Design methodologies for

smoke and heat exhaust

ventilation

H P Morgan
B K Ghosh
G Garrad
BRE FRS R Pamlitschka
J-C De Smedt
L R Schoonbaert
Photo acknowledgements
Front cover photo courtesy of:
Brussels International Airport
Company (BIAC)

Plates courtesy of:

Colt: Plates 1, 3, 5 and 6
Cooper Group: Plate 4
IFSET: Plates 2, J1, J2, J3 and J4
 BRE
Garston, Watford
WD2 7JR

Design methodologies
for smoke and heat
exhaust ventilation

H P Morgan BSc, PhD, C Phys, M lnst P, F IFire E

B K Ghosh MSc, BA, C Phys, M lnst P, Dip Math

G Garrad BSC, MSc

DipI Ing R Pamlitschka (Colonel)

J-C De Smedt A I Fire E

Ing L R Schoonbaert DipI CFPA, A I Fire E

BRE FRS
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BR 368
ISBN 1 86081 289 9

© Copyright BRE 1999

First published 1999

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Front cover photo:

Hot-smoke test at Brussels
Airport, Belgium

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 iii

Foreword

Use by fire engineers of smoke and heat exhaust ventilation systems (SHEVS as they have become
known) has grown in recent years. It is therefore welcome that this guide has been produced
which provides the fire engineer with assessment design methodologies for the use of these
systems. SHEVS require the most careful design prior to introduction. It is important however to
ensure, as with all fire-engineering designs, that due regard is taken over issues such as escape time
and fire growth since these features provide the base upon which the design parameters can be
made.
It is also important that due regard be ultimately made regarding the maintenance of any
systems installed and current guidance, primarily within the British Standards Institution’s DD240
Fire safety engineering in buildings. DD240 has introduced the overall design process which the fire
engineer should consider. DD240 also makes it clear that caution is necessary and that all options
have to be considered before entering into a particular design process. SHEVS is one of those
options and this book therefore provides comprehensive identification of the issues which need
consideration. It is particularly important to pay attention, as the document outlines, to the
restrictions of computer software modelling programs, as it is also for the fire engineer to
recognize there are limitations as to what any systems (and that includes SHEVS) can achieve.
With these thoughts in mind, this book provides a most useful and comprehensive review of
current thinking regarding SHEVS design methodologies for utilization by the fire engineer.

D T Davis OBE QFSM CEng FIFireE CIMgt

HM Chief Inspector of Fire Services for Scotland
1 June 1999
iv

Preface

This guide summarizes the advice available from the Fire Research Station, to designers of Smoke
and Heat Exhaust Ventilation Systems (SHEVS) for atria and other buildings. It builds upon
currently available published advice (especially BRE Report Design approaches for smoke control in
[13]
atrium buildings , but also BRE Report Design principles for smoke ventilation in enclosed shopping
[24]
centres ), by including more guidance on the use of the methods given, and by including the
results of research carried out since the publication of ref. [13] in 1994. In particular, the use of a
design fire size is considered in more detail, including:
• a discussion of growing fires,
• formulae and calculation methods to determine the deflection of smoke curtains in fire
situations so that the specification of smoke curtains can become part of the SHEVS design,
• the effects due to airflow on the efficiency of natural smoke exhaust ventilators and on the
stability of smoke layers.

This guide does not consider the scenario where a fire in a room connecting to an atrium causes a
flame plume to rise into the atrium. In this context, any large space adjoining the fire room may be
considered to be an atrium, eg malls in shopping complexes.
A discussion is included of the factors which need to be considered when specifying the
hardware (ventilators, smoke curtains, etc.) required to implement the design in a building.
Some advice is also included on:
• factors to be considered in installing the system in buildings,
• how to test the functioning of the equipment separately and as a complete system once it has
been installed, and
• ‘good practice’ measures involving the management and maintenance of the system when the
building is in everyday use.

The purpose of this book therefore is to provide practical guidance on the design of smoke-control
systems. It reflects current knowledge and is based on the results of research where available,
including as yet unpublished results of experiments. In addition, it draws on the authors’
cumulative experience of design features required for regulatory purposes in many individual
smoke-control applications. Many of these design features have evolved over several years by
consensus between regulatory authorities, developers and fire scientists, rather than by specific
research.
The methodology underpinning the book is explicitly empirical in approach and can easily be
extended to most buildings. Where guidance is necessary to address practical design issues but
there are gaps in the established knowledge-base, the authors have exercised their professional
judgement in offering conservative, pragmatic advice. When guidance is offered in these
circumstances any potential weaknesses are made explicit. Related to this is the continuance of the
[13,24]
philosophy used in the book’s predecessor BRE Reports that even where a document is
difficult to obtain, or even verbal private communication is the source of advice, it is listed as a
reference.

HPM, BKG, GG, RP, J-C De S, LRS

June 1999
 V

About the authors

Howard P Morgan
Principal Consultant, Fire Protection Systems Centre,
Fire Research Station (FRS), BRE
Head, FRS (Asia) Centre
Technical Director, FRS/lFSET (Asia) Ltd, Hong Kong

Fire Research Station, BRE, Bucknalls Lane, Garston,

Watford, WD2 7JR, UK

Email: morganh@bre.co.uk

Bijoy Ghosh
Senior Fire Consultant, Fire Research Station (FRS),
BRE

Fire Research Station, BRE, Bucknalls Lane, Garston,

Watford WD2 7JR, UK

Email: ghoshb@bre.co.uk

Gordon Garrad
Fire Scientist, Fire Research Station (FRS), BRE

Fire Research Station, BRE, Bucknalls Lane, Garston,

Watford, WD2 7JR, UK

Email: garradg@bre.co.uk
vi About the authors
Colonel R Pamlitschka
Head of Fire Prevention Department, Professional Fire
Service, Vienna, Austria
Head of Smoke-Control Department, Prüfstelle für
Brandschutztechnik des Österreichischen
Bundesfeuerwehrverbandes, Austria

CO Ma. 68, Hauptfeuerwache Mariahilf,

Gumpendorfer Gurtel 2, A-1060 Wien, Austria

Jean-Claude De Smedt
Managing Director/Principal Consultant, International
Fire Safety Engineering Technology (IFSET), Belgium
Managing Director, FRS/IFSET (Asia) Ltd, Hong Kong

NV IFSET SA, Stationsstraat 35, B-1730 ASSE,

Belgium

Email: jcds@ifset.com

Lieven R Schoonbaert
Senior Consultant, International Fire Safety Engineering
Technology (IFSET), Belgium
Director, FRS/lFSET (Asia) Ltd, Hong Kong

NV IFSET SA, Stationsstraat 35, B-1730 ASSE,

Belgium

Email: ls@ifset.com
 vii

Contents

Foreword iii
Preface iv
About the authors v
Contents vii
Abbreviations xii
Nomenclature xiii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 The hazards of smoke 1
1.2 The regulatory background 1
1.3 The role of smoke and heat exhaust ventilation 2
1.4 Smoke and heat exhaust ventilation as a part of fire safety engineering 2
1.5 A brief history of smoke ventilation 4
1.6 The atrium: description and behaviour in fire 5
1.7 Active control of the fire 6
1.8 Implementation of a smoke and heat exhaust system in a building 7
1.9 The purpose of this book and its relationship to earlier guidance 8
Chapter 2 General principles of smoke production, 10
movement and control
2.1 Fire growth and smoke production 10
2.2 Pressurization and depressurization 12
2.3 Throughflow ventilation (or smoke exhaust ventilation) 12
2.4 Smoke and heat exhaust design philosophies 13
Chapter 3 Design-fire size 14
3.1 General 14
3.2 Growing design fires 15
3.3 Steady-state design fires 16
3.4 Acceptable failure rates 19
Chapter 4 Escape times 20
Chapter 5 Smoke control on the storey of fire origin 22
5.1 Within the fire room 22
5.1.1 Plumes above large fires 22
5.1.2 Plume above small fires 24
viii Contents

5.1.3 Effects of adjacent walls on entrainment into the plume 25

5.1.4 Effects of sprinkler 25
5.2 The flow of hot gases out of the room of origin into 25
a taller adjacent space (eg an atrium or mall)
5.3 Ventilation of single-storey smoke reservoirs 27
(including the balcony space where smoke is contained
and exhausted from beneath a balcony)
5.4 Smoke layer temperature 28
5.5 Effects of sprinkler systems in smoke reservoirs 30
5.6 Flowing layer depth 30
5.7 Local deepening 31
5.8 Automatic smoke curtains 31
5.9 Inlet air 32
5.10 Minimum number of exhaust points 34
5.11 Throughflow ventilation: area of natural ventilation required 35
5.12 Natural ventilators and wind effects 35
5.13 Required ventilation rate (powered exhaust) 37
5.14 Slit extract 37
5.15 False ceilings 37
5.16 The use of a plenum chamber above a false ceiling 38
5.17 Maximum dimensions for smoke reservoirs 38
Chapter 6 Smoke ventilation within multistorey spaces (eg the atrium) 39
6.1 Smoke movement in the atrium 39
6.2 Channelling screens 40
6.3 Entrainment into ‘spill plumes’ rising through the atrium 42
6.3.1 The effective height of rise from the spill edge 42
to the smoke layer base
6.3.2 Entrainment calculation methods 44
6.3.3 Recommendations for selecting a spill plume formula 49
6.4 High temperature plume 49
6.5 Fires on the atrium floor 50
6.6 Throughflow ventilation: remaining design procedures 50
6.7 Limitations to the use of throughflow ventilation 50
Chapter 7 Alternative forms of smoke control for atria 53
(including multistorey malls but excluding throughflow ventilation)
7.1 Void filling 53
7.2 Compartment separation 53
7.3 Depressurization ventilation 53
7.3.1 Principles 53
7.3.2 Natural depressurization 54
7.3.3 Natural depressurization and wind effects 57
7.3.4 Powered depressurization 58
Chapter 8 Depressurization/smoke ventilation hybrid designs 59
Chapter 9 Atrium smoke layer temperature 61
Chapter 10 Additional design factors 64
10.1 Atrium roof-mounted sprinkler systems 64
10.2 Controlled fire load on the atrium base 64
 Contents ix

10.3 Air-conditioned atria 64

10.4 Channelling screens and hybrid systems 65
10.5 Wind-sensing devices 65
10.6 Crossdraught within the atrium 65
10.7 Crossflow within the gas layer 65
10.8 Wind effects on horizontal ventilators 66
Chapter 11 Interactions with other systems in the building 67
11.1 Sprinklers 67
11.1.1 Automatic sprinklers 67
11.1.2 Automatic smoke exhaust ventilation 67
11.1.3 Sprinklers combined with smoke ventilation 67
11.2 Fire-detection systems 69
11.3 Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)/ 69
Air Conditioning and Mechanical Ventilation (ACMV)
11.4 Pressurization of stairwells and lobbies 70
11.5 Lighting and signage 70
11.6 Public address and voice alarm systems 70
11.7 Security 70
11.8 Computerized building control systems 71
Chapter 12 SHEVS and the fire services 72
12.1 General 72
12.2 Design objectives for SHEVS and implications for the design-fire 72
as a basis for design
12.2.1 Fundamental fire-fighting objectives 72
12.2.2 Design objectives for SHEVS in connection 73
with fire-fighting objectives
12.3 Circumstances which reduce or impede the ability of a SHEVS 76
to assist fire-fighting operations
12.3.1 Factors adversely affecting successful intervention 77
by the fire services
12.3.2 Additional provisions for optimizing the effective use 77
of a smoke-free layer created by a SHEVS
for fire-fighting operations
12.4 Circumstances where a SHEVS is of minor benefit 77
for fire-fighting operations
12.5 Circumstances where SHEVS are not applicable 78
12.5.1 Premises with risk of fast-growing fires 78
12.5.2 Premises which must not be entered in case of fire 78
because of other prevailing hazards
13 Selection of equipment 79
13.1 General 79
13.2 Natural smoke and heat exhaust ventilators 80
13.2.1 Time taken to come into full operation 80
13.2.2 Coefficient of performance 80
13.2.3 Resistance to heat 81
13.2.4 Opening under load: snow 81
13.2.5 Opening under load: side-wind 81
x Contents

13.2.6 Low ambient temperature 82

13.2.7 Reliability 82
13.2.8 Ability to resist wind suction 82
13.2.9 Ability to resist rain penetration 82
13.3 Powered smoke and heat exhaust ventilators 82
13.3.1 Time to come into full operation 82
13.3.2 Resistance to heat 83
13.3.3 Opening under load: snow 83
13.3.4 Opening under load: wind 83
13.3.5 Low ambient temperature 83
13.3.6 Reliability 83
13.4 Automatic smoke curtains 83
13.4.1 Time to deploy to the fire-operational position 83
13.4.2 Speed of fall of bottom bar 83
13.4.3 Resistance to high temperature 83
13.4.4 Reliability 84
13.4.5 Fail-safe 84
13.5 Air inlets and doors 84
13.6 Smoke dampers 84
13.7 Smoke ducts 84
Chapter 14 Installation 86
Chapter 15 Acceptance testing (commissioning) 89
15.1 General 89
15.2 Testing and commissioning 89
15.3 Hot-smoke tests 91
Chapter 16 Maintenance, management and re-testing 92
Chapter 17 Some common mistakes in the design of smoke ventilation systems 94
17.1 Mis-location of the point source of a ‘point-source’ smoke plume 94
17.2 Inadequate specification of smoke curtains 94
17.3 Installation does not follow design 94
17.4 Mis-use of computer models 94
17.5 Mistaken perceptions of conflict between 95
active and passive fire precautions
Chapter 18 Smoke ventilation design and enforcement of regulations 96
Chapter 19 Acknowledgements 97
Chapter 20 References 98
Annex A: Design procedure with a growing design fire 101
Annex B: Design procedure with a steady-state design fire 103
Annex C: Deflection of smoke curtains 106
Annex D: A comparison of different spill-plume calculation methods 109
Annex E: User’s guide to BRE spill-plume calculations 112
Annex F: 1977 fire at IMF building, Washington DC (based on reference [18]) 117
Annex G: Design procedure for hybrid systems 119
 Contents xi

Annex H: Effect of a buoyant layer on the minimum pressure 120

recommended for a pressure differential system
Annex I: Aspects of hot-smoke tests to confirm the performance of SHEVS 121
Annex J: Case history – smoke-control design in ‘D3 Espace Leopold 123
Building’, European Parliament, Brussels
xii

Abbreviations

ACMV Air conditioning and mechanical ventilation

BRE Building Research Establishment Limited
BS British Standard
BSI British Standards Institution
CEA Comité Européen des Assurances
CEN Comité Européen de Normalisation
CFD Computational fluid dynamics
Eqn Equation
FRG Fire-resisting glazing
FRS Fire Research Station
HST Hot-smoke test
HVAC Heating, ventilation and air conditioning
IFSET International Fire Safety Engineering Technology
NIST National Institute for Standards and Technology (USA)
NPP Neutral pressure plane
RTI Response time index
SHEVS Smoke and heat exhaust ventilation system
 xiii

Nomenclature

Note: An additional Nomenclature list can be found in Annex E

A Function defined by Eqn (7.3)

Af Area of the fire (m2)
Ag Area of the gaps between smoke curtains, or between curtain and structure (m2)
Ai Area of inlet (measured) (m2)
Ares Plan area of smoke reservoir (m2)
Av Area of exhaust ventilator (measured) (m2)
Aw Area of opening (window), eg between a side-room and an atrium (m2)
c Specific heat of air (kJkg-1K-1)
C A constant (kgms-1kW-1/3)
Cd Coefficient of discharge for a vertical opening
Cdo Cd for flows out of an opening where a balcony or canopy projects beyond the opening
Cds Cd for flows at a spill edge.
Ce Entrainment coefficient in ‘Large-fire plume model’
Ci Coefficient of discharge (ie the performance coefficient) for an inlet
Cm Dimensionless entrainment coefficient, found experimentally to be 0.44 for a free plume,
and 0.21 for an adhered plume
Cn A constant in Zukoski’s small-fire plume model[43]
Cp Wind pressure coefficient
Cpi Wind pressure coefficient acting on an inlet
CpL Wind pressure coefficient acting on the leeward side of building
Cpv Wind pressure coefficient acting on an exhaust ventilator
Cv Coefficient of discharge (ie the performance coefficient) for an exhaust ventilator
dc Horizontal deflection of a smoke curtain, measured at its bottom bar (m)
dl Visible depth of smoke layer in the smoke reservoir (m)
d0 Depth of an opening between an atrium and a side-room,
measured from top to bottom of that opening (m)
d2 Effective depth of smoke layer – only used as part of spill plume entrainment calculation (m)
D Depth of smoke beneath an exhaust point (m)
DB Depth of a smoke layer under a balcony (m)
Dd Depth of a downstand fascia (m)
Df Diameter of fire (m)
Dl Design depth of a smoke layer in a reservoir (m)
Dw Depth of a flowing smoke layer in a vertical opening (m)
Dmax Maximum depth of smoke in an atrium (m)
(Note: This can either be to the floor, or the maximum allowable in a
hybrid SHEVS/depressurization design)
Dmin Minimum allowable smoke layer depth in a hybrid SHEVS/depressurization design (m)
g Acceleration due to gravity (ms-2)
h Height of the top of a vertical opening/window above the base of the fire inside the room (m)
hb Height of rise of a thermal line plume from an opening or balcony edge to the smoke layer (m)
hp Height of rise of leakage gases from the base of the hot gas layer in the smoke reservoir to the ceiling
in the adjacent protected area (m)
H Height of a vertical opening (m)
Ha Height of the atrium (m)
Hc Height to the ceiling (m)
L Channelling screen separation; also length of a spill edge (m)
(Note: L = W for a spill plume rising directly above an opening)
xiv Nomenclature
Lc Length of the smoke curtain from top to bottom bar, measured along the fabric (m)
M Mass flow rate (kgs-1)
Mb Mass per metre length of the curtain’s bottom bar (kgm-1)
Mc Mass per m2 of the curtain fabric (kgm-2)
MCRIT Critical exhaust rate at an exhaust point prior to the onset of ‘plugholing’ (kgs-1)
Me Mass flow rate of smoky gases exhausted from the smoke reservoir (kgs-1)
(Note: Usually Me = MI)
Mf Mass flow rate in the plume above the fire (kgs-1)
Mg Mass of gas flowing through the gap between smoke curtains, or between curtain and structure (kgs-1)
MB Mass flow rate under a balcony (kgs-1)
Ml Mass flow rate entering a smoke layer in a reservoir (kgs-1)
Mp Mass of gas flowing into gas layer in protected area, having leaked through gaps in smoke curtains (kgs-1)
Mw Mass flow rate flowing through a vertical opening (kgs-1)
n An integer used to identify one stage in an iterative process
N Number of exhaust points
P Perimeter of fire (m)
q Heat release rate (kW)
qf Heat release rate per unit fire area (kWm-2)
Q Heat flux (kW)
Qf Convective heat flux in the gases after the initial flame plume (kW)
Qw Convective heat flux passing through a vertical opening (or under a balcony) (kW)
r A function defined by Eqn (H.1)
t time after ignition (s)
T Absolute temperature of gases (K)
TB Mass-weighted average absolute temperature of gas layer under a balcony (K)
Tc Maximum value of absolute temperature in a layer beneath a ceiling or soffit (K)
Tl Mass-weighted average absolute temperature of gas layer in a reservoir (K)
Tc Absolute ambient temperature (K)
Vwind Wind velocity at the same height as the top of the building (m s-1)
V Volumetric flow rate of gases (m3s-1)
VI Volumetric flow rate of gases exhausted from a reservoir (m3s-1)
W Width of vertical opening (m)
WB Width of balcony (distance from vertical opening to front edge of balcony) (m)
Wv Characteristic width of the ventilator/exhaust point (m)
x Height from the base of the smoke layer to the NPP (m)
Xp Effective height of rise of a spill plume (m)
y Height above the top of the fuel to the smoke layer immediately above (m)
y0 Height of the virtual origin of the plume measured above the top of the burning fuel (m)
(Note: This usually takes a negative value)
yNPP Height above the NPP in a smoke layer (m)
Y Height from the base of the fire to the smoke layer immediately above (m)
Y0 Height above the base of the fire to the virtual origin of the smoke plume (m)
(Note: This usually takes a negative value)
ß Coefficient in critical exhaust rate eqn (kgm-3)
γ A constant defining the steepness of a time-squared fire growth curve (kWs-2)
δM Entrainment rate into both free ends of a spill plume (kgs-1)
∆ Empirical height of virtual source below a spill edge (m)
∆ DB Additional smoke depth due to local deepening (m)
∆ Py Buoyant pressure rise above ambient at a height y NPP above the NPP (Pa)
θ Temperature rise above ambient of smoky gases (°C)
θB Temperature rise above ambient of smoky gases under a balcony (°C)
θl Temperature rise above ambient of smoky gases in a reservoir (°C)
θw Temperature rise above ambient of smoky gases in a vertical opening (°C)
ρ Density of gases (kgm-3)
ρo Density of ambient air (kgm-3)

1 Introduction
1.1 The hazards of smoke
In the context of fire the term smoke is used to describe
liquid and/or solid particulates produced by combustion
of fuel materials, suspended in a mixture of air and
gaseous products of combustion, including steam. It is
thus convenient to use the word ‘smoke’ to include both
the particulate and the gaseous products, including any
air which is entrained into the fire plume and into
subsequent smoke flows.
The gaseous combustion products usually include
toxic gases, the most common in building fires being
carbon monoxide, although hydrogen cyanide and other
toxic gases might be present to some extent; irritants such
as Acrolein; and relatively harmless products such as
water and carbon dioxide. Smoke particles themselves
can be irritants, and can be particularly dangerous to
people who are subject to asthma or other respiratory
problems. The reduction in oxygen due to combustion
can itself be dangerous in some situations, and can result
in the suffocation of victims trapped in smoke. The heat
in the gases due to combustion is also potentially
hazardous, either to people who might be immersed in
the hot gases or by heat radiation from the hot smoky
gases if the gas temperature is high enough.
The reduction in visibility in smoke also represents a
severe hazard. It hampers evacuation and the rescuing of
disabled or injured occupants of buildings as well as
affecting fire-fighting operations which can result in large
fires involving serious threat to lives and the
environment.
In general, if the visibility through the smoke is
sufficient or the emergency exits are visible to the
escapees, the toxic products will not stop those people
from escaping to safety. In practice this means that either
the smoky gas must be diluted with sufficient clean air to
achieve a safe visibility (typically of 10 m which has come
into widespread use internationally, although it has a very
weak scientific basis, and should only be regarded as
approximate), or there should be a physical separation
between the smoky gases and the people at risk. Note
that the direct products of combustion may need to be
diluted by more than one thousand times by volume to
achieve a safe visibility.
1
Smoke is potentially lethal. It is a well established fact
that in the UK most deaths from fires are due to smoke
inhalation rather than to the victim having been burned.
However, the majority of these deaths occur in dwellings.
Deaths from fires in other premises are relatively
infrequent. This implies that the life-safety measures
required by legislation for most public and commercial
buildings have been effective on the whole.
1.2 The regulatory background
Each country in the world has its own approach to the
creation and enforcement of regulations covering the
topic of safety in fire. Each has its own history by which it
developed that approach. In this section we focus on the
UK, in view of its early and continuing development of
fire regulations.
Fire safety in buildings must, in the UK, conform to the
relevant regulations (eg guidance for England and Wales
is given in Approved Document B [1]). The principal
objective of these regulations is to safeguard life by:
• reducing the potential for fire initiation,
• controlling fire propagation and spread,
• the provision of adequate means of escape for the
building’s occupants.
Means of escape in case of fire was first introduced to the
Building Regulations for England and Wales in 1973. Prior
to that date the powers of control in England and Wales
over means of escape had been contained in other
legislation[2-4].
Historically, the prevention of fire growth within (or
between) buildings has been achieved by the
containment of the fire and its products, by means of
compartmentation and/or separation. The design of
structural compartmentation and separation has been
largely empirical and the concepts gradually refined and
enhanced in such a way that the Building Regulations
now cover primarily life-safety and the protection of
means of escape. It is necessary to consider four major
aspects of buildings – purpose, size, separation and
resistance to fire – to promote safe design.
Smoke and heat exhaust ventilation does not appear
directly in the UK’s regulations, except in some Local
2 Design methodologies for SHEVS
Acts. It has formed part of the recognized package of
measures needed to merit a Relaxation from the Building
Regulations for shopping malls since 1972[5]; and at the
time of writing has become an indirect requirement of
Approved Document B [1], which requires that new malls
in England and Wales comply with British Standard
BS 5588: Part 10[6] which in turn requires that malls
should have smoke ventilation as an essential part of their
safety provisions. It is expected that a similar link will be
established between future editions of Approved
Document B and British Standard BS 5588: Part 7 for
atria [7] .
Several other countries have legislation concerning the
protection of property in case of fire – especially that
property neighbouring an object on fire – and the
protection of the environment (eg air pollution and/or
contamination of water and soil) which will be
endangered if a fire is likely to reach an unmanageably
large size.
1.3 The role of smoke and heat exhaust
ventilation
This book focuses on the use of smoke and heat exhaust
ventilation, rather than other forms of smoke control
such as smoke control using pressure differentials
(although it does also discuss the need to allow for the
interactions between such systems when designing).
As mentioned in section 1.1, the combustion products
from building content fires may require a very large
dilution to achieve a safe visibility. With typically smoky
fuels such as many polymers this dilution can reach one
thousand times the initial volume of combustion gases.
This is difficult to achieve for the size of fire we typically
have to consider in designing fire safety measures, and is
rarely a feasible option – but it may be possible where the
design fire is small, and the building volume is large.
Physical separation of smoke and people is
conventionally achieved using walls and doors, and is
specified in the regulations of most countries, differing
only in details. This approach cannot, by definition, be
used where the people (or property, or escape routes)
being protected from smoke are in the same undivided
space as the fire; and in many modern buildings, large
undivided spaces are used to improve the appearance and
environmental ventilation. It is this scenario where
smoke and heat exhaust ventilation is of value. The
principles are very simple. Hot, buoyant gases from a fire
rise to form a stable layer in a reservoir below the ceiling
such that a cooler clear layer of sufficient height may be
present for long enough to achieve safe evacuation of
occupants. Often it is necessary to vent the smoke from
the reservoir using a natural or mechanical exhaust. In
this book such a Smoke and Heat Exhaust Ventilation
System will be referred to using the acronym SHEVS.
It is rare to find circumstances where a SHEVS is
required within a small room. It is usually sufficient in
such circumstances to ensure safety by a combination of
fire-resisting compartmentation, sufficiently short travel
distances for escape, and measures for detecting the fire
in an early stage and alerting the occupants of the
building. It should be noted, however, that
compartmentation may not be sufficient by itself to assist
fire fighting. Facilities to remove smoke and heat may be
of benefit for fire fighting operations, and in some cases a
reduction of compartmentation may be inevitable as a
result of fire fighting practice (eg smoke may spread out
of a small room into a number of other rooms through
door openings held open by fire hoses). The assessment
of suitable facilities to remove smoke and heat from such
small rooms and their neighbouring spaces during and
after extinguishing procedures will be a case-by-case
decision in accordance with the experience and training
of fire fighters, and not as a result of calculation. These
precautions for removing smoke and heat are not within
the scope of this book.
A SHEVS is more likely to be advantageous in a larger
room, such as an exhibition hall, shopping mall, or a
factory, where there is no internal compartmentation and
where the travel distances are appreciable.
A SHEVS is no different in principle whether designed
for a large single-storey space which is essentially a large
box (eg many factories, or exhibition halls), or for a
complicated (but undivided) space containing many
storeys of balconies or mezzanine levels with potential
fire locations in rooms to the side of but open to the main
space. As can be seen below, the former can be regarded
as a special case of the latter.
1.4 Smoke and heat exhaust ventilation as
a part of fire safety engineering
Every fire is a chemical and physical process producing
energy (mainly heat) and smoky gases as well as other
less hazardous products. Therefore, every fire prevention
concept must have the same main objectives:
• to avoid ignition and thus the outbreak of a fire at all,
• to protect human beings, goods, the building and the
environment from the hazardous effects of the
products of the fire (eg heat and smoke) as long as they
are still being produced by the fire,
• to hamper and finally stop the production of heat and
smoke (ie to extinguish the fire).
Any fire prevention concept therefore should be a
composite of well-selected measures being in tune with
each other, and which hamper or stop the production of
heat and smoke, and/or which protect the objects which
are intended to be protected (people, property, etc.) by
separating them from smoke and heat. Where this last
cannot be fully achieved, the purpose must be to diminish
the effects on the protected people and/or objects.
These relationships are illustrated in Figure 1. The
thick arrows represent those influences which diminish
the production of smoke and heat; or which reduce their
effects; or which keep the hazardous products of
combustion away from the endangered people or objects
to be protected. The thin arrows show the interactions
 1 Introduction 3

INFLUENCES
STRUCTURAL (PASSIVE)
FIRE PRECAUTIONS TECHNICAL FIRE
Fire resistant structures for PRECAUTIONS
compartments, means of escape, fire detection systems,
access routes, combustibility of structure extinguishing and fire suppression
and equipment systems,
fix installed fire fighting equipment
(eg risers, hydrants)

Limitation of fuel,
preventing the spread Reduction of fire
of products of duration, limitation
combustion of volume on fire
and amount of
products of
combustion
INFLUENCES

INFLUENCES
FIRE
chemical / physical FIRE FIGHTING
process
OPERATIONS

PRODUCTS OF
COMBUSTION

HEAT SMOKE
fire spread heat transfer
thermal stress to toxic affects
structure corrosion

Reduction of fire duration Reduction of effect of

smoke and heat by
removing them

ORGANISATIONAL FIRE
PRECAUTIONS SMOKE AND HEAT EXHAUST
trained staff for first fire fighting operations VENTILATION SYSTEM
and/or evacuation intervening plans, (SHEVS)
provision of extinguishing agents

INFLUENCES
Figure 1 The role of SHEVS in Fire Safety Engineering

between the different activities which produce those
influences.
Figure 1 demonstrates that any SHEVS exists within a
much more comprehensive fire prevention concept.
Structural (passive) fire precautions separate what is
protected (eg people, goods) from the products of
combustion (eg smoke and heat) by structural means. In
most cases this means that the relevant structure will be
fire resisting. This form of protection implies that
everything inside a fire compartment may be lost if no
further active measures to extinguish the fire take place or
cannot be performed; these active measures can include
an attack by the fire services. People have to be able to
leave the compartment which is on fire and reach either a
structurally protected safe place, or the exterior of the
building, in a sufficiently short time if they are to be safe.
A SHEVS can remove the hazardous products of
combustion, smoke and heat, from the compartment and
can separate the objects and/or people to be protected
from smoke and heat already inside the compartment, at
least until the fire has reached a certain size (design-fire
size) wherever the SHEVS has been designed to create a
smoke-free layer beneath a buoyant smoky layer.
Because of this smoke-free layer, fire-fighting operations
can be performed more easily by the fire services, which
will control and stop production of smoke and heat more
quickly and lessen their effect on any people and goods
remaining in the building. It follows from this, that there
is a close correlation between the effect of a SHEVS and
possible fire-fighting measures, including the effect of the
latter on the likely design-fire size (see Note 1, next page),
which in turn influences the design of a SHEVS.
Technical fire precautions mainly affect the reduction of
the time between ignition and the fire being attacked
4 Design methodologies for SHEVS
successfully, thus preventing further growth.
• Automatic fire suppression or extinguishing systems,
eg sprinklers, attack the fire directly.
• Automatic fire detection systems (especially smoke
detection systems) shorten the time until successful
fire fighting operations can be performed. This is
especially true where the fire services are called
automatically on the operation of the detection
system. Note that where the automatic smoke
detection system triggers the SHEVS, the fire-fighting
approach and attack are supported by the smoke-free
layer created by the SHEVS by calling the fire services
at a very early stage of fire development. Such
detection systems also alert occupants of a building
who in turn may be able (supported by a smoke-free
layer due to an effective SHEVS) to attack an
automatically detected, and usually therefore still
small, fire themselves with technical fire precautions
such as the portable extinguishers or hosereels
provided in the building, even before the fire brigade is
on site.
In this way, SHEVS interact with technical fire
precautions and fire-fighting operations, which together
have the potential to influence the design-fire size. It has
to be admitted, however, that the effectiveness of first-aid
fire fighting by the occupants of a building is questionable
in many cases, and should not be considered when
assessing the design fire. Nevertheless, the effectiveness
of a fire-fighting approach can be improved if trained staff
familiar with fire-fighting techniques and the technical
fire precautions are present and are supported by an
effective SHEVS.
This leads to organizational fire precautions, which are a
part of the Fire Safety Management arrangements for a
building. These include:
• trained staff to:
– start fire fighting (eg ‘Works Fire Brigades’), and/or
– manage evacuation, and/or
– assist fire-fighting activities performed by the fire
brigade (eg by delivering all information needed
about usage and population of the building, critical
items inside the building, technical building
equipment including technical fire precautions and
their intended function);
• intervention plans, including such provisions for
emergency management as:
– fire prevention plans of the building, or
– fixed installed communication devices, or
– extinguishing agents in store ready for use by the fire
services (especially if distinctive agents are to be
used for certain fuels present, which must not be
attacked by plain water);
Note:
The concept of the design fire is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. For the present purpose,
where a SHEVS is designed to assist operational fire-fighting, the design-fire size is the most
pessimistic but still realistic assumption of an area, or more precisely of a volume, involved in the
fire and producing a certain amount of heat, when the extinguishing measures (the attack on the
fire by the fire services) become successful so that the fire does not grow any larger.
• the
organizational precautions for assisting evacuation of
building which may include:
– acoustic guidance systems or
– trained evacuation staff.
All these organizational fire precautions will assist fire-
fighting operations because they allow more of the fire
brigade resources to concentrate on extinguishing
operations with fewer or no crews having to be employed
in searching or rescuing people.
All the precautions listed above, technical and
organizational, enhance an early successful attack on the
fire. Thus, the hazard caused by the products of
combustion (smoke and heat) to people, the building and
its environment is diminished.
It has to be born in mind, however, that the
effectiveness of all the precautions listed above benefit
considerably from the creation of a smoke-free layer
produced by a well-designed SHEVS. In other words, a
SHEVS should be an integral component of an overall
fire prevention concept and of the fire-fighting strategy,
which becomes considerably less effective in the absence
of a SHEVS to create a smoke-free layer at an early stage
in the fire.
1.5 A brief history of smoke ventilation
Smoke ventilation is not new. Our distant ancestors knew
that if they wanted to light a fire inside a hut they needed
to make a hole in the roof, otherwise the occupants of the
hut would be choked by smoke. Modern smoke
ventilation merely applies the same principle to large fires
in modern buildings.
Smoke ventilation as a dedicated fire precaution
became popular for industrial buildings following some
large fires (eg General Motors plant in Michigan, USA, in
1953, see Plate 1; the Jaguar plant in Coventry, UK, in
1957, and Vauxhall Motors at Luton, UK, in 1963). Only
the last of these three plants had automatic ventilators[8].
During the 1960s the Fire Research Station (FRS) in the
UK developed design algorithms suitable for
circumstances where the fire would be directly below the
thermally buoyant smoke layer formed beneath the
ceiling[9,10]. The technique was mostly used as a way of
reducing property damage by allowing fire fighting to
become much more effective.
A fire in the linked Wulfrun and Mander Shopping
Centres in Wolverhampton, UK in 1968[11], alerted people
to the tremendous potential for the spread of smoky
gases in covered malls. It was realized that such a fire
could cause a large loss of life if it occurred when the mall
was being used by the public.
Researchers realized that the smoke ventilation
approach already developed for large spaces could be
adapted to keep smoke entering a mall safely above
peoples’ heads; thus protecting the means of escape in
the mall. Research into the way in which smoke moves
within malls continued through the 1970s, leading to the
development of design formulae for calculating the

Plate 1 Fire at General Motors plant, Livonia, Michigan, USA, 1953
movement of the smoke, the mixing of air into the smoke,
and hence the sizes of the vents or fans needed to exhaust
the smoky gases in order to maintain the smoke layer in
the malls at a safe height. A summary of the design advice
available from FRS was published in 1979[12]. This advice
has been expanded and updated in the light of further
research and experience, and has been incorporated in
the most recent design guidance available from FRS[13].
In the late 1970s, research began on the related
problems of atrium buildings. The main feature of an
atrium building is that a central void rises through two or
more storeys, allowing any smoke entering the void to
affect more storeys than the original fire storey. Unless, of
course, these floors are separated from the atrium by fire-
resisting construction, in which case the atrium is merely
a room with an unusually high ceiling! It follows that
design calculation methods which apply to atria in
general, including the case where the fire is on the base of
the atrium directly beneath the ceiling, also cover
virtually all other building geometries of interest. Note
however that the design-fire sizes depend very strongly
on the use and contents of the building.
It should be readily obvious that a shopping mall of
two or more storeys represents a special case of an
atrium. It is an atrium with a single class of occupancy.
The smoke movement will be similar, the smoke hazards
will be similar, and the smoke control solutions can be
expected to be similar. The pivotal problem for both
malls and atria is that smoke entering the void must not
be allowed to endanger the safe escape for people in the
mall or the atrium itself, or for people in any adjacent
space open to the mall or atrium on any storey.
In atria or multistorey malls, every storey open to the
void is potentially rapidly affected by smoke from a fire
on any other storey. Two fires that illustrate this were the
fire in the Regency Hyatt hotel at O’Hare in Chicago in
1972[14] and the fire in the St John’s Centre in Liverpool in
1977[15]. It follows that to protect the safe escape of the
building’s occupants, special measures are needed for
atria as for malls.
Any measures to protect egress from a building will
also assist easier entry for fire fighters. Hence, the same
1 Introduction 5
measures will serve to improve the property-protection
aspects of the fire-protection package, although where
the smoke ventilation system is solely intended to assist
in fire-fighting operations (ie to assist the fire service in
protecting the property and/or contents) the design
criteria required for safety can be different from those
required to protect the general public in view of the
special equipment and clothing used by fire-fighters.
1.6 The atrium: description and behaviour
in fire
Social and technical changes have led to changes in
building environments which incorporate new (or
revived) building forms and the use of innovative
construction techniques and new synthetic materials.
The buildings adopting these changes often have
included within their design large spaces or voids, often
integrated with many of the storeys. These large spaces
have been described as malls, atria, arcades and light
wells. The generic term for the building type tends to be
‘atrium’ and by their very nature, they can often run
contrary to the traditional Building Regulations’
approach in terms of horizontal compartmentation and
vertical separation.
The original atrium was an entrance hall in a Roman
house and was one of the most important rooms in the
building. The concept of this space has evolved
architecturally over the past few hundred years and now
applies to structures much larger than the typical Roman
house. Modern atria are designed such that the visual and
spacial ‘outdoor’ environments are created indoors[16].
In Roman times the control of any smoke and hot
gases that may have issued from a fire in a room adjacent
to the atrium was likely to have been a simple matter,
provided there were no adverse wind conditions (due to
local topography of adjacent structures) then the smoke
and heat would undoubtedly vent itself via the open
portion of the atrium roof known as the ‘compluvium’
(generally used for lighting purposes).
Modern atrium buildings tend to contain large
quantities of combustible material and often have open-
plan layouts increasing the risk of the spread of fire. The
populations within such buildings have also increased,
hence there has been a substantial increase in the number
of people to be protected and evacuated in an emergency.
Modern atrium buildings are usually designed with the
atrium as a feature which can be appreciated from within
the adjacent rooms. The room/atrium boundary is
usually either glazed or completely open. Thus when
compared with ‘conventional’ buildings, this
architectural/aesthetic requirement imposes additional
problems of life safety during a fire, as smoke, hot gases
and even flames may travel from one (or more) rooms
into the atrium and thence affect areas which, but for the
presence of the atrium, would not be affected.
In conventional multistorey structures there is always
the possibility of fire spread up the outside of the building
with flames issuing from one room and affecting the
6 Design methodologies for SHEVS
floors above. Examples of this mode of fire spread are an
office block in Sao Paulo[17] and the Villiers Building fire in
London on 19 January, 1979. If the escape facilities from
the various rooms are of a suitable standard and are
segregated from other compartments (as required in the
UK), there should not (in theory) be any serious hazard
to life safety in this fire condition. It is only when the
means of escape are inadequate or the parameters
dictating their design are violated, that the loss of life may
occur.
If a building has an atrium then this fire and smoke
spread can also occur internally since there is generally a
maximization of the window area and/or open boundary
between the rooms and the atrium. Hence, there is an
increased risk to other levels of the entry of smoke and
toxic gases and even flames from a fire.
A number of methods can be used to ensure safety in
an atrium building. BS 5588: Part 7[7] gives the relevant
Code of Practice describing which combinations of
measures are currently recommended and in which
circumstances. One of those methods is smoke and heat
exhaust ventilation.
Experience of fires in atrium buildings in the USA[14,18]
has shown the problem of flame travel internally through
the atrium to be minor in comparison with the problem
of hot and toxic gases accumulating and filling the atrium;
spreading throughout the building; and affecting escape
routes. Thus, there appears to be a need for a properly
designed smoke and heat exhaust ventilation system in
atrium buildings.
The ideal option would be to prevent any smoke from
a room fire entering the atrium at all. An easily
understood way of achieving this is to ensure that the
boundary between the room and the atrium is both
imperforate and fire resisting, and that the atrium base
has only a very restricted use. This option has frequently
been used, but is architecturally restrictive. Consequently
it is not favoured by designers. The concept has been
labelled the ‘sterile tube’ [16].
Where the boundary between the room and the atrium
is open, it is sometimes feasible to provide a smoke
ventilation system within the room, to maintain smoky
fire gases above the opening to the atrium. Unfortunately,
it is often very difficult, impractical, or extremely
expensive to fit a separate smoke exhaust system to each
and every room, however small. Occasionally,
circumstances dictate that smoke control dedicated to
each room in this way is the most viable option for
protecting the atrium (this can occur, for example, when
the room layout is of a large area, is predominantly open-
plan and open-fronted). There have been several
examples of this. Nevertheless, it remains generally true
that this option is rarely found to be appropriate for most
atrium buildings.
Another possibility is that the atrium should be
pressurized to prevent smoke moving from a room into
the atrium. This is not usually a viable option where the
opening between the room and the atrium is large (eg an
open-fronted room or room whose glazing has fallen
away in whole or in large part). This is because the
airspeed needed from the atrium into the room in order
to prevent the movement of smoky gases the other way
through the same opening, can vary between about
0.5 ms-1 and approximately 4 ms-1 depending on gas
temperature, etc. All of this air must be continuously
removed from within the fire room in order to maintain
the flow. The quantities of air-handling plant required
will often exceed the size of smoke ventilation systems for
many typical atrium room openings. Note, however, that
pressurizing the atrium may be a viable option where the
atrium facade has only relatively small leakage paths.
Where smoke from a fire in a room can spread into the
atrium, with the possibility of rapid further spread
affecting other parts of the building, there will be an
extreme threat to safe evacuation of occupants from the
affected parts of the building. Similar threats will occur if
there is a serious fire in the atrium space itself. In either
case, the threat to means of escape which are either
within the atrium, or are in spaces open to the atrium, can
develop rapidly unless some form of smoke control is
used in the atrium, in order to protect those means of
escape. In other words, a smoke control system in the
atrium is essential to ensure that escape is unhindered, by
ensuring that any large quantities of thermally buoyant
smoky gases can be kept separate from people who may
still be using escape routes, or awaiting their turn for
evacuation. Therefore, the role of a smoke control system
is principally one of life safety.
In order for a design to be achieved, it is necessary to
identify the various ‘types’ of atrium that are built. These
can be simply defined as follows.
• The ‘sterile tube’ atrium: the atrium is separated from
the remainder of the building by fire-resisting glazing
(FRG). The atrium space generally has no functional
use other than as a circulation area (Figure 2).
• The closed atrium: the atrium is separated from the
remainder of the building by ordinary (non fire-
resisting) glass. The atrium space may well be
functional (cafeterias, restaurants, recreation, etc)
(Figure 3).
• The partially open atrium: here some lower levels are
open to the atrium and the remaining levels closed off
by glazing (Figure 4).
• The fully open atrium: some of the upper levels or all of
the building levels are open to the atrium (Figure 5).
1.7 Active control of the fire
A more detailed discussion of active fire fighting is
presented in Chapter 12.
It should be remembered that fire fighting becomes
both difficult and dangerous in a smoke-logged building.
It follows that to assist the fire services, the smoke control
system should be capable of performing its design
function for a period of time longer than that required for
the public to escape (see also 12.2.2.1), thus allowing a
speedier attack on the fire to be made after the arrival of
the fire service. Any measures to protect egress from a

Figure 2 Sterile tube: fire-resisting glazing between atrium and
compartments
Figure 4 Partially open atrium
building will also assist easier entry for fire fighters.
Hence, the same measures will serve to improve the
property protection aspects of the fire-protection
package (see also 12.2.2.2). Where the smoke ventilation
system is solely intended to assist in fire-fighting
operations, the design criteria required for safety might
be different from those required to protect the general
public in view of the special equipment and clothing used
by fire fighters (see also 12.2.2.4).
Any smoke control measures need to specify a
maximum fire size for its design and sprinklers are often
needed to limit the size to this maximum. It is also likely
that some kind of smoke ventilation will be required to
maintain a clear escape route. Thus both sprinklers and
smoke ventilators are needed to achieve a proper life
safety design. At present there is considerable debate
over the effects of interaction between the two. One
1 Introduction 7
Figure 3 Closed atrium: standard (non fire-resisting) glazing
between atrium and compartments
Figure 5 Fully open atrium
argument is that opening the smoke ventilators on smoke
detection, ie before sprinkler operation, may delay the
activation of sprinklers and thus have detrimental effect
on sprinkler performance. On the other hand, if the
opening of smoke ventilators is delayed until sprinkler
operation, there may be considerable smoke logging and
the effectiveness of the SHEVS may be seriously
compromised. This debate is discussed in more detail
elsewhere in this book.
1.8 Implementation of a smoke and heat
exhaust system in a building
When the ‘concept design’ of the SHEVS has been
completed satisfactorily (eg by following the methods
described in this book), there still remains a great deal to
be done before the system is successfully installed in a
8 Design methodologies for SHEVS
fully functioning state in the finished building. The ideas
must be turned into physical reality, in a way that ensures
that the resulting arrangement will function as desired
when the fire actually occurs: regardless of the conditions
applying at the time.
It follows that there are many necessary considerations
when selecting the equipment needed to make the design
a reality. The equipment (hardware) must be able to
function in the fire condition expected under the design
conditions, and ought to have been tested by the
manufacturers and/or the suppliers to confirm this. The
equipment should also be appropriate to the
circumstances of the building in which it is to be fitted.
These circumstances include the geographical and
meteorological conditions expected, both at the time of
the fire and in normal use. It is not the purpose of the
present document to try to provide detailed guidance on
the selection of systems in all circumstances.
Nevertheless, some pointers towards the parameters
which should be considered are described in Chapter 13.
Even the best equipment can be installed wrongly.
There have been many instances where what was
installed did not exactly correspond to what was
intended, or where the installation procedures have not
been worked out in sufficient detail. It is not the purpose
of this book to provide detailed guidance similar to the
equipment specification. Nevertheless, some guidance
concerning procedures is included in Chapter 14.
Human nature being as fallible as it is, it is desirable
that when a system is fully installed, it should be tested
for functionality. This can either involve tests to confirm
that the equipment still performs to specification
(perhaps most important where ducts are used to move
the gases) without actually simulating the buoyancy of
fire gases, or it can involve special tests (hot smoke tests)
to confirm that both the equipment and the design
concept itself are performing to expectation. Once again,
the discussion and advice in this book is limited to outline
guidance, and can be found in Chapter 15.
As the fire may not occur until many years after the
system is installed, it is also necessary to ensure that the
hardware is capable of surviving many years of
installation and is still ready to serve its purpose if a fire
occurs. This implies that there ought to be regular
maintenance and re-testing procedures as part of a larger
fire safety management strategy for the building in
question. Some discussion can be found in Chapter 16.
1.9 The purpose of this book and its
relationship to earlier guidance
Previous guidance to designers of atrium smoke control
systems within the UK has been provided by the British
Standard BS 5588: Part 7 Code of practice for the
incorporation of atria in buildings [7], and the BRE Report
Design approaches for smoke control in atrium buildings [13].
There have been a number of qualitative papers, and
other papers using relatively simple models of smoke
movement within atria [19-21] . The National Fire
Protection Association of the USA has developed a
Code[22] which sets out a fire engineering approach to the
design of smoke control for atria (termed ‘Smoke
Management’ in the USA). While this code is in many
ways very comprehensive and broader in purpose than
this book, some of the approaches used differ from
alternatives with which UK designers are more familiar,
and can be more approximate than methods currently
recommended by FRS. This particularly applies to smoke
entering the atrium from adjacent rooms.
Some other countries have recognized existing
publications within their own guidelines. For example,
Singapore has referred in its 1997 Code of practice for fire
precautions in buildings[23] to BRE guidance on the design
of SHEVS[24,13] .
It can be noted that there is a major difference between
any application of this book to smoke and heat exhaust
ventilation of shopping malls of more than one storey,
and the earlier guidance for such malls published by
BRE [24]. The difference is not so much in the formulae
and the resulting design solutions, as in the underlying
philosophy of design. The earlier guidance adopted the
view that it was possible to specify a generically typical
smoke flow rate leaving from the front opening of a retail
unit, when specifying the flow parameters in the smoky
gases approaching the spill edge. It further assumed that
these typical flow rates could be taken to be those
measured experimentally in a scale model of a shop
unit [25]. The result was to give a relatively simple
calculation, which allowed for different widths of the
unit’s front opening, without the designer or the regulator
having to worry about changes of contents in the units, or
of detail differences between neighbouring units. The
disadvantage of this earlier approach is that it becomes
unreliable for real malls which depart too far from the
dimensions modelled in the experiment[25] . In practice,
this means that the earlier guidance strictly only applies
for storey heights close to 5 m, and for a 5 MW, 3 m x 3 m
design fire.
The advantage of this current book is that it allows the
circumstances of the fire in the unit to be included
explicitly in calculation, including the actual dimensions
of the building. This implies that separate calculations
must be done for fires located in each and every unit
suspected of being a potentially ‘worst case’ for the mall
in question. In practice, the current book is the more
powerful technique for design, but this advantage is
gained at the expense of some loss of relative simplicity
compared with earlier guidance. Note, however, that
where the real mall’s shape and dimensions are close to
those on which the earlier guidance was based, that
earlier guidance can still be used with confidence.
It is hoped that the current book will support the
Regulatory and Standard Codes being developed by BSI
and CEN. This book cannot cover all the infinite
variations of atrium design. Instead, it gives general
principles for the design of efficient systems, with
simplified design procedures for an ideal model of an
atrium and then further guidance on frequently

encountered practical problems. As the design
procedures are of necessity simplified, the book also gives
their limitations so that, when necessary, a more detailed
design by specialists can be carried out.
The above-mentioned design procedures and
guidance documents are based on the use of zone models:
in which the problem is divided into separate zones
(which may or may not interact); and relatively simple
formulae (often empirical in origin) are used to describe
the smoke and heat movement in each one. While this is
a very powerful technique which can be applied with
confidence to a majority of smoke ventilation design
circumstances, it must be recognized that a building
geometry which deviates too far from the idealized
geometry used in deriving the design formulae cannot be
designed using those formulae.
Since the mid-1970s, field modelling has been
developed which exploits the new techniques of
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) to deduce how, and
at what rate, smoke would fill an enclosure. It does this by
avoiding resort to experimental correlation, as far as is
currently possible, and by returning to first principles to
solve the basic laws of fluid flow and thermodynamics. As
a consequence, with adequate validation, this type of
modelling should have wide application. The use of a
1 Introduction 9
computer is necessary since the technique involves the
solution of tens of thousands of mathematical equations
for every step forward the simulation makes, and
consequently involves relatively long computational
times compared with the use of zone models. This makes
CFD simulations relatively expensive, particularly when
used for buildings with complicated geometry. As the
computers become faster and more powerful and the
algorithms evolve and improve, CFD is likely to become
cheaper and to gain more widespread use in Fire Safety
Engineering including the smoke control design process.
Users of CFD models should be aware of the
importance of:
• correctly identifying the boundary conditions
appropriate to the precise circumstances of the design,
• correctly identifying the appropriateness of the sub-
models used, for example the heat transfer and
radiation model, turbulence model, etc.
• using a small enough grid size so that the converged
solution is independent of the grid size.
The CFD methodology is beyond the scope of this book,
but a full description together with a discussion of current
limitations is given, for example in reference [26].
10
2 General principles of smoke
production, movement and control
2.1 Fire growth and smoke production
In most instances, a room (compartment) fire may be
assumed to burn in either of two ways.
• Fuel Bed Control is when the rate of combustion, heat
output and fire growth depends on the fuel being
burned and there is more than sufficient oxygen
present to support the combustion. This is the ‘normal’
fire condition found in most single-storey buildings
whilst the fire is still small enough for successful smoke
control.
• Ventilation Control is where the rate of combustion etc.
is dependent upon the quantity of air available to the
fire compartment, assuming that any mechanical
ventilation systems have been made inactive.
The quantity of smoky gases produced, ie the mass flow
rate of fire gases in and from the compartment, and the
energy (heat flux) contained therein, may be very
different for both regimes. It is therefore important to
identify the regime which applies and to determine the
mass flow and the heat flux within the smoky gases.
It is important to understand the basic mechanisms
which control the fire condition. A step-by-step history
of a growing fire may be as follows.
1 The fire starts for whatever reason, its rate of growth
depending upon the materials involved, their
orientation and positions relative to each other. In
most practical compartments there is sufficient oxygen
to support combustion in the first few minutes, and the
fire growth and smoke production are controlled by
the fuel, ie fuel bed control.
2 Smoke from the fire rises in a plume to the ceiling. As
the plume rises, air is entrained into it, increasing the
volume of smoke and reducing its temperature. The
entrainment increases with increasing height of rise of
the plume. The smoke spreads out radially underneath
the ceiling and forms a layer which deepens as the
compartment begins to fill. If the compartment is open
to the atrium (or a mall), then the gases flow out
immediately they reach the opening.
If the compartment is glazed or the opening is
below a deep downstand then the smoke steadily
deepens. As the layer gets deeper there is less height
for the plume of smoke to rise before it reaches the
smoke layer, hence less air is being entrained, with the
result that the temperature of the smoke layer
increases with layer depth, even for a steady fire. Most
fires will continue to grow larger as the layer deepens,
reinforcing this effect.
3 6 mm plate glass may shatter when exposed to gases as
little as 100 K warmer than ambient. One of the main
reasons for glass breakage is the different thermal
expansion values of the glass and its mountings;
breakage at relatively low temperature may result
when there is no provision for differential expansion.
Thus, once this temperature is passed, there is an
increasing likelihood that the glass will fracture. If the
compartment is sprinklered and the water spray hits
the glass, the localized heating of the glass by radiation
from the fire and by the gas layer, combined with
sudden cooling due to the water spray may increase
the likelihood of the glass breaking ( note:there are
‘deluge’ sprinkler systems designed to keep the glass
cool and prevent it from breaking). Plate or ‘float’ glass
breaks in an unpredictable way. A crack may not result
in glass falling out; but the assumption that glass will
fall away once broken is a safe assumption for design in
the circumstances covered in this book. The smoke
and hot gases will then flow externally to the
atmosphere, or enter the atrium (where one is
present), or both, depending upon the nature of the
compartment and its relative position in the building,
the size and position of the fire in the compartment,
and the strength of differing glazing systems.
In atrium buildings, if the fire can be accidentally or
deliberately vented to the atmosphere then the threat
to other levels via the atrium is greatly reduced. There
will, however, be instances when a fire will vent all its
effluent gas into the atrium, and this is generally the
worst design scenario (Figure 6).
There is so much mixing of ambient air into the
plume that, except close to the fire itself, the hot smoky
gases can be regarded as consisting of warmed air,
when calculating the quantity (mass flow rate) being
produced in the compartment.
4 Initially, this mass flow rate of smoke will be controlled
by the fuel bed, as mentioned above. However, the
 2 Smoke production, movement and control 11

Downstand
T > 873K
Mw Dw

Air Inflow

Area A f
Perimeter P

Figure 6 Smoke entering an atrium from a fuel bed controlled fire Figure 7 The onset of flashover
in an adjacent room

geometry of the opening onto the atrium has a crucial

effect. As the fire grows large in comparison to the area
of the opening, the air supply to the fire is ‘throttled’,
causing the fire to burn inefficiently.
5 This leads to the situation where the inability of the
compartment to vent the gases effectively due to the
restricted area available causes the layer to deepen
further, which combined with the increasing fire area, T > 1273K
causes the layer temperature to rise. Once the layer
temperature reaches approximately 600 °C, then in Air Inflow
most compartments the downward radiation from the
gas layer is sufficient to cause ignition of the remaining
combustible materials in the compartment (Figure 7).
Where there is sufficient fuel within the compartment
for the entire compartment to become involved, the
layer temperature will rapidly rise to flame Figure 8 A fully involved ventilation-controlled fire
temperature, very approximately 1200 K (930 °C). The
rate of burning, heat output and mass flow leaving the
compartment are now strongly dependent upon the reduced to two principal parameters for most
geometry of the opening, ie ventilation control compartments:
(Figure 8).
6 The transition from the fuel bed controlled fire with a AwH 0.5, (where Aw is the area of the opening into the
layer at 600 °C to the ventilation-controlled condition atrium and H is the height of the opening); and
is very rapid, and may take only seconds. This Aƒ (the area of the fire).
condition is often known as ‘flash-over’.
7 There may be an intermediate situation where the For a further discussion, see eg references [27-29].
compartment has flashed over or the fire has simply
grown to encompass the entire width of the Note: Both the fully-involved large-opening fire and
compartment, but where the quantity of air now ventilation-controlled fire conditions will almost
required to maintain combustion is adequate, even certainly produce flames from the opening into the
though the only surface available for air entrainment is atrium.
the width of the opening (as opposed to the fire 9 The presence of sprinklers will usually serve to prevent
perimeter for a fuel-bed controlled fire). This fire growth proceeding to full involvement; if the
condition is known as the ‘fully-involved, large- burning material is not shielded from the water spray
opening fire’ (Morgan & Hansell[27]). then the fire is likely to be extinguished (or almost
8 There are many factors which determine the prevailing extinguished); with shielding, the fire will continue to
condition including the type and disposition of the fuel, burn, although it is likely to be maintained in a fuel-
the dimensions of the enclosure and the dimensions of bed-controlled state and the fire size will be limited.
the ventilation opening. They can, however, be
12 Design methodologies for SHEVS
general approach needed for successfull design.
2.2 Pressurization and depressurization
Air mixes into the fire plume as it rises giving a larger
In pressurization, air is introduced into an escape route volume of smoky gases. These gases flow outwards below
(usually a stairway) at a rate sufficient to hold back any the ceiling until they reach a barrier (eg the walls, or a
smoke trying to pass onto that route. The pressure downstand, see Plates 2 and 3). The gases then form a
difference across any small opening onto the route must deepening layer, whose buoyancy can drive smoky gases
be large enough to offset adverse pressures caused by through natural ventilators (or alternatively smoky gases
wind, building stack effect and fire buoyancy. It must also can be removed using fans). For any given size of fire, an
be low enough to allow the escape doors to be opened equilibrium can be reached where the quantity of gases
with relative ease. The air supply must also be large being removed equals the quantity entering the layer in
enough to produce a velocity sufficient to hold back the fire plume – no significant mixing of air occurs
smoke at any large opening onto the pressurized space. upwards into the base of the buoyant smoke layer. It is
The requirements are somewhat contradictory. essential that sufficient air enters the space below the
Pressurization systems are designed to have adequate air layer to replace the gases being removed from the layer,
flow across any large openings (eg doors). Excessive otherwise the smoke ventilation system will not work.
pressure difference across a small opening (when the The design procedures are described in detail in the
doors are closed) can be prevented by the use of dampers remainder of this book, and the calculation procedures
(eg barometric dampers). Experience of pressurization are summarized in Annex A (for time-based calculations
designs suggest that it is well-suited to the protection of involving a growing design fire) and in Annex B (for
stairways used as escape routes in tall buildings, although steady-state calculations).
the technique can be useful in other circumstances.
Codes for pressurization can be found in BS 5588:
Part 4[30].
Depressurization is a special case of pressurization,
where gases are removed from the smoke-affected space
in a way that maintains the desired pressure differences
and/or air speeds across leakage openings between that
[30]
space and adjacent spaces . Note that depressurization
does not protect the smoke-affected space in any way.
Instead it protects the adjacent spaces. In the
circumstances of an atrium, it is sometimes possible to use
the buoyancy of the smoky gases themselves to create the
desired depressurization effects. This is explained in
more detail in section 6.3.

2.3 Throughflow ventilation (or smoke

exhaust ventilation)
Smoke exhaust ventilation (throughflow ventilation) is
used when the fire is in the same space as the people,
contents, or escape routes being protected, without it Plate 2 Example of a fixed glazed smoke curtain in a shopping mall
filling that space. The intention is to keep the smoke in
the upper regions of the building leaving clean air near
the floor to allow people to move freely. This
stratification or layering of the smoke is made possible by
the buoyancy of the hot smoky gases produced by the
fire, and it follows that to be most successful the high-
level smoke layer must remain warm. Smoke ventilation
is therefore only suitable for atria where fires can cause
smoke to enter the atrium space and for large single-
storey spaces which are high enough for an appropriate
layering. Such fires can either be fuel-bed-controlled fires
at the base of the atrium, or fires in adjacent spaces
(rooms) which allow smoky gases to enter the atrium.
Much of the current book is concerned with the
calculation of design parameters for smoke ventilation
systems tailored to the circumstances found in various
types of atria. First, though, it is worth reviewing the Plate 3 Example of a fixed smoke curtain being used as a reservoir
underlying principles of smoke ventilation and the boundary

2.4 Smoke and heat exhaust design
philosophies
The smoke ventilation system can be designed to fulfil
one or more separate requirements within a building.
Protection of means of escape
The objective is to achieve a desired smoke-free clear
layer beneath a smoke layer. This is a commonly used
approach where the purpose of the smoke exhaust
ventilation system is to allow the continued use of escape
routes which are in the same space as the fire (examples
include enclosed shopping malls and many atria or large
single-storey spaces, eg for public assembly). The
thermally buoyant smoke forms a layer beneath the
ceiling. The smoke exhaust (using either natural smoke
exhaust ventilators or powered smoke exhaust
ventilators) is calculated to be large enough to keep the
smoke at a safe height above the heads of people using
the escape routes for a given design fire size, even while
the fire is still burning. It is essential that the system
comes into operation as early as possible during the fire,
and it is usual to initiate the operation automatically on
receipt of a signal from a smoke detection system.
Temperature control
Where the height of clear air beneath the thermally
buoyant smoke layer is not a critical design parameter, it
is possible to use the same calculation procedures as for
protection of means of escape, but in a different way. The
smoke exhaust can be designed to achieve a particular
temperature of the gases in the buoyant layer. This allows
the use of materials which would otherwise be damaged
by hotter gases. A typical example is where an atrium
facade has glazing which is not fire resisting, but which is
known to be able to survive gas temperatures up to some
specified value. The use of a ‘temperature control’ smoke
exhaust ventilation system in such a case could, for
example, allow the adoption of a phased evacuation
strategy from higher storeys separated from the atrium
only by such glazing.
Assisting fire-fighting operations
In order for fire fighters to deal successfully with a fire in a
building, it is first necessary for them to drive their fire
appliances to entrances giving them access to the interior
of the building. They then need to transport themselves
and their equipment from this point to the scene of the
fire.
2 Smoke production, movement and control 13
In extensive and multi-storey complex buildings this
may involve travel to upper and lower levels, and may
take some time. This travel, as well as the fire-fighters’
efforts to effect rescues and to carry out fire-fighting
operations, may be seriously hampered if the building is
full of hot smoky gases. The provision of heat and smoke
ventilation systems required to assist means of escape or
for the protection of property, may also aid fire fighting.
There is often the desire to design a smoke exhaust
ventilation system specifically for fire-fighting operations,
where the design philosophies are similar to that used for
a SHEVS design for life safety but the functional
requirements may be less stringent (ie more severe
conditions may be acceptable) because of the specialist
equipment and clothing available. If the SHEVS is
designed solely to assist fire fighting and has no other life
safety implications, and certain other appropriate
circumstances apply (eg when the primary design
objective is property protection and automatic
extinguishing systems are present), it can be appropriate
to leave the ventilators closed (this may reduce fire
growth) until the fire brigade arrives and then to open
them manually. Functional requirements should be
agreed by the fire service responsible for the building in
question.
The applicability of SHEVS to operational fire fighting,
and the close relationship between the two, is discussed
in much greater detail in Chapter 12.
Property protection
Smoke exhaust ventilation by itself cannot prevent a fire
from growing large. It will guarantee that a fire in the
ventilated space has a continuing supply of oxygen to
keep growing.
It follows that smoke exhaust ventilation can only
protect property by allowing active intervention of the
fire services to be quicker and more effective. Depending
on the materials present, a property protection
philosophy may be based on the need to maintain the hot
buoyant smoke layer above sensitive materials, or may be
based on the need to maintain the smoke layer below a
critical temperature. In either case, the functional
requirement for key parameters on which the design
must be based, need not be the same as where the
primary purpose is life safety. They will depend on the
circumstances applying in each case. These key
functional requirements must be agreed with all relevant
interested parties.
14
3 Design-fire size
3.1 General
Many areas of fire safety engineering require the
identification of an appropriate fire size upon which the
design can be based. Design fires can take many forms,
for example, when considering fire resistance of doors
and walls a fully developed post-flashover fire on one side
of the door or wall is assumed: the design fire in this case
will be a fully-involved fire compartment.
Smoke exhaust ventilation is only of value when the
people, contents or structure being protected are in the
same space as the fire, and it is therefore conventional to
consider only pre-flashover fires. That scenario is also
commonly found where the ‘time to danger’ for the
building’s occupants is being calculated, either as part of a
smoke and heat exhaust ventilation system design or as a
separate calculation. The calculation of the quantity of
smoke and heat produced by a fire requires a knowledge
of the size of the fire, in terms of area, perimeter and heat
flux developed per unit area or from the fire as a whole.
When designing smoke ventilation or depressurization
systems, the mass flow rate and heat flux developed in the
room are major parameters in the calculation of the
system requirements, changes in which can substantially
affect all of the subsequent smoke flow conditions.
Ideally, the design fire would be based on the materials
within an occupancy, suggesting that the choice of a
design fire should be straightforward. Unfortunately, this
is not the case. While the heat release rates for many
materials are known, it is rarely possible to say that a fire
will consist of a known quantity of material. Within an
occupancy a fire will involve a combination of different
materials, so that the heat release rate for that occupancy
will be a function of all the materials present. Hence the
development of a fire is dependent on a number of
factors, including:
• the precise location of the ignition with respect to the
fuel,
• the type of materials present,
• the quantity of materials present,
• the position of the materials relative to each other,
• possible chemical reactions between materials present
if their containment is destroyed by fire,
• the position of materials relative to walls, ceilings and
similar,
• the availability of oxygen (in sealed rooms a fire can
become oxygen-starved),
• the presence and effectiveness of fire suppression
devices,
• changing of burning behaviour due to ageing of
materials.
Consequently, there is no method available to calculate
the development of a fire in any but the simplest fuel
arrays. The likely size of a fire can only be deduced from
the analysis of the statistics of fires in the type of
occupancy of interest, or from experiments on
appropriately similar fuel arrays. The values for fire
growth and fire size contained in this book are based on
both statistical analyses and experimental work. It is
worth noting here that design fires based on statistical
analysis are always based on an implied acceptable risk
which can differ for various applications, and which is
always ultimately related to public opinion.
A design fire can either be a steady-state fire with
constant heat output or a time-dependent growing fire to
which the means of escape and evacuation time for the
particular building occupancy could be related (see also
section 12.2.2.1). Steady-state fires for design calculation
in various occupancies are given in the relevant standards
and these have usually been used historically. Although it
is acknowledged that a real fire is not usually ‘steady
state’, it is relatively simple to assess the maximum size a
fire can reasonably be expected to reach during the
escape period in a particular scenario, and to design a
smoke control system able to cope with that.
The assumption of a steady-state fire allows the smoke
control system to cater for all fires up to design fire size,
and by not considering the growth phase of the fire, often
introduces a significant margin of safety to the system
design. A fire will produce smaller quantities of cooler
smoke in its early ‘small’ stage, depending on the nature
and arrangement of fuels. The reduction in effectiveness
of a natural SHEVS due to the lower temperature will be
compensated by the reduction in the quantity of smoky
gas needing to be exhausted.
On the other hand, use of a growing fire could result in
a less onerous design criterion which may result in

considerable savings in the implementation of a SHEVS
design in a large or complex building. Historically, one
reason for not using growing fires for design has been the
lack of available data about fire growth rate in various
occupancies and scenarios. Research has been carried out
in the last few years, at FRS and elsewhere, to determine
the likely fire growth rate in some occupancies. Data are
still not available for many scenarios. It is hoped that a
database of fire growths will be built up which will enable
widespread use of growing fires for SHEVS designs. Any
fire safety strategy must inevitably compare the time to
the onset of dangerous conditions, which in turn depends
strongly on the assumed fire growth rate, to the estimated
evacuation time for occupants as well as to the
attendance time of fire-fighting services. Such strategies
are very sensitive to influences on these parameters,
which can include the inappropriate behaviour of
escaping people, minor changes in the building’s
geometry, traffic jams or roadworks on the access routes
of the fire-fighting services, temporary absence of fire
crews at the nearest fire stations for whatever reasons,
etc.
Either method of assessment of the design fire size can
sometimes be based upon available statistics on fire-
damaged areas but may have to depend upon
experienced judgement, based on the anticipated fire
load where a more rigorous approach is not feasible.
It follows from the foregoing that there is a strongly
subjective element in assessing what fire size is
acceptably infrequent for safe design purposes. Clearly,
an ‘average’ fire for safety design is unacceptable, since by
definition, nearly half of all fires would grow larger. Also,
it is unreasonable to expect a SHEVS to be designed for
the largest possible fire.
3.2 Growing design fires
The time-dependent growing design fire has the
attraction of trying to model the reality of growing time-
varying fires. For horizontal fire spread a time squared (or
‘t2’) curve may be considered:
q = γ t2 (3.1)
where:
q = heat release rate (kW),
γ = a constant defining the steepness of the curve (kWs –2),
t = time after ignition (s).
This approach is followed in several design guidance
documents for smoke control [22,28,29] including NFPA
92B[22], which classifies the fires as slow, medium, fast and
ultra-fast. Values for γ for those fire growth rates are given
in Table 3.1. Where this approach is used it is desirable to
carry out other calculations (eg the fire size at the onset of
flashover) to set an upper limit to what would otherwise
be an infinite fire growth.
In reality, of course, any actual sample of fires
occurring in the same nominal occupancy will never be
describable by a single growth curve. There will be a
3 Design-fire size 15
Table 3.1 Various t2 fire growth rates
Time to reach
Fire 1000 kW γ
–2
growth (s) (kWs )
Ultra-fast 73 0.18760
Fast 146 0.04689
Medium 292 0.01172
Slow 584 0.00293
distribution of growth curves depending on such factors
as variations in fuel layout and variations in the location
of the initial ignition. This distribution means in principle
that the designer should choose an appropriately
pessimistic curve: put perhaps too simply, any design
based on an average curve implies a failure rate of one in
two. This is usually unacceptable where life safety is
involved. It is nevertheless unreasonable for the designer
to base the design on the worst curve possible – this
would be an explosion. The designer (or more usually in
practice the enforcer of regulations) must decide where
the limits of reasonableness lie. Ideally this could be
specifiable in terms of the constant γ in Eqn 3.1 being a
specified number of standard deviations away from the
mean value appropriate to the class of occupancy. Also,
for some scenarios, the growth rate may vary with time,
eg a fire may grow at a ‘medium’ rate for the first five
minutes and then change into a ‘fast’ fire.
Ramachandran [31] has pioneered the analysis of the
UK Fire Statistics database to deduce not only fire growth
curves (expressed in exponential form) but also to derive
the probability distributions for those curves.
Unfortunately the available data do not cover many
occupancy types of major interest to the smoke control
designer.
Exponentially growing fires have also been used in
some other documents[22]. The fire growth is given as:
q = α (exp ( β t) –1) (3.2)
where α and β are constants (note: these constants are not
the same parameters represented by α and β elsewhere in
the present work). Exponential growth can be very rapid
and principally applies to fire spread in vertical surfaces.
They are not normally used for SHEVS designs.
There is a remaining sub-group of growing fires for
design use. These are where the fuel load corresponding
to a specific occupancy has been recreated under a
calorimeter (eg the ‘sprinklered calorimeter’ at FRS[32,33])
and has been burned so that the heat release rate and
other important parameters are known as a function of
time. These data can then be used by designers to predict
the consequences of what would have happened if that
same fire had been burned in the building geometry of
interest to the design. This technique is useful in that it
can allow a confident departure from the more usual
design fires for a specific application where the fuel load
16
is not likely to vary much from the arrangement studied
in the experiment.
Some designers of fire safety systems assume that a
growing design fire in the presence of sprinklers will grow
until it has become large enough to trigger the first
sprinkler head, after which it will probably decline or be
extinguished. It is often cited as a pessimistic assumption
that it is sufficient for designers to take as the largest size
fire that which triggers the first sprinkler and thereafter
remains constant[22,28,29] –but note that BS DD 240 (the
last of the three references) also allows the designer to
select other options including that the fire should
continue to grow.
There is a considerable body of knowledge concerning
the effect of sprinklers on specific fuel arrays used in
experiments. It is clear from these experiments that the
effectiveness of sprinklers depends strongly on the degree
to which the fuel is shielded from the water spray
(eg reference [32]). It is also clear from these and many
other experiments that there is a wide range of possible
fire growth behaviour, and that while sprinklers will
usually control a fire and will often extinguish it, there can
be circumstances where the fire can indeed grow after the
first sprinkler operates. Unfortunately there appear to be
no experimentally derived statistics available to quantify
the probabilities of these possibilities.
Thus, the commonly held assumption that the upper
limit to a growing design fire can be taken to be the size at
which the first sprinkler operates, remains unconfirmed.
As mentioned earlier, results from experimental work
in which fires with the fuel load typical of a specific
scenario have been studied under a calorimeter can
provide information for use in SHEVS design. The
experiments provide heat release rates and other relevant
parameters in the rig as a function of time. The results can
then be extrapolated to build up a realistic fire growth
scenario for the building of interest. Results from some
recent experimental work are given in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Results of experiments simulating different types of occupancy
Fire Heat release HRR at operation of
Type of growth rate (HRR)
occupancy rate per m2 fuel
Retail premises Fast to ultra-fast 280–650 kWm –2
–2
Cellular offices Medium 270 kWm
–2
Libraries Slow to medium 150–650 kWm
Note: Heat release rate values are prior to sprinkler operation.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
A design procedure with a growing design fire is
summarized in Annex A.
3.3 Steady-state design fires
There is a common misconception that a steady-state fire
is meant to be one which grows to a particular size, and
then continues at a constant burning rate limited by some
factor such as limited availability of fuel or limited
ventilation. In practice, this definition has not featured in
the ‘steady-state’ approach to specifying design fires.
The actual approach followed in the UK and many
other countries over the past 30 to 35 years has been to
assess the largest size the fire is likely to reach during its
development (including the effect of the fire services in
controlling the size of fire as well as the effectiveness of
sprinklers or other extinguishing media), and to design
the system as if the fire was always of this size. This
approach requires the assumption that any system able to
achieve safe design conditions for this large fire will also
achieve safety for all smaller stages of the same fire (see
section 3.1 above). It also follows from this concept that
the steady-state design fire is inherently a statistical
concept.
As for the growing fire described above, assuming an
‘average’ maximum fire size will imply an unacceptable
failure rate of 50%, whereas the largest possible fire is
always unreasonable. The designer and regulator has to
adopt the concept of a subjectively acceptable largest
design size (see also section 3.1). Unfortunately, steady-
state design fires contain no information about the actual
times involved in the fire.
The UK Fire Statistics are much easier to analyse in
terms of the largest tire-damaged area recorded after an
incident than in terms of the actual growth rate
(eg Morgan & Hansell[34] and Ghosh [35]). Another
approach to the maximum area has been discussed by
Ramachandran [36] using mainly information for fires in
HRR at operation of
1st quick-response 1st normal-response
sprinkler sprinkler Notes
Between 100 kW Between 500 kW This occupancy type can contain
(videos) and 700 kW and 1000 kW a wide range of fire hazards,
(packets of crisps) leading to a wide range of
growth rates and heat release
rates. The arrangement of
materials can also have a
significant effect on fire growth,
eg fire growth may be more
rapid in goods displayed on
shelving.
The fire load mainly comprised
furniture, papers and computers.
The fuel comprised hardback and
paperback books.

(a)
200
100 Day and night
sprinklered
50 Day and night
40 unsprinklered
30
20
10
5
4
3
0 5 10 15 20 25 50
% of sample > A ƒ
Figure 9 Percentage of fires exceeding a specified fire-damaged area: (a) offices, (b) retail areas
the textile industry. References [34,35] followed the
earlier Morgan & Chandler[37] paper defining a ‘relative
frequency’, such that it represents the percentage of fire
incidents out of a defined population of incidents which
exceed a specified fire-damaged area. For example, in
Figure 9a (from reference [34]), 10% of incidents from a
population defined as fires starting in offices where
sprinklers are present, exceed a fire-damaged area of
16 m 2. In this case, which has become the commonly
adopted design fire for sprinkler-equipped offices, we can
say that the design fire has a relative frequency of 10%.
Another example is the more recent study by Ghosh [35] of
fires starting in retail areas of retail premises (Figure 9b),
although the decision as to the design fire size for
sprinkler-equipped public areas of retail premises was
taken on the basis of much weaker evidence[5,24].
Figures 9a and 9b show that sprinklers have the effect
of reducing the frequency with which fires exceed any
given area, for all except the smaller fires. It is also well
established that sprinklers, when in operation, make it
much less likely that a fire in a room will achieve
flashover. It is common in the UK to specify that
sprinklers be fitted, as part of the smoke ventilation
concept, in order to keep the fire within limits which
allow more practical smoke ventilation. Indeed, in the
UK the fitting of sprinklers in shops open to enclosed
shopping malls, combined with smoke exhaust
ventilation in those malls, is mandatory.
It can also be seen from Figures 9a and 9b that different
occupancies (in this case offices and retail areas) do not
follow the same curve. It immediately follows that there is
no such thing as a universal design fire. Each different
3 Design-fire size 17
(b) 100
50
20
10 Day and night
sprinklered
5 Day and night
unsprinklered
2
1
0 20 40 60 80
% of fires > A ƒ
class of occupancy must be expected to have its own
characteristic design fire.
It is also impossible in most cases to arrive at a heat
release rate from the UK Fire Statistics database, and so it
has always been necessary to assume or derive from some
other source a value of heat release rate per square metre
appropriate to the occupancy in question. It has been
usual to assume a pessimistic value from a frequency
distribution of heat release rates per square metre, where
this can be deduced[27]. This approach necessarily means
that a pessimistic view has been introduced in two
separate stages of the argument in arriving at a design fire.
It can also be noted that where there is a lack of reliable
evidence to support the choice of either a growing or a
steady-state fire, it is usually more practicable to assess
the largest size that a fire might reasonably achieve rather
than the time it might take to reach such a size. This
means, for example, that when there is no clear evidence
available to support a choice of either a particular
constant in the ‘t2’ growth formula, or a statistically
reliable steady-state maximum fire, it is usually safer to
ask an experienced fire officer to assess the size of fire his
first-attending crew would begin to extinguish than to ask
him to assess how long the fire would take to grow to that
size.
Work on design guidance for smoke ventilation
systems in shopping centres[5,24] used the principle of
selecting a fixed size of fire that would cater for almost all
of the fire sizes likely to be found in that class of
occupancy and then deducing a pessimistic heat output
from that fire[34,24]. This procedure has been adopted for
occupancies other than retail, which are also commonly
18 Design methodologies for SHEVS
Table 3.3 Steady-state design-fire sizes
Fire Fire Heat release Total convective
Occupancy area, Af perimeter, P rate density, q f heat flux
–2
type (m ) 2
(m) (kWm ) (kW)

Retail areas
Standard response sprinklers 10 12 625 5000
Quick response sprinklers 5 9 625 2500
No sprinklers Entire room Width of opening 1200 ?
Open-plan offices
Standard response sprinklers 16 14 255 2700 (close to the fire flume)
1000 (at the window)
No sprinklers: fuel-bed 47 24 255 8000 (close to the fire plume)
controlled 6000 (at the window)
No sprinklers: full involvement Entire room Width of opening 255 ?
of compartment
Hotel bedroom
Standard response sprinklers 2 6 250 400 (close to the plume)
300 (at the window)
No sprinklers Entire room Width of opening 100 1000 (at the window)
(typically c. 20 m 2 )
Car park
(a burning car) 10 12 400 3000 (close to the plume)

Notes:

Experiments in a sprinklered calorimeter indicate that the fire sizes in some occupancies may be smaller than given in the table, but as yet there iS not enough information to give reliable values.

Design fire sizes for offices and hotel rooms are not officially ‘approved’ choices, although they are widely used.

Recent information on burning cars suggests that modern cars use materials which may sometimes give higher burning rates than in the Table. The position is not yet clear for cars on fire in car parks, and
this recommendation may change when better data become available.

associated with atrium buildings, ie offices and hotel above. The mass flow rate of gases entering the final
bedrooms[34,38] . reservoir will be less than would be calculated using the
Table 3.3 summarizes several of the more commonly value given above. Even for this scenario, therefore, the
adopted steady-state design fire sizes in current use. The above value should err on the side of safety. Designers
heat release rate (q fAf) is the total heat generated by wishing to take sprinkler cooling in the fire compartment
combustion per second, and is the parameter measured in more rigorously into account should adopt a fully fire-
most calorimetry experiments. Some of this heat is engineered approach appropriate to their specific
radiated from the flames, and warms the surrounding circumstances, for example by using the methods
walls, floor, etc. The heat remaining in the gases is the described in section 5.5 to assess the effect of sprinkler
convective heat flux, and is the heat flow parameter cooling on the outflowing gases.
required for calculations of subsequent smoke The use of the bedroom floor area for the hotel
movement. bedroom design fire reflects the situation where there are
When considering an unsprinklered office occupancy no sprinklers present. Unpublished research on
there exists the potential for flashover to occur, and for sprinklered bed fires[39], where the low heat output per
the entire floor becoming involved in fire. Even if the unit area was comparable to values for hotel bedrooms,
building geometry can accommodate this fire condition, suggest that the much lower fuel load (compared with an
the destructive power of a fully involved office room fire office) expected in a hotel bedroom utilizing
is such that smoke control systems cannot usually be conventional sprinklers should make it possible for the
designed to protect satisfactorily means of escape in this smoky gases to be cooled sufficiently to be retained
situation, except for fires in small rooms. An assessment within the room of origin (assuming the window is not
of the mass flow rate and heat flux from a room fire will open). The operation of sprinklers is likely to cool any
allow the potential for flashover to be estimated, and smoke from a fire and suppress that fire to such an extent
thence whether additional precautionary measures are that the glazing to the bedroom will probably remain
required, eg sprinklers. This book will only provide intact. This is particularly true for double-glazed
guidance for the design of smoke control systems for a windows.
fuel-bed-controlled fire in an office, and a fully involved The same research [39] indicates that the use of
fire in a hotel bedroom. conventional sprinklers in a residential environment may
Gases flowing into the atrium from a fire deep within a not, however, allow conditions within the room to
large-area office with operating sprinklers may be cooler remain tenable, and it may be inferred that the presence
than is assumed in the ‘sprinklered office’ design fire of an open window to the room could produce hazardous

conditions in the atrium, at least above the floor of fire
origin. There are no statistical data available on fires in
sprinklered hotel bedrooms in the UK; consequently, any
choice of design fire size will be subjective. Should a
designer wish to examine the effect of a plume emanating
from an open window in a sprinklered hotel bedroom, it
would not seem unreasonable to use a value of 6 m
perimeter (equivalent to a single bed) with a convective
heat output of around 500 kW as the design fire.
Research into the use of fast-response sprinklers in a
residential environment[40,41] has clearly shown that at the
time of operation of these sprinklers the conditions inside
the rooms were still tenable, ie there was no life-safety
risk from the smoke, even with excessive ceiling level
temperatures. This clearly indicates that for any gases
flowing into the atrium (eg through an open window) the
further entrainment induced by the rising smoke plume
will ensure that conditions within the atrium must be
tenable, regardless of the smoke temperature or smoke
production rate in the room. While it is possible that this
may also be true for cellular offices employing fast-
response sprinklers, there is no evidence (experimental or
empirical) to validate this, and so to err on the side of
safety, this book will regard sprinklered offices employing
fast-response sprinklers in the same way as offices using
conventional sprinklers. Further research and statistical
data are desirable in this area.
The design procedure for a steady-state design fire is
summarized in Annex B.
3.4 Acceptable failure rates
It has already been noted that it is never feasible to design
a fire safety engineered system to cope with the largest
3 Design-fire size 19
possible fire, or the fastest possible fire growth rate. In
practice, it is always necessary to design for the largest
reasonable size of fire; or in other words for a fire which
will be exceeded in an acceptably small proportion of fire
incidents likely to occur in the occupancy type of interest
to the designer. Where the data exists in the correct form,
this essentially means choosing an appropriate value of
relative frequency and finding the corresponding area for
the design fire. Similarly for growing fires, it is always
necessary to choose a design fire whose growth rate will
be exceeded in an acceptably small proportion of
incidents in the type of occupancy of interest. As has
already been noted above, the paucity of available
probability distributions of growth curves makes the
choice of design fire difficult. For both steady-state and
growing design fires, these decisions are necessarily
subjective (more so where decisions have to be based on
an experienced judgement in the absence of a known
probability distribution).
One expects differences of perception. It is common to
find that individuals responsible for a single building will
see as low those values of probability which the regulator
will see as unacceptably large when applied to a large
number of similar buildings for which he has
responsibility.
What constitutes an acceptable point in a probability
distribution also depends on the likely public reaction in
potentially multi-fatality fires. Anecdotal evidence, eg the
strength of the public reaction following a major
multiple-death fire such as the Kings Cross Underground
Station fire in London in 1987 after many decades
without any fire deaths in similar circumstances, suggests
that for some types of public building the acceptable
failure rate can be very low indeed.
20
4 Escape times
SHEVS are often designed such that a clear layer will
remain for an indefinite period, provided the design fire
size is not exceeded. If the purpose of the smoke control
system is purely for life safety then a clear layer only need
be maintained for such a period that safe evacuation of all
the occupants can take place. In these cases, it is
important to determine both the available escape time
and the required escape time to ensure that the available
escape time is at least as long as the required escape time.
Available escape time is defined as the time from the
detection of a fire to the ‘time to danger’ where escape
becomes impossible or very difficult. The time to danger
is the time until:
• the clear layer height is less than 3 m (may be lower in
some cases), or
• the hot gas layer temperature is 200 °C or more.
If the clear layer (ie visibility of at least 10 m) was too
shallow then escape would be through smoke and will be
difficult. Radiation from a layer whose temperature is
more than 200 °C may cause severe pain and discomfort.
It is relatively straightforward to calculate the available
escape time from procedures given in this book.
It is much more difficult to assess what the required
escape times will be. In general, they will have two
components:
• alerting time and
• evacuation time.
Alerting time
Alerting time is the time needed for the people to realize
that there is a life threat and to start to move. Evacuation
time is the time needed to reach a place of safety. Alerting
time will depend on many factors, some of the most
important being the type of alarm given and the
availability of trained staff. Proulx & Sime[42] have shown
that when using only a fire bell, as an alarm the alerting
time can be nearly 10 minutes, whereas with voice-alarm
and staff intervention this can be reduced to 60–90 s.
Note that alerting times can change due to too many false
alarms or to failure of the alarm system. Experience has
shown that people tend to ignore alerts if they occur
frequently.
Evacuation time
Evacuation time will depend on the travel distance, the
number and width of exits, and the population. It also
depends on the presence of stragglers, disabled or injured
people and the unpredictable behaviour of human beings
in an emergency: people who have already reached a safe
environment will often go back into an endangered zone
for subjective reasons (eg a mother looking for her child
from whom she became separated during evacuation).
Also, the population of a building cannot be estimated
accurately for all circumstances, eg in the time before
Christmas there can be far more people than normal
inside a shopping mall. In this case, the required escape
time can be longer than assumed in the design. This could
lead to deaths if the safety margin included in the design
is insufficient.
It is beyond the scope of this book to discuss escape
times in detail. In general, specialist help should be
sought for egress calculations. In some scenarios, it is not
possible to consider smoke control without an estimate of
escape times.
The sensitivity of the ‘time to danger’ to the assumed
fire growth rate has been discussed in Chapter 3. This
introduces a probabilistic aspect to the concept of the
available escape time. Similarly, the time needed for safe
evacuation of occupants should ideally be described in
terms of probabilities, although the dependence on
human behaviour makes this difficult. Ideally, it should be
possible to calculate the combined probability of a design
being successful taking into account all the separate
probabilities of the different assumptions, both in the
available time for escape and in the time required for
escape. Unfortunately this will be impossible to do with
accuracy in most cases because of the inadequacy of
available supporting data, and it will be necessary to
approximate to a greater or lesser extent. This in turn
suggests the need for adequate safety margins to be
applied to the results and conclusions of such
calculations.
It should not be forgotten that the time required for
safe escape of the occupants from a building may not be
the only time limit which has to be considered when
carrying out a time-based SHEVS design. It is useful to
regard fire-fighters as building occupants while they are

inside fighting a fire; the design of the SHEVS should not
allow them to be put at risk simply because the original
occupants have escaped. Any choice of design
4 Escape times 21
parameters which leads, for example, to the prediction
that fire crews may be caught in a flashover cannot be
regarded as good practice in SHEVS design (see also
section 12.2.2.1).
22
5 Smoke control on the storey
of fire origin
5.1 Within the fire room
In any situation involving the potential movement of
smoke into escape routes it is always preferable, although
not always practicable (as in most shopping malls), to
control the smoke in the fire room and hence prevent its
passage to otherwise unaffected areas. Ventilation of the
fire room may be achieved either by a dedicated SHEVS
or by adapting and boosting an air-conditioning or
ventilating system. The latter systems are usually
designed to distribute air uniformly through a space and
not to establish thermal stratification as in a SHEVS. It
follows that control dampers will usually be needed be
needed to modify the mode of operation, eg to keep
exhaust points near the ceiling open and to shut down air
supply from the ceiling downwards, as well as other
related changes in operation. If the compartment is open
to an adjacent atrium, then the compartment must have
either a downstand barrier to create a reservoir within the
compartment, or a high-powered exhaust slot at the
boundary edge to achieve a similar effect (Figures 10a
and 10b).
The minimum height of the smoke layer base in the
room must be compatible with the openings onto the
atrium, with the layer depth being no lower than the soffit
(a)
Exhaust from
compartment
Downstand
Figure 10 Smoke ventilation within a compartment: (a) use of a downstand to create a smoke reservoir, (b) use of a ‘slot exhaust’ to
prevent smoke from entering the reservoir
of the opening (Figure 11). Where no downstand exists,
and an exhaust slot is used instead, the exhaust capacity
provided will need to be compatible with the layer depth
(Figure 12). See section 5.12 on exhaust slots (slit extract).
More generally, the minimum height to the base of the
smoke layer formed in the smoke reservoir should be
chosen on the grounds of safety. Some minimum values
are listed in Annex B for different types of occupancy of
the building.
This type of plume is defined as an axi-symmetric
plume as the smoke flow should be approximately
symmetrical about an axis; in the absence of wind the axis
will be vertical. Having established the clear layer height
in the room, the mass flow rate of smoke can then be
calculated.
5.1.1 Plumes above large fires
Plumes above large fires can be considered to be those
where:
Y ≤ 10(Af)0.5 (m) (5.1)
where Y is the height of rise of the plume and Af(m2) is
the area of the fire.
Work by Hansell[43] drawing on work by Zukoski et
(b)
Exhaust from Boundary edge
compartment exhaust slot
No downstand

Exhaust from
compartment *
Downstand
* Volumetric flow rate sufficiently great
to prevent smoke spillage beneath
downstand for height of rise Y.
Figure 11 Plume height and layer depth with a downstand
Exhaust from Boundary edge
compartment * exhaust slot *
No downstand
* Volumetric flow rate sufficiently great
to prevent smoke spillage beyond the
exhaust slot for height of rise Y.
Figure 12 Plume height and layer depth with a slot exhaust
al[44] and Quintiere et al[45] to modify earlier studies by
Thomas et al[9] and Hinkley[46] has shown that the rate of
air entrainment into a plume of smoke rising above a fire,
Mf, may be obtained using the equation:
Mf = Ce P Y3/2 (kgs-1) (5.2)
where:
C e = 0.19 (kgs-1m -5/2) for large-area rooms such as
auditoria, stadia, large open-plan offices, atrium
floors, etc. where the ceiling is well above the fire.
C e = 0.21 (kgs-1m -5/2) for large-area rooms, such as open-
plan offices, where the ceiling is close to the fire.
(Note: it is not known how and under what
conditions one should regard a ceiling as being
close to the fire. Until better evidence appears, it is
hereby suggested that C e should take the value 0.21
whenever Y is < three times √ Af. It is hoped that
research will allow a better basis for choice).
5 Smoke control on storey of fire origin 23
C e = 0.34 (kgs-1m -5/2) for small rooms such as unit shops,
cellular offices, hotel bedrooms (prior to flashover
or full involvement), etc. with ventilation openings
predominantly to one side of the fire (eg from an
office window in one wall only). Thus most small
rooms will take this value.
P = perimeter of the fire (m).
The earliest form of Eqn (5.2) was by Thomas et al[9], and
was developed from theoretical considerations for the
flame region above extensive areas of fire: where the fire
is not close to any wall, the ceiling is much higher than
the flame region of the plume, and air is free to approach
the fire from all sides.
The basic equation was simplified by merging
constants, and by giving certain parameters values
appropriate to flame conditions, reducing to Eqn (5.2)
with Ce = 0.188. It follows that the justification for using
Eqn (5.2) for the thermal plume region above the flames
is essentially empirical, and has been summarized by
Hinkley [46], showing that the equation has been validated
experimentally for values of Y up to 10 times (Af)0.5 (from
0.1 m to 20 m)[46] for fires in large spaces, using square
fires of side lengths between 0.2 m and 4.5 m. The
equation has been validated for fire sizes between 8 kW
and 30 MW, with values of the heat release rate density
between 200 kWm -2 and 1800 kWm -2. Its extension
beyond those ranges is untested, but it is likely that any
fire extending above that range will rapidly lead to
flashover, and the full involvement of any room, and that
any fire smaller than that range would be subject to the
thermal plume breaking up into a larger number of
smaller plumes.
[48]
Poreh & Morgan have shown that Eqn (5.2) is
equivalent to the equation derived by Zukoski et al[44]
(see section 5.1.2 below) for entrainment into a buoyant
plume, within the limits of the available experimental
uncertainties.
Note here that Eqn (5.2) (and all other axi-symmetric
plumes) will be further modified if the fire is very close to
one or more walls. This effect is discussed in section 5.1.3
below.
The quantity of smoke entering a ceiling reservoir or
flowing layer given by Eqn (5.2) is shown graphically in
Figures 13a and 13b for both (small) cellular and open-
plan rooms (Ce = 0.34 and Ce = 0.19) and for sprinklered
and unsprinklered offices (P = 14 m and P = 24 m).
Similar curves are shown graphically in Figure 14 for
sprinklered large retail areas of shops.
The demarcation between a cellular room and an
open-plan layout is determined by the ability of the
incoming airflow to flow into the rising plume from all
sides. The narrower the room becomes, the less easily the
air can flow behind the plume. In this regard, cellular
rooms are considered herein to be those in which the
maximum room dimension is less than or equal to 5 times
the effective width of the design fire size (eg its diameter
if circular), and the incoming air can only enter from one
direction (Figure 15). This demarcation dimension was
24 Design methodologies for SHEVS

(a) Ce = 0.188 Ce = 0.337

(b)
5

Ce = 0.188 Ce = 0.337
5

1
1

0 0

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 0 20 40 60 80 100

Mass flow (kgs -1) Mass flow (kgs -1)

Figure 13 Rate of production of hot gases for (a) sprinklered, (b) unsprinklered offices

5
chosen arbitrarily when first proposed for inclusion in
reference [13], based on the experienced judgement of
the authors, and still has no theoretical derivation.
Research in this area is highly desirable.
4 Whilst Figures 13a and 13b show the mass flow
production curves for cellular offices, many such
configurations will not in practice have a fixed wall
construction with a good enough fire resistance, or have a
large enough opening to sustain the replacement air
3
supply (see section 5.8) needed for such large fires.
Figure 13b also has a ‘cut-off' below which the
temperature of the gas layer will exceed 600 °C and
flashover of the room will almost certainly have occurred.
2 The mechanism of flashover may well start to occur prior
to this critical point, and gas temperatures in excess of
500 °C may be considered a conservative lower limit for
flashover potential[47] . The ‘danger-zone’ is shown as a
shaded area on Figure 13b.
1
Mass flow rates should be above this shaded zone for
the smoke control systems to operate safely.

5.1.2 Plumes above small fires

0 Plumes above small fires are those where the
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 characteristic dimension of the fire (eg the diameter of a
Mass flow (kgs-‘)
round fire) is sufficiently smaller than the plume height
above the fire that the plume can be regarded as being
Figure 14 Rate of production of hot gases for large essentially circular in horizontal cross-section and at
sprinklered shops these plume heights appears to behave as if it were

conical in shape rising from a point source. Because of
this behaviour mathematical models based on this
approximation are often known as ‘point-source’ models.
Note that in these models the actual fire is taken to
correspond to a horizontal plane in the conical plume,
some distance above the point of the inverted cone. It
follows that the location of the point is virtual (ie
imaginary, having no real existence), and this location
can often be lower than the floor beneath the actual fire.
The distance from the actual fire to the virtual point
source can be defined from different heights in the fuel
array, and can take different values in different models.
In view of the greater convenience of Eqn (5.2), this
current book will only consider these ‘small-fire’ models
as being appropriate for:
Y > 10(Af)0.5
Poreh & Morgan [48] have shown that Eqn (5.2) is
equivalent to the equation derived by Zukoski et al[44] for
entrainment into a buoyant plume, within the limits of
the available experimental uncertainties. Following
Zukoski et al, we can write:
Mf = C nQ f1/3(Y-Y 0)5/3 (kgs-1)
where:
C n = 0.071 (kgs-1 kW-1/3 m -5/3),
Q f = convective heat flux (kW),
Y0 = height above the base of the fire to the virtual origin
of the smoke plume (m).
The use of Eqn (5.4) r equires that the value of Y0 must be
determined for each fire size.
Y 0 can be calculated from reference [44]:
Y 0 = -l.02D f + 0.083Q f 2/5 (m)
Eqn (5.5) has only been validated for pool-type fires, and
it is assumed that for most solid fuels found in buildings
the value of Y0 is likely to be similar. The value of the
convective heat flux (Q f) can be assumed as ˜70% of the
total heat released per second by the fire for most
practical fuel materials.
If the height of the fuel is known then a more accurate
calculation of entrainment may be done by using the
formula derived by Heskestad [49] :
M = 0.071Qf0.33(y-yo)1.67[1+0.026Qf0.67(y-y0)-1.67] (kg s-1)
where y0 is the height of the virtual origin of the plume
measured above the top of the burning fuel, and:
y0 = -l.02Df + 0.083Q f2/5
5.1.3 Effects of adjacent walls on entrainment
into the plume
Where a fire is expected to be directly bounded by walls,
it is commonly assumed that the walls act to reduce the
5 Smoke control on storey of fire origin 25
entrainment into the buoyant plume.
When using the Large Fire Eqn (5.2), it is sometimes
assumed that the reduction in mass flow is the same as
the reduction in the effective fire perimeter. Thus, a liquid
pool fire in a 1 x 1 m tray will have a perimeter of 4 m
when the tray is away from any wall; 3 m when one side
of the tray is close to a wall; and 2 m when the tray is
located in a corner, ie two of the sides are located close to
walls. For the same height of rise of a plume, the
corresponding mass flux should then be M f, 0.75M f and
0.5Mf when the fire is in the middle of the room, near one
wall, and in a corner respectively.
When using Eqn (5.4) it is often assumed, from
theoretical analysis, that the walls will reduce the mass
flow from the fire such that the entrainment will be
0.63 times that of the same fire in the middle of the room
(5.3) when the fire is close to one wall, and is 0.4 times that of
the same fire in the middle of the room when the fire is in
a corner.
Recent unpublished experimental evidence obtained
at the Fire Research Station suggests that when the fire is
near one or more walls the true mass flow may be greater
than those values. For a fire close to one wall the mass
flow was ˜0.7 times that of the same fire in the middle of
(5.4) the room, and for a fire in a corner the mass flow was
˜0.65 times that of the same fire in the middle of the
room. Data are only available from a very limited number
of experiments.
Therefore, design assumptions will err on the side of
safety if the smaller values of M are used to predict
flashover conditions and the larger values of M (typically
for fires not close to walls in most cases) used for
calculating the capacity of the SHEVS.
5.1.4 Effects of sprinkler
(5.5) There is no information available to show how the
equations for entrainment into a plume should be
modified to allow for the effects of sprinkler spray
interactions. Consequently, they are used here
unmodified.
5.2 The flow of hot gases out of the room of
origin into a taller adjacent space (eg an
atrium or mall)
Many buildings have rooms opening into a common
space with a much higher ceiling. Examples include
(5.6a) multistorey shopping malls, single-storey shopping malls
where the mall has a much higher ceiling than the shop’s
opening height, atria and buildings with mezzanine
floors. In such buildings any fire on the floor of the larger
space can be described as if it were a simple single-storey
(5.6b) space with a high ceiling.
Additional processes must be considered when the fire
occurs in one of the rooms adjacent to the tall space. In
such a room the selection process for the design fire
remains unchanged. The plume immediately above the
fire is as described in Eqn (5.2), but the smoke layer
formed under the ceiling of the room will flow
26
horizontally through the opening(s) to the larger space
unless special measures are taken to prevent it.
A SHEVS design requires calculation of the mass flow
rate of smoke at each stage en route. This requires a
calculation of the mass flow rate at the room’s opening. It
is also necessary to identify whether the selected design
fire is realistic for the circumstances. This can be checked
by calculating the temperature of the gases beneath the
ceiling of the fireroom – or at its opening. If the
temperature is too high heat radiation in the room will
rapidly cause full involvement of all available fuel in the
room (ie flashover). In such a case, the only reasonable
design fire is a fully involved room, requiring a
reassessment of the heat release rate, and also requiring a
change in the calculation procedures. It can be assumed
that sprinklers in the fire room will prevent flashover.
The mass flow rate of smoky gases passing through a
vertical opening (Mw) may be found from references
[43,13]:
3/2
C e PWh
Mw =
2/3 3/2 (kgs - 1 )
2/3 1 CeP
W +
Cd 2 Figure 15 Limiting size of cellular room
where:
W = width of opening (m),
h = height of the top of opening above the floor (m),
C d = effective coefficient of discharge for the opening.
Note: The number ‘2’ in Eqn (5.7) is the result of
combining various parameters, and has dimension.
It is worth repeating at this point the earlier comment
that the demarcation between a cellular room and an
open-plan layout, ie the basis for choosing C e , is
determined by the ability of the incoming airflow to flow
into the rising plume from all sides. The narrower the
room becomes, the less easily the air can flow behind the
plume. In this regard, as stated in section 5.1.1, cellular
rooms are considered herein to be those in which the
maximum room dimension is less than or equal to 5 times
the diameter of the design fire size, and the incoming air
can only enter from one direction (Figure 15).
Where the smoke flow directly approaches a ‘spill
edge’ with no downstand (eg where the ceiling is flush
with the top of the opening), Cd = Cds = 1.0. Where
smoke spills past a deep downstand at the spill edge, the
discharge coefficient for smoke flows directly beneath the
downstand can be taken to be 0.65.
Where the smoke flows beyond a downstand or lower
ceiling level at an opening set back from the actual spill
edge, rising in the form of a plume of height Dd (Figures
16a and b) it has been shown that the height of rise of the
plume has an effect on the rate of flow of smoke leaving
the opening[43]. This effect can be expressed as a
modification to the coefficient of discharge at the
opening (which we can write as C do in order to maintain a
distinction between the two scenarios). Note: This should
not be confused with the coefficient of discharge at the
Design methodologies for SHEVS
Cellular room
Restricted air flow to
fire and plume
-Width<5xDf
W opening
Df
Cellular room
(5.7)
spill edge itself (discussed in the previous paragraph).
An empirical correlation involving an iterative method
of calculating C do was developed by Hansell[43] and was
included in earlier guidance from BRE[13]. Unfortunately,
it had not been possible for his work to study a wide
variety of opening widths, opening heights, or mass flow
rates of hot gases. It has been found in practice that
although the correlation gave a good result over the
experimental range, the predicted value of C do can
become unbelievably large when it is used for
circumstances too different from the original
experimental geometries which gave rise to Hansell’s
correlation. It is noteworthy that where the design
condition is close to the experimental geometry, most of
the calculated values of C do for ‘intermediate-depth
downstand’ using Hansell’s full method are reasonably
close to 0.8.
As a result of the above, a simpler alternative is here
recommended for calculating the appropriate value of
C do :
• Make an initial assessment of the mass flow rate using
Eqn 5.7 and a trial value of Cdo (Cdo = 0.65) and thus an
initial assessment of the flowing layer depth D w can be
made from:
2/3
1 Mw
Dw = (m) (5.8)
Cd o 2W
using the same initial trial value of Cdo. (Note that
Eqn 5.8 is a simplified and approximated version of the
more detailed equation discussed in section 5.6. While
it is sufficiently accurate for the purposes of the
iterative procedure described herein, it is better to
follow section 5.6 where the actual layer depth has to

(a)
Figure 16 Flow out of an opening with (a) downstand and projecting balcony, (b) a high balcony
be calculated.)
• Where Dd = 0 (ie no downstand), do not separately
calculate for the window opening if it is not also the
spill edge. In practice, it should be possible to ignore
very small downstands. It is here suggested without
evidence that we can treat all values of Dd less than
0.25 Dw as being able to be ignored.
• Where Dd >> Dw (it is here suggested without
evidence that one can assume D d > 2D w), we can
assume that Cdo = 0.65.
• For all intermediate cases, assume that Cdo = 0.8.
Note: the number ‘2’ in Eqn (5.8) is the result of
combining various parameters, and has dimension.
It is clear that this represents an unsatisfactory position,
and this approach can be expected to be superseded as
soon as a more comprehensive experimental study can
lead to a better, more widely validated, correlation.
Early experiments in smoke flow in shopping malls [50]
and unpublished further analysis of the data at FRS have
shown that the smoke flowing from a room with a deep
downstand and then under a balcony beyond the
opening becomes more turbulent with increasing mixing
of air. This analysis was based on the differences in
temperature measured beneath the downstand at the
opening, and beneath the balcony. In the continuing
absence of better evidence, we suggest that for the
purpose of engineering design the mass flow rate of
smoke entering the balcony reservoir M B can be taken to
be approximately double the amount given by Eqn (5.7)
ie:
MB = 2M w (kgs-1) (5.9)
This assumption is taken in the spirit of the philosophy of
this book declared in the Preface, and is known to be
crude. Further research is highly desirable.
5 Smoke control on storey of fire origin 27
(b)
Note that for the specific case of single-storey
shopping malls whose ceilings are not too much taller
than the shop units opening into those malls, there has
been an alternative empirical correlation [24,51]. In this
approach, all the calculations of outflow from the fire-
compartment detailed in section 5.2, as well as Eqn (5.9),
are simply replaced by Eqn (5.1) with Y being the height
measured from the base of the fire to the base of the
buoyant smoke layer in the mall and with C e taking the
value 0.38. It is believed that this correlation will break
down for malls where the smoke reservoir layer’s base is
too high above the top of the fire-compartment’s opening
(ie the window between shop unit and mall), and it is
suggested that this simple correlation should not be used
where the layer base is more than 2 m above the top of
[24]
the opening . Instead, the designer should employ the
calculation methods detailed in Chapter 6.
5.3 Ventilation of single-storey smoke
reservoirs (including the balcony space
where smoke is contained and exhausted
from beneath a balcony)
This section applies both where an axisymmetric plume
rises directly into a smoke reservoir, and where a smoke
reservoir is formed on the same storey as the fire but
outside the room of fire origin. This latter case occurs
when the smoke cannot be contained within the room of
origin because the rooms have demountable partitions;
and/or insufficient replacement air can be provided;
and/or the engineering implications are too costly or
difficult to apply, then the smoke and hot gases will be
able to travel from the room of origin into the space
beyond. This space can be a single-storey mall, or part of
the same storey as the fire-room. This section therefore
applies to any smoke reservoir formed on the same storey
as the fire-room, but adjacent to that fire-room.
Some atria are designed with balconies around the
28
Room
Atrium
Room Common
balcony
space
Figure 17 Schematic section of an atrium with balconies
Exhaust from
balcony reservoir
Atrium
Balcony edge
screen
Figure 18 An under balcony smoke reservoir
perimeter of the void, serving all the rooms at that level.
Figure 17 illustrates in schematic form an atrium with
floors (two levels only are shown in the Figures) which
have balconies which leave a considerable area for
pedestrians. On each level there is a large area situated
below each balcony. If screens (activated by smoke
detectors or as permanent features) are hung down from
the balcony edges, the region below each balcony can be
turned into a ceiling reservoir (Figure 18). In this case, the
clear air height beneath the smoke reservoir must also be
selected on the grounds of safety; see Annex B for a
listing of typical minimum values. This is similar to the
procedure used in multistorey shopping complexes [24] .
This reservoir, however it has been formed, can then
be provided with its own exhaust system. Smoke curtains
can be positioned (eg across the balcony) to limit the size
Design methodologies for SHEVS
Smoke curtains
Figure 19 Under-balcony smoke reservoir venting into an atrium
smoke reservoir
of the reservoir to ensure that the smoke retains its
buoyancy. Each reservoir should be limited to an area not
exceeding 1300 m2 in area, with an upper limit to the area
of the fire-room of 1300 m 2 where powered smoke
exhaust is used; or 1000 m 2 for each parameter where
natural smoke ventilation is used (by analogy with
shopping malls [24]). Note that it is logically equivalent to
specify that the total area of fire-room plus adjacent
smoke reservoir should not exceed 2000 m 2 for natural
smoke ventilation, or 2600 m 2 if powered smoke
ventilation is used. Also by analogy with shopping
malls [24], the smoke reservoir should have a maximum
length of 60 m. See section 5.17 below for a fuller
discussion of the limits to smoke reservoir size.
Where the smoke reservoir is formed beneath a
balcony in a multistorey space (eg an atrium or mall), the
screens around the balconies will, in general, be fairly
close to potential fire compartments (eg offices). Being
close, smoke issuing from such a compartment will
deepen locally on meeting a transverse barrier. The depth
of these screens should take into account local deepening
(see section 5.7). Smoke removed from these lower-level
reservoirs should usually be ducted to outside the
building but can be ducted into the ceiling reservoir of the
atrium (Figure 19). The mass flow rate of smoke to be
exhausted from the atrium roof will then be that
calculated for the under-balcony condition [50] .
5.4 Smoke layer temperature
The mean temperature rise of the smoke layer above
ambient, θ, can be calculated from:
Qw
θ = (K) (5.10)
Mc

where:
Q w = convective heat flux in the gases (kW),
M = mass flow of smoke (eg Mw or MB) (kgs-1),
c = specific heat capacity of the gases (kJ (kg)-1K-1).
Tables 5.1a to 5.1d give the temperature rise θ for
1 MW, 2.5 MW, 5 MW and 6 MW convective heat fluxes
respectively. Note that an ambient temperature of
15 °Celsius has been assumed when preparing these
Tables.
In unsprinklered fire situations a high smoke layer
temperature will result in intense heat radiation which
5 Smoke control on storey of fire origin 29
may cause difficulties for people escaping along a balcony
beneath the smoke layer, especially if the balconies form
a major escape route. The maximum smoke layer
temperature which will allow safe evacuation without
undue stress is of the order of 200 °C. If this gas
temperature (or lower) cannot be achieved under the
balcony then consideration should be given to:
• alternative escape routes,
• shorter escape paths along the balcony,
• the installation of sprinklers, above the balcony to cool
the gases further.

Table 5.1a Volume flow rate and temperature of gases for a Table 5.1b Volume flow rate and temperature of gases for a
1 MW convective heat flux 2.5 MW convective heat flux
Mass Temperature Volume rate Mass Temperature Volume rate
flow rate of gases of exhaust flow rate of gases of exhaust
(mass rate above (at maximum (mass rate above (at maximum
of exhaust) ambient temperature) of exhaust) ambient temperature)
(kgs )-1
(°C) (m3s-1) (kgs )-1
(°C) (m3s-1)

4 258 6.2 10 248 15.2

6 165 7.7 12 206 16.8
8 124 9.4 15 165 19.3
10 99 11.0 20 124 23.4
12 83 12.6 25 99 27.5
15 66 15.1 30 83 31.6
20 50 19.2 35 71 35.7
25 40 23.3 40 62 40.0
30 33 27.4 50 50 48.0
35 28 31.4 60 41 56.1
40 25 35.6 75 33 68.4
50 20 43.8 90 28 80.8
110 23 97.2

Table 5.1c Volume flow rate and temperature of gases for a Table 5.1d Volume flow rate and temperature of gases for a
5 MW convective heat flux 6 MW convective heat flux
Mass Temperature Volume rate Mass Temperature Volume rate
flow rate of gases of exhaust flow rate of gases of exhaust
(mass rate above (at maximum (mass rate above (at maximum
of exhaust) ambient temperature) of exhaust) ambient temperature)
3 -1
(kgs -1) (°C) (m s ) (kgs )-1
(°C) (m3s-1)

10 495 22.2 12 495 26.7

12 413 23.9 15 396 29.1
15 330 26.3 20 297 33.2
20 248 30.5 25 238 37.4
25 198 34.5 30 198 41.1
30 165 38.6 35 170 45.5
35 141 42.7 40 149 50
40 124 46.8 50 119 58
50 99 55.0 60 99 66
60 83 63.2 75 79 78
75 66 75.4 90 66 91
90 55 87.7 110 54 107
110 45 104 130 46 123
130 38 120 150 40 140
150 33 137 200 30 181
200 25 178
30
5.5 Effects of sprinkler systems in smoke
reservoirs
Offices, shops, assembly, industrial and storage or other
non-residential purpose groups in England and Wales are
now expected to have sprinklers if they have a floor more
than 30 m above ground level. Multistorey buildings in
the assembly, shop, industrial or storage purpose groups
will also be fitted with sprinklers if individual
uncompartmented floors exceed a given size. Sprinklers
may also be required in other circumstances for insurance
purposes.
The action of a sprinkler system in an office on the
cooling of gases flowing from the office to the atrium is
accounted for in the derivation of the 1 MW heat flux at
the window [27]. It is, however, the usual practice in the
UK to assume that the heat flux leaving a shop unit
through its window has the same value as for the initial
convective heat flux close to the fire plume. This
difference in approach can only be explained historically,
and rationalization of the different approaches awaits
further research.
Where the smoke layer is contained wholly within the
room of origin by a smoke control system and has a large
area, the sprinklers will cool the smoke layer further.
Similarly, where smoke is collected within a balcony
reservoir adjacent to sprinklered rooms, operation of
sprinklers under balconies will lead to increased heat loss
reducing the buoyancy of smoke, which in turn can
contribute to a progressive loss of visibility under the
smoky layer.
When the fire occurs in an adjacent room, the
operation of sprinklers in an adjacent smoke reservoir
outside that room will not assist in controlling the fire. If
too many sprinklers operate outside the fire room,
sprinklers in the room could become less effective as the
available water supply approaches its limits.
It follows therefore that sprinklers need only be
installed in a smoke reservoir:
• if the smoke layer temperature is likely to exceed
200 °C, and thus produce sufficient radiation to be a
danger to lightly clad people below the smoke, and
thus to impede escape, or
• if there is the likelihood of sufficient combustibles
being present to pose a significant threat of excessive
fire spread.
A powered exhaust system, to a reasonable
approximation, removes a fixed volume of smoke
irrespective of temperature. Therefore, if the extent of
sprinkler cooling is overestimated the system could be
under-designed.
A system using natural ventilators depends on the
buoyancy of the hot gases to expel smoke through the
ventilators. In this case, the system would be under-
designed if the sprinkler cooling were underestimated.
The heat loss from fire gases due to the water spray
from sprinklers is currently the subject of research and
data suitable for design application are not yet available.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
Nevertheless, an approximate estimate can be obtained
as follows.
If the smoke passing a sprinkler is hotter than the
sprinkler operating temperature that sprinkler will
eventually be set off. The sprinkler spray will then cool
the smoke. If the smoke is still hot enough, the next
sprinkler will operate cooling the smoke further. A stage
will be reached when the smoke temperature is
insufficient to set off further sprinklers. The smoke layer
temperature can thereafter be assumed to be
approximately equal to the sprinkler operating
temperature beyond the radius of operation of the
sprinklers. This radius is generally not known.
In the absence of better information, it may be
acceptable to assume that no more sprinklers will operate
than are assumed when calculating the design of sprinkler
systems and their water supply (eg 18 heads for Ordinary
Hazard Group 3).
For powered exhaust systems the cooling effect of
sprinklers can be ignored in determining the volume
exhaust rate required. This will err on the side of safety.
Alternatively, this further cooling and the consequent
contraction of smoky gases can be approximately
estimated on the basis of an average value between the
sprinkler operating temperature and the calculated initial
smoke temperature. Where the fan exhaust openings are
sufficiently well separated it can be assumed that one
opening may be close to the fire, and will extract gases at
the full initial temperature given by Eqn (5.10). The other
openings in these circumstances can be assumed to be
outside the zone of operating sprinklers, and will extract
gases at the sprinklers’ effective operating temperature.
The number of potential ‘hot’ and ‘cool’ intakes must
be assessed when calculating the average temperature of
extracted gases.
If the sprinkler operating temperature is above about
140 °C, or if it is above the calculated smoke layer
temperature, then sprinkler cooling can be ignored for
natural ventilators.
Note that the effect of sprinkler cooling is to reduce the
heat flux Qw without significantly changing the mass flux.
It follows that once a new value of θ has been estimated,
the new heat flux can be found using Eqn (5.10).
5.6 Flowing layer depth
Smoke entering a ceiling reservoir will flow from the
point of entry towards the exhaust points. This flow is
driven by the buoyancy of the smoke. Even if there is a
very large ventilation area downstream (eg if the ceiling
downstream were to be removed) this flowing layer
would still have a depth related to the width available
under the remaining ceiling (which can now be
considered a balcony), the temperature of the smoke and
the mass flow rate of smoke. Work by Morgan [52] has
shown that this depth can be calculated for unidirectional
flow as follows:

2/3
0.36 M B Tl (5.11)
DB =
Cd θ1 0.5 WB T 0.5
0
where:
D B = flowing smoke layer depth under the ceiling or
balcony (m),
MB = mass flow rate under the ceiling or balcony (kgs-1),
WB = ceiling or balcony channel width (m),
C d = 1 if no downstand is present at right angles to the
flow; 0.6 if a deep downstand is present at right
angles to the flow.
Note: the subscript ‘B’ can simply be replaced with ‘l’ in
Eqn (5.11) for it to apply to the minimum depth of flow in
any smoke reservoir or flowing buoyant smoke layer,
instead of simply to an under-balcony flow.
Values of C d for an intermediate depth downstand cannot
be stated with confidence for the wide range of geometry
to be found in practice. It is suggested that either of the
extreme values should be adopted in seeking a
conservative design approach.
The resulting values of layer depth for different
balcony reservoir widths and mass flow rates of smoke
are the minimum possible assuming an excess of smoke
exhaust employed downstream: consequently it
represents the minimum depth for that reservoir. The
depth must be measured below the lowest transverse
downstand obstacle to the flow (eg structural beams or
ductwork) rather than the true ceiling. Representative
values are shown in Tables 5.2a–d for 1 MW, 2.5 MW,
5 MW and 6 MW convective heat fluxes respectively,
and for flows beneath a smooth ceiling.
In order to use Tables 5.2 to find the minimum depth of
flow beneath a deep downstand (eg a structural beam)
across the direction of flow, find the value in Tables 5.2
corresponding to the same mass flow rate and channel
width, and then multiply that value by 1.67.
5.7 Local deepening
Where a buoyant layer of hot smoke flows along beneath
a ceiling and meets a transverse barrier, it deepens locally
against that barrier because the energy of the
approaching layer is converted to buoyant potential
energy against the barrier as the gases’ downward
velocity is brought to a halt [53].
When designing a smoke ventilation system for atria or
for shopping malls, in which the balconies are acting as
reservoirs, it is often necessary to control the path of
smoke flow using downstand smoke curtains. These are
typically installed around the edge of the voids to prevent
smoke flowing up through the voids. If the void edge is
close to the fire room this local deepening could cause
smoke to spill beneath the smoke curtain and flow up
through the void, possibly affecting escape from other
storeys. Clearly, the void edge screens must be deep
enough to contain not only the established layer, but also
the additional local deepening outside the room on fire.
5 Smoke control on storey of fire origin 31
The extent of local deepening can be found from
Figure 20. The depth of the established laer (D B in
Figure 20) under the balcony immediately downstream of
the local deepening must first be found using the design
procedure given in the preceding sections. Usually this
means in the channel formed between the void edge
screen and the room facade. The additional depth D B can
then be found by inspection of Figure 20, allowing the
necessary minimum overall depth (D B + ∆ D B) of the void
edge screen to be found[53].
The following scale-independent formula can be used
to approximate to Figure 20[54,13]:
5DB
1 – Loge
Hc
∆DB = 0.4 Hc (5.12)
5WB
Loge
Hc
where:
∆D B = the additional deepening at the transverse
barrier (m),
H c = the floor to ceiling height (m),
D B = the established flowing layer depth (m),
WB = the distance between the opening and the
transverse barrier (ie balcony breadth) (m).
5.8 Automatic smoke curtains
It is commonplace to use automatic smoke curtains to
form part of the reservoir boundary. Smoke curtains can
also be used to achieve separation between the main
smoke reservoir and adjacent spaces higher than the
design smoke layer base in the smoke reservoir, by
deploying from ceiling to floor in the opening between
such adjacent spaces and the smoke reservoir. These
devices are usually made of an appropriate fabric, able to
withstand the temperature predicted for the smoky gases
they are in contact with. The curtains are usually
contained in a box fastened to the ceiling, and deploy to
the design position on receiving a signal from the SHEVS
control system. When deployed the fabric is kept under
tension by a weighted bottom bar, which also serves to
keep the curtain straight.
Automatic smoke curtains are usually designed such
that when they are in their deployed position they hang
freely, being fastened to the building structure only at
their top edge, and depending on the weight of the
integral bottom bar to hold them vertical. The buoyancy
of the hot smoke layer exerts a pressure on the surfaces
containing the layer. The pressure of the smoke layer acts
on the curtain as if it were a sail, pushing it sideways. If
the pressure is too great then the sideways deflection
becomes significant, the bottom edge of the curtain lifts,
and the curtain might not contain the smoke layer, thus
causing the SHEVS to fail to achieve its design purpose.
See Plate 4 for an example of a lightweight curtain being
deflected by an airstream from a fan intended to simulate
smoke buoyancy.
It is crucially important that all smoke curtains forming
32 Design methodologies for SHEVS

Table 5.2a Minimum reservoir depths or minimum Table 5.2b Minimum reservoir depths or minimum
channelling screen depths for 1 MW convective heat flux. channelling screen depths for 2.5 MW convective heat flux.
Unimpeded flow: smooth soffit Unimpeded flow: smooth soffit
Mass flow rate Mass flow rate
entering the entering the
smoke layer Channel widths (m) smoke layer Channel widths (m)
(kg s-1) 4 6 8 10 12 15 (kg s-1) 4 6 8 10 12 15

4 0.57 0.51 0.36 0.31 0.27 0.24 10 1.058 0.81 0.67 0.57 0.51 0.44
6 0.77 0.59 0.49 0.42 0.37 0.32 12 1.204 0.92 0.76 0.65 0.48 0.50
8 0.96 0.74 0.61 0.52 0.46 0.40 15 1.420 1.08 0.89 0.77 0.68 0.59
10 1.157 0.88 0.73 0.63 0.56 0.48 20 1.776 1.36 1.12 0.96 0.85 0.74
12 1.347 1.03 0.85 0.73 0.65 0.56 25 2.13 1.63 1.90 1.16 1.02 0.88
15 1.635 1.25 1.03 0.89 0.79 0.68 30 2.481 1.89 1.56 1.35 1.19 1.03
20 2.107 1.61 1.33 1.14 1.01 0.87 35 2.833 2.16 1.78 1.54 1.36 1.17
25 2.581 1.97 1.63 1.40 1.24 1.07 40 3.186 2.43 2.0 1.73 1.53 1.32
30 3.044 2.32 1.92 1.65 1.46 1.26 50 3.88 2.96 2.44 2.11 1.87 1.61
35 3.549 3.55 2.24 1.93 1.71 1.47 60 4.60 3.51 2.90 2.50 2.21 1.91
40 4.00 3.05 2.52 2.17 1.92 1.66 75 5.64 4.31 3.55 3.06 2.71 2.34
50 4.95 3.78 3.12 2.69 2.38 2.05 90 6.66 5.08 4.20 3.62 3.20 2.76
Note 1: The minimum depths for bi-directional smoke flow can be found by looking at the column
110 8.04 6.14 5.1 4.37 3.87 3.33
corresponding to twice the actual width of the channel or reservoir.
See Notes to Table 5.2a.
Note 2: To find the minimum depth of flow beneath a deep downstand (eg a structural beam)
across the direction of flow, find the value in Tables 5.2 corresponding to the same mass flow rate
and channel width, and then multiply that value by 1.67.

Table 5.2c Minimum reservoir depths of minimum Table 5.2d Minimum reservoir depths or minimum
channelling screen depths for 5 MW convective heat flux. channelling screen depths for 6 MW convective heat flux.
Unimpeded flow: smooth soffit Unimpeded flow: smooth soffit
Mass flow rate Mass flow rate
entering the entering the
smoke layer Channel widths (m) smoke layer Channel widths (m)
(kg s-1) 4 6 8 10 12 15 (kg s-1) 4 6 8 10 12 15

10 1.082 0.83 0.68 0.59 0.52 0.45 12 1.22 0.93 0.77 0.66 0.59 0.51
12 1.206 0.92 0.76 0.65 0.58 0.50 15 1.40 1.07 0.88 0.76 0.67 0.58
15 1.386 1.06 0.87 0.75 0.67 0.57 20 1.68 1.28 1.06 0.91 0.81 0.69
20 1.68 1.28 1.06 0.91 0.81 0.70 25 1.95 1.49 1.23 1.06 0.94 0.81
25 1.97 1.50 1.24 1.07 0.95 0.82 30 2.22 1.69 1.40 1.21 1.07 0.92
30 2.25 1.72 1.42 1.22 1.08 0.93 35 2.49 1.90 1.57 1.35 1.20 1.03
35 2.54 1.94 1.60 1.38 1.22 1.05 40 2.76 2.10 1.74 1.50 1.33 1.14
40 2.82 2.15 1.78 1.53 1.36 1.17 50 3.29 2.51 2.07 1.79 1.58 1.36
50 3.38 2.58 2.13 1.84 1.63 1.40 60 3.82 2.92 2.41 2.07 1.84 1.58
60 3.94 3.01 2.48 2.14 1.89 1.63 75 4.61 3.52 2.90 2.50 2.22 1.91
75 4.78 3.65 3.01 2.59 2.30 1.98 90 5.40 4.12 3.4 2.93 2.60 2.24
90 5.62 4.29 3.54 3.05 2.70 2.33 110 4.92 4.06 3.50 3.10 2.67
110 5.14 4.24 3.65 3.24 2.79 136 5.71 4.71 4.06 3.60 3.1
130 4.94 4.26 3.77 3.25 150 5.37 4.63 4.10 3.53
150 5.64 4.86 4.31 3.71 200 7.0 6.04 5.35 4.61
200 6.35 5.62 4.85 See Notes to Table 5.2a.

See Notes to Table 5.2a.

part of a SHEVS are ‘fit for purpose’. This means that

whatever the intended purpose of each curtain in the
SHEVS design, it must be able to fulfil that purpose in its
deflected position. It is therefore necessary to calculate the
expected deflection of each curtain in the design, and to
use these calculations to specify the properties required
of the curtains. Some calculation procedures are set out in
Annex C.
5.9 Inlet air
There must be adequate replacement air for the efficient
operation of a smoke ventilation system. When
ventilating compartments directly, if the facade is
normally sealed then facilities should be provided for the
necessary quantity of replacement air to be supplied to
the fire room automatically. This requirement often
 5 Smoke control on storey of fire origin 33
W B=6m W B=4m
0.65
W B=8m
0.6
8 m wide channel

6 m wide channel

0.5 4 m wide channel

NB: Flow away from barrier is

bi-directional in all cases
0.4
∆DB(m)

NB: Error bars are one

standard deviation

0.3

0.2

0.1

0 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5

DB(m)

Figure 20 Local deepening at a transverse barrier

Naturally ventilated systems having more than one

Plate 4 Experimental smoke curtain deflecting under test
makes the provision of smoke ventilation to the room of
origin prohibitive or undesirable. The provision of
replacement air to a system employing balcony reservoirs
is far easier, provided the balconies are open to the
atrium, as is also the provision of replacement air to
systems employing a smoke reservoir in an atrium or
mall.
In naturally ventilated SHEVS designs having natural
inlets, the effect of the flow resistance of the inlet
openings is explicitly included in the design equations
used to calculate the vent area needed. See for example
Eqns (5.15a and b).
smoke reservoir, and where there may not be sufficient
inlet area available at low level, may be able to use open
ventilators in reservoirs which are not affected by smoke
as inlets for replacement air. This is because the ambient
temperature air entering the building has no intrinsic
buoyancy, and so can move up or down as easily as
moving sideways. It is important that whatever the height
of the inlet openings, the replacement air must be below
the smoke layer in the affected reservoir when it first
comes into contact with that smoke layer. It is also
important that ventilators functioning as inlets should not
be too close to ventilators emitting smoke, or there is a
danger that some smoke will be drawn back into the
building. There has been no research into the minimum
separation between ventilators acting as inlets and those
emitting smoke, but it is suggested here that this
minimum separation should be 6 m.
A replacement airflow beneath a buoyant smoke layer
can disturb the interface and cause the smoke to mix
downwards if the relative velocity is too large. It is good
practice to ensure that the airspeed of the replacement
air, where it first comes into contact with a buoyant
smoke layer, is less than 1 ms-1.
If the area available for inlet becomes too restricted,
incoming airflow through escape doors may be at too
high a velocity for easy escape. Such air inflows through
doors in public buildings could hinder escapees.
34
Research [55] on the ability of people to move through an
exit against an opposing airflow has shown that
movement is not impeded for airspeeds below 5 ms-1,
although people acting as test subjects reported that they
believed that they were being slowed by the air moving
against them at this airspeed. Measurements of the
subjects’ actual walking speeds showed that it was not
seriously impeded below 10 ms-1 (although some
discomfort was reported at these higher airspeeds). This
suggests that inflow airspeeds should not usually exceed
5 ms-1 for psychological reasons. Consequently a 5 ms-1
maximum limit is currently adopted in the UK and is
recommended in this current book.
Other values may be appropriate for other
circumstances. For example, in buildings where the
population is largely familiar with the escape routes;
where the incoming air is entering the fire room directly,
or where in the instance of the inlet air being supplied via
the atrium and the major escape routes are away from the
atrium, then a less onerous parameter can be applied.
A fan-driven inlet air supply may be used, but can give
problems when mechanical exhaust is used (the building
will usually be fairly well sealed in such circumstances).
This is because the air warmed by the fire before being
taken out will have a greater volume than the cooler inlet
air. As the fire grows and declines, the mismatch in
volume between the inlet air and the exhausted fire-
warmed air will also change. This can result in significant
pressure differences appearing across any doors on the
escape routes, making them difficult to open and
potentially impeding the easy use of escape routes. For
this reason simple ‘push–pull’ systems, ie powered inlet
and powered exhaust systems, should be avoided.
5.10 Minimum number of exhaust points
The number of exhaust points within the reservoir is
important since, for any specified layer depth, there is a
maximum rate (M C R I T ) at which smoky gases can enter
any individual exhaust point. Any further attempt to
increase the rate of exhaust through that exhaust point
merely serves to draw air into the orifice from below the
smoke layer. This is sometimes known as 'plug-holing'.
Where ‘plug-holing’ is present part of the installed
exhaust capacity is being ‘wasted’ by drawing clean air
into the orifices of the ventilators instead of smoky gases.
This is not necessarily a problem if the fire is smaller than
the maximum assumed for design; but represents a waste
of capacity for the design fire size itself. If the effect has
been ignored when calculating the necessary fan capacity
(or the necessary total area of natural ventilators), then it
follows that ‘plug-holing’ at the design fire condition will
represent a failure of the system as the ventilators will not
be exhausting the full amount of smoky gases required.
It follows that, for efficient exhaust, the number of
exhaust points must be chosen to ensure that no air is
drawn up in this way.
The critical exhaust rate M CRIT for a ventilator away
from a wall is given by[56]:
Design methodologies for SHEVS
0.5
2 . 0 5 ρ 0 ( g Τ 0 θ1 ) D 2 WV
0.5
M CRIT = (5.13)
T1
where:
MC R I T = critical exhaust rate at an exhaust point prior to
the onset of ‘plugholing’ (kgs-1),
ρο = density of air at ambient temperature (kgm -3),
g = acceleration due to gravity (ms-2),
D = depth of smoke layer below the exhaust point
(m),
T0 = absolute ambient temperature (K),
θ1, = excess temperature of smoke layer (°C),
T1 = T0 + θ1 (K)
Wv = characteristic width of the ventilator (m) (eg the
diameter, or the diameter of the circle of the
same area).
The equation implies that the available exhaust rate
increases rapidly with increasing layer depth. It also
implies that a number of small ventilators may be used
instead of a single large ventilator to optimize the exhaust
efficiency.
Proximity to a wall will reduce the available smoke
discharge capacity, although only limited data are
available for this particular scenario. If the ventilators are
small compared with the layer depth then the critical
exhaust rate can be found from reference [57], with the
constant subsequently re-analysed by Heselden [58] .
Heselden’s method of analysis is strictly only applicable
where the characteristic width of the ventilator orifice is
much smaller than the depth of smoke layer beneath the
ventilator. It is much more common for the characteristic
width of the orifice to be comparable to the depth
beneath at the onset of ‘plug-holing’. Nevertheless,
Heselden’s analysis gives more pessimistic results (ie a
larger minimum number of exhaust points required) than
the alternatives for ventilators not close to side-walls, and
consequently can be regarded as a worst-case method for
ventilators which are close to walls.
1/2
gD5 T0 θ1
M CRIT = 1.3 (kg s -1 ) (5.14)
2
T1
The required number of extract vents (N) is then given
by:
M e
Ν≥
MCRIT
where M e = mass flow rate entering the layer
(ie M f or MB) (kgs-1).
Where sprinklers are installed and additional cooling
of the smoke layer needs to be accounted for, the number
of exhaust points required can be determined by
calculating the critical exhaust rate for an opening using
Eqns (5.13) or (5.14), whichever is appropriate, taking into
consideration the lower gas temperature due to sprinkler
cooling.
Where very large or physically extensive ventilators
are used (eg a long intake grille in the side of a horizontal
duct) an alternative method is possible. For this case,

Eqn 5.11 can be used with WB re-defined to be the total
horizontal accessible perimeter of all the ventilators
within the reservoir (eg the total length of intake grilles in
the example above) and the ‘minimum reservoir depth’
corresponds to the depth of the smoke layer beneath the
top edge of the intake orifice.
Intermediate size intakes (ie where the ventilator
width is comparable to the layer depth) cannot be treated
so simply and it is recommended that Eqn (5.13) be used.
5.11 Throughflow ventilation: area of
natural ventilation required
A natural ventilation system uses the buoyancy of the
smoke to provide the driving force for exhaust. The rate
of exhaust is largely dependent upon the depth and
temperature of the smoke. The advantage of a natural
ventilation system is that it is very simple and reliable,
and can cope with a wide range of fire conditions. Should
the fire grow larger than the design fire size for any
reason, a greater depth and temperature of smoke leads
to an increased exhaust rate, so to an extent a natural
ventilation system has a self-compensating mechanism.
The precise relationship between the mass flow rate
extracted, the ventilator area, the inlet area and the
smoke layer is given by Thomas et al[9]:
ρ0 AV CV (2gD θ1Τ0)1/2
M1 = (5.15a)
2
1/2
AvCv
T 12 + T0T1
AiCi
and can be re-arranged algebraically into the more
convenient form:
M1 T 1
Av Cv = 0.5 (5.15b)
T 1 T 0 M 12
2 g ρ20 D θ1 T0 -
Ai Ci2
where:
A v = measured throat area of ventilators (m2),
A i = total area of all inlets ( m2),
C v = coeficient of discharge (usually between 0.5
and 0.7),
C i = entry coefficient for inlets (typically about 0.6),
M1 = mass flow rate of smoke to be extracted (kgs -1 ),
ρ 0 = ambient air density (kgm-3),
g = acceleration due to gravity (ms -2 ),
D = depth of smoke beneath ventilator (m),
θ 1 = temperature rise of smoke layer above ambient (°C),
T 1 = absolute temperature of smoke layer (K),
T 0 = absolute temperature of ambient air (K).
Tables 5.3 a–d give the minimum free area of ventilation
required based on Eqns (5.15), ignoring the effect of any
inlet restriction (ie assuming an infinite area of inlet
ventilation), and for a convective heat flux through the
ventilators (note that this heat flux is the same as Q f if one
5 Smoke control on storey of fire origin 35
ignores cooling of the smoky gases after they leave the
fire plume).
5.12 Natural ventilators and wind effects
When natural ventilators are used for smoke exhaust, it is
important that they are positioned where they will not be
adversely affected by external wind conditions. A positive
wind pressure can be much greater than the pressure
head developed by a smoke layer. Should this occur the
ventilator may act as an inlet rather than as an exhaust.
However, if sited in an area of negative wind pressure, the
resultant suction force on a natural ventilator would assist
smoke exhaust (Figure 21).
Tall buildings or taller areas of the same building (such
as rooftop plant rooms, etc.) can create a positive wind
pressure on lower nearby roofs. Steeply pitched roofs ie,
roofs over 30° pitch, may also have a positive wind
pressure on the windward slope.
A suggestion sometimes advanced for offsetting wind
over-pressure, is to increase the total area of natural
ventilation per reservoir. Since the over-pressure is, by
definition, force per unit area, this will usually not work
and indeed could exacerbate the problem by allowing
even greater quantities of air to be driven through the
ventilator to mix into the smoke.
In some cases it may be possible to retain natural
ventilation openings in a vertical plane by arranging them
to face inwards to either a region sheltered from wind
action, or where the wind will always produce a suction.
In other cases the erection of suitably designed screens or
wind baffles (outside the vertical wall or window holding
the ventilators) can overcome wind interference and may
even be able to convert an over-pressure into a suction.
There is also the possibility of selectively opening
ventilators in response to signals from a wind direction
sensor. Expert advice should be sought for such designs.
Due to the complexity of wind-induced air flow over
some atrium buildings and the surrounding buildings, it
Wind direction
Ventilator, subject to
negative wind pressure
Figure 21 Positioning natural ventilators to be sheltered from
wind action
 36 Design methodologies for SHEVS

Table 5.3a Minimum total ventilation area A v (m 2 ) needed for Table 5.3b Minimum total ventilation area Av (m2) needed for
a smoke reservoir (from Eqn 5.15 with Cv = 0.6); Q = 1 MW a smoke reservoir (from Eqn 5.15 with Cv = 0.6); Q = 2.5 MW
Mass Mass
flow rate flow rate
(exhaust (exhaust
rate) Smoke depth beneath ventilators (m) rate) Smoke depth beneath ventilators (m)
-1 -1
(kgs ) 1.5 2 3 4 5 7 10 (kgs ) 1.5 2 3 4 5 7 10

4 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.8 10 5.13 4.4 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.0
6 3.2 2.8 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.2 12 6.23 5.4 4.4 3.8 3.4 2.9 2.4
8 4.5 3.9 3.2 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.7 15 8.0 6.9 5.6 4.9 4.4 3.7 3.1
10 5.9 5.1 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.7 2.3 20 11 .2 9.7 7.9 6.8 6.1 5.2 4.3
12 7.4 6.4 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.4 2.9 25 13.5 11.7 9.6 8.3 7.4 6.3 5.2
15 9.9 8.5 7.0 6.0 5.4 4.6 3.8 30 18.4 16.0 13.0 11.3 10.1 8.5 7.1
20 14.5 12.5 10.2 8.9 7.9 6.7 5.6 35 22.5 19.5 15.9 13.8 12.3 10.4 8.7
25 19.6 17.0 13.9 12.0 10.8 9.1 7.6 40 26.8 23.2 19.0 16.4 14.7 12.4 10.4
30 25.3 21.9 17.9 15.5 13.9 11.7 9.8 50 36.0 31.2 25.5 22.1 19.7 16.7 14.0
35 31.4 27.2 22.2 19.2 17.2 14.5 12.2 60 46.5 40.3 32.9 28.5 25.5 21.5 18.0
40 37.9 32.9 26.8 23.2 20.8 17.6 14.7 75 63.2 54.7 44.7 38.7 34.6 29.3 24.5
50 52.2 45.2 36.9 32.0 28.6 24.2 20.2 90 81 70 57.3 50.0 44.4 37.5 31.4
60 67.9 58.8 48.0 41.5 37.2 31.4 26.3 110 108 93 76 66 59 50.0 41.7
Notes to Table 5.3: To allow for the effect of limited fresh air inlets the following guide can be used Note: See Notes to Table 5.3a.
as an alternative to Eqn 15.15):

If the Inlet area to the atrium is twice the exhaust ventilation area given by Table 5.3 the indicated
ventilation area and the inlet area should both be increased by approximately 10%.

If the inlet area is equal to the exhaust ventilation area, the indicated ventilation area and the inlet
area should both be increased by approximately 35%.

If the inlet area is half the exhaust ventilation area, the indicated ventilation area and the inlet area
should both be increased by approximately 125%.

Table 5.3c Minimum total ventilation area Av (m2) needed for Table 5.3b Minimum total ventilation area Av (m2) needed for
a smoke reservoir (from Eqn 5.15 with Cv = 0.6); Q = 5 MW a smoke reservoir (from Eqn 5.15 with Cv = 0.6); Q = 2.5 MW
Mass Mass
flow rate flow rate
(exhaust (exhaust
rate) Smoke depth beneath ventilators (m) rate) rate) Smoke depth beneath ventilators (m)
-1 -1
(kg ) 1.5 2 3 4 5 7 10 (kgs ) 1.5 2 3 4 5 7 10

10 5.3 4.6 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.1 10 5.5 4.7 3.9 3.3 3.0 2.5 2.1
12 6.24 5.4 4.4 3.8 3.4 2.9 2.4 12 6.4 5.5 4.5 3.9 3.5 2.9 2.5
15 7.7 6.7 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.6 3.0 15 7.8 6.7 5.5 4.8 4.3 3.6 3.0
20 10.3 8.9 7.3 6.3 5.6 4.8 4.0 20 10.2 8.9 7.2 6 .3 5.6 4.7 4.0
25 13.0 11.3 9.2 8.0 7.1 6.0 5.0 25 12.9 11.1 9.2 7.9 7.0 6.0 5.0
30 16.0 13.8 11.3 9.8 8.7 7.4 6.2 30 15.6 13.5 11.1 9.6 8.6 7.2 6.1
35 19.1 16.5 13.5 11.7 10.4 8.8 7.4 35 18.6 16.1 13.1 11.4 10.2 8.6 7.2
40 22.3 19.3 15.8 13.7 12.2 10.3 8.6 40 21.6 18.7 15.3 13.2 11.8 10.0 8.4
50 29.3 25.4 20.7 18.0 16.1 13.6 11.4 50 28.2 24.4 19.9 17.2 15.4 13.0 10.9
60 36.9 31.9 26.1 22.6 20.2 17.1 14.3 60 35.2 30.5 24.9 21.6 19.3 16.3 13.6
75 49.3 42.7 34.9 30.2 27.0 22.8 19.1 75 46.7 40.4 33.0 28.6 25.6 21.6 18.1
90 63 54 44.4 38.4 34.4 29.1 24.3 90 59.2 51.2 41.8 36.2 32.4 27.4 22. 9
110 82 71 58 50 45.1 38.1 31.9 110 77.2 66.9 54.6 47.3 42.3 35.8 29.9
130 104 90 73 63 57 48.0 40.2 130 96.8 83.8 68.5 59.3 53.0 44.8 37.5
150 126 109 89 77 69 59 49.0 150 117.8 102.0 83.3 72.1 64.5 54.5 45.6
200 189 164 134 116 103 87 73 200 175.9 152.3 124.4 107.7 96.3 81.4 68.1
Note: See Notes to Table 5.3a. Note: See Notes to Table 5.3a

may sometimes be desirable to carry out boundary layer
wind tunnel studies to establish the wind pressure over
the building’s envelope. Once areas of over-pressure and
suction have been identified for all possible wind
directions, design of ventilators or fans can proceed as
before.
The interaction between the wind and horizontal
natural ventilators is discussed further in section 10.8.
A powered exhaust system should be used where
positive wind pressures are likely to be a problem, or
where it is necessary to extract smoke via an extensive
ductwork system.
5.13 Required ventilation rate (powered
exhaust)
A powered smoke exhaust system consists of fans and
associated ductwork designed to remove the mass flow
rate of smoke entering the smoke reservoir, and to be
capable of withstanding the anticipated smoke
temperatures.
The controls and wiring should of course be protected,
to maintain the electrical supply to the fans during a fire.
The mass flow rate of smoke determined from the
previous sections can be converted to the corresponding
volumetric flow rate and temperature, using Tables 5.la
to 5.ld or the following equation for selection of the
appropriate fans:
M 1T 1
(5.16)
V1 =
ρ 0T0
where:
V 1 = volumetric exhaust rate required in the reservoir
(m 3s-1),
M1 = M f or MB determined from the previous section
(kgs-1),
T0 = ambient air temperature (K),
T1 = T 0 + θ1 (K),
ρ0 = density ofambient air (kgm-3).
5.14 Slit extract
When removing the smoke from a common balcony
reservoir and there is no possibility of using downstand
screens to prevent the passage of smoke or wherever a
physical barrier may not be used, a slit extract system
may be employed over the length of the flow path to
supplement the main reservoir exhaust system and
replace the screens (Figure 22). A slit extract system can
be used across a room's openings to prevent any outflow
of smoke, or at a balcony edge to protect an atrium.
Such a system is likely to work best with further
exhaust distributed within the fire room, which for a
sprinklered room may possibly be provided by the
normal ventilation exhaust system, the normal ventilation
input and recirculation of air being stopped, or for an
unsprinklered room, be provided by a partial smoke
exhaust system. Whilst this system is designed to prevent
5 Smoke control on storey of fire origin 37
Drop screen
Balcony
Reservoir
screen
Air inlet
Atrium void
Figure 22 Slit exhaust
smoke passing the slit (eg entering the atrium void), it will
not necessarily maintain a clear layer within the room
itself, and the space below the smoke layer may become
‘fogged’. The exhaust should be provided very close to
the opening from a continuous slit which may be situated
in the plane of the false ceiling.
Wraightr[59] showed that powered exhaust from a slit at
right angles to a layer flow could completely prevent
smoke passing that slit, provided that the exhaust rate at
the slit was at least 5/3 times the flow in the horizontal
layer flowing towards the slit. This allows a useful general
method for sizing such an extract:
• first calculate the flow rate of gases approaching the
opening (or gap in the balcony edge screens) using
sections 5.2–5.4 above as appropriate,
• multiply this mass flow rate by 5/3.
• using the known layer convective heat flux (and
allowing for sprinkler cooling using section 5.5 above if
appropriate) calculate the volumetric exhaust rate
required from the slit, using Eqn (5.10) to calculate the
mean gas temperature drawn through the fan, and
Eqn (5.16) to calculate the required fan capacity.
5.15 False ceilings
Where there is an unbroken false ceiling in the fire room
or balcony, it must be treated as the top of the smoke
layer. If the false ceiling is porous to smoke, ie if it has an
appreciable free area, any smoke curtains forming the
smoke reservoir must be continued above the ceiling. If
the proportion of free area is large enough, the reservoir
and its screens may even be totally above the false ceiling.
The permeable ceiling ought not to interfere appreciably
with the flow of smoke from the fire to the smoke
ventilation openings above the false ceiling.
It has been shown experimentally[60] that a minimum
free area of 25% can be used as a ‘rule of thumb’ value
which will allow smoke to flow through almost
unhindered. For single-storey and balcony reservoirs
cool smoke can be expected to affect some nearby rooms
under some circumstances, but would not significantly
38
hinder safe escape. Free areas of less than 25% are
possible in some circumstances while still allowing safe
conditions; it is possible to calculate approximately
smoke flow through the ceiling from first principles –
expert advice should be sought where this possibility is
thought to be desirable.
5.16 The use of a plenum chamber above a
false ceiling
Some designs have been seen in which the space above
the mainly solid false ceiling in a roof or above a balcony
is used for the exhaust of air for normal ventilation
purposes. A fan extracting air from this space (effectively
a plenum chamber) reduces its pressure and so draws air
from the space below through a number of openings in
the false ceiling. In the event of a fire a fan of suitably
larger capacity starts up and draws smoky gases into the
chamber in a similar way.
A potentially valuable bonus of such a system in a
sprinklered building is that the sprinklers which are
normally required in the space above the false ceiling will
cool the smoky gases before they reach the fan.
Furthermore, it can be desirable to leave the false ceiling
below the exhaust points ‘solid’ (ie not able to pass
smoke) to prevent air being drawn up through the smoke
layer. A sufficiently extensive area of ‘solid’ false ceiling
will ensure that the smoke passes through at least one
sprinkler spray en route to the extract.
The plenum chamber should not be larger in area than
its associated smoke reservoir. Larger chambers should
be subdivided by smoke screens extending the full height
of the chamber, and below the false ceiling to form a
complete smoke reservoir below. The minimum number
of openings through the false ceiling required within a
single subdivision can be found from section 5.10. The
total area of such openings per reservoir should be
decided by consideration of the design pressure
differences between chamber and smoke layer, and of the
flow impedance of the openings concerned. A system of
reasonably wide (perhaps 1 m or 2 m) slots surrounding a
region of false ceiling could perhaps be used instead of
screens below the false ceiling.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
5.17 Maximum dimensions for smoke
reservoirs
Most throughflow smoke control systems are designed
with an arbitrary limitation to the ceiling reservoir of
between 1000-3000 m 2[24,9,25], one reason being to
prevent excessive energy loss from the buoyant smoke
layer. Many atria cannot physically or architecturally
adopt such reservoir formations, and if larger than the
areas mentioned above will cause additional energy to be
lost from the layer. It has become the common practice to
specify that the maximum area acceptable for a smoke
reservoir should be 2000 m 2 where there are natural
ventilators and the objective is to protect escape routes;
rising to 2600 m 2 for powered ventilators and the same
objective; rising to 3000 m 2 where the objective is to
protect property with no significant life-safety objective.
Note, however, that in the UK, these same principles
are expressed differently when the building is a shopping
mall: with natural ventilators, smoke from shop units of
up to 1000 m2 plan area can enter a mall smoke reservoir
which can itself be up to 1000 m2 in plan area; with
powered ventilators each value increases to 1300 m 2.
There is no scientific reason for this different way of
expressing the principles. Instead, the difference is based
on decisions made by UK Regulatory Authorities as to
the ease of enforcement in the circumstances applying to
shopping malls.
It is likely that this maximum area will be revised when
mathematical modelling of heat transfer processes from
smoke layers becomes sufficiently reliable for confidence
in the results. Currently, however, the best available
argument for the present limit is that there is no clear
evidence that it has proved excessively large an area in
real fires.
Another commonly adopted limit, applied
simultaneously with the area limit, is to apply a maximum
length to each smoke reservoir of 60 m, measured along
the mid-line of the reservoir. The origin of this limit has
never been formally published, but anecdotally first
appeared in 1972[5] based on a UK committee belief that
people escaping below a buoyant smoke layer should be
able to move out from below that layer in less than 30 m
from any point. This was expressed as a maximum length
of reservoir in the interests of simplicity of enforcement.
The committee’s opinion was based on an assessment of
the probable psychological reactions of members of the
general public in such circumstances.

6 Smoke ventilation within
multistorey spaces
(eg an atrium)
6.1 Smoke movement in the atrium
When the smoke and heat cannot, for various reasons, be
confined and removed from the room of origin or
associated balcony space, the use of ‘throughflow’ or
steady-state ventilation from the atrium itself is usually
considered.
This form of smoke control is commonly called ‘smoke
ventilation’ or SHEVS and is based upon a defined
buoyant smoke layer being established at some point
within the structure, with a ‘clean’ layer of air beneath.
The mass flow of gases entering this layer being
equivalent to that flowing out through the exhaust
system (Figure 23).
The base of such a layer is usually at a height chosen
for safety reasons (See Annex B, where it is noted that the
clear height above the highest exposed escape route
should be 0.5 m more than for the single-storey case
described in Chapter 5), or to avoid breaching the
practical ‘cut off’ limits outlined in section 6.7 below.
Once the height of this layer base is chosen for a lowest-
Open ventilators
Inlet
Figure 23 Throughflow ventilation of an atrium
39
level fire, the height above the top of the opening (or
above the edge of the projecting canopy or balcony above
the opening where relevant) must be established where
the fire is in an adjacent room.
Note that when the fire is on the floor of the atrium and
is directly below the smoke layer that forms under the
atrium ceiling, entrainment into the rising axi-symmetric
plume is similar to that given in section 5.2 above. This
special case is discussed in section 6.4 below.
In general, however, the worst condition to be catered
for is a fire in an adjacent room on the lowest level, as this
results in the most entrainment in the rising smoke plume
and hence the largest quantity of smoky gas entering the
buoyant layer.
The fire condition in the compartment (the design fire)
should be specified, and the mass flux leaving through the
compartment opening and any entrainment under the
projecting balcony or canopy can be calculated as
described in sections 5.1–5.3.
As the smoke flows through the room opening into the
atrium space it will either:
40
• pass
rotate upward around the top edge of the opening and
directly into the atrium space as a plume, or
• beyond the opening, pass to the edge of the projection
flow under a horizontal projection such as a balcony
and rise upwards into the atrium space as a plume.
Such plumes are often referred to as ‘spill’ plumes, or as
‘thermal’ line plumes. The term ‘line’ denotes that the
base of the plume immediately following rotation is long
and relatively narrow.
Line plumes may take one of two forms: adhered
plumes or free plumes.
Adhered plumes are where the smoky gases project
directly from a compartment opening, and the plume
attaches to the vertical surface above the opening whilst
rising upwards. This will also occur when there is a
vertical surface immediately above any rotation point
into the void. The surface of the plume in contact with
the ambient atmosphere in the atrium will cause
additional air to be entrained into it (Figure 24a). This
type of plume is also known variously as a single-sided,
attached or wall plume.
Free plumes are where the smoky gases project into a
space beyond a horizontal projection (eg a balcony), thus
allowing the forming plume to rise upwards unhindered.
This creates a large surface area for entrainment on both
sides of the plume along its spill width (Figure 24b), for
which reason they are also known as double-sided
plumes.
The degree of entrainment into the rising plume, and
hence the total quantity of gases entering the smoke layer
forming under the ceiling of the atrium space, is governed
basically by four initial parameters[25]:
1 the mass flow rate or temperature of the gases at the
edge of the rotation point into the atrium,
2 the heat flux of the gases,
3 the length of the line plume entering the atrium,
measured along the edge past which the smoke spills,
4 the height through which the plume must rise.
(a)
Figure 24 (a) adhered plume, (b) free plume
Design methodologies for SHEVS
Reductions in the mass flow rate of smoke entering the
smoke layer can usually be effected by changes to
parameters 3 and 4. In practice, the height of rise of the
plume is usually chosen to permit safe evacuation, leaving
only a dependency on the length of the line plume.
6.2 Channelling screens
When the atrium has a plane facade with no horizontal
projections, the length of the plume is determined by the
width of the opening through which the smoke is passing.
When, however, smoke is able to flow unrestricted under
a horizontal projection, eg a balcony, it will flow forwards
towards the balcony edge, and laterally sideways. It will
continue to flow sideways until it meets an obstruction or
loses sufficient energy to become stagnant and will then
rise into the atrium space as a very long line plume
(Figure 25a and Plate 5). This results in large quantities of
air being entrained and hence a very large mass flow rate
of smoke entering the layer in the atrium roof.
This excessive entrainment can be reduced by
restricting the sideways travel of the smoke under the
balcony and hence reducing the length of the line plume.
The devices used to achieve this are commonly known as
channelling screens, and literally ‘channel’ the smoke
from the exit from the room to the balcony edge
(Figure 25b and Plate 6). This concept is used in smoke
control systems in multistorey shopping centres [24] .
The minimum depth required for a pair of these
screens to channel all the smoke is dependent on their
separation at the void edge (L). Some values for lMW,
2.5 MW, 5 MW, and 6MW convective heat fluxes are
given in Tables 5.2.
Alternatively, the minimum channelling screen depth
may be calculated using Eqn (5.11), modified to:
2/3
0.36 MB TB
DB = (m)
0.5
Cd θB L T00.5
(b)
 6 Smoke ventilation within multistorey spaces 41
(a) (b)

Figure 25 (a) Smoke spreading sideways beneath a projecting canopy or balcony; (b) smoke confined to a compact ‘spill’ plume by
channeling screens

Plate 5 Smoke spreading beneath a balcony Plate 6 Use of channeling screens

42
where:
QW
θΒ =
MB c ’
C d = the discharge coefficient appropriate to the
horizontal flow approaching the spill edge, and is
therefore the same as C ds introduced in section 5.2,
L = the channelling screen separation width.
The resulting depth is the maximum flowing smoke layer
depth and hence minimum screen depth. Good practice
suggests that a safety margin should be considered. An
additional depth of at least 0.1 m would be reasonable.
Screens may be fixed or may descend upon smoke
detection. As described above, the final mass flow
entering the layer is a function of four initial parameters,
one of which is the plume length at the balcony edge. The
narrower the plume is at its base, the less the mass flow
entering the layer.
Thus, the closer the screens may be installed to each
other, the more the smoke base may be allowed to rise for
the same mass flow entering the smoke layer.
These screens must, of course, meet the wall of a
compartment where it meets the balcony. Any screen
fixed midway across a compartment opening will serve
no purpose since smoke will flow on both sides
simultaneously.
If channelling screens are created using free hanging
smoke curtains then their deflections and consequent rise
of their bottom bars must be taken into consideration.
Deflection of smoke curtains is given in Annex C.
Research suggests that channelling screens are
unnecessary if the balcony projects no more than 1.5m
beyond the fire room [61].. This research has also shown
that balconies which are shallow (<2m) will cause the
rising plume to curl inwards towards the structure
(Figures 26a and 26b). If there are higher balconies a
vortex will be created between the balconies, smoke
logging the balcony levels above the fire floor.
(a)
Figure 26 Effect of balcony depth on plume trajectory: (a) deep balcony projection, (b) shallow balcony projection
Design methodologies for SHEVS
6.3 Entrainment into spill plumes rising
through the atrium
6.3.1 The effective height of rise from the spill edge to
the smoke layer base
All existing theories of line plumes apply to plumes rising
through free space, where the air outside the plume is
uniformly at ambient temperature, although some
theories can be modified to approximate to plumes
adhered to a vertical surface as they rise.
Where the width (which can be defined as the square
root of the plan area) of the smoke reservoir is small
compared with the layer depth, the air beneath the layer
usually appears to have a uniform temperature. Where
the converse is true, the air beneath the visible base of the
buoyant layer has a temperature excess relative to the
true ambient temperature (Figure 27). Experiments have
shown that there is a difference in the entrainment into
the spill plume in these two cases. For a given height of
rise, the entrainment into the plume where the smoke
reservoir area is large compared to the plume dimensions
is smaller than when the smoke reservoir is comparable
in size to the smoke plumes horizontal dimensions at the
height of the smoke layer’s base. See for example Morgan
& Marshall[62] for a large area reservoir, and Hansell et
al[61] for a small area reservoir.
This difference was discussed in Poreh et al[63], who
noted that the existing data supported two alternative
ways of expressing this difference in entrainment
(without being able to differentiate significantly between
them). One method is to assign different values to the
plume entrainment coefficient for the two cases, while
taking the height of rise of the plume to be to the visible
base of the smoke layer. The alternative method is to
adjust the height of rise of the plume for the large-area
reservoir case to a lower value, without altering the
plume entrainment constant. The authors suspect,
though without tangible proof, that the true physical
process is neither of the above, but is an interface
phenomenon where the plume enters the smoke layer. A
(b)
 Ceiling

Height above split

edge (m)

Temperature above ambient (oC)

Figure 27 A typical temperature profile for a broad reservoir layer

6 Smoke ventilation within multistorey spaces
43
44
CFD study by Miles et al[64] came to broadly similar
conclusions. It is sufficient for design, however, to note
that the phenomenon is experimentally observable, and
that either of the two methods of including this
phenomenon in design calculations should be empirically
acceptable.
The current book will only present the method for
adjusting the height of rise of the plume in order to
achieve greater simplicity of calculation. This method is
as follows.
0.5
6.3.1.1 Smoke reservoirs where visible depth < 0.67 A res
For reservoirs where the visible depth is less than
0.67 A 0.5
res, (and noting that this is based on an analysis of
empirical data [61] with no underpinning theory) proceed
as follows.
To calculate the mass flow rates of smoke entering the
reservoir, introduce a correction factor for the smoke
layer depth in the reservoir. Experiments with flat-roofed
models [62] have shown that for calculating plume
entrainment, the effective layer depth (d 2) is 1.26 times
the visible layer depth d 1 (see Figure 27).
The effective height of rise of the spill plume above the
spill edge is then given by:
Xp = H - 1.26 d1 (m)
A negative or very small value of X p resulting from this
procedure means that one has gone beyond the limits of
validation of Eqn (6.1). It follows that if, after applying
Eqn (6.1), X p < 0.75 m is obtained then Xp should instead
be defined as:
X p= H - d1 (m)
Note that these procedures only apply when calculating
entrainment into the spill plume d 2 has no validity for
any other application.
6.3.1.2 Smoke reservoirs where visible depth > 0.67 A 0.5
res
For smoke reservoirs where the visible depth is greater
than 0.67 A0.5res, no correction applies, and
Xp = H - d1 (m)
6.3.1.3 Matching X p to the spill-plume model
Use the value of X p resulting from either section 6.3.1.1 or
section 6.3.1.2 as the height of rise of the spill plume
above the spill edge when calculating entrainment for the
BRE method outlined in section 6.3.2(a), but only use
Eqn (6.2) for determining X p, for sections 6.3.2(b), (c) or
(d) and then only in the context of large area reservoirs.
This seeming contradiction is a consequence of the
methods used to derive the entrainment in the source
papers.
6.3.2 Entrainment calculation methods
Calculations of entrainment into the smoke flows rotating
around the opening/balcony edge and into the
Design methodologies for SHEVS
subsequent rising plume may be carried out using a
number of alternative procedures. Some of them are
given below. It has been shown[63,65] that all four methods
give reasonably close agreement when compared with
the available experimental data. This is not surprising in
view of the fact that all derive their empirical terms from
the same experimental sources of data.
(a) The ‘BRE method’
This is the procedure which was given in BRE Report
Design approaches for smoke control in atrium buildings [13].
Follow the procedures of Morgan & Marshall[25,62] for free
plumes, using the modifications introduced by Morgan &
Hansell[27]. Entrainment into smoke flows rotating into a
rising adhered plume can be calculated using a similar
method given by Morgan & Hansell[27], although it
should be noted that the entrainment constant
appropriate to an adhered line plume is about half that for
[66,61]
a free plume . A value of 0.077 may be used for the
[61]
calculation .
This calculation method is outlined in detail in
Annex E. The algorithm described can be used either
directly, or as the basis for a computer program.
Once the desired height of the layer base (hb) has been
chosen, the opening width has been established, or the
(6.1) channelling screens separation L [and hence also
channelling screen depth using Tables 5.2 a or 5.2 b, or
Eqn (5.11)] has been chosen on the basis of practicality
(eg such that the screens contact the walls separating the
rooms) then the mass flow rate of smoke entering the
layer forming the ceiling space of the atrium can be
calculated.
Results of example calculations of smoke production
(6.2) due to entrainment into the rising plume are shown
graphically in Figures 28–39. These Figures may be used
for design purposes but it is preferable to do a more
precise calculation, using the procedures of Annex E.
(b) Method using equations derived by Poreh et al[63]
Recent work by Poreh et al [65], based on data reported by
Marshal1 and Harrison [67], has shown that the
complicated calculation methods given in the BRE
method above to determine the entrainment into spill
plumes can be simplified as follows:
MW
M1 = QW1/3 C hb + Db + (6.3)
C QW1/3
where:
M1 = mass flow of smoky gases entering the smoke layer
at height h b (kgs –1),
Q w = convective heat flux in gases (kW),
C = a constant (kgms-1 kW -1/3 ),
hb = height of rise of thermal plume from balcony to the
atrium smoke layer,
DB = depth of smoke layer beneath a balcony (m),
MW = mass flow of gases beneath a balcony (kgs-1).
C is a constant for a given atrium and a given ambient

temperature and is defined as:
C = 0.3Cm ρ 0L2/3
where:
C m = dimensionless entrainment coefficient, found
experimentally to be 0.44 for a free plume, and 0.21
for an adhered plume,
ρ 0 = density of ambient air (kgm-3),
L = length of spill edge (m).
This calculation procedure gives the entrainment along
the length of the plume, but does not allow for
entrainment into the ends of a plume where the plume is
not bounded by walls. It is possible to combine this
calculation procedure with that of Thomas (1987) [68] to
give a single procedure which is simple and which
includes entrainment into the free ends. This is discussed
in Method (c) below.
Note 1: This combined method only applies to free
plumes, and cannot be used for adhered plumes.
Note 2: The empirical constants in this method were
essentially derived for large-area reservoirs, and so the
method should not be used for small-area reservoirs. It is
suggested that for the present work the criterion for
differentiating between large and small area reservoirs
can be the same as in section 6.3.1 above.
(c) Method to calculate the entrainment into the line
plume derived by Thomas (1987) [68]
This treats the plume in a ‘far plume’ approximation
apparently rising from a line source of zero thickness
some distance below the void edge. The relevant formula
is:
1/3
g Qw L2 0.22( hb + 2∆ )
M1 = 0.58ρ ( hb + ∆ ) 1+
ρ cT0 L (for temperate climates at sea-level)] and treat it as if it
where:
M1 = mass flow of smoky gases entering the smoke layer
at height h b (kgs-1),
ρ = density of warm gases at height hb (kgm -3),
Qw = convective heat flux in gases (kW),
L = length of void edge past which gases spill (m),
c = specific heat of air (kJkg-1K-l),
T 0 = absolute ambient temperature (K),
∆ = empirical height of virtual source below void edge
(m),
h b = height of rise of thermal plume above void edge
(= Xp from section 6.3.1) (m).
It should be realized that the derivation of Eqn (6.5) limits
its application to scenarios where smoky gases issue
directly from the compartment on fire, with a balcony
projecting beyond. With appropriate changes to the
value of ∆ to cater for changes in room/opening
geometry, and hence the mass flow under the balcony
6 Smoke ventilation within multistorey spaces 45
(see sections 5.3 and 5.4 for a more detailed discussion of
the dependence of this flow on conditions in the source
(6.4) compartment), the Eqn (6.5) and calculation method
given in Annex E should give broadly similar results since
although both methods use different empirical
approaches, these constants were obtained by fitting to
the same data. It should also be realized that Eqn (6.5)
only describes a free or double-sided plume and cannot
be adopted for an adhered or single-sided plume.
This formula has the advantage of explicitly including
entrainment into the exposed ends of the spill plume,
unlike the formula of Poreh et al in method (b) above.
Unfortunately the value of ∆ is not a constant, but varies
with such parameters as perimeter of the source fire, heat
output per unit area of the source fire, opening geometry
between the fire-room and atrium, presence of a
downstand at that opening, etc.
In view of the essential similarity between Eqns (6.3)
and (6.5), however, and because we do not expect
proportionately much entrainment into the idealized
‘wedge-shaped’ plume at and below the spill edge, we can
use Poreh et al’s method to identify a method of
calculating ∆ for use in Thomas’ formula (Eqn (6.5))
appropriate to the design scenarios of interest. First
calculate ∆:
MB
∆ = Db + (m) (6.6)
CQW1/3
Then use the result in Eqn (6.5) as if it was a constant
(which it will be for a given smoke flow out of the
specified source compartment).
Eqn 6.5 has a minor practical dificulty in that it
contains a gas density term (ρ) which can only be found
accurately if the result of the calculation is known before
the start. In practice, it is usually sufficient to assume a
value a little smaller than ambient air density [eg using a
2/3
value of 1.1 kg/m 3 instead of the more usual 1.2 kg/m 3
(6.5)
were constant. For greater precision it is possible to use
repeated iteration, with each calculation leading to a
revised gas density for use in the next iteration.
The source data available at the time of the derivation
of this method only covered large smoke reservoirs. It is
not clear how it will apply to small smoke reservoirs, and
it should be used with great caution in such
circumstances.
(d) Method to calculate the entrainment into the line
plume derived by Thomas et al (1998) [65]
This treats the spill plume in a rigorous dimensional
analysis, leading to expressions a little more complicated
than Poreh et al’s method described in (b) above. It
requires the prior calculation of M w and Q w at the spill
edge but does not require prior calculation of the depth of
the approaching smoke flow at the spill edge. In principle
it should also give more reliable results close to the
turning region at the spill edge than any of the other
methods. It does, however, only apply to free plumes and
46 Design methodologies for SHEVS
28 20 29 20

15 15

Height above floor(m)

Height above floor(m)

10 10

W= 5m W= 5m
W= 10m W= 10m

W= 15m W= 15m

W= 20m W= 20m

5 5

Top of opening
Top of opening

0 0
0 20 100 150 200 250 300 350 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
–1
Mass flow (kgs –1
) Mass flow (kgs )

Figures 28,29 Free Free plume from open-plan sprinklered office: 28 no downstand, 29 1.0 m downstand

30 20 31 20

15 15
Height above floor(m)
Height above floor(m)

10 10

W= 5m W= 5m

W= 10m W= 10m

W= 15m W= 15m

W= 20m W= 20m

5 5

Top of opening Top of opening

0 0

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

–1 –1
Mass flow (kgs ) Mass flow (kgs )

Figures 30, 31 Adhered plume from open-plan sprinklered office: 30 no downstand, 31 1.0 m downstand
 6 Smoke ventilation within multistorey spaces 47
30 30
32 33

24 24

18 18

Height above floor (m)

Height above floor (m)

W= 5m W= 5m

12 W= 10m 12 W= 10m
W= 15m W= 15m
W= 20m W= 20m
W= 30m W= 30m

W= 40m W= 40m
W= 50m W= 50m

6 6

Top of opening Top of opening

0 0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
–1 –1
Mass flow (kgs ) Mass flow (kgs )

Figures 32, 33 Free plume from large shop fitted with quick-response sprinklers: 32 no downstand, 33 1.0 m downstand

30 30
34 35

24 24

18 18
Height above floor (m)

Height above floor (m)

W= 5m W= 5m

12 W= 10m W= 10m
12
W= 15m W= 15m
W= 20m W= 20m
W= 30m W= 30m
W= 40m W= 40m
W= 50m W= 50m

6 6

Top of opening Top of opening

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
–1
Mass flow (kgs ) Mass flow (kgs –1
)

Figures 34,35 Adhered plume from large shop fitted with quick-response sprinklers: 34 no downstand, 35 1.0 m downstand
48 Design methodologies for SHEVS
30 30
36 37

24 24

18 18
Height above floor (m)

Height above floor (m)

W= 5m W= 5m
W= 10m W= 10m
12 12
W= 15m W= 15m
W= 20m W= 20m
W= 30m W= 30m
W= 40m W= 40m
W= 50m W= 50m

6 6

Top of opening Top of opening

0 0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
–1 –1
Mass flow kgs ) Mass flow (kgs )

Figures 36,37 Free plume from large shop fitted with standard-response sprinklers: 36 no downstand, 37 1.0 m downstand

30 30
38 39

24 24

18 18
Height above floor (m)
Height above floor (m)

W= 5m W= 5m
W= 10m W= 10m
12 12
W= 15m W= 15m
W= 20m W= 20m
W= 30m W= 30m
W= 40m W= 40m
W= 50m W= 50m

6 6

Top of opening Top of opening

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400
–1
Mass flow (kgs ) Mass flow (kgs –1
)

Figures 38,39 Adhered plume from large shop fitted with standard-response sprinklers: 38 no downstand, 39 1.0 m downstand

not to adhered plumes.
Thomas et al[65] expressed some uncertainty about the
effects of large and small reservoirs on the entrainment
predicted by their method, and identified the need for
further research into this aspect. They developed the
entrainment equations primarily in terms of data for large
area reservoirs so consequently their method should not
be applied to small area smoke reservoirs. In the absence
of better data, we can assume that the same criterion as in
section 6.3.1 can be used to differentiate between large
and small area smoke reservoirs.
The entrainment into the spill plume (ignoring
entrainment into the free ends) is then:
1/3
QW
M1 = 1.2 M W + 0.16X p L + 0.0027QW (kg s–1)
L Annex D that, for the example chosen therein, there is a
while the entrainment into both the free ends ( δ M) is (for
X p/L ‘not too large’, and where this limiting criterion is
unknown) [65] :
1/3
QW
δ M = 0.09 X p (kg s–1)
L for greater heights, although it is noteworthy that there is
6.3.3 Recommendations for selecting a spill plume
formula
The different methods outlined in section 6.3.2 above do
not all cover the same circumstances and scenarios. Some
of these limitations derive from the ways in which the
methods were derived. It is not the purpose of the current
book to review the details of the research papers
concerned (which are anyway cited as references above).
It is useful to summarize where each can in principle be
expected to be applicable, based on the assumptions and
selected data employed in those source papers.
The BRE method (see 6.3.2 (a) above), while being
complicated to use, covers free and adhered plumes. It
can be used for large or small area smoke reservoirs. It
can be used either with or without mixing of air into the
free ends of the spill plume. This makes it the most
versatile of the four methods.
The Poreh et al method (see 6.3.2 (b) above) is much
simpler. It can be expected to apply to free and adhered
plumes, but only to those rising between side walls which
prevent any entrainment into the ends of the spill plume.
This greatly limits the range of scenarios likely to be
found in practice. It applies to large smoke reservoirs and
not to small ones.
The Thomas (1987) method (see 6.3.2 (c) above) only
applies to free plumes, and cannot be used for adhered
plumes. Entrainment into the ends of the spill plume is
explicitly calculated. The method can only be used with
confidence with large smoke reservoirs, and not with
small reservoirs. The difficulty of knowing the
appropriate value of ∆ , the height from the virtual line
source to the spill edge, without calculating it each time
for the circumstances of the specific design scenario,
implies that this method should only be used when ∆ can
be calculated.
6 Smoke ventilation within multistorey spaces 49
The Thomas et al (1998) method can be expected to
apply to free plumes only, and to large smoke reservoirs
only. While it includes terms for entrainment into the
ends of the spill plume, these were stated with a
cautionary note in the source paper [65].
We should note that any and all empirically based
models can be expected to have some dependence on the
source experiments used in deriving the empirical aspects
of those models. It is noteworthy that all the models cited
in section 6.3.2 draw on the same experimental sources,
although not all use all of the available data.
The methods have been compared in Annex D for a
design scenario which applies to all four, but extending
into a range of parameter values differing from the
original experimental source data. It can be seen from
(6.7)
reasonable if not close agreement for up to 5 m above the
spill edge for all methods. This is within the most
common range of design heights of rise for spill plumes.
Note here that only the Thomas et al (1998) method is
expected to give accurate results at heights of rise less
than about 3 m above the spill edge. The methods diverge
(6.8)
a much closer agreement between the BRE method and
the Thomas (1987) method using Eqn (6.6) to calculate ∆
for all relevant heights.
The larger values of mass flow represent the more
conservative design option in terms of safety, particularly
in view of the fact that at these greater heights of rise, and
hence at the correspondingly very large mass flow rates,
the smoky gas temperatures tend to be low. It should also
be noted that there was a good match between the BRE
method and experimental observation in a full-scale hot
smoke test[69] with the very different circumstances of an
adhered plume with entrainment into the free ends, again
with a large-area smoke reservoir. This tends to give
greater confidence in the range of validation of the BRE
method, and by implication of the Thomas (1987)/Poreh
method for free plumes.
Consequently, the authors of this book recommend
the following.
• For free plumes rising less than 3 m above the spill
edge, into a large smoke reservoir, use the Thomas et al
(1998) method of 6.3.2 (d).
• For free plumes rising more than 3 m above the spill
edge use either the BRE method of 6.3.2 (a) for large or
small reservoirs, or the Thomas (1987) method of
6.3.2 (c) using Eqn (6.6), for large smoke reservoirs
only.
• For all other spill plume scenarios, use the BRE
method.
6.4 High temperature plume
Hansell et al[65] has suggested that the entrainment into a
high-temperature spill plume might be lower than into a
thermal plume. The effect is not sufficiently well studied
to allow quantitative advice to be given, beyond the
statement that the effect becomes apparent for values of
50 Design methodologies for SHEVS
25
θB (or of θ W where the compartment opening has no
projecting canopy) greater than approximately 300°C.
Where the entrained mass is the critical design parameter
(eg for estimating the capacity of powered smoke exhaust
ventilators) it is recommended that the same calculation
procedures be followed as for lower temperature thermal 20

plumes, since this will result in an over-estimate of the

exhaust capacity and an under-estimate of the smoke-
reservoir’s layer temperature; giving an extra margin of
safety. It is expected that all the calculation procedures
for spill plumes described in the current book will give

Height above atrium base (m)

15

sufficiently erroneous results for flame plumes

[eg typically for θ B (or θ W ) greater than about 550°C]
that they should not be employed. It is not clear what
calculation procedures can be adopted for flame spill
plumes.
10

6.5 Fires on the atrium floor

This relatively simple case can be treated in the same way
P = 9m
as a fire in a single-storey space, where the plume can rise P = 12m

unhindered from the fire directly into the base of the
layer. The design fire can be specified in terms of area Af
and perimeter P, based on expert assessment of the fire
load at the atrium floor (which can vary from trees to
cars, from furniture to exhibitions). If known, the calorific
value of the likely fuel can be used to estimate the heat
flux in the rising gases Q f. Examples of known heat fluxes
may be:
• a group of four easy chairs, clustered together, forming
a perimeter of around 6 m, with a convective heat flux
of 2 MW,
• a sprinklered office environment, providing the
sprinklers can operate over the fire area, with a total
convective heat flux (qf) of about 115 kWm –2 of fire*,
• an unsprinklered office environment with a total
convective heat flux Q f of about 250 kWm –2 of fire,
• a vehicle (car) with a fire perimeter of 12 m and a total
convective heat flux of 3.0 MW.
*Note: if the atrium ceiling is high, special provisions may
have to be made to ensure effective sprinkler operation.
If the heat flux is not known for the predicted fuel load,
a convective heat flux Q f of 0.5 MWm –2 of fire area is a
usefully pessimistic ‘rule of thumb’ covering many cases.
The mass flow rate in the plume as it enters the smoke
layer may be established from Figure 40 or Eqn (5.2). This
procedure can be used for Y ≤ 10.0 (Af)0.5. For larger
values of Y, it would be better to use the ‘small fire’ plume
theories (see section 5.1.2 above).
6.6 Throughflow ventilation: remaining
design procedures
Once the smoky gases have reached the base of the
smoke layer in the final smoke reservoir, there will be no
significant further entrainment. Once the mass flow rate
of smoky gases entering this layer is known, the design
5 P = 14m
P = 24m
0
0 50 100 150 200
-1
Mass flow into the layer (kgs )
Figure 40 Rate of production of hot gases from a fire on an
atrium floor
calculations are essentially the same for all subsequent
stages of smoke movement in the smoke reservoir as for
an axi-symmetric plume. The designer can simply
employ the methods described in section 5.4 and
onwards to complete the basic design of the SHEVS.
Note however that the designer will still have many other
factors to take into account, as discussed elsewhere in the
current book.
6.7 Limitations to the use of throughflow
ventilation
The mass flow rate generated by the entrainment into the
rising plume increases rapidly with increasing height of
rise of a plume, and hence the plume cools quickly with
height. This large increase in mass flow with increases in
height tends to suggest that there may be some cut-off
point in the rise of the plume above which it might
become economically impractical in terms of a smoke
control system. Experience suggests that this is often true
for flows larger than 150–200 kgs–1.
Another effective limit may occur if the temperature of
the smoky gas layer forming in the roof void is too low. If
internal day-to-day heat gains (solar, plant, etc.) are
allowed to accumulate within the atrium roofspace
(eg passive solar atria) then high-level air temperatures

Figure 41 Early (or premature) stratification
within the atrium may be very high. Roof space
temperatures have been recorded at or above 50°C.
Smoke spreading into an atrium during the incipient
stages of a fire will naturally be very cool, and the
entrainment processes will draw in the surrounding
ambient air as the plume rises. In most instances this
ambient air will be at or near 20°C (either due to
ventilation or air-conditioning) producing a plume
temperature which may be considerably lower than the
air within the roofspace.
Unless this hot air can be removed sufficiently quickly,
this will result in the initial smoke layer forming at a point
lower down in the building than may be desirable. This
process is known as early (or premature) stratification
(Figure 41). As the fire is probably growing, the plume
temperature will rise progressively with time. This may
result in hotter smoke ‘punching’ its way through the
cooler smoke layer and forming another warmer layer
above. This process may continue until the smoke ‘strata’
have become sufficiently mixed to rise up as a single bulk
of smoke. This problem of early stratification can to some
extent be overcome by providing smoke detectors at
many heights within the atrium or located to ensure
detection of smoke close to the fire. Once a forming
smoke stratum is detected and the smoke ventilation
system set off, the hottest (and therefore highest) gases
will be removed first, allowing any cooler strata to rise to
take their place. Hence smoky gases will reach the
ventilators and the smoke ventilation system should
settle into its ‘design’ state. The timescale for this process
is uncertain and hence ‘early’ detection of smoke in these
circumstances is essential.
A further problem which may be encountered may be
more problematical during cooler weather. Atria with
large areas of external glazing will present a large surface
area to the smoke layer, which can lead to large heat
losses from the layer.
6 Smoke ventilation within multistorey spaces 51
This energy loss will increase with the distance the
smoke has to travel from the fire source, and will manifest
itself as a loss of buoyancy within the flowing layer. This
in turn can cause the layer to deepen beyond the desired
design depth, perhaps considerably so.
Cool smoke will also be sensitive to airflow
movements, such as air currents (draughts) due to
ventilation, air conditioning or weather conditions.
Excessive air movement in contact with a cool but
otherwise stable smoke layer can cause it to become
unstable, spreading further throughout the building. The
formation of a smoke layer depends upon buoyancy for
the maintenance of stability. Smoke layers which have
temperatures (and hence densities) approaching that of
the incoming replacement air supply will have a tendency
to ‘mix’ with this air, rather than ‘float’ above it. This
process is known as dilution ventilation and is frequently
used in industry to reduce contamination levels in
buildings (eg welding shops). The mechanisms involved
in dilution ventilation can easily induce downward
mixing of a smoke layer to the extent that, with sufficient
air movement, complete smoke logging of an atrium can
occur. It follows therefore that the atrium smoke layer
should be at a temperature compatible with stable
stratification.
There is little information available on the
destabilization of cool buoyant layers, so a precise
limiting temperature beyond which the above effects will
lessen cannot be given. Further research is desirable in
this area. Experience and experimental observation
however indicate that these effects may be severe in
terms of smoke control, perhaps leading to smoke
spreading to otherwise unaffected escape routes.
In the absence of the necessary experimental data, and
as a result of practical experience this book will adopt a
lower limit to the layer under ‘design’ conditions of 20°C
above ambient as the critical layer temperature below
52
which undesirable effects may occur. This temperature
rise should be regarded as that which the layer will have
after suffering heat losses to the structure in which it is
contained.
Thus, the practical limitations to the use of
throughflow ventilation are a maximum mass flow rate of
150–200 kgs –1 and/or a minimum smoke layer
temperature of 20°C above ambient.
Which limit is reached first will depend upon the
situation being considered, ie on the type of fire
Design methodologies for SHEVS
considered, the construction of the compartment, the
geometry of the atrium, etc.
Experience (and Figures 28–39) suggests that one or
other limit is usually reached when the height of rise
above the fire room opening exceeds 8–12 m. It follows
that it does not usually appear to be practicable to design
a throughflow ventilation system requiring more than
three to six storeys (sometimes less) to be kept free of
smoke, regardless of whether it is powered or natural
smoke ventilation.

7 Alternative forms of
smoke control for atria
(including multistorey malls
but excluding throughflow ventilation)
7.1 Void filling
Some atria provide large available volumes in which any
smoke from a fire could be contained, such that smoke
ventilation may be unnecessary.
This approach is usually based upon the assumption
that a fire will grow at a predictable rate, and that the
quantity of smoke generated can be contained safely in
the roof void during the evacuation period, without
prejudicing the evacuation of occupants of the space.
This relies upon quantitative predictions of both fire
growth and personnel escape times. Fire growth is
difficult to predict during the very early stages of fire
development and can therefore, at best, be only a rough
estimate. Similarly, actual times needed for evacuation
are also extremely difficult to determine. Pauls [70] has
shown that escape periods in multistorey buildings can
vary from 10 minutes for a 15-storey building, where
escapees were ‘caught’ on the 13th floor for 5 minutes
before being able to descend, to 31 minutes for a 21-
storey structure where escapees were ‘caught’ on the 12th
floor for 20 minutes. Anecdotal reports of similar exercise
in a shopping mall in the UK have shown a total
evacuation time in excess of 30 minutes. Similarly, we
must also remember that it is customary for the fire
service to search buildings for trapped or lost escapees.
There will be some designs where the evacuation times
will be shorter than the time for smoke to endanger the
escape routes. It follows that the smoke control option of
‘doing nothing’ should not be ruled out completely, but
should only be accepted when supported by ‘Fire
Engineering’ calculations embodying appropriate safety
margins.
7.2 Compartment separation
One approach that may be considered for the protection
of the atrium from fires in adjacent rooms (or vice-versa)
is the concept of the ‘sterile tube’ (discussed in Chapter 1
in outline).
In this instance, the atrium is glazed throughout with
fire-resisting glass, or its engineered equivalent. Thus,
there is no opportunity for hot smoky gases to enter
rooms adjacent to the atrium, and the building fire safety
53
precautions revert to those found in the absence of an
atrium.
The obvious advantage of this technique is simplicity.
However, it has several disadvantages. It is rather
restrictive for building designers, as the atrium cannot be
utilized as a functional space, and generally there must
only be limited quantities of combustible material
contained on the atrium floor. There can be no areas of
public movement within the atrium space other than at
ground floor level.
Since there is the potential for the atrium to be wholly
full of smoke, the facade should be well sealed. If the
gases in the atrium become hot, as they often may local to
the fire, the facade materials and construction (and the
sealing techniques used) must be able to withstand these
higher temperatures.
Such atria may be fitted with means of removing
smoke for Fire Service use. These systems are often
provided on an arbitrary design basis, usually comprising
an air-change rate criterion if powered ventilation is used,
or a percentage of the atrium floor area if natural
ventilation is used. These systems are for Fire Service use
only, for clearing of residual smoke (usually post-
extinction) and must not be regarded as life-safety
systems. Air-change rates of between 6 and 12 per hour
are often employed.
7.3 Depressurization ventilation
7.3.1 Principles
Greater architectural freedom becomes possible if the
atrium facade need not be sealed, but can be allowed to
be leaky, even if the upper atrium is filled with smoke.
Examples of such ‘leaky facade’ designs might include:
• hotel bedrooms having doors onto ‘decorative’
balconies overlooking the atrium (ie not access or
escape routes), small enough to be evacuated through
the doors in a few seconds,
• facades where unsealed windows are used for
simplicity and cheapness, or
• facades where small ventilation openings allow air to
circulate between the accommodation spaces and the
atrium.
54
Clearly, there must be no escape routes open to the upper
atrium.
If such doors and other such leakage paths do not have
tight seals, smoke from the atrium may enter many
adjacent rooms on many levels, causing a loss of visibility
in those rooms and possibly affecting escape routes away
from the atrium (Figure 42).
This might happen simultaneously on many floors,
requiring the simultaneous evacuation of all affected
floors, thus adding to the pressure of use on escape routes
elsewhere in the building. This is likely to be a particular
problem where there is a ‘sleeping risk’, eg atrium hotels.
It will also be a problem for fire fighters, since they may
feel the need to search all accommodation on all affected
floors to ensure that no-one remains at risk. Such a search
would be much quicker if all accommodation were kept
clear of smoke.
Hence smoke must be prevented from passing in
appreciable quantities through these small leakage
openings. One way of achieving this may be by
depressurizing the atrium[71,72].
7.3.2 Natural depressurization
In any structure with natural ventilation openings at high
and low level, and with a quantity of heat trapped inside,
a ventilation rate will be created due to the ‘stack effect’.
In order for air to move out through the high-level
opening, the pressure at high level inside must be greater
than the external pressure otherwise there would be no
air movement. Similarly, for air to flow inwards at low
level the pressure at low level inside must be less than
that outside. Thus there must be a position within the
structure where the pressure inside is equal to that
outside. This is known as the ‘neutral pressure plane’. Any
openings situated at the neutral pressure plane will have
no airflow through them, as there will be no pressure
differential at that height.
In buildings where a throughflow ventilation system is
Figure 42 Smoke logging in a ‘leaky’ closed atrium
Design methodologies for SHEVS
installed, where the inlet area is equal to the exhaust vent
area, then the neutral pressure plane will exist
approximately midway within the smoke layer
(Figure 43). If the inlet vent area is smaller than the
exhaust vent area, then the neutral pressure plane will
move upwards (Figure 44).
Any openings above the neutral pressure plane will be
under a positive pressure (defined positive outwards from
the atrium). Thus, there will be a flow of smoke from the
atrium into rooms above the neutral pressure plane
through any leakage path which might exist.
However, careful manipulation of the neutral pressure
plane can raise it to a ‘safe’ height above sensitive levels,
where there is little or no threat from the positive
pressure above (Figure 45). The pressure in the atrium
below the neutral pressure plane will be at a pressure
lower than ambient, thus any airflow will be from the
room into the atrium. Hence the levels below the neutral
pressure plane are protected from heat and smoke
contamination.
Annex F gives a description of a fire that occurred in
the IMF building in Washington [18]. The fire occurred on
the 10th floor of a 13-storey atrium, and by the time the
fire service arrived (16 minutes later) the smoke level had
descended below the 10th floor.
An interesting aspect of this fire was that despite the
presence of a natural ventilation system in the roof, the
atrium became completely smoke-logged at one point.
This apparent failure of the venting system was attributed
to the use of natural ventilation in a ‘tall’ building, where
the smoke had insufficient buoyancy to reach the vents.
However, the fire occurred on the 10th floor, and for all
practical purposes, when the fire broke out it was
effectively in a three-storey building with a deep
basement. Natural ventilation works extremely well in
‘shallow’ buildings, and therefore there must have been
some other mechanism in action, affecting the operation
of the ventilation system.
 7 Alternative forms of smoke control for atria 55

Open ventilators

Neutral pressure plane

Leakage

Inlet: equals
vent area

Figure 43 Neutral pressure plane (NPP): throughflow ventilation

Open ventilators
Larger vent area

Neutral pressure plane

Leakage

Inlet: smaller
vent area

Figure 44 NPP: exhaust is larger than inlet

The atrium had no apparent inlet facility and depending upon factors such as: inlet/vent area ratio, gas
accordingly instead of the ventilators providing a temperatures, wind pressures, etc. It is not, and should
throughflow ventilation effect, the atrium became not be confused with, the actual base of the smoke layer.
depressurized in the manner described above. This, in The equation describing the above relationship, in the
turn, prevented smoke from spreading beyond the absence of wind effects is [71,72 ] :
atrium, despite being smoke-logged to ground-floor level 2
AvCv T1
at one stage. = (7.1)
The neutral pressure plane (NPP) will lie somewhere AiCi D max
T0 –1
within the depth of the smoke layer in the atrium X
56 Design methodologies for SHEVS
Open ventilators

Neutral pressure plane

Figure 45 NPP is above highest leaky storey

where:
X = the height from the base of the smoke layer to the
desired position of the NPP (m),
20
D max = maximum depth of smoke layer from the
centreline of the exhaust ventilator (m).

This equation is represented graphically in Figure 46.

Eqn (7.1) represents the condition where the atrium
has a single, dominant inlet leakage path from the 15

exterior (eg access doors) but smaller leakage paths

between the atrium and accommodation and the exterior
(Figure 47). AvCv
2

With the technique as described above it is quite AiCi

possible for the atrium to be entirely filled with smoke
(see Annex F: IMF building), in which case D max will 10

approach the height of the atrium (Ha ), eg D max Ha.

It is a straightforward task to calculate the ventilation
requirements for a ‘pure’ depressurization system using
Eqn (7.1) or Figure 46, and Chapter 8 to determine the
smoke layer temperature from the appropriate heat
5
output for the occupancy concerned (see section 5.4 for
the heat output).
If the NPP was to descend below the desired design
depth then some of the higher storeys may become
endangered. This can arise from an increase in the actual
inlet leakage area available, eg where the fire brigade has
0
opened access doors to the atrium to investigate the 1.0 1.5 2.0
severity of the fire. A successful depressurization design Dmax
should be able to prevent smoke infiltration into adjacent X

spaces on the higher floors even in this condition.

Additionally, it is possible that the fire may cause Figure 46 Solution to NPP Eqn (7.1)
windows to break on both the external facade and the
atrium facade of the fire room. In this case, the broken
areas can act as a ‘dominant’ leakage path from the
exterior.

Open ventilators
Figure 47 NPP: dominant inlet
Thus, all potential inlet leakage paths must be assessed
when using Eqn (7.1) or Figure 46.
It should be noted that the simple approach set out
here will be invalid where the leakage paths across the
atrium boundary have appreciable areas on several
storeys [although all leakage areas below the smoke
layer’s base can be aggregated and regarded as being at
the layer’s base for calculation purposes when using
Eqn (7.1) or Figure 46]. Where there are appreciable
significant leakage paths on several storeys above the
layer's base, the same depressurization principle can be
employed but a more complicated ‘flow network’
calculation must be used. This is best left to specialists in
the field.
It is difficult to give a simple general rule to identify
when a building can be regarded as having a single
dominant inlet. Nevertheless, it may be sufficient to adopt
a guideline from the related field of ‘air infiltration’, so
that one can assume a ‘dominant inlet’ if the total area of
all openings below the layer base is more than twice the
total area of all openings above the layer base (excluding
the area of the ventilators themselves) [73].
7.3.3 Natural depressurization and wind effects
The NPP is sensitive to the effects of wind, and ‘adverse’
wind pressures might cause the NPP to fall to a lower
position on the leeward side of the building, possibly
contaminating the topmost leeward storeys of the
building. It follows that the depressurization design
procedure must take wind-force into account.
To assess the efficiency of operation of a
depressurization system a knowledge of the wind
pressure coefficients acting upon a building will be
necessary. These are a well-established way of relating
the wind pressure anywhere on a building to the wind
velocity at roof level.
7 Alternative forms of smoke control for atria 57
Neutral pressure plane
Wind pressure coefficients (C p’s) have often been
measured so that structural wind loading can be
calculated. There is a considerable body of data in
existence.
Where complete certainty is required for a novel or
complicated building, wind-tunnel observations using
scale models will yield usable results. In general,
however, it should often be possible to obtain reasonable
values for the Cp’s needed for smoke control calculations
from available literature (see eg reference [73]).
Figure 48(a) shows the typical 3-dimensional
complicated pattern of wind pressure coefficients over a
tall tower block[74]. In practice, it would be necessary to
identify the most pessimistic values for each storey, in
which case the problem can be simplified to
2-dimensional as shown in Figure 48(b).
With these data established for any specific building
the design procedure for checking on the performance of
a natural depressurization system is fairly simple where
there is a single dominant opening.
To prevent smoke leakage into the top leeward storey
for all wind speeds[71]:
(A – 1) C pv – A C pL + C pi ≤ 0 (7.2)
where:
Cpv = wind pressure coefficient at the vent,
CpL = wind pressure coefficient at the topmost leeward
storey of the building,
Cpi = wind pressure coefficient at the inlet, and
2
T0 AvCv
A= +1 (7.3)
T1 AiCi
Provided the requirements of Eqn (7.2) are satisfied, then
natural ventilation will work at all wind speeds. This
58 Design methodologies for SHEVS

(a) (b)

-0.8

Windward Leeward
-0.60
0.75 -0.55
0.95 -0.45
0.95 -0.45
0.90 -0.45
-0.8 0.80 -0.45
0.70 -0.45
0.65 -0.45
0.65 -0.45
0.60 -0.45
0.55 -0.45
0.50 -0.45
-0.7 0.45 -0.45
0.35 -0.45
0.30 -0.45
0.25 -0.45
- 0.6

0.2
0.5 -0.5
0.7
0.8
0.9 Figure 48 Wind pressure coefficients (C p‘s) around a typical tower
0.95 block: (a) 3-dimensional, (b) 2-dimensional distribution

implies that the roof ventilation system should be A natural smoke control system will be affected by the
subjected to suction wind pressures at all times. wind pressures operating against all the openings in the
However, if it is impossible to use a natural ventilator on a structure, thus pressure differentials vary with wind
particular building, fans can be used instead. direction and opening position and the throughflow of air
will vary with wind velocity.
7.3.4 Powered depressurization However, when the hole in the roof is replaced by a
The necessary capacity is a little harder to calculate, and Fan, the pressure differentials within the building now
the best fan is one which is not affected by wind pressures have to be changed by mechanically altering the
on its exhaust. With a fan, however, one must always throughflow of air. Therefore, the system must be
assume a maximum wind speed for design purposes. The designed with a maximum design wind velocity to cater
required volumetric flow rate may be calculated from [71]: for all conditions.
Further sophistication may be achieved by the use of
1/2
T1 Ai Ci 2 g θ1 X an anemometer and having ‘groups’ of fans, each group
V1 = ( C pi – C pL ) v 2 wind + (7.4)
T0 T1 operating at a different wind velocity. So if the wind was
light, one group could operate, and if the wind speed
where: increased, further groups might be activated as necessary.
3 -1
V 1 = fan capacity required (m s ),
-1
v wind = design wind velocity (ms ).

8 Depressurization/smoke ventilation
hybrid designs
Chapters 3 to 6 have indicated how smoke ventilation
can only keep a limited number of lower storeys clear of
smoke below the buoyant smoke layer formed in the
atrium. The technique does in principle, however, allow
those lower storeys to have adjacent spaces, and their
escape routes, open to the atrium. Sections 7.3 and 7.4
above show that it is often possible to design a
depressurization system where clean air is drawn through
all significant leakage openings on the atrium facade
immersed in the smoke layer. Depressurization does not,
however, protect any large leakage openings on any
storey above the layer base in the atrium. Nor will it
protect any escape routes on that storey open to the
atrium. In this context a large opening is one where the
opening in the atrium facade is larger than the sum of
openings further along the same leakage path away from
the atrium (eg if the atrium facade opening is larger than
openings in the external wall).
It will often be the case however, that architects will
want to maximize use of the atrium space, and an obvious
way is to combine the smoke ventilation approach of
Chapters 3 to 6, allowing greater freedom of design on
the lowest storeys, with the lesser freedom of ‘leaky
facades’ allowed by the depressurization technique set
out in sections 7.3 and 7.4 above. In this ‘hybrid’ design
the ratio of vent area to fresh-air inlet area will be
determined by Eqn (7.2) or Figure 46, whereas the actual
values of these areas must be consistent with the
necessary smoke exhaust requirement as defined in
sections 5.12 and 5.13. It should be appreciated that in
59
such a hybrid design the smoke layer temperature in the
atrium required for the depressurization calculations is a
natural outcome of the plume entrainment calculations
needed for the smoke exhaust calculation. Note that
hybrid designs are similarly possible where powered
ventilators are used for atrium smoke exhaust.
Hybrid designs usually follow one of two approaches:
mass-flow-based approach and temperature-based
approach.
Mass-flow-based approach
This approach is where the atrium is designed with a
number of open levels above the atrium floor and
requires a plume of a specific height. The maximum
number of levels will be determined by either the
magnitude of the mass flow rate entering the layer, or the
smoke layer temperature falling below the minimum
value of 20 °C. The principles of a mass-flow-based
hybrid smoke ventilation system are shown in Figure 49
(see next page).
Temperature-based approach
This approach is to cool a potentially hot smoke layer by
the deliberate entrainment of ambient air into the rising
plume. This may enable the use of facade materials which
cannot withstand high temperatures (eg float glass). The
principles of a temperature-based hybrid smoke
ventilation system are shown in Figure 50 (see next page).
A design procedure for hybrid systems is given in
Annex G.
 60 Design methodologies for SHEVS

Open ventilators
Centre line of ventilators AvCv

Neutral pressure plane

Inlet A i C i

Figure 49 Principles of ‘hybrid’ smoke ventilation system: mass-flow-based approach

Open ventilators

Neutral pressure plane

Centre line of ventilators AvCv

Inlet Aid

Situation A Situation B

Figure 50 Principles of ‘hybrid’ smoke ventilation system: temperature-based approach


9 Atrium smoke layer
temperature
In most smoke control system designs no account is
taken of the heat losses to the structure. It is assumed that
there is conservation of heat and that all of the heat flux
entering a smoke reservoir is contained in, and remains
in, the smoke. Experimental work in the past has shown
that this assumption holds good for relatively small
smoke reservoirs, with medium to high thermal
resistance in the containing structure, or for high mass
flow rates of smoke.
When considering atria, however, this assumption can
no longer be considered entirely valid. An atrium smoke
reservoir generally has a large surface area, which is
Heat carried by
exhaust gases
open ventilators or
powered exhaust units
Heat loss
through walls
into rooms
Figure 51 Heat balance in an atrium
61
predominantly glazed in most cases, thus providing a
good heat sink. There will be a passage of heat energy
from the smoke layer into the structure, and accordingly
the smoke layer will suffer a reduction in temperature.
Figure 51 shows the heat balance in an atrium. A
simple computer model based on these principles was
used to determine the loss of energy from the smoke
layer, based upon ‘worst case’ assumptions for the
facade[72]. The facade fabric is assumed to be thin glazing
with no apparent delay in the transfer of the energy from
the layer. The results of using this model are shown
graphically in Figures 52, 53 and 54 for 1 MW, 5 MW and
Heat loss through roof.
Heat loss
through external
walls.
Radiation downwards.
62 Design methodologies for SHEVS

6 MW fires, respectively. The model showed, despite the
fact that many differing atrium geometries were
considered with different values of external exposure, the
resultant calculation points could be plotted comfortably
as single curves for each value of mass flow rate.
At high values of mass flow rate there is little change in
the atrium smoke layer temperature for wide variations in
smoke layer surface area. This is due to the gas flow being
the prime mover of energy, and tends to justify the
assumption that loss of heat to the structure of a building
may be ignored for relatively small contact areas.

150

140

130

120

110

Q = 1MW
100 –1
M = 0 kgs
–1
M = 10 kgs
Smoke layer temperature rise θ £ (°C)

90
–1
M = 25 kgs
(Outside ambient = 0°C)

–1
80 M = 50 kgs
–1
M = 100 kgs
70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24

Total surface area (including base)

(m2 x 1000)

Figure 52 Atrium layer temperature for fire of 1 MW

 9 Atrium smoke layer temperature 63
320

300

280

260

240

220

Q = 1MW
200
–1
M = 0 kgs
Smoke layer temperature rise θ£ (°C)

–1
M = 10 kgs
180
–1
M = 25 kgs
(Outside ambient = 0°C)

–1
160 M = 50 kgs
–1
M = 100 kgs
140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24

Total surface area (including base)

( m 2 x 1000)

Figure 53 Atrium layer temperature for fire of 5 MW

320

300

280

260

240

220

Q = 1MW
200
–1
M = 0 kgs
Smoke layer temperature rise θ£ ( ° C )

–1
180 M = 10 kgs
–1
M = 25 kgs
(Outside ambient = 0°C)

160 M = 50 kgs –1

–1
M = 100 kgs
140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24

Total surface area (including base)

2
(m x 1000)

Figure 54 Atrium layer temperature for fire of 6 MW

64
10 Additional design factors
10.1 Atrium roof-mounted sprinkler
systems
Conventional sprinklers mounted in the roof of an atrium
will only be of potential benefit if there is a fire on the
atrium floor itself. However, due to the height that these
sprinklers will generally be mounted above the floor, the
fire will be of considerable proportions before the
sprinklers activate and they will therefore be of limited
benefit. More importantly perhaps, if a smoke layer is just
above the operating temperature of the sprinklers, it will
be reasonably stable (θ1≥ 50 °C). The action of all the roof
sprinklers operating almost simultaneously (as can be
inferred from work by Hinkley[75]) may rapidly cool the
layer and cause it to become unstable. This can occur if a
fire is above the atrium floor, and is highly undesirable.
One method of overcoming this problem is to use wall-
mounted, long-throw sprinklers around the sides of the
tall space. It is unlikely in such circumstances that the hot
gases from a fire which is not actually against one of the
walls will contact the sprinkler heads, and so
conventional sprinkler triggering devices cannot be used.
Instead, if the sprinklers are able to operate in
predetermined zones on receipt of an electrical signal;
and if there is a fire-detection system able to identify the
position of the fire sufficiently closely, then a signal can be
sent automatically to operate the appropriate sprinkler
zone. This approach has been pioneered by Ove Arup
Limited.
10.2 Controlled fire load on the atrium base
If there is a likelihood that a fire load will be present on
the atrium floor, the smoke control system designed for a
fire in an adjacent room will generally be able to cope
with the products of a much larger fire directly beneath
the roof. Thus, with proper management to restrict the
use of fuel assemblies and good housekeeping, such a fire
could feasibly exist and burn itself out before becoming a
problem to other areas outside the atrium. This does, of
course, assume that the methods detailed elsewhere in
this book will have been used to demonstrate that such a
fire does not represent a threat.
BS 5588: Part 7[7] includes a definition of the upper
limit criteria for a controlled fire load for an atrium base as
follows.
• If the total weight of combustibles on the atrium base
exceeds 160 kg, the materials should be confined to
isolated islands.
• Each island should:
– contain a maximum of 160 kg of combustible
material,
– cover a maximum floor area of 10 m2,
– be separated from other areas of combustibles by at
least 4 m (except where those areas are protected
by a sprinkler system).
• All wall and ceiling linings should have at least a
Class 1 surface spread of flame when tested in
accordance with BS 476: Part 7.
• When tested in accordance with BS 5852, all
upholstered furniture should resist ignition by the
smouldering source (ignition source 0) and the flaming
source (ignition source 5)*.
• All textiles (drapes and curtains) should meet the
requirements of BS 5867: Part 2.
*Note: Attention is drawn to the provisions of the
Upholstered Furniture (Fire Safety) Regulations in
respect of filling materials, in the UK.
10.3 Air-conditioned atria
In some hot countries it is common practice for an atrium
to be fully air-conditioned, making the internal ambient
temperature in the atrium lower than the external
ambient temperature. In such cases, especially for the
relatively small heat outputs in the early stages of a fire,
the temperature of the smoke layer which initially forms
in the atrium can be cooler than the external ambient
temperature, while still being warmer than the initial
internal atrium air temperature. In which case, use of a
natural ventilation system would cause a reverse stack
effect, ie with the roof vents acting as inlets and the inlets
(including any doors being used as escape routes from the
atrium to the exterior) acting as vents. This could cause
problems of cool smoke spreading downwards towards
(and through) the escape doors. Once the cool atrium air
has been flushed out by the warmer ambient air entering

through the vents, the system will reverse its direction of
flow, with the further potential for drawing back into the
building the cool smoke which has just been vented to
the street outside.
This problem of an initial downward movement of
smoke may be alleviated by the use of smoke detectors in
the rooms, rather than in the atrium, causing the
ventilation system to operate and creating a balance
between the internal and external temperatures prior to
the smoke entering the atrium in quantity; or by using
powered ventilators.
10.4 Channelling screens and hybrid
systems
It has been shown in section 6.2 that when smoke passes
under a balcony to rise into the roof void above, the
quantity of smoke entering the smoke layer in the rising
smoke plume can be reduced by restricting the width of
the plume as it passes the balcony edge, by the use of
channelling screens.
The need for plume width restriction is necessary for
any smoke control design where a clear layer of air is
required above a balcony projection beyond the fire room
(eg for escape purposes), and so will apply to a hybrid
smoke control system when the height of rise of the
smoke plume is fixed by escape requirements (mass-flow-
based systems).
As described in Chapter 8, an alternative use of a
hybrid system is to cool the smoke layer for some
purpose (eg to prevent glazing from cracking) by
deliberate entrainment of air into the smoke plume
(temperature-based systems). When designing a natural
ventilation system for this purpose a knowledge of the
depth of the smoke layer in the atrium is necessary to
calculate the vent area required. This in turn implies a
knowledge of the height of rise of the smoke plume.
Therefore, an estimate of the plume width leaving the
room is desirable to determine the height of rise required
for cooling purposes, and the plume width should be
reasonably narrow (usually not more than 10-20 m).
However, variations between the mass flow entering, and
that being vented from, the atrium smoke layer with this
type of hybrid system will be immediately compensated
for by a change in the depth of the smoke layer. Thus, the
actual width of plume achieved is irrelevant to the
satisfactory operation of the system. Hence there is no
practical advantage in physically reducing the width of
the rising plume for this form of hybrid system. Therefore
in the design of temperature-based hybrid systems,
channelling screens are unnecessary.
10.5 Wind-sensing devices
Sections 5.12 and 7.3.3 concluded that roof vents should
operate in areas of high suction pressure for all wind
directions. In certain instances it may be likely that
natural vents may experience an adverse pressure effect
(eg vertically mounted vents). In which instance the
10 Additional design factors 65
ventilation system should be controlled by a wind
direction indicator, and the required amount of
ventilation should operate in a leeward zone only.
It is possible to use a wind direction sensor to open
natural ventilators in zones of wind-induced suction for
more conventional ‘throughflow’ systems as well as for
depressurization systems, while leaving closed any
ventilators which might experience a wind overpressure.
In either case, it is necessary to map out the zones of
suction and overpressure for all possible wind directions.
This can most easily be done using a model of the
building and its surroundings in a boundary-layer wind
tunnel. It is also implied that the ventilators must be
controlled by an automatic, probably computer-based,
control system.
It should be noted that, although systems based on
wind-direction sensors have been installed in buildings,
the technique is relatively uncommon.
10.6 Crossdraught within the atrium
This describes the action of a horizontal air flow beneath
a hot gas layer, such as through the entrance of a building
into an atrium or mall. There can be a high relative
velocity between the smoke layer and incoming air when
air is drawn in through an inlet of limited area and passes
directly below the smoke layer. Smoke will be drawn
down into the air stream by the Venturi effect, and also by
turbulent entrainment of smoke from the gas layer into
the flow. That will lead to loss of visibility in the clear
layer[76].
The effect of the flow depends on the width of the
entrance through which air enters the building, and on
the relative position of the base of the gas layer and the
top of the air inlet. For flow through narrow inlets, such as
single or double doors, there can be serious loss of
visibility in the clear layer when the flow has a velocity of
0.3 ms-1 or greater, and the layer is less than 2 m above the
top of the inlet.
Where flow is across a wider opening, such as across
the width of a mall, flows of greater than 1.0 ms-1 can
cause serious loss of visibility in the clear layer when the
base of the hot gas layer is close to the top of the inlet.
When the base of the hot gas layer is more than 1 m
above the top of the inlet but less than 2 m above it, then
flows of greater than 1.9 ms-1 can cause serious loss of,
visibility in the clear layer.
It is very difficult to protect against the mixing caused
by the flow of air under a hot gas layer, but ensuring that a
screen defining the end of the reservoir is placed at least
3 m back from the air inlet will minimize the effect.
10.7 Crossflow within the gas layer
Experiments have shown that where there is horizontal
flow within the hot gas layer across the opening into a
centrally mounted natural smoke exhaust ventilator,
there will be no significant reduction in the efficiency for
velocities of up to 4 ms-1[77]. It is reasonable to assume that
66
the results will be similar where mechanical smoke
exhaust is used. Hence such crossflows can be ignored
when designing ventilation systems.
10.8 Wind effects on horizontal ventilators
Wind flowing over horizontal ventilators can influence
the exhaust rate through the ventilator, especially for
natural ventilators. The wind can increase the mass flow
through the ventilator due to the Venturi effect, or reduce
the effective vent area by reducing the effective discharge
coefficient. This latter phenomenon appears to be due to
the creation of a wind-induced vortex inside and closely
below the leeward edge of the ventilator’s opening.
Experiments have shown that natural ventilators
mounted on a flat roof, and having a kerb (to form a
Design methodologies for SHEVS
chimney around or beneath the ventilator) at least 0.2 m
high, are not adversely affected by external winds. This
appears to be due to the kerb deflecting the air flow
upwards far enough for the flow to re-attach to the roof
downwind of the ventilator itself. Ventilators which are
flush with the roof can be adversely affected for wind
speeds as low as 4.5 ms-1[78]. However, even with a kerb
gas layers shallower than 2 m, and at a temperature of less
than 25 °C above the ambient can be adversely affected
by winds flowing tangentially across them. There is also
some anecdotal evidence that the aspect ratio of natural
ventilators, even for those fitted with kerbs, should not
exceed 5:1 in order to avoid these problems when the
wind blows in a direction close to the long axis of the
ventilator.

11 Interactions with other systems
in the buiding
11.1 Sprinklers
11.1.1 Automatic sprinklers
Automatic sprinklers have a major impact on the
protection of property against fire. The statistical effect of
sprinklers is to reduce the frequency of large fires.
Sprinklers can control fire growth, provided the sprinkler
installation is chosen to match the nature and
arrangement of the fuels expected to be present. Even so,
there will always be a small proportion of fires which will
become large. Nevertheless, all studies show that
sprinklers have a good effectiveness in controlling fires.
Sprinkler design rules tend to be very prescriptive, and
have been described in many documents over the years,
eg by the CEA[79], or by many national standards
(eg BS 5306: Part 2[80]).
Over the past 10–15 years in particular, it has been
recognized increasingly widely that sprinklers which can
operate early in a fire can have a life-safety role as well as
protecting property; although it is still generally true that
sprinklers are not universally accepted for this role.
Where life-safety is seen as important, many modern
Standards specify additional features for the sprinkler
installation compared with installations solely intended
for property protection.
Where sprinklers operate in a building and where the
fire service also intervenes, it can be very difficult to say
which had the greater effect. In practice sprinklers and
fire services, acting together, usually achieve better
results than either acting separately.
11.1.2 Automatic smoke exhaust ventilation
Smoke exhaust ventilation systems were first proposed to
achieve the benefits of venting through the roof, while
the fire was still small.
From 1972, in the UK and many other countries, it has
become commonplace to require smoke ventilation
systems for certain types of building in order to protect
the escape routes during the early stages of a fire.
Examples include enclosed shopping malls and many
atrium buildings. This places a very clear life-safety role
on smoke ventilation, and demands operation of the
smoke ventilation system earlier than the arrival of the
fire services – usually on the first detection of smoke.
67
It is also true that direct fire-fighting intervention is
faster and more effective if the fire-fighters can see what
they are doing. Part of the training of fire services
everywhere is concerned with the use of ventilation to try
to control the movement of smoke in order to improve
visibility. Hence SHEVS can also assist in fire-fighting
operations.
Ever since the 1960s, it has been recognized that a
smoke ventilation system cannot, on its own, control the
size of a fire. Either it allows the fire service to control the
fire more easily, or it requires additional measures to
control fire growth. In the UK, for example, it has been
routine since 1972 for sprinklers to be required in
enclosed shopping complexes to limit the fire size to a
magnitude which the smoke ventilation system can cope
with [5]. That is, by making the smoke ventilation possible,
the sprinklers have been seen as sharing in the same life-
safety role.
11.1.3 Sprinklers combined with smoke ventilation
It follows that sprinklers and smoke ventilators are both
important for life safety and for property protection,
although smoke ventilation should only be seen as being
useful for property protection by making fire fighting
easier and faster. It is therefore reasonable to expect both
sprinklers and smoke ventilators to be used together,
both for life safety and for property protection.
It would be ideal if the operations of one system
(sprinklers or smoke ventilators) had no adverse effect on
the operation of the other. Unfortunately that is not the
case.
Factory Mutual Research Corporation carried out
some excellent experiments in the early 1970s[81]. Their
main conclusions were that vents allowed more fire
damage (ie more fuel was consumed) and caused delays
in the operation of sprinklers. Thus, sprinklers would
perform more effectively without vents, especially if the
building was allowed to fill with smoke to create low-
oxygen conditions which would further limit
combustion. This led to their advice, publicized most
clearly after 1980, to ‘button-up’ the building and to allow
sprinklers to achieve extinction of the fire.
No account was taken of the potential for active fire
service intervention in their analysis, and indeed their
68
‘button-up’ approach effectively recommended that the
fire services should wait outside the building until the fire
had been extinguished by the sprinklers. This approach
was contrary to the operational doctrine of the Fire
Brigades in the UK and elsewhere. They wanted smoke
Sprinklers open
ventilation to make their job easier, and to reduce the risk
of a backdraft threatening their fire fighters when they
enter what could otherwise be a smoke-filled building.
The result has been a polarization of views. One side
supports the ‘button-up’ idea, and thinks that smoke
ventilation reduces the effectiveness of sprinklers. The
other side favours using smoke ventilation simultaneously
with sprinklers in order to increase the effectiveness of
fire fighting. There were many papers published during
the 1980s discussing and reinforcing these viewpoints.
Since then, much research has been carried out on
interactions between sprinklers, ventilators and the
thermally buoyant layers. A number of computer models
have been developed, some of which are listed in Table
11.1. Typical results from some of the models predict a
small increase in the time to operation of sprinklers
coupled with a considerable extension of the time to
develop smoke-logging in the compartment.
There have also been some experiments, most notably
the large experiments in Ghent in Belgium[88], and at
[89]
SP Boras . Figure 55 is a typical example of the results
from the Ghent experiments, showing a small increase in
the time to operate the first sprinklers, and an unexpected
reduction in the total numbers of sprinklers operating
during the fire. Note that the fire growth and control was
arbitrarily selected for the purposes of the experiment.
Results from the Ghent experiments have been used to
test the predictions of RADISM and results from the
SP Boras experiment have been used to test the
predictions of SPLASH and JASMINE.
Unfortunately the same evidence has been interpreted
differently by the two sides and progress since 1980 has
not removed the controversy, although it has cleared up
many details. It has tended to confirm the two opposite
poles of the argument in their respective views.
A compromise was suggested by Morgan [90] as follows.
• Where the primary purpose of the smoke ventilation
system is the protection of life, eg by protecting the
Table 11.1 Computer models developed to determine
interactions between sprinklers, ventilators and thermally
bouyant layers
Computer Developer
model
RADISM Developed by Hinkley from a joint FRS–Colt
International project, UK[82]
LAVENTS Developed by Cooper at NIST, USA[83,84]
SPLASH Developed by Gardiner (1988) and Jackman (1992)
from a joint collaboration between Brandforsk,
[85,86]
Sweden, FRS and South Bank University, UK
JASMINE A two-phase version developed by Kumar et al at
[87]
FRS. UK
Design methodologies for SHEVS
55
50
45
40
Experiment 26
No vents
Experiment 31
35
Experiment 32
30
25
20
15
10
20 vents
5
10 vents
0
0 6 120 180 240 300 360 420
Time (secs)
Figure 55 The effect of smoke ventilators on sprinkler operation
escape routes used by occupants of the compartment,
this must take priority. Sprinklers will usually be
needed to control the fire to a size with which the
smoke ventilation system can cope. The smoke
ventilation system and all its associated features
(except the sprinklers) must be activated on first
detection of smoke, which almost always means earlier
than any sprinklers will operate.
• Where the property is likely to experience a high-
challenge fire, there should be a different approach.
Pending research into this aspect, we can assume that
‘extra-high-hazard’ occupancies identified for
sprinkler installation purposes correspond to this
category. Means of escape should not depend on
smoke exhaust ventilation, but should instead depend
on compartmentation and adequately short travel
distances for escape of the occupants. If a smoke
ventilation system is needed to assist fire fighting, it
should be operated by a switch easily accessible for fire
fighters without them having to enter the fire
compartment. This will allow the risk of a backdraft to
dissipate before any of the fire-fighters have to be put
at risk.
• For properties below the extra-high-hazard category,
and where the primary purpose of the smoke
ventilation system is to protect property by assisting
fire-fighting intervention, we can identify two
alternative strategies:
– where the attendance time of the fire services is
likely to be long, adopt the same strategy as for
extra-high-hazard occupancies as above.
– where the attendance time of the fire services is
likely to be short, operate the smoke ventilation
system on first detection of smoke in order to obtain
the maximum advantage of a smoke-free region for
fire-fighters to work in. Sprinklers can be allowed to
operate with their usual triggering devices.
It has since been suggested that in the last point above, a

smoke ventilation system may be initiated by a flow
switch in the sprinkler supply, but only if quick response
sprinklers are used. There is also a strong and clear
recommendation that the issue of whether the
attendance time will be long or short should be decided
by discussion with Fire Officers who know the local
circumstances affecting any individual building design
(for a more detailed discussion see Chapter 12).
The compromise proposals outlined above must be
regarded as an interim solution to the problem, allowing
standards-writers and regulators to cope with real
building designs, and allowing Fire Services to develop
their operational and training procedures accordingly.
However, where a SHEVS design is primarily for life
safety, it must be operated at the earliest possible
opportunity, which in practice will usually mean
triggering on smoke detection.
11.2 Fire-detection systems
The operation of any smoke control system is generally
dependent upon a smoke detector operating and there
are scenarios where particular detection strategies may
need to be considered. It is essential that where operation
of the SHEVS is dependent on the prior operation of
smoke or other fire detection, the detection system must
link into the SHEVS control system in a way which
allows the latter to operate the appropriate zones, and to
initiate other appropriate actions (eg to start alerting
occupants, to call the fire service, etc.).
In a particularly tall atrium, stratification of the smoke
layer before reaching the ceiling is probable, especially in
atria which are air-conditioned in the lower portion only,
or have a high proportion of roof glazing. Thus, if the
only detection system present is roof-mounted it may not
operate, or at least be considerably delayed in operation.
This problem may be overcome by the installation of
smoke detection to the various rooms where fire might
start and/or by intermediate detection zones at different
heights in the atrium, possibly using beam detectors.
If the environment is particularly ‘dirty’ then point
smoke detectors will be prone to false alarms, and it may
be necessary to reduce the operating sensitivity. With
intelligent analogue addressable detectors it will also be
possible to use a ‘progressive’ system where different
actions may be taken depending on the signals given by a
number of detectors. In some environments the use of a
sampling system will be of greater benefit.
Although smoke detectors will be used in the majority
of applications, other forms of detection may be
considered. For example, there may be scenarios where
an infra-red flame detector may have superior
performance characteristics. Sensitive infra-red heat
detectors may perform adequately in some situations,
and can be essential to identify the location of the fire and
to trigger wall-mounted, long-throw sprinklers where
they are used because the ceiling is too high for
conventional sprinklers to be ceiling-mounted.
11 Interactions with other building systems 69
11.3 Heating, Ventilation and Air
Conditioning (HVAC)/Air Conditioning and
Mechanical Ventilation (ACMV)
HVAC and ACMV systems are intended to do essentially
the same task: they provide a comfortable environment
within the building. The term HVAC is used mainly in
cooler climates, and ACMV in warmer climates where it
is rarely necessary to heat the building. These ventilation
systems serve an essentially different purpose to a
SHEVS. They are typically designed to minimize energy
losses from (or into) the building–unlike a SHEVS
which is designed to let energy (heat from the fire) out of
the building. Other important differences include the fact
that HVAC is usually designed to bring warm air which
has risen to the ceiling back down to lower heights where
the occupants are to be found. This is the exact opposite
of what a SHEVS is trying to achieve. When these
systems are in ‘air-conditioning’ mode, it is common to
introduce air into the spaces at high level, near the
ceiling, and to remove ‘used’ air from low level – once
again, the opposite of what a SHEVS is trying to achieve.
It follows that it is rare that a HVAC or ACMV can
simply fulfil a double role as a SHEVS, although this can
be possible with a sufficiently ‘intelligent’ control system.
It is the most common practice for the HVAC/ACMV
system to shut down on receipt of a signal from the same
detection system that starts the SHEVS operating. The
result of this is that any ducts with openings exposed to
the smoke layers associated with the SHEVS, regardless
of whether they function as supply or exhaust in non-fire
conditions, are able to act as pathways for that smoke –
often in undesired ways and to undesired parts of the
building. This process is often referred to as ‘siphoning’.
The designer of the SHEVS should try to foresee all of
these potential unwanted smoke paths, and should
specify that smoke dampers be installed in those ducts in
positions which will prevent any smoke spreading
beyond the boundaries of the smoke zone.
These dampers must be motorized, and should be
triggered into operation by receipt of a signal from the
SHEVS control system – subject of course to any delays
required by the control system in order to ensure the
correct sequencing of operation of different components
and thus to prevent any damage. In general, all SHEVS
should be tested regularly for operation as a part of
management responsibilities. This will require that the
smoke dampers must be capable of being motorized back
open after the test. This is because, if re-setting the
equipment after such a test is too demanding of staff time,
the test will only ever be done once!
The authors have found, while checking other
designers’ work, that it is regrettably true that the need
for smoke dampers to prevent siphoning is often
overlooked in many designs. In practice, the absence of
such dampers will usually only be noticed by an in-situ
‘hot smoke test’, when smoke starts to appear in parts of
the building where it should not be. As such tests are still
very infrequent, it seems likely that a significant but
70
unknown proportion of SHEVS installations will have
this failing.
There can often be advantages if the HVAC/ACMV
system is designed in a coordinated way with the
SHEVS. This can allow, as far as is possible, the
HVAC/ACMV to be zoned with the same boundaries as
the SHEVS, and so reduce the need for (and the cost of)
smoke dampers.
11.4 Pressurization of stairwells and
lobbies
In some atrium buildings there may be a requirement or
desire to pressurize the escape stairs and associated
lobbies. If the atrium employs a depressurization or
hybrid smoke control system and the glazing between
the fire room and the atrium has cracked or shattered, the
pressure within the fire room will, of necessity, be lower
than the outside ambient pressure. This reduction in
pressure will act as though an extract fan was fitted to the
fire room, increasing the pressure differential developed
across the escape lobby doors. This increased pressure
differential will increase the air flow through the leakage
paths of the lobby, thus enhancing the efficiency of the
pressurization system in preventing the passage of smoke
into the escape route.
The situation will be different where the pressurized
stairwell or lobby connects through to the atrium space
itself, especially where the atrium has a ‘throughflow’
SHEVS without any special ‘atrium depressurization’
features. In this case all parts of the atrium above the NPP
will be at a higher pressure than ambient, requiring a
higher value of the minimum design pressure difference
for the pressurized shaft and/or lobby. A procedure for
the calculation of this changed value is outlined in
Annex H.
11.5 Lighting and signage
In general, the presence of a SHEVS will make little
difference to the usual requirements for the provision of
emergency lighting and of emergency exit/wayfinding
signs. It is possible, however, to make some observations
of good practice based on common sense.
It is expected that a SHEVS will result in a buoyant
layer of smoky gases beneath the ceiling, either in a
smoke reservoir or in channelled flows en route to the
smoke reservoir. This smoke is likely to be optically dense
and black in any real, severe fire. It follows that any lights
and any signs positioned higher than the design smoke
layer base in these circumstances are unlikely to be of any
actual value to people trying to escape. If the design of the
SHEVS is taken into account when decisions are made
about the locations of the lights and of the signs, then
these can be located below the design layer base, and
they can serve their intended function. In some cases, it
may be easier to design the SHEVS so that the smoke
layer base is higher than the emergency lights and signs,
although the costs incurred by the extra entrainment and
Design methodologies for SHEVS
hence the larger smoke exhaust capacity will usually
outweigh any savings on the lighting and signage.
11.6 Public address and voice alarm
systems
It is the purpose of an alarm (ie an alerting) system to
persuade the occupants of a building to start to evacuate
the building. There is considerable experience [42]
(including many Fire Service anecdotes) that a simple
bell or sounder is essentially ineffective in persuading
untrained occupants to start to escape. There is a
developing consensus that a voice alarm will be far better
at persuading people to start[42]. That is, that a simple,
clear, and informative message in plain language is much
better at motivating people to stop their other activities
and start to escape. A public address system can very
easily be adapted to meet this function.
It is an unfortunate consequence of human nature that
such voice messages should not be delivered ‘live’. The
designated person may not be present at the critical
moment, or may not realize the importance of giving the
warning rather than carrying out other emergency
actions. It follows that it is better to use a pre-recorded
message, automatically triggered by the same controls
that start the SHEVS. In a large and complicated
building, it may even be reasonable to use different
automatically generated messages in different areas
depending on the detected location of the fire. This
would, for example, allow people to be automatically
directed on the safest route away from the fire, or to take
part in a phased evacuation where those closest to the fire
are evacuated first.
It should be noted that powered ventilators (fans) can
be very noisy in operation, and can drown out the voice
message unless this has been allowed for in design. It
follows that any voice alarm system must be loud enough
to be heard clearly and audibly above the noise of the
fans.
11.7 Security
Most buildings large enough and complex enough to
warrant a SHEVS will also need security arrangements to
protect against theft, vandalism, etc. At its simplest this
can mean that all doors into the building, and all other
large openings, will be locked (eg at night, or outside
normal working hours). This can conflict with the
requirements that all designated air inlets for the SHEVS,
which can often include doors, must be able to open
automatically when the SHEVS comes into operation.
Note that there will usually also be a regulatory
requirement that security measures must never block
escape routes for people inside the building. It is also
undesirable in most cases for the security measures to
hinder fire fighters’ access into the building in the event of
fire.
Possible compromises to resolve the conflict might
include, for example, the use of automatically unlocking

and opening doors on receipt of a signal from the SHEVS
control panel where those doors are intended to serve as
air inlets for the SHEVS. Another possibility might be to
use open-mesh security shutters, with keys being in the
possession of the fire service.
11.8 Computerized building control
systems
A constantly increasing number of buildings have their
internal services controlled by a central computer. It is
particularly tempting to link the SHEVS and other fire-
protection measures into the same computer system,
both for convenience and because of the large number of
required automatic actions affecting the normal building
services in the event of fire.
Unfortunately, it is the common experience that the
‘environmental’ controlling software often requires
amendment, and that the computer itself will be
upgraded. Whenever these occur, there is a danger that
the fire-protection system software will be inadvertently
affected, or that it may be less compatible with the latest
upgrade to the operating system, or any one of several
other problems.
11 Interactions with other building systems 71
The designer of the SHEVS’ control software should
ensure that there is a full description in the system
documentation, including a fully detailed and annotated
listing of the program code. This should also be the case
for other fire-protection measures controlled by the same
computer. Unfortunately this will not prevent problems
of the sort envisaged in the previous paragraph, although
it should make problem-solving easier once they occur.
A small measure of extra protection might be gained
by using a separate dedicated computer for the fire
software, but this still faces the difficulty that many of the
necessary actions will require the building control
software to respond in the appropriate manner.
The only way to be sure that changes do not degrade
performance is to ensure that whenever any changes are
made to the building control hardware or software, or to
the fire protection hardware or software, it would be
good practice to test the fire-protection measures,
including the SHEVS, by triggering the fire-detection
system (eg by blowing a small amount of smoke into a
smoke detector) and confirming that all the actions
which ought to take place do in fact still take place,
according to the design specifications.
72
12 SHEVS and the fire services
12.1 General
As discussed in section 1.4 both SHEVS and operational
fire-fighting have their place within an integrated
approach to fire-safety engineering. Chapter 2
mentioned that the assistance of operational fire-fighting
can be one of the design objectives for a SHEVS, and that
perhaps the most important way in which a SHEVS can
serve to protect property is by making fire-fighting
intervention easier and quicker.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine more closely
the factors which influence the effectiveness of a SHEVS
in assisting fire-service operations. It is not the purpose of
the current book to provide complete operational
guidance for the fire services. While much of what
follows takes the form of actions to be taken by the fire
services, the authors’ intention is to alert readers to the
problems and needs of the fire-fighter.
12.2 Design objectives for SHEVS and
implications for the design-fire as a basis
for design
12.2.1 Fundamental fire-fighting objectives
Fire-fighting by human beings has been a self-evident
necessity through the ages, although not always fully
successful in all cases. Even nowadays, though many
approved and reliable extinguishing or suppression
systems are available, fire-fighting by human beings is still
inevitable and therefore established in the legislation of
many countries as a duty. That is partly because no
technical device can achieve 100% reliability. Apart from
fire suppression systems which prevent the ignition of a
fire in very specific and confined spaces (eg inside
machinery for processes having explosion risks) and gas
extinguishing systems for single apparatus or small rooms
or spaces (eg underneath false floors used for electric
installations), extinguishing systems cannot avoid every
adverse effect of the products of combustion (especially
smoke) before the fire is extinguished in all cases.
From experience it is known that extinguishing
systems applying water sprays cannot extinguish all fires
in every case. They will usually achieve control,
depending on the nature and distribution of the fuel to be
protected. It should also never be forgotten that water
sprays cannot extinguish fuel which is shielded from that
water. Therefore, accompanying and follow-up
extinguishing operations by fire services will be
inevitable.
This implies the necessity of fire-fighting operations
(including rescuing people) and suggests the benefit or
even necessity of SHEVS supporting fire services even
though extinguishing systems are present. To understand
the various design objectives for a SHEVS and the
resulting requirements, it is useful first to consider what is
meant by a ‘successful’ fire-fighting operation.
A common doctrine defining what fire-fighting
operations ought to achieve sets out the fundamental fire-
fighting objectives (see Box, below).
I Rescuing lives
This objective comprises all activities to help occupants
trapped in an endangered zone to escape from it, if
necessary by means of ladders and/or by supporting
them with breathing apparatus and guiding them out to
places of safety. It also includes the search for missing or
trapped people, and the transport of disabled or injured
people out of spaces threatened by fire and smoke.
II Extinguishing fires
This objective includes all activities which hamper and
interrupt the chemical process ‘burning’ and therefore is
dedicated to controlling the fire growth and achieving
extinction of the fire. In this way, goods and contents not
set on fire can be protected from ignition, but without
being protected from the adverse effects of smoke if they
are not separated from it. Actions intended to extinguish
the fire will also reduce the heat output and therefore
diminish the thermal stress on the building’s structure.
Fundamental fire-fighting objectives
I Rescuing lives
II Extinguishing fires
III Saving the structure, valuable goods, contents and equipment in
premises
IV Saving the surroundings and the environment

III Saving the structure, valuable goods, contents and
equipment in premises
This objective comprises all activities besides
‘extinguishing’ to separate valuable items and/or
equipment from the adverse effects of fire (smoke and
heat) before they become damaged or destroyed. This
will be particularly of importance if it can be foreseen that
the fire cannot be stopped in time (eg due to lack of
extinguishing agents, of enough fire-fighting equipment,
and/or of enough personnel) but there is still the
possibility to carry those valuable things out of the
endangered zone before they are affected by fire or
smoke.
IV Saving the surroundings and environment
This objective includes all activities to protect the
surroundings of a compartment or building from being
ignited, and to prevent excessive harm to the
environment, eg by air pollution or by contamination of
soil or groundwater. This objective is usually achieved by
extinguishing a fire at an early stage of burning.
Following the priority and urgency of the fire-fighting
objectives listed above, adequate operations have to be
carried out in this sequence (or all together if it is possible more time between detection and the alert being given to
with the man power and equipment available).
Naturally, a fire-fighting operation is totally successful
if all four fire-fighting objectives can be achieved. If, for
whatever reasons (regulatory or by the choice of the
occupant of a premises – if he is free to do so) the fire
services are only supposed to achieve one or a choice of
the fire-fighting objectives outlined above (eg just
objectives I and IV), then a fire-fighting operation which
achieves these objectives has to be considered to be
‘successful’ (even if, following the example given in
brackets above, the whole occupancy affected by fire is
lost but there are no casualties or damage to the
environment). Note that the concept of the ‘throw-away
building’ is not new!
From the foregoing it follows immediately that the
design objectives for a SHEVS and the resulting
requirements for it should be closely correlated with the
fire-fighting objectives I-IV above.
12.2.2 Design objectives for SHEVS in connection withproperty losses, with these being mainly restricted just by
fire-fighting objectives I-IV
12.2.2.1 SHEVS design objective ‘life safety only’
supporting fire-fighting objective I
The design objective for such a SHEVS must be to
remove smoke and heat from the accommodation on fire
and to protect any means of escape within that space by
creating a smoke-free layer from the beginning of smoke
production until the last occupant of the building has
escaped from it or has reached a safe place (ie protected by
a fire-resisting structure which is well vented).
If the fire can develop without being controlled the
SHEVS will become unable to cope with the larger
quantities of smoke and heat. This will result in:
• smoke logging of the whole fire compartment,
12 SHEVS and the fire services 73
• levels,
temperature rise of gases near the floor to harmful
and finally
• flashover of the compartment into full involvement.
When this has happened the SHEVS is not of any value
for fire-fighting (or for escape or rescue as anyone left in
the compartment will be dead or dying).
Therefore, design approaches which only equate the
presumed ‘escape time to the ‘time to danger’ based on a
growing fire, and take the fire size and heat output at this
time as the basis of design for a SHEVS, can only support
all four fire-fighting objectives (ie I-IV above) if there is a
considerable degree of confidence in the calculated basic
parameter escape time’, and also if this period is longer
than the time which has passed to the point when fire-
extinguishing operations become successful in
preventing further fire growth.
Note: The time between fire alert and extinguishing
operations becoming successful is often described as ‘fire-
fighters’ intervention time’ and consists of the attendance
time of fire services plus the time needed to develop a
successful attack on the fire, ie to put enough water on the
fire to prevent it from growing further. It should also not
be forgotten that some time will have elapsed between
ignition and detection of the fire, and sometimes even
the fire service. All these periods of time should be
considered in SHEVS design calculations of the type
being discussed.
If the fire-fighters’ intervention time is less than the
‘time to danger’, fire-fighting operations will start while
evacuation is still in progress. This will allow the fire-
fighters to begin to control the fire growth and thus delay
the onset of danger to people escaping. In addition,
people will behave in a more disciplined way and are
more likely to follow evacuation instructions in the
presence of fire-fighting personnel.
Otherwise, if the fire-fighters’ intervention time is
greater than the presumed ‘time to danger’ and to
evacuation time (however well assessed!) the
effectiveness of the SHEVS can break down before
successful fire-fighting operations can start. Thus, in
these circumstances a SHEVS cannot contribute to
achieving fire-fighting objectives I-IV above. In a very
large and complex building this will result in greater
compartmentation. In the absence of fixed extinguishing
systems (which can be expected to prevent uncontrolled
fire growth even if they do not extinguish the fire) total
losses of whole fire compartments can be expected.
Total losses of large fire compartments usually also
threaten the environment by heat radiation, flying sparks
and often by toxic smoke. Larger fires can also present a
threat to the environment in the form of the run-off of
contaminated fire-fighting water.
In this respect, a design concept for life safety which
uses the assumed or calculated evacuation time to define
the upper limit of the growing design fire is potentially
very dangerous and vulnerable to abuse.
Even where legislation only concerns the safety of the
74
building’s occupants and saving the environment around
the building from the fire threat, it is not clear that there is
public acceptance for fire ‘prevention’ concepts which
allow for the total loss of a building as long as occupants’
safety and protection of the environment are achieved.
The issue of the consequential costs to society in terms of
job losses, rebuilding costs, etc. is a frequent subject for
debate.
An even more threatening aspect of using the
evacuation time as the determining design parameter for
the fire size of a growing fire, which in turn is a key
parameter for designing a SHEVS, is the possibility of
underestimating the evacuation time.
Computer models simulating evacuation, or
evacuation exercises performed by test persons, will be
very helpful in assessing escape times. But it has to be
borne in mind that these simulations should allow for the
possible existence of stragglers, disabled and/or injured
people. In addition, the fact that firemen often have to
search for missing people after a completed ‘evacuation’
should not be forgotten. It is well known that people
often enter a burning building again for subjective
reasons. The existence of these problems implies the
need for safety margins in the estimated evacuation time.
The main uncertainty in assessing an evacuation time
is the unpredictable period between alerting the
occupants and their subjective decision to start escaping.
After 24 years’ experience as an officer of a professional
fire brigade the author of this chapter has found that
people usually do not start to try to escape until they
perceive themselves to be endangered which is often too
late for safely escaping without support from the fire
services.
A definite start of evacuation can therefore only be
assumed if the occupants are subject to some form of
directed organization. This can be either inside an
existing hierarchy amongst themselves, as will be the case
for employees of a company or civil servants in large
office accommodation, or where the occupants are
controlled by an organization established for the purpose
of evacuation such as trained staff in hotels or premises
for public assemblies.
12.2.2.2 SHEVS design objective ‘life safety and
property protection’ supporting fire-fighting
objectives I–IV
It follows from the discussion in section 12.2.2.1 above
that the design of a SHEVS merely for life safety based on
a design fire size dependent on the evacuation time is
dangerous and inappropriate from fire-fighting aspects.
Each assessment for a suitable design fire size should rely
on the effectiveness of extinguishing systems or on the
most likely assumption that the fire is controlled by fire-
fighting operations and cannot grow further.
For steady-state fires, which are derived from statistics
(eg > 90% of fires have not been larger than a specified
area when the fire brigade started a successful attack on
them) or from experiments which provide evidence for
the effectiveness of extinguishing systems, the
Design methodologies for SHEVS
assumption of the design fire being the most ‘plausibly
pessimistic’ fire size will depend on the limits of the
relevant statistics.
For growing fires where either there is no fixed fire-
extinguishing medium, or where its effect on the growing
fire cannot be reliably identified, the intervening time for
the fire services (ie attendance time plus time for
developing a successful attack on the fire as defined in
section 12.2.2.1 above) has to be the suitable parameter
for assessing the fire size, although there might be some
severe uncertainties in these assumptions. These
uncertainties include difficulties in assessing the
attendance time of the fire services due to traffic jams or
casual deviations due to road works on the access route,
or simply the possibility that the fire-fighting forces
closest to the building concerned and dedicated to
intervene there first are already employed elsewhere on
another emergency.
Whatever method was used, once having assessed a
suitable design-fire size on the pessimistic assumption
that it is the ‘most likely largest fire size’ when
extinguishing operations (performed manually and/or
automatically) become successful, a SHEVS designed on
this basic parameter will serve for life safety and property
protection because all four fire-fighting objectives
(SHEVS design objectives ‘life safety and property
protection’ supporting the fire-fighting objectives I-IV)
can be achieved.
12.2.2.3 SHEVS design objective ‘property protection
only’ supporting fire-fighting objectives II and IV, and,
if also designed to do so, III
For some occupancies, there is no, or just a very low, risk
to lives due to threat from smoke. This will be true for all
circumstances where there are very few or usually no
persons inside a fire-affected compartment (eg as in most
warehouses, especially if they are automatically loaded
and unloaded by robots (see also section 12.3 below).
Another example concerns premises where the means of
escape are provided by compartmentation: ie where
corridors and staircases are enclosed by a fire-resistant
structure and protected from ingress of smoke (eg by
vented lobbies with fire doors or by pressurization
systems). Under these circumstances, SHEVS need not
provide a smoke-free layer from the very beginning of the
outbreak of a fire to ensure that people are able to escape.
Where the concern is limited to property protection
there are two main approaches possible, although the
distinction between them can be blurred:
• property protection mainly relying on fire-fighting
operations,
• property protection mainly relying on effectiveness of
extinguishing systems.
12.2.2.3a Property protection relying on fire-fighting operations
In this case a SHEVS is supposed to support fire-fighting
operations by removing smoke and heat in sufficient
amounts for fire-fighters to be able to:
• enter the compartment on fire,

• extinguish
identify the location of the still relatively small fire, and
• compartmentit quickly so that the rest of the
remains undamaged.
This means that a SHEVS has to be designed to create a
smoke-free layer in the fire compartment. This smoke-
free layer need not be provided from the very beginning
of smoke production (as mentioned above) but must be
available for fire-fighting operations. This consideration
only has an influence on the time for actuating the
SHEVS, but not on the design fire size and the results of
consequent calculations for designing the SHEVS (see
also section 11.1.3).
Therefore, a SHEVS intended to protect property only
by supporting fire-fighting operations by creating a
smoke-free layer, will not need less technical effort put
into the design than will systems for life safety plus
property protection.
A delay in actuating the SHEVS is only tolerable if the
temperature rise due to smoke logging of the
compartment is not so severe that it may ignite other
goods away from the fire’s origin, or may seriously
endanger the building’s structure. This is unlikely to
happen if the SHEVS is actuated by a flow switch in the
sprinkler supply, particularly where quick-response
sprinklers are used to ensure that the sprinkler system
starts operating as early as possible, and where that
operation has the minimum delay due to heat extraction
by the SHEVS. Despite this temperature criterion,
caution has to be applied when considering the adverse
effects where smoke is not removed from the very early
stages of the fire.
If goods, contents, linings or structure may be
destroyed or become unusable because of the corrosive
and contaminating effects of smoke, any design concept
involving delayed response of a SHEVS is of minor
benefit to protect such goods or property. Where this is a
significant consideration, actuating the SHEVS on a
signal from smoke detection can be recommended. It is
also a well-experienced fact that it takes a significant time
to create a smoke-free layer in an already smoke-logged
space, especially if natural throughflow ventilation is
used. For this reason, the actuation of a SHEVS on
detection of smoke is also preferable for assisting fire-
fighting operations in these circumstances. SHEVS
designed to open on a signal from smoke detection
support fire-fighting objective III, which is to separate
valuable items (eg works of art, documents, data, etc.)
before being affected by the fire and/or its products
(smoke and heat).
The reasons why the actuation of a SHEVS should be
delayed until the actuation of sprinklers, or should be
deferred until the arrival of fire-fighters often can be
considered to be as follows.
A SHEVS encourages the development of a fire by
ensuring that the fire has a supply of air. Therefore, it
should only be actuated if extinguishing or controlling
operations either by fire-fighters or by extinguishing
systems are already in progress. This is true in principle.
12 SHEVS and the fire services 75
But the temperature rise due to the fact that heat is not
exhausted from a closed space also enhances fire spread
and, in the absence of sprinklers, can lead to early
flashover.
Therefore, if the intervening time of well-equipped fire
services can be expected to be reasonably short (eg 10
minutes after being alerted by a smoke-detection
system), the maximum benefit of a SHEVS creating a
smoke-free layer can be obtained if it is actuated on
smoke detection before the fire-fighters arrive (as long as
the design fire size remains manageable for the fire-
fighters).
This is likely to apply for properties below ‘High
Hazard’ risks (‘Extra-High Hazard’ in older terminology)
which are protected by sprinklers or for very low risks
(due to the nature of the contents) even if not protected
by sprinklers.
Nevertheless, it has to be borne in mind that in the
absence of sprinkler protection the design fire sizes can
be larger, often getting beyond manageable sizes for the
fire brigade. Where this happens, a SHEVS is not a useful
component of the fire-prevention concept and limitation
of property losses can only be achieved by
compartmentation.
If the intervening time for fire services is assessed to be
longer than 10 minutes (for risks below High Hazard, for
which 10 minutes may be too long), fire sizes will be more
likely to grow beyond manageable sizes if no
extinguishing system is used. In this case installation of an
extinguishing system to control the fire until fire-fighting
operations become successful, has to be ensured.
There is a widespread belief amongst people in the
sprinkler world, that this can only be achieved by
activating a SHEVS after sprinklers have come into
operation. It has to be kept in mind, however, that
contents susceptible to smoke might not be protected by
this approach as the compartment could be totally smoke
logged by the time fire-fighters arrive. A compromise
solution (as explained in section 11.1) could be to activate
the SHEVS on a flow-switch in the sprinkler supply
provided that quick-response sprinklers are used as
mentioned above. This makes it much more likely that
sprinklers will be able to control the fire until
extinguishing is completed by fire-fighters. This will only
apply for risks below the (Extra-) High Hazard category.
Another frequently heard argument for actuating a
SHEVS manually is the belief that false actuating by the
smoke-detection system causes opening of natural vents
and leads to property damage due to rain, snow or
freezing. This problem must not be solved by relying on
manual actuation of the SHEVS, but instead by making
the detection system more sophisticated and reliable.
12.2.2.3b Property protection relying on effectiveness of
extinguishing systems
Where there are adverse effects for fire-fighting as
outlined in sections 12.3 and 12.4 below, or long
intervention times for fire services so that successful fire-
fighting is only possible with the support of extinguishing
76
systems, there must be sufficient confidence that these
systems will achieve their designed purpose and will not
be influenced adversely by other systems including
SHEVS. This is true for storage risks belonging to the
High Hazard category and for other storage risks if the
intervention time of the fire services can become
considerably long (eg more than 15 minutes, or even less
for fast or ultra-fast fire-growth rates).
In these circumstances, and to give the best chance for
complete extinguishing by the extinguishing system, it
would be wise to activate a SHEVS only manually from a
safe place outside a fire compartment at the discretion of
the fire services. This is discussed further in sections 12.3
and 12.4.
This kind of SHEVS cannot provide a smoke-free layer
when fire-fighting services arrive at the place of the fire
because it is activated only when the fire-fighters operate
it. Such a SHEVS can only clear a compartment from
smoke and heat after arrival of fire-fighters. Nevertheless,
it can still provide access for them to extinguish any
remaining burning fuel which had not been extinguished
by the extinguishing system. Prior to activation in these
circumstances, it is quite likely that the compartment will
have become filled with smoke, even down to the floor.
This allows the smoke to become hotter, faster, than with
the SHEVS in operation, and gives the sprinklers (or
other extinguishing medium) the best conditions for
early operation and therefore the best chance of
successful suppression of the fire. When the SHEVS is
activated, the buoyant smoky layer should lift, allowing
fire-fighters to see and move around beneath the hot
smoky gases.
The design of such a system requires that a design fire
size should be assessed, and that the system should be
calculated as it is desired to be after it has been activated.
Additional information is given in section 12.2.2.4.
12.2.2.4 SHEVS design objective ‘assisting fire-fighting
operations only’, mainly supporting fire-fighting
objective II
There is no special design dedicated only to assisting fire-
fighting operations. Each fire-fighting operation pursues
at least one of the four fire-fighting principles discussed
above. Using extinguishing measures without
simultaneously aiming at protection of life or property, or
of protecting the environment is a senseless exercise.
Therefore, each SHEVS designed for one of the design
objectives ‘life safety’ and/or ‘property protection’
automatically assists fire-fighting by creating a smoke-
free layer (except under adverse design assumptions for
design objective ‘life safety only’ as outlined in section
12.2.2.1.
No smoke-free layer is initially provided for fire-
fighters at their arrival by SHEVS following the design
objective ‘property protection’ relying on effectiveness of
extinguishing systems as discussed in section 12.2.2.3b)
above, although a reasonably clear layer will become
established quickly once the SHEVS has been manually
initiated which will enable the fire-fighting services to
Design methodologies for SHEVS
complete the task of extinguishing the fire.
Although any devices (eg windows, simple light
domes, etc.) allowing smoke and heat release out of a
compartment on fire can in principle assist fire-fighting
operations, these cannot be regarded as a SHEVS, which
has to be designed and calculated following the
methodologies outlined in this book.
12.2.2.5 SHEVS design objective supporting fire-
fighting objective IV
The fire-fighting objective IV can usually be achieved
without support of a SHEVS especially if fire-resistant
structures and compartmentation are applied to prevent
spreading of fire and smoke. In this case, any opening in
the structure will have an adverse effect on preventing
smoke from affecting the surroundings of the building. It
is usually sufficient to have a large enough water supply
and extinguishing capacity for the fire services on site to
prevent fire spread. It is worth mentioning, however, that
large amounts of smoke and toxic gaseous or dusty
materials spreading from their containers which have
been destroyed by the fire will endanger the environment
even where fire spread is prevented.
Therefore, SHEVS can contribute to achieve fire-
fighting objective IV by creating a smoke-free layer and
thus supporting the fire-fighting objectives II and III so
that the fire is less likely to become large enough to
threaten the environment by its consequences. It follows
that any SHEVS serving property protection will also
contribute to protection of environment.
12.3 Circumstances which reduce or
impede the ability of a SHEVS to assist fire-
fighting operations
A SHEVS on its own cannot prevent or slow fire growth.
Even where it serves to protect the means of escape there
is often a need for the fire service to search the building to
confirm that no-one remains, or to rescue people who
have failed to evacuate the building. It follows that even
with a SHEVS, there is often still a role for the
intervention of fire services to save lives. It is also the case
that the fire services will have a major role in
extinguishing the fire and thus protecting property.
A SHEVS, if well designed, can create a smoke-free
layer which assists fire-fighting. For certain risks and/or
under adverse circumstances a successful intervention of
the fire services can become impossible without the
presence of technical precautions such as fire detection or
automatic fire-extinguishing systems in spite of the
presence of a smoke-free layer when the fire is first
attacked.
It is fundamental that successful fire-fighting activities
can only be performed if the fire brigade is called and can
arrive on site before the fire compartment is fully involved
in fire, and when the fire is still small enough to be
controlled and finally extinguished by the available
means for fire-fighting. The latter requires that there is a
large enough water supply (or supply of other

extinguishing agents if needed) and sufficient fire-fighting
equipment on site. Note that the reference here to a fire
compartment applies primarily where the fire
compartment is large (which will almost always be the
case where a SHEVS is employed).
12.3.1 Factors adversely affecting successful
intervention by the fire services
• No automatic fire-detection system to alert the fire
services automatically
• Inadequate water supply (or supply of other
extinguishing agents if needed) on site for a successful
suppression of the fire by fire-fighting activities
• Inadequate fire-fighting equipment on site available in
time: this can be due to the location of the building
relative to the number and locations of the fire stations,
and to the number and type of appliances which are
allocated to intervene in a building in case of fire. The
presence of obstacles affecting the access for fire-
fighters and their appliances have to be taken into
account as well.
12.3.2 Additional provisions for optimizing the effective
use of a smoke-free layer created by a SHEVS for fire-
fighting operations
In order to gain full benefit for fire-fighting operations
from the smoke-free layer created by a SHEVS, and to
avoid adverse effects outlined in section 12.3.1 above, the
following precautions have to be observed.
1 The building designer should provide automatic fire
detection and automatic alarm transmission to the fire
services.
2 There should be an adequate water supply, or a
sufficient reserve of extinguishing water if the normally
available water supply from a fixed pipe network is
insufficient. Where appropriate, ensure that sufficient
stocks of special extinguishing agents (if needed for
certain fuels, eg foaming agents) are present.
3 There should be direct unhindered access to the
building for the number of appliance crews dedicated
to intervene in case of fire in the building concerned.
The fire service should ensure that after receipt of the
alarm, they can deliver within 10 minutes the
extinguishing capacity needed (manpower and
equipment) to extinguish the design fire. In view of the
many practical uncertainties (eg having to drive
through heavy traffic, or the possibility of appliances
from the nearest fire stations being at a different fire
when the call arrives) it is wise to allow a safety margin
of 100%. If this is not possible, or is difficult to achieve,
fire-fighting precautions have to be made inside the
building comprising trained fire-fighting staff with
corresponding fire-fighting equipment to deliver the
extinguishing capacity.
4 Alternatively, a fixed automatic extinguishing system
(eg sprinklers) can be provided in the building. While it
cannot be guaranteed that sprinklers will extinguish a
fire, they are known to be very good at controlling fire
growth and thus reducing the size of fire which the fire
12 SHEVS and the fire services 77
service finds on arrival at the scene, and which has to
be considered in 2 and 3 above. The presence of a
properly designed automatic extinguishing system will
usually remove the need for an on-site, specially
trained group of employees acting as a ‘works fire
brigade’. Note, however, that there may still be a need
for such groups where there are special circumstances.
Having taken these precautions, the fire services can take
full advantage of a smoke-free layer created early by an
automatically activated SHEVS (preferably on smoke
detection), with a good chance of being able to extinguish
a still relatively small fire immediately after arrival on site.
Thus, the objectives for life safety, property protection
and also environment protection can be achieved.
12.4 Circumstances where a SHEVS is of
minor benefit for fire-fighting operations
For some buildings and fuels it is not possible for the fire
brigade to apply water by using hoses directly and
immediately on all the burning fuel, because of the
arrangement of that fuel. In such circumstances, the fire
will still become larger even though it is being attacked.
This is mainly true for high risks such as high-rack-
storage with narrow aisles between the racks, or storage
in racks without clear aisles allowing free movement (eg
where racks are loaded and unloaded automatically by
robots). In case of fire inside such racks, there is no safe
access leading near enough to the burning fuel to apply
the water properly, whether there is a smoke-free layer or
not. On their way through such burning racks fire-
fighters would be endangered by burning goods falling
down on them or by collapse of the racks. A SHEVS will
be of very limited value in such cases, since it is incapable
of affecting the primary problem of rapid fire growth and
spread. In these circumstances, only fixed automatic
extinguishing systems can be applied successfully to
control the fire.
The benefit of a smoke-free layer in this case is not
important in the first stage of fire-fighting, because
firemen will not enter the fire compartment immediately
for safety reasons, as outlined above, but will instead rely
on the automatic extinguishing systems to control the
fire. These extinguishing systems will be more effective in
relatively small and sealed spaces if the fire is not
ventilated.
In very large poorly sealed spaces there will be enough
oxygen for combustion. A SHEVS can be used to remove
heat from the fire-affected space, and to reduce the
temperature of the smoke layer under the ceiling
compared with an unventilated space, and thus reduce
the number of sprinklers opening far away from the fire.
Thus, unnecessary water and pressure losses on the
extinguishing system are reduced and the effectiveness of
the extinguishing system is enhanced. It should be noted,
however, that this benefit only occurs if the SHEVS
comes into operation either before the sprinklers operate
or immediately after the first sprinkler operates.
78
Where the SHEVS has not operated very early, and
the building is possibly full of smoke when the fire service
arrives, fire-fighters should release the SHEVS manually
from outside the fire compartment and thus avoid
backdraft when the access doors are opened. When the
fire is controlled or almost extinguished by the sprinklers
the SHEVS will gradually establish a smoke-free zone.
Then fire-fighters can even climb inside the racks or
remove goods to get access to still glowing fuel and fire
pockets for final extinguishing.
The removal of heat will also have reduced the thermal
stress on the building structure and racks, which makes
these follow-up extinguishing activities safer for the fire-
fighters.
12.5 Circumstances where SHEVS are not
applicable
12.5.1 Premises with risk of fast-growing fires
Where there is a high probability of fast development of a
fire which makes fire suppression or extinguishing
systems necessary, installation of a SHEVS would serve
no useful purpose. Examples for such fire risks are where
flammable liquids can cause large liquid pool or jet fires,
or where the spread of combustible gases or dusts can
cause explosions.
These risks can only be overcome by installed foam or
gas-extinguishing systems, or suppression systems which
prevent the outbreak of a fire. In most cases these systems
will only be effective in a relatively sealed space.
Therefore, SHEVS designed to create a smoke-free layer
based on balancing air inflow against smoke exhaust are
not applicable. The extinguishing or suppression systems
in these cases have to be designed to extinguish a possible
Design methodologies for SHEVS
fire completely and not just to control it. This is different
to the usual design basis for sprinklers, which aims at
control although in most cases sprinklers also extinguish
a fire.
Therefore, for such risks it will be sufficient to take
precautions to remove the smoke from the affected space
after the fire has been extinguished. In most cases the
existing openings for natural light and access to the space
will be sufficient, especially if portable fans are applied by
the fire brigade. Sometimes it will be necessary to provide
additional openings of a few square metres for this
purpose which are normally closed and can be opened
manually.
12.5.2 Premises which must not be entered in case of
fire because of other prevailing hazards
Examples for such risks are premises in universities,
hospitals, research or industrial plants where hazardous
infectious, viral or bacterial, substances or radioactive
liquids or dusts are handled which must not be released
into the open atmosphere, eg with the smoke of a fire.
Therefore, such premises have to be totally separated
from other spaces by completely leaktight and fire-
resisting construction. Smoke spread in this case is not a
matter for discussion. The enclosing structure must be
fire resistant and all openings for ventilation must be shut
by fire-resistant and gastight dampers.
The problem will be to remove the cold, contaminated
smoke from the compartment after the fire has been
extinguished by automatic extinguishing systems. For
this purpose, special equipment with appropriate
cleaning devices has to be provided – this is beyond the
scope of this book.

13 Selection of equipment
13.1 General
No design is of any value unless it results in the
installation of a system which is fit for its intended
purpose.
This concept of ‘fitness for purpose’ is of critical
importance for all fire protection measures, and not just
for a SHEVS. All fire protection measures share the
common feature that they must work as intended when a
fire occurs even if that fire is a rare event in the lifetime of
the building. This carries implications for how the
equipment to implement a design must be specified, as
well as for how that equipment must be installed,
serviced, and maintained during its time in the building.
This carries the further implication that the equipment
ought to be capable of being serviced and maintained in
as easy a manner as possible.
A known bad example concerns smoke ventilators
which have to be manually closed by someone climbing
onto the building’s roof, especially when a test of the
functioning of the system results in many ventilators
being opened. It is unlikely that many managers will carry
out such a test more than once, in view of the time,
trouble, and possible wind and rain damage which might
occur while the ventilators are being reset. And yet
without regular functional tests there can be no
confidence that the system will operate when a fire does
occur. The answer to this paradox is, of course, to specify
equipment which can be closed easily by operation of a
simple switch in the central control panel, but to make
that switch inaccessible to everyone except an authorized
person so that a real operation of the system is not
terminated prematurely. Regular and frequent functional
testing is especially important where the SHEVS is
designed to reduce the threat to life.
These simple principles apply to all the specialist
equipment needed for a SHEVS. ‘Fitness for purpose’ can
be met in many cases by ensuring that the equipment has
been tested in an appropriate way.
Note the word ‘appropriate’. This hides a considerable
degree of necessary complexity. In general, an item of
equipment will have to function when exposed to a
variety of different environmental conditions. These will
themselves vary from place to place: eg equipment in
79
Scandinavia or the Alps will have to operate even when
the building’s roof is covered with deep snow; whereas in
tropical countries there is no such need. The test
methods will have to reflect these differing requirements,
and will often pass an item of equipment as being in a
particular ‘Class’, ie performing better than one value of
the tested parameter, but not achieving the value defining
the next Class.
Similarly, the design methodology described
elsewhere in this report will describe the conditions to
which the item of equipment will be exposed. For
example, the design calculations will predict the highest
smoke layer temperature to which smoke curtains, fans,
or natural ventilators will be exposed; another example is
that the deflection calculations for a hanging smoke
curtain will lead to the specification of the minimum
weight of bottom bar and fabric for a particular
application. The test methods carried out on the product
(the item of equipment) by its manufacturer or supplier
should allow the specifier to select the appropriate Class
or Classes for the conditions predicted by the design.
It is regrettably true that at the time of writing, many of
these tests either do not exist as Standards, or are still in
Draft. The developing European Standards in the
PrEN 12101 series once published should fill the need
within Europe, but it has to be recognized that the
specifier of equipment for a SHEVS in many parts of the
world will continue to have to rely on the results of ad-
hoc tests carried out by the manufacturer (or by the
supplier).
It must also be recognized that the enforcer of fire
regulations faces the same difficulties. This reinforces the
desirability of early and continuing consultation between
the regulator and the equipment specifier (who may not
always be the same as the system designer) in order to
ensure that the equipment being installed into the
building is appropriate to the needs both of the building
and of the environment to which the system will be
exposed. The authors suggest, for example, that where an
item of equipment can be obtained satisfying any one of a
range of classes, then it should be the ultimate
responsibility of the regulator to specify which Class is
appropriate to the circumstances of the building.
Economies can sometimes be obtained if an item of
80
equipment serves a dual role. That is, where it fulfils a
non-fire role in everyday use, and changes to a fire-role as
an integral part of the SHEVS following detection of the
fire. Examples would include doors which also serve as
inlets for replacement air; and ducts which serve the
HVAC/ACMV role until they are needed as part of the
SHEVS. These dual-role items face the challenge of
having to meet all the requirements of normal use, as well
as all the appropriate requirements for the fire protection
application. In other words, the specifier (and the
regulator) must be satisfied that those items are ‘fit for
purpose’ in both roles.
It is not the purpose of this chapter to be a
comprehensively detailed guide to all of the requirements
of every last nut, bolt, and wire used in a SHEVS. Neither
is it an attempt to describe each test method. What
follows is instead intended to be an indication, for some
of the major components of a SHEVS, of some of the
factors which need to be considered if the installed
system is to be ‘fit for purpose’.
13.2 Natural smoke and heat exhaust
ventilators
13.2.1 Time taken to come into full operation
When a SHEVS is required to come into operation, it will
usually be an urgent need. Part of the design and
specification process should be to decide which sequence
of operation of the different items of equipment will be
needed so as to avoid one interfering with another. At the
same time, we can recognize that very few real fires are
likely to grow explosively, and if they do then a SHEVS is
not appropriate to cope with an explosion! It seems a
reasonable compromise to suggest that the entire SHEVS
should come into its fully operating state in a time of not
more than one minute from the initiating signal being
generated (whether by human or automatic means).
Natural smoke and heat ventilators only operate to
pass smoky gases when those gases build up beneath
them. There will be no clear adverse effects on the rest of
the system if they take as long to open fully as the rest of
the system takes to deploy into its fire-operational state.
It follows that it is reasonable to allow a maximum time of
one minute for the ventilator to open fully to its fire-open
position.
This maximum time should apply, however, regardless
of the forces or temperatures to which the ventilator
might be exposed, and so this maximum time must be
satisfied as a ‘pass’ criterion in all those test methods for
other parameters where the ventilator is required to open
as part of the test. Most ventilators available on the
market open in much shorter times than one minute, so
this is not an onerous criterion.
It is not a direct life-safety issue if the ventilator cannot
close as quickly. One should, however, consider whether
the ventilator will be faced with a requirement for
repeated functional testing during its installed lifetime. It
is the opinion of the authors that such regular and
frequent testing is highly desirable wherever the purpose
Design methodologies for SHEVS
of the SHEVS is to protect life safety (eg by protecting
escape routes), and that it should be the responsibility of
an enlightened building management to carry out such
tests. It has already been noted in section 13.1 that such
tests are unlikely to be done if each time there is a
significant cost (in time, effort, or inconvenience).
Consequently it is felt that all ventilators specified for
use in a SHEVS having a life-safety role should be
capable of being closed automatically, on receipt of a
signal from the control panel. The time taken to close is
less critical, and could well be longer than one minute.
An additional feature essential to all ventilators except
those intended for use in manually initiated systems, is
that the ventilator should open (ie should ‘fail-safe’)
whenever there is a loss of power to the usual opening
mechanisms.
13.2.2 Coefficient of performance
The purpose of a natural ventilator is to allow smoky
gases to flow through it from inside the building to the
outside. Its ability to do this obviously depends on the
size of the opening (known as the geometric free area)
and on the resistance to flow of that opening including
any turbulence-generating features within it (eg springs,
rods, louver blades, etc.). The geometric free area is easily
determined by simple measurement of the size of the
opening in the plane where the ventilator is fastened onto
the building. An older but less useful definition took the
narrowest part of the flow-path through the ventilator.
This can be difficult to measure, and when combined
with the measured coefficient of performance (see
below) leads to the same practical result. The only
significance of the older definition should be that
everyone concerned should be aware of the possibility of
confusion! The resistance to flow is less easy, and requires
a test of the entire ventilator (except where there is a
sufficient collection of existing measurement data on
similar ventilators for an assessment to be made –
possible on only a few ventilator shapes).
Such tests can be done by driving air at ambient
temperature through the ventilator by a measured
pressure difference, or by using a thermally buoyant hot
gas layer to simulate the fire condition. Current tests use
the former method, while the latter has been
demonstrated experimentally as being feasible. We then
have the following relationship:
ρ V2
∆p =
2(C v A v ) 2 (13.1)
where:
∆p = pressure difference between the front of the
ventilator (ie inside the building) and the back
(ie outside the building) (Pa),
ρ = density of the gases passing through the ventilator
(kg m-3),
V = volume flow rate through the ventilator (m 3 s-1),
Av = geometric free area of the ventilator (m 2),
Cv = coefficient of performance.

Note: The product AvC v is know as the Aerodynamic Free
Area.
The coefficient of performance is also known as the
discharge coefficient. It is a measure of the efficiency of
the ventilator’s design, higher values indicating a higher
efficiency. A useful benchmark is the well-known value
for a simple hole in an infinite plane baffle, for which
Cv = 0.6. Careful shaping of the flowpath through the
ventilator will lead to higher values, while turbulence-
generating devices in the gas-stream will reduce the
value.
It is known (see eg section 10.8) that a side-wind
blowing across the outlet from the ventilator can increase
the flow resistance and lead to a reduction in the C v value.
The better test methods include a way of measuring this
effect by rotating the ventilator in a selectable airstream
(simulating the side-wind) while the aerodynamic free
area is being measured. Such tests usually require that the
worst (ie the lowest) value of C v corresponding to the
worst combination of side-wind speed and direction must
be cited by the manufacturer and/or supplier as being the
appropriate value for use in design calculations such as in
section 5.11.
It is commonly found that ventilators having kerbs (see
section 10.8) and no parts projecting above the plane of
the outlet opening (ie above the top of the kerb) do not
suffer adverse problems from side-winds. Ventilators
having a single flap which rises above the opening in the
fire-operational position can cause catastrophic problems
to the coefficient of performance, with or without a kerb
present.
13.2.3 Resistance to heat
A natural smoke and heat exhaust ventilator can be
expected to experience exposure to the hot gases passing
through it. In general, however, one does not expect the
operating mechanisms to be able to survive exposure to
heat – the ventilator will be expected to open while the
fire has only just been detected and is still small. The
exception to this concerns ventilators designed to be used
in applications where the SHEVS will be triggered
manually relatively late in the fire. These latter ventilators
must be able to withstand considerable exposure to heat
while remaining closed, and yet still be able to open
satisfactorily when called upon to do so. Relatively few
existing designs are suited to this combination of
circumstances.
With this exception noted, we can state that the
important heat-resisting properties of a ventilator should
all apply when the ventilator is already open.
The ventilator must not reduce its aerodynamic free
area when subjected to a throughflow of hot gases. This
must be demonstrated by the test method.
The ventilator must not allow hot or burning parts or
flaming droplets to fall onto people or objects below the
smoke layer since this could result in injury or in
secondary fires. This requirement also concerns the
safety of fire-fighters, who should not be endangered by,
for example, hot plastic parts falling on them.
13 Selection of equipment 81
The ventilator must not cause the hot gases emitted
from it to play on the roof surface outside the building
since this could cause secondary fires. Similarly, the
outside of the ventilator body should not become
sufficiently hot to threaten the roof to which it is fixed.
13.2.4 Opening under load: snow
Snow comes in many different forms, depending on the
proportions of ice, air, and liquid water in the mixture. In
general, older, more compacted snow will be denser,
although partially thawed snow can also be very dense as
water displaces the originally trapped air.
With the possible exception of ventilators designed for
manual triggering, we expect that a SHEVS will come
into operation very early in the fire. It follows that it is not
reasonable to depend on the heat of the fire gases inside
the building melting enough snow above the ventilator
for it to open despite a relatively weak opening
mechanism.
The requirement for a natural ventilator is that it
should be able to open successfully, even when it is
covered on the outside by a layer of snow. The depth and
density of that snow will vary with the location and the
season, as well as being subject to the usual random
chance of weather. In practice this is not such a problem
as it might seem because those countries and localities
where snow loads might be a problem will already have
their own Codes for structural loading with design limits
for the expected snow loads. These limits can simply be
adopted for specifying the appropriate load Class for
ventilator operation, as proved by an appropriate test.
Note that if a ventilator is designed to be mounted on
sloping surfaces steep enough that snow cannot build up,
there is no need to test for this parameter. A minimum
slope of 45° should ensure that no snow will build up on
the slope.
On the other hand, there may be obstacles on a roof
(eg structures for lift machinery, chimneys) which can
cause considerably high and dense packages of snow due
to snow transport by wind. In these locations ventilators
must not be installed.
13.2.5 Opening under load: side-wind
It has been stated in section 13.2.2 that parts of a
ventilator which project into a side-wind blowing across
the ventilator can affect the measured coefficient of
performance. If such a part (eg a flap, or the dome of a
domelight) has to open against the wind direction, it may
be possible for the force of that wind to prevent it from
opening fully (even if there is a locking mechanism to
hold the part in place once it has been fully opened). It
follows that the ventilator should have been tested with a
real or simulated side-wind to ensure that its opening
mechanism is strong enough to function properly. One
can expect that this is not a problem for any ventilator
without any moving parts projecting into the external
wind.
82
13.2.6 Low ambient temperature
When any piece of machinery is cooled, parts made of
different materials contract at different rates, and
lubricating oils and greases tend to become more viscous.
This is obviously also true for natural ventilators. There is
a chance that a badly designed ventilator, if cooled
sufficiently, may require a much larger force than usual to
open to the fully fire-operational position. There is even a
chance that moving parts of the opening mechanism
might fail to clear other parts of the ventilator, which
might then jam. Of more specific concern to those
ventilators powered by high-pressure gas cartridges is the
fact that the pressure in the cartridge will fall at lower
temperatures.
It will usually need a considerable drop in temperature
before these factors become important. Low values of
ambient temperature occur in many northern countries,
and even in northern Scandinavia there are some
unheated buildings used for storage.
Consequently, depending on the climatic conditions
expected for the locality of the building, the specifier and
regulator should satisfy themselves that the selected
ventilators are capable of opening satisfactorily at the
lowest temperature likely to be experienced.
13.2.7 Reliability
Any ventilator must be made of materials expected to
keep their properties for the expected lifetime of the
SHEVS. This is primarily a matter for design by the
manufacturer.
Perhaps more important is the need to be sure that the
SHEVS will work when needed, however many years
might have passed since installation. This implies a need
for regular maintenance by appropriately skilled
personnel, perhaps most often satisfied by some form of
regular service contract. Where there is a high
dependence on successful operation, such as where the
purpose of the SHEVS is to protect life safety, it will
usually be desirable to have a regular programme of
functional testing as part of the responsibility of the
building’s management, in order to identify failures as
they occur and to replace faulty components.
Wherever such a programme is envisaged, it will be
necessary to specify ventilators (and other equipment)
which are designed to survive the number of open/close
cycles expected over the lifetime of the installation. This
reliability should have been confirmed by a repeated-
operation test, where the ventilator’s own opening and
closing devices have been used (perhaps with a separate
external source of power) for that number of cycles. For
example, if the expected programme is for weekly
operation over a 20-year lifespan, the minimum number
of cycles becomes more than 1000. If the ventilator is
intended to be used for day-to-day comfort ventilation,
closing whenever it rains (as is one application in
practice) the minimum number of cycles can be much
greater still.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
13.2.8 Ability to resist wind suction
Natural ventilators should never be expected to operate
in positions where they may be exposed to wind-induced
overpressures. It follows that they will only normally
experience wind-induced suctions. If a ventilator can be
forced open by these wind forces when it is supposed to
remain closed (ie when there is no fire), it will become an
embarrassment to the building’s management and there
is a strong likelihood that it will be fastened shut
permanently.
Natural ventilators should be able to withstand the
largest suction force expected for the location on the
building, and for that building’s own location. Wind
forces have been well researched over the years in view
of their importance for structural wind loading in the
design of buildings[91,92], and appropriate values of wind
force can be adopted from these sources to identify the
appropriate Class of ventilator. It is important that any
ventilator specified has been tested for its ability to
remain closed under the application of the appropriate
simulated wind force.
13.2.9 Ability to resist rain penetration
Many applications of SHEVS will be in circumstances
where the ventilators must not allow any rain penetration
in normal everyday use. This does not matter during the
emergency circumstances of a real fire, but one does not
want the ventilators to be covered over by some sort of
fabric to stop rain penetration (as has happened). It
follows that the ability of a ventilator to resist rain
penetration can have safety implications, as well as being
practical and cost-related.
An additional feature which can be considered for
ventilators intended to be used for day-to-day comfort
ventilation is a rain sensor, which automatically closes the
ventilators when a sensitive surface detects water. It is, of
course, necessary for the rain sensor to be excluded from
the control algorithm when a fire is detected.
13.3 Powered smoke and heat exhaust
ventilators
13.3.1 Time taken to come into full operation
As for natural ventilators, powered smoke and heat
exhaust ventilators (almost always this means fans,
although other devices are possible) must fit into a
SHEVS design which allows the entire system to come
into full operation quickly once the system has been
initiated.
The only complicating feature with fans is that they
usually have a much larger starting current than when
running at full speed, and this often requires that the fans
be started in sequence, rather than all at the same time. In
order for the entire system to be operating within one
minute, this means that individual fans have to be quicker
in running up to full speed. A maximum time of 30
seconds has been suggested as being appropriate, and
should represent the ‘pass’ criterion in all tests of
individual fans which involve starting the fan.

13.3.2 Resistance to heat
In the same way as the natural ventilator, the fan must be
able to continue working for long enough for the SHEVS
to achieve its design purposes, when exposed to the
expected gas temperatures passing through it. The design
conditions for the exhausted gases can vary from below
100 °C to flame temperatures, depending on the purpose
of the design. Consequently most test methods will
identify classes, each of which is a combination of gas
temperature and exposure time. Examples include
‘200 °C for 2 hours’, ‘300 °C for 1 hour’, ‘600 °C for
1 hour’, and many more. In practice, different
combinations have been required by different regulatory
authorities in different countries. There is no a priori
universally correct combination, but the choice should be
dictated by the design calculations with of course a good
safety margin for the time in view of the usual
uncertainties in time-dependent aspects of the design
calculations.
Other secondary aspects can be important, eg the
external casing of the fan should not become hot enough
to ignite anything in contact, and where a separate
cooling air supply is used for the motor it should not be
hot enough to ignite (or discharged in a place where
ignition of any) nearby materials might be possible.
13.3.3 Opening under load: snow
Many smoke exhaust fans are mounted with their
exhausts pointing upwards. Sometimes there can be
other devices to close the exit from the fan. Some of these
may simply be flaps which are held open by the force of
the exhausted gases. Others may be similar to the
automatically opening natural ventilator mechanisms.
For all of these there is the possibility that snow may
accumulate on the exhaust of the fan, or even fill the
throat of an unprotected fan. As stated in section 13.2.4,
one cannot depend on the heat of the fire gases to melt
the snow–the SHEVS must operate early in the fire
when the gases being exhausted will be barely above
ambient temperature.
The snow load which the fan must overcome can be
selected in the same way as for natural ventilators (see
13.2.4 above), and must be appropriate for the location of
the building. The selected fan for any application should
have been tested and passed in a Class suitable for that
location.
13.3.4 Opening under load: wind
Fans are commonly specified where wind overpressures
are expected on the roof of buildings. Sometimes these
pressures can be large. Fans fitted with devices to close
the exhaust opening when the fan is not in use will need
to be able to overcome the dynamic pressures of the
wind. Where this is relevant to a SHEVS design, the fans
must be specified as being able to open to the fully
operating position in less than 30 seconds against a load
simulating the wind pressure.
13 Selection of equipment 83
13.3.5 Low ambient temperature
The problem facing a fan in low ambient temperatures is
essentially the same as for natural ventilators. The
solution is also similar, in that the ventilator should be
shown by a suitable test to be able to operate fully in less
than 30 seconds in ambient temperature conditions
appropriate to the location of the building.
13.3.6 Reliability
The same arguments in favour of regular functional
testing apply to fans as to natural ventilators when used in
a SHEVS. It follows that the fan should have been tested
for an equivalent number of start/stop cycles compared
with the natural ventilator, for a similar use.
13.4 Automatic smoke curtains
13.4.1 Time to deploy to the fire-operational position
Automatic smoke curtains serve two main roles. They
can provide part of the smoke reservoir’s containing
boundary, or they can channel the smoke flow while the
smoke is en route to the reservoir. If the SHEVS is to
reach its full operating condition in one minute, then the
curtains can take up to that one minute to deploy.
13.4.2 Speed of fall of bottom bar
If a curtain deploys too quickly, its bottom bar can reach a
relatively high velocity and represent a danger either to
someone whose head is in the way, or to the fixings
holding the curtain to the building’s structure if the
curtain reaches its full extension and stops with a jerk.
The curtain needs to be designed in such a way that it will
not damage itself, even if the design calculations of
section 5.8 lead to the specification of a very heavy
bottom bar. In many designs this is achieved with a
friction brake, and with the curtain falling under its own
weight. It is important that the test on the curtain allowed
for the heaviest weights which might occur in the design
of the building’s SHEVS. One cannot simply expect a
curtain mechanism that worked with a light bottom bar
to be equally successful with a heavy bar.
The maximum allowable speed to avoid injury to
people is more difficult to assess. Many curtains will be so
designed that they never reach head height, and so this
criterion is not relevant to them. Other curtains, such as
those intended to close off a higher storey from an
atrium, carry a greater risk. There is no clear guidance on
how to tackle this problem. Being struck by a heavy bar
travelling at even 1 m s-1 could be dangerous. Perhaps the
best compromise is to allow the curtain to fall at up to
1 m s-l, but to design the positions of these curtains in
order to minimize the exposure of people to this risk.
13.4.3 Resistance to high temperature
It is generally true that smoke curtains should be able to
survive the temperatures to which they will be exposed,
as predicted by the design of the SHEVS. That is, the
curtain should be able to continue to fulfil its function as a
barrier to the movement of smoke. It does not matter
84
from a safety point of view if the mechanisms which
deploy the curtain are destroyed, as long as the curtain
remains functional and in place.
Typical temperatures of gases in contact with the
curtains will rarely exceed 200 °C in most reservoir
applications. Typical temperatures experienced by
channelling screens could be higher, perhaps
approaching flame temperatures, which can be
pessimistically taken (ie a high value) to be about 600 °C
and above.
A different argument can be put forward, that if the
gases in a smoke layer in a reservoir reach temperatures
which will cause radiative ignition of materials away from
the original seat of the fire, the entire compartment is
about to flash over. Once this has happened the fire will
be much larger than can be controlled by the SHEVS,
and so the subsequent failure of the SHEVS is effectively
irrelevant: it will already have failed to meet its design
purpose. This pessimistic argument suggests that the
highest temperature gases that a smoke curtain can
usefully be expected to contain in most cases will be
about 600 °C. Consequently this is a common upper
temperature limit in tests on smoke curtains.
There will always be some applications where curtains
may be exposed to higher temperatures (eg if a curtain is
used to close off an otherwise open shop front) and the
fire could be located very close to that curtain.
Fortunately some new curtain materials appearing on the
market are able to withstand the full fire-resistance
heating curve used in furnace tests (although not meeting
the insulation requirement for fire resistance), and can be
regarded as blurring the distinction between smoke
curtains and lightweight fire shutters.
13.4.4 Reliability
The same arguments apply to the advantages of a
programme of regular functional testing, as applied to the
natural ventilators. For the same reasons, wherever such a
programme is envisaged, the curtains must be tested for
their ability to remain functional after the appropriate
number of deploy/closure cycles, which should in
principle be the same number as for the ventilators,
although the additional number of test cycles for
ventilators intended to provide everyday ventilation need
not be taken into account for the numbers of test cycles
for smoke curtains.
As with the ventilators, it is of great importance that
curtains intended to meet the needs of such a programme
can be motored back into their ‘concealed’ positions
easily on receipt of a ‘reset’ signal from the control panel.
Hence the curtains used in the reliability test should use
their own on-board mechanisms, to close as well as to
open.
It is also important for the heavier curtains that the
reliability test should have been done on equivalently
heavy curtains.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
13.4.5 Fail-safe
It is important that all smoke curtains specified for the
SHEVS should be designed to deploy into their fire-
operational position when the source of power is cut off
for any reason. This is perhaps the main reason why
many designs use gravity to deploy, slowed and
controlled by a friction device.
13.5 Air inlets and doors
Inlets for replacement air have the advantage that they
ought never to be exposed to high-temperature gases.
There is also the disadvantage that at the time of writing
there is no specific test for air inlets required for SHEVS.
The functional requirements for doors and inlets can
be identified as being the following.
• There is a need to open fully within the same 1 minute
as the entire SHEVS.
• Where the SHEVS uses a powered exhaust, the
doors/inlets need to be able to open before any of the
fans have developed an appreciable exhaust flow,
otherwise the fans could develop a significant drop in
pressure inside the building which might prevent the
inlets from opening. In practice, this may mean that
the doors and/or inlet devices must be able to open
within 2 or 3 seconds of receipt of the signal to open.
13.6 Smoke dampers
A smoke damper is a device usually fitted into a duct, but
possibly mounted onto the duct opening into a room, or
serving to redirect air flows from one duct path (eg for
HVAC/ACMV purposes) into another (eg for smoke
exhaust).
At the time of writing, there are no clearly developed
published Standards for smoke dampers, although there
is an Underwriters’ Laboratory Standard [93] . Some
performance requirements can, however, be identified.
The damper must be able to move into its fire-
operational position fast enough to allow the SHEVS to
meet its l-minute target. Note that some dampers will
have to move from open to closed positions, whereas
others will have to move from closed to open.
The damper must be able to withstand the anticipated
gas temperature to which it is exposed, and
simultaneously the pressure differences to which it will be
exposed, without moving from the fire-operational
position. When open in the fire-operational position, the
damper must not fail by increasing the flow resistance.
When closed, it must not allow increased leakage; the
leakage past a closed smoke damper must be minimal.
In many designs, the fire-operational position of an
individual damper will depend on the detected location
of the fire. In such designs there can be no fail-safe
position for the damper. Consequently, the dampers for
such designs will need an unusually high level of
reliability. This places even greater stress on the
importance of testing the damper through a large number
of operating cycles.

13.7 Smoke ducts
A smoke duct is a duct intended to carry smoke as part of
a SHEVS. There are no specific test Standards for such
ducts at the time of writing, although a duct which meets
the requirements of fire resistance can be expected to be
satisfactory for smoke ventilation. This level of
specification is necessary for those ducts which pass
through fire-compartment boundaries since the duct
must now serve effectively as an extension of that
13 Selection of equipment 85
boundary and should be built to the same requirements as
that boundary. Note that the duct must be able to survive
hot temperatures inside the duct and cold outside, and
also cold inside and hot outside (where the duct is
exposed to a fire in the next compartment).
A lesser Standard is reasonable for ducts which are
designed to be wholly immersed in a smoke reservoir
since their failure if the gas temperature passes 600 °C will
be no more significant than for the case of the smoke
curtain mentioned above.
86
14 Installation
When the SHEVS has been designed, the equipment
needed to implement that design has been specified, and
that design has been deemed acceptable in principle by
the Regulatory Authorities, there remains the task of
installing the equipment into the building for which it is
intended. This step has provided many examples of error
in practice. It is not the role of the current book to provide
a detailed description of all the procedures necessary for
successful installation. Nevertheless, a discussion is
presented in outline form to alert the reader to some of
the more important aspects.
While a system may be installed by a single contractor,
it is more commonly the case that many of the individual
pieces of equipment will be fitted by specialist
contractors. For example, the smoke curtains may be
installed by a different contractor to the ventilators; or
where use is made of the HVAC/ACMV system as part of
the SHEVS there will also be a division of responsibility
for different equipment. The possibilities for confusion
are many. It is important that there should be a single
contractor responsible for co-ordinating the activities of
every participant in the installation of the SHEVS. It is
important that this co-ordinating contractor should be
experienced in the field of SHEVS design and
installation, and that its personnel involved should fully
understand the concept design in all its aspects. This can
be expected to be the case where the co-ordinating
contractor is also the designer of the system; but where
this is not the case it is important that the co-ordinating
contractor should liaise closely and frequently with the
designers of the SHEVS concepts. There have been
many examples where late architectural changes have
adversely affected the effectiveness of the SHEVS
without the installers having realized that this was the
case.
It is, as has been noted, often the case that the people
who developed the ‘concept design’ do not continue with
the responsibility to turn their concept into physical
reality. It is the responsibility of the co-ordinator of the
installation process to ensure that:
• all the separate components are compatible,
• all the connections are correctly specified, and
• the specifications of the equipment are appropriate to
the design concept and to the circumstances both of
the building and of the location of the building.
The parameters identified in Chapter 13, and the results
of testing on the different products, are especially
important. It is particularly important here that the
proposed maintenance and re-testing regime should be
established prior to specification of the equipment. This
will allow the correct specification of equipment in terms
of the ‘reliability’ test (see Chapter 13) and in terms of the
ability to deploy/return equipment easily using a remote
manual signal in order to ensure that routine functional
testing is easy, and will not cause excessive wear in the
system. Ease of replacement and/or maintenance of
faulty components must also be borne in mind; eg it
would be unwise to locate a smoke detector in the middle
of a large area of fragile glazed ceiling at the top of a
multistorey atrium.
It is the co-ordinating contractor’s responsibility to
ensure that the control sequence allows the different
parts of the system to come into operation without
impeding or overloading other parts. It is his/her
responsibility to ensure that all interconnections with the
non-fire building systems (eg with the HVAC/ACMV
system), and with the other essential fire safety systems
(eg the smoke detection system) have been considered
and properly specified. In short, it is his/her
responsibility to ensure that the design concept is
implemented correctly.
If the installers of the SHEVS are to be sure of success,
they need full and sufficient information on all the
equipment used in the system. Therefore, all suppliers
must give the necessary information on recommended
methods for fixing components, for electrical wiring, for
operating instructions, and for recommended
commissioning procedures for their particular product.
The suppliers should also give full information on the
important parameters for linking their product to others,
eg by giving recommended maximum and minimum
pressures in pneumatic lines needed to provide operating
energy for a ventilator. Not only the technical details of
the product and the recommended methods of
installation, but also the limits thereof need to be defined.
It can be seen from the above that there needs to be a
continuing liaison between the installer and the creator of

the concept. It is usually a mistake to assume that a design
can be bought from one consultant and installed by
another without any continuing involvement of the first.
It is even worse to assume that having bought the
concept, the developer only needs to employ specialist
contractors with no co-ordination at all for installation.
Many examples exist of all these faults, which usually
derive from a belief on the part of the developer or
his/her agents that fire is a simple thing which does not
require the continued application of specialist
engineering expertise.
Some aspects of installation have a direct bearing on
safety, as well as on the successful operation of the
complete system. The positioning of ventilators and
ducts present special problems, and special attention
needs to be given to the following details.
• Ventilator exhausts (natural or powered) need to be
positioned so that the hot gases emitted from them will
not be deflected onto the roof or wall surfaces close to
the ventilator. All gases emitted should be directed
away from the building’s structure.
• Combustible parts of the roof structure adjacent to
smoke ventilators need to be protected as flames can
ignite the vulnerable zone around the ventilator. It is
suggested that protection should extend at least 0.5 m
around the ventilator.
• Combustible materials, whether structure, linings, or
surface finishes, should similarly be protected where
they are adjacent to ducts which are intended to carry
hot smoky gases through a compartment or outside
wall.
• The free area of a natural ventilator needs to be free of
obstruction above and below the ventilator for at least
2 m in order to avoid increasing the flow resistance of
that ventilator, except where such an obstruction has
been explicitly included in the design calculations.
This can represent a significant constraint on structural
features near ventilators.
• The outlet of a powered ventilator and/or its ductwork
must be free of any obstructions over a distance of 1.5
times the diameter of that exhaust outlet. This is also
intended to avoid the creation of flow resistances
which might increase the back-pressure on the fan and
hence reduce the volume flow rate of the exhaust.
• Where wind deflectors are fitted to avoid wind
overpressure problems on natural smoke exhaust
ventilators, but those deflectors do not form part of the
ventilator itself, care should be taken to ensure that
snow (where climatically relevant) cannot collect and
create a greater snow load for the ventilator to
overcome when opening. Care should also be taken to
ensure that any such deflectors will not experience
wind-driven resonant vibration which can accelerate
fatigue and early failure of the deflectors.
Where emergency power supplies must be installed to
back-up the power supply for the SHEVS in case of
failure of the Mains power supply, special attention must
be given to correct labelling of equipment and switches,
14 Installation 87
and to the provision of protection from damage
(mechanical or by fire) both for the power supply and for
all of its connections to the SHEVS. The objective must
be to ensure that the back-up supply cannot be prevented
from operating when needed. Switching between main
power supply and emergency power must be automatic,
and sufficiently fast to ensure that the SHEVS continues
to fulfil its function with no risk to the building’s
occupants or to the SHEVS design objectives.
The worst case for back-up power supply is when the
Mains supply fails at the start of the fire. Consequently,
the emergency supply power must be designed to fulfil its
duty during the required operation time of the SHEVS.
The same level of protection and labelling must be
given to the electrical cabling as well as to the control
panels. The manual controls must be located outside the
smoke reservoir and must be reached easily, in sight of a
safe access door or route. Where the SHEVS is designed
to be triggered by a manual fireman’s switch rather than
by an automatic method, the manual controls must be
located outside the fire compartment served by the
SHEVS, and must be on the primary access route
planned for use by fire-fighters entering the building. This
is to allow the SHEVS to remove any threat of backdraft
before any fire-fighters have to enter the affected fire-
compartment.
Ductwork forming part of the SHEVS must be labelled
clearly as such and the hangers must be constructed in
such a way that the duct system will stay in place for the
required operation time. It should not be forgotten that in
some circumstances the hangers as well as the duct may
be exposed to hot gases, and so they should be capable of
surviving the expected smoke temperatures. Another
occasional mistake involving ducts is to fail to make
allowance for the thermal expansion of the duct when it is
exposed to hot gases. The expansion of a duct
constrained at both ends will usually lead to a split in the
duct.
When smoke dampers are installed, a removable panel
or grid should provide easy access to the activator and
damper blade. No element attached to the smoke damper
should obstruct the proper functioning of the damper
blade. It is good practice to select dampers which make it
easy to see the position of the damper, directly, by an
electrical indication, or by a mechanical pointer external
to the casing. It has been a common mistake to fit
dampers in inaccessible locations, often obscured by
other equipment or structure, in such a way that it is
impossible to assess whether the damper has operated
satisfactorily or not. This can make both testing and
maintenance checks extremely difficult to do, and
therefore less likely to be done.
Air inlets are needed for a good smoke control
installation. These are normally located at low level in
order not to disturb the smoke layer in the reservoir.
There is a realistic chance that blocking the air inlet will
occur if positioning (eg in the sidewall) is not designed
carefully. Controllable inlets, including automatically
opening doors where these form part of the air inlet
88
provision, must be connected to the emergency back-up
power supply.
When installing smoke curtains and particularly
automatic retractable curtains, special attention needs to
be given to the maximum gap between fabric and
structure, and between adjacent curtains where separate
curtains are combined to form a long run of curtain, when
in the deployed position. Ideally there should be no gaps
at all. This is not practicable, although where adjacent
curtains form a straight run it is possible to overlap the
curtains, and to clip together the bottom bars, in a way
which minimizes the leakage gap between the sheets of
fabric. It is more difficult to reduce the size of the gaps
between the edge of a curtain and the adjacent structure.
It is more difficult still to reduce the gap size where there
is a junction between two curtains which are not aligned,
although in this case the effects of buoyant deflection of
the curtains in opening up the gap can be reduced by
using a heavier bottom bar.
The larger the gap the more smoke will leak through,
and the worse the effect will be on the nominally smoke-
free side. It is possible, though difficult and beyond the
scope of the current book, to estimate the movement and
rate of build-up of smoke on the side supposedly clear of
smoke. The problem is complex, and depends on the air
movements and on the volume of the space the leakage of
smoke is entering, as both factors influence the dilution of
the smoke. What is safe in one circumstance can be
dangerous in another. At the time of writing there is no
consensus on the safe limits to such gaps, although it
Design methodologies for SHEVS
is suggested herein that the pragmatic approach can be
adopted of assuming that the total area of all such gaps
may not exceed 1% of the total curtain surface.
These gap sizes are sufficiently small that they are very
sensitive to the detail and quality of the work of the
installers, indicating the essential task of the co-ordinator
in checking that installation has been done satisfactorily.
Other important decisions required of the installer
concerns the specification, design, location, and
ergonomic layout of control panels, bearing in mind the
requirements of the Fire Service as well as of the
building’s management. Some further details are included
in Chapter 15.
Lastly, and very importantly, there must be a set of
detailed engineering drawings (the Detailed Engineering
Plan) showing the complete SHEVS installation as well
as of the related systems. These latter can be expected to
include the sprinkler and smoke-detection systems in
most cases, and should also indicate all the control
dampers in the HVAC/ACMV system which have a role
to play during a fire. This Plan should be prepared in
advance of any actual installation of equipment, and
should be revised during installation so that it is at the
end an accurate representation of what has been fitted
into the building. These drawings ought to be made
available to the Fire Service as well as to the building’s
management, together with the SHEVS Design
documentation. It is crucially important that these
drawings should be updated whenever any changes are
made to the system during the building’s lifetime.
 89

15 Acceptance testing
(commissioning)

15.1 General Testing and commissioning checks

• Design check
Before handing over the installation to the final user, a file
• Control andcheck
Mechanical
should be prepared by the installer containing all relevant • Electrical checkactuation check
technical documents, test reports of the individual • Running check
components, as-built plans, set points and an acceptance • – Initial start
report. The system cannot be commissioned without
– Functional test in control
these documents.
– Balancing and regulating of airflow
The as-built plan should represent the whole system,
indicating quantity, size and location of the ventilators, air
inlets and other SHEVS elements, fixing of the main The following instruments and tools will very often be
elements (eg ductwork), location of the control panels, required:
smoke dampers and their access, labelling of the whole • clamp-on ammeter,
and eventually indicating the protective measures to • volt meter,
mechanical damage. An electrical wire plan should be • anem om et er,
provided if an emergency power supply unit is installed.
The whole constitutes the Detailed Engineering Plan
• smoke tracer.

referred to in Chapter 14.
It is an everyday experience that what is built is not
always exactly what was intended, and it will be
necessary to carry out commissioning tests on the system
once it has been installed. These tests should include the
following items (not an exhaustive list).
• Reaction time of the SHEVS to open
• Airflow measurements for powered ventilators
• Simultaneous opening of ventilators and air inlet
devices
• Eventual pneumatic leakages where such power
supplies are used
• Reaction of automatic and manual controls
• Start-up time of the emergency power supply
• Behaviour of the automatic smoke curtains
Except for simple devices such as pitot-static tubes,
inclined manometers, U-gauges and similar, all
instruments, meters, etc. used for testing purposes
should:
• be provided in duplicate,
• have a manufacturer-claimed accuracy of not more
than plus or minus 2% of range,
• be manufactured to an appropriate standard or
recognized equal international or national standards
where appropriate and available.
• have been calibrated by a recognized testing or
calibration laboratory not more than three months
prior to the date of test. The calibration certificate
provided by the laboratory should be available during
the test.

15.2 Testing and commissioning
It is recognized that requirements may vary from country
to country, and that occasionally circumstances might
require ad-hoc departures from the procedures. Hence
the procedures in this section are intended to be a guide
rather than a set of rigid requirements. In general, the
checks and tests given in the box opposite are
recommended.
Design check
The as-built layout should be checked against the system
designer’s approved plans.
Mechanical check
• Check the results of the pressure test on the smoke-
exhaust-system ductwork which should have been
carried out during construction.
• Perform the mechanical check as per test procedure for
fans and motorized dampers.
• Check smoke zone boundary and automatic smoke
90
curtain location according to approved smoke control
design layout.
• Check motorized fire smoke dampers are correctly
connected, and that the smoke and fire damper blade
and bearing rotate smoothly.
• Check that smoke curtains drop down smoothly and
the bottom bars stop at the correct position.
Control and actuation check
• Check that all systems automatically actuate and
remain in operation until reset by the testers, either
manually or by activation of a central reset control.
• Check that when in ‘fire’ mode, all other building
systems connected with the SHEVS are put into the
appropriate fire-operational state.
• Check that multiplexer or similar devices do not affect
transmission of actuating signals from the automatic
fire-alarm panel for the operation of the smoke exhaust
systems unless such devices have the approval or
certification of one of the testing authorities.
• Check that each system is provided with a manual
on/off control switch and indicator light at the master
fire control panel.
– Check that switches for all smoke exhaust/removal
systems are grouped in one area of the panel
together with those for staircase pressurization
systems or similar.
– Check that all switches have the same
method/direction of operation.
– Check that a device that senses effective operation
of the relevant smoke/air handling system (eg a
centrifugal switch or an air pressure switch) actuates
the indicator lights.
– Check that all switches and indicators are clearly
labelled to show operating positions and systems
served and stating that the controls shall be operated
only by authorized personnel.
Electrical check
Prior to the initial running of any electrically driven fan,
the following procedures will be adopted.
• In a normal situation, all smoke and fire dampers must
be installed as per the design layout.
• For each simulated position of the fire recognized in
the design scenario, the smoke and fire dampers in the
extract and supply systems must either move into, or
remain in (as appropriate), their design fire-
operational positions.
• Should there be a failure of the supply make-up fans
(where included in the design) then only the supply
system must shut down and all smoke and fire dampers
on the supply duct must return to the design position.
The exhaust system shall continue to operate.
• Should there be a failure of the power supply to the
smoke and fire dampers, these must move into their
fire-operational positions where these have been
identified in the design scenario. Note that in some
designs there can be no fail-safe position.
• Both audio and visual warnings must be provided to
Design methodologies for SHEVS
indicate a fault detected on:
– the signalling wire connecting the control panel
to the smoke extraction system control panel, or
– the wiring of the detectors.
• All equipment serving the smoke exhaust and
complementary replacement air systems shall be
provided with an appropriate emergency power
supply.
• Perform the electrical check as per test procedures for
fan and motorized damper.
Running check
All systems must be completed and tested to ensure that
they are functioning correctly before the final full test and
demonstration takes place. A full set of test and functional
operation check records should be prepared, and may be
required to be submitted to the authorities. It is also
recommended herein that the system designer should
observe the full test and attach to the Report a signed
comment confirming or otherwise that he is satisfied that
the installation(s) are operating in accordance with his
design.
Full and complete records must be kept of all tests and
the results thereof, typically including the items listed in
the Box below).
Initial start
• Perform the test run as per test procedure for fan and
motorized damper.
Functional test in control check
• Check that interlock of fans and dampers function
properly.
• Check the proper function of remote ON/OFF
operation.
Balancing and regulating of airflow should be checked.
Any adjustments needed to achieve the design airflows
should be made, and their effectiveness confirmed by
appropriate re-testing.
This, however, does not guarantee that the control
mechanisms, or the computer software, will correctly
operate everything in the correct sequences, or following
the appropriate logic where devices may have more than
one fire-operational state depending, eg on the location
of the fire. It is desirable as part of the acceptance test
Items to include in a running check record
• Make,
Records of pressure testing during construction
• with a serial no. type and owner of all instruments used, together
copy of the calibration certificates
• Resulting
Actual measurements taken
• Make, serialairflows,
current, belt tensions, shaft speeds, etc.
• rotational speeds, pressure
no. type and use of every device checked, including
drops/generation, etc.
• Signature of operator/tester or supervisor and any witness for
Date and time of tests
• each test
• Signature of designer confirming his/her acceptance

procedure to trigger operation of the SHEVS by initiating
a realistic signal (for example by blowing a small quantity
of smoke into a smoke detector) and then confirming that
all of the desired actions have in fact occurred. Where
different patterns of actions are required for fires in
different locations, all of these ought to be checked by
simulating detection of a fire in different locations or in
different ways (the latter might include break-glass fire
alarm points, or simulated operation of sprinklers, instead
of a smoke detector).
15.3 Hot-smoke tests
There is a more complicated option: the Hot-Smoke
Test. This uses real fires in controlled conditions, in the
building as close to completion as possible, in order to
provide a flow of buoyant smoky gases which can test not
only the operation of separate components, but also to
test in a quantitative manner the proper functioning of
the design concept itself. In other words, to test that the
proper functioning of the total system has been achieved.
Variations on this technique have been developed in
Australia [94,95] and in the UK and Belgium[69,96]. Both
15 Acceptance testing (commissioning) 91
methods use alcohol fires in view of their clean and
predictable burning. The Australian method is restricted
to fires directly beneath the final smoke reservoir,
whereas the BRE technique has also been used for fires in
side rooms where smoke can spill into a larger mall or
atrium. Both use artificial smokes to mark the fire gases
and to make them visible: the Australian method uses
pyrotechnic smoke generators; the BRE method uses oil-
mist generators of the type widely used in theatres and
for fire-service training.
Hot-smoke tests are not needed where there is
confidence in the design scenario, and in the design
calculations. They are desirable wherever it is not
possible to feel such levels of confidence. A summary of
points to be considered by anyone contemplating the use
of hot-smoke tests is presented in Annex I.
Where the commissioning of the installation is
checked by an independent body, details of the testing
body, the names of its representatives, the test methods
employed and the results of those tests, as well as the
engineering plan available to that body, should all be
mentioned in the acceptance report.
92
16 Maintenance, management
and re-testing
Whatever the basic objective of the SHEVS, it will be
intended to function properly when the fire happens.
Fires are essentially infrequent events, which can occur in
a random way. It is very unlikely that the fire will happen
immediately after the system has been installed and
successfully demonstrated to work. Years might pass
before the system is called upon to work, and then it is
critically important that the system does indeed work as
designed.
Buildings will not remain static in the intervening
years, and the usual forces of corrosion and decay can be
expected to operate. It follows then, that as with any
other active system involving machinery, there is a need
for the system to be maintained and serviced during these
years. This places a major responsibility on the building’s
management.
A regular check on the system is essential to ensure
that it will operate as designed, if needed. Also,
intervention of trained staff is sometimes beneficial or
even necessary to achieve satisfactory evacuation of the
occupants in the event of a fire. For example, calculations
done at FRS[100] have indicated that the presence of
trained staff to help with evacuation is of great benefit in
large single-storey buildings. It is difficult to ensure that
there is a continual training programme, particularly
when the ‘ownership’ of a building changes.
The best way to confirm that the SHEVS is working as
intended is to generate a fire-detection signal (eg by
blowing a small amount of smoke into a smoke detector)
and confirming that all the devices supposed to operate
actually have operated satisfactorily. If this is done
regularly it is more likely that any mechanical or
electrical failures will be identified in time for the fault to
be corrected. It is also more likely that any poor
maintenance will be identified in time to be corrected.
The optimum extent and frequency of regular re-
testing of the system will inevitably depend on
circumstances. Systems having a crucial role in protecting
life safety ought to be tested much more frequently than
those which have no such role. Even where life safety is
concerned, the frequency of functional re-testing may
vary. For example, it would be desirable to check the
operation of a SHEVS in a large shopping complex at
least once a week, whereas in an office building it may be
more appropriate to test it once a month. It may be more
appropriate for systems intended for property protection
to be tested once a year in some cases. It can be expected
that the Regulatory Authorities having responsibility for
a building will have a strong interest in the frequency of
functional re-testing, especially if the SHEVS is intended
to protect the lives of the public.
The building’s management will find their task much
easier if they have been provided with full documentation
summarizing the design concepts, in all the different
scenarios considered, as well as the ‘Detailed engineering
plans’ and documentation recommended to be provided
by the installer in Chapter 15. It is also important that the
key individual in the building’s management should be
familiar with this documentation, and should understand
the ideas involved. These documents, taken together,
form the basis of a ‘log book’ for the SHEVS, and could
usefully be widened to include all other aspects of fire
safety, although that goes beyond the scope of the
current report.
The manager’s task will also be eased if the installer has
provided a ‘maintenance file’ as part of the log book in
which the management can record all maintenance,
modifications, tests and their results, etc., during the
building’s lifetime.
The maintenance programme can be subdivided in
different sections, in direct relation to the frequency of
checking. Note that the frequencies suggested here are
intended to be illustrative, and are certainly not intended
to be universal for all applications!
Basic functional check (once a month)
• The component parts of the SHEVS are operated and
people can see, hear or smell malfunctioning parts:
pressured air leakages are quite common, a rusty spring
can prevent natural ventilators from closing again.
• All defective parts must be repaired or replaced
immediately.
Maintenance programme (one per 6 months)
• On the basis of a maintenance checklist, all moving
parts of the installation will be looked at and replaced
where necessary.
• Special attention is given to corrosion, mechanical

damage, penetrations, blocked activators, overheated
electrical parts.
• All parts are cleaned and relabelled where necessary.
Full functional test (once per year)
After the maintenance tour, a functional check must be
worked out, possibly attended by a representative of the
Regulatory Authorities, to see whether the instillation
still complies with the acceptance report.
• This test starts with the triggering of one or more
detectors in the tested zone and all subsequent
automatisms (ie the actions which follow
automatically without human intervention) are
checked out (reaction time, emergency power supply
unit coming up, opening or closing of dampers,
lowering of smoke curtains, …).
This test shall be activated and the equipment reset for
every smoke control zone. Results should be recorded in
the log book.
Apart from the maintenance programme, a SHEVS
management program needs to be set up. This means
16 Maintenance, management, re-testing 93
that the user must verify through the years whether the
installed system is still capable of dealing with a real-fire
situation.
It is usually easy to recognize when a major structural
modification to a building will influence the functioning
of a SHEVS. For example, changing a workshop into a
high-rack warehouse will have big implications for the
design parameters of the SHEVS. It is less often realized
that a succession of small modifications, each one
seemingly too trivial to matter, can cumulatively affect
the functioning of a SHEVS. It should also be recognized
that many buildings specialists with no knowledge of fire
can easily fail to distinguish between what is major and
what is minor. Where as-built plans, test reports and
maintenance programs have been kept fully up-to-date, it
is more likely that changes will be correctly identified,
and that mistakes will be more readily noticed and
corrected. Note in this context that the building’s
managers share with the Regulatory Authorities (in most
countries) the responsibility for commissioning a new
SHEVS analysis and re-design if the building’s
modifications change the assumptions and conditions
which were appropriate to the original design.
94
17 Some common mistakes
in the design of smoke ventilation
systems
17.1 Mis-location of the point source of a
point-source smoke plume
Some of the formulae available for the calculation of the
mass of air entrained into a smoke plume rising directly
above a fire are derived for small fires. When applied to
fires which are not small (such as those in real fire
scenarios), they require a correction which treats the
smoke as though it was rising from a point (zero width)
source at a distance below the real fire which depends on
the actual physical size of the fire. Several guidance
documents state that it is acceptable to ignore this
correction and to take the plume height as being the
height of the layer above the floor (or the base of the real
fire if different). However, such an assumption can lead to
an underestimate of the mass of smoky gases entering the
smoke layer. For example, when the fire diameter
approaches the height of rise of the smoke plume the
mass of air entrained into the smoke can be
underestimated by more than a factor of two.
17.2 Inadequate specification of smoke
curtains
Research by FRS has shown that the existing deflection
tests for smoke curtains are virtually meaningless in terms
of actual behaviour, and that it is necessary to bring
smoke curtains into the design process[97], using the
procedures given in Annex C. It is necessary to specify
the correct combination of curtain material weight and
bottom bar weight to ensure that the curtain deflection
remains within acceptable design limits for the particular
application. In general, the hotter and deeper the smoke
layer becomes, then the heavier the curtain and/or
bottom bar must be. This in turn can require major
differences in the components, eg the curtain might need
stronger motors, stronger brakes and stronger
attachments to the building.
Specification of a smoke curtain which is too light for
the application can result in excessive deflection, with
accompanying rise of the bottom bar and leakage of
smoke past the curtain.
Another common mistake is to position smoke
curtains which are light enough to deflect appreciably, on
the line between columns. This position has the apparent
advantage of economizing on the necessary length of
curtain, and hence on cost. Unfortunately, where the
columns are rounded or otherwise lacking in parallel
surfaces, any small deflection leads to a rapidly increasing
gap between the curtain’s edge and the column’s surface,
with consequent smoke leakage past the curtain.
17.3 Installation does not follow design
It is common for detail design changes to occur during
the construction of buildings. A possible consequence is
that an initially correct design becomes unsuitable. An
example known to the authors is of smoke curtains being
1.5 m too short when fitted. It is desirable that the fire
safety system designers be retained by the building design
team to comment on all design changes and to confirm
that the final installed system fulfils the design concept.
17.4 Mis-use of computer models
Every computer model of any aspect of smoke
movement is based on mathematical representations of
the underlying physics. In zone models these are often
empirically derived formulae. In CFD models these are
more fundamentally based, solving conservation
equations typically for mass, momentum, enthalpy, etc. It
is often forgotten that the equations expressing
turbulence in current commercial CFD models are also
partly empirical.
Empirical relationships of whatever sort all share the
common feature that they have been developed to fit a
specific range of experimental circumstances. They may
not be as accurate for other circumstances outside that
range. This affects the reliability of validation of the
model: within the appropriate ranges a model can be
correctly shown to match reality – but outside the
appropriate ranges of parameter values the same model
can give grossly incorrect answers. It is never simply
enough to note that a model ‘has been validated’.
One example of this type of problem concerns the
expression for the fire size at the onset of flashover in a
compartment. One of the most common correlations for
this relationship is based on work by McCaffrey et al[98],

and variations on this are used in design guidance, eg
refs[28,29]. McCaffrey et al’s correlation was derived for a
test room of less than 30 m3 in volume, with window
openings which were predominantly tall compared with
their width. It can be shown that very different
relationships can be expected for the fire size at the onset
of flashover in very large rooms having large openings[99].
Another common example concerns the common
practice in Zone Models based on small-fire plume
formulae to default the location of the virtual point source
to the base of the fire regardless of the size of the fire (see
section 17.1 for a more detailed discussion of this error).
CFD models depend for accurate modelling of reality
on the correctness of the initial and of the boundary
conditions used to define the problem mathematically.
These ‘input conditions’ are essential to state correctly
the physical and chemical nature of the problem being
studied, and if they are inappropriate, the CFD model
will give an inappropriate result. Another essentially
mathematical constraint is that the computational mesh
size (ie the selected dimensions of each elementary
‘calculation volume’) must be appropriate to the problem
being studied. In practice, this means that the ‘solution’ to
the calculation must be independent of the mesh size,
which cannot be automatically assumed for all
circumstances.
The validity of a CFD model for a given application
would depend on the fact that it incorporates proper
descriptions, through submodels, of the dominant
physical and chemical processes (such as combustion,
radiation, turbulence, etc.) for that application. Because
of the often partially empirical nature of the built-in
submodels, validation of the CFD model is crucial to
ensure the validity of its submodels for a particular
application. It follows that a successful validation for one
application will apply to other scenarios in the same
category of application, but not necessarily to other
categories. For example, care must be taken when a CFD
model validated for smoke movement is applied to
problems involving flame spread. In general, one can say
that in view of the complex nature of CFD models,
knowledge of fire science and of CFD is essential for
‘correct’ use for a practical fire application.
The foregoing paragraphs should not be seen as an
argument against using computer models. Many designs
would be impossible without their use. They should
instead be read as a warning that computer models
should not be used by inexperienced people as ‘black
boxes’ always assumed by them to give the correct
answer. It is always necessary for the designer of a
SHEVS to ensure that he/she has identified which model
(or models – a design may require the use of more than
one) is appropriate to the circumstances being
considered. It is always necessary for the designer of a
SHEVS to satisfy him/her self that the model is being
used within its prudent limits. And of course it is
necessary for the Regulator assessing a design proposal to
become satisfied that the designer of the system has
considered these factors.
17 Common design mistakes 95
17.5 Mistaken perceptions of conflict
between active and passive fire precautions
There often appears to be a widespread misconception
that in some way active fire precautions such as a SHEVS
and passive fire precautions such as fire-resisting
partitions are competing one against the other. Such
views can be seen to be the result of too narrow a focus on
one part of the wide range of measures available. Similar
problems exist in misconceptions of the perceived
conflict between different active measures (see section
11.1, for example, concerning the interactions between
smoke ventilation and sprinklers).
It can be misleading to contrast one form of fire
protection with another as if they were completely
independent of each other. In practice, each system
influences the others. It is better to regard the building
itself as the system, with different forms of fire protection
sharing contributions towards overall safety. The
importance of this cannot be overstated.
In fact virtually all forms of smoke control depend on
aspects of ‘passive’ fire protection. Pressure differential
systems are designed to protect against smoke leakage
through small gaps in what is otherwise passive
protection enclosing the escape route. The market for
fire-resisting materials is essentially unaffected by the
presence of such methods of smoke control. Smoke and
heat exhaust ventilation allows the use of spaces much
larger than a conventional fire compartment. Usually this
is the result of using sprinklers as well. But even for this
case there are still many requirements for ‘passive’ fire
protection, eg all shop unit walls except the front, of shop
units opening onto a mall where a SHEVS is fitted into
the mall, or where smoke exhaust ducts pass through
neighbouring fire compartments. Other examples
include:
• partition walls,
• ceiling membranes,
• downstands for smoke reservoirs or smoke barriers.
Related ‘passive’ fire-protection measures important for
smoke control can also include intumescent seals for fire
doors and fire-resisting glazing.
As for all applications, there are the same requirements
for fire-resisting materials to be able to withstand thermal
shocks, to be impermeable to smoke, and to be stable
under different environmental conditions including the
ability to resist humidity, fungal attack, the freeze-thaw
cycle, and ageing of the materials. If the material cracks, it
could render the smoke control system unable to prevent
the passage of smoke. All larger openings, such as holes
made for pipes, cables, ducting, etc., must be properly
sealed. This has to be a proper fire and smoke seal, not a
patchwork using whatever material is left on site
(examples exist of the failure of fire-resisting walls
because of such inadequate materials as cardboard and
polystyrene having been used to seal holes made for
cables, pipes, etc.–this kind of fault is seen all too often
during post-fire investigations).
96
18 Smoke ventilation and
enforcement of regulations
The final decision as to what is acceptable rests with
those who are responsible for enforcing the relevant fire
safety regulations. In large or complex buildings it is
usually impractical to follow the prescriptive guidelines
given in the relevant standards and a fire safety
engineering approach is needed to achieve a successful
smoke and heat exhaust ventilation system so that the
same level of safety is accomplished as for a more
conventional building without the same amount of
compartmentation.
The success or failure of the design will often depend
on the details. The assumptions and calculation
procedures which are correct for one scenario may not be
correct for another. It should also be clearly understood
that the various published formulae were derived from
experiments and may not be appropriate when the design
scenario is very different. For example, a formula
experimentally derived from a tall and narrow atrium
may not be suitable for SHEVS design of a wide atrium
with a relatively low ceiling. Unfortunately there is often
confusion about the validity of various assumptions and
calculation formulae used in the design process
It should be emphasized further that any SHEVS
design procedure has ‘assumptions’ built into it. It is
impossible to do a smoke-control design from first
principles without any assumptions. Thus, it follows that
the enforcer of regulations, and the building’s owner or
developer, should insist that the designer of a system
should make all the assumptions explicit, and should state
the sources for methodology and/or data. It is often the
case that the most worrying problems with a design arise
from unreasonable assumptions. Although it may
sometimes be difficult to follow the calculation
methodology it is usually possible to make a
commonsense judgement about the validity of the
assumptions.
As the buildings become more complicated, both in
size and geometry and also with the introduction of new
innovative materials and construction techniques,
formulae normally used for design of smoke control
systems become less reliable and particular care is needed
in the design process. In those scenarios it may be
desirable for the enforcer of regulations to seek a second
opinion from an independent source of expertise. If the
building is so complex that confidence in the design
process is low then it may be desirable to do an ‘in-situ’
commissioning fire test to check the SHEVS design and
to fine tune the system. A further advantage of such a test
is that it may clearly show some implementation faults, eg
whether a damper in a duct has been installed such that it
opens in the ‘wrong’ direction in the event of a fire. The
test involves the use of one or more alcohol fires to
produce sufficient heat such that the hot buoyant gas
layer flows can be monitored and the effectiveness of the
SHEVS can be assessed. Obviously the temperature must
also be kept low enough so as not to cause any damage to
the building. Non-toxic and non-corrosive oil-mist
theatrical smoke may be injected into the fire plume if
visualization of the hot gas layer is desired. Such methods
have been developed and used successfully in the last few
years.
One other problem with a smoke-control system is
maintenance and training of staff where needed. A
regular check on the system is essential to ensure that it
will operate as designed, if needed. Also, intervention by
trained staff is sometimes beneficial or even necessary to
achieve satisfactory evacuation of the occupants in the
event of a fire. For example, calculations done at FRS[100]
indicated that the presence of trained staff to help with
evacuation is of great benefit in large single-storey
buildings. It is difficult to ensure that there is a continual
training programme, particularly when the ‘ownership’ of
a building changes.

19 Acknowledgements
The authors of this book would like to record their
indebtedness to Dr G O Hansell, co-author of Design
approaches for smoke control in atrium buildings[13] , an earlier
BRE publication, some of whose text has been carried
forward into this present book; and to Mr Joris Verbeek of
IFSET for his work on the Figures and Plates.
97
They would also like to state their appreciation of the
work of CEN/TC191/SC1 and of the related ‘Mirror
Groups’ in the national Standards Institutes in preparing
the draft Parts of PrEN 12101. Many ideas have developed
and have been clarified as a result of their discussions.
98
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Annex A: Design procedure
with a growing design fire
Note: The principles described in Annex B are applicable
here as well.
A.1 Choose a design fire curve
This has been discussed in more detail in section 3.1. It
will also be necessary to identify the average heat release
rate per square metre for the selected scenario.
A.2 Establish the required escape time
This must be done using methods from sources outside
the field of smoke ventilation.
A.3 Calculate times to danger, ie available
escape time
Use an iterative procedure based on the principle of a
‘quasi-steady-state’ calculation, where the growing fire is
treated as if it is a succession of steady fires, each in its
own defined time interval, with the whole approximating
to the actual curve. This lends itself well to converting
into a computer program, and can be much more general
in application than a fully analytical solution, since the
latter will yield very complicated formulae for all but the
simplest of building geometries.
(a) Select a time increment for calculation
Too large an increment will give poor accuracy and could
result in the calculation being mathematically unstable, ie
inherently unable to give the correct answers. The
smaller the increment the more accurate the results of
this method of calculation, but too small an increment
can lead to arithmetical errors arising in computers which
specify numbers by using too few digits. A one-second
increment seems to work well with computer programs
in the present authors’ experience.
(b) Iterative procedure
• Identify mass of smoky gases resident in the smoke
reservoir at the end of the previous iteration.
Set = 0 for the first iteration.
• Identify total heat resident in the smoky gases in the
smoke reservoir at the end of the previous iteration.
101
Set = 0 for the first iteration.
• Identify the location of the buoyant smoke layer’s base
in the smoke reservoir at the end of the previous
iteration. Set = ceiling height for the first iteration.
Hence, identify the height of rise to the layer base at
the start of the current iteration.
• Using the appropriate growth curve identified earlier,
and the heat-release rate identified earlier, calculate
the average fire perimeter during the time interval for
the current iteration.
• Calculate the average convective heat flux in the
smoky gases during the time interval for the current
iteration.
• Using the height of rise, the heat flux, and the fire
perimeter calculate the average mass flow rate of
smoky gases entering the layer during the current
iteration, using the same methods as for a steady-state
design fire. Note that this will cover both single-storey
geometries and the more complicated atrium-like
geometries.
• Using results calculated for the layer from all previous
iterations and steady-state formulae for the ventilators,
calculate the exhaust mass flow during the current time
interval.
• From the difference between the mass entering the
layer and the mass being exhausted, calculate the net
mass of smoky gases adding to the layer during the
current increment. If the exhaust is greater than the
flow rate entering the layer, default the layer depth to
the depth of a ceiling-jet.
• From the difference between the heat carried into the
gases and the heat being exhausted from the layer,
calculate the net heat adding to the layer during the
current increment.
• By adding the net addition of mass to the mass resident
at the start of the increment, calculate the mass of
smoky gases resident in the layer at the end of the
current increment.
• By adding the net addition of heat to the heat resident
at the start of the increment, calculate the heat resident
in the layer at the end of the current increment. Note
that it is conventional to ignore heat losses from the
layer other than by the exhaust gases, but one could
include the effect of sprinkler cooling if necessary.
102 Design methodologies for SHEVS
Inclusion of heat losses to the building structure is
A.4 Acceptability criteria for calculated
difficult.
times
• inCalculate the excess temperature of the gases residing
the layer at the end of the current increment. Apply
the same ‘maximum layer temperature above ambient’
• Where the layer temperature is higher than the
‘steady-state’ criteria before the ‘time required for
criteria as for the steady-state design: if the layer is too safety’, the design is not acceptable.
hot, end the iteration and branch out to section A.4. • Where the layer depth exceeds our ‘steady-state’
• Using the mass of smoky gases and the layer
temperature, resident in the layer at the end of the
criteria earlier than the ‘time required for safety’, the
design is not acceptable.
current increment, and the known horizontal area of
the smoke reservoir, calculate the layer depth at the
• When neither criterion is exceeded earlier than the
‘time required for safety’, the design is acceptable in
end of the current increment. Note that one can principle, but still has to be subjected to other criteria
introduce non-rectangular-section smoke reservoirs by specified in the ‘steady-state’ design methodology.
making the area a function of height.
• Using minimum clear heights specified as for the
steady-state design method, check whether the
A.5 Further acceptability criteria
calculated layer depth has reached the deepest The designer should use the layer depth and
acceptable limit. If it has, stop the iterative calculation temperature, and the exhaust mass flow rate, calculated
and branch out to section A.4. for the final time increment to carry out the same ‘steady-
• Check whether the total time to the end of the current
iteration has reached the ‘time required for safety’. If it
state’ calculations such as minimum possible layer depth
for flow to the exhaust ventilators, wind effects on
has, stop the iterative calculation and branch out to ventilators, air speed at escape doors being used as inlets,
section A.4. etc.
• Loop back to the start of the iterative process and start
the calculations for the next time interval.

Annex B: Design procedure
with a steady-state design fire
B.1 General introduction
The flow of thermally buoyant gases away from a fire,
through a building, into a smoke reservoir, and their
exhaust from the building into the surrounding
atmosphere, is influenced by many factors. These include
the shape of the building at each part of the flow, and
external factors such as wind pressures, snow loads, etc.
To be successful a smoke exhaust ventilation system must
be designed in a way which includes consideration of all
such influences.
B.2 Identification of ‘design regions’ needed
in calculation
The design procedure must consider a succession of
zones (also called herein ‘design regions’), which
correspond to successive stages in the path followed by
the smoky gases.
B.3 Zone-by-zone deterministic calculation
procedure: single-storey spaces
For large single-volume spaces (ie where smoke rises
directly from the burning fuel to the thermally buoyant
layer in the smoke reservoir) the following design regions
are necessary.
(a) The fire
The design should be based on a steady-state fire of a size
appropriate to the building concerned, as discussed in
Chapter 3.
(b) The plume above the fire, rising into the smoke
reservoir
The height to the smoke base must be specified for life-
safety applications. Some possible requirements are listed
in Table B1. The mass flow rate of smoky gases entering
the reservoir is then calculated.
For temperature control designs the temperature of the
buoyant smoke layer must be specified; and the mass flow
rate entering the layer and the height of rise of the plume
are then calculated.
103
Table B1 Minimum clear height above escape routes
Type of building Minimum height
Public buildings (eg single-storey malls, 3.0 m
exhibition halls)
Non-public building (eg offices, 2.5 m
apartments, prisons)
Car parks Smaller of 2.5 m or
0.8 times ceiling height
Note. These heights apply to single-storey situations. Where smoke must rise through another
storey before reaching the final smoke reservoir, it is usual to add another 0.5 m to each value.
(c) The smoke reservoir and ventilators
The smoke reservoir must be of sufficient depth; this
requires calculation of the minimum depth of layer
necessary for gases to flow from the plume’s point of
entry to the layer towards the ventilators.
The gases in the layer shall be between acceptable high
and low temperature limits: the high limit being 200 °C to
avoid painful heat radiation on lightly clad people
beneath the smoke layer, the low limit being more
arbitrary but typically being a minimum design layer
temperature of 20 °C to avoid loss of buoyant stability of
the layer.
The area of natural ventilators (ie where the gases are
propelled through the ventilators by the buoyant
pressure of the layer beneath the ventilator), or the
capacity of powered ventilators (usually fans), must be
calculated to exhaust the same mass flow rate as enters
the layer in the plume rising from the fire.
Note: Natural and powered smoke exhaust ventilators
should never be used simultaneously in the same smoke
reservoir.
(d) Effect of external influences (eg wind and snow)
The effect of external influences must be allowed for in
the design. This is particularly important in deciding the
location of natural ventilators and in choosing between
natural and powered smoke ventilators. In essence, no
natural ventilator should be located where it might
experience an overpressure from a wind. Wind-induced
overpressures occur on the upwind sides of buildings, and
104
for a considerable distance on any lower surfaces upwind
of a higher structure. The possibility of snow or ice
affecting the operation of the ventilators must also be
taken into account when specifying equipment.
(e) Air inlets (including any doors serving as air inlets)
These must allow sufficient replacement air to enter the
building to replace the gases being exhausted as smoke. If
they are usually closed, they must open on receipt of the
same signal that operates the rest of the smoke
ventilation system. The airspeed through any inlets also
serving as escape doors (a common design feature) must
be less than 5 m/s to avoid adverse effects on people
escaping through those doors. All inlet air must be below
the smoke layer and preferably moving at less than 1 m/s
when it enters the affected zone. Powered inlet fans
should never be used with powered smoke exhaust fans,
in order to avoid changing pressure forces on escape
doors as the fire size changes.
Note: If the provision of inlet air is inadequate, the entire
smoke ventilation system will be ineffective.
(f) Free-hanging smoke curtains
Where present, these shall allow for the effects of
buoyancy-induced deflection away from the vertical, and
must meet the criteria for minimum leakage when in the
deflected position. Note that this aspect of design and
specification of smoke curtains has been largely
overlooked until recently, and does not feature in any
earlier design guides. Nevertheless, it is clear from
experiments at FRS[97] that deflection can be a serious
problem capable of jeopardizing the success of the entire
smoke ventilation design, especially for lighter and
deeper curtains, unless the problem is properly addressed
by calculation during the design of the system and by
specifying the equipment to compensate and thus reduce
the problem to harmless proportions.
(g) Suspended ceilings
Where present, these can complicate the flow of smoky
gases, and must be allowed for in the design.
B.4 Zone-by-zone deterministic calculation
procedure: complex flow path involving spill
plumes
Buildings where the initial plume above the fire is
intercepted by a ceiling and the smoke travels laterally
before spilling into a higher adjacent space (eg see
Figure 5), require additional steps in the calculation of
smoke movement and of the entrainment of air into
smoky gases. Examples include multistorey shopping
malls, atria and buildings with mezzanine floors.
(a) The fire
The selection of a design fire is as for the single-volume
space above.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
(b) Entrainment in, and flow out of, a side room
The plume above the fire is as above, but can be
combined with the flow of smoky gases leaving the
fireroom into a single calculation.
(c) Smoke flows beneath a canopy or balcony,
approaching a spill edge
Where a canopy (or the underside of a balcony) projects
beyond the fireroom’s opening, the effect on the smoke
flow at the spill edge can be calculated to find the mass
flow rate flowing towards that edge. If the smoke exhaust
ventilation design requires that smoke be contained
beneath the canopy or balcony, and be prevented from
spilling into the adjacent space, the remainder of the
design calculation is essentially as for section B.3.
(d) The spill plume
The mixing of air into the spill plume as it rises to meet
the buoyant smoke layer under the ceiling must be
calculated, to give the total mass flow rate of gas entering
the smoke layer. For life-safety applications the height of
the base of the buoyant layer of smoky gases above the
highest escape route open to the same space as the fire,
must be specified. It is usual to add 0.5 m to the minimum
values listed in Table B1.
For temperature control systems the temperature of
the gases in the smoke reservoir (ie in the layer) shall be
specified and the mass flow entering the layer calculated.
The calculation procedures for the spill plume can be
used to find the height to the smoke layer base.
Where there are higher balconies above the spill edge,
the design must take into account the breadth of the
balconies, ie the distance between the edge of the balcony
and the wall (or glazed facade). This affects the ability of
air to move between the plume and the facade, and
determines whether the plume will throw itself clear of
the wall or be pulled back against it to smokelog the
higher balconies.
(e) The smoke reservoir
All calculations and requirements from sections
B.3 (c)–(f) shall also apply to the present case.
(f) Atrium depressurization
Where the pressures in the smoke layer in an atrium are
to be reduced below ambient to prevent smoke moving
into rooms adjacent to that atrium, the effects of wind
pressures on the outside of the building must be included
in the design calculations.
B.5 Integrating the SHEVS into the building
Compatibility with other safety and building systems in
the same building is essential. It is also a common
experience that any safety measures which interfere with
the building’s everyday use will be ‘deactivated’ for the
sake of convenience. This practical and psychological
problem can be greatly reduced if the fire-safety
measures are properly integrated into the building design

at an early stage. It is still common practice in all
countries, unfortunately, to design the fire-safety
measures into the building almost as an afterthought.
This reduces the chances of those measures remaining
effective over the building’s life, and is also likely to
increase the initial cost of the fire-safety measures.
B.6 Computer-based design calculations
Where computer-based zone models are used to carry
out calculations as part of the design process, all
Annex B: Design procedure — steady-state fire 105
mathematical formulae used in those models,
assumptions made, and values of input parameters should
be explicitly included in the documentation made
available to the owner of the building, and to the enforcer
of regulations if they require it.
In addition, information concerning validation of the
computer-based zone models used in design should be
included in the documentation. Where such validation
information exists in the publicly available literature it
ought to be sufficient to cite appropriate references.
106

Annex C: Deflection of
smoke curtains

C.1 Principle
In SHEVS smoke curtains are used to create reservoirs
which will contain smoke and hot gases. To fulfil that role
they must resist the sideways deflection caused by the
buoyancy-driven forces due to hot gases, or the fan-
induced forces in mechanical exhaust systems.
If they do not resist those forces, gaps might occur
beneath the curtain or between the curtain and the
building structure, leading to the flow of hot gases from
the reservoir into adjacent areas.
Theoretical and experimental work has shown that the
deflection of a smoke curtain and the flow of hot gases
through gaps in it can be related to the hot gas layer
contained by the curtain.
This Annex considers the deflection of free-hanging
curtains only, as those which are fixed at both ceiling and
floor and/or sides are effectively locked in place and will
not be subject to deflection. The method of calculation of
the leakage through gaps in the curtains is valid for all
types of curtains. Figure C1 Deflection of a smoke curtain which does not reach
Free-hanging smoke curtains can be divided into two the floor
categories:
• those which act to contain a gas layer which does not
extend below the bottom of the curtain (Figure C1) (eg C.2 Curtains not reaching the floor
reservoir screens and channelling screens),
• those which fall to floor level and act completely to
seal areas from a smoke compartment in which the gas
The deflection of the curtain is calculated following
reference [97] (Figure C1):
layer extends below the bottom of the curtain (Figure
C2) (such as might be installed along balconies to form ρ 0 θ 1 D13
dc = 1.2 (C.1)
a closed atrium). 3T1 (2 Mb + M c Lc )
The types will be referred to as those which do not reach
the floor and those which close an opening, respectively. where:
d c = deflection of the curtain (m),
The pressure of gases acting on the smoke curtain will ρ o = density of ambient air (kgm -3),
cause it to deflect from the normal vertically hanging θ 1 = temperature rise above ambient of the gases in the
position. That horizontal deflection of the curtain causes smoke layer (°C),
the bottom of the curtain to rise, which could lead to D1 = depth of the gas layer (m),
leakage of gas underneath the curtain if the rise takes the T = absolute temperature of the gas (K),
bottom of the curtain above the base of the gas layer. Mb = mass per metre length of the curtain’s bottom bar
Because the curtains are not rigid, they are also likely to (kgm -1 ),
bow in use, like a sail in the wind. Such bowing will lead Mc = mass per m 2 of the curtain fabric (kgm-2),
to a further rise of the bottom of the curtain. L c = length of the smoke curtain from top to bottom
bar, measured along the fabric (m).
 Annex C: Deflection of smoke curtains 107

dc
tan–1
d0
Lc = d0 + dc tan (C.5)
2

The procedure is:

1 assume a value for Lc ≥ d 0,
2 calculate d c using Eqn (C.4),
3 calculate L c using Eqn (C.5).

Repeat steps 1–3 with the new value of L c, until

successive values of Lc differ by 1% or less.
The calculated value for L c must then be modified by
including a term to allow for bowing of the curtain as for
curtains not reaching the floor, so that:

L c(final) = Lc + 1.7 (Lc – d0) (C.6)

C.4 Smoke leakage through gaps in

Figure C2 Deflection of a smoke curtain closing an opening
curtains
The leakage of smoke and hot gas through vertical gaps
at the edges of smoke curtains can be related to the hot
The length of the curtain to contain a gas layer of depth gas layer that they contain by the following equation [101]:
D1 is calculated using an iterative procedure: 1/2
352.17 2 gD1 θ 1
dc Mg = Ag (C.7)
tan–1 T1 T0
D1
Lc = D1 + d c tan (C.2)
2 where:
Mg = mass of gas flowing through the gap (kgs-1),
A g = area of the gap (m 2),
The procedure is: T1 = absolute temperature of the gases in the layer (K),
1 assume a starting value for L c ≥ D1, T0 = absolute ambient temperature (K),
2 calculate d c using Eqn (C.1), D1 = depth of gas in reservoir (m),
3 calculate next value of L c using Eqn (C.2). g = acceleration due to gravity (ms-1),
θ 1 = temperature rise above ambient of the gas (°C).
Repeat steps 1–3 with the new value of L c, until
successive values of L c differ by 1% or less. The gases flowing through curtain gaps will entrain air as
The calculated value for L c must then be modified by they rise to the ceiling, and may cause the formation of a
including a term to allow for bowing of the curtain [97], so smoky gas layer within the area which the curtains are
that: intended to protect. Such a gas layer will be considerably
cooler than that within the main reservoir. Where a
smoke layer forms within the area intended to be
L c(final) = Lc + 1.7 (Lc – D1) (C.3)
protected by the smoke curtains, then it may be necessary
to consider further measures to protect occupants. Such
entrainment has not been closely studied, but preliminary
C.3 Curtains closing an opening
research [101] suggests that the mass entrained can be
The deflection of the curtain is calculated from (see related to the mass flowing through the gaps to give a
Figure C2): conservative estimate of the smoke rising to the ceiling.

ρ 0 θ (3D1 – 2 d 0 )d 20 Mp = 6 M g h p (C.8)
d c = 1.2 (C.4)
3T1 (2Mb + M c Lc )
where:
where d 0 is the height of the opening (m) and other Mp = mass of gas flowing into gas layer in protected area
variables are as defined above. (kgs-1),
The required curtain length to contain a gas layer of Mg = mass of gas flowing through a gap in a smoke
depth D1 is calculated using an iterative procedure: curtain (kgs-1),
h p = height of rise from the base of the hot gas layer in
108 Design methodologies for SHEVS

the reservoir to the ceiling in the protected area. Mgθ1

Note: This equation is derived from a small number of θp = (K) (C.9)
experiments [101] . It is desirable to extend the study further M p

to confirm the derived correlation.

where θ p = temperature above ambient of the smoke
A calculation procedure for the temperature of the gas layer initially forming (ignoring any subsequent cooling)
layer within the protected area is: in the protected reservoir adjacent to the leakage (°C).
 109

Annex D: A comparison of different

spill-plume calculation methods

reservoir, it is necessary to specify the height of the

D.1 The example scenario
The spill-plume methods described in section 6.3.2 apply
to differing scenarios. The limited shared features of
these methods dictate that a comparison must be based
on a scenario involving a large-area smoke reservoir, with
a free plume rising from the spill edge. One of the most
common of such scenarios is a multistorey shopping mall,
where the fire is located in a shop and the smoke travels
out of the shop and is channelled to a length of spill edge.
The following typical example of a shop unit scenario
is used as the basis for comparison.
Shop width = 10 m, having no downstand facia (chosen to
remove a major area of uncertainty in the calculation).
Storey height = 5 m, simplified for purposes of this
example so that the shop opening is taken as 5 m high.
Assuming a steady-state design fire:
Convective heat flux leaving the shop = 5000 kW, coming
from a 3 m × 3 m fire having a perimeter of 12 m.
Because the shop width is less than 5 times the side of the
fire (see section 5.1) C e in Eqns (5.2) and (5.7) = 0.34.
The smoke is channelled directly to the spill edge over a
length of edge of 10 m.
There is no downstand at the void edge.
ceiling in the mall in order to be able to use the ‘effective
layer depth correction’ in assessing the effective height of
rise of the spill plume for use in the BRE method. It does
not affect the other methods. We consider here two
ceiling heights:
• 15 m above the floor, and
• 11 m above the floor.
See Figure D1 which illustrates the dimensions of this
example.
It is now necessary to calculate the mass flow entering a
visible smoke layer base at different heights above the
spill edge, within a smoke reservoir formed beneath the
ceiling. Results are listed below and are shown
graphically in Figure D2. The Thomas (1987) method has
not been included in its unmodified form in view of the
uncertainties surrounding the choice of an appropriate
value of ∆ for the circumstances of this example. The
method has been used in its modified form where the
value of ∆ is calculated using Poreh’s method.

Using Eqn (5.7):

Mass flow rate of gases approaching spill edge =
29.2 kg/s.

Using Eqn (5.11):

Depth of smoke layer approaching spill edge = 1.19 m.

A more precise calculation is possible using Eqn (E.3),

where the temperature dependence of the parameter κ M
can be included for still greater accuracy[52], giving a
depth of 1.14 m. This last value has been used in the
present calculation, although Eqn (5.11) alone is
sufficiently accurate for normal design purposes. Figure D1 Idealized shopping mall: example for comparing spill
Hence at the spill edge we have for the approach flow: plume calculation methods
Q W = 5000 kW
MW = 29.2 kg/s
D W = 1.14 m

Because the example stipulates a large-area smoke

110 Design methodologies for SHEVS

D.2 BRE method D.3 Thomas et al (1998) method

(a) 15 m ceiling Calculations were done using Eqns 6.7 and 6.8. Results
The results of applying section 6.3.2 (a) and Annex E are are listed in Table D.3 and are shown in Figure D2.
shown in Table D.1.

Table D.1 Entrainment into the example spill plume: Table D.3 Entrainment into the example spill plume:
BRE method, 15 m ceiling Thomas et al (1998) method
Height of visible Mass flow rate of Height of visible Mass flow rate of
smoke base smoky gases entering smoke base smoky gases entering
above spill edge smoke layer above spill edge smoke layer
(m) (kg/s) (m) (kg/s)

3.6 105 2 75
5.24 146 4 102
6.83 189 6 129
8.41 239 8 156
10 285 10 183

(b) 11 m ceiling
The results of applying section 6.3.2 (a) and Annex E are
D.4 Poreh et al method
shown in Table D.2.
Calculations were done using Eqns 6.3 and 6.4. Results
Table D.2 Entrainment into the example spill plume: are listed in Table D.4, and are plotted graphically in
BRE method, 11 m ceiling Figure D2.
Height of visible Mass flow rate of
smoke base smoky gases entering Table D.4 Entrainment into the example spill plume:
above spill edge smoke layer Poreh method
(m) (kg/s) Height of visible Mass flow rate of
smoke base smoky gases entering
2.04 84.3 above spill edge smoke layer
2.83 105
(m) (kg/s)
3.62 124
4.41 146 2 69
5.21 167 4 94
6 189 6 119
8 144
10 170
Height of Visible Smoke Base Above Floor (m)

15

10

BRE-method - 15m ceiling

BRE-method - 11m ceiling

5 Thomas et al (1998) method

Poreh et al method

Modified Thomas (1987) method

50 70 90 110 130 150 170 190 210 230 250 270 290
Mass Flow Rate in Spill Plume (kg/s)

Figure D2 Spill plume entrainment: comparison of calculation methods

 Annex D: Spill-plume calculation methods 111
the Thomas (1987) method. It does, however, suggest
D.5 Thomas (1987) using Poreh method to
that this method is not ready yet for general
Calculate ∆ . application.
Calculations were done using Eqns 6.5 and 6.6. Results
are listed in Table D.5 and are shown graphically in
• Poreh’s
The Thomas (1987) method with ∆ calculated using
method (Eqn 6.6) is in close agreement with
Figure D2. the BRE methods throughout the height range.
• The Thomas (1998) method is in reasonable
agreement (although the end-entrainment
Table D.5 Entrainment into the example spill plume:
Modified Thomas (1987) using Poreh method to calculate ∆ contribution is surprisingly small) for lesser heights of
Height of visible Mass flow rate of rise (perhaps acceptably so for heights up to around 4
smoke base smoky gases entering m for design purposes). There is a large and growing
above spill edge smoke layer discrepancy compared with the BRE and the modified
(m) (kg/s) Thomas (1987) methods above this height.

2 97.5 It is generally true that designs based on the larger mass-

4 136
6 177
8 219
10 263
D.6 Discussion and conclusions
It can be seen from Figure D2 that:
flow values are conservative in terms of safety. We can
also note that for the very different circumstance of the
European Parliament hot smoke test (adhered plume
with end entrainment, 1 MW fire, two fire trays, large
smoke reservoir)[69] (summarized in Annex J), the BRE
method predicted a smoke layer base within measuring
error of the observed visual smoke layer base. While this
is not complete validation of the BRE method, this good
agreement represents a major extension of the ‘envelope’

• The Poreh method, while applicable to situations

where end effects are unimportant, appears to predict
consistently the lowest entrainment. This is not
surprising in view of the absence of any end-
entrainment terms. This is unlikely to matter where
the plume is very narrow, such as in the ‘virtual’ part of
of validation and as such tends to lend added confidence
in that method. By extension, we can infer that it also
lends greater confidence in the modified Thomas (1987)
method for the free plume example cited in this Annex.
None of the other methods described in this book can be
applied to this hot-smoke test scenario.
112

Annex E: User’s guide to

BRE spill-plume calculations

Note: This Annex uses a different nomenclature to the modification of the original theory to include more recent
rest of this book: see the nomenclature list at the end of work on thermally buoyant horizontal flows[27] and
the Annex. adhered (or attached, or wall, or single-sided)
plumes[27,61] (Figure 24a).
The calculations can be done using an electronic
E.1 Introduction
calculator having full scientific functions. This, however,
FRS has carried out a number of studies into the may be time-consuming, particularly where the designer
movement of smoke in buildings. Part of this book has wishes to look at a number of geometries or conditions.
resulted in the development of a theory by Morgan & The calculations can easily be incorporated in a computer
Marshall[25] to estimate the amount of air entrained into program where frequent calculations are required. An
free (or double-sided) thermal spill plumes (Figure 24b). alternative method to Figure E1 is given later in this
This calculation method is important for smoke-control Annex in order to facilitate such programming.
design in that it enables the designer to calculate the Many of the variables used in equations in this Annex
required fan capacity or vent area for a smoke ventilation do not appear in the main body of the book. To avoid
system for large undivided volume buildings (eg multi- unnecessary complications for the reader who does not
level shopping malls and atria). A number of studies have wish to use this calculation procedure, this Annex is
since been carried out which have resulted in the provided with a separate list of nomenclature.

5
(=v ))

b"

p"
("p"

Dimensionless vertical velocity(u")

U"
buoyancy

4
(b")
reciprocal
half-w id th

3
Dimensionless
Dimensionless

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 25 3 3.5 4

Modified distance above virtual

source I (v)

Figure E1 Graphical representation of the theoretical solution for a plume issuing from a restrained source F < 1

E.2 Scenarios and assumptions
The calculation method strictly only applies to fire
scenarios where a horizontally flowing, thermally
buoyant layer of smoky gases approaches a void, through
which those gases then rise. More specifically, the
following assumptions are made.
• This approach flow is assumed to be beneath a flat
ceiling (or a downstand) at the edge of the void.
• It is channelled by downstands (which may be either
walls or channelling screens).
• The flow has flow-lines which are everywhere parallel
and which approach the edge of the void at a right-
angle.
• The approach flow is also assumed to be fully
developed.
• There is no immersed ceiling jet.
• It is also assumed that the velocity of the clear air
below the smoke layer has a value smaller than that of
the layer itself.
Fortunately, these assumptions correspond to many
practical scenarios of interest to designers.
Further, it should be noted that experimental
evidence [61] suggests that the calculation procedure
which is the subject of this guide should not be used for
approach flow layer temperatures higher than about
350 °C. Accurate methods for higher temperatures do not
yet exist. The present method significantly overpredicts
the mixing of air into the rising hot gases for higher
temperatures.
In practice, the designer will have arrived at the key
parameters of the approach flow by some calculation
procedure independent of the present guide. For
example, by using Eqns (5.7) and (5.8) to calculate the
flow of smoky gases passing from a room into an atrium
void. Another example is where a single-storey mall
allows smoke to rise through the void of a two-storey
mall: here, the flow in the single-storey mall can be
calculated in the usual way using, for example, sections
5.2 and 5.3 of this book.
E.3 Outline of procedure
The calculation proceeds in discrete stages:
1 The designer must know:
(a) the internal geometry of his building, including
relevant channel widths,
(b) at least two of the key parameters of the approach
flow; useful pairs are:
mass flow/heat flux,
mass flow/mean layer temperature,
mass flow/ceiling temperature,
heat flux/mean layer temperature,
heat flux/ceiling temperature,
heat flux/layer depth,
layer depth/mean layer temperature,
layer depth/ceiling temperature.
2 Using the known parameters for the approach flow,
Annex E: BRE spill-plume calculations 113
calculate the remaining parameters of the flow.
3 Using the results from the preceding stage, calculate
the entrainment into the flow as it rotates around the
void edge, ie as the smoky gases change from a
horizontally moving flow to a vertically moving flow.
By the end of this stage the key parameters required for
the next stage of calculation of the vertically moving
gases will be known at the horizontal plane passing
through the ceiling/void edge. These parameters are
the heat flux, the vertically moving mass flux, and the
kinetic energy of the gases (this last is based only on
the vertical component of velocity).
4 The plume at greater heights behaves as if it rises from
an infinitely wide source located in the horizontal
plane passing through the ceiling/void edge, where
that source has horizontal profiles of both buoyancy
and (the vertical component of) velocity which can be
described by Gaussian functions. This source is, of
course, virtual. We have followed Lee & Emmons[102]
in using this source, and indeed in the method of
calculating the plume above this source. The BRE
method follows Lee & Emmons in calling this source
an ‘Equivalent Gaussian Source’.
Calculate the key parameters of the Equivalent
Gaussian Source by ensuring that the three key
parameters from stage 3 above keep the same values.
5 Knowing the height above the ceiling/void edge (eg
this is likely to be chosen to be equal to the smoke layer
base in the reservoir above the void), calculate the
entrainment into the spill plume. This calculation
treats the plume as a perfect 2-D plume having a length
equal to the width of the channel of the approach flow.
It is important that the designer first identifies whether
the ‘effective height of rise’ discussed in section 6.1 of
the main text of the present work applies to his/her
circumstances.
6 Calculate the additional entrainment into the free ends
of the plume. This assumes that the bulk of the plume is
relatively unaffected by these end effects; this is
reasonable for plume heights typically smaller than or
comparable to the plume length [62] .
E.4 Detailed calculation procedure
E.4.1 Deriving key approach-flow parameters
Complete all necessary pre-calculations to derive the key
parameters of the approach flow described in stage 1(b)
above.
E.4.2 Determining remaining approach-flow parameters
Select from the following Eqns (from [27]) to determine the
remaining parameters for the approach flow from the
initial known parameters.
Calculate the mean layer temperature (θ w):
Qw
θ w = (K) (E.1)
M wc
Calculate the mass flow rate (Mw) at the opening[52]:
114 Design methodologies for SHEVS

2 Wρ0 anomalous entrainment above the spill edge as if it

Mw= Cd 3/2
(2 g θ cwT 0)1/2 d w 3/2 κ M (kgs -1 ) (E.2) occured in the rotation region.
3 Tcw
If the line plume is single-sided go to E.4.7 after
where: completion of this step.
ρ 0 = 1.22 kgm-3 for an ambient temperature T0 of 288 K,
C d = 0.6 for opening with a deep downstand or 1.0 for E.4.4 Calculate the Equivalent Gaussian Source:
no downstand, First convert Q and M y into the corresponding
-2
g = 9.81 ms , parameters per unit length of plume (ie divide by the
κ M = 1.3 for most typical flowing layers. channel width (W) to give Q o and A). Then solve the
following Eqns:
The depth of the layer (dw) at the opening is then given
by [ 5 2 ] : Q0 1
ξ = A + (E.10)
[Note the importance of knowing whether there is a T0c ρ0√π
downstand running along the edge of the void (and thus
at right angles to the direction of the flow), because this
changes the value of Cd.] θ Q0√ 1+λ2 (E.11)
2/3 T G Q0
3 M wTcw T0cλ A +
d w = (m) (E.3) T0c
3/2 1/2
2 Cd κ M W ρ 0(2 g θ cwT 0)
where the empirical thermal constant[102] λ = 0.9:
The mass-weighted average temperature θ w of the gas
layer is[52]: 2B
ς = (E.12)
1 θ λ
κQ ρ0 – √π
θ w = θ cw (K) (E.4) √3 T G √ 1+3λ2
κM

where KQ = 0.95 for most typical flowing layers. ζ

UG = (E.13)
Greater accuracy can be achieved by calculating the ξ
values of the profile correction factor κ M and κ Q using the
temperature-dependent formulae in [52] , although this is and
usually unnecessary for most practical designs.
bG = ξ
The layer’s characteristic velocity (v) is given by[27]: (E.14)
uG
1/3
Cd κ M gQ wT cw
v = 0.96 (m s-1) (E.5) θ
κ Q 1/3 c ρ 0 WT 20 w h e r e T G, u G and bG are parameters of the Equivalent
Gaussian Source.
For a deep downstand, where C d = 0.6, this becomes:
1/3 E.4.5 Calculate the entrainment into the rising plume:
gQ wT cw -1
(E.6) The Source Froude number (F) for the line plume is [25]:
v = 0.76 (m s )
c ρ 0 WT 20 1/2

1/4
2 α uG
With no downstand at the opening, C d = 1.0, and F = (E.15)
π θ ( gbG )
1/2
1/3 λ
g Q wT c w T
v = 1.27 (m s-l) (E.7) G

c ρ 0 WT 2
0
where α = 0.16 for double-sided[102] and 0.077 for single-
Calculate the horizontal flux (B) of vertical buoyant sided[61] line plumes. Calculate the transformed
potential energy[27,25] (relative to the void edge): parameter (υ G) for the Equivalent Gaussian Source:
1
ρ 0 θ cw gvd 2 υ g = (E.16)
B = w (W m ) -1
(E.8) (1 – F 2)1/3
2 T cw
Determine the value of I1 ( υ g ) by using the following
E.4.3 Calculate the mass flux (My) rising past the void procedure (or the alternative procedure of E.6 below):
edge [ 2 7 ] :
υ G represents a value on the vertical axis of Figure E1.
2 θ c 1/2 3/2
M y = ρ 0 W α '(2 g d w + M w (kg s-1) (E.9) Look across to the middle solid curve and find the
3 T0 corresponding value of I1 ( υ G) on the other axis.
where the entrainment constant α ' = 1.1.
Note: α ' takes such a large value as a result of treating all Calculate the transformed height parameter of x'
 Annex E: BRE spill-plume calculations 115

corresponding to the desired plume height (x), noting δMr=4buαxρ (kg s-1) (E.26)
0
that x must be set equal to the appropriate effective
height of rise identified in section 6.1 of Chapter 6 of this
book. where:
2 x
x' = α (E.17) ( ba + b )
√π b = (m) (E.27)
bG
2
Next calculate ∆ I1( υ ):
( ua + u )
u = (m) (E.28)
x' 2
∆ I 1( υ ) = 1/3 (E.18)
F 2(1 – F 2)
Note that while the original derivation was semi-
and empirical, this treatment is equivalent to regarding the
free ends of the line plume as if they were themselves line
I 1( υ ) = I 1( υ G ) + ∆ I 1( υ ) (E.19) plumes of length 2 b at each end, although the
parameter b takes its values from the properties of the
Determine values of b', p' and u' corresponding to the main line plume itself.
calculated value of I1(n) using the following method or an Add this to the plume entrainment result from E.4.5 to
alternative procedure which is set out in E.7 below. obtain the total mass flow M r of smoky gases rising past
I1 (υ) represents a value on the horizontal axis of Figure the specified height (x), ie:
E1. Using this value find the corresponding values (from
all three curves) for u", p" and b". Then use the following M r = m rW + δ M r (kg s-1) (E.29)
equations to determine u', p' and b':
1/3
It should be noted that where both ends of a plume are
u' = u" F (E.20) bounded by side walls (eg as in a shaft) then δ Mr = 0.

1
p' = (E.21) E.4.7 Modifications to the above procedure for single-
(1 – F 2)1/3 p " sided[27,61] (or adhered) line plumes
Convert both the Equivalent Gaussian Source and the
b' = b" [ F 2(1 – F 2)]1/3 (E.22) plume into a composite of a real and an imaginary half,
such that the centre line of the composite lies along the
Next determine the characteristic half-width (b) of the vertical wall to which the plume is adhering. This is done
line plume [25] at height x: by doubling values for B, My (and hence A), and Q from
E.4.3) before returning to E.4.4–E.4.6 above. Note that
b = b' bg (E.23)
experiments [61] show that the value of α needed in
Then calculate the axial vertical velocity component E.4.4–E.4.6 should change value from 0.16 (valid for a
(u) of the gases at height x: free- or double-sided plume) to 0.077 for the adhered
plume.
u' uG
u= (E.24) On completing E.4.6, halve the final value of mass flow
F
Mr rising past the desired plume height (x).
Calculate the mass flow per unit plume length (m r)
passing the chosen height[25] x:
E.5 Limits to spill-plume entrainment
θ λ
calculations
mr = √π ρ 0 ub 1 – p ' (kg s-1 m-1) (E.25) It is known from experimental studies with free plumes
T G (1 + λ 2)1/2
that for heights of rise from the spill edge to the visible
Convert to the total mass flow in the line plume smoke layer base of less than 3 m, no current theory
(ignoring end-effects) by multiplying Eqn (E.25) by the adequately describes the entrainment. The mass flow
channel width (ie m r W). rates predicted by theory are greater than observed in
practice. Where heights of rise less than 3 m occur, this
E.4.6 Calculate the entrainment δ Mr[25,62] into the free over-prediction of entrainment will usually provide an
ends of the line plume additional safety margin in the provision of smoke
The width of the line plume (and also its axial velocity) exhaust ventilation.
can be taken as being approximately constant for most of
its height as a first-order approximation, and equal to the E.6 Alternative method for determination
mean of the values at the Equivalent Gaussian Source and
at the chosen height x. υ g)
of I1(υ
The entrainment δ Mr into both ends of the line plume If υ g ≥ 1.549 then I1( υ g) = ( υ g – 0.75)/0.9607
is then [62]: If υ g ≤ 1.549 and υ g > 1.242
116
then I1( υ g) = ( υ g – 0.843)/0.8594
If υ g ≤ 1.242 and υ g > 1.059
then I1( υ g) = ( υ g – 0.9429)/0.6243
If υ g< 1.059 then I1( υ g) = ( υ g – 1.0)/0.3714
E.7 Alternative method for calculating value
of b', p' and u'
E.7.1 Determination of u"
If I1( υ ) > 1.896 then u" = 1.0
If I1( υ g) > 0.786 and I1( υ ) ≤ 1.896
then u" = 0.0908I1( υ ) + 0.821
If I1( υ ) ≤ 0.786 then u" = I1( υ )0.35
E.7.2 Determination of p"
If I1( υ ) > 0.832 then p" = 0.9607I1( υ ) + 0.75
If I1( υ ) > 0.464 and I1( υ ) ≤ 0.832
then p" = 0.8594I1( υ ) + 0.8429
If I1( υ ) > 0.186 and I1( υ ) ≤ 0.464
then p" = 0.6243I1( υ ) + 0.9429
If I1( υ ) ≤ 0.186 then p" = 0.3714I1( υ ) + 1.0
E.7.3 Determination of b"
If I1( υ ) > 2.161 then b" = 0.938I1( υ ) + 0.82
If I1( υ ) ≤ 2.161 and I1( υ ) > 1.296
then b" = 0.89I1( υ ) + 0.95
If I1( υ ) ≤ 1.296 and I1( υ ) > 0.896
then b' = 0.81I1( υ ) + 1.071
If I1( υ ) ≤ 0.896 and I1( υ ) > 0.65
then b" = 0.619I1( υ ) + 1.214
If I1( υ ) ≤ 0.65 and I1( υ ) > 0.543
then b" = 0.331I1( υ ) + 1.414
If I1( υ ) ≤ 0.543 and I1( υ ) > 0.421
then b" = 0.0627I1( υ ) + 1.55
If I1( υ ) ≤ 0.421 and I1( υ ) > 0.348 then b" = 1.821 – 0.6I1( υ )
If I1( υ ) ≤ 0.348 then b" = I1( υ )-0.4
Now calculate u', p' and b' from Eqns (E.20)–(E.22) in
E.4.5
Design methodologies for SHEVS
Nomenclature used in Annex E
Parameters
A Upward mass flow rate per metre across the
horizontal plane through the balcony (kgs -1 m -1 )
b Characteristic half-width of line plume at height x
b ' Dimensionless half-width of line plume
B Potential energy flux per metre of horizontal gas
stream approaching spill edge (Wm -1 )
C d Coefficient of discharge
c Specific heat at constant pressure of gas (kJ kg-1 °C-1)
d Depth of gas stream beneath ceiling (m)
F Source Froude number (for line plume)
g Acceleration due to gravity (ms-2)
I1 Transformed height (dimensionless)
m Mass flow rate per unit width of gas stream
(kg m -1s-1)
δ m Mass per second per metre of air entrained into hot
gas stream at corridor ceiling edge (kg m -1s-1)
M Mass flow rate of gases (kgs-1)
δ M Mass per second of air entrained into free ends of
plume (kgs -1 )
p ' Dimensionless buoyancy on plume axis
Q Heat flux in the gas (kW)
Q o Heat flux per second per unit width of gas flow
(kWm - 1 )
T Absolute gas temperature (K)
u Vertical gas velocity at height x (ms-1)
u ' Dimensionless vertical gas velocity
v Horizontal velocity component of gas (ms-1 )
W Width of gas flow (m)
x Height of clear layer above fire
compartment/balcony (ie spill) edge (m)
x' Dimensionless variable
α Entrainment constant for plume (0.077 and 0.16 for
single-sided and double-sided plumes)
α ' Entrainment constant for air mixing into gases
rotating around a horizontal edge
κ M Profile correction factor for mass flow (approx. 1.3)
κ Q Profile correction factor for heat flux (approx. 0.95)
λ An empirical thermal plume constant (λ = 0.9)
ρ Gas density (kgm -3 )
θ Excess temperature of gases above ambient
temperature (°C)
υ Transformed reciprocal of buoyancy
(dimensionless)
ξ Function defined in Eqn (E10)
ζ Function defined in Eqn (E12)
List of subscripts
o An ambient property
c Variable evaluated at highest point in a flow
(but outside any boundary layer)
g A property of the equivalent Gaussian source
r Base of ceiling smoke reservoir
w Variable evaluated in the horizontal flow at opening
y Variable evaluated in vertical flow past top of
opening

Annex F: 1977 fire at IMF building,
Washington DC
(based on reference [18])
Case history: Fire at IMF Building, Washington DC, in 1977
Building 13-storey, square-shaped reinforced concrete
office building with penthouse, basement and
4-storey underground garage
Atrium A centrally situated enclosed courtyard created the
atrium. The windows of the offices facing the
atrium were of 6.35 mm plate glass
Date of fire 13 May 1977
Location of fire 10th-floor office
Fire protection
Two ventilation systems recirculated air at the top of the
atrium, and at the base of the atrium there was an air-
handling unit. Smoke detectors were provided at the fans
of the air-handling unit and were arranged to shut down
the fans when the detectors activated. The units could be
manually restarted and put on exhaust. The general office
area was fed by penthouse air-handling units that could
go into a ‘smoke-purge mode’ if they were running when
a fire occurred. None of the above systems was in
operation at the time of the fire.
The roof of the atrium was made of clear plastic panels.
Six custom-made smoke ventilators were provided in the
atrium’s roof comprising clear plastic panels on hinges
Origin of fire
Atrium
Figure F1 Plan of the 10th floor of the IMF building showing
location of the office where the fire started
117
equipped with springs and release mechanisms. The
release device was operated by one smoke detector
located in the atrium roof. Fusible links on individual
ventilators were also fitted. Sprinklers were provided at
roof level in the atrium and the building was equipped
with manual fire-alarm points and hydrant valves on each
floor.
The fire
At 6.45 pm a worker discovered a fire in a small office
(3 m x 4.6 m) on the 10th floor (see Figure F1 for a plan of
this floor). The Fire Brigade received the alarm at
7.01 pm. On arrival, firemen found fire venting from the
office window into the atrium. The fire floor was hot and
smoky and this, coupled with the fact that the fire
involved an inner office, made locating the fire difficult.
Thick black smoke issuing from the office had built down
from the roof of the atrium to below the 10th floor.
Although the smoke detector had operated, only two
of the six smoke ventilators had opened. The other four
had released but the springs had lost sufficient strength to
open them fully. These units had to be manually opened
from outside. Smoke however did not vent effectively
and at one stage completely smoke-logged the atrium.
Smoke extractors could not be connected to the smoke
ventilators and so firemen used large extractors pointed
upward from the atrium ground floor to pull fresh air
from the front doors and push smoke upwards and out
through the ventilators. No building engineering staff
were available to advise firemen on the HVAC smoke-
purge capability until much later. It took 2–3 hours to
finally remove the smoke from the atrium.
Conclusions
• The fire was confined to the room of origin by the
closed office door and wall construction.
• Windows facing the atrium above the fire floor were
cracked by heat but fire and smoke had not penetrated
other floors.
• The temperature of the gas layer in the atrium was
insufficient to activate the sprinklers in the atrium roof.
• Due to an insufficiency of replacement air the existing
118 Design methodologies for SHEVS
ventilation system design was inappropriate for
clearance of smoke from the atrium, and the ‘dilution’
• Despite the fact that there were unprotected openings
onto the atrium, and that at one point the atrium was
ventilation approach used by the Fire Brigade took totally smoke-logged, smoke did not migrate from the
many hours to clear the smoke. atrium to other parts of the building. This indicates
• If this had been an atrium with balconies providing
access to escape ways, the smoke may well have
that the existing ventilation arrangements apparently
‘depressurized’ the atrium.
caused serious escape problems from upper floors.

Annex G: Design procedure
for hybrid systems
G.1 Mass-flow-based systems (Figure 49)
• Determine the height of rise of the smoke plume
required to clear the open levels, h , with the design
b
fire (see Chapter 3) chosen on the lowest open level.
This will also yield the smoke layer depth D, measured
from the centreline of the ventilator.
• From Figures 28–39 or by detailed calculation and with
the desired channelling screen separation L, or
opening width W, determine the mass flow rate M1
entering the base of the layer. If the fire is on the atrium
floor, determine M 1 using section 6.5.
• Calculate the total surface area of the smoke layer (the
atrium surface area in contact with the smoke layer
plus the area of the layer base), and determine the
likely smoke layer temperature using Chapter 9. If the
smoke layer temperature is below 20°C above
ambient, then the number of open levels may need to
be reconsidered, or some (or all) of the lower levels
vented independently from the atrium, using the
procedures set out in Chapter 5.
• Set the neutral pressure plane height X, to that
required above the base of the smoke layer, and
determine the value of (AVC V/AiC i) from Eqn (7.1) or
Figure 46.
• With these values of (AVCVAiCi), D, M1 and θ 1 calculate
the ventilation area required from Eqn (5.15), (or from
Eqn 93 in reference [9]), and also the inlet area
required.
• Follow procedure given in section G.3 below
G.2 Temperature-based systems
(Figure 50)
• Decide on a smoke layer temperature rise θ 1 operation with regard to wind effects.
compatible with the facade material employed. For
float glass a temperature rise of 70°C above ambient
will give a reasonable safety margin to the system
design. Toughened glass may be capable of
withstanding higher temperature rises
(eg 200–300°C).
• Calculate the total surface area of the smoke layer (the
atrium surface area in contact with the smoke layer
plus the area of the layer base), and determine the mass
119
flow rate required to give the desired temperature rise,
using Chapter 9. As a simplification incorporating a
margin of safety, this step can be omitted and the mass
flow rate calculated using Eqn (5.10).
• By detailed calculation and with the channelling
screen separation L or opening width W, determine
the height of rise hb to the base of the layer, necessary
to give the required mass flow rate (see sections 6.2 and
6.3).
• With the design fire at the lowest level (see Figure 50)
and taking into account the necessary height of rise hb
for cooling purposes, determine the maximum smoke
layer depth D max. Set the neutral pressure plane height
X, to that required above the base of this smoke layer
depth, and determine the value of (AVC V/AiC i) from
Eqn (7.2).
• With the same value of h b determine the shallowest
smoke layer depth D 1, compatible with the
depressurization concept (this is often the second level
beneath the NPP).
• With these values of (AVCV A/ iCi ), D1, M1 and θ1
calculate the ventilation area and the inlet area
required using Eqn (5.15), (or from Eqn 93 of
reference [9]).
• Follow procedure given in G.3 below.
G.3 Common procedure
• greater
In the event that the actual inlet area available is
than that required by calculation, then the
ventilation area should be increased to maintain the
ratio of (AVC V/AiC i).
• Using Eqns (7.2) and (7.3) and the appropriate wind
pressure coefficients (C p’s), check the system
• In the event that the wind effects may adversely affect
the operation of a natural ventilation system, calculate
the fan capacity required using Eqn (7.4), with the
appropriate value of design wind velocity.
• Check that the anticipated suction pressure and/or air
inflow velocities do not in themselves endanger the
safe use of any escape routes away from the atrium (see
section 5.9).
120

Annex H: Effect of a buoyant layer

on the minimum pressure
recommended for a pressure
differential system

Smoke exhaust
H.1 Assessment of height of the neutral Me (Av Cv if a natural ventilator)
pressure plane (NPP)
The designer of the SHEVS will have calculated the
depth D and temperature θ1 of the buoyant smoke layer.
Height of
He/she will also know the ventilator and inlet highest
parameters, including the mass exhaust rate of smoky leakage
path to
gases (Me). pressurized
space
H.1.1 With a ‘dominant’ air inlet
A ‘dominant’ air inlet occurs when the total area of inlets Pressurized
below the smoke layer’s base is more than twice the total Height space
of NPP
area of all openings, other than the ventilators
themselves, above the smoke layer’s base.
The height of the NPP above the base of the smoke
layer is for natural smoke and heat exhaust ventilators
neglecting wind effects (see Figure H1):
Air
d lv Tamb r2 inlet
X = (H.1) AiCi
(m)
Tamb r2 + T1
Figure H1 The NPP and smoke layer buoyant pressure
where:
CV Avtot
r = using a flow network analysis considering all significant
Ci Ai
leakage paths.
and C iAi = total aerodynamic free area of the dominant This is beyond the technical scope of the present book,
Inlet (ie of all inlets below the smoke layer’s base). and is not considered further herein.
For powered smoke and heat exhaust ventilators
neglecting wind effects (see Figure H1):
H.2 The pressure rise at a specified height
T1M12
above the NPP
X = (m) (H.2)
2 g θ 1 ρ02 (ΧιΑι)2 The buoyant pressure at a height y NPP , above the NPP is:

θ1
∆ py = ρ0 gy NPP (Pa) (H.3)
H.1.2 With no dominant air inlet T1
Where there is no dominant air inlet there is no means of
simple calculation, and the height must be calculated

Annex I: Aspects of hot-smoke tests
to confirm the performance
of SHEVS
I.1 Why do hot-smoke tests (HSTs)?
Hot-smoke tests (HSTs) are a form of on-site acceptance
test of the entire SHEVS, in as close a form as possible to
the final installed system. It is not always necessary to do
them. HSTs are desirable in the following circumstances.
• Where the design calculations for the SHEVS are
believed to be inadequate by the Regulatory Authority,
who is nevertheless willing to grant conditional
approval subject to proof of performance. Note that
this should not occur very often, as inadequate designs
should be identified at an early stage in Approvals
Procedures and the design corrected before
installation of the SHEVS equipment. It may be
considered where a design is defended by the specialist
designer, but is still not trusted by the Regulatory
Authority.
• Where the system, building shape, or equipment as
installed does not match the proposal on which
approval was granted, but the SHEVS designer
nevertheless argues that the system will work
satisfactorily. This scenario ought never to happen, but
occurs all too often.
• Where the circumstances of the building are such that
the fundamental assumptions underlying the theories
upon which designs are based are not valid, and
approximations had to be made in the design. A typical
case might be where a spill plume rises past a strongly
curved (in the horizontal plane) spill edge whereas the
design methods are all based on the spill edge being
straight. This can perhaps be regarded as a special case
of the first circumstance above, with no-one in a
position of blame in any way. In an ideal world, this
ought to be the only reason for wanting HSTs.
I.2 Choosing the test location
It is possible in most buildings fitted with a SHEVS to
imagine a real fire occurring in any one of many locations.
Some of these locations will represent a more severe
threat than in other places. For example, a fire on the
floor of an atrium, not near to the walls, will entrain less
air than the same fire located in a side-room whereby the
smoke enters the atrium as a spill plume. The fan capacity
121
needed to maintain a smoke layer at a given height might
for the latter case be twice what is needed for the former.
Similar differences can occur between an adhered spill
plume and a free spill plume. Another example is where
smoky gases from a side-room (eg from a shop) can
spread sideways underneath a projecting balcony before
spilling into the atrium, compared with another location
where such sideways spread cannot occur.
It is generally true that a SHEVS should be designed to
cope with the worst-case location within any smoke zone
(ie within any area feeding smoke into a single smoke
reservoir). It is therefore necessary to locate the test fire
in that same location.
The fire should never be located in the easiest locations
simply because they are more convenient.
I.3 Choosing the test fire
The basic requirements for the HST are that:
• it must not damage the building, and
• it must be as similar as possible to the design fire, in
order to minimize the extent of extrapolation required
afterwards.
Reconciling these conflicting requirements inevitably
means that the HST must be specifically designed to
match the chosen location in the building. The following
list gives a few considerations.
1 The fuel must burn cleanly. Ethanol (either pure
anhydrous, or as the almost-pure industrial methylated
spirits) is excellent as it burns with no visible smoke,
and leaves no deposits.
2 The perimeter of the fire should be as close as possible
to the design value in order to obtain a similar rate of
entrainment. This may mean using more than one fire
tray to simultaneously satisfy 3, next point below.
3 The heat output of the HST should be as close as
possible to the design value, subject to the gas
temperatures being low enough to avoid doing any
damage. This must be calculated.
4 Heat insulating materials must be used wherever the
gases will be hot enough to cause local damage.
Typically this will include lining or simulating a side-
room and any balcony projecting beyond the opening,
122
and/or any glazing above the opening to a height pre-
calculated as being necessary.
5 A typical maximum layer temperature in the HST
must be based on the most vulnerable material (often
PVC in cable insulation, or otherwise, for which the
temperature must never exceed 70°C). Good practice
requires that a safety margin of at least 20°C be left
below that value. The maximum heat output for
point 3 above is usually derived by reverse-calculation
from this layer temperature.
I.4 During the test
1 Thermocouples should be used to measure the layer
temperature in the smoke reservoir, preferably as a
vertical profile.
2 Height markers should be positioned to make it easy
and accurate to estimate the height of the smoke
layer’s base.
3 The smoke generators should be of a type which leaves
no deposits.
4 The smoke generators should be positioned so that the
smoke is not destroyed by the gas temperature (ie the
smoke should not be introduced too close to the fire).
5 Enough smoke should be used for the layer to be
visible – and for any smoke leakage elsewhere to be
visible. Note that it is effectively impossible for the
HST smoke to be as optically dense as from a real fire.
It is better to say that if it is possible to see the test
smoke at all, the real fire smoke would be
unacceptable! Calculations of smoke densities in real
fires are possible, although difficult.
6 Observers should look for smoke leakage where it
should not occur. (This is crucially important.)
7 There should be sufficient safety procedures for people
present during the HST. These should include having:
– a fire-crew ready with hose laid (or other
extinguishing apparatus) in case of trouble,
– ‘minders’ for the inevitable crowds of onlookers and
VIPs with instructions on how to guide them to
safety,
– a safety officer in charge of the test with sole
authority to demand evacuation if conditions
become unsafe, etc.
8 The building must have been effectively cleared of
people before the HST (apart from those taking part in
it, or being controlled spectators), especially at higher
levels where smoke is expected to accumulate. Note
that there will be enough CO2 from the test fire in the
smoke layer to be harmful to anyone breathing it. (Also
note that for one HST one of BRE’s observers had to
Design methodologies for SHEVS
order one of the building’s security staff to leave the
top floor against his will because he had been told by
the building owner to stand there and keep people
from entering that floor!).
9 There should be a preliminary HST with a smaller size
of fire to confirm that the actual smoke behaviour
safely meets the calculated HST parameters. (For one
HST the testers had to abandon the original full fire
size because in the preliminary test smoke was seen to
be unexpectedly intercepted by a ceiling having
sprinklers. The full original size of HST fire would have
triggered several dozen of the sprinkler heads.)
I.5 The subsequent analysis
1 Conclusions should not be based solely on visible
smoke density. This is a major mistake, see section I.4,
point 5 above.
2 Did the observed results match the predictions for the
HST?
(a) If yes, has the same method used to calculate the
HST been used to extrapolate to the full design
condition? In this case this can be done with
confidence.
(b) If no, has a location-specific correction been
derived and applied to the design scenario for that
same location? This is the best that can be done in
the circumstances.
3 Were there any other problems revealed by the test
which require separate modifications to the SHEVS or
to other aspects of the building? Examples in the past
have included:
– deflection of hanging smoke curtains,
– siphoning of smoke through HVAC/ACMV ducts
which lacked smoke dampers,
– build-up of smoke in ‘stagnant corners’ beneath the
smoke layer,
– build-up of smoke in supposedly protected spaces
due to unexpected leakage paths,
– smoke at roof level which has already left the
building through the smoke ventilators, re-entering
plant-room intakes which serve other parts of the
building, etc.
4 Does the extrapolated design scenario, calculated as in
point 2(a) or 2(b) above, and considering any
additional problems as in point 3 above, represent a
worsening of safety compared with the original design
criteria being tested?
5 If no, the SHEVS has passed the HST.
6 If yes, the SHEVS has failed the HST.
 123

Annex J: Case history–

smoke-control design in
‘D3 Espace Leopold Building’,
European Parliament, Brussels

Note: This design study was carried out using the

predecessor documents to the present book (ie two
BRE Reports [24,13]), but using methods which were
essentially similar to the present book.

The ‘D3 Espace Leopold Building’ of the European

Parliament in Brussels is highly innovative and for
architectural reasons required a performance-based
approach to fire-safety design. The building includes a
300 m long covered ‘light street’ or atrium, open to three
tall storeys of foyers on one side, leading to most of the
meeting rooms, and to six storeys of offices on the other.
The fire-safety engineered design described in this
Annex includes a SHEVS incorporating automatic smoke
curtains to isolate the foyer storey openings as part of the
provision to protect the means of escape, and to separate Plate J1 External appearance of European Parliament buildings,
adjacent smoke reservoirs. An extensive analysis of Brussels
possible fire scenarios led to specifications for
programming the Fire Safety Management system, and to
writing evacuation procedures and fire intervention plans Belgium also has very prescriptive codes and without a
for the building. Fire Safety Engineering approach the design of the new
At the request of the Brussels Fire Service, a hot smoke headquarters of the European Parliament would not have
test was conducted in the ‘light street’, using a 1 MW fire been possible.
in a specially constructed simulated shop compartment, The European Parliament buildings (Plate J1) in the
to confirm the proper functioning of the smoke-control heart of Brussels are today’s and tomorrow’s centres of
design. This test confirmed the appropriateness of the important decisions. One major decision, made 4 years
basic smoke ventilation design, but yielded important ago, is already in execution: the offices and meeting-
recommendations, especially for finalizing the room complex for Members of the European Parliament
installation of the smoke curtains. as well as for the administration (ie the D3 building) will
This case study will cover the following topics : be extensively equipped with active fire protection,
• Architect’s design including a flexible approach to compartmentation,
• Code requirements for fire safety in Belgium smoke detection, sprinklers where appropriate, and
• Achievement of fire safety level in accordance with the
architect’s view
smoke-control installations. The authors wish to make it
clear that the fire safety engineering design described
• Fire Brigade request: hot-smoke test to verify the
function of the smoke-control system and to check
herein was done by IFSET, with FRS only becoming
involved when a hot-smoke test was proposed.
whether secondary problems could occur.
J.2 A plan of the D3 complex
J.1 Introduction
The D3 complex is a building with different areas
In most of the countries around the world fire regulations interconnected with each other to create a maximum
are still very prescriptive and very little freedom for spatial effect. The building comprises the following areas.
design is given to architects to design special buildings ‘as
the codes do not allow it’.
12 4
0m 10m 20m 30m 40m 50m
Figure J1 The ‘light street’ covered with a glass roof
J.2.1 Underground levels
The building has five underground levels of which Levels
–5, –4 and –3 are used for car parking only. On average,
the levels have the following dimensions : length 273 m,
width 77 m and height 2.4 m.
Each level has a parking capacity of about 660 cars.
There are two entrances (North and South) open
between the different levels, connecting each level to
form a single open volume.
Parking Level –2 has the same overall dimensions
although that part of the building between axes A and D
(width = 25 m) is used for other purposes. The north side
is used for leisure activities, the south side for deliveries,
both incoming and outgoing, and includes space for
storage. The number of parking spaces is thus reduced to
360 cars.
Level –1 is not used as a parking area but has 20
delivery quays for unloading and loading goods
into/from large and small transport vehicles. There is a
large storage hall as well as a self-service restaurant.
J.2.2 The inner street (covered with a glass roof)
As can be seen in Figures J1 and J2, and in Plate J2, there is
a void between the 7-storey-high construction at the
front of the building and the 16-storey-high construction
at the rear. This void is covered with a glazed roof
forming a ‘light street’ so that the entire length (240 m)
can be considered as an atrium 6 storeys high, interrupted
by a central forum between axes N04 and S04.
At every second level, 3 walkways (bridges) cross the
light street from axis G to axis H.
Design methodologies for SHEVS
At ground-level 00 (FigureJ2), the covered street is a
meeting place and circulation zone. The adjacent offices
have social functions, and there are also a few shops
located at this level as well as the printing office and the
restaurant.
The Fire Safety Plan had to consider the following
offices and meeting rooms which are either adjacent to or
have escape routes open to the light street.
J.2.2.1. Conference block ‘Rue Wiertz’
Between axes A and G, a total of 39 conference rooms are
located on three levels: Level 01, Level 03 and Level 05.
Each conference room extends over two levels in height.
At the entrance to each large conference room (140 seats)
there is a lobby which is completely open to the covered
light street. Between S11 and S14 there are some smaller
offices which have glass towards the inner street
(FigureJ3).
J.2.2.2 Office block ‘Rue Mail’
Between grid lines H and L smaller offices are situated on
each level (from 01 to 06). Some 40 offices on each level
are adjacent to the covered light street and separated
from it by plain glass windows (grid line I) (FigureJ3).
J.2.3 The central region
The central region is mainly a circulation zone on
Levels 01–04. The library is situated on Levels 05 and 06
and was included in the study for active fire-protection
systems.
Figure J2 D3 Escape Leopold Building: plan of ground-level 00
Annex J: Case history

Figure J3 Espace Leopold Building: plan of Rue Wiertz conference block

125
126
Plate J2 D3 Espace Leopold Building: the ‘light street’
J.3 Fire risks and smoke control scenarios
J.3.1 The underground levels (Plate J3 )
The design fire for a covered car park was taken to be
12 m perimeter fire with a convective heat-release rate of
2500 kW (2.5 MW).
The ceiling area needs to be divided into smoke
reservoirs by means of automatic curtains to prevent
excessive cooling of smoke leading to smoke-logging of
the entire floor area.
The volume of smoky gases needing to be exhausted
from the underground zone was calculated as follows.
Mass flow
Mf = 0.188 x P x (Y) 3/2 = 5.68 kg/s
where:
P = 12 m perimeter,
Y = 1.85 m height of rise.
Smoke layer temperature
θ 1 = Qf /(cMf ) = 440°
where:
Qf = 2500 kW convective heat flux.
Plate J3 D3 space Leopold Building: car park
Design methodologies for SHEVS
Exhaust volume flow
Mf.T c /(1.22 T o) = 11.9 m 3/s (J.3)
where:
T o = 15 + 273 = 288 K,
T 1 = 440 +288 = 728K,
θ 1 = 440°, and
ambient temperature = 15 °C.
This exhaust rate is the same for all four underground
levels (Levels –5 to –2). There are no sprinkler
installations planned for the car park areas.
The entrances on the north or south side will provide
replacement air.
At Level –1 there is also a storage room for incoming
goods. As this part of the building can contain flammable
goods, there is an appropriate quick-response sprinkler
installation. It was agreed that it would be appropriate to
use the same fire size as before, and hence Eqns
(J.1)–(J.3) also apply here, with the same numerical
values as above.
As the smoke temperature will be affected by cooling
by the sprinklers, the volume rate is reduced to 6.8 m 3/s.
At Level –1, however, the exhaust rate will be
determined by the possibility of a fire in a truck at a
loading quay or of a fire in the stockroom or restaurant.
As there is a high potential for risk to life in the restaurant,
and to reduce the chance of a severe lorry fire, the
decision has been taken to install quick-response
sprinklers in both the restaurant and the delivery quay.
The following fire parameters have been adopted :
Restaurant
In the absence of any specific data for restaurant fires, it
was decided that adopting the BRE Report[24] design fire
(J.1) for retail areas would be appropriately pessimistic,
modified by the more recent advice from FRS that the
size can be halved when quick-response sprinklers are
used instead of standard-response sprinklers.
Area = 5 m 2 ,
Qf = 2.5 MW.
(J.2)
Stock-holding areas
In the absence of specific data for fires in the stock-
holding areas, it was decided to adopt the BRE Report[24]
3

design fire for standard-response-sprinklered retail areas.
Area = 9 m 2 (Note: this should not be used as a
universal precedent.),
Qf = 5MW.
Delivery quay
In the absence of specific data for sprinklered fires at
delivery quays, it was decided to adopt a design fire twice
as large as the corresponding retail fire advised by FRS
for retail areas equipped with quick-response sprinklers.
Area = 9 m 2
Qf =5MW
According to Eqns (J.1)–(J.3) and applying a height rise
of2 m in the restaurant and 3.2 m in the delivery quay, the
following smoke exhaust rates are predicted:
stock 6.8 m 3/s,
restaurant 4.8 m 3 /s,
delivery quay 13.2 m 3 /s.
J.3.2 Covered street
It was considered that the covered light street constituted
a large atrium. Consequently the smoke control design
drew on the guidelines and calculation procedures in a
BRE Report[13], which are similar to those in this book.
On the ground-floor (Level 00), the fire risk in the
street itself is negligible. However, the restaurant,
adjacent shops and printing room have a fire risk. As the
smoke will be exhausted from the atrium (the covered
light street), the mass flow and the air-flow rates must be
calculated for the worst case scenario on the ground floor.
This is the case for a fire in a shop with a shopfront of 7 m
wide facing the street.
Quick-response sprinklers will be installed to reduce
the design fire size and the amount of smoke produced.
The design fire parameters are thus:
P = 9 m perimeter of fire,
Q f = 2500 kW.
Annex J: Case history 127
With a further height rise of2.5 m after the smoke has left
the compartment (ie a further height rise of2.5 m above
the top of the shop’s opening into the atrium), a mass
flow of37 kg/s will enter the smoke layer with an average
temperature rise of 67 °C. (This was calculated following
the method in reference [13]. That is, using the BRE spill
plume entrainment procedure but without using the layer
depth correction for a large-area smoke reservoir which
has subsequently been shown to apply to atria such as
this, and which is recommended for this and similar
scenarios in section 6.3. The effect of this for this case
study is that the smoke exhaust volume could have been a
little smaller than was calculated, ie the design erred on
the side of safety.)
The total smoke extract volume is 38 m3/s (Figure J4).
J.3.2.1 Conference block ‘Rue Wiertz’
As this side is fully open to the light street, the potential
danger exists that all smoke entering the atrium will
entrain large quantities of air so that a large amount of
cold smoke will fill the atrium. Therefore, the smoke
should not enter the atrium and must be exhausted
directly from the foyer without significant spillage into
the atrium.
As the fire risk is low, it was decided that an
unsprinklered fire of 9 m2 and 1 MW could be taken as
design fire parameters for use with Eqns (J.l)–(J.3). This
predicted a mass flow of 11.8 kg/s (equivalent to 13 m 3/s)
to be exhausted separately from the foyers’
compartments on each appropriate level (Figure J5).
J.3.2.2 Offices ‘Rue Mail’
At the other side of the atrium (covered street) the
situation is different. Here, there are unsprinklered, small
offices on six levels, which are not open to the atrium but
are only separated with a window. The smoke is allowed
to flow from the fire-level into the atrium (after the fire
has broken the window). The design used the principle of
temperature-control, where enough entrainment is

SMOKE CURTAINS AT 7
DOUBLE POSITION

5
SMOKE CURTAINS
4 POSITIONED AT
THE BRIDGES

3
= 67°C
Mf = 37 kg/s
3
V = 38 m / h 2
= 136.800 m/h MAIL
1
Y = 2.5 m

A C = 12.6 m 2
i v

Figure J4 SHEVS design: smoke in light street from a shop fire

128 Design methodologies for SHEVS

MAIL

Figure J5 SHEVS design: smoke in conference block foyer

allowed to reduce the average layer temperature in the
atrium to a value that will not break any glazing exposed
to the layer. This corresponded to a height of rise of 1.9 m
above the fire-room’s window to cool the smoke to 80 °C.
The calculation procedures were essentially similar to
those for a shop fire in the ‘covered street’, but with a
design fire more appropriate to the office scenario. The
design solutions were similar but less onerous, and are
not detailed further herein.
J.3.3 Central region
In this area, the fire risk is very low because there are no
shops or offices. Therefore, this location is not
sprinklered. One should note however that, similarly to
the forums near the conference rooms, a spillage of
smoke into the atrium from lower storeys could cause
high risks for the people at higher levels. The worst-case
fire scenario is when a fire starts beside one of the voids
because smoke will rise through the voids to a higher
level while cooling large amounts of surrounding air by
entrainment.
It was decided that an appropriate design fire for this
region would be:
Area = 1 m 2 ,
Qf = 500 kW, with smoke allowed to spill into the
void past a length of spill edge of 5 m.
In this case, once again following the calculation
procedures in reference [13], the smoke volume entering
the void will be 4.6 kg/s.
After entering the void, a further height of rise of 2.5 m
is calculated to allow people on the higher levels to
evacuate. The resulting mass flow of smoke entering the
smoke reservoir is 24 kg/s while the temperature rise is
50 °C at this point. Hence the volume rate = 22 m3/s
according to Eqn (J.3).
J.3.4 Summary of smoke-control scenarios
See Table J1.
J.4 Practical solutions and installation
The following aspects had to be taken into consideration
when designing interactive fire-protection systems.
• Smoke compartments (automatic smoke curtains)
• Automatic smoke detection systems
• Sprinklers (normal or quick-response) where needed
• Reliable smoke exhaust fans.

Table J1 Summary of smoke-control scenarios

Smoke Temperature
Zone Level Sprinklers? exhaust Volume rise
(m 3/s) (°C)

Car park –2 to -5 No Compartment 11.9 450

Storage –2 Yes Compartment 6.8 70
Restaurant –1 Yes (FRS)* Compartment 4.8 70
Delivery quay –1 Yes (FRS)* Compartment 13.2 70
Ground-level 00 Yes (FRS)* Covered street 38 67
Rue Wiertz 01–06 No Compartment 13 92
Central part No Void 22 50
Offices 07–16 No No — —
* Quick-response sprinklers

J.4.1 Smoke and fire compartments
J.4.1.1 Fixed fire compartment
According to Belgian Standards, the building is divided
into separate fire compartments. A fire-resistance rating
(Rf) is defined in terms of exposure to the test furnace
heating curve.
This means:
• the complex is compartmented horizontally, at every
level (Rf = 4 h),
• rooms or places having voids over 1 or more levels
need to be compartmented from the other places on
that level,
• technical rooms (eg plant rooms) are compartmented
(Rf = 2 h),
• staircases and elevators are compartmented (Rf = 1 h),
• sprinklered and non-sprinklered rooms are
compartmented one from the other (Rf = 1 h).
J.4.1.2 Flexible smoke compartmentation
To prevent the smoke diluting too much and becoming
too cool (with the effect of losing the desired layering),
automatic smoke curtains are specified in the
underground levels, the covered street and around the
voids in the central region.
The smoke curtains in the underground car parks will
lower 1 m to contain the smoke to a limited area.
The smoke curtains at the entrances have two
positions:
• if the fire occurs at the same level (this will be indicated
by the addressable smoke-detection installation) the
screen will lower for 1 m to allow replacement air to
enter,
• if the smoke tends to rise through the entrances to a
higher level, the screens can be lowered further in
order to prevent the smoke from leaving the
compartment.
J.4.1.2.1 Covered street
In the atrium three types of movable smoke curtains are
installed.
• Screens have been installed along the balconies
between the covered street and the forums in front of
the three large conference rooms. These curtains can
be lowered to two positions.
– If there is a fire on the same level the curtains will
lower to half position. The smoke will be kept in the
compartment and replacement air can enter the
compartment (see Figure J5)
– If there is a fire in the offices or shops at the
opposite side of the street the curtains will lower to
the base of the openings to the forums to close
those openings and prevent smoke propagation
towards the forums (see Figure J4).
• Curtains have been hung under the bridges across the
covered street. These screens will always lower
through the total height between the underside of the
higher bridge to the walkway of the lower bridge
directly beneath, to provide a boundary to the smoke
compartment (smoke reservoir) in the street.
Annex J: Case history 129
• Curtains have been installed which will close off the
openings between the bridges and the corresponding
levels to prevent the smoke moving from one side of
the covered street to the other.
A total length of about 1.5 km of movable smoke curtains
has been installed in the D3 building.
J.4.1.2.2 Central region
In the central area there are two types of movable smoke
curtains:
• curtains that lower for 1 m and which form the smoke
compartment, not allowing the smoke to enter the
lobbies adjacent to the conference rooms,
• curtains at Level 03 around the void to prevent smoke
from Levels 02 or 01 passing through the void and
entering Level 03.
J.4.1.2.3 Certified quality
The movable smoke curtains are tested to British
Standard BS 7346: Part 3 [103] which indicates a heat-proof
fabric that can survive a smoky gas temperature of 600 °C
for half an hour.
J.4.2 Automatic smoke detection
The whole complex is equipped with an appropriate
smoke-detection system. These smoke detectors are
addressable so that the fire location can be identified as
quickly as possible. The control panel must perform the
following automatic actions:
• close fire doors,
• open escape doors,
• lower smoke curtains to their appropriate design
height,
• activate the emergency power supply,
• start the smoke exhaust fans,
• open the air inlets for replacement air,
• bring the lifts to evacuation level,
• stop the normal ventilation installations,
• activate the alarm signals.
J.4.3 Sprinklers
As already mentioned in the description of the fire risks,
sprinklers are only installed in places where there is a risk
of fast-growing fires.
Quick-response sprinklers are a ‘new generation’-type
of sprinkler with a low response time index (RTI) value.
They are used in restaurants and on delivery quays for the
trucks at Level –1.
J.4.4 Smoke exhaust fans
As indicated in the fire scenarios all smoke exhaust
installations are powered. Natural exhaust with smoke
vents was not applicable because of the strong probability
of adverse wind effects around such a tall and complex
building.
The fans, as well as the ductwork, must withstand the
anticipated design temperatures (see Table J1).
130 Design methodologies for SHEVS
The fans are tested following British Standard BS 7643:
Part 2.
It is obvious that fans must operate without
interruption in an emergency situation. Therefore, fire-
resisting cabling is used at all times.

J.5 Hot-smoke test

J.5.1 Introduction
In view of the novel features, and the limited full-scale
validation of calculation procedures for adhered spill
plumes in atria, the Brussels Fire Service required a full
scale hot-smoke test in the building in order to confirm
both the design and the operation of the smoke-control
system. This requirement was part of the conditions to
obtain the building permit. The test was scheduled for a
date as near to completion of the building as was
compatible with the construction schedule. Temporary
sheeting was used extensively to close off openings,
which were due to be closed more permanently before
completion.
In March 1996 IFSET and FRS collaborated for the
second time to carry out a hot-smoke test in a building
(the first test being Brussels Airport Terminal). The test
scenario agreed with the Fire Service was a fire in a
typical shop opening out into the atrium. Two test fires Figure J6 Schematic arrangement of hot-smoke test
were carried out, a preliminary one with a 0.5 MW fire
and the main test with a 1 MW fire in conjunction with
theoretical calculations to extrapolate the experimental
results to the full design scenario.
A full report was presented to the client and to the Fire
Service describing the test giving the results and
conclusions.

J.5.2 Description of the test

The test followed the procedure developed by FRS.
Industrial methylated spirits were burned in trays, which
in turn were floated on water. A lightweight fire-resisting
fire compartment was built to simulate the shop
geometry and to protect the actual structure of the
building. This protection was carried up the facade of the
atrium high enough to ensure protection of the structure
and glazing directly above the opening to the fire
compartment (Figure J6 and Plate J4).
The test fire was chosen to be large enough to allow
confident scaling of the results to the full design scenario,
but not so large as to cause any damage to the building. A
preliminary test fire of half the calculated size was used
first in order to confirm the validity of the design of the
main test, and to confirm that there were no unexpected
departures from the design assumptions.
Temperature measurements were made in the smoke
layer formed in the atrium, as well as in the fire
compartment. In addition, observations were made of the
layer depth in the atrium as well as of the build-up of
smoke in the forums due to leakage past the smoke
curtains. The hot gases were made visible using a Plate J4 Hot-smoke test: fire in simulated shop
synthetic oil-mist smoke from commercial theatrical-
type smoke generators. Additionally, observations were

made by ‘roving observers’ looking for any unexpected
phenomena, such as the appearance of smoke in other
parts of the building due to leakage or siphoning through
ventilation ducts.
Safety protocols were agreed with the Fire Service, and
were applied very strictly.
Calculations of the entrainment in the atrium were
made following the procedures set out in this book,
including the ‘effective layer depth’ procedure.
Calculation procedures for extrapolating the observed
build-up of smoke in the forums, and for deducing
implications for modifications to ensure the desired
performance in the completed building, were deduced
from first principles. Reductions in smoke curtain gap
widths were proposed.
J.5.3 Summary of conclusions from the test
• The test was successfully carried out without damage
to the building. Fires of approximately 0.5 and 1.0 MW
were burnt in a simulated shop unit.
• The powered SHEVS maintained a smoke layer base
in the atrium reservoir with a base at 15.5 ± 0.5 m
above ground-floor level. The predicted result agreed
within experimental observational uncertainty. By
extrapolation from the test results, the SHEVS is
expected to maintain the layer base unit at 10.4 m
above ground-floor level, from a 2.5 MW,
2.2 m × 2.2 m quick-response-sprinklered fire in a
shop.
• There should be a series of functional tests carried out
on the smoke curtain system when the building is in its
final state and when the permanent smoke curtain
system is in place. These functional tests should
confirm that all gaps are as small as possible and not
larger (preferably smaller) than those proposed in the
calculations (not included in the present summary). If
larger gaps remain when the building is completed it
would be necessary to recalculate the smoke filling
times for the foyers and bridges. These functional tests
should also test the operation of the automatic
detection system and should confirm that all the
smoke curtains operate automatically on detection.
• For the main test the curtain on Bridge 2, Level 05
deflected 0.10 m.
For the design condition the curtain on Bridge 2,
Level 05 was calculated to deflect approximately
0.38 m. The length of the fabric in the curtain should be
enough for the bottom bar to rest on the walkway even
when deflected. (Note that the installers had needed to
modify these curtains prior to the test to allow for the
relatively large buoyant pressures expected in this
design).
• In the test smoke travelled through unforeseen leakage
paths. All openings that are likely to be in the smoke
layer should be identified and remedied. For example,
builders’ work ducts to be closed, door gaps to be
sealed, gaps around windows to be sealed.
• In the test smoke entered other reservoirs through
edge gaps around the under-bridge smoke curtains, but
Annex J: Case history 131
was well layered. It is desirable that fans should be
operated in adjacent reservoirs simultaneously to the
one containing the fire to remove this smoke, if the
provision for inlet air and for electrical power allows.
• Smoke entered the foyer on Level 05 mainly through
gaps between the smoke curtains and reached
dangerous conditions after approximately 6 minutes
from ignition in the main test. This would have been
perhaps 3 minutes from ignition for the design
conditions with real smoke and an ultra-fast growing
fire. Reducing the smoke curtain gaps could increase
the time available for escape. Also, it was
recommended that early automatic detection and a
voice alarm system be provided in these areas and a
similar system in adjacent areas to warn people not to
escape through the foyer.
Consideration could be given to studying the
possibility of using a powered dilution system in the
foyers to extend the time available for evacuation.
• Consideration should be given to providing early
automatic detection in the shop and office units to
trigger both the smoke exhaust and alerting systems.
• The windows in the offices opening onto the atrium
should be kept closed at all times.
J.6 Fire safety management
As the building is an open construction relying very much
on the use of active fire protection installations, fire
scenarios have been written for the approximate total of
400 compartments in the building.
These fire scenarios identify all the automatisms (ie the
automatically initiated electronic, electrical and/or
mechanical operations) of each technical installation
which will play a role in case of fire. All the possible
interactions have been defined such that everything
could be programmed onto the central management
system for the building. It is intended that this will greatly
simplify the degree of control of the building’s systems
required of the Fire Service.
In addition to defining the fire scenarios and the
consequent automatisms, it is intended to define and
prepare evacuation procedures and plans, and Fire
Service intervention plans in similar detail so that all the
actions, both automatic and by human agencies, required
during a fire emergency will be taken in a fully integrated
manner.
It is not enough to design systems into a building to
ensure fire safety. It is important that those systems must
still be working, perhaps years later, when a fire actually
occurs. For this reason, it is important that the building’s
management should be able to maintain the systems and
to train key staff in their operation. It is also of
considerable practical importance that these fire safety
management activities should not involve too much
inconvenience to the normal use of the building.
In this building, the fire safety management procedures
must be able to monitor and maintain four types of active
fire-protective systems. As the control panels of the
132 Design methodologies for SHEVS

smoke curtains, fire detection, sprinkler installation and

J.7 Conclusions
smoke-control installation are centralized in one control
room, their status and interactions can be checked easily.
It is also easy to generate fire simulations or scenarios,
• Aswiththethearchitecture of the building could not comply
prescriptive regulations in Belgium, a Fire
which facilitates easy and frequent fire training for the Safety Engineered approach has been applied leading
security staff who usually man the Control Room. to an integrated approach to the application of fire
safety measures.
• The Fire Service Department have approved the active
fire protection and fire safety management procedures,
which have been developed for this complex.
CI/SfB (68.5) About this book
1999 This book summarizes the advice available from the
Fire Research Station, to designers of Smoke and
Heat Exhaust Ventilation Systems (SHEVS) for atria
and other buildings. Its purpose is to provide
practical guidance on the design of smoke-control
systems. It reflects current knowledge and is based
on the results of research where available, including
as yet unpublished results of experiments. In
addition, it draws on the authors' cumulative
experience of design features required for regulatory
purposes in many individual smoke-control
applications. Many of these design features have
evolved over several years by consensus between
regulatory authorities, developers and fire scientists.

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