TABLE OF CONTENTS

POWERS AND STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT

I. PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS
A. Nature of a Constitution
• Bernardez vs. The City Government of Baguio, G.R. No. 197559, March 21,
2022 ....................................................................................................... 1

II. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

A. Concept of Presidential Immunity
• Disini vs. Republic, G.R. No. 205172, June 15, 2021 ................................. 1

III. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS (COMELEC, COA, CSC)

A. Powers, Functions, and Jurisdiction
• San Felix vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 198404, October 14, 2019
............................................................................................................. 1

THE CITIZEN IN RELATION TO THE STATE

I. BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Due Process
• Manila International Ports Terminal, Inc. vs. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R.
No. 196199, December 7, 2021 .............................................................. 2
• Ante vs. University of The Philippines Student Disciplinary Tribunal, G.R. No.
227911, March 14, 2022 ......................................................................... 2
B. Arrests, Searches, and Seizures
• Diaz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 213875, July 15, 2020 ............ 3
• Uy y Sayan vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 217097 ....................... 4
C. Right to Speedy Trial and Speedy Disposition of Cases
• Zaldivar-Perez vs. First Division of the Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 204739,
November 13, 2019 ............................................................................... 5
D. Writs of Habeas Corpus, Kalikasan, Habeas Data, and Amparo
• Miguel vs. Director of the Bureau Of Prisons, UDK-15368, September 15, 2021
............................................................................................................. 6
• Morada vs. Rias, G.R. No. 222226, February 14, 2022 .............................. 6

LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ELECTION LAW,

AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

I. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

A. Accountability of Public Officers
• Villanueva vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218652, February 23, 2022
............................................................................................................. 7
• Marzan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 226167, October 11, 2021 ... 7
 • CSC v. Beray, G.R. Nos. 191946 & 191974, December 10, 2019 ............... 7
• Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Bool, G.R. No. 207522, April 28, 2021 ....... 8
• Gonzalbo-Macatangay vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 239995, June 15,
2022 ..................................................................................................... 9

II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A. Judicial Recourse and Review
• Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital,
G.R. No. 214485, June 15, 2022 ............................................................. 9

III. LOCAL GOVERNMENT

A. Local Government Unit (LGU)
• Bernadez vs. The City Government of Baguio, G.R. No. 197559, March 21,
2022 ..................................................................................................... 10
• Municipality of Corella vs. Philkonstrak Development Corporation, G.R. No.
218663, February 28, 2022..................................................................... 10
• Miñao vs. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), G.R. No. 231042, February
23, 2022................................................................................................ 11
• Manila Electric Company vs. City of Muntinlupa, G.R. No. 198529, February 9,
2021 ..................................................................................................... 12
1. The Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City
Government of Onepiece enacted Ordinance
No. 01 for the appropriation of available funds
for the purpose of reorganization or
restructuring of its local departments. Pursuant
thereto, City Mayor Luffy issued AO 11
designating Engineer Zorro as an Acting
Building Official. Aggrieved, Sanji, being the
present City Engineer at the time, filed a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of AO 11
contending that the City Government
overstepped its powers of local legislation by
not making Sanji the head of CBAO. Further,
Sanji alleged that AO suffered irregularities in
its implementation particularly on the subject of
reorganization due to the absence of legislative
act authorizing Mayor Luffy to effect the same,
and that the ordinance is an appropriation
measure which contains a non-appropriation
measure which is a violation of the Constitution.
Should AO 11 should be nullified for being
contrary to law?
No. The validity of laws, orders, or such other
rules with the force of law cannot be attacked
collaterally because there is a legal presumption
of validity of these laws. Here, Sanji implicitly
questioned Ordinance No. 1 by asserting that
said ordinance, while an appropriation
measure, contains non-appropriation items
such as reorganization and restructuring of
local departments. (Bernardez vs. The City
Government of Baguio, G.R. No. 197559, March
21, 2022, J. Hernando)
2. The RED Planet Project is a project of
President Gil awarded to Juan Corp. and Dos
Inc. as main contractor and architect-engineer.
After the term of President Gil, a complaint was
filed for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution and damages against him and Raz,
his close associate, for amassing ill-gotten
wealth. It was found that Juan Corp. and Dos
Inc. solicited the influence of Raz, who was the
sales representative for the project, to ensure
its appointment. It was further claimed that all
commissions were directly paid by Juan Corp.
and Dos Inc. to Raz. Raz claims that there was
also no evidence to prove that the alleged
commissions he received were part of the
purchase price paid by the Republic to Juan
Corp. and Dos Inc. for the RED Planet Project.
A. May the commissions received by Raz be
considered as ill-gotten wealth?
B. Assuming that the Republic failed to prove
by preponderance of evidence the amount of
commissions received, will Raz be free from
liability?
A. Yes. Under prevailing jurisprudence, ill-
gotten wealth encompasses those derived
directly and indirectly from government funds
or properties through the use of power,
influence, or relationship resulting in unjust
enrichment and causing grave damage and
prejudice to the Filipino people and the
Republic. Here, the alleged subject
commissions may not have been sourced
directly from the public funds but it is beyond
cavil that Raz would not have amassed these
commissions had he not exerted undue
influence on President Gil. (Disini vs. Republic
G.R. No. 205172, June 15, 2021, J. Hernando)
B. No. Under the principle of unjust enrichment,
the said commissions shall be recovered in
favor of the Filipino people. No one should
unjustly enrich himself by receiving
commissions in connection with a government
project when clearly he has no right for it nor
entitled to retain the same. In order to prove
the amount of the total commissions received
by Raz, the best evidence would have been the
Juan Corp. and Dos Inc. contracts and their
corresponding commission agreements. (Disini
vs. Republic, G.R. No. 205172, June 15, 2021,
J. Hernando)
3. A police officer, Mandu Rugas, will be taking
a Police Officer I examination. However, on the
day of the examination, Mandu Rugas
conspired with another person to take the exam
in his behalf. The CSC Regional Office of Iloilo
City charged Mandu Rugas with dishonesty for
allegedly conspiring with another person to
impersonate him and take the examination in
his behalf. Mandu Rugas alleged that by the
passage of RA No. 8551, the Civil Service
Commission has been divested of its authority
and jurisdiction to conduct entrance and/or
promotional examination to the members of the
1
Philippine National Police. Did Mandu Rugas
correctly impugn the jurisdiction of the CSC?
No. The CSC has the authority and jurisdiction
to investigate anomalies and irregularities in
the civil service examinations and to impose
necessary and appropriate sanctions. It is true
that when R.A. No. 8551 became effective, the
power to administer and conduct entrance and
promotional examinations to police officers
from the CSC to the NPC. However, the lack of
authority of the CSC in the conduct of PO I
examinations must not be used to shield Ruga's
wrongdoing, as he was not in good faith.
Although the CSC had no authority to
administer entrance and promotional
examinations for police officers, R.A. No. 8551
cannot deprive the CSC to investigate the facts
of any wrongdoings by a civil servant. As the
central personnel agency, the CSC has the
original disciplinary jurisdiction in order to
protect the integrity of the civil service system
as an integral part of the CSC’s duty, authority
and power provided for by the 1987
Constitution. (San Felix vs. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 198404, October 14,
2019, J. Hernando)
4. Due to substantial violations of a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which
resulted to the deterioration of Port Services,
Executive Order No. 30 (EO30) was issued
which revoked the Manila International Ports
Terminal, Inc.'s (MIPTI) franchise granted by
Presidential Decree No. 634 of Pres. Ferdinand
E. Marcos. EO30 likewise authorized Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA) to take over MIPTI's
operations and seized its equipment, while also
transferring the cargo-handling operation to
Metrostar and allowing the latter to continue
using the seized properties. MIPTI contended
that the revocation violated its rights to due
process of law and non-impairment of contract
when it recommended the revocation of its
franchise without first investigating or inquiry
on the alleged complaints of port users as well
as its alleged contract violations. Is EO 30
unconstitutional?
Yes. EO 30 is unconstitutional for violating
MIPTI's right to procedural due process. A
franchise is broadly defined as a special
privilege that is not demandable as a matter of
right, and when granted, is subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress.
However, the traditional distinction between
franchise as a "privilege" and franchise as a
"property right" has faded as a result of the
recognition that privileges previously granted to
individuals should not be taken through the
"unfettered whims of government officials."
Thus even if a franchise is a special privilege
thus not a demandable right, it is still
considered a property right and cannot be
revoked without due process of law. (Manila
International Ports Terminal, Inc. vs. Philippine
Ports Authority, G.R. No. 196199, December 7,
2021, J. Hernando)
5. Disciplinary actions were filed against Ariel
and other students of the University of the
Philippines (UP) before its Student Disciplinary
Tribunal (tribunal) over alleged hazing
activities/initiation rites conducted by the Alpha
Philcoa Fraternity, that led to the death of
another student, Chris. After the tribunal’s
preliminary inquiry, formal charges were then
filed accusing them of participating in the
alleged hazing activities/initiation rites. Ariel, in
his answer argued that according to UP’s Rules
Governing Fraternities, a valid preliminary
inquiry must first be conducted to determine
whether a formal charge against any member
or officer of a fraternity is warranted. Thus,
Ariel filed a motion to quash the formal charges
on the ground that the preliminary inquiry was
invalid because of the tribunal’s prejudgment
when it filed a case against him even though
according to UP’s rules, what is required in its
preliminary inquiry is only a determination of
the sufficiency of a report or complaint. Ariel
argues that the prejudgment is a form of
prejudice which violates his right to due process
because it infringes his right to be presumed
innocent. Is the tribunal guilty of prejudging the
case thereby violating Ariel’s right to due
process?
No. There can be no violation of Ariel’s right to
due process when proceedings on the formal
charges are yet to begin. Under prevailing
2
jurisprudence, the Court has laid down the
requisites of procedural due process in cases
involving students. These are (1) the students
must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of accusation against them; (2) they shall
have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them; (4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5)
the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide a
case. Here, formal proceedings are yet to
begin, therefore due process is not yet violated.
It is Ariel himself who refuses to participate –
which is the essence of due process, and
instead resorts to other means to avoid the
proceedings. (Ante vs. University of The
Philippines Student Disciplinary Tribunal, G.R.
No. 227911, March 14, 2022, J. Hernando)
6. Based on the application filed by PO2 Gomez,
RTC Judge Antonio issued a Search Warrant
after finding probable cause that a certain Pinky
Garcia has possession and control of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu
which is kept in her house at Green Meadows
Street Brgy. Mabiga, Mabalacat City,
Pampanga. In support of the application, an
informant named Jeff submitted two sketches
of Garcia’s house. One sketch reflected the
buildings along Green Meadows Street, with
Garcia’s house marked with an “X” and the
other reflected the floor plan of her studio type
house. Pinky Garcia was immediately arrested
and detained for alleged violation of R.A. No.
9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002 for the shabu found inside her
home. Pinky Garcia filed a Motion to Quash
Search Warrant on the ground that the same
was in the nature of a general warrant which
failed to describe with particularity the place to
be searched. Pinky Garcia averred in her motion
that: (a) her house number did not appear in
her home address as stated in the warrant; and
(b) the warrant failed to distinguish her unit,
which was the place intended to be searched,
from the other units or rooms representing the
three other households inside the house located
in Green Meadows Street Brgy. Mabiga,
Mabalacat City, Pampanga.
A. Did the Search Warrant fail to particularly
describe the place to be searched?
B. What are the requirements of a valid search
warrant?
C. What is the test of definiteness or
particularity?
A. No. The test of definiteness or particularity
is satisfied when the description of the place to
be searched under the warrant is sufficient and
descriptive enough to prevent a search of other
premises located within the surrounding area or
community. Here, the failure of the warrant to
(a) indicate that the place to be searched
contained five rooms which were separately
occupied by petitioner and her siblings; and (b)
confine the search to petitioner's unit is
inconsequential and, therefore, does not affect
the warrant's validity. The units or rooms where
petitioner and her siblings lived all form an
integral part of the house, which was
sufficiently described with particularity under
the warrant. The rooms inside the house, which
were in fact occupied by family members of
petitioner, cannot be treated separately as they
form part of the house where petitioner actually
resided. As such, the test of definiteness is met
since description of the place to be searched
under the warrant is sufficient and descriptive
enough to prevent a search of other premises
located within the surrounding area or
community. (Diaz vs. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 213875, July 15, 2020, J. Hernando)
B. The requirements of a valid search warrant
are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution and in Rule 126, Section 428
of the Rules Court: "(1) probable cause is
present; (2) such probable cause must be
determined personally by the judge; (3) the
judge must examine, in writing and under oath
or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched
and the things to be seized." The absence of
any of these requisites will cause the downright
nullification of the search warrant. (Diaz vs.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 213875, July
15, 2020, J. Hernando)
3
C. The test of whether the requirement of
definiteness or particularity has been met is
“whether the description of the place to be
searched under the warrant is sufficient and
descriptive enough to prevent a search of other
premises located within the surrounding area or
community”. A "place" may refer to a single
building or structure, or a house or residence.
(Diaz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
213875, July 15, 2020, J. Hernando)
7. Members of the Philippine National Police
established a mobile checkpoint at Purok 14,
Barangay Vasra pursuant to the
implementation of COMELEC Resolution No.
6446, imposing the COMELEC gun ban. While
conducting the routine inspection in the
checkpoint, the police officers flagged down
Noy, a motorist. They asked for the Certificate
of Registration (CR) and Official Receipt (OR) of
the Noy’s motor vehicle, but he was unable to
present them. This led to the officers being
suspicious and thus, asked Noy to open the
tools compartment of his motor vehicle. From
the tools compartment, the police officers
found five bundles of marijuana placed and
wrapped in a cellophane. The search of the
compartment under the driver's seat further
yielded several bundles of marijuana. He was
brought to the police station. Upon arrival at the
police station, Noy was interviewed by the
police officers and the confiscated dried
marijuana leaves were marked. The specimen
was then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory
in Malaybalay City. The result of the
examination showed that seized items are
marijuana. Noy's urine examination also yielded
positive for use of prohibited drugs.
A. Was the warrantless search valid?
B. Was the warrantless arrest valid?
C. Was the Chain of Custody complied
with?
D. Is a checkpoint a valid warrantless
search?
A. Yes. Checkpoints are considered as a variant
of searching moving vehicles which is an
exception to the general rule that search and
seizure must be carried out through the
strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon
the existence of probable cause. Further,
although as a general rule, motorists as well as
pedestrians passing through checkpoints may
only be subjected to a routine inspection,
vehicles may also be stopped to allow
authorized personnel to conduct an extensive
search when there is probable cause which
justifies a reasonable belief on the part of the
law enforcers that either the motorist is a law
offender, or that the contents of the vehicle are,
or have been, instruments of some offense.
Here, the search and seizure conducted by the
police officers in the checkpoint was valid since
the extensive search was done after Noy failed
to produce the OR/CR and upon seeing the
plastic cellophane protruding from the tools
compartment which constituted a reasonable or
probable cause to believe that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime in the vehicle to be searched. (Uy y Sayan
vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 217097,
February 23, 2022, J. Hernando)
B. Yes. Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, a peace officer or private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person in
flagrante delicto. Such arrest requires the
concurrence of two elements: (a) the person
arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he or she has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (b) the overt act was done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer. Here,
a valid warrantless search in a checkpoint was
conducted when Noy failed to produce the
OR/CR of his vehicle which led to the discovery
of several plastic sachets of marijuana upon
extensive search. Noy was arrested in flagrante
delicto since he is in possession of an illegal
drug and it was personally seen by the police
officers. (Uy y Sayan vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 217097, February 23,
2022, J. Hernando)
C. No. Pursuant to Section 21 of RA 9165,
apprehending officers are mandated to
immediately conduct the marking, physical
inventory and photograph of the seized drugs.
Moreover, the physical inventory and taking of
photographs shall be conducted in the presence
of: (a) the accused or the persons from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel; (b) a
representative from the media; (c) a
representative from the Department of Justice
(DOJ); and (d) an elected public official, after
4
seizure and confiscation. The procedure is
considered substantive law and not merely a
procedural technicality and as such, must be
strictly followed at all times except when there
are justifiable grounds for noncompliance or
when the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized evidence are preserved despite
noncompliance. In the case at hand, there was
total lack of compliance. Upon arrest, the pieces
of evidence were merely marked and was then
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory without
an inventory report. Absent the inventory
report, the required presence of the insulating
witnesses cannot be considered to have been
complied with. Consequently, rendering a
judgment of conviction without being able to
establish that Noy, along with the required
witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165, were
able to personally see the movement of the
seized drugs amounts to a violation of
substantive law. (Uy y Sayan vs. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 217097, February 23,
2022, J. Hernando)
D. Yes, checkpoints are valid and not illegal per
se. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, for as
long as the necessity of a checkpoint is justified
by the exigencies of public order and conducted
in a way least intrusive to motorists.
Inspections at checkpoints are not violative of
an individual's right against unreasonable
searches if limited to the following: (1) the
officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3)
flashes a light therein without opening the car's
doors; (4) where the occupants are not
subjected to a physical or body search; (5)
where the inspection of the vehicles is limited
to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6)
where the routine check is conducted in a fixed
area. Further, when a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search instead of a
mere routine inspection, such search remains
valid as long as the officers who conducted the
search have a reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime in the vehicle to be searched. (Uy y Sayan
vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 217097,
February 23, 2022, J. Hernando)
8. A complaint-affidavit was filed on April 28,
2006 against Gov. Dela Cruz for Unlawful
Appointment, defined under Art. 244 of the RPC
with the Office of Prosecutor. Gov. Dela Cruz,
in her counter-affidavit dated September 20,
2006, argued that the appointment she made
was proper and well-deserved by the
appointee. A preliminary investigation ensued,
and a resolution dated August 6, 2009,
recommending that a criminal complaint for
violation of Art. 244 be filed was forwarded to
the Deputy Ombudsman. Due to administrative
changes, it was only until March 24, 2012 that
information indicting Dela Cruz was filed before
the Sandiganbayan. Prior to arraignment, Dela
Cruz filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds of violating her constitutional right to
a speedy disposition of the case.
A. Will the Urgent Motion to Dismiss prosper?
B. If the Sandiganbayan denied the Urgent
Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Dela
Cruz never made an assertion of her right to the
speedy resolutions of the said preliminary
investigation but only after she was indicted, is
the Sandiganbayan’s contention, correct?
C. When is the right to speedy disposition
enshrined in Section 16, Article III of the
Philippine Constitution deemed violated?
A. Yes. The right to a speedy disposition of
cases, as protected under Section 16, Article III
of the Philippine Constitution, is deemed
violated when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
Here, approximately six years have passed from
April 28, 2006, the time the complaint-affidavit
was filed before the Office of Prosecutor, until
March 24, 2012, when the case was filed before
the Sandiganbayan. The length of delay was
unreasonable and inordinate so as to constitute
an outright violation of the speedy disposition
which would result in Dela Cruz’s inability to
adequately prepare for her case and
impairment of her possible defenses. (Zaldivar-
Perez vs. First Division of the Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 204739, November 13, 2019, J.
Hernando)
B. No. It is the duty of the prosecutor to
speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by
the Constitution, regardless of whether the
petitioner did not object to the delay. It is not
for Dela Cruz to ensure that the wheels of
justice continue to turn. Rather, it is for the
5
Ombudsman to guarantee that the case is
disposed of within a reasonable period. It is
sufficient that the constitutional infraction was
raised by Dela Cruz prior to her arraignment
before the Sandiganbayan. (Zaldivar-Perez vs.
First Division of the Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
204739, November 13, 2019, J. Hernando)
C. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the Court
provided certain guidelines to determine
whether the right to speedy disposition of cases
has been violated. The factor that may be
considered and balanced are as follows: (1) The
length of delay; (2) The reasons for the delay;
(3) The assertion or failure to assert such right
by the accused; and (4) The prejudice caused
by the delay. (Zaldivar-Perez vs. First Division
of the Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 204739,
November 13, 2019, J. Hernando)
9. Love, Forty and Ellie were coming from Xylo
at around 3 in the morning of August 4, 1991.
Forty was walking Ellie home along Mahogany
Street in Dasmarinas Village, Makati City when
Joe came up behind them in his car. He stopped
the two and asked for their identification cards.
Ellie and Forty showed them their PRC ID, but
Joe instantly grabbed their wallets. Love, who
was just waiting in the car, came and asked Joe
why he was bothering them. Joe thereafter
took out his gun and shot Love in the chest,
killing her instantly. Afterwards, he also shot
Ellie in the jaw and Forty on the temple before
driving away. Forty died 2 weeks later due to
brain hemorrhages. Joe was charged with the
crime of Murder before the RTC. After trial, Joe
was found guilty as charged and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Joe
was delivered to the National Bilibid Prison on
January 15, 1994. His conviction was later
affirmed by the Supreme Court in a Decision
dated March 10, 1996. On August 19, 2015, Joe
filed a petition for the issuance of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus on the ground that his
continued detention no longer holds legal basis
in view of RA No. 10592 or the Good Conduct
Time Allowance Law. Will Joe's petition
prosper? Explain.
No, Joe’s petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus will
not prosper. Joe failed to observe the principle
of hierarchy of courts. While it is true that the
trial court, the appellate court, and Supreme
Court exercise concurrent jurisdiction over
petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus, this does not mean that parties are
absolutely free to choose before which court to
file their petitions. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
extraordinary writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly, and specifically set out in the
petition. Hence, Joe should have filed the
present petition before the RTC, absent any
showing of special and important reasons
warranting a direct resort to this Court. (Miguel
vs. Director of the Bureau Of Prisons, UDK-
15368, September 15, 2021, J. Hernando)
10. Jennie Kim had two daughters with her
husband, Vee. On June 21, 2021, Jennie
received a text message from her daughter,
Lisa, that Jisoo was arrested and detained in
Barangay 8421, Parañaque City for alleged
theft of an Iphone 14 Promax in the house of a
barangay tanod. On the same day, Jennie was
informed by the barangay that Jisoo was
already released from their custody as
evidenced by the entry in the barangay blotter
signed by Jisoo herself. On the following
month, Jennie reported that her daughter is
missing. Rumors circulated within Barangay
8421 that Jisoo had been extrajudicially killed
and that her body was chopped and thrown to
a river to conceal the incident. As such, Jennie
instituted a petition for the issuance of a writ of
amparo to compel the barangay tanods to
determine the whereabouts of Jisoo, and the
person/s responsible for her disappearance or
possible death. Is the petition meritorious?
No. For the issuance of a writ of amparo, it has
to be shown by substantial evidence that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the
government or a political organization, and that
there is a refusal to acknowledge the same or
to give information on the fate or whereabouts
of the missing person. In the case, Jennie failed
to substantiate any extrajudicial killing or
enforced disappearance since she relied merely
on rumors circulating in their barangay and
speculations that Jisoo’s body was chopped and
thrown to a river. Thus, there is no basis for the
issuance of the writ of amparo. (Morada vs.
6
Rias, G.R. No. 222226, February 14, 2022, J.
Hernando)
11. Lucho was a transferee student from Sulu
to a university in Manila. One night, he told his
brother that he will attend a welcoming rite with
his fraternity brothers in Manila. The next day,
he did not go home and was declared missing.
The family suspects that he was possibly killed
and his fraternity brothers were involved. They
went to report the incident to the police and
claims that there was an enforced
disappearance on the case. Was there enforced
disappearance here? Explain.
No. The elements constituting enforced
disappearance as defined under Republic Act
No. 9851 are as follows: (a) that there be an
arrest, detention, abduction or any form of
deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out
by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization; (c) that it be followed by the State
or political organization's refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the
amparo petition; and (d) that the intention for
such refusal is to remove subject person from
the protection of the law for a prolonged period
of time. The case presented failed to meet any
of the requirements. Hence, Lucho’s family’s
contention is untenable. (Morada vs. Rias, G.R.
No. 222226, February 14, 2022, J. Hernando)
12. The municipality of ONE, through Mayor
Saitama entered into a MOA with DOH, to
implement the Rescue and Emergency Disaster
Program, for purchase of medicines,
equipment, devices, and the likes, for
distribution to municipalities. Its execution and
implementation was coursed through the
municipal government, by virtue of SB
Resolution No. 318-2000. DOH released the
amount of P15M for the program. The
Committee on Awards proceeded with the bids
despite the absence of the provincial auditor. It
recommended the award to Dekupharma and
ShotoDrug, both were approved by Mayor
Saitama. However, on post-audit, a Notice of
Suspension and Notice of Disallowance were
issued by the provincial auditor. It was
uncovered that both companies were owned by
Bakugo, and that Dekupharma had a
suspended accreditation at the time of the
bidding. After preliminary investigation, the
Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause
to indict the municipal officers who conducted
the bidding, including Bakugo, for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Can Bakugo, a private
individual, be held liable under Sec. 3 (e) of R.A.
3019 repressing graft and corrupt practices?
Yes. Private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if
found guilty, held liable under Section 3 of R.A.
3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of
the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of
public officers and private persons alike
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or
which may lead thereto. Here, Bakugo’s
actuations revealed his joint purpose,
concerted action, and concurrence of
sentiments with his co-accused public officials
in-charge of conducting a flawed bidding to
unjustifiably favor his business entities.
(Villanueva vs. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 218652, February 23, 2022, J. Hernando)
13. Tarzan and Atty. Lupisan were charged
with violation of Sec. 3 (a) of RA 3019. It is
alleged that Provincial Legal Officer Lupisan
persuaded, induced, or influenced accused
Senior Jail Officer Tarzan to release from
detention Gulay and Pascual without Court
Order and in violation of existing rules and
regulations. Jail Officer Tarzan argued that the
prosecution failed to prove that he allowed
himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced
by Atty. Lupisan. He asserts that he released
them from detention pursuant to the instruction
of his superior, Toyo, and not by virtue of Atty.
Lupisan’s inducement or influence. Is the
defense of Tarzan tenable?
No, The elements of Section 3 (a) of R.A. 3019
are: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the
offender persuades, induces, or influences
another public officer to perform an act or the
offender allows himself to be persuaded,
induced, or influenced to commit an act; (3) the
act performed by the other public officer or
committed by the offender constitutes a
7
violation of rules and regulations duly
promulgated by competent authority or an
offense in connection with the official duty of
the latter. Here, the prosecution duly
established the existence of the foregoing
elements. First, it is undisputed that Tarzan was
a public officer at the time of the commission of
the crime. Second, the crime of violation of
Section 3 (a) of RA 3019 may be committed in
either of the following modes: (1) when the
offender persuades, induces, or influences
another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations
duly promulgated by competent authority or an
offense in connection with the official duties of
the public officer; or (2) when the public officer
allowed himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced to perform said act which constitutes
a violation of rules and regulations promulgated
by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of the public
officer. The law is clear that the second mode
merely requires that the offender who allowed
himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced, is a public officer, such as Tarzan.
(Marzan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
226167, October 11, 2021, J. Hernando)
14. Viray was the Chief of Subsidiary and
Revenue Section of the DPWH whose duty was
to supervise the recording and control of the
Notice of Cash Allocation issued by the DBM for
the cash requirements of the Office. He was
also vested with authority to sign for the chief
accountant’s Requests for Obligation and
Allotment (ROAs), and Disbursement Vouchers
(DVs) for payment of supplies, materials,
furniture and equipment. Viray approved the
reimbursement of the emergency repair and
purchases of spare parts of a vehicle even when
the spare parts enumerated on the Requisition
for Supplies and Equipment forms (RSEs)
cannot be considered as emergency in nature.
He certified the propriety of the expenditures
and completeness of supporting documents. He
also signed the portion for the Department
Chief Accountant and Recommending Approval
of the voucher even if the funds used for the
four vouchers were charged against the Capital
Outlay Fund which cannot be used for
emergency repairs and purchases of spare
parts. The DPWH found Viray guilty of gross
neglect of duty and was meted the penalty of
dismissal from the service. The CSC affirmed
the findings of the DPWH but held that Viray
was not only liable for gross neglect of duty but
also for grave misconduct. The CA, on the other
hand, found Viray liable only for simple neglect
of duty. What Viray actually approved was a
single ROA containing a summary of several
DVs each with amounts not exceeding
P200,000.00. It therefore cannot be said that
he exceeded his delegated authority.
Nonetheless, Viray was remiss in his duty when
he affixed his signature in the subject ROA
despite the absence of counter-signature of the
requesting authority in the alterations thereon.
Thus, the CA reduced his penalty from dismissal
from service to suspension of three (3) months
and one (1) day without pay. Did Viray’s acts
constitute simple neglect of duty?
No. A public office is a public trust and public
officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people. Here, the nature of
Viray's position requires that he should be
meticulous in the approval of disbursement of
public funds and to be more circumspect in
examining the documents for his approval.
While the amount involved is not humongous
compared to other government transactions,
the fact still remains that taxpayers' money was
spent and at the expense of the government.
Hence, Viray is guilty of gross neglect of duty
as he miserably failed to efficiently and
effectively discharge his functions and
obligations. (CSC v. Beray, G.R. Nos. 191946 &
191974, December 10, 2019, J. Hernando.)
15. On 2017, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP) awarded the contract for the supply and
delivery of finished banknotes to FCOP, a
French firm engaged in private security
printing. FCOP extended an invitation to BSP to
send its representative to witness the
production of the litho and intaglio printed
sheets and approve the same. BSP authorized
respondent Bong to travel to France as BSP's
representative. Bongo, an employee of BSP for
35 years, was tasked to ensure that the quality
of the printed sheets conformed to the BSP's
prescribed specifications for the 100-Piso and
1000-Piso denominations before the start of the
actual production. Unfortunately, it was
discovered that the surname of former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the 100-
8
Piso outsourced notes was misspelled as
"Macapal" instead of "Macapagal." The CSC
found Bongo guilty of gross negligence of duty
and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal
from service, with forfeiture of retirement
benefits, cancellation of civil service eligibility,
and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service, and
bar from taking the Civil Service Exam.
However, the CA modified the penalty from
dismissal from service to suspension for one
year due. The CA ruled that Bongo's length of
service, good faith, and the fact that it was his
first offense served to mitigate his liability. Was
the decision of the CA to reduce the penalty
correct?
No. Gross neglect of duty is a grave offense
under Section 52 (A) (2), Rule I V 19 of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (Uniform Rules). The Uniform
Rules prescribe the penalty of dismissal from
service for gross neglect of duty even if
committed for the first time. In appreciating the
presence of mitigating, aggravating or
alternative circumstances to a given case, two
constitutional principles come into play which
the Court is tasked to balance: public
accountability and the preservation of the
public's faith and confidence in the
government. Length of service cannot be
considered as a mitigating circumstance when
the length of respondent's service itself helped
facilitate the commission of the offense, which
is found to be grave or serious. It was in
consideration of Bongo's extensive experience,
special skills, and relevant expertise that he
acquired by reason of his long years of service
with the BSP that he was chosen for the highly
technical work abroad. He was also not in good
faith as he failed to check the spelling error.
Lastly, his defense of first offense does not
apply. Section 52 (A) (2), Rule IV of the Uniform
Rules and Section 46 (A) (2), Rule 10 of the
Revised Rules clearly state that the grave
offense of gross neglect of duty is punishable
by dismissal, even if committed for the first
time. (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas vs. Bool, G.R.
No. 207522. April 28, 2021, J. Hernando)
16. Marites filed a complaint- affidavit before
the CSC alleging that during the existence of
her marriage with Derek, the latter contracted
a second marriage with Anne on February
1997. Anne held the position of Secretary in the
Standards of the DTI. This prompted Marites
to file a criminal case for Bigamy before the
RTC. Upon arraignment, Anne and Derek
pleaded guilty, resulting to their conviction for
the crime of Bigamy. An administrative case
was initiated in 2002, the CSC found Anne guilty
of the administrative offense of Conviction of a
Crime Involving Moral Turpitude; she is meted
the penalty of dismissal from service, along
with the imposable accessory penalties. It is
well-settled that the crime of Bigamy involves
moral turpitude. Considering that Anne invoked
her length of her service for 20 years and
outstanding performance as a mitigating
circumstance, is the imposition of the penalty
of dismissal from service proper?
Yes. Considering that the administrative case
against petitioner was initiated in 2002, the
applicable rules would be the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS), which was enacted in 1999. The
URACCS provide that the administrative offense
of Conviction of a Crime Involving Moral
Turpitude is a grave offense that is punishable
with dismissal from service upon first
commission. The administrative offense of
Conviction of a Crime Involving Moral Turpitude
is a grave offense, punishable by dismissal from
service. Bigamy cannot be taken lightly as its
commission reflects the person's character.
Here, Anne flagrantly disregarded the law in
marrying Derek despite her knowledge of his
prior and existing marriage. This shows her
moral depravity and casts serious doubt on her
fitness and integrity to continue in the public
service. Hence, Anne's length of service cannot
outweigh her commission and conviction of
Bigamy. Likewise, "first offense" and
"outstanding performance" are not provided in
Section 53 of the URACCS as circumstances
that may be appreciated. (Gonzalbo-
Macatangay vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R.
No. 239995, June 15, 2022, J. Hernando)
17. Urban Sacred Heart (USH) is a health care
institution duly accredited by the PhilHealth.
USH has been providing Philhealth members
the necessary treatments and procedures
9
which are deemed compensable under
PhilHealth rules. However, during the COVID-
19 pandemic, 100 claims remained unacted
upon and 80 claims were denied by the
Philhealth Board. USH thus filed before the RTC
a Complaint against PhilHealth for its failure to
pay or act upon the claims in violation of the
rule mandating that the latter to act on the
claims within 60 calendar days from its receipt.
The RTC noted that USH did not comply with
the procedural rules in pursuing the claim.
Pursuant to RA 7875 the hospital’s recourse
was to file a claim before the Philhealth
Regional Office where the health care provider
operates. If the RO denies or reduces the claim,
the claimant can file a motion for
reconsideration (MR). If the MR is denied, the
claimant can file an appeal with the Protest and
Appeals Review Department (PARD) under the
Philhealth Office of the President and Chief
Executive Officer (OP-CEO). The decision of the
PARD will be considered final and executory,
subject to a judicial appeal under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court. However, the RTC still took
cognizance of the case. On the other hand,
Philhealth argues that USH failed to exhaust
administrative remedies and that the case
should not be considered as an exception to the
doctrine on the exhaustion of administrative
remedies since (a) Philhealth has not decided
on some of USH’s claims and (b) USH did not
allege extraordinary circumstances which
would warrant its exemption. Should the
reimbursement claims of USH be denied for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies?
No. Non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
was justified in light of the denial of its claims
by the Philhealth's Board itself, the body
superior to the RO or the PARD where USH was
supposed to file an MR or appeal. Moreover, the
trial court correctly considered USH's Complaint
as an exception to the application of the
doctrine on exhaustion of administrative
remedies on the basis of strong public interest.
Alternatively, the instant case may also fall
under the following exceptions: (a) "when to
require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable" and (b) "when there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention." (Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation vs. Urdaneta Sacred
Heart Hospital, G.R. No. 214485, January 11,
2021, J. Hernando)
18. The Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City
Government of Onepiece enacted Ordinance
No. 01 for the appropriation of available funds
for the purpose of reorganization or
restructuring of its local departments. Pursuant
thereto, City Mayor Luffy issued AO 11
designating Engineer Zorro as an Acting
Building Official. Aggrieved, Sanji, being the
present City Engineer at the time, filed a
complaint for the declaration of nullity of AO 11
contending that the City Government
overstepped its powers of local legislation by
not making Sanji the head of CBAO.
Further, Sanji alleged that AO suffer
irregularities in its implementation particularly
on the subject of reorganization due to the
absence of legislative act authorizing Mayor
Luffy to effect the same. Can there be a valid
appointment of a local building official that is
separate and distinct from the City or Municipal
Engineer?
Yes. The Court holds that that while city or
municipal engineers shall also act as local
building officials of their respective cities or
municipalities, it is still within the legislative
discretion of city or municipal governments to
create and organize the office of the local
Building Official separate and distinct from the
Office of the City Engineer pursuant to and in
accordance with the provision and limitations
set by law. (Bernardez vs. The City Government
of Baguio, G.R. No. 197559, March 21, 2022, J.
Hernando)
19. Municipality of Eastridge, under then Mayor
Eren, conducted a public bidding for the
rehabilitation and improvement of its municipal
waterworks system project. MOSHY emerged
as the winning bidder. By the end of the year,
MOSHY accomplished more than 50% of the
work essential for the project and expended the
amount of P8M. The present Mayor of Eastridge
by that time was Mayor Armin who refused to
pay the said amount. MOSHY filed a complaint
for the collection of sum of money to the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC). Mayor Eren averred that he was
10
authorized to enter into a contract with MOSHY
in accordance with Municipal Ordinance (MO)
No. 2023-01 or “An Ordinance Appropriating
the Amount of Twenty-Seven Million Pesos
(P27, 000, 000.00) for the Purchase of Heavy
Equipment: One Unit Brand New Road Grader
for the Rehabilitation/Improvement on the
Existing Waterworks System of the [Local
Government Unit]. Such MO was passed by
majority of the quorum of the Sanggunian
members present at the time it was adopted.
On the other hand, Armin asserted that the
contract is not binding because the Municipal
Ordinance was in violation of Article 107(g) of
the IRR of RA 7160 or the LGC of 1991 which
provides that no ordinance or resolution shall
be passed by the Sanggunian without prior
approval of a majority of all the members
present. CIAC, as also affirmed in finality by
the Court, ordered in favor of MOSHY to pay
the said obligation.
A. Is Mayor Eren legally authorized to enter into
a contract with MOSHY pursuant to Municipal
Ordinance No. 2023-01?
B. Assuming that Mayor Eren was not legally
authorized, did the Court err in its decision in
affirming the decision of CIAC for Eastridge to
pay MOSHY?
A. No. The contract between MOSHY and
Eastridge is not valid and binding. In the case
at bar, Mayor Armin asserts that Municipal
Ordinance No. 2023-021, the appropriation
ordinance in question, directs and authorizes
the payment of money; thus, requires a
majority vote of all the members of the
Sangguniang Bayan, not only of the members
present. Hence, the contract between
Eastridge and MOSHY is null and void.
(Municipality of Corella vs. Philkonstrak
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 218663,
February 28, 2022, J. Hernando)
B. No. First, since the CIAC decision as affirmed
by the Court has attained finality, it may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if it be
made by the Court that rendered it or by the
Highest Court of the land. Hence, the CIAC
decision cannot be disturbed under the time-
honored doctrine of immutability of judgment.
Second, Eastridge is obliged to pay MOSHY
based on the principle of quantum meruit. This
legal principle predicated on equity, states that
a person may recover a reasonable value of the
thing he delivered or the service he rendered.
Hence, despite the invalidity of Municipal
Ordinance No. 2023-01, which in turn rendered
the contract between Eastridge and MOSHY,
invalid, the latter is still entitled to receive
payment for the services it rendered for the
local government of Eastridge. Eastridge
cannot be unjustly enriched and allowed to
retain the benefits of the services rendered by
MOSHY without properly paying for it.
(Municipality of Corella vs. Philkonstrak
Development Corporation, G.R. No. 218663,
February 28, 2022, J. Hernando)
20. OIC District Engineer of the DPWH
Zamboanga del Norte 1st Engineering Office,
Dipolog City, along with others, were
administratively charged and dismissed from
government service for splitting of government
contracts by awarding eleven (11) separate
purchase orders to a single supplier, failure to
conduct public bidding as mandated by R.A.
9184, and procured substandard and
overpriced materials. Samantha claimed that
under the SARO, the main project was split into
11 projects, hence the splitting of the contracts.
OMB-Mindanao concluded that there could only
be one procurement/contracts since the
materials to be procured for the 11 projects are
identical and can be supplied by a single
supplier.
A. Is the claim of Samantha tenable?
B. Does RA 9184 and its IRR prohibit or penalize
the splitting of projects into subsections?
A. No. Under Sec. 54.1 of the IRR of R.A. 9184,
splitting of Government Contracts means the
division or breaking up of contracts into smaller
quantities and amounts, or dividing contract
implementation into artificial phases or sub-
contracts for the purpose of evading or
circumventing the requirements of law,
especially the necessity of competitive bidding
and the requirements for the alternative modes
of procurement. Here, since, the materials to
be procured for the project are identical and
can be supplied by a single supplier, hence, any
splitting of the contract will amount to
circumventing or evading legal and procedural
11
requirements under the law. (Miñao vs. Office
of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), G.R. No.
231042, February 23, 2022, J. Hernando)
B. No. RA 9184, including its IRR, does not
prohibit or penalize the splitting of projects into
sub-sections. What the law penalizes is the
splitting of contracts. The government may
enter into contracts with private individuals or
entities for the implementation of several
projects. The current state of laws, however,
prohibit the splitting of contracts in order that
the requirements of the law may not be evaded
or circumvented to suit personal interests in
government procurements. (Miñao vs. Office of
the Ombudsman (Mindanao), G.R. No. 231042,
February 23, 2022, J. Hernando)
21. In 1994, Sec. 25 of Municipal Ordinance 93-
35 or the Revenue Code of the Municipality of
Muntinlupa imposed a franchise tax on private
persons or corporations operating public
utilities within its territorial jurisdiction.
Subsequently, in 1995, Section 56 of RA 7926,
converted the municipality into a highly
urbanized city and adopted all existing
municipal ordinances of the then Municipality of
Muntinlupa. Later, the Municipality of
Muntinlupa demanded franchise tax from
Meralco for the years 1992-1999. However, the
latter contends that the then municipality did
not have the power and authority to impose
and collect a franchise tax.
A. May the Municipality of Muntinlupa collect
franchise tax?
B. What are the requirements for an ordinance
to be valid, legally binding, and enforceable?
C. What are the two (2) tests in determining the
validity of an ordinance?
D. Does MO 93-35 meet the requirements of a
valid ordinance?
A. No. Section 137 of R.A. 7610 provides that
provinces may impose a franchise tax on
businesses granted with a franchise to operate.
Since provinces have been vested with the
power to levy a franchise tax, it follows that
municipalities, pursuant to Section 142 of RA
7160, could no longer levy it. (Manila Electric
Company vs. City of Muntinlupa, G.R. No.
198529, February 9, 2021, J. Hernando)
B. It should: (1) be NOT contrary to the
Constitution or any statute: (2) be NOT unfair
or oppressive; (3) be NOT partial or
discriminatory; (4) NOT prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) NOT unreasonable.
(Manila Electric Company vs. City of
Muntinlupa, G.R. No. 198529, February 9,
2021, J. Hernando)
C. Formal and Substantive Tests. Formal Test
requires the determination of whether the
ordinance was enacted within the corporate
powers of the LGU, and whether the same was
passed pursuant to the procedure laid down by
law. Meanwhile, the Substantive Test primarily
assesses the reasonableness and fairness of the
ordinance and significantly its compliance with
the Constitution and existing statutes. (Manila
Electric Company vs. City of Muntinlupa, G.R.
No. 198529, February 9, 2021, J. Hernando)
D. No. Applying the Formal Test, the passage
of the subject ordinance was beyond the
corporate powers of the then Municipality of
Muntinlupa, hence, ultra vires. While
ordinances, just like other laws and statutes,
enjoy the presumption of validity, they may be
struck down and set aside when their invalidity
or unreasonableness is evident on the face or
has been established in evidence. Based on the
Substantive Test, Section 25 deviated from the
express provision of RA 7160. Section 142 in
relation to Sections 134, 13 7 and 151 of RA
7160 vesting to the provinces and cities the
power to impose, levy, and collect a franchise
tax. Muntinlupa being then a municipality
definitely had no power or authority to enact
the subject franchise tax ordinance. (Manila
Electric Company vs. City of Muntinlupa, G.R.
No. 198529, February 9, 2021, J. Hernando)
12