Israel's New Challenges of counter-terrorism in Gaza

Dr. Avner Barnea is a research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University
of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior official in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the
author of "We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business
Intelligence" (Lexington Books, 2021).
Note: This article was published in YNET, the most popular news website in Israel on 8
November, in Hebrew. https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/yokra13669409
Two days before the outbreak of the Second Gulf War in 2003, a diplomat from the US Embassy
in Tel Aviv contacted a professor from the Hebrew University specializing in the Palestinian
issue and asked to meet with him as soon as possible. At the beginning of the meeting, the
diplomat stated that he was asked to study the Israeli experience of how to deal with the
terrorism expected after the occupation of Iraq. At the end of the meeting, the professor said to
the diplomat he wondered why the Americans only now remembered to ask about this matter.
It is known that the American army that occupied Iraq was not prepared for intelligence
capabilities towards counter-terrorism, which became critical as time passed. The responsibility
was in the hands of the army's intelligence, which lacked counter-terrorism experience, and
personnel specializing in the Islam issue and had to make extensive use of local interpreters
which was very problematic. This is what happened to the Americans in Afghanistan as well.
This was also the case throughout the years of the Vietnam War when the responsibility for
intelligence was mainly in the hands of the military who operated with the assistance of local
interpreters.
In Israel, the situation is completely different. Immediately after the end of the Six-Day War,
Prime Minister Eshkol, on the advice of Defense Minister Dayan, decided to place the
responsibility for countering terrorism in the territories on the ISA (Israel Security Agency
known as Shabak) thanks to the experience it had gained in dealing with Israeli Arabs. This has
been the case ever since the ISA operates in areas that are under military rule in full coordination
with the Israel Defense Forces. The successful experience led to the fact that even at the outbreak
of the Lebanon war in 1982, Prime Minister Sharon decided to place the responsibility for
countering terrorism in Lebanon on the ISA. There, as in the territories, the ISA worked in close
coordination with the IDF. The success in Lebanon was partial, and the ISA had great difficulty
penetrating the ranks of Hezbollah and thwarting attacks against IDF forces.
Assuming that the IDF is expected to remain in Gaza in one form or another for about a year or
even longer, clearly, the ISA will handle the issue of counter-terrorism in Gaza in any
international constellation of one kind or another that will manage Gaza the day after, probably
in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority. Even if we succeed in collapsing Hamas, which I
am skeptical about, it is possible that the day after a "new Hamas" arises in light of the desire to
avenge the many losses in addition to the fanatic religious ideology.
After the disengagement and Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, the ISA adapted its
Modus Operandi when it was outside the territory. This situation made it complicated to execute
intelligence activity, and perhaps this should be seen as one of the reasons for not giving a
warning about the Hamas attack on October 7.
The ISA has been active in the Gaza Strip since the Six-Day War in 1967 and since gained
broad experience in counter-terrorism in Gaza. The situation of entering again Gaza is not
similar to the one when the ISA entered Lebanon in 1982, which was a completely new territory
for it, and it had no familiarity with what happened there. The study period was long and partly
painful. A few months after entering Lebanon, in November 1982, while the ISA was in the
process of organizing, a serious attack took on the IDF and ISA headquarters building in Tyre
that was blown up by Imad Mornia, who led the activities of the newly formed Hezbollah against
Israel. The headquarters of US Marine forces operating in Lebanon was also the target of a
severe attack by Hezbollah in which approximately 300 of them were killed.
It is very difficult to estimate what will happen in the strip in the future.
In the "day after" the ISA expected to have two main objectives: thwarting attacks on the IDF
forces that will be deployed throughout Gaza or later when they enter to carry out targeted tasks
according to the model Zone B model of Judea and Samaria. It can be expected that over time
elements of "New Hamas" which will emerge will emerge in the Strip and/or others as happened
in Lebanon. At the same time, the ISA will work to locate Hamas members who will remain in
the area. The ISA is expected to quickly use up the significant advantage of returning to Gaza
with experienced field personnel, renewing contact with former agents, and using other
intelligence capabilities. The ISA did indeed have a very difficult time formulating a broad
picture as happened in the absence of warning before the "Black Sabbath" (The Hamas attack on
October, 7th) but upon his return to Gaza, its advantage will be manifested in countering
terrorism.
Assuming that the Palestinian Authority will be a major factor in Gaza the day after, and since
both sides have a common enemy - Hamas, cooperation between its security forces and the ISA
is expected as a significant force multiplier as has been successfully operating for many years in
the Judea and Samaria. To this will be added the contribution of the US in helping to build the
capabilities of the Palestinian Authority security forces in Gaza as it exists in Judea and Samaria.
It can be estimated that the great destruction in Gaza and the high number of casualties, dead and
wounded, will make it difficult for the ISA since not a few of the residents of Gaza will have the
motivation to take revenge, therefore, the ISA is expected to deal with a large and hostile
population from the first moment of its entry and also during its establishment in Gaza. This will
oblige the ISA to be extra careful for fear of attempts to harm its personnel and facilities, as well
as difficulties in recruiting agents.