the Lord, a statement we are already acquainted
with. He quotes ChUp IV.15.1, the verse this is taken from, and
then proceeds to quote portions of the following three verses, i.e.
ChUp IV.15.2,3 and 4, as further support that the Lord is the
intended object. The implication is that if verses 2, 3 and 4 refer
to the Lord, then verse 1, which refers to the Person in the eye,
must also be taken as signifying the parame≤vara. What is it that
•aákara quotes from these verses?
From ChUp IV.15.2 •aákara quotes: “They call Him the goal
of all attractive things because all things that are sought after pro-
ceed towards Him.”113 The idea seems to be that all the normally
yearned for attractive things of this world both come from and return
to the Lord, their source, whose beauty is infinitely greater than their
own. It is possible that this verse also intends to declare that the
Lord is that which humans blindly seek in their grasping after finite
objects.
From the next verse, ChUp IV.15.3, •aákara takes: “This One
is certainly the carrier of all attractive things (vàmanìreßa), for it is
this One that carries all attractive things.”114 •aákara explains this
text in his commentary on ChUp as referring to One who governs
the universal law of action and retribution. He interprets vàmàni as
punyakarmaphalàni, the results of virtuous actions, and states that this
One leads (nayati ) or, as Gambhirananda paraphrases, “makes avail-
able to the creatures ( prà»ibhyo)”115 these results, or fruits, according
113
MB 75, lines 16–17: etaá saáyadvàma ityàcakßate etaá hi sarvà»i vàmànyabhisaáyanti.
G. tr., ChUpBh 295. I have selected this translation instead of G.’s translation of
the same verse in BrSùBh I.2.13, because the ChUpBh rendering is from 1983,
eighteen years after the translator’s work on the BrSùBh. The original translation,
from 1965, which G. appears to have rejected, read: “They call Him the ‘goal of
the results of actions’, for all the results of actions proceed towards Him.” See
BrSùBh• 127.
In favor of the more recent translation is •aákara’s clarification of vàmàni as
≤obhanàni, i.e. “beautiful things.” See TPU 461, line 7. The noun ≤obha means not
only beauty, but also, among other things, splendor, grace, loveliness. See MW
1092, col. 1.
114
MB 75, lines 17–18: eßa u eva vàmanìreßa hi sarvà»i vàmàni nayati. The transla-
tion is based on BrSùBh• 127, but I have taken the liberty of sustituting “attrac-
tive things” (vàmàni ) for G.’s “good results of works,” for the sake of consistency.
Both of G.’s translations of this Upanißadic verse read too much of •aákara’s com-
mentary into them.
115
G. tr., ChUpBh 296.
192  
to the merit of those actions. That is to say, the law of karma does
not take effect according to some blind mechanism, but is animated
by the guiding power of a supreme conscious principal, which •aákara,
in BrSùBh 1.2.13, identifies as the supreme Lord. A good or meri-
torious action brings fruit of some kind to the doer only by the con-
sent and will of ì≤vara.116
The last scriptural proof •aákara offers that it is the supreme
Lord who is meant in all these passages is ChUp IV.15.4: “This one
again, is indeed called the Bestower (Carrier) of lustre because this
one shines in all the worlds.”117 In his ChUpBh to this verse •aákara
states that in all the worlds, in the forms of sun, moon, fire, etc. i.e.
in all that gives light, this One shines. He says that this is in accord
with KaUp II.2.15: “Through his lustre all these are variously illu-
mined.”118 In his commentary on this last passage •aákara declares
that it is only brahman which is intrinsically luminous and thus capa-
ble of imparting luminosity to things such as the sun and moon. In
this same passage, in which he asserts the identity of brahman with
the Self, he likewise states that everything shines according as the
supreme Lord shines.119 Thus •aákara’s commentaries on the ChUp
and KaUp support his final argument in BrSùBh I.2.13 that it is
the supreme Lord who is the light of all created lights.
Let us now restate some important teachings of •aákara gleaned
from this sùtra:
1) •aákara explicitly identifies the “That” (tat) of the mahàvàkya That
thou art” as the parame≤vara, the supreme Lord, instead of the cus-
tomary Advaitic reference to the highest brahman. He states, too,
that selfhood in its primary (mukhyaá) sense refers to the Lord.
Thus, for •aákara, there is nothing higher than the supreme
Lord; the highest brahman must be seen as synonymous with him,
but not beyond him. The paraá brahman is the parame≤vara.
2) This same Lord is seen by •aákara, in accordance with the ≤ruti,
as not only untarnished by sin, but also as the source of all beauty
(ChUp IV.15.2) and all radiance (ChUp IV.15.4).
3) The supreme Lord is affirmed by •aákara to be the overseer of
116
Date I:93, loosely translates: “He is also called Vàmanì . . ., that is, one who
distributes the fruits to all.”
117
Eßa u eva bhàmanìreßa hi sarveßu lokeßu bhàti. Text in ChUpBh, G. tr. 296.
118
Tasya bhàsà sarvamidaá vibhàti. Text and tr. in EU I:198.
119
See TPU 96, line 21, to 97, line 5, as well as EU I:198.
all actions and results in the world.120 It is only through his gov-
erning power that meritorious deeds are rewarded with their proper
fruit. •aákara says nothing in this context about the Lord impelling
creatures to will and to perform good or evil, as he did when
quoting KauUp III.8 in BrSùBh I.1.28 above. There is no men-
tion of predestination here.
In VPS 1.2.13,121 which is the same sùtra dealt with here, Nimbàrka
also sees the passage the “Person seen within the eye” as referring
to ChUp IV.15.1, and, as •aákara does, he goes on to quote from
the remainder of IV.15.1 (the Self is deathless, fearless, the brahman)
and from IV.15.2 (the goal of all attractive things) to support his
contention that the supreme Person ( purußottama) is the intended object.
Thus, for Nimbàrka the supreme Person is identical with the Self
and brahman. This, of course, is very close to what •aákara says,
when he refers to the supreme Lord ( parame≤vara). In his argumen-
tation, however, •aákara expands on what Nimbàrka states. He not
only quotes from ChUp IV.15.1 and 2, as Nimbàrka does, but from
verses 3 and 4 as well. More importantly, •aákara does not hesi-
tate to cite the mahàvàkya “That thou art” in support of his teach-
ing that the Self is the supreme Lord, an argument that Nimbàrka
does not make. Neither •aákara nor Nimbàrka explicitly refers to
divine grace, but in citing ChUp IV.15.3 •aákara does allude to
the Lord’s action of governing the moral law of cause and effect at
work in the world.
Bhàskara,122 too, does not link ì≤vara with the mahàvàkya “That
thou art.” “Tat tvam asi” is not mentioned at all.
6. BrSùBh I.2.24
The sùtra reads: “Vai≤vànara, for the words denoting many things
are used specifically.”123
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “Vai≤vànara (the Cosmic
Person) is the supreme Lord, for though the (two) words (Self and
Vai≤vànara) denote many things, they are used specifically.”124
120
See ChUpBh IV.15.3.
121
See VPS 58, lines 2–5, and Bose I:111.
122
BhBrSùBh I.2.13, p. 41, line 27 to 42, line 11.
123
G. tr. 146.
124
G. tr. 146.
194  
Sùtras I.2.24 to I.2.32 comprise the subject matter (adhikara»a) deal-

ing with Vai≤vànara, an almost pantheistic conception of the deity,
which, in the context of these sùtras, is taken from the ChUp. I have
chosen to briefly examine the present sùtra as well as I.2.29,125 because
of explicit references made to grace there, although, as I intend to
show, they do not offer much towards comprehending •aákara’s
own position on the subject. I thus intend to remain as succinct as
possible here.126
The issue at hand here is whether the designation of the Self as
Vai≤vànara in ChUp V.11.6 means the Vai≤vànara which is the
digestive fire of the stomach,127 the Vai≤vànara which is the ordinary
element of fire, the Vai≤vànara designated as the god of fire,128 or
whether it refers to some other entity, such as the individual soul
or the supreme Lord, since this Vai≤vànara is called the “Self.”
•aákara answers that the highest Self, the supreme Lord, brah-
man is meant here.129 Only the Self may be regarded as the cause
(kàra»a) of all;130 only the knowledge of brahman can be meant when
ChUp V.24.3 declares that the knowledge of Vai≤vànara burns away
all sins. Therefore, all other meanings of the term “Vai≤vànara”, as
given above, must be excluded.
What is pertinent to the present study is the verse from the °g
Veda, which •aákara quotes in support of the pùrvapakßa view that
the deity of fire may be signified by Vai≤vànara. °g Veda I.98.1 reads:
“May we be in the favour (sumatau) of Vai≤vànara; for he is the king
of the beings, giving pleasure, of ready grace (abhi≤rì˙).”131 The word
125
I.e. immediately following the investigation of BrSùBh I.2.24 in the present
chapter.
126
For an analysis of the present adhikara»a as well as a summary of •aákara’s
views, see BS 282–285; R.D. Ranade, Vedànta. The Culmination of Indian Thought
(Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1970), 92–94; Date I:107–115; Potter 135. See
also on Vai≤vànara •aákara’s commentary on ChUp V.11.1 to V.18.2.
127
As in B‰Up V.9.
128
As in °g Veda I.98.1.
129
See MB 87, line 22, to 88, line 10. Again, the terms are used synonymously.
130
•aákara is referring here to the representation, for the purpose of medita-
tion, of the Vai≤vànara-Self as heaven and earth itself. The representation is pos-
sible, because what is the cause of all must be seen as containing every possible
effect. See MB 88, lines 4–5.
131
Th. tr. I:144. MB 87, lines 15–16, reads: vai≤vànarasya sumatau syàm ràjà hi kaá
bhuvanànàmabhi≤rì˙. G., BrSùBh• 147, translates: “Because Vai≤vànara, the king of
the worlds, ordains happiness, and because all glories belong to him, therefore may
we remain within his favour.” Both of these are rather loose translations, seeking
to best interpret the final word ≤rì, or abhi≤rì. MW 1098, cols. 2 to 3, defines ≤rì,
sumati literally means good mind or disposition, thus also benevo-

lence, kindness, favor.132 It is not one of the terms •aákara gener-
ally employs for grace, favor or its synonyms. Anugraha is the word
he normally uses for favor.133 •aákara does not go beyond quoting
this verse in the present sùtra; he makes no comment about Vai≤vànara,
here another name for the fire-god Agni, in his function as a benev-
olent power.134 He will show that a deity such as a god of fire does
not possess certain qualities that can only characterize the highest
Lord, such as creatorship of the world.
A few sùtras later, in BrSù I.2.27, •aákara will add that the divine
power (ai≤varyam) of the god of fire depends on the parame≤vara, the
highest Lord.135 We may infer that the power of showing favor to
human beings would belong to this ai≤varyam, which •aákara sees
as derived from the supreme Lord himself. However, this is not a
point that •aákara explicitly makes, nor here wishes to make.
By way of summary we may say that •aákara’s reference to divine
favor in this sùtra is of but little help to us in determining his own
position on grace. By quoting °g Veda I.98.1 •aákara’s overriding
interest is to show that one of the meanings of Vai≤vànara is to des-
ignate Agni, the god of fire. As such, this divinity’s benevolent dis-
position towards humankind has no bearing on the main theme of
this study, which is to determine the role of grace in •aákara’s sote-
riology as well as to trace back grace to its ultimate source. At most,
this sùtra, when taken in conjunction with I.2.27, might be seen as
linking Agni’s grace to that of the highest Lord, since •aákara derives
the power of individual deities from the parame≤vara.
For Nimbàrka, Vai≤vànara refers to the highest Self, to brahman,
because of such distinctive attributes as having heaven as its head,
etc. Although he states that “Vai≤vànara” may denote fire, he does
not introduce the topic of the fire-deity nor quote from the °g Veda,
among other things, as light, lustre, radiance, splendour, glory, beauty, grace, love-
liness; in the °g Veda especially as prosperity, welfare, good fortune, success, aus-
piciousness, wealth, treasure, riches, etc.
132
See MW 1230, col. 2.
133
See Chapter VII.B.
134
See R. Panikkar, The Vedic Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1977), 325–328, who sees this verse as indicative of Agni’s lordship over the earth.
Panikkar also sees Agni as a special mediator between the gods and humans, though
he himself is a created deity.
135
See MB 90, line 17.
196  
as •aákara does.136 In sùtra I.2.28, which is I.2.27 for •aákara,

Nimbàrka merely remarks that the reasons for excluding fire and
the “deity” (devatà) as that which is signified by Vai≤vànara have been
given above.137
In his BrSùBh I.2.24 Bhàskara agrees that the highest Self ( paramàtma)
is meant here; like •aákara, he quotes °g Veda I.98.1 in support of
his argument.138 In I.2.27,139 however, he makes no mention of the
fact that the power of individual deities is derived from the supreme
Lord.
7. BrSùBh I.2.29
The sùtra reads: “On account of manifestation; so À≤marathya.”140

For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “According to À≤marathya,
it is from the point of view of manifestation (that God is referred
to as spatially limited).”141
We recall that this sùtra is to be read within the context of the

adhikàra»a encompassing BrSù I.2.24 to I.2.32, and is thus related to
the sùtra just examined. The correct or siddhànta view has been estab-
lished: The Vai≤vànara-atman refers to the highest Self, the supreme
Lord and not to some limited deity or to the individual soul. Here,
in this sùtra, the question now arises as to the applicability of ChUp
V.18.1 to the supreme Lord. ChUp V.18.1 states that the Vai≤vànara-
Self is to be meditated on as spatially limited, i.e. as having a lim-
ited length ( pràde≤amàtram). How can spatial size refer to the infinite
and transcendent supreme Lord?
Sùtras I.2.29 to I.2.31 give three ancient answers to this question,
only the final one of which seems to have gained •aákara’s com-
plete acceptance. Each of these sùtras names a certain philosopher
as the particular exponent of the view summarized. They are
À≤marathya, Bàdari and Jaimini. All three thinkers are more ancient
than even the sùtrakàra, who records their attempted solutions. Little
is known of the ancient commentators cited by name here and else-
136
See VPS I.2.25, p. 69, lines 21–22 and Bose tr. I:132.
137
See VPS 73, lines 10–11 and Bose tr., I:136.
138
See BhBrSùBh, p. 47, line 7 to p. 48, line 9.
139
See BhBrSùBh, p. 49, line 4.
140
See BS tr. 284.
141
G. tr. 154.
where by the final redactor of the BrSù, and À≤marathya is one of

them. His name appears in only one other place in the BrSù, in
I.4.20, in the context of the relationship between the individual self
and the highest Self. In both I.2.29 and I.4.20 À≤marathya’s opin-
ion is given as the first of three views considered, and was thus
regarded as incorrect by the sùtrakàra, who always makes the last
teaching presented the correct one.142 In BrSù I.4.20 À≤marathya
espouses the view that the individual self and the supreme Self are
non-different, a view •aákara would have upheld were it not asserted
in the context of the affirmation of difference-and-nondifference
(bhedàbheda).143
Again, as to BrSù I.2.29 and the question of the Self and its spa-
tial limitation, •aákara summarizes À≤marathya’s position thus: “The
circumstance of the highest Lord who transcends all measure being
spoken of as measured by a span has for its reason ‘manifestation.’
The highest Lord manifests himself as measured by a span, i.e. he
specially manifests himself for the benefit of his worshippers in some
special places, such as the heart and the like, where he may be per-
ceived. Hence, according to the opinion of the teacher À≤marathya,
the scriptural passage which speaks of him who is measured by a
span may refer to the highest Lord.”144
What •aákara states here as representing À≤marathya’s interpre-
tation of ChUp V.18.1 is reminiscent of what he himself has already
taught in BrSùBh I.1.20 and I.2.7 above. In I.1.20 •aákara had
142
Nakamura, A History of Early Vedànta Philosophy, 374, remarks:
“Throughout the entire Brahma-Sùtra, whenever it lists different theories, it is a
definite rule to give the finally determined theory last . . .”
•aákara normally upholds this scheme, but sometimes diverges from the con-
clusion of the sùtrakàra, and must seek the siddhànta solution in one of the earlier
theories. See Nakamura, History 378 note 2.
143
See •aákara’s summary of À≤marathya’s position in I.4.20 and his explicit
refutation of that view in I.4.22. Commentators on the BrSù such as Bhàskara,
Ànandajñàna and Govindànanda have likewise referred to À≤marathya as a bhedàb-
hedavàdin. See Nakamura 384. Although the theory of Kà≤ak‰tsna is presented by
the sùtrakàra in I.4.22 as the correct one, it is not clear whether this view entails
bhedàbhedavàda or advaitavàda. Since the sùtrakàra himself advocates a brand of difference-
and-non-difference, it may be supposed that he views Kà≤ak‰tsna as sharing that
same worldview. Yet •aákara appears to have regarded Kà≤ak‰tsna as a strict non-
dualist, either genuinely or in order to combine the latter’s teaching with his own.
See Nakamura 378 note 4.
144
Th. tr. I:150–151. MB 91, lines 16–20, reads: atimàtrasyàpi parame≤varasya
pràde≤amàtratvamabhivyaktini mittaá syàt. abhivyajyate kila pràde≤amàtraparimà»a˙ parame≤vara
upàsakànàá k‰te. prade≤eßu và h‰dayàdißùpalabhdisthàneßu vi≤eße»abhivyajyate. ata˙ parame≤vare’pi
pràde≤amàtra≤rutirabhivyakterupapadyata ityà≤marathya àcàrya manyate.
198  
declared that for the sake of his devotees, the supreme Lord some-
times makes himself manifest through a màyà-body. He had also
taught that for the purpose of meditation the Lord may be regarded
as inhabiting a limited space. In I.2.7 he returns to the theme of
the omnipresent Lord being seen to dwell in a limited object, such
as the lotus of the heart or the ≤àlagràma stone. In both sùtras •aákara
warns against strictly identifying brahman or the Lord with a limited
form or associating him too closely with a given limited place.
The present sùtra succinctly states that “manifestation” (abhivyakti)
is À≤marathya’s answer to the question of how the highest Self may
be regarded as spatially limited. •aákara clarifies by explaining that
the supreme Lord manifests himself, i.e. makes an appearance in a
measurable form, even though in reality he is infinite. This is the
sense of ChUp V.18.1. À≤marathya’s view is that the Lord does this
for the sake or benefit of (his) worshippers. It is worth noting that
•aákara articulates À≤marathya’s view on grace with the weak expres-
sion upàsakànàá k‰te, i.e. without using any of the standard terms for
grace or favor. The genitive plural of “worshippers” is the medium
•aákara chooses to convey this idea. He does not elaborate further.
•aákara also mentions that for À≤marathya the Lord has special
places of manifestation such as the heart etc., again without offering
an explanation. Of course, this brings to mind what •aákara has
already stated about symbols and meditation practices, and it may
be presumed that on this point, too, •aákara and À≤marathya con-
cur. It is in their basic metaphysics that they differ. •aákara does
not, however, declare here where he may or may not agree with
À≤marathya.
It is necessary to briefly summarize the positions of Bàdari and
Jaimini in the next two sùtras as they are transmitted by •aákara,
so as to determine whether •aákara himself does prefer Jaimini’s
theory to those of the other two ancient sages, just as the sùtrakàra
does. But first a glimpse of Nimbàrka’s and Bhàskara’s representa-
tion of À≤marathya’s position will prove instructive when compared
with •aákara’s own commentary.
Whereas •aákara states that À≤marathya’s theory refers to the
supreme Lord, Nimbàrka relates it to the highest Self ( paramàtma)
and Bhàskara to the Lord (ì≤vara). This in itself is of no great impor-
tance, since none of these thinkers clearly distinguishes between the
Self and the Lord. What is, however, more striking is that both
Nimbàrka and Bhàskara, in presenting À≤marathya’s theory, use the
same word to describe the action of grace: anugrahàya, i.e. “out of

favor,” or, “with a view to favoring.” •aákara, by contrast, who
probably had at least one text before him in composing the BrSù,
that of Nimbàrka,145 chooses to delete one of his own standard terms
for grace, anugraha, and to replace it with a genitive plural con-
struction. Just why he did this cannot be determined with any cer-
tainty. It may have something to do with •aákara’s general disregard
for all bhedàbheda theories and the linking of those theories with teach-
ings about the Lord’s grace.
There is basic agreement between all three commentators as to
the content of À≤marathya’s position, but with a slight variation.
Nimbàrka writes: upàsakànàmananyànàmanugrahàyànanto’pi paramàtmà . . .146
which Bose translates as, “With a view to favouring His worship-
pers who are devoted to Him alone and to none else, the Highest
Self though infinite . . .147 However, this passage could also be trans-
lated to read, “With a view to favoring His worshippers and no one
else, the highest Self though infinite . . .” This would mean that the
Self manifests itself graciously only to those who offer it worship. It
is possible that Bhàskara’s version of À≤marathya on the subject of
grace is in response to Nimbàrka. Bhàskara writes: pùrveßàmupàsakà-
nàmanugrahày-ànantasyàpì≤varasya . . . .148 This may be rendered as, “With
a view to favoring His many worshippers, the Lord, though in-
finite . . .”149 •aákara’s words are close to those of Nimbàrka and
Bhàskara: atimàtrasyàpi . . . parame≤vara upàsakànàm k‰te.150 I.e., “For the
sake of His worshippers, the supreme Lord, although immeasur-
able . . .”151 •aákara thus skirts the issue altogether as to whether
the Lord manifests himself to a restricted number or not. It is worth
remarking, too, that none of these thinkers goes on to further artic-
ulate what À≤marathya had to say about divine grace.
How do the positions of Bàdari and Jaimini differ from that of
À≤marathya? À≤marathya had stated that spatial limitation was a fea-
145
In addition, we recall Ingalls’ theory that both •aákara and Bhàskara drew
on another common source, namely the work of the so-called “Proto-Commentator,”
in writing their respective BrSùBhs.
146
See VPS I.2.30, p. 74, lines 7–8.
147
Bose I:138.
148
149
My translation.
150
See note 144.
151
My translation.
200  
ture of the Lord’s manifestation,152 whether visible to the senses or

within the heart.153 From this I inferred the likelihood that a kind
of upàsanà meditation was meant,154 although À≤marathya himself
does not explicitly make mention of this practice. Bàdari, by con-
trast, in his interpretation of what the Lord’s spatial limitation signifies,
does indeed refer to the practice of meditation when he is reported
by the sùtrakàra to teach “on account of remembrance” (anusm‰ter).155
•aákara explains this to mean that the Lord is remembered by the
mind which is seated in the heart; it is the heart which is spatially
limited.156 As an alternative, •aákara adds that the supreme Lord,
although unlimited, is to be ‘remembered’, i.e. meditated on, as of
limited size.157
Jaimini’s view is that because of “imaginative identification”158 or
“meditation based on superimposition” (sampatte˙)159 spatial limitation
is spoken of. •aákara interprets this to mean the meditation on the
parts of the human body, i.e. on spatially limited objects, as corre-
sponding to and denoting everything from heaven to earth, whose
Self is Vai≤vànara. •aákara concurs with this in his commentary on
ChUp V.18.1, which verse is the point of departure for the present
discussion. After giving basically the same explanation in the ChUpBh
as he does in the sùtra on Jaimini (1.2.31), •aákara goes on to say
that the etymology of Vai≤vànara is derived from the idea of guid-
ing or leading (nayati ) all (vi≤va) persons (nara) in accord with their
merit and their vices. For that reason Vai≤vànara is ì≤vara, who is
the Lord, the Self of all.160
152
See Potter 135.
153
See on this point S. L. Pandey, Pre-•aákara Advaita Philosophy (Allahabad:
Darshan Peeth, 1983), 119.
154
The term upàsakànàá which emerges in all three commentaries dealing with
this À≤marathya-sùtra has the sense of both “worshippers” and “devout meditators.”
155
BS tr. 284.
156
See the translations by G., BrSùBh• 155, and Thibaut, I:151.
157
Th. tr. I:151. Bhàskara also refers here to the heart, but makes the heart
itself—and not the mind seated in the heart—as that which remembers: h‰dayenànus-
mara»àt. See BhBrSùBh I.2.30, p. 49, line 24. See also Nakamura 387. Nimbàrka
diverges even more widely from •aákara when he declares that À≤marathya’s
“remembrance” must be taken to mean the kalpanam, i.e. imagination “of a body
from head to foot.” See VPS I.2.31, p. 74, lines 23–24 and Bose tr. I:139.
It is remarkable that these three commentators give such widely dissenting inter-
pretations of Bàdari when they were in such basic agreement about À≤marathya.
158
See Th. tr. I:151, and BS 284.
159
See BrSùBh• 155.
160
See TPU 400, lines 1–2, and G.’s translation of ChUpBh V.18.1, p. 395. By
If •aákara’s commentary on ChUp V.18.1 largely agrees with

what he says about Jaimini in BrSùBh I.2.31, then this must have
been recognized by •aákara as representing the siddhànta position,
in contrast to the views of À≤marathya and Bàdari. What does this
say about •aákara’s representation of À≤marathya? Does •aákara
reject the whole of the theory presented in I.2.29? It is doubtful that
he does, as all three solutions offered to the problem of spatial lim-
itation deal with meditation of some kind. This is acceptable to
•aákara, because meditation is the key to understanding ChUp
V.18.1. Yet, of all the three theories, Jaimini’s—or what •aákara
depicts as Jaimini’s position—is the most correct as it best establishes
the sense of spatial limitation. The other views are incomplete,
although they may be harmonized with what Jaimini teaches; •aákara
does not formally reject them or show their internal inconsistency,
as he would in the case of a pùrvapakßa view.
Let us now sum up BrSùBh I.2.29, which has necessitated reach-
ing far beyond this single text in order to make possible its proper
interpretation.
1) •aákara does not introduce the subject of divine grace in this
sùtra independently. It is something he has inherited from the tra-
dition preceeding him. Both Nimbàrka and Bhàskara likewise
declare that, in À≤marathya’s opinion, the highest Self or the Lord
manifests himself in a spatially limited way as a means of show-
ing favor to his worshippers.
2) Whereas Nimbàrka and Bhàskara use the expression anugrahàya,
i.e. “out of favor” or “with a view to favoring” the devotees,
•aákara inexplicably avoids using this word, although it is nor-
mally one of the most frequent terms he uses to express the real-
ity of grace. It is not clear why he does this. Instead he uses the
genitive plural construction upàsakànàá k‰te, i.e. “for the sake of
the devotees,” which is a weaker expression for grace than that
of Nimbàrka and Bhàskara. Is it possible that •aákara’s rejec-
tion of the bhedàbheda viewpoint includes a disparaging of that sys-
tem’s theology of grace?
3) The complete agreement between Nimbàrka, Bhàskara and •aákara
that the bhedàbhedavàdin À≤marathya taught the gracious manifes-
tation of the highest Self or the supreme Lord, together with the
contrast, Nimbàrka, VPS I.2.32, p. 75, lines 7–10, sees Jaimini as referring to the
Agnihotra-sacrifice of ChUp V.24.2. See Bose tr. I:140.
202  
advaitavàdin •aákara’s own affirmation of the same, as we have

seen in previous sùtras, suggests that the idea was not only pre-
sent in the Bhagavad-Gìtà and the Purà»as, but was widespread in
early Vedàntic theological circles as well, as heterogeneous as they
might otherwise have been.
4) •aákara’s commentary on ChUp V.18.1, which should be read
together with the present sùtra, states that Vai≤vànara is a name
for ì≤vara, who is the Lord and the Self of all. •aákara justifies
this on the basis of his own particular etymology, which sees the
word Vai≤vànara as signifying the Lord in his function as guid-
ing the destinies of persons in accord with their virtues and vices.161
It is striking how often •aákara returns to this theme. For him
the lordship of ì≤vara is closely bound with his role as overseer of
the law of retribution.
8. BrSùBh I.3.30
The sùtra reads: “And on account of the similarity of name and form
(there is) no contradiction even in recurrence, as is seen from the
≤ruti and the sm‰ti.”162
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “And there is no contra-
diction, since similar names and forms are repeated even in the revo-
lution of the world cycles, as is known from the Vedas and the Smrti.”163
The previous sùtras had taken up the theme that the Vedas have
existed from all eternity and had also defended the idea that although
brahman is the cause of the universe the individual things within that
same universe are brought into being from the words of the Vedas
which signify them according to their class or species.164 The pre-
sent sùtra takes up a related theme, that of the periodic destruction
and re-creation of the universe. This presents a new problem: If,
after each annihilation of the world, things are created anew, there
is no continuity with the previous creation. Consequently, Vedic
words do not have an eternal connection between their meaning and
161
This view is more loosely expressed by •aákara in BrSuBh I.2.28 when he
declares Vai≤vànara to be the ordainer, nara, of the universe, vi≤va. See G. tr.,
BrSùBh• 154.
162
See BS 303.
163
164
See •aákara on BrSùBh I.3.28 and 29.
the things which they are to signify, as the things they are meant
to signify are destroyed, and in their place something new emerges.
How, then, can the affirmation of an eternal connection between
words and things be reconciled with the teaching of the world’s
destruction?165
To the objection raised by the pùrvapakßin, •aákara replies that
the same names and forms which existed at the end of the previ-
ous kalpa will reemerge at the beginning of the new one. There is
thus a continuity between the new and the old; the so-called cre-
ation of new beings in each kalpa is only a relative beginning for
them.166 •aákara clarifies this so: “Moreover, this world when being
dissolved (in a mahàpralaya) is dissolved to that extent only that the
potentiality (≤akti) of the world remains, and (when it is produced
again) it is produced from the root of that potentiality; otherwise we
should have to admit an effect without a cause.”167
165
The background to this teaching is, of course, the almost universal Hindu
belief in a beginningless and endless repetition of the world’s creation and reab-
sorption into its ground, a belief that gained popularity especially with the Purà»ic
idea of the four yugas, or world-ages, which are characterized by a successive decline
of virtue and consciousness until one cycle, one mahà-yuga, is complete, and a new
“golden age,” i.e. a new beginning, is ushered in. According to Hindu teaching,
the present world finds itself in the worst of all ages, the kali yuga, which is the
fourth and last of the present mahà-yugas, and is thus a period marked by great
decline and extraordinary evil.
To proceed further: According to Purà»ic teaching, one thousand revolutions of
the four yugas, i.e. one thousand mahà-yugas, comprise one day in the life of the cre-
ator god Brahma, a period which is equal to millions of years of earthly human
life. This day in the life of Brahma is called a kalpa, and is followed by the destruc-
tion of the world, a pralaya, which is the beginning of the cessation of the creative
process and marks a period of divine inactivity equal in duration to a kalpa. It is
thus called a night of Brahma. Day and night continue to alternate until the time
for a mahà-pralaya or a prak‰ta pralaya is ripe. At this time the supreme Lord—not
the creator god Brahma—is said to effect the total withdrawal of the world into
himself. Although this last act appears to have the ring of finality to it, it is clear
that, since creation is both without beginning and end, even a mahà-pralaya will be
succeeded by a reemergence of the world of some sort. That might explain why
MW, in his entries to pralaya and mahà-pralaya, does not appear to distinguish between
the two. See MW 689, col. 3 and p. 797, col. 3. On the conception of cyclic time
just sketched, see Swami Prabhavananda, The Spiritual Heritage of India (Hollywood,
California: Vedanta Press, 1969), 140–141; S. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, An
Introduction to Indian Philosophy (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1960), 23–24;
K. Bharadvaja, A Philosophical Study of the Concept of Viß»u in the Purà»as (Delhi: Pitambar
Publishing Company, 1981), 2, 131; S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (Bombay:
Blackie & Son, 1983), II:551; R. Panikkar 615–616.
166
See Th. tr. I:212.
167
Th. tr. I:214. MB 130, lines 8–10, reads: pralìyamànamapi cedaá jagacchak-
tyava≤eßameva pralìyate. ≤aktimùlameva ca prabhavati. itarathàkasmikatvaprasa»gàt.
204  
What guarantees the continuation of the beings from the previ-

ous kalpa after the intervening pralaya is the law of karma, or retri-
bution. Accordingly, not only does a creature reap the results of its
actions from a previous state of existence in terms of the circum-
stances in which it is born, but that same creature continues to
remain under the influence of the kind of action it performed dur-
ing its previous existence.168 So long as the creature is bound to its
actions and desires it will inherit the fruits of those actions as well
as its old nature. The reemergence of the universe serves the pur-
pose of providing the individual jìva with the proper circumstances
for inheriting its past and working out its present karma.169 That is
why •aákara states that successive creations come into being as the
result of the merit and demerit (dharmàdharmaphala) of the beings of
the past kalpa.170
Because of the continuation or renewal of the old names and
forms from the preceding kalpa, •aákara likens the experience of
creatures in a fresh creation to a man rising from sleep; the crea-
ture emerging from the relative non-existence of pralaya to a new
life of activity and consciousness is like a man awaking from a slum-
ber in which both his consciousness and the world were seemingly
absent.171
To this the opponent replies that a man awaking from sleep has
at least the memory of what he did preceding sleep to ensure the
continuity of his identity, whereas this is not applicable in the case
of renewed existence after a pralaya or especially after a mahàpralaya,
because here there is an absence of all memory. Hence the experi-
ence of death, not sleep, would be a more appropriate analogy. A
man who returns from sleep will have memories of his past, but
from a former birth a man will have no recollection. With the inter-
vention of a mahàpralaya a man will certainly have no memory from
a preceding kalpa, as he is destroyed.
•aákara grants that in the case of normal men it is indeed so
that after a mahàpralava there is no memory of the past, yet there
still remain examples to prove that memory, and hence identity, are
168
In support of this •aákara cites Viß»u-Purà»a I.5.59–61 and 64. See BrSùBh•
219, 221. On •aákara’s use of these texts see V. Raghavan, “The Viß»upurà»a
and Advaita,” Adyar Library Bulletin 39 (1975):294–295.
169
See Potter 140, and Date’s paraphrase I:162–163.
170
See MB 130, line 7 and Th. tr. I:214.
171
See G. tr., BrSùBh• 218.
preserved among some beings even after such an annihilation. He

says:
For although the final dissolution intervenes to obliterate all empirical
behaviour, still by the grace of the Supreme Lord ( parame≤varànugrahàd ),
it is reasonably possible for divine beings (ì≤varà»àá) like Hira»yagarbha
to recollect the behaviour in an earlier cycle. From the fact that ordi-
nary creatures are not seen to recollect their past lives, it does not fol-
low that the fact must be the same in the case of divine beings (ì≤varà»àá)
as well. It is noticed that although as living creatures all are the same,
counting from men to a clump of grass, still the obstruction to the
manifestation of knowledge, glory, etc. increases successively all through
the series at each stage; similarly when it is mentioned more than once
in the Vedas and Smrtis that knowledge, glory, etc. become increas-
ingly more manifest at each successive stage counting from men them-
selves up to Hira»yagarbha, it cannot be brushed aside as non-existent.
From this it logically follows, on the analogy of a man risen up from
sleep, that the recollection of the behaviour in a past cycle is possible
for beings like Hira»yagarbha, who had undertaken meditation and
work in a superexcellent way in a past cycle, who have emerged at
the beginning of the present cycle (as a result of past achievement),
and who have been vouchsafed the grace of the Supreme Lord (para-
me≤varaànug‰hìtànàm). In support of this here is a Vedic text: “Hankering
after liberation, I take refuge in that self-effulgent Being, revealing
Himself in my intellect that is transformed in the likeness of that Being
Himself, who created Hira»yagarbha in the beginning and transmitted
the Vedas to Him” (SvUp VI.18).172
It is important to recall that the pùrvapakßin had just raised the objec-
tion that there is no evidence to support the assertion of a conti-
nuity between creations, in view of the fact that no one can recall
having existed in a previous kalpa. •aákara’s reply is thus directed
172
BrSùBh• 218–219, with the exception that I have translated parame≤vara as
the “Supreme Lord” instead of “God,” for the sake of greater accuracy. Thibaut,
in his translation, strongly diverges from Gambhirananda’s rendering on significant
points, but both interpretations will be taken into account in the course of exam-
ining this text. The text itself, MB 129, lines 6–18, reads: satyapi sarvavyavahàrocchedini
mahàpralaye parame≤varànugrahàdì≤varà»àá hira»yagarbhàdìnàá kalpàntaravyavahàrànusaád-
hànopapatte˙. yadyapi pràk‰tà˙ prà»ino na janmàntaravyavahàramanusaádadhànà d‰≤yanta iti, tathàpi
na pràk‰tavadì≤varà»àá bhavitavyam. tathàhi prà»itvàvi≤eße’pi manußyàdistambaparyanteßu
jñànai≤varyàdipratibandha˙ pare»a pare»a bhùyànbhavand‰≤yate, tathà manußyàdißveva
hira»yagarbhaparyanteßu jñànai≤varyàdyabhivyaktirapi pare»a pare»a bhùyasì bhavatìtyetac-
chutism‰tivàdeßvasak‰danu≤rùyamà»àá na sakyaá nàstìti vaditum. tata≤càtìtakalpànuß†itapra-
k‰ß†ajñànakarma»àmì≤varà»àá hira»yagarbhàdìnàá vartamànakalpàdau pràdurbhavatàá
parame≤varànug‰hìtànàá suptapratibuddhavatkalpàntaravyavahàranusaádhànopapatti˙. tathàca
≤ruti˙—‘yo brahmà»aá vidadhàti pùrvaá yo vai vedàá≤ca prahi»oti tasmai. taá ha devamàtmabud-
dhiprakà≤aá mumukßurvai ≤ara»amahaá prapadye’ (•vUp VI.18) iti.
206  
to the problem of memory; the fact of the universe retaining its

latent power is, however, an answer to another question, namely the
how of continuity, and •aákara will discuss it later in this sùtra.173
•aákara maintains that the supreme Lord grants to beings such
as Hira»yagarbha the grace of being able to recall what has occurred
in the preceding kalpa.174 The highest Lord, however, does not con-
cede this to ordinary human beings, but rather to the ì≤varas, liter-
ally to the “lords”, i.e. the gods and certain men who are in possession
of ai≤varyam, or divine power. In such divine beings knowledge and
glory are especially made manifest by virtue of the meditation and
asceticism performed by them in the past kalpa. The implication is
that only such exalted beings are worthy or capable of receiving the
special grace of supernatural memory. From what •aákara states,
the conclusion may be drawn that this grace is granted only after
great spiritual effort has been made. Further, it may be noted that
even the highest created god, Hira»yagarbha,175 stands in need of
the grace of the supreme Lord to recall its past existence. •aákara
goes so far as to stress this point twice in the same paragraph.176
The question of a divine election of the recipient or recipients of
grace is not raised here at all, however. •aákara does not declare
whether the supreme Lord is in some sense bound to grant his grace
to the most spiritually advanced of his creatures nor does he make
a statement about the parame≤vara’s sovereignty.
Nimbàrka, in VPS I.3.30,177 states that the continuity of succes-
sive ages is guaranteed by the recurrence of the same names and
173
Thibaut I:212–213 appears to have confused the two issues when he has
•aákara reply to the objection regarding the absence of memory that beings such
as Hira»yagarbha continue to exist after a mahàpralaya through the grace of the
supreme Lord, thus leaving the question of memory temporarily unanswered. By
contrast, Gambhirananda, BrSùBh• 218–219, translates the text in such a way that
•aákara directly answers the challenge of absence of memory with his assertion
about the paramesvara’s grace and the resulting capacity of beings such as Hira»yagarbha
to recall behavior from the previous kalpa.
174
As we shall see later, •aákara’s ì≤vara does not dispense the grace of knowl-
edge to the spiritually inept, but only to the advanced.
175
Also known as Prajàpati and Brahma. On Hira»yagarbha, see especially
A. C. Swain, “Concept of Hira»yagarbha in the Philosophy of •aákara,” Rßikalpanyàsa
(no editor given) (Allahabad 1971) 126–133.
176
As stated above (note 173), in both instances of the present sùtra where •aákara
brings up the subject of grace, Thibaut takes it to mean that divine grace guarantees
the continued existence of certain divine beings, thus not necessarily relating grace
to the issue of memory. Gambhirananda’s solution appears to be the more logical.
177
forms. In support of this he not only cites ≤ruti, but also Viß»u-Purà»a
I.5.64, which •aákara also quotes along with two other verses from
this Purà»a, as we have seen. Nimbàrka makes no reference to the
problem of memory or to divine grace or to Hira»yagarbha.
Bhàskara also takes up the problem of memory and makes the
“Lord” the dispenser of grace and Prajàpati the recipient (ì≤varànugu-
rahàt prajàpate˙).178 As with Nimbàrka and •aákara, Bhàskara, too,
quotes Viß»u-Purà»a I.5.64.179 Unfortunately, since the evidence is not
overwhelming that both Sankara and Bhàskara drew on a common
Proto-Commentator, it is difficult to say whether •aákara’s references
to grace are inherited from a tradition preceding him or whether
Bhàskara has borrowed one of •aákara’s own original arguments.
We may now summarize this sùtra in regard to the question of
grace:
1) •aákara introduces the idea of divine grace in his bhàßya with-
out the sùtra appearing to call for it. This does not necessarily
mean, however, that •aákara was completely independent in
doing this, as Bhàskara, who is not normally regarded as a great
advocate of grace,180 brings up the subject of favor in a way sim-
ilar to •aákara, and also uses the same term for it: anugraha. It
is thus possible that both •aákara and Bhàskara were compelled
to follow tradition wherever possible, in this case a tradition that
asserted the reality of divine grace in the context of BrSù I.3.30.
Yet even if this theory were to be proven true, the fact remains
that •aákara and Bhàskara were allowed to interpret the teach-
ings of the past in their own individual way.
2) The dispenser of grace is the parame≤vara, and no synonym for
him is given, such as brahman, paramàtman etc.
3) The recipient of grace is the god Hira»yagarbha and other divine
beings, including men, who have reached the state of an exalted
knowledge and glory.
4) The purpose of the dispensation of grace is the granting of a
supernatural and otherwise unattainable knowledge, i.e. the mem-
ory of one’s past in a preceding kalpa. Such knowledge is, how-
ever, irrelevant to the path to liberation; it is not a mukti-jñàna.
178
See BhBrSùBh I.3.30, p. 64, lines 14–15, and 65, line 22.
179
See BhBrSùBh I.3.30, p. 64, line 28 to 65, line 4. It is only •aákara who
quotes more than one verse from this Purà»a, citing also I.5.59–61.
180
See note 61 above.
208  
5) By limiting the dispensation of the supreme Lord’s grace to divine

beings such as Hira»yagarbha, who, through their meditation and
austerities in a previous kalpa have achieved a state of exalted
knowledge and glory, •aákara seems to imply that a great spir-
itual effort is the prerequisite to the reception of grace. He does
not, however, clarify whether such gods or god-like humans,
through their achievement, have made themselves somehow wor-
thy of grace in the eyes of the parame≤vara, who might freely choose
to dispense his grace, or whether the elevated state of such beings
gives them a special capacity to automatically receive, as it were,
a grace that is always offered to all, but unattainable to the less
pure. That is to say, •aákara makes no declaration as to whether
the supreme Lord is in some sense bound to grant his grace to
the most spiritual of his creatures, nor does he openly assert the
Lord’s sovereignty to dispense grace where he wills. The question
of a divine election is not really raised here at all.
9. BrSùBh II.1.21–23
At this point we shift our attention away from those sùtras in which
the notion of grace or favor is more or less articulated and turn to
three aphorisms that take up a different, but related theme, that of
the question of evil and suffering in the world. The reason I do this
is because later in his BrSùBh •aákara returns to the problem of
theodicy over and over again.181 In these sùtras •aákara will attempt
to absolve the Lord from the responsibility of having created an
unjust and suffering world, and it is here, in the context of defend-
ing the Lord’s goodness, that some of •aákara’s most open and
important assertions about divine grace will be made. The problem
of reconciling the evil of the world with the goodness of the Lord
is clearly of major importance for •aákara, as it has been for many
of the great religious thinkers of the past, both east and west. It is
a perennial problem that continues to baffle and trouble both the
professional and the non-professional theologian and philosopher,
and which presents at one time or another an enormous challenge
to virtually all devotees of a personal Lord.
181
See BrSùBh II.1.21–23, II.1.34–36, II.2.37–41, II.3.41–42, III.2.38–41.
The present sùtras together form a single adhikara»a.182 It is here

for the first time that •aákara begins to address the problem of evil
and suffering in connection with the Lord’s alleged responsibility.
•aákara’s answers in later sùtras are more detailed and far-reaching
in their analysis, but his bhàßya on the present aphorisms does throw
some light on the proper interpretation of what will come hereafter.
In BrSùBh II.1.21183 the opponent raises anew the objection that
a conscious principle cannot be the cause of the world. Since the
Upanißads, in particular ChUp VI.8.7 and VI.3.2 and TaiUp II.6,
declare the unity of the individual embodied self with brahman,184 it
follows that the power of creating the world predicated of brahman
can also be attributed to the individual. If that is the case, then it
would be expected that the individual soul would not create a prison
for itself, i.e. a world beset with death, old age, disease, and other
evils. Nor would the soul, ever-pure, allow itself to become enfleshed
in the extremely unclean entity known as the body. Further, assum-
ing that the soul finds itself in the state of bondage, it would have
the power to extricate itself from its situation and become liberated.
Therefore, since the individual soul obviously does not perform such
actions as would destroy all evil and suffering, and since the soul is
one with brahman, which is designated by Vedàntins as possessing
unlimited power and consciousness, it follows that the Vedàntic the-
ory of a conscious principle being the cause of the world is incor-
rect. The world, which is full of suffering, could not have been
created by a conscious agent, for no agent would create a world
that would bring harm to itself.
In the next sùtra, BrSù II.1.22,185 •aákara declares that the oppo-
nent’s objection is unfounded, as the non-duality asserted by the
Upanißads has been misunderstood. It is not the case that the indi-
vidual embodied soul is equal in nature to brahman, the creator of
the world. Brahman, by virtue of its being omniscient, omnipotent,
182
Radhakrishnan, BS 354, has appropriately entitled this adhikara»a “God and
the Problem of Evil.”
183
itaravyapade≤àddhitàkara»àdidoßaprasakti˙. Radhakrishnan, BS 354, translates this
as: “On account of the mention of another (the individual soul as non-different
from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) faults like not doing what is
beneficial to others and the like.”
184
See MB 208, line 8: itarasya ≤arìrasya brahmàtmatvaá vyapadi≤ati ≤ruti˙.
185
adhikaá tu bhedanirde≤àt. Radhakrishnan, BS 355, translates this as: “(But Brahman)
is something more (than the individual soul) on account of the indication of difference.
210  
eternally pure, intelligent, and free, is certainly superior to the embod-

ied soul. Furthermore, the charge of not doing what is beneficial to
itself cannot be raised against brahman, for, being eternally free and
lacking nothing, there is no action which would be of any benefit
to it.
Having established this teaching, •aákara cites passages from the
Upanißads that support the notion that the Self, or brahman, is to be
sought after as an object greater than the seeker, i.e. the individual
soul. Therefore, it is brahman that is solely capable of creating the
world, and not the soul.
To this the opponent queries: First you assert the non-duality of
the soul and brahman, and then you declare that the one is superior
to the other. How can you claim both difference and non-difference
at the same time?
In answer •aákara reminds the objector of the analogy of infinite
space made to appear limited by its containment in a plurality of
pots. That is to say, the difference between contained space and
unlimited space is only illusionary, and can be proved when the pots
are destroyed. The removal of the illusion of difference or separa-
tion is likewise possible in the case of the individual soul and brah-
man. Their difference is only illusory. At the dawning of liberating
knowledge the notions of “the transmigratoriness of the individual is
removed as also the creatorship of Brahman.”186
In other words, •aákara answers the objection put by the oppo-
nent from two different standpoints or levels. From the standpoint
of limited truth, where there is still a consciousness of a duality sub-
sisting between brahman and the soul, scripture shows that brahman is
the creator of the world, and that the individual soul is neither
empowered to create the world nor to eradicate it of all evil and
suffering. Thus, from the dualistic point of view, the Vedàntic teach-
ing still stands that a conscious principle is the cause of the world’s
creation. This, however, does not yet solve the problem of recon-
ciling the world’s evil with the creator’s purity and goodness. To
approach this problem, it is necessary for •aákara to shift his point
of view to that of the higher truth, i.e. the awareness of non-duality.
From the non-dualistic standpoint, the so-called eternally pure cre-
ator of the world cannot be held responsible for having created a
186
pratibodhito bhavatyapagataá bhavati tadà jìvasya saásàritvaá brahma»a≤ca sraß†‰tvaá.
See MB 209, lines 12–13. G. tr., BrSùBh• 349.
world full of evil and suffering, because, in the awareness of non-

duality, the problem no longer exists. The problem is only a prob-
lem for a mind trapped in the error of dualism. Dualism takes as
absolutely real a creator set apart from an equally real world of mul-
tiplicity. In the state of non-dual consciousness, however, there exists
the awareness of something higher: the non-dual brahman, reality in
the absolute sense, besides which the plural world is not perceived
as an independent reality. In this state of awareness the notion of
brahman as creator is absent as is the mistaken perception of an onto-
logically independent world. It is important to note that •aákara
does not outright deny that brahman is the cause of the world; he
merely declares that in the state of non-dual awareness the percep-
tion of the creatorship (sraß†utvaá) of brahman is absent. In this state
there is the awareness of the divine essence, i.e. of the plenitude of
being and the infinity of consciousness; the notion of plurality as the
final ontological truth has been sublated.
•aákara attributes the soul’s apparent bondage to ignorance (avidyà);
it is an error for the soul to mistakenly identity itself with the body
that suffers and perishes; it is ignorance, too, that accounts for the
false notion that brahman is essentially a creator rather than the non-
dual reality, or that names and forms represent a real modification
or transformation of brahman.187 In short, it is due to ignorance that
the world of dualities appears in a distorted sense as well as the con-
comitant mistaken belief that one transmigrates and suffers.
To briefly sum up •aákara’s strategy: On the one level, the level
where dualities are perceived, it is correct to say that brahman, and
only brahman, is the creator of the world. Since brahman is pure, it
cannot be responsible for the evil and suffering in the world. Where
then is the source of suffering to be found? It is at this point that
•aákara shifts to a higher level. He answers: This is a problem only
to a consciousness that perceives dualities. In the awareness of non-
duality the question of a creator being responsible or not responsi-
ble for the existence of evil and suffering does not even enter in.
187
That is to say, when •aákara states that “the body and the senses are a cre-
ation of name and form called up by ignorance” (G. tr., BrSùBh• 349) he denies
both the possibility of their separateness apart from their source as well as their
identity with brahman. It must be noted that •aákara’s bhàßya on this sùtra could
easily be misconstrued as evidence for a teaching of acosmic illusionism, especially
since the example of pots and space appears to make a statement about an iden-
tity between brahman and the world.
212  
Thus, rather than answering the question in the terms in which it

is put, •aákara nullifies the question altogether by appealing to the
reality of a higher consciousness. In the higher state of awareness
all suffering is annihilated, and that is the true solution to the prob-
lem of evil.
This solution may not prove satisfactory to one and all, and it is
perhaps for that reason that •aákara offers an alternative theory in
later discussions dealing with the problem of theodicy, which takes
into account, whatever their ontological status, the realities of a cre-
ator God and a plurality of individual jìvas. In that context •aákara
will revert to dualistic language. But both theories uphold one com-
mon teaching: brahman cannot be held responsible for the problem
of suffering.
In the final sùtra of this adhikara»a, BrSù II.1.23,188 •aákara indi-
rectly refers back to the opponent’s objections from sùtra 21, namely
that the Upanißad statements on non-duality would imply that every-
thing in the created universe is equal in power to its source, or that
brahman is responsible for the world’s suffering. The sùtrakàra refutes
this position “on the analogy of stone etc.”189 •aákara explains this
as follows, using several analogies: Though all stones originate from
the same earth, some, such as jewels, are more precious than oth-
ers. Though all seeds grow from the same soil, their plants differ in
the kind of leaves, flowers and fruit they bring forth. Though blood
and hair are different, they both originate from the same nutriments
of food (annarasa). In the same way, even from the one brahman there
may be such great distinctions as that between the individual soul
and the highest Self ( pràjña) and the many other effects.190 Yet, as
ChUp VI.1.4 states, “the modifications have speech alone as their
origin,” i.e. though the effects are in some sense real, brahman only
apparently transforms itself into these effects; there is in reality no
modification of brahman.191 Since brahman is not to be equated with
188
a≤màdivacca tadanupapatti˙. Radhakrishnan, BS 356, translates this as: “And like
stones and the rest, these (defects) cannot be conceived.”
189
190
See MB 210, lines 1–2: evamekasyàpi brahma»o jìvapràjñap‰thaktvaá kàryavaicitryaá
copapadyata . . . It is significant here that in place of pràjña •aákara does not use
such terms as ì≤vara or parame≤vara, which are for him normally used synonymously
with brahman. It is possible that in this sùtra he has retained certain key terms from
a tradition prior to him. As evidence for this, compare Bhàskara, BrSùBrBh II.1.23,
p. 103, lines 22–23: tathà brahma»a ekatve’pi jìvapràjñayorbhedo na virudhyate.
191
Brahman is not regarded by •aákara as a fullness consisting of the totality of
parts, but as changeless, partless, and simple.
the manifested universe of dualities, it does not share the limitations

of the individual soul which cannot extricate itself from its suffering.
And since, in the highest sense, brahman infinitely transcends creation,
it cannot be held ultimately responsible for the imperfections of the
world.
The present adhikàra»a constitutes VPS I.1.20–22 for Nimbàrka.192
As might be expected, Nimbàrka’s bhàßya on these three sùtras, though
much shorter than •aákara’s, hardly differs from that of the Advaitin
in its interpretation. The only significant variation is Nimbàrka’s
affirmation of a simultaneous difference and non-difference between
brahman and the individual soul. By contrast, •aákara appeals to an
ultimate transcendental non-dualism.
Bhàskara193 adds nothing of any significance to this discussion.
To summarize the important points of •aákara’s commentary on
BrSù II.1.21–23:
1) The present sùtras provide •aákara with his first opportunity to
deal with the problem of reconciling the world’s imperfections
with brahman’s apparent responsibility for the world’s flaws, although
the immediate problem he must deal with is the misunderstand-
ing that the Upanißadic statements on non-duality imply a pan-
theistic identity between brahman and the suffering individual
embodied soul. This conclusion •aákara refutes on the grounds
that brahman is greater than the jìva, and he cites further Upanißadic
verses in support of this.
2) On the level of dualities, brahman is absolved from having in some
way caused the evil in the world, because brahman is eternally
pure. Furthermore, being eternally free and lacking nothing,
brahman is not necessitated to perform some good or to avoid some
evil.
3) On the level of non-duality, the question of theodicy does not
arise. The non-dualistic consciousness transcends the dualities of
creator on the one hand and universe and soul on the other.
Thus, on this level, it is less appropriate to say that the theoret-
ical problem of theodicy has ben solved than to acknowledge that
the problem has been dissolved and the question nullified, since
all duality and all suffering have been destroyed.194
192
See VPS 164–165 and Bose I:297–300.
193
See BhBrSùBrh II.1.21–23, p. 103.
194
See also Potter 151.
214  
10. BrSùBh II.1.34
The sùtra reads: “Not inequality and cruelty, owing to a dependence.

For so (≤ruti) shows.”195
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “No partiality and cru-
elty (can be charged against the Lord) because of (His) taking other
factors into consideration. For so the Vedas show.”196
This sùtra together with the following two constitute an adhikàra»a

explicitly given to the problem of the inequality of suffering.197
•aákara’s bhàßya here is particularly important for the present study,
for in it he not only returns to the topic of grace and favor, but
also for the first time goes at length to enunciate his teaching on
the divine will at work in the world. With this sùtra we have approached
the heart of •aákara’s doctrine of grace. Much is left unsaid by
•aákara, however, and it is necessary to turn to his other writings,
especially his BhGBh, in order to further clarify the relation between
divine grace and human free will. But for now the present sùtra
must be thoroughly examined and analyzed. We recall that •aákara
offers here an alternative theory to the one given in BrSùBh II.1.21–23
on the problem of the Lord’s relation to evil and suffering.198
The bhàßya begins with an objection directed specifically at the
notion of the Lord (ì≤vara); there is no mention here at all of parame≤vara
or brahman as being the focus of the attack, nor does •aákara, in
his role as the siddhàntin, choose to introduce the terms parame≤vara
or brahman into the discussion, making one or both of them at least
loosely synonymous with ì≤vara. In the context of what we have seen
so far in his BrSùBh, this is certainly uncharacteristic of •aákara,
and would seem to indicate either an implicit subordination of the
concept of ì≤vara to that of parame≤vara in the commentary on this
particular sùtra, or else it would indicate that •aákara has adapted
195
See BS 363, and G. tr. 362.
196
G. tr. 362. I have substituted the words “the Lord” here in the place of
Gambhirananda’s “God,” so as to keep close to the word ì≤vara, which appears
repeatedly in •aákara’s commentary on this sùtra.
197
Gambhiranada, BrSùBh• 362, entitles this section “Partiality and Cruelty;”
Radhakrishnan, BS 363, calls it “The Problem of Suffering and Evil.”
198
See the discussion just completed.
himself linguistically to an ancient commentary centered specifically

on the role of ì≤vara or the creator.199
The opponent says that the Lord cannot be the cause of the world,
because if he were, the faults of partiality and cruelty (vaißamyanairgh‰»ye)
would have to be attributed to him. For we see that some beings,
like the gods, are created with eminent happiness (atyantasukhabhàja˙),
that others, such as animals, are created experiencing extreme unhap-
piness (atyantadu˙khabhàja˙), and that still others, such as humans, are
created experiencing an intermediate position between the two extremes
(anmadhyamabhogabhàjo). Such a Lord would have created this unjust
world out of the motives of passion and hatred (ràgadveßa), just as
any low person ( p‰thagjana) is seen to act. But this is contrary to the
affirmation of the Lord’s essential goodness by ≤ruti and sm‰ti. Moreover,
apart from the question of the unequal distribution of happiness and
suffering, there is also the circumstance of the infliction of misery
and final destruction on all creatures (du˙khayogavidhànàtsarvapra-
jopasaáhàràcca),200 a fact that leaves the Lord open to the charge of
lack of mercy (nirgh‰»atvam) and of great cruelty (atikrùratvamá), a
quality that even a villain would abhor (khalajanairapi jugupsitaá). Thus,
because of the two evils of partiality and cruelty, the Lord cannot
be the cause of the world.201
•aákara refutes the idea that any whimsy or cruelty can be ascribed
to the Lord in his creation of the inequalities of the world. Other
factors are involved which necessitate the apparently unfair distrib-
ution of happiness and suffering. These factors are the merit (dharma)
and demerit (adharma) of the creatures. Without taking these factors
into consideration the Lord, of course, could be blamed for the
inequalities of creation; but, in fact, the Lord does take into con-
sideration the acquired merit and demerit of creatures about to be
born when he allots to them their proper station in life. That is to
say, the creatures themselves determine their fate, not the capri-
ciousness of the creator. The creator’s activity is like rain ( parjanya),
says •aákara:
199
To attempt to answer this question, it will of course be necessary to turn to
the commentaries of Nimbàrka and Bhàskara, after examining •aákara’s bhàßya.
200
Upasaáhàra, end, death, destruction, literally means the act of withdrawing.
See MW 208, col. 3. The reference is obviously to the termination of a kalpa, at
which time all creatures are withdrawn into their source.
201
216  
Just as rainfall is a common cause (sàdhàra»aá kàra»aá) for the growth

of paddy, barley, etc., the special reasons for the differences of paddy,
barley, etc., being the individual potentiality of the respective seeds,
similarly the Lord is the common cause (sàdhàra»aá kàra»aá) of the
creation (s‰ß†i) of gods, men and others, while the individual fruits of
works associated with the individual creatures are the uncommon causes
for the creation of the differences among the gods, men and others.
Thus the Lord is not open to the defects of partiality and cruelty,
since He takes other factors into consideration.202
In other words, whether beings come into the world as gods, men
or animals, whether they experience extreme happiness or suffering
or a state inbetween the two, their position in life is the direct con-
sequence of the merit accrued by their actions in a previous exis-
tence. The Lord, in creating, or better, re-creating, the world, brings
into existence a universal justice. This moral law of cause and effect
initiated by the Lord guarantees that each new creation brings with
it the individual forms and conditions necessary to provide an eth-
ical continuity between the jìvas in their previous and present births.203
The Lord is both the creator and superintendent of this law, rais-
ing the beings to a higher station in the universe if they have lived
virtuously, and lowering them if they have performed maliciously.204
Thus he creates a law in which “ ‘as one thinks, or desires, or does,
or worships, so one becomes,’ and, conversely, ‘as one is, so also
one thinks, or desires, or does, or worships.’ ”205
The opponent then asks how it is known that when the Lord cre-
ates the world (saásàra) of unequal states he takes into considera-
tion other factors (such as the merit and demerit of the creatures).
•aákara replies that ≤ruti shows this, and he offers two quotations
as evidence. The first is from KauUp III.8, which •aákara has
202
MB 217, line 23 to 218, line 3 reads: yathàhi parjanyo vrìhiyavàdis‰ß†au sàdhàra»aá
kàra»aá bhavati, vrìhiyavàdivaißamye tu tattadbìjagatànyevàsàdhàra»aàni sàmarthyàni kàra»àni
bhavanti, evamì≤varo devamanußyàdis‰ß†au sàdhàra»aá kàra»aá bhavati. devamanußyàdivaißamye
tu tatajjìvagatànyevàsàdhàra»àni karmà»i kàra»àni bhavantyevamì≤vara˙ sàpekßatvànna vaißamya-
nairgh‰»yàbhyàá dußyati.
The translation is a combination of BrSùBh• 363 and Thibaut I: 358–359.
203
This, of course, applies as well to the transmigration and successive births of
the jìva even within a particular creation.
204
These ideas will become clearer and more pronounced in later sùtras where
•aákara again takes up this theme. For a good summary of •aákara’s position on
karma and the Lord’s causation, see R. De Smet, “The Law of Karma: A Critical
Examination,” Indian Philosophical Annual 2 (1966): 328–335.
205
De Smet, “Law of Karma” 328.
referred to in a previous sùtra:206 “It is He indeed who makes him

perform virtuous deeds whom He would raise high above these
worlds; and it is He indeed who makes him perform vicious deeds
whom He would cast below these worlds.” Now this verse is cited
by •aákara to support the teaching that the Lord does not act
unjustly, but fashions the world in accord with the moral perfor-
mance of the creatures. •aákara does not yet intend to raise the
issue of the Lord’s apparent control over the will of his creatures.
Thus he gives this scriptural verse a quite different sense than it may
originally have intended to convey. As De Smet has pointed out,
•aákara quotes this verse favorably, emphasizing the “divine per-
sonal government of the world by will,” even though it originally
“smacks of predestination.”207
The second ≤ruti verse quoted by •aákara is B‰Up III.2.13, which
is repeated in B‰Up IV.4.5: “It (the soul) becomes virtuous through
good acts, and vicious through evil acts.”208 The emphasis here, of
course, is on the responsibility of the individual for its own fate.
•aákara quotes this verse, as he did the preceding one, to account
for the unequal conditions and forms of created beings. The crea-
tures themselves are responsible for their situation. Though there is
no mention of the Lord’s governance of the process of karma in this
verse, •aákara does include the Lord’s action in his commentary
on B‰Up III.2.13. The Upanißadic verse had exclusively emphasized
the role of work, or action, in determining the soul’s future fate. But
•aákara modifies this: “Not only this: having accepted time, work,
destiny and God as causes, what they praised there was work alone.”209
•aákara next proceeds to both summarize what has been said in
the two ≤ruti verses as well as to introduce a passage from sm‰ti, by
making the following declaration: “The Sm‰ti also shows that the
Lord’s dispensation of favour (anugrahìt‰tvaá) and disfavour (nigrahìt‰tvaá)
is contingent on the different quality of the works of living beings . . .”210
The sm‰ti verse that •aákara quotes is BhG IV.11: “According
to the manner in which they (people) approach Me, I favour them
206
See BrSùBh I.1.28.
207
De Smet, “Law of Karma” 331.
208
209
na kevalaá, kàlakarmadaive≤vareßvabhyupagateßu hetußu yatpra≤a≤aáasatustau, karma haiva
tatpra≤a≤aásatu˙. TPU 797, lines 20–22. Tr. by Swami Madhavananada, B‰UpBh 310.
210
Sm‰tirapi prà»ikarmavi≤eßàpekßameve≤varasyànugrahìt‰tvaá nigrahìt‰tvaá ca . . . MB 218,
lines 7–8. The translation is a combination of BrSùBh• 363 and Th. I:359.
218  
in that very manner.”211 Here, in contrast to the two ≤ruti verses just
quoted, •aákara selects a passage that does not refer to the crea-
ture’s action in general but to the various motives that impel peo-
ple to worship the Lord. In his bhàßya •aákara explains BhG IV.11
to mean that the Lord rewards the devotee with whatever the devo-
tee has his or her heart set on, be it some worldly good or be it
liberation itself, the highest human goal. As far as the action of the
Lord goes, •aákara concurs in his commentary with what he has
said in BrSùBh II.1.34. He has the Lord speak: “On the other hand,
I do not favour anybody out of love or aversion, or out of delusion.”212
Thus, in this sùtra •aákara begins with a discussion of the prob-
lem of the inequality of the forms and conditions of the various cre-
ated beings in the world as this problem relates to the Lord, and
ends by articulating briefly a theology of grace and freedom that
underscores the works of creatures and the Lord’s impartiality. It
must be noted, however, that •aákara has not answered both objec-
tions levelled at him by his opponent. He has devoted his entire
commentary to refuting the charge of the Lord’s partiality in creat-
ing such widely differing states of happiness and suffering, but he
has not taken up the issue at all of the Lord’s causing the (periodic)
destruction of all his creatures.
Before moving on to the following two sùtras, which attempt to
refute objections to this theory of karma and divine causality, I shall
briefly examine the parallel commentaries on the present sùtra as
presented by Nimbàrka and Bhàskara.
This is VPS II.1.33 for Nimbàrka.213 In all brevity Nimbàrka sim-
ply states that the individual souls themselves, through their works,
are responsible for all the negativities of the world, which include
not only the inequality of the creatures’ fate, but also the destruc-
tion of the world as a whole. The creator (karttur) of the world’s ori-
gin etc. is thus not at fault. This is analogous to rain. B‰Up II.2.13
is quoted in support of this theory, as in •aákara’s bhàßya. Thus,
211
Ye yathà màá prapadyante tàástathaiva bhajàmyaham. I have chosen here Gam-
bhirananda’s more literal rendering as found in his Bhagavadgìtà With the Commentary
of •a«karàcàrya (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1984), 182–183, rather than the translation
offered by the same translator in the present sùtra from •aákara’s BrSùBh 363.
212
Na puna˙ ràgadveßanimittaá mohanimittaá và kaácid bhajàmi. BhGBh IV.11, Gita
Press ed., 110, lines 28–29. Tr. by Gambhirananda, BhGBh 183.
213
Nimbàrka makes the creatures even responsible for the world’s destruc-
tion, as opposed to •aákara’s theory, and, unlike •aákara, Nimbàrka
makes no mention of divine grace.214
Without going into the details of Bhàskara’s position in his com-
mentary on BrSù II.1.33,215 it may be noted that he upholds the
same argument we have seen repeated so far, i.e. that the creatures
themselves determine their fate and that ì≤vara is merely the com-
mon cause (sàdhàra»akàra»aá). He also quotes KauUp III.8. In addi-
tion, he asserts the omniscience and omnipotence of the supreme
Self, but he does not bring up the subject of grace.
The most obvious objection to the theory expounded by •aákara
in BrSùBh 11.1.34 is articulated in the following sùtra.216 It has been
stated that differentiation and inequality of states are the direct results
of actions performed by creatures in a prior existence; but prior to
the first creation there could have been no creaturely works that the
Lord would have taken into consideration in fashioning the multi-
tude of forms and conditions. That is to say, given an absolute begin-
ning of creation, this theory suffers the flaw of the absence of a prior
conditioning karma upon which the inequalities would be based.
The Vedàntin’s answer is simple and well-known: Creation, or
saásàra, is beginningless (anàditvam). Were this not the case, the objec-
tion raised by the opponent would be valid. But in fact, the fruits
of action and the inequality of created states act upon each other
as cause and effect, analogous to the process of seed and sprout,
each producing the other. And this process is without beginning.217
214
There is a contradiction in Nimbàrka’s position, in that he makes the crea-
tures responsible for their general destruction, while at the same time he upholds
the existence of a being who is the cause of the world’s “origin, etc.” ( janmàdi ).
Janmàdi is a technical term referring to the origin, continuance, and destruction of
the world. See the important use of this expression in BrSù I.1.2.
215
See BhBrSùBh 106, line 23 to 107, line 12.
216
BrSù II.1.35 reads: na karmàvibhàgàditi cennànàditvàt. Radhakrishnan, BS 364,
translates this as: “If it be said that this is not (possible) on account of the non-
distinction of works (before the first creation we say that it) is not so for (saásàra)
is without beginning.”
217
As regards the possibility of a creation without a temporal beginning, De
Smet, “Law of Karma” 333, notes: “It may be of interest to remark that •a«kara’s
theory on this most difficult point agrees with that of Aquinas. For Aquinas also
God is the universal Cause of everything in this evolving universe, whether the uni-
verse itself has a temporal beginning or not (for Aquinas both alternatives are log-
ically possible and neither can be ruled out by mere rational argument).”
220  
This idea is continued in the next sùtra, II.1.36,218 and given both
a rational and a scriptural foundation.
According to •aákara’s commentary on II.1.36, reason dictates
that saásàra, i.e. transmigratory existence, must be without begin-
ning, for otherwise certain unallowable alternatives would result. If,
for example, the world were to suddenly spring up without reason
(akasmàt), even liberated souls (muktànàmapi ) would reenter the cycle
of transmigration instead of being freed from it. Furthermore, there
would be no explanation, no cause, for the inequalities of happiness
and misery, which would result without reference to any preceding
karma. It has already been stated that ì≤vara is not the cause of these
inequalities, but neither can ignorance (avidyà) sufficiently account for
them, since avidyà is uniform (ekarùpatvàt), i.e. alone it does not have
the potentiality to cause a multiplicity of states. At best, avidyà may
be considered to be the cause of inequality in the sense that the
actions that determine the merit and demerit of creatures and their
future happiness or misery are themselves influenced by mental ten-
dencies or impressions (vàsanà) issued forth by the afflictions (kle≤a)
of desire (ràga) etc. from one’s past, which are themselves manifes-
tations of ignorance.219 But if saásàra is accepted to be beginning-
less, everything makes sense on the analogy of the seed and the
sprout.
Moreover, this is the teaching of both ≤ruti and sm‰ti. For example,
ChUp VI.3.2 speaks of the Source entering into the jìva, the “living
being,” at the start of creation. But, adds •aákara, the word jìva
signifies what is already alive even at the start of creation; it must
thus be prior to creation, i.e. creation must be beginningless. °g Veda
X.190.3 similarly speaks of the Ordainer (dhàtà) creating the sun and
moon like before ( yathàpùrvamakalpayat), which points to the existence
of earlier kalpas. BhG XV.3 likewise asserts the beginninglessness of
saásàra when it declares that its beginning (àdi˙) is unknown. And,
218
BrSù II.1.36 reads: upapadyate càpyupalabhyate ca. This Radhakrishnan, BS 364,
translates as: “(The beginninglessness of saásàra) is ascertained (by reason) and is
observed (in Scripture).”
219
My discussion here of avidyà intends to paraphrase MB 218, line 23 to 219,
line 1, which reads: nacàvidyà kevalà vaißamyasya kàra»aá, ekarùpatvàt. ràgàdikle≤avàsanàk-
ßiptakarmàpekßà tvavidyà vaißamyakarì syàt. The “etc.” (àdi) appended to “desire” (ràga)
in the final sentence is thought by Gambhirananda to include hatred and delusion.
One important medieval commentator, Ànandagiri, appears to concur with this
interpretation. See Thibaut I:360, note 1.
finally the Purà»as teach that there is no numbering of the past and
future kalpas.
We may now summarize what •aákara teaches about the prob-
lem of suffering in BrSùBh II.1.34–36, especially in regard to its rel-
evance for this study on divine grace:
1) These three sùtras must be seen as offering an alternative theory
to the solution provided by •aákara in II.1.21–23 to the prob-
lem of the inequality of suffering and the possible responsibility
of brahman or the Lord for this unjust universe. In this second
theory there is no recourse to arguing from the standpoint of non-
duality; the word non-difference (abheda) and its synonyms do not
appear even once. •aákara is content to argue within the pre-
misses of a dualistic framework in defending the Absolute from
the accusation of unfairness.
2) Whereas in II.1.21–23 •aákara had spoken primarily of brahman,
in II.1.34–36 his remarks are exclusively directed to ì≤vara. Not
even the term parame≤vara crops up once. It is possible that •aákara
was following a tradition that clearly demarcated which term for
the divinity was used for each set of sùtras. However, this con-
clusion is not entirely dependable if one takes Nimbàrka’s bhàßya
into consideration. It is more likely that •aákara himself has cho-
sen to limit himself to using the term ì≤vara in this dualism-related
discussion, preferring instead the terms parame≤vara or brahman for
broader topics that would include the notions of non-duality and
an absolute ( pàramàrthika) standpoint of truth.
3) The notion of divine favor or grace (anugrahìt‰tvaá) appears near
the end of II.1.34, although the sùtra does not directly call for it
and Nimbàrka and Bhàskara do not refer to it. This is clearly a
point •aákara wished to make on his own.
4) •aákara ties in the idea of grace with the apparent predestina-
tion taught by KauUp III.8, whose cruel sense he modifies and
reinterprets as an affirmation of human freedom to choose good
or evil. B‰Up III.2.13 is also cited in the context of divine favor
or disfavor because of its emphasis on free will. BhG IV.10 empha-
sizes the Lord’s impartial responsiveness in granting the devotees
exactly what they ask. In this sense the Lord is the common cause
(sàdhàra»aá kàra»aá) of the inequalities of creation. The Lord’s
favor or disfavor is motivated neither by partiality nor cruelty nor
capriciousness, but rather corresponds to the merit and demerit
of the creatures’ actions. The law of justice and the responsibility
222  
of human beings for their own fate are thus underscored in this
concept of divine grace, which does not initiate, but responds.
What appears to be ruled out in this understanding of the divine
will is the idea of election, i.e. that some creatures, for whatever
reasons, are singled out and made recipients of divine favor inde-
pendently of their merit or demerit. Such a notion would have
to be rejected by •aákara on the grounds of partiality, i.e. that
the Lord would unfairly favor some of his creatures while spurn-
ing others.
11. BrSùBh II.2.37–41
These five sùtras, although not dealing with the topic of grace, do
form an important adhikara»a, which discusses the causality of the
Lord and takes up again the problem of theodicy. I include these
sùtras in the present study, because of the light they shed on •aákara’s
concept of the Lord and his activity. It is worth noting at the out-
set of this discussion that such important interpreters of •aákara as
J. Sinha220 and K. Potter221 read this bhàßya as a refutation of the-
ism in general, and not merely of the kinds of theism that •aákara
openly attacks. That is to say, these modern •aákara interpreters
do not appear to allow the possibility of a theism within the con-
text of non-duality.222
The overriding concern of this adhikara»a is to show that an ade-
quate conception of the Lord cannot limit his causality to a mere
efficient or directing one,223 but must also include the notion of a
reality-giving causality, what modern interpreters tend to mislead-
ingly call the “material cause.”224
The problem of considering the Lord a material cause is obvi-
ously his immateriality. When •aákara asserts, for example, in BrSùBh
I.4.23 that the àtman is the upàdàna of the universe, this term should
220
Sinha, A History of Indian Philosophy, II (Calcutta: Sinha Publishing House, 1956),
471–473.
221
Potter 163.
222
That another interpretation of these sùtras is possible will be seen in the course
of the examination of this adhikara»a.
223
Radhakrishnan, BS 390, entitles this section “Consideration of the View That
God is Only the Efficient Cause.” Gambhirananda, BrSùBh• 433, calls it “God is
Not a Mere Superintendent.”
224
See e.g. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, II:552; E. Deutsch, Advaita Vedànta
(Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980), 35.
not be rendered as “material cause,” but rather as the “immanent”

or “inner” cause, since upàdàna simply conveys the notion of the “that
from which” the effect arises, a source which need not be material.
Because within the universe of things the upàdàna of a material object
is always another material object that suffers some kind of change
or self-modification ( pari»àma), the reference to the Lord as the upàdàna
of the universe has traditionally been thought to mean that brahman
undergoes some kind of self-modification when creating the world,
however illusionary this world may ultimately be regarded. But
•aákara does not teach that the Lord undergoes a kind of trans-
formation in creating the world, or that the world is ontologically
unreal. His teaching is more subtle than that. •aákara teaches that
the non-material brahman is the upàdàna kàra»a, i.e. the reality-pro-
viding cause of the universe, without that cause being affected in the
least by its real, though dependent creation. Brahman is eternally
changeless.225
In his introduction to BrSù II.2.37226 •aákara recalls that earlier
sùtras227 had settled the question of the Lord being both the mater-
ial-providing cause of the world as well as its ruler or efficient cause.
The purpose of the present set of sùtras is to refute those concepts
of the Lord, for example as found in the systems of Sàákhya, Yoga,
•aivism, and Vai≤eßika,228 which see ì≤vara as a mere efficient or
directing cause of the world without being at the same time the
source of the world’s very being.
225
The true meaning of upàdàna in •aákara’s thought is a recurrent theme in
the writings of De Smet, not surprisingly, since the interpretation of this term is
closely linked with one’s assessment of •aákara’s metaphysics as a whole. See III.C
above for a brief discussion.
The reflections on upàdàna in the present section have been gleaned from De
Smet, “Origin: Creation and Emanation,” Indian Theological Studies 15 (1978):270–271;
“The Philosopher’s Transition from Atheism to Theism in India from the Fourth
to the Eleventh Century A.D.,” Challenges of Societies in Transition, ed. M. Barnabas
et al. (Delhi: Macmillan, 1978), 326–327; “Love Versus Identity,” Indian Philosophical
Quarterly 7 (1980):525.
It goes without saying that in affirming that the world is not an illusion one need
not conclude that the world enjoys the ontological fullness or degree of reality as
does its source. That is the real sense of the illusionism articulated in •aákara’s
metaphysics.
226
BrSù II.2.37 reads: patyurasàmañjasyàt. Radhakrishnan, BS 390, translates this
as: “(The doctrine) of the Lord (as only the efficient cause of the world) (is unten-
able) on account of inadequacy.”
227
BrSù I.4.23–24.
228
It is significant that •aákara has not included any of the Vaiß»avite sects as
an object of his attack. See here Hacker, “Relations of Early Advaitins to Vaiß»avism,”
224  
The first argument •aákara puts forward against his opponents

might at first be construed to negate his own solution to the prob-
lem of theodicy as set down in BrSùBh II.1.34–36, were one to for-
get that his attack is lodged against those who do not acknowledge
the unity of causation.229 Against the Sàákhya and Yoga forms of
theism, •aákara argues, just as his opponent had done in II.1.34,
that a Lord who creates such inequalities among creatures must
surely be animated by the faults of desire and aversion, just as we
human beings are. If the opponent answers, as •aákara himself had
earlier answered, that this is not so, because the Lord takes into con-
sideration the merit and demerit of the creatures, •aákara replies
that even this answer is inadequate, as it makes the actions of crea-
tures and the action of the Lord mutually dependent. The implica-
tion is that this theory suffers the fault of infinite regress (anavasthà).
To this the opponent replies that creation is indeed without begin-
ning, and so this theory remains intact. Thus far the opponent of
this sùtra and the •aákara of II.1.34–36 are in complete agreement.
At this point, however, •aákara introduces a new objection that
did not emerge in the earlier discussion of theodicy. He says that
even the argument about saásàra being without beginning is not sat-
isfying, for the mutual dependence between the action of the Lord
and the karma of creatures would hold at all times, and this auto-
matic process would be like the blind leading the blind. •aákara
seems to imply that this theory of divine retribution does not safe-
guard the Lord’s sovereignty, so long as this particular concept of
the Lord does not include the idea of the Lord being the upàdàna
kàra»a and the total cause of the world.230 It is likely for that rea-
son that such an objection was omitted from the earlier debate,
KS 206–207. Does •aákara thus consider Vaiß»avite theology more in harmony

with his concept of ì≤vara and the Lord’s universal causation or does his exclusion
of Viß»u’s devotees from his criticism reflect a mere reluctance to openly oppose
that religion which may have contributed to his own spiritual development?
229
See B. N. K. Sharma, The Brahmasùtras and Their Principal Commentaries (Delhi:
Munshiram Manoharlal, 1986), II:95, who remarks that for •aákara “the inade-
quacy (asàmañjasya) referred to in the first Sùtra lies in the very conception of a
creator-God within the framework of Kevalanimittakàra»avàda, as it exposes God
to the charges of partiality and cruelty in being responsible for the inequalities in
His creations.”
230
Potter, 164, perceptively notes that •aákara, in arguing against this theory,
has recognized that neither the Lord nor the karma of the creatures is “ultimately
responsible” for this process.
because in it •aákara’s ì≤vara was understood to be both the efficient

as well as the reality-giving cause of the world.
Furthermore, •aákara argues, there is another flaw. The Naiyàyikas
hold that all action originates in some imperfection, be it action per-
formed for the sake of oneself or for another. Even if we were to
acknowledge that the Lord acts for the sake of another, still he is
impelled by that motive and is thus imperfect. The idea here seems
to be that the Lord’s activity is bound to some exterior circumstance,
even if it were the desire to reward the creature for its merit. The
Lord is therefore not completely sovereign and transcendent. The
fact that the Lord has his own purpose (svàrtha) to actuate is a sign
of his imperfection.231
The final objection is levelled by •aákara against the concept of
the Lord in the Yoga system, which sees ì≤vara as a special kind of
purußa who does not act, and as such, is without relation to the world,
except in so far as he is made an object of pious meditation by
practitioners of yoga. To such a Lord there could obviously be no
attribution of even efficient causation.
Thus, for all these reasons, it is contradictory to hold that the
Lord could be merely the efficient cause of the world without being
also the source of its very existence. Otherwise the result would be
an ultimate dualism between that from which the world originates
and that by which it is governed. A correct understanding of the
Lord must consider him to be an agent in a double sense.232
B. N. K. Sharma points out that both •aákara and his sub-com-
mentator Vàcaspati,233 in arguing in various ways against their oppo-
nents, are actually taking a stand “against those who have pledged
themselves to be guided exclusively by reasoning in determining the
nature of God’s causality of the world.”234 He recalls the teaching
of the sùtrakàra in BrSù I.1.3 and II.1.11–12, which asserted the
inadequacy of reason to determine transcendental matters without
231
We must keep in mind that since •aákara directs this objection against an
imaginary opponent, he is not required to give it an adequate answer. It is clear
enough that •aákara’s brahman is capable of dynamism and creative activity with-
out being in any way impelled to do so from without. Being such, it is utterly free.
232
•aákara’s last argument against the ì≤vara of the Yoga system departs some-
what from the main thrust of his attack in this sùtra in that this ì≤vara, besides not
being an upàdàna kàra»a, suffers an even greater imperfection in not being a true
efficient governing cause either.
233
In Vàcaspati’s Bhàmatì II.2.38.
234
B. N. K. Sharma II:96.
226  
the help of ≤ruti. Thus, in arguing effectively both for and against
the opposing view, •aákara illustrates how reason, left to itself, is
inconclusive and lacks finality. In his bhàßya on the following sùtra,
II.2.38, •aákara will in fact cite the authority of ≤ruti as the ulti-
mate reason for embracing the position he does.235
Nimbàrka, in VPS 11.2.37,236 upholds the unity of the efficient
and reality-providing causes of the world, solely on the authority of
the Vedas. He does not renew the debate over the problem of theo-
dicy, as •aákara has done, with its attendant multiple counter-
arguments, and he directs his attack solely against the Pà≤upatas, i.e.
against the followers of the Lord •iva.
In the next sùtra, II.2.38,237 a further objection to the Sàákhya-
Yoga form of theism is raised by the sùtrakàra and elaborated on by
•aákara. How is ì≤vara to be related to pradhàna and the other purußas?
The relationship of saáyoga, or connection, presupposes a union of
objects which consist of parts, but the Sàákhya-Yoga teaching is
that ì≤vara, pradhàna, and the individual souls are all partless and
infinite. The relationship of samavàya, or inherence, is also ruled
out, because of the impossibility of determining what inheres in
what. Nor may the relationship be determined by starting with the
effect and inferring the kind of cause it has, because the world
as a possible effect is the very thing that is being subject to consid-
eration.238
The opponent who, in the absence of the Lord being the upàdàna
kàra»a of the world, is unable to put forth a logical theory to explain
how his ì≤vara may be related to the world, now throws the chal-
lenge back at the Advaitin. How does the teacher of brahman explain
this relation?
235
B. N. K. Sharma II:97–99, who is a follower of the system of dualism pro-
pounded by the Vedàntin Madhva, asserts that all the objections raised by the
sùtrakàra and by •aákara in II.2.37 against the idea of a Lord being merely the
efficient cause could also be levelled against •aákara’s own concept of ì≤vara being
both the efficient cause (nimitta kàra»a) and the reality-providing cause (upàdàna kàra»a)
of the world. However, Sharma has apparently overlooked the fact that only a Lord
who is the upàdàna kàra»a of the universe could, in the truest sense, be the tran-
scendent Lord of the world and ultimately responsible for the process of karma-
saásàra.
236
237
BrSù II.2.38 reads: sambandhànupapatte≤ca. Radhakrishnan, BS 391, translates
this as: “And on account of the impossibility of the relation.”
238
See here the translations by Gambhirananda, BrSùBh• 435, and Thibaut
I:436, as well as the summaries by Radhakrishnan, BS 391 and Potter 164.
•aákara answers: “This relationship we reasonably define as ‘hav-

ing-that-as-àtman.’ ”239 •aákara does not feel it necessary to offer here
an elaborate explanation, as his teaching on non-dualism is well-
known from previous sùtras. The idea is that the effect, i.e. the world,
has brahman as its innermost and total cause, or Self, without the
two sharing an absolute identity.240
The proper meaning of tàdàtmya is another recurrent theme in the
writings of R. De Smet, who has carefully worked out its sense based
on •aákara’s own utterances, in distinction from the tradition that
succeeded him. He concludes that the tàdàtmya relationship that exists
between brahman and all its effects, e.g. the world and the soul, in-
cludes such characteristics as unreciprocality, dependence, indwelling,
non-separation, non-otherness, and distinction.241
•aákara adds that the strength of his position is guaranteed by
the authority of the Vedas; he is thus not limited to the perceptible
examples of causality provided by our everyday experience.242
To this argument arising from the authority of the revealed ≤ruti
•aákara’s opponent objects that even non-Vedàntic systems may
claim their scriptures to be infallible by virtue of their omniscient
human authorship. •aákara considers this to be an errant view, as
its argumentation is circular, i.e. scripture’s truth is said to be guar-
anteed by human omniscience and human omniscience is said to be
proved from the fact that it authored a sacred scripture. For •aákara,
the Vedas have a divine, not human, authorship, but, even more
than that, their supreme truth ought of itself to be obvious to any-
one with an open mind. That is to say, •aákara does not make
special use of an extrinsic argument, such as divine authorship, to
prove the superiority of Vedic truth, although he could have.243
239
MB 257, line 14, reads: tasya tàdàtmyalakßa»asaábandhopapatte˙.
240
Unfortunately, the translators of this passage continue to label tàdàtmya as
“identity.” See Gambhirananda, BrSùBh• 436; Thibaut I:436; Potter 164; Radha-
krishnan, BS 391; Date I:341.
241
See R. De Smet, “Forward Steps in •a«kara Research,” Darshana International
26 (1987):41–42. De Smet’s “Love Versus Identity” 525, also provides a useful intro-
ductory summary. See in addition the excellent concurring study by S. Grant,
•a«karàcàrya’s Concept of Relation (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999).
242
That is to say, the Lord’s causation as the upàdàna kàra»a of the world is of
a special nature, not finding any corresponding example of causation in the world,
whose kinds invariably include some form of transformation or pari»àma. See De
Smet, “Philosophers’ Transition” 327, who states: “•a«kara’s solution is to deny the
universality of the link between pari»àma and upàdàna.”
243
See here Date I:431 note 1, and Radhakrishnan, BS 391. •aákara teaches
in BrSùBh I.1.3 that ≤ruti’s source is in God.
228  
In II.2.39244 and II.2.40,245 both of which are given two interpre-

tations by •aákara, nothing significant is added to what has been
stated in the previous two sùtras. In the final sùtra of this adhikàra»a,
II.2.41,246 •aákara raises a final objection to the doctrine that the
Lord is merely the efficient cause of the world and not its reality-
giving cause also. His rebuttal may also be seen as the unmasking
of a teaching that is futile, because it takes only reason as its guide.
•aákara argues that the position of the Tàrkikas, the logicians, who
hold that the Lord may be both infinite and omniscient and yet
remain a mere operative cause of the universe, is untenable. For the
Tàrkikas also assert that both pradhàna, the material world, and the
individual souls are immeasurable.247 But this presents some difficulties
for a correct understanding of the Lord. If, on the one hand, the
Lord is omniscient, then he must know the measure and number of
the world and the souls. But to know something is to know its lim-
its. Therefore, in contrast to what the Tàrkikas maintain, the world
and the souls must be limited. As a further consequence of this,
saásàra, or the transmigratory state, would one day come to an end,
as all the souls in bondage, understood to be a limited number,
would eventually come to be liberated. But the Lord, whose power
to rule is defined in terms of the objects of his dominion, would no
longer be Lord, as saásàra would no longer exist.248 If, on the other
hand, to avoid this impasse, it be maintained that the number of
souls and the extent of the universe are impossible to determine,
even by the Lord, then the Tàrkikas’ assertion of the Lord’s omni-
science would also be proved to be fallacious.
244
BrSù II.2.39 reads: adhiß†hanànupapatte≤ ca. Radhakrishnan, BS 391, translates
this as: “And on account of the possibility of a support (or substratum) (the Lord
cannot be the maker).”
245
BrSù II.2.40 reads: kara»avaccenna bhogàdibhya˙. Radhakrishnan, BS 392, trans-
lates this as: “If it be said that as in the case of sense-organs (we say) no on account
of enjoyment and the rest.”
246
BrSù II.2.41 reads: antavattvamasarvajñatà và. Radhakrishnan, BS 392, translates
this as: “(On this view there will result) finitude or non-omniscience.”
247
There is some discrepancy here among contemporary interpreters of this bhàßya
as to whether ananta˙, “unlimited,” is to be understood in the sense of infinite num-
ber or of infinite duration. It is possible that both senses are implied in the pre-
sent sùtra. See the interpretations given by Gambhirananda, Thibaut, Date, Potter,
and Radhakrishnan in their remarks and translations of this sùtra-bhàßya.
248
As Date I:344 paraphrases: “And when the pradhàna thus comes to an end,
what remains there for the Lord to supervise or to rule? It is as good as saying
that he too comes to an end.”
At this point the present adhikara»a comes to an end without

•aákara providing a summarizing conclusion to support his own
position. We must infer in what way •aákara’s concept of a Lord,
who we know to be both the upàdàna kàra»a and the nimitta kàra»a
of the world, can better answer the objections of this last sùtra against
the Tàrkikas, than the logic of a Lord who only directs the world
without having also caused it. Are we to suppose that •aákara merely
wants to make the point that because ≤ruti does in fact assert that
the Lord is also the upàdàna kàra»a that we need not occupy our-
selves with the formidable objections against theism raised by rea-
son?249 This solution is very unlikely, as •aákara normally takes
pains to show that things which can only be known through the
revealed ≤ruti can in fact be subsequently defended by the tool of
reason.
What •aákara does in fact appear to imply is that the sovereignty
of the Lord can never be safeguarded in any system that denies his
being the upàdàna kàra»a. This is the point he makes in all of his
arguments against the Lord being a mere nimitta kàra»a and it is the
point he is making in II.2.41 as well. What the dilemma regarding
the Lord’s omniscience just discussed has revealed is that a Lord
who is not an upàdàna kàra»a is reduced to being a mere correlate
to the universe he rules. Take away the objects he rules and there
can no longer exist a ruler, if the Lord is defined only in terms of
rulership. This may appear to be mere quibbling with words, but
for •aákara it is clear that a Lord who is not only the ruler of the
world, but also its periodic originator, sustainer, and destroyer is not
limited by the world which is the object of his action.250
Elsewhere, too, we have repeatedly seen that the sovereignty of
the Lord is guaranteed by •aákara, who, in contrast to post-•aákara
Advaita, does not clearly distinguish ì≤vara from the highest brahman.
What points relevant to the present study may be taken from the
present adhikara»a?
249
B. N. K. Sharma, II:102, implies this with regard to •aákara and his com-
mentator Vàcaspati. Sharma believes, moreover, that all the objections raised by
•aákara in II.2.41 could be levelled even more forcefully against •aákara’s own
system, which Sharma interprets in the traditional illusionistic fashion, whereas, he
implies, other, more realistic schools of theism would have no difficulty answering
•aákara’s criticisms.
250
See BrSùBh• I.1.5.
230  
1) The absolute sovereignty of •aákara’s conception of the Lord is

underscored in his renewed discussion of theodicy. Against the
objection that the Lord’s sovereignty is compromised by his action
being dependent on the actions and merits of creatures, •aákara
implies that, as the upàdàna kàra»a of the world, the Lord is the
creator of the law of retribution and is thus not bound by that
same law. He is thus ultimately responsible for the entire mech-
anism of karma and retribution. One might go so far as to say
that the Lord chooses to abide by the moral law he has freely
brought into existence. The Lord’s absolute freedom to act is thus
maintained.
2) The world, being a contingent reality, is seen by •aákara as sub-
sisting in a tàdàtmya relation with its source, i.e. it has “that” (tad ),
i.e. brahman-ì≤vara (the two terms are used synonymously in II.2.38),
as its reality-providing cause. The relationship between brahman
and the world should thus not be interpreted in terms of strict
identity. This ontology would preserve a real distinction between
creaturely and divine freedom in the context of non-duality.
3) •aákara’s bhàßya on sùtra II.2.41 rules out the possibility of regard-
ing the Lord as merely a correlate to his dependent and ruled
reality, i.e. the world. As such, this text provides further evidence
of the Lord’s sovereignty and transcendence, a fact already well-
attested by •aákara’s tendency to identify the Lord as the supreme
reality, who is independent of and unaltered by the world which
is dependent upon him.
12. BrSùBh II.2.42
The sùtra reads: “On account of the impossibility of origination.”251

For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “(The Bhàgavata view
that Saákarßana and others originate successively from Vàsudeva
and others is wrong), since any origin (for the soul) is impossible.”252
This sùtra follows immediately upon the refutation of the Tàrkikas

in II.2.41, and •aákara is quick to point out that the opponents he
next attacks, the Bhàgavatas, do share with him the teaching that
the highest Lord, Nàràya»a-Vàsudeva, is both the nimitta and upàdàna
kàra»a of the world. •aákara is even willing to go so far as to iden-
251
BS 393.
252
tify this Lord with the supreme Self revealed by the Upanißads.253 It
is to other doctrines of this movement that •aákara objects, espe-
cially to the notion that the individual soul ( jìva) is a created real-
ity rather than eternal, a teaching which, in •aákara’s mind, would
not allow the soul to attain liberation, as created realities eventually
merge with their source and are destroyed.254
What is of interest in the commentary on this sùtra is that •aákara’s
criticism of the Bhàgavata position is so mild.255 Although the Bhàga-
vata movement may originally have had a non-Aryan origin, it even-
tually became associated with the worship of K‰ß»a, and, through
him, with Viß»u.256 By •aákara’s time it had become one of the
movements of the intricate Vaiß»ava religion. It is for this reason,
according to Paul Hacker, that •aákara is quick to express his ap-
proval of so many of the Bhàgavata teachings and practices, whereas
his criticism of •aivate theology in the previous adhikara»a is unquali-
fied.257 In other words, •aákara had a great affinity for the Vaiß»ava
religion, for reasons that cannot properly be determined today.
What are some of the practices and beliefs of this Vaiß»ava sect,
which •aákara so clearly and forthrightly endorses? In his own
words:
The believer after having worshipped Vàsudeva for a hundred years
by means of approach to the temple (abhigamana), procuring of things
to be offered (upàdàna), oblation (ijya), recitation of prayers, &c. (svàd-
hyàya), and devout meditation ( yoga), passes beyond all affliction and
reaches the highest Being.
Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend to con-
trovert the doctrine that Nàràya»a, who is higher than the Undeveloped,
who is the highest Self, and the Self of all, reveals himself by divid-
ing himself in multiple ways; for various scriptural passages, such as
‘He is onefold, he is threefold’ (Ch. Up. VII.26.2), teach us that the
highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to
the inculcation of unceasing concentration of mind on the highest Being
which appears in the Bhàgavata doctrine under the forms of reveren-
tial approach, &c.; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know
full well from Sm‰ti and Scripture.258
253
See MB 260, lines 1–5 and Hacker, “Relations” 209.
254
See G. tr., BrSùBh 441 and •aákara’s bhàßya on BrSù II.3.17.
255
See Deutsch/van Buitenen 115.
256
See Deutsch/van Buitenen 114.
257
See Hacker, “Relations” 206–210.
258
Th. tr. I:440–441.
232  
Hacker acknowledges the significance of this passage in the follow-

ing summary:
I think it cannot be overlooked that a marked sympathy for the Vaiß»ava
religion speaks from these words. This sympathy even goes beyond
what might be expected from the point of view of strict advaitism. For
not only does Sankara stress that the doctrine of God or the Brahman
being the material as well as the efficient cause is common to both
his system and that of Vaiß»avism, but he even identifies the Highest
Self as taught by the Advaita system with a figure of mythology, namely
with Nàràya»a, the Bhagavan, who is the highest deity of Vaiß»avism,
and he expressly approves of Vaiß»ava practices of worship and devo-
tion. If he had leanings towards •aivism or if he had, as the myth of
our days would have it, maintained the equality or unity of all the
religions or varieties of Hinduism, one would expect to find similar,
sympathetic statements at least in his treatment of the •aiva system.
But no trace of a similar sympathy for •aiva doctrine or practices is
discernible in the SBh.259
Thus, by way of summary, we see that •aákara does not appear
to merely concede the value of devotional religion for the as yet
unenlightened, but clearly underscores its significance in the spiri-
tual life, in particular the devotional spirituality and theology of
Vaiß»ava religion. For •aákara the theology of the Vaiß»avites is
true; that of the •aivites is not. •aákara does not here provide the
reader with an explicit theory of the relation between devotional reli-
gion and advaitic realization; he is content in this passage to affirm
the value of worship of and devotion to the supreme Lord, who is
MB 259, line 26 to 260, line 7, reads: tamitthaáabhùtaá parame≤varaá bhagavan-

tamabhigamanopàdànejyàsvàdhyàyayogairvarßa≤atamiß†và kßì»akle≤o bhagavantameva pratipadyata
iti. tatra yattàvaducyeta yo’sau nàràya»a˙ paro’vyaktàtprasiddha˙ paramàtmà sarvàtma sa àtmanàt-
mànamanekadhà vyùhyàvasthita iti, tanna niràkriyate, ‘sa ekadhà bhavati tridhà bhavati’ (Ch.
VI.26.2) ityàdi≤rutibhya˙ paramàtmano’nekadhàbhàvasyàdhigatatvàt. yadapi tasya bhaga-
vato’bhigamanàdilakßa»amàràdhanamajasramananycaittatayàbhipreyate, tadapi na pratißidhyate.
≤rutism‰tyorì≤varapra»idhànasya prasiddhatvàt.
Date I:345 paraphrases as follows: “If a man goes to the temple and worships
this Vàsudeva for hundred years by means of offerings, prayers and meditation, he
will thereby be able to overcome affliction and reach the Vàsudeva himself. Now
we have no desire to dispute over the doctrine that Nàràya»a who transcends the
avyakta, and who is the highest and the internal Àtman of all divides himself and
manifests in various forms. For •ruti also tells us that the highest Àtman appears
in many forms, that ‘he is one, he becomes three’ (Cha. 7, 26, 2). Nor do we wish
to contend against the devotional approach and the unceasing one-pointed medi-
tation on God; for this has been recommended both by •ruti and Sm‰ti.”
259
Hacker, “Relations,” 209–210. “SBh” stands for •aákara’s bhàßya on the BrSù.
the Self revealed by the Upanißads, and likewise the sole cause of
the world’s existence and operations. It is, of course, clear from what
•aákara has stated in other passages in the BrSùBh that the goal
of the spiritual life is the realization of non-duality (not strict iden-
tity) between the Lord and the aspirant. For that reason the prac-
tices of devotional religion cannot be regarded as valuable solely in
themselves; their worth lies in their power to lead the worshipper to
the supreme intuition. This, however, does not, in contrast to the
thinking of many interpreters of •aákara today, necessarily result in
the view that the spiritual life is to be regarded as the ascent from
the personal to the impersonal. •aákara, as has often enough been
seen, does not define the Absolute in purely personalistic or imper-
sonalistic terms, and he makes no clear distinction between the
parame≤vara and the highest brahman.
Nimbàrka, in VPS II.2.42,260 in contrast to •aákara, interprets
this sùtra as relating to the view of origination of the world as put
forth by the •àktas, not that of the Bhàgavatas. He makes no men-
tion of devotional practices nor does he identify •akti, the so-called
originator of the world, with the supreme Self of the Upanißads, in
the way that •aákara had linked Nàràya»a with the paramàtman.
For Bhàskara this is sùtra 11.2.41.261 Bhàskara agrees with •aákara
that this sùtra is directed against the Pañcaràtra doctrine of emana-
tion.262 And, like •aákara, using identical terminology,263 he affirms
that through devotional practices such as prayer, sacrifices, medita-
tion, temple worship and the like one may attain the highest. The
highest in this case is Vàsudeva, a personal Lord; as a whole, in his
BrSùBh Bhàskara does not distinguish between a personal Lord and
an impersonal Absolute. That is to say, Bhàskara is even less inclined
than •aákara to distinguish ì≤vara from brahman and paramàtman; he
treats the three as synonymous.264
260
261
See BhBrSùBh 128, lines 13–28.
262
See Bose I:383.
263
264
See D. H. H. Ingalls, “Bhàskara the Vedàntin,” Philosophy East and West 17
(1967): 61–67.
234  
13. BrSùBh II.3.29
The sùtra reads: “But that declaration is on account of its having

for the qualities of that, even as the Intelligent Self.”265
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “But the soul comes to
have such appellations because of the dominance of the modes of
that (intellect); this is just as in the case of the supreme Self.”266
The purpose of •aákara’s bhàßya on this sùtra is to refute the idea

that the jìva is atomic or minute in size. Being essentially non-different
from the supreme brahman, the jìva is to be regarded as all-perva-
sive. When the all-pervasive soul, however, is mistakenly identified
with its limiting adjuncts it is seen to take on the properties of those
adjuncts. It is the intellect, the buddhi, says •aákara, that is minute
in size, and it is the superimposition of the buddhi on the soul that
gives rise to the mistaken conviction that the soul itself is atomic.267
Or, he says, the sense of minuteness (a»utva) in this sùtra may be
taken to refer to the fact that the Self or soul is difficult to know,
i.e. that it is inscrutable.268
What then of MuUp III.1.9, which explicitly declares the atom-
icity of the soul, with the words: “This atomic (a»u˙) Self is to be
realized through the intellect (cetasà)”? •aákara interprets this pas-
sage as referring to the subtlety of the jìva, i.e. to the difficulty in
really getting to know it. The text has nothing to do with the notion
that the jìva might be of a given limited size, or in some sense tan-
gible or even visible.269 He justifies this interpretation by pointing
out that the subject of both MuUp III.1.9 and the preceding verse
is ultimately the supreme Self, which is inaccessible to the senses
and to thought. It is thus something entirely transcendent; a»u˙ in
the sense of atomicity could not apply to it.270 In this context •aá-
kara explicitly quotes the famous phrase from MuUp III.1.8, that the
265
See BS 409.
266
267
See the excellent summary of this sùtra by V. S. Ghate, The Vedànta (Poona:
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1981), 86–87.
268
See G. tr., BrSùBh• 488 and Th. II:44.
269
See also •aákara’s bhàßya on MuUp III.1.9 in EU II:157, and the original
text in TPU 169–170. In the first line of this commentary •aákara defines anu˙
in the present context as sùkßma˙, which includes both the ideas of minuteness and
subtlety. See MW 1240, col. 3.
270
Self is revealed through jñànaprasàda˙, i.e. the favorableness of the

intellect.271
Jñànaprasàda˙ could be translated in several ways, and has been
done so by the modern interpreters of •aákara’s BrSùBh. Does jñàna
here mean knowledge or rather the instrument of knowledge, i.e.
the intellect? Does prasàda mean grace or mere favorableness or even
serenity? In the context of his bhàßya on MuUp III.1.8 (which we
shall return to later in this study) •aákara speaks at length about
the pivotal role of an unsullied intellect as a pure receptor of the
knowledge of the Supreme, so much so that Gambhirananda’s trans-
lation “favourableness of the intellect” appears justified. However,
the broadness of the word prasàda should be kept in mind. Thibaut272
translates “by the serene light of knowledge.” More expansively,
Date,273 in an extreme but useful paraphrase, renders the passage in
question as “Brahman . . . is to be realized through knowledge and
grace, and not to be apprehended by the senses.” •aákara himself
in BrSùBh II.3.29 does not make it clear when dealing with MuUp
III.1.8–9 whether grace is involved; the point he wants to make is
that the Self can be known only under very extraordinary circum-
stances (whether it be through an intellect totally purified of all
defilement or through a gift of grace), and it is this fact that pre-
cludes the attribution of atomicity for the jìva rather than the more
correct “subtlety.”
Nimbàrka, in the same sùtra, i.e. VPS II.3.28,274 comes to a different
conclusion than •aákara, upholding a real atomicity of the soul.
Furthermore, rather than referring to MuUp III.1.8–9, he makes ref-
erence to MuUp I.1.6. The question of grace or of words relating
to grace does not arise.
The same sùtra is II.3.29 for Bhàskara.275 In his discussion of the
possible atomicity of the soul, Bhàskara makes no mention of prasàda
and does not refer to MuUp III.1.8 or I.1.6.
To sum up:
1) In BrSùBh II.3.29 •aákara refers to the important compound
jñànaprasàda˙ from MuUp III.1.8 and uses it in a new context
271
MuUp III.1.8 actually reads jñànaprasàdena; •aákara’s bhàßya on the present sù-
tra offers a slightly different reading: jñànaprasàdagamyatvena. See MB 286, lines 25–26.
272
Th. II:44.
273
Date II:36.
274
See VPS 228, lines 4–6 and Bose tr. I:419–420.
275
236  
that formally has nothing to do with grace. The issue at stake is

whether the jìva is atomic in nature or all-pervasive. •aákara’s
discussion in the present sùtra throws no light on his understanding
of the word prasàda as taken from the MuUp, other than it tends
to emphasize his conviction that supreme Self-knowledge is attain-
able only under extreme and unusual circumstances. It is •aákara’s
commentary on MuUp III.1.8 itself (assuming the commentary is
authentic) that best helps to clarify the true sense of prasàda, and
to that bhàßya we shall return later in this study.
2) The translators of BrSùBh II.3.29 diverge widely as to the proper
translation of prasàda as taken from MuUp III.1.8, rendering it
e.g. as “serene” or “serene light” (Thibaut) or as “favourableness”
(Gambhirananda) or as “grace” (Date). This is indicative of the
various meanings that properly belong to the word prasàda, and
it serves as a reminder that a sense of gratuitousness can never be
totally excluded from the word. We shall keep this in mind when
we deal with MuUp III.1.8 and •aákara’s commentary on it.
14. BrSùBh II.3.41
The sùtra reads: “But from the highest, because scripture (teaches)
that.”276
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “But that (agency of soul)
is derived from the Supreme Lord, so Scripture (teaches).”277
This is the most important sùtra on grace in •aákara’s entire BrSùBh,

because here the bhàßyakàra clearly makes liberation dependent upon
the Lord’s grace. The context of this and the following sùtra is the
problem of the jìva’s freedom; is it real or is the jìva totally manip-
ulated by the Lord? As might be expected when dealing with the
question of divine and human freedom, or of free will and grace,
the topic of theodicy emerges once again.278
The bhàßya begins with the pùrvapakßin summarizing •aákara’s view
regarding the agency (kart‰tvaá) of the jìva, i.e. that agency arises
276
See Th. tr. II:58.
277
BS 415.
278
When dealing with the various interpretations of BrSù II.3.41–42 by classical
Vedàntin thinkers, especially in regard to the problem of the Lord’s alleged par-
tiality and cruelty when dealing with individual jìvas, B. N. K. Sharma II:262, makes
the astounding remark: “The question is of vital interest only to Theists like Ràmànuja
and Madhva and not to •a«kara.” (Emphasis given by Sharma).
from the association of the jìva with its limiting adjuncts (upàdhis) in
the state of ignorance (avidyà). The point is that agency is not nat-
ural to the jìva; in its original and pure state it does not act.279
Assuming then, the pùrvapakßin continues, that agency is attribut-
able to the jìva in the state of ignorance, the question must now be
raised as to whether this agency is entirely the jìva’s or is in some
way dependent on ì≤vara, the Lord.280
The pùrvapakßin would like to conclude that the jìva’s agency does
not depend on the Lord. He gives three reasons to support this con-
tention. First, a dependence on the Lord is not needed to account
for the soul’s activity, as this activity can be completely accounted
for already by the motives inspiring action, such as attraction and
By now it should be abundantly clear, however, that the problem of theodicy is

an important one for •aákara, enough so that he returns to it again and again in
his BrSùBh. And his solution is always the same: to absolve the Lord from the
responsibility and blame for suffering in the world and for unequal fate.
279
See the important passage from •aákara’s bhàßya on the previous sùtra (II.3.40):
“We say that it is not possible for the soul to have natural agentship, for that would
lead to a negation of liberation. If agentship be the very nature of the Self, there
can be no freedom from it, as fire can have no freedom from heat. Moreover, for
one who has not got rid of agentship, there can be no achievement of the highest
human goal (liberation), for agentship is a sort of misery (kart‰tvasya du˙kharùpatvàt).”
See G. tr., BrSùBh• 498 and MB 292, lines 8–10.
280
Sharma II:261 points out an inconsistency in this question. If the soul’s
agentship is due to ignorance and is not real, then what sense is there in debating
whether this agency is in some part due to the Lord? The same objection is raised
by Ghate 92: “Now if it were decided that the self is not an agent at all, that his
kart‰tva is only superimposed on him, how could the question arise whether the self
is an independent agent or a dependent one?”
The objection appears to be valid, and the only solution would be that •aákara
is posing a question from the vyavahàra point of view. Yet even this solution is not
entirely satisfying, for not only does •aákara not declare that the following dis-
cussion is being pursued from the standpoint of ignorance and duality, but it is also
clear that the purpose of the siddhànta position that •aákara will give, i.e. that the
jìva is dependent on ì≤vara for its activity, is to dispel an errant viewpoint. One
might therefore expect that, with the intention of eliminating errant viewpoints,
•aákara would disallow altogether the question put by the pùrvapakßin as invalid,
on the simple grounds that neither jìva nor the supreme àtman can be regarded as
in any way possessing agentship. But this he does not. Is it possible that the pre-
sent bhàßya is to be regarded as a pedagogical tool to lead the seeker of truth to a
higher level of awareness, though not yet the highest? To be refuted as the lowest
level of insight about one’s activity and nature would be the general human con-
viction that one acts absolutely independently of a higher causality when acting.
The next, and higher, level of truth would acknowledge that all one’s willing and
doing is accomplished under the influence of the Lord, the universal inner and
outer controller. The highest and final state would be reached with the realization
that I, the jìva, am in reality a non-doer, as I no longer identify myself with ‘my’
upàdhis; rather ‘my’ àtman is one with brahman, and thus ever inactive and free.
238  
aversion, and by the instruments of that action that the soul itself
employs.281 That is to say, one has the experience of being the doer.
Second, ordinary observation shows that the Lord is not required
for common worldly activity; the bullock plowing the field is required
for the purpose of agriculture, but the Lord’s activity is not.
And, finally, the third reason given by the pùrvapakßin in support
of his view that the jìva acts independently of the Lord is a return
to the heart of the problem of theodicy: “Moreover (if all activity
depended on the Lord) it would follow that the Lord is cruel because
imposing on his creatures activity which is essentially painful, and
at the same time unjust because allotting to their activities unequal
results.”282 It should be noted here that the focus of the theodicy
problem has slightly shifted; although here, as before, there is still
concern with the unequal destinies of creatures and their degrees of
suffering and happiness, the major objection raised against the Lord’s
goodness is now the fact that he is responsible for a world in which
jìvas suffer the misery of having to act, “for agentship is a sort of
misery.”283 The implication is that the very real agency which the
jìva possesses is not in any way dependent on the Lord, for if it were
the Lord would be subject to the charge of cruelty.
In reply to the counterobjection that BrSùBh II.1.34 had absolved
the Lord from all blame regarding the creatures’ suffering on the
grounds that the creatures themselves, through their good and evil
actions, are responsible for their own individual fate, the pùrvapakßin
retorts that it is the reality of the jìva’s agency which is the very
thing here at issue. In other words, is the jìva truly free or only
apparently so? If the individual souls do not possess agentship, then
they cannot acquire merit and demerit, and consequently, they can-
not be held responsible for their fate. That responsibility would be
solely the Lord’s. And since the creatures’ unequal suffering would
no longer (as BrSùBh II.1.34 would have it) result from merit and
demerit, but only from the Lord, then it would be the Lord’s unfair-
ness or caprice that would ultimately be the reason for the diversity
of suffering and happiness in the world.284
281
Obviously, the body is meant here, but also all else in the world that the jìva
may employ to execute and accomplish its activity.
282
Th. tr. II:58. See MB 295, lines 19–20.
283
See note 279 above.
284
See the discussion in Th. II:58–59.
•aákara refutes the above position on the authority of the sùtrakàra,

who asserts in II.3.41 that the soul’s agentship is, indeed, dependent
on the Lord. •aákara then goes on to elaborate as follows:
For the soul which in the state of Nescience is blinded by the dark-
ness of ignorance and hence unable to distinguish itself from the com-
plex of effects and instruments, the saásàra-state in which it appears
as agent and enjoyer is brought about through the permission of the
Lord who is the highest Self, the superintendent of all actions, the wit-
ness residing in all beings, the cause of all intelligence; and we must
therefore assume that final release also is effected through knowledge
caused by the grace (anugraha) of the Lord.285
•aákara thus declares three things. First, it is through the permis-
sion (anujñà) of the Lord that the soul in ignorance of its true nature
becomes a transmigrator, an agent and an experiencer of (worldly)
happiness and unhappiness. Why “permission”? With this word
•aákara rules out that either the jìva or the Lord is the cause of
avidyà. Rather, this is a mystery that the Lord permits. Saásàra, we
recall, is beginningless. Avidyà “belongs” neither to the jìva nor to
the Lord.286 But even here, and that is the second point, within this
world of transmigration and of causes and effects, the Lord who is
the highest Self (and thus the Self of all) is to be regarded as the
superintendent of all actions and the inner controller and light of
consciousness of all beings. Third, this Lord, who is the supreme
Self and who only permits avidyà but does not cause it, is declared
to be the giver, i.e. the cause (hetu), of the grace (anugraha) of liber-
ating knowledge.287
On what grounds (kuta˙), the pùrvapakßin asks, is this affirmed?
•aákara continues: “Because scripture teaches that.” For although
the soul has its own imperfections, such as passion and so on, for
motives, and is furnished with the whole apparatus of action, and
although ordinary experience does not show that the Lord is a cause
285
Th. tr. II:59. MB 295, line 26 to 296, line 2 reads: avidyàvasthàyàá kàrya-
kara»asaádhàtàvivekadar≤ano jìvasyàvidyàtimiràndhasya sata˙ parasmàdàtmana˙ karmàdhyak-
ßàtsarvabhùtàdhivàsàtsàkßi»e≤vatayiturì≤varàttadanujñayà kart‰tvabhokt‰tvalakßa»asya saásàrasya
siddhi˙, tadanugrahahetukenaiva ca vijñànena mokßasiddhirbhaviturmahati.
286
See D. H. H. Ingalls, “•aákara on the Question: Whose is Avidyà?,” Philosophy
East and West 3 (1953–54):69–72.
287
See the paraphrase by Date II:51: “The soul has been blinded by the dark-
ness of avidyà and is unable to distinguish itself as distinct from the complex of
phenomenal causes and effects; but it must achieve its release through the grace of
God.”
240  
in occupations such as ploughing and the like, yet we ascertain from

scripture that the Lord is a causal agent in all activity.”288
This is a clear example of •aákara arguing as a ≤rutivàdin. Although
ordinary experience does not reveal the Lord involved in the activ-
ities of the world, ≤ruti does teach this truth. So far •aákara has not
yet indicated whether he understands the Lord’s involvement in
human effort and activity as completely determining that action, or
whether he would allow for a real, though limited, human freedom,
which would somehow be influenced by the divine will. Of course,
in previous sùtras dealing with the problem of theodicy •aákara did,
in fact, basically uphold the reality of human freedom, merit and
responsibility, while attributing to the Lord the function of the over-
seer or governor of the law of retribution. Here, however, in sup-
port of his contention that ≤ruti supports the view he is defending,
he cites once again KauUp III.8: “It is he who makes him do good
works whom He would raise above these worlds, and it is He who
makes them do evil works whom He would drag down.”289 Now in
the present context of trying to ascertain just how real human free-
dom is the quoting of KauUp III.8 gives a decidedly deterministic
flavor to •aákara’s position. It would seem, at this point, that the
Lord acts as a puppeteer, completely controlling human destiny
and freedom, casting down whom he would and granting liberating
knowledge to whom he would.
•aákara also quotes •atapatha Bràhma»a XIV.6.7.30: “He who
dwells in the sound and controls the soul from within.”290 When read
in connection with KauUp III.8 this verse should be read as an indi-
cation that it is the Lord who moves the wills of humans to do good
or evil. •aákara adds that there are other texts of this kind.291 What
is remarkable is that •aákara, who has a complete mastery of the
Vedic texts, and who, on other occasions, does not hesitate to quote
a great number of verses in his support, refrains here from citing
Upanißadic texts on grace, such as KaUp I.2.23 or the many verses
from the •vUp. Later in this study I shall conclude why he proba-
288
Th. tr. II:59. MB 296, lines 2–5 reads: tacchrute˙. yadyapi doßaprayukta˙ sàma-
grìsaápanna≤ca jìva˙, yadyapi ca loke k‰ßyàdißu karmasu ne≤varakàra»atvaá prasiddhaá, tathàpi
sarvàsveva prav‰ttißvì≤varo hetukarteti ≤ruteravasìyate.
289
G. tr., BrSùBh• 504–505.
290
291
caivaájàtìyakà. See MB 296, line 8 and G. tr., BrSùBh• 505.
bly does not, especially when examining his commentary on KaUp

I.2.23.
It is thus no wonder that the pùrvapakßin objects that this is no
argument at all in favor of the Lord’s goodness and blamelessness,
for “if causal agency thus belongs to the Lord, it follows that he
must be cruel and unjust, and that the soul has to undergo conse-
quences of what it has not done.”292 It would appear that the dis-
cussion has gone full circle and that we are back where we started.
•aákara, however, will provide a solution in the following sùtra.
Nimbàrka, in his commentary on the same sùtra, VPS II.3.40,293
affirms that the soul’s agency is in some sense derived “from the
Highest,” on the basis of the authority of the scriptural text Tait.
Ar. III.11.1–2, which affirms the the inner rulership of the highest
reality, but he declines to elaborate. In previous sùtras Nimbàrka had
declared the soul’s agency to be real and not due simply to its prox-
imity to limiting adjuncts. In the present sùtra no mention is made
of the problem of theodicy, of KauUp III.8, or, most importantly,
of the Lord’s grace.
Bhàskara, in BrSùBh II.3.41,294 likewise derives the soul’s agency
from the supreme Lord and from the soul’s proximity to its upàdhis
(as does •aákara), and he also quotes the first half of KauUp III.8
(“eßa hyeva sàdhu karma kàrayati . . .”), but he does not go as far as
•aákara in explicitly affirming that liberation is due to the grace of
the Lord.
We may now summarize the most important points of this sùtra:
1) Here for the first time •aákara formally declares that the jìva’s
liberation is effected by the grace (anugraha) of the Lord, who is
expressly stated to be the supreme Self.
2) The grace that is given is the supreme knowledge that is the cause
of liberation.
3) Among the three earliest commentators on the BrSù whose works
are still extant, •aákara stands alone in his bhàßya on this par-
ticular sùtra in bringing up the issue of grace and in affirming its
pivotal role in the destruction of avidyà. Since the sùtra itself does
not appear to call for any reference to grace it is understandable
292
293
294
242  
that Nimbàrka and Bhàskara make no mention of it. It would

thus appear that grace is a reality that is important to •aákara.
4) The context in which •aákara introduces the subject of grace
concerns the relationship between human and divine agency. In
citing KauUp III.8 in support of his contention that human agency
is dependent on the Lord, •aákara makes it initially appear as
if the Lord totally controls the jìva’s will and agency, as if the jìva
were a kind of puppet. Thus behind the appearance of a real
human agency ≤ruti reveals that in actuality it is nothing but the
divine agency at work. Thus the performance of good and evil
works and their resulting merit and demerit would ultimately have
to be attributed to the Lord. That is at least what the pùrvapakßin
thinks, but •aákara will offer a rebuttal of this in the next sùtra
in order to vindicate the Lord’s goodness. At the minimum, •aá-
kara implies that everything that happens takes place in some way
in dependence on the Lord, either through the Lord’s permission
(e.g. the jìva’s bondage), the exercising of the jìva’s will to choose
to do good or evil, or, finally, the granting of the summum bonum,
liberating knowledge itself.
5) The ontological context of this bhàßya is puzzling and unclear. On
the one hand the jìva’s agency is said to result from the jìva’s
proximity to its upàdhis in the state of avidyà, thus implying that
agency itself to be illusionary. On the other hand •aákara affirms
that the Lord, who is the supreme Self, is the cause behind all
the jìva’s activity. •aákara gives no indication that he is shifting
back and forth between the vyavahàra-avasthà and the paramàrtha-
avasthà, i.e. between the practical-empirical and supreme-meta-
physical standpoints. We must thus take seriously his affirmation
that the Lord, who is the supreme Self, is the giver of the grace
of liberating knowledge, and postpone until later a more com-
prehensive interpretation of •aákara’s utterances on grace.
15. BrSùBh II.3.42
The sùtra reads: “However, dependent on the efforts made, on grounds

of the enjoined and prohibited duties not becoming meaningless and
so on.”295
295
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “But (the Lord’s making
the soul act) is dependent on the efforts made (by it); only thus will
the injunctions and prohibitions, etc., be meaningful.”296
This sùtra completes the adhikara»a begun with II.3.41 regarding the
relationship between human and divine agency and provides •aákara
with the opportunity to exonerate the Lord of all wrongdoing in his
dealings with the jìvas.
•aákara begins by pointing out that the objections raised by the
pùrvapakßin against the Lord’s goodness are invalid, because the Lord’s
influence on the activities of jìvas is not to be understood as a totally
manipulating kind of control, but rather an activity—as has been
shown before in previous sùtras—that takes into account the real
freedom of the individual to will and perform good and evil. It is
striking that •aákara is able to maintain this after having quoted
such an apparently deterministic ≤ruti text from the previous sùtra as
KauUp III.8. This, however, he does do in all serenity. In devel-
oping his argument he at first repeats what he has said elsewhere:
“In causing the individual to act, God (ì≤vara) takes into account the
efforts—characterized either as virtuous or vicious—which the indi-
vidual makes. Hence the defects, pointed out, do not arise. God acts
merely as a general instrumental cause, dividing the resulting fruits
of works unequally in accordance with the inequality of merit and
demerit acquired by the individual beings, even as rain does . . . God
ordains good and bad for the individual beings in accordance with
the efforts made by the beings themselves.”297
But, the pùrvapakßin persists, if the soul’s agency is dependent on
the Lord, then it makes no sense to say the Lord takes into con-
sideration the effort and merit of the soul.298 The pùrvapakßin seems
to imply that it must be either the soul or the Lord who impels activ-
ity, and if that is the case, he understands •aákara to be saying
that the individual in reality does not act, but the Lord through it.
In refuting the objection that the Lord has nothing of the soul to
take into consideration, since the soul is not really free to act,
296
BS 416.
297
G. tr., BrSùBh• 505. MB 296, lines 12–15 and 18–19 reads: k‰to ya˙ prayatno
jìvasya dharmàdharmalakßa»astadapekßa evainamì≤vara˙ kàrayati. tata≤caite codità doßa na
prasajyante. jìvak‰tadharmàdharmavaißamyàpekßa eva tattatphalàni vißamaá vibhajetparjanyavadì≤varo
nimittatvamàtre»a. . . . evaá jìvak‰taprayatnàpekßa ì≤varasteßàá ≤ubhà≤ubhaá vidadhyàditi ≤lißyate.
298
See G. tr., BrSùBh• 505; Th. tr. II:60; MB 296, lines 19–20.
244  
•aákara’s language turns strongly paradoxical: “By no means, we

reply; for although the activity of the soul is not independent, yet
the soul does act. The Lord indeed causes it to act, but it acts itself.
Moreover, the Lord in causing it to act now has regard to its former
efforts, and he caused it to act in a previous existence, having regard
to its efforts previous to that existence; a regressus against which,
considering the eternity of the saásàra, no objections can be raised.”299
The modern commentators have surprisingly passed over this mys-
terious passage without remarking on its obscurity. Radhakrishnan300
notes that “the Lord directs the soul taking into account previous
good and bad deeds.” Just what this “directing” exactly entails he
does not say. Date301 summarizes as follows: “It can never be said
that the activity of men is entirely dependent on God. Man acts
himself, and God causes him to act in such a way as is consistent
with his former efforts. The former efforts of man again are being
done by him, because God wishes him to do so in view of his still
former efforts, and so on.” The problem with this interpretation is
that it would tend to support the pùrvapakßin’s denial of a real free-
dom of choice for the jìva in •aákara’s system, a freedom •aákara
is anxious to uphold; otherwise the old charge of the Lord’s unfair-
ness could be raised anew. Potter302 interprets the same passage as
follows: “God allots appropriate results corresponding to the merit
or demerit that was earned by each self through its previous activ-
ities. Just as the rain causes all kinds of seeds, good and bad, to
sprout, so God causes all kinds of seeds of action to sprout, whether
good or bad.” Thus, this author emphasizes the retributive conti-
nuity of actions and results, but does not address the obvious and
central problem of this particular bhàßya, namely the “how” of the
working together of the human and divine wills.303
299
Th. tr. II:60. In place of Thibaut’s “causes” and “causing,” Gambhirananda,
BrSùBh• 506, translates “directs,” but this is a loose rendering. MB 296, lines
20–23, reads: naißa doßa˙. paràyatte’pi hi kart‰tve karotyeva jìva˙. kurvantaá hi tamì≤vara˙
kàrayati. apica pùrvaprayatnamapekßyedànìá kàrayati pùrvataraá ca prayatnamapekßya purva-
makàrayadityanàditvàtsaásàrasyetyanavadyam.
300
BS 416.
301
Date II:52.
302
Potter 168.
303
Harold Coward, ed., Life After Death in World Religions (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1997),
4–5, helps clarifiy the issue when he describes the general Hindu doctrine of karma
as follows: “The law of karma maintains that every time we do an action or think
a thought, a memory trace is laid down in the unconscious. A good action or
thought leaves behind its trace, as does an evil action or thought. When we find
We must not, however, give into the temptation of attempting an

absolutely clear and definitive answer on this point. •aákara him-
self simply declares a particular truth without explaining how it can
be. He affirms the responsibility (and hence real freedom) of the jìva
for its actions, but at the same time declares that the jìva’s action is
in some way dependent on and governed by the Lord. •aákara thus
appears to embrace a middle position between human freedom alone
and divine freedom alone; he upholds a real human freedom under
the power of ì≤vara, a teaching that would exclude the possibility that
the soul is completely independent of the Lord or totally under his
manipulation.
•aákara then offers further evidence in support of his teaching
that the Lord does not manipulate the jìva, but rather takes the jìva’s
actions into consideration when superintending the law of retribu-
tion. He says, following the teaching of the sùtrakàra, that the com-
mands and prohibitions laid down by scripture would be meaningless
if they did not presuppose a real freedom on the part of the jìva to
obey or disobey them.304 On the other hand, if the jìva were entirely
under the control of the Lord, lacking all independence, not only
would injunctions lose all sense, but the Lord, too, might be thought
of as acting without any standard, punishing those whom he would
impel to act according to ≤ruti’s injunctions and rewarding those who
transgress the sacred precepts. But then the authority of the Vedas
would be nullified.305 Furthermore, if the jìva were under the total
whimsical manipulation of the Lord and not under a just law of ret-
ribution over which the Lord presides, then even ordinary actions
(as opposed to one’s response to Vedic injunctions and prohibitions)
would become threatened, for nothing would hold together space,
time and causation in a meaningful way.306
ourselves in a similar situation in the future, the previous memory trace rises up
in consciousness as an impulse to do a similar action or think a similar thought.
Note that this is merely an impulse (a disposition or desire) and in itself does not
force us to repeat the good or evil action or thought. We still have free choice.”
Emphasis by Coward. Though ì≤vara has not been brought into these considera-
tions by Coward it is easy to see how the Lord, who is the creator and governor
of the law of karma, is involved in preserving the individual jìva’s storehouse of mem-
ory traces and impulses from lifetime to lifetime.
304
See Th. tr. II:60.
305
See G. tr., BrSùBh• 506 and Date II:52.
306
246  
Nimbàrka, in VPS II.3.41,307 also sees this sùtra as ruling out the
possibility of the Lord’s “partiality etc.,” but does not go beyond the
simple acknowledgement that the Lord has “regard” for the works
of the soul, and justifies this by quoting the sùtra itself that injunc-
tions and prohibitions would otherwise become meaningless.
Bhàskara, in his BrSùBh II.3.42,308 adds nothing new to the dis-
cussion. As usual, his commentary is shorter than •aákara’s; like
•aákara, he refers to ì≤vara as the common cause (sàdhàra»aá kàra»aá)
who takes into account the action of the jìva. In that way, ì≤vara’s
activity is to be compared with rain ( parjanya).
In summary of •aákara’s BrSùBh II.3.42:
1) The Lord (defined by the previous sùtra as the supreme Self ) is
not to be regarded as manipulating the will and action of the jìva,
although the jìva does act in dependence on the Lord’s causation.
Just how these two agencies work together •aákara does not say,
although, once again, in a related theme, he readily brings forth
his familiar theory explaining that the Lord links together the
actions and results of the jìva. Although he does not offer a theory
explaining the exact influence of the Lord on the operation of
the human will, •aákara is able to justify his teaching of the rel-
ative autonomy of the human will on the grounds that, were it not
so, the Vedic precepts would be negated and the Lord’s goodness
and neutrality in human matters would no longer be credible.
2) The rebuttal of the notion that the Lord totally manipulates, rather
than somehow influences the life of the jìva without taking away
its freedom must be regarded as a negation of a deterministic
interpretation of KauUp III.8.
3) •aákara declares his opposition to a conception of the Lord that
would allow that the Lord punishes in the case of merit or rewards
in the case of demerit. As a result of this renewed affirmation of
divine justice, neutrality and impartiality and, at the same time,
of the reality of human freedom and merit, it would appear that
•aákara’s important declaration in the previous sùtra that liber-
ating knowledge is granted through the grace of the Lord should
be understood to mean that grace is freely given as a reward for
acquired merit. Merit, of course, would be only one prerequisite
307
308
for the reception of this gift,309 not the only one, or even neces-
sarily the most important one.310 In this interpretation of grace,
the Lord’s sovereignty would remain intact, as ì≤vara would not
be compelled to grant grace to even a supremely meritorious indi-
vidual (though one could only guess at the reasons for the possi-
ble withholding of the Lord’s grace in such a case).311 But what
this does rule out in my interpretation of •aákara is that the
Lord would act with partiality by taking away the obstacles to
liberation of an individual lacking in merit, i.e. by removing avidyà
despite an unmeritorious preparation on the part of the aspirant.
That is to say, an elective grace without regard to merit would
have to be ruled out according to •aákara’s theory of human
merit and divine neutrality.
Why then the word “grace?” Even for those rare individuals who
have attained through their own effort a complete inner purity and
who long for liberation to the exclusion of all other desires mokßa
does not come automatically, but remains a work of the Lord, the
supreme Self. The highest state of consciousness is otherwise forever
unattainable to the aspirant, who is unable to “reach” it, as •aákara
tirelessly proclaims, through human effort alone.
16. BrSùBh II.4.20
The sùtra reads: “But the fashioning of name and shape of him who
renders tripartite, on account of the teaching.”312
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “The arrangement of des-
ignation and shape, however, is by Him who made the elements tri-
partite, for it is taught (in the Upanißads).”313
309
It is important to remember here that, strictly speaking, it is not knowledge
that is given to the jìva as a gift, for in its essence the jìva is ever free, but rather
the grace consists in the destruction of the avidyà that prevented the soul from real-
izing what it already is.
310
See e.g. the discussion above on BrSùBh II.3.29 regarding the necessary purity
of the intellect, which would enable it to receive the supreme knowledge.
311
Radhakrishnan, BS 416, in the context of inner-worldly retribution granted
by the Lord, remarks: “This does not take away from the independence of the
Lord, even as a king who rewards or punishes his subjects according to their deeds
does not lose his independence.”
312
BS 431.
313
248  
Again, a question concerning the nature of human agency needs to

be resolved. Chapter six of the ChUp has revealed that the deity
called Being (sat) originally created the three elements fire, water,
and earth, out of which everything in the universe with name and
form is composed. But the context of ChUp VI makes it difficult to
determine whether the evolution of the three basic elements into
their myriad particular forms was also the work of Being, who
•aákara now designates as the supreme Lord ( parame≤vara), or whether
it is rather the work of the jìva. For •aákara it is clear that it is
not the jìva, but the supreme Lord alone who can fashion all living
and non-living forms in the world out of the three elements that he
has created.314 Scripture indeed asserts this: “For the text says at first
‘that divinity,’ &c., and then goes on in the first person ‘let me
evolve;’ which implies the statement that the highest Brahman only
is the evolving agent.”315
From this passage it is clear that the quality of evolving or cre-
ating (vyàkart‰tvam) is explicitly attributed by •aákara to none other
than the highest brahman ( parasyaiva brahma»o), who •aákara has also
designated the supreme Lord. This is particularly noteworthy in view
of the post-•aákara Advaita tradition, which would certainly allow
creatorship and evolution of the universe to the supreme Lord, but
not, however, to the highest brahman, who is not considered to be
an active principle.
As to the extent of the soul’s agency, •aákara continues: “And
with regard to all the manifold names and forms such as mountains,
rivers, &c., no soul, apart from the Lord, possesses the power of
evolution; and if any have such power, it is dependent on the high-
est Lord.”316
Earlier in this same sùtra •aákara had given examples of what
kind of creative power the jìva has: the fashioning of jars, dishes etc.
or the naming of other forms made by human hands, such as a
314
315
Th. tr. II:97. MB 321, lines 22–24, reads: tathàhi—‘seyaá devataikßata’ ityu-
pakramya ‘vyàkaravà»i’ ityuttamapurußaprayoge»a parasyaiva brahma»o vyàkart‰tvamihopadi≤yate.
316
Th. tr. II:97. G., BrSùBh• 549, translates: “Moreover, an individual soul,
bereft of divinity as it is, has no power of creatorship with regard to such diverse
kinds of names and forms as mountains, rivers, seas, etc. Even in the case of those
things, with regard to which the soul has any power, it is only under God’s dis-
pensation that it has this.”
MB 322, lines 2–4 reads: naca girinadìsamudràdißu nànàvidheßu nàmarùpeßvanì≤varasya
jìvasya vyàkara»asàmarthyamasti.
∂ittha (wooden elephant) or a ∂avittha (wooden deer).317 In all cases

of human activity the soul acts upon something that already exists,
and in doing this the soul is dependent on the Lord for its freedom
to act.
Nimbàrka, in VPS II.4.19,318 affirms, as does •aákara later, but
using a different term, that the origination and evolution of the mate-
rial universe is the work of the “supreme deity” ( paradevatà), but he
does not mention the nature of the jìva’s special power of acting or
attempt to relate it to the highest reality.
For Bhàskara this is sùtra II.4.20.319 As with •aákara and Nimbàrka,
Bhàskara teaches a distinction of powers between the Lord and the
jìva. The jìva is unable to create a mountain ( giri) or an ocean (samu-
dra),320 but does have the ability to fashion pots ( gha†a˙) and chari-
ots (ratha˙) and other things. Bhàskara does not use •aákara’s examples
of a ∂ittha and ∂avittha.
To sum up:
1) The manifestation of the basic material of the world as well as
its subsequent evolution into individual objects is attributed by
•aákara to the highest brahman, which is at the same time the
supreme Lord and Being itself. The three terms are used by
•aákara synonymously.
2) The jìva’s power to act, in this case to fashion and name, is seen
by •aákara to be in some sense dependent on the supreme Lord.
It is through the power of the Lord that the jìva is enabled to
act. The condition of the jìva’s freedom is thus the absolute free-
dom of the supreme reality.
17. BrSùBh III.1.4
The sùtra reads: “If it be said on account of the scriptural statements

as to entering into fire, etc. not so on account of the metaphorical
nature.”321
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “If it be objected (that
the organs do not accompany the soul at the time of death) since
317
See BrSùBh• 548.
318
See VPS 251, lines 12–17 and Bose tr. I:470–471.
319
320
•aákara, MB 322, lines 2–3, speaks of mountains, rivers (nadì), and oceans.
321
BS 433–434.
250  
the Upanißadic texts mention their entry into (the deities) Fire and
others, then we say, not so, for that is said in a secondary sense.”322
In his bhàßya on the present sùtra •aákara refutes the idea that the
activities of the organs ( prà»as), both cognitive and functional,323 are
able to operate without the assistance of the presiding deities, i.e.
gods who rule the individual natural elements (e.g. fire, water, earth),
which correspond to the particular powers of the physical body.324
This is a theme that •aákara has already dealt with in some detail
in BrSùBh II.4.14–16. There it was said that the organs operate on
the analogy of a cart. The cart is quite capable of doing its own
work, but only when pulled by a bullock. The presiding deity of
each organ is like a bullock; the organ functions only when impelled
by its given divinity.325 •aákara does concede that both alternatives
are logically possible, i.e. that the organs act of themselves or that
they operate under the guidance of their respective divinities, but he
affirms the latter position on the basis of scriptural authority.326 As
he says elsewhere, “When the presiding deities cease to work, the
organs become like tools, such as a bill-hook, laid down.”327
Now the question raised in the present sùtra concerns the teach-
ing of B‰Up III.2.13, which states that at the time of the body’s
death the prà»as or organs merge with their respective deities. Does
this mean that the soul continues on to its next embodiment with-
out the accompaniment of the prà»as? •aákara answers in the neg-
ative. The transmigrating soul is still in bondage, and to be in
bondage means to be under the influence of the prà»as and all other
upàdhis. In fact, the soul cannot go anywhere without its being linked
to such conditioning factors as the prà»as. •aákara cites B‰Up IV.4.2
as evidence for the correctness of his position, namely that at death
the prà»as accompany the soul on its journey to the next earthly life.
What, then, is the meaning of B‰Up III.2.13, that the prà»as merge
with their respective divinities? •aákara explains that, on the basis
of what has already been discussed, this ≤ruti passage is not to be
taken literally: “Accordingly, having the fact in view that Fire and
322
323
See Nakamura 508.
324
See Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy II:598.
325
See BrSùBh• II.4.14, p. 543, and Paul Deussen, The System of the Vedànta
(Chicago: Open Court, 1912), 66.
326
See BrSùBh• II.4.14 and MB 318, line 6.
327
B‰UpBh III.2.13, Madhavanada tr., 310.
other deities, presiding over speech and the rest and helping them
in their activities, cease to favour them thus at the time of death, it
is said in a figurative way that speech etc. enter into Fire etc.”328
That is to say, the merging of the prà»as with their respective
deities is interpreted by •aákara to mean that the deities withdraw
their assistance at the time of death, so that the various organic pow-
ers are rendered helpless and suspended until their journey to the
next incarnation is complete.
•aákara interprets the gods’ assistance as an upakàra, which
Gambhirananda renders as “favour” or “help.”329 Thibaut, by con-
trast, tones down the gratuitous nature of this assistance and trans-
lates upakàra as “cooperation.”330 Monier-Williams defines upakàra as
“help, assistance, benefit, service, favour; use, advantage.”331 The root
from which this word is derived, upa-k‰, is first defined by the same
compiler as “to bring or put near to, furnish with, provide;” and
then, “to assist, help, favour, benefit, cause to succeed or prosper,”
and also, “to foster, take care of; to serve, do homage to.”332 The
gods’ activity on the prà»as is thus first of all an assistance, which
may be interpreted in a gratuitous fashion, but need not be. Upakàra
is indeed not one of the words •aákara normally chooses to express
a divine gratuitous act or divine favor.333 The articulation of the
gods’ upakàra in the present context does nothing more than give a
theoretical foundation to the operation of the prà»as in life and their
absence at death, and is affirmed by •aákara only on the basis of
the revealed ≤ruti. Contentwise it has little, if any, soteriological rel-
evance.334
Nimbàrka, in VPS III.1.4,335 likewise denies a literal interpretation
of the text under discussion, but does not elaborate, and makes no
mention either of the functioning of the prà»as through the assis-
tance of the gods or to the word upakàra.
328
G. tr., BrSùBh• 559. MB 327, lines 7–9, reads: ato vàgàdyadhiß†hàtrì»àmagnyà-
didevatànàá vàgàdyupakàri»ìnàá mara»akàla upakàraniv‰ttimàtramapekßya vàgàdayo’gnyàdin-
gacchantìtyupacaryate.
329
See the previous note.
330
See Th. tr. II:106.
331
MW 195, col. 2.
332
MW 195, col. 2.
333
See Chapter VII above.
334
In AiUpBh I.2.5 •aákara more strongly affirms the presiding deity Fire’s gra-
cious action than he does in the present sùtra. See EU II:33, and TPU 334, lines
14–22, especially line 18.
335
See VPS 257, lines 9–12 and Bose tr. II:479.
252  
Bhàskara, in BhBrSùBh III.1.4,336 makes no mention of upakàra,

but agrees that the statements from B‰Up III.2.13 about the merg-
ing of the organs with their presiding deities is to be understood in
a figurative, or secondary, sense.
In summary:
1) The present bhàßya has been selected for analysis because of the
word upakàra, which •aákara has chosen to describe the activity
of the gods upon the prà»as. This word has not revealed itself to
be of any particular importance for a discussion on grace in a
soteriological context, and it is not one of the words •aákara
typically uses when speaking of divine favor. In the present case
the subject of upakàra is not, at least formally, the supreme reality.
2) The question does remain, however, as to why •aákara did choose
to select the term upakàra, a word with gratuitous overtones, to
describe the activity of the gods on the jìva, when he is not con-
strained to do so.
18. BrSùBh III.2.5
The sùtra reads: “But by meditation on the Highest, that which is

hidden, for from him are its bondage and freedom.”337
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “From the meditation on
the supreme Lord, however, becomes manifest that which remains
obscured; because the soul’s bondage and freedom are derived from
Him.”338
The bhàßya on the present sùtra is one of the most important for a
discussion of •aákara’s views on grace and is normally one of the
two passages cited by modern scholars in acknowledgement of the
fact that the topic of grace does emerge at times in •aákara’s thought,
however one may attempt to evaluate its place there.339 At the same
time it has been pointed out that the adhikara»a in which this sùtra
appears, III.2.1–6, is of exceptional importance for the study of the
history of Vedànta, because the various metaphysical positions taken
by some of the greatest Vedàntins of the past are clearly illustrated
336
337
See BS 445.
338
339
See, e.g., Deussen 86–87. The other important passage is, of course, II.3.41.
here in their very disparate commentaries.340 Our focus here, of

course, is on •aákara alone, and to understand what he is saying
in III.2.5 it is necessary to first summarize what •aákara has stated
in the four preceding sùtras of this adhikara»a.
The underlying theme of sùtras 1–6 concerns the powers of the
soul in its dream state.341 The first three sùtras attempt to determine
whether the creation in the dream state is as real as the creation
experienced by the soul in its waking state.342 The question is not:
Does the world seem to be as real to the soul while in the state of
dreaming as it does to the soul while in the waking state, but rather,
is the world in a dream as ontologically real as our normal every-
day world?
•aákara, in sùtra 3, replies that the world of the dream is a mere
illusion (màyà), since it is contradicted by the normal experience of
space, time, and causation within the waking state. That is to say,
the dream state is repeatedly sublated or replaced by the waking
state upon the cessation of sleep. Scripture, too, in particular B‰Up
IV.3.10, denies the reality of things experienced in the dream state.
The upshot of all this is that the soul does not create real things in
dreams, but only pictures of things.343
In the next sùtra, III.2.4, •aákara somewhat qualifies his asser-
tion that dreams have nothing to do with waking reality by point-
ing out that, whatever else may be said to be lacking in the dream
state, the dream may yet serve to transmit an omen, i.e. to portend
future good and evil for the waking state. He also notes that although
it is the individual soul who is the creator of dream-objects, still it
cannot be denied that the highest ( pràjña) Self is active in dreams,
“for as being the Lord of all it may be considered as the guide and
ruler of the soul in all its states.”344 •aákara concludes this sùtra
340
See Ghate 109.
341
As is well known, Indian philosophy traditionally distinguishes four states of
consciousness: the waking state, the dream state, the state of deep sleep, and the
state of liberated awareness or pure consciousness.
342
See Ghate 109.
343
See Deussen’s use of the expression “dream-pictures” for the present adhikara»a,
344.
344
The implication here is that whereas it is the soul who is the originator of the
dream objects, it does so under the influence of the Lord, who is the inspirer of
the dream and the transmitter of the omen, from which the jìva learns about its
future.
254  
with a remark intended to dispell any confusion regarding his ontol-

ogy. While it is true, he says, that the dream world is sublated by
the world of the waking state, the waking world is in itself not the
final reality either, for it too, as a reality appearing separate from
brahman, is sublated at the time of the realization of the non-duality
of the Self and brahman.345 The world, then, being not absolutely real
when compared to brahman, is regarded by •aákara as “nothing but
màyà” (màyàmàtratvam).346 The world as seen in brahman enjoys a greater
reality than the world seen in itself.
We have now arrived at sùtra III.2.5, the focus of the present dis-
cussion. Immediately we are confronted with a difficulty, for the
pùrvapakßin makes a questionable assumption that is not here refuted
by •aákara, although its absolute validity was called into question
by him in sùtras II.3.43–45. The pùrvapakßin states that the individ-
ual soul is a part of the supreme Self in the same way that a spark
is a part of fire, and for that reason the two share the same quali-
ties. The point the pùrvapakßin wants to make, as can be summarized
from his position, is that if the individual soul shares the Lord’s
infinite power, then there is nothing to deny that a chariot created
in the dream state is as real as a chariot created in the waking
state.347 In sùtra II.3.43 •aákara had pointed out that the individ-
ual soul is only apparently a part of the Lord, in the sense that a
spark is a part of fire, for the Lord in reality is not composed of
parts.348 The analogy of a part to a whole or a spark to a fire is
used for the sake of expressing the non-difference of the jìva’s con-
sciousness with the absolute consciousness.349 But •aákara acknowl-
edges in II.3.45 that other analogies are also appropriate to express
the relationship between the jìva and the Lord, such as that between
the ruler and the ruled.350 It is clear, then, that when •aákara offers
no objection in sùtra III.2.5 to the pùrvapakßin’s assertion that the soul
is related to ì≤vara as a part to a whole, this statement must not be
taken in a literal sense. It is likely, too; that •aákara remains silent
345
See the important term vyavasthita from the MB 347, line 2, which •aákara
uses to refer to the world as it appears in the waking state. Thibaut, II:138, appro-
priately interprets this word as “fixed and distinct.”
346
See MB 347, line 1.
347
See MB 347, lines 5–8, and B. N. K. Sharma III:38.
348
See the translations by Thibaut, op. cit., 38, p. 61, and G., BrSùBh• 507,
as well as the remarks by Hacker, Eigen. 101.
349
See Th. tr. II:62.
350
See Th. tr. II:63.
on this point, because it will not affect the teaching he is about to

expound.
The point •aákara wishes to make is that although the soul may
be regarded in a limited sense as standing in relation to the Lord
as a part to a whole, still the soul also has the qualities which are
different or opposite (viparìta) to the Lord.351 The soul and the Lord
do not share the same character in every respect. Furthermore, what
the soul does share with the Highest is a hidden reality, not easily
discerned and realized. In •aákara’s own cryptic words: “. . . we
say that the equality of attributes, although existing, is hidden by
the veil of Nescience. In the case of some persons indeed who stren-
uously meditate on the Lord and who, their ignorance being dis-
pelled at last, obtain through the favour of the Lord (ì≤varaprasàdàt)
extraordinary powers and insight, that hidden equality becomes man-
ifest—just as through the action of strong medicines the power of
sight of a blind man becomes manifest; but it does not on its own
account reveal itself to all men.”352
This brief quotation from •aákara makes reference to a number
of teachings, not all of which are clear. First, the “extraordinary
powers” (saásiddhi or siddhi ) referred to by •aákara are very likely
the powers attained by the practicing yogi, and listed in great detail
in Yoga-Sùtra III.16–56.353 Elsewhere, in BrSùBh I.3.33, •aákara
clearly expresses his conviction that the superhuman powers pro-
claimed in such passages as Yoga-Sùtra II.44 are indeed real. •aákara
quotes II.44 verbatim,354 which teaches the yogi’s acquired capacity
of communing with, or being united with, one’s chosen deity (iß†a-
devatà). •aákara goes on to say: “And that Yoga does, as Sm‰ti
declares, lead to the acquirement of extraordinary powers, such as
subtlety of body (a»iman), and so on, is a fact which cannot be set
aside by a mere arbitrary denial. Scripture also proclaims the great-
ness of Yoga, ‘When, as earth, water, light, heat, and ether arise, the
fivefold quality of Yoga takes place, then there is no longer illness,
351
352
Th. tr. II:139. MB 347, lines 10–14, reads: vidyamànamapi tattirohitamavidyàdi-
vyavadhànàt. tatpunastirohitaá satparame≤varamabhidhyàyato yatamànasya jantorvidhùtadhvànta-
sya timiratirask‰teva d‰k≤aktiraußadhavìryàdì≤varaprasàdàtsaásiddhasya kasyacidevàvirbhavati na
svabhàvata eva sarveßàá jantùnàm.
353
See I. K. Taimni, The Science of Yoga (Adyar, Madras: The Theological Publishing
House, 1979), 303–373.
354
See MB 135, lines 11–12, which reads: svàdhyàyàdiß†adevatàsaáprayoga˙.
256  
old age, or pain for him who has obtained a body produced by the
fire of Yoga’ (•vet. Up. II.12).”355
•aákara’s term for “extraordinary powers” in BrSùBh I.3.33, i.e.
ai≤varyam, literally “lordly power,” is sometimes used as a terminus tech-
nicus for the best-known of the yogic powers, a group of eight called
the “great powers” (mahà-siddhis),356 all of which are listed by Monier-
Williams in his entry on ai≤varya.357 These powers include such abil-
ities as making oneself minute, of becoming light as a feather, of
increasing one’s size at will, of acquiring all things at will, of mas-
tering oneself, including possessing a perfect control of one’s will and
desire, in short, of attaining to a superior level of being.358
That •aákara is thinking of the mahà-siddhis in particular in BrSùBh
I.3.33 is made clear by his expansion of the word ai≤varyam to
a»imàdyai≤varyam, literally “the capacity of becoming minute (animan)
and other (adi ) powers.”359 A»imàdi is clearly a reference to Yoga-Sùtra
III.46, which, using the same term, makes mention of the group of
mahà-siddhis just discussed.360
Thus •aákara, who reveals throughout his BrSùBh a strong affinity
and respect for yoga practice, is very likely referring to the powers
(siddhis) normally associated with the yogic path when, in BrSùBh
III.2.5, he speaks of “extraordinary powers.” The prerequisite for
the acquisition of such powers, according to •aákara, is two-fold.
On the one hand, it is necessary that some sort of sàdhana or spir-
itual practice be undertaken by the aspirant, which involves a stren-
uous meditation on the Lord.361 It is possible that •aákara’s Vaiß»avite
devotional practice is being referred to in this passage.362 The con-
text here may, however, again be the Yoga-Sùtra, although •aákara
does not follow the terminology of this sacred text. Yoga-Sùtra I.23;
II.32 and 45 speak of ì≤vara-pra»idhàna, i.e the possibility of attain-
ing liberation through surrender of oneself to the Lord, as an alter-
native to the control of one’s mind through the force of sheer will.
It is worth noting that sùtra II.45, one of the three major passages
355
Th. tr. I:223.
356
See Taimni 357.
357
MW 234, col. 3.
358
See the separate entries in MW for a»imàn, laghiman, mahimàn, pràpti, pràkàmya,
va≤itva, ì≤itva, and kàmàvasàyitva.
359
MW 135, lines 12–13.
360
See Yoga-Sùtra III.46 and the commentary by Taimni 357.
361
See Th. tr. II:139.
362
On •aákara’s Vaiß»avite leanings see Hacker, “Relations.”
in the Yoga-Sùtra on surrender to the Lord, follows immediately upon

the sùtra that •aákara had quoted verbatim in BrSùBh I.3.33 above.
He might therefore have linked Yoga-Sùtra II.44 and 45 closely in
his own thought.
In any case, •aákara does not use the expression ì≤vara-pra»idhàna
in BrSùBh III.2.5, but rather retains the sùtrakàra’s abhidhyànàt,
“meditating on (or desiring),”363 and replaces para (the Highest) with
parame≤varam (the supreme Lord) and strengthens the entire phrase
with yatamànasya (with a firm resolve).364 The verb abhidhyai and its
nominal derivative, abhidhyàna, include more than the notion of med-
itating or focusing on an object or person; also included are the
ideas of setting one’s heart upon something, wishing, longing for,
desiring.365 Thus an element of devotion seems to be included in this
sàdhana.366
The second prerequisite for the acquisition of the miraculous sid-
dhis, according to •aákara, is the grace ( prasàda) of ì≤vara. That is
to say, one’s meditation and devotion are insufficient to obtain the
siddhis; one requires rather the grace of ì≤vara or the parame≤vara. Here
the terms ì≤vara and parame≤vara are used synonymously. •aákara
does not explain why human effort alone is incapable of manifest-
ing the siddhis, even though the Yoga-Sùtra does not appear to teach
the same. The Yoga-Sùtra links the acquirement of the siddhis with
yogic practice and does not make their reception dependent on the
Lord’s grace. •aákara, by contrast, does declare that these powers
are from the Lord, but does not elaborate.
It is clear that for •aákara the manifestation of the siddhis, though
it be due to the grace of the Lord, is not the goal of the spiritual
path. The spiritual aspirant may indeed be given such powers, but
should never confuse them with the highest good, namely liberation
from all bondage and all duality.
What is more important for •aákara in his bhàßya on BrSù III.2.5
than declaring the acquisition of unusual powers through the Lord’s
grace is his teaching that the jìva does not know its essential nature,
which is hidden (tirohitaá) by the veil of avidyà, and that this hidden
363
See MB 347, line 11.
364
See MB 347, lines 11–12. G., BrSùBhS 595, translates this phrase as “med-
itates on God with diligence.”
365
See MW 63, col. 2.
366
See Date II:120.
258  
nature may be uncovered through the same two prerequisites men-

tioned regarding the acquisition of special powers: the effort of the
jìva and the grace ( prasàda) of the Lord. Without these two the jìva
remains in bondage to ignorance.
•aákara states that the jìva in its essence is like ì≤vara, or has
attributes like (samànadharmatvaá) ì≤vara.367 In the following sùtra, III.2.6,
•aákara explains more fully what he means: “It is impossible, we
reply, to assume the soul to be separate from the Lord.”368 He then
buttresses his position with a list of well-known passages from the
Upanißads, which he interprets in a non-dualistic fashion. The most
famous of these verses is the mahàvàkya of ChUp VI.8.7: “That is
Truth; that is the Self; that thou art, O •vetaketu.” •aákara explains
that this Great Saying “teaches that the Lord is the Self of the soul”
( jìvàyopadi≤atì≤varàtmatvam).369 He adds further: “Hence the soul is non-
different from the Lord (ato’nanya eve≤varàjjiva˙) . . .”370
The significance of this mahàvàkya in the present context has not
been lost on at least one modern •aákara interpreter. V. H. Date
notes that •aákara is here equating ì≤vara with the highest brahman,
who is the àtman of the soul.371 In other words, •aákara treats ì≤vara
as synonymous with the highest reality in the present sùtra. To know
ì≤vara is to become liberated, to have the veil of ignorance removed.
This is a different kind of language and theology than that of the
post-•aákara Advaitic tradition, which makes ì≤vara subordinate to
brahman, even illusory, and which shuns making ì≤vara the referent
of any mahàvàkya.
Thus •aákara’s teaching in BrSùBh III.2.5–6 is that the jìva and
the Lord are first of all quite unalike, especially (for reasons we shall
soon see) in as far as the jìva is embodied and in bondage. •aákara
then, however, goes on to say that the jìva does not really know
itself; its real nature is hidden. But through the grace of the Lord
the jìva’s ignorance is removed and it realizes that it stands in a non-
dual relation with the Lord, who is the jìva’s true Self. In III.2.5
•aákara compares the ignorance-destroying divine grace given to
the jìva with medicine (außadhaá) given to a blind man to restore his
sight after having been afflicted with an eye disease.
367
See MB 34, lines 9–10; G. tr., BrSùBh• 595; Th. tr. II:139.
368
Th. tr. II:140. MB 348, line 2 reads: nahyanyatvaá jìvasye≤varàdupapadyate.
369
Th. tr. II:140. See MB 348, line 5.
370
371
See Date II:516.
•aákara furthermore declares that the liberating awareness of non-

duality is not naturally (svabhàvata) made manifest to all people (sarve-
ßàá jantùnàm).372 He explains, in accord with the sùtrakàra, that both
bondage and liberation (bandhamokßau)373 are from the Lord. What
this means first of all in a positive sense is that one’s liberation is
ultimately due to the Lord, as we saw earlier in the present sùtra.
There is nothing new in this pronouncement of •aákara.
The real question is how •aákara, in keeping with the expressed
words of the present sùtra, will attribute to the Lord the soul’s bond-
age. Sùtra III.2.5, taken as it stands, sounds no less deterministic
than the declaration of KauUp III.8: “It is He indeed who makes
him perform virtuous deeds whom He would raise high above these
worlds; and it is He indeed who makes him perform vicious deeds
whom He would cast below these worlds.”374 As we saw above in
other sùtras, •aákara is able to remove all sense of a predetermi-
nation from KauUp III.8.
As in his interpretation of KauUp III.8, •aákara dispels from
BrSù III.2.5 any sense of the Lord predetermining the jìva’s fate or
the Lord manipulating the jìva’s freedom. •aákara absolves the Lord
from all responsibility for the jìva’s bondage, despite what the sùtrakàra
appears to intend. •aákara explains this sùtra as meaning not that
the soul’s bondage is directly caused by the Lord, but rather that
“bondage is due to the absence of knowledge of the Lord’s true
nature (svarùpa).”375 In short, •aákara is simply saying that bondage
is due to ignorance, and he leaves the Lord’s causation out of the
discussion.
The sùtrakàra himself has offered an alternative cause for the jìva’s
bondage to the one offered in III.2.5. Instead of (và) the Lord being
the cause of the soul’s suffering, or in addition to (api ) the Lord
being the cause, III.2.6 finds the cause of the soul’s ignorance to be
its connection with the body (dehayogàt).376 •aákara ignores the first
alternative and accepts the second. In his bhàßya on III.2.6 he writes:
“. . . the state of concealment of the soul’s knowledge and lordship
372
See MB 347, lines 13–14. G., BrSùBh• 595, loosely renders kasyacideva (line
13) as “some rare person.”
373
See MB 347, line 14. The sùtrakàra does not explicitly use the word “libera-
tion” (mokßa); BrSu III.2.5 reads bandhaviparyayau, “bondage and its opposite.”
374
See G. tr., BrSùBh• II.1.34, p. 363.
375
376
260  
is due to its being joined to a body, i.e. to a body, sense-organs,

mind, buddhi, sense-objects, sensations, &c. . . . its knowledge and
lordship remain hidden as long as it is possessed by the erroneous
notion of not being distinct from those adjuncts . . . Hence the soul
is non-different from the Lord, but its knowledge and power are
obscured by its connexion with the body.”377
Thus, in selecting the second alternative alone as the cause of the
soul’s bondage, and not linking it in any way to the notion that the
Lord might in some sense have willed the jìva’s suffering, •aákara
expresses himself in his bhàßya on III.2.5–6 quite in accord with what
he had written in previous sùtras regarding the problem of theodicy.
In all instances •aákara is careful to preserve the Lord’s goodness,
fairness, and purity.
For Nimbàrka this is also BrSù III.2.5.378 Nimbàrka makes no
mention of grace explicitly, but does affirm the teaching of the
sùtrakàra about both bondage and release deriving from the Lord,
who is here called by Nimbàrka the parame≤vara. He supports this
position on the strength of •vUp VI.16, which makes the Lord the
cause of the soul’s transmigration, bondage, subsistence and libera-
tion. He understands the Lord to be the cause of bondage only in
the sense of the Lord acting “in accordance with the deeds of the
soul,” much in the way •aákara has written in his theodicy-sùtras.
Bhàskara, in BrSùBh III.2.5,379 makes no explicit mention of grace
either, and teaches meditation-devotion (abhidhyàyata˙)—as does •aá-
kara—to the “Highest” ( param) instead of to •aákara’s “supreme
Lord” ( parame≤vara) for the manifestation of siddhis. He interprets the
link between ì≤vara and the jìva’s bondage similarly to Nimbàrka, and
sees liberation resulting from right knowledge (samyagjñànàt). He does
not, however, closely ally the Lord with the jìva’s acquisition of this
knowledge, as does •aákara.
Let us now attempt to summarize and evaluate •aákara’s affirmation
of divine grace in BrSùBh III.2.5, keeping in mind the help offered
by III.2.6 for its understanding.
1) In contrast to BrSùBh II.3.41, in which the other of the two most
important utterances on grace in the entire BrSùBh occurs, •aákara
does not use the term anugraha. Rather, in BrSùBh III.2.5 •aákara
377
Th. tr. II:140. See MB 347, line 22 to 34, line 6.
378
See VPS 274, line 21 to 275, line 1 and Bose tr. II:513.
379
chooses the term prasàda for expressing divine grace. A compar-

ison of the two passages, however, reveals no striking discrepan-
cies in •aákara’s understanding of grace. The two terms for grace
appear to be used synonymously.
2) •aákara makes ì≤vara the dispenser of grace. However, in III.2.5
•aákara makes parame≤vara synonymous with ì≤vara, and in III.2.6
•aákara declares ì≤vara to be the referent of the mahàvàkya “That
thou art,” thereby making ì≤vara equivalent to the highest reality,
by inference to paraá brahman. It would therefore appear that for
•aákara the supreme reality is itself gracious.
3) Neither Bhàskara nor Nimbàrka explicitly mention grace in their
commentaries, in contrast to •aákara. Furthermore, their reticence
to speak about grace is all the more remarkable in view of the
Sùtrakàra’s explicit teaching that the soul’s liberation is from ì≤vara.
4) Because BrSù III.2.5 declares the jìva’s liberation to be “from
Him,” it is less surprising that •aákara introduces a word for
grace here than in BrSù II.3.41, which does not speak of a link
between the Lord and the soul’s liberation. Nonetheless, it should
be noted that the present sùtra need not be interpreted in the
sense of a gracious divine dispensation. Not only is there no word
signifying grace in the sùtra itself, but the sùtra even declares that
the Lord is the source of the jìva’s bondage. Thus BrSù III.2.5 is
quite ambiguous on the subject of divine grace, i.e. it could be
interpreted in terms of grace, but need not be. •aákara, in his
commentary, is not at all ambiguous, affirming that the Lord is
indeed responsible for the jìva’s liberation, but denying that the
Lord is in any way responsible for the soul’s bondage. The real-
ity of grace, then, appears important to •aákara.
5) The grace that is given by the Lord is not only the cause of the
manifestation of miraculous powers (siddhis) in the jìva, but, more
importantly, is also the cause of the removal of the ignorance of
the jìva’s real nature, in the same way that medicine removes
blindness and allows the patient to see. Thus the medicine of
grace enables the jìva to realize its essential non-duality with the
Lord, who is the jìva’s true Self. The jìva is not elevated to a
higher level of being, but rather the obstacles to the realization
of the jìva’s true nature, which had remained hidden, although
always existent, are removed.
6) •aákara does not say that the manifestation of the siddhis or the
jìva’s liberating awareness of its true nature are granted by the
262  
Lord without any effort on the part of the sàdhaka, but rather
declares that strenuous spiritual effort is required of the jìva.
•aákara emphasizes this by adding to the sùtrakàra’s “meditation-
devotion” the words “with a firm resolve.” •aákara therefore
appears to link the reception of grace with human effort, but he
does not say whether human effort merely purifies the soul to
make it capable of receiving grace, or whether the soul’s action
in some sense earns or wins the Lord’s grace. From what we
know of •aákara from preceding sùtras, it is unlikely that the lat-
ter meaning is intended.
7) It is striking that •aákara mentions the manifestation of siddhis
together with the liberation of the jìva when he speaks of the
Lord’s grace. It is possible that •aákara is thinking of the prac-
tice of yoga when he recommends strenuous spiritual effort for
the aspirant to liberation.
19. BrSùBh III.2.24
The sùtra reads: “And in perfect meditation also, according to ≤ruti

and sm‰ti.”380
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “Moreover, Brahman
is realized in samadhi, as is known from direct revelation and
inference.”381
Kokileswar Sastri sees this bhàßya as important evidence that •aákara
makes divine grace a necessary prerequisite to liberation. It is one
of the three passages from •aákara’s BrSùBh that he cites in favor
of grace, the other two being the better-known II.3.41 and III.2.5.382
Yet in contrast to these latter two •aákara does not mention grace
in BrSùBh III.2.24, except when citing a ≤ruti text.
In his commentary on the two previous sùtras •aákara had denied
the absolute reality of the phenomenal world and had posited brah-
man alone as true being (satyam). Everything but brahman is limited
finite existence, although it has brahman as its substratum. The high-
est brahman is none of this (neti neti ). Its relation with the phenome-
nal world is non-reciprocal: The world has brahman as its essence,
380
See BS 45.
381
G. tr., BrSùBh 629.
382
K. Sastri, An Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy (Calcutta: University of Calcutta,
1926), 221–222.
but brahman does not have the world as its essence. 383 It is itself
unmanifest (avyaktam), and is unattainable through austerity (tapas) or
works (karma).384 The highest reality is not apprehended by thought,
but is in fact the witness (sàkßin) of all perception. It is indescribable
and imperceptible, and is best defined through the negation of lim-
itations than through the affirmation of positive attributes ( gu»as).
•aákara, in taking this position in BrSùBh III.2.22–23, draws on a
large number of ≤ruti texts, both from the major and minor princi-
pal Upanißads.
An implicit question linking BrSù III.2.23 and 24 is: If brahman is
not in any way a perceptible reality and has nothing to do with the
world of limited forms, how do we know that it really exists? The
sùtrakàra answers in effect: because it is experienced in “perfect med-
itation.”385 Moreover, this experience is attested to by ≤ruti and sm‰ti.
No references to any definite scripture passages are made in the sùtra
formulation itself, nor does the sùtrakàra speak of grace or a divine
response to the practice of perfect meditation. He only states that
the highest reality is known in the meditative state. What does
•aákara do with this sùtra?
First of all, he declares, it is the Yogins ( yogina˙) who make the
supreme realization of the àtman, and they make their experience in
a “perfect meditation” (saáràdhane), which •aákara describes as “devo-
tion, contemplation, deep meditation, and such other practices” (bhak-
tidhyànapra»idhànàdhyanuß†hànam).386 Thus •aákara clearly understands
this spiritual practice as including an element of devotion; “devo-
tion” (bhakti ) is in fact the first word he uses to describe what the
sùtra means when it speaks of saáràdhane.
•aákara does not say to whom devotion is given that the Self
may be realized, and nowhere does he outright declare that the high-
est reality responds to the sàdhaka’s devotion by granting grace or
liberation. He merely states that the Self is realized in the state of
devotion-meditation.
However, he makes himself a bit clearer in the ≤ruti and sm‰ti
passages he cites, which underscore the reality of the liberating
383
See G. tr., BrSùBh• 620 and MB 361, line 24: brahmasvabhàvo hi prapañca na
prapañcasvabhàvaá brahma.
384
•aákara cites here MuUp III.1.8.
385
See BS tr. 457.
386
G. tr., BrSùBh• 629. See MB 367, line 3.
264  
awareness of the Absolute. After quoting KaUp II.1.1, which declared

that the wise man turns within to behold the Self, •aákara cites
MuUp III.1.8: “Since one becomes purified in mind through the
favourableness of the intellect ( jñànaprasàdena), therefore one can see
that indivisible Self through meditation.387 Jñànaprasàdena can, how-
ever, also be rendered “through the grace of knowledge.” In other
words, to have such knowledge is to be graced; it is not a knowl-
edge that is attained through effort alone. In the previous sùtra, draw-
ing on the same Upanißad, •aákara had already pointed out that
the highest knowledge is not attainable through effort (tapas), i.e.
effort alone. Thus, the present context seems to mandate translating
jñàna as “knowledge” rather than as “intellect.”
•aákara adds that sm‰ti, too, witnesses to the realization of the
supreme reality: “He who is seen as light by the Yogins meditating
on him sleepless, with suspended breath, with contented minds, with
subdued senses; reverence (nama˙) be to him.” Also, he adds: “The
Yogins see him, the august, eternal one.”388 •aákara does not say which
sm‰ti this passage is from, but adds that there are others like it.
Thus, •aákara links liberating Self-awareness with devotion to the
absolute reality, to whom the bhàßyakàra offers salutations. It is difficult
to avoid the conclusion that •aákara offers salutations to the Absolute
in view of its gracious dispensation of liberation. The reality of lib-
erating awareness of brahman, an awareness that is otherwise outside
the reach of human effort, is, after all, the context of the present
sùtra. Nonetheless, •aákara is less explicit here about divine grace
than he is in BrSùBh II.3.41 and III.2.5.
In the following surtra, III.2.25, •aákara denies that this under-
standing of a meditator standing in relation to its object of medita-
tion implies an ultimate duality. The ultimate awareness of the jìva
is of its non-duality with the Self. The differences are due to the
limiting adjuncts (upàdhis).389
Nimbàrka, VPS III.2.24,390 declares that brahman is realized in
devotion (bhaktiyoge) and meditation (dhyàne), and supports his view
by recourse to MuUp III.1.8 (as does •aákara), which verse how-
ever, reads brahmajñànaprasàdena, i.e. “through the grace of the knowl-
387
388
Th. tr. II:172 and MB 367, lines 8–10.
389
See Th. II:172 and MB 367, lines 12–18.
390
See VPS 288, lines 1–5 and Bose tr. II:545–546.
edge of brahman.”391 •aákara’s Upanißad text does not include the

word brahman. Nimbàrka does not offer any further ≤ruti texts, but
does add BhG XI.54: “But through exclusive devotion, I may be
known thus, O Arjuna, and perceived in truth, and entered, O con-
querer of enemies!”392 Satyanand sees Nimbàrka’s bhàßya on III.2.24
as affirming the teaching that brahman “grants a direct vision of
Himself to His upàsakas (worshippers).”393
For Bhàskara, this is sùtra III.2.24.394 Bhàskara, like Nimbàrka and
•aákara, understands saáràdhane as including devotion, meditation,
and the like (bhaktirdhyànàdi ). He quotes MuUp III.1.8 according to
the wording that •aákara also quotes, in which brahman is not men-
tioned. He also cites a shorter slightly varied version of the sm‰ti pas-
sage •aákara had quoted. He does not quote KaUp II.1.1, as
•aákara had done.
By way of summary of •aákara’s bhàßya on BrSù III.2.24:
1) •aákara does not use a word for grace outside his quotation of
MuUp III.1.8, which spoke of the “grace of knowledge” ( jñà-
naprasàdena). •aákara is not alone in citing this passage, for
Nimbàrka, his likely predecessor, as well as Bhàskara, quote the
same verse.
2) Furthermore, Nimbàrka, •aákara, and Bhàskara all understand
the kind of spiritual effort involved in the sùtra’s saáràdhane as
including a devotional element. Because of the evidence provided
by Nimbàrka’s VPS it is probable that •aákara inherited the
term bhakti, as well as the quotation of MuUp III.1.8, from a tra-
dition preceding him, if not from Nimbàrka himself.
3) In his bhàßya on the previous sùtra •aákara strongly stressed the
inherent unknowability of brahman through effort and works alone.
Since human effort is, of itself, incapable of knowing brahman,
•aákara’s quotation of a ≤ruti text on the grace of knowledge as
well as his salutation to the supreme reality, who is the subject
of the present adhikara»a, must be regarded as representing his
own conviction. •aákara has not attempted to deny in any way
the graciousness of the dawning of liberating knowledge, but rather
391
See VPS 288, line 2.
392
See Bose tr. II:546.
393
See Joseph Satyanand, Nimbàrka: A Pre-•aákara Vedàntin and His Philosophy
(Christnagar-Varanasi: Vishwa Jyoti Gurukul, 1994), 245.
394
266  
underscores it with his selection of texts. He in fact supplies more

texts than does either Nimbàrka or Bhàskara, although it must
be admitted that Nimbàrka has offered a strong text from the
BhG that •aákara ignores.
4) The dispenser of grace in this bhàßya appears to be the àtman,
who is also brahman, and perhaps also the Lord. •aákara’s final
sm‰ti text includes the word bhagavantaá, which Gambhirananda
has translated as “Lord.”395 Thibaut had rendered the word “the
august . . . one.”396 It is difficult to determine whether in this case
bhagavantaá is to be regarded as synonymous with ì≤vara. Such a
possibility cannot be ruled out.
5) As in previous sùtras, once again •aákara closely links the recep-
tion of grace not only with liberating knowledge, but also with a
prerequisite spiritual effort. If jñànaprasàdena were to be translated
as “favourableness of the intellect,” and then linked with •aákara’s
long sm‰ti passage from this bhàßya, the idea would be that the
intellect, now perfectly quiescent, had attained a favorable state
in which to receive liberating knowledge. The goal of spiritual
discipline would be, then, to completely subdue the senses and to
pacify the breath and mind, so as to become perfectly receptive
to the grace of liberating awareness.
The sùtra reads: “From him the fruit, for that is reasonable.”397
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “The fruit of action is
from Him, this being the logical position.”398
The present adhikara»a, encompassing sùtras 38 to 41, is given to a

discussion of karma, the cosmic law of moral cause and effect. The
focus is on the results of actions. Does the future “fruit” ( phalam) of
any action return to the doer because something about the action
itself causes the fruit to emerge at the proper time, or does the later
proper fruit emerge due to the will of the Lord (ì≤vara)?
•aákara argues that only the Lord is capable of bringing about
appropriate results of deeds committed earlier, since the actions them-
395
G. tr., BrSùBh• 629. See MB 367; line 10.
396
See Th. tr. II:172.
397
BS 465.
398
selves pass away immediately, are not conscious agents, and do not
have the capacity to leave behind some sort of residue that at a
future time would create a fruit. The harmonious link between pre-
sent actions and future fruits requires an omnipotent ruler of the
phenomenal world, and this indeed is ì≤vara’s role. “The ruler of all
who by turns provides for the creation, the subsistence and the reab-
sorption of the world, and who knows all the differences of place
and time, he alone is capable of effecting all those modes of requital
which are in accordance with the merit of the agents; actions, on
the other hand, which pass away as soon as done, have no power
of bringing about results at some future time, since nothing can
spring from nothing.”399
•aákara argues further that even if actions could leave behind
some principle of merit (apùrva), that principle would still require a
conscious agent for it to bring about the action’s just fruit at the
proper time. And it is ì≤vara who the Vedàntin declares to be that
agent.
Nimbàrka, VPS III.2.38,400 simply states that brahman alone can
be the giver of fruits, but he does not give reasons why.
Bhàskara, in his commentary on III.2.38,401 agrees with what
•aákara has said, declaring that only the Lord (ì≤vara) has knowl-
edge of times and places, and is therefore the ordainer of the results
of actions. But Bhàskara’s argument is extremely brief in compari-
son to that of •aákara. He does not use the arguments about actions
passing away or their inability to leave behind a future potency.
In sum, •aákara repeats in this sùtra what he has stated else-
where about ì≤vara’s action. Universal justice occurs in the world
because of ì≤vara and for no other reason. Ì≤vara is a just all-power-
ful ruler of the world, who takes care not to give the jìvas unjust
rewards and punishments.
The sùtra reads: “Bàdaràya»a, however, thinks the former since he

is designated as the cause.”402
399
400
401
402
See BS 467.
268  
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “Bàdaràya»a, however,
thinks the former (i.e. the Lord, to be the cause of the fruits of ac-
tion), since he is designated as the cause (of the actions themselves).”403
In sùtra III.2.39 •aákara had offered B‰Up IV.4.24 as the ≤ruti text
alluded to by the sùtrakàra in support of the teaching that actions
themselves are impotent to bring about their own results.404
In sùtra III.2.40 the position of Jaimini is presented, which would
see actions themselves, independent of a governing ì≤vara, as the sole
cause of the variety of fruits experienced in the world. •aákara’s
imaginary opponent adds that the Lord would otherwise be partial
and cruel, dispensing whimsically various ‘fruits’ to the jìvas. This,
of course, is the same argument raised in II.1.34. And, the oppo-
nent adds, what would be the use of performing good deeds if they
did not automatically lead to a good result?
In III.2.41, the present sùtra, the sùtrakàra refutes the views of
Jaimini by upholding the position of Bàdaràya»a, namely that the
Lord, and not actions independent of the Lord, produces the future
results of deeds committed now. •aákara is willing to allow the exis-
tence of an unseen power (apùrva) emerging from a given deed, so
long as that power is regarded as needing ì≤vara to bring about its
proper fruit.
In answer to the charge of the Lord’s partiality and cruelty,
•aákara offers again his well-known position that the Lord merely
responds to the previous action of the jìva, by providing the appro-
priate result to the jìva’s merit or demerit.
What is surprising, however, in view of what •aákara had declared
in earlier sùtras, is a formulation from the present bhàßya overlooked
by some modern commentators.405 After establishing that the Lord
is the ordainer of the fruits of all actions, •aákara adds, “This view
is proved by the circumstance of scripture representing the Lord not
only as the giver of fruits but also as the causal agent with refer-
ence to all actions whether good or evil.”406 He then goes on to
403
Th. tr. II:182.
404
•aákara, Nimbàrka and Bhàskara all quote B‰Up IV.4.24 as the ≤ruti text
referred to by the sùtrakàra, but it is only Nimbàrka who adds a second text: TaiUp
II.7, which reads, “For he alone causes bliss.” See VPS 297, lines 1–3 and Bose
tr. II:571–572.
405
See BS 467 and Date II:160–161.
406
Th. tr. II:183. MB 374, line 20 reads: dharmàdharmayorapi hi kàrayit‰tvene≤varo
heturvyapadi≤yate.
quote yet again KauUp III.8: “He makes him whom he wishes to
lead up from these worlds do a good deed; and the same makes
him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds do a bad
deed.”407
One would expect •aákara to have expressed himself in a way
that would be less suggestive of the manipulation of the jìva’s free-
dom. In almost all the previous sùtra commentaries in which •aákara
had quoted KauUp III.8, he had interpreted the verse as affirming
the free action of the jìva and ì≤vara’s response to that free action,
even though the ≤ruti verse itself did not seem to allow such an inter-
pretation. In the present sùtra •aákara for the first time appears to
teach that the Lord, and not the jìva, is responsible for the jìva’s
actions, both good and evil. Yet •aákara goes on to declare that
the Lord acts in response to the jìva’s merit and demerit, a state-
ment that appears after all, and in accord with what he had previ-
ously emphasized in his BrSùBh, to affirm a real freedom on the
part of the jìva. Why does •aákara make two apparently contra-
dictory statements in the context of a single sùtra?
•aákara himself does not appear to recognize here an inconsis-
tency of any kind. If he had acknowledged such a possibility, it is
likely that he would have let his imaginary opponent challenge him
on the point, only to be refuted by •aákara’s logical reply. We can
only tentatively hazard an explanation. We need to remember that
the crux of the present debate is whether actions alone suffice to
bring about their fruits or whether the further action of ì≤vara is
required for this. •aákara not only affirms that ì≤vara is responsible
for the dispensation of fruits, but he also wants to make another
point. Lest the opponent doubt the influence of ì≤vara in the world,
•aákara adds that scripture rules out the total independence of the
jìva even in the operation of its will. This is especially problematic
in as much as •aákara potentially includes evil actions as the result
of the Lord’s causation. It is possible that •aákara is simply over-
stating his point.
In addition to KauUp III.8 •aákara adds a second scriptural
verse to support his position. BhG VII.21–22 states: “Whichever
divine form a devotee wants to worship with faith, I ordain for him
unswerving faith in that very form. Endowed with that very faith,
407
Th. tr. II:183.
270  
he continues in the worship of that form, and obtains from it the

results he desires, as ordained by Me.”408
This second text appears to indicate a divine response to a human
request, and in that sense human freedom is again affirmed. It is
after citing these two scriptural passages that •aákara repeats his
teaching that the Lord dispenses fruits in accord with the jìva’s pre-
vious action and merit. It is therefore likely that •aákara’s appar-
ent denial of human freedom is to be read in this context of a larger
affirmation of freedom. The meaning would then be: The jìva’s free-
dom is not absolute. The jìva’s freedom is in some sense linked to
the freedom of ì≤vara. •aákara does not express how the two free-
doms are linked, but recourse to his commentary on II.3.42 is help-
ful. There •aákara had stated: “The Lord indeed causes it to act,
but it acts itself. Moreover, the Lord in causing it to act now has
regard to its former efforts, and he caused it to act in a former exis-
tence, having regard to its efforts previous to that existence.”409
This passage is itself enigmatic, but is helpful in explaining the
present sùtra because of its affirmation of both human and divine
freedom in every human act. •aákara’s apparent denial of human
freedom in III.2.41 can not therefore be taken as the final word on
the subject. But what •aákara does not explain is how the Lord
takes the jìva’s previous efforts into consideration when causing—in
some sense—the jìva to act in the present. Perhaps he intends to say
this: ì≤vara not only provides the proper circumstances of the jìva’s
next birth, but also ensures a continuity of mental and moral incli-
nations in the jìva from one embodiment to the next. The jìva, even
while in possession of a real freedom, is nonetheless born with cer-
tain dispositions and propensities as a result of its karma from a pre-
vious birth. The present possession of these tendencies to act so and
not so is the work of both the jìva and of ì≤vara.
Nimbàrka, VPS III.2.41,410 declares the fruits of actions to be from
the highest Self rather than from the actions themselves. He does
not, however, quote the same scriptural passages as •aákara, but
rather PrUp III.7 (“In consequence of good work, it leads to a holy
world.”) and KaUp II.23, which is also MuUp III.2.3 (“He is attain-
able by one alone whom he chooses.”). It is worth noting that
Nimbàrka’s choice of this last scriptural verse is less problematic for
408
409
Th. tr. II:60.
410
defending the goodness of ì≤vara than is •aákara’s repeated use of

KauUp III.8.
For Bhàskara this is sùtra III.2.41.411 Bhàskara quotes only KauUp
III.8, and of this verse he quotes only the first half: “He makes him
whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds do a good deed. He
says nothing about the Lord bringing the jìva down to lower worlds
as a result of evil deeds. Furthermore, Bhàskara speaks of the high-
est Self as the antaryàmin, or inner controller or inner guide of the
jìva. This antaryàmin both impels and restrains the jìva and also dis-
penses the fruits of the jìva’s actions.
•aákara’s bhàßya on III.2.41 may now be summarized.
1) •aákara upholds the view of Bàdaràya»a that the Lord is the
dispenser of the fruits of actions. Actions themselves as well as an
unseen theoretical apùrva attached to actions are incapable of
bringing about future results. Scripture, in particular KauUp III.8
and BhG VII.21–22, teaches this.
2) In response to the opponent’s objection of the Lord’s partiality
and cruelty, •aákara affirms the jìva’s free will and responsibility
by showing that ì≤vara’s dispensation of results is merely a response
to the jìva’s previous act. This teaching adds nothing new to what
•aákara had said in earlier sùtras.
3) •aákara’s response becomes more complex with his statement
that the Lord is the causal agent of all the jìva’s actions, both
good and evil. It is possible to read this passage as a denial of a
real human free will. However, •aákara’s apparent denial of
human freedom must be read in connection with his general
affirmation of freedom both here, in III.2.41, as well as elsewhere,
e.g. in II.3.42 and III.2.5. •aákara wishes to affirm both human
and divine freedom, but never explains how the two cooperate
in the same volitional act. Rather, he simply rules out both an
absolute autonomy of the human will as well as its total manip-
ulation by the divine will.
The sùtra reads: “Of those who have an office to fulfil there is sub-
sistence (of the body) as long as the office lasts.”412
411
412
BS 486.
272  
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “Those who have a mis-
sion to fulfil continue in the corporeal state as long as the mission
demands it.413
Gambhirananada regards this sùtra as an adhikara»a of its own.414

•aákara is faced with a problem regarding his soteriology. He
had taught that knowledge alone is the means to liberation, and that
this knowledge was of the nirgu»a brahman. Knowledge of the sagu»a
brahman is a lower knowledge and therefore does not lead to final
liberation, but only to a journey after death on the path of the gods
for the purpose of receiving a lesser good. The knower of the nirgu»a
brahman does not travel anywhere, having realized the unity of the
omnipresent Absolute and become identified with all.415 Furthermore,
the knower of the highest brahman does not create any new karma,
and therefore is not reborn. All that remains is for the jìvanmukta or
liberated man to live out the remainder of his last incarnation, an
incarnation that was made necessary by the karma brought into being
by past action. The jìvanmukta remains in the world until the body’s
pràrabdha karma is exhausted. After the death of the body the jìvan-
mukta is not reborn. Its journey is over.
The problem with this teaching, according to •aákara’s oppo-
nent, is that sm‰ti, for instance the Purà»as, teach that some so-called
enlightened souls such as Apàntaratamas are reborn after all. It there-
fore seems that knowledge of the nirgu»a brahman does not necessar-
ily lead to liberation, since reincarnation appears to continue.
To this •aákara answers that Apàntaratamas and others are indeed
liberated but continue to be reborn because they are entrusted with
the mission (adhikàram) of maintaining the world (lokasthitihetußvadhikà-
reßu) by promulgating the Vedas and so on (vedapravartanàdißu).416 •aá-
kara does not explain in detail what this mission is, but does indicate
that it is the highest Lord ( parame≤vara) who commands it: “. . . so
Apàntaratamas and other Lords (ì≤varà˙) to whom the highest Lord
has entrusted certain offices; last—although they possess complete
knowledge, the cause of release—as long as their office lasts, their
413
414
See G. tr., BrSùBh• 701. Radhakrishnan, BS 486, includes III.3.31 within
this adhikara»a.
415
See G. tr., BrSùBh• III.3.30, pp. 698–699.
416
See MB 406, lines 2–4 and the translations by Th. II:236 and G., BrSùBh•
702.
works not yet being exhausted, and obtain release only when their
office comes to an end.”417
•aákara goes on to add that these same realized souls fulfil this
mission at the same time that they wait for their pràrabdha karma to
run its course. Being liberated, no longer identified with their upàd-
his, their action does not ensnare them in the web of binding cause
and effect, in contrast to the actions of those who are not liber-
ated.418 When their mission has ended and their pràrabdha karma has
run out, these liberated souls cast off their bodies once and for all.419
But the essential liberation had already been realized prior to the
death of the body. As •aákara says, “That thou art” is not to be
construed as “That thou will be only after death.”420
Nimbàrka, VPS I.II.3.32,421 is extremely brief, mentioning that
certain figures such as Va≤iß†ha remain (in the body) “owing to the
influence of the works of which their office is the result.” No men-
tion is made of the nature of this office or mission nor to a high-
est Lord who commands the mission.
Bhàskara, in sùtra III.3.32,422 follows basically the same argument
as •aákara and adds that the mission given to certain individuals
by ì≤vara is for the grace or welfare of the world (lokànugrahàrthe). This
language is terminologically closer to “grace” than that used by
•aákara, but there appears to be no great difference regarding the
beneficial effect realized souls with a mission have on the world,
according to the witness of both bhàßyakàras. Bhàskara does not, how-
ever, elaborate as to what this activity of the realized souls is.
By way of summary:
1) •aákara declares that some souls who have realized the ultimate
truth articulated in the mahàvàkya “That thou art” continue to be
reborn both in order to allow their pràrabdha karma to become
exhausted as well as by command of the parame≤vara. That is to
say, a jìva who has realized the truth of non-duality may fulfil a
mission ordained by the highest Lord.
417
418
See G. tr., BrSùBh• 703–704.
419
See Date II:219.
420
See MB 407, lines 15–16 and the translations by Th. II:238 and G., BrSùBh•
705.
421
422
274  
2) The mission, loosely defined by •aákara, involves the main-

tenance of the world through the promulgation of the Vedas.
Apparently the jìva who has attained liberation is to teach, or per-
haps embody, the Vedic truths for the liberation of others. Thus,
the parame≤vara’s command may be regarded as a gracious dis-
pensation to the world.
3) •aákara’s affirmation of a divine mission does not appear to be
indebted to Nimbàrka who preceded him.
4) Bhàskara’s formulation of the purpose of the divine mission is
phrased in terms that more strongly indicate grace (anugraha) than
does •aákara’s formulation.
The sùtra reads: “And special works favour.”423

For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “And (in their case) there
can be the favour of special factors (like japa etc.).”424
The present sùtra belongs to an adhikara»a (111.4.36–39) dealing with

those individuals who stand outside the normal Upanißadic stages of
life (à≤ramas), consisting of being a student (brahmacarya), a married
householder (gàrhasthya), a forest dweller (vànaprastha), and a wander-
ing renunciate (sa«nyàsa).425 Each of these à≤ramas carries with it given
duties, the faithful performance of which leads to the jìva’s purification
and is therefore conducive to the rise of salvific knowledge. The issue
here is: What is the situation of those outside of the normal stages
of life, for instance a destitute widower, who lacks the financial means
to remarry? Is he excluded from the path to liberating knowledge
because of his inability to perform the normal duties demanded by
tradition?
The sùtrakàra had taught in III.4.36 and 37 that such individuals
are not without hope, as ≤ruti and sm‰ti take their case into account.
The same compiler adds in the present sùtra that other means that
promote the rise of knowledge are indeed available to such people,
but he does not name them.
What does •aákara have to say about these special means? He
423
See BS 518.
424
425
begins with a list of activities that he links with the word anugraha,
whose meaning needs yet to be uncovered in the present context:
Also for widowers, &c., the favour of knowledge (anugraho vidyàyà˙) is
possible through special acts of duty, such as praying ( japa), fasting,
propitiation of deities, &c., which are not opposed to their à≤rama-less
condition and may be performed by any man as such. Thus Sm‰ti
says, ‘By mere prayer ( japa) no doubt the Bràhma»a perfects himself.
May he perform other works or not, the kindhearted one is called
Bràhma»a (Manu Samh. II, 87), which passage shows that where the
works of the à≤ramas are not possible prayer qualifies for knowledge.426
Gambhirananda translates anugraha not as favor or grace, but as aid
or help: “it is possible for knowledge to be helped.”427 From the con-
text, either one of these translations is acceptable. Later in his com-
mentary on this same sùtra •aákara uses a variation of this word,
- when he declares, “Moreover, it is possible for knowledge
anugrahìt ‰,
to be helped by the virtuous deeds performed in the different stages
of life in earlier lives . . .”428 Thibaut’s translation does not vary much
from that of Gambhirananda: “the aggregate of the different puri-
ficatory ceremonies performed in former births promotes knowl-
edge.”429 Thus it appears that a word that may sometimes refer to
grace or favor may in the present text be regarded in the general
sense of auxiliary or help. However, grace cannot be ruled out, espe-
cially in the first instance cited here.
•aákara teaches here that the repetition of a mantra or a name
of God,430 as well as fasting, the worship of gods, and being kind-
hearted are all means which, even while available to those individ-
uals who are outside the normal à≤ramas, do lead indirectly to the
rise of knowledge. From what we generally know of •aákara’s sote-
riology it would appear that these exceptional means lead to knowl-
edge by their purifying the sàdhaka’s mind.
Thus whether anugraho vidyàyà˙ in the opening sentence is to be
translated as the “favor” or “grace” of knowledge, or whether, on
the other hand it is to be loosely rendered “knowledge is helped
by,” the point remains the same: Knowledge, the highest good, that
which is necessary for liberation, is not available only to those within
426
427
428
429
Th. tr. II:316.
430
See Date II:300 note 1 on the meaning of japa for this sùtra.
276  
a particular à≤rama, but is also accessible to those outside the à≤ramas,

so long as such people expend effort to purify themselves in various
ways. In all cases for •aákara, knowledge is only able to dawn for
people who have completely purified themselves spiritually.
Nevertheless, in the following sùtra (III.4.39) •aákara clearly states
that the normal à≤ramic stages are superior to the path he prescribes
in sùtra 38, because they are accentuated by both ≤ruti and sm‰ti.
Nimbàrka, VPS III.4.38,431 limits the “facilitation” (anugraha) of
knowledge for those outside of the à≤ramas to the results of deeds
performed in previous lives, and quotes BhG VI.45 in support. This
is an argument •aákara had also employed, using the same sm‰ti
verse. However, Nimbàrka does not give the example of the wid-
ower as •aákara had done nor does he add to his karma teaching
the other examples of helpful means cited by •aákara.
Bhàskara, in BrSùBh III.4.38,432 quotes BhG VI.45 for the same
reason as do •aákara and Nimbàrka, but adds to his list of help-
ful means to knowledge not only japa and worship of the gods, but
also the practice of non-violence (ahiásà) and the speaking of truth
(satyavacana).
To summarize •aákara’s bhàßya on BrSù III.4.38:
1) •aákara uses the word anugraha, but it is not clear, even doubt-
ful, whether this word is to be taken as signifying grace. Even
when liberating knowledge is looked upon as a “help,” this help
need not signify a gracious response of any kind. Indeed, •aákara
does not mention the words brahman, ì≤vara, parame≤vara etc. in this
commentary even once, although one would expect him to, based
on his previous articulations, if anugraha were to signify divine
favor or grace.
2) •aákara shows a greater liberality than Nimbàrka in allowing a
plurality of indirect means to knowledge for people who stand
outside the à≤ramas and are thus unable to contribute to their
purification through the normal means. What •aákara considers
purificatory and helpful are not only one’s past (good) actions,
but also prayer, worship of the gods, fasting, and kindness. Prayer
is especially emphasized here by •aákara when he quotes from
431
432
sm‰ti: “By mere prayer ( japa) no doubt the Bràhma»a perfects

himself.” (Manu Samh. II.87).433
24. BrSùBh IV.1.2
The sùtra reads: “And on account of the indicatory mark.”434

For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “And (this is so) on account
of the indicatory mark.”435
The first two sùtras of the fourth adhyàya comprise the adhikara»a deal-
ing with the question of spiritual practice or repetition. The inquiry
deals with the process of ≤rava»a, manana and nididhyàsana. Is this
process (or a part of this process) to be undertaken only once or is
it to be repeated? In sùtra 1 •aákara declares that the Upanißads
teach repetition; the whole point of the three-step method is the
attainment of liberating knowledge. If the aspirant does not realize
brahman the first time he undertakes ≤rava»a etc. then of course he is
to continue with his practice until the purpose of this process is
achieved.
•aákara interprets sùtra 2 similarly, repeating that ≤ruti teaches the
necessity of repetition for one who has not attained liberation the
first time after hearing the mahàvàkya “That thou art.” Repetition is
necessary to clear away the obstacles to realization, namely igno-
rance (ajñàna), doubt (saá≤aya), and misconception (viparyaya).436 Those
who are in possession of a sharp mind ( yeßàm . . . nipu»amatìnàá) and
not burdened with the obstacles just named may attain the supreme
intuition of “That thou art” upon the first hearing. The others must
embark on the path of hearing, reasoning and meditating.
At this point •aákara indicates the kind of wrong attitudes that
the aspirant to liberation inevitably falls prey to, and which must be
corrected by the guidance of the teacher and the further repetition
of the process of ≤rava»a etc.:
For him, on the other hand, who does not reach that intuition all at
once, we admit repetition, in order that the desired intuition may
be brought about. He also, however, must not be moved towards
433
Th. tr. II:316.
434
BS 525.
435
436
See MB 462, lines 17–20 and Th. tr. II:335.
278  
repetition in such a way as to make him lose the true sense of the
teaching, “That thou art.” In the mind of one on whom repetition is
enjoined as a duty, there arise infallibly notions opposed to the true
notion of Brahman, such as “I have a claim on this (knowledge of the
Self ) as an agent; this is to be done by me.” But if a learner, natu-
rally slow-minded, is about altogether to dismiss from his mind the
purport of the sentence, because it does not reveal itself to him, it is
permissible to fortify him in the understanding of that sense by means
of reasoning on the texts relative to repetition and so on.437
•aákara teaches here the necessity of repetition, but also teaches
that mere repetition without the proper attitude is insufficient to
bring about liberation. It may happen that the meditator thought-
lessly and mechanically repeats a certain prescribed practice, aban-
doning the true purpose of his effort: to understand. He may also
become discouraged after long practice, because knowledge has not,
after all, finally dawned. The sàdhaka, says •aákara, should there-
fore not merely repeat the words “That thou art,” but should try
to understand their meaning and truth on the theoretical plane
through reasoning. Through reason, he seems to imply, one’s faith
in and commitment to practice is renewed and strengthened.
The aspirant may also erroneously think that the investment of
great effort somehow entitles him to the dawning of knowledge. Such
a claim implies that jñàna may be achieved through the effort of an
agent who has made itself the center of the spiritual quest and the
recipient of the future prize of knowledge. But what needs to be
done, according to •aákara, is to rid oneself of the illusion of doer-
ship. One must be constantly reminded of the true nature of the
àtman, which is neither doer nor experiencer.
For Sara Grant the present sùtra is an indication of •aákara’s
conviction that “awareness of the absolute gratuitousness of the gift
of brahmavidyà must be safeguarded at all costs.”438 In other words,
even after properly practicing manana, the disciple can only wait for
the grace of knowledge to dawn while immersed in the final phase
of nididhyàsana.439 The disciple can do nothing directly to bring about
knowledge, can only clear away the obstacles to its gratuitous dawn-
437
438
See “Christian Theologizing and the Challenge of Advaita,” Theologizing
in India, ed. M. Amaladoss et al. (Bangalore: Theological Publications in India,
1981), 77.
439
See Grant 77–78.
ing. Such an interpretation based on grace does not deny the neces-
sity of effort and may be seen to exclude as well an arbitrary oper-
ation of the divine will. However, in this sùtra •aákara does not
expressly declare the need of divine grace for one who wants to
awaken to the true reality, although grace may be implied in what
he writes.
In short, practice and repetition must be undertaken with the cor-
rect theoretical understanding of the absolute reality of the Self and
the illusory nature of the acting grasping jìva. When, then, all mis-
conceptions, all doubt, and all ignorance have been cleared away by
repetition, there is nothing more the aspirant to realization can do
except patiently wait for the grace of liberating awareness.
Nimbàrka, in VPS IV.1.2,440 does nothing more than quote BhG
XII.9: “By force of practice, desire to attain me, O Dhanañaya.”
Bhàskara, in his brief commentary on the same sùtra, restricts him-
self to a reflection on ChUp I.5.1–2, which deals with meditation
on the sun and many meditations on the rays of the sun for the
purpose of being blessed with many sons.441 Bhàskara uses this exam-
ple in support of the necessity of repetition of spiritual practice, but
adds nothing more. •aákara starts with the same example when he
begins this particular bhàßya, but expands his commentary consider-
ably in comparison with both Bhàskara and Nimbàrka. Neither of
the latter two commentators has anything to say about the mental
obstructions facing the meditator nor indicates the gratuitous char-
acter of liberating knowledge.
To summarize this sùtra bhàßya in terms of grace:
1) •aákara does not explicitly mention divine grace in IV.1.2 nor
does he refer to the Absolute (brahman, àtman, parame≤vara) as a
giver of grace or a dispenser of liberating knowledge.
2) However, in his remarks concerning the obstacles that the aspi-
rant may face during the repetition of certain practices •aákara
seems to imply that spiritual effort, right reasoning and the removal
of doubt, ignorance and false conceptions, however indispensable
for the reception of liberating jñàna, are of themselves inadequate
to bring about the desired goal of the spiritual path. •aákara
appears to imply that mokßa can only finally be brought about
440
441
See BhBrSùBh IV.1.2, p. 220, lines 27–30.
280  
through grace, even if the knowledge that is revealed should not

be regarded as additive to the being of the sàdhaka, but is in fact
constitutive of the sàdhaka’s very being.
25. BrSùBh IV.2.17
The sùtra reads: “There occurs an illumination of the top of its

abode; having the door illumined by that, owing to the efficacy of
knowledge and owing to the appropriateness of the constant medi-
tation about the way which is a part of that, under the favour of
Him who resides in the heart, through that which is the hundred
and first.”442
For •aákara this sùtra has the sense of: “(When the soul of the
man who has realized the qualified Brahman is about to depart),
there occurs an illumination of the top of the heart. Having that
door illumined by that light, the soul, under the favour of Him who
resides in the heart, departs through the hundred and first nerve,
owing to the efficacy of the knowledge and the appropriateness of
the constant thought about the course which is a part of that knowl-
edge.”443
For •aákara the entire section IV.2.1–21 generally describes what
happens to the unrealized jìva at death.444 Without the highest knowl-
edge ( parà vidyà) the jìva continues its journeying; depending on the
degree of its knowledge, a variety of destinations awaits the trans-
migrating soul upon the death of the gross, or physical, body. For
the realized soul, however, there is no journeying at all. As •aákara
had stated a few sùtras prior to the present one: “And for him who
knowing Brahman has become the Self of that omnipresent Brahman,
and in whom all desires and works have become extinct, departing
and going are not even possible, as there is not any occasion for
them.”445 And since the sùtrakàra links together grace (anugraha) and
the soul’s journeying, it is clear that •aákara, the bhàßyakàra, can-
not regard the recipient of this grace as already being in possession
of the salvific knowledge. We are thus dealing with a sùtra-bhàßya
that does not intend to make a statement about the link between
442
443
444
See the summary by Potter 23–24, 179.
445
See G. tr., BrSùBh• IV.2.13, Th. tr. II:375 and MB 485, lines 21–23.
divine grace and final realization. Nevertheless, since grace is expressly

mentioned in the present sùtra, it is worthwhile to examine •aákara’s
reflections on it.
Although for •aákara the present discussion deals with the fate
of the unrealized jìva, •aákara makes a distinction between two kinds
of unrealized souls: those who have a higher knowledge of brahman,
and those who have an inferior awareness. But in the present con-
text the brahman about whom jìvas may have a higher or lower knowl-
edge is, according to •aákara in IV.3.7, the lower or aparaá brahman.
That is why both kinds of knowledge involve some kind of jour-
neying after death. It is only the lower brahman that may be re-
garded as an object to be reached. This teaching of •aákara in
IV.3.7 is aptly paraphrased by Gambhirananda: “For this condi-
tioned Brahman can properly be a goal to be reached, since it has
a locus. But with regard to the supreme Brahman there can be no
such conceptions as an approacher, a goal, and progress towards It,
for the absolute Brahman is omnipresent and is also the inmost Self
of the travellers.”446
B‰Up IV.4.1–2 provides the basis for the articulation of the pre-
sent sùtra, IV.2.17. There it was stated that the soul about to depart
from the gross body first withdraws itself into the heart,447 waiting
for the top of the heart to brighten. The soul then passes through
that brightened top of the heart and then exits the body, “either
through the eye, or through the head, or through any other part of
the body.”448 The soul then continues its journey through time and
space to the next appropriate body.
It is noteworthy that B‰Up IV.4.1–2 does not make mention of
grace, whereas the sùtrakàra, in referring to this passage, speaks of
“the favour of Him who resides in the heart.” •aákara, in comment-
ing on B‰Up IV.4.2, states only that the soul departs “with the help
of the light at the top of the heart” (h‰dayàgraprakà≤ena), using an
instrumental construction instead of a word for grace or favor to
express himself.449 He further states that those whose passageway is
446
G. tr., BrSùBh• 879. See MB 495, lines 7–9.
447
Potter 604 note 4 remarks on BrSùBh• IV.2.17: “Indian philosophers use this
term to mean the place within the body where feeling, willing, thinking, etc., takes
place. It does not necessarily denote the physical organ that goes by that name in
Indian anatomy.”
448
See B‰Up IV.4.2 and the translation by Madhavananda, with •aákara’s com-
mentary. The translation here is from p. 489.
449
See Madhavananda tr. 490 and TPU 910, line 12.
282  
through the head are entitled to journey to the world of Hira»ya-

garbha.450
In his commentary on BrSù IV.2.17 •aákara declares that only
the man of knowledge (of the lower brahman) proceeds through the
vein of the top of the skull; the other souls with their lesser knowl-
edge depart through other veins. Why does only the man of knowl-
edge travel along this route? Because this is the only route to the
lower brahman. The man of knowledge is entitled to such a journey,
because he had undertaken a meditation on brahman as abiding in
the heart and thereby united himself to brahman in thought.451 One
travels the way one meditates.452
It is remarkable that •aákara makes no mention here of Hira»-
yagarbha as the goal of the man of knowledge, as he had done in
his bhàßya on B‰Up IV.4.2. In BrSùBh IV.3.1 and 7 he states the
goal of the journey to be the lower brahman. Potter is able to link
the two by explaining Hira»yagarbha to be the ruler of the world
of brahman to which the pilgriming souls are travelling.453
The sùtrakàra had stated that the soul who exits the body through
the hundred and first nerve, whose location is identified by •aákara
as being in the skull, does so because of three factors: the power of
knowledge, the type of meditation that had been performed, and the
grace of him who resides in the heart. When •aákara comments
on these three factors, it is the power of knowledge that he men-
tions and comments on first. He declares a just connection between
the type of knowledge attained and its result. It is only an exalted
knowledge that can lead to an exalted sphere or goal. This is, of
course, inseparably linked to the second factor, the type of medita-
tion performed, which has just been discussed.
As regards the third factor, grace, •aákara remarks that it is the
grace of brahman that is referred to, the brahman meditated on as
residing in the heart, but •aákara does not state whether this is the
higher or lower brahman. Since brahman is here localized one would
naturally think of the lower brahman. If it is indeed the lower brah-
man it would be difficult to explain how this mental construct could
be a giver of grace, unless •aákara means that grace itself is here
450
See Madhavanada tr. 490.
451
452
See Th. tr. II:378.
453
See Potter 179.
the illusory correlate of such a meditation. We must remember that

the knower of the lower brahman, however exalted his knowledge is,
yet remains in bondage until the final awakening to his true Self.
Or does •aákara mean that through meditation on the lower
brahman, who is a mental construct, the higher brahman dispenses a
real grace? From the present sùtra it is impossible to come to a
definite conclusion. The fact that •aákara remains altogether silent
on the issue of grace when dealing with B‰Up IV.4.2 may help here.
If •aákara refuses to speak of grace elsewhere when dealing with
the same subject matter, it is difficult not to draw the conclusion
that when he speaks of grace at all in the present context, it is
because he is forced to by the sùtra he is commenting on.
For Nimbàrka this is VPS IV.2.16.454 Nimbàrka quotes ChUp
VIII.6.5 as the source of the present sùtra, but does not refer to
B‰Up IV.4.1–2. He declares the dispenser of grace to be the parame≤vara,
who is pleased by both the jìva’s power of knowledge as well as by
his meditation. The grace that is given is the lighting up of the heart
and the making known of the vein to immortality. This is in con-
trast to •aákara, who had stated that the top of the heart is made
visible to both the man of higher knowledge and the man of igno-
rance, but that only the man of knowledge is able to enter such a
passageway. It would appear that for •aákara brahman’s grace is only
efficacious for the spiritually advanced. This grace ensures that the
soul with knowledge of the lower brahman does in fact exit the gross
body by the proper path and attain its appropriate goal.
For Bhàskara, as with Nimbàrka, this is sùtra IV.2.16.455 Bhàskara
quotes B‰Up IV.4.2 and ChUp VII.6.6 and declares the one resid-
ing in the heart to be the parame≤vara. Bhàskara does not declare,
beyond the words of the sùtra itself, wherein the grace of parame≤vara
consists.
To summarize •aákara’s commentary on BrSù IV.2.17:
1) For •aákara, unlike the commentators of other Vedàntic schools,
the fully realized soul does not travel anywhere. Thus the pre-
sent sùtra, which speaks of a going at the time of death, can only
refer to a soul not yet liberated. The fact that the soul’s depar-
ture from the gross body through a very special nerve called the
454
See VPS 406, lines 15–22 and Bose II:827.
455
284  
“hundred and first” is possible only under certain conditions, e.g.

“under the favour of Him who resides in the heart,” does not
deny the fact that a final liberation is not indicated by sùtra
IV.2.17.
2) •aákara refers to the dispenser of grace residing in the heart as
brahman. This is in contrast to Nimbàrka and Bhàskara who refer
to the giver of grace as parame≤vara. It is not clear whether the
higher or the lower brahman is meant here by •aákara. Does
•aákara intend to say that meditation on the lower brahman leads
to a real grace of some kind? From the present context this ques-
tion cannot be answered.
3) It is likely that •aákara speaks of grace at all here because he
is forced to by the sùtra itself which explicitly mentions grace. He
makes no mention of grace when commenting on B‰Up IV.4.2,
which forms the background to BrSù IV.2.17. B‰Up IV.4.2 itself
does not refer to grace. •aákara does not therefore appear eager
to speak of grace in the present context. He is impelled to do so.
4) •aákara gives a slightly different interpretation than does Nimbàrka
regarding the purpose of brahman’s grace. The grace does not so
much consist in the lighting up of the heart for one and all, i.e.
for both the knower of the lower brahman as well as for the igno-
rant, as it does in enabling the man of knowledge to travel the
higher passageway to an exalted sphere. Thus, the present bhàßya
underscores what •aákara has indicated elsewhere: Grace is espe-
cially manifest for those advanced in knowledge.
C. S  •á’ T  G
My analysis of the BrSùBh leads us to conclude that for •aákara,

the “Prince of Advaitins,” divine grace is a reality that is fully
accepted, and whose source is the supreme reality itself. Such a con-
clusion indeed calls into question long-held views about the impos-
sibility of predicating graciousness of the highest brahman, but the
evidence is quite overwhelming that •aákara does take such a posi-
tion. In II.3.41 the Lord whose grace (anugraha) causes the knowl-
edge that effects final release is explicitly declared to be the highest
Self. The parame≤vara in III.2.5 whose grace ( prasàda), like medicine,
dispels ignorance and restores the liberating vision of one’s true
nature, is further identified in III.2.6 to be the paraá brahman. The
argument for the equation of paraá brahman-parame≤vara is striking:

Both in III.2.6 and in I.2.13 the referent of the mahàvàkya “That
thou art” is explicitly stated to be—not the àtman—but ì≤vara or
parame≤vara. Paul Hacker was correct in his discovery that •aákara
frequently makes the Lord the highest reality, rather than making
him subordinate to àtman-brahman.
Further, a comparison with the commentaries of Nimbàrka and
Bhàskara reveals the independence with which •aákara affirms the
soteriological relevance of divine grace. In II.3.41 it is •aákara alone
of the three Vedàntins who makes mention of divine grace at all,
and he does this even though the sùtra upon which he comments
gives no hint of divine aid. In III.2.5 it is •aákara who goes far-
thest in affirming the grace taught by the sùtrakàra: by explicitly
employing a word for grace ( prasàda) by using the analogy of med-
icine, and by clearly distancing himself from the sùtrakàra’s claim that
bondage, too, is from the “highest.” Thus, though not constrained
to do so, •aákara clearly establishes himself in his bhàßya on II.3.41
and III.2.5 as an advocate of grace. For •aákara, then, the high-
est reality itself, and not a mere sagu»a brahman or inferior Lord, is
by nature gracious.
What we do not, of course, find alongside these affirmations of
the importance of divine grace for the attainment of liberation is an
outright theology of grace. We hear nothing of the operation of
grace, very little of the possible prerequisites for the reception of
grace, still less of the motive behind the divine dispensation. To com-
prehend •aákara’s thinking on grace we must therefore turn to pas-
sages other than II.3.41 and III.2.5.
It is clear that for •aákara brahman-ì≤vara wills only good. In his
frequent reflections on theodicy (e.g. II.1.34–35, II.3.41) •aákara
lays the burden of the inequality of creaturely suffering on human
free will. He reinterprets KauUp III.8 such that ì≤vara is absolved of
all responsibility for the jìva’s suffering. It is the Lord’s doing only
to make sure that the human deed is justly retributed (III.2.38).
Ì≤vara’s action is, for the most part, regarded by •aákara as a response
to a prior human action. Yet •aákara also states that the exercise
of the jìva’s freedom is itself linked to that same Lord (II.3.42), but
in what exact way he does not make clear. •aákara does at least
avoid the two extremes of making the jiva’s freedom either totally
independent of or totally manipulated by the divine will. •aákara
believes in both divine grace and a real creaturely freedom.
286  
Further, the Lord who effortlessly brings forth the world and also
bestows grace on his creatures does so without in any way under-
going a self-modification. In bestowing grace, too, the Lord does not
act out of any need (II.1.21–23). He is the sovereign supreme Lord
whose grace is not in any way forced by its recipient or results in a
change in the dispenser. The Lord acts freely, “as he pleases” (I.1.20).
Ì≤vara’s grace is extended to all fairly and impartially in the same
way that rain falls equally on every variety of plant. Yet though this
grace is extended to all, it is not received by all equally. And it is
here that we may profitably speculate as to why this is so, by draw-
ing on •aákara’s own scattered utterances.
Those who •aákara most frequently names as recipients of the
divine prasàda and anugraha are those who are advanced on the path
of spirituality. •aákara does not say that they are so advanced,
because of the divine prasàda; indeed, in contrast to much of later
Indian tradition, •aákara nowhere teaches that one must be first
‘graced’ in order to set out on the path to liberation. However, R.
Panikkar reminds us that for •aákara “the desire to know Brahman
is aroused by the ≤ruti itself.” Yet given that truth, Panikkar goes on
to say, “even if the desire to know Brahman were not ‘natural’, but
‘inspired’, there would still be a difference between the grace of desir-
ing and the gift of realization.”456 •aákara may not be clear about
how grace initiates the first steps that lead to liberation, but he does
explicitly teach the consummation of life’s highest goal through divine
grace.
Whether through their own effort or with the help of divine grace
the spiritually adept have reached a level of inner tranquility, purity
and detachment from the world which makes possible their recep-
tion of divine gifts. It is specifically the Yogins who through the
grace of the Lord have knowledge of the world’s past and future
(I.1.5); it is the Yogins again who through ì≤vara’s prasàda are endowed
with extraordinary powers (siddhis) and have their ignorance destroyed
(III.2.5). It is the spiritually advanced who are able to take advan-
tage of brahman’s grace and enter the passageway leading out of the
skull (IV.2.17). Even Hira»yagarbha and other exalted beings are
granted knowledge of their past kalpa by parame≤vara (I.3.30).
•aákara teaches in III.2.5 that the Yogins have strenuously exerted
themselves in their meditation, and he implies that this effort is a
456
The Unknown Christ of Hinduism (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1981), 116–117.
prerequisite for their receiving the grace of liberating knowledge.

Similarly, writes •aákara, knowledge is helped by japa, fasting, wor-
ship, and prayer (III.4.38). The value of spiritual practices faithfully
repeated lies in their power to remove ignorance, doubt and mis-
conception, all of which are obstacles to liberating awareness. Yet
the sàdhaka must avoid the pitfall of imagining that he or she has,
by virtue of effort expended, a claim on enlightenment (IV.1.2). No
amount of spiritual investment entitles one to the dawning of knowl-
edge. And so while it is true that knowledge will not dawn on those
who make no effort toward Self-realization, it is also true that effort
alone cannot force liberating insight either. The knowledge that
removes all suffering is gratuitous in nature, according to •aákara.
Liberation is not the result of action, although the effort given to
purify oneself may be regarded as an auxiliary cause of liberation;
probably an indispensable one at that.
The paradox, then, is this: The grace of illumination comes to
those who exert themselves, but this effort, although indispensable,
is of itself insufficient to bring about its desired goal. Knowledge is
revealed freely by the Absolute to those who are capable of receiv-
ing it, and this operation does not in any way compromise the Lord’s
impartiality to his creatures. Neither human effort alone nor divine
grace alone can sufficiently account for the process that leads to lib-
eration. But we must remember that however much •aákara
opposes knowledge and action, he never opposes knowledge and
grace. His problem is with those who feel that action is a direct
cause of liberation. By contrast, •aákara never sees a teaching on
divine grace as in any way mitigating the truth of liberation through
knowledge.
•aákara’s understanding of grace appears to be influenced by
Vaiß»avism. That ì≤vara is able to miraculously assume bodily forms
through his power of màyà certainly refers, at least indirectly, to a
Vaiß»avite conception (I.1.20). •aákara’s ì≤vara does this “in order
to gratify thereby his devout worshippers.” •aákara does not say
that the Lord assumes such màyà-forms in order to make worship-
pers out of non-worshippers. Rather the Lord appears to those who
are already his devotees. Here, too, we see grace as a divine response
to a prior human action or effort. •aákara’s indebtedness to Vaiß»a-
vism becomes explicit in his references to meditation on Viß»u
through the ≤àlagràma stone (I.2.7, I.2.14; I.3.14). The Lord becomes
gracious when worshipped there (I.2.7). Such articulations serve to
288  
underscore both the personal and sovereign character of •aákara’s

understanding of divine grace.
Does the avidyà-destroying divine grace inevitably come to those
who have attained the proper spiritual disposition? And if so, how
is this still grace? For •aákara, the Lord is one who offers grace
freely and abundantly and, although the Lord is not compelled to
do so, •aákara could hardly have imagined him withholding grace
to the recipient who had made himself worthy to receive it. It is
likely, therefore, that •aákara had a great confidence in that freely
offered divine mercy.
CHAPTER NINE
THE NOTION OF GRACE IN •AÁKARA’S

OTHER WRITINGS
Although •aákara’s Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya (BrSùBh) is usually taken as

the standard by which to discern •aákara’s true teaching as well as
to assess the authenticity of other works ascribed to him, the fact
remains that the BrSùBh alone fails to give a complete picture of
•aákara’s position on grace. •aákara’s Upanißad commentaries, his
bhàßya on the Bhagavad-Gìtà, and his independent treatise Upade≤asàhasrì
together contribute toward a more comprehensive, and therefore
more accurate, understanding of what divine grace may or may not
mean for •aákara than the BrSùBh taken by itself. These same
works I have selected for the present chapter, because there is a
broad consensus among Vedàntic scholars that they are authentic-
ally from •aákara.
In attempting to summarize •aákara’s position in each of his
works I will try to be as succinct as possible, offering less commen-
tary than in my analysis of the BrSùBh, simply because the sheer
number of passages on grace in •aákara’s writings precludes lengthy
elaboration. In the case of what I consider to be particularly impor-
tant articulations by •aákara on the subject of grace, however, it
will be necessary to go into some detailed explanation, so as to
extract the full meaning from the text.
A. •á’ UPANIÍAD C
1. B‰hadàra»yaka-Upanißad-Bhàßya
a. brahman-àtman-ì≤vara-antaryàmi
According to •aákara, the internal ruler (antaryàmi), who is ever free,
and “is by nature given to doing things for others” ( paràrthakartavy-
atàsvabhàvatvàt), is also ì≤vara, Nàràya»a, the immortal àtman (III.7.3).1
1
Swami Madhavananda, trans., The B‰hadàra»yaka Upanißad With the Commentary
290  
Brahman, who is known through ≤ruti as pure intelligence (vijñànaá)

and bliss (ànandaá), as well as being serene ( prasannaá) and beneficent
(≤ivam), is also the bestower of the fruits of the sacrificer (III.9.–28.7).2
The word ≤ivam, “auspicious, propitious, gracious,”3 translated by
Madhavananda as “beneficent,” is not one of the terms normally
used by •aákara in his BrSùBh to signify grace or graciousness.
One realizes ì≤vara as one’s àtman and is freed from fear. This
same Self “bestows on all the respective results of their deeds,” and
is the God (deva) or Lord (ì≤a) of the past, present and future (IV.4.–15).4
Here again we see the difficulty of distinguishing the supreme self
from an active Lord. On the activity of the self, see also •aákara
on B‰Up IV.4.22.5
Meditation on Om, which is “the best means for the realization
of Brahman,” leads to brahman being “pleased” ( prasìdati) with the
devotee. (V.1.1).6 This brahman or self who is to be meditated on is
the conditioned or qualified (sopàdhika) self.7 This same conditioned
brahman, manifested through name and form, is, in its true form, the
supreme brahman. “Although it emanates as an effect, it does not
give up its nature, infinitude, the state of the Supreme self; it emanates
as but the infinite.”8 Thus there is but one brahman for •aákara,
and this brahman is “pleased.”
As analogous to meditation on Om, •aákara gives the example
of how worshippers regard the image ( pratimà) of Viß»u and others
(viß»vàdi ) as non-different (abheda) from the deity itself. (V.1.1).9 Both
Viß»u and the supreme brahman require the help of imagery if they
are to be realized by the devotee: “Because the latter (= brahman),
being beyond the reach of the eye and other organs, cannot be per-
ceived without some help, therefore the aspirant superimposes it with
faith (≤raddhà), devotion (bhakti) and great rapture on the syllable Om,
of •a«karàcàrya (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1965), 349. See Ten Principal Upanißads
with •a«karabhàßya. Works of •a«karàcàrya in Original Sanskrit (= TPU), Vol. I (Delhi:
Motilal Banarsidass, 1987), 821, line 20 to 822, line 9.
2
See TPU 848, line 19–24 and Madhavananda tr. 393.
3
See Monier-Williams, ed., Sanskrit-English Dictionary (= MW) (Delhi: Munshiram
Manoharlal, 1981), 1074, col. 1.
4
Madhavananda tr. 515. See TPU 926, line 11–20.
5
See Madhavananda tr. 522.
6
Madhavananda tr. 562. See TPU 954, lines 19–22.
7
See Madhavananda tr. and TPU 950, lines 14–15.
8
Madhavananda tr. 557.
9
See Madhavananda tr. 562 and TPU 954, line 21.
    291
as people superimpose Viß»u on images of stone etc. with carvings

of His features . . . Now, whether it is . . . the unconditioned Brahman
or . . . the conditioned Brahman, in either case the syllable Om, as
a symbol, becomes a means of realising it, like an image.”10
This discussion of brahman being “pleased” in connection with the
example of an image of Viß»u is reminiscent of •aákara’s reference
to the ≤àlagràma stone in BrSùBh I.2.7. and I.2.14.11 As in those pas-
sages, Viß»u is compared with nothing less than the highest brahman.
As in BrSùBh I.2.7, so here in B‰UpBh V.1.1, it is impossible to
determine whether prasìdati might be better translated as “becomes
gracious” rather than “is pleased.”
b. The Teacher and Scripture

In II.1.20 •aákara relates the well-known parable of a prince brought
up in a fowler’s home, not knowing his true identity. It was not until
a “supremely merciful man” ( paramakàru»ika˙) instructed the prince
of his true identity that the prince was enabled to give up the false
notions about himself and return to his original state.12 It is the same
with the embodied self: “It does not know that it is the Supreme
Self. But when the teacher (àcàrya) enlightens it that it is not the
body etc., but the transcendent Supreme Brahman, then it gives up
the pursuit of the three kinds of desire and is convinced that it is
Brahman. When it is told that it has been separated from the Supreme
Brahman like a spark, it is firmly convinced that it is Brahman, as
the prince was of his royal birth.”13
Thus it is only through a supremely compassionate teacher, a man
established in brahman, that the seeker of liberation is able to take
to the path of liberation. The àcàrya’s mercy is exhibited in his pro-
viding the seeker with true theoretical knowledge of the jìva’s iden-
tity and in instilling in the jìva the conviction that the teaching is
true. •aákara does not say that the teacher actually causes enlight-
enment to occur, but that the teacher lays the necessary ground-
work for enlightenment to occur.
The parable does break down at one point. Perhaps the only place
10
Madhavananda tr. 562–563 and TPU 954, line 25 to 955, line 5.
11
See VIII.B.4.
12
Madhavananda tr. 210. See TPU 738, lines 16 to 22.
13
Madhavananda tr. 211. See TPU 738, line 25 to 739, line 3.
292  
in which it does not correspond to the reality of the teacher-disciple

relationship is in the compassionate man of the parable instructing
the prince as to his true identity, without first being asked. In reality,
the seeker of liberation must first approach the teacher with a desire
to attain liberation in order to receive instruction. •aákara’s para-
ble serves to underscore the compassionate nature of the one rooted
in the knowledge of brahman. That is why •aákara, in IV.2.1, expands
Janaka’s entreaty to the enlightened Yàjñavalkya from “Tell me, sir,”
to “Tell me, sir, if you are gracious to me” ( yadi prasanno màá prati ).14
Similarly, in IV.3.14, •aákara intensifies the merciful nature of
the teacher over what the ≤ruti itself claims when he transforms
Janaka’s simple plea to Yàjñavalkya, “Please instruct me further about
liberation,” into “Hence I request you to instruct me further about
liberation, so that I may hear the decision about the whole of my
desired question, and through your grace (tyatprasàdàt) be altogether free
from this relative existence.”15
In IV.4.15 •aákara explicitly unites the compassion and the grace
of the teacher when he declares: “But when a man, somehow meet-
ing a highly merciful teacher and receiving his grace ( paramakàru»ikaá
kañcidàcàryaá pràpya tato labdaprasàda˙) afterwards directly realises this
effulgent (Deva) Self, or the Self that bestows on all the respective
results of their deeds, the Lord of all that has been and will be, i.e.
of the past, present and future, he no longer wishes particularly to
hide himself from It, this Lord.”16
It is striking that the text •aákara is commenting on, B‰Up
IV.–4.15, makes no mention of a teacher or the teacher’s grace and
compassion.
We return to II.1.20 to note that •aákara closely links the grace
of the teacher with the grace of scripture (≤àstra). •aákara clarifies
which people are excluded from realizing the unity of brahman. They
are, first of all, “logicians, those first-rate heretics and liars,” pre-
sumably those individuals whose reason is not guided by the infal-
lible ≤ruti. Second, liberating awareness is “inaccessible to persons of
shallow understanding.” Finally, enlightenment is not possible for
“those who are devoid of the grace of the scriptures and the teacher”
(≤àstraguruprasàda).17 •aákara gives three ≤ruti texts in his support, and
14
Madhavananda tr. 411. My emphasis. See TPU 857, line 23.
15
Madhavananda tr. 448–449. My emphasis. See TPU 883, lines 11–14.
16
17
    293
adds that this teaching is also known “from those that describe truth
as attainable through special favour and grace” ( prasàda).18 He does
not, however, name the texts to which he is referring.
These last citations from II.1.20 appear to indicate that the grace
of the teacher and of scripture is ineffective against those lacking in
a certain degree of intelligence. For “it is impossible for persons of
shallow understanding clearly to grasp the meaning of the scrip-
tures.” (IV.5.15).19 Yet others, e.g. “the blind, the hump-backed, and
so forth, who are unfit for rites, surely deserve the compassion of
the ≤ruti” (anugràhyà eva ≤rutyeti ).20 This last remark •aákara has put
into the mouth of his opponent, but since the real conflict centers
on the necessity of renunciation and not on the compassion of scrip-
ture, it may be assumed that both members of the dispute agree
that ≤ruti is compassionate. The point of contention between the two
opponents centers on what it is that the compassionate ≤ruti con-
cretely lays down.
As an illustration of ≤ruti’s merciful intent, •aákara further remarks
in V.1.1 that scripture not only enjoins meditation on Om, but also
“the practice of self-control, charity and compassion” (damaá danaá
dayàm).21 This is yet another striking example of how •aákara expands
on the text before him. Whereas B‰Up V.5.1 had simply prescribed
knowledge of Om as the way to the realization of brahman, •aákara
adds that ≤ruti also prescribes an attitude of mercy towards other
beings. He is referring to V.2.3. •aákara does not conclude his
remarks on the importance of charity and compassion when com-
menting on V.2.3. In his introduction to V.3.1 he states that one is
qualified for meditation only by first becoming compassionate.22 Thus,
the ≤ruti which is compassionate enjoins the jìva to likewise practice
compassion.
c. The Gods
•aákara does not fail to mention that even the gods are gracious,
but his discussion in I.4.10 makes clear that it is only the ignorant
man, one who worships gods as different from himself, who feels
18
Madhavananda tr. 219–220. See TPU 744, line 25.
19
20
21
Madhavananda tr. 556. See TPU 950, line 17.
22
See Madhavananda tr. 568 and TPU 958, lines 1–2.
294  
himself to be under their power or in need of them. For •aákara,

the gods appear to be in an ambivalent relation to human beings:
“The gods can thwart as well as help (anugrahaá) an ignorant man.”23
He goes on to say:
What is there to wonder at if the gods feel mortified when a man . . .
gets rid of the idea that he is their creature, as when a householder
is robbed of many animals? Therefore it is not liked by them, these
gods . . . that men should somehow know this truth of the identity of
the self and Brahman. Hence as men try to save animals from being
seized by tigers etc., so the gods seek to prevent men from attaining
the knowledge of Brahman lest they should cease to be their objects
of enjoyment. Those, however, whom they wish to set free, they endow
with faith and the like; while the opposite class they visit with lack of
faith etc. Therefore a seeker of liberation should be devoted to wor-
shipping the gods, have faith and devotion, be obedient (to the gods)
and be alert about the attainment of knowledge or about knowledge
itself.24
Thus one may turn to the gods if one finds help there. If, however,
one is devoted to the gods but receives nothing and is even hin-
dered on the path that leads to liberation, one should forsake the
gods altogether and be aware of the underlying unity of brahman
without their help.25 The help that the gods are able to offer, accord-
ing to •aákara, is the gift of “faith etc.,” presumably the convic-
tion of the truth of non-duality as revealed by the ≤ruti and the
teacher. Just how the gods bequeath faith to humans •aákara does
not say.
In another passage, •aákara states that in the dream state it is
sometimes possible for the jìva to receive a glimpse of the future
results of present good and evil deeds. “Those glimpses of the results
of merits and demerits that are to come in the future life, he expe-
riences through the urge of those merits and demerits, or (và) through
the grace (anugraha) of the gods.”26 •aákara does not appear clear
as to whether the gods are in fact responsible for the jìva’s ability
23
24
Madhavananda tr. 118–119. See TPU 680, lines 3–11.
25
In commenting on the word asuryà˙, “of devils,” in Ì≤aUp 3, Shankara states,
“as compared with the attainment of the non-dual state of the supreme Self, even
gods are asuras, devils; and the worlds belonging to them are asuryà˙.” See Swami
Gambhirananda, trans., Eight Upanißads: With the Commentary of •a«karàcàrya. Vol. I
(Calcutta: Advaita Asrama, 1982), 8. Vol. II is also 1982.
26
Madhavananda tr. 441. My emphasis. See TPU 878, lines 5–6.
    295
to foresee the future in a dream. In BrSùBh III.2.4 •aákara discusses

how a dream may be the bearer of an omen concerning the jìva’s
good or evil fate, and notes that “mantras, gods, and special sub-
stances” cause some dreams to occur.27 •aákara refers to Chàndogya
Upanißad V.2.8 as the source of his information that dreams may
reveal the future. Yet neither in the B‰ UpBh nor in the BrSùBh
does •aákara go into any detail concerning the influence that the
gods may have on dreams.
•aákara’s final reference to the grace of the gods is V.15.1. He
comments on the prayer of a man dying, a man who “has com-
bined meditation with rites,” i.e. one who has not made the final
renunciation. The prayer of the dying man is directed to the vari-
ous gods: Pùßan, Yama, Sùrya, Hira»yagarbha, Agni. He prays to
them that the truth of satya-brahman may be revealed and that he
may be fully merged in the divine. In addressing the deity fire (Agni)
at the end of his prayer the dying man of the Upanißad switches
from the first person singular to the first person plural: “O Fire, lead
us along the good way towards our riches (desserts). O Lord, thou
knowest everybody’s mental states; remove the wily evil from us. We
utter repeated salutations to thee.”28 In his commentary •aákara
adds to ≤ruti’s “Remove all the wily evil from us,” that the evil is
removed by this Lord’s grace: “Freed from it through thy grace
( prasàda), we shall go along the northern path.” 29 However, for
•aákara freedom from evil is not yet the final liberation, towards
which all beings are striving, for in the final liberation there is no
going anywhere. (BrSùBh IV.3.14). Yet it is through the grace of
the gods that the jìva may be helped on the way to a higher state
that is not yet the full and final self-realization.
Thus, in his B‰UpBh, •aákara speaks of the grace of brahman, of
ì≤vara, of the teacher, of scripture, and of the gods, all of whom to
varying degrees contribute to the final blessed awakening of the jìva
to the àtman: “Such indeed is Self-knowledge: it gives one the con-
viction that one is completely blessed (k‰tàrtha) and it requires no
other witness than the testimony of one’s own experience; so what
27
See Swami Gambhirananda, transl., Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya of •a«karàcàrya (= G.
tr.) (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1977), 592.
28
Madhavananda tr. 598–599.
29
296  
can be better than this? (IV.4.8)”30 And also “Being under the spell
of the long sleep of ignorance, we have somehow known that Brahman
which is under consideration as our own self; oh, blessed (k‰tàrtha)
are we . . . Oh, blessed are we that we have been saved from this
great destruction by knowing Brahman, the one without a second.”
(IV.4.14)31
2. Chàndogya-Upanißad-Bhàßya
As regards grace, •aákara’s bhàßya on the Chàndogya Upanißad differs
from his commentary on the B‰hadàra»yaka Upanißad on one important
point: The ChUpBh makes no mention of the grace of scripture.
However, as in the B‰UpBh, •aákara speaks here of the gracious-
ness or mercy of the Absolute, of the teacher, and of the gods.
a. brahman-àtman-Om-“Providence”
Fairly early in his ChUpBh •aákara states the usefulness of medi-
tation on “Om,” a practice that hearkens back to B‰UpBh V.1.1
above: “This letter Om, as the name (abhidhànaá) of the supreme
Reality ( paramàtmana˙, “of the supreme Self ”), is nearest to Him (or
“it”: nediß†ham); when that is used He (sa) surely becomes gracious
( prasìdati ) just as a man becomes so when his favourite name is
used . . . Thus it is known in all the Upanißads that Om, as a name
and as a symbol, holds the highest position of being an aid to the
meditation of the supreme Self. (I.1.1)”32
This Absolute, who is both the àtman and the Lord, responds in
a very personal way to the devotee’s meditation on Om. He becomes
gracious, or is pleased, in a way analogous to a human responding
to the hearing of his or her preferred name.33
After noting in I.1.3 that Om “is competent to take the place of
30
Madhvananda tr. 509. See TPU 923, lines 1–2.
31
Madhvananda tr. 514. See TPU 926, lines 1–6.
32
Swami Gambhirananda, trans., Chàndogya Upanißad With the Commentary of
•a«karàcàrya (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1983), 7. All words in parentheses added
to Gambhirananda’s translation. See TPU 352, line 23 to 353, line 2.
33
V. H. Date, Vedànta Explained (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1973), II:532
paraphrases as follows: “ ‘Om is the name of the highest Atman,’ says Samkara,
‘and so serves the purpose of being the nearest approach to him. He is pleased
when he is called by this name, and worshipped through this symbol (Cha. 1, 1, 1).”
    297
the supreme Self since it is to be worshipped like the supreme Self,”34

•aákara states that the Chàndogya Upanißad had earlier “glorified Om
because it is the symbol of the supreme Self and hence the cause
(hetu) of immortality.”
A new word, “Providence” (daivam), is used by •aákara in a way
suggestive of grace at the end of his long commentary on II.23.1.
The objection had been raised that the man who abandons the
sacred fire for the purpose of renouncing the world will incur guilt
upon himself. •aákara replies: “No. Since that giving up is caused
by Providence (daivam) itself, that fire becomes abandoned after the
realisation of Unity, on the authority of the Vedic text, ‘(Thus) van-
ishes the fire-hood of fire’ (VI.4.1). So the householder does not incur
any guilt by becoming a monk.”35
Gambhirananda’s translation of daivam as “Providence,” with a
capital “P,” suggests some kind of divine control over the world. In
that case, •aákara is saying that the great good of renouncing the
world for the sake of realizing the Self, of having true knowledge of
brahman, is in some sense the work of something or someone beyond
the power of the jìva. That is why the jìva incurs no guilt. However,
as MW points out, daivam may mean, along with “divine power or
will,” also “destiny, fate, chance.” When the suffix vàt is appended
to it, as in the present case, the word may mean “by chance, acci-
dentally.”36 This latter meaning is reminiscent of the instances in
which •aákara declares how a person in bondage “somehow” or
“by some chance” meets a merciful teacher who guides him along
the path to liberation.37 It is difficult to know exactly what •aákara
is referring to in the present text, but it does seem that the fate of
the jìva who is to be liberated is somehow in the “hands” of a higher
power.
Elsewhere, in commenting on the ≤ruti’s “Person ( purußa˙) seen in
the eye,” who is the Self (IV.15.1) and also the “Bestower of mer-
its” (IV.15.3), •aákara states that this Person “makes available to
the creatures . . . all results of virtuous deeds in accordance with their
merits.” (IV.15.3)38 This remark does not add anything substantial
to the text and is a repeat of what is known already from the
34
G. tr. 9–10. See TPU 353, line 21.
35
G. tr. 156. See TPU 408, lines 18–20.
36
See MW 497, col. 2.
37
See B‰UpBh II.1.20 and IV.4.15; Madhavananda tr. 210, 515.
38
G. tr. 296. See TPU 461, lines 11–12.
298  
BrSùBh.39 Similarly, in V.18.1, •aákara derives the word Vai≤vànara

as follows: “The word Vai≤vànara is derived in the sense of ‘He who
guides all (vi≤va) persons (nara) according to their virtues and vices.’
This one is indeed God (ì≤vara, “Lord”), the Self of all.”40
Again, •aákara does not distinguish the “self of all” from the
“Lord” who guides all creatures.
The theme of the àtman’s controllership of the world emerges again
in VIII.4.1. The Upanißad likens àtman’s preservation of the world
and its keeping separate the world of sorrow from the blissful world
of brahman to a dam that keeps in check all proper boundaries and
holds together the totality. •aákara interprets this text in terms of
the Lord (ì≤vara) holding together the whole world “in accordance
with the rules of distinctions in castes, stages of life, etc. and actions,
accessories and results in accordance with the nature of the per-
former.”41 •aákara calls this àtman who controls the world as Lord
samprasàda˙, which is translated by Gambhirananda as “the fully
serene one.”42 However, as noted above in the discussion of the
words •aákara uses for grace or synonyms for grace, prasàda has
both the sense of tranquillity and of graciousness.43 Thus samprasàda˙
as used in the present context could be translated as “the fully serene
and gracious one.”
In VII.17.1 the jìva’s need to transcend itself and receive through
grace what it cannot attain through its own effort alone is expressed
by •aákara as follows: “Moreover, that realisation of the Truth is
not achieved unless there is an enquiry about it and prayer ( pràrthi-
taá) for it.”44 What Gambhirananda translates as “prayer” is, in its
most basic meaning, “wish, desire,” from the root pràrth, “to wish
or long for, desire; to ask a person for.”45 Thus it is not clear whether
•aákara includes the idea of petition to a personal Lord within the
more general sense of longing to know the highest truth. We shall
return to the subject of prayer later in this chapter in Ka†ha Upanißad
I.2.23, a central ≤ruti text.
39
See, for example, the discussion on BrSùBh I.2.13 in VIII.B.5 above.
40
G. tr. 395. The words ì≤vara and “Lord” have been added in parentheses to
G.’s translation for greater accuracy. See TPU 500, lines 1–2.
41
G. tr. 596. See TPU 575, lines 20–21.
42
G. tr. 596. See TPU 575, line 18.
43
See VII.A above.
44
G. tr. 554. See TPU 559, line 27.
45
See MW 708, col. 3.
    299
In IV.15.5 •aákara appears to take a stand against the reality of

divine grace. The Upanißad speaks of the path taken by the deceased
to the world of Brahma. •aákara makes it clear that the goal indi-
cated in this verse is not the highest human goal, i.e. the attainment
of brahman, because, as has been said before the realization of brah-
man does not involve a going anywhere, since brahman is omnipresent.
This verse of the Chàndogya Upanißad describes the journey of the
ascending traveller, which leads him to the sun, moon and beyond.
•aákara understands all references to light here as indicating vari-
ous deities. The Upanißad also declares that the traveller is finally
accompanied by “some superhuman being” ( purußa˙ amànava˙).46 Thus
the traveller is helped along to the attainment of a higher sphere of
being by the various gods and by the mysterious superhuman being.
At this point •aákara remarks on the sheer illogicality involved
in imagining that brahman might be attained through a heavenly jour-
ney. Ultimately, one attains brahman by becoming brahman, not by
going to brahman. (BrUp IV.4.6) The attainment of brahman, says
•aákara, “comes through the eradication of all differences.” He con-
tinues: “Moreover, there is no other unseen path which can serve
(a man who has not realised the absolute Brahman) for proceeding
(to It), because there is the other Vedic text, ‘He (God, the supreme
Self ) who has not been realised does not protect (help) (bhunakti) this
one (to reach the Supreme).”47
•aákara does not identify the Vedic text upon which he is draw-
ing nor explain what he means. He seems to be saying first of all
that no spatial path could be of any use for the seeker of liberation,
because brahman is not the goal of any such journey. Further, the
Vedic text •aákara quotes appears to teach that one is not pro-
tected by the Self until the Self is realized, or, as Gambhirananda
interprets, the Self does not help one reach the highest goal. But
from all that •aákara has said so far about the gracious nature of
the Absolute, this last statement is quite baffling. Could it be that
•aákara means the following?
Neither this nor any other path leads upward to brahman. What
the seeker of liberation must therefore do is realize the truth of the
unity of àtman-brahman. This realization, which does not include any
46
G. tr. 298.
47
G. tr. 299. See TPU 462, lines 16–17. The text reads: na càd‰ß†o margo’ga-
manàyopatiß†hate ’sa enamavidito na bhunakti’ iti ≤rutyantaràt.
300  
kind of departure or going, may be ‘accomplished’ instantaneously

through knowledge. One must not therefore expect the Lord to
accompany one on the path to a higher spacial sphere if that jour-
ney is of no avail for liberation. Thus the context of this interpre-
tation is all-important. Since •aákara’s point is to contrast realization
through knowledge with a physical ascent, he need not be seen to
deny divine help altogether, but rather an understanding of grace
that functions to make possible a liberation understood as the goal
of a spacial journey.
It would, of course, be helpful to know the source of •aákara’s
Vedic text. How is bhunakti understood in the original context? Has
•aákara altered its sense? What exactly does •aákara mean by
quoting a text which declares that “He who has not been realised
does not protect”? Could avidita˙, “realized,” not be better translated
as “without the knowledge of,”48 i.e. knowledge in a theoretical sense?
This would harmonize well with what •aákara is known to say
about soteriology elsewhere. The new meaning would be: “He does
not protect who is not first correctly known (through ≤ruti and the
teacher).” Only the correct understanding of brahman, gained through
the triple-process of ≤rava»a, manana and nididhyàsana, leads with cer-
tainty to liberation. The seeker of liberation needs the protection of
the true teaching about brahman, which will culminate in the expe-
rience of non-duality. Such an understanding contradicts the notion
that brahman is attained by a going-to.
b. The Teacher
VI.14.1–2 relates the parable of a man with eyes bound, brought to
a remote place and left to seek the return to his homeland. The
man shouts in all directions for help. Someone comes along who
removes the bandage from the man’s eyes and instructs him to jour-
ney in the proper direction to his home. In the same way, teaches
the Upanißad, a man requires the instruction of a teacher in order
to become liberated.
It is remarkable that in his commentary on this text •aákara adds
the words “kind-hearted” or “merciful” five times to describe the
nature of the teacher, when the ≤ruti verse itself does not. •aákara
writes that it was a “kind-hearted” (kàru»ika˙) man who removed the
48
See MW 108, col. 3.
    301
bandage from the other man’s eyes.49 Again, the first man was “freed
from bondage by the kind man (kàru»ikena);”50 he was “somehow
(kathañcit) liberated by some kind man (karunikena).”51 In the same
way, when a person is bound by ignorance and crying out for help,
it may happen “somehow” (kathañcit) that sufferer comes across a
“supremely kind” ( paramakàru»ikaá) knower of brahman, fully liber-
ated, who instructs him as to the source of his pain, namely attach-
ment to the things of this world.52 Finally, it is through the teacher’s
compassion (kàru»ya) that the seeker of liberation “becomes dispas-
sionate towards all objects of the world.”53
When •aákara speaks of the liberator in the parable he uses the
word kàru»ika˙, but he describes the spiritual teacher as paramakàru»ika˙.
Thus the instruction given by the spiritual guide is the more mer-
ciful, since the pain of ignorance of one’s true self is greater than
that of being physically lost in an area far removed from one’s home-
land.
•aákara also states that this mercy would be ineffective if its
receiver were not “an intelligent man who was able to understand
the path . . . as instructed by others” and if the man did not have a
powerful longing for liberation.54
Such a teacher is able to show the way to liberation, because he
himself is “God-like” (bhagavàn). (VII.26.2)55 He is able to take the
disciple “to the other shore of the sea of sorrow, with the help of
the raft of knowledge of the Self.”56
c. The Gods
In the story of the encounter between a man named Baka and a
pack of dogs, a narrative not directly concerned with liberation,57
•aákara adds that the white dog who approached the man was
49
G. tr. 486. See TPU 535, line 1.
50
51
52
See TPU 535, lines 15–17 and G.’s tr. 487–488, which neglects to translate
the parama of paramakàru»ikaá into “supremely kind.”
53
G. tr. 488. See TPU 535, lines 16–17.
54
G. tr. 486–487. See TPU 535, lines 2–4 and 7.
55
See G. tr. 570.
56
G. tr. 509. See TPU 543, lines 8–9.
57
S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanißads (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989),
358 calls ChUp I.12.1–5 “a satirical protest against the externalism of the sacrificial
creed, in the interests of an inward spiritual life.”
302  
none other than “some deity or some ‰ßi,” in canine form, who,
pleased with Baka’s study, had come to bestow a favor (anugrahàrthaá).
(I.12.2)58 This favor was food. We note here that the favor given
was a response to Baka’s previous effort.
In III.11.1 •aákara states that the sun, who appears to be a sym-
bol of brahman, helps (anugraha) the creatures experience the results
of their actions, by rising and setting.59 Radhakrishnan adds by way
of paraphrase, “when these experiences have ended the sun takes
the creatures unto himself.”60
Similar to the story of Baka and the white dog (I.12.2), IV.5.1
begins the account of a meeting between a man named Satyakàma
and a talking bull. •aákara explains this to be possible because the
god air (vàyu) had entered the bull, being pleased that Satyakàma
“had attained perfection through faith and austerity.” Vàyu’s inten-
tion was to favor (anugrahàya) the man.61 He does this in vv. 2 and
3 by explaining what brahman is like and by teaching Satyakàma how
to meditate on this teaching. Again, this favor is granted as a response
to human effort.
In the final passage, IV.10.4, the fires tended by the youth Upakosala
themselves instruct him as to the truth of brahman. •aákara adds
that they do this because they are “filled with compassion” (kàru»ya).62
Their compassion appears to be kindled by Upakosala’s service, devo-
tion, sorrow, asceticism and faith.63 Once again, the grace of instruc-
tion is a response to a prior effort or suffering condition.
3. Taittirìya-Upanißad-Bhàßya
This commentary more frequently emphasizes the value of prayer
than either the B‰UpBh or the ChUpBh had done. There is no
mention of the grace of scripture, and references to the grace or
compassion of the teacher are less frequent.
58
G. tr. 89. See TPU 384, lines 12–13.
59
See G. tr. 186 and TPU 419, lines 6–7.
60
Radhakrishnan 386.
61
See G. tr. 269 and TPU 451, lines 8–10.
62
G. tr. 283. See TPU 456, lines 12–13.
63
See G. tr. 283.
    303
a. brahman-ì≤vara-Om
•aákara begins his commentary by offering salutations to brahman,
which is of the nature of consciousness and from which the world
arises, is sustained, and into which it dissolves.64 Soon after, in I.1.1,
which is a litany of prayers to various gods as well as to brahman for
the purpose of removing all obstacles to liberating knowledge, •aákara
offers a petition to brahman as Vàyu, the god of air. This brahman is
the pratyakßam brahma, the “direct and immediate Brahman,” not the
Absolute beyond all name and form:65 “May that, the all-pervasive
Brahman, called Vàyu, being thus prayed to by me who hanker
after knowledge, avatu màm, protect me—by endowing me with knowl-
edge. May that very Brahman protect the expounder—by endow-
ing him with the power of exposition.”66
Thus brahman is held to respond to prayer by granting both knowl-
edge and the ability to transmit true teaching to others. We may
note that such a conception of “protecting,” in the sense of endow-
ing with knowledge, harmonizes well with the alternative interpre-
tation of ChUp IV.15.5 offered in the previous section.
In I.4.2 •aákara, in dependence on ≤ruti, again takes up the theme
of meditation on Om, which is everlasting and unoriginated, the sym-
bol of brahman. Here the prayer articulated by ≤ruti is for wealth and
mental vigor or intelligence (medhà),67 perhaps even wisdom,68 but it
is also a prayer for immortality. This same Om is also Indra and the
parame≤vara. In the following quotation, •aákara reworks and expands
a simple ≤ruti prayer for intelligence and immortality: “He, the Om, . . .
which is indra˙, the ordainer of all desires, the supreme Lord; sp‰»otu,
may (He) gratify or strengthen—for the strength of wisdom is the
object prayed for—me, with wisdom. Deva, O God, may I become
the wearer of immortality—of the knowledge of Brahman which is
the cause of immortality, this being the context of that knowledge.”69
Thus •aákara has turned a prayer for immortality specifically into
a prayer for liberation that comes from the knowledge of brahman.
•aákara next comments on I.4.3, which calls on the “gracious
64
See TPU 258, lines 5–6 and tr. in EU I:223.
65
Tr. EU I:230. See TPU 260, lines 21–22.
66
67
See MW 833, col. 1.
68
See tr. in EU I:239.
69
Tr. EU I:239–240. See TPU 264, lines 2–4.
304  
Lord” (bhaga)70 to enter into and be entered by the devotee, to purify

of sin, and to reveal himself. The Lord is compared to a house of
rest ( prative≤a˙). •aákara does not add anything substantially new to
the text except to closely link the removal of sins to the peace of
liberation. Devotion to the Lord plays an important role here in the
removal of sin:
Thus to those who are devoted to you are like a rest-house, a place
where all sorrows resulting from sin can be removed. Therefore towards
me you reveal yourself and reach me through and through—make me
full of you and identified with you as a metal is when soaked in mer-
cury. The prayer for prosperity is dealt with in this context of knowl-
edge for the sake of wealth; for wealth is needed for rites, and rites
are calculated to diminish accumulated sins, on the exhaustion of
which knowledge becomes revealed. Supporting this view there is this
Sm‰ti: “Just as one sees oneself on the clean surface of a mirror, so
knowledge arises for man on the exhaustion of sin” (Mbh.•à.204.8;
Garu∂a.I.237.6).71
Thus, •aákara in no way takes away the force of the powerful bhakti
statement of the ≤ruti verse he comments on; indeed •aákara affirms
that as a result of devotion to the Lord all sorrow and sin are
removed. Through the help of the Lord the devotee is made pure
enough to allow true knowledge of brahman to dawn. This idea of
mind-purification using the metaphor of a mirror is employed again
by •aákara in his commentary on Mu»∂aka Upanißad III.1.8.72
One important passage on the Lord’s grace remains to be dis-
cussed in the present bhàßya, one that rivals •aákara’s statements in
BrSùBh II.3.41 and III.2.5 in importance. This is found in •aákara’s
commentary on I.11.4. The entire section I.11.1–4 is devoted, accord-
ing to Karl Potter, to a lengthy discussion between •aákara and his
imaginary opponents “as to whether liberation comes from action
alone, or from action assisted by knowledge, or from a combination
of action and knowledge, or from knowledge assisted by action, or
from knowledge alone.”73
70
See MW 743, col. 2. Both MW and Radhakrishnan 531 translate bhaga as
“gracious Lord,” whereas Gambhirananda in EU I:242 renders the term “adorable
One” and “venerable One.”
71
72
See the discussion below in the present chapter.
73
K. Potter, Advaita Vedànta up to •aákara and His Pupils (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1981), 207.
    305
•aákara excludes all proposals that would modify the Advaitic

axiom that liberation is attained through knowledge alone, but at
the same time he professes the usefulness of certain practices and
virtues that help clear away the obstacles to liberating knowledge
and which inculcate in the seeker the right mental framework for
becoming enlightened. In other words, •aákara makes some things
auxiliary to the rise of knowledge. His final opponent misunderstands
him to be acknowledging the capacity of rites and actions (karmas)
to bring about liberation of themselves, without recourse to under-
standing the truth of scripture. Since •aákara had declared that the
practice of the karmas is beneficial to the rise of knowledge, and since
karmas, properly performed, take away sins, could it not be, asks the
opponent, that the total removal of sins through the performance of
the karmas automatically brings about liberation?74
In his answer, which is at the same time a summary of his posi-
tion and the conclusion of the entire discussion, •aákara surpris-
ingly mentions the Lord’s grace (ì≤varaprasàda) for the first time:
No, for there is no restrictive rule that knowledge arises from the mere
elimination of the obstructions alone, and not from the grace of God
(ì≤varaprasàda) or the practice of austerity, meditation, etc.; for (as a
matter of fact) non-injury, celibacy, etc., are aids to enlightenment;
and hearing (≤rava»a), thinking (manana), and meditating (nididhyàsana)
are the direct causes of it. Hereby is established the need of other
stages of life, and it is also proved that people in all stages of life can
aspire for knowledge, and that the supreme goal is attainable through
knowledge alone.75
What •aákara clearly does not say is that liberation comes through
grace instead of through knowledge However, he does say that knowl-
edge arises from the grace of the Lord and,76 or along with, certain
spiritual practices. There is nothing in the discussion so far that
would constrain •aákara to make mention of the Lord’s grace as a
factor in the rise of knowledge. It is therefore all the more striking
that he does so. He does not, however, explain just how divine grace
operates in the process of liberation, but he does place prasàda at
the head of his list of factors leading to enlightenment. Only after
74
See EU I:282.
75
76
There is no “or” in the Sanskrit text. Rather “grace,” “austerity,” and “med-
itation” are joined together in one compound.
306  
refering to grace does he make mention of austerity and meditation.

His emphasis, moreover, in answer to the opponent’s query regard-
ing the necessity of knowing scripture, is that ≤rava»a, manana, and
nididhyàsana are the “cause” (kàra»a) of enlightenment. This three-step
process must be applied to scripture if liberation is to occur.
b. The Teacher
After beginning his bhàßya with a salutation to brahman, •aákara
immediately salutes “those adorable Teachers (gurubhi˙) by whom was
explained this Upanißad in the past.”77 He then expresses his inten-
tion to compose a commentary on the essence of the Taittirìya Upanißad
for the benefit of others. •aákara attributes his understanding of
this ≤ruti text to “the grace of my teacher” (mayàcàryaprasàdata˙),78 who
tradition claims to be Govinda. •aákara does not refer to his teacher
by name, but rather simply expresses his indebtedness to him.
No mention of the gracious role of the teacher is made for the
remainder of the bhàßya until near the conclusion, in III.10.5. There
a description is given of the behavior of the man who has realized
brahman. He wanders about the earth, perceiving his unity with all
things, since the Self he has realized is the Self of all. He sings the
truth about àtman-brahman. He becomes a blessing for the world: “He
continues declaring the unity of the Self as also announcing, for the
good of others (lokànugrahàrthaá), the result of that knowledge con-
sisting in absolute contentment.”79
Though the word “teacher” is not used here, •aákara’s descrip-
tion surely applies to the realized àcàrya.
c. The Gods
Returning to I.1.1,80 the litany of prayers to various gods and to
brahman, •aákara remarks on the role of the gods on the path to
liberation: “Since the comprehension, retention, and communication
of knowledge of Brahman can proceed when the gods are benevo-
lent (sukhak‰tsu) their benignity (sukhakart‰tvaá) is being prayed for.”81
As mentioned above on this same verse, Íaákara appears to iden-
77
Introduction to TaiUp. Tr. EU I:223. See TPU 258, lines 7–8.
78
Tr. EU I:223. See TPU 258, line 9.
79
80
See above under “brahman-ì≤vara-Om.”
81
    307
tify the gods with brahman, so that their power is the power of brah-
man. Yet this identification breaks down when we recall that the
benevolence of the gods is sometimes called into doubt. (BrUpBh
I.4.10) In the passage now quoted a helping attitude must first be
prayed for if the gods are to be propitious. By contrast, there is no
indication by •aákara that brahman-ì≤vara’s relationship to creatures
is in any way ambivalent.
For a discussion of the role of the god Indra, who is identified
with Om and the parame≤vara in I.4.2, see above.82
d. Prayer
By now it has been made clear just how important prayer is in the
Taittirìya Upanißad and for •aákara, who is quick to offer his sup-
port for the practice whenever possible. There are prayers to the
gods and to brahman in I.1.1 that liberation may be finally attained,
and also to the Lord in I.4.3 for the removal of sin and sorrow. In
I.3.1 •aákara remarks as follows on the ≤ruti’s prayer for fame and
spiritual pre-eminence: “This is an expression of a prayer on the
part of the pupil. For in the case of a pupil a prayer is appropri-
ate, since his aspiration still remains unrealised. But this is not a
prayer of the teacher, as he has gained the desired consummation.
For a teacher is called so when his aspiration is fulfilled.83
Thus •aákara closely links liberation with prayer. One prays for
liberation, but when realization occurs the prayer ceases, as the peti-
tion has been fulfilled.
On II.1.1 •aákara remarks: “An unobstructed acquisition of the
knowledge of the Self is being prayed for (à≤àsyate), since the supreme
goal ( paraá ≤reya) is dependent on (tanmùlaá) that enlightenment.”84
In particular, it is a prayer “for averting the obstacles to the acqui-
sition of the knowledge of brahman.”85 We see here, then, that liber-
ation is dependent on knowledge, but we also note that prayer, and
by implication the divine response to that prayer, makes possible the
removal of obstacles to true knowledge as well as the emergence of
that knowledge itself.
82
See “brahman-ì≤vara-Om” above.
83
84
85
Tr. EU I:284, 285. See TPU 280, lines 13–14 and 20.
308  
e. Practices
It is not only brahman-ì≤vara, the àcàrya and the gods who benefit the
seeker of liberation with their dispensation of grace; •aákara uses
much the same language to describe the propitiousness or grace of
the seeker’s own actions and practices, both past and present. In
I.4.3, as already seen, devotion to the Lord is regarded as beneficent
to the sàdhaka. But in other passages as well, in particular II.11.4,
•aákara speaks of the religious practices of former lives being of
great help for the sàdhaka in the present life. Such practices ensure
the emergence of a mind more predisposed to enlightenment in the
next rebirth, a mind more detached from the objects of worldly con-
cern, “owing to the tendencies (saáskàrebhyo˙) created in the past
lives”: “For (the dispassionate man) there is the favourableness ensured
by practices in his previous lives ( janmàntarak‰tànugrahàt) . . . The kar-
mas such as Agnihotra, as also the practices of celibacy etc., under-
taken in the past lives, become helpful (anugrahàkam) to the rise of
knowledge, because of which fact, some are seen to be non-attached
to the world from their very birth, while others are seen to be
engaged in karma, attached to the world, and averse to enlighten-
ment . . . Non-injury, celibacy, etc. are aids to enlightenment; and
hearing, thinking, and meditating are the direct causes of it.”86
4. Ì≤a-Upanißad-Bhàßya
This is •aákara’s shortest commentary on any Upanißad. The Ì≤aUp

itself consists of only eighteen verses, by far the briefest of the prin-
cipal Upanißads. Verses 15–18 are a repeat of B‰Up V.15.1, which
was discussed above,87 and which, according to R. Panikkar “seem
to have no direct link with the rest of the (Ì≤a) Upanißad. According to
tradition they are a prayer for a dying person, followed by prayers
to Agni, to the Sun, and to Pùßan.”88 In what follows I shall empha-
size what •aákara adds here in his commentary on verses 15–18
in comparison to what he has already stated in his commentary on
the parallel text, B‰Up V.15.1. It is in commenting on these verses
86
Tr. EU I:281, 282. See TPU 29, lines 2–7, 14–16.
87
See the present chapter, section A.1.c.
88
R. Panikkar, The Vedic Experience (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977),
799.
    309
that •aákara makes his statements about the graciousness of the

Absolute.
It is necessary to point out that these ≤ruti verses make no clear
ontological distinction between the Lord and the gods. Verses 15–18,
although loosely attached to the previous fourteen verses, as Panikkar
has noted, do carry forth essentially the same theme of the unity of
divine transcendence and immanence that marks this Upanißad as a
whole.89
In B‰Up V.15.1 •aákara had introduced this text by saying that
the dying man “is praying to the sun.”90 Yet when •aákara intro-
duces this same text at the end of his commentary on Ì≤aUp 14, he
expressly declares that the prayer is directed to the àtman. The man
“prays at the time of death to the Self, for the door leading to the
Self ” (àtmànamàtmana˙ pràptidvàraá yàcate).91 It is impossible to know
which of these commentaries •aákara wrote first, assuming that he
is indeed the author of the Ì≤aUpBh. If the Ì≤aUpBh does not man-
ifest a development in •aákara’s thinking over that of the B‰UpBh,
then one may perhaps at least conclude that •aákara more explic-
itly identifies in the Ì≤aUpBh who the addressee of the prayer is than
he had done in the B‰UpBh: A prayer to the sun? That means a
prayer to the Self.
In both Ì≤aUpBh 15 and in B‰UpBh V.15.1 •aákara identifies
brahman as the truth which is concealed.
In both Ì≤aUpBh 16 and in B‰UpBh V.15.1 •aákara states that
Pùßan, who is the sun and nourisher, is also Yama, controller of
everything, as well as Sùrya, acquirer of all life, who is in turn iden-
tical to “the son of Prajàpati.”92 Again, •aákara’s two commentaries
converge in the prayer to the divinity that the sun’s rays may be
withdrawn, so that, in the words of the Upanißad, “that form of
thine which is most benign (kalyà»atamaá)” may be seen. In both
instances •aákara speaks of the dazzling blinding radiance of the
divine that prevents its most gracious form from being seen.
It is here that the two commentaries again diverge over the word
àtman. Whereas in the B‰UpBh •aákara identifies the radiant one
as “the Lord of all beings,” or, too, Hira»yagarbha, the one who is
89
Panikkar 798–799.
90
91
92
310  
implored to remove his dazzling rays, in his bhàßya on Ì≤aUp 16

•aákara declares this benign one to be the àtman. He directly declares
the Self to be the giver of grace: “That which is thy most benign,
most graceful, form, that I shall see by thy grace, who art the Self ”
(tavàtmana˙ prasàdàt).93 Here, in the Ì≤aUp, •aákara does not declare
ì≤vara to be the giver of grace, but rather the àtman itself.
In the next sentence •aákara goes on to say, “Moreover, I do
not entreat thee like a servant (bh‰tya); the Person who is there, in
the solar orb . . . that Person am I (sa˙ aham asmi ).”94 •aákara uses
similar language in BhGBh V.10; there he declares that the igno-
rant man who dedicates all his actions to brahman-ì≤vara performs
those actions with the idea, “I am working for Him, as a servant
(bh‰tya) does everything for his master.”95 The benefit of such action
will be the purification of the jìva. Unfortunately, as is so often the
case in regard to the relation between human entreaty and the oper-
ation of divine grace, •aákara does not offer a full-fledged theology
of grace to explain what he means in Ì≤aUp 16. However, if we
look to BhGBh V.10 as an aid to understanding Ì≤aUp 16, it appears
that for •aákara one ought not approach the Lord or the self for
the grace of realization as a servant approaches a master, precisely
because—on the highest level of awareness, not on the plane of
ignorance—the Self is not to be objectified and regarded as an other.
There are, ultimately speaking, not two selves; there is only the one
Self that must be realized. In other words, the seeker must think:
Although I do not yet experience myself as liberated, I know that I
am in fact eternally liberated. The veil of ignorance need only be
removed, for by nature I am always free. That is why I do not
entreat thee as does a servant, for thou and I are not-two.
At the conclusion of B‰UpBh V.15.1 •aákara attributes the removal
of evil to the grace of the Lord. In the corresponding text in the
Ì≤aUp, v. 18, •aákara remarks that sin is removed by Agni, who
•aákara had identified in the previous verse as brahman. But •aákara
does not explicitly refer to grace in this context.
Thus, in his Ì≤a-Upanißad-Bhàßya •aákara clearly teaches the efficacy
of the grace of the highest Self for the Self-realization of the seeker.
93
Tr. EU I:25. See TPU 11, lines 24–25. For the parallel text in B‰UpBh V.15.1
see TPU 975, lines 3–7, tr. Madhavananda 599.
94
Tr. EU I:25. See TPU 11, line 25 to 12, line 3.
95
GP 152, lines 28–30. G. tr. 249. See also BhGBh III.36, XI.54; BrSùBh II.3.43,
IV.4.9.
    311
5. Kena-Upanißad-Bhàßya
•aákara is supposed to have written two commentaries on the Kena

Upanißad, the one called the “word” ( pada) and the other the “sen-
tence” (vàkya) bhàßya. The former is most accepted by scholars as
authentic and is the focus of the present analysis.96 I shall limit my
remarks here to •aákara’s commentary on III.1–2, 12.
The KenaUp professes: “It was Brahman, indeed, that achieved
victory for the sake of the gods.” (III.1)97 •aákara states that this
was a victory of the gods over the devils; he is perhaps referring to
B‰Up I.3.1–7.98 •aákara declares this brahman to be “the ruler in
every way, the supreme Deity ( paro deva˙) of even the deities, the
supreme Lord (ì≤vara) over the lordly beings, inscrutable (durvijñeya),
the cause of victory of the gods, and the cause of the defeat of the
devils.”99 This brahman is the “supreme Brahman” ( paraá brahma).100
Here the Lord and the highest brahman are synonymous terms.
KenaUp III.2 continues: “They thought, ‘Ours, indeed, is this vic-
tory; ours, indeed, is this glory.’ Brahman knew this pretension of
theirs. To them He did appear. They could not make out about
that thing, as to what this Yakßa (venerable Being) might be.”101
Thus the gods pride themselves on the victory over the devils, not
realizing that it was in fact the victory of brahman. In the words of
•aákara, the gods did not know that “this victory and this glory
belonged to God (ì≤vara) who sits in the hearts as the indwelling Self
( pratyagàtmana)—omniscient, dispenser of the fruits of all works of all
creatures (sarvakriyàphalasaáyojayitu˙ prà»inàá), omnipotent, and desirous
of encompassing the stability of the world ( jagata˙ sthitiá cikìrßorayaá).”102
Here •aákara very clearly makes àtman-ì≤vara the one source of
the appropriate fruits for all creaturely action as also the source of
the world’s continued maintenance. •aákara’s profession thereby not
only serves to identify the one to whom true Lordship belongs; it
also serves as a reminder of the graciousness of this absolute Lord.
96
See Potter 281.
97
98
Tr. EU I:69. See TPU 30, lines 7–8 and R. E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal
Upanishads (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), 337 note 4.
99
100
101
Tr. EU I:70–71. See TPU 30, lines 2 and 22–23.
102
312  
It therefore also provides a useful introduction to •aákara’s next

more heightened declaration of the Lord’s grace. •aákara notes that
brahman does not simply leave the gods to their conceit and ignor-
ance: “Brahman surely knew that deliberation of those whose thoughts
were being directed by a false self-conceit . . . Noticing this false pride
of the gods, and thinking, ‘In order that the gods may not be thus
defeated like the devils, as a consequence of their vainglory (mithyàb-
himàna), I shall, out of grace (anukampayà) for them, favour (anug‰h»ìyàm)
the gods by removing their presumptuousness (mithyàbhimàna).’ ”103
Here the Lord does not respond to any kind of petition, but him-
self initiates the movement back to true knowledge. Of course, this
is the teaching of the Upanißad itself, and •aákara does not choose
to contradict it by declaring that the gods had in some way first
implored brahman to be graciously disposed to them. What •aákara,
however, clearly does add to the ≤ruti text is to openly affirm the
grace of the highest brahman and to define the effect of this grace as
the removal of pride and false self-understanding. Brahman’s motiva-
tion for doing this is to prevent the gods from being ruined. Brahman
does this out of sympathy or compassion (anukampayà) for them.
Finally, the way brahman concretely favors the gods and removes
their presumption is by making himself visible “through an unprece-
dentedly wonderful and astonishing form created by Brahman’s own
power of Màyà;” brahman “appeared as an object of perception to
the senses of the gods.”104
The word yoga must be substituted for Gambhirananda’s màyà in
this last quote, as the text reads svayoga rather than svamàyà.105 It is
through brahman’s yoga that brahman makes himself visible to the gods
in an amazing form. It is possible that •aákara is drawing here on
the miraculous manifestation of the “Lord of Yoga” ( yoge≤vara) in
Bhagavad-Gìtà XI. Here, through the Lord’s yoga, Arjuna sees the
entire differentiated universe manifested in the unity of the one divine
form, and also sees the plurality of gods in the body of the one God
(deva).106
Still, after this miraculous and gracious display of glory and power,
the gods, according to the KenaUp, did not understand who or what
103
104
Tr. EU I:71–72. See TPU 31, lines 1–2.
105
See TPU 31, line 1.
106
See especially BhG XI.13, 15.
    313
this strange being might be. How did, then, brahman’s grace finally
take effect? Brahman is finally revealed to the gods, starting with
Indra, by a mysterious figure, the “superbly charming woman” Umà
Haimavatì. (III.12, IV.1).107 According to Radhakrishnan, Umà is
“wisdom personified . . . the Wisdom that dispel’s Indra’s ignorance.
Mere knowledge untouched by divine grace will not do.”108 •aákara
states that Umà is knowledge (vidyà), obviously the knowledge of brah-
man. He writes that Umà made her appearance to Indra, which is
another way of saying that knowledge of brahman dawned on Indra,
and this happened because Umà understood and accepted Indra’s
devotion (bhakti) to brahman’s incomprehensible form ( yakßa).109 Thus,
•aákara makes devotion, at least in the present context, a prereq-
uisite for receiving the knowledge of brahman, which comes to the
recipient as a grace.
In his Kena-Upanißad-Bhàßya, then, •aákara attributes grace to the
highest brahman and also makes the dawning of liberating knowledge
and the removal of avidyà dependent on divine grace.
6. Aitareya-Upanißad-Bhàßya
Here I shall examine •aákara’s views as expressed in I.2.5, I.3.1,

and I.3.13. These passages deal with the favor of the supreme Lord
and the supreme compassion of the liberated teacher.
a. ì≤vara
The beginning of the Aitareya Upanißad presents a myth of the cre-
ation of the cosmic person or universe from the àtman. After their
creation the gods are homeless until they are sent by the Lord to
be the presiding deities of the various functions of the human per-
son. Fire becomes the speech of the human mouth, the sun becomes
human vision etc. But Hunger and Thirst, who are not deities,
implore the creator God to find a home for them, too. They are
then assigned to the gods, and will henceforth have a share in the
oblations offered to the gods by humans. According to this Upanißad,
the creator says to Hunger and Thirst, “I assign you (àbhajàmi vàá)
107
Tr. EU I:76–78.
108
Radhakrishnan 589.
109
314  
a place in these divinities.”110 •aákara understands this to mean “I

favour (anug‰h»àmi ) you by assigning your livelihood. I make you
sharers among these gods.”111 Thus •aákara takes an existing ≤ruti
verse and strengthens its affirmation of the Lord’s (ì≤vara) mercy by
explicitly professing the favor of God.
In his commentary on the next verse, I.3.1, which records the
Lord creating food for the deities, •aákara notes that this “Great
Lord” (mahe≤vara) is not compelled to be so gracious to his creatures,
just as human lords act with great sovereignty in deciding whether
to act with favor or disfavor: “Thus is seen in the world the inde-
pendence (svàtantryam) of lordly persons (ì≤varà»àm) with regard to
extending favour (anugraha) or disfavour (nigraha) to their own peo-
ple. Therefore the supreme Lord (mahe≤vara), too, has independence
(svàtantryam) in the matter of favouring (anugraha) or disfavouring
(nigraha) all, since He is the Lord of all (sarve≤vara).”112
This is a clear statement by •aákara that the supreme Lord is
completely sovereign in his dispensation of grace to the creature.
•aákara does not say that the Lord ever does in fact withhold his
grace, but he does say that the Lord is free to do so. The Lord’s
grace cannot be forced.

The same story continues. The creator of the universe enters into
the human body for the purpose of self-realization. For, after hav-
ing created the human body and assigned to it the various presid-
ing deities, the Lord was still left with the following dilemma: “If
speaking is through speech, if breathing is through breath, if seeing
is through the eyes, hearing is through the ears, if touching is through
the skin, if meditation is through the mind, if breathing out is through
the outbreath, if emission is through the generative organ, then who
am I? (I.3.11)”113
Two verses later the embodied self attains the realization of its
identity with brahman. Yet how self-realization occurred to the indi-
vidual self is not said. The Upanißad simply declares: “He realized
this very Purußa as Brahman, the most pervasive, thus: ‘I have real-
110
Tr. Radhakrishnan 517. See TPU 334, line 11.
111
Tr. EU II:33. See TPU 334, lines 17–20.
112
113
Tr. Radhakrishnan 519. See TPU 336, lines 11–14.
    315
ized this.’ ”114 •aákara provides a solution to the question of how

self-realization was achieved by introducing the role of the teacher
into his bhàßya: “When, by good luck (kadàcit),115 a teacher of supreme
compassion ( paramakàru»ikenàcàrye»a) beat near his ears the drum of
the great sayings of the Upanißads (vedànta) whose notes were cal-
culated to wake up the knowledge of the Self, then the individual
realized this very Purußa (as Brahman)—the Purußa that is being dis-
cussed as the Lord of creation etc., who is called Purußa because of
residence in the city (of the heart).” (1.3.13)116
Thus realization was attained with the help of the teacher who
awakened the seeker through scripture. It is likely that for •aákara
the teacher initially attempts to awaken the seeker by simply declar-
ing the mahàvàkyas such as “That thou art” or “I am brahman.” In
the event that this fails to bring about the desired result the teacher
would then proceed to guide the seeker along the path of a grad-
ual assimilation of the meaning of ≤ruti through the three-fold process
of ≤rava»a, manana, and nididhyàsana. In any case the teacher is moti-
vated by pity or compassion (karu»a); in fact, as •aákara states, the
teacher is “supremely compassionate” ( paramakàru»ika). Yet without
the revelation provided by scripture, the teacher is ineffective.
•aákara remarks in his introduction to II.1 that the story just
told of the Self-creator who enters into his creation is not to be
taken literally. Obviously the Absolute is not to be localized, since
it is omnipresent, and it is certainly not deficient in knowledge. The
point of the story is the message propagated in various ways by all
the Upanißads. “It is well known in all the Upanißads (sarvopanißat)
that from the knowledge of the unity of the Self (aikàtmyasvarùpa-
parijñànàttu) follows immortality (am‰tatvaá) as a result.”117
7. Pra≤na-Upanißad-Bhàßya
I shall briefly examine here •aákara’s bhàßya on V.2. Verses V.1–7

of the Pra≤na Upanißad take up the question as to what worlds are
attained through meditation on Om. The conclusion is that all spir-
114
Tr. EU II:43. See TPU 338, line 4.
115
Or “at some time or other.” See MW 248, col. 1.
116
AiUpBh I.3.13. Tr. EU II:43. See TPU 338, lines 9–11.
117
Tr. EU II:46. See TPU 339, line 18. On •aákara’s view of Upanißadic cre-
ation accounts, see III.D above.
316  
itual realities are known through Om, including the highest brahman
( paraá brahma).
PrUp V.2 in particular declares that both the higher ( paraá) and
lower (aparaá) brahman are Om. “Therefore the illumined soul attains
either of the two through this one means alone.”118
•aákara comments on this ≤ruti verse extolling meditation on Om
in words reminiscent of B‰UpBh V.1.1 and ChUpBh I.1.1 and II.24.1:
This very Brahman, that is both superior and inferior ( paraá ca aparaá
ca)—the superior being that which is Truth (satyam) and Immutable
(akßaraá) and is called Purußa; and the inferior being the First Born
( prathamajaá), called Prà»a, is but Om; being identical with Om, since
Om is Its symbol ( pratìka). As the supreme Brahman cannot be (directly)
indicated by words etc. and is devoid of all distinctions created by
attributes—and as It is (on that account) beyond the senses—therefore
the mind cannot explore It. But to those who meditate on Om, which
is comparable to the images ( pratimà) of Viß»u and others (viß»vàdi )
and on which is fixed the idea of Brahman with devotion (bhakti), that
Brahman becomes favourable ( prasìdati ) (and reveals Itself ). This is
understood on the authority of scriptures. Similar is the case with the
inferior Brahman.119
•aákara’s emphasis here is on the paraá, not the aparaá, brahman,
which is beyond all words and thought. The supreme reality is
unknowable to unaided human effort and enquiry; what is required
is brahman’s perfect symbol Om for true knowledge to dawn. Yet even
meditation on Om with devotion will not suffice to bring about the
liberating knowledge of brahman, according to •aákara; brahman must
become favorable to the seeker if it is to be known at all. Thus we
are left with the curious and paradoxical teaching that the highest
reality, changeless and unthinkable, must become graciously disposed
to the devotee if true knowledge is to dawn. Here brahman takes on
both the so-called “personal” and “impersonal” traits, without the
one predominating over the other.
We note, too, •aákara’s reference to meditation on Viß»u under
various images, a reference not easily lost on those who would deter-
mine whether •aákara’s affinity lies more with Vaiß»avism or with
•aivism.
118
119
Tr. EU II:470–471. See TPU 129, lines 1–6.
    317
8. Ka†ha-Upanißad-Bhàßya
In this commentary •aákara again teaches the grace of the highest

self, of the teacher and of scripture, but he does not refer to the
grace of the gods.
This bhàßya is of particular importance for the present study, because
in commenting on I.2.20 and I.2.23 •aákara appears to negate what
for many is an obvious teaching on the grace of the Lord in favor
of an interpretation that does not allow a distinction between a gra-
cious ordainer and its beholden creature. Such a “strained inter-
pretation of texts,”120 which clearly ought to recognize KaUp I.2.20
and I.2.23 for what they are, namely as being two of the clearest
references to divine grace in the entire body of early Upanißadic lit-
erature, has provided some of •aákara’s interpreters with powerful
evidence in presenting their case that •aákara is ultimately inimi-
cal to the notion that divine grace plays any significant role in his
soteriology.121 We must therefore examine these texts to determine
whether they indeed present a contradiction to all •aákara has stated
elsewhere in affirmation of grace’s reality.
a. àtman-ì≤vara
We shall begin by probing •aákara’s controversial interpretation of
I.2.20 and I.2.23. I.2.20 may be reliably translated as follows:
Smaller than the small, greater than the great, the àtman is hidden in
the core of every creature. One free from desire and thus free from
grief sees the greatness of the àtman by grace of the Ordainer (dhàtu˙-
prasàdàt).122
The meaning of this text is that the àtman, which is difficult to know,
is revealed to the person free of desire by the “grace of the Ordainer”
or creator. In fact, the revelation of the àtman may be seen as the
“self-revelation of the Creator God.”123 However, as noted elsewhere
in this study,124 one may read the text as dhàtu-prasàdàt, i.e. as “through
120
Eric Lott, Vedàntic Approaches to God (London: Macmillan, 1980), 153.
121
For Eric Lott, 156, “it is clear that the concept of the ‘Lord’s grace’ takes a
negligible role in •a«kara’s scheme. Taken seriously, such a Lord introduces an
intolerable anomaly to the absolutist system.”
122
Panikkar tr. 566.
123
Radhakrishnan 618.
124
See V.A.
318  
the tranquillity of the mind and the senses.”125 It may thus be argued
that this ≤ruti text does not refer to divine grace at all.
•aákara gives the text the latter interpretation. He does not under-
stand I.2.20 to refer to divine grace, but rather regards it as teach-
ing that “through dhàtu-prasàdàt, through the serenity of these organs,”
e.g. “mind etc.” (mana àdi), a “desireless man” (akàma˙) sees the great-
ness of the àtman. •aákara interprets this “sees” ( pa≤yati ) as the real-
ization “This One I am” (ayamahamasmìti ), i.e. as “I am the Self.”126
•aákara teaches that the detachment from outer objects, a mark of
the desireless man and a prerequisite for the dawn of liberating
knowledge, is made possible when the mind and senses “become
composed” ( prasìdanti ).127 Thus the absence of all desire for worldly
objects and the need to make both the senses and mind tranquil
comprise the heart of the message of this particular verse, accord-
ing to •aákara. This is so important for •aákara that he introduces
the next verse, I.2.21, with the words, “the Self is difficult to be
known by ordinary people who are possessed of desire, because”—
and he then proceeds to comment on a text that speaks of the
omnipresence, which is at the same time the elusiveness, of the self.
For •aákara, then, the main theme and teaching of these verses is
that human attachment and desire for worldly objects prevent the
jìva from knowing the Self.
One need not therefore conclude that •aákara is inimical to the
idea of divine grace because he does not read this text to refer to
the divine prasàda. If in this same Upanißad-bhàßya and elsewhere
•aákara brings up the subject of divine favor on his own, inde-
pendently of what the text he is commenting on dictates, then it is
surely allowable for him to discuss the importance of tranquillity in
a text (I.2.20) that may be read with justification as either “through
the tranquillity of the senses” or “through the grace of the Ordainer.”
The text leaves itself open to both interpretations.
•aákara’s rendering of I.2.23 is more difficult to follow than his
interpretation of 1.2.20. But first we must see what ≤ruti itself teaches.
KaUp I.2.23 reads:
125
Radharishnan tr. 61.
126
127
    319
By him whom he chooses (v‰»ute) is the àtman attained.

To him the àtman reveals his own being.128
This verse is also found in Mu»∂aka Upanißad III.2.3, to which we
shall turn later in examining •aákara’s commentary on it.129
KaUp I.2.23 more clearly represents a teaching of grace than does
I.2.20, although no word for grace is expressly used.130 The central
term here is “chooses” or “elects” (v‰»ute). The KaUp repeatedly dis-
cusses the difficulty of knowing the Self and lays down guidelines
that must be followed if Self-realization, which is not a mere theo-
retical knowing, is to occur. The present verse teaches that no amount
of learning will bring the aspirant to the final goal; what must finally
take place is a revelation of the àtman itself. The àtman reveals (viv‰»ute)
itself to him whom it chooses. According to Richard De Smet, this
verse teaches a “divine grace” that is “linked with the idea of spe-
cial election which gives it gratuitousness but denies its universality.”
He notes further that this grace “is essentially a grace of knowledge.”131
What this means, of course, or what might be concluded from this
passage, is that the self chooses to elect some seekers to receive this
special grace of knowledge while withholding it from others.
Such a teaching obviously presents a challenge to •aákara who,
in his theodicy discussions in his BrSùBh, was able to absolve the
Lord from all partiality to his creatures through recourse to the doc-
trine of karma.132 •aákara is emphatic in teaching the Lord’s impar-
tiality. We recall that •aákara, while affirming the role that divine
grace plays in the liberation of the jìva (BrSùBh II.3.41), neverthe-
less insisted that the future fate of each creature was dependent on
that creature’s own effort. The same applies to •aákara’s soteriol-
ogy as well, and not merely to the kind of birth each creature will
experience in its next incarnation: Effort and action have value in
as much as they lead to the eradication of all that prevents the jìva
from Self-realization. Yet effort and action do not cause knowledge
to dawn, strictly speaking. Keeping this in mind, we now turn to
128
Panikkar tr. 10.
129
See IX.A.9.
130
For a discussion of this verse see Chapter V.A.
131
R. De Smet, “The Status of the Scriptures in the ‘Holy History’ of India,”
Research Seminar on Non-Biblical Scriptures, ed. D. S. Amalorpavadass (Bangalore: NBCLC,
1975), 280–299.
132
See, for example, Shankara’s commentary on BrSùBh II.1.34–36, and II.3.41–42
in Chapter VIII.B.10, 14, and 15.
320  
•aákara’s commentary on I.2.23 which proclaims that liberation

occurs if the jìva is chosen by the àtman.
•aákara begins by declaring the insufficiency of mere hearing and
intellectual knowledge of scripture if the Self is to be attained. How
then is the Self to be known? •aákara’s answer is a reworking of
the second half of KaUp I.2.23. Instead of “By him whom he chooses
is the àtman attained; to him the àtman reveals his own being,”
•aákara writes: “Yam eva that (Self ) indeed which is his (i.e. aspi-
rant’s) own Self which; eßa˙ this one—the aspirant; v‰»ute prays to;
tena by that—by that very Self which is the seeker (himself ); the Self
Itself is labhya˙ can be known, i.e. It becomes known to be such and
such: The meaning is that to a desireless man who seeks for the Self
alone, the Self becomes known of Its own accord. How is It known?
This is being said: eßa˙, this Self, tasya, of that seeker of the Self;
viv‰»ute, reveals; syàm, Its own—Its real; tanùm, body, i.e. Its own
nature.”133
Some commentators feel that through “an ingenious exegesis,”134
i.e. “by this ingenious inversion of subject and object in the second
half of the verse,”135 •aákara has eliminated altogether the distinc-
tion between a Self which chooses and a self which is chosen. In
the opinion of Eric Lott: “All this choosing, obtaining, and reveal-
ing is explained by Sankara in terms of the one Self . . . it would
surely be more faithful to the actual wording to take the self which
‘chooses’, which is ‘obtained and reveals itself ’, as the supreme Self,
distinct from the seeking self . . . But such a concept of personal grace
can never play more than a concessional role in Sankara’s scheme,
any more than the idea of Brahman’s personal attributes.”136
Such an interpretation presupposes that •aákara is a monist for
whom the absolute Self alone exists. Yet •aákara’s commentary on
KaUp I.2.23 need not be read in this sense. De Smet translates the
key passage as: “that very own àtman which this aspirant takes as
his goal, by that very àtman (which is) the chooser (tenaivà-’tmanà
varitrà) his own àtman is obtained, known.” He thus takes •aákara
to mean that “the same àtman is both the origin and the end of
the aspirant’s choice.” De Smet’s translation continues: “the àtman
133
134
Radharishnan 620.
135
Mariasusai Dhavamony, Love of God According to •aiva Siddhànta (Oxford: Clarendon,
1971), 66.
136
Lott 153.
    321
of that seeker after the àtman reveals, manifests, its own supreme
form, its own true reality.”137
It is therefore legitimate to assume that a real distinction exists
between the seeker and the highest self, yet the seeker’s choice for
its proper goal is made under the influence of the pratygàtman. •aákara
very clearly states in his bhàßya on the present verse that a revela-
tion of the self is made to the “desireless man,” i.e. a man detached
from all the things of this world. But at the same time •aákara also
teaches that without a deep yearning for knowledge of brahman lib-
eration is not possible. In the present bhàßya he adds that this desire
for, choice, or yearning (v‰»ute) is the work of the highest Self. De
Smet comments on the similarity between •aákara and Thomas
Aquinas on this point. “We find here an imporant similarity with
Aquinas who also holds that the Godhead immanent in us origi-
nates the natural desire for seeing it and itself fulfils it by a direct
revelation of its own supreme form or true essence.”138
In summary, •aákara’s commentary on the present verse, if not
interpreted in a monistic sense, may be regarded as supportive of
the operation of divine grace in the life of the aspirant to liberation.
It is only through the influence of the àtman that the seeker begins
the journey to liberation, and it is only through the àtman, again,
that the àtman is found.
There is no denying, however, that •aákara has considerably
altered the particular understanding of grace that this ≤ruti text pro-
claims. KaUp I.2.23 clearly comes out in favor of divine grace over
human effort in the process that leads to final liberation. It is my
contention that •aákara could not let KaUp I.2.23 stand unchanged,
for three reasons. First, •aákara is careful to affirm the importance
of both human freedom and divine grace, as we have often seen in
this study, and not merely the one or the other. Hence, he very
clearly transforms the meaning of the text, which speaks of divine
choice, into the idea of a necessary preparatory and inward-driving
longing and prayer for liberation. Second, to declare that liberation
is due to the àtman’s choice might lead one to the errant position
that the àtman also withholds its grace, an interpretation that leaves
itself open to the earlier BrSùBh accusation that the Lord is partial
137
R. De Smet, “•a«kara and Aquinas on Liberation,” Indian Philosophical Annual
5 (1969): 245.
138
De Smet, “Liberation” 245.
322  
and unfair, a teaching •aákara is eager to refute. We have, of

course, seen •aákara affirm the sovereignty of the supreme Lord to
favor or disfavor all, in AiUpBh I.3.1.139 But •aákara never once
declares that the Lord or the Self ever in fact rejects the seeker of
liberation. In fact, the opposite is true. Both in his theodicy and in
his remarks on grace, •aákara is quick to uphold the impartiality
of a Lord or Self whom he considers thoroughly gracious. To under-
score this teaching in the present verse, •aákara links the revela-
tion of the àtman to the prior proper—in this case desireless—disposition
of the seeker. The àtman’s choice? That is the choice of the seeker
under the impulsion of the Self. Third, it is •aákara’s teaching that
the seeker is in his or her essence eternally free. Thus, by stressing
the unity of the Self in his present interpretation, •aákara is able
to avoid drawing the conclusion that with the àtman’s choosing the
seeker receives something which he or she did not have.
Thus •aákara’s unusual interpretation may reflect his intention
to overcome what sounds like an excessively dualistic and even deter-
ministic text, a text that appears to place the process of liberation
entirely at the disposition of the Self rather than, in accord with
•aákara’s normal understanding, to make liberation the outcome of
the cooperation of a jìva endowed with the capacity to work towards
the eradication of its ignorance, and a Self or Lord graciously dis-
posed to help this same jìva. In other words, this ≤ruti verse places
an extreme emphasis on divine grace over human effort, whereas
•aákara is concerned to uphold both.
There are three other passages in the KaUpBh in which •aákara
offers his thoughts on the grace of the self or Lord: II.2.13, II.3.13,
and II.3.19.
In the first passage, II.2.13, •aákara comments on ≤ruti ’s decla-
ration that the Self, the sole eternal reality and consciousness itself,
“alone dispenses the desired objects to many” (eko bahùnàá yo vidad-
hàti kàmàn).140 •aákara identifies the Self here with “the omniscient
Lord of all” (sarvajña˙ sarve≤vara˙) in order to establish a causal con-
nection between the Absolute and creaturely beings and to empha-
size the former’s transcendence. He states that “the power to manifest
consciousness that is seen in others is owing to the consciousness of
139
See IX.A.6 above.
140
Tr. EU I:196.
    323
the Self (àtmacaitanyanimittameva).”141 He goes on: “Besides He (is) the

omniscient Lord of all who alone arranges diversely, i.e. dispenses
without effort desirable things, the fruits of work according to merit,
as also out of His own grace (karmànurùpaá kàmànkarmaphalàni svànu-
grahanimittàsca).”142
When •aákara speaks here of the results of human effort, we
note that he limits himself to a discussion of the Lord’s response to
good behavior; he is not concerned with the Lord’s response to both
human good and human evil. The text he is commenting on speaks
of “desirable things” (kàmàn). Now what is noteworthy about •aákara’s
teaching here, in contrast to what he had declared in the BrSùBh,
is that the Lord’s dispensation of good results for good deeds done
need not be guided by a strict adherence to human merit. •aákara
expressly states that the Lord not only responds according to merit,
but also out of favor or grace (anugraha). •aákara appears then to
teach that the Lord’s generosity may exceed the demands of the law
of karma established by the Lord himself.
•aákara does not say that it is out of the Lord’s grace that a
person is liberated; he simply states that the Lord is free to respond
generously to human effort. He does add, in his commentary on the
same verse and in accord with its teaching, that eternal peace is for
those who realize the Self dwelling in their own heart. For •aákara
this Self who is realized is the Lord who graciously dispenses desir-
able things to the creatures in bondage.
In his commentary on II.3.13 •aákara speaks of this same Self
who becomes graciously disposed to reveal itself to the man who
knows it to be the truly real, i.e. being itself. When the Self is known
thus, states the ≤ruti verse, then tattvabhàva˙ prasìdati. This phrase is
translated by Radhakrishnan as “his real nature becomes clear (later
on)”143 and by Hume as “His real nature manifests itself.”144 In keep-
ing with what he believes •aákara’s interpretation of this phrase to
be, Gambhirananda translates tattvabhàva˙ prasìdati as “becomes
favourably disposed (for self-revelation).”145 There is justification for
this translation, as the word prasìdati is almost a terminus technicus in
141
142
143
Radhakrishnan 646.
144
Hume 360.
145
EU I:211.
324  
•aákara’s writings for the deity becoming graciously disposed towards

human beings, especially in the context of a prior human action or
attitude. This is particularly true when •aákara identifies the deity
as Viß»u.146 The bhàßya on the present verse bears out this truth.
•aákara states that the Self which “becomes favourably disposed for
revealing itself ” is the “unconditioned (nirupàdhika); attributeless (ali»ga)
Self,” “non-dual by nature” (advayasvabhàva˙),147 identified at the first
of this set of verses (I.3.1) by •aákara as the “supreme Brahman”
(parabrahma).148 This same brahman is furthermore regarded by •aákara
in I.3.1 as Viß»u.149
•aákara explains the ≤ruti’s word prasìdati, a term he normally
understands as indicating divine grace, as abhimukhibhavati, which
means “is in the presence of or facing” and carries the sense of
being favorable to.150 Thus •aákara teaches that the Self, who is
the supreme brahman and also Viß»u, becomes graciously disposed to
the seeker who has the correct theoretical knowledge of its nature,
more precisely, “to the man who had realised it earlier as existence.”151
The Ka†ha Upanißad’s closing prayer for both teacher and disciple
provides •aákara with the opportunity to express his support for
the need of the Lord’s protection and blessing. The prayer reads:
May He help both of us,
may He be pleased with both of us,
may we act together in a vigorous way,
may our study be successful,
may we never hate each other.
Om! Peace, peace, peace!152
•aákara understands this prayer as directed towards the supreme
Lord ( parame≤vara) “who is revealed in the Upanißads” (upanißatpra-
ka≤ita˙).153 This Lord protects, according to •aákara, “by revealing
the real nature of knowledge” (vidyàsvarùpaprakà≤anena) and “by reveal-
ing the result of that knowledge” (tatphalaprakà≤anena).154 In other
146
See, e.g., B‰UpBh V.1.1.; PrUpBh V 2.
147
Tr. EU I:211–212. See TPU 102, lines 19–20 and 24.
148
See tr. in EU I:200 and TPU 97, line 17.
149
See tr. in EU I:199 and TPU 97, line 13. See also Potter 280, who sum-
marizes •aákara on KaUp I.3.1 as meaning that Viß»u is brahman.
150
See MW 67, col. 2.
151
Tr. EU I:212.
152
Panikkar tr. 570.
153
154
    325
words, it is due to the Lord that the path to liberation is revealed.

The Lord protects both master and disciple by revealing to them
their true nature. In the present verse •aákara does not lay down
any prerequisites for the Lord to reveal the highest human goal.

In his KaUp bhàßya •aákara devotes one sentence each to the favor
of the teacher (I.2.13) and of scripture (II.1.15) and one sentence to
both together (II.1.11).
In I.2.13 the god death, Yama, teaches the seeker Naciketas that
any mortal who chooses the spiritually good over earthly pleasure
and is able to comprehend the subtle Self will surely attain the high-
est joy. •aákara explains that the disciple’s hearing of this wonder-
ful teaching that leads to liberation has been made possible “through
the favour of the teacher” (àcàryaprasàdàt).155
Likewise in his commentary on II.1.11 •aákara states that a mind
(manas) which is capable of perceiving unity rather than diversity is
a mind “which is purified by the teacher and the scriptures” (àcàryàga-
masaásk‰tena), the implication being that without these the mind is
incapable of such vision.156
The subject of scripture emerges again—uncalled for by ≤ruti—in
•aákara’s bhàßya on II.1.15. Commenting on a verse proclaiming
the merger of the “man of knowledge” with the Self, •aákara explains
how it is possible that ignorance is destroyed and the àtman is attained.
His tribute to scripture here is one of the strongest made anywhere
in his writings: “Therefore, giving up the perception of duality that
bad logicians (kutàrkika) have and the erroneous notions that the non-
believers (nàstika) entertain, the people whose pride (darpa) has been
quelled should eagerly seek after the realisation of the unity of the
Self, that is inculcated by the Vedas that are more beneficent than
thousands of fathers and mothers (màt‰pit‰sahasrebhyo’pi hitaißinà).”157
Obviously the seeker of the highest truth must be trusting of the
message of ≤ruti, just as a child automatically trusts his or her par-
ents and is thereby trained for life. With the Vedas one must not
be a non-believer (nàstika) or attempt to attain the goal through
155
156
157
326  
reason alone. One requires the help that only the ≤ruti can give.
Elsewhere, too, •aákara takes up the theme of parenthood and scrip-
ture, declaring that ≤ruti teaches “zealously (àd‰tà) lika a (devoted)
mother.”158
9. Mu»∂aka-Upanißad-Bhàßya
In this commentary •aákara does not refer to the grace of scrip-

ture or of the gods, but he does speak twice of the revelation of the
Self in a way suggestive of grace. In four other passages he affirms
the grace and compassion of the teacher. In his commentary on yet
one more verse he speaks of the grace or favorableness of “knowl-
edge,” which may be a synonym for the intellect.
a. àtman
In his bhàßya on III.1.9 •aákara does not contribute substantially to
the ≤ruti’s claim that the Self is revealed, or shines forth, when the
mind is purified ( yasminvi≤uddhe vibhavatyeßa àtmà).159 Yet he does not
dispute this teaching or attempt to alter its meaning. •aákara’s gloss
adds that the Self is known “in that internal organ, which having
become pure, freed from the dirt of grief etc. the foregoing Self
reveals Itself distinctly, in Its own reality.”160 How the purity of the
mind and the realization of the Self are intimately connected is more
clearly described in •aákara’s commentary on the previous verse,
III.1.8, which will be discussed shortly.
MuUp III.2.3 is identical to KaUp I.2.23. Since we have already
examined •aákara’s bhàßya on the latter, I shall now focus attention
on what additional insight •aákara offers on the present verse. Again,
the text reads:
By him whom he chooses (v‰»ute) is the àtman attained.
To him the àtman reveals his own being.161
158
Upad I.18.3. Tr. TT 172.
159
See the translations in EU II:157, Radhakrishnan 688, Hume 375 and TPU
169, line 23.
160
161
Panikkar tr. 710.
    327
As we saw in his commentary on KaUp I.2.23, •aákara is eager

to downplay what he perceives to be an excessive emphasis on divine
grace or even divine predestination over human effort. Also, in
upholding the impartiality of the Self, •aákara needed to interpret
this verse in a way that would cancel any notion of an arbitrary
election or choice of souls to be saved. •aákara maintains, of course,
that the Absolute is entirely free in dispensing grace, but he is equally
quick to deny that the àtman ever really withholds its grace or
beneficent influence. For that reason in his independent treatise the
Upade≤asàhasrì •aákara quotes BhG IX.29, “And I am always the
same to all beings,” in two places.162
•aákara’s commentary on MuUp III.2.3 follows these same lines.
The Self cannot be known simply by hearing and understanding
scripture. Something more is needed, the mumukßutvaá or deep long-
ing for liberation expressed by •aákara in BrSùBh I.1.1. •aákara
does not use this term here, but does speak of the need for yearn-
ing and for prayer:
By what then can It be reached? . . . That very entity, the supreme
Self, which this one, the man of knowledge, seeks to reach; by that
fact of hankering (vara»enaißa) is attainable; but not through any other
spiritual effort (nànyena sàdhanàntare»a), for It is by Its very nature ever
attained (nityalabdhasvabhàvatvàt). Now is being explained how this attain-
ment of the Self by the man of knowledge comes about. Of him this
Self reveals ( prakà≤ayati) Its own supreme stature, Its reality that was
enveloped in ignorance; the idea is that when knowledge dawns, the
Self becomes revealed just like pots etc. on the coming of light. Hence
the purport is that the means for the attainment of the Self consists
in praying for this consummation to the exclusion of everything else
(tasmàdanyatyàgena àtmalàbhapràrthanaiva àtmalàbhsàdhanamityartha˙).163
Immediately after, as an introduction to the next verse that praises
the value of perseverance, absence of delusion, and knowledge,
•aákara notes that these three “are helpful (sahàya) to the prayer
( pràrthana) for the attainment of the Self.”164 In other words, •aákara
makes the prayer for liberation the central theme of KaUp III.2.3,
so much so that he carries it on to the next verse. He makes prayer
the only necessary spiritual effort.
162
Upad I8.3 and I.10.8. See tr. in TT 120, 124.
163
164
328  
The word •aákara uses for prayer, pràrthana, is from the root
pràrth, meaning “to wish or long for, desire; to ask a person for or
ask anything from; to wish or ask a person to” etc.165 Thus the root
includes both the idea of longing and of prayer. Two of its nomi-
nal derivatives are pràrthana, n. “wish, desire, request, entreaty, solic-
itation, petition or suit for,” and prarthanà, f. “prayer.”166 Of these
two, •aákara chooses the latter to express in his summarizing and
concluding sentence the essence of this supreme sàdhana, i.e. the more
personal petitional prayer, although the text upon which he com-
ments does not appear to call for it.
It is remarkable that •aákara does not introduce the term ì≤vara
or parame≤vara as the addressee of the prayer, but rather lets stand
scripture’s àtman. It would thus appear that •aákara understands
the Self to respond graciously to the prayer of the seeker by reveal-
ing itself, or perhaps “himself.” Such a prayer is singleminded, exclud-
ing all other desires and goals, and is therefore effective. Here no
other temporary desirable goal or object may serve as even a moment’s
respite from the intensity of this kind of prayer. This is truly a prayer
coupled with monasticism (sannyàsa) or renunciation of the world and
all worldly goals.167
b. The Teacher
The theme of renunciation is already declared by •aákara in his
introduction to this Upanißad, and it is linked to the grace of the
teacher. The two together, renunciation and the teacher’s grace,
make the knowledge of brahman attainable. This Upanißad, he says,
“speaks of the knowledge of Brahman that is the means for the high-
est goal and is achievable through the grace of the teacher (guruprasàda)
after renouncing everything, whether it be an end or means.”168
Renunciation is also linked with the necessity of finding a spiri-
tual guide in MuUp I.2.12:
Having scrutinised the worlds won by works, let a Bràhma»a arrive at
non-attachment.
The (world) that is not made is not (won) by what is done. For the
165
See MW 708, col. 3.
166
See MW 708, col. 3.
167
See •aákara’s bhàßya on the next verse, MuUp III.2.4, in TPU 172, line 6.
Tr. EU II:163.
168
Tr. E II:80. See TPU 141, lines 15–16.
    329
sake of this knowledge, let him only approach, with sacrificial fuel in
hand, a teacher who is learned in the scriptures and established in
Brahman.169
This verse describes the teacher as a knower of both the scriptures
and brahman, but •aákara adds other qualities that the competent
teacher must have, if the seeker is to realize the Self: “Having become
detached . . . the dispassionate Brahma»a should go to a teacher alone,
who is blessed with mental and physical self-control, mercy, etc.
(≤amadamadayàdi )170 for the sake of understanding that fully. The
emphasis in ‘the teacher alone’ implies that he should not seek for
the knowledge of Brahman independently, even though he is versed
in the scriptures.”171
Thus the aspirant to realization, though knowledgeable in the
teachings of scripture, cannot dispense with the mercy (dayà) of
the teacher if the final goal is to be reached. The guru is absolutely
indispensable.
Another passage, MuUp II.2.6, includes a blessing to the listener,
outside the context of any conversation. No speaker is identified.
The ≤ruti simply wishes, “May you be free from hindrances in going
to the other shore beyond darkness.”172 •aákara interprets this as a
blessing pronounced by a realized teacher to his disciples: “The
teacher (àcàrya) utters his benediction so that they may realize Brahman
without any obstacle.”173
In a final passage dealing with the grace or compassion of the
teacher, •aákara comments on MuUp III.1.2, which compares the
suffering human soul with a bird that eats fruit but is never satisfied:
On the self-same tree, a person immersed (in the sorrows of the world)
is deluded and grieves on account of his helplessness.
When he sees the other, the Lord (ì≤am) who is worshipped and his
greatness, he becomes freed from sorrow.174
•aákara describes this Lord, the vision of whom fulfills all desires
and therefore brings peace, as fully transcendent, unconditioned,
“supramundane (asaásàri»aá), beyond hunger, thirst, sorrow, delusion,
169
Radhakrishnan tr. 679.
170
See MuUpBh I.2.12, AAS 18, line 9. TPU 153, line 4 lacks “mercy” (dayà),
and reads ≤amadamàdi.
171
172
Tr. EU II:134.
173
174
Radhakrishnan tr. 686.
330  
and death, the Lord of the whole universe.175 The seeker realizes his
non-duality with this Lord, who is his true Self.
The means to this realization is yoga, which includes the correct
ethical and ascetic practices as well as meditation. This yoga is made
known to the seeker of truth by a compassionate teacher, but the
initial encounter with this teacher seems to be made possible only
when the seeker has accrued enough good karma from past deeds.
This is a teaching that helps to explain •aákara’s declaration in his
other Upanißad commentaries that the seeker “somehow” or “by
good fortune” meets a very compassionate teacher who shows him
the way to liberation. In the present bhàßya •aákara writes: “That
soul, while constantly undergoing the degradation of being born
among ghosts, beasts, men and others, is, in the course of multi-
farious births, perchance shown the path of Yoga, as a result of his
accumulation of good deeds, by some very compassionate person
(kenacitparamakàru»ikena); and then becoming endowed with non-injury,
truth, continence, renunciation of everything, control of internal and
external organs, and concentration of mind, when, while engaged in
meditation, (it) sees . . . the adored One.”176
It appears to be the teaching of •aákara that the path to liber-
ation is shown only to those who, because of their past, are capable
of benefiting from its instruction. But this instruction is only made
known by a realized person, and such a person is marked by a great
measure of compassion.
c. jñànaprasàda
The compound jñànaprasàdena is found in MuUp III.1.8 and the
translation of each of its components is a matter of dispute among
modern commentators. The verse, according to R. Panikkar, reads:
Eye cannot see him, nor words reveal him;
by the senses, austerity, or works he is not known.
When the mind is cleansed by the grace of wisdom ( jñànprasàdena),
he is seen by contemplation—the One without parts.177
175
176
177
See Panikkar 667.
    331
Radhakrishnan translates jñànaprasàdena as “by the light of knowl-

edge,”178 Hume “by the peace of knowledge,”179 and Gambhirananda
“through the favourableness of the intellect.”180 •aákara himself seems
to understand the term more in Gambhirananda’s sense, as will be
seen from my summary of •aákara’s commentary. Thus jñàna does
not mean here “knowledge,” but rather its instrument, namely the
intellect or mind, while prasàda means a propitious condition of the
intellect rather than grace in its strictest sense.
Since the Self is beyond the grasp of the senses and the descrip-
tion of words, and is not attained by action or through austerity,
how is it made known? For •aákara, the Self is revealed when the
intellect is made pure and calm, completely detached from all that
is not the source of its life, which is the àtman:
Though the intellect in all beings is intrinsically able to make the Self
known, still being polluted by such blemishes as attachment to exter-
nal objects etc., it becomes agitated (aprasannam) and impure (a≤uddhaá),
and does not, like a stained mirror or ruffled water, make the reality
of the Self known, though It is ever at hand. The favourableness of
the intellect comes about when it continues to be transparent (svac-
chaá) and tranquil ( prasàditaá) on having been made clean like a mir-
ror, water, etc., by the removal of the pollution caused by the dirt of
attachment, springing from the contact of the senses and sense-objects.
Since vi≤uddhasattva˙, one who has become pure in mind (vi≤uddhànta˙karano),
through that favourableness of the intellect (tena jñànaprasàdena), becomes
fit for seeing Brahman (brahma drß†um); therefore one sees, realizes that
Self.181
Thus the mind is not in any way causative of liberation, but is made
pure and receptive to the manifestation of the Self by the knowl-
edge mediated through the revelation of scripture, the guidance of
the teacher, the repetition of Vedic truth, the practice of virtue, the
withdrawal from all objects, both physical and mental, and through
an inward penetrating meditation and silent expectation. When all
doubt has been removed and the mind is totally receptive to the
final manifestation of the Self, then that favorableness of the intel-
lect has been attained about which both scripture and •aákara speak.
This passage, then, is especially illustrative of the central importance
178
Radhakrishnan 688.
179
Hume 375.
180
EU II:155.
181
332  
that the purification of the mind plays in •aákara’s soteriology.

Through the external grace of ≤ruti and the teacher, and through
the relentless effort of the sàdhaka, the complete mastery of the mind
is achievable. Final liberation itself, however, is not achievable; it is
an unchanging and eternal fact. The mind is now in the propitious
state to experience this truth. It awaits the internal grace of the Self
and the dawn of the highest knowledge. Its success depends on both
its own tranquility and transparency, and on the grace of the Self.
B. •á’ BHAGAVAD-GÌTÀ-BHÀÍYA
The BhG represents one of the high-water marks in the Hindu tra-
dition on grace. This text therefore offers •aákara greater possibil-
ities to expound on divine mercy and assistance than did either the
Upanißads or the Brahma-Sùtra.
Because grace is so strongly emphasized in the Gìtà it is not sur-
prising that •aákara, with his great reverence for tradition and sacred
texts, has more to say about the divine mercy in his commentary
on this work than in any of his other commentaries. This of course
raises the question as to how seriously we must take those passages
in •aákara’s work that strongly emphasize the need for and efficacy
of divine grace. For some modern interpreters such as J. A. B. van
Buitenen and E. Deutsch the BhG presents •aákara with an awk-
ward situation; he must affirm a radical personalism represented by
the BhG that is alleged to be quite at variance with his own stance,
but he will, however, finally concede to embrace this personalism
from a limited (vyavahàrika) standpoint.182
Rudolf Otto, too, despite noting •aákara’s very positive attitude
towards theism as embodied in the BhGBh, felt that the master
Advaitin ultimately taught a form of monistic impersonalism or
suprapersonalism that negated the idea of a personal God. Although
he did add that •aákara’s conception of the highest reality, the
impersonal brahman, did still bear “the fragrance and color of the
ground from which it springs,” namely theistic personalism, Otto
182
See Eliot Deutsch and J. A. B. van Buitenen, A Source Book of Advaita Vedànta
(Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980), 213. Though the word vyavahàrika is
not used here, it appears to be implied in the author’s remarks about theism and
personalism.
    333
concluded that •aákara was “a passionate theist” only on the level

of the lower knowledge, the aparà vidyà.183
Such an interpretation, of course, presupposes a clear-cut distinc-
tion between a higher impersonal brahman and a lower personal Lord,
a position that, as has been shown by Paul Hacker, is foreign to the
mind of •aákara, whether one accepts •aákara, to be a monist (as
Hacker did) or not.184
Worth noting, also by way of preface to this text, is that •aákara,’s
BhGBh, far from reluctantly affirming the reality of divine grace
because of the dictates of the Gìtà itself, frequently strengthens by
elaboration what the sm‰ti professes about grace. Occasionally •aákara
will even bring up the subject independently.185
Let us now begin our examination of this difficult text, leaving
aside such questions as to whether •aákara, “willfully distorts” the
Gìtà’s sense so as to propagate his own particular teaching, one which
tends to downplay the Gìtà’s insistence on the importance of works
in the process of liberation.186 Our primary interest is in examining
•aákara’s thoughts on grace.
1. K‰ß»a/Vàsudeva/Nàràya»a/Viß»u Identical with brahman-àtman
To begin, •aákara does not dispute the Gìtà’s teaching that K‰ß»a
is the supreme Self (XIII.31) and the supreme person (XIII.22), as
also the highest brahman.187 That is to say, he does not posit an imper-
sonal brahman superior to an ultimately illusory personal Lord. Rather
he conceives the one divine reality to be personal, without falling
into a primitive anthropomorphism, for Vàsudeva, Nàràya»a and
Viß»u, moreover, are identified as the universally immanent supreme
àtman.
As evidence of this we read that liberation occurs when monks
realize their non-difference with the supreme deity, Nàràya»a ( paraá
devaá nàràya»am), who is their own Self (IX.22).188 Similarly, •aákara,
183
Rudolf Otto, Mysticism East and West (New York: Meridian, 1957), 121–123.
184
See the discussion in III.B.2.
185
See IX.B.4.c and IX.B.5.c.
186
See Potter, 295, on P. M. Modi and other writers, who “find that the Gìtà,
unlike •aákara, teaches that action is either the primary way to liberation or at
least a viable one to knowledge.”
187
See R. C. Zaehner, The Bhagavad-Gìtà (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), 38.
188
See Swami Gambhirananda, trans., Bhagavadgìtà With the Commentary of •a«karàcàrya
(Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1984), 388. For the Sanskrit see Bhagavad-Gìtà with
334  
declares Vàsudeva, the Supreme ( para˙), to be “the inmost Self of

all” (sarvapratyagàtmà) (II.61).189 The “man of Knowledge” ( jñànì), the
“knower of Reality,” is one who knows the reality or truth of Viß»u
(viß»o˙ tattvavit), who knows, in other words, that Vàsudeva is his own
Self (VII.16–17).190
These are all professions articulated quite independently of the
sm‰ti verses upon which they comment. In them and in many other
passages like them •aákara simply equates the reality of brahman-
àtman with a personal Lord, whose names, while changing, refer to
a single deity.
2. •aákara’s Vaiß»avite Sectarianism
•aákara’s personal Lord (ì≤vara) is normally treated in a non-sec-

tarian fashion, although •aákara reveals in his BrSùBh and else-
where a greater sympathy for Vaiß»avite religion than for any other
form of devotionalism.191 In his BhGBh, however, more clearly than
in any of his other works including the BrSùBh, •aákara bares his
allegiance to Vaiß»avite faith by repeatedly inserting into his com-
mentary references to Viß»u-Nàràya»a as the highest reality when
the text he is commenting on does not explicitly provide a divine
name at all. Lest it be thought that the Gìtà is essentially a Vaiß»avite
work, which presumes K‰ß»a as the incarnation (avatar) of Viß»u,
J. A. B. van Buitenen reminds us:
The God who chooses to descend remains nameless. As God, K‰ß»a
does not refer to himself by name, except once (7.19). Characteristically,
in the long list of divine Ubiquities, he makes only casual mention of
his present human identity: “Among the V‰ß»is I am Vàsudeva, among
the Pà»∂avas Arjuna; of the hermits I am Vyàsa, of sages Kavi U≤anas”
(10.37). Equally casual is his mention of Vi≤»u: “Of the (Vedic group
of the) Àdityas I am Viß»u, of celestial lights the shining sun, of (the
storm gods) the Maruts I am Marìci, to the constellations I am the
moon” (10.21), just as of the Rudras he is •iva and of the Yakßas
Kubera (10.23). If God’s name is Viß»u, K‰ß»a is not aware of it.
Arjuna addresses him twice with Viß»o, “O Viß»u!” (11.24; 30), but he
also identifies him with Vàyu, Yama, Agni, Varu»a, the moon, Prajàpati,
•a«karabhàßya, ed. K. Goyandaka (Gorakhpur: Gita Press, 1988 = GP), 238, lines
22–24.
189
G. tr. 108. See GP 68, line 13.
190
G. tr. 328–329. See GP 203, lines 17–18.
191
See III.B.3.
    335
and Brahma (11.39), and there is nothing in the Gìtà elsewhere to hint
that K‰ß»a was an avatara of a specific God, Viß»u. The Gìtà is supra-
sectarian.192
Of course, by •aákara’s time Viß»u’s status was established as a
supergod, as was •iva’s.193 The Gìtà became accepted as a Vaiß»avite
work, in which Viß»u descends as the Lord K‰ß»a. •aákara read-
ily accepts this interpretation of the Gìtà and frequently names the
otherwise nameless God Viß»u, Nàràya»a and Vàsudeva. But the
frequency with which •aákara identifies the God of the Gìtà with
Vaiß»avite names is such that his predilection for Viß»u appears
unmistakable.
A statistical analysis bears this out. The Gìtà itself never mentions
the name Nàràya»a, but •aákara inserts it into his commentary
seven times (introduction to I; II.21, V.29, IX.22, XI.9, XIV.26,
XVIII.61),194 eight if one includes the telling invocatory verse to the
Gìtà:
Om! Nàràya»a is higher than the Unmanifest.
The (Cosmic’) Egg comes out of the Unmanifest.
All these worlds, including the earth with its seven
islands, are in the Egg.195
The name Viß»u, mentioned only three times in the Gìtà (X.21,
XI.24, 30),196 is employed by •aákara, sixteen times (introduction
to I; II.51, VII.14 twice, VIII.4 thrice, IX.15, X.21, XI.24 twice,
XII.20, XIII.2, XV.6 twice, XVIII.62).197 •aákara, frequently redes-
ignates the Gìtà’s reference to the state of liberated awareness as “the
supreme state of Viß»u” ( padaá paramaá viß»o˙) (II.51, VI.31, XI.38,
XV.6, XVIII.62), which is also “the state of the supreme Self ”
( paramàtmabhàva˙), who is again identified as Vàsudeva (XIII.18).198
Further, in a passage (IV.24) that comments on brahman being the
sacrificial act as well as all the instruments involved in that act,
192
J. A. B. van Buitenen, The Bhagavadgìtà in the Mahàbhàrata (Chicago: University
of Chicago, 1981), 28.
193
See Jan Gonda, Viß»uism and •ivaism (London: Athlone, 1970).
194
See Word-Index to the Bhagavadgìtà, ed. Francis D’Sa (Pune: Institute for the
Study of Religion, 1985); Word-Index to •a«kara’s Gìtàbhàßya, ed. Francis D’Sa (Pune:
Institute for the Study of Religion, 1985), 176.
195
G. tr. 1.
196
See Gìtà Index 61.
197
See Gìtàbhàßya Index 292.
198
See G. tr. 97–98, 302, 457, 539, 599, 736.
336  
•aákara makes the distinction between those who intuitively realize

that brahman is all and are thereby liberated and those who would
superimpose the idea of brahman on objects of knowledge, a process
that does not result directly in liberation (though it is perhaps indi-
rectly useful for the attainment of the ultimate goal). The latter prac-
tice •aákara illustrates, quite characteristically, with the example of
those who superimpose the idea of “Viß»u etc.” (viß»vàdi ) on images.
Just who these other gods might be •aákara does not say, but in
his bhàßya on IV.24 he refers to the superimposition of Viß»u on
images not once, but three times, another indication of the influence
Vaiß»avism may have had on him.199
The name Vàsudeva, mentioned four times in the Gìtà (VII.19,
X.37, XI.50, XVIII.73),200 is introduced by •aákara, thirty-eight
times, according to the Gìtàbhàßya Index (introduction to II three times;
II.24, II.61, III.30, III.31 thrice, IV.5, IV.6 twice, IV.35, VI.30 twice,
VI.47, VII.17 thrice, VII.18 twice, VII.19 thrice, VII.20, VIII.7,
X.37, XI.50, XI.54, XIII.10, XIII.18 twice, XVIII.1, XVIII.56,
XVIII.57, XVIII.65, XVIII.67, XVIII.74),201 forty-one times if vàsude-
vàkhya (“called Vàsudeva”) is included.202
3. The Incarnation of K‰ß»a
From the beginning to the end of his BhGBh •aákara speaks of

the reality of divine grace, more frequently even than the Gìtà itself.
It is not true, as Eric Lott holds, “that the concept of the ‘Lord’s
grace’ takes a negligible role in •a«kara’s scheme” or that “•a«kara’s
references to ‘the grace of the Lord’ are . . . largely a matter of con-
cession to the teaching of scripture, wherever the text cannot possi-
bly be interpreted in a monistic sense.”203 Not only in the BhGBh,
but in his other commentaries as well, •aákara does not hesitate to
introduce the topic of divine grace, even when the text he comments
on does not so much as allude to divine favor or mercy. This we
have seen both in •aákara’s BrSùBh (Ch. VIII) and in his bhàßyas
on the Upanißads (the present chapter).
199
G. tr. 211–213. See GP 129, lines 19–21 and 130, lines 5–8, 19–21.
200
See Gìtà Index 58.
201
See Gìtàbhàßya Index 279. This Index follows the AAS edition of •aákara’s
Gìtàbhàßya. The GP edition contains slightly fewer instances of the word Vàsudeva.
202
See Gìtà Index 279 and •aákara’s introductions to BhGBh X.8 and XIII.12.
203
Lott 156.
    337
But now we come to a passage in the BhGBh that appears to

negate the very reality of grace that •aákara seeks to affirm in his
other writings. In his introduction to the BhGBh, •aákara presents
his views on the incarnation of K‰ß»a and the grace that results
from that incarnation, but in such a way that grace appears to be
a mere provisional and ultimately illusory reality. This is reminis-
cent of the position represented by such thinkers as A. G. Krishna
Warrier and T. M. P. Mahadevan, as has been summarized above.204
•aákara’s reflections on the incarnation of K‰ß»a can indeed be
used as a strong argument in support of the view that •aákara ulti-
mately denies the reality of grace and a personal Lord.205 But other
interpretations are also possible.
The passage in question is the entire first half of •aákara’s intro-
duction to the Gìtà, which is now quoted here in full:
After projecting this world, and desiring to ensure its stability (tasya ca sthi-
tiá cikìrßu˙), He, the Lord, first created the Prajàpatis, viz Marici and
others, and made them follow the dharma (virtuous path) character-
ized by action (rites and duties) as revealed in the Vedas. And then,
having created others, viz Sanaka, Sanandana, and so on, He made
them espouse the dharma characterized by renunciation and distin-
guished by Knowledge and detachment. For, the dharma revealed in
the Vedas is of two kinds—one characterized by action, and the other
by renunciation. That dharma, which is meant for the stability of the world
and is the direct means to both secular and spiritual welfare of living beings
(dharma . . . jagata˙ sthitikàra»amá prà»inàá sàkßàt abhyudayanih≤reyasahetu˙),
continues to be followed by Bràhma»as and others belonging to different
castes and stages of life, who aspire after the highest.
When, after a long time, dharma became overpowered by adharma
(vice), and adharma increased owing to the deterioration of discrimi-
native knowledge, caused by the rise of desire in the minds of the fol-
lowers (of this dharma), then, as tradition goes, Viß»u, called Nàràya»a,
the Prime Mover, took birth—as a part of Himself—as K‰ß»a, the son
of Devaki by Vàsudeva, for the protection of Brahminhood which is
Brahman manifest on earth, and for ensuring the stability of the world
( jagata˙ sthitiá paripipalayißu˙). Because, when Brahminhood is preserved
the Vedic dharma becomes well guarded, for the distinctions among
castes and stages of life depend on it.
And He, the Lord, ever endowed with Knowledge, Sovereignty,
Power, Strength, Valour and Formidability, exercises His command
over His own Màyà which naturally belongs to (Him as) Viß»u, and
204
See VI.C.
205
See Lott 153–156; van Buitenen, Bhagavadgìtà 9–11.
338  
which goes by the name Primal Nature, consisting of its three gu»as
(sattva, rajas and tamas), and as such, through His own Màyà, He appears
as if embodied, as if born, and as if favouring people (svamàyayà dehavàn iva
jàta iva ca lokànugrahaá kurvan iva lakßyate)—though by His nature, He
is birthless, changeless, the Lord of all creatures, eternal, pure, con-
scious and free.
Although He had no need for Himself, still for the sake of favouring
the creatures (bhùtànujigh‰kßayà), He imparted that very twofold Vedic
dharma to Arjuna who had sunk into the sea of sorrow and delusion,
with the idea that the dharma would surely propagate if it is accepted
and put into practice by people who are endowed with an abundance
of good qualities.206
To summarize: After creating the world and its inhabitants, the Lord
imparted a two-fold dharma. The dharma of action, when followed
correctly, would lead to the acquirement of earthly goods, whereas
the purpose of the dharma of renunciation and detachment was the
attainment of liberation, a purely spiritual goal. In both dharmas a
good is revealed to be followed by all human beings; only a devia-
tion from both dharmas would harm the universal order intended by
the Lord. Thus the picture of the Lord offered here by •aákara is
quite in keeping with the conception given by the Gìtà: that of a
benevolent creator and governor of the universe, one who is con-
cerned about the welfare of his creatures.
•aákara goes on to say that this universal order deteriorated due
to inordinate human desire. By laying the cause of the world’s trou-
bles squarely at the feet of the human race, i.e. in human craving,
we note that •aákara does not impute this deviation from the divine
order to a divine predestination, but to human free will. And it is
to human free will that the Lord appeals, by appearing as the teacher
K‰ß»a, whose mission it is to persuade people to return to the orig-
inal dharma and thereby find happiness.
As noted by Anantanand Rambachan, K‰ß»a’s teaching in no way
cancels out the original dharma, but rather is given “for the purpose
of reintroducing and strengthening the Vedic religion;” K‰ß»a “revivifies
and reiterates the doctrines of the Vedas.” In other words, “The
instructions of the avatara are in the form of a restatement and do
not in any way supersede the primacy of the Vedic revelation. K‰ß»a
206
G. tr. 2–5. See GP 13, line 12 to 14, line 21. My emphasis except for the
words gu»as, sattva, rajas, tamas. See also the translation in W. 1–3 and the partial
translation offered by van Buitenen, Bhagavadgìtà 9–10.
    339
does not claim to be instituting a new path to freedom but empha-

sizing His traditional links and the conventional approach.”207
Yet it is true that the Gìtà distinguishes itself from the ancient
Vedic religion with its notion that divine instruction is imparted
through the medium of a descent of the supreme being itself. What
does •aákara have to say about this descent? The key sentence, as
quoted above, reads: “Through His own Màyà, He appears as if
(iva) embodied, as if (iva) born, and as if (iva) favouring people.”208
The word iva is central here, meaning, among other things, “as
it were, as if; in a certain manner, in some measure, a little, per-
haps,” but also “just so, just, exactly, indeed.”209 Most translators
favor the first group of meanings and thereby translate •aákara’s
sentence in the sense of “as if ” or “as it were.”210
Such a meaning would then be unmistakable: The Lord only
appeared to be born, only appeared to be in human form, only
appeared to grant grace to people, when in reality the Lord did
none of these. Such an interpretation, advocated by J. A. B. van
Buitenen, insists that for •aákara there is no divine incarnation and
no divine grace despite the testimony of the sacred sm‰ti. Van Buitenen
labels •aákara’s “as it were, as it were” (iva . . . iva) “Advaitic hedg-
ing.” He contrasts this with Ràmànuja’s preamble to the Gìtà, which
van Buitenen regards as an affirmation of “the physical presence of
God.”211 He sees •aákara’s intentionally ambiguous statement as to
the reality of the incarnation quite in conformity with the imper-
sonal monism he believes •aákara to represent. “Sankara, who ulti-
mately does not accept the notion of God, has no problem with him
on the level of practicality.”212
Before proceeding to an alternative interpretation of •aákara’s
understanding of the incarnation of K‰ß»a, we must consider the
conclusions that can be drawn from the denial of such an embodi-
ment of the divine. For van Buitenen, •aákara’s rejection of a real
incarnation amounts to a denial of both a personal God and of grace
207
A. Rambachan, Accomplishing the Accomplished: The Vedas as a Souce of Valid Knowl-
edge in •a«kara (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 31–32.
208
G. tr. 4. See GP 14, lines 14–16.
209
See MW 168, col. 2.
210
Van Buitenen, Bhagavadgìtà 10, reads: “This Blessed Lord was perceived as
born, as it were, as an embodied person, as it were, by virtue of his own power
of illusion, doing, as it were, a favor to the world.”
211
Van Buitenen, Bhagavadgìtà 11.
212
Van Buitenen, Bhagavadgìtà 9.
340  
in a general sense. But is such a conclusion warranted by the text?

Immediately after •aákara’s triple-iva (“embodied as it were, born
as it were, favoring people as it were”) •aákara points out that the
Lord remains nonetheless by nature (svabhàva), among other things,
“the Lord of all creatures . . . conscious and free,” surely character-
istics of a personal God.213 This personal God, as we have seen from
both the BhGBh and •aákara’s other writings, is identified as the
highest brahman, and is the source of all grace. If then, as van Buitenen
would have it, •aákara denies the reality of the incarnation, this
ought not lead one to conclude that •aákara rejects grace in its
entirety, i.e. in its universal availability apart from the manifestation
of K‰ß»a, but rather only that grace which is mediated through the
incarnation. The grace of the Lord affirmed by •aákara elsewhere
as causative of the dawn of liberating knowledge ought to remain
in effect even if the incarnation of K‰ß»a had never occurred.
What other possibility presents itself as an alternative to that of
van Buitenen? How may we grasp •aákara’s probable intent in
declaring that the Lord appeared to be born, embodied, dispensing
grace “as it were” (iva)?
First of all, we need to draw attention to other verses in •aákara’s
Gìtàbhàßya that give support to a real incarnation. One of these is
BhGBh IX.11. The sm‰ti verse reads: “Not knowing My supreme
nature as the Lord of all beings, foolish people disregard Me who
have taken a human body.”214
•aákara does not in any way attempt to weaken this affirmation
of the Lord taking a human body (mànußìá tanuá); without the inser-
tion of a mitigating iva he has the Lord declare: “Not knowing my
supreme Reality . . . foolish people, the non-discriminating ones, dis-
regard, belittle Me, although I am by nature thus eternal, pure, intel-
ligent, free and the Self of all beings, and who have taken a human
body common to men, i.e. when I act with the help of a human body
(manußyasaábandhinìá . . . deham à≤ritaá manußyadehena vyavaharantam).”215
This is a clear affirmation that in some sense at least the Lord is
linked to a human body.
Satchidananda Murty, in his important work Revelation and Reason
in Advaita Vedànta, likewise supports the view that •aákara accepts
213
G. tr. 4. See GP 14, lines 13–14.
214
G. tr. 4.
215
G. tr. 38. See GP 233, lines 7–13.
    341
the incarnation of K‰ß»a as a truth even to the point of being incon-

sistent with his usual teaching of the partlessness of the supreme. He
bases this on •aákara’s assertion in the introduction to the Gìtà
that the Lord Nàràya»a “took birth—as a part of Himself (aá≤ena)—
as K‰ß»a,”216 or, in Murty’s words, “was partially born as K‰ß»a.”217
Murty comments as follows:
Here Sankara’s use of the word ‘partially’ is intriguing. As God could
not have any parts, the word ‘partially’ can only mean that though
God incarnated as K‰ß»a, he has not ceased to be the creator and
sustainer of the universe, and omnipresent and omniscient. Though he
became K‰ß»a, he was not exhausted in the form of K‰ß»a.218
As further evidence Murty notes BhGBh IV.4 where •aákara states
that only fools doubt that Vàsudeva (= K‰ß»a) “has no God-hood
and omniscience,” i.e. that K‰ß»a is not a mere human.219 “Sankara
accepts the theory of Incarnation fully and believes K‰ß»a to be
Ì≤vara himself.”220
Even Eric Lott, who gives considerable attention to •aákara’s
conception of incarnation and concludes that for the Advaitin an
avatara is a mere illusory descent into human form, concedes that a
realistic dimension is implicit in •aákara’s understanding of K‰ß»a.
“When •a«kara describes the descent of Krishna as intended to
enlighten souls concerning their oneness with the supreme Self, he
comes nearest to acknowledging the ultimate reality of the descent
itself.”221 In other words, human beings could not be instructed by
K‰ß»a were he not visibly present to them, perhaps even physically
present.
We find then in •aákara’s Gìtàbhàßya verses that appear to deny
the reality of the incarnation, i.e. the iva passages,222 as also articulations
216
G. tr. 4.
217
S. Murty, Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedànta (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1974) 8.
218
Murty 8.
219
Murty 8. See G. tr. 178.
220
Murty 8. However, on pp. 278–79 Murty offers what he believes to be a
more penetrating analysis of •aákara’s avatàra teaching. Ultimately •aákara’s “as
if ” (iva) “implies that the appearance of an avatàra is an illusion in a double sense,”
the illusion of an incarnation in a world that is itself an illusion.
221
Lott 155.
222
In addition to •aákara’s Introduction, see also his commentary on IV.6, to
which I shall shortly turn.
342  
that seem to affirm a genuine divine descent into human form. Why
has •aákara not unequivocally stated his position?
The answer to this question is partially revealed in •aákara’s
description of the supreme reality, the Lord Viß»u-Nàràya»a, who
is said to be birthless (aja˙) and changeless (avyaya˙). In his discus-
sion of the incarnation of K‰ß»a •aákara is careful not to impose
limitations on the essential nature of Viß»u, who remains eternal and
immutable. Or, as S. Radhakrishnan writes, “God is never born in
the ordinary sense. Processes of birth and incarnation which imply
limitation do not apply to Him.”223 That is to say, God, though
‘born,’ is without beginning. He appears as if born in K‰ß»a. “Though
the Lord knows no birth or change, He has many times been born.
K‰ß»a is the human embodiment of Viß»u.”224
In other words, since the Lord cannot be both birthless and born,
cannot be both changeless and subject to change, •aákara declares
him to be “born as it were.” The Lord’s essence is untouched by
his entry into the world.
The exact nature of the Lord’s human birth and life is not clear
from •aákara’s statements. He repeats in his commentary on BhGBh
IV.6 what he had taught in the introduction: the Lord “appears to
become embodied, born as it were” (dehavàn iva bhavàmi jàta iva).225
He omits here the introduction’s third iva: “favoring people as it
were.” Instead he writes that the Lord becomes embodied through
his own màyà (àtmano màyayà), also called “the Màyà of Viß»u”
(vaiß»avìá màyàá), but not embodied “in reality like an ordinary man”
(na paramàrthato lokavat).226
It must be remembered that for •aákara màyà is God’s extraor-
dinary power.227 By referring to màyà •aákara is able to affirm the
seemingly contradictory teachings of incarnation and changelessness.
As an example of the Lord’s supreme power expressive of his mere
will we recall BrSùBh I.1.20, which is suggestive of •aákara’s under-
standing of divine incarnation: “Even for God there may be forms
created at His will out of Màyà for the sake of favouring the aspi-
rants . . .” He then quotes an unidentified sm‰ti verse in which the
223
S. Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgìtà (Bombay: Blackie & Son, 1977), 31.
224
Radhakrishnan, The Bhagavadgìtà 32.
225
G. tr. 180. See GP 108, line 24.
226
G. tr. 179–180. See GP 108, lines 20–21.
227
See Eigen. 94–95; R. De Smet, “Màyà or Ajñàna?,” Indian Philosophical Annual
2 (1966):223–224.
    343
Lord declares, “You must not understand me thus.”228 Similarly, in

KenaUpBh III.2 •aákara states that brahman visibly appeared to the
gods “through an unprecedentedly wonderful and astonishing form
created by Brahman’s own power of Màyà.”229
It is possible to interpret •aákara in at least three ways when he
declares in BhGBh IV.6 that K‰ß»a, through the power of màyà, is
not embodied like ordinary people. First of all, ordinary people are
subject to the law of karma-saásàra and the bondage of the body
until liberation dawns. By contrast, K‰ß»a has complete mastery over
the physical realm, voluntarily taking human form for the good of
others, not out of any inherent necessity. Krishna Warrier writes:
“The embodiments of the jìvas are not voluntary but obligated by
the effect of the karmas they have performed in their past lives,
whereas God’s self-embodiment as Avatàr is voluntary, He not being
under the sway of karmas.”230
The second possible reason why •aákara distinguishes K‰ß»a’s
embodied state from that of all other humans lies in the nature of
K‰ß»a’s body itself, a body miraculously brought into being by the
power of màyà. Is it possible that the K‰ß»a who has complete mas-
tery over the matter of the world appears to others in a body that
is of a different nature than other human bodies? Commenting on
BhG VII.25, which has K‰ß»a declare, “Being enveloped by yoga-
màyà, I do not become manifest to all,” •aákara glosses, “I do not
become manifest to all, to the world. The idea is that I become
manifest only to some devotees of Mine.”231 Of course, this could
mean that K‰ß»a is only truly known to those who have the spirit-
ual insight regarding his true divine status which comes from devo-
tion to Him. But •aákara may also mean that K‰ß»a’s presence is
of a special type; he appears, interacts with Arjuna and others, but
is not physically present exactly in the same way as other human
beings are. He appears in bodily form, but only through the mirac-
ulous power of màyà. Is there perhaps in •aákara’s mind a tension
between affirming a normal human body for K‰ß»a and a mere
appearance of such a body? Might this not explain the apparent
228
BrSuBh•, G. tr. 80–81.
229
Tr. in EU I:71.
230
K. Warrier, God in Advaita (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1977),
156–157. See also Swami Tapasyananda, •rìmad Bhagavad Gìtà (Madras: Sri
Ramakrishna Math, 1984), 135.
231
G. tr. 334–335. See GP 207, lines 12–15.
344  
contradiction that •aákara both affirms and denies a physical embod-

iment of the Lord in his Gìtàbhàßya?
One other interpretation of the miracle of K‰ß»a’s incarnation pre-
sents itself. We may draw here on an entirely different spiritual tra-
dition for the sake of illustration and explanation, namely the early
Christian heterodox teaching called docetism, which taught that Jesus
only apparently had a body, but did not in fact live or suffer bod-
ily. He had the mere appearance of a body, an appearance made
necessary by his mission to instruct the way to salvation. Behind this
denial of a real human body, one important contemporary theolo-
gian notes, was the attempt to safeguard the divinity of Christ. “Yet
the very existence of docetism is also a testimony to the tenacity of
the conviction that Christ had to be God, even at the cost of his
true humanity.”232
May not •aákara have shared a similar view in regard to K‰ß»a?
Eager to preserve the true divinity of the Lord, •aákara appears to
have left open the question as to whether the Lord’s visible pres-
ence implied a normal human physical presence. We do not know
finally whether •aákara understood the manifestation of K‰ß»a to
be 1) of a normal human body imbued with a special divine power,
2) of a human body of a unique physical nature, or 3) a mere
appearance of a human body. But perhaps for •aákara the ques-
tion as to whether the Lord was really incarnated or only appeared
to be incarnated was after all of only secondary importance. In either
case the Lord’s grace would be made manifest through K‰ß»a, regard-
less of the exact nature of his presence. Whatever interpretation one
gives, it is clear that •aákara understands the cause of the visible
manifestation of K‰ß»a to lie exclusively in the sovereign grace of
the highest Lord, who is intent on saving his creatures from the sea
of bondage and sorrow. In •aákara’s own words, K‰ß»a imparts the
twofold dharma to Arjuna “for the sake of favouring the creatures”
(bhùtànujigh‰kßayà).233
4. The Grace of Lord K‰ß»a/Viß»u/Nàràya»a/Vàsudeva
In the numerous instances in which •aákara affirms the efficacy of

divine grace he sometimes upholds the Gìtà’s teaching without elab-
232
See Jaroslav Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1971), 174.
233
Introduction to the Gìtà. G. tr. 5. See GP 14, lines 1–21.
    345
orating further on it. More frequently, however, •aákara strength-

ens the Gìtà’s profession of the Lord’s grace or introduces the topic
of grace in his commentary altogether where the Gìtà itself does not
speak of it. There are no instances in which •aákara ignores or
seeks to lessen a clear affirmation of grace by the Gìtàkàra.
In the present section I shall focus my attention on what •aákara
teaches about the grace of the Lord as distinct from the grace of
the teacher, distinguishing between the three kinds of utterances
noted in the previous paragraph.
a. Passages Where •aákara Adds Nothing to the Text

In accord with the Gìtà, but without further clarification, •aákara
teaches that the Lord strengthens the faith of those committed to
worshipping him under other divine forms than K‰ß»a (VII.21)234
In XI.25, 31, and 45 Arjuna, terrified by the divine majesty of
the Lord fully revealed, calls out, “Be gracious ( prasìda)!” •aákara
repeats the same plea with the words prasanno bhava and prasàdam
kuru or leaves the original unchanged.235
In XI.44 Arjuna prostrates himself before the Lord and declares:
“And so I bow to You, prostrate my body, crave grace ( prasàdaye)
of You, (my) Lord adorable.236 •aákara simply glosses with the syn-
onym prasàdaá kàraye.237
The concluding chapter of the Gìtà, XVIII, contains many impor-
tant verses explicitly or implicitly extolling the importance of divine
grace. •aákara lets two of these stand without offering any hint of
their importance for a theology of grace. They are:
Having your mind fixed on Me, you will cross over all difficulties
through my grace (matprasàdàt).
If, on the other hand, you do not listen out of egotism, you will get
destroyed. (XVIII.58)238
234
Zaehner, 282, remarks: “Krishna says that He strengthens the faith of peo-
ple who worship other gods. The reason is, as He here reveals, that they are really
worshipping Him.”
235
G. tr. 445, 449, 464. See GP 270, line 7; 272, line 6; 280, line 2.
236
Zaehner tr. 317. Similar A. G. Krishna Warrier, trans., •rìmad Bhagavad Gìtà
Bhàßya of •rì •aákaràcàrya (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1983 = W), 375. G.
463 translates: “I seek to propitiate you.”
237
See GP 279, line 15.
238
G. tr. 733. See 734.
346  
Take refuge in Him alone with your whole being,

O scion of the Bharata dynasty.
Through His grace (tatprasàdàt) you will attain the supreme Peace and
the supreme Abode. (XVIII.62)239
In the first verse •aákara lets matprasàdàt stand as it is; in the sec-
ond he explains “His grace” as “the grace (or favor) of the Lord”
(ì≤varànugrahàt).240 In XI.47, too, •aákara makes prasàda and anugraha
synonymous terms.241
b. Passages Where •aákara Expands on the Text

BhG IV.11 reads:
According to the manner in which they approach Me,
I favour (bhajàmi) them in that very manner.
O son of P‰tha, human beings follow My path
in every way.242
•aákara’s commentary here is revealing and important. As an intro-
duction to this verse he formulates an objection, to which IV.11 is
seen as the reply. The previous verse had declared that “many”
(bahava˙) have taken refuge in the Lord and therefore attained lib-
eration. For •aákara this brings into question the fairness and impar-
tiality of the Lord, an issue repeatedly raised in •aákara’s other
works. Here he writes: “In that case, You have love and aversion
(ràgadveßau), because of which You grant ( prayacchasi) the state of iden-
tity with Yourself (àtmabhàvaá) only to a few, but not to others?”243
In other words, if you, who are the all-powerful Lord and who
are able to grant liberation to all, do not in fact grant liberation to
all, then your action is motivated by the faults of attachment to some
people and dislike of others. How can you thus be the all-merciful
Lord?
This is, of course, the exact objection levelled against the idea of
an all-powerful personal Lord by the sùtrakàra in BrSùBh II.1.34, to
which •aákara was impelled to offer the following answer: ì≤vara
239
G. tr. 736.
240
See GP 457, line 8.
241
See GP 280, line 18.
242
G. tr. 182–183.
243
G. tr. 182. See GP, 110, lines 11–12. Ràgadveßau might be better translated
as “attachment and aversion.”
    347
does not act out of partiality or cruelty. Rather he acts in accord

with the specific merit of each individual, connecting each jìva’s past
action with its future appropriate fate, mental disposition, and phys-
ical and social environment. By so strongly linking the jìva’s future
with its own past karma •aákara is hard put to affirm that libera-
tion is due to divine grace, which he nonetheless does explicitly teach
(BrSùBh II.3.41).
On the issue of divine grace and human responsibility, •aákara’s
intention is clear: He wants to affirm the reality and importance of
divine grace without falling into the error of asserting an arbitrary
divine election of souls, which would open his conception of the
Lord to the charge of partiality. This is the reason why also in
KaUpBh I.2.23 and MuUpBh III.2.3 •aákara very clearly trans-
forms the meaning of the text, which had spoken of divine choice,
into the idea of a necessary preparatory action, in this case an inward-
driving longing and prayer for liberation.
•aákara’s bhàßya on BhG IV.11 goes even further than the above-
mentioned commentaries in explaining how the Lord’s dispensation
of grace cannot be regarded as unjust or subject to partiality:
According to the manner in which they approach ( prapadyante) Me,
seeking whatever fruit, in that very manner I favour (anug‰h»àmi) them,
by granting that fruit. For they are not seekers’ of liberation (teßàá
mokßaá prati anarthitvàt). Indeed one cannot be at the same time a seeker
of liberation and a seeker of (finite) fruits.
Therefore, by granting fruits ( phalapradànena) to those who hanker
after fruits; by granting Knowledge ( jñànapradànena) to those who fol-
low what has been stated (in the scriptures) and are seekers of liber-
ation, but do not hanker after rewards; by granting liberation
(mokßapradànena) to those who are knowers and are monks aspiring for
liberation ( ye jñànina˙ saányàsino mumukßava˙ ca); by removing the miseries
(àrtihara»ena) of the afflicted—thus do I favour (bhajàmi ) them accord-
ing to the manner in which they approach Me. This is the meaning.
On the other hand, I do not favour (bhajàmi) anybody out of attach-
ment, aversion, or out of delusion (ràgadveßanimittaá mohanimittaá và).244
Thus •aákara sees that whatever people desire, that they get, and
they receive it according to the gracious divine dispensation. In the
words of Karl Potter: “God rewards men precisely in accord with
244
Translation based on G. 183 and W. 141, with slight variations. See GP 110,
lines 16–29.
348  
the way in which they seek Him. If they do not pursue liberation
they don’t get it; if they seek pleasure they get it, etc.”245
This last passage of •aákara is also one of the clearest affirmations
made by him in all his writings that liberation, whose prerequisite
is the total and exclusive yearning for it and not for any earthly
finite gain, is ultimately made possible by the grace of the Lord.
Thus, what is implicit and assumed in KaUpBh I.2.23 and MuUpBh
III.2.3 is made explicit in BhGBh IV.11: The Lord responds with
grace to the longing and prayer of those who seek liberation. As
•aákara summarizes in his introduction to the following verse, the
Lord, who is free from all defects such as attachment etc., is ready
to show favor or grace to all creatures alike (sarvaprà»ißu anujigh‰kßàyàá
tulyàyàá) and is capable of granting every fruit or reward.246
One question remains concerning •aákara’s commentary on IV.11,
however. How are those who are granted knowledge related to those
who are granted liberation? Are they one and the same class of peo-
ple or are they different? At first sight it would appear that •aákara
must be referring to the same group of persons, but in two different
ways, for •aákara would hardly declare that those who follow scrip-
ture and long for liberation to the exclusion of all else (see also
MuUpBh III.2.3) would be granted something less than full libera-
tion. After all, had not •aákara declared in the previous verse (IV.10)
that liberation came to those “who were steadfast in Knowledge
alone, and were purified, who had become supremely sanctified by
. . . Knowledge itself, about the supreme Reality”?247
However, as R. C. Zaehner points out in his commentary on
IV.11, it is likely that at least in the present instance •aákara does
in fact distinguish between the gift of jñàna and liberation itself:
“According to S. God rewards different people in different ways: He
grants the desires (‘fruits’, phala) of the self-interested, gives wisdom
(right knowledge, jñàna) to those who aspire after liberation, and lib-
eration itself to wise men who utterly renounce all works and their
fruits (saányàsins).”248
According to Zaehner, then, •aákara distinguishes between a)
knowers/wise men and b) knowers/wise men who are monks. It is
245
Potter 299.
246
See G. tr. 184 and GP 111, lines 5–7.
247
G. tr. 182.
248
Zaehner 186.
    349
only the latter who attain liberation. This view, of course, presup-
poses that knowledge in the present sense is the highest wisdom short
of the permanent liberated awareness.
Zaehner’s distinction between an elevated wisdom and final lib-
eration finds considerable support when we compare MuUpBh III.2.3
and 4 with BhGBh IV.11. In MuUpBh III.2.3, as noted above, the
central prerequisite for the attainment of liberation was said to be
an intense longing and prayer for emancipation. However, •aákara’s
commentary on the following verse further clarifies his position.
According to MuUp III.2.4 liberation is not attainable without for-
titude, nor through heedlessness nor tapaso và’pyali»gàt.249 This latter
phrase has been variously translated as “through a false notion of
austerity”250 and “through austerity without an aim.”251 •aákara’s
solution, a controversial one, affirms the need of the very renunci-
ation that the modern interpreters see the text as disclaiming. •aákara
writes: “Tapas here means knowledge ( jñànam), and li»ga means monas-
ticism (sannyàsa˙). The purport is that It is not gained through knowl-
edge’ unassociated with monasticism (sannyàsarahitàjjñànànna labhyata
ityartha˙).”252
Thus we find that in both BhGBh IV.10 and MuUpBh III.2.3
•aákara offers an initial general affirmation that liberation is the
result of knowledge but specifies already in the following verse of
both commentaries (BhGBh IV.11 and MuUpBh III.2.4) that this
knowledge is unattainable without a prerequisite monasticism. The
consequence of this teaching is that for •aákara, although the Lord’s
grace is offered to all men in accord with their desire, the grace of
the dawning of Self-realization is granted only to those who have
made a supreme and total renunciation of all earthly goods and have
formally embraced the life of the monk. It is clear from what we
already know of •aákara’s teaching that the Lord’s apparent spe-
cial favoring of the monk is not due to partiality; rather, in •aákara’s
understanding, it is only the monk who has totally disposed himself
to receive the grace of liberating knowledge, having cleared away
all the obstacles and impediments to its reception.
There are several other passages in his Gìtàbhàßya in which •aákara
249
See Radhakrishnan, Principal Upanißads 690 and Hume 376.
250
Hume 376.
251
Radhakrishnan, Principal Upanißads 690.
252
Tr. in EU II:163. See TPU 172, lines 6–7.
350  
expands on the theme of grace or the divine dispensation. Some of

these are minor remarks that do not contribute a great deal to the
knowledge of •aákara already gleaned from an analysis of his other
writings. For example, in VIII.9 •aákara expands the Gìtà’s “Ordainer
of everything” (sarvasya dhàtàraá) to “one who grants the fruits of
actions, in all their varieties, individually to all creatures.”253 The
“Dispenser with faces everywhere” (dhàtà . . . vi≤vatomukha˙) of X.33
becomes, in •aákara’s terminology, “the dispenser of the fruits of
actions of the whole world.”254
On the other hand, •aákara sometimes applies useful images to
the Gìtà text that help to elucidate what he feels to be its meaning.
An example is BhG IX.29, which reads:
I am impartial to all beings;
to Me there is none detestable or none dear.
But those who worship Me with devotion
they exist in Me, and I too exist in them.255
•aákara comments as follows: “I am impartial, equal towards all
beings; to Me there is none detestable, none dear. I am like fire: As
fire does not ward off cold from those who are afar, but removes it
from those who approach near, similarly, I favour (anug‰h»àmi ) the
devotees, not others. But those who worship Me, God (ì≤varaá) with
devotion, they exist in Me—by their very nature (svabhàvata); they
do not exist in Me because of My love (ràganimittam). And I, too,
naturally (svabhàvata) exist in them, not in others. Thus there is no
hatred towards them (the latter).256
This passage provides further confirmation of what •aákara has
said elsewhere about human effort and divine grace as also divine
impartiality. Ì≤vara does not change in his attitude towards the jìva
or in his offer of grace. In that sense he is like fire that exudes its
warmth and light equally in all directions, irrespective of the per-
sons who are near or far. It is up to the devotee to draw near and
receive the ‘warmth’ or favor (anugraha—a derivative of which •aákara
explicitly adds to the text) of God. Such devotees do not exist in
253
G. tr. 348. See GP 215, lines 4–6.
254
G. tr. 421. See GP 256, lines 19–20.
255
G. tr. 394.
256
G. tr. 394–395. See GP 242, lines 5–12. Ràga does not connote the pure gift-
love of a selfless being; it has therefore nothing to do with pity or mercy, but rather
corresponds to desirous need-love.
    351
God by virtue of God’s favoritism or attraction (ràga; translated by

Gambhirananda as “love”) to them, but by virtue of their own nature
that is fixed on God, resides in God.
•aákara’s commentary on BhG X.11 has been discussed in some
detail above,257 but I shall point out here some of its more salient
features in summary form. The sm‰ti passage reads:
Out of compassion (anukampàrtham) for them alone,
I, residing in their hearts,
destroy the darkness born of ignorance
with the luminous lamp of Knowledge.258
•aákara glosses anukampàrtham with its synonym dayàheto˙, both of
which refer to divine mercy or compassion as the source of the jìva’s
liberation. To this he adds, “anxious as to how they may have bliss
(≤reya˙),” to describe the divine intention.259 Thus the Lord acts com-
passionately to enable the jìva to experience the highest joy that
comes with the realization of the àtman within.
•aákara goes into great detail explaining the process of libera-
tion which is fueled by divine grace. The mind is to attain a state
of unruffled calm like a flame in a windless place. This is only pos-
sible if it is withdrawn from the attraction of sense-objects. Such a
state of mind is attainable through the help of disciplines such as
celibacy (brahmacarya), by meditation on the Lord and by “divine
grace resulting from devotion” (bhaktiprasàda). The result is an ever-
greater discriminating knowledge that prepares for the final destruc-
tion of darkness and delusion by the Lord who dwells in the jìva’s
internal organ (anta˙kara»a). For R. De Smet BhGBh X.11 provides
evidence that for •aákara “the whole process of brahma-jijñàsà is ini-
tiated and constantly sustained by divine grace” and not restricted
to “the external grace of the guru.”260 Indeed, in this passage •aákara
does not refer to the teacher or scripture at all.
The bhàßya on X.11, then, appears to teach that the availability
of what De Smet calls “inner grace,” i.e. the enlightening presence
of the àtman at the center of one’s mind, is dependent upon the
257
See VI.D.4.
258
G. tr. 407.
259
G. tr. 407. See GP 249, line 21.
260
ed. C. M. Vadakkekara (Bangalore: Asirvanam Benedictine Monastery, 1980),
212–213.
352  
degree of calm achieved by the mind. But the possibility of the mind
attaining such a state is itself dependent on the discrimination aris-
ing from the teaching of both scripture and the teacher, what De
Smet calls “external grace.”261
The Lord, after unveiling to Arjuna his awe-inspiring cosmic form,
reveals in XI.47 that He has done this “graciously disposed” ( prasan-
nena) or “out of grace.”262 •aákara expands this as follows: “Out of
grace—grace means the intention of favouring you ( prasàdo nàma
tvayi anugrahabuddhi) by Me—who am gracious, being possessed of
that (intention of favouring you) (tadvatà prasannena mayà).”263
•aákara again characteristically defines prasàda in terms of anugraha.264
We now turn to •aákara’s commentary on the final chapter of
the Gìtà, XVIII, to determine how this bhàßyakàra expands or strength-
ens the Gìtàkàra’s teaching on grace.
K‰ß»a declares in XVIII.56:
Let him then do all manner of works continually,
putting his trust in Me;
for by my grace (matprasàdàt) he will attain
to an eternal, changeless state.265
•aákara understands “all manner of works” (sarvakarmà»i) to mean
not only good works, but “even the prohibited ones” ( pratißiddhàni
api).266 This assertion must be understood in conjunction with •aákara’s
bhàßya on later verses. In XVIII.57 he explains that what is impor-
tant is for one’s mind to be fixed on the Lord, in all that one does.
And a few verses later, in XVIII.66, •aákara is quick to add that
all actions, both good and evil, must be finally renounced if real-
ization is to occur. What •aákara seems to indicate, therefore, in
his commentary on the present verse is that surrender to the Lord,
a total focusing of the mind on the Lord, and the reception of the
Lord’s grace—made possible through such constant bhakti—are more
important than the performance of good works. Indeed good works
are of as little value, or as much a hindrance, for attaining the “State
of Viß»u” (vaiß»avaá padam)267 as are the forbidden ones. If one’s goal
261
De Smet, “Contemplation” 212–214.
262
G. tr. 465.
263
G. tr. 465. See GP 280, lines 18–19.
264
See BhGBh XVIII.62 and section IX.B.4.a of the present chapter.
265
Zaehner tr. 398.
266
G. tr. 732. See GP 454, line 24.
267
See G. tr. 732 and GP 455, line 4.
    353
is final liberation—and not the mere acquisition of limited goods—

neither good works nor evil works are relevant. Rather the mind
must reach a state of one-pointed inaction and tranquility in order
to be a worthy receptacle or reflector of the àtman within.
BhG XVIII.65 reads:
Have your mind fixed on Me, be My devotee,
be a sacrificer to Me and bow down to Me.
(Thus) you will come to Me alone.
(This) truth do I promise to you.
(For) you are dear to Me.268
•aákara comments that the prerequisite for the realization of the
promise of “coming” to God, is for the devotee to surrender “all
ends, means and needs to Vàsudeva alone,” for, as he summarizes,
“liberation is the unfailing result of devotion to the Lord” (bha-
gavadbhakte˙ ava≤yaábhàvimokßaphalam). Therefore, “one should have
dedication to God as his only supreme goal.”269
BhG XVIII.65, though not the final verse of the Gìtà, concludes
its spiritual teaching, as •aákara himself notes. The verse reads:
O Acyuta, (my) delusion has been destroyed,
and memory has been regained by me through Your grace (tvatprasàdàt).
I stand with my doubt removed;
I shall follow Your instruction.270
•aákara’s praise of the Lord’s grace is especially strong here. It is
by grace that “delusion, born of ignorance” is overcome, an obsta-
cle as difficult to overcome as crossing an ocean. Likewise, the great
goal attained, knowledge of the àtman, is due to divine grace. All
has been won “through Your grace,” says the Gìtàkàra. •aákara
strengthens this phrase: “through Your grace, through my depen-
dence on Your grace” (tvatprasàdàt tava prasàdàd mayà tvatprasàdam
à≤ritena).271
At the same time •aákara attributes the destruction of delusion
and the attainment of the Self to the correct understanding of scrip-
ture (≤àstra), a sign that •aákara sees no contradiction in ascribing
liberation to both the grace of the Lord and to correct knowledge.
268
G. tr. 738.
269
G. tr. 738. See GP 458, lines 18–19.
270
G. tr. 767.
271
G. tr. 767–768. See GP 479, lines 16–20.
354  
What remains for •aákara here is to comment on the second

half of the Gìtà verse: “I stand with my doubt removed; I shall fol-
low Your instruction.” Somewhat surprisingly, •aákara returns to
the theme of grace again instead of commenting on the words “doubt”
or “instruction.” His statement is powerful: “By Your grace I have
achieved the goal of life” (ahaá tvatprasàdàt k‰tàrtho). Nothing more
remains to be achieved” (na mama kartavyam asti ). And then, as if to
let grace have the last word, he adds: “The teaching of the Scripture
is concluded” (parisamàpta˙ ≤àstràrtha˙).272
Grace and illumination are linked once more in •aákara’s bhàßya
on XVIII.75. In the Gìtà, Sañjaya attributes to the man Vyàsa, the
traditional author of the Mahàbhàrata, of which the Gìtà is a part,
the favor of having been able to hear directly K‰ß»a’s highest teaching:
Through the favour of Vyàsa (vyàsaprasàdàt)
I heard this secret concerning the supreme Yoga,
from K‰ß»a the Lord of yogas,
while He Himself was actually speaking!273
•aákara expands the gift of grace from hearing to hearing and
divine sight or vision: “And through the favour of Vyàsa, by hav-
ing received divine vision from him (tato divyacakßurlàbhàt), I heard
(≤rutavàn) this secret dialogue.”274
c. Passages Where •aákara Introduces the Topic of Grace Altogether

If one includes •aákara’s introduction to the Gìtà,275 there are at
least a dozen passages in his BhGBh in which he introduces the
topic of divine grace or favor without being compelled to do so by
the text upon which he is commenting. In what follows I shall refer
to these texts individually in the order in which they appear in
•aákara’s bhàßya.
After the introduction, the first passage is to be found in BhGBh
II.11. Near the beginning of a long discussion over the possible value
of works for the attainment of liberation, •aákara clearly states his
272
G. tr. 768. See also W. tr. 638 and GP 480, lines 5–8.
273
G. tr. 769.
274
G. tr. 769. See also W. tr. 639 and GP 480, lines 19–20. Radhakrishnan,
Bhagavadgìtà 382, remarks: “Vyàsa granted to Saájaya the power to see and hear
from a distance all that transpired on the battlefield so that he might report the
events to the blind king D˙‰taràß†ra.”
275
See IX.B.3 above.
    355
position that liberation comes from knowledge alone. Immediately

after, he links the theoretical knowledge that makes experiential
knowledge possible, with the grace of the incarnated Lord: “Sorrow
and delusion are . . . the sources of the cycles of births and deaths.
And their cessation comes from nothing other than the knowledge
of the Self which is preceded by the renunciation of all duties. Hence,
wishing to impart that (knowledge of the Self ) for favouring the
whole world (tadupadidikßu˙ sarvalokànugrahàrtham), Lord Vàsudeva, mak-
ing Arjuna the medium, said ‘You grieve for those who are not to
be grieved for,’ etc.”276
For •aákara, the conflict here is between knowledge and works,
not knowledge and grace. It is out of the divine mercy that K‰ß»a’s
salvific message of dharma is proclaimed.
The next passage, an especially important one, is in the bhàßya on
II.39. K‰ß»a declares to Arjuna that by adhering to the wisdom he
is about to receive he “will get rid of the bondage of action.”277 As
usual, •aákara focuses on the evil of all action and the necessity of
renouncing it—even good action—for the sake of final liberation.
But here again the topic of grace surprisingly emerges: “Karma-band-
ham, the bondage of action—action is itself the bondage described
as righteousness and unrighteousness (dharmàdharmàkhyo); you will get
rid of that bondage by the attainment of Knowledge through God’s
grace (ì≤varaprasàdanimittajñànapràpte˙). This is the idea.”278
We note here that •aákara wishes to downplay the effectiveness
of disinterested action (nißkàma karma) as the supreme means to lib-
eration, although it is perhaps the central recommendation of the
Gìtàkara himself. •aákara nevertheless does advocate actions dedi-
cated to the Lord in the context of his soteriology. Such total ded-
ication serves at least to pacify the mind and make it receptive to
the knowledge that the jìva is not in its essence a doer, but rather
the quiescent àtman.
•aákara insists here that bondage is eradicated through knowl-
edge alone. Yet the ultimate cause of the dawning of liberating knowl-
edge he attributes to the grace of the Lord. It is here that •aákara
and the Gìtàkàra concur: Salvation is in some sense at least due to
the grace of God. For •aákara, the knowledge that is so indispensable
276
G. tr. 36. See also GP 26, lines 18–22.
277
G. tr. 85.
278
G. tr. 86. See GP 56, lines 17–19.
356  
for the attainment of liberation is ultimately made possible through

divine grace. We recall •aákara’s important declaration in BrSùBh
11.3.41: “Liberation, too, results from realization that is vouchsafed
by Him out of His grace.”279
In III.24 •aákara comments on the words of K‰ß»a, “These worlds
will be ruined if I do not perform action,” a reference to the Lord’s
own disinterested action in maintaining the world’s existence and
harmony.280 •aákara, speaking as K‰ß»a, teaches the impossibility
of the Lord’s action being anything but gracious: “That is to say, I
who am engaged in helping the creatures ( prajànàm anugrahàya prav‰tta˙),
shall be destroying them. This would be unbefitting of Me, who am
God (mama ì≤varasya ananurùpam àpadyeta).”281
The liberated sage, too, •aákara immediately adds, is likewise
constrained to act for the good of the world, as does the Lord: “On
the other hand, if like Me, you or some one else possesses the con-
viction of having attained perfection (k‰tàrthabuddhi˙) and is a knower
of the Self (àtmavid ), it is a duty of such a one, too, to help others
( parànugraha) even if there be no obligation on his own part.”282
This good is spelled out in the following verses as adherence to
dharma and the pursuit of spiritual development, primarily through
the dedication of one’s work to the Lord. One’s proper work is what
is appropriate for one’s caste.
Two chapters later, in V.29, which proclaims K‰ß»a as “the great
Lord of all the worlds,” “the enjoyer of sacrifices and austerities,”
and “the friend (suh‰daá) of all creatures,” •aákara adds that Nàràya»a
is “the Benefactor of all without consideration of return” (sarvaprà»inàá
pratyupakàranirapekßatayà upakàri»am) and “the dispenser of the results
of all works” (sarvakarmaphalàdhyakßam).283
We next come to the first of three instances in the Gìtàbhàßya in
which •aákara uses the term anukro≤a, meaning “tenderness, com-
passion”284 or its verbal form anukro≤ati. This term is of special inter-
est for this study on grace, for the Gìtàkara does not use it in any
of its variations. It is a word •aákara himself interjects into his
bhàßya to describe the Lord’s attitude to humans in distress. For
279
G. tr. 156.
280
G. tr. 157. See GP 96, lines 13–16.
281
G. tr. 157. See GP 96, lines 1–19.
282
G. tr. 157. See GP 96, lines 17–19.
283
G. tr. 268–269. See GP 166, lines 6–7.
284
See MW 31, col. 3.
    357
example, in his introduction to VII.13, which speaks of the entire

world being lost and deluded, •aákara states that “the Lord (bha-
gavàn) evinces his pity (anukro≤aá dar≤ayati, literally “looks with com-
passion”) for the world that fails to know Him intimately.”285 But
•aákara also notes in the same sentence that this compassionate
Lord is “the cause of burning away the seed of the evil of transmi-
gration” (saásàradoßabìjapradàhakàra»aá). Further, this bhagavàn who
out of tender compassion for suffering creatures frees them from the
great evil of rebirth is none other than the supreme Lord ( parame≤vara),
“whose nature is eternally pure, enlightened, and free.” And, finally,
this Lord is nirgu»aá, without attributes, obviously a standard appel-
lation of the highest brahman.286
The term anukro≤aá also appears in •aákara’s commentary on
VII.23 and XV.10. In the former passage the Lord (bhagavàn) is said
to feel compassion (anukro≤aá dar≤ayati ) for those who worship the
gods rather than God, for they do not thereby attain the highest
goal. “The Lord thus evinces pity for the worshippers of gods.”287
In the latter passage, XV.10, •aákara remarks that the Lord (bha-
gavàn) “expresses His pity (anukro≤ati )” for those in bondage to the
body and its experiences, not realizing the Lord within.288
In XI.36 •aákara comments on the Gìtà’s theme that the Lord
is deserving of praise and the cause of delight. This is so, writes
•aákara, because “the Lord is the Self of all beings and the Friend
of all” (ì≤vara˙ sarvàtmà sarvabhùtasuh‰ta).289 Earlier, in IX.18, •aákara
had defined a friend as “one who does a good turn without thought
of reward” ( pratyupakàrànapekßa˙ san upakàrì).290
We next turn to •aákara’s bhàßya on XIV.27, in which K‰ß»a
says: “For I am the base ( pratiß†hà) supporting Brahman,—immortal
(Brahman) which knows no change,—(supporting) too the eternal law
of righteousness and absolute beatitude.”291
This verse is a difficult one for traditional Advaitins, as it seems
to suggest that the personal Lord is higher than the so-called impersonal
285
W. tr. 260. See GP 202, lines 3–4.
286
G. tr. 325. See GP 202, lines 1–4.
287
W. tr. 268. See GP 206, lines 23–25.
288
W. tr. 500. See GP 372, lines 7–11.
289
G. tr. 455. See GP 275, lines 2–3.
290
G. tr. 384. See GP 236, lines 18–19.
291
Zaehner tr. 358.
358  
brahman.292 Despite the various attempts at disproving this thesis on

the basis of •aákara’s own commentary, the fact is •aákara does
not really unequivocally solve the problem. K‰ß»a’s “I” he makes
into the “I” of the inmost Self ( pratyagàtman), which is identical to
brahman, but •aákara acknowledges that this brahman may be under-
stood in one sense as the highest brahman, and in another as the
conditioned brahman.293
What is, however, more relevant to the present study is •aákara’s
attempt to link the present verse with the previous one (XIV.26)
which had declared that one becomes fit to become brahman by virtue
of one’s total devotion to the Lord. In the present verse •aákara
explains that one becomes fit to become brahman through the power
of the Lord. He thus understands K‰ß»a’s “I” to refer to that power:
“The purport is this: Indeed, that power of God (ì≤vara≤aktyà) through
which Brahman sets out, comes forth, for the purpose of favouring
the devotees, etc. (bhaktànugrahàdiprayojanàya), that power which is
Brahman Itself, am I. For a power and the possessor of that power
are non-different (≤akti≤aktimato˙ ananyatvàd).”294
The favor bestowed on the devotees does not directly bring real-
ization, but rather makes them fit to realize their non-duality with
the Lord by virtue of the detachment from the world attained through
their devotion. •aákara does not go far as to say here that the
dawning of liberating knowledge is itself due to the Lord’s grace,
although he does affirm this elsewhere.
At the very beginning of his introduction to Chapter XV •aákara
offers yet another profession of the Lord’s power and grace while
typically harmonizing the paths of devotion and knowledge which
together lead to liberation. He speaks as K‰ß»a: “ ‘Since the result
of actions of those who perform their rites and duties and the result
of those who tread the path of Knowledge are at My disposal, there-
fore, those who worship Me through the Yoga of Devotion, they,
having transcended the qualities (gu»as) through the stages leading
to Illumination, attain Liberation by My grace (matprasàdàd ).’ ”295
“Transcending the gu»as” is one way of speaking of renunciation
292
See Swami Tapasyananda, trans., •rimad-Bhagavad-Gìtà (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna
Math, 1986), 375.
293
G. tr. 590. See GP 363–364.
294
G. tr. 590. See GP 364, lines 1–3.
295
G. tr. 591. See GP 365, lines 1–4.
    359
and detachment from the world, a central tenet of •aákara. Such

renunciation is a prerequisite for the realization of the àtman, a knowl-
edge that is unveiled by the Lord’s grace. Thus everything, from the
results of performed rites and duties motivated by the desire for lim-
ited goods up to the attainment of liberation itself, is subject to the
gracious will of the Lord.
In the final passage of this section, which comes from •aákara’s
bhàßya on XVIII.50, the bhàßyakàra states that the very process lead-
ing to the capacity for perfect quietude and detachment is itself the
result of the Lord’s grace, a grace that in turn results from the jìva
having dedicated all its activities to him: “The seeker after perfec-
tion has won the fitness (siddhiá) of the body and the senses for the
discipline of knowledge—a fitness born of the grace of God (ì≤varaá . . .
prasàdajàá) due to His worship by the doing of one’s works.”296
Here the stress is neither on human effort alone nor on divine
grace alone. Both are indispensable for liberation.
5. The Grace of the Teacher and of Scripture
In his BhGBh •aákara’s teaching on the grace of the spiritual guide

and of scripture does not depart in any way from what he has said
in his other works. The guru and ≤ruti serve to purify the seeker of
the not-Self by bringing the mind to a passive and receptive tranquility
on the basis of a correct theoretical awareness of true identity.
What follows is a list of the more explicit passages that point to
the role of the teacher and of scripture. In contrast to the preced-
ing section on the grace of the Lord, almost all the following pas-
sages appear without warning in contexts that do not appear to
require mention of the need of the help of the àcàrya or of the ≤àstra.
Only •aákara’s bhàßya on XVI.23 adds nothing to the sm‰ti verse,
while only XVIII.67 strengthens a sm‰ti teaching. In the twelve or
so other passages, •aákara himself introduces the importance of the
teacher and of scripture.
To begin, in his commentary on XVI.23 •aákara simply reiter-
ates what sm‰ti teaches: Without the injunctions of scripture (≤àstravid-
hiá) one attains neither perfection nor earthly or heavenly happiness
nor liberation.297
296
W. tr. 599. See GP 445, lines 8–10.
297
See G. tr. 632–633 and GP 391, lines 1–7.
360  
In XVIII.67 K‰ß»a declares that “this” (idaá), presumably his

teaching to Arjuna, should not be taught to a non-ascetic, a non-
devotee, to one who does not seek it, nor to one who reviles the
Lord.298 •aákara understands “this” to be the ≤àstra or scripture. He
also says that an ascetic who is without devotion is improperly pre-
pared to receive this teaching, and by devotion he understands bhakti
to both the teacher and to God (gurudevabhakti ).299
The remaining passages are independent reflections of •aákara:
In II.21 the Advaitin quotes B‰Up IV.4.19: “It is to be realized
through the mind alone.” •aákara interprets this as follows: “The
mind that is purified by the instructions of the scriptures and the
teacher, and control of the body and organs, etc. becomes the instru-
ment for realizing the Self (≤àstràcàryopade≤a≤amadamàdisaásk‰taá mana
àtmadar≤ane kara»am).”300
In III.41 the knowledge ( jñàna) that is eulogized by K‰ß»a is,
according to •aákara, that which is gained from scripture (≤àstra)
and the teacher (àcàrya) and which leads to the wisdom (vijñàna) of
realized experience (anubhava).301
Although the Gìtà in IV.39 teaches that knowledge is won by the
man of faith who is intent on gaining wisdom and has controlled
his senses, •aákara apparently feels that such a means left to itself
is inadequate, for he adds that the aspirant must be “steadfast in
the service of the teacher” (gurùpàsana),302 or, in a variant reading,
the seeker of wisdom must apply himself by first “approaching a
teacher” (gurùpasadana).303
BhG VI.14 describes the behavior and sàdhana of a yogi. The com-
pound brahmacàrivrate, “in the vow of a celibate,” is mentioned.
•aákara adds that this state of celibacy includes “service of the
teacher (guru≤u≤rùßa), eating food got by begging, etc.”304
It is clear that for •aákara the practice of meditation is of little
use on the path to liberation if it is not linked to the Vedic revela-
tion. That is why when Gìtà VIII.8 prescribes constant meditation
on the Lord, •aákara is quick to add that this spiritual practice is
298
See W. tr. 633.
299
See W. tr. 633 and GP 476, lines 3–7.
300
G. tr. 68. See GP 46, lines 14–15.
301
See G. tr. 172 and GP 104, line 22.
302
G. tr. 227. See GP 138, line 22.
303
See W. tr. 177.
304
G. tr. 289. See GP 180, line 16.
    361
to be performed “in accordance with (anu) the instruction of teach-

ers and scriptures” (≤àstràcàryopade≤am anudhyàyan).305
Brahmàcàrya, the state of celibacy, is again the theme in VIII.11.
As in VI.14, •aákara emphasizes that celibacy is to be practiced
“under the guidance of a teacher” (gurau).306
In XIII.12 •aákara declares that revelatory scripture (≤abda) is the
“sole means” (ekapramà»a) for knowing the supersensuous brahman.307
But in XIII.34 •aákara includes both the àcàrya and scripture as
indispensable for Self-realization: “knowledge of the Self, which arises
from following the instructions of the scriptures and the teachers”
(≤àstràcàryopade≤ajanitam àtmapratyayikajñànaá).308
The opening three verses of Chapter XVI give a long list of the
virtues that are conducive to liberation. Among those listed in V.1
is “persistence in knowledge and yoga” ( jñànayogavyavasthiti˙). •aákara
makes very clear exactly what knowledge this is and whence it comes:
“Jñàna means knowledge of such subjects as the Self, learnt from
scriptures and teachers” (≤àstrata àcàryata˙ ca).309
The same idea is repeated again in XVIII.17. The liberated
renunciate is one “whose intellect (lit. “self,” àtman) is refined by the
instructions of the scriptures and the teachers and reason” (≤àstràcàry-
opade≤anyàyasaásk‰tàtmano).310
•aákara’s bhàßya on XVIII.50 contains one of his most explicit
declarations linking liberation to the grace of the teacher. The con-
text of his reflection is knowledge of brahman-àtman. If the self is with-
out form is it not then impossible to know? •aákara answers:
What is to be undertaken is only the elimination of the superimposi-
tion on Brahman through ignorance, but no effort ( yatna˙) is needed
for knowing Brahman (Consciousness), for It is quite self-evident (atyan-
taprasiddhatvàt)! It is because the intellect is distracted by particular
appearances of name and form imagined through ignorance, that
Brahman, even though self-evident, easily realizable (suvijñeyam), nearer
than all else (àsannataram) and identical with oneself (àtmabhùtam), appears
to be concealed, difficult to realize (durvijneyam), very far (atidùram) and
305
G. tr. 346. See GP 214, line 21.
306
W. tr. 281. See GP 216, line 15.
307
G. tr. 529. See GP 324, line 1.
308
G. tr. 566. See GP 349, lines 20–21. Warrier’s text inserts the word prasàda:
“the grace of teachers.” However, this word is lacking in both the GP and AAS
editions.
309
G. tr. 615. See GP 380, lines 16–17.
310
G. tr. 679. See GP 419, line 1.
362  
different (anyad ). But, to those whose intellect has become free from
external appearances and who have attained the grace of a teacher
and serenity of mind (labdhagurvàtmaprasàdànàá), there is nothing more
blissful, manifest, well-known, easily realized and nearer to oneself than
this Self (na ata˙ paraá sukhaá suprasiddhaá suvijñeyaá svàsannam asti).311
From this paragraph it is clear that the grace of the teacher is instru-
mental in turning the mind within so that the knowledge of the Self
may dawn without further human effort.
Even after having said all this •aákara is well aware that those
who do not really appreciate these truths, those whom he labels
“some self-styled scholars” (kecit . . . pa»∂itaámanyà),312 will continue to
doubt whether the formless àtman can be known. Of course, such
skeptics cannot know the Self, and he clarifies why this is so: “This
is truly so for those who have not associated with a traditional line
of teachers (gurusaápradàya); who have not heard the Upanißads
(a≤rutvedàntànàm); whose intellects are too much engrossed with exter-
nal objects; and who have not applied themselves diligently to the
perfect means of knowledge.”313
Thus effort is required on the path to liberation, but only such
an effort as is directed and guided by the truth passed on by the
correct tradition of scripture and teachers.
This theme is repeated in shorter form in •aákara’s commentary
on XVIII.55. Liberating knowledge emerges “with the renunciation
of all actions that arise from the perception of the distinction among
their accessories such as agent etc. and which unfolds from the
instruction of the scriptures and teachers (≤àstràcàryopade≤ena), depend-
ing on purity of the intellect etc. (buddhivi≤uddhayàdi ) and humility etc.
(amànitvàdi ) which are the auxiliary causes (sahakàrikàra»aá) of the ori-
gin (utpatti) and maturity (paripàka) of Knowledge.”314
As usual, •aákara links the help of the teacher and of scripture
to the process whereby the intellect is purified. The renunciation of
action is, further, brought about through the insight that one is not
an agent. This insight is made possible, •aákara indicates, through
the virtue of humility, i.e. the ego-destroyer, the inhibitor of false
knowledge. All of these together do not, strictly speaking, cause knowl-
311
G. tr. 721–722. See GP 447, line 18 to 448, line 1. “Knowing” emphasized
by G.
312
W. tr. 602. See GP 448, line 3.
313
G. tr. 722. See GP 448, lines 6–8.
314
G. tr. 730. See GP 453, lines 9–13.
    363
edge to occur, it being eternal and ever-present; rather they are aux-
iliary causes, clearing away all that obstructs self-knowledge from
becoming manifest.
6. The Compassion of the Liberated Devotee
In BhG IX.11–15 K‰ß»a contrasts the fools who are unable to per-
ceive his divine nature with those great ones who adore him and
know him as the Lord. According to IX.13 these latter possess a
nature that is godlike or divine (daiviá prak‰tim).
•aákara states wherein such a godly nature consists: It is “marked
by restraint of mind and senses (≤amadama), compassion (dayà), faith,
etc. (≤raddhàdi ).”315
In his bhàßya on the following sùtra, IX.14, •aákara again intro-
duces compassion (dayà) as an important virtue. The noble devotees
are those intent on “cultivating virtues like the withdrawal of sense-
organs (indrayopasaáhàra), restraint of mind and senses (≤amadama) com-
passion (dayà), non-violence, etc. (ahiásàdi ).”316
C. •á’ UPADE•ASÀHASRÌ
We recall that the Upad is the only independent non-commentato-

rial treatise of •aákara that has passed modern tests of authentic-
ity.317 I had further noted the remarkable fact that the term ì≤vara
appears relatively infrequently in the Upad in comparison with the
BrSùBh and that the Upad does not contain a single clear or explicit
reference to the grace of the Lord. The Upad, in striking contrast
to •aákara’s other works, gives no important place to ì≤vara. We
shall see that on the other hand •aákara does not hesitate to refer
to the grace of the guru in the Upad. Does this therefore mean that
the grace of the teacher is more important for •aákara than the
grace of the Lord? Such a question cannot be answered on the basis
of the Upad alone. Our conclusions about the role of the àcàrya’s
grace and ì≤vara’s grace will be drawn in the next chapter. For now
we will examine passages in the Upad that refer to grace, either
explicitly to the grace of the teacher or perhaps implicitly to the
supreme reality itself.
315
W. tr. 306. See GP 234, line 15.
316
W. tr. 306. See GP 234, lines 23–24.
317
See I.C.2.d.
364  
1. caitanya-àtman
In the Upad •aákara offers salutations (nama˙) four times to either

the supreme àtman or to its synonym caitanya (“pure consciousness”).
Each of these four passages occurs in the padyabandha or Metrical
Part of the Upad. They are as follows:
Salutation (nama˙) to the all-knowing Pure Consciousness (caitanyaá)
which pervades all, is all, abides in the hearts of all beings, and is
beyond all objects (of knowledge). (I.1.1)318
Since nothing else exists, it is certainly the highest Àtman, all-know-
ing, all-seeing, and pure, which is the Àtman to be known. Salutation
(nama˙) to this Àtman which one should know. (I.17.1)319
Salutation (nama˙) to that knowledge-Àtman ( jñànàtmane) which is all-
knowing and almighty and besides which there is nothing else, neither
knowledge, nor object of knowledge, nor knower. (I.17.87)320
Salutation (namo) to that Àtman, the Constant Awareness (nityàvagataye),
Àtman of the notions of the intellect, through which the modifications
(of the intellect) disappear and rise. (I.18.1)321
Since in the Indian traditions a salutatory verse normally appears at
the beginning or end (or both) of one’s work, it is likely that the
Upad, at least its Metrical Part, is a compilation of more than one
of •aákara’s writings, perhaps even of writings composed at different
times. Chapter XVII, for example, as can be seen here, includes a
salutation to the àtman both in its opening and in its next to last
verse,322 an indication that the piece may have originally stood iso-
lated from the rest of what is now the Upad. Was •aákara himself
the compiler of these writings or did a follower of his collect them
for posterity? Were any other brief treatises lost? Such questions can-
not be answered at this time, but they do point to the problems
involved in coming to a correct appreciation of the place of the
Upad in •aákara’s thought.
It appears from the four verses quoted that •aákara praises the
àtman for what it is, not for what it does. The àtman is worthy of
318
Sengaku Mayeda, trans., A Thousand Teachings. The Upade≤asàhasrì of •a«kara
(= TT) (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1979), 103. See text in •a«kara’s
Upade≤asàhasrì (= USS), ed. Sengaku Mayeda (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1973), 71.
319
TT tr. 160. See USS 131.
320
321
322
The final verse of Chapter XVII is a salutation to the teachers and will be
examined below.
    365
adoration because of its unique and non-dual status; it is both tran-

scendent to all and immanent to all, and is the sole reality.
The word namas, used by •aákara in all four verses, literally means
“bow, obeisance, reverential salutation, adoration,”323 and is employed
by him in the Upad also in relation to the teachers of his Advaitic
tradition, to whom he expresses his debt. But •aákara does not
express any debt to the àtman in his salutatory verses. Or are such
verses themselves a sign of •aákara’s indebtedness to the àtman for
his liberation?
A clue towards solving this question is given in I.18.108. •aákara
writes: “The result (= final release) is proper to (Àtman) though (It
is) immovable, just as victory, etc. are proper to a king, since that
result (i.e., final release) is neither the nature nor the cause of either
action or the notion.”324
Here it appears that •aákara attributes a liberating role to the
àtman itself, careful to distinguish its kind of influence from the action
of mere worldly agents, whose action involves a self-transformation.
As Mayeda notes, commenting on this verse: “Àtman is compared
to a king who, without acting himself, makes others act by his mere
presence.325
In I.18.156 •aákara refers to the “help of Àtman” (anugraha àtmana˙),
but this reference is epistemological rather than soteriological, dealing
with the capacity of the intellect to illumine objects of perception.326
2. The Teacher
Both in the Metrical Part ( padyabandha) and in the Prose Part (gadya-
bandha) •aákara acknowledges the indispensable help of the spiritual
guide for bringing the seeker of truth to self-realization. It is only
in the Metrical Part, however, that •aákara offers salutations to the
teacher or to the tradition of teachers to whom he is indebted. All
five of these verses occur in Chapters XVII to XIX, either at the
respective chapter’s beginning or end. Three of these stanzas (I.17.2–3;
I.17.88; I.18.2) occur immediately after a salutatory stanza to the
àtman, never preceding it, a sign that however important the teacher
323
See MW 528, col. 1.
324
325
TT 199 note 78.
326
See USS 171 and TT tr. 188.
366  
may be, he is not to be confused with the goal itself, which is knowl-
edge of the Self. Two of these salutatory stanzas to the teacher
(I.18.230; I.19.28) appear at the close of a chapter without homage
being paid to the Self. The five passages are as follows:
I ever bow down (nityaá pra»ato) to those who, by their knowledge of
words, sentences, and means of knowledge, have like lamps illumined
Brahman, the secret doctrine of the Vedas. Paying homage to those teach-
ers ( pra»amya tàn gurùn) whose words have reached (me) and destroyed
(my) sins as the sunbeam reaching and destroying the darkness, I shall
state the conclusion about the knowledge of Brahman. (I.17.2–3)327
Salutation (namas) to the all-knowing teachers (gurubhyo) by whom
through knowledge we have been led across the great ocean of birth
and death filled with ignorance. (I.17.88)328
Salutation (namo) to an Indra among ascetics, teacher of the teacher
(guror garìyase), a man of great intellect, who defeated hundreds of ene-
mies of the •rutis by means of sword-like words supported by thun-
derbolt-like reasoning ( yukti) and protected the treasure of the meaning
of the Vedas. (I.18.2)329
Salutation (nama˙) to this good teacher (tasmai sadgurave) who, like a
bee, has collected for us from the flowers of the Upanißadic sentences
the best honey of the nectar of knowledge. (I.18.230)330
Salutation (namo) to the teachers (gurubhya˙) who churned out from
the ocean of the Veda what they held to be supreme, this knowledge,
as the gods, the great souls, (churned) from the great ocean the elixir
of immortality. (I.19.28)331
Of note is that in the salutations offered at the beginning and end
of Chapter XVIII, i.e. the third and fourth of the last series of
quotes, a definite teacher appears to be honored by •aákara, whereas
in the other three verses Advaitic teachers in the plural are vener-
ated. Just who this particular individual might be has been discussed
above.332 Whether the words “teacher of my teacher” (guror garìyase)
refer to the sage Gau∂apàda cannot be decided with certainty.
327
328
329
330
331
TT tr. 207. See USS 189. A somewhat clearer translation of I.19.28 is pro-
vided by Swami Jagadananda, A Thousand Teachings (Mylapore, Madras: Sri
Ramakrishna Math, 1984), 299: “I bow down to the teachers, the great souls, who
realized the Supreme Truth and gathered from the ocean of the Vedas this knowl-
edge (described in the present book) like gods who churned the great ocean in
ancient time and gathered nectar.”
332
See I.A.
    367
What is of greater significance is that in all but the second quo-

tation (I.17.88) the function and importance of the teacher is linked
to the teacher’s capacity to comprehend the true meaning of ≤ruti,
to preserve that meaning from false interpretation, and to illuminate
for his disciples the true purport of scripture, so that the seekers of
truth might realize the highest truth through their own experience
and thereby find liberation. Nowhere does •aákara say that the guru
directly enlightens or liberates the disciple. The reference in the first
quote to the guru destroying one’s sins is probably indicative of the
long process by which the seeker is cleansed of all blemishes, both
mental and moral, by the guru’s teaching, taken to heart. The teacher’s
helping role, then, is to assist the seeker in internalizing the truth of
≤ruti and to thereby prepare for the dawning of the final breakthrough
into the non-dual consciousness.
•aákara states in I.17.50 that a seeker of truth who is concen-
trated upon the àtman “should resort to a teacher (gurum à≤rayet).”333
Two verses later, in I.17.52, he adds, “If a student is disciplined and
properly qualified, the teacher should immediately transport him over
his great interior ocean of darkness in the boat of the knowledge of
Brahman.”334
Turning now to the gadyabandha, a different section of the Upad
in three chapters, which takes the form of a dialogue between an
enlightened teacher and his disciple, I will briefly examine II.1.6 and
II.2.74. •aákara’s purpose in writing this section, according to
Sengaku Mayeda, was to answer “a very practical and pedagogical
problem, that is, how a teacher should teach the knowledge of Àtman
to a pupil.”335 It is therefore instructive to read what qualifies one
to become a spiritual guide.336 Along with being a knower of brah-
man and being astute enough to explain the subtleties of Advaitic
teaching, •aákara demands a flawless character of the teacher: “And
the teacher is able to consider the pros and cons (of an argument),
is endowed with understanding, memory, tranquility, self-control,
compassion (dayà), favor (anugraha) and the like . . . with the only pur-
pose of helping others (kevalaparànugrahaprayojano) he wishes to make
use of knowledge. ”(II.1.6)337
333
334
335
USS 66.
336
For further discussion of the role and character of the teacher, see IV.C.3.
337
TT tr. 212. See USS 192, lines 3–7.
368  
It is not clear why •aákara makes a distinction here between the

teacher’s compassion (dayà) and the teacher’s favor (anugraha) or desire
to show favor toward others ( parànugraha). In any case, being established
in brahman, the teacher cannot but be compassionate to others.
Mayeda correctly notes that the qualifications of a teacher “are
not so different from those of a pupil.”338 For in II.1.2 •aákara
describes the kind of student who is qualified to hope that the àcàrya
might instruct him. Among other things, the seeker must be detached
from the things of the world, become a wandering monk ( parama-
haása), be self-controlled etc. It is noteworthy that •aákara demands
of the seeker of brahman the virtue of compassion (dayà).339 Is this
because compassion toward others is itself desirable or is it because
the presence of compassion is a sign that the seeker’s ego has become
so weakened that the teacher may reach him and transform him
through the power of his words? •aákara does not indicate a solu-
tion to this question.
In II.2.74 •aákara speaks explicitly of the teacher’s grace. The
teacher has just clarified for the disciple the source of the latter’s
confusion about the perception of pain in the dream and waking
states and the absence of that pain in the state of deep sleep. The
pupil has been instructed not to identify himself with his changing
states, but rather to see that his real nature is the pure conscious-
ness of the àtman. Because the pupil now understands, he says to
the teacher: “Your Holiness, the delusion has gone thanks to your
gracious assistance” (bhagavan, apagatas tvatprasàdàd vyàmoha˙)340—but
he then proceeds to ask other questions that torment him.
The teacher’s grace ( prasàda), then, at least in II.2.74, is expressed
not only in the teacher’s willingness to address the questions put to
him by the seeker of truth, but also in the answer itself that he gives.
The student is blessed by the rationality and clarity of the truth that
has been revealed to him by his guru, and he is therefore grateful.
3. Scripture
We have seen in the previous section on the teacher the importance

of scripture. Most of the verses offering salutations to the teacher or
338
TT 229 note 16.
339
See USS 191, line 7 and TT tr. 211.
340
    369
teachers indicate the indispensability of scripture on the path to Self-

knowledge. To those verses may be added I.18.3, which appears
immediately after salutations to the àtman and to the teacher. This
chapter, the longest in the Metrical Part, discusses the mahàvàkya
“That thou art” (tat tvam asi ). As if to deal head-on with doubts con-
cerning ≤ruti’s capacity to trigger enlightenment in the seeker of lib-
eration, •aákara asks: “If the understanding, ‘I am ever-free, the
existent,’ could not arise, for what purpose does the •ruti teach zeal-
ously (àd‰tà) like a (devoted) mother (màt‰vac)?”341
In other words, the very purpose of ≤ruti is to bring enlighten-
ment. It must therefore be trusted in this capacity. •aákara’s com-
parison of ≤ruti with a mother in the Upad is unique and does not
occur in any of his other writings. It is both a sign of his love of
scripture and his indebtedness to it.
4. The Continuity of Knowledge
In II.1.3, after speaking of the need of the student to approach a

qualified teacher, so as to receive the proper instruction, •aákara
writes: “For when knowledge (of Brahman) is firmly grasped, it is con-
ducive to one’s own beatitude and to the continuity (santatyai ) (of
knowledge of Brahman). And the continuity of knowledge (vidyàsan-
tati≤ ) (of Brahman) is helpful to people ( prà»yanugrahàya), as a boat (is
helpful) to one wishing to get across a river (naur iva nadìá titìrßo˙).”342
What is meant’ by “continuity of knowledge?” Swami Jagadananda
translates the compound as “transmission of knowledge,”343 but does
not explain its meaning. Presumably he means to say that when
knowledge has been firmly grasped, it becomes capable of being
taught. It is the transmission of knowledge from master to disciple
from age to age that constitutes a great aid (anugraha) to people.
It is also possible that by “continuity of knowledge” •aákara
means incessant meditation on the truth of brahman received from
the teacher. This would indicate the nididhyàsana stage of the path
leading to liberation. Thus constant mindfulness of brahman to the
exclusion of all other thoughts is helpful as an auxiliary aid leading
341
342
343
Jagandananda tr. 3.
370  
to mokßa. But this attentiveness to the truth that is brahman is itself

the outcome of the guru’s grace.
5. The Compassion of •aákara
•aákara, who normally speaks of the “teacher” or “teachers” in a

theoretical sense, provides a rare glimpse of himself as teacher in
I.8.5. He does not call himself compassionate, but his purpose for
having composed the Upad reveals his dayà towards his fellow jìvas:
“Considering that people are attached to cause and effect, I have
composed this dialogue (saávàdam imaá prak¬ptavàn), making (them)
understand the meaning of the truth of their own nature (svarù-
patattvàrtha), so that they may be released (vimokßa»e) from (their)
attachment to cause and effect.”344
•aákara’s next verse promises liberation to anyone who reflects
deeply on this writing. To be sure, •aákara returns again to a the-
oretical, less personal, mode of discourse, but one may detect in the
promise of liberation the confirmation of •aákara’s own enlightened
state: “If a man ponders on this dialogue, he will be released from
ignorance, the origin of great fears. And such a man is always free
from desire; being a knower of Àtman, he is ever free from sorrow,
the same (to beings), and happy.” (I.8.6)345
The phrase “the same” (sama) most immediately refers back to
I.8.3 where •aákara has àtman-brahman declare itself to be “always
the same to all beings” (sadà ca bhùteßu samo), a sentence probably
taken from BhG IX.29,346 which I have discussed above.347 We should
recall that in his commentary on that Gìtà passage •aákara had
likened the Lord to a fire that radiates warmth in all directions, an
illustration well-suited to underscore the Lord’s impartiality. Elsewhere
in the Upad •aákara refers to both ì≤vara (I.10.8) and brahman-àtman
(I.10.11; I.14.47) as being the same to all beings.
Thus, for •aákara both brahman-àtman-ì≤vara and the realized sage
are “the same” toward all beings. The teacher is the living embod-
iment of brahman’s anugraha, which extends itself to all, and which,
344
345
346
347
See IX.B.4.b.
    371
as in the case of a fire, awaits those in darkness to draw near to it

and receive its light and warmth.
D. MÀ¤DÙKYA-UPANIÍAD-BHÀÍYA  GAUÎAPÀDA-KÀRIKÀ-BHÀÍYA
This work, the GKBh, I have not included with •aákara’s other
Upanißad commentaries, because of its controversial authorship.348 It
is a writing that is particularly popular among acosmic interpreters
of •aákara, but, for a number of reasons, some of the most impor-
tant contemporary scholars of Advaita hold it to be spurious. In
what follows I will briefly summarize •aákara’s, or perhaps Pseudo-
•aákara’s, remarks on I.10, III.16, IV.1, and IV.100.
In I.10 •aákara offers nothing of significance to the GK’s asser-
tion that “the inexhaustible non-dual One is the ordainer—the Lord—
in the matter of eradicating all sorrows.”349 He comments: “The idea
is that He is the Lord capable of ordaining the cessation of sorrow
(du˙khaniv‰tti ), for sorrow ceases as a result of His knowledge (tadvi-
jñànanimittatvàt).”350 We see here that the Lord does not so much
actively remove sorrow as that sorrow is removed through the knowl-
edge of the Lord, however obtained. So far this harmonizes quite
well with what we know •aákara to teach in his other writings.
Kàrikà III.16 states: “There are three stages of life—inferior, inter-
mediate, and superior. This meditation (upàsanà) is enjoined for them
out of compassion (anukampayà)”.351 The meditation spoken of, accord-
ing to •aákara in his introduction to this verse, refers back to var-
ious injunctions found in the B‰Up and ChUp that deal with the
theme of searching for and reflecting on the àtman as also with the
performance of works.352 •aákara goes on to say that such com-
mands to meditate and to act are not therefore intended for those
who already have the conviction of the Self ’s non-duality, but rather
are “for the sake of people of dull and medium intellect who are
affiliated to the stages of life etc.,” in other words for non-monks.353
Here •aákara makes more explicit the grace of scripture than does
348
See I.C.1.
349
Tr. EU II:212.
350
351
Tr. EU II:289.
352
See EU II:289.
353
Tr. EU II:290.
372  
the GK. He writes: “(This is done) by the kind Vedas (dayàlunà vedenà)
out of compassionate consideration (anukampayà), as to how people
treading the path of righteousness (sanmàrgagà˙) may attain this supe-
rior vision of unity (uttamàmekatvad‰ß†iá) . . .”354
Such a statement is quite in keeping with •aákara’s by now well-
known view of the ≤ruti’s gracious intent. There is nothing in this
quotation that adds or alters what he has stated elsewhere.
In the next passage to be considered, •aákara comments on IV.1,
which reads:
I bow down to the One who is the chief among all persons, who has
known fully (saábuddha) the souls resembling (infinite) sky, through his
knowledge that is comparable to space and is non-different from the
object of knowledge.355
According to Paul Hacker, Gau∂apàda’s eulogy to the person—
a human person (literally “the best among the bipeds,” dvipadàá
varam)356—who is the founder of the school he represents, can only
be the Buddha, since “Gau∂apàda’s monism owes much to idealis-
tic Buddhism.”357
But •aákara introduces this verse with the remark: “This first
verse is meant as a salutation to the promulgator of the school of
non-duality (advaitadar≤anasampradàyakartu˙) by identifying him with
non-duality itself. For it is desirable to worship one’s teacher (àcàryapùjà)
at the commencement of a scripture so that the result aimed at may
be achieved.”358
For Hacker, •aákara must refer to the founder of the advaitavàda
rather than to the founder of Buddhism. Who can this supreme per-
son be? Once Buddha was excluded, many options remained for
•aákara. His choice would inevitably reveal a preference, even a
partiality. Hacker continues: “Now he (= •aákara) chose to inter-
pret the Saábuddha as Nàràya»a the Purußottama. This means that he
substituted for the Buddha of the original not an abstract Highest
Being—which would, by the way, have been difficult on account of
the additional words dvipadàá vara˙—nor any human teacher, but
the supreme deity of a concrete religion, and this religion is no other
354
355
Tr. EU II:325.
356
Tr. EU II:326.
357
P. Hacker, “Relations of Early Advaitins to Vaiß»avism,” KS 208.
358
    373
than that which we should expect after having examined the SBh
(= BrSùBh), namely Vaiß»avism.”359
The text of •aákara Hacker refers to reads: “. . . the Self that is
to be known. He indeed is the Lord (ì≤vara) called Nàràya»a. Him
I salute, the best among the bipeds, that is to say, the supreme
Person among all persons, that are suggested by the word ‘biped’.
Under the garb of this salutation to the teacher, it is suggested that
the purpose of this chapter is to establish, through a refutation of
the opposite views, the philosophy of the supreme Reality ( paramàr-
thatattvadar≤anam) that is devoid of the distinctions of knowledge, know-
able, and knower.”360
That is to say, •aákara does not interpret the phrase “best among
the bipeds” as referring to a human person, but rather to the divine
person Nàràya»a. In so doing, he makes Viß»u the ultimate source
of the advaitavada, which is the teaching leading to liberation. Swami
Nikhilananda suggests that •aákara is referring to a well-known story
in which Nàràya»a appears in human form before Gau∂apàda; this
human form would be the dvipadàá vara˙ referred to in GK IV.1.361
In either case, •aákara would be here acknowledging the grace of
the Lord Nàràya»a, who is identical to the supreme àtman. Again,
as in the two previous verses of this section, we note a simple
affirmation of the reality of grace without, however, a description of
grace’s actual operation. This, too, harmonizes well with •aákara’s
other writings.
In the final verse to be examined, GK IV.100, Gau∂apàda offers
salutations to the supreme state ( padam) itself:
After realizing that State (of Reality)
that is inscrutable, profound, birthless, uniform, holy,
and non-dual,
we make our obeisance to It to the best of our ability.362
•aákara repeats this verse in his bhàßya without expanding upon it
with any depth, but then proceeds—by switching from Gau∂apàda’s
plural to his own singular use of the pronoun—to offer three more
359
Hacker 208–209.
360
GKBh IV.1. Tr. EU II:326. See TPU 228, lines 10–14.
361
See The Mà»∂ùkya Upanißad with Gau∂apàda’s Kàrikà and •a«kara’s Commentary
(Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1987), 214 note 6 and 215 note 12.
362
Tr. EU II:402.
374  
salutations—to brahman, to the teacher of his teacher (presumably

Gau∂apàda) and to his immediate teacher.
Interestingly enough, in his salutations to brahman •aákara uses
language strongly reminiscent of his introduction to the BhG. He
speaks of brahman “which, though birthless, appears to be born through
Its inscrutable power” (ajamapi janiyogaá pràpadai≤varyayogàd).363 However,
what makes the alleged •aákara authorship of this verse somewhat
suspect is the almost total disparity of terminology when compared
to the Gìtàbhàßya Introduction. Here •aákara makes no mention of
Nàràya»a, màyà or the much-discussed iva. Nonetheless, whether this
work is from •aákara or not, the bhàßyakàra adds that brahman
“destroys the fear of those who take shelter in It,”364 yet another indi-
cation of the Lord’s grace.
•aákara further prostrates himself before the “teacher of my
teacher” ( paramagurum), who he describes as “the most adorable among
the adorable, who, on seeing the creatures drowned in the sea (of
the world), infested with sea monsters undergoing incessant births
and deaths, rescued, out of compassion (kàru»yàd ) for all beings, this
nectar, which is difficult to be obtained even by gods and which lies
in the depths of the ocean, called the Vedas, which (Vedas), he
stirred up by inserting the churning rod of his illumined intellect.”365
The reference to the world as an ocean filled with monsters is
reminiscent of •aákara’s commentary on AiUp I.2.1.366 Further, the
praise of the guru’s compassion for having distilled the essence of the
Vedas and made that knowledge available to suffering jìvas recalls
•aákara’s salutations to the teacher in Upad I.17.2–3, 1.18.2, I.18.230,
and especially I.19.28 (“who churned out from the ocean of the
Veda . . . this knowledge . . . the elixir of immortality”).367
Lastly, •aákara salutes his own teacher in words that are so
strongly akin to what we know elsewhere of his theology as to require
no further elaboration: “I offer my obeisance with my whole being
to those sanctifying feet—the dispellers of the fear of transmigra-
tion—(feet) of my own teacher, through the light of whose illumined
intellect was dispelled the darkness of delusion enveloping my own
mind, who destroyed forever my fear of appearance and disappear-
363
364
365
Tr. EU II:403. See TPU 256, line 24 to 257, line 2.
366
See EU II:28.
367
See IX.C.2.
    375
ance in this terrible sea of innumerable births, and having taken

shelter at whose feet others also get unfailingly the knowledge of the
Upanißads, self-control, and humility.”368
I have now completed the investigation of the most important of
•aákara’s references to divine grace and human mercy that appear
independently of his commentary on the BrSù. In the next chapter
I will attempt to present—as far as is possible—•aákara’s implicit
theology of grace in the form of a systematic summary encompass-
ing his BrSùBh, Upanißad commentaries, BhGBh and Upad.
368
CHAPTER TEN
SUMMARY: THE ROLE OF DIVINE GRACE IN

•AÁKARA’S SOTERIOLOGY
After examining in some detail in Chapter VIII what •aákara, in

his BrSùBh, teaches about grace, I proceeded to explore his views
on the same subject in his other writings in Chapter IX. We have
now reached the point where I may attempt to reflect on •aákara’s
grace-articulations as a whole with the hope that the fundamentals
of a theology of grace may be worked out.
Such an endeavor may appear to some to be a questionable under-
taking. For, as has been amply shown in the previous two chapters,
•aákara himself offers practically nothing in the way of a system-
atic approach to the question of divine grace and mercy, and perhaps
deliberately so. We recall Paul Hacker’s contention that •aákara’s
primary concern is more soteriological than theoretical or meta-
physical; it may be added that even with regard to his more prac-
tical teachings •aákara nowhere makes an attempt to systematize
or summarize his soteriology as a whole, let alone to provide an
explanation as to the exact place and function divine grace enjoys
in his thinking, even while he repeatedly affirms that it does indeed
have a place.
It is surprising, even baffling, to encounter on the pages of •aákara’s
genuine works clear and explicit affirmations that liberation is in
some sense the outcome of divine grace ( prasàda, anugraha), and then
to discover as one reads on that •aákara neglects to explain why
this is so. In most cases •aákara simply proceeds with his work,
giving no clue that in affirming grace’s importance many trouble-
some issues must inevitably arise for the (modern!) reader: Since
•aákara is a non-dualist, can there really be a place for grace in his
thought? If so, then what is it? Is grace real or perhaps only pro-
visionally real, i.e. ultimately illusory? If grace is real, is it indis-
pensable for liberation? How are divine grace and human freedom
related? Does one merit grace or is grace given irrespective of merit,
wholly gratuitous? Is grace a divine response to human endeavor or
does it initiate the human search for liberation? If human freedom
378  
and divine grace are both real how do the two collaborate? Does the
distinction between divine freedom and human freedom threaten the
Advaitic insight? Further, if grace is freely given, must one first make
oneself eligible for its reception? May the aspirant to liberation,
through his or her own effort or power, somehow dispose over divine
aid? How does liberation-through-grace relate to •aákara’s most
central soteriological teaching, namely liberation-through-knowledge?
To such questions •aákara has precious little to say, offering
at most hints as to a unified thinking on grace. It is left, then, to
•aákara’s readers to piece together his brief remarks on grace to
determine where and how they cohere and where ambiguities, even
inconsistencies, might appear. It is clear, then, that what emerges as
•aákara’s “theology” of grace is a good deal indebted to the spec-
ulative method, but it is a method that seeks to base itself on •aákara’s
authentic utterances.
Any interpretation of •aákara’s understanding of grace will obvi-
ously differ from the interpretations of others, not only because of
the free speculative method involved nor also because of the par-
ticular kinds of questions the individual inquirer brings to •aákara’s
texts. Of equal or greater importance is the kind of ontology one
holds •aákara to represent; the position one takes will prove to be
decisive in the conclusions one draws about •aákara’s teaching on
divine favor or mercy. Clearly those who see •aákara as a realist
for whom the seeker of liberation is not strictly identical with the
Absolute, but is rather non-dual with it, will tend to make greater
room for the reality of grace than those who interpret •aákara’s
ontology in terms of monism and acosmic illusionism. For non-dual-
ists of a realist bent, the category of relation is not a mere provi-
sional or erroneous truth.
I begin this summary by pointing out what are obvious misun-
derstandings regarding •aákara’s thinking on grace, based on what
we now know from the previous two chapters.
A. F A  •á’ V  G
To begin, •aákara is not silent on the issue of grace, as some inter-

preters of him might lead us to believe when they discuss his sote-
riology without referring to grace. There are in fact an astonishing
number of passages in which •aákara speaks of grace: the grace of
the Lord, of the teacher, of scripture etc.
 379
Further, •aákara is not hostile to the notion of grace. There is not

a single passage in •aákara’s writings that may unequivocally be
regarded as inimical to the notion of divine grace, not even the most
often cited passages in support of this position, i.e. KaUpBh I.2.23,
MuUpBh III.2.3, and BhGBh Intro. There are, however, modern
interpreters of •aákara who appear to be convinced from the start
that •aákara is inimical to the idea of grace, as can be seen from
the fact that they quote only those few passages of •aákara that
might be construed to oppose grace, while ignoring the many pas-
sages that affirm its reality.
Nor is •aákara indifferent to the idea of grace, allegedly referring
to it only where he is forced to do so by the text upon which he
happens to be commenting or “because scripture teaches it.” While
it is true that in a number of instances •aákara adds nothing to
the text upon which he is commenting, merely repeating what the
sacred text teaches about divine favor or grace, there are many other
passages where •aákara actually strengthens and expands on the
text’s affirmation of grace. Even more eye-opening is the fact that
•aákara frequently introduces the subject of grace where one would
least expect him to do so, precisely because the text in question does
not even indirectly allude to the issue of grace.
Nor are the notions of liberation-through-grace and liberation-
through-knowledge opposed in •aákara’s thought. When •aákara
declares that liberation comes through enlightenment or higher knowl-
edge alone, in most instances, if he is embroiled in a dispute with
an imaginary opponent, that opponent is one who upholds the false
notion that liberation results from works/rituals or from some com-
bination of works/ritual/effort and knowledge. The issue is usually,
then, whether liberation derives from knowledge or from works or
from some combination of the two. To this •aákara replies that lib-
eration derives directly from knowledge alone, all other means being
but preliminary, preparatory and indirect causes of emancipation. It
is for that reason that some of •aákara’s interpreters assert a con-
tradiction between knowledge and grace, since •aákara so stresses
the centrality of knowledge. Yet in actuality there is not a single
instance in •aákara’s writings in which •aákara attempts to show
the incompatibility of belief in liberation-through-knowledge with be-
lief in liberation-through-grace. Of course, the challenge to •aákara’s
reader is to determine how the two truths go together. Certainly what
is to be rejected in •aákara’s thinking is the subordination of the
380  
principle of liberation-through-knowledge to the principle of libera-

tion-through-divine-grace. There is nothing akin to the Protestant
Christian teaching of sola gratia in •aákara’s advaitavàda. But what is
equally to be rejected is the notion that grace is of little or no rel-
evance for •aákara’s soteriology.
Also to be rejected is the post-•aákara Advaita subordination of
an illusory grace-giving ì≤vara or parame≤vara to the truly transcendent
and absolutely real impersonal nirgu»a brahman. The former, the so-
called “personal God” of contemporary Advaita, is said to be a mere
product of avidyà and human imagination, and is made identical with
the sagu»a brahman, the Absolute upon which are superimposed indi-
vidual anthropomorphic attributes.
•aákara’s conception of the Absolute, however, is different from
the tradition after him. While it is true that the sagu»a brahman is for
•aákara often enough a mental construct meant to serve the pur-
pose of pious meditation, the being called ì≤vara or parame≤vara is not
strictly or in most cases identical with the sagu»a brahman. Rather
•aákara frequently makes ì≤vara or parame≤vara ontologically equal to
the highest brahman itself; in fact, the terms nirgu»a or para brahman,
paramàtman, ì≤vara and parame≤vara are often used interchangeably in
•aákara’s writings. That is to say, not only does •aákara distin-
guish between a nirgu»a and sagu»a parame≤vara (BrSùBh IV.4.19), but
there are clear instances in which he simply equates brahman-àtman
with ì≤vara or parame≤vara (e.g. BrSùBh II.3.41, III.2.6, B‰UpBh III.7.3,
IV.4.15, ChUpBh I.1.1 V.18.1, KenaUpBh III.1–2, KaUpBh II.2.13,
BhGBh XI.36) or makes Viß»u-Nàràya»a synonymous with the high-
est reality (e.g. B‰UpBh III.7.3, KaUpBh II.3.13, BhGBh VII.16–17
etc., GKBh IV.1). At times •aákara does the truly unthinkable, mak-
ing the referent of the mahàvàkya “that thou art” not brahman-àtman,
but rather ì≤vara or parame≤vara (BrSùBh I.2.13, III.2.6). Further, the
state of liberation is sometimes declared by •aákara to be the
“supreme state of Viß»u” (e.g. BrSùBh IV.3.10, BhGBh 11.51, VI.31,
XI.38, XV.6, XVIII.62).
Thus, it is not in keeping with •aákara’s own linguistic usage to
make as a foundational doctrine the idea that ì≤vara/parame≤vara is
an illusory reality superimposed upon the supreme reality, i.e. upon
the nirgu»a brahman.1 •aákara’s equation of para brahman with parame≤vara
1
See R. Panikkar, The Unknown Christ of Hinduism, rev. and enl. ed. (Bangalore:
Asian Trading, 1982), 151.
 381
makes clear that his conception of the Absolute does not exclude
the possibility that this Absolute might in some sense be personal.
Whether the highest reality is also in fact graciously disposed toward
the world is, of course, an altogether different, though not unrelated,
question. But such a possibility, i.e. that the highest reality might
be, by its very nature, gracious, cannot be automatically ruled out
on the grounds of a supposed clear separation between a higher
impersonal” brahman and a lower “personal” God or Lord.
B. H L T D G
We have seen in •aákara’s commentary on Brahma-Sùtra I.1.5 and

III.2.5 that certain powers are granted to the jìva as a result of divine
grace. These powers are probably the siddhis that form an impor-
tant part of Patañjali’s Yoga-Sùtras. And along with Patañjali, •aákara
does not declare these unusual powers to be indicative that the lib-
erated state has been attained; they are rather a phenomenon that
is manifested on the way to liberation. However, it may be assumed
that for both •aákara and Patañjali the manifestation of the siddhis
does not occur in isolation from a very advanced state of mental
calmness and control.
The graces, then, which the siddhis represent are of no great impor-
tance for a study that seeks to determine in •aákara’s soteriology
the role divine mercy or favor might play in the attainment of the
ultimate human goal, which is mokßa, the release from saásàra, from
ignorance, and from suffering. Since mokßa in general Hindu termi-
nology signifies freedom from rebirth, it is clear that the extraordi-
nary powers manifested in the jìva and attributed to the Lord are
of limited relevance for the present investigation. Rebirth continues
even for one who has been granted extraordinary powers. My goal
here is to determine whether divine grace is in any way instrumen-
tal for the attainment of the supreme goal of human life, which is
liberation from rebirth.
We need always recall that for •aákara human bondage is due
to avidyà, and that this avidyà gives rise to desire and action, which,
in their turn, bring about reincarnation. Thus the ultimate good that
divine grace could confer would be the eradication of avidyà. And this
is •aákara’s expressed teaching in BrSùBh II.3.41, III.2.5, Tait-
UpBh I.11.4, and BhGBh II.39: The final cause of the dawn of lib-
erating knowledge is the grace of the Lord. This grace is essentially
382  
illuminative, bringing the jìva to the state of correct awareness of its

unity with the Absolute, thereby eliminating the seed of desire and
action that binds it.
•aákara does not teach that liberating knowledge dawns automatic-
ally given the proper mental and moral dispositions and a proper
grasp of the mahàvàkyas. It is rather the case that the fully pure and
quiescent sàdhaka can only await the breakthrough into the higher
consciousness in passive and trusting expectation, continuously inspired
by the desire to know brahman, fully aware of its inability to reach
the goal through unaided effort. The final and permanent removal
of ignorance is something over which it has not the slightest control
or claim (see BrSùBh IV.1.2). The sàdhaka’s contribution to the process
of liberation lies solely in the preparatory stage of removing false con-
ceptions, distractions, desires, and inappropriate moral tendencies.
Liberating knowledge is ultimately dependent on the self-disclosure
of the Absolute itself, which is the àtman of the seeker.
C. I G, H F   L  KARMA
We saw how in BrSùBh II.1.34–36, II.3.41–42 and elsewhere •aákara

defends the Lord from the charge of partiality and cruelty by appeal-
ing to the impartial cosmic law of retribution (karma) that the Lord
himself brings into existence and maintains, and also chooses to abide
by (AiUpBh 1.3.1), so that justice may never be transgressed. The
Lord acts thus in an eminently impartial way in linking together the
jìva’s past deeds and its future retribution. The jìva receives the appro-
priate recompense for its accumulation of merit or demerit.
One might argue that the freedom to determine its own fate and
to ascend to the liberated state is thus a great gift given to the jìva, a
gift that bequeaths upon it a unique dignity and independence when
compared to the other beings in the hierarchy of the created order.
Modern reincarnationists have indeed argued in favor of the good-
ness of a creator who provides the suffering creature with the capac-
ity to work out its destiny in time. Shall we therefore say of •aákara,
as A. H. Armstrong has written of the soteriology of Plotinus, that
“what the One gives is first and foremost a power of return”?2 The
2
A. H. Armstrong, “Salvation, Plotinian and Christian,” Plotinian and Christian
Studies (London: Variorum Reprints, 1979), 128.
 383
answer to this is negative. We ought not be surprised that •aákara

never refers to the jìva’s freedom as a grace, and for good reason.
The freedom implied by the process of karma-reincarnation, the free-
dom of choice and of means and ends,—in contrast to the freedom
of the liberated state—is a freedom that is itself a product of igno-
rance and must be eliminated. As •aákara declares, “Agentship is
a sort of misery.” (BrSùBh II.3.40) The power to do good as well
as the power to do evil both derive from a false identification of the
àtman with the upàdhis of the body and mind. In thinking itself to
be a doer (kart‰) and enjoyer (bhokt‰) the jìva is prevented from real-
izing its true nature; the jìva in effect suffers from an illusion of this
false freedom. It is therefore incorrect, in contrast to the opening
sentence of this paragraph, to speak of an ascent to liberation through
the tool of earthly freedom. In fact, there is no ascent at all; the jìva
is already in its essence eternally free and must simply make that
realization if its bondage is to be overcome.
Nonetheless, there remains the paradox that the Lord does not
bypass or override the creaturely freedom that results from avidyà.
Divine grace and human freedom are both necessary for the jìva to
attain realization of its true nature. Though the freedom of choice
does not affect the jìva in its essence, it may be assumed that this
freedom is not purely illusory; it is the real (though not absolutely real,
as is the Absolute) effect of a false identification. The jìva in bondage
must learn to employ this freedom in the task of purifying itself, in
preparation for the dawn of true knowledge.
The Lord’s impartiality in administering the proper fruits of action
and of not interfering with the cosmic law of justice may or may
not be regarded as a gracious dispensation. Again, •aákara does
not explicitly declare the cosmic law of retribution to be an effect
of grace, a law that is governed by the omniscient and all-powerful
Lord. Yet it appears to be implicit in •aákara’s thinking that the
Lord’s governance of the law of retribution is indeed a gracious dis-
pensation, and for two reasons. First, by means of his control of the
law the Lord establishes a great good, namely universal justice and
the world’s stability (KenaUpBh III.1–2). Second, this maintenance
of cosmic fairness is not the result of a power that sets limitations
on the Lord or impels the Lord to act in such and such a way;
rather the Lord is completely independent and sovereign in his action
toward the world (AiUpBh I.3.1). The fair governance of the uni-
verse by the Lord is an entirely free action.
384  
However, it is clear that the grace of a universal just dispensation

of the fruits of creaturely actions is not the grace that liberates the
jìva. The grace that liberates from bondage is the dawning of true
knowledge of the Absolute, precisely as self-knowledge. To whom is
this grace given and according to what prerequisites? Is there an
impartiality of this type of grace in accord with the impartiality of
the dispensation of the fruits of merit and demerit?
At first sight it appears quite clear that •aákara’s ì≤vara is with-
out partiality in dispensing the grace of liberating knowledge, not
only because this ì≤vara is the same Lord •aákara so frequently
defends as impartial in his theodicy (“the Lord is like rain . . . a com-
mon cause”), but also because of passages in which •aákara dis-
cusses the grace of the dawning of liberating knowledge. The key
passages, KaUpBh I.2.23 and MuUpBh III.2.3, reveal that •aákara
takes pains to transform texts that speak of a divine election—and
possibly arbitrary election—into statements of how one is made eli-
gible for the reception of divine grace, an eligibility attained through
the jìva’s longing, prayer and effort. Here a divine predestination is
excluded, as it is incompatible with •aákara’s affirmation of human
freedom and the Lord’s impartiality towards all jìvas. It is not sur-
prising that one of •aákara’s favorite passages from the Gìtà is IX.29:
“And I am always the same to all beings.”3
Further evidence of the Lord’s equal treatment of all beings is
provided by •aákara when he speaks of the Lord being like fire
(BhGBh IX.29). Just as one warms oneself only by drawing near to
an immobile fire that sheds its heat equally in all directions, so too
does the seeker of liberation receive the Lord’s grace by approach-
ing him with loving devotion. In that sense alone does •aákara
declare that the Lord favors some and not others. The devotee
experiences the favor of the Lord not because the Lord has a
special love for him, but because the devotee has completely dis-
posed himself to receive the Lord’s illuminative grace. This harmo-
nizes well with BhGBh IV.11 where •aákara declares that the Lord
grants whatever the jìva desires, be it some earthly pleasure or be it
liberation itself, for in each case the Lord responds neutrally to the
jìva’s plea.
3
See e.g. this verse quoted in Upad I.10.8, I.10.11, I.14.47, both in reference
to ì≤vara and to brahman-àtman.
 385
Even after the Lord’s impartiality is so strongly underscored, ques-

tions remain concerning ì≤vara’s sovereignty, initiative and love. The
problem centers around the mental state of the jìva and its relation
to the Lord’s freedom to remove ignorance and illumine the mind
by his presence. Quite clearly for •aákara, the Lord is always pre-
sent to the jìva as the jìva’s very àtman. It is also clear that in puri-
fying the mind the jìva becomes more disposed to perceive the light
of the àtman within. Yet we know that nothing can ‘force’ the break-
through into the higher awareness; for •aákara this breakthrough
is ultimately the work of the Lord. But what is the connection between
the attainment of a perfectly receptive mental state and the Lord’s
removal of the binding avidyà? BhGBh IX.29’s analogy with fire
appears to stress the centrality of human effort to ‘tap’ into the
higher consciousness, whereas BhGBh IV.11 lays emphasis on the
sovereignty of the divine response to human effort and entreaty. Such
a conception of sovereignty rules out the possibility of an automatic
breakthrough into liberating awareness given the right human effort.
The question remains: Does the sovereign Lord freely choose to
respond to the jìva’s acquired merit and therefore remove the jìva’s
ignorance or are other factors operative that call forth the divine
response? Is it possible, as Bruce Reichenbach suggests, that “grace
is simply there for the meritorious to take,” a solution that “dimin-
ishes the religious significance of God”?4 Does the Lord in any way
reward the jìva for its effort and for the attainment of a passive and
purified mind? Is the concept of reward even appropriate here? Does
the Lord in any way withhold his liberating grace from the soul
until a mental state conducive to liberation has been achieved? If
not, in what sense, then, may one speak of a “granting” of the lib-
erating light?
There are indications in •aákara’s writings that a strict impar-
tiality and passivity on the Lord’s part do not suffice to account for
ì≤vara’s gracious disposition towards the jìva. Passivity is ruled out first
of all by AiUpBh 1.3.1, in which •aákara declares that mahe≤vara is
not compelled to act graciously towards the creatures; rather this
Lord “has independence in the matter of favouring or disfavouring
all, since He is the Lord of all.” The context of this passage is the
divine mercy rather than the divine justice. The implication is that
4
B. Reichenbach, The Law of Karma: A Philosophical Study (Honolulu: University
of Hawaii Press, 1990), 100.
386  
the Lord who acts justly is not compelled by justice to withhold his
mercy. This is made more explicit in KaUpBh II.2.13: •aákara
states that in responding to the jìva’s actions the Lord dispenses the
results of those actions not only according to merit, but also accord-
ing to grace (anugraha). The Lord, then, is not only theoretically free
to exceed the demands of karmic justice with a response marked by
generosity, but actually does treat his creatures so. On the other
hand, there is no indication in •aákara’s writings that the Lord ever
dispenses a lesser fruit to a good action performed by the jìva than
the law of karma would demand.
Further, all the passages that speak of the Lord “becoming gra-
cious” ( prasìdati ) (BrSùBh I.2.7) or the supreme brahman becoming
such (B‰UpBh V.1.1; PrUpBh V.2) or the supreme Self doing the
same (ChUpBh I.1.1; KaUpBh II.3.13) rule out a divine passivity.
It is difficult in the present context to see how these verses that speak
of grace could be interpreted in the sense of the jìva disposing over
an already offered divine grace. Rather the prasìdati passages make
clear that a free response of the Lord is required if the jìva is to be
graced by him.
The passages, moreover, that indicate an active divine response
rather than a divine passivity over which one may dispose appear
to reflect a Vaiß»avite influence. In BrSùBh I.1.20 we saw that ì≤vara
miraculously assumes bodily forms through his power of màyà, and
that this conception presupposes some degree of Vaiß»avite theol-
ogy. Further, the reason offered for this divine activity is that the
Lord may “gratify thereby his devout worshippers.” In the prasìdati
passages •aákara speaks of meditating on the Lord in the lotus of
the heart (BrSùBh I.2.7), or on Om as the best means for realizing
brahman (B‰UpBh V.1.1; ChUpBh I.1.1; PrUpBh V.2), or of realiz-
ing the Self as being (KaUpBh II.3.13). In each of these cases the
Absolute or Lord responds graciously to the devotee’s sàdhana. Further,
in all but one of these passages (ChUpBh I.1.1) •aákara either links
these practices explicitly to Vaiß»avite devotional methods or else
equates brahman-àtman-ì≤vara with Viß»u. In addition to these, of
course, are all the other instances in which •aákara makes refer-
ence to Viß»u or Vaiß»avite worship (e.g. BrSùBh I.2.12, I.2.14,
I.3.14, I.4.1, III.3.9, IV.1.3, IV.1.5, IV.3.10 etc.). In I.4.1 •aákara
equates knowledge of the supreme Self with the highest state of
Viß»u.
It appears, then, that •aákara’s thinking on grace is indebted to
 387
both the demands of a correct rational theology (a theology that

nonetheless has its material origin in ≤ruti and sm‰ti ) as well as to
Vaiß»avite practice and reflection. The first source or method appears
to express itself in terms of divine justice, impartiality and passivity,
while the Vaiß»avite influence is responsible for the affirmation of a
more personalistic and active divine response and of a mercy that
exceeds the mere demands of karmic justice. How the two approaches
to grace refer to the single activity of one and the same Lord •aákara
does not say. The two conceptions remain in tension with one another.
At the very minimum, however, one may recognize the following:
The Lord is never impartial or unfair when dealing with the jìva,
and he is sure to administer, at the very least, what creaturely merit
demands according to the standard of justice that the Lord himself
has established. In addition to this, the Lord, who is sovereign over
the law of cosmic retribution and generous by nature, is free to
exceed the strict demands of justice and may respond with an un-
merited mercy and generosity. Those to whom he tends to grant such
a bountiful display of mercy are those who are his true devotees,
who, moreover, seek liberation to the exclusion of every other desire.
What the Lord, perhaps finally out of pity (anukro≤a), grants to the
suffering and yearning devotee is liberation itself (BhGBh VII.23).
D. T G   T   S
For •aákara, as for much of Hinduism, though the Absolute is at

all times immediately present to the devotee or seeker of enlighten-
ment, the seeker requires the mediation of revealed truth both in the
form of scripture and in the person of a spiritual guide if the divine
presence is to be realized in an irrevocable liberating experience.5
•aákara expressly refers to the grace or mercy of the teacher in
B‰UpBh II.1.20, IV.3.14, IV.4.15; ChUpBh VI.14.12; TaiUpBh
Intro.; AiUpBh I.3.13; KaUpBh I.2.13; MuUpBh Intro., I.2.12,
III.1.2; BhGBh XVIII.50; Upad II.1.6, II.2.74; GKBh IV.100. He
does not use the expression in the BrSùBh, Ì≤aUpBh, KenaUpBh,
or PrUpBh.
5
See Richard Viladesau, Answering for Faith: Christ and the Human Search for Salvation
(New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 174–179, who speaks of the “ ‘incarnational’ prin-
ciple outside of Christianity.”
388  
Similarly, •aákara speaks of the grace or mercy of scripture in

B‰UpBh II.1.20; KaUpBh II.1.15; GKBh IV.100, but does not use
the expression in the other writings that we have examined.
Shall we conclude, on the basis of the greater frequency of the
term “grace/mercy of the teacher” over that of “grace/mercy of
scripture” that the former is more central to •aákara’s soteriology
than is the latter? Further, shall the notable absence of both of these
terms in the BrSùBh lead us to infer a lack of harmony between
the BrSùBh and the writings in which these terms appear? The
answer to both of these questions is negative. The centrality of the
enlightened teacher and of the revealed scripture is affirmed through-
out the corpus of •aákara’s writings, whether he appends the word
“grace” to them or not.
The fact that •aákara does append the word “grace” to both the
teacher and to scripture is noteworthy, however. For •aákara, the
“direct experience of Brahman . . . is always mediated through the hear-
ing of the Upanißadic sentences.”6 Thus the sacred scriptures make
possible a liberation that is unattainable through human effort and
reflection alone. Further, the availability of scripture to the seeker
of liberation is made possible through the causation of brahman, which
effortlessly breathes it forth. (BrSùBh I.1.1, I.1.3).7 Without the cau-
sation of brahman the seeker of truth would be forever deprived of
the possibility of destroying bondage. For ≤ruti is not only the final
arbiter in all religious matters, it not only declares the working of
the karmic law of cause and effect, but more importantly it declares
the salvific truth of the jìva’s true identity in the words of the Great
Sayings (mahàvakyà). Without the scriptural declaration of the unity
of brahman and àtman and the subsequent grasping of this truth by
the aspirant no liberation is possible.
But •aákara also remarks that the aspirant should not seek for
knowledge of brahman independently, that is without a teacher, even
though the seeker may be versed in the scriptures. (MuUpBh I.2.12)
In the event that the dawning of enlightenment does not occur at
the first hearing of a mahàvàkya (an almost given fact), repetition is
6
K. Satchidananda Murty, Reason and Revelation in Advaita Vedànta (Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass, 1974), 9–10. Emphasis given by Murty.
7
See Sara Grant, “•a«kara’s Conception of •ruti as a Pramà»a,” Research Seminar
on Non-Biblical Scriptures, ed. D. S. Amalorpavadass (Bangalore: National Biblical,
Catechetical and Liturgical Centre, 1974), 345.
 389
necessary (BrSùBh IV.1.2), and the aspirant must embark on or con-

tinue on the path to liberation under the guidance of an enlight-
ened and therefore qualified guide. And just as scripture by itself
does not normally lead the sàdhaka to Self-realization, so also •aákara
nowhere declares that the teacher ( guru, àcàrya) directly enlightens or
liberates the disciple. The teacher merely helps to indirectly facili-
tate the dawn of knowledge by enabling the disciple to internalize
the truth and meaning of scripture, or, perhaps to express it more
accurately, in clarifying scripture the teacher helps clear away the
errant notions that prevent the seeker from realizing the eternal unity
of his innermost being with brahman.
It is thus not surprising that •aákara often speaks in the same
sentence of the necessity of adhering to the instruction (upade≤a) of
both scripture and the teacher. For example, he states that enlight-
enment is not possible for “those who are devoid of the grace of
the scriptures and the teacher.” (B‰UpBh II.1.20) More precisely,
the grace referred to is the instruction that purifies the aspirant of
false notions and desires. That is the basic function of the teacher
and of scripture: to purify the mind of the aspirant and to thereby
prepare it for the illumination of the interior Self. In •aákara’s own
words, only one kind of mind is capable of the highest intuition, a
mind (manas) “which is purified by the teacher and the scriptures.”
(KaUpBh II.1.11)
More concretely, the teacher instructs the sufferer as to the source
of his pain, which lies in attachment to the things of this world.
When the sufferer gains the conviction that what the teacher says is
true, he gives up all desire and becomes dispassionate towards all
worldly objects. (ChUpBh VI.14.1–2) The ultimate source of this
desire is, of course, ignorance of one’s true nature; thus the realized
teacher frequently proclaims the truth of the mahàvàkyas and the lib-
eration from suffering that results from its comprehension. (TaiUpBh
III.10.5; AiUpBh I.3.13 etc.)
Teacher and ≤ruti, then, work together to purify the mind of desire
and to bring it to a state of passive and receptive tranquility. The
mind that is purified by the instruction of scripture and the teacher
becomes a capable instrument for realizing the Self. (BhGBh II.21,
XVIII.17, XVIII.50)
Proper meditation on the Lord, too, a meditation that is an aux-
iliary to the intuition of the Lord’s non-duality, is only possible when
done in accord with the instruction of the teacher and of scripture.
390  
(BhGBh VIII.8) Only when the instructions of the teacher and of

scripture are adhered to can knowledge of the Self arise. (BhGBh
XIII.34) The instruction of scripture and the teacher leads to renun-
ciation of agency and then to liberating knowledge. (BhGBh XVIII.55)
Thus, the guru and ≤ruti are indispensable aids to the seeker, with-
out which enlightenment is impossible. The teacher’s grace is embod-
ied not only in his willingness to answer the disciple’s many questions,
but refers also to the rationality and clarity of the teaching revealed
by the guru. (Upad II.2.74) The disciple expresses his gratefulness to
the àcàrya both because of the teaching imparted by the latter and
because of the teacher’s compassion towards him. The àcàrya is not
only endowed with intellectual prowess, an ability to teach, qualities
of self-control and the like, but also with compassion and favor
toward the suffering seeker. (Upad II.1.6) The implication seems to
be that the teacher is the very embodiment of liberating divine grace,
just as ≤ruti is.
Scripture and the teacher, then, bring the aspirant to the very
door of liberation, but can do no more. The seeker now can only
wait in passive expectancy for the dawn of liberating knowledge. But
it must be pointed out, according to •aákara, that the teacher’s
mercy is ineffective if the seeker lacks the intelligence or under-
standing to grasp the meaning of scripture (B‰UpBh IV.5.15; ChUpBh
VI.14.2) or if the sufferer lacks a complete desire for liberation.
(ChUpBh VI.14.2)
E. T SÀDHANA   SÀDHAKA
We have seen that •aákara recognizes a real freedom of the jìva to

embrace a spiritual path (sàdhana) oriented to the Upanißadic ideal
of renunciation (sannyàsa) and of bodily and mental control. The
practitioner (sàdhaka) puts his faith (≤raddhà) in the inherent truth, reli-
ability and efficaciousness of the revealed ≤ruti as well as in the guid-
ance of a teacher established in brahman. There is no grace of liberating
knowledge given apart from the prior striving of the aspirant to com-
prehend the truth of ≤ruti and to purify himself.
However the desire or striving to know brahman may itself already
be regarded as a divine grace, as some Indian systems of soteriol-
ogy have assumed. •aákara does not expressly teach this, but he
does appear as a whole to uphold the notion that the very desire
 391
to know Brahman (brahma-jijñàsà) is aroused by the encounter with

the revealed scriptures.8 However, it is also possible to see the crea-
turely desire to know “that” which transcends the world as given
with the very existence of the jìva, although only ≤ruti can tell us the
nature of “that.” This basic urge to know may of course be regarded
as “natural,” yet if the world and the jìva in any way derive from
brahman without being identical to it, one might also conclude that
the dynamism and desire to pass beyond all beings to the one Being
(sat), whether consciously or not, are a gift of brahman. Indeed, as
R. De Smet points out, •aákara’s bhàßya on BhG X.11 appears to
indicate that “the whole process of brahma-jijñàsà is initiated and con-
stantly sustained by divine grace,” and not just by “the external grace
of the guru.”9
In any case, the conscious enquiry into brahman is not just a the-
oretical one, centering on the hearing and comprehension of scrip-
ture (≤rava»a, manana, nididhyàsana), but is also expressed as an existential
prayer or longing (ChUpBh VII.17.1; KaUpBh 1.2.23; MuUpBh
III.2.3), the implication being that the goal of liberation is quite
beyond the power of the sàdhaka to accomplish. Thus human effort
is indispensable to liberation, but ultimately insufficient. This is an
important point for anyone seeking to interpret •aákara’s soteriol-
ogy in terms of grace-alone or effort-alone. Both divine grace and
human freedom are central to and presupposed in the totality of
•aákara’s soteriology.
Yet we must never forget that for •aákara it is only the renun-
ciate who is capable of Self-realization, because only he has renounced
the desire for temporal goods as well as a life in the world that
serves only to perpetuate the bondage of ignorance and desire (see
MuUpBh III.2.4; BhGBh IV.11). It is only the monk who has totally
prepared and opened himself to receive the grace of Self-realization,
having cleared away all the obstacles and impediments to its reception.
Finally, a word needs to be said about •aákara’s rejection of the
jñànakarmasamuccayavàda, or what K. Potter calls “the combined-path”
view,10 and how this teaching may be profitably compared to •aákara’s
8
Panikkar 116–117.
9
ed. C. M. Vadakkekara (Bangalore: Asian Trading, 1980), 212–213.
10
K. Potter, Advaita Vedànta up to •aákara and His Pupils (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
1981), 20.
392  
own soteriological view of the sàdhaka’s effort. According to Potter,

the combined-path view entails the notion that the aspirant to lib-
eration must follow both the karmakà»da and jñànakà»∂a sections of
scripture. The first lays down regulations concerning action, espe-
cially ritual action, while the latter declares the unity of brahman-
àtman and the necessity of meditation. Further, not only must both
paths be followed, but it must be recognized that the paths are
equally important in leading the sàdhaka to liberation.11 Finally, the
upholders of the combined-path view teach that ritualistic actions
must continue to be observed even after Self-realization has dawned,
otherwise final liberation cannot be achieved.12
•aákara’s problem with this view is its assumption that the real-
ized sage is capable of such action at all. The true Self that is uncov-
ered is revealed to be totally quiescent and desireless; further the
state of unitive consciousness allows for no distinction of means and
ends, so that action lacks all sense.13 Thus it is impossible for one
who has realized the Self to follow any longer the injunctions of the
karmakà»∂a.
What •aákara recommends instead is the view that actions have
a function only up until the moment of liberating knowledge, and
that these actions, in as much as they are directed to the ultimate
goal of spiritual liberation rather than to mere temporal gains, are
purificatory. They do not produce liberation, but, in the words of Potter,
they help the aspirant to “become eligible for Self-knowledge,”14 pre-
sumably by purifying the mind. Liberation occurs as a result of the
proper grasp of the mahàvàkyas. Thus the two kà»∂as cannot be
regarded as ultimately equal in value; the jñànakà»∂a is primary and
the karmakà»∂a subsidiary, because the occurrence of liberation is the
direct result of the comprehension of the Self.15 In other words, no
action can cause or bring about liberation, precisely because libera-
tion is eternal. All that needs to be done is to awaken to that fact.
John Taber has pointed out that •aákara’s position on effort or
“religious practice” is sometimes made out to mean that “one can
attain liberation or enlightenment—salvation—solely by means of the
11
Potter 50.
12
Potter 41.
13
Potter 41.
14
Potter 52.
15
Potter 53.
 393
cognition of the true nature of the Self and its relation to the world
without the least dependence on religious practice, such as the per-
formance of sacred ritual, the worship of a personal God, or the
practice of yoga.”16
In other words, •aákara’s rejection of the combined-path view is
too often presented by his interpreters as a knowledge-versus-action
or a knowledge-versus-devotion teaching, when in fact the necessity
of both action and devotion on the path to liberation needs to be
stressed (BrSùBh III.4.38), so long as the absolute centrality of knowl-
edge is safeguarded. Still, neither Potter nor Taber, both of whom
recognize the value of action and devotion as a means to realiza-
tion, goes so far as to affirm the function of divine grace in the
actual dawning of liberating knowledge. Taber does, however, quote
TaiUpBh I.12 which speaks of knowledge emerging as a result of
ì≤vara’s grace, ascetic discipline, assimilation of scriptural truths etc.,
but he does not comment on the word prasàda.17 Taber goes only
so far as to declare that “religious practice is for Sankara the cause
of knowledge, which in turn is the cause of mokßa.”18
F. T P   UPADE•ASÀHASRÌ
For a study drawing the conclusion that grace plays a much more
central role in •aákara’s soteriology than has hitherto been appre-
ciated, the Upad poses a special problem. We recall the importance
of the Upad for determining what is central to •aákara’s soteriol-
ogy by virtue of its being the only writing of •aákara that is an
independent treatise.19 We are confronted with the fact that, unlike
the BrSùBh, the BhGBh and some of the Upanißad commentaries,
the Upad contains not a single passage that could be construed as
referring to divine grace. In addition, as S. Mayeda has noted,
•aákara uses the term ì≤vara only eight times in the Upad, whereas
his use of the term in the BrSùBh is strikingly frequent, a tendency
that his later followers do not share.20 It is therefore necessary in
16
John Taber, Transformative Philosophy: A Study of •a«kara, Fichte and Heidegger
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983) 5.
17
Taber 23. This is TaiUpBh I.11.4 in my reading; see above, IX.A.3.
18
Taber 23–24.
19
See above, I.C.2.d.
20
S. Mayeda, •a«kara’s Upade≤asàhasrì (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1973), 38–39, 57,
62–63.
394  
some way to make the attempt to account for this remarkable fact
that the term ì≤vara is so infrequently used in the Upad and that
divine grace is not referred to at all.
According to Mayeda (who does not take up the issue of grace)
the infrequent use of the word ì≤vara in the Upad is due first of
all to the Upad being a much smaller work than the BrSùBh.21
While this is certainly true, the brevity of the Upad alone probably
cannot account for what appears to be a hesitation on •aákara’s
part to speak of ì≤vara, a hesitation that is not characteristic of his
other works.
Second, Mayeda suggests that •aákara “wants to expound his
doctrine in the Upad from the standpoint of paramàrtha,” as can be
seen from the fact that while such designations of the Absolute as
paraá brahma, brahman, paramàtman, and àtman are frequently used, the
term aparaá brahma (lower brahman) is not used at all.22 Now, accord-
ing to Mayeda, the word ì≤vara is little used in the Upad as com-
pared with its more frequent use in the BrSùBh, because in the latter
work ì≤vara is an ambiguous term that is sometimes used synony-
mously of the higher, sometimes of the lower, brahman. Thus, in com-
parison with the BrSùBh, •aákara restricts his use of the term ì≤vara
in the Upad; he makes it interchangeable only with paraá brahma,
paramàtman, etc.23
This in itself is a strong argument; it accounts for the fact that
the term ì≤vara is retained while aparaá brahma is not. However,
Mayeda goes one step further; he writes that the word ì≤vara is used
infrequently in the Upad, because it is “unnecessary.” Ì≤vara is unnec-
essary, because it “has more or less the implication of a personal
God,” and a personal God, Mayeda feels, is “incompatible with the
paramàrtha.”24 But one might contest the accuracy of such an assump-
tion. Does not the frequent interchangeability of ì≤vara with the high-
est brahman and the highest Self in •aákara’s works suggest the very
opposite of what Mayeda contends? Could it be that the highest
reality is indeed in some sense at least for •aákara, characterized
by personhood? Does not the occasional attribution of mercy or
grace to brahman-àtman give support to this view?
21
Mayeda 62.
22
Mayeda 62.
23
Mayeda 62–63.
24
Mayeda 63.
 395
Thus we cannot account for •aákara’s silence on divine grace in

the Upad by equating the paramàrtha standpoint with impersonalism.
The Upad’s silence remains problematic, although it may neverthe-
less be harmonized with the affirmations of divine grace made by
•aákara elsewhere. The Upad does, after all, offer salutations to
àtman or caitanya four times (I.1.1, I.17.1, I.17.87, I.18.1). We can
only conclude that for some unclear reason the factor of grace, which
emerges so unexpectedly in a number of •aákara’s other writings,
is not treated in the Upad at all. We may only speculate as to why
this is so by raising certain questions.
For example, is the Upad to be regarded as an exhaustive sum-
mary of what is important for •aákara or is it incomplete? The fact
that •aákara appears to have composed the various chapters of the
verse or metrical portion ( padyabandha) at different times indepen-
dently,25 leaves open the question whether •aákara completed all
the chapters he set out to compose in his short lifetime. Also, would
it not be too much to expect •aákara to compose a verse chapter
on divine grace in the Upad when, in his other works, he only treats
grace in passing, never systematically? And, too, if •aákara’s pri-
mary interest in composing the Upad were to distinguish what is
unique about this soteriology in contrast to the other soteriologies
of his time, some of which would assume a clear separation between
the Lord and the jìva, might not an affirmation of divine grace tend
to blur the distinction that •aákara wanted to make between his
advaitavàda and the theisms of his day? Might it also be that the real-
ity of divine grace was not a subject of debate for the Vedàntins of
•aákara’s time, that it was simply taken for granted and therefore
not requiring a special treatment? And, finally, how much of the
Upad is, despite Mayeda’s probing scholarship, genuinely from
•aákara? In this regard K. Potter has noted that the work of Mayeda
and P. Hacker suggests that •aákara wrote “portions of a treatise
entitled Upadesasahasri.”26 That is to say, part of the Upad is genuine
and part is not. Potter does not, in this essay, specify which por-
tions are authentic and which are not, but in another work he raises
the question of the authenticity of the prose section (gadyabandha).27
25
Potter 217.
26
“The Development of Advaita Vedànta as a School of Philosophy,” Radhakrishnan
Centenary Volume, ed. G. Parthasarathi and D. P. Chattopadhyaya (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1989), 87. My emphasis.
27
Potter, Advaita Vedànta 217.
396  
The work of a different scholar, Robert Gussner, suggests that the

first and last (no. 19) chapters of the verse section are spurious.28
We can only await the results of future scholarship to throw more
light on the problems surrounding the Upad. As for now, there are
a great many things about this work that remain unclear.
G. T P  •á’ T  G  Và

H
•aákara’s remarks affirming grace are seldom descriptive of grace’s

operation or of the prerequisites for grace’s manifestation in the jìva.
For that reason alone it is difficult to determine where and whether
•aákara has substantially contributed to the Vedàntic tradition’s
ongoing reflections on the reality and function of divine grace. Indeed,
the Vedàntic tradition or traditions prior to •aákara that affirm
grace are characterized by the same lack of systematization as marks
his own system. Further, it appears that almost all of the discern-
able notions regarding grace that we find in •aákara’s writings are
already present in other Vedàntic writings that emerged prior to
him. The surprise is that •aákara should so clearly affirm the teach-
ings of divine grace that were circulating in his time when so much
of modern scholarship has been quick to deny that •aákara shared
this feature with the great majority of Vedàntic thinkers of old.
1. •aákara’s Unity With Early Vedànta
On the one hand, then, •aákara’s implicit theology of grace is typ-

ical of his time and of the centuries immediately prior to him:
1) Both •aákara and the post-Vedic traditions of Vedànta are uncon-
cerned with petition to the gods for worldly favors or for for-
giveness for transgressions and sins as their primary religious goal.
Their orientation is to the Upanißads; their overriding concern is
for liberation from rebirth and suffering.
2) Both •aákara and the Vedàntic schools prior to and contempor-
aneous to him affirm the cosmic law of karma as controlled by
and expressing the just will of a transcendent Lord.
28
R. Gussner, “A Stylometric Study of the Authorship of Seventeen Sanskrit
Hymns Attributed to •a«kara,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 96 (1976):263.
 397
3) Like the late Ka†ha, Mu»∂aka and •vetà≤vatara Upanißads that give
prominent place to a personal Lord as the refuge of the jìva and
its deliverer through grace, •aákara and at least some of his con-
temporaries hold ì≤vara to be involved in the jìva’s liberation.
4) Like the author of the Bhagavad-Gìtà •aákara is able to harmo-
nize the principle of liberation-through-knowledge with liberation-
through-grace. This is not to say that •aákara and the Gìtàkàra
propound identical teachings on grace. Indeed they do not. Although
•aákara refers to divine grace more frequently than the Gìtà, his
emphasis always remains on knowledge.
5) Like the author or final redactor of the Brahma-Sùtra •aákara
absolves the Lord from the charge of partiality and cruelty towards
the jìvas by appealing to the reality of the jìva’s freedom on the
one hand and the just retribution of the Lord on the other. Both
Nimbàrka and •aákara, in their respective commentaries on the
BrSù, compare the Lord’s impartial action to rain that falls equally
on every variety of plant.
6) Like the Gau∂apàdìyakàrikàs before him •aákara is able to com-
bine language about the illusory nature of the world and the jìva
with statements asserting the benevolence of the Absolute. However,
I must once again point out my view that •aákara does not
espouse the GK’s acosmicism.
7) In striking similarity with Àdi≤eßa’s Paramàrthasàra, •aákara shows
a greater concern for soteriology than for metaphysics. And although
the PS has no explicit teaching on grace or bhakti one may dis-
cern in this work with its strong Advaitic strain an implicit affir-
mation of bhakti and grace throughout. Further, the Viß»u who
is repeatedly eulogized is, as in the works of •aákara, made syn-
onymous with brahman-àtman-parame≤vara. Thus in both this work
and in •aákara’s writings there is no clear distinction between a
so-called “impersonal” Absolute and a “personal” Lord. Both
Àdi≤eßa and •aákara appear, then, to be strongly influenced by
Vaiß»avism. Both, too, whether professing grace explicitly or only
implicitly, teach that liberation comes through knowledge alone.
8) Like Nimbàrka, •aákara distinguishes the supreme reality in itself
from the supreme reality in relation to the cosmos, yet does not
always abide by a clear-cut distinction between a non-relational
brahman and a relational Lord. For example, although Nimbàrka
formally attributes grace to the bhagavan, he does not hesitate to make
brahman-àtman the dispenser of the jìva’s reward and punishment.
398  
Liberation, too, for Nimbàrka is attributed to both bhagavàn and

parame≤vara as well as to paramàtman and brahman. Also, for both
Nimbàrka and •aákara the Lord’s grace is not regarded as an
independent means of liberation, as it is in other later schools of
Hinduism, but it appears to be integral to the liberation process.
Most importantly, Nimbàrka’s theology implies that the jñàna that
brings the jìva to Self-realization and therefore liberation, is ulti-
mately a gift of parame≤vara-brahman; liberation is unattainable
through the jìva’s effort alone. This appears to be very close to
•aákara’s position.
9) Thus •aákara’s Advaita system shares much with the bhedàbheda
and incipient non-dualistic soteriologies before him in terms of
grace. When contrasted with later Vedàntic traditions the period
of early Vedànta, of which •aákara is a part, clearly lacks in
every case the extreme doctrines of grace and bhakti as indepen-
dent means of salvation, i.e. of prapatti (throwing oneself upon the
mercy of the Lord as the only means of salvation) and gurupasatti
(devotion to the teacher as the primary means of liberation).
However, one must be careful not to contrast too strongly early
and later Vedànta on this point. There is continuity in their
respective teachings; for in •aákara, as in many other systems of
early Vedànta, the grace of the Lord and the centrality of the
guru are accepted without hesitation. These are not doctrines that
are subject to dispute. But they are not regarded as factors in the
liberation process independent of the jìva’s effort, although they
will occasionally become so many centuries later.
Also the affirmations of divine grace made by •aákara and other
early Vedàntins are, for the most part, fragmentary in nature, and
scattered throughout their respective works, so that one has to piece
together what might finally be regarded as a consistent, though often
implicit theology of grace.
2. Where •aákara Differs From Early Vedànta
Since the thousand-year period between the writing of the later prin-
cipal Upanißads and the arrival of •aákara has bequeathed to pos-
terity but few names of the important thinkers and writings of early
Vedànta one cannot decide with certainty whether •aákara’s diver-
gence with what is known about this era does in fact reflect his own
 399
original views or whether these views are indebted to others whose

names are now lost. Be that as it may, I shall now attempt to sum-
marize certain features of •aákara’s understanding of grace that are
not found in his known contemporaries and predecessors or at least
not as strongly emphasized.
1) In contrast to KaUp I.2.23 and MuUp III.2.3, •aákara allows
no place in his system for an arbitrary divine election of jìvas. No
one arrives at the state of liberation through sovereign grace alone
or through the divine fiat alone.
2) Similarly, despite the claims of •vUp VI.16, KauUp III.8, BrSù
III.2.5 and PS 32, •aákara in no way imputes the soul’s bondage
to the Lord, either in the sense of a manipulation of the jìva or
in the sense of a self-delusion of the divine. When commenting
on BrSu II.3.41 and III.2.5, which speak of the Lord’s activity,
it is •aákara, again, rather than Nimbàrka, who explicitly intro-
duces divine grace each time and thereby forcefully emphasizes
the essentially merciful nature of the divine action and excludes
the notion of an even indirect responsibility of the Lord for the
jìva’s bondage.
3) The Lord’s transcendence and sovereignty are affirmed in the
BhG, but they are not taken up for discussion by Nimbàrka.
•aákara, however, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, clearly
affirms the divine freedom to dispense grace and retribution.
4) Divine grace is more explicit in •aákara than in the GK.
5) Both divine grace and the centrality of the Advaitic message are
more central and explicit in •aákara than in Àdi≤eßa’s PS.
6) Unlike Nimbàrka, who at the outset of his VPS makes the desire
for the grace of the Lord and the vision of him one of the require-
ments for brahmajijñàsà, •aákara speaks in this context of the
desire for liberation. He makes no mention of the Lord or of the
Lord’s grace. But one cannot therefore conclude that grace is for
Nimbàrka more central than for •aákara, as we have seen.
7) •aákara clearly distinguishes himself from any theory that would
make liberation derive directly from the jìva’s agency. Liberation
comes through knowledge, i.e. Self-realization, alone. Does the PS
or the VPS go so far as to explicitly affirm that the dawning of
liberating knowledge is caused by the grace of the Lord? The
answer is negative; in the PS and the VPS this notion is at best
implied, while in •aákara divine grace is explicitly articulated.
400  
H. C A
The heart of •aákara’s teaching on grace is that the jìva is inca-

pable through its own power of passing beyond the state of ignor-
ance and attaining the blissful and liberating intellectual experience
(anubhava) of the Self or brahman. To reach this state of higher aware-
ness •aákara, drawing on the teachings of the revealed Upanißads,
prescribes a path to liberation that, although absolutely essential in
its purificatory function, is ultimately insufficient to bridge the chasm
between the world of suffering and the state of liberation from that
suffering. It is in this context that the question of grace arises.
Richard De Smet, writing of anubhava, states: “In the state of igno-
rance we rather experience our desire for it, our inability to con-
quer it, our need for a helping grace.29 He goes on to say, summarizing
the position of both Aquinas and •aákara, that “the Godhead imma-
nent in us originates the natural desire for seeing it and itself fulfils
it by a direct revelation of its own supreme form or true essence.”30
This “blissful intuition of the divine essence,”31 then, is only possi-
ble as the gift of a Self-revelation, which presupposes both the dis-
tinction and non-separation of the revealer and its recipient. One
must speak of non-separation or non-duality, because this intuition
constitutes for the sàdhaka “an awakening to his deepest reality,” an
“identity of sac-cid-ananda,” in which the experiencer “is merged and
abides in the pure Caitanva and no distinction endures between his
blissful knowledge and the divine Bliss-Consciousness.”32
Such an interpretation of •aákara’s teaching stresses the Lord’s
sovereignty and transcendence; that is to say the divine mystery can-
not be penetrated or disposed over by human resolve and effort.
Devotion may lead to the mind’s one-pointedness and therefore purify
the mind of its attraction and aversion to finite objects, both men-
tal and extramental. It may thereby bring the mind to a state of
tranquility and receptiveness to the light of the àtman within. Further,
•aákara appears to teach that the jìva’s devotion not only purifies
and pacifies the mind, but also calls forth an active response of brahman-
àtman-ì≤vara to his devotees. But this gracious movement of the Lord
29
R. De Smet, “•a«kara and Aquinas on Liberation (Mukti),” Indian Philosophical
Annual 5 (1969):245.
30
De Smet, “•a«kara and Aquinas” 245.
31
32
 401
is entirely free and therefore personal. We find examples of this not

only in •aákara’s BrSùBh, but also in some of his Upanißad com-
mentaries and in the BhGBh.
We see now that •aákara’s attribution of liberation to divine
grace, e.g. in BrSùBh II.3.41, III.2.5; TaiUpBh I.11.4, and BhGBh
II.39, amounts to more than a curious appendage to his soteriology.
Because the jìva can actively do no more than prepare itself for the
dawn of the higher knowledge it must thereafter await in passive,
hopeful and trusting expectation the grace of the revelation of the
pratyagàtman. This gift of intuition restores the jìva to its original state
of transparency to brahman-àtman by the light of true knowledge.
It is clear that •aákara does not answer our desire for a detailed
account of his theology of grace. Although I have been helped in
my assessment of his position by what he affirms about divine grace,
these affirmations are often enough cryptic and difficult to interpret
with certainty. Perhaps it is equally telling to see what •aákara
denies—not merely affirms—about the positions of his various oppo-
nents, if we are to gain a comprehensive view of his teaching on
grace. For example, in dealing with the question of divine grace and
human free will, •aákara steers clear of the extreme solutions of
both salvation through grace alone and salvation through human
effort alone. Yet he will affirm the truth hidden in each position:33
Divine grace and human effort work together, but the “how” of their
cooperation is left unsaid; the bare fact that they do is simply affirmed.
(BrSùBh II.3.42) •aákara’s underlying intent appears to be to point
the reader to and beyond the validity of each theological position
to a mystery that encompasses the truth of each while remaining in-
accessible in itself to a purely rational explanation and articulation.
In other words, •aákara’s statements on grace and his denial of
false teaching point beyond themselves to an unfathomable and inex-
pressible mystery, and they thereby take into account both the activ-
ity of the creature, indispensable to salvation, and the supporting,
directing ‘activity’ or ‘power’ of the Supreme that enables the crea-
ture to reach its goal. Thus there exists the paradox in •aákara of
the absolute necessity of the jìva’s action and effort and the ultimate
incapability of action and effort to attain liberation. Ontologically
this paradox has its roots in the relative being of the creature and
33
See •aákara’s repeated use of KauUp III.8, whose predestinarian sense he
tones down.
402  
the absolute Being of brahman. It is, in short, the mystery of advaita.

It may be that •aákara’s hesitation to speak much of divine grace
is due to its possible anthropomorphic misunderstanding, in which
the divine activity would be conceived in all too human and there-
fore comprehensible terms. •aákara’s reticence to speak at length
on the subject of grace is certainly not due to a lack of faith in
grace; rather his advaitic conviction and intuition make it well nigh
impossible for him to bring the experience of grace to expression,
just as the Upanißads never tire in proclaiming brahman-àtman to be
beyond the reach of the mind. In approaching the mystery of grace
we approach finally the mystery of the unfathomable brahman in its
relation to the world. Perhaps •aákara chooses not to discuss the
workings of grace in any detail, because of the impossibility of artic-
ulating the mystery that the word “grace” points to.
May it be that, on the one hand, •aákara is compelled by his
personal experience to witness to the reality of grace, but, on the
other hand, he recognizes the impossibility of objectifying what is
properly the mystery of liberation?
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INDEX
àbhàsa 67–68 Apàntaratamas 272

Abhinavagupta 14 n. 65 apùrva 267–268, 271
àcàrya xi n. 1, 82, 291–292, 306, Aquinas, Thomas 40 n. 34, 65,
315, 325, 361, 372, 389–390, 219 n. 217, 321, 321 n. 137, 400,
grace of 291, 306, 308, 325, 329, 400 nn. 29–32
359, 363, 368 Aristotle 38
adharma 75–76 Arjuna 99, 265, 312, 334, 338,
adhikàras 69, 79, 79 n. 50, 80–81 343–345, 352, 355, 360
adhyàsa 69, 71–73, 76, 84 Armstrong, A. H. 382, 382 n. 2
Àdi≤eßa xii, xiv, 89, 110–111, 397 arthàpatti 37–39
advaita xiii, 110–112, 124, 136, 157, asatkàryavàda 47
189, 197 n. 143, 232, 278 n. 438, À≤marathya 101, 196–197,
304 n. 73, 305, 339, 343 n. 230, 197 n. 143, 198–200, 200 nn. 154
357, 365–367, 372–373, 388 n. 6, and 157, 201
391 n. 10, 395, 395 n. 27, 399, à≤rama 274–276
402, as monistic-illusionistic xiii, àtman, grace of 310, 319, 332, 365,
107–108, 371, as ontological 386
realism xiii, 170 Àtreya 101
Agni 106, 195, 195 n. 134, 295, 308, Au∂ulomi 101
310, 334 avatàra 98, 127, 150, 176, 334–335,
ai≤varya 195, 206, 256 338, 341 n. 220, 343
ajàtivàda 108 avidyà 16, 16 n. 77, 29 n. 147, 49,
Alston, Anthony 16 n. 77, 64 n. 74, 51–52, 55, 65–67, 67 n. 91, 73–74,
74 n. 15 76, 78, 85, 87, 105, 112, 122, 135,
Amaladoss, M. 87 n. 95, 278 n. 438 151 n. 65, 155, 171 n. 21, 211,
Amalànanda 3 n. 11 220, 220 n. 219, 237, 239, 239 nn.
Amalorpavadass, D. S. 39 n. 20, 286–287, 241–242, 247, 247 n. 309,
319 n. 131, 388 n. 7 257, 288, 313, 380–381, 383, 385
Amaruka 12 n. 60 avidyàvasthà 34
Ànandagiri 10 n. 45, 14 n. 65, avidyàvißaya 34
17 n. 77, 32, 220 n. 219
Ànandajñàna 197 n. 143 Bàdaràya»a 20–24, 24 n. 114,
antaryàmin xii n. 3,104, 108, 128, 151, 25–26, 101–102, 267–268, 271
271, 289 Bàdari 101, 196, 198–200,
Antoine, R. 52 n. 23 200 n. 157, 201
anubhava 78, 360, 400 Balasubramaniam, R. 13 n. 61
anugraha 103, 135, 136 n. 2, 146, Ballantyne, James R. 23 n. 102
161–163, 163 n. 16, 174, 181, 195, Barnabas, M. 62 n. 67, 223 n. 225
199, 201, 205, 205 n. 172, 207, Belvalkar, S. K. 18 n. 82
217, 221, 239, 241, 260, 273–276, bhagavàn 113 n. 101, 128, 130–132,
280, 284, 286, 293–294, 302, 306, 266, 301, 357, 368, 397–398
308, 312, 314, 323, 338, 344, Bhàgavatas 230–231, 233
346–347, 350, 352, 355–356, 358, bhakti 94, 98–99, 105 n. 61, 106,
365, 367–370, 377, 386 116, 119, 121, 126–127, 129, 137,
anukampà 99, 351, 371–372 141, 154, 263–265, 290, 304, 313,
anukro≤a xv, 164, 356–357, 387 316, 351–353, 360, 397–398
anumàna 37–38 Bhandarkar, R. G. 6, 6 nn. 27–28,
anupalabdhi 37 117 n. 112
422 
Bharadvaja, K. 203 n. 165 211, 211 n. 187, 212 nn. 190–191,

Bhàratì 12 n. 60 214, 234–235, 265, 276–279,
Bhart‰prapañca xiv, 103, 289–293, 295, 299–302, 306,
103 n. 50, 104, 104 n. 54, 105, 306 n. 80, 307, 307 n. 82, 309,
105 nn. 59–63, 106, 311–312, 314–315, 321, 328–329,
106 nn. 64–67 335, 340, 343, 361, 366–369, 374,
Bhàskara xv, 3, 3 n. 15, 4, 4 n. 17, 382, 386, 388–390, 400, and àtman
29, 29 n. 148, 30, 30 n. 148, 26, 76, 82, 97, 132, 137, 154,
31–33, 65 n. 79, 101, 117, 122, 177, 180 n. 57, 183–184, 188,
124, 126, 166, 173, 173 n. 28, 190 n. 111, 192–195, 210, 227,
180–181, 183, 189, 193, 196, 233, 237 n. 280, 254, 258, 266,
197 n. 143, 198–199, 199 n. 145, 279–281, 285, 289–290, 294,
200 n. 157, 201, 207, 212 n. 190, 296–299, 306, 310, 324, 331,
213, 215 n. 199, 218–219, 221, 333–334, 358, 361, 370, 380,
233, 233 n. 264, 235, 241–242, 384 n. 3, 386, 388, 392, 393,
246, 249, 252, 260–261, 265–267, 397–398, 401–402, as cause 60–63,
268 n. 404, 271, 273–274, 276, 279, 225 n. 231, 388, 400, as cause of
283–285 bondage 102, 128–129, 211–213,
Bhattacharya, Kalidas 48 n. 8 221, 285, as dispenser of reward
bhedàbheda 26, 26 n. 128, 100, and punishment 128–131, 267,
103–104, 106, 110–112, 116, 397, as gracious 132, 148, 150,
122–123, 132, 136, 197 n. 143, 264, 282–284, 286, 295, 302–303,
213 308, 312–313, 370, 386, 391, 394,
bhokt‰ 66–67, 78, 383 398, 400, as impersonal xi, 45,
body 70, 72, 75–76, 78, 209, 211, 51, 316, 332–333, 357–358,
211 n. 187, 238 n. 281, 250, 380–381, 394–395, 397, as
255–256, 259–260, 271–273, mukhyam 167 n. 8, 169, 173, as
280–281, 281 n. 447, 283, 291, nirgu»a xiv, 46, 51–54, 54 n. 30,
314, 320, 340, 342–344, 357, 359, 55–57, 141, 143–144, 150, 175,
383, 386, 390 179–180, 187–188, 272, 357, 380,
Bose, Roma 117 nn. 112 and 115, as personal xi, xi n. 2, 45, 51, 92,
122 n. 136, 128 nn. 167–168, 129, 92 n. 9, 100, 146, 316, 320, 332,
129 nn. 169–170, n. 172, n. 174, 381, 394, relation to the world
130 nn. 176–178, 131 n. 179, xiii, 53, 61, 90, 112, 128, 140, 172,
173 n. 27, 180, 180 nn. 60–61, 183, 211–213, 227, 230, 254,
183 n. 73, 189 n. 103, 193 n. 121, 262–263, 263 n. 383, 290, 307,
196 nn. 136–137, 199, 199 n. 147, 336–337, 381, 391, 397, 401–402,
201 n. 160, 206 n. 177, 213 n. 192, as sagu»a xiv, 51–54, 54 n. 30,
218 n. 213, 226 n. 236, 233 nn. 260 55–56, 143, 144, 150, 153,
and 262, 235 n. 274, 241 n. 293, 167 n. 8, 175, 180, 272, 285,
246 n. 307, 249 n. 318, 251 n. 335, 380, and •iva 19, as source of
260 n. 378, 264 n. 390, 265 n. 392, ≤ruti 39, as source of creation
267 n. 400, 268 n. 404, 270 n. 410, 50, 55, 62, 77, 167 n. 8, 170,
273 n. 421, 276 n. 431, 279 n. 440, 173, 177 n. 45, 202, 209–211,
283 n. 454 223, 227, 232, 248–249, 303, as
Brahma 203 n. 165, 206 n. 175, 299, twofold 24, 59, 105, 142, 148,
335 153, 180 n. 57, 187, 233, 248, 258,
brahmacàrya 81, 351, 361 261, 280–285, 290–291, 303, 316,
brahmajijñàsa 37, 79, 87, 127, 154, 358, 380, 394, and Viß»u 19, 324,
156, 351, 391, 399 380
brahman xii, 42, 73, 85, 133, 168, 168 Brooks, Richard 47 n. 7, 48, 49
n. 8, 171, 175, 181–182, 186 n. 95, n. 10
188–189, 190 nn. 108 and 112, Buddha 372
198, 207, 209 nn. 183 and 185, Buddhism 107, 109–110, 372
 423
Cenkner, William 7 n. 34, 13 n. 62, 117 n. 113, 153, 153 n. 76, 154,
14 nn. 63 and 68, 15, 15 n. 70, 154 nn. 77–81, 155, 155 nn. 82–85,
21 nn. 94–95, 79, 79 nn. 44 and 156, 156 nn. 87–88, 170 n. 19,
46, 80 n. 53, 82, 82 nn. 65 and 67, 177, 177 nn. 42 and 44, 178, 178
87 n. 94, 91, 91 n. 6, 92 nn. 7–8 nn. 49–50, 216 nn. 204–205, 217,
Chatterjee, S. C. 21 n. 94, 38 n. 9, 217 n. 207, 219 n. 217, 223 n. 225,
n. 13, nn. 15–16, 39 nn. 17–18 and 227, 227 nn. 241–242, 319, 319
21–22, 53 n. 27, 203 n. 165 n. 131, 320, 321 nn. 137–138,
Chattopadhyaya, D. P. 395 n. 26 342 n. 227, 351, 351 n. 260, 352,
Clooney, Francis X. 17 n. 78 352 n. 261, 391, 391 n. 9, 400,
Conio Caterina 108 nn. 76–77 400 nn. 29–32
Coward, Harold G. 43 n. 47, determinism 91, 182–183, 193, 217,
244 n. 303, 245 n. 303 221, 236, 238, 240, 242–244, 246,
259, 269–271, 285, 322, 327, 338,
daivam 297 384, 399, 401 n. 33
dama 80 Deussen, Paul 28, 28 n. 144, 29, 46,
Dandekar, R. N. 6 n. 28, 20 n. 90, 46 n. 3, 86, 145, 145 nn. 34–38,
21 n. 95, 28, 28 n. 138, 98, 146, 146 nn. 39–42, 250 n. 325,
117 n. 112, 163 n. 13 252 n. 339, 253 n. 343
Danielson, Henry 107 n. 72, Deutsch Eliot 9 n. 42, 10 n. 46, 11
110 n. 86, 111 nn. 90–91 and n. 48, n. 50, n. 52, n. 55, 12 n. 59,
94–96, 112, 112 n. 97, 113 n. 102, 14 nn. 63 and 65, 15 n. 74, 42
114 n. 103, 116 n. 109 n. 46, 43 n. 50, 47 n. 7, 86 nn. 91
Dasgupta, Surendranath 47, 47 n. 5, and 93, 87 n. 96, 99, 100 n. 38,
90 n. 3, 97 n. 29 136 n. 6, 222 n. 224, 231 nn.
Date, V. H. 83, 83 n. 70, 85 n. 89, 255–256, 332, 332 n. 182
149, 149 nn. 51–55, 150, 150 Devaraja N. K. 29, 29 n. 145
nn. 56–63, 151 n. 64, 167 n. 8, dharma 75–76
170 n. 18, 174 n. 34, 192 n. 116, Dharmakìrti 4, 6–7
194 n. 126, 204 n. 169, 227 nn. Dhavamony, Mariasusai 92 n. 11,
240 and 243, 228 nn. 247–248, 93 n. 12, 94, 94 n. 19, 96 n. 25,
232 n. 258, 235, 235 n. 273, 236, 139 n. 11, 162 n. 9, 320 n. 135
239 n. 287, 244, 244 n. 301, dhyàna 120, 129, 263–265
245 n. 305, 257 n. 366, 258, 258 docetism 344
n. 371, 268 n. 405, 273, 274 D’Sa, Francis 335 n. 194
n. 425, 275 n. 430, 296 n. 33 Dvivedin, V. P. 173 n. 28
Datta, D. M. 21 n. 94, 38 n. 9,
n. 13, nn. 15–16, 39 nn. 17–18 and effort 87–88, 93–94, 96, 105, 106,
21–22, 47–48, 48 n. 8, 53 n. 27, 137, 139–140, 145, 157, 172, 206,
203 n. 165 208, 240, 242–244, 247, 256–258,
dayà 80, 135, 136 n. 2, 163, 293, 262–266, 270, 276, 278–279,
329, 329 n. 170, 351, 363, 367–368, 286–287, 298, 302, 316, 319,
370, 372 321–323, 327, 332, 350, 359, 362,
de Letter, Paul 164 n. 25 377–378, 382, 384–385, 388,
De Smet, Richard xiii, xiv n. 4, 390–392, 398, 400–401
xvi, xvi n. 5, 18 n. 82, 27, 27 elective grace 93, 138–139, 155, 206,
n. 130, 37 n. 8, 38 n. 9, n. 14, 208, 222, 247, 319–323, 326, 347,
n. 16, 39 nn. 19 and 25, 40 n. 29, 384, 399
48, 48 n. 9, 49, 49 n. 12, 52 nn. Eliade, Mircea 9 n. 43
23–24, 54 nn. 31–32, 62, 62 nn. enlightenment xi, xiv, 286–287,
64–67, 65 nn. 76–77, 66 n. 82, 291–293, 303–308, 310, 370, 382,
67 nn. 84–86 and 88–89, 73, 85 384–385, 388–389, 398–400, content
n. 86, 97 nn. 27 and 29, 98, 98 of 43–44, 46, 48–49, 138, 140,
n. 33, 99, 99 n. 35, 100 n. 37, 145, 157, 177, 211, 213, 264, 279,
424 
281, 283, 294 n. 25, 295, 299, 319, 306–309, 312–314, 317, 326,
327, 362, 367, 369–370, 373, 336, 343, 345 n. 234, 357, 366,
382–383, 387, 389–390, 392–393, 366 n. 331, 374, 396
400–401 Gonda, Jan 50, 50 nn. 16–18,
evil 102, 174, 182–183, 193, 53 n. 25, 95, 95 n. 23, 162,
208–209, 209 n. 182, 210–211, 162 nn. 7–8, 335 n. 193
213–214, 217, 221, 238, 240, Govinda 6, 6 n. 28, 7 n. 34, 11,
242–243, 244 n. 303, 245 n. 303, 11 nn. 48 and 50, 27, 107, 306
253, 268–269, 271, 295, 310, 323, Govindànanda 17 n. 77, 32,
336, 340–341, 352–353, 355, 197 n. 143
357–358, 383 Goyandaka, K. 334 n. 188
grace as personalistic xii
Fallon, P. 53 n. 28 Grant, Sara xvi, 39 nn. 20 and
Feuerstein, Georg 162 23–25, 40 n. 27, 42 n. 41,
Fichte, J. G. 88 n. 100, 393 n. 16 87 nn. 95 and 97, 227 n. 241, 278,
Frauwallner, E. 110 n. 86 278 n. 439, 388 n. 7
free will xvi, 99, 151, 183, 214, Griffiths, Bede 138–139, 139 nn. 11
217–218, 221, 230, 236–237, and 13
237 nn. 279–280, 238, 240, gu»a 51–52, 65, 180 n. 57, 263, 338,
242–245, 245 n. 303, 246, 248, 338 n. 206, 358
259, 269–270, 285, 321, 338, Gupta, Sanjukta 94 n. 15
377–378, 382–384, 390–391, 397, guru 69, 82–83, 85–86, 113, 120, 154,
401, rooted in divine agency 99, 306, 359–362, 366–368, 374,
151, 239–241, 245, 249, 269, 271, 389–390, 398, grace of 91, 119,
285 127, 150–151, 154, 156, 292,
328–329, 351, 362, 370, 391
Gambhirananda, Swami 18 n. 84, gurùpasatti 120–121, 398
109 n. 83, 110, 114 n. 103, 166 Gussner, Robert 18 n. 83, 19 n. 86,
n. 4, 177 n. 45, 179, 179 n. 52, 396, 396 n. 28
186 n. 95, 190 nn. 110–112, 191,
191 n. 113, 205 n. 172, 206 nn. Hacker, Paul xii–xiii, 10 n. 44,
173 and 176, 214 nn. 196–197, 15 n. 69, 16, 16 nn. 76–77, 17,
218 nn. 211–212, 220 n. 219, 222 17 n. 78, 18 n. 82, 19, 19 n. 85,
n. 223, 226 n. 238, 227 n. 240, 20, 20 nn. 90–92, 27, 29,
228 n. 247, 235–236, 244 n. 299, 29 nn. 146–147, 30, 30 n. 150,
257 n. 364, 259 n. 372, 266, 272, 31–32, 36, 49, 49 n. 11, 51–52,
275, 281, 294 n. 25, 295 n. 27, 54 n. 30, 55–56, 56 n. 40, 57–58,
296 n. 32, 297–299, 301 n. 52, 58 nn. 47 and 52, 59, 59 n. 57, 60,
304 n. 70, 312, 323, 331, 333 96 n. 26, 151, 151 n. 65, 152, 165,
n. 188, 351 171 n. 21, 174 n. 34, 175 n. 38,
Gau∂apàda xiv, 5 n. 23, 6, 6 n. 28, 177, 177 nn. 42–44, 178, 180 n. 57,
7, 7 nn. 34 and 37, 107, 107 n. 68, 184 n. 81, 185, 185 nn. 82–83,
112, 126–127, 366, 371–373, 373 187 n. 97, 223 n. 228, 231, 231
n. 361, 374, 397 nn. 253 and 256, 232, 232 n. 259,
Ghate, V. S. 21 n. 94, 23, 23 254 n. 348, 256 n. 362, 285, 333,
nn. 103–104, 26 n. 125, 102 n. 44, 372, 372 n. 357, 373, 373 n. 359,
117 n. 112, 188 n. 99, 234 n. 267, 377, 395
237 n. 280, 253 nn. 340 and Halbfass, Wilhelm 16 n. 76, 40
342 n. 32, 41, 41 nn. 35 and 38–39, 42,
gods 75, 90–91, 110, 181, 195, 42 n. 42
195 n. 134, 196, 203 n. 165, Hari 184–185, 188
205–208, 215–216, 250–251, 251 Hastàmalaka 2 n. 11, 11
n. 334, 252, 272, 275–276, 299, heart 280–281, 281 n. 447, 282–284,
311, grace of 293–295, 301, 303, 315, 323, 351, 364, 386
 425
Heidegger, M. 88 n. 100, 393 n. 16 334, 341, 346, 350, 355–359, 363,

Hira»yagarbha 105, 105 n. 61, 106, 370, 373, 380, 384, 384 n. 3, 385,
205, 205 n. 172, 206, 206 n. 173, 386, 393–394, 397
206 n. 175, 207–208, 282, 286, 295, Ì≤varak‰ß»a 125–126
309 ì≤vara-pra»idhàna 256–257
Hiriyanna, M. 22, 22 n. 99,
26 n. 126, 46, 46 n. 4, 51 n. 21, Jacobi, H. 18 n. 82, 21 n. 95,
54 n. 33, 103 n. 50, 104, 104 nn. 25 n. 121
54–56, 105, 105 nn. 59–63, 106, Jagadananda, Swami 366 n. 331,
106 nn. 64–67 369, 369 n. 343
Hirst, Jacqueline 59 n. 54 jagat 45, 48–49, 61
Hume, R. E. 89 n. 1, 94, 94 n. 18, japa 274–277, 287
138 n. 10, 182 n. 71, 183 n. 72, Jaimini 24, 25 n. 115, 102, 196,
311 n. 98, 323, 323 n. 144, 326 198–201, 201 n. 160, 268
n. 159, 331, 331 n. 179, 349 nn. Janaka 292
249–250 janmàdi 219 n. 214
Jesus Christ 83, 286 n. 456, 344, 387
Indra 181, 303, 307, 313, 366 n. 5
inequality of suffering 214–221, jìva 44, 44 n. 53, 45, 47, 66–76, 81,
224, 224 n. 229, 237 n. 278, 238, 83, 87, 91, 102, 105, 111–112, 128,
285 130–132, 137–138, 142–143, 149,
Ingalls, Daniel H. H. 2, 2 n. 7, 3–4, 151, 177, 182, 204, 212, 212
4 nn. 16–17, 10 n. 44, 21 n. 95, 25 n. 190, 213, 216, 216 n. 203, 220,
n. 121, 27, 27 nn. 131–132, 28 nn. 231, 234, 236–237, 237 n. 280, 238,
136 and 140–142, 29, 29 nn. 238 n. 281, 239, 240 n. 288,
146–147, 30, 30 nn. 149–153, 31, 241–243, 243 n. 297, 244 n. 299,
31 n. nn. 154–155, 32–33, 36, 40 245, 245 n. 303, 246, 247 n. 309,
n. 31, 67 n. 91, 74 n. 16, 165, 181, 248–249, 252, 253 n. 344, 254,
199 n. 145, 233 n. 264, 239 n. 286 257–258, 258 n. 368, 259–262, 264,
Isayeva, Natalia 65 n. 78 268–271, 273–274, 279–281, 283,
Isherwood, Christopher 19 n. 86 285, 291, 293–295, 297–298, 310,
ì≤vara/parame≤vara xiv, 16, 20, 29 318–320, 322, 343, 347, 350–351,
n. 147, 35, 45, 51, 55–57, 58 n. 48, 355, 359, 370, 374, 381–388,
61, 76, 104, 108–109, 113 n. 101, 390–391, 395–399, 400–401
114–115, 128, 130–132, 142–146, jìvanmukta 78, 272
148, 151 n. 65, 152–153, 167, 167 jñànakà»∂a 83–84, 392
n. 8, 169, 170–171, 171 nn. 21–22, jñànakarmasamuccayavàda 104, 391
172–174, 174 n. 34, 175, 175 n. 37, Joshi, S. D. xiv n. 4, 117 n. 113
176, 179–180, 180 n. 57, 181, 184
n. 81, 188, 189 n. 102, 190, 190 Kàlidàsa 4 n. 20
n. 110, 191–193, 195, 197 n. 144, kalpa 203, 203 n. 165, 204–205, 205
198–200, 202, 205, 205 n. 172, 206, n. 172, 206, 206 n. 173, 207–208,
206 nn. 173–174, 207–208, 212 215 n. 200, 220–221, 286
n. 190, 214, 214 n. 196, 215, 216 karma 66, 73, 75, 75 n. 19, 78,
n. 202, 219–221, 223, 224 n. 228, 88 n. 100, 97, 97 n. 29, 106, 113,
225, 225 n. 232, 226, 226 n. 235, 136, 149, 192–193, 204, 216 nn.
232 n. 258, 233, 237, 237 n. 280, 204–205, 217, 217 n. 207, 218–219,
243, 243 n. 297, 244 n. 299, 245, 219 n. 217, 224, 224 n. 230, 226
245 n. 303, 246–248, 254–255, 255 n. 235, 230, 244 n. 303, 245
n. 352, 256–258, 260–261, 266–268, n. 303, 263, 266, 270, 273, 276,
268 n. 406, 269–273, 276, 283–287, 305, 308, 319, 323, 330, 343, 347,
289–290, 295, 298, 298 n. 40, 303, 352, 355–356, 382–383, 385 n. 4,
305, 306 n. 80, 307, 307 n. 82, 386–388, 396, nißkàma karma 355
308, 310–314, 317, 322, 324, 328, karmakà»∂a 83–84, 392
426 
Kàrß»àjini 101 nn. 18–22, 294 nn. 23–24 and 26,

kart‰ 66–67, 78, 87, 383 295 nn. 28–29, 296 nn. 30–31, 297
karu»a 147, 164, 302, 315, 374 n. 37, 309 n. 90, 310 n. 93
kàru»ika 161, 291–292, 300–301, 301 Madhva 1, 10 n. 45, 22, 63 n. 71,
n. 52, 315, 330 226 n. 235, 236 n. 278, 293 nn.
Kà≤ak‰tsna 101, 197 n. 143 18–22
Kattackal, Jacob 43 n. 48, 49, 50 Mahadevan, T. M. P. 7 n. 32, 18
n. 13, 86 nn. 91 and 93, 87 nn. 94 n. 83, 21 nn. 94–95, 47, 47 n. 6,
and 96 71, 71 nn. 4 and 6, 79, 79 nn. 47
kle≤a 220, 220 n. 219 and 50, 80, 80 nn. 52 and 55, 136
Klostermaier, Klaus 97 n. 28 n. 6, 143, 143 nn. 22–26, 152, 337
k‰pà 163 mahàvàkya 56, 69, 76–77, 77 n. 40,
K‰ß»a 23 n. 106, 60, 97–100, 118, 78, 84, 84 n. 82, 85–86, 105–106,
121, 176, 231, 333–345, 345 n. 234, 153, 188, 190, 190 nn. 110–111,
352, 354–358, 360, 363 192–193, 258, 261, 273, 277, 285,
Kulkarni, B. R. 97 n. 27 315, 369, 380, 382, 388–389, 392
Kumarappa, Bh. 92 n. 11 Maitreyi 86
Kumàrila Bhà††a 4, 4 n. 20, 5–6, 8, Malkovsky, Bradley xi n. 2, xvi n. 5,
12, 37 16 n. 77, 54 n. 29, 63 n. 70, 74
n. 15, 77 n. 40
Lacombe, Olivier 161 n. 1, 162, 162 manana 69, 85–87, 154, 277–278,
n. 5, 163 n. 11 300, 305–306, 315, 391
Leggett, Trevor 15 n. 70, 18 n. 83, Ma»∂anami≤ra 4–5, 5 nn. 24–25, 6
20 nn. 89 and 91–92, 171 n. 22 n. 26, 8, 11–12, 12 nn. 59–61, 13
Lewis, H. D. 74 n. 17 n. 61, 136
liberation xi, xvi, 26, 76–78, 218, mantra 275
237 n. 279, 241–242, 247, 253 màyà 16, 29 n. 147, 47, 49, 50
n. 341, 256–266, 271–275, 277–278, n. 15, 51, 55, 99, 111, 114–115,
283–287, 291–292, 294–295, 299, 141, 151 n. 65, 171 n. 21, 174,
301, 303–308, 310, 316, 319–321, 174 n. 34, 175 n. 37, 177, 177 nn.
321 nn. 137–138, 322–323, 325, 42–45, 178, 178 nn. 46, 49–50,
327, 330–333, 333 n. 186, 336, 179, 180–181, 198, 253–254, 287,
340, 343, 346–349, 351, 353–356, 312, 337–339, 342, 342 n. 227, 343,
358–360–362, 365, 365, 369–370, 374, 386
373, 377–393, 396–402 Mayeda, Sengaku 6, 6 nn. 28 and
Lipner, Julius J. 77 n. 40 30, 7 nn. 33 and 36, 8, 8 n. 39, 9
Lorenzen, David 1 n. 3, 14 n. 63 n. 42, 10 n. 44, 11 nn. 51 and 57,
Lott. E. 176 n. 39, 177 n. 41, 178 12 n. 59, 13 nn. 61–62, 14 n. 63,
n. 51, 317 nn. 120–121, 320, 320 15 nn. 69–70, 16 n. 75, 17, 17
n. 136, 336, 341 n. 80, 18 n. 82, 20 nn. 91–92, 22,
love xi, 92 n. 11, 98–100, 121, 129, 22 n. 98, 25 nn. 118 and 122, 26
139 n. 11, 140, 140 n. 16, 223 nn. 124 and 127, 27 n. 132, 28,
n. 225, 227 n. 241, 320 n. 135, 336 28 n. 139, 33, 33 n. 168, 34, 34
n. 203, 337 n. 205, 341 n. 221, nn. 170–172, 35, 35 nn. 173–174
350, 350 n. 256, 351, 369, 384–385 and 177, 40 nn. 28 and 30–32,
Loy, David 45, 45 n. 1 42 n. 44, 60, 60 n. 61, 66, 66
nn. 82–83, 67 n. 91, 73 n. 12, 74
Macdonell, Arthur A. 1 n. 1 n. 17, 75, 75 nn. 18–19, 79 n. 45,
Madhava 1 80 nn. 56–57, 81 n. 60, 83 n. 71,
Madhavananda, Swami 19 n. 86, 186 85 n. 84, 87 nn. 98–99, 135, 135
n. 95, 217 n. 209, 250 n. 327, 281 n. 1, 136, 136 nn. 2–3, 364 n. 318,
nn. 448–449, 282 n. 450, 289 n. 1, 365, 367–368, 393 n. 20, 394, 394
290, 290 nn. 2 and 4–9, 291 nn. nn. 21–24, 395
10 and 12–13, 292 nn. 14–17, 293 medicine 255, 258, 261, 284–285
 427
merit 132, 132 n. 184, 204, 215–216, n. 160, 206–207, 213, 215 n. 199,
220–222, 224–225, 230, 238, 240, 218–219, 219 n. 214, 221, 226,
242–244, 246–247, 262, 267–270, 233, 235, 241–242, 246, 249, 251,
294, 297, 323, 347, 377, 382, 260–261, 264–265, 265 n. 393,
384–387 266–267, 268 n. 404, 270, 273–274,
Mìmàásà 12, 13, 13 n. 61, 23 276, 279, 283–285, 397–399
n. 101, 25, 25 n. 115, 37, 39–40, nimitta-kàra»a 61, 226 n. 235,
136 229–230
Modi, P. M. 26 n. 129, 333 n. 186 Nyàya 38
mokßa 247, 259 n. 373, 279, 347, 370,
381, 393 Oberhammer, Gerhard xii n. 3, 20
Monier-Williams, Monier 163, 168 n. 91
n. 9, 251, 256, 290 n. 3 Om 109, 186 n. 95, 290–291, 293,
mukti 207, 400 n. 29 296, 296 n. 33, 297, 303, 306
Müller, Max 1 n. 1 n. 80, 307, 307 n. 82, 315–316,
mumukßutva 81, 327 386
Murti, T. R. V. 43 n. 47 Organ, Troy Wilson 137, 137 n. 7,
Murty, K. Satchidananda 340–341, 138, 138 n. 8
341 nn. 217–220, 388 n. 6 Otto, Rudolf 144, 144 n. 29, 332,
333 n. 183
Naiyàyika 225
Nakamura, Hajime 1, 1 n. 2, nn. Padmapàda 2–3, 3 n. 11, 4, 4 n. 16,
4–5, 2, 2 nn. 7–9, 3, 3 nn. 11–15, 11, 11 n. 53, 14, 14 nn. 65 and
4, 4 nn. 18–20, 5, 5 nn. 22–23 and 68, 16 n. 77, 17 n. 77, 54 n. 33
25, 6 n. 28, 8 n. 40, 12 n. 59, 20 Pàñcaràtra 58, 58 n. 53, 60–61, 94
nn. 91–92, 21 nn. 93 and 95, 22 n. 15, 233
nn. 97 and 100, 23, 23 nn. Pandey, S. L. 5 n. 23, 21 nn. 94–95,
106–108, 24, 24 nn. 109–113, 25, 60 n. 58, 111 n. 87, 200 n. 153
25 nn. 115–116, 118–122, 26 nn. Panikkar, Raimundo 21 n. 95, 22
123 and 127, 28, 28 nn. 135 and n. 96, 26 n. 127, 51, 51 n. 20,
139, 30 n. 148, 37 nn. 1 and 5–6, 91 n. 5, 92 nn. 9–10, 93, 93 nn.
40 n. 33, 59, 60 n. 58, 89 nn. 1–2, 12–13, 94, 96, 101 n. 43, 163,
100 nn. 40–41, 101 n. 42, 117 163 nn. 15–16, 195 n. 134, 203
n. 112, 188 n. 102, 197 nn. n. 165, 286, 308, 308 n. 88,
142–143, 200 n. 157, 250 n. 323 309, 309 n. 89, 317 n. 122, 319
nàmarùpa 16, 29 n. 147, 37 n. 1, 151 n. 128, 324 n. 152, 326 n. 159,
n. 65, 170–171, 171 n. 21, 172 330, 330 n. 177, 380 n. 1,
Nàrada 174 391 n. 8
Nàràya»a 59–60, 97, 109 n. 83, 112, paramaguru 7, 7 n. 37
115, 230–232, 232 n. 258, 233, paramahaása 81, 81 n. 60
289, 333–335, 337, 341–342, 344, paramàrtha-avasthà 42, 44, 62, 221,
356, 372–374, 380 242, 394–395
Neevel, Walter G. 58 n. 53, 60, 60 pari»àma-vàda 61–62, 223,
nn. 59–60 227 n. 242
nididhyàsana 69, 85, 87, 154, 277–278, Parthasarathi, G. 395 n. 26
300, 305–306, 315, 369, 391 Pà≤upatas 226
nigraha 163, 314 Patañjali 2 n. 10, 171, 171 n. 22,
Nikhilananda, Swami 19 n. 87, 373 381
Nimbàrka xii, xiv–xv, 10 n. 45, 31 Pathak, K. B. 1, 1 n. 1–2, 6
n. 158, 89, 116–117, 117 nn. Pelikan, Jaroslav 344 n. 232
112–113, 118, 119, 119 n. 122, 121, Pereira, Jose 104 n. 54
122–133, 166, 173, 173 n. 27, 180, Plotinus 382
180 n. 59, 183, 189, 193, 195–196, post-mortem journey 280–284,
198–199, 200 n. 157, 201, 201 299–300
428 
Post-•aákara Advaita 16 n. 77, 17 prasìdati 184 n. 81, 186, 186 n. 95,

n. 78, 31, 49–52, 57, 61–62, 74, 189, 290–291, 296, 316, 318,
74 n. 15, 80, 112, 143, 152, 165, 323–324, 386
175, 177, 177 n. 42, 190 n. 110, Pratardana 181
227, 229, 248, 258 pratimà 59, 290, 316
Potter, Karl 5, 5 nn. 21 and 23–24, pratyakßa 37–38, 4
6, 6 nn. 26 and 28–29, 7 nn. 31 prayer 158, 231, 233, 275–277, 287,
and 37, 8 n. 38, 9 nn. 41–42, 10 295, 298, 302–304, 306–309,
nn. 44–47, 11 n. 52, n. 54, n. 56, 320–321, 324, 327–328, 347–349,
12 nn. 57 and 59–60, 13 nn. 384, 391, 391 n. 9
61–62, 14 n. 65, 15, 15 nn. 71 and Pre-•aákara Vedànta xii–xiv, 6–8,
73, 16 n. 74, 17,17 n. 79, 18, 18 27, 30, 32, 57, 89–133, 200 n. 153,
nn. 81–82 and 84, 21 n. 95, 24 202, 207, 265 n. 393, 372 n. 357,
n. 114, 54 n. 33, 67 n. 91, 71 n. 5, 396–398
72, 72 n. 9, 80 n. 54, 83 n. 74, Protestant Christianity 380
84 n. 75, 85 n. 88, 104 nn. 57–58, Protocommentator 28–33, 36, 165,
105 n. 61, 107 nn. 69 and 73, 108, 181, 199 n. 145, 207
108 n. 78, 135, 135 n. 1, 136, 136 Puligandla, R. 9 n. 42, 11 n. 50, 21
nn. 4–5, 165 n. 1, 194 n. 126, 200 n. 94, 38 n. 12, 43 n. 51, 63 nn.
n. 152, 204 n. 169, 213 n. 194, 68–69, 71 n. 7, 125, 172 nn. 24–25
222, 222 n. 221, 224 n. 230, 226 purußa 167, 167 n. 8, 174, 190, 190
n. 238, 227 n. 240, 228 n. 247, n. 108, 193, 225–226, 297, 299,
244, 244 n. 302, 280 n. 444, 281 314–316, 372
n. 447, 282, 282 n. 453, 304, 304 Pùßan 295, 308–309
n. 73, 311 n. 96, 324 n. 149, 333
n. 186, 347, 348 n. 245, 391, Ràdhà 118, 121
391 n. 10, 392, 392 nn. 11–15, Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli 1 n. 1, 6
393, 395, 395 nn. 25 and 27 n. 27, 10 nn. 44 and 46, 11 nn.
Prabhàcandra 3 n. 15 48–49, 12 n. 60, 14, 14 n. 67, 21
Prabhàkara 12 n. 58 nn. 93–95, 22, 22 n. 100, 42 n. 43,
Prabhavananda, Swami 19 n. 86, 46, 46 n. 2, 72 n. 10, 86 n. 92, 89
136 n. 6, 203 n. 165 n. 1, 90 n. 4, 93 nn. 12 and 14,
prabhu˙ 108 94, 94 nn. 17 and 20, 95 n. 21,
pradhàna 166–167, 167 n. 8, 168, 102 nn. 45–48, 117 n. 112, 166
171, 173, 226, 228, 228 n. 248 n. 3, 203 n. 165, 209 nn. 182–183
Prajàpati 206 n. 175, 207, 309, 334, and 185, 212 n. 188, 214 n. 197,
337 219 n. 216, 222 nn. 223–224, 223
Prakà≤àtman 17 n. 77 n. 226, 226 nn. 237–238, 227 nn.
prak‰ti 99, 113 240 and 243, 228 nn. 244–247,
pralaya 203, 203 n. 165, 204, 205 244, 247 n. 311, 250 n. 325, 272
n. 172, 206 n. 173 n. 414, 301 n. 57, 302, 302 n. 60,
prà»a 66, 181, 181 n. 64, 182–183, 304 n. 70, 313, 313 n. 108, 314 nn.
250–252, 316 110 and 113, 317 n. 123, 318
prapatti 119–121, 398 n. 125, 320 n. 134, 323, 323
prasàda 92–96, 99, 106, 120, 127, n. 143, 326 n. 159, 329 nn. 169
129–130, 132, 135, 136 n. 2, 137, and 174, 331, 331 n. 178, 342, 342
146, 152, 154, 161–163, 163 n. 16, nn. 223–224, 349 nn. 249 and 251,
170, 186, 235, 235 n. 271, 236, 354 n. 274, 395 n. 26
255, 255 n. 352, 257–258, 261, ràga 350, 350 n. 256, 351
264–266, 285–286, 292–293, 295, ràga-dveßa 147, 215, 218 n. 212, 220
298, 305–306, 310, 317–318, 325, n. 218, 346, 346 n. 243, 347
328, 330–331, 345–346, 351–355, Raghavan, V. 204 n. 168
358–359, 361 n. 308, 362, 368, 377, Raja K. Kunjunni 13 n. 61
393 rajas 168, 338, 338 n. 206
 429
Raju, P. T. 14, 14 n. 66, 21 nn. 332–333, 336, 339, 341 n. 220, 378,
94–95, 37 n. 1, n. 4, n. 7, 38 nn. 380, 397, and language 48,125,
9–11, 39 n. 21, 55 nn. 34–36, 117 212, 215, 244, 308, 320, 380, 397,
n. 112, 126 as a realist xiii, 18 n. 82, 40,
Ràma 176 47–50, 73, 170, 223, 223 n. 225,
Ràmàkànta Purußottama 118, 121, 378, 397, and •aivism xii, 12, 15
127–128, 130–131, 133 n. 72, 57–59, 231–232, 316, and
Ràmànuja 1, 10 n. 45, 22, 63 n. 71, theism 222, 332–333, as a
120–122, 138, 153, 236 n. 278, theologian 27, 40, 386–387, as a
339, 351 n. 260, 391 n. 9 Vaiß»avite xii, xii n. 3, xvi, 15
Rambachan, Anantanand 50 n. 14, n. 72, 28 n. 137, 57–60, 96, 185,
79, 79 n. 48, 80 n. 55, 85 n. 87, 224 n. 228, 231–232, 256, 256
338, 339 n. 207 n. 362, 287, 316, 334–336,
Ranade, R. D. 194 n. 126 372–373, 386–387, 397, and yoga
Reichenbach, Bruce 385, 385 n. 4 12 n. 60, 20 n. 92, 28
reincarnation 41, 66, 74–77, 81, 94, Saákarßana 230
105, 113, 135, 174, 182, 204–205, Sàákhya/Sà«khya 97, 110–111, 121,
210–211, 216, 216 n. 203, 220, 125–127, 166, 167, 167 n. 8,
228, 239, 250–251, 260, 270, 272, 168–169, 171–172, 172 n. 24, 173,
275–276, 280–281, 308, 319, 330, 223–224, 226
343, 355, 357, 374–375, 381–383, saásàra 66, 73–76, 82, 105, 216, 219,
396 219 n. 216, 220, 220 n. 218, 224,
relations 65, 378, logical 54, 65, 226 n. 235, 228, 239, 244, 343,
ontological 54 357, 381
Renou, L. 2, 2 n. 7 sannyàsa 69, 81–82, 328, 349
Rudra-•iva 94, 96 Sanshodhitam 173 n. 27
Rukmani, T. S. 20 n. 91 ≤àstra, grace of 292, 353, 359
Rüping, Klaus 29 n. 148, 31, 31 nn. Sastri, Kokileswar 67, 67 n. 87, 147,
156–157 and 160–161, 32, 32 nn. 147 nn. 43–45 and 47, 148, 148
162–167, 104, 104 nn. 51 and 53, nn. 48–50, 262, 262 n. 382
107 nn. 71 and 74, 110 n. 86, Sastri, Suryanarayana 7 n. 32, 18
111 n. 89, 165, 181 n. 82, 111, 111 nn. 88 and 92–93,
112, 112 nn. 98 and 100, 114, 114
≤abda 37, 39 n. 104, 115 n. 105, 116, 116 nn.
Sahasrabudhe, M. T. 7 n. 34 108 and 110
•aiva Siddhànta 92 n. 11, 139 n. 11, sat 167, 248, 391
320 n. 135 satkàryavàda 62
•aivism 223, 226 sattva 168, 338, 338 n. 206
sàkßàtkàra 37, 47–48 Satyanand, Joseph xiv, xiv n. 4,
sàkßin 263 |117, 117 nn. 113–114, 118,
•àktavàda 121, 125–127, 233 118 nn. 116–120, 119, 119 nn.
•akti 233 121–126, 120, 120 nn. 127–130,
≤àlagràma stone 59, 184–185, 121 nn. 131–135, 122, 122 nn.
187–189, 198, 287, 291 137–140, 123, 123 nn. 141–144,
≤ama 80 124, 124 nn. 145–148, 125, 125 nn.
samàdhàna 80 149–153, 126, 126 nn. 157–158,
•aákara, and bhedàbheda 28, 28 127, 127 nn. 159 and 162–163,
n. 142, 31, 31 n. 158, 32, 115, 129, 129 nn. 164–166, 129, 129 nn.
122–124, 197, 199, 201, 398, and 171 and 175, 131, 131 n. 180,
Buddhism 13 n. 62, 21 n. 95, 132, 132 nn. 181–185, 265,
epistemology of xiii, as an 265 n. 393
illusionist-monist xiii, 18 n. 82, 40 Schmithausen, Lambert 16 n. 76,
n. 32, 46–48, 50, 60, 73, 141, 143, 58 n. 47, 96 n. 26, 151 n. 65, 171
146, 152, 211, 223 n. 225, 320, n. 21
430 
Sen, K. M. 21 n. 94 Taber, John 16 n. 76, 40 nn. 28 and

Sharma, B. N. K. 21 n. 94, 224 33–34, 41 n. 36, 42 n. 40, 88
n. 229, 225, 225 n. 234, 226 n. 100, 392–393, 393 nn. 16–18
n. 235, 229 n. 249, 236 n. 278, tàdàtmya 227, 227 nn. 239–240, 230
237 n. 280, 254 n. 347 Taimni, I. K. 255 n. 353, 256 nn.
Sharma, C. 9 n. 42, 12 n. 58, 356 and 360
13 n. 61, 51 n. 21, 125, 172 nn. tamas 168, 338, 338 n. 206
24–25 Tapasyananda, Swami 343 n. 230,
Sheth, Noel 63 n. 68 358 n. 292
Siauve, Suzanne 139–140, 140 nn. tarka 40
14–18, 141 Tàrkikas 41, 228–229, 230
Siddhantashastree, R. K. 185 nn. ta†asthalakßa»a 54
85–88, 186 n. 92 teacher, grace of 154, 156, 292–293,
siddhi 255, 255 n. 352, 256–257, 296, 302, 328, 332, 345, 352, 361,
260–262, 286, 381 361 n. 308, 362–363, 368, 378,
Siegel, Lee 99, 100 n. 38 388–390
sin 74, 77, 174, 176, 179, 192, 194, theism xii, 62 n. 67, 110–111,
304–305, 307, 366–367, 396 171–172, 222, 223 n. 225, 226, 229,
Singh, R. P. 65 n. 79, 66, 66 n. 80 229 n. 249, 395
Sinha, Jadunath 142, 142 n. 20, 152, theodicy 183, 208, 212–213, 222,
222, 222 n. 220 224, 226, 230, 236, 237 n. 278,
•iva 110, 226, 334–335 238, 240–241, 260, 285, 319, 322,
•ivaguru 10 384
sleep 204–205, 253, 253 nn. 341 Thibaut, Georges 61 n. 63, 141,
and 343–344, 254, 264, 294–296, 141 n. 19, 169 n. 15, 190 nn. 110
368 and 112, 200 n. 165, 205 n. 172,
sola gratia 380 206 nn. 173 and 176, 216 n. 202,
≤raddhà 80, 87, 290, 363, 390 220 n. 219, 226 n. 238, 227 n. 240,
≤rava»a 69, 85–86, 154, 277, 300, 228 n. 247, 235–234, 244 n. 299,
305–306, 315, 391 251, 254 nn. 345 and 348, 266,
•rìnivàsa 117 n. 112, 119, 173 275
n. 27 Thrasher, Allen 5, 5 n. 24, 6 n. 26
Srinivasachari, P. N. 26 n. 128, 105 time, understandings of 9 n. 43
n. 61 titìkßà 80
•rìvatsàáka 3 To†aka 2 n. 11, 11
≤ruti 39, 51, 63–64, 77, 105, 154,
240, 286, 307, 359, 388 n. 7, upàdàna-kàra»a 61–62, 222–223,
390, grace of 156, 293, 325–326, 223 n. 225, 224, 225 n. 232,
332, 371–372, 378, 388–391, and 226, 226 n. 235, 227 n. 242,
reason xiii, 40–42, 77, 83–88, 229–230
124, 141, 154, 167, 176, 220 upàdhi 64–66, 237, 237 n. 280,
n. 218, 225–226, 229, 278, 292, 241–242, 250, 264, 273, 383
366–367 upakàra 251–252
Sudhi P. 185 nn. 85 and 89–90, upamàna 37–38
186, 186 n. 90, 186 nn. 91 and uparàti 80
93 upàsanà 54, 105, 149, 176, 187, 200,
Sure≤vara 2 n. 11, 3, 4, 4 n. 16, 5, 371
5 n. 23, 12 n. 61, 13 n. 61, 16 Upendra 112–113
n. 77, 106
Sùrya 295, 309 Vàcaspati-mi≤ra 2, 2 n. 9, 3, 3 n. 11,
svarùpalakßa»a 54 4, 7–8, 16 n. 77, 32
•vetà≤vatara 96 Vadakkekara, C. M. 153 n. 76, 225,
Swain, Anam Charan 63, 63 n. 72, 225 n. 233, 229 n. 249, 351 n. 260,
206 n. 175 391 n. 9
 431
vairàgya 80 224 n. 228, 231, 287, 290–291,

Vai≤eßika 223 316, 324, 324 n. 149, 333–337,
Vaiß»avism xii, 110–111, 126–128, 342, 344, 352, 373, 380, 386,
132, 140, 140 n. 16, 176, 184 397
n. 81, 185, 185 n. 82, 185 n. 85, vivarta 62, 122
187, 223 n. 228, 231–232, 287, viveka 79
334–335, 372 n. 357, 386 von Brück, Michael 157, 157 nn.
Vai≤vànara 106, 193–194, 194 nn. 89–93, 158
126 and 130–131, 195–196, 200, Vyàsa 171 n. 22, 354, 354 n. 274
202, 202 n. 161, 298 vyavahàra-avasthà 42, 44, 56, 60, 62,
Vallabha 10 n. 45 67, 76, 78, 152, 237 n. 280, 242,
van Bijlert, Victor A. 111 n. 91, 112 332, 332 n. 182
n. 99, 116 nn. 107 and 111 vyùha 58, 127
van Buitenen, J. A. B. 9 n. 42, 10
n. 46, 11 n. 48, n. 50, n. 52, n. 55, Walker, B. 14 n. 65
12 n. 59, 14 nn. 63 and 65, 15 Warrier, Krishna 144, 144 nn.
n. 74, 31, 31 n. 157, 231 nn. 27–33, 145, 152, 337, 343, 343
255–256, 332, 332 n. 182, 334, 335 n. 230, 345 n. 236, 361 n. 308
n. 192, 337 n. 205, 338 n. 206, Werner, Karel 59 n. 54
339, 339 nn. 210–212, 340 Winternitz, M. 9 n. 42
Varadaràja 23 n. 102 Wood, Thomas E. 7 n. 35
vàsanà 220 Woods, James Haughton 2 n. 10
Vasubandhu 25
Vàsudeva 97, 112–113, 121, Yàjñavalkya 86, 292
127–128, 130–131, 133, 230, 232 Yàma 295, 309, 325, 334
n. 258, 233, 333–336, 336 n. 201, Yàmuna 3, 31 n. 157, 58 n. 53
337, 341, 344, 353, 355 yoga 37, 97, 109–110, 129, 139–140,
Vetter, Tilmann 8 n. 38, 18 n. 82, 140 n. 14, 154, 168, 170, 170
20 n. 91 n. 20, 171, 171 n. 22, 172–173,
Vidyànanda 4 223–224, 225, 225 n. 232, 226, 231,
Vidyàra»ya 9 n. 42 232 n. 258, 255, 255 n. 353, 256,
Vijñànabhikßu 172 256 n. 360, 257, 262–264, 286, 312,
Vijñànavàda 25, 40 330, 343, 354, 358, 360–361, 381,
Viladesau, Richard 387 n. 5 393
vi≤eßa»a 65 yuga 203 n. 165
Vi≤ißtàdvaita 111 yukti 40
Viß»u 97, 110–112, 112 n. 101,
113–116, 132, 178, 180, 185–186, Zaehner, R. C. 333 n. 187, 345 nn.
186 n. 90, 187–189, 189 n. 102, 234 and 236, 348, 348 n. 248, 349,
203 n. 165, 204 n. 168, 207, 352 n. 265, 357 n. 291
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2001. isbn 90 04 12044 0
issn 0169-8834

(Studies in The History of Religions 91) Samkaracgasarya - Malkovsky, Bradley J - The Role of Divine Grace in The Soteriology of Śamkargasāc Asarya (2001, Brill) - Libgen - Li

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(Studies in The History of Religions 91) Samkaracgasarya - Malkovsky, Bradley J - The Role of Divine Grace in The Soteriology of Śamkargasāc Asarya (2001, Brill) - Libgen - Li

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THE ROLE OF DIVINE GRACE IN THE SOTERIOLOGY OF

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Die Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-Einheitsaufnahme

© Copyright 2001 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal

printed in the netherlands

I. •AÁKARA’S LIFE AND WORK

V. GRACE IN PRE-•AÁKARA VEDÀNTA

VI. MODERN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ROLE

2. Karl Potter ...................................................................... 136

VII. •AÁKARA’S TERMS FOR GRACE AND

VIII. THE NOTION OF GRACE IN •AÁKARA’S

8. BrSùBh I.3.30 ................................................................ 202

IX. THE NOTION OF GRACE IN •AÁKARA’S

6. Aitareya-Upanißad-Bhàßya .................................................. 313

X. SUMMARY: THE ROLE OF DIVINE GRACE

D. The Grace of the Teacher and of Scripture .................... 387

Bibliography ................................................................................ 403

Index .......................................................................................... 421

examination of all •aákara’s authentic writings. It is on the basis

In many ways this volume carries on the work of Paul Hacker

personal lord (ì≤vara), the giver of grace, is to be more closely identified

on •aákara’s view of grace, ranging from 1) silence on the subject

writings are tied together and summarized in a final conclusion. I

On a more personal note I would like to express my gratitude to

To Peter M. Butler of the Butler Foundation in Minnesota I offer

•AÁKARA’S LIFE AND WORK

A. B  D D

Despite the impossibility of determining exact year dates, reliable

Thus the following historical sequence can be drawn: •aákara, fol-

itly mention Padmapàda in his Bhàmatì, but Amalànanda in his Vedàntakalpataru,

which are not found in •aákara’s works.16 He therefore suggests

with him.21 Since Ma»∂ana was a disciple of Kumàrila, Nakamura

the middle of the seventh century, because of the dating of Kumàrila

sions “paramaguru” and “guror garìyase” both of which may be translated

proximity to •aákara, which suggests that •aákara must be placed

From the western viewpoint it is paradoxical that so little is known

In the following, I will attempt to present a summary of what is

in Prayàga •aákara sought out Kumàrila Bhà††a, after whom one

After his debate with Ma»∂ana •aákara is said to have travelled

makes it difficult to ascribe •aákara-discipleship to Ma»∂ana. Ma»∂ana also

doctrinal orthodoxy. All other works ascribed to •aákara would have

foundational work of classical Advaita Vedànta.” This is as true today as it was in

on •aákara in the twentieth century, inaugurated a new phase of

By contrast the GKBh has practically nothing to say about divine

ticity, the •vUpBh accepts the •vUp’s identification of Rudra-•iva

Adhyàtmapatala-Vivara»am (APV).89 The latter two are subcommentaries

2. Authorship of the Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya

As noted above, the BrSùBh is normally regarded as •aákara’s most

the reliability of ascertaining •aákara’s teaching on the basis of the

In support of his theory that Bàdaràya»a is not the author of the

lation of the Mìmàásà-Sùtra,115 Nakamura places Bàdaràya»a in the

same time, apparently contradictory Upanißadic passages needed to

b. •aákara and Tradition

ing the modern interpreter from the necessity of examining •aákara’s

break with tradition.”154 The particular tradition that Ingalls believes

at all, although Ingalls makes this his primary piece of evidence.

what is particular to •aákara on religious issues. •aákara’s other

d. The Brahma-Sùtra-Bhàßya and the Upade≤asàhasrì

enjoys the reputation of being an indispensable aid for penetrating

Upad is probably a compendium of short writings taking up partic-

A. T M  K

•aákara is not as clear as the later Advaitic tradition as to just how