Mobilization and Participation: Social-Psychological Expansisons of Resource Mobilization

Theory
Author(s): Bert Klandermans
Source: American Sociological Review , Oct., 1984, Vol. 49, No. 5 (Oct., 1984), pp. 583-600
Published by: American Sociological Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2095417

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

American Sociological Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to American Sociological Review

This content downloaded from

187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION:
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPANSIONS OF RESOURCE
MOBILIZATION THEORY*

BERT KLANDERMANS
Free University, Amsterdam

Resource mobilization theorists have nearly abandoned social-psychological

analysis of social movements. In this paper a fresh case is made for social
psychology. New insights in psychology are combined with resource mobilization
theory in an attempt to overcome the weaknesses of traditional social-psychological
approaches to social movements. Expectancy-value theory is applied to movement
participation and mobilization. It is assumed that the willingness to participate in a
social movement is a function of the perceived costs and benefits of participation.
Collective and selective incentives are discussed. Expectations about the behavior of
others are introduced as an important expansion of expectancy-value theory to make
this framework applicable to movement participation. The theory is applied to
mobilization campaigns of the labor movement, and empirically tested in a
longitudinal study of a campaign during the 1979 collective negotiations in the
Netherlands. Outcomes support the theory. Theoretical and practical implications
are discussed.

Resource mobilization theory was a reaction to
traditional social-psychological theories of
social movements (Zurcher and Snow, 1981).
Those theories focused on what attracted
people to participation in social movements.
Amongst the explanations were: personality
traits (cf. Kenniston, 1968; Kerpelman, 1969);
marginality and alienation (cf. LeBon [1903]
1968; Freud, 1922; Hoffer, 1951; Kornhauser,
1959); and grievances and ideology (cf. Davies,
1962; Toch, 1966; Geschwender, 1968; Gurr,
1970; Rothman, 1974; Landsberger, 1976).
These explanations tended to be based on the
assumption that participation in a social
movement, like other forms of collective be-
havior, is an unconventional, irrational type of
behavior (Schwartz, 1976).1 Thanks to re-
source mobilization theorists themselves,
these approaches became increasingly ques-
tionable. Attempts to show that movement
participants have characteristic personality
traits were not very successful (Heberl6, 1968;
Roberts and Kloss, 1974; Klandermans,
1983b). Marginality and alienation, for exam-
ple, were not the typical background of partici-
*Direct all correspondence to: Bert Klandermans,
Department of Social Psychology, Free University,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
I wish to thank two anonymous reviewers who
provided many insightful comments on an earlier
version of this paper.
I Schwartz contrasts the social-psychological "ir-
rational" approach with the structural "rational" ap- theories of mobilization and participation has
proach. I hope to show here that such a charac-
terization of social psychology is unjust.
pants in such divergent movements as fascism
in Germany (Oberschall, 1973), the student
movement (Kenniston, 1968), the civil rights
movement (Morris, 1981), the union movement
(Moore, 1975), political protest movements
(Marsh, 1977; Barnes and Kaase, 1979), the
environmental, antiabortion, and antinuclear
movements (Leahy and Mazur, 1978), and the
unemployed movement (Klandermans, 1979).
The importance of grievances and ideology as
determinants of participation in a social
movement has been ambiguous (Gerlach and
Hine, 1970; McCarthy and Zald, 1976; Walsh,
1978; Leahy and Mazur, 1978; Tilly, 1979).
In contrast to traditional social-psycho-
logical interpretations, resource mobili-
zation theory emphasizes the importance of
structural factors, such as the availability of
resources to a collectivity and the position of
individuals in social networks, and stresses the
rationality of participation in social movements
(Oberschall, 1973; Gamson, 1975; Marx and
Wood, 1975; McCarthy and Zald, 1976; Zald
and McCarthy, 1979; Snow et al., 1980; Gam-
son et al., 1982). Participation in a social
movement is seen not as the consequence of
predisposing psychological traits or states, but
as the result of rational decision processes
whereby people weigh the costs and benefits of
participation.
Currently, resource mobilization theory is
the dominant approach in the field. Paradoxi-
cally, a demand for new social-psychological
developed (Gamson et al., 1982; Jenkins, 1983;
Walsh and Warland, 1983). Resource mobili-

American Sociological Review, 1984, Vol. 49 (October:583-600) 583

This content downloaded from
187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 584 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

zation theory went too far in nearly abandoning A general criticism of resource mobilization
the social-psychological analyses of social theory has been that it underestimates the
movements. In this paper a fresh case is made significance of grievances and ideology as de-
for a social-psychological analysis of mobiliza- terminants of participation in a social move-
tion and participation in a social movement. By ment (Carden, 1978; Fireman and Gamson,
combining new insights in psychology with re- 1979; Useem, 1980; Isaac et al., 1980). This
source mobilization theory, the weaknesses of shortcoming results from confusing the indi-
earlier social-psychological approaches in the vidual and societal levels of analysis (see also
field can be overcome. Geschwender, 1968). The fact that grievances
and ideology cannot explain the rise of social
movements does not mean that they. do not
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND RESOURCE
play a role in the decisions of individuals to
MOBILIZATION THEORY
participate in a social movement. One of the
Social psychology can expand resource aspirations of this social-psychological expan-
mobilization theory in an important way by sion of resource mobilization theory is to find a
revealing processes of social-movement par- more satisfying theoretical solution for the
ticipation on the individual level. To resource problem of grievances and ideology as deter-
mobilization theorists, participation results minants of participation in a social movement.
from "weighing" costs against benefits. How-
ever, little attention is given to weighing these
PERSUASION AND ACTIVATION: A
at the individual level. Nor is much attention
SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF
given to the interaction between individuals
MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION
that generates mobilization.2
Identifying the interaction between individu- Participation in a social movement fluctuates.
als as the appropriate level of analysis has sig- Alternatingly, a movement has its rank and file
nificant theoretical consequences. It takes into in action and then it falls back on its cadre.
account the psychological truism that people Mobilization plays an important part in these
behave in a perceived reality. Individual deci- fluctuations. The remainder of this article will
sions to participate in a social movement are focus on participation in a social movement
based on perceived costs and benefits of par- and on the way it changes as a result of mobili-
ticipation. That perceived reality is capable of zation attempts.
being influenced, and both social-movement
leaders and adversaries try to do so. Persua-
The Willingness to Participate
sion is an important element in every mobiliza-
tion campaign. The efficacy of a mobilization A person will participate in a social movement
campaign in persuading the individual is a key if s/he knows the opportunities to participate, if
determinant of participation. s/he is capable of using one or more of these
Movement participation denotes activities opportunities, and if s/he is willing to do so.
This paper elaborates the third condition by
ranging from signing a petition to sabotage, and
applying expectancy-value theory to move-
from part-time or one-time to full-time activity.
The perceived costs and benefits for different ment participation. In general this theory "at-
activities can vary greatly (see also Tolbert, tempts to relate action to the perceived attrac-
1981). Moreover, there can be substantial dif- tiveness or aversiveness of expected con-
ferences in perceived costs and benefits be- sequences" (Feather, 1982:1).3 The key ele-
tween individuals, across regions, and during
the life cycle of the movement. This has im-
3 Expectancy-value models in psychology com-
portant implications for mobilization cam-
prise such concepts as attitude, motivation, choice
paigns. By timing, and by their choice of strat- and decision. The motivation for a certain behavior
egy and arena, social-movement organizations is a function of the expectation that it will yield
can profoundly influence the costs and benefits certain outcomes and the values of those outcomes
of participation. (Rotter, 1954, 1972; Mitchell, 1974; Campbell and
Pritchard, 1977). The value of an outcome of behav-
2 A number of students of social movements ior is a function of the instrumentality of the primary
whose approaches are cognate with resource mobili- outcome for other, secondary outcomes and the
zation theory do pay attention to processes at the value they have. Expectancy-value theory is a
individual level (Schwartz, 1976; Mitchell, 1979; rational-choice theory. It is one of the subjective
Oberschall, 1980; Tolbert, 1981; Gamson et al., 1982). utility theories in psychology. As such, it is easily
Their analyses bear resemblances to the one pre- compatible with resource mobilization theory. How-
sented here. They have in common, however, their ever, I do not want to suggest that social psychology
lack of a systematic, psychologically based theoreti- has nothing more to offer that is useful to the study of
cal framework. Moreover, they are not theoretical: social movements (see Gamson et al., 1982; Pinard,
they provide no empirical data at the individual level. 1983; Ferree and Miller, 1984).

This content downloaded from

187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION 585

ments of the theory are expected outcomes
(expectations) and the value of these out-
comes. Theoretically, values and expectations
combine in a multiplicative way. Even if the
value of an outcome is very high it will not
motivate individuals as long as they do not
believe that the outcome can be produced by
their efforts. Usually different outcomes (ma-
terial and nonmaterial) are distinguished. For
each outcome a value-expectancy product can
be calculated. Motivation is defined as the sum
of these different value-expectancy products.4
A rational-choice framework does not imply
that feelings, emotions or sentiments are unim-
portant in relation to movement participation.
Nor does it argue that potential participants are
consciously multiplying and adding values and
expectations. The usefulness of the framework
is that it provides a device for the systematic
analysis of the variety of beliefs, expectations
and attitudes that are related to participation in
a social movement (see Schwartz [1976] and
Oberschall [1980] for defenses of the rational
view of human action).
However, before this general theoretical
framework can be applied to movement par-
ticipation, it has to be modified in an important
way. The goals of social movements are "col-
lective goods." Obtaining a collective good is
not directly contingent on the decision of an
individual to participate (Olson, 1977). Ra-
tional individuals will not participate in the
production of a collective good unless selective
incentives motivate them to do so. Though Ol-
son's argument has been criticized (Schwartz,
1976; Mitchell, 1979; Fireman and Gamson,
1979; Oliver, 1980), it clarified the distinction produce the expected collective benefits of par-
between collective benefits and selective ben-
efits. If one finds it untenable that only the
latter motivates movement participation, one
must acknowledge that the relationship be-
tween participation and collective benefits is
different from the relationship between partici-
pation and selective benefits.
Collective benefits and participation. Both
Gamson (1975) and Schwartz (1976) argue that
people participate in activities to produce a
collective goal precisely because they are
aware that the good would never be produced
if everyone sat back and waited for someone
else to do something. Oberschall (1980) re-
marked that this was especially true for people
who are strongly in favor of the collective
good. Fireman and Gamson (1979) and
4 There is considerable discussion in the literature
concerning the mathematical part of the theory (see,
e.g., Kuhl, 1982). Leaving aside the theoretical
argument, in practice most researchers use multiple
regression analysis to combine the different vari-
ables.
Fleishman (1980) stressed the importance of
feelings of responsibility and solidarity in this
connection. Schwartz (1976) and Oberschall
(1980) added the probability of success as very
important. In their analysis the probability of
success is related to the number of partici-
pants. Oberschall (1980) pointed out that the
important question for the individual is what
his/her participation will contribute to the
probability of success. From a hypothesized
relationship between the number of partici-
pants and the probability of success, the indi-
vidual contribution as a function of the number
of participants can be derived. Oliver et al.
(1983) made clear that there is a variety of such
production functions.
These arguments do not touch the funda-
mental issue, namely, that persons have to de-
cide to participate at a point when they do not
know whether others will participate. There is
a social-psychological solution to this problem.
Although people do not know what others will
do, they have expectations. Based on their ex-
pectations about the behavior of others, people
assess the probability of success and their own
contribution to it. The expectation that partici-
pation helps to produce the collective good can
therefore be categorized as follows:
a. expectations about the number of partici-
pants;
b. expectations about one's own contribu-
tion to the probability of success;
c. expectations about the probability of suc-
cess if many people participate.
These expectations combine in a multiplicative
way with the value of the collective good to
ticipation.
Applying expectancy theory yields the hy-
pothesis that the value of a collective good is a
function of its instrumentality6 for social
changes which the movement hopes to achieve
and of the value of changes. To form an opin-
ion about this instrumentality, an individual
must have knowledge about the collective good
and its implications.
Participation and selective costs and bene-
5On the basis of the expectations distinguished,
we can define the free-rider problem more closely. A
free rider is someone who believes that his/her own
contribution to the probability of success will be very
small, but who believes that the number of partici-
pants and the probability of success are large enough
to expect that the collective good will be produced.
See Klandermans (1983a) for a reconsideration of
the free-rider dilemma along this line. Oliver et al.
(1983) propose a similar limitation of the free-rider
problem.
6 In expectancy-value theory expectation is used
for behavior-outcome relations and instrumentality
for outcome-outcome relations.

This content downloaded from

187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 586 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

fits. Selective costs and benefits are by defini- negative, the other motives can be so strong
tion contingent on participation. Expectations that a person is willing to participate. If the
about, and values of, these incentives directly collective motive is strong, the social motives
influence the willingness to participate. In the and/or reward motives can be negative without
literature there are different classifications of making a person unwilling to participate. Of
selective costs and benefits (cf. Freeman, 1979; course there are also situations in which the
Tolbert, 1981). An important distinction is that collective motive does not outweigh negative
between expected reactions of significant social and/or reward motives, either because
others7 and expected material costs and bene- the collective motive is too weak, or because
fits like money, time, injury, entertainment.8 the social and reward motives are too negative.
Motives. The willingness to participate in a Figure 1 summarizes the theory on the willing-
social movement can be defined as a function ness to participate.
of the perceived attractiveness or aversiveness
of the expected consequences of participation.
Mobilization
This signifies that willingness to participate is a
function of: Mobilization attempts by a movement organi-
(a) the expectation that participation will zation have the aim of winning participants,
help to produce the collective good and the that is, persuading people to support the
value of the collective good-the collective movement organization by material and non-
motive; (b) the expected selective costs and material means. Mobilization attempts always
benefits and the value of these costs and bene-contain two components. These are called con-
fits. As distinguished in the reactions of signifi- sensus mobilization and action mobilization.
cant others, these comprise the social motive. Consensus mobilization is a process through
As they relate to nonsocial costs and benefits, which a social movement tries to obtain sup-
they comprise the reward motive. port for its viewpoints.9 It involves (a) a col-
Expectations or instrumentalities and values lective good, (b) a movement strategy, (c)
combine in a multiplicative way and the three confrontation with the opponent, (d) results
motives in an additive way. The value of a achieved. Neither collective goods nor types of
collective good will be zero if it is not believed action are fixed quantities. They change, and
to be instrumental for valued societal changes, this requires renewed consensus mobilization.
or if the changes it is said to be instrumentalConsensus
for mobilization does not take place in
are not valued. The value of a collective good' a vacuum. Collective goods and actions are
will be negative if it is believed to hinder valued often controversial. Opponents, counter-
societal changes, or if changes are valued movements, rival organizations counter the
negatively. arguments of a social movement. A social
If the value of the collective good is zero, movement
the will have to go into these
collective motive will be zero. If this value arguments.
is In short, a "paper war" is waged
negative the motive will be negative, unlesspromote the or to discourage the mobilization of
expectation component is zero. consensus. The degree of success with which
The collective motive will also be zero if the consensus is mobilized around the collective
expectation that participation will help to pro- goods can be measured by the extent to which
duce the collective good is zero: persons will these goods are known and valued. Whether
not be motivated by the collective good if theypeople value a collective good depends on the
do not feel that their participation contributes extent to which consensus mobilization suc-
to the probability of success, or do not believe ceeded in making them believe that this good is
that enough other people will participate, or doinstrumental for valued social changes.
not feel there is any chance of success even if Action mobilization is the process by which
many people participate. an organization in a social movement calls up
Since the different motives combine in an people to participate. Consensus mobilization
additive way, they can compensate one an- does not necessarily go together with action
other. If the collective motive is weak, zero mobilization,
or but action mobilization cannot do
without consensus mobilization. Action
mobilization involves motivating people to
7To avoid circularity, it is important to point out participate. Ideally, social movement organi-
who in a person's environment will be significant. zations will take a variety of approaches, ap-
Although it is difficult to give exhaustive enumera- pealing both to collective and to social and
tions, certainly friends, colleagues and family mem-
bers are among them.
8 These costs and benefits can vary greatly de- 9 Consensus mobilization bears resemblances to
pending on the situation and the kind of participa- the spread of generalized beliefs (Smelser, 1971).
tion. However, often the main costs and benefits of a Consensus mobilization, however, is a purposeful
particular form of participation can be specified. effort of a social-movement organization.

This content downloaded from

187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION 587

Attitude theory
Motivation theory

value of social
change advocated
I l value of collective
x 0 good

familiarity instrumentality of x
with collec- 0. collective good for I I
tive good social change advo- expectation that
cated participation will
help to achieve the
collective good*

- pa rticipation contributes to probabi-i value of reaction

lity of success i of significant

- expected number of participants i others
- expected success. if many people
participate
+ willingness
x +- + to parti-
cipate

expected reaction
of significant
others to partici-
pation and to
non-partici pation

value of costs
and benefits

expected costs and

benefits of parti-
cipation and non-
partici pation

a X means a multiplicative relationship.

+ means an additive relationship.

Figure 1. A Theory of the Willingness to Participatea

reward motives (Gamson, 1975; Carden, 1978;
Snow et al., 1980). They have every reason to
do so. Participation because of collective mo-
tives means that both the collective good and
the type of participation are attractive. But it
will seldom be the case that each and every
member of a collectivity is won over to the
collective good and the form of participation in
the time available. Particularly if nearly
unanimous participation is demanded, there is
always a certain percentage who, lacking com-
plete consensus, will have to be mobilized
using social and/or reward motives. Another
factor to be contended with is the occurrence
of free-rider behavior. Since free riders take a
positive stand on the collective good but do not
believe that its production depends on their
participation, it is not of much use to appeal to
collective motives. What remains is to try to
mobilize them using social and/or reward mo-
tives. Here, again, the chance that a social
movement decides to do this will be greater if a
higher degree of participation is required. '0
"I Not all types of action are equally vulnerable to
nonparticipation (cf. Fireman and Gamson, 1979;
Klandermans, 1983a; Oliver et al., 1983). This will
differ for different types of action.

This content downloaded from

187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 588 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
A mobilizing organization will try to make
the benefits of participation and the costs of
nonparticipation as high as possible, and the
costs of participation and the benefits of non-
participation as low as possible. Apart from
influencing the three motives directly, a
movement also has indirect means of control-
ling the costs and benefits of participation.
Two important ones are (a) the choice of the
type of action and (b) the choice of the scene.
A movement can choose among several types
of action, from moderate to militant. With its
choice of the type of action, a movement can
determine to a large extent the costs and bene-
fits of participation. A movement can fight
where it is strongest, that is, in sectors of soci-
ety with strong movement networks where it
can organize many people. Resource mobiliza-
tion literature has shown that people are more
easily mobilized in such sectors (cf. Ragin et
al., 1982). The premise here is that this is prob-
ably because a more favorable cost-benefit
ratio can be created in such sectors.
Psychologically speaking, there will be an
element of projection in estimates of the number
of participants in a movement. A person who
does not wish to participate will make a lower
estimate of the number of participants than a
person who does wish to take part. "I In a col-
lectivity this has all the look of a self-fulfilling many regretted the meager results. Few be-
prophecy: if many people think that few people
will participate, many people will have doubts
about the efficacy of their own participation.
Thus a downward spiral ensues which is fatal
to the willingness to participate. Mobilization
efforts attempt to reinforce the view that
"many people will participate." If this is -not
successful, the prophecy fulfills itself.
METHOD
The theory of mobilization and participation
has been applied in research on mobilization
campaigns of the union movement, the
women's movement and the peace movement.
This paper presents data from a study of the
effects of a mobilization campaign by the In-
dustrial Workers' Union of the Dutch Union
Federation, the largest union of industrial
workers in the Netherlands.
The Campaign
In 1979, the Industrial Workers' Union (IB
FNV) tried to mobilize its members for a
shorter work week. It was argued that
shortening the work week would reduce unem-
I See Granberg and Holmberg (1983) for an in-
teresting elaboration of a similar assumption regard-
ing voting behavior.
This content downloaded from
187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
ployment. The campaign started in August
1978 when the chairman of the IB FNV
launched the 35-hour work week as the chief
demand in the 1979 negotiations. The campaign
included numerous publications in the press
and appearances on radio and television, issues
of the union's magazine, posters, bulletins, and
pamphlets, work by union officials and by
members. The union, however, quickly went
on the defensive. Not just their opponent, but
public opinion and even many "friendly"
economists or politicians turned against it. In
an effort to break this massive resistance, the
union twice changed its goals: first, by replac-
ing the 35-hour week with a 39-hour week, later
by dropping the shorter work week and de-
manding extra days off.
Collective bargaining is a series of events.
Our study was devoted to some of them. One
did have a great deal of influence: the failure of
a 6-week strike against the West German steel
industry in which the 35-hour work week was
at stake. This failure made the union keenly
aware of its small chances of success, even if
militant action were taken. Thus no action was
taken in the Netherlands that year. Ultimately,
however, an agreement was reached giving a
few extra days off. Although the members
were not markedly dissatisfied with this result,
lieved it would have a favorable effect on em-
ployment.
Research Design
Mobilization campaigns often last several
months. In this case the campaign started in
August 1978, and the negotiations were not
completed until June 1979. In such a situation,
longitudinal research is to be preferred. From
the end of November 1978 through July 1979
we interviewed a group of union members
about once a month. We chose the timing so
that the interviews fell shortly before or-after
an important event. Although a total of seven
waves were held, for methodological reasons a
design was developed which ensured that no
respondent would be interviewed more than
three times. Seven groups of members were
selected, and they were interviewed according
to the schedule in Figure 2. When the similarity
of the seven groups was controlled on a
number of variables, the differences found
were so few that the groups can be used for
comparison with no difficulty.'2 In addition,
12 To check whether the differences found affected
the outcomes, analyses of covariance were carried
out on all effect variables, with the variables which
had shown significant differences as covariates. Not
once did they lead to different conclusions.
 MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION 589

group I 1st 2nd 3rd

interview interview interview

group II 1st 2nd 3rd

interview interview interview

group III 1st 2nd 3rd

interview interview interview

group IV 1st 2nd 3rd

interview interview interview

group V 1st 2nd 3rd

interview interview interview

group VI 1st 2nd

interview interview

group VII 1st

interview

Nov. 20-29 Jan. 29- Feb. 19- Apr. 3-18 May 18- June 11-
|an. 4-18 Fe15. 9 Mar-. 2 June 1 July 11

Figure 2. Design

this design13 has many advantages. We can get The Interviews

a picture of the course of the campaign by
The interviews were held at the participants'
comparing the outcomes of the successive
homes and were carried out by the Netherlands
interviews. We can also study the effect of a
Institute of Opinion Polls. Each questionnaire
single event by comparing the outcomes of the
consisted of one part that was the same each
interviews before and after that event while
time and another that changed. The initial
controlling for repeated measurement.
interview included a general list of personal
data.
Respondents
The Questionnaire
Members of the IB FNV were interviewed at
three plants belonging to the AKZO concern: The variables from the theory of willingness to
Enka in Emmen; Enka in Ede; and AKZO take action were operationalized as follows. (I)
Pharma in Oss. A sample of 746 persons was The familiarity with the collective good was
taken from the membership lists of the union. measured by the following questions: Are the
The data set includes 490 complete series of unions demanding shorter working hours? (yes,
interviews (66%), well distributed over plants no, don't know). In what way do they want to
and interview waves. The first interview had shorten working hours? (open question). (II)
the highest nonresponse rate. This interview The instrumentality of the collective good for
was completed with 565 members (76%). the social change advocated: We asked the re-
Slightly less than half the dropouts refused to spondents if they felt that a "shorter working
take part in this interview. The others were not week would make a contribution to reducing
at home, were no longer members, no longer unemployment" (definitely, I think so, I don't
worked for the company, were sick, or had think so, definitely not). (III) The value of the
moved. The refusals (1/8 of the original sample) social change advocated: From the responses
may have damaged the representativeness. to various questions we were able to infer that
Small percentages again fell off at the second the interviewees almost without exception at-
(4%) and third interviews (6%). Half of the tached much value to reducing unemployment.
dropouts at the third interview were members Theoretically, this means that the value of the
who had already left for vacation. social change advocated equals 1 for each re-
spondent.
The question on the motives to participate in
union action always distinguished between two
II The design is one of the variants of the separate
types of action: militant action, such as a
sample-pretest-posttest design (Campbell and Stan-
ley, 1963): strike; and moderate action, such as holding
meetings on work time, a slowdown, a short
R 0, x 02 work stoppage, etc.
R x 02 Collective motives. (IV) The value of the

This content downloaded from

187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 590 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

collective good: Union members were asked Willingness to take action. (IX) We mea-
how they stood on a shorter work week. They sured the willingness to take part in action by
could reply on a 5-point scale from very posi- asking, "If it comes to action for the negotia-
tive to very negative. tions, will you take part in moderate/militant
(V) The expectation that participation helps action?" (definitely, I think so, I don't think so,
to achieve the collective good: (a) The expec- definitely not).14
tation about one's own contribution to the
probability of success was operationalized in RESULTS
the following two statements: "It really doesn't
The Theory of the Willingness to Participate
make much difference whether or not I take
part in action." "It is important that I take part Tables I and 2 summarize the overall evalua-
in action, because in doing this I support the tion of the theory. Table 1 concentrates on the
union" (agree entirely, agree, disagree, dis- attitude towards the collective goal and Table 2
agree entirely). (b) The expectation about the on the willingness to participate.
number of participants was established as fol- Table 1 presents the correlations between
lows: "In your estimate, how many people at beliefs about the instrumentality of shorter
your plant will participate in moderate/militant working time for unemployment reduction and
action in connection with the negotiations?" the attitude toward shorter working time in five
(very few, not so many, quite a few, very successive interviews. The data show a signifi-
many). (c) The expectation about success if cant relationship between these two variables
many people participate was measured by the at all five points in time. It could be that people
question: "Imagine that very many people take- believe that shorter working hours reduce un-
part in moderate/militant-action. Do you think employment as a rationalization for their desire
that this will induce the employers to take into to have a shorter work week. That is, it may be
account the union standpoint in the negotia- that the attitudes produce the beliefs about in-
tions?" (definitely, I think so, I don't think so, strumentality rather than the reverse. The sec-
definitely not). ond part of Table 1 examines this issue. This
Social motives. (VI) Three categories of part of the table presents the correlations of the
people seemed significant: members of one's changes in the variables.15 The argument that
family, colleagues, and direct superiors. A instrumentality produces attitudes is confirmed
variable indicative of social motivation to par- if changes in one are correlated with changes in
ticipate was calculated. Basic data were (a) the the other, for it is unlikely that other possible
value a person attaches to reactions of family determinants of the attitude (for instance, the
members, colleagues, and direct superiors, and need for more leisure time) change in the same
(b) the expected reactions of these persons to way. As Table I shows, changes in the vari-
participation and to nonparticipation. The so- ables are significantly correlated.
cial motivation score is the sum of the products Table 2 is derived from six hierarchical re-
of values and expectations. If persons expect gression analyses with stepwise inclusion
favorable reactions if they participate and un- (three for moderate and three for militant ac-
favorable ones if they do not, then the score is tion).16 Following a procedure suggested by
positive. If they expect unfavorable reactions if
they participate and favorable ones if they do
not, then the score is negative. 14 To overcome the drawback that an important
Reward motives. Two types of costs seemed variable would only be measured by one question,
important: (a) financial sacrifices, and (b) other questions were asked at other points in the
worsening of a person's position in the com- interviews about the attitude toward action. The an-
swers to these questions correlated reasonably well
pany. (VII) For the financial sacrifices, we
with those to the direct question on the willingness to
asked: "Suppose that it would cost money if
take part in action (mean r = .50 for moderate action,
you took part in any action in connection with
and .67 for militant action), and they did not show
the negotiations. Do you feel this is not too any differences in their relationships to other vari-
detractive, detractive, or very detractive?" By ablest
this formulation we set the expectancy compo- 15 Residual scores were computed by substracting
nent at 1 and restricted ourselves to the value from the score on time 2 the score on time 1 multi-
component. (VIII) For the position in the com- plied by the correlation between the two scores.
pany, we assumed that no one would be indif- 16 Originally, expectancy-value theory prescribed
simple addition of the separate motives. This un-
ferent about his/her position in the company
realistically assumes that different motives are
worsening. We set the value of a worsened
mutually independent and have the same weight. A
position at -1 and restricted ourselves to this more realistic approach is to account for intercorre-
expectation by asking whether a person's posi- lations and different weights by using regression
tion in the company would worsen by par- analysis rather than simple summation (cf. Mitchell,
ticipating in moderate/militant action. 1974).

This content downloaded from

187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION 591

Table 1. The Attitudes Towards Shorter Working Time and the Instrumentality of Shorter Working Time for
Reducing Unemployment: Pearson Correlations of Single and Change Scores

Instrumentality

Nov. Jan. Early Feb. End of Feb. April

a) Single Scores
Attitude Towards
-shorter working hours .47*** .37** .44*** .38*** .48***
-shorter working week .35** .34** .33** .38*** .21*

Early Feb.! End of Feb.

Nov./Jan. Jan./Early Feb. End of Feb. April

b) Change Scores
Attitude Towards
-shorter working hours .35** .29* .39*** .44***
-shorter working week .19* .36** .25* .11
* p<.05.
** p<.o1.
p<.OO1.

Finn and Mattson (1978), in each regression
analysis the variables connected with one of
the three motives are included in the last step.
The data show that the contribution of each of
the three motives in this last step is significant;
each helps to account for the variance in the
willingness to participate in action. Together
the motives account for 43 percent of the vari-
ance in the willingness to participate in militant
action and 38 percent of the variance for mod-
erate action.
The contribution of reward motives is rela-
tively small, possibly because these costs only
really count when it actually comes to action,
and then especially if the action goes on a long
time. Alternatively, it may be that the kinds of
costs asked about (financial sacrifices, wors-
ening of the position in the company) are all in
the game for many people; only by becoming
too high might they dissuade these people from
participation. There is a wide difference in the
contribution of the social motives for the two
Table 2. Regression of Motives on the Willingness
to Participate in Moderate and Militant
Action: R2 Changes When a Motive is In-
troduced in the Last Stepa
Moderate Militant
Action Action
A R2 A R2
Collective Motives 13%*** 7%***
Social Motives 4%*** 10%***
Reward Motives 0.8%* 1%**
a This table reflects the results of six stepwise
regression analyses; the percentage in the table
applies to the motive on the left when it is introduced
in the last step.
* p<.05.
** p<.Ol.
*** p<.oo1.
types of action (4 and 10 percent in the last step
and 20 and 31 percent in the first step). Militant
actions are more controversial than moderate
actions. Thus, reactions of significant others
will be more pronounced and have more influ-
ence. Theoretically significant is the large
contribution of the collective motives even
when the other motives are accounted for. This
is in opposition to Olson's (1977) argument that
persons are not motivated to participate in
collective behavior by the collective good but
only by selective incentives. For a better
theoretical understanding it is useful to break
down the collective motive again. Most of the
members had a positive attitude toward shorter
working time (see next paragraph); hence it
follows that whether a person will be motivated
to participate by the collective good depends
upon the expectancy component. The expec-
tancy component is made up of three elements:
the expectation that participation contributes
to the probability of success; -the expected
number of participants; and the expected suc-
cess if many people participate. The correla-
tions between these elements were low, which
underlines the fact that each plays his/her own
role in the decision to participate. This is made
clear by the /3 coefficients in Table 3. The
prominence of two elements (a2 and b) de-
serves some comment. Feelings of solidarity
and responsibility are reflected in the willing-
ness to support the union. Its weight validates
Fireman and Gamson's (1979) argument that
group solidarity is an important determinant of
participation. The significance of expectations
about the number of participants confirms the
argument that the expected number of partici-
pants is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Contrary to
Olson's logic, the willingness to participate in
collective action appears to be strengthened by
the belief that many others will participate.

This content downloaded from

187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 592 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Table 3. Regressions of the Four Components of the Expectation that Participation Helps to Achieve the
Collective Good on the Willingness to Participate

Moderate Action Militant Action

B /3 B la
al. My participation doesn't matter .066 ** .052 .08*
(.027)a 11(.029)
a2. I participate because I want to support the union .296 39*** .282 35***
(.035) * (.038)
b. Number of participants .236 .28*** .29 .33***
(.039) (.040)
c. Expected success if many people participate .654 11** .075 12**
(.027) (.029)

R2 .57 .56

a Standard errors.
* .15<p<.10.
** p<.05.
*** p<.001.

The remainder of this discussion concerns
the results over the course of the campaign.
Table- 4 gives a brief chronology of major
events in the campaign in relation to the seven
interview waves.
Consensus Mobilization
Knowledge. Adequate diffusion of knowledge
of the collective good is the cornerstone of
every mobilization campaign. Collective
goods., however, are not invariable quantities.
They can change, influenced by circum-
stances, interaction with the opponent, etc.
For a social movement, two dangers can arise:
(a) the collective good as it is defined initially
does not become widely enough known; (b)
changes in the definition of the collective good
do not become widely enough known. As can
be seen from Table 4, there were two policy
changes in the 1979 negotiations.
Figure 3 clearly shows that both policy
changes led to difficulties about the knowledge
of the goals. After a quite adequate initial level
(70-80Wo knew what the goals were), with the
knowledge is never more than a condition for
the spread of a positive attitude toward a col-
lective good. The key concept here is the in-
strumentality of the collective good for social
changes felt to be worth fighting for or for the
preservation of a desirable situation. Cam-
paigns for the mobilization of consensus strive
to make such instrumentality plausible, often
in the face of counterarguments by the oppo-
nent. The 1979 campaign for a shorter work
week failed in this respect. The central ques-
tion was whether a shorter work week would
have a positive effect on employment opportu-
nity.
As Figure 4 shows, after an initial increase
there is a dramatic decrease in the extent to
which union members believed that a shorter
work week would reduce unemployment.
90 change
1st policy

first policy change the number of people aware 80 4

of the changed goals was cut in half. A month 2nd policy

70 change
and a half later this number was once again 60

rising, but it did not reach the level of early

50
February. At the end of May the second policy
40
change took place, and again the number of
correct answers was cut in half. 30

In general, the union "elite" (the members 20

with a higher education and/or level of partici- 10

pation in the union) was better informed of the

goals of action after policy changes. Members end of mid- early end of mid- end of
outside these categories were less well in- Nov. Jan Febr. Febr. April May

Note Responses to first interview

formed and more vulnerable when it came to
dissemination of knowledge about changes in Figure 3. Percentages of Union Members Who
policy. Could Correctly Formulate the Demands
Beliefs and attitudes. Dissemination of for a Shorter Work Week

This content downloaded from

187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION 593

Table 4. Major Events in the Campaign

August 1978 The chair of the IB FNV proposes the 35-hour work week; mobilization
campaign starts; discussion on shorter work week begins

November 20-29, 1978 1 st interview

November 27, 1978 Government and employer organizations refuse to negotiate a nation-wide
agreement on a shorter work week.
December 1978 Steel strike in West Germany for a 35-hour work week.

January 4-18, 1979 2nd interview

End of January 1979 Steel strike in West Germany lost.

January 29-February 9 3rd interview

Beginning of February 1979 First policy change: 35 hours becomes 39 hours.

February 19-March 2 4th interview

March/April Negotiations with AKZO make no progress.

April 3-18 5th interview

April 17 Negotiations with AKZO break down.

April 24 Second policy change: 39 hours becomes a few days off.
May 15 Negotiations with AKZO start again.

May 18-26 6th interview

May 23 Agreement with AKZO

June 5-18 Membership meetings: membership agrees with contract.

June 11-July 11 7th interview

From the end of February onwards a majority
no longer believed this. As expected, the de-
velopments in the attitude toward a shorter
work week show the same picture, although
without becoming negative. These results
make clear the importance of beliefs about the
instrumentality of the collective good for
valued social changes. Very often, as in the
case of reducing unemployment, the social
change itself is above all discussion. The real
problem is to make people believe that the
collective good will advance this change.

Action Mobilization
definitely
instrumental
2.00 A mobilizing organization will try to make the
.40 benefits of participation and the costs of non-
\30 participation as high as possible, and the costs
.20 . \ of participation and the benefits of non-
.10 participation as low as possible. There are
0?- various ways of doing this: (a) choosing the
-.10
type of action; (b) choosing the scene, and (c)
-.20
influencing the motives to participate. This
-.30 \
must be viewed in the context of maneuvers by
-.40
the opponent and/or external events which
-2.00 A
may influence the costs and benefits of partici-
definitely end of mid- early end of mid-
not instru- Nov. Jan.' Febr. Febr. April
pation. The degree of success achieved in an
mental
action-mobilization campaign can be read from
Note Responses to first interviews.
Significant trend: F-lineair = 7.29, p <.01, df = 1.
the willingness to take action.
Difference jan. - april: p<.01 Figure 5 presents the developments in the
willingness to participate in moderate and mil-
Figure 4. Mean Perceived Instrumentality of Shorter
itant action. The figures for Ede and Oss did
Working Hours for Reducing Unemploy- not differ significantly, so they are presented
ment together. In the establishments in Ede and Oss

This content downloaded from

187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 594 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Moderate action Militant action

Willing to Willing to
participate participate

1.00 1.00

.40 .40

.30 .30

.20 - .20 -

0?0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
0~~~~~~~~~~~

- .20 -~~0~ .20 ?

--~~~
.10~~ 03
- 0 01
.10 ?~~?
0~~~~~~~~~~~

_O.,5 , -- ,-- - 00
0-~~ - -O 0- -0
- .30 - . 30--

- .40- - .40

Notwilling to late mid- early late mid- Notwilling to late mid- early late mid-
rarticipate Nov. Jan. Febr. Febr. April participate Nov. Jan. Febr. Febr. April

Ermen - -- Ec O-SS Dnen - F- Ede / Oss

Notes Ede and Oss, no significant differences between groups; no significant trend.
Emren, moderate action: linear trend; F-unique = 5.711, df = , p< .05; F-step = 5.554. df 1,
p < .05. Militant action: no significant trend; difference Nov. - April: p = .12.

Figure 5. Mean Willingness to Take Action

there was a weak willingness to participate in
moderate action, and no willingness to partici-
pate in militant action throughout the entire
period. In Emmen, willingness to participate in
both types of action was comparatively high at
first, but it gradually melted away. Initially,
Emmen had the most potential participants,
but by April the opposite was true.
From these results we can conclude that the
union did not succeed in mobilizing its mem-
bers. In two of the three establishments there
was a willingness to participate in moderate
action, it is true, but it very soon became clear
that moderate action would not be of any help,
and the initial willingness to participate in mil-
itant action in the third establishment disap-
peared.
Changes in the costs and beliefits of partici-
pation. Theoretically, the willingness to take
action is a function of collective, social and
reward motives. We have already shown that
the collective good lost in value. Over the same
period the expectation that participation would
help to achieve the collective good lost its
force, not because members no longer believed
that their participation would contribute to the
probability of success, but because they grew
more and more pessimistic about the number
of participants and the probability of success
even if many people were to participate.
Niuminber (f particip(lats. Estimates of
number of participants could vary from very
few to very many. Because members estimated
the efficacy of an action based on the number
ot participants, the percentage that expected
very many colleagues to participate was of
interest.
Figure 6 concentrates on the outcomes for
one of the three establishments (Emmen) be-
cause of dramatic changes there. In the other
two the percentages were low throughout the
campaign.
As Figure 6 shows, the percentages of union
members who expected very many participants
decline rapidly, indicating that the campaign
was losing its momentum. After an initial in-
crease (up to 58 percent in the case of moderate
action and 39 percent in the case of militant
action), starting in January there was a sharp
decline which reached 4.5 percent in April, or
the level at Ede and Oss at the time.'7
'' If, instead of the percentage that expect very
many participants, we use changes in the mean esti-
mate of the number of participants, we find the same
pattern, except that the mean runs somewhat less
steeply. For moderate action, we found a significant
quadratic trend (F-unique = 7.074, df = 1, p = .01;
F-step = 6. 181, df = 1, p = .01). For militant action
we foUnd a marginally significant linear trend (F-
tunique - 3.33, df = 1, p = .08( F=step = 3.075, df =
the
I, p .0)X.

This content downloaded from

187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION
60
50 .
40 /
30 /
20
10
end of mid- early eind of mid-
Nov. Jan. Febr. Febr. April
- militant action ----- moderate action
Figure 6. Percentages of Union Members in Emmen
Who Expect that Very Many Colleagues
will Participate in Action, by Type of
Action
Probability of success. Perhaps more than
the other determinants of the willingness to
participate, the probability of success is influ-
enced by external events. The 1979 negotia-
tions provide a good example.
In 1979, at the start of the negotiations in the
Netherlands, a strike broke out in West Ger-
many in which a shorter work week was also at
stake. The strike lasted six weeks. Both sides
played hard. Ultimately the West German
unions lost the strike, and early in February
they concluded an agreement which made no
reference to a shorter work week. This out-
come also affected the negotiations in the
Netherlands, and this was expressed most
clearly in the expected success of actions
there. Figure 7 shows the changes in those
expectations. Since we found no significant
differences between the establishments, the re-
sults are here combined.
Even before the disappointing end to the
West German steel strike, the adamant attitude
of the Dutch employers had already made it
clear that little could be gained by moderate
action. The number of union members who felt
moderate action would be effective showed an
immediate and rapid decrease. Members re-
mained optimistic longer about the effective-
ness of militant action. But this optimism also
suffered a setback when, around mid-January
and early February, the metal unions in West
Germany lost their strike. Of the union mem-
bers questioned in early February, 60 percent
felt this would make the negotiations in the
Netherlands a good deal more difficult. Figure
7 reflects this gloomy outlook; the percentage
of union members who were confident that
militant action would change the minds of the
This content downloaded from
187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
employers went down to 25 percent, and for
moderate action to 10 percent.
Due to failing consensus mobilization, action
mobilization which lost its momentum, and
external events that made success unlikely, the
collective motive to participate vanished. It
was weak in two of the three establishments
from the outset, and it disappeared in the third.
Since the reward motives had been negative for
many people from the beginnning, 18 only social
motives might have compensated for this loss
in motivation. In Emmen, however, the social
motives diminished as well, although not in
the same dramatic way as the collective mo-
tives. In Ede and Oss the social motives for
participation in militant action were negative,
so they strengthened the aversion to militant
action. In the case of moderate action, how-
ever, the social motives were positive and did
compensate for the absence of collective mo-
tives. This explains why we found a weak
willingness to participate in moderate action
there.
Type of action. Different costs and benefits
are associated with participation in different
types of action. Table 5 summarizes evidence
on the interaction of motives and moderate or
militant action in relation to willingness to par-
ticipate. Persons who only wish to take part in
moderate action are compared with persons
who are also willing to take part in militant
actions. '9 The first group is of interest because
they perceive such differences in the costs and
benefits that they are not willing to participate
militant action is
40%1 definitely
effective
0
- - nmerate action is
30% - definitely
effective
20%
10% - - _ -
late mid- early late mid-
Nov. Jan. Febr. Febr. April
Note derate action linear trerd, F-unque = 7.313, df = 1,
p 4.01; F-step = 7.71, df = 1, p < .01.
Militant action F-unique = 6.21, df = 1, p .05;
F-step = 6.17, df = 1, p < .05.
Figure 7. The Effectiveness of Trade Union Action
in Attaining the Goal of a Shorter Work
Week
"I For instance, on the average, 50% feared wors-
ening of their position in the company in the case of
participation in militant action, and 32% in the case
of moderate action.
'9 Seventy-three persons were not willing to par-
ticipate in any kind of action. They are omitted from
this table because they are not relevant for this dis-
cussion.
 596 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Table 5. Mean Costs and Benefits of Participation in Moderate or Militant Action by Willingness to Take
Action

Wishes to Participate in
Wishes to Participate in Both Moderate and
Moderate Action Only Militant Action
(n = 79) (n = 200)
Collective Motives
a. How many colleagues will partici-
pate in moderate action? 2.41 2.82
same for militant action 1.69 2.54
b. Is moderate action effective? 0.51 0.25
same for militant action 0.51 0.85
Social Motives
c. moderate action 0.26 0.56
militant action -0.68 0.44
Reward Motives
d. Will position in company grow
worse as a result of participation
in moderate action? -0.33 -0.25
same for militant action -0.66 -0.40

in militant action. The first column of Table 5 collective motive is stronger for militant action
reveals these differences, especially in the so- because such action is perceived to be more
cial and reward motives. In the perception of efficacious. If one has to accept costs anyhow,
these persons, for militant action the costs of the more efficacious type of action is to be
participation are considerably higher than for preferred even if the costs are higher.
moderate action. Such differences could be Different plants. There were large dif-
balanced by collective motives. A look at ferences among the three plants in the strength
Table 5, however, makes it clear that this is not of the union (Table 6). Of the three establish-
the case. There are no differences in perceived ments, the union was strongest in Emmen. In
efficacy, and regarding the number of col- accordance with resource mobilization lit-
leagues, these persons are more pessimistic erature, at the start of the negotiations the
about militant action. In their perception, willingness to take action was the highest in
moderate action has a higher probability of Emmen; Table 6 shows why. To summarize
success because they expect more people to be the evidence: the stronger the position of the
willing to participate. So why should they take union, the greater is the chance that colleagues
the higher costs of militant action? will motivate people to participate; the less
A comparison of this group with the group they fear for worsening their position in the
that supported militant action shows important company, the more favorable can be the ex-
differences in social and collective motives. pected number of participants. The result is
Whereas the social motives of the "moderate" that the members are more easily mobilized. A
group are negative, those of the "militant" union can capitalize on this state of affairs by
group are positive. Optimism about the effi- fighting a conflict where it is strongest, that is,
cacy of militant action and the number of par- in plants that are highly unionized and have a
ticipants results in strong collective motives strong union network. This does not imply,
among the "militant" group as compared to the however, that the union can be assured of
"moderate" group. willingness to take action in such plants. This
It is of interest to note that the differences only refers to the potential which may be
between the two groups on the reward motives mobilized. A campaign that does not go well,
are not very large. In both groups many per- counterpropaganda, and setbacks can also
crush willingness to take action in such plants.
sons expect a worsening of their position in the
company. Nevertheless, all these people are The negotiations of 1979 were a vivid example
willing to participate because other motives of this.
compensate for the costs.
The evidence in Table 5 warrants a final re-
DISCUSSION
mark. The differences in perceived costs and
benefits of each type of action for the "mili- The theory formulated in this paper aims a
tant" group suggest that for this group militantbreak with both the traditional social-
action is more attractive. The social and re- psychological approaches to social movements
ward motives differ only slightly, whereas theand the neglect of social-psychological

This content downloaded from

187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION 597

Table 6. The Strength of the Trade Union, the Expected Reactions of Colleagues, the Fear for a Worsened
Position, and the Expected Number of Participants in the Three Plants

Trade Expects Positive Fears for a Expects

Level of Union Reactions of Worsened Very Many
Organization Network Colleaguesa Positiona Participantsb

Enka-Emmen 65% + 60% 32% 39%

Enka-Ede 30% - 23% 59% 5%
AKZO-Pharma-Oss 15% + 25% 59% 5%

a Expectancies of participation in militant action. Mean percentages from the series of interviews.
b Expectancies of participation in militant action. Highest percentage.

analyses by resource mobilization theory. not participate in a social movement unless

Contrary to the traditional social-psychological
approach, participation in a social movement is
assumed to be rational. The emphasis is not on
personality characteristics or psychological
states, but on the psychological process of
weighing costs and benefits. One of the objec-
tions to the traditional approach is that it de-
fines participation as tension release, and thus
it does not matter in which movement a person
participates. In the theory presented in this
article it does. Participation is seen as a ra-
tional choice in the situation as the person per-
ceives it, and as a way to obtain desired out-
comes. In the eyes of the participant, partici-
pation is a means of reaching valued goals.
These goals and their relation to factors such
as relative deprivation and frustration have
been the subject of much discussion in social-
movement literature. Resource mobilization
has ruled this discussion out of order without
solving the problem. The theory developed in
this article attempts to reconcile the social psy-
chological and resource mobilization ap-
proaches in this respect. Feelings of relative
deprivation or frustration do not necessarily
evoke agreement with the goals of a movement
which pretends to remedy these feelings: goals
have to be perceived as instrumental to the
elimination of these feelings. The research re-
sults support the validity of this argument.
Theoretical emphasis must therefore shift from
relative deprivation to the perceived instru-
mentality of the collective good for the elimi-
nation of relative deprivation. Such percep-
tions do not originate spontaneously. Consen-
sus mobilization is needed for this. Campaigns
are needed which explain the situation and
make clear why the collective good will bring
relief (cf. Schwartz, 1976). Agreement with the
goals of the movement does not necessarily
lead to participation: a person may doubt
whether participation will help to achieve the
goals, social and/or reward motives may be too
negative.
Theories that stress the rationality of partici-
pation in a social movement have to solve the
problem of the dilemma of collective behavior.
As Olson (1977) stated it, rational persons will
selective incentives motivate them to do so.
Resource mobilization theory does not really
solve that problem. Concepts like ideological
incentives (Gamson, 1975; Carden, 1978),
feelings of solidarity (Gamson and Fireman,
1979) or responsibility (Fleishman, 1980), the
perceived indispensability of an individual's
contribution (Tolbert, 1981), differences be-
tween action forms in vulnerability to free rid-
ing (Gamson and Fireman, 1979; Oliver, 1980),
different production functions (Oberschall,
1980; Oliver et al., 1983), or thresholds
(Granovetter, 1978) do not really touch the
heart of the matter, which is- that persons have
to decide at a point when they do not know
whether others will participate.20 This article
argues that the problem can be solved on a
social-psychological level. Since people have
expectations about others' behavior, they can
formulate their "own" production functions.
As the evidence presented demonstrates, this
production function heavily influences the
willingness to participate. On a collective level,
the expectation that others will participate
works as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Counter to
Olson's argument, a collective good can moti-
vate persons to participate in a social move-
ment if they expect that others will also par-
ticipate.
'Moreover, if the expectancy component is a
little larger than zero, a collective motive to
participate can exist if the collective good is
valued highly (cf. Oberschall, 1980). If a person
comes from a supportive social background
(positive social motive) then there can be quite
a few nonsocial costs of participation (negative
reward motive) before the balance turns to the
negative. Oliver et al.'s (1983) theoretical no-
20 Pinard (1983) arrived at the same conclusion.
Using an expectancy-value framework, Pinard tried
to solve the problem primarily by expanding the
value component with moral obligation as a separate
force. He mentioned expectancy of success as a
factor but did not elaborate it in detail. In contrast to
Pinard, the solution here is sought in the expectancy
component by introducing "expectations about
others' behavior" as a separate factor.

This content downloaded from

187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 598 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL
tions about the different production functions
that characterize the relationship between in-
dividual contribution, the number of partici-
pants and the production of the collective good
are not invalidated by this argument. In par-
ticular, their hypotheses concerning the dif-
ferential mobilizability of people depending on
the part of a function that is relevant for them
still stand. We must keep in mind, however,
that individuals construct their own functions
based on their expectations; although these
expectations need not be real, they are real in
their consequences.
The evidence presented makes it clear that
such expectations, in combination with selec-
tive costs and benefits, are of great importance
for the choice a person makes among alterna-
tive forms of action. For instance, in the eyes
of some respondents the goal could be reached
by moderate action. Why should they take the
higher risks of militant action? For those who
did not believe moderate action to be effective,
it did not make much sense to accept the costs
of such action. They preferred to participate in
militant action, even though the perceived
costs were higher.
People's expectations are based on past ex-
periences. In a mobilization campaign a
movement organization tries to influence these
expectations. Resource mobilization theory
has used the mobilization concept in a rather
unspecific way. By making the distinction be-
tween consensus and action mobilization we
separated the processes of convincing and ac-
tivating. The research results on the spread of
knowledge and the beliefs about the instru-
mentality of shorter working time showed the
importance of consensus mobilization as a sep-
arate process. Schwartz (1976) made a similar
distinction between "ignorance reduction" and
"organizational disciplinization." The im-
portance of such distinctions is that they
specify convincing and activating as two dif-
ferent processes with different determinants.
In yet another way, research on mobilization
would do well, to specify mobilization efforts.
Attempts to influence different motives require
different efforts. Influencing the collective
motive demands consensus mobilization for
the collective good, but also attempts to influ-
ence the expectations about the behavior of
others, the probability of success, and the indi-
vidual contribution to the probability of suc-
cess. For instance, by means of tryouts it can
be proved that others will participate. This is a
delicate affair, because one can make persons
believe that enough people will participate and
that their participation is not necessary. Inten-
sifying social motives requires influencing a
person' s social environment. Social networks
(Snow et al., 1980) and mobilization en bloc
This content downloaded from
187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
REVIEW
(Oberschall, 1973) are important in this re-
spect. Influencing reward motives demands
manipulation of rewards and punishments, for
instance, by creating organizations that can
help victims, decrease risks or collect money in
support of activists (cf. Morris, 1981).
REFERENCES
Barnes, Samuel H. and Max Kaase
1979 Political Action. Mass Participation in Five
Western Democracies. London: Sage.
Campbell, Donald and Julian C. Stanley
1966 Experimental and Quasi-Experimental De-
signs for Research. Chicago: Rand Mc-
Nally.
Campbell, John P. and Robert D. Pritchard
1977 "Motivation theory in industrial and orga-
nizational psychology." Pp. 63-131 in Mar-
vin D. Dunnette (ed.), Handbook of Indus-
trial and Organizational Psychology.
Chicago: Rand McNally.
Carden, Maren L.
1978 "The proliferation of a social movement,
ideology and individual incentives in the
contemporary feminist movement." Pp.
179- 96 in Louis Kriesberg (ed.), Research
in Social Movements, Conflict and Change,
Volume 1. Greenwich, CT: JAI.
Davies, James
1962 "Towards a theory of revolution." Ameri-
can Sociological Review 27:5-19.
Feather, N.
1982 Expectations and Actions: Expectancy-
Value Models in Psychology. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Ferree, Myra M. and Frederick D. Miller
Forth- "Mobilization and meaning: toward an inte-
com- gration of social psychological and resource
ing perspectives on social movements."
Sociological Inquiry.
Finn, J. D. and I. Mattson
1978 Multivariate Analysis in Educational Re-
search. Chicago: International Education
Service.
Fireman, Bruce and William A. Gamson
1979 "Utilitarian logic in the resource mobiliza-
tion perspective." Pp. 8-45 in Mayer N.
Zald and John D. McCarthy (eds.), The
Dynamics of Social Movements. Cam-
bridge, MA: Winthrop.
Fleishman, John A.
1980 "Collective action as helping behavior: ef-
fects of responsibility diffusion on contri-
butions to a public good." Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology 38:629-37.
Freeman, Jo
1979 "Resource mobilization and strategy: a
model for analyzing social movement orga-
nization actions." Pp. 167-89 in Mayer
N. Zald and John D. McCarthy (eds.), The
Dynamics of Social Movements. Cam-
bridge, MA: Winthrop.
Freud, Sigmund
1922 Group Psychology and the Analysis of Ego.
London: Hogarth.
 MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION 599
Gamson, William A.
1975 The strategy of Social Protest. Homewood,
IL: Dorsey.
Gamson, William A., Bruce Fireman and Steve
Rytina
1982 Encounters with Unjust Authorities.
Homewood, IL: Dorsey.
Gerlach, Luther P. and Virginia H. Hine
1970 People, Power, Change: Movements of So-
cial Transformation. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill
Geschwender, James A.
1968 "Explorations in the theory of social
movements and revolutions." Social Forces
47:127-35.
Granberg, Donald and Sbren Holmberg
1983 "Modeling the relationships among prefer-
ence, expectations and voting behavior."
Department of Political Science, University
of Gdteborg.
Granovetter, Mark
1978 "Threshold models of collective behavior."
American Journal of Sociology 83:1420-43.
Gurr, Ted Robert
1970 Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Heberle, Rudolf
1968 "Social movements I: types and functions
of social movements." Pp. 438-44 in D.L.
Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan.
Hoffer, Eric
1951 The True Believer. New York: Harper.
Isaac, Larry, Elizabeth Mutran and Sheldon Stryker
1980 "Political protest orientations among black
and white adults." American Sociological
Review 45:191-213.
Jenkins, J. Craig
1983 "Resource mobilization theory and the
study of social movements." Annual Re-
view of Sociology 9:527-53.
Kenniston, Kenneth
1968 Young Radicals: Notes on Committed
Youth. New York: Harvest.
Kerpelman, Louis C.
1969 "Student political activism and ideology:
comparative characteristics of activists and
non-activists." Journal of Counseling Psy-
chology 16:8-13.
Klandermans, P.G. Bert
1979 "Werklozen en de werklozenbeweging."
Mens en Maatschappij 54:5-33.
1983a "The expected number of participants, the
effectiveness of collective action, and the
willingness to participate: the free riders
dilemma reconsidered." Paper presented at
the 1983 American Sociological Association
Annual Meeting, Detroit.
1983b "Rotter's I.E.-scale and socio-political
action-taking: the balance of 20 years of
research." European Journal of Social Psy-
chology 13:399-415.
Kornhauser, William
1959 The politics of mass society. Glencoe, IL:
Free Press.
Kuhl, Julius
1982 "Expectancy-value approach within the
theory of social motivation: elaborations,
This content downloaded from
187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
extensions, critique." Pp. 125-63 in Nor-
man T. Feather (ed.), Expectations and
Actions. Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
Landsberger, Henri A.
1976 "Labor movements, social movements and
social mobility." Pp. 839-77 in Robert
Dubin (ed.), Handbook of Work Organiza-
tion and Society. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Leahy, Peter and Allen Mazur
1978 "A comparison of movements opposed to
nuclear power, fluoridation and abortion."
Pp. 143-54 in Louis Kriesberg (ed.), Re-
search in Social Movements, Conflicts and
Change, Volume 1. Greenwich, CT: JAI.
LeBon, Gustave
[1903] "The mind of the crowds." Pp. 6-11 in
1968 Louis E. Genevie (ed.), Collective Behav-
ior and Social Movements. Itasca, IL:
Peacock.
Marsh, Alan
1977 Protest and Political Consciousness.
London/Beverly Hills: Sage.
Marx, Gary T. and James L. Wood
1975 "Strands of theory and research in collec-
tive behavior." Annual Review of Sociol-
ogy 1:363-429.
McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald
1976 "Resource mobilization and social move-
ments: a partial theory." American Journal
of Sociology 82:1212-93.
Mitchel, Robert C.
1979 "National environmental lobbies and the
apparent illogic of collective action." Pp.
87-121 in Clifford S. Russell (ed.), Collec-
tive Decision Making Applications from
Public Choice Theory. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Mitchell, Terence R.
1974 "Expectancy models of job satisfaction,
occupational preference and effort: a
theoretical, methodological and empirical
appraisal." Psychological Bulletin
81:1053-77.
Moore, Robert S.
1975 "Religion as a source of variation in
working-class images of society." Pp.
35-55 in Martin Bulmer (ed.), Working-
Class Images of Society. London: Rout-
ledge and Kegan Paul.
Morris, Aldon
1981. "Black Southern student sit-in move-
ments: an analysis of internal organiza-
tion." American Sociological Review
46:744-67.
Oberschall, Anthony
1973 Social Conflict and Social Movements. En-
glewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
1980 "Loosely structured collective conflict: a
theory and an application." Pp. 45-68 in
Louis Kriesberg (ed.), Research in Social
Movements, Conflict and Change, Volume
3. Greenwich, CT: JAI,
Oliver, Pamela
1980 "Rewards and punishments as selective in-
centives for collective action: theoretical
investigations." American Journal of
Sociology 85:1356-75.
 600 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Oliver, Pamela, Gerald Marwell and Ruy Teixeira
1983 "Group heterogeneity, interdependence
and the production of collective goods: a
theory of the critical mass, I." Madison,
WI: Department of Sociology, University
of Wisconsin.
Olson, Mancur
1977 The Logic of Collective Action. Public
Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pinard, Maurice
1983 "From deprivation to mobilization." Paper
presented at the Annual Meetings of the
American Sociological Association, De-
troit.
Ragin, Charles C., Shelley Coverman and Mark
Hayward
1982 "Major labor disputes in Britain 1902-
1938." American Sociological Review
47:238-53.
Roberts Ron E. and Robert Marsh Kloss
1974 Social Movements Between the Balcony
and the Barricade. Saint Louis: C. V.
Mosby.
Rothman, Jack
1974 Planning and Organizing for Social Change.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Rotter, Julian B.
1954 Social Learning and Clinical Psychology.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
1972 "Beliefs, social attitudes and behavior: a
social learning analysis." Pp. 335-51 in Ju-
lian B. Rotter, June E. Chance, and E.
Jerry Phares (eds.), Applications of a Social
Learning Theory of Personality. New York:
Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Schwartz, Michael
1976 Radical Protest and Social Structure. New
York: Academy Press.
Smelser, Neil J.
1971 Theory of Collective Behavior. New York:
Free Press.
Snow-, David A., Louis A. Zurcher, Jr., and Sheldon
Ekland-Olson
1980 "Social networks and social movements: a
This content downloaded from
187.250.41.241 on Fri, 20 Oct 2023 19:53:28 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
microstructurat approach to differential re-
cruitment." American Sociological Review
45:787-801.
Tilly, Charles
1979 "Repertoires of contention in America and
Britain, 1750-1830." Pp. 126-156 in Mayer
Zald and John McCarthy (eds.), The
Dynamics of Social Movements. Cam-
bridge, MA: Winthrop.
Toch, Hans
1966 The Social Psychology of Social Move-
ments. London: Methuen.
Tolbert, Pamela
1981 "Determinants of social movement partici-
pation." Paper presented at the Annual
Meetings of the American Sociological As-
sociation, Toronto.
Useem, Bert
1980 "Solidarity model, breakdown model and
the Boston anti-busing movement." Ameri-
can Sociological Review 45:357-69.
Walsh, Edward J.
1978 "Mobilization theory vis a vis a mobilization
process: the case of the United Farm
Workers movement." Pp. 155-77 in Louis
Krnesberg (ed.), Research in Social Move-
ments, Conflicts and Change, Volume 1.
Greenwich, CT: JAI.
Walsh, Edward J. and Rex H. Warland
1983 "Social movement involvement in the wake
of a nuclear accident: activists and free rid-
ers in the Three Mile Island area." American
Sociological Review 48:764-81.
Zald, Mayer and John D. McCarthy
1979 The Dynamics of Social Movements: Re-
source Mobilization, Social Control and
Tactics. Cambridge, MA: Winthrop.
Zurcher, Louis A., Jr., and David A. Snow
1981 "Collective behavior: social movements."
Pp. 447-82 in Morris Rosenberg and Ralph
H. Turner (eds.), Social Psychology,
Sociological Perspectives. New York:
Basic.