Epistemology

Epistemology
Lecture 4
C A RT ES I A N S K E PT I C I S M :
M O O R E – P RO O F O F A N E X T E R N A L
WO R L D
N OZ I C K – K N OW L E D G E A N D S K E PT I C I S M
S O SA – H OW TO D E F EAT O P P O S I T I O N
TO M O O R E
Nihel Jhou
周先捷
G. E. Moore: Proof of An External World
2
We can prove that external

things exist. How? By
holding up my two hands,
and saying, 'Here is one hand,
and here is another.'
G. E. Moore (1873-1958)
Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

Distinguishing Different Things
3
 Physical objects = material things.

 My body, horses, the sun, etc.
 Not including shadows.
 Empirically external objects = things to be met with in

space. (There are “things.”)
 My body, horses, the sun, shadows, a reflection in a glass, etc.
 Not including after-images, double images, bodily pains, dreaming,
hallucination, etc.
 Modal feature: they might be perceived by everyone without being
perceived.

External Things
4
 Things internal to my mind: mental occurrences or

processes (experiences):
 It is with my mind that I feel bodily pains, perceive, remember,
think, imagine, etc.
 I was, at a given time, having no experience, if I was at the time
neither conscious nor dreaming nor having a vision nor anything
else of the sort.
 Things external to my mind: from a proposition that it
existed at a specified time, it doesn't follow that I was
having an experience at the time.

The Two Are Not Identical
5
 Things external to our minds ≠ things to be met with in

space.
 Animal pain: external to our minds but not to be met with in space.
 “There is at least one star” =>
not only
“There is at least one thing to be met with in space”
but also
“There is at least one external thing,”
and similarly in all other cases.

Self-Mind-Independent Things
6
 Something exists => it is logically independent of my

perception (= it could have existed without being
perceived).

The Proof of External Things
7
 Proof that two human hands exist:

By holding up my two hands, and simultaneously
saying, 'Here is one hand, and here is another.'

The Reason
8
 Suppose, for instance, it were a question whether there

were as many as three misprints on a certain page in a
certain book.
 A says there are, B is inclined to doubt it. How could A
prove that he is right?
 Surely he could prove it by taking the book, turning to
the page, and pointing to three separate places on it,
saying “There's one misprint here, another here, and
another here.” Surely that is a method by which it
might be proved!

The Skepticist Argument 1
9
 The skeptics really want: a general statement as to how

any propositions of this sort may be proved.
Our perception is generally veridical.
We generally perceive that there are external things.
Therefore, there are external things

Moore’s Response
10
 I have conclusive reasons for asserting that I am not now

dreaming; but that is a very different thing from being
able to prove it.

The Skepticist Argument 2
11
 If Moore cannot give such extra (general) proofs, then the

(particular) proofs (about hands) that Moore has given
are not conclusive proofs at all. (The argument from
ignorance)
I don’t know I am not a BIV.
If I don’t know I am not a BIV, then I don’t know I
have two hands.
Therefore, I don’t know I have two hands.

Moore’s Response
12
 I certainly did know the premises of my two proofs

(about hands), even if I could not prove them.
 Those who are dissatisfied merely on the ground that I
did not know their (general) premises, have no good
reason for their dissatisfaction.
I know I have two hands.
If I know I have two hands, I know I am not a BIV.
Therefore, I know I am not a BIV.

The Real Issue
13
(P1) I know I have two hands.

(P2) I don’t know I am not a BIV.
 Which one is more plausible? Which one has the default

status? Which one is common-sense (natural)?

Closing Questions
14
 According to Descartes, Evil Genius cannot deceive me

about my existence as a thinking thing as long as I am
thinking. What’s Descartes’s reason for such claim? What
is Moore’s common-sense defense of our knowledge
about the external world? Which position do you think is
more convincing? What’s your reason?

Robert Nozick: the truth-tracking account
15
When one’s belief

that p tracks its
truth, s/he knows
that p.
This account of
knowledge can dismiss
Gettier’s problem &
Robert Nozick (1938-)
Cartesian skepticism.
Cartesian skepticism based on CP
16
 Closure Principle (CP):

If S knows that p, and
he knows that 'p entails q,' then
he also knows that q.
 Knowledge is closed under known
logical implication: the deductive
move from something known to
something else doesn’t take us
outside of the {closed} area of
knowledge. Groot is tall deductively There is a
infers
tall guy.
 Compare with Gettier’s similar
principle.

Application of CP
17
 According to CP:
If (a) I know that I am in the classroom, and
(b) I know that ‘that I am in the classroom entails that I am not a BIV,'
then (c) I also know that I am not a BIV.
deductively I am not a BIV

I am in the classroom infers

Application of CP
18
 The skeptical equivalent conditional:
If (~c) I don’t know that I am not a BIV, and
Then (~a) I don’t know that I am in the classroom.
A&B ~C ~C & B
then C then ~A or ~B then ~A
If student A wins the prize and student B If at most one student wins the prize and
wins the prize, student B wins the prize,
then at least two students win the prize. then student A doesn’t win the prize .
Cartesian skepticism based on CP
19
 Cartesian (global) skepticism:

1. The skeptical equivalent conditional:
If (~c) I don’t know that I am not a BIV, and
Then (~a) I don’t know that I am in the classroom.
2. I don’t know that I am not a BIV.
3. I know that ‘that I am in the classroom entails that I am not a BIV.‘
4. Therefore, I don’t know that I am in the classroom.
 Acceptance of the skeptical equivalent conditional and two of
its antecedents entails ignorance of almost everything.
 Comparing two premises, which one is more convincing?
 I know that I am in the classroom?
 I don’t know that I am not a BIV?

Truth-tracking account of knowledge
20
 S knows that P if and only if

1. P is true,
2. S believes that P,
3. if P weren't true, S wouldn't believe that P, and
4. if P were true, S would believe that P.

Subjunctive (Counterfactual) Conditionals
21
 Examples:
 It’s a fact that I am not Superman and I cannot fly.
 Were I Superman, I would fly.
 If it had been the case that P, then it would have been the
case that Q.
 P→ Q (“→” stands for subjunctive conditional.)
 Semantics: “P → Q” is true iff
in all those worlds in which P holds true that are closest to the
actual world, Q is also true.

Truth-tracking account of knowledge
22
 (3) If P weren't true, S wouldn't believe that P.

 Not-P → not-(S believes that P).
 In the "close" worlds where Not-P is true, it’s not the case that S
believes it.
 (4) If P were true, S would believe that P.
 P → S believes that P.
 In the "close" worlds where P is true, S believes it.
 Truth-tracking: there is a close tie between the truth and

the belief, i.e., the belief is not just accidentally true.

Gettier’s case
23
 Smith believes that (P) the man who gets the job has 10
coins in his pocket.
 P is true.
 Intuitively, Smith doesn’t know that.
 The subjunctive condition 3 is not met:
Were P false, Smith would still believe that P.
 E.g. Smith had no coins, or no one would get the job.
 Hence, Smith doesn’t know that P. The subjunctive
condition 3 produces the correct result.

BIV+
- I am a BIV but I don’t know it
24
 SUPPOSE: I am in fact a BIV

(P), and I do believe it.
 The computer manipulates it.
 Intuitively, I don’t know that P.
 T: (3) Were P false, I wouldn’t
have believed that P.
 Normal world, normal person.
 F: (4) Were P true, I would
have believed that P.
 I could have been manipulated in a
different way.

CP is wrong
25
 Assume (a) and (b), does (c) hold?
 Deduce from (a), (b), (CPB?): I am not a BIV, and I do believe it.
 (3) Were it false that I am not a BIV, then I wouldn’t believe it? False.
Nothing could prevent me from believing that I am not a BIV
(especially if manipulated).
 (4) Were it true that I am not a BIV, then I would believe it? True.

CP is wrong
26
 Assume (a) and (b), does (c) hold? No!
 So to speak, there is no tight connection between the fact that I am
(not) a BIV and my belief that I am (not) a BIV. Hence, (c) doesn’t
hold.
I am
not a
BIV

CP is wrong
27
 Assume (a) and (b), does (c) hold? No!
 Analysis:
 p: I am in the classroom; q: I am not a BIV.
 Kp, K(p -> q), Bp, B(p -> q), ((Bp & B(p -> q)) -> Bq), Bq, p, (p ->q), q.
 If q were False, then p would be False, then I wouldn't believe that p

(from Kp). But it doesn't follow I wouldn't believe that q.
 Truth/belief is closed, but justification/knowledge is not.

Hence global skepticism is wrong
28
 If CP is right, then Cartesian (global) skepticism holds:

(~c) I don’t know that I am not a BIV, and
it follows that (~a) I don’t know that I am in the classroom.
 If CP is wrong, then Cartesian (global) skepticism doesn’t
hold:
(~c) I don’t know that I am not a BIV, and
but (a) I could still know that I am in the classroom.

No global skepticism
29
The skeptic is right

that we don't know if we are
not BIV, but wrong that we
don't know many other truths

Now think
30
 Come up with an example that one satisfies Nozick’s four

conditions for knowledge but does not really have
knowledge.
 Come up with a case where one has knowledge but
doesn’t satisfy Nozick’s four conditions.
 Must Cartesian skepticism depend on CP? Explain your
answer.
 Can I know that I am in the classroom?

Ernest Sosa: Defeating Opposition to Moore
32
Knowledge requires not

sensitivity but safety.
Safety is preserved under
known entailment.
Ernest Sosa (1940 - )

The Skeptic’s “Argument from Ignorance” AI
33
 h: I am a handless brain in a vat being fed experiences as

if I were normally embodied and situated.
 o: I now have hands.
 The skeptic’s “argument from ignorance” AI:
1. I do not know that not-h.
If Ko & K(o|=~h), then K~h (CP)
2. If 1, then c (below). K(o|=~h)
c. I do not know that o.
Skeptic: 1, 2, c
Nozick, et al.: 1, ~c, ~2
Moore: 2, ~c, ~1

The Principle of Exclusion
34
 The Principle of Exclusion (PE):

In order to know a fact P one must rule out (i.e.,
know to be false) every incompatible possibility
that one knows to be incompatible with it.
1. I know that o.
2. I don’t know that not-h.
3. I know that <o> entails <not-h>.
4. I know that <o> and <h> are incompatible. (By 3)
5. I cannot rule out <h>. (By 2)
6. I don’t know that o. (By 5 & PE)

Criticism 1
35
 Nozick’s account implies an paradoxical conjunction: that

I know o without knowing not-h.
1. Tracking is not preserved by entailment, nor even by
known entailment. Hence, CP fails.
2. The failure of CP implies the conjunction.
3. The principle of exclusion seems plausible.
4. Therefore, the conjunction is paradoxical.
 That is, Nozick’s account (the failure of CP) is
incompatible with the principle of exclusion.

Criticism 2
36
 The skeptic and the Nozickian et al. (and the

contextualist) all require that, in order to be correctly
characterizable as “knowledge,” a belief must be
“sensitive.”
 But the “sensitivity” of a belief that p is not a necessary
condition for knowing that p.

Sensitivity Approach
37
 A belief by S that p is “sensitive” iff

were it not so that p, S would not believe that p.
(~p → ~Bp)
 Sensitivity Approach: In order to constitute knowledge a
belief must be sensitive.
 By Sensitivity, I do not know that not-h. (AI-1)

Sensitivity Is not Necessary for Knowledge
38
 <p>
 <I do not believe falsely that p> (b)
 Kp & Bb entails Kb.
 Yet in cases where Bp is sensitive, Bb could never be
sensitive.
 Hence, Kb doesn’t require Bb be sensitive.
Bp is sensitive If Bb is sensitive
World 1 ~p, ~Bp ~~(~p & Bp), ~B~(~p & Bp)
World 2 ~p, ~Bp ~~(~p & Bp), ~B~(~p & Bp)

Sensitivity Is not Necessary for Knowledge
39
 On my way to the elevator I release a trash bag down the

chute from my high rise condo.
 Presumably I know my bag will soon be in the basement
(p).
 If it had been snagged somehow in the chute on the way
down, I would still believe that p.
 Hence, my believe p is not sensitive but I do know that p.

Safety Approach
40
 A belief by S that p is “safe” iff

S would believe that p only if it were so that p.
(Bp → p)
 Safety Approach: in order to constitute knowledge a
belief must be safe (rather than sensitive).
 By Safety, I know that o. (~AI-c)
 By Safety, I know that not-h. (~AI-1)

Safety
41
 But how?
 A belief is safe only if
a belief is based on a reliable deliverance.
 A deliverance is reliable if and only if
it would occur only if the delivered proposition were
true.
 The delivering must be fundamentally through the
exercise of an intellectual virtue (when perceiving, or
remembering, or deducing something). The source must
be in a reliable or trustworthy way a source of truth.

Advantages
42
 PE does not give Safety the problem: <not-h> is not

sensitive but safe. Safety is preserved under known
entailment.
 Safety can explain why the skeptic’s distinctive premise
(not knowing not-h) seems plausible: the skeptic confuses
sensitivity with safety.
 (Bp → p) v.s. (~p → ~Bp)
 Safety fits the stance of the Moorean.

Closing Questions
43
 What is Closure Principle? Why is safety but not

sensitivity preserved under know entailment?
 Compare Nozick’s sensitivity approach with Sosa’s safety
approach in response to the argument from ignorance.
Which one do you think is more successful? Explain.

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We can prove that external

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 Physical objects = material things.

 Not including shadows.

 Empirically external objects = things to be met with in

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 Things internal to my mind: mental occurrences or

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 Things external to our minds ≠ things to be met with in

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 Something exists => it is logically independent of my

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 Proof that two human hands exist:

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 Suppose, for instance, it were a question whether there

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 The skeptics really want: a general statement as to how

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 I have conclusive reasons for asserting that I am not now

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 If Moore cannot give such extra (general) proofs, then the

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 I certainly did know the premises of my two proofs

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

(P1) I know I have two hands.

 Which one is more plausible? Which one has the default

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 According to Descartes, Evil Genius cannot deceive me

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

When one’s belief

 Closure Principle (CP):

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

deductively I am not a BIV

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 Cartesian (global) skepticism:

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 S knows that P if and only if

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 Were I Superman, I would fly.

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 (3) If P weren't true, S wouldn't believe that P.

 In the "close" worlds where P is true, S believes it.

 Truth-tracking: there is a close tie between the truth and

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 SUPPOSE: I am in fact a BIV

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 If q were False, then p would be False, then I wouldn't believe that p

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 If CP is right, then Cartesian (global) skepticism holds:

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

The skeptic is right

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)

 Come up with an example that one satisfies Nozick’s four

Epipstemology - Lecture 4 (Nihel Jhou)