Antagonism All the Way Down: Kant, Intersectionality and the Antinomic Absolute

One of Kant’s formulations of the categorical imperative is known as the ‘formula of humanity.’ It
has often been pointed out, however, that when Kant writes ‘Humanity’ or ‘Human Being’ he really
only refers to white men, and not to women, people of color or non-Europeans.

This stark opposition gives rise to the question……. how to deal with Kant’s philosophy from an
intersectional perspective.

There are several options. The First option is, of course, to go down the rout of Normativity Theory.
In this case, we read Kant primarily as a philosopher of the rational subject. For Kant, human beings
are rational subjects who, with their help of their reason, think up concepts and rules that have
universal validity, which it applies to particular cases. The limit of the normativity theory approach is
that it turns the question of universality in Kant, …………. into an analysis of the universal concepts he
came up with – like the moral law. This approach therefore tends to become a bit abstract.

I think it’s better to first look at a concrete case. A case of intersectionality in practice, so to speak.
First I analyse the case, then I examine how, …. and in what sense it illuminates Kant’s thinking
about universality.

In 2015, a group of about 50 students of the university of Amsterdam organised a demonstration

against the proposed budget cuts at that time. The students named themselves the ‘Academic
Community,’ which they defined as ‘all students and teachers of the university of Amsterdam.’
During the occupation, however, a new group appeared on the stage: the University of Colour. The
university of Colour reproached the students of the Academic Community with the following: you
call yourselves the academic community, but do not represent our interest; for us decolonisation is
much more important, and should have priority over stopping incidental budget cuts. To which, after
having a meeting, the representatives of the Academic Community said: that’s great, we have an
inclusive mindset, we value difference, we are in principle open to all students, so you can of course
join the group, and, in any case, you were always already part of the academic community. And so
the representatives of the Academic Community wanted to include the University of Colour into the
Academic Community, so that the University of Color could join the meetings and debate on equal
terms, even though they were always already part of it. The University of Color Refused.

The point on which I focus is this: had the inclusion worked, from that moment onward, the
‘Academic Community’, which comprises, according to itself …….. all students and teachers, was
made up of two particular subgroups. The name of the first subgroup still was ‘the academic
community’ and the name of the second ‘the university of colour.’

We could apply Sarah Amhed’s formula: universal = white men, here: in this case, the formula
would be the following: ‘the academic community’ = white male students, which was the de facto
situation.

This is the topic of my paper: how come that in some situations, the universality in question – the
academic community, in this case – encounters itself as one of the particulars that make it up?

Now to quickly show that thiss is a structure that we find everywhery in our culture, and to bring
closer to intuition what I have in mind, I I give a few eamples. The members of Stan Lee’s super hero
group the fantastic four are, 1) an invisible women called ‘the invisible women’ 2) a man who can set
his body on fire, called ‘the human torch,’ 3) a rock-like thing of a man, called ‘the thing’ and then 4)
there is a man the can stretch his limbs very far, an his name ‘Mr. Fantastic’. The members of the X-
men are Ice man, who is a man made of ice, Angel, a man who looks like an angel, Wolverine, a wolf-
like man, Etc. but there this is one character who goes by the name of Professor X, and who is
deemed to be the leader of the group. The Smurfs are a group, and their members are: Clumsy
smurf, Brainy smurf, Greedy smurf, Grouchy smurf, Jokey smurf. Etc. there are all kind of different
smurfs…… and then there is Papa Smurf, or Big Smurf, as we call him in the Netherlands. and he is
called papa not because his particular trait is that he is a father of a little family of smurfs, no he is
the papa of all smurfs.

In all thse cases, it is clear that all ordinarily included elements are determined according to their
particular properties (this is also the case with the University of Color as part of the Academic
Community, it is determined in terms of color). But in each case there is also one element that, on
the contrary, is not determined, specified. This element does not get a specific determination,
precisely because it is directly named after the universal.

This is the topic of my paper: why should this be so? Why is there in each case of universality, one
element that, although it belongs to the universal as a part, is not specified according to its particular
characteristics, but rather refers back to the universality?

Kant

If we look at Kant’s philosophy with this question in mind, ….. we find something very interesting.

Kant begins the first critique by lamenting that, though mathematics and natural science have made
good progress precisely by becoming scientific, metaphysics has not progressed at all, and is still full
of contradictions. For Kant, Metaphysics is the science of the totality of all things, the world qua
world. It employs concepts such as substance, cause, unity and totality, and these concepts are
supposed to apply to absolutely all objects of the world. It is the domain of pure, as opposed to
mathetmatical or empirical reason. Traditionally, this totality of all things it is the very subject of
philosophy as such. Kant’s main question in the first critique therefore is: Can metaphysics be a
science?

Kant takes his cue from mathemetics and natural science. Take the case of mathmatics. Its
judgments are universal and necessary; the sum 7 + 5 = 12: is universally and necessarily true.
Mathematics doesn’t run into problems, however, because its judgments are not about the totality
of all things. Natural science also goes its merry way. Its judgments are universal and necessary:
newtow’s law f = m * a………. has at least the pretension that its universally and necessarily true.
However, the defining feature of Natural science is that it test such judgments empirically.. It’s
judgments are empirical: they apply ‘so far’ ----- and so are not universally true in a strict sense.

But Kant’s sees that in the case of metaphysics, precisely because its concepts must apply to
absolutely all objects of the world, runs into flat out contradictions, or antinomies as he calls them.

What is Kant’s solution? How does Kant try to save metaphysics from running into contradiction? He
adds a condition: Kant’s says: yes, the only way our metaphysical concepts such as unity and
plurality, cause, substance, DO apply to absolutely all objects,….. is on the condition that these
objects are essentially spatial temporal representations, and not things in themselves.

This means that, for Kant, deploying metaphysical concepts, we do not start with the absolute
whole, rather it starts locally, that is from a certain finite perspective, from this or that subject’s
limited perspective. Nonetheless, we do NOT deploy them in the same sense as, empirical concepts,
concepts that hold good so long as we can verify them empirically. We really deploy the
metaphysical concepts to all local objects. And so metaphysical concepts as unity, plurality and
totality, substance and cause, are valid, but only locally, as the condition of objecthood of every
object. So when I say that’s a cat, I also say that it’s a proper object, and if its an object, it is a unity
of a plurality, i.e., a totality, it is a substance, it has a cause. If it wasn’t a unity, it wasn’t an object,
and in that case, it also wasn’t a cat.

This way, Kant puts reason is put at ease, and solves its contradiction when it turns to metaphysics:
metaphysics is possible, it seems.

So now: very important:

For Pure Reason rears its ugly head once more, and it is about to produce a blatant contradiction
again. To simplify a bit: one aspect of Reason, for Kant, is that it performs a restless reiteration of
some kind of operation on some kind of object. In this case, reason picks the function or operator
‘totality.’ A totality for Kant is simply a unity of a plurality.

For Kant, the concept of ‘Totality’ applies to all local objects of experience, insofar they are objects.
Think for example about the cat again. It’s an object, and the metaphysical concepts apply to it.
Think now of two cats. It’s a new object: a pair of cats. Think now of all cats of the uk. It’s an object:
it is also a unity of a plurality of cats that reside in the uk. Now we can think of the UK. The uk is an
object, it’s a unity that contains all objects that belong to the uk. But the UK is in turn an object part
of the object called the Earth, and the Earth is an object part of an object called the milky way, and
so on.

What Reason does, is that it simply applies this operator again and again to the generated new
objects, and then jumps straight ahead toward the end of the series, and completes it. It directly
envisions the totality of all objects, the “object of all objects,” the world qua world.” The question
now is: can you think of the object of all objects, which contain absolutely everything? The point is
that you can: the totality of all objects is precisely what we normally call ‘the world’ or ‘the universe.’

The problem, however, is that this generates a new object. And if it is an object, it should be part of
the totality as well. So should we add the new object to itself? We can do this, but it would generate
a new object. This new object, which now includes the newly generated object as its part, should
also be part of the whole again, and so on and so on ad infinite.

This process cannot stop, it seems. The problem is precisely this: the whole cannot be also one of its
proper parts.

So how to solve this problem? Kant’s solves it with his notion of the ‘the transcendental idea.’

With Kant we can thus answer the question I started out with: Why does the whole – the academic
community, whose parts are the academic community and the university of color - also appears as
one of its proper parts?

Kant’s solution in the domain metaphysics is the following.

What if we could add the entire object – the totality of all objects, the thing we call ‘the world’ –
nonetheless to itself, as if it is just one among the elements part of the world? In that case the
totality would be part of itself, but on the strict condition that you cannot determine its specificity at
all. This is why Kant says that the categories, the concept that condition proper objecthood, in other
words, are not allowed to apply to the thing in itself, the whole of all wholes. You can think it: that is
why it is called an idea of the world – it has a regulative, normative status. But for Kant, It’s strictly
forbidden to determine it.

What happens if you nonetheless determine it? Well then the totality falls apart.

This leads us back to intersectionality. Both the ‘transcendental idea of the world’ and ‘the academic
community’ is what intersectional theory proponent Gloria Wekker, in her book White Innocence,
calls an ‘unmarked category’:

A characteristic of unmarked categories is that they do not have to name themselves; the
power position they represent speaks for itself. That is the reason why ‘human’ really refers
to white male’ and why “women” really refers to white women; when other women appear,
the latter are specifically mentioned (Wekker).

Wekker simply to point out this contradiction, that the whole cannot also contain itself as one of its
elements. How? Precisley By determining the unmarked category, nonetheless.

This is what Ahmed’s formula does. It simply states: ‘Universal [EQUALS] white men.”

Liberals do not like this, and for good reason. For this pointing out of the contradiction, threatens
the peaceful unity of the totality. This is what they mean when they fear: “polarisation.”

To conclude…. I sum the three conceptions of difference I have worked with

1. First there is specific difference, the difference between the elements that are part of a
whole, for example in the case of the superhero groups.
2. Second there is antagonistic difference, the difference between elements that have nothing
in common, for example, when the University of Color refused to be included into the
Academic Community.
3. Third there is yet another kind of difference, perhaps we should call it a pure difference, or
an internal difference: that is the difference inscribed into the element of a set, that is both
and at the same time, on the one hand, a mere element among others, and on the other,
the mark of the whole itself.
After naming the group, Reid quickly turns to the urgent matter at hand (stopping Dr Doom
destroying the world). But the others interrupt him: “It’s not fair!,” Johnny protests. Reid, perplexed,
asks the team to speak up. He doesn’t get what all the fuss is about. Ben explains: “Now Reid, just
hear me out… We’re the Fantastic Four, you’re Mr. Fantastic… The Fantastic Four comprises of the
Thing, the Invisible Girl, the Human Torch… and Mr. Fantastic… doesn’t that seem a little odd to
you?” Reid replies indignantly: “what is odd about that? Just because my name is Mr. Fantastic and
the Group’s called the Fantastic Four, that’s your problem?” Ben: “well in a nutshell, yes…” Reid: “It’s
a coincidence! Johnny: “a coincidence you created!"

In the meantime, Sue, Ben and Johnny have suggested several alternatives (Mr Stretch-Guy, El-
Stretcho, Mr. Stretchy Arms). Mr. Fantastic however, in an increasingly weary, despondent tone,
stresses again that the naming procedure isn’t unfair and that he will stick to his name, implying that
these ‘semantic quibbles’ are a waste of time. He again urges the group to start fighting the real
problem: Dr Doom. And in fact, he adds, it is not even possible to change the names, since they have
already been published in the newspapers (i.e., it’s already official).

When Sue, Ben and Johnny still protest, Reid finally snaps, yelling aggressively: “Well okay then, I’m
changing my name, I won’t be called Mr Fantastic anymore. You know what, you can call me Mr
Assface! You like that?! And I will call all the press and tell them to change all the names from Mr
Fantastic to Mr Assface and the press will have a FIELD DAY with that!!” At this point, Johnny finally
caves in: “all right if it is that important, you can call yourself Mr Fantastic.” Reid then asks the
others again (to seal the deal) “Okay so I am Mr Fantastic?!” to which the other reply defeated “Yes,
yes…” At the last moment, when the issue finally seems settled, Ben asks Reid in an ironic tone:
“Okay, what should we now do Mr. “Fantástic”?