The Kurdish Drive For Self Determination

The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determination
Author(s): Israel T. Naamani

Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Summer, 1966), pp. 279-295
Published by: Middle East Institute
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THE
MIDIE EAST
VOLUME20 SUMMER1966 NUMBER 3
THE KURDISHDRIVE FOR

SELF-DETERMINATION
Israel T. Naamani
T tHE Kurdsownno master,"
is not an innocuous
folksayingin northern
Iraq. It held true some 4,000 yearsago when Kurdishrecordedhistory
began, and it holds true at the present. They were conqueredmany
timesbut nevermastered.The problemof IraqiKurdstoday:They cannotbe
subduedand they cannotdefeat the Iraqiarmy.
The precedingparagraphspecifiesIraq. But there are sizeableKurdish
communitiesalso in Turkeyand in Iran, and smaller but neverthelesssig-
nificant groups in Syria and in the USSR, and still smaller confluxesin
Afghanistanand Pakistan. A favorite game of Kurdologistsis to "guess-
timate"the numberof Kurdsinhabitingthe large, ill-definedbut contiguous
territory,split because of politics, economicsand war among the various
states mentionedabove. Some Kurdishnationalistsdaim 13,000,000 com-
patriots. The Committeeon ForeignRelationsof the United StatesSenate
arrived at an 8,500,000 figure: 4,000,000 in Turkey, 2,500,000 in Iran,
1,500,000 in Iraq and 500,000 in Syria and the USSR.' William Eagleton,
1. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy-
Middle East, 86th Congress,2nd Session,No. 13, June 9, 1960, p. 53.
> ISRAELT. NAAMANIis professorof political scienceat the Universityof Louisville. In the sum-
mer of 1965 he co-directeda professors'workshopin the Middle East, sponsoredby New York
University and the State Department. When the project was completed,he detachedhimself
from the group and made contacton his own with the Kurds.
279

280 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
of the US Foreign Service,suggests the following: 2-3,000,000in Turkey,

1,500,000 in Iran, 1,200,000 in Iraq, 200,000 in Syria and 100,000 in the
USSR2-a total of 5-6,000,000.The GreatSovietEncyclopediaindicatesthat
there are about 200,000Kurdsin Afghanistanand Pakistanand only 45,866
Kurds (as of 1939) in the USSR.3
Even thoughthereis no agreementregardingthe size of theirpopulation,
it appearsthat the Kurdsare the fourthlargestethnicgroup in the Middle
East. Only the Arabs, Turks and Persians,in that order,outnumberthem.
The area they occupyis rich in coal, copper and, especially,oil, but it is
also landlocked,with no outlet to the Mediterranean, BlackSea or the Per-
sian Gulf. It does not have the opportunitiesfor contactwith the Western
world that, for instance,Israel,Cyprusand Lebanonhave.
Yet, as a RussianKurdologist,MikhailSemenovitchLazarev,points out
in an excellent study (when one disregardsthe artificiallyappendedincon-
gruities-the Communistcliches), the area was strategicallyimportantin the
19th century. It becamea center of contentionfor the imperialistdesigns
of CzaristRussia,Great Britainand later of Franceand Germany.Lazarev
adds, of course,that after World War I, GreatBritainand the UnitedStates
having grabbedthe oil-richlands, "inflamedthe peoples"of the region and
stirredup discontent,so as to enablethe colonialiststo establishin Kurdistan
a base of operationagainstthe USSR.4
Socio-Cultural
Revival
Some Kurds are as primitivetoday as their ancestorswere at the dawn
of civilization. But it has been emphasizedby many who know them that
they learn swiftly enough, given the opportunity.A Kurd pursuingknowl-
edge is as purposefulas a Kurd pursuingan adversary.5
The region he inhabitsis rugged,mountainous,not given much to culti-
vationor commerce,so he was drivento horseand rifle. He becamea scourge
to everyone.But if his mannersare bad,they are the mannersof one who has
been incessantlykicked around,without an opportunityfor creative self-
expression.
The Kurdclaimsthat his namemeanslion. It appears,however,that the
appellationis derivedfrom Gutu or Gutiumof ancientAssyria,in whichem-
pire the people who later becameknownas Kurdsseemedto have had some
2. William Eagleton,Jr., The KurdishRepublicof 1946, London, 1963, p. 38.
3. BolshayaSovetskayaEntzikiopedia,Vol. XXIV, 1953, p. 91.
4. M. S. Lazarev,Kurdistani KurdskayaProblema,Moskva, 1964, pp. 5-6.
5. Basile Nikitine, "La feodalite kurde,"Revue du Monde Musulman,LX (Deuxi&meTri-
mestre) 1925, pp. 1-26. A more recentwork by this noted Russo-Frenchauthorityon Kurdishfolk-
ways and mores is, Les Kurdes, etude sociologique, et historique, Paris, 1956. See also C. J.
Edmonds,Kurds, Turks and Arabs, London, 1957, and by the same author, "The Kurds of Iraq,"
Middle East Journal,Vol. XI, No. 1, Winter, 1957, pp. 52-62, and ThomasBois, Connaissancedes
Kurdes,Beyrouth,1965.

THE KURDISH DRIVE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 281
political identity. Even though they lived amongSemites,the Kurdsare of

Aryanstock,kindredto that of the Persiansand Turks,but they fought both
Aryansand Semitesalike until the time of Cyrusthe Greatof Persia,whom
they helped in his empire-building.Later they had their problemswith the
Macedoniansand Parthians.In the 7th centurythey were overcomeby the
Arabs. AcceptingIslam, the Kurdsneverthelessresistedthe Khalifs and suc-
ceeded in regaininga semblanceof nationalexistencein the 11th centuryin
two autonomouskingdoms:Shahrizorand Diarbekr.It was Saladinthe Great,
in the 12thcentury,a proudand dauntlessKurdfromthe mountainsof Ravad,
who broughthis kinsmenunder his sway. But the attemptsof the Mongol
khansin the 13th century,and subsequently by the Ottomansultansto control
the Kurds,were fruitless.
Although the vast majorityof the Kurds is Sunni Muslim-in common
with the Turksand with most Arabs-there is a great deal of sectarianpro-
fession among them accordingto localityand expediency.They were rarely,
if ever, religiousfanatics. As David Adamson,correspondent of the Sunday
Telegraph(London), who went into Kurdistanin 1963, observes:"Theyare
Kurdsfirstand Moslemssecond,and manylook backwith romanticnostalgia,
ratheras Irishmenmourn over the lost kings and myths of Ireland,to the
pre-Islamicdays. . . when theywere followersof Zoroaster."7Certainlytoday
the nationalistdrive,at least amongthe IraqiKurds,is strongerthanreligious
stimulus.
It was the Young Turk Revolutionin 1908 that sparkedthe Kurdsto a
reneweddrive for self-determination.For many years they had no national
center,no politicalor spiritualleadership,no unifyingsymbols. The Young
Turksintroducedsomeconstitutionalreformsin the OttomanEmpire.Kurdish
representativesin a newly organizedparliamentwere stirred into action.
Kurdishclubs were establishedin Constantinople,Baghdadand Mosul. In
orderto "acquireand organizea good language,"8for the use of all Kurds,
a newspaperwas initiatedin Constantinople.Brochuresand books bringing
to light treasuresof Kurdishfolkloreand unwrittenliteraturealso appeared.
The youthwas urgedto attendschools,to studylaw and sciences,to readand
sometimesmemorizethe poemsof Eli Termuki(10th century)andHajjQadir
of Koi (19th century),the folktalesof AhmedKhane (17th century),and the
romantic-nostalgic historyof Kurdsby CherefOudine (Sharafeddin),Cheref
Nimeh.9
6. An Oxonian scholar wrote that it is not unlikely that the earliest trace of Kurds is to be
found on a Sumerianclay tablet of the third millenium B.C. in which the land of -Kar-da"or
"Qar-da"is mentioned. See G. R. Driver, "The Name Kurd and its Philological Connexions,"
The Journalof the RoyalAsiatic Society,Vol. XXXVII, July, 1923, p. 393. See also Egon Freiherr
von Eckstedtt,Turken,Kurdenund Iranerseit dem Altertum,Stuttgart,1961, p. 42.
7. David Adamson,The KurdishWar, New York, 1965, p. 16.
8. Arshak Safrastian,Kurds and Kurdistan,London, 1948, p. 70.
9. Sharafeddin'swork, "an epic history,"was written in Persian, not in Kurdish, but was

Sulaymaniyah,in Iraq,wherein 1918 Kurdishwas firstproclaimedthe lan-

guage of the administration,becamethe Kurdishculturalcenter. But sub-
sequentlyKurdishbooksand especiallyperiodicalswereprintedin manyother
places,openlyandin secret. Evena partiallistingof the journalsis impressive:
Kurdistan,Hiwa, Khebat (by the KurdishDemocraticParty), Roia New,
Zhin, Hatav,Azadi,Rea Taza, (in USSR), and in English,KurdishFacts,(by
the InternationalSociety Kurdistanin Amsterdam),The KurdishJournal
(mimeograph,by the KurdishStudentOrganizationin the United States).
Unfortunately,most of theseperiodicalswere and arepublishedsporadically.'0
The Kurdsin Turkey

The YoungTurkRevolutionin 1908,as indicatedpreviously,evokedhopes
in the heartsof the Kurds. SureyaBedr Khan, leaderof the Kurdsat that
time, said later that at a congressin Paris in 1907 the Armenians,Kurds,
Greeksand Macedoniansagreedto makecommoncausewith the YoungTurks
to overthrowthe "Hamidiantyranny."The 1908uprisingwas a result,accord-
ing to BedrKhan,of this pact. When on July24, AbdulHamidwas forcedto
prodaima constitution,the reinspassedinto the handsof the Young Turks.
"Butno soonerhad the Young Turksattainedpowerthanthey brazenlyrepu-
diatedthe pledgesof the Pactof Paris.""1The strugglewith Turkishpatriots
continueduntil after World War I. Wilson's "Point 12," stipulatingthat
non-Turkishnationalitiesof the OttomanEmpireshouldbe assuredof an un-
molestedopportunityfor autonomousdevelopment,gave impetusto Kurdish
aspirations.In fact, the Treatyof Sevresmade provisionfor Kurdishself-
determination.But the documentwas neverratifiedby Turkey. In the mean-
time,KemalAtatiirk,who rose to poweron the ruinsof the OttomanEmpire,
negotiatedin 1923 the Treaty of Lausannewith the allies. The new pact
omittedmentionof Kurdishpoliticalaspirations.Thus thereensuedanother
translatedinto French-curiously in Russia by a Czaristgovernment. It appearedin four volumes

under the title, Cheref Namek, ou Pastes de la nation Kurde, St. Petersburg,1868-70.
10. There is a great deal of interestin the culturalawakeningof the Kurdsamong scholarsin
the USSR, in GreatBritain,Germany,Franceand even in the United States. Thus a Russianjournal
of sociology, published by the USSR Academyof Sciences,containedin its first numbera major
articleon the Kurds,"NekotoriyeDanniyeDlya Charakteristike KurdovSenjabiv Irane,"Sovetskaya
Etnografia,Nu. 1, Moskva, 1952, pp. 113-119. The Russiansalso have published a great many
grammarsand dictionaries.Extremelyuseful works are: U. Ch. Bakaev,GovorKurdovTurkemenii,
Moskva, 1962, and K. K. Kurdoyev,GrammatikaKurdskoveYazika,Moskva, 1957. There is also
a wealth of material in Krasnii Arkbiv issues. D. N. McKenzie has compiled an impressive
bibliographyof SouthernKurdishcoveringthe years 1945-1955for the Journalof the Royal Central
Asian Society, Vol. XLIV, January 1957, pp. 31-37. It contains titles of poetry anthologies,
biography,travel, religion, fiction, drama,education,etc. Also Emest R. McCarus,Director of the
Foreign Service Institute Field School of Beirut, has preparedan excellent bibliography,"Kurdish
LanguageStudies,"Middle East Journal,Vol. XIV, No. 3, Summer,1960, pp. 325-335.
11. PrinceSureyaBedr Khan, The Case of KurdistanAgainst Turkey,by authorityof Hoyboon,
SupremeCouncilof the KurdishGovernment,Philadelphia,1929(?), p. 31.

period of rebellionand bloodshed. In 1927, the Kurds actuallyprodaimed

theirindependenceand establisheda Hoyboon,an assemblyand a government-
i-exile.
But the politico-economic and socio-religious
changesin post-WorldWar II
Turkeyhavecreateda new atmosphere.The Kurdsin thatcountryareactually
only a linguisticminority,sinceboth ethnicallyand by religion (SunniIslam)
they and the Turksare dosely related. Thus in 1925, when Kurdishleaders
were queriedby a Leagueof Nations commissionas to theirpreference,they
were indined more towardTurkishthan towardArabadministration.'2
Kurdishtribalchiefs rebelledagainstAtatiurkmainlybecauseof his "new
ways" and his interferencewith local autonomy.When Ismet tndni, often
describedas being of Kurdishdescent,relaxedsomeof the controlsand when
AdnanMenderesand his DemocraticPartytook over from 1950 to 1960 and
restoreda modicumof autonomyand politicalpowerto the villages,the Kurds
were somewhatpacified. If from time to time there occurreda disturbance,
insteadof the whole communitybeing punished,the aghas, or leaders,were
removedto non-Kurdishvillages. This, in many instances,even pleased the
local communitiesbecauseit relievedthem of the taxes their own aristocracy
exactedfrom them,in additionto governmentimpositions.
Compulsorymilitaryservicealso plays an importantpart in the Turkifica-
tion of the Kurds. Life in the army,with all its shortcomingsand miseries,is
still morepleasantandmoreprofitablethanlife in the soldier'svillage. When
he retumsto his community,he has had contact"withthe world,"he has some
moneyin his pocketand, most significantly,he speaksTurkish,thus obliterat-
ing the most distinguishingtraitof his minoritystatus.
In addition,the rulers of Turkeynever professedmuch love for 'Abd
al-KarimQasimin Iraqor for the regimesthatsucceededhis. Also, the rebelli-
ous Kurds of Iraq are circumspectin not antagonizingthe governmentsof
Turkeyor Iran by talkingof a pan-Kurdistan movement.FleeingKurdsare
offeredrefuge in Turkeyand Iran. Moreover,suppliesand armsflow from
the two Iraqi neighborsto Kurdishrebels, as the writer of this artide can
testify from knowledgegained duringvisits to Turkeyin 1962 and to Iran
in 1965.
All this is not to say that the Kurdswere assimilatedby the Turkishpopu-
lation and have lost their drivefor self-determination. Fromtime to time the
world press recordsarrestsof Kurds demonstratingin Diarbekr,Bitlis and
in other cities. The Ninth Annual Congressof the KurdishStudentSociety
in Europe,held in August 1965, in Hanover,Germany,demandedthe release
of all Kurdish political prisonersin Turkey.'"Nevertheless,there is not
12. Lettie M. Wenner, "Arab-KurdishRivalries in Iraq, Middle East Journal, Vol. XVII,
Winter-Spring,1963, Nos. 1 and 2, p. 70.
13. The KurdishJournal,Vol. II, Nos. 3 and 4, December,1965, p. 1.

enough convincingevidence today of a Kurdish nationalistmovementin

Turkey.
The Kurdsof Iran

The problemsfacingthe IranianKurdsare similarto, but arenot the same
as, those of their brothersin Turkey. The Kurdsare relatedto the Persians
by commonAryan stock, by cognatelinguisticantecedents,and even by the
Muslimreligion. It is in the latter,however,that thereis divergence.Nearly
all Persiansare Shi'ites,whereasmost Kurdsare Sunnis. This denominational
differencewas significantin the past historyof the area,when duringone of
the numerousKurdishrebellions-this time under the leadershipof Shaykh
Obaydullah-the preferencefor Turkishratherthan Iranianprotectorateover
an autonomousKurdistanwas voiced on religiousgrounds.' But sectarian
variancedid not completelyobliteratethe sense of kinshipbetweenthe Kurd
and the Persian.As pointedout in a recentworkon Iran,historically-minded
Persians,consciousof the intimateconnectionbetweentheirown and Kurdish
origins,insistthat the past demonstratesthatall Kurds,not only thoseof Iran,
are reallyIranian.15
Thus, in the 19th centuryand early20th centuryKurdishgovernorsruled
vast areasof Persia,supportingthe Qajardynastyagainst"constitutionalism"
and "modernity."But like their brothersin Turkey,who defiedAtatiurkand
his vitiationof local autonomyand breakupof parochialauthority,the Kurds
of IranresistedRizaShih's attemptsin the 1920'sand 1930'sat centralization
and nationalization.Eventhe KurdishRepublicof 1946 in Mahabad,fostered
and then abandonedby the Russians,was not fully supportedby the Kurdsof
Iran. In fact, they left it to Mulla MustafaBarzaniand his followersfrom
Iraq to defend the bordersof the republic! Moreover,the presidentof the
republic,Qazi Muhammad,was not surewhetherhis was an autonomousor a
completelyindependentstate.'6
Thoughmanyof the leadersof the MahabadRepublic,amongthemQazi
Muhammad,were executedby the Iraniangovernmentafterthe collapseof the
state, the post-WorldWar II period is one of rapprochement betweenthe
Persiansand the Kurds. In the summerof 1960,a leadingKurdishintellectual,
14. George N. Curzon,Persiaand the PersianQuestion,London,1892, pp. 550-53.

15. RichardW. Cottam,Nationalismin Iran, Pittsburgh,1964, p. 67.
16. For admirableaccounts of this abortive attempt at statehood see Archie Roosevelt, Jr.,
"The KurdishRepublicof Mahabad,"Middle East Journal,Vol. I, No. 3, July, 1947, pp. 247-269
and William Eagleton,Jr., op. cit. Incidentally,the GreatSoviet Encyclopediahardlymentionsthe
MahabadRepublic. The brief paragraphdescribingit merely says that it was an aspect of the
general anti-imperialistand anti-colonialmovementin the Middle East, aimed specificallyat Anglo-
Americanaggression. However,Qazi Mubammadis depictedas the greatestof the Kurdishfreedom
fighters who was executed by direction of the US General Schwartzkopf.Bolshaya Sovetskaya
Entziklopedia,op. cit., Vol. XIX, p. 367.

ProfessorKamuranBedir-Khanof the Sorbonne,said in East Berlinthat the

conditionsof the Kurds in Iran were better than those of the Kurds in
Turkey.'7The Shih of Iran, MuhammadRizd Pahlavi,in an exclusiveaudi-
ence grantedthe authorof this articlein August 1965, spoke with evident
sincerityand warmthaboutthe Kurds. Moreover,manyof the Kurdswhom
this writer later met in Mahabadreciprocatedfully the sentimentsof their
ruler. What causedthis rapprochement?
The ethnicaffinitymentionedearlieris one factor;anotheris the economic.
A majorcrop in the Kurdishregionsof Iranis tobaccowhich is sent into the
Persianurbancentersin greatquantity.Also the sheepandcattlebreedersnow
get higher prices for their stock, dairyproductsand wool. Evidenceof this
newly acquired"prosperity" is a brokendown car, transistorradio or some
such.
Then thereis the anti-Russian sentimentamongthe Kurdsof Persiawhich
has earlyrootsin Czaristplunder,murderand the burningof villagesin north-
ernKurdishregions. Thereis a lingeringantagonismtowardsthe SovietUnion
in the mindsof some intellectualsbecauseof the "betrayal"of the Mahabad
Republic. There are manyrumors,sometimesinspiredby the Iraniangovern-
ment, of the punishmentinflictedon those in the USSRwho do not conform
to the communistway of life.
Also, the Shih himself playeda majorpart in bringingaboutthis "eraof
good feeling." Like the Turkishrulers,he had no great affectionfor Qasim.
He had an even betterreasonfor his aversion:regicide. Nor did he warmup
to the regimessucceedingQasim's. Sincethe IraqiKurdsare tactful enough
not to provokehim with pan-Kurdish slogans,he closeshis eyesto armssmug-
gling. Somehowthe Kurdsof Iraqacquiredthousandsof Brnorifles,sincethe
Iraniansdiscardedthemin favorof the Americanarmycarbine.
But thereare also positivefactorsin the Shah'srelationshipwith the Kurds.
Moderatemeasures,such as limited and governmentsupervisedradio broad-
castsand sporadicpublicationsin Kurdishwereintroducedrecently.Of course,
the new agrarianreforms,sponsoredby the Shah,havebenefitteda greatmany
Kurdswho cheerhim lustilyas he distributesland titles amongthem. Perhaps
the greatestattractionto the young Kurd is the higher culturalstandardof
Iraniansocietyand the opportunitiesit offers. Many of them go to the big
cities and find it difficultin time to identifythemselveswith thoseleft behind.
The Kurdsof Syria,the USSR,Pakistanand Afghanistan

Althoughnumericallyless significantthantheirbrothersin Turkey,Iranor
Iraq,the Kurdsof Syriaat times exhibitedrelativelygreaternationalistzeal.
Someof this fervorwas fannedby the Frenchwho afterWorld War I secured
17. Gunther Nollau and Hans Jurgen Wiehe, RussiadsSouth Flank, New York, 1963, p. 59.

a mandateover Syria. It seemedastuteto Paris,for obviousreasons,to create

divisivenessamong the inhabitantsof the area. Nevertheless,when Kurdish
demandsfor autonomybecamemoreinsistent,the Frenchfailed to meet them
even thoughParisdid accordsomeautonomyto dissidentprovinceslike Latakia
and JabalDruze.
Most of the 200,000 to 300,000 Kurdsin Syriaare concentratedin the
Jazirah. A US Defense Departmentanalyst estimatedin 1958 that about
50,000 lived in the Kurdishquarterof Damascus,"8 whichwould makeit one
of the largestKurdishurbanconcentrations in the MiddleEast. But the Kurds
of the Jazirahdo not constitutea clear majorityof the local population.In
the past, the variousminoritiesof the districtcould agree on nothingexcept
their oppositionto Damascusrule. Eachfeared dominationby anotherlocal
group. Nevertheless,the Jazirahprovidedsome early leadershipto the pan-
Kurdistanmovement. During the inter-bellumperiod the districtreceived
many Kurdishrefugees from Turkey. In 1927-28, the Hoyboonparty and
assembly,the Kurdishgovernment-in-exile, operatedfrom that area.
Muchof Kurdishnationalismin Syriahas abatedin the post-WorldWar II
period. The Hoyboonevincedno greatenthusiasmfor the MahabadRepublic
becauseof its sponsorshipby the USSR. On the otherhand,the leaderof the
Syrian-Lebanese CommunistPartyin the post-bellumperiod, who had some
tenuousdealingswith Mulla MustafaBarzani,is the KurdKhalidBakhdash.
In the 1950's the KurdishDemocraticPartysupplantedthe Hoyboonin
Syria. For a while therewas a flareupof Kurdishnationalismin the country
causedby SyriajoiningEgyptto form the United ArabRepublic.Underthe
leadershipof Dr. Nur al-Zaza,the Kurd nationalistswent undergroundand
launcheda campaignfor autonomy.
When the Bath detachedSyriafrom the United Arab Republicin 1961,
a new processof "socialization" and "Arabization"of the Kurdswas initiated.
Tribalself-ruleand distinctionsbeganto disappear.Michel'Aflaq,the ideolo-
gist of the Ba'thmovement,evidentlyalso has had a part in the anti-Kurdish
measuresin Iraq,when the Ba'thin that countryoverthrewQasim.'9Yet it is
also true, as in the case of Turkeyand Iran,that manySyrianKurdsare now
beginningto adopt Arab customsand clothing,to learn Arabicand even to
assumepositionsof leadershipin Syriannationalism.
A drivefor self-determination amongthe Kurdsof the USSRis, of course,
not apparent.In the firstplace, theirnumberis small and they are scattered
throughthe Armenianand CentralAsian areas. In the secondplace, like so
manyother minoritiesin the SovietUnion they are permittedto have schools
of their own, to publishbooks from time to time, to issue periodicals(Rea
18. RobertF. Zeidner, "KurdishNationalismand the New Iraq Government,"Middle Eastern

Affairs, Vol. X, No. 1, January1959, p. 28.
19. Dana Adams Schmidt,JourneyAmong BraveMen, Boston, 1964, p. 245.

Taza), to performat the festival of nationalitiesin Moscow, and to sing

Kurdishsongs on radio and TV. Ethnographicand philologicalresearchis
encouraged.Kurdishfolkloreis gatheredup and made availablenot only to
the Kurdsbut to the Russianpublicin general.20Nevertheless,as in the case
of otherminoritiesin the USSR,politicalself-expressionis not allowed. The
Kremlin'srole in the Kurdishnationalistmovementoutsidethe SovietUnion
will be discussedsubsequently.
The numberof Kurds in Pakistanand in Afghanistanis small, yet the
interestthereis great in the Kurdishpush for politicalrecognition.Firstthe
Kurdsare co-religionists;second,the strugglehas its repercussions
amongthe
minoritiesin thatpartof the world. Forexample,the Pathansin the northwest
of Pakistanwant autonomyand a Pathanistan.Thus,a bookwrittenby Shaykh
A. Waheed and publishedin two editions in Lahore,with a forewordby
MohammadAyubKhan,then commander-in-chief of the Pakistaniarmy,is a
paeanof praisefor Kurdishculture,folkloreand religiouscustoms. But it is
also a vehementdeprecationof Kurdishpoliticalaspirationsand of Western
imperialismand colonialism,which,in the view of Waheed,fomentedKurdish
troubleby "increasedandwell-plannedactivitiesof the enemiesof the Mussal-
mans to createfrictionamongMuslimpeople,thus dissipatetheirstrengthby
makingthem fight betweenthemselves."2'
The Kurdsof Iraq

All "guesstimates,"withoutexception,indicatethat Iraqhas fewer Kurds
than either Turkeyor Iran. Why, then, is Iraq now the centerof Kurdish
nationalismand the sceneof currentorganizedrebellion?One significantrea-
son is that in proportionto the generalpopulationof Iraq the Kurdsform a
larger minoritythere than the Kurdsin the other countries. The Kurdsof
Turkeyand Iranmakeup no morethan ten per cent of the respectivepopula-
tions of Iraq's neighbors,while they constituteabout 20 per cent of the
populationin Iraq. Other importantfactors: The Kurds of Iraq are more
geographicallyconcentrated,mostly in mountainousterrain;they resentrule
by the Arabswho, like themselves,werea subjectpeopleunderthe Turks;they
fear Arab nationalismmore than that of the Turksor of the Iranianswhom
theyconsideras ethnicbrothers;theyhavemoreeffectivemilitaryandpolitical
leadership,and,paradoxically, the Iraqisrecognizedthem,informallyand even
officially,as a separateminorityentitled to certain political, cultural and
economicrights.
Whetheron humanitarian groundsor out of sheerpoliticalconsideration,
20. For instance,the two volume collection of exquisite Kurdish tales: A. Dzhindi, Kurdskie
NarodnyeSkazki,Erivan,1961-62.
21. A. Waheed, The Kurds and Their Country,Lahore,1958, p. 135.

the Englishwere in contactwith Kurdishleadersin Mesopotamiaeven before

the 1918 armisticewith the Turks. When it becameevidentthat, becauseof
the impendingTreatyof Lausanne,Kurdishdistrictsin Iraqcouldnot be incor-
poratedinto an independentor autonomousKurdistan,the Britishmadesome
effortsat providinglimitedautonomyto KurdishenclaveswithinIraqibounda-
ries. A United Kingdom report to the Councilof the League of Nations
pointed out that "any seriousattemptto form an independentKingdomin
thesedistrictswas impossiblefor manyreasons.It was not an economicpropo-
sition;it wouldhave beenregardedwith intensedistrustby neighbouringpow-
ers who werealso havingdifficultieswith theirown subjects;andit wouldhave
postulateda degree of cohesion and cooperationamong the Iraqi Kurds
themselveswhich,as has been shown,did not exist."22
It was this lack of cohesionthat militatedagainsta successfuldrive for
Kurdishautonomyin the 1920'sas it hinderseven now the attemptsfor self-
determination.ShaykhMalhmid,head of an importantsayyid family, was
entrustedby the Britishsoon after theirarrivalin the areato lead the Kurdish
community. He immediatelyantagonizedmany of the other prominent
shaykhs,as well as the Britishthemselves,by makingextravagantdemands,
includinga crown for himself in a Kurdishkingdom. Thus there ensueda
periodof numerousuprisingssubjectedto frequentpunitiveexpeditionsby the
army.
The Anglo-IraqiTreatyof 1930, signifyingthe end of the Britishmandate
in 1932, failed to specify Kurdishrights. Protestsaddressedto the League
of Nations broughtforth a written declarationfrom the Iraqi government
definingthe areaswherethe Kurdishlanguage,local administration, law courts
and primaryeducationwere to function. The new Iraq,beset by manyprob-
lems-like any other young state-did not and couldnot implementthe pro-
visions of the declaration.The strugglethus continueduntil World War II,
when the Kurdsunderthe old but still activeShaykhMahmiidralliedin sup-
port of Rashid'All al-Gaylani'scoup d'etat againstthe royal family. When
the war was over, the old regime and the Kurdishproblem returnedto
Baghdad.
A proposedunion betweenIraq and Jordanin which they would become
an even smallerminorityfurtherincensedthe Kurds. The BaghdadPactalso
angeredmanyKurdishleaderswho saw in it a vehiclefor futureanti-Kurdish
cooperationamongTurkey,Iran,Iraqand Pakistan.Thus the Kurdsnot only
welcomedbut activelyhelpedin bringingaboutthe "JulyRevolution"of 'Abd
al-KarimQasimin 1958. Mulla MustafaBarza.ni, who for about12 yearswas
22. Great Britain, Colonial Office,Special Report by His Majesty'sGovernmentin the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the
Progressof 'IraqDuring the Period 1920-1931 (Colonial, No. 58), London,H. M. StationeryOffice,
1931, pp. 255-256.

THE KURDISH DRIVE FOR SELF-DETERMINAMON 289
in exile in the SovietUnion,returnedto his homeland.A provisionalconstitu-

tion referredto the Iraqi state as an "Associationof Arabsand Kurds"and
guaranteedKurdishcommunalrightswithinthe frameworkof Iraqiunity. The
KurdishDemocraticParty(KDP) was allowedto functionunderthe nominal
presidencyof Barzani,but actuallyit was directedby Ibra.himAhmad, the
secretarygeneral and editor of Khebat,and by anotherleader, young and
promisingJalalal-Talabini.
But Qasim,who had to strugglewith manyinternalproblemsas well as
with communistopportunismand "Nasserite"pan-Arabism, could not fulfill
the promiseshe madeto the Kurds. Moreover,the inter-tribaldisputesamong
the Kurdsthemselves,especiallybetweenthe Barzanisand the Zibarls,necessi-
tated the interventionof the regularIraqiarmy. While IbrahimAhmadand
KDP continuedto professloyaltyto the Baghdadregime,BarzRni, havingsub-
dued his adversaries,broke with the Sole Leader,as Qasim styled himself,
when the Iraqichief-of-statefailed to heed a Kurdishultimatumregardingthe
implementationof the 1958 promises.In the meantime,Qasimby successive
degreeshad becomethe most hatedman in Iraq,not only by the followersof
Barzanibut by mostArabsas well.
It was naturalfor the Kurdsto join forces with the Bath which toppled
Qasimon February8, 1963. But the new regime,like previousArabgovern-
ments,could not affordto grantKurdishdemandsfor autonomy.To yield to
a minoritymeantcompromisingits commitmentto Arabinterestsand, in fact,
meantmoderatingthoseinterests.' Also, fromthe pointof view of the Kurds,
the Ba'thbecamemoremenacingthanformerregimes,becauseit had the mak-
ings of a socio-economicideologyand an appealto Arabintellectualsbeyond
Iraq. To proveits genuineArabnationalismand at the sametime to provide
a rallyingsymbolfor the new government,the Ba'th launcheda devastating
campaignagainstthe Kurds. It had its repercussions not only in the Western
world,but in the USSRas well. The Russianscalledit genocide.24
The Ba'this,however,did not long remainin power-partly becauseof
their failureagainstthe Kurds. On November18, 1963, 'Abd al-Salam'Arif
took over the reins of government,only to lose them in a tragicair mishap
on April 13, 1966. 'Abd al-Rahman'Arif, the brotherof the dead leader,
inheritednot only the presidencyof Iraqbut also the Kurdishproblem.
KurdishDemandsand the IraqiDilemma

Eversincethe foundingof modernIraq,the Kurdshave beencomplaining
of political, economicand social disabilities.They have protestedtime and
againthat the guaranteesof theirrights,enunciatedby the Leagueof Nations
23. Derk Kinnane,The Kurds and Kurdistan,London, 1964, p. 74.
24. Lazarev,op. cit., p. 374.

in 1925 and in 1932, were skimpilyimplementedor ignoredaltogether;that

they were not providedwith adequateelementaryand secondaryeducation;
that they were barredfrom institutionsof higher learning;that they did not
have a fair sharein the social and welfareservicesof the state;that develop-
ment projects-irrigation,conservation,roads-were hardly effected in the
north; that they did not get an equitablepart of the revenuesfrom the oil,
which is mostlyin Kurdishinhabitedareas. Throughoutthe yearsthe Kurds
insistedthat they wantedautonomywithin the boundariesof Iraq,withoutin
any way affectingthe politicalor territorialintegrityof the country.Officially
theyneverpressedfor a separatestatecarvedout of Iraq;nor did theyformally
speakof a pan-Kurdish politicalentity.
But autonomyis a vague termgiven to differentinterpretation by different
leaders at differenttimes. A clearer than usual formulationof the basic
demandsfor Kurdishautonomywas offeredin an interviewwith IsmetSharif
Vanly, "Envoy-at-Large of the CommandCouncilof the Revolution,"by the
KurdishJournalon June 11, 1965:
1. To readmitthe officialuse of the historicalnameof our country,by creatingan
autonomous"Vilayetof Kurdistan,"with five Kurdishprovinces;
2. The pillars of this autonomywill be a Kurdish legislative body, freely elected by
all the populationof Kurdistan,and an ExecutiveCouncil issued from that body and
responsiblebefore it;
3. Mattersof education,justice, police, administration,tobacco,agriculture,forests,
municipalities,
laborand sociallegislationwill be, in the Kurdishterritory,of the
competenceof the autonomousauthorities. Defense and foreign relations,and other
importantmatters,will remainin the hands of the Iraqi centralGovernment;
4. Taxes collected locally will be spent locally. But the largest revenue of Iraq, oil
royalties,revenuesof ports, customsand airportsshould be shared,and the Kurdish
part in them will be proportionalto the populationof Kurdistanto that of the Iraqi
Republic;
5. Kurdish conscriptswill accomplishtheir military service in the Iraqi Army, but
in Kurdistan. If the central Governmentwishes to send more troops to Kurdistan,
this can be done only with the agreementor at the requestof the Kurdish autono-
mous authorities. Martiallaw can be proclaimedin Kurdistanby the Iraqi Govern-
ment only in the same conditions. This should be understoodas a guaranteeagainst
any other Iraqi aggressionin Kurdistanin the future....
6. On the other hand, the last articleof the programmeof the KurdistanDemocratic
Partysays that in the case of unity betweenIraq and any arabcountry,the people of
Iraqi Kurdistanshould exercisetheir right to self-determination.25
These demands,patently,are just shortof completeindependence.When
David Adamson,the Britishjournalist,interviewedIbrThimAhmadand asked
him how he woulddefineautonomy,the Kurdishleaderansweredthatit would
"dependon our strengthand that of our enemy."26
BaghdadgovernmentssinceWorld War I have beenin a dilemma.What-
25. The KurdishJournal,Vol. II, No. 2, June 1965, p. 5.
26. Adamson,op. cit., p. 92.

ever its errorsof omissionor commission,Iraqis the only country(excepting

the USSR) where the Kurdswere officiallyrecognizedand given legal status.
In fact, at times, Kurdishautonomywas encouragedby Iraqi leaders-for
example, during the early days of Qasim who saw in the Kurds valuable
co-workersin his conflictwith Nasir. However,as pointedout earlier,none of
the Iraqiregimescould affordto meet all the Kurdishdemands.It would be
accusedby its Arabneighborsof creatingan incongruouspoliticalentityamidst
a pan-Arabworld;of giving away"sacredArabsoil";of generatinga "second
Israel." Baghdadalso fears the reactionof non-ArabTurkeyand Iranwhose
largeKurdishminoritiesmightbe sparkedby the Iraqiexperiment.Moreover,
the centralgovernmentis stymiedby the divisiveness,acrimonyand rivalry
amongthe Kurdsthemselves(sometimesfomentedbyBaghdad). Forinstance,
Barzini'solder brother,ShaykhAhmad, the religiousleader of the Barzani
tribe, did not identifyhimself with Mulla Mustafa'scause and on numerous
occasionssworeloyaltyto the rulersof Iraq-whoever theywere, from Faysal
I to the 'Arifs. Also, weak governmentsneeding a rallyingcause, a hate-
symbol,a scapegoatfound the Kurdsa most convenientobject. Finally,the
Soviet Union, UAR, Iran, Turkey,Great Britainand even the United States
havehad theirsharein unsettlingrelationsbetweenthe Kurdsand the Baghdad
regimes.
The IraqiKurdsand the Arab World

What is the attitudeof the ArabsoutsideIraq to the Kurdishstruggle?
Generallyspeaking,Arabnationalists,despiteinter-group clashes,wouldregard
the defeat of any Arab entityby non-Arabelementsas calamitous-one only
need point to the instanceof Israel. Actually,the Kurdsare not as offensive
to the Arabsas the Israelis,becausetheyare Muslims.Arableaders,especially
spokesmenfor the Arab League,tried to assurethe "Kurdishbrothers"that
Arab nationalismis not detrimentalto their socio-culturalor even economic
development.But the Kurdsfear that in a pan-Arabalignmentthey will be
submergedin the overwhelmingArabmajorityof the new politicalunion.
However,despiteArabaversionto completeor evennear-complete Kurdish
self-determination,some Arab rulersfind it expedientto use the Kurds for
troublemakingwhen they considera particularBaghdadregime distasteful.
Officiallythe governmentsof Arabcountriesrefrainfrom injectingthemselves
into the Kurdo-Iraqiclash,maintainingthatthisis an internalproblem.Never-
theless,Kurdishenvoys,notablyJalal al-Talabani,ShawkatAkrawiand Ismet
Sharif Vanly, have visited time and again the variousArab capitalsseeking
supportby professingMuslimsolidarityand claimingthat Kurdishautonomy
would providea bufferbetweenthe Arab world and the "hated"Turksand
Iranians.Their effortshave been in vain.

Yet one cannothelp butwonder:In this socio-economic andreligio-political

quandary,do the Kurdishleadersof the IbrThimAhmadtype have more in
commonwith the old Kurdishtribalchiefs thanwith the modernArableaders
of the Ba'thibend?
Baghdadon many occasionsaccusedthe Kurds of being "paid Zionist
agents,"of being secretallies of Israel. Despite a certainobviousmutuality
of interests,the IraqiKurdsdisclaimall contactwith the Israelis. They insist
that the "Palestineproblem"is purelyan Arabaffair. On the otherhand,the
Europeanand Americansupportersof the Kurdishcausesee in Israela success-
ful effort againstArab intransigence.The informalapproachesto leadersin
Israel and to Jews outside Israel are made mostly by "friends,"not by the
Kurds themselves. Thus, for instance,Silvio van Rooy, presidentof Inter-
nationalSocietyKurdistan,was interviewedon June20, 1963,by the Jerusalem
Post and indicatedareasof cooperationbetweenIsraelisandKurds.
In Israel itself there is a large group of KurdishJews who still have a
sentimentalattachmentto theirbirthplace.In directappealsto the Israeligov-
ernmentand in lettersin the dailypress,theyseekto elicithelp for the "valiant
freedomfighters."The governmentof Israelhas takenno standin the Kurdo-
Iraqiconflict,not wishingto intensifyArabhostility,and not anxiousto incur
the animosityof Turkeyand Iranwith whomIsraelmaintainsrelations.
The IraqiKurdsand the Easternand WesternBlocs

Communistattitudestowardsthe Kurdshave beenopportunistic, or as Jus-
tice William 0. Douglas puts it, schizophrenic.The Kremlin,of course,is
sensitiveto the attitudesof the Arabworld. Openand systematicassistanceto
the IraqiKurdswould naturallyoffendthe susceptibilities of this very impor-
tant elementin the Middle East and of the membersof a significantbloc of
votes in the UnitedNations. But Russianexploitationof the unrestin Iraqand
even its contributionto it is naturalin big powerpolitics. At least until the
overthrowof the monarchyin 1958, the Kremlin'sopen but moderatesupport
of the Kurdshad been consistent.It offeredBarzaniand severalhundredsof
his followersfriendlyasylumin the USSR. It conferredon him the rankof
generaland sponsoredbroadcastsby him from Erivanand Bakuto the Kurds
"underchauvinistdomination."
With Qasimin power and with Barzin!backin Iraq,the Kremlinurged
Baghdadto negotiate a fair settlementwith the Kurds. When Qasim and
Khrushchevhad a falling out, Erivanand Baku,joinedby EastBerlin,resumed
anti-Baghdad broadcasts.Moreover,armsand suppliesbeganfindingtheirway
to the north. No soonerhad MoscowandBaghdadreacheda thawingperiod-
when the USSR,in November1961, vetoedKuwayt'sadmissionto the United
Nations-the broadcastsstopped, and Barzani,the erstwhile"friend,"was

THE KURDISH DRIVE FOR SELF-DETERMINATON 293
dubbedby the Russiansa Britishagent provocateur.Again, when relations

deterioratedbetween Qasim and Khrushchev,the Kurdswere urged by the
communistpartiesthroughoutthe MiddleEastto overthrowthe "theBaghdad
hangman."Also, the Ba'thregime,succeedingQasim'sadministration, did not
muchplease the Kremlinwhen it launcheda fiercecampaignagainstboth the
Kurdsand the communistsof Iraq. Workingthroughthe MongolianPeople's
Republic,the communistsurged in 1963 the secretarygeneralof the United
Nations to put "thepolicyof genocide. . . againstthe Kurdishpeople"on the
agendaof the GeneralAssembly. The column"Heroesof the Strugglefor
Communism," in a recentissue of the WorldMarxistReview,eulogizesIraqis
and Kurds who fell during the "('Abd al-Salam) 'Arif dictatorship,"but
whose "heroismilluminesthe path to victory."27
The leadersof the Kurdishdrive for self-determination in a sense recip-
rocate communistopportunism.The USSR, after all, is the only significant
powerthat fromtime to timecameout openlyin supportof Kurdishdemands.
It was natural,therefore,for Kurdishleadersto look Eastwardfor support.
But even thoseof the politicalelite who earlierin theircareerswerecaptivated
by the communistpromisehave been disappointedboth with its ideologyand
its practice,especiallyas they prevailin the MiddleEast. Nevertheless,these
same Kurds will not fail to take advantageof any help Moscow or even
Peking,which of late has initiatedactivityin the area,28may want to extend
to them.
The Westernworld, for obviousreasons,has takenlittle officialnotice of
the currentclash betweenthe Kurdsand Iraqis. But even the generalpublic
is indifferentand uninformedas to what is going on in an areadose to what
has been often called the cradleof civilization.Severalsmall organizationsof
Kurdishemigres,students,intellectualsand sympathizers, suchas the Kurdish
StudentSocietyin Europe,the KurdishStudentOrganizationin the United
States,and the InternationalSocietyKurdistan(operatingfrom Amsterdam)
are activeon behalf of the Kurdishcause. But they have no impacton public
opinion. Fromtime to time Kurdishdelegationsappearat the UnitedNations
where the doors are officiallylocked to them. Kurdishemissariessuch as
Talabaniand Vanly visit Europeanand Americancities, attemptingcontacts
with leadingpoliticalpersonalitieswho moreoften thannot refuseto see them.
The few who do consentto a meetingusuallyinsiston informal,off-the-record
arrangements.Oncein a while, the emissariesachievea "diplomatictriumph,"
as when the InternationalLeaguefor the Rightsof Man, condemned,on Oc-
tober 28, 1963, the Iraqigovernmentfor its mass slaughter.
27. World Marxist Review, Vol. VIII, No. 10, October, 1965, pp. 79-80.
28. The material for the uniforms and caps now being introducedby the Kurdish Army of
Liberationis supplied by CommunistChina at special prices.

Whatof the Future?

As it appearsat the present,the possibilityof the IraqiKurdswinningtheir
"revolution"is even more remotethan the possibilityof theirlosing it. Else-
wherein this artide it was pointedout why any Iraqigovernmentwill find it
difficult,if not impossible,to make real concessionsto the Kurds. What are
the factorsmilitatingagainsta successfulKurdishuprising?
The Kurds of Iraq have producedno charismaticleader to capturethe
imaginationand to unite all elements,or at least most factions,of theircom-
patriots. Barzaniis a flawed hero. He is a great guerillafighter,a superb
commanderin "protractedwarfare,"a Joshua,but no Moses, Saladinnor
Atatiirk.He is primarilya tribalchieftainwhoseinterestsareparochial.When
he sayshe has no desirefor a pan-Kurdistan, includingthe Kurdsof Iranand
Turkey,his declarationis believable,becausehe has no "sweep,"no "horizon,"
no "grandeur."His affinityis with the aghas,the local shaykhs,the landlords.
His ideal of autonomousKurdistanis an enlightenedoligarchywith a reformist
tendency.
IbrahimAhmad, secretarygeneral of the KurdishDemocraticParty, is
intellectual,articulatein print,a modern-day socialist(with an urbaneview of
Marxism), whose spiritualbrothersare Nyerere,Kenyatta,'Aflaq. Kurdish
intellegentsiain Iraq and abroadcan identifyitself with IbrahimAhmad,but
is frustratedand sometimesembarrassedby Barzini. Yet, paradoxically,
Ibrahim Ahmad is replaceablein the Kurdish insurrection,Barzani is
indispensible.
Jalalal-Talabini-young, resourceful,energetic,successfulpastcommander
of the southernfront, a "rovingambassador" of the "revolution"in Middle
East and Europeancapitals,and frequentlyin self-imposed"exile"-is a cross
betweenBarzTniand Ibr5h!mAhmad. It could be that he is the man of the
future. In the meantime,thereis a subduedbutneverthelessreal rivalryamong
the threeleaders,and suspicionsbetweenTalabTniandVanly,another"roving
ambassador," representingBarzamn.29
Thus the strengthof the insurrectionists is eroded by their own tribal
squabbles(the "patriots"againstthe "josh"-the jackasses)and ideological
divisions. But thereare also genuineeconomicobstaclesto successfulKurdish
self-determination.Lackof Kurdishcapitalmakesthe northdependenton the
29. The confusion of aims and the lack of coordinationamong the variousKurdishemissaries,
"official"and "unofficial"is terrifying. State Departmentpersonnelas a matter of policy and for
self-evidentreasonsrefuse to receive even informallyKurdishdelegationsand "envoys." One soft-
heartedMiddle East expert in the Department,however,yielded to the beseechmentof friends and
agreedto see two Kurdish "diplomats."One of them in halting English insisted that the Kurds of
Iraq are interestedonly in autonomywithin the boundariesof that country. The other, evidently
without understandingwhat his colleague was saying, got up and in perfect Frenchpleadedfor a
Kurdistanwhich would includealso parts of Turkeyand Iran ...

centralgovernment,so that thereis little fervoramongthe merchantsfor the

uprisingagainstBaghdad.
Thereis no Kurdishproletariatto speakof-an elementcertainlyimportant
in a modernrevolution.The urbanKurdsare mostlyin the civil serviceor in
professionsrelatedto the governmentand they cannotbe countedon for an
all-outpush. It is, therefore,the agrarianelementthat at presentis the main
supportof the insurrection.Yet it is the middleclass and the proletariatwho
mustultimatelydecidethe fate of the revolution.
The Kurdishproblemmay becomeeven morecomplicatedshouldthe revo-
lution succeed-and it may succeed, if there is a general upheaval and
rearrangement in the MiddleEast,not an inconceivablepossibility.Barzanm in
a new politicalentitywould,in all probability,createthe sameproblemfor the
Kurdishgovernmentand for the KDP leadersthat he is now constitutingfor
the Iraqigovernment.But like the managersof recentand successfuldrives
for independencein the Middle East and in Africa,the Kurdishleadersmay
or maynot realizethe futuredifficultiesthey and theircountrymay encounter.
Their problem now is how to achieve the immediateand magnitudinous
objective self-determination.


The Kurdish Drive For Self Determination

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VOLUME20 SUMMER1966 NUMBER 3