UPSA LAW SCHOOL

FIRST SEMESTER, 2023-2024 ACADEMIC YEAR

BLAW 403: JURISPRUDENCE I
READING ASSIGNMENT

READING ASSIGNMENT 1: Read and summarize Freeman MDA 840 - 868

START DATE: October 31
END DATE: November 6

FULL NAME: PHILOMENA APPAW

INDEX NO:10282621

CLASS: Evening
TUTORIAL GROUP: Justice Tally Team

LECTURER: Dr. Rowland Atta-Kesson

SUBMISSION DATE: October 3, 2023

HONOR STATEMENT:
By signing below, I confirm that I have personally read and summarized this reading in not more than
3 pages as instructed, and that I did not use any artificial intelligence software.

SIGN:………………………………………
O. W. HOLMES- The Path of the Law

The question of what defines the law has varying answers. Some suggest it's based on reason and
ethics, potentially differing from court decisions. However, a practical perspective, represented by
the "bad man," prioritizes knowing what Massachusetts or English courts will actually do. This
pragmatic approach, focused on predicting court actions rather than abstract principles, is what the
author considers as the essence of the law.

J. FRANK - Law and the Modern Mind

In this passage, the author discusses two groups of legal scholars known as "constructive skeptics"
who question conventional legal theories and aim to reform legal practices. The first group, called
"rule skeptics," seeks greater legal certainty by identifying "real rules" that describe actual judicial
behaviour, particularly in upper-court decisions. They focus on predicting appeals court rulings but
ignore the trial courts.

The second group, known as "fact skeptics," goes further in their skepticism of legal certainty. They
believe that due to the unpredictability of facts in most lawsuits, it is impossible to predict future
decisions accurately, especially in trial courts. They emphasize the pursuit of judicial justice rather
than legal certainty.

The author aligns with the fact skeptics and emphasizes the challenges in predicting trial court
decisions due to the complexities of fact-uncertainty and the intertwining of facts and rules in judicial
decision-making. The author also critiques the overreliance on precedents, as they may not always
apply in cases with disputed facts. This passage underscores the importance of considering trial
courts and the limitations of precedent systems in understanding legal uncertainty and judicial
decision-making.

K. LLEWELLYN - Some Realism About Realism

The passage introduces a group of legal scholars known as "realists" who share common ideas and
approaches regarding the study of law. They believe that law is constantly changing and influenced
by judicial decisions. They view law as a means to achieve societal goals and emphasize the need to
examine its purpose and effects regularly. Realists separate value judgments from objective
observations during their study of law.

These scholars also distrust traditional legal rules and question their influence on court decisions.
They categorize cases and legal situations more narrowly, seeking correlations between facts and
outcomes to understand why courts make specific decisions. They insist on evaluating legal rules
based on their effects and adopt a sustained approach to address legal problems.
Overall, realists seek to improve the accuracy of predicting court decisions and challenge the idea
that traditional legal rules are the sole basis for such predictions. They approach legal study with a
critical and analytical mindset.

K. LLEWELLYN- My Philosophy of Law

The passage explores the multifaceted nature of law, emphasizing that it extends beyond mere rules.
It describes law as a complex institution that fulfills various roles within society. The passage suggests
that jurisprudence should focus on understanding how the legal system operates as a whole, its
impact on society, and its relationship with individuals, crafts, and rules. It argues that by studying
the functioning of the legal institution, including its various components, such as different legal
professions, one can improve legal rules and decision-making. The passage also indicates that a
proper understanding of legal crafts can help comprehend the intricacies of legal rules. It emphasizes
the importance of sociology in studying law to create effective legal techniques that align with
societal needs and values.

K. LLEWELLYN - The Common Law Tradition

The passage discusses the "Grand Style of the Common Law," a specific approach to legal thinking
and decision-making in appellate courts. This style involves considering precedents but subjecting
them to three types of reasoning: reputation of the judge, legal principles, and policy consequences.
The Grand Style emphasizes constant re-examination and renovation of legal doctrine while
maintaining a connection with the past. It is characterized by simplicity in verbal expression and
clarity in legal reasoning.

Reckonability of Result - Theory of Rules

The passage discusses the accessibility of the methods and approaches for reading legal opinions to
ordinary lawyers. It suggests that these methods are understandable and do not require specialized
training or unusual talents. By shifting their focus from "what was held" in court opinions to how and
why the court decided, lawyers can enhance their predictive power regarding legal outcomes. The
passage emphasizes that these approaches provide practical benefits and clarity, making values more
apparent to lawyers in their work with appellate cases.

Rules are Not to Control, but to Guide Decision

The passage highlights a fundamental truth regarding the role of a court in introducing reason, sense,
and fairness into its work, considering the specific circumstances of a case. When a legal rule is both
wise and technically clear, it can provide strong guidance, almost dictating the outcome. However,
the passage emphasizes the need to distinguish between different types of legal rules in terms of
what can be expected from them and what they should be in a given situation.

W. TWINING - The Significance of Realism

The passage argues that the realist movement in jurisprudence should be seen primarily as a
historical phenomenon rather than a distinct school of thought. It identifies several key questions
that were of particular concern to leading figures in law schools at Harvard, Yale, and Columbia
during the rise of legal realism, including questions about legal education, legal research, the role of
legal institutions, and the relationship between law and other social sciences. The passage also
emphasizes that the realists did not consider themselves as legal philosophers but were more
focused on practical issues. The realist movement emerged in response to a revolt against formalism,
with various figures providing different rationalizations and solutions to the issues they saw in
traditional legal education and practice. The movement eventually became fragmented after the
Columbia crisis, and the analytical treatment of realist ideas should start with particular writings of
named individuals. The passage also mentions that there is a wide range of literature associated with
realism, including detailed studies and writings about realism, which sparked debates on various
legal issues.

The passage discusses the controversies and debates surrounding the legal realist movement in
jurisprudence. It points out that jurists have faced criticism and opposition in their discussions and
applications of realist ideas. The passage highlights that the debates on realism have been
characterized by misunderstandings, misrepresentations, and false allegations against the realists,
which led to further disputation. It mentions that some critics have accused the realists of supporting
totalitarianism, unfettered official discretion, and other extreme views, but these allegations are
largely unfounded. The passage acknowledges that realism was not a single unified movement, and
different realists had diverse perspectives on legal issues.

The passage also emphasizes the importance of debates and discussions in shaping juristic thought,
even though many of these debates were artificial, unnecessary, and repetitive. It questions why
realism, which emphasized the study of law in its social context, has been so controversial when
most jurists and legal scholars agree that taking a broader perspective is desirable. The passage
suggests that the core of realism, emphasizing the study of law within its social context, is relatively
uncontroversial and accepted by many law teachers and scholars. It discusses Karl Llewellyn's view
that the main contribution of the realist movement was not in its theoretical ideas but in its
determination to apply those ideas systematically in research, teaching, and legal practice.
Llewellyn's evaluation is that the movement should be judged by its practical achievements and
impact on legal research and education rather than its theoretical contributions to jurisprudence.

The passage underscores the practical implications of adopting a sociological or contextual approach
to law, as demonstrated by the legal realist movement. It suggests analyzing the effects of formalist
and contextual ideas on specific legal products, such as judicial opinions and statutes, to understand
the impact of different jurisprudential approaches. It encourages legal scholars and students to
engage in comparative analyses to assess how these approaches influence legal materials.

Furthermore, the passage emphasizes the significance of interdisciplinary collaboration between law
and other fields, like social sciences and philosophy, to enhance the study of law. It cautions against
overly optimistic expectations regarding interdisciplinary work, citing the challenges faced by the
legal realist movement.

The passage also highlights that Anglo-American legal culture allows for two main approaches: one
that broadens the study of law from within, building on legal traditions, and another that views law
from outside through other disciplines. It suggests that a balanced approach, combining systematic
generalization with sensitivity to specific contexts, offers the best way to preserve and benefit from
the common law tradition.

In summary, the passage stresses the importance of examining the practical consequences of
jurisprudential approaches, the challenges of interdisciplinary cooperation, and the role of
jurisprudence in integrating insights from other disciplines into the study of law.