Cases Digested Pt.1

Name of the PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION (PCMC) v IGNACIO B.
Petitioner/ TAGYAMON
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 191475 December 11, 2013

Number
Allegations of the Petitioner (PCMC) claimed that respondents belatedly filed their complaint as
petitioners they allowed almost three years to pass making the principle of laches
applicable. Considering that respondents accepted their separation pay and
voluntarily executed deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim, PCMC invoked the
principle of estoppel on the part of respondents to question their separation from
the service.
Defense of the Respondents elevated the matter to the CA in a petition for certiorari. In reversing
defendants the earlier decisions of the LA and the NLRC, the CA refused to apply the principle
of laches, because the case was instituted prior to the expiration of the prescriptive
period set by law which is four years. It stressed that said principle cannot be
invoked earlier than the expiration of the prescriptive period.
Topic Doctrine of Laches under the Court of Equity
Principle Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are
basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist
the enforcement of an existing legal right. Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are
bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them
Court Procedure An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an injury
to the complainants’ rights which should be brought within four years from the
time of their dismissal pursuant to Article 114633 of the Civil Code. Respondents’
complaint filed almost 3 years after their alleged illegal dismissal was still well
within the prescriptive period. Laches cannot, therefore, be invoked yet. To be
sure, laches may be applied only upon the most convincing evidence of deliberate
inaction, for the rights of laborers are protected under the social justice provisions
of the Constitution and under the Civil Code.
Facts Respondents were affected by the petitioner’s (PCMC) retrenchment and voluntary
retirement program due to a slump in the market demand which constrained to
reduce the number of its workforce. Aggrieved by the PCMC’s decision to terminate
their employment, respondents filed for illegal dismissal against PCMC. Petitioner
(PCMC) in response stressed that respondents belatedly filed their complaint as
they allowed almost three years to pass making the principle of laches applicable.
Considering that respondents accepted their separation pay and voluntarily
executed deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim, PCMC invoked the principle of
estoppel on the part of respondents to question their separation from the service.
Finally, as to Marcos, Ilao and Nemis, PCMC emphasized that they were not
dismissed from employment, but in fact they voluntarily retired from employment
to take advantage of the company’s program.The Labor Arbitrer rendered a
decision in favor of PCMC. When the respondents filed an appeal to the NLRC, the
latter sustained the LA decision. Still undaunted, respondents elevated the matter
to the CA in a petition for certiorari. In reversing the earlier decisions of the LA and
the NLRC, the CA refused to apply the principle of laches, because the case was
instituted prior to the expiration of the prescriptive period set by law which is four
years. It stressed that said principle cannot be invoked earlier than the expiration
of the prescriptive period.
Issues Whether or not the doctrine of laches can be invoked against the respondents.
Ruling NO.
Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are
basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist
the enforcement of an existing legal right. Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are
bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them.As for
equity which has been aptly described as a "justice outside legality," this is applied
only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial
rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive
rules being present here, they should preempt and prevail over all abstract
arguments based only on equity.Thus, where the claim was filed within the
[four-year] statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be barred by laches.
Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of
time limited for the commencement of actions at law."
Reference of the abat Jr. v. Court of Appeals. this Court was more emphatic in upholding the rules
case of procedure. We said therein:
As for equity which has been aptly described as a "justice outside legality," this is
applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case,
judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent
positive rules being present here, they should preempt and prevail over all
abstract arguments based only on equity.
Important Notes Philippine Courts are both Courts of Law and Courts of Equity.
Equity is however not applied in all cases. Equity does not apply when there is a
law applicable to a given case.
For all its concerned merits, equity is available only in the absence of law and not
as replacement.
Name of the THE UNITED STATES v JOSE TAMPARONG

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 9527 August 23, 1915.

Number
Allegations of the Respondents, unsatisfied with their conviction from the Court of First Instance,
petitioners escalated the case to the Supreme Court.
Defense of the Petitioners questioned the power of the court to examine the evidence for the
defendants purpose of determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants.
Topic Supreme Court
Principle Judicial Power of the Supreme Court as to appeals is limited to determine the
validity or constitutionality of a statute involved.
Court Procedure Appeals can be taken to the Supreme Court in such cases when the validity or
constitutionality of a statute is involved. This procedure does not carry with it
the right of review of the facts, but is confined to the purpose stated — that is, of
determining the validity or constitutionality of the statute or ordinance upon
which the judgment was predicated.
Facts The defendants were convicted by the justice of the peace of Baguio for having
played the game of chance called "monte" in violation of Ordinance No. 35. They
appealed to the Court of First Instance, where they were again tried and convicted
upon the same charge. An appeal was escalated to the Supreme Court and was
allowed only because the validity of Ordinance No, 35 was drawn in question
during the trial of the cause in the court below.
Issues Whether or not the Supreme Court has the power to review of the facts of the case
to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendants.
Ruling NO.
Under the Spanish criminal procedure, appeals from justices'courts were allowed
only to Courts of First Instance. By section 43 of General Orders No. 58, this
procedure has been so amended that appeals can be taken to the Supreme Court in
such cases when the validity or constitutionality of a statute is involved. This
amendment of the procedure does not carry with it the right of review of the facts,
but is confined to the purpose stated — that is, of determining the validity or
constitutionality of the statute or ordinance upon which the judgment was
predicated. Former cases reviewed, showing that such has uniformly been the
interpretation of section 43 by this court.
In fact, the court has not, since its organization, held in any case that it has the
power to review the facts touching the guilt of an accused person in cases of the
character of the one under consideration.
Reference of the Trinidad vs. Sweeney : Upon the facts stated in the complaint the plaintiff is
case entitled to prosecute an appeal to this court; but upon such appeal the only
question to be considered will be that of the validity or invalidity of the ordinance.
We cannot review the evidence nor pass upon any other question of law which
may appear in the record.
United States vs. Trinidad: In cases where the appeal involves the
constitutionality or validity of a statute, the disagreement of the assessors with the
judgment of the Court of First Instance on appeal does not authorize this court to
review the evidence, but its decision shall be confined only to the question of the
validity of the Act or statute in question, as occurs in the present case.
United States vs. Espiritusanto: we examined the facts touching the due
enactment of the ordinance. After so doing, the ordinance was held valid, but the
facts touching the guilt or innocence of the appellant were not gone into.
Important Notes Section 43 of General Orders No. 58. This procedure has been so amended that
appeals can be taken to the Supreme Court in such cases when the validity or
constitutionality of a statute is involved. This amendment of the procedure does
not carry with it the right of review of the facts, but is confined to the purpose
stated — that is, of determining the validity or constitutionality of the statute or
ordinance upon which the judgment was predicated.
Name of the RAYOS v CITY OF MANILA

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 196063 December 14, 2011

Number
Allegations of the On 7 December 2009, petitioners Orlando A. Rayos, Fe A. Rayos Dela Paz, and Engr.
petitioners Manuel A. Rayos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that
(1) Ordinance No. 7949 is unconstitutional and;
(2) the cases of Lagcao v. Labra7 and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation,
Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila apply squarely to the present
case.
Defense of the In its Complaint, the City of Manila alleged that it passed Ordinance No. 7949
defendants authorizing the City Mayor to acquire "by expropriation, negotiation or by any
other legal means" the parcel of land co-owned by defendants, which is covered by
TCT No. 227512 and with an area of 1,182.20 square meters. The City of Manila
offered to purchase the property at ₱1,000.00 per square meter.
Topic Hierarchy of Courts
Principle That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original
jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
[an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Court’s docket.
Court Procedure Respondent City of Manila filed a complaint against the petitioners for eminent
domain.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
The trial court denied the petition and ruled to continue with the trial for the
determination of just compensation
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied by the TRIAL COURT
Petitioners DIRECTLY FILED A PETITION TO THE SC
Facts The present case originated from a complaint for eminent domain filed by
respondent City of Manila against the petitioners. The city wanted to acquire the
land, and offered ₱1,000.00 per square meter, but the owners wanted ₱50,000.00
per square meter. Laureano, one of the defendants, died on 1 December 2003 and
was substituted by his son petitioner Manuel A. Rayos. The petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing the unconstitutionality of the city's ordinance and citing
Lagcao v. Labra and Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality
(now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila. The trial court denied the motion, and the
petitioners appealed, reiterating their constitutional and precedent-based
arguments.
Issues 1. Whether or not a motion to dismiss is appealable

2. Whether or not the petitioners violates the hierarchy of courts
Ruling 1. NO.
The Supreme Court ruled that an order denying a motion to dismiss is

interlocutory and not appealable. An order denying a motion to dismiss does not
finally dispose of the case, and in effect, allows the case to proceed until the final
adjudication thereof by the court. As such, it is merely interlocutory in nature and
thus, not appealable. Section 1(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final

order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(c) An interlocutory order;
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Clearly, no appeal, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, may be taken from an
interlocutory order. In case of denial of an interlocutory order, the immediate
remedy available to the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, since the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss is not
appealable, petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to
assail such order, and not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. For being a wrong remedy, the present petition deserves outright
dismissal.
2. YES.
Even if the Court treats the present petition as a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, which is the proper remedy to challenge the order denying the motion to
dismiss, the same must be dismissed for violation of the principle of hierarchy of
courts. This well-settled principle dictates that petitioners should file the petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and not directly with this Court.
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is

shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the
court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy
of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a

Court’s docket.
Likewise, assuming the present petition is one for declaratory relief, as can be
gleaned from the caption of the petition, this Court has only appellate, not
original, jurisdiction over such a petition. While this Court may treat a petition
for declaratory relief as one for prohibition or mandamus, over which this Court
exercises original jurisdiction, it must be stressed that this special treatment is
undertaken only in cases with far reaching implications and transcendental
issues that need to be resolved.
Reference of the Section 1 (c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

case
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable. No appeal may be taken from:
(c) An interlocutory order;
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Even if the Court treats the present petition as a petition for certiorari under Rule
65, which is the proper remedy to challenge the order denying the motion to
dismiss, the same must be dismissed for violation of the principle of hierarchy of
courts. This well-settled principle dictates that petitioners should file the petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and not directly with this Court.
Important Notes A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is
shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals.
Name of the UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION v NEA

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012

Number
Allegations of the Petitioners raise the following issues:

petitioners
1. The NEA Board has no power to terminate all the NEA employees;
2. Executive Order No. 119 did not grant the NEA Board the power to terminate all
NEA employees; and
3. Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 were carried out in bad faith.
Defense of the Respondents argue in their Comment dated August 20, 2009 that:
defendants
1. The Court has no jurisdiction over the petition;
2. Injunction is improper in this case given that the assailed resolutions of the NEA
Board have long been implemented; and
3. The assailed NEA Board resolutions were issued in good faith
Principle That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
Court’s docket.
Court Procedure The petitioners DIRECTLY APPEALED TO THE SC
Facts Petitioners are former employees of NEA who were terminated from their
employment with the implementation of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 269 issued
on August 6, 1973.
Under PD 269, Section 5(a)(5), the NEA Board is empowered to organize or

reorganize NEA's staffing structure. Thereafter, in order to enhance and accelerate
the electrification of the whole country, including the privatization of the National
Power Corporation, Republic Act No. (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA Law), was enacted which took effect
on June 26, 2001.
The law imposed upon NEA additional mandates in relation to the promotion of
the role of rural electric cooperatives to achieve national electrification.
On August 28, 2002, former President Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo issued Executive
Order No. 119 directing the NEA Board to submit a reorganization plan. Thus, the
NEA Board issued the assailed resolutions.
Thereafter, the NEA implemented an early retirement program denominated as

the "Early Leavers Program," giving incentives to those who availed of it and left
NEA before the effectivity of the reorganization plan. The other employees of NEA
were terminated effective December 31, 2003.
Issues Whether or not the petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts
Ruling NO.
Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an
exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside
for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case involving
as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees
all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one swift stroke. This
to the mind of the Court entails its attention.
Moreover, the Court has made a similar ruling in National Power Corporation
Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) v. National Power Corporation
(NPC).2 In that case, the NPC-DAMA also filed a petition for injunction directly with
this Court assailing NPC Board Resolution Nos. 2002-124 and 2002-125, both
dated November 18, 2002, directing the termination of all employees of the NPC on
January 31, 2003. Despite such apparent disregard of the principle of hierarchy of
courts, the petition was given due course. We perceive no compelling reason to
treat the instant case differently.
Reference of the National Power Corporation Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC-DAMA) v.
case National Power Corporation (NPC).2 In that case, the NPC-DAMA also filed a
petition for injunction directly with this Court assailing NPC Board Resolution Nos.
2002-124 and 2002-125, both dated November 18, 2002, directing the termination
of all employees of the NPC on January 31, 2003. Despite such apparent disregard
of the principle of hierarchy of courts, the petition was given due course.
Important Notes Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an
exception to this general rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside
for special and important reasons. Such reason exists in the instant case involving
as it does the employment of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700 employees
all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one swift stroke. This
to the mind of the Court entails its attention.
Name of the ERNESTO DY v HON. PALAMOS
Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. September 11, 2013. G.R. No. 196200

Number
Allegations of the His situation calls for the direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction in the
petitioners interest of justice
He deemed it proper to bring this case immediately to the attention of this Court.
He claims that the present case involves a novel issue of law — that is, whether in
an action to recover, a defendant in wrongful possession of the subject matter in
litigation may be allowed to return the same in a deteriorated condition without
any liability.
Defense of the Petition should have been filed with the CA, following the doctrine of hierarchy of
defendants courts.
It pointed out that petitioner failed to state any special or important reason or any
exceptional and compelling circumstance which would warrant a direct recourse
to this Court.
Principle Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is improper
because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in
order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it
to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and
preventing the overcrowding of its docket
Court Procedure
Facts Petitioner Ernesto Dy (petitioner) and his wife, Lourdes Dy (Lourdes), were the
proprietors of Limchia Enterprises and in 1990, they obtained a loan from Orix
Metro Leasing and Finance Corporation (respondent) to fund its acquisition of
M/V Pilar-I, a cargo vessel, which Limchia executed the Deed of Chattel Mortgage.
Due to financial losses suffered when M/V Pilar-I was attacked by pirates, Spouses
Dy failed to make the scheduled payments as required in their promissory note.
Lourdes issued several checks to cover the remainder of their loan but the same
were dishonored by the bank, prompting respondent to institute a criminal
complaint for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.
Issues Whether or not the rule on hierarchy of courts is applicable to the instant petition?
Ruling No, this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of hierarchy of
courts. Justice demands that this Court take cognizance of this case to put an end to
the controversy and resolve the matter which has been dragging on for more than
twenty (20) years. Moreover, in light of the fact that what is involved is a final
judgment promulgated by this Court, it is but proper for petitioner to call upon its
original jurisdiction and seek final clarification.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes The invocation of this Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari has
been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons
clearly stated in the petition, such as, (1) when dictated by the public welfare and
the advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of
justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or (4) when
analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the
immediate and direct handling of the case.
Name of the THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE
Petitioner/ M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY vs.
Respondents COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY,
ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON
Date and G.R. January 21, 2015. G.R. No. 205728

Number
Allegations of the Petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona on this court's discretionary power to take
petitioners cognizance of a petition filed directly to it if warranted by "compelling reasons, or
[by] the nature and importance of the issues raised…”.
Petitioners submit that there are "exceptional and compelling reasons to justify a
direct resort [with] this Court."
Defense of the Petitioners' failure to file the proper suit with a lower court of concurrent
defendants jurisdiction is sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition.
Observation of the hierarchy of courts is compulsory, citing Heirs of Bertuldo

Hinog v. Melicor
While there are exceptions to the general rule on hierarchy of courts, none of these
are present in this case
Principle Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to this Court is improper
because the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in
order for it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions, thereby allowing it
to devote its time and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and
preventing the overcrowding of its docket.
Court Procedure
Facts On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. One of the tarpaulins,
contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH)
Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. On
February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, issued a Notice to
Remove Campaign Materials since it violated the size requirement of two feet (2')
by three feet (3'). Concerned about the imminent threat of prosecution for their
exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for
certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order.
Issues Whether or not the petitioners violated the hierarchy of Courts Doctrine in directly
filing their petition before this court
Ruling No.
The present case falls under the recognized exceptions, and as such may be
resolved by this court directly.
The assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners' right to

freedom of expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases.
The case before this court involves an active effort on the part of the electorate to
reform the political landscape.
There is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of
expression which warrants invocation relief from this court.
This is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of whether
the right of suffrage includes the right of freedom of expression. This is a question
which this court has yet to provide substantial answers to, through jurisprudence.
It is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with
finality on whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed
acts contrary to the Constitution through the assailed issuances.
Although the elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that
necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify
as an exception for direct resort to this court.
If petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies

with the lower courts, any ruling on their part would not have been binding for
other citizens whom respondents may place in the same situation.
The repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute an

exceptionally compelling reason to justify the direct resort to this court.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with
causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus leave
time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that
the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely
necessary or when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to
the policy. It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at
the same time to justify a direct resort to this court.
EXCEPTIONS:
● when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed

at the most immediate time;
● when the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
● in cases of first impression;
● when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the Supreme
Court;
● when the exigency or time element presented in the case cannot be
ignored;
● when the petition filed reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
● when petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law; and
● when the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare
and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader
interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent
nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.
Name of the HOME GUARANTY CORP v R-II BILDERS

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011

Number
Allegations of the HGC, the petitioner in the case, argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
petitioners case due to insufficient docket fees paid by R-II Builders. HGC contended that the
estimated value of the properties involved in the Asset Pool exceeded the amount
covered by the docket fees. Additionally, HGC claimed that the amended complaint
sought to confer jurisdiction when the court initially had none and accused R-II
Builders of forum shopping.
Defense of the R-II Builders and NHA, the respondents in the case, maintained that the RTC did
defendants have jurisdiction over the matter and that the docket fees paid were appropriate.
They asserted that the character of the relief sought fell within the jurisdiction of
the RTC and that the withdrawal of R-II Builders' Amended and Supplemental
Complaint eliminated the forum shopping allegation.
Topic Jurisdiction-Definition
Principle Principle of non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal

court, is an elementary principle in the administration of justice. It states that no
court should interfere with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction that has the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.
Court Procedure On September 1, 2005, R-II Builders filed a complaint against Home Guaranty
Corporation (HGC) and NHA in the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 24.
Branch 24 of the Manila RTC initially issued a writ of preliminary injunction in

favor of R-II Builders. The case was later re-raffled to Branch 22 of the Manila RTC
(respondent RTC). Respondent RTC issued orders admitting R-II Builders'
amended and supplemental complaints, with certain conditions on docket fee
payments.
Respondent RTC also granted R-II Builders' application for a receiver to safeguard
the Asset Pool properties.
Court of Appeals Decision:
The Court of Appeals (CA) Former Special Fifteenth Division determined that the
RTC had jurisdiction over the case, whether it was a real action or one incapable of
pecuniary estimation. The CA denied HGC's motion for reconsideration, affirming
its earlier decision.
Facts The case revolves around a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) entered into between
the National Housing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. The agreement was
for the implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation
Project (SMDRP) which aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite into a
habitable housing project. The JVA outlined the rights and obligations of both
parties, with R-II Builders developing the project and NHA acting as the
landowner/implementing agency.
Issues Whether or not whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañ aque City, Branch
257 violated the doctrine of non-interference or judicial stability when it took
cognizance of a nullification case filed by Teresita Tan, despite the fact that the
collection case from which it originated fell within the jurisdiction of the Makati
RTC..
Ruling YES.
The Supreme Court ruled that Parañ aque RTC indeed violated the doctrine of non-
interference or judicial stability. This doctrine, also known as the principle of
non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, is an
elementary principle in the administration of justice. It states that no court
should interfere with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent
jurisdiction that has the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction.
The rationale behind this rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction. A court
that acquires jurisdiction over a case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment and all its incidents.
In this case, the Makati RTC had issued a judgment in the collection case, and all
proceedings related to the execution of that judgment were considered
proceedings in that same case. This means that any issues arising from the
execution, including the validity of the levy and sale of the subject property, should
have been dealt with by the Makati RTC, which originally rendered the judgment.
The Parañaque RTC's decision to entertain the nullification case, despite being
a co-equal court with the Makati RTC, was deemed a violation of the doctrine of
non-interference. The Supreme Court emphasized that the power to open, modify,
or vacate a judgment or order is restricted to the court that rendered the judgment
or order. The Parañ aque RTC lacked jurisdiction to nullify the levy and sale of the
subject property, as that power lay with the Makati RTC.
Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the Parañ aque RTC's decision to nullify
the auction sale and related documents was void for lack of jurisdiction, and the
nullification case should not have been entertained. The doctrine of non-
interference or judicial stability was upheld in this case as a fundamental principle
to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and prevent conflicting rulings from
co-equal courts.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right
to act in a case. In addition to being conferred by the Constitution and the law, the
rule is settled that a court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
the relevant allegations in the complaint, the law in effect when the action is filed,
and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted. Consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of
the Revised Rules of Court which provides that the prescribed fees shall be paid in
full "upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiates an action or
proceeding", the well-entrenched rule is to the effect that a court acquires
jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing and docket
fees.
Name of the DAVAO LIGHT v COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 111685, August 20, 2001

Number
Allegations of the The plaintiff, a private corporation, initially claimed Banilad, Cebu City, as its
petitioners principal place of business in the lawsuit, which is crucial for determining the
venue.
Defense of the However, the defendant's motion to dismiss presented evidence from contracts
defendants with NAPOCOR indicating that the plaintiff's principal office was at "163-165 P.
Reyes Street, Davao City." This discrepancy in the plaintiff's claimed principal
office led to a dispute over the appropriate venue for the lawsuit. The
representation made by the plaintiff in the 2 aforementioned Lease Contracts
stating that its principal office is at "163-165 P. Reyes Street, Davao City" bars the
plaintiff from denying the same.
Topic Jurisdiction v Venue
Principle
Court Procedure
Facts On April 10, 1992, petitioner Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. filed a complaint for
damages against private respondent Francisco Tesorero before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City complaint praying for damages in the amount of
P11,000,000.00.
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss claiming that: (a) the complaint
did not state a cause of action; (b) the plaintiff's claim has been extinguished or
otherwise rendered moot and academic; (c) there was non-joinder of
indispensable parties; and (d) venue was improperly laid. Of these four (4)
grounds, the last mentioned is most material in this case at the bar.
Consequently, the trial court issued a Resolution dismissing petitioner's complaint

on the ground of improper venue.
The court acknowledges that venue choices should not be arbitrary, as parties
might have hidden motives. Courts also consider factors of judicial efficiency,
convenience, and the rules of procedure when deciding venue disputes. Based on
these principles, the court ruled that the plaintiff's principal office was in Davao
City and dismissed the complaint due to improper venue, directing the case to be
filed in Davao City.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated October 1,

1992.
The petitioner initially filed a case in the Supreme Court but it was referred to the
Court of Appeals for resolution.
The Court of Appeals made a decision denying the petitioner's request, and the
petitioner received a copy of the decision. Instead of filing a motion for
reconsideration, the petitioner directly filed a new petition with the Supreme
Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not address one of the important
issues and that the petitioner has the right to file the case in Cebu City where its
main office is located.
The petitioner claims that it should not be prevented from doing so based on an
alleged estoppel, unless specific conditions are met
Issues Whether or not the proper venue is Davao City or Cebu City for the civil case filed
by the petitioner, considering the private respondent's argument that the
petitioner is estopped from claiming residence in Cebu City based on contradictory
statements and evidence presented.
Ruling YES.
The Court determined that the proper venue for the case is Cebu City, rejecting the
arguments made by the private respondent regarding estoppel and contradictory
statements. The Court emphasized that the petitioner's principal office is in Cebu
City as stated in its articles of incorporation, and that the representations made in
contracts and other civil cases were not sufficient to establish a different principal
office for venue purposes.
It cannot be disputed that petitioner's principal office is in Cebu City, per its
amended articles of incorporation and by-laws. An action for damages being a
personal action, venue is determined pursuant to Rule 4, section 2 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tied
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant
or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Reference of the Practically the same issue was addressed in Young Auto Supply Co. v. Court of
case Appeals.14 In the aforesaid case, the defendant therein sought the dismissal of an
action filed by the plaintiff, a corporation, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, on the ground of improper venue. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss; on certiorari before the Court of Appeals, the denial was reversed and the
case was dismissed. According to the appellate tribunal, venue was improperly laid
since the address of the plaintiff was supposedly in Pasay City, as evidenced by a
contract of sale, letters and several commercial documents sent by the plaintiff to
the defendant, even though the plaintiff's articles of incorporation stated that its
principal office was in Cebu City. On appeal, we reversed the Court of Appeals. We
reasoned out thus:
In the Regional Trial Courts, all personal actions are commenced and tried in the
province or city where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be
found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff x x x.
There are two plaintiffs in the case at bench: a natural person and a domestic
corporation. Both plaintiffs aver in their complaint that they are residents of Cebu
City, thus:
The Article of Incorporation of YASCO (SEC Reg. No. 22083) states:
"THIRD. That the place where the principal office of the corporation is to be
established or located is at Cebu City, Philippines (as amended on December 20,
1980 and further amended on December 20, 1984)" x x x.
A corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term is applied
to a natural person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical
sense a resident of the place where its principal office is located as stated in the
articles of incorporation (Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd., 34 Phil. 526
[1916] Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillo, 19 SCRA 379 [1967]). The Corporation
Code precisely requires each corporation to specify in its articles of incorporation
the "place where the principal office of the corporation is to be located which must
be within the Philippines" (Sec. 14[3]). The purpose of this requirement is to fix the
residence of a corporation in a definite place, instead of allowing it to be
ambulatory.
Important Notes Venue and jurisdiction are entirely distinct matters. Jurisdiction may not be
conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of an action; but the venue of an action as fixed
by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties and an objection that the
plaintiff brought his suit in the wrong county may be waived by the failure of the
defendant to make a timely objection. In either case, the court may render a valid
judgment. Rules as to jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of
the parties, whether or not a prohibition exists against their alteration.
Venue is determined pursuant to Rule 4, section 2 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tied where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff
EXPLANATION: Venue means the place where a lawsuit can be started. For
personal matters, like disputes between people, the lawsuit can be started where
the plaintiff (the one filing the case) lives, or where the defendant (the one being
sued) lives. If the defendant doesn't live there, then it can be where they can be
found, and the plaintiff can choose where to start the case.
Name of the NOCUM v LUCIO TAN

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 145022. September 23, 2005

Number
Allegations of the INQUIRER and NOCUM filed their joint answer, dated October 27, 1998, wherein
petitioners they alleged that: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; (2) the
defamatory statements alleged in the complaint were general conclusions without
factual premises; (3) the questioned news report constituted fair and true report
on the matters of public interest concerning a public figure and therefore, was
privileged in nature; and (4) malice on their part was negated by the publication in
the same article of plaintiff's or PAL's side of the dispute with the pilot's union.
Defense of the On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand
defendants Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-2288, seeking moral and exemplary damages
for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news article.
Further, ALPAP and UMALI likewise filed their joint answer, dated October 31,
1998, and alleged therein that: (1) the complaint stated no cause of action; (2)
venue was improperly laid; and (3) plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a real party in
interest. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the residence of the
complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place
where the libelous article was printed and first published.
Topic Jurisdiction v. Venue
Principle Hon. Florenz D. Regalado,14 differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a)
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place where
the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law;
venue, of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court
and the subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or
petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be
conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the act or agreement of the
parties.
Court Procedure Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an Order dated February 10, 1999,
dismissing the complaint without prejudice on the ground of improper venue.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent Lucio Tan filed an

Omnibus Motion dated February 24, 1999, seeking reconsideration of the
dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the amended
complaint, it is alleged that "This article was printed and first published in the City
of Makati" (p. 53, Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 55192), and in par. 2.04.1, that "This
caricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati" (p. 55, id.).
The lower court, after having the case dismissed for improper venue, admitted the
amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of dismissal.
Facts Respondent Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum, Capt.
Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
seeking moral and exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory
imputations contained in a news article.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an order dismissing the complaint
without prejudice on the ground on improper venue.
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent Lucio Tan filed an

Omnibus Motion dated February 24, 1999, seeking reconsideration of the
dismissal and admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the amended
complaint, it is alleged that "This article was printed and first published in the City
of Makati" (p. 53, Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 55192), and in par. 2.04.1, that "This
caricature was printed and first published in the The lower court, after having the
case dismissed for improper venue, admitted the amended complaint and deemed
set aside the previous order of dismissal.
The petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA which denied the same.City of
Makati" (p. 55, id.).
Issues Whether or not the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case upon the
filing of the original complaint for damages
Ruling YES.
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the
complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's causes of action. In the case at bar, after examining the
original complaint, we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when
the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondent's cause of
action is for damages arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the
RTC. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code provides that it is a Court of First
Instance 12 that is specifically designated to try a libel case.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former colleague, the Hon.
Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows:
(a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue is the place
where the case is to be heard or tried;
(b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law;
(c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter;
venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and respondent;
and,
(d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may
be conferred by the act or agreement of the parties.
Reference of the In Escribano v. Avila, pursuant to Republic Act No. 4363, 17 we laid down the
case following rules on the venue of the criminal and civil actions in written
defamations.
1. General rule: The action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense.
2. If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila at the time the
offense was committed, the venue is Manila or the city or province where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
3. Where an offended party is a public official with office outside of Manila, the
venue is the province or the city where he held office at the time of the commission
of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published.
4. If an offended party is a private person, the venue is his place of residence at the
time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and
first published.
The common feature of the foregoing rules is that whether the offended party is a
public officer or a private person, he has always the option to file the action in the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed
or first published.
We further restated the rules on venue in Article 360 as follows:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the
libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed
in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time
of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the
commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action
may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held
office at the time of the commission of the offense.
Important Notes The mistake or deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been
cured in the Amended Complaint which can still be properly admitted, pursuant to
Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in as much as the Order of dismissal is
not yet final. Besides, there is no substantial amendment in the Amended
Complaint which would affect the defendants' defenses and their Answers. The
Amendment is merely formal, contrary to the contention of the defendants that it is
substantial.
We note that the amended complaint or amendment to the complaint was not
intended to vest jurisdiction to the lower court, where originally it had none.
The amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. It is a
well-established rule that venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in
criminal actions. Assuming that venue was properly laid in the court where the
action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In
fact, in civil cases, venue may be waived.
It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel

may be waived since they do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of
venue is procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to jurisdiction of
the court over the person rather than the subject matter. Venue relates to trial and
not to jurisdiction.20 It is a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the
place of trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be
brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court.21 It is meant to provide
convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their access to the courts as it
relates to the place of trial.22 In contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that
venue is jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction
Name of the PADLAN v DINGLASAN

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 180321. March 20, 2013.

Number
Allegations of the On January 17, 2000, petitioner, through counsel, filed an Opposition to Declare
petitioners Defendant in Default with Motion to Dismiss Case for Lack of Jurisdiction Over the
Person of Defendant. Petitioner claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over her, because the summons was not validly served upon her person, but only
by means of substituted service through her mother. Petitioner maintained that
she has long been residing in Japan after she married a Japanese national and only
comes to the Philippines for a brief vacation once every two years.
Defense of the Respondents demanded petitioner to surrender possession of Lot No. 625-K, but
defendants the latter refused. Respondents were then forced to file a case before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan for the Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 137466, docketed as Civil Case No. 438-ML. Summons was, thereafter,
served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan
On December 13, 1999, respondents moved to declare petitioner in default and

prayed that they be allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Topic Determined by the allegations in the complaint
Principle Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The
nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of
the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in
the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments
therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Court Procedure This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 dated June 29,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86983, and the Resolution
dated October 23, 2007 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondents filed their Complaint with the RTC; hence, before proceeding any
further with any other issues raised by the petitioner, it is essential to ascertain
whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case based on the
above-quoted provisions.
Facts Elenita Dinglasan (Elenita) was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by
TCT No. T-105602. While on board a jeepney, Elenita's mother, Lilia Baluyot (Lilia),
had a conversation with one Maura Passion (Maura) regarding the sale of said
property. Believing that Maura was a real estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owner's
copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to Maura. Maura then subdivided the
property into several lots under the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo.
Through a falsified deed of sale bearing forged signature of Elenita and Felicisimo,
Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers, one of whom was Lorna Ong
(Lorna). Sometime in August 1990, Lorna sold the lot to Editha Padlan for P4,000.
After learning what happened, Elenita demanded Padlan to surrender possession

of said land, but the latter refused. Respondents files a case before the RTC of
Balanga, Bataan and summons to petitioner was thereafter served.
On December 13, 1999, respondents moved to declare petitioner in default and

prayed that they be allowed to present evidence ex parte. Petitioner opposed the
same contending that the court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter
and over her person.
Issues Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
person of the petitioner.
Ruling NO.
The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and consequently, over the
person of the petitioner.
Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time BP 129, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by RA No. 7691, An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession, of real property, or any interest therein which does not
exceed P20,000 or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed P50, 000.
In order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination
of the complaint is essential. Basic as hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations
in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action.
In the case at bar, the only basis of valuation of the subject property is the value
alleged in the complaint that the lot was sold in the amount of P4, 000. No tax
declaration was even presented that would show the valuation of the subject
property. Since the amount alleged is only P4, 000, the MTC and not the RTC has
jurisdiction over the action.
Reference of the Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
case original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; . . .
Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level
courts, thus:
Section 3.Section 33 of the same law [BP Blg. 129] is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in
cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be
determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots
Important Notes In order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an examination
of the complaint is essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations
in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which
court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also
remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Name of the GONZALES v QUIRICO PE

Petitioner/
Respondents

Number
Allegations of the Petitioners alleged that since respondent failed to pay the docket and other legal
petitioners fees at the time he filed the Notice of Appeal, his appeal was deemed not perfected
in contemplation of the law. Making the RTC decision final and executory. Section
4, Rule 41
Defense of the Respondent theorizes that his appeal has been perfected by the mere filing of the
defendants notice of appeal and the trial court is now relieved of jurisdiction to dismiss his
appeal and, therefore, only the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to determine and
rule on the propriety of his appeal. Section 9, Rule 41
Topic Residual power/jurisdiction
Principle The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter
involved in the appeal.
There is no residual jurisdiction to speak of where no appeal or petition has even

been filed.
Court Procedure Petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision dated June 23,
2004 and Resolution dated February 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals.
Facts The respondent Quirico Pe was engaged in the business of Construction materials
and had business transactions with the petitioner.
The respondent agreed to supply cement to the two projects of the DPWH which
were awarded to the petitioner. To avail of the prepayment program of the DPWH,
the petitioner issued a blank check (no date and amount) in favor of the
respondent in exchange of OR# 1175 for ₱1,507,008 for 15,697 bags of cement
issued by the respondent.
The check was supposed to be just a guarantee, however, one year later, the
respondent filled out the check in the amount of ₱2,062,000.00 dated June 30,
1999.
The petitioner filed an amended complaint for Declaration of Payment,

Cancellation of Document and Damages against respondent in the RTC.
The respondent filed an answer to the complaint attesting that he had delivered
40,360 bags of cement to the petitioner who remitted ₱2,306,500.00 thereby
having an outstanding balance of ₱2,062,000.00. The check was dishonored for
being DAIF.
By way of compulsory counterclaim, he sought recovery of the balance of

P2,062,000.00, with interest at 24% from January 29, 1999 until fully paid as
actual damages.
The RTC, in applying the Negotiable Instrument Law, rendered judgment in favor
of the petitioner and dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim.
After receipt of the copy of the decision, the respondent filed a Notice of Appeal on
July 30, 2002. The RTC gave due course of the respondent’s appeal and directed
the Branch Clerk of Court to transmit the entire record of the case to the CA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal, and for Issuance
of Writ of Execution, stating that respondent’s appeal should be dismissed as the
same was not perfected due to non-payment of docket and other lawful fees. The
trial court dismissed respondent's appeal and directed the issuance of a writ of
execution to implement the RTC Decision.
The respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order,16
seeking to set aside the RTC Order dated September 23, 2002.
The CA granted the respondents’ prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and, in
the Resolution18 dated August 20, 2003, approved the respondent’s injunction
bond and directed the Division Clerk of Court to issue the writ of preliminary
injunction.
“The trial court is hereby ordered to assess the appellate docket fees, if it has not
done so, and allow the petitioner to pay such fees and give due course to the
petitioner's appeal. No costs.”
The petitioner filed an MR but was later denied by CA thus, the petition.
Issues Whether or not the court of appeals erred in reversing the decision of the lower
court and allowing respondent to belatedly pay the required appellate docket and
other legal fees.
Ruling YES.
Since respondent’s appeal was not perfected within the 15-day reglementary
period, it was as if no appeal was actually taken. Therefore, the RTC retains
jurisdiction to rule on pending incidents lodged before it, such as the petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration, to Dismiss Appeal, and for Issuance of Writ of
Execution, filed on August 26, 2002, which sought to set aside its Order dated
August 5, 2002 that gave due course to respondent’s Notice of Appeal, and directed
the issuance of a writ of execution. Having no jurisdiction over the case, the
prudent thing that the CA should have done was to dismiss the respondent’s
appeal for failure to pay the appeal fees, and declare that the RTC Decision dated
June 28, 2002 has now become final and executory.
The Court of Appeals erroneously took cognizant over the case. The RTC decision
should be reinstated and the said decision having become final and executory
should be promptly executed.
To recapitulate, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly
comply with the requirements of the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss
of the right to appeal.30 The rules require that from the date of receipt of the
assailed RTC order denying one’s motion for reconsideration, an appellant may
take an appeal to the CA by filing a notice of appeal with the RTC and paying
the required docket and other lawful fees with the RTC Branch Clerk of Court,
within the 15-day reglementary period for the perfection of an appeal.
Otherwise, the appellant's appeal is not perfected, and the CA may dismiss the
appeal on the ground of non-payment of docket and other lawful fees. As a
consequence, the assailed RTC decision shall become final and executory and,
therefore, the prevailing parties can move for the issuance of a writ of execution.
While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to
perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It
raises jurisdictional problem, as it deprives the appellate court of its jurisdiction
over the appeal. After a decision is declared final and executory, vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within
the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the decision on the case.31
Reference of the (Residual Jurisdiction: This was not applicable in this case because the appeal was
case not perfected in the first place. However, it was still discussed)
Section 9., Rule 41 of the Rules of Court
Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — A party's appeal by notice of appeal is

deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to

the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due
time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal
of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject
matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the
expiration of the appeal of the other parties.
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on
appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights
of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal
in accordance with 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. (9a)
Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules states that the CA may dismiss an appeal taken
from the RTC on the ground of non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees
within the 15-day reglementary period:
SEC 13. Dismissal of appeal. — Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the
record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may motu proprio or on
motion dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time, or for non-payment of
the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
On the failure to pay appellate fee, the SC said that for negligence to be excusable
must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded
against. In this case, there was no payment of appellate fee made at all.
Important Notes The one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the
requirements of the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to
appeal.
While every litigant must be given the ample opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to
perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It
raises jurisdictional problems, as it deprives the appellate court of its jurisdiction
over the appeal. After a decision is declared final and executory, vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within
the prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the decision on the case.
Name of the BAGANU v SPOUSES AGGABAO

Petitioner/
Respondents

Number
Allegations of the The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR Secretary’s
petitioners jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ conflicting claims of ownership, notwithstanding
that the same issue is pending with the RTC. By ruling that the petitioner bought
Lot 258 (and not Lot 322) from Atty. Binag and for adjudicating Lot 322 to the
respondents, the DENR effectively reformed contracts and determined claims of
ownership over a real property – matters beyond the DENR’s competence to
determine.
The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction since
the issue of who has a better right over Lot 322 does not involve the "specialized
technical expertise" of the DENR. On the contrary, the issue involves interpretation
of contracts, appreciation of evidence and the application of the pertinent Civil
Code provisions, which are matters within the competence of the courts.
Defense of the
defendants
Topic Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Principle Doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a

controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.
Court Procedure Motion for reconsideration filed by Rosito Bagunu (petitioner) to reverse our April
13, 2009 Resolution which denied his petition for review on certiorari for lack of
merit.
Facts Spouses Aggabao filed a protest against the petitioner’s’ free patent application
over a parcel of unregistered landlocated in Caniogan, Sto. Tomas, Isabela, pending
before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region II,
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.
The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first
sale) to Felicisimo Bautista. In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land
(second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag.
On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent over the subject land
with the Bureau of Lands. On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject
land (third sale) to the petitioner, who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent
applicant. The parties deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the
same lot subject of Atty. Binags pending free patent application.
On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the petitioner’s free
patent application. The respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on
the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June 23, 1971 and April 15,
1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael Bautista.
On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully
included Lot 322 in his free patent application since this lot belongs to the
respondents.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office denied the
motion ruling that in determining the identity of a lot, the boundaries and not the
lot number assigned to it are controlling. Since the boundaries indicated in the
deed of sale in the petitioner’s favor correspond to the boundaries of Lot 258, what
the petitioner acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the erroneous description of
the lot sold as Lot 322.
On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed the ruling of the DENR Regional Office.
After noting the differences in the boundaries stated in the parties respective
Deeds of Sale, the DENR Secretary concluded that the land claimed by the
petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed by the respondents.
The DENR Secretary ruled that based on the parties’ respective deeds of sale, the
Subdivision Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner and Atty. Binags affidavit -
claiming that the designation of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the petitioner’s favor
is erroneous -what the petitioner really acquired was Lot 258 and not Lot 322.
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA affirmed DENR Secretary

Decision applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The CA ruled that since
questions on the identity of a land require a technical determination by the
appropriate administrative body, the findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office,
as affirmed by the DENR Secretary, are entitled to great respect, if not finality.
Issues Whether or not the CA is wrong in applying the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction.
(The DENR has primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of title over public
lands)
Ruling No, in the determination of the identity of a public land is within the DENR’s
exclusive jurisdiction to manage and dispose of lands of the public domain.
Reference of the Doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a
case controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.
Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192, the Director of the Lands Management
Bureau has the duty, among others, to assist the DENR Secretary in carrying out
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141) by having direct
executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale or any other forms of
concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain.
Important Notes If the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills
and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or
intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even
though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
It applies "where a (1) claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into
play whenever (2) enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues
which, (3) under a regulatory scheme, have been (4) placed within the special
competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.
The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for
the dismissal of the case. It need only be suspended until after the matters within
the competence of [the Lands Management Bureau] are threshed out and
determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is salutarily served.
The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the
regular courts’ area of competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial in
character. However, regular courts would have no power to conclusively resolve
this issue of ownership given the public character of the land, since under C.A. No.
141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192, the disposition and management of
public lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject
to review by the DENR Secretary.
Name of the OMICTIN v COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2007

Number
Allegations of the The criminal case for estafa against George I. Lagos should not be suspended, as
petitioners there is no prejudicial question between the SEC case and the criminal case.
Saag Phils., Inc. is a separate legal entity from Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., and the authority
of the petitioner to act on behalf of Saag Phils., Inc. is not relevant to the criminal
case.
The SEC case was filed merely to delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Defense of the The SEC case involves issues related to the corporate status of Saag Phils., Inc. and
defendants the authority of the petitioner to act on its behalf.
The resolution of these issues in the SEC case could impact the criminal case, as
one of the elements of estafa is a valid demand, and the validity of the demand is
tied to the authority of the petitioner.
Principle The doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows a court to refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction when the resolution of a case involves technical and intricate matters
that fall within the competence of an administrative agency or a specialized
tribunal.
Court Procedure Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court seeking to nullify
the Court of Appeals' decision to suspend the criminal proceedings.
The Court of Appeals initially ruled in favor of suspending the criminal case due to
the existence of a prejudicial question.
The SEC case was originally filed with the SEC but was later transferred to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) due to changes in jurisdiction under Republic Act No.
8799.
The petitioner argued that the SEC case and the criminal case were not related by a
prejudicial question, and the suspension was not justified.
Facts Vincent E. Omictin, the petitioner and Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag
Phils., Inc., filed a complaint for estafa against George I. Lagos, the respondent. The
complaint alleged that Lagos, the former president of Saag Phils., Inc., failed to
return two company vehicles entrusted to him. The case progressed to indictment,
but Lagos filed a motion to suspend proceedings and recuse the presiding judge
based on the existence of a pending case before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) involving the same parties.
Issues Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable in this case.
Ruling YES.
The Court ruled that a prejudicial question indeed exists, warranting the
suspension of the criminal proceedings. Additionally, the Court held that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable to the case. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction recognizes that in certain cases involving technical and specialized
matters within the expertise of an administrative agency, the initial decision
should be left to that agency rather than a court. In this case, the issues raised in
the intra-corporate dispute involve the status of Saag Phils., Inc. and the authority
of Omictin to act on behalf of the corporation, which are matters related to
corporate law and are within the competence of the RTC hearing the intra-
corporate case. The RTC, acting as a specially designated tribunal, has the primary
jurisdiction to determine these issues.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes The doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows specialized agencies or tribunals to
handle cases involving technical or intricate matters within their expertise.
In this case, the SEC case and the criminal case were considered related, as the
resolution of the issues in the SEC case could impact the outcome of the criminal
case.
The suspension of criminal proceedings due to the existence of a prejudicial

question is a procedural remedy to ensure that the resolution of related issues is
done in an orderly manner.
Name of the EURO-MED LABORATORIES v PROVINCE OF BATANGAS

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 148106, July 17, 2006

Number
Allegations of the The Province of Batangas owed Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. a sum of money
petitioners amounting to P487,662.80 as of February 28, 1998, for purchases of Intravenous
Fluids (IVF) products made between August 19, 1992, and August 11, 1998.
The purchases were supported by invoices duly received and signed by the
authorized representatives of the Province of Batangas.
Despite repeated demands, the Province of Batangas failed to settle its unpaid
accounts.
Defense of the The Province of Batangas admitted most of the allegations but denied the specific
defendants unpaid balance mentioned in the complaint.
The Province claimed that it had made some payments, not reflected in the
complaint, and that it was making efforts to determine the accurate amount owed.
The Province argued that the case involved compliance with the Local Government
Code provisions and COA rules on supply and property management, and
therefore, the Commission on Audit (COA) had primary jurisdiction to resolve the
matter.
Principle The doctrine of primary jurisdiction states that if a case involves issues requiring
the expertise, specialized training, and knowledge of an administrative body, relief
must first be sought through an administrative proceeding before resorting to the
courts, even if the matter falls within the court's jurisdiction. It applies when
enforcement of a claim necessitates the resolution of issues placed within the
competence of an administrative agency
Court Procedure Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. filed a complaint for a sum of money against the
Province of Batangas in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Facts Petitioner Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil., Inc. filed a complaint for sum of money
against respondent Province of Batangas, alleging unpaid balances for Intravenous
Fluids (IVF) products supplied to various government hospitals. Respondent
admitted most allegations but disputed the unpaid balance due to claimed
payments and ongoing efforts to ascertain the true amount owed. During trial,
respondent moved to dismiss the case, asserting that the Commission on Audit
(COA) had primary jurisdiction over the money claim due to the applicable Local
Government Code provisions and COA rules on supply and property management
in local governments. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted respondent's motion
and dismissed the case without prejudice.
Issues 1. Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to the case.
2. Whether respondent's participation in the proceedings waived its right to

invoke primary jurisdiction.
Ruling 1. YES.
This case is one over which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction clearly held sway
for although petitioner’s collection suit for P487,662.80 was within the jurisdiction
of the RTC,13 the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s claim brought it clearly
within the ambit of the COA’s jurisdiction.
First, petitioner was seeking the enforcement of a claim for a certain amount of
money against a local government unit. This brought the case within the COA’s
domain to pass upon money claims against the government or any subdivision
thereof under Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines:14
The authority and powers of the Commission [on Audit] shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to the examination, audit, and settlement of all
debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities.
The scope of the COA’s authority to take cognizance of claims is circumscribed,

however, by an unbroken line of cases holding statutes of similar import to mean
only liquidated claims, or those determined or readily determinable from
vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of accounting officers.15
Petitioner’s claim was for a fixed amount and although respondent took issue with
the accuracy of petitioner’s summation of its accountabilities, the amount thereof
was readily determinable from the receipts, invoices and other documents. Thus,
the claim was well within the COA’s jurisdiction under the Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines.
2. NO.
The Supreme Court ruled that the court may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction
sua sponte and its invocation cannot be waived by the failure of the parties to
argue it as the doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial
and administrative bodies and not for the convenience of the parties
Reference of the
case
Important Notes The doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows an administrative agency to address
issues within its expertise before the courts, even if the courts have jurisdiction.
The court may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction on its own, and it cannot be
waived by the parties as the doctrine serves to properly allocate power between
judicial and administrative bodies.
The COA has jurisdiction over claims against the government and its subdivisions,
especially when compliance with specific laws and regulations is involved.
Name of the AGRA ET AL v COA

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 167807 : December 6, 2011

Number
Allegations of the A group of NEA employees claimed that they did not receive meal, rice, and
petitioners children's allowances. Thus, they filed a special civil action for mandamus against
NEA and its Board of Administrators alleging violation of their right to the equal
protection clause under the Constitution.
Defense of the The assailed COA decision is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
defendants disallowance of payment for the rice [subsidy] by the COA is in accord with the law
and the rules." COA maintains that the law on the matter, Section 12 of Republic
Act No. 6758, is clear, as its last sentence provides reservation of certain
allowances to incumbents.
Principle Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body is clothed
with original and exclusive jurisdiction, courts are utterly without power and
authority to exercise concurrently such jurisdiction.
Court Procedure This is a special civil action via certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure from the Decision of the Commission on
Audit (COA) No. 2003-134 dated October 9, 2003, which denied the grant of rice
allowance to employees of the National Electrification Administration (NEA) who
were hired after June 30, 1989 (petitioners) and COA's Resolution 2 No. 2005-010
dated February 24, 2005, which likewise denied petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration.
Facts On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989) took effect, Section 12 of which provides for the
standardization of salary rates of government employees.
Pursuant to its authority to implement Republic Act No. 6758 under Section 23
thereof, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) on October 2, 1989
issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), otherwise
known as the "Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6758."
A group of NEA employees claimed that they did not receive meal, rice, and
children's allowances. Thus, they filed a special civil action for mandamus against
NEA and its Board of Administrators alleging violation of their right to the equal
protection clause under the Constitution.
RTC rendered its Decision in their favor. RTC issued a Writ of Execution.
Thereafter, the RTC issued a Notice of Garnishment against the funds of NEA with
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).
NEA questioned before the Court of Appeals the Orders of the lower court. Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision declaring null and void the Resolution as well as the
Order of the RTC, and ordering the implementation of a writ of execution against
the funds of NEA. Thus, NEA filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this
Court.
Court reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals decision.
However, the resident auditor of COA did not allow the payment of rice allowance
to NEA employees who were not incumbents as of June 30, 1989, under Notice of
Disallowance. NEA appealed Agullana's disallowance to the COA arguing that the
disallowance had no basis in law and in fact, and that the subject disbursement
was anchored on a court decision that had become final and executory. The COA
denied the appeal from the disallowance in a Decision.
Issues 1. Whether or not the immutability of final decision doctrine must prevail over the
exclusive jurisdiction of [the COA] to audit and settle disbursements of funds;
2. Whether or not the NEA employees hired after June 30, 1989 are entitled to rice
allowance.
Ruling 1. NO.
The COA prevails. The immutability rule applies only when the decision is
promulgated by a court possessed of jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. All
money claims against the Government must be filed with the Commission on Audit
which shall act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the
claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect sue
the State thereby.
2. NO.
As petitioners were hired after June 30, 1989, the COA was correct in disallowing
the grant of the benefit to them, as they were clearly not entitled to it. As quoted
above, we have repeatedly held that under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, the
only requirements for the continuous grant of allowances and fringe benefits on
top of the standardized salary rates for employees of GOCCs and GFIs are as
follows: (1) the employee must be an incumbent as of July 1, 1989; and (2) the
allowance or benefit was not consolidated in the standardized salary rate as
prescribed by Republic Act No. 6758.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.

COA Decision No. 2003-134 dated October 9, 2003 and COA Resolution No. 2005-
010dated February 24, 2005 are hereby AFFIRMED with the CLARIFICATION that
the petitioners shall no longer be required to refund the rice subsidies for the
period January to August 2001, which they had received from NEA but were later
disallowed by the COA.
Reference of the On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (the Compensation and Position
case Classification Act of 1989) took effect, Section 12 of which provides:
Sec. 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation.
— All allowances, except for representation and transportation allowances;

clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and
crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances
of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM,
shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such
other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by
incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates
shall continue to be authorized.
5 . The following allowances/fringe benefits authorized to GOCCs/GFIs pursuant

to the aforementioned issuances are not likewise to be integrated into the basic
salary and allowed to be continued only for incumbents of positions as of June 30,
1989 who are authorized and actually receiving said allowances/benefits as of said
date, at the same terms and conditions prescribed in said issuances:
5.5.1 Rice Subsidy; 5.5.2 Sugar Subsidy; 5.5.3 Death Benefits other than those
granted by the GSIS; 5.5.4 Medical/dental/optical allowances/benefits; 5.5.5
Children's Allowance; 5.5.6 Special Duty Pay/Allowance; 5.5.7 Meal Subsidy; 5.5.8
Longevity Pay; and 5.5.9 Teller's Allowance. (Emphasis added.)
Important Notes
Name of the SPOUSES FAJARDO v FLORES

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 167891. January 15, 2010.

Number
Allegations of the Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Lot No. 2351, with an area of
petitioners 25,513 sq m, was agricultural land; that they had been continuously,
uninterruptedly, and personally cultivating the same since 1960 up to the present;
that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case, considering that the dispute
between the parties, regarding the Kasunduan, was referred to the DARAB; and
that the assumption by the DARAB of jurisdiction over the controversy involving
the lot in question therefore precluded the MTC from exercising jurisdiction over
the case.
Defense of the As the sole heir of the late Leopoldo delos Reyes, she inherited a parcel of land
defendants consisting of stony land, not devoted to agriculture, and land suitable and devoted
to agriculture located in Barangay Sumandig, San Ildefonso, Bulacan; In February
1999, respondent approached petitioners and verbally informed them of her
intention to repossess the stony portion, but petitioners refused to heed the
request.
Principle The doctrine of primary jurisdiction prevents the courts from resolving a
controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.
Court Procedure Petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 28,
2004 and its Resolution dated April 19, 2005, denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
-> MTC (Rendered in favor of respondent) , April 25, 2001
-> RTC (affirmed), August 29, 2002
-> RTC, reconsideration (decision reversed), December 10, 2002
-> CA, assailed RTC decision and reinstated MTC’s, October 28, 2004
-> SC reverses CA and RTC decision reinstated
Facts Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel of land located in Barangay Sumandig in
Hacienda Buenavista, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. In 1963, he allowed petitioner Jesus
Fajardo to cultivate said land. The net harvests were divided equally between the
two until 1975 when the relationship was converted to leasehold tenancy. From
the time petitioner cultivated the land, he was allowed by Leopoldo delos Reyes to
erect a house for his family on the stony part of the land, which is the subject of
controversy.
On January 26, 1988, Leopoldo delos Reyes died. His daughter and sole heir, herein
respondent Anita Flores, inherited the property. On June 28, 1991, Anita Flores
and Jesus Fajardo executed an agreement, denominated as “KASUNDUAN NG
PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG
PANIG followed by another agreement, “KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA,”
executed on July 10, 1991, wherein the parties agreed to deduct from Lot No. 2351
an area of 10,923 sq m, allotting the same to petitioner. Apparently, there was a
conflict of claims in the interpretation of the Kasunduan between Anita Flores and
Jesus Fajardo, which was referred to the DAR, Provincial Agrarian Reform Office,
Baliuag, Bulacan. The case was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), Malolos, Bulacan.
On December 22, 2000, a complaint for ejectment was filed by herein respondent
Anita Flores, assisted by her husband Bienvenido Flores, against petitioners with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Lot No. 2351, was agricultural
land; that they had been continuously, uninterruptedly, and personally cultivating
the same since 1960 up to the present; that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
case, considering that the dispute between the parties, regarding the Kasunduan,
was referred to the DARAB; and that the assumption by the DARAB of jurisdiction
over the controversy involving the lot in question therefore precluded the MTC
from exercising jurisdiction over the case.
Resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the MTC ruled that, while at first glance, the court
did not have jurisdiction over the case, considering that it was admitted that
petitioner was allowed to cultivate the land, a closer look at the Kasunduan,
however, revealed that what was divided was only the portion being tilled. By
contrast, the subject matter of the complaint was the stony portion where
petitioners’ house was erected. Thus, the court ruled that it had jurisdiction over
the subject matter. On April 25, 2001, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of
respondent.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Third Judicial Region,
Malolos, Bulacan, affirmed the MTC Decision in toto upon a finding that no
reversible error was committed by the court a quo in its Decision dated August 29,
2002. On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC issued an Order on
December 10, 2002, reversing its decision dated August 29, 2002. The RTC found
that the issue involved appeared to be an agrarian dispute, which fell within the
contemplation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, and thus ordered the dismissal of
the case for lack of jurisdiction.
A petition for review was then filed by respondents with the CA to annul the Order
of the RTC dated December 10, 2002. On October 28, 2004, the CA rendered the
assailed decision, which reinstated the MTC decision. It disagreed with the findings
of the RTC and ruled that the part of Lot No. 2351 where petitioners’ house stood
was stony and residential in nature, one that may not be made to fall within the
ambit of the operation of Philippine agrarian laws, owing to its non-agriculture
character. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this
petition
Issues Whether or not it is MTC and not the DARAB which has jurisdiction over the case
Ruling NO.
DARAB has jurisdiction. We agree with the RTC when it clearly pointed out in its
Order dated December 10, 2002 that the resolution of this case hinges on the
correct interpretation of the contracts executed by the parties. The issue of who
has a better right of possession over the subject land cannot be determined
without resolving first the matter as to whom the subject property was allotted.
Thus, this is not simply a case for unlawful detainer, but one that is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, definitely beyond the competence of the MTC.
The instant case involves a controversy regarding tenurial arrangements. The

contention that the Kasunduans, which allegedly terminated the tenancy
relationship between the parties and, therefore, removed the case from the ambit
of R.A. No. 6657, is untenable. There still exists an agrarian dispute because the
controversy involves the home lot of petitioners, an incident arising from the
landlord-tenant relationship.
Furthermore, the records disclose that the dispute between the parties, regarding
the interpretation of the Kasunduan, was, in fact, raised and referred to the DAR,
which in turn referred the case to the DARAB. In view of the foregoing, we reiterate
Hilario v. Prudente, that:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a

controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction
is vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Reference of the
case
Important Notes
Name of the PROVINCE OF AKLAN v JODY KING CONSTRUCTION

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. Nos. 197592 & 20262, November 27, 2013
Number
Allegations of the Petitioner denied any unpaid balance and interest due to respondent. It asserted
petitioners that the sums being claimed by respondent were not indicated in Change Order No.
3 as approved by the Office of Provincial Governor. Also cited was respondent’s
June 10, 2003 letter absolving petitioner from liability for any cost in connection
with the Caticlan Passenger Terminal Project.
Defense of the Petitioner failed to settle the following: (1) Unpaid accomplishments on additional
defendants works undertaken; (2) Refund of taxes levied despite it not being covered by
original contract; (3) Price escalation (Consistent with Section 7.5, Original
Contract; (4) Additional Labor Cost resulting [from] numerous change orders
issued sporadically; (5) Additional Overhead Cost resulting [from] numerous
Orders issued sporadically; and (6) Interest resulting [from] payment delays
consistent with Section 7.3.b of the Original Contract.
Principle The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of the
proper administrative bodies, relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well
be within their proper jurisdiction.
Court Procedure Petitions for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Facts On January 12, 1998, the Province of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction
and Development Corp. (respondent) entered into a contract for the design and
construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal (Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. The
total project cost is ₱38,900,000: P 18,700,000 for the design and construction of
passenger terminal, and ₱20,200,000 for the design and construction of the jetty
port facility. In the course of construction, petitioner issued variation/change
orders for additional works. The scope of work under these change orders were
agreed upon by petitioner and respondent.
On January 5, 2001, petitioner entered into a negotiated contract with respondent

for the construction of Passenger Terminal Building (Phase II) also at Caticlan Jetty
Port in Malay, Aklan. The contract price for Phase II is ₱2,475,345.54.
On October 22, 2001, respondent made a demand for the total amount of
₱22,419,112.96 covering the items which petitioner allegedly failed to settle.
On July 13, 2006, respondent sued petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Marikina City (Civil Case No. 06-1122-MK) to collect the aforesaid amounts.
After trial, the trial court rendered its Decision on August 14, 2009, in favor of
plaintiff Jody King Construction and Development Corporation and against
defendant Province of Aklan.
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration on October 9, 2009 stating that it
received a copy of the decision on September 25, 2009. In its Order dated October
27, 2009, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration upon verification
from the records that as shown by the return card, copy of the decision was
actually received by both Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ronaldo B. Ingente and
Atty. Lee T. Manares on September 23, 2009. Since petitioner only had until
October 8, 2009 within which to file an MR, its motion filed on October 9, 2009 was
filed 1 day after the finality of the decision.
On December 7, 2009, the trial court denied petitioner’s notice of appeal filed on
December 1, 2009. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the December 7,
2009 Order was likewise denied. On May 20, 2010, petitioner filed another petition
for certiorari in the CA questioning the aforesaid orders denying due course to its
notice of appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 114073.
By Decision dated October 18, 2010, the CA’s First Division dismissed the petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 111754 as it found no grave abuse of discretion in the lower
court’s issuance of the writ of execution. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was likewise denied by the CA. The CA stressed that even
assuming as true the alleged errors committed by the trial court, these were
insufficient for a ruling that grave abuse of discretion had been committed. On the
matter of execution of the trial court’s decision, the appellate court said that it was
rendered moot by respondent’s filing of a petition before the Commission on Audit
(COA).
On August 31, 2011, the CA’s Sixteenth Division rendered its Decision dismissing
the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 114073. The CA said that the petitioner failed to
provide valid justification for its failure to file a timely motion for reconsideration;
counsel’s explanation that he believed in good faith that the August 14, 2009
Decision of the trial court was received on September 25, 2009 because it was
handed to him by his personnel only on that day is not a justifiable excuse that
would warrant the relaxation of the rule on reglementary period of appeal. The CA
also held that petitioner is estopped from invoking the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction as it only raised the issue of COA’s primary jurisdiction after its notice
of appeal was denied and a writ of execution was issued against it.
Issues Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was correctly applied in this
case.
Ruling NO.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable

in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which
the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties
would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the court in

determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an
administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some
question arising in the proceeding before the court.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Sec. 26 of PD No. 1445, it is the
COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities. Pursuant to its rule-making authority conferred by
the 1987 Constitution and existing laws, the COA promulgated the 2009 Revised
Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit.
Respondent’s claim therefore involved compliance with applicable auditing laws

and rules on procurement. Such matters are not within the usual area of
knowledge, experience and expertise of most judges but within the special
competence of COA auditors and accountants. Respondent’s collection suit being
directed against a local government unit, such money claim should have been first
brought to the COA. Hence, the RTC should have suspended the proceedings and
refer the filing of the claim before the COA. Moreover, petitioner is not estopped
from raising the issue of jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of appeal
and before the CA.
There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b)
where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is
relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application
may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate
due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto
proceedings. However, none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable in the
present case.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially
lodged with an administrative body of special competence. All the proceedings of
the court in violation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby
are null and void.
In its Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner argued that it is the
COA and not the RTC which has original jurisdiction over money claim against
government agencies and subdivisions. The CA, in denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, simply stated that the issue had become moot by respondent's
filing of the proper petition with the COA. However, respondent's belated
compliance with the formal requirements of presenting its money claim before the
COA did not cure the serious errors committed by the RTC in implementing its void
decision. The RTC's orders implementing its judgment rendered without
jurisdiction must be set aside because a void judgment can never be validly
executed.
Reference of the Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26 of PD No. 1445, it is the
case COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government
agencies and instrumentalities.
2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA. Rule II, Sec. 1 specifically enumerated
those matters falling under COA’s exclusive jurisdiction, which include "money
claims due from or owing to any government agency."
Important Notes
Name of the ARUEGO v COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner/
Respondents

Number
Allegations of the Private respondent's action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was
petitioners brought under Book I, Title VIII of the Civil Code on PERSONS, specifically Article
285 thereof, which state the manner by which illegitimate children may prove
their filiation, which was the "open and continuous possession of the status of
illegitimate children" of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr. who showered them, with
the continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and affection as outlined
in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint.
Defense of the Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family Code
defendants on August 3, 1988, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private
respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under Article 175,
paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that
an action for compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the "open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," must be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any exception, otherwise the
action will be barred by prescription.
Topic Adherence to Jurisdiction
Principle The jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot
be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it
retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.
Court Procedure
Facts In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had
an amorous relationship with Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on
March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F. Aruego and Evelyn F.
Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint
prayed for an Order praying that herein private respondent and Evelyn be
declared the illegitimate children of the deceased Jose M. Aruego, Sr.; that herein
petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory
heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the
estate of their deceased father be determined and ordered delivered to them.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, in favor of the
private respondents (Antonia, Evelyn & Luz).
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss
of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the
passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive Order No. 227),
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August
3, 1988. This motion was denied by the lower court in the Order, dated January 14,
1993.
Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due course
on the ground that it was filed out of time.
A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction was filed by herein petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals, the
petition was dismissed for lack of merit in a decision promulgated on August 31,
1993. A Motion for Reconsideration when filed was denied by the respondent
court in a minute resolution, dated October 13, 1993.
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private
respondent and her alleged sister was filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1)
year after the death of their presumed father on March 30, 1982, the action has
clearly prescribed under the new rule as provided in the Family Code. Petitioners,
further, maintain that even if the action was filed prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant case pursuant to Article
256 of the Family Code which provides:
This Code shall, have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested of acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Issues Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the petition before it did
not involve a question of jurisdiction and cannot thus be a substitute for a lost
appeal.
Ruling NO.
The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory

recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the
advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and
not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be
given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application
will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided
under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by the fact that she
filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the
conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding
the fact that it was brought when the putative father was already deceased, since
private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the
general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court,
which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost
jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209, also known as the
Family Code of the Philippines.
Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether
in criminal or civil cases, once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent
happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it
finally disposes of the case. 8
Reference of the Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive Order No. 227), otherwise
case known as the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Important Notes
Name of the BARRAMEDA v RURAL BANK OF CANAMAN

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 176260, November 24, 2010

Number
Allegations of the Lucia appealed the RTC ruling to the CA, asserting that the RTC-Iriga had
petitioners jurisdiction. The CA modified the decision, ordering the consolidation of the case
with the liquidation proceedings in RTC-Makati. The CA's decision cited the
principle of consolidating cases to prevent confusion, avoid multiple suits, and
promote the objective of just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions.
Defense of the RBCI, through the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) as its receiver,
defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the RTC-Iriga had no jurisdiction over the
case due to the existence of the liquidation court in RTC-Makati. The RTC-Iriga
granted the motion to dismiss based on the pronouncement that the liquidation
court should have jurisdiction over claims against the insolvent bank.
Topic Adherence of Jurisdiction
Principle The doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has exceptions. One
exception is when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character.
Court Procedure Original Complaint:
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition challenges the decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 82711, which modified the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 36 (RTC-Iriga). The original complaint was filed by
Lucia Barrameda Vda. De Ballesteros (Lucia) against her children and the Rural
Bank of Canaman, Inc., Baao Branch (RBCI).
Facts Petitioner Lucia Barrameda Vda. De Ballesteros (Lucia) filed a complaint for
Annulment of Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Mortgage and Damages with
prayer for Preliminary Injunction against her children all surnamed Ballesteros,
and the Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc., Baao Branch (RBCI) before the RTC-Iriga.
In her complaint, Lucia alleged that her deceased husband, Eugenio, left two (2)
parcels of land and without her knowledge and consent, her children executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver of the estate of her husband wherein all
the heirs, including Lucia, agreed to allot the two parcels to Rico Ballesteros (Rico);
that, still, without her knowledge and consent, Rico mortgaged Parcel B of the
estate in favor of RBCI which mortgage was being foreclosed for failure to settle
the loan secured by the lot; and that Lucia was occupying Parcel B and had no
other place to live. She prayed that the deed of extrajudicial partition and waiver,
and the subsequent mortgage in favor of RBCI be declared null and void having
been executed without her knowledge and consent. She also prayed for damages.
In its Answer, RBCI claimed that in 1979, Lucia sold one of the two parcels to Rico
which represented her share in the estate of her husband. The extrajudicial
partition, waiver and mortgage were all executed with the knowledge and consent
of Lucia although she was not able to sign the document. RBCI further claimed that
Parcel B had already been foreclosed way back in 1999 which fact was known to
Lucia through the auctioning notary public. Attorney’s fees were pleaded as
counterclaim.
Issues Whether or not a liquidation court, established due to the closure and receivership
of a bank, could take jurisdiction over a case involving claims against the bank that
were pending before another court before the bank's closure.
Ruling YES.
Indeed, the Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction. Lucia,

however, must be reminded that such principle is not without exceptions. It is well
to quote the ruling of the CA on this matter, thus:
This Court is not unmindful nor unaware of the doctrine on the adherence of
jurisdiction. However, the rule on adherence of jurisdiction is not absolute and has
exceptions. One of the exceptions is that when the change in jurisdiction is
curative in character (Garcia v. Martinez, 90 SCRA 331 [1979]; Calderon, Sr. v.
Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 459 [1980]; Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v. Navarro,
149 SCRA 432 [1987]; Abad v. RTC of Manila, Br. Lll, 154 SCRA 664 [1987]).
For sure, Section 30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the
liquidation court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the
adjudication of the disputed claims against the Bank. The interpretation of this
Section (formerly Section 29, R.A. 265) becomes more obvious in the light of its
intent. In Manalo v. Court of Appeals (366 SCRA 752, [2001]), the Supreme Court
says:
xxx The requirement that all claims against the bank be pursued in the liquidation
proceedings filed by the Central Bank is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions
against the insolvent bank and designed to establish due process and orderliness
in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid
injustice and arbitrariness (citing Ong v. CA, 253 SCRA 105 [1996]). The
lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience, only one court, if possible,
should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank and that the liquidation
court should assist the Superintendents of Banks and regulate his operations
(citing Central Bank of the Philippines, et al. v. CA, et al., 163 SCRA 482 [1988]).9
Reference of the Section 30 of R.A. 7653 provides that the liquidation court has jurisdiction over all
case claims, whether they involve assets of the insolvent bank, specific performance,
breach of contract, damages, or other issues.
The cited Morfe case11 held that "after the Monetary Board has declared that a
bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the Board becomes the
trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors, including depositors.
The assets of the insolvent banking institution are held in trust for the equal
benefit of all creditors, and after its insolvency, one cannot obtain an advantage or
a preference over another by an attachment, execution or otherwise."
Important Notes
Name of the TAN v CINCO ET AL

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 213054, June 15, 2016

Number
Allegations of the Teresita asserted that the subject property was conjugal, and the sale should be
petitioners nullified as she was not included in the collection case proceedings. She argued
that her affidavit asserting the property's conjugal nature was not sufficient to
waive her right to recover the property separately. Teresita claimed that the
nullification case was not barred by Res Judicata.
Defense of the
defendants
Topic Doctrine of non-interference or judicial stability
Principle The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or

judgments of a co-equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of
justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of
another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief
sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment
therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate
courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
Court Procedure
Facts The respondents extended a loan to one Dante Tan and the loan was facilitated by
PentaCapital Investment Corporation and was secured by Dante's shares in Best
World Resources Corporation (BWRC).7 When Dante failed to pay the loan upon
maturity and despite demands, he proposed to settle the same by selling his shares
in BWRC and assigning the proceeds to SLHI, the individual lenders, and
PentaCapital (respondents).
However, when he was due to execute the corresponding deeds of assignment,

Dante disappeared, leaving his obligations unpaid.9 Hence, respondents filed an
action for sum of money against him before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
The Makati RTC rendered judgment ordering Dante to pay respondents. In order to
enforce the writ, Deputy Sheriff Ignacio (Sheriff Ignacio) levied on a property
registered in Dante's name (subject property). An auction sale was then conducted.
Consequently, Dante sought the quashal of the writ by presenting an affidavit
executed by his wife, attesting to the conjugal nature of the subject property.
Meanwhile, the period to redeem the subject property lapsed without redemption
having been made; hence, a Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of
respondents.
Undeterred, Dante filed a motion alleging that the subject property was a family
home and therefore, exempt from execution, and that being a conjugal property, it
cannot be made to answer for his personal obligations without any showing that it
had redounded to the benefit of the family. The Makati RTC denied Dante's
Omnibus Motion and held that attachment and levy on the subject property had
been validly done. Consequently, it directed the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of respondents and ordered Dante and all persons claiming rights under him
to vacate the subject property. Dante's motion for reconsideration was denied, and
there being no appeal taken therefrom, the Makati RTC's disposition of the case
became final.
On May 2, 2007, Teresita - Dante's wife - filed before the Paranaque RTC a
complaint against respondents, respondent Sheriff Ignacio. However, Paranaque
RTC initially dismissed the nullification case on the ground of res judicata, ruling
that the issues raised therein had already been passed upon by the Makati RTC
with Teresita's active and voluntary participation.
However, upon Teresita's motion for reconsideration, the Paranaque RTC, in an

Order, reversed its initial disposition and instead, nullified the auction sale, the
certificate of sale, and the Final Deed of Sale in favor of respondents. It held that
Teresita was considered a third party in the collection case before the Makati RTC,
not having been impleaded therein together with her husband Dante, and that the
submission of her Affidavit before the Makati RTC did not make her a party to the
said case. Moreover, she had not waived her right to institute a separate action to
recover the subject property, and the nullification case was not, after all, barred by
res judicata.
Respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied and intending to file a

petition for certiorari before the CA, they filed a Motion for Extension. Eventually
realizing their error, and apparently unaware that the CA had already denied their
motion for extension, respondents withdrew their motion for extension before the
CA on June 17, 2011 and instead, simultaneously filed a Notice of Appeal before the
Paranaque RTC. Unfortunately, it was filed ten (10) days late.
Paranaque RTC denied the Notice of Appeal for having been filed out of time.
Respondents' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Aggrieved,
respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, arguing, inter alia, that the
Paranaque RTC had no jurisdiction and power to review the proceedings of a co-
equal court.
The CA granted the petition and directed the Paranaque RTC to allow respondents'
Notice of Appeal.
Teresita's motion for reconsideration was denied in the hence, this petition.
Issues Whether or not the Paranaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability when
it took cognizance of the nullification case filed by Teresita and declared as null
and void the auction sale, the certificate of sale, and the Final Deed of Sale in favor
of respondents
Ruling YES.
the Court finds that the Paranaque RTC violated the doctrine of judicial stability
when it took cognizance of Teresita's nullification case despite the fact that the
collection case from which it emanated falls within the jurisdiction of the Makati
RTC. Verily, the nullification case ought to have been dismissed at the outset for
lack of jurisdiction, as the Paranaque RTC is bereft of authority to nullify the levy
and sale of the subject property that was legitimately ordered by the Makati RTC, a
coordinate and co-equal court. In fact, the Paranaque RTC was already on the right
track when it initially dismissed the nullification case in its Decision51 dated July 8,
2010. However, it changed its stance and reconsidered its disposition upon
Teresita's motion for reconsideration, thereby committing reversible error. To
reiterate, the determination of whether or not the levy and sale of a property in the
execution of a judgment was valid properly falls within the jurisdiction of the court
that rendered the judgment and issued the writ of execution.
Thus, Teresita's nullification case filed before the Paranaque RTC was improper
and in glaring violation of the doctrine of judicial stability. The judgment rendered
by the Makati RTC in the collection case, as well as the execution thereof, and all
other incidents arising therefrom, may not be interfered with by the Paranque
RTC, a court of concurrent jurisdiction, for the simple reason that the power to
open, modify, or vacate the said judgment or order is not only possessed but is
restricted to the court in which the judgment or order is rendered or issued.53
Consequently, the Paranaque RTC lacked jurisdiction over the same, rendering all
the proceedings therein, as well as the Decision and other orders issued thereon,
void for lack of jurisdiction.
A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be
attacked anytime. It creates no rights and produces no effect. It remains a basic fact
in law that the choice of the proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a court or
tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect.
Reference of the In Barroso v. Omelio,49 the Court explained the doctrine of judicial stability as
case follows
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or

Important Notes It discusses the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular
orders or judgments of a co-equal court. The court emphasized that once a court
acquires jurisdiction over a case and renders a judgment, it has exclusive authority
over that judgment, including its execution and all related matters. No other
coordinate court can interfere with or enjoin the judgment of another court of
concurrent jurisdiction that has the power to grant the relief sought.
The rationale behind this doctrine is rooted in the concept of jurisdiction. Once a
court has jurisdiction over a particular case, it has the authority to decide the
issues presented and issue judgments accordingly. This jurisdiction extends to the
execution of the judgment and all its incidents. In order to ensure the orderly
administration of justice, the court has the power to control the conduct of
ministerial officers who are involved in the execution of the judgment.
A case where an execution order has been issued is considered as still pending, so
that all the proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court
which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of
justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.
To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in
the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of
jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.
Name of the DEL ROSARIO v OCAMPO-FERRER
Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. June 20, 2016, G.R. No. 215348

Number
Allegations of the Petitioners averred that the complaint filed by the Respondent in Civil Case No. LP-
petitioners 07-0037, should be dismissed because of the following reasons: (1) the complaint
was barred by prior judgment in Civil Case No. LP-03-0088 and that Respondent
never challenged the same; and (2) the subject matter of Civil Case No. LP-7-0037
is not within the jurisdiction of RTC Las Pinas, Branch 198, as it is a co-equal court
of RTC Las Pinas, Branch 275.
Defense of the Respondent sought the annulment of the sheriff’s sale in Civil Case No. LP-07-0037.
defendants She claimed that Petitioners committed unlawful acts in enforcing the writ of
execution in Civil Case No. LP-03-0088.
Topic Jurisdiction of Courts
Principle The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or

courts, for its execution and over all incidents, and to control, in furtherance of
Court Procedure Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court
Facts Sometime in February 2001, Respondent obtained a loan from the Petitioners in
the amount of P850,000.00. The said loan was secured by a parcel of land covered
and after Respondent failed to pay her obligation, Petitioners filed a complaint for
sum of money before RTC Las Pinas. Subsequently, Petitioners and Respondent
entered into a Compromise Agreement, which was adopted and approved by the
court.
Despite the agreement duly approved by the court, Respondent failed to comply
with her obligation. Thus, Petitioner moved for the execution of the decision. After
the issuance of the Writ of Execution, the court sheriff issued a demand/notice to
pay to Respondent, which she failed to act upon. So, the court sheriff levied
Respondent’s land covered by TCT No. 30480. During the auction sale, Petitioners
were the sole and highest bidder. So, a Certificate of Sale was issued in their favor.
Subsequently, Respondent filed a case before RTC Las Pinas, Branch 198 seeking
the annulment of sheriff’s sale and payment of damages. The said court dismissed
the case for lack of merit and ordered Petitioners to return to the Respondent.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied. So, Petitioners appealed the
case to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the ruling of RTC Las Pinas, Branch
198, and declared null and void the following: (a) the levy performed by Sheriff
Ortiz on the property covered by TCT No. 30480 and the consequent auction sale
of the same; and (b) the Certificate of Sale in favor of Del Rosario, the annotation
thereof on TCT No. 30480, and the Officer's Deed of Final Sale. The Court of
Appeals held that the court sheriff’s levy on the property covered by TCT No.
30480 was procedurally defective as there was no showing that the court sheriff
gave the Respondent the opportunity to exercise the option of immediately
choosing which among her properties should be levied upon. Petitioners moved
for reconsideration, but it was denied. So, Petitioners filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
Issues Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly held that the levy and consequent
sale of the lot covered by TCT No. 30480 is null and void.
Ruling NO.
The Court of Appeals was incorrect in nullifying the levy and consequent sale of the
lot covered by TCT No. 30480.
Under the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or

judgments of a co-equal court, the various trial courts of a province or city, having
the same equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere
with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments.
The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that
acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction
over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution
and over all incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
In the case at bar, the court sheriff was merely enforcing the writ of execution
issued by the RTC-Las Pinas, Branch 275 pursuant to its Decision in Civil Case No.
LP-03-0088. Since said writ of execution emanated from the RTC-Las Pinas Branch
275, its enforcement cannot be assailed in a co-equal court such as the RTC-Las
Pinas, Branch 198, as it would violate the doctrine of judicial stability or non-
interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court. Unfortunately,
Ocampo-Ferrer still chose to assail the enforcement of said writ by filing a case
before the RTC-Las Pinas. Worse, the RTC-Las Pinas - and even the CA on appeal -
chose to resolve the case on the merits instead of simply dismissing the same in
deference to the aforesaid doctrine.
As correctly pointed out by petitioners at the earliest opportunity in their Answer

with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, the RTC-Las Pinas has no jurisdiction
to annul actions emanating from a lawful order of a co-equal court such as the RTC-
Las Pinas.
In other words, when the RTC-Las Pinas took cognizance of Civil Case, it acquired
full jurisdiction over the matters at hand, to the exclusion of all other coordinate
courts. Thus, in consonance with the afore-discussed doctrine, the proper remedy
to assail orders originating from the RTC-Las Pinas is to file an action before a
higher court with authority to nullify such orders and not before a co-equal body.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes At the outset, the Court emphasizes that under the doctrine of judicial stability or
non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court, the
various trial courts of a province or city, having the same equal authority, should
not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much
less with their orders or judgments.
Name of the CABILI v HON. BALINDONG

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. September 6, 2011, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225

Number
Allegations of the Complainant averred that the Respondent Judge interfered with the order of a co-
petitioners equal court, RTC – Iligan City, Branch 6 by issuing a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) to enjoin the court sheriff from garnishing the monetary award from MSU’s
bank account. Thus, Complainant is charging the Respondent Judge with Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion, and/or Grave
Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial Service.
Defense of the Respondent Judge denied that he interfered with the order of RTC – Iligan City,
defendants Branch 6. He explained that he merely gave the parties the opportunity to be heard
and eventually dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Topic Jurisdiction of Courts
Principle Doctrine of Judicial Stability or Non-Interference in the regular orders or

judgments of a co-equal court
Court Procedure Administrative Complaint
Facts On November 29, 1997, RTC – Iligan City, Branch 6 rendered a Decision holding
Mindanao State University (MSU) liable for damaged. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the said decision. No appeal was subsequently filed. Thus, an entry of
judgment was issued.
On March 10, 2009, RTC – Iligan City, Branch 6 issued a writ of execution.
However, MSU failed to comply with the writ; thus, the court sheriff served a notice
of garnishment on MSU’s depositary bank.
On April 1, 2009, MSU filed before RTC-Marawi City a petition for prohibition and
mandamus with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or preliminary injunction against the bank and the court sheriff.
The Respondent Judge set the hearing for the application for the issuance of a TRO.
Thereafter, the Respondent Judge issued a TRO restraining the court sheriff from
garnishing the monetary award from MSU’s bank account.
On April 17, 2009, the respondent Judge conducted a hearing on the application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thereafter, he required MSU to file
a memorandum in support of its application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. On April 21, 2009, Sheriff Gaje moved to dismiss the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Respondent Judge thereafter granted the
motion and dismissed the case.
On May 8, 2009, Complainant filed an administrative complainant against
Respondent Judge for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse
of Discretion, and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Judicial
Service.
Issues Whether or not the Respondent Judge is administratively liable.
Ruling YES.
The Respondent Judge is administratively liable.
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or

Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has been
issued is considered as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution
are still proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a writ of execution has the
inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial
officers and to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the
jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents arising in
execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice.
Jurisprudence shows that a violation of this rule warrants the imposition of

administrative sanctions.
In the present case, the Respondent Judge clearly ignored the principle of judicial
stability by issuing a TRO to temporarily restrain the court sheriff from enforcing
the writ of execution issued by a co-equal court, RTC- Iligan City Branch 6, and
from pursuing the garnishment of the monetary award from MSU’s account with
the bank.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes
Name of the VILLAMOR v SALAS
Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 101041, November 13, 1991

Number
Allegations of the Judge Villamor challenges the actions of Judges Aleonar and Salas in taking
petitioners cognizance of actions for damages against him for allegedly rendering an unjust
order of direct contempt, which was subsequently annulled by the Supreme Court
Defense of the Judges Aleonar and Salas proceeded with the actions for damages against Judge
defendants Villamor.
Topic Jurisdiction of courts to review and interfere with judgments of co-equal courts
Principle Only higher appellate courts have the authority to review and correct errors of
trial courts. Co-equal courts should not interfere with each other's cases,
judgments, and orders.
Court Procedure Petition for certiorari and prohibition
Facts The case involves a series of legal actions stemming from a land dispute between
Gloria Naval and George Carlos. Civil Case No. B-398 was filed for the recovery of
ownership of a parcel of coconut land, which was assigned to the petitioner, Judge
Adriano Villamor. Respondent Carlos filed multiple criminal cases against Naval,
which were temporarily archived due to the pending civil case. After a decision in
favor of Naval in the civil case, Carlos moved to activate the archived criminal
cases. Judge Villamor dismissed the criminal cases against Naval, leading to Carlos
filing an administrative case against him. This administrative case was summarily
dismissed by the Supreme Court. Dissatisfied, Carlos filed a civil action for damages
against Judge Villamor. This led to a series of legal actions and counter-actions,
ultimately leading to the central issue of whether judges from co-equal courts can
take cognizance of actions for damages against Judge Villamor for his alleged
unjust actions.
Issues Whether or not Judges Aleonar and Salas can proceed with actions for damages
against Judge Villamor for allegedly rendering an unjust order of direct contempt.
Ruling NO.
The Supreme Court ruled that allow respondent Judges Aleonar and Salas to
proceed with the trial of the actions for damages against the petitioner, a co-equal
judge of a co-equal court, would in effect permit a court to review and interfere
with the judgment of a co-equal court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction or
power of review. The various branches of a Court of First Instance (now the
Regional Trial Court) being co-equal, may not interfere with each other's cases,
judgments and orders (Parco vs. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 262).
This Court has already ruled that only after the Appellate Court, in a final
judgment, has found that a trial judge's errors were committed deliberately and in
bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be levelled
against the latter.
Reference of the G.R. No. 101296 November 13, 1991;

case
The various branches of a Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court)
being co-equal, may not interfere with each other's cases, judgments and orders
(Parco vs. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 262);
This Court has already ruled that only after the Appellate Court, in a final
judgment, has found that a trial judge's errors were committed deliberately and in
bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be levelled
against the latter (Garcia vs. Alconcel, 111 SCRA 178; Sta. Maria vs. Ubay, 87 SCRA
179; Gahol vs. Riodique, 64 SCRA 494);
A judge is not liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or wrongful
conduct in rendering it (Barroso vs. Arche, 67 SCRA 161).
Important Notes The case highlights the principle of non-interference among co-equal courts and
the importance of appellate courts in reviewing errors of trial courts. It
underscores that judges should not be held liable for erroneous decisions in the
absence of malice or wrongful conduct.
Name of the HEIRS OF MARASIGAN v MARASIGAN

Petitioner/
Respondents

Number
Allegations of the The petitioners, who are heirs of Alicia Marasigan, filed a petition for partition of
petitioners her estate after her death. They claimed entitlement to their respective shares in
the estate consisting of several parcels of land. They contested the inclusion of
certain properties in the action for partition, asserting that those properties had
already been previously partitioned and distributed.
Defense of the The respondents opposed the petitioners' request to include additional properties
defendants in the partition, arguing that those properties had already been distributed. They
also defended the decision of the court-appointed commissioners to recommend
the assignment of shares in lieu of physical partition due to the impracticality of
dividing the estate.
Topic Lack of jurisdiction- raised at earliest possible opportunity
Principle While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of an action,
nevertheless, the party raising such question may be estopped if he has actively
taken part in the very proceedings which he questions and he only objects to the
court’s jurisdiction because the judgment or the order subsequently rendered is
adverse to him.
Court Procedure The case initially went through the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which issued an
Order of Partition and appointed commissioners to assist in the partition. The
commissioners recommended assigning shares in lieu of physical partition. The
RTC adopted the recommendation, leading to appeals by the petitioners to the
Court of Appeals (CA) and eventually to the Supreme Court (SC).
This Court has consistently held that one of the purposes for which courts are
organized is to put an end to controversy in the determination of the respective
rights of the contending parties. With the full knowledge that courts are not
infallible, the litigants submit their respective claims for judgment, and they have a
right at some time or another to have final judgment on which they can rely over a
final disposition of the issue or issues submitted, and to know that there is an end
to the litigation; otherwise, there would be no end to legal processes.
Facts Alicia owned in common with her siblings 13 parcels of land with a total area of
496 hectares. A complaint for judicial partition was filed before the RTC by private
respondents against Cesar. In response to the complaint, Cesar enumerated several
other properties of Alicia and wanted them included in the action for partition. The
request was contested by the respondents on the ground that the properties he
enumerated had already been partitioned and distributed to the appropriate
parties. The RTC decided in favor of the respondents and issued an Order of
Partition of the Estate of Alicia.
Due to the different locations of Alicia’s estate, the parties could not agree on how
they can physically partition the estate. Private respondents filed a Motion to
Appoint Commissioners following the procedure outlined in Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7
of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. The RTC granted the motion and appointed Myrna
Badiong and Sandie Dacara as commissioners. Cesar failed to nominate a third
commissioner despite notice. The two Commissioners conducted an ocular
inspection. However, Cesar contended that he did not receive any notice from the
Commissioners to attend the ocular inspection and he was, thus, not present on
said occasion.
The Commissioners findings and recommendations states that 47.24 hectares

represents the 2/12 pro-indiviso share of Alicia Marasigan and the 1/7 shares of
each heir is equivalent to 6.74 hectares. Considering that the pro-indiviso share is
situated in different locations, the Commissioners recommended that the heirs
may assign their 1/7 share to one of the parties willing to buy the same at P
700,000.00 per hectare.
Cesar opposed the findings and asked for disapproval of the report. The RTC ruled
approving the recommendations of the Commissioners. Motion for reconsideration
was denied. Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed
the petition. Subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner, then,
filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court and raised the issue of lack of
jurisdiction and caused of action for the first time in their Memorandum.
Issues Whether or not lack of jurisdiction can be raised as an additional issue in a

memorandum before the Supreme Court.
Ruling NO.
The parties were duly informed by the Court in its Resolution dated 17 September
2003 that no new issues may be raised by a party in his/its Memorandum and the
issues raised in his/its pleadings but not included in the Memorandum shall be
deemed waived or abandoned. The raising of additional issues in a memorandum
before the Supreme Court is irregular, because said memorandum is supposed to
be in support merely of the position taken by the party concerned in his petition,
and the raising of new issues amounts to the filing of a petition beyond the
reglementary period. The purpose of this rule is to provide all parties to a case a
fair opportunity to be heard. No new points of law, theories, issues or arguments
may be raised by a party in the Memorandum for the reason that to permit these
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
Reference of the Petitioners failed to heed the Court’s prohibition on the raising of new issues in the
case Memorandum.
Moreover, Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that:
SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the
court has not jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred
by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
First, it bears to point out that Cesar, petitioners’ predecessor, did not file any
motion to dismiss, and his answer before the RTC did not bear the
defenses/objections of lack of jurisdiction or cause of action on these grounds;
consequently, these must be considered waived. The exception that the court may
still dismiss a case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, although the
same is not pleaded, but is apparent in the pleadings or evidence on record, does
not find application to the present Petition. Second, petitioners’ arguments on the
lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the case more appropriately pertain to venue,
rather than jurisdiction over the subject matter, and are, moreover, not apparent
from the pleadings and evidence on record. Third, the property subject of partition
is only the 47.2 hectare pro-indiviso area representing the estate of Alicia. It does
not include the entire 496 hectares of land comprising Hacienda Sta. Rita.
Important Notes The case addresses procedural issues such as the raising of new issues in
memoranda, the effect of waiver and estoppel on jurisdictional defenses, and the
prohibition against forum shopping.
The case emphasizes the importance of due process and the opportunity to be
heard in legal proceedings.
The case highlights the principle that partition aims to terminate co-ownership
and enable parties to have a final disposition of their claims.
The case also discusses the circumstances under which an appellate court may or
may not interfere with findings of fact made by lower courts or commissioners.
Name of the TIJAM v SIBONGHANOY

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. L-21450; April 15, 1968

Number
Allegations of the The writ of execution of the surety bond should be enforced for the judgment
petitioners becomes final and executory.
Defense of the The plaintiff filed the case in a wrong court, for the Court of First Instance of Cebu
defendants has no jurisdiction over the recovery of sum of P1,908.00 and that Under RA 296
or Judiciary Act of 1948 (which the case filed a month after the effectivity of the
Judiciary Act) Section 88 of which states that the original exclusive jurisdiction of
the inferior courts, all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or amount
of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and cost.
Topic Lack of Jurisdiction – raised at earliest possible opportunity
Principle (Note: exception case ni ah 😊) Although it is true that jurisdiction over the
subject-matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and the lack of it
affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case. The objection
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. In this case the defendant was
barred by laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Court Procedure Court of First Instance: Ruled in favor of Sps. Tijam and denied the motion to quash
by writ of execution of Surety company. Thus, appealed to CA.
CA: Sustained the CFI’s decision and Surety company filed a motion to dismiss for
the first time on the ground that CFI has no jurisdiction of the case. So, CA
forwarded the case to SC.
Facts - Sps. Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog file a Civil Case against Sps. Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio at the Court of First Instance of Cebu to recover
from the defendant the sum P1,908.00 with legal interest from date of filing of
complaint until whole obligation is paid plus the cost.
- A writ of attachment was issued by the court against the defendants’ properties,
but it was dissolved after the defendants filed a counter-bond issued by a surety
company.
- The court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was
unsatisfied, so they filed a writ of execution against the surety’s bond.
Issues Whether or not the defendant’s (surety company) motion to dismiss was correct
on the ground that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction of case filed
Ruling No. The surety company failed to raise the question of lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu by reason of the sum of money involved which was
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts and instead, at several
stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it
invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its
case for a final adjudication on the merits, and it was only after an adverse decision
was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally raised said question of
jurisdiction, to sanction such conduct on its part would in effect be declaring as
useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July
19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The
inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it
finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction and that it is almost fifteen
years before they filed its motion to dismiss for the first time in the CA.
Although it is true that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the
courts exclusively by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to
take cognizance of the case. The objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case – which
shall forthwith be set forth – the Surety Company is now barred by laches from
invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done in
the case. The defendant should have raised the issue on jurisdiction way before it
reaches the CA.
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such
relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not
important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because
the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but
for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of
public policy.
Reference of the RA No. 296 or Judiciary Act of 1948 - Section 88 of which placed within the original
case exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the
subject-matter or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive
of interest and cost.
Important Notes Party guilty of laches may not invoke lack of jurisdiction on appeal as in instant
case.
Parties may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action if it took them an unreasonable and unexplained length of time
to object to the court's jurisdiction.
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction. The question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in
such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for
the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of
public policy.
Name of the VILLAGRACIA v FIFTH SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 188832 ; April 23,2014

Number
Allegations of the He should be relief from judgment with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
petitioners injunction. That he cited Article 155 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines. Arguing that the Shari’a District Courts may only hear civil actions and
proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, hence
the Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan;s
action for recovery of possession of a parcel of land.
Defense of the (1) That the petitioner intentionally waived his right to defend himself for he failed
defendants to file an answer and that he only went to court when he lost his right to assail the
decision via certiorari. (2) Vivencio cited wrong provision of law: Article 155 (2) of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines referes to the jurisdiction of
Shari’a Circuit Court, not of Shari’a District Courts. (3) Regardless of Vivencio being
a non-muslim, his rights were not prejudiced since respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court decided the case applying the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Topic Lack of Jurisdiction – raised at earliest possible opportunity
Principle Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of
the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." This power is
conferred by law, which may either be the Constitution or a statute. Since subject
matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose, consent to, or agree as
to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes. If a court hears, tries, and
decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the
judgment rendered, are void.
Court Procedure This is a petition for certiorari with application for issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to set aside the Fifth (5th) Shari'a
District Court's decision 1 dated June 11, 2008 and order dated May 29, 2009 in
SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200.
Respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court had no authority under the law to decide
Roldan's action because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims.
Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldan's action for recovery of possession. All its
proceedings in this case are void.
Facts Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300 sq. m. parcel of land located in Poblacion,
Magundanao, and he acquired a TCT over that land under his name. At the time of
the purchased, Vivencio Villagracia occupied the the said parcel of land.
Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed and the geodetic engineer found that
Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered by Roldan’s TCT. Conciliation
proceedings conducted in the barangay which they both failed to settle the the
conflict.
Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of the parcel of land with
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court. Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim
and that he is the registered owner of the lot which Vivencio occupied, depriving
him of the right to use, possess, and enjoy such property. He prayed that Vicencio
should be ordered to vacate the lot. Despite of the service of summons, Vivencio
failed to file his answer. So, the Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled in favor of Roldan.
Issues Whether or not Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one
of the parties is not a Muslim.
Ruling No. Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide Roldan’s
action for recovery possession.
This case involves an action for recovery of possession of real property. As a

matter of law, Shari'a District Courts may only take cognizance of a real action
"wherein the parties involved are Muslims." Considering that one of the parties
involved in this case is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court had no
jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the action for recovery of possession of real
property. The judgment against Vivencio is void for respondent Fifth Shari'a
District Court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. Regardless
of the fact that it applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in
resolving the action.
Vivencio never invoked respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court's jurisdiction to

seek affirmative relief. He filed the petition for relief from judgment precisely to
assail the jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court over Roldan's
petition for recovery of possession.
Thus, the general rule holds. Vivencio validly assailed the jurisdiction of
respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court over the action for recovery of possession
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of Roldan's action.
Reference of the Calimlim v. Ramirez: A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and
case upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the
subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent
or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by
recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited
case of [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy] . It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in
said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated
therein.
Important Notes Shari'a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where one of the
parties is not a Muslim.
No provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines expressly

prohibits non-Muslims from participating in Shari'a court proceedings. Example:
On marriage and divorce apply to the female party in a marriage solemnized
according to Muslim law, even if the female is non-Muslim
The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts is the Code of the
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code,
Shari'a District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with "existing civil
courts" over real actions not arising from customary contracts.
Name of the REPUBLIC v BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G. R. No. 162322 March 14, 2012

Number
Allegations of the Petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
petitioners application, because the RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing beyond the
90-day period provided under the Property Registration Decree
Defense of the
defendants
Topic Lack of jurisdiction over subject matter may be raised at any stage
Principle The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only
by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged
by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the
first time on appeal.
Court Procedure
Facts On July 17, 1997 respondent Bantigue Point Development Corp. filed with the RTC,
Rosario Batangas, an application for original registration of title over a parcel of
land with a total assessed value at Php 14,920.00. On July 18, 1997 the RTC issued
an Order setting the case for hearing on October 22, 1997 with a subsequent order
resetting the hearing for November 4, 1997.
The petitioner republic then filed its opposition to the application for registration
on January 8, 1998 while the records were still with the RTC. The Clerk of Court
then transmitted motu proprio the records of the Case to MTC of San Juan, since
the value of the parcel of land is allegedly less than Php 100,000.00.
The respondent corporation was then awarded the land by the MTC, after proving
that the lot was under the alienable and disposable zone.
The Court of Appeals, then ruled that the petitioner is estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the lower court after it participated in the proceedings, but
failed to raise the Jurisdictional Challenge. Petitioner then filed this petition under
Rule 45 raising the following issues
Issues Whether or not the Republic can be estopped from questioning the Jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court over the application for Original Registration of Land
Title even for the first time on appeal.
Ruling NO.
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner is not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the lower court even if the question is raised on appeal. The court
further elaborated that; it is a settled rule that the lack of jurisdiction can be raised
at any stage of the proceedings.
Furthermore, the CA ruling that “a party maybe estopped from raising such
{jurisdictional} question if he has taken part in the very proceeding which he
questions, belatedly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in the event that the
judgement or order is adverse to him” is based on the doctrine of estoppel by
latches. The doctrine was enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, where the party
litigant actively participated in the proceedings, only questioning the jurisdiction
only after 15 years and receipt of an adverse Decision on the merits from the
appellate court.
The unique facts of the case of Tijam v. Sobinghanoy has caused the court to
consider estoppel in laches. The case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is to be construed as
an exception to the general rule and applied only on cases of exceptional
circumstances whose factual status is similar to the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
The Court further elucidated that “Laches has been defined as the "failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it."
The petitioner republic could not have displayed unreasonable failure or neglect
that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert its right
to question the lower court’s decision. Thus, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel
by laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.
Reference of the Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.

case
In Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings before the
lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after
receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-
litigant question the lower court’s jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that
case, we held that estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from
raising the question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal.
In Figueroa v. People,24 we cautioned that Tijam must be construed as an

exception to the general rule and applied only in the most exceptional cases whose
factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.
Important Notes
Name of the TIJAM v SIBONGHANOY
Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968

Number
Allegations of the
petitioners
Defense of the
defendants
Topic
Principle
Court Procedure
Facts July 19, 1948 barely a month after Republic Act No. 296 also known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948 became effective, spouses Serafin Tijam and Felecitas Tagalog
commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in CFI of Cebu against spouses Magdaleno
Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover sum of P 1,908.00 with legal interest and
plus costs from the filing of the complaint until obligation is performed.
After the trial the Court rendered a judgement in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a
writ of execution after it became final and executory against the defendants.
Having returned the execution and found it unsatisfied the plaintiffs against the
surety’s bond (counter-bond made by the defendants and the Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co.,), which the surety made an opposition. Which the court denied
reasoning that the there has been no previous demand made upon the Surety for
satisfaction of Judgement. Where a second demand was made and upon failure of
the Surety to satisfy the judgement a second motion for execution was filed against
the counter-bond.
The Court granted the motion for execution with a corresponding writ being
issued. The Surety filed a motion to dismiss the writ on the ground that it was
issued without undergoing a summary hearing. Where the Court then denied the
motion made by the surety. The CA decided the case affirming the orders appealed
therefrom, after receipt of the decision the Surety filed a motion for extension with
reconsideration which the CA granted. Two days later the Surety filed a pleading
entitled MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees' action was filed
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum
of P1,908.00 only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of
which placed within the original exclusive... jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil
actions where the value of the subject matter or the amount of the demand does
not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First
Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case.
Issues Whether or not the CFI acquired jurisdiction of the case in light of R.A. 296 and
whether or not Surety is estopped in raising the lack of jurisdiction of the Court.
Ruling The Supreme Court ruled that, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of
the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. However,... considering the facts and circumstances of the
present case - which shall forthwith be set forth - We are of the opinion that the
Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the
purpose of... annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active
participation.
the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948,
that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January
12,... 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and
for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by... laches.
Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within
a... reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against
his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or
question that same jurisdiction... the question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in
such cases because the party is barred from... such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for,
the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated - obviously for reasons of
public... policy.
after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the

merits, it is too late for the looser to question the jurisdiction or power of the
court... it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked... the jurisdiction of
a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny
that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have
raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the... sum of money involved
which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as... well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the
jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a
final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was
rendered by the
Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were
We to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless
all the proceedings had in the present... case since it was commenced on July 19,
1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The
inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes
Name of the DE HERRERA v BERNARDO

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. June 1, 2011 (170251)

Number
Allegations of the Petitioner averred that the COSLAP has no adjudicatory powers to settle and
petitioners decide the question of ownership over the subject land. Further, the present case
cannot be classified as explosive in nature as the parties never resorted to violence
in resolving the controversy. Petitioner submits that it is the Regional Trial Court
which has jurisdiction over controversies relative to ownership of the subject
property
Defense of the Respondents argued that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction
defendants of the COSLAP by reason of laches due to Alfredo's active participation in the actual
proceedings before the COSLAP.
Topic Lack of jurisdiction over subject matter may be raised at any stage
Principle Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
Court Procedure
Facts Respondents heirs of Crisanto S. Bernardo, filed a complaint before the

Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against Alfredo
Herrera (Alfredo) for interference, disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and
trespassing over a portion of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Dalig, Cardona,
Rizal.
Respondents claimed that said parcel of land was originally owned by their
predecessor-in-interest, Crisanto Bernardo, and was later on acquired by Crisanto
S. Bernardo. Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the portion of the subject
property was bought by Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo's father, from a certain
Domingo Villaran. Upon the death of Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo inherited the 700-
square-meter lot.
The COSLAP, in a Resolution, ruled that respondents have a rightful claim over the
subject property. Consequently, a motion for reconsideration and/or reopening of
the proceedings was filed by Alfredo but the COSLAP, denied the motion.
Aggrieved, petitioner Celia S. Vda. de Herrera, as the surviving spouse of Alfredo,

filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA, dismissed the petition and
affirmed the resolution of the COSLAP. The CA ruled that the COSLAP has exclusive
jurisdiction over the present case and, even assuming that the COSLAP has no
jurisdiction over the land dispute of the parties herein, petitioner is already
estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction because Alfredo failed to raise the
issue of lack of jurisdiction before the COSLAP and he actively participated in the
proceedings before the said body. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied by the CA.
Issues 1. Whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction to decide the question of ownership
between the parties.
2. Whether or not the petitioner is estopped from questioning the

jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of laches
Ruling NO.
The COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561, issued on
September 21, 1979 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. It is an administrative
body established as a means of providing a mechanism for the expeditious
settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners and members of the
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that
can only wield powers which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute.
Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land
dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to the agency
having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume
jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the
law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large
number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other
similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to
assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency
concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land
involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need
for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and
damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the
COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.9
In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
respondents' complaint. The present case does not fall under any of the cases
enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561. The dispute
between the parties is not critical and explosive in nature, nor does it involve a
large number of parties, nor is there a presence or emergence of social tension or
unrest. It can also hardly be characterized as involving a critical situation that
requires immediate action.
NO.
Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or
by estoppel. The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of
a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the
subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent
of the parties.
In Regalado v. Go, the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the
Sibonghanoy21 doctrine to apply, thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained

length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it."
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine
enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the
exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue
of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that
in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present;
that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to
assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in a
motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost years after the questioned ruling had
been rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a quo as well as in
the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of the said courts to
obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits.
It was only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it
finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.221avvphi1
The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case at bar
that would justify the application of estoppel by laches against the petitioner. Here,
petitioner assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP when she appealed the case to
the CA and at that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed for laches to attach.
Therefore, petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.
Additionally, no laches will even attach because the judgment is null and void for
want of jurisdiction.
Reference of the Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 specifically enumerates the instances when the COSLAP
case can exercise its adjudicatory functions:
Section 3. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the following
powers and functions:
2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate
jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided,
That the Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve
land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering,
for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence
of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate
action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber

concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public
domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude
Important Notes The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does
not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter,
since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties
Name of the MEGAN SUGAR CORPORATION v RTC OF ILOILO

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. June 1, 2011 (170352)

Number
Allegations of the MEGAN points out that its board of directors did not issue a resolution authorizing
petitioners Atty. Sabig to represent the corporation before the RTC. It contends that Atty. Sabig
was an unauthorized agent and as such his actions should not bind the
corporation. In addition, MEGAN argues that the counsels of the different parties
were aware of Atty. Sabig’s lack of authority because he declared in court that he
was still in the process of taking over the case and that his voluntary appearance
was just for the hearing of the motion for intervention of Passi Sugar.
Defense of the Both EPCIB and NFSC, however, claim that MEGAN is already estopped from
defendants assailing the authority of Atty. Sabig. They contend that Atty. Sabig had actively
participated in the proceedings before the RTC and had even filed a number of
motions asking for affirmative relief. They also point out that Jose Concha
(Concha), who was a member of the Board of Directors of MEGAN, accompanied
Atty. Sabig during the hearing. Lastly, EPCIB and NFSC contend that all the
motions, pleadings and court orders were sent to the office of MEGAN; yet, despite
the same, MEGAN never repudiated the authority of Atty. Sabig.
Topic Objection to jurisdiction over a party; holding out theory or doctrine of ostensible
agency
Principle “holding out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency, imposes liability, not as the
result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions
of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that
the relationship or the authority exists
Court Procedure
Facts The respondent New Frontier Sugar Corporation (NFSC) obtained a loan from
respondent Equitable PCI Bank (EPCIB). Said loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage over NFSC’s land and a chattel mortgage over NFSC’s sugar mill and
because of liquidity problems and continued indebtedness to EPCIB, NFSC entered
into a Memorandum of Agreement with Central Iloilo Milling Corporation
(CIMICO), whereby the latter agreed to take-over the operation and management
of the NFSC raw sugar factory and facilities for the period covering crop years
2000 to 2003.
The NFSC filed a complaint for specific performance and collection against CIMICO
for the latter’s failure to pay its obligations under the MOA. In response, CIMICO
filed with the RTC, a case against NFSC for sum of money and breach of contract.
Because of NFSC’s failure to pay its debt, EPCIB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings over NFSC’s land and sugar mill. However, CIMICO filed with the RTC
a complaint and the RTC issued a restraining order, directing EPCIB and PISA to
desist from taking possession over the property in dispute. Hence, CIMICO was
able to continue its possession over the property.
Later on, CIMICO and petitioner Megan Sugar Corporation (MEGAN) entered into a
MOA whereby MEGAN assumed CIMICO’s rights, interests and obligations over the
property. As a result of the foregoing undertaking, MEGAN started operating the
sugar mill. However, the Passi Sugar filed with the RTC a Motion for Intervention
claiming to be the vendee of EPCIB. Passi Sugar claimed that it had entered into a
Contract to Sell with EPCIB after the latter foreclosed NFSC’s land and sugar mill.
During the hearing on the motion for intervention, Atty. Sabig appeared before the
RTC and entered his appearance as counsel for MEGAN. Several counsels objected
to Atty. Sabig’s appearance since MEGAN was not a party to the proceedings;
however, Atty. Sabig explained to the court that MEGAN had purchased the interest
of CIMICO and manifested that his statements would bind MEGAN.
On August 23, 2004, the CA issued a Decision dismissing MEGAN’s petition. In

denying MEGAN’s petition, the CA ruled that since Atty. Sabig had actively
participated before the RTC, MEGAN was already estopped from assailing the
RTC’s jurisdiction.
Aggrieved, MEGAN then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however,
denied by the CA.
Issues Whether or not the petitioner is estopped from questioning the assailed orders
because of the acts of Atty. Sabig
Ruling YES.
The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy, fair dealing,
good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act,
representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed
and who reasonably relied thereon. The doctrine of estoppel springs from
equitable principles and the equities in the case. It is designed to aid the law in the
administration of justice where without its aid injustice might result. It has been
applied by this Court wherever and whenever special circumstances of a case so
demand.25
Based on the events and circumstances surrounding the issuance of the assailed
orders, this Court rules that MEGAN is estopped from assailing both the authority
of Atty. Sabig and the jurisdiction of the RTC. While it is true, as claimed by MEGAN,
that Atty. Sabig said in court that he was only appearing for the hearing of Passi
Sugar’s motion for intervention and not for the case itself, his subsequent acts,
coupled with MEGAN’s inaction and negligence to repudiate his authority,
effectively bars MEGAN from assailing the validity of the RTC proceedings under
the principle of estoppel.
In the first place, Atty. Sabig is not a complete stranger to MEGAN. As a matter of
fact, as manifested by EPCIB, Atty. Sabig and his law firm SABIG SABIG & VINGCO
Law Office has represented MEGAN in other cases26 where the opposing parties
involved were also CIMICO and EPCIB. As such, contrary to MEGAN’s claim, such
manifestation is neither immaterial nor irrelevant,27 because at the very least,
such fact shows that MEGAN knew Atty. Sabig.
MEGAN can no longer deny the authority of Atty. Sabig as they have already
clothed him with apparent authority to act in their behalf. It must be remembered
that when Atty. Sabig entered his appearance, he was accompanied by Concha,
MEGAN’s director and general manager. Concha himself attended several court
hearings, and on December 17, 2002, even sent a letter28 to the RTC asking for the
status of the case. A corporation may be held in estoppel from denying as against
innocent third persons the authority of its officers or agents who have been
clothed by it with ostensible or apparent authority.29Atty. Sabig may not have
been armed with a board resolution, but the appearance of Concha made the
parties assume that MEGAN had knowledge of Atty. Sabig’s actions and, thus,
clothed Atty. Sabig with apparent authority such that the parties were made to
believe that the proper person and entity to address was Atty. Sabig. Apparent
authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding out" theory, or doctrine
of ostensible agency, imposes liability, not as the result of the reality of a
contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of a principal or an
employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or
the authority exists.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes The rule is that the active participation of the party against whom the action was
brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or
administrative body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of
that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will
bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.
Name of the PHIL. WOMEN’S CHRISTIAN TEMPERANCE UNION v YANGCO

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 199595, April 2, 2014

Number
Allegations of the PWCTUI filed the herein petition captioned as one for "Prohibition & Certiorari and
petitioners to Re-Open the Case with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) &/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction."27 PWCTUI prayed for the following
reliefs:
a.) a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued preventing and/or

enjoining public respondents, Register of Deeds of Quezon City and the Sheriff of
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218 from executing the RTC Decision dated
January 24, 2008;
b.) to make the injunction permanent by annulling and setting aside all orders,
decisions, resolutions and proceedings issued and taken in relation to LRC Case No.
Q-18126(04) before the trial and appellate courts for having been promulgated in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and
c.) LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) be re-opened, re-considered and re-studied in the
interest of true and fair justice.
In support of its pleas, PWCTUI submitted the following arguments:
A. based on the deed of donation, the expiration of PWCTUI’s corporate term is not
stated as a ground for the nullification of the donation and the operation of the
reversion clause;
B. the commercial leasing of portions of the donated land did not violate the
condition in the donation because the lease contract with Jelby Acres was pursued
for the generation of funds in order for PWCTUI to carry on the charitable
purposes of the Abiertas House of Friendship;
C. TRY Foundation has no legal standing or cause of action to claim the land
because its members are not the true heirs of Yangco who died single and without
descendants. His only relatives are his half-siblings who are the legitimate children
of his mother, Doñ a Ramona Arguelles Corpus and her first husband Tomas
Corpus, hence, no right of inheritance ab intestato can take place between them
pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code; and d. Even assuming that TRY
Foundation has a cause of action for the revocation of the donation, the same has
already prescribed because more than 40 years has lapsed from the date the
donation was made in May 19, 1934.
Defense of the
defendants
Topic Lack of jurisdiction
Principle
Court Procedure This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking the issuance of an order commanding the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City and the Court Sheriff of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, to cease
and desist from implementing the Court Resolutions denying with finality
Philippine Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Inc.'s (PWCTUI) petition for
review of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision4 which affirmed the Decision5 of the
RTC in LRC Case which orders the RD to cancel TCT No. 20970 T-22702 and issue
in lieu thereof a new title in the name of Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd and 3rd
Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc. free from all liens and encumbrances. PWCTUI
also prays, as ancillary remedy, for the re-opening of LRC Case No. Q-18126(04)
and as provisional remedy, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.
Facts Respondent Teodoro R. Yangco (2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs) Foundation, Inc.
(TRY Foundation) filed before the RTC of Quezon City, acting as a Land
Registration Court, a Petition for the Issuance of New Title in Lieu of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 20970 T-22702 of the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City docketed as LRC Case No. Q-18126(04).
TRY Foundation alleged that it is composed of the 2nd and 3rd generation heirs
and successors-in-interest to the first generation testamentary heirs of the late
philanthropist Teodoro R. Yangco (Yangco) who donated a parcel of land subject to
two conditions:
A) the property shall be used as a site for an institution to be known as the

Abierrtas House of Friendship the purpose of which shall be to provide a Home for
needy and unfortunate women and girls, including children of both sexes and
promote, foster all efforts, work and activities looking toward their protection
from the ravages of all forms of immoralities;
B) Should the property herein be used for any other purpose or purposes not
herein specified, the present gift shall become ipso facto null and void and
property given shall automatically revert to the donor, his heirs and assigns, but
any improvement or improvements placed, constructed and/or maintained on said
premises by the Donee, shall remain the property of said Donee to be by it
removed there[f]rom (sic) at its expense after reasonable notice from the donor,
his heirs and assigns.9
The property was then registered in the name of PWCTUI by virtue of TCT No.
20970 at the back of which the above-quoted conditions of the donation were
annotated. PWCTUI’s corporate term expired. Five years thereafter, using the same
corporate name, PWCTUI obtained SEC Registration and forthwith applied for the
issuance of a new owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 20970 over the subject
property thru LRC Case No. 22702 (a new LRC Case). The application was granted
and PWCTUI was issued a new TCT No. 20970 T-22702 which, however, bore only
the first condition imposed on the donation.
TRY Foundation claimed that the expiration of PWCTUI’s corporate term

effectively rescinded the donation pursuant to the "unwritten resolutory
condition" deemed written by Article 1315 of the Civil Code14 prescribing that the
Corporation Code, specifically Section 122 thereof, be read into the donation.
Interestingly the latter provision mandates dissolved corporation to wind up their
affairs and dispose of their assets within three years from the expiration of their
term. Being comprised of the heirs of the donor, TRY Foundation claimed that it is
entitled to petition for the issuance of a new title in their name pursuant to Section
108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. TRY Foundation prayed for the
issuance of a new title in its name after the cancellation of PWCTUI’s TCT No.
20970 T-22702.
PWCTUI opposed the petition arguing that: (1) TRY Foundation has no legal
personality to bring the action because the donation has never been revoked and
any right to demand for its revocation already prescribed; (2) although PCWTUI’s
corporate term was not extended upon its expiration in 1979, it nonetheless
registered anew and continued the operations, affairs and social work of the
corporation; it also continued to possess the property and exercised rights of
ownership over it; (3) only the appropriate government agency and not TRY
Foundation or any other private individual can challenge the corporate life and
existence of PCWTUI; (4) TRY Foundation and its counsel are guilty of forum
shopping because they have already questioned PWCTUI’s corporate personality in
a different forum but failed to obtain a favorable relief; (5) TRY Foundation is
guilty of fraud for failing to include PWCTUI as an indispensable party and to
furnish it with a copy of the petition; and (6) the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
petition because PWCTUI is unaware of its publication
The RTC granted TRY Foundation’s petition by ordering the cancellation of

PWCTUI’s TCT No. 20970 T-22702 and the issuance of a new title in the name of
TRY Foundation.
PWCTUI appealed to the CA, arguing, among others, that it must be determined
whether the condition imposed in the donation has already occurred or deemed
fulfilled. The CA affirmed the RTC’s findings.
PWCTUI no longer raised the jurisdiction issue before the CA and limited its appeal
to the factual findings and legal conclusions of the RTC on its corporate existence
and capacity as the subject property’s uninterrupted owner. The matter reached
the Court thru a petition for review under Rule 45, but with the question of
jurisdiction absent in the appellate pleadings, the Court was constrained to review
only mistakes of judgment.
PWCTUI sought recourse with the Court thru a petition for review on certiorari.
The petition was denied for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the
assailed CA decision. PWCTUI moved for reconsideration but its motion was
denied with finality. The court Resolution became final and executory.
Issues Whether or not the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the petition of TRY Foundation
Ruling No. The RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition of TRY Foundation. The
RTC judgment in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) and all proceedings taken in relation
thereto were void because the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
fundamental subject matter of TRY Foundation’s petition for the issuance of a title
which was in reality, a complaint for revocation of donation, an ordinary civil
action outside the ambit of Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529.
Observably, TRY Foundation is actually seeking to recover the possession and
ownership of the subject property from PWCTUI and not merely the cancellation of
PWCTUI’s TCT No. 20970 T-22702. The propriety of pronouncing TRY Foundation
as the absolute owner of the subject property rests on the resolution of whether or
not the donation made to PWCTUI has been effectively revoked when its corporate
term expired in 1979.
While PWCTUI could have still challenged the RTC’s jurisdiction even on appeal, its
failure to do so cannot work to its disadvantage. The issue of jurisdiction is not lost
by waiver or by estoppel; no laches will even attach to a judgment rendered
without jurisdiction.51
Hence, since the Court Resolutions dated July 21, 2010 and September 15, 2010 in
G.R. No. 190193 disposed the case only insofar as the factual and legal questions
brought before the CA were concerned, they cannot operate as a procedural
impediment to the present ruling which deals with mistake of jurisdiction.1â wphi1
This is not to say, however, that a certiorari before the Court is a remedy against its
own final and executory judgment. As made known in certain cases, the Court is
invested with the power to suspend the application of the rules of procedure as a
necessary complement of its power to promulgate the same.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes Jurisdiction in a land registration cases being a proceeding in rem, is acquired by
constructive seizure of the land through publication, mailing and posting of the
notice of hearing.44 Persons named in the application are not summoned but
merely notified of the date of initial hearing on the petition.45
The payment of docket fees is another jurisdictional requirement for an action for
revocation which was absent in the suit filed by TRY Foundation. On the other
hand, Section 111 of P.D. No. 1529 merely requires the payment of filing fees and
not docket fees.
Name of the MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT v COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987

Number
Allegations of the Petitioners argued that filing fees should be based on the amended complaint,
petitioners citing the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. They contended that the Court of Appeals
made an error by levying the filing fee based on the damages sought in the original
complaint.
Defense of the
defendants
Topic Payment of filing/docket fees- jurisdictional
Principle All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also
in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not
be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
Court Procedure Present case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance with
prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. ---i.e., petitioner MDC filed a complaint
for specific performance against City Land to compel the latter to execute a Deed of
Sale in favor of the former.
Facts Petitioner alleged that respondent City Land forfeited their tender of payment for a
certain transaction thereby causing damages amounting to P78,750,000.00. Said
amount was alleged in the BODY of the complaint but was not reiterated in the
PRAYER.
Petitioner paid a docket fee of P410.00 based on the allegation that their action is
primarily for specific performance and is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Court ruled that there is an under-assessment of docket fees, and thus ordered
petitioner to amend its complaint.
With leave of court petitioner complied and lowered the amount of claim for
damages to P10M, which was again not state in the PRAYER (but stated in the
BODY).
Issues Whether or not the jurisdiction is acquired when correct docket fee has not been
paid.
Ruling No.
As setted in the Magaspi case: “a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the
docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court.”
The Court held that in the present case, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case by the payment of P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of
the complaint vest jurisdiction upon the Court.
For all legal purposes, there is no original complaint that was duly filed which
could be amended.
The order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and
actions taken by the trial court are null and void.
CA was correct in ruling that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be
the amount of damages sought in the original complain and not in the amended
complaint.
The Court made it clear that jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment to the complaint or similar
pleading does not vest jurisdiction in the Court, nor does the payment of the docket
fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. This decision effectively
overturned and reversed the ruling in the Magaspi case.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes
Name of the NESTLE PHILIPPINES v FY SONS

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. NO. 150780 May 5, 2006

Number
Allegations of the The petitioner asserts that the documentary evidence presented by the respondent
petitioners to prove actual damages in the amount of P4,246,015.60 should not have been
considered because the respondent's complaint only prayed for an award of
P1,000,000. It further contends that the court acquires jurisdiction over the claim
only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee.
Defense of the The petitioner breached the distributorship agreement by committing various acts
defendants of bad faith such as: failing to provide promotional support; deliberately failing to
promptly supply the [respondent] with the stocks for its orders; intentionally
diminishing the [respondent's] sales by supporting a non-distributor; and
concocting falsified charges to cause the termination of the distributorship
agreement without just cause.
Topic Payment of filing/docket fees –Jurisdictional
Principle A court acquires jurisdiction over the claim of damages upon payment of the
correct docket fees.
Court Procedure This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 57299 dated
January 11, 2001 which in turn affirmed with modification the decision of Branch
57 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Civil Case No. 90-3169, as
well as the CA's resolution dated November 14, 2001 which denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Facts The petitioner and respondent entered into a distributorship agreement. Nestle
terminated the agreement after FY Sons refused to pay the fine for supplying retail
outlets proscribed by Nestle. Nestle demanded payment of the balance of the
respondent’s accounts and when the alleged accounts were not settled, the
petitioner applied for the P500,000 time deposit which FY Sons gave as security
for its credit purchases as partial payment. FY Sons filed a complaint for damages
against Nestle in the amount of P4,246,015.60 with a prayer for an award of
1,000,000, alleging bad faith. The Makati City RTC ruled in favor of the respondent.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. On January 11, 2001, the CA
rendered a decision affirming the RTC’s decision and ordering Nestle to refund the
500,000 time deposit to FY Sons and delete the payment of the balance of FY Sons’
account since Nestle failed to prove that the respondent had an outstanding
balance. Hence the instant case.
Issues Whether or not the CA committed a grave error in awarding to the respondent
actual damages and not awarding to the petitioner its counterclaim.
Ruling The petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 11, 2001 and resolution dated November 14, 2001 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 57299 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Reference of the Indeed, a court acquires jurisdiction over the claim of damages upon
case payment of the correct docket fees. In this case, it is not disputed that
respondent paid docket fees based on the amounts prayed for in its
complaint. Respondent adduced evidence to prove its losses. It was
proper for the CA and the RTC to consider this evidence and award the
sum of P1,000,000. Had the courts below awarded a sum of more
than P1,000,000, which was the amount prayed for, an additional filing
fee would have been assessed and imposed as a lien on the judgment.
Both the RTC and CA found that respondent had satisfactorily proven the
factual bases for the damages adjudged against the petitioner. This is a
factual matter binding and conclusive upon this Court. It is well-settled
that -
. . . findings of fact of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of

Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court. This rule may be
disregarded only when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial court or are not
supported by the evidence on record. But there is no ground to apply this
exception to the instant case. This Court will not assess all over again the
evidence adduced by the parties particularly whereas in this case the
findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals completely
coincide.
Important Notes A court acquires jurisdiction over the claim of damages upon payment of the
correct docket fees.
Name of the SUN INSURANCE v ASUNCION

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

Number
Allegations of the Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paid the
petitioners amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and considering that
the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and supplemental
complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private
respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners
contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom
should be annulled. Citing Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA “The Court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest
jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the
amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far
as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed.”
Defense of the The private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot apply
defendants retroactively to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in
court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent
avers that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete,
wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even
if the docket fee paid was insufficient.
Topic Payment of filing/docket fees –Jurisdictional
Principle It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
Court Procedure This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed
a complaint with the RTC Makati for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire
insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against
private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong of whom was declared in default for
failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the
RTC Quezon for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against
petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional
defendants.
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which
prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case
No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees
and in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all
clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants
were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be
recovered in their complaints.
Judge Asuncion issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to
comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying
with the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by
private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. On
January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended
Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual
compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended
complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages
and attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second
amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper
compliance with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be
furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket fees. The
reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's claim of "not less
than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages" amounted to
P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning the said
order of Judge Asuncion.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an

additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as d.qmages so the total claim amounts to
about P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the
supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P80,396.00.
On August 13, 1987, the CA denied the petition insofar as it seeks annulment of the
order, petitioner’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint but giving due course
to the portion thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and
requiring the Honorable respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid
by private respondent on the basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00..
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of
respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90
on April 28, 1988.
Issues Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the lower court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case on the ground of nonpayment of the correct
and proper docket fee.
Ruling The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is
hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be
paid by the private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in
the original complaint and the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the
allegations and the prayer thereof and to require the private respondent to pay the
deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs.
Reference of the The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The
case pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is
obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the
second amended complaint. However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any
additional docket fee until the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering
influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as
ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by manifesting
his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still
insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the
clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk
in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must
require the private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefore is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently,
the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court
or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
Important Notes GR: The payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory
Exception: where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of
time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
This rule is not without recognized qualifications. The Supreme Court has declared
that in appealed cases, failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the
prescribed period warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal
of the appeal and that the court shall exercise its power to dismiss in accordance
with the tenets of justice and fair play, and with a great deal of circumspection
considering all attendant circumstances.
Name of the PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE v PARAMOUNT GEN. INSURANCE

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 165147, July 9, 2008

Number
Allegations of the Petitioners argue that respondent Pyramid deliberately omitted to pay the correct
petitioners docket fee to evade payment.
They contend that the trial court's jurisdiction depends on the proper payment of
docket fees and that the omission in specifying the amount of damages sought
should lead to the dismissal of the complaint.
Defense of the Respondent Pyramid maintains that it paid the assessed docket fee based on the
defendants assessment it received from the Clerk of Court.
They argue that they were not aware of the extent of the defendants' liability under
the insurance policies and left it to the trial court's determination.
Pyramid claims that their omission in specifying the amount sought in the prayer
was not intended to mislead the court or evade payment.
Principle The payment of the prescribed docket fee vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of the action.
Complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of
damages being prayed for both in the body of the pleading and in the prayer.
Subsequent amendments to the complaint or similar pleading, and payment of the

docket fee based on the amount in the amendment, are allowed within a
reasonable time, as long as prescription has not set in.
Court Procedure Pyramid initially filed a complaint seeking specific performance and damages
against the petitioners.
The trial court assessed a docket fee based on the amount specified in the prayer of
the complaint and Pyramid paid that fee.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the
inadequate docket fee.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the complaint was not
dismissible but required proper docket fees to grant the prayers.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari.
The Court of Appeals partially granted the petition, ordering Pyramid to pay the
correct docket fees based on the allegations in the complaint.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, which
was denied.
The present case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the petitioners
before the Supreme Court.
Facts Respondent Pyramid filed a complaint against petitioners seeking specific

performance and damages for their alleged failure to settle insurance claims.
The trial court assessed a docket fee based on the amount specified in the prayer
for attorney's fees.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the docket fee was insufficient
due to the omission of specifying the amount of damages sought in the prayer.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, but required proper docket fees to
grant the prayers in the complaint.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which partially granted their petition,
ordering Pyramid to pay the correct docket fees.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, which
was denied.
Issues Whether or not the respondent Pyramid's deliberate omission to pay the correct
docket fee affects the trial court's jurisdiction.
Ruling The Supreme Court denied the petition of the petitioners.
The Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which ordered Pyramid to pay
the correct docket fees based on the allegations in the complaint.
The Court clarified that the trial court's jurisdiction is established by the payment
of the prescribed docket fee and that complaints must specify the amount of
damages sought both in the body and in the prayer.
The Court emphasized that subsequent amendments to the complaint and

payment of correct docket fees are allowed within a reasonable time, as long as
prescription has not set in.
The Court criticized Pyramid's counsel for their lack of forthrightness in drafting
the complaint and reminded them of their duty to assist in the efficient
administration of justice.
The Court also reminded the trial judge of their responsibility to apply court rules
and jurisprudence correctly.
Reference of the The case references the Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals
case ruling and the Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion ruling, which established the
principle that the payment of docket fees vests jurisdiction in the trial court.
The Court also refers to Circular No. 7-88 issued by the Supreme Court on March
24, 1988, which embodies the Manchester ruling and sets guidelines for the
payment of docket fees.
Important Notes The case highlights the importance of proper payment of docket fees to establish
the trial court's jurisdiction over a case.
It also emphasizes that complaints should specify the amount of damages sought
both in the body and in the prayer to ensure accurate assessment of docket fees.
The Court also reminds legal practitioners and trial judges of their ethical and
professional responsibilities in the administration of justice.
Name of the HOME GUARANTY CORP v R-II BUILDERS

Petitioner/
Respondents

Number
Allegations of the R-II Builders filed a complaint against HGC and NHA alleging that the DAC (Deed of
petitioners Assignment and Conveyance) to HGC should be rescinded, seeking appointment as
a new trustee, and requesting various reliefs related to the Smokey Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP).
Defense of the HGC challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court over the case and argued that R-II
defendants Builders had not paid the correct docket fees, thus lacking proper jurisdiction.
Principle A court acquires jurisdiction over a case upon the payment of the prescribed filing
and docket fees, and the nature of an action, whether it is a real action affecting
title to or possession of real property, determines the appropriate docket fees.
Court Procedure The case was initially filed in Branch 24 of the Manila RTC, which was a Special
Commercial Court. However, due to the court's determination that it lacked
jurisdiction, the case was re-raffled to Branch 22 of the Manila RTC, a regular court.
This re-raffling was questioned due to the inconsistency of Branch 24's orders,
which both declared a lack of authority to hear the case and attempted to transfer
it.
Meanwhile, R-II Builders filed various amended complaints, each with different
causes of action, making changes to its claims and reliefs sought.
Facts Home Guaranty Corp. (HGC) and R-II Builders were parties to a Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) for the implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development
and Reclamation Project (SMDRP). R-II Builders filed a complaint against HGC and
the National Housing Authority (NHA) before Branch 24 of the Manila Regional
Trial Court (RTC), which was a Special Commercial Court (SCC). The complaint
alleged various matters, including the need to rescind the Deed of Assignment and
Conveyance (DAC) to HGC, a request for R-II Builders' appointment as trustee, and
other reliefs related to the SMDRP.
The RTC, Branch 24, issued a writ of preliminary injunction on October 26, 2005.
HGC moved for a preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses, including issues
of jurisdiction, improper venue, and the pendency of another case challenging the
validity of the JVA.
R-II Builders subsequently filed an Amended and Supplemental Complaint,

modifying its original prayer for resolution of the DAC and introducing new causes
of action. This new complaint sought, among other things, the conveyance of title
to and/or possession of the entire Asset Pool, payment for changes and additional
works on the project, and an increased amount for attorney's fees.
The case was later re-raffled to Branch 22 of the Manila RTC (respondent RTC) due
to a clarificatory order from Branch 24 that it lacked authority to hear the case, as
it was an ordinary civil action and not an intra-corporate controversy.
Issues 1. Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint.
2. Whether or not the Second Amended Complaint should be admitted

despite non-payment of the correct docket fees.
Ruling The Supreme Court reversed the RTC's ruling and dismissed R-II Builders' case.
The Court held that jurisdiction over a case is acquired only upon payment of the
prescribed docket fees. The failure to pay the correct docket fees prevents the
proper attachment of jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that the jurisdictional
error was compounded by the fact that the case was transferred from a Special
Commercial Court (Branch 24) to a regular court (Branch 22) that did not have
jurisdiction over the case.
Regarding the payment of docket fees, the Court explained that the fees are
intended to cover court expenses, and non-payment of correct fees not only
hinders the functioning of the judiciary but also constitutes a violation of the rules.
Even if R-II Builders amended its complaint to change its claims and reliefs, the
Court ruled that this could not cure the jurisdictional defect caused by the non-
payment of correct docket fees.
The Court also noted the inconsistency in R-II Builders' claims. While it did not
directly claim ownership of the Asset Pool, its claims for the conveyance and
transfer of possession of the same properties presupposed a real action, and thus
appropriate docket fees should have been paid. The Court emphasized that the
character of the action, whether real or personal, determines the appropriate
docket fees.
In conclusion, the Court emphasized that jurisdiction is a fundamental aspect of

due process, and the correct payment of docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement.
As R-II Builders did not pay the correct docket fees and sought to evade them
through successive amended complaints, the Court ruled that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Therefore, the Court reversed the lower court's ruling and dismissed R-II Builders'
case.
Reference of the Jurisdiction and Docket Fees:

case
Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court - This rule governs the payment of docket
fees and court costs.
"Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals" - This case established

the principle that jurisdiction is acquired only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fees, and it is both mandatory and jurisdictional.
"Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion" - This case provided
guidelines for situations where docket fees were not properly paid and discussed
the lien on judgments for unpaid fees.
Nature of Actions:
The distinction between real actions and personal actions - Real actions affect title
to or possession of real property, while personal actions are primarily for the
recovery of money or personal property.
"Calleja v. Panday" - This case dealt with issues related to the jurisdiction and
transfer of cases between courts.
Rules of Procedure:
Rules of Civil Procedure - The case referred to various rules within the Rules of
Civil Procedure, such as Rule 17 (dismissal of actions), Rule 59 (appointment of
receivers), and Rule 98 (appointment of trustees).
Doctrine of Amendments:
General principles related to the amendment of pleadings - The case discussed the
importance of allowing amendments to pleadings in the interest of justice, but also
highlighted that amendments should not be used to confer jurisdiction where it
has not been properly acquired.
Affirmative Defenses and Jurisdiction:
The case made references to HGC's affirmative defenses related to jurisdiction,

improper venue, and the pendency of another case, showing how these factors
were integral to the procedural history of the case.
Previous Court Orders and Decisions:
The case analyzed the orders and decisions issued by Branch 24 and Branch 22 of
the Manila RTC, particularly how the re-raffling of the case between these branches
was inconsistent and contributed to the jurisdictional issue
Important Notes Jurisdiction is the authority of a court to hear and determine a case. It is
determined by relevant allegations in the complaint, the law in effect at the time of
filing, and the character of the relief sought.
A court acquires jurisdiction over a case upon payment of the prescribed filing and
docket fees. Failure to pay the correct docket fees can result in the lack of proper
jurisdiction.
The nature of an action (real action affecting real property or personal action
primarily for recovery of money) determines the appropriate docket fees.
Amendments to pleadings are favored, but an amendment intended to confer

jurisdiction where none has been acquired yet is not allowed.
Name of the UNICAPITAL v CONSING

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R.Nos.175277 & 175285, September 11,2013

Number
Allegations of the
petitioners
Defense of the
defendants
Principle
Court Procedure May 3, 1999 – Respondent filed a Complex Action for Declaratory Relief; later
amended to C.A.f. Injunctive Relief before the RTC- Pasig.
Petitioner,URI, and Martinez – filed separate MOTIONS TO DISMISS; posited that

RTC-PasigCity did not acquire jurisdiction over the case given that Consing, Jr.
failed to pay the proper amount of docket fees among others
September 14/1999 – RTC issued a RESOLUTION; denying the petitioners’ Motions

to Dismiss holding that Consing since jurisdiction was already vested in it upon the
filing of the original
complaint.
Petitioner, et al –MOVED FOR RECONSIDERATION
February 15/2001 – RTC - DENIED the said MfR for lack of merit
Petitioner, et al - Filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the COURT
OF APPEALS
October 20/2005 –Rendered a Joint Decision; It ruled that while the payment of
the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment will not
automatically cause the dismissal of the case. Any deficiency in the payment of
such fees, shall constitute a lien on the judgment award.
Petitioner (Note: P Unicapital) - sought reconsideration before the CA

October 25/2006 –DENIED the Motion for Reconsideration
HENCE, the present petitions for review on certiorari before the SUPREME COURT
Facts Respondent Consing was appointed by his mother as her attorney-in-fact, for the
transactions involving the sale of a 42,443 square meter-parcel of land to
Petitioner Unicapital, where they obtained an Php 18 million loan from in 1997,
and Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI), a real estate company. However, PBI confirmed that
the title of the said land that was presented by Respondent's mother was forged
and that Teng and Yu, who informed PBI about the forged document, were the
lawful owners. Petitioner and PBI sent separate demand letters, seeking for the
return of the purchase price that they have paid for. Respondent now claims that
he is just a mere agent of his mother for the transactions and that the demand
letters constituted harassment and oppression which severely affected his
personal and professional life, and that he was coerced by the Respondent to
commit some unlawful acts, i.e. BP Blg.22.
Issues Whether or not Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the
dismissal of his complaint
Ruling NO. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time
of the filing of the complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the
complaint provided that the fees are paid within a reasonable period.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes When insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no
intention to defraud the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THIS CASE/THE REASON WHY IT WAS ASSIGNED :
This case emphasized that even if docket fees are not paid at the time of
the filing of the Complaint, this will not automatically lead to the dismissal of the
Complaint PROVIDED the they are paid within a reasonable period, Provided
further that it was not done in bad faith.
Name of the RAMONES v SPOUSES GUIMOC

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R.No. 226645, August 13, 2018

Number
Allegations of the In her Reply, petitioner countered that based on Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal
petitioners Procedure, actual damages are not included in the computation of the filing fees in
cases where the civil action is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, and the
filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment. The RTC affirmed the MTC ruling
with modification, acquitting Elenita on the ground of reasonable doubt, but still
maintaining respondents' civil liabilities.
Defense of the In their Memorandum on Appeal filed before the RTC on January 10, 2012,
defendants respondents argued that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to award damages in
favor of petitioner for failure of the latter to pay the correct amount of docket fees
pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 35- 2004 (SC Circular No.
35-2004), which provides that the filing fees must be paid for money claims in
estafa cases. They claimed that due to petitioner's failure to make an express
reservation to separately institute a civil action, her payment of filing fees in the
amount of P500.00 was deficient. The damages sought was worth P663,000.00;
thus, the correct filing fees should have allegedly been around P9,960.00.
Principle
Court Procedure The RTC did not rule upon the issue of non-payment of correct filing fees. Upon
reconsideration, the CA held that SC Circular No. 35-2004 was in effect at the time
petitioner filed the case against respondents, and therefore, the court a quo erred
when it awarded damages in her favor. Consequently, the CA deleted the order
directing respondents to pay their respective civil liabilities.
Facts he case stemmed from an Information filed before the Municipal Trial Court of
Mariveles, Bataan (MTC), docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-8539, charging
respondents with the crime of Other Forms of Swindling under Article 316 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code. After the said Information was filed by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bataan to the MTC, the latter's Clerk of Court wrote a
letter to petitioner requiring her to pay the amount of P500.00 as docket fees. After
petitioner's payment thereof, a certification was later issued by the MTC Clerk of
Court reflecting the same.
Eventually, the case proceeded to trial, and thereafter, the MTC, acquitted
Teodorico but found Elenita guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Other
Forms of Swindling under Article 316 (2) of the RPC, and accordingly, sentenced
her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment.
In addition, Elenita was ordered to pay the amount of P507,000.00, and despite his
acquittal, Teodorico was also directed to pay the amount of P60,000.00, which
amounts reflect their respective civil liabilities, both with legal interest from
December 13, 2006 until fully paid.
Issues Whether or not the CA correctly deleted the award of damages.
Ruling NO.
Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states that "except as otherwise
provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages." Among
these exceptions, Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.
No. 04-2-04- SC - which guidelines were reflected in SC Circular No. 35-2004 and
was already in effect at the time the Information was filed - states that the payment
of filing fees is required in estafa cases under the following conditions:
SEC. 21. Other fees. -The following fees shall also be collected by the clerks of court
of the regional trial courts or courts of the first level, as the case may be:
In estafa cases where the offended party fails to manifest within fifteen (15) days
following the filing of the information that the civil liability arising from the crime
has been or would be separately prosecuted, or in violations of BP No. 22 if the
amount involved is.
In Sun Insurance, the Court found that "a more liberal interpretation of the rules
was called for considering that, unlike Manchester, the private respondent
[therein] demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required." Nonetheless, the Court held that "the clerk of
court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge
should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, x xx must require the
private respondent to pay the same."
Accordingly, subsequent decisions now uniformly hold that "when insufficient

filing fees are initially paid by the plaintiffs and there is no intention to defraud the
government, the Manchester rule does not apply."
In line with this legal paradigm, prevailing case law demonstrates that "the non-
payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial court.
Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk of
court, and the amount paid turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires
jurisdiction over the case, subject to the payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency
assessment. “The reason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerk
of court is not fair if the party has acted in good faith."
In this case, it is undisputed that the amount of P500.00 paid by petitioner was
insufficient to cover the required filing fees for her estafa case under the premises
of Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC.
Nonetheless, it is equally undisputed that she paid the full amount of docket fees as
assessed by the Clerk of Court of the MTC, which is evidenced by a certification
dated April 11, 2016 issued therefor. In addition, petitioner consistently
manifested her willingness to pay additional docket fees when required. In her
petition, she claims that she is "very much willing to pay the correct docket fees
which is the reason why she immediately went to the clerks of court and records
show that she paid the MTC of the amount assessed from her." Indeed, the
foregoing actuations negate any bad faith on petitioner's part, much more belie any
intent to defraud the government. As such, applying the principles above-
discussed, the Court holds that the courta quo properly acquired jurisdiction over
the case. However, petitioner should pay the deficiency that shall be considered as
a lien on the monetary awards in her favor pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court. Besides, the Court observes that if respondents believed that the
assessment of filing fees was incorrect, then it was incumbent upon them to have
raised the same before the MTC. Instead, contrary to the CA's assertion, records
show that respondents actively participated in the proceedings before the MTC
and belatedly questioned the alleged underpayment of docket fees only for the first
time on appeal before the RTC, or five (5) years later after the institution of the
instant case. The Court is aware that lack of jurisdiction, as a ground to dismiss a
complaint, may, as a general rule, be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
However, in United Overseas Bank, the Court has observed that the same is subject
to the doctrine of estoppel by laches, which squarely applies here.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes In line with this legal paradigm, prevailing case law demonstrates that "the non-
payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial court.
Yet, where the plaintiff has paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk of
court, and the amount paid turns out to be deficient, the trial court still acquires
jurisdiction over the case, subject to the payment by the plaintiff of the deficiency
assessment. “The reason is that to penalize the party for the omission of the clerk
of court is not fair if the party has acted in good faith."
Name of the HEIRS OF RENATO DRAGON ET AL v MANILA BANKING CORP

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 205068. March 06, 2019

Number
Allegations of the
petitioners
Defense of the
defendants
Principle
Court Procedure The Court held that the Petition for Review on Certiorari indeed raises questions of
law that are proper for resolution under Rule 45. The issues raised involve the
interpretation and application of legal principles, such as whether the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the insufficient payment of docket fees,
whether the April 22, 1991 Decision served as res judicata, and when the
prescriptive period began to run. These issues require the Court's determination of
whether the lower courts correctly applied the law to the facts presented.
Facts This case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Heirs of Renato P.
Dragon (petitioners) assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The case stems from a collection of sum of money complaint filed by The Manila
Banking Corporation (respondent) against Renato P. Dragon. Respondent claimed
that Dragon owed them an amount of P6,945,642.00, plus interest, penalties, and
attorney's fees corresponding to loans obtained by Dragon from 1976 to 1983.
Dragon raised defenses of novation and prescription in his Answer to the

complaint. He alleged that the loans were novated and that the cause of action had
prescribed. However, these defenses were not raised in a motion to dismiss or
before the termination of pre-trial.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of respondent, ordering Dragon to
pay the principal amount, interest, penalties, and attorney's fees. Dragon appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC's decision. The Heirs of Dragon
then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court. The
Petition raises questions of fact not cognizable under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
and whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the Complaint of respondent
due to the insufficient payment of docket fees.
Issues Whether or not the insufficient payment of filing fees is a requirement to acquire
jurisdiction
Ruling YES. The general rule is that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. A party is
only estopped from raising the issue when it does so "in an unjustly belated
manner especially when it actively participated during trial." The jurisdiction of a
court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be
conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The Supreme Court
(SC) has consistently held that a party may be estopped from questioning the lack
of jurisdiction due to insufficient payment of filing or docket fees, if the objection is
not timely raised.
Under Rule 141, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, filing fees must be paid in full at
the time an initiatory pleading or application is filed. Payment is indispensable for
jurisdiction to vest in a court. All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the
body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered
in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply
with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
While the payment of docket fees, like other procedural rules, may have been
liberally construed in certain cases if only to secure a just and speedy disposition
of every action and proceeding, it should not be ignored or belittled lest it scathes
and prejudices the other party's substantive rights. The payment of the docket fee
in the proper amount should be followed subject only to certain exceptions which
should be strictly construed. Moreover, the filing party must show that there was
no intention to defraud the government of the appropriate filing fees due it. The
RTC Court gravely erred when it merely stated that Sun Insurance Office was
applicable.
The SC however is intrigued with the issue raised for the first time by defendant in
his reply and supplemental opposition. According to the defendant, since plaintiff
willfully and deliberately evaded payment of the correct docket fees for the
amounts claimed for interests, penalties and attorney's fees, plaintiff is deemed to
have abandoned such claims. Defendant further argues that as a consequence of
the non-payment of the correct docket fees by plaintiff, this court has not acquired
jurisdiction to award the amounts claimed by the plaintiff. Truly, the payment of
complete docket fees for the claimed interests, penalties and attorney's fees cannot
be made at the time of the filing of the complaint since their true or exact amount
cannot be determined as yet with certainty until after the resolution of the case.
However, the demand letters sent to Dragon prior to the filing of respondent's
Complaint already contained respondent's computation of the accrued interests,
penalties, and attorney's fees corresponding to the Promissory Notes. Respondent
itself, in multiple pleadings, stated that it had computed the outstanding interests,
penalties, and attorney's fees owed it in the amount of P41,082,626.98. Clearly,
respondent is perfectly capable of estimating the accrued interests, penalties, and
charges it demanded as of the date it filed its Complaint. But despite respondent's
demand letters containing computations of accrued interests, penalties, and
attorney's fees, none of these computations were mentioned in the Complaint,
either in its body or prayer.
Here, on the other hand, absolutely no filing fees were paid by respondent for the
accrued interest it claimed. In multiple pleadings, respondent reasons that it has
not defrauded the government because the court may simply recoup the filing fees
in the form of a lien over the judgment award in the event that it be awarded all the
amounts it is allegedly owed. What respondent forgets is that the payment of
correct docket fees cannot be made contingent on the result of the case. Otherwise,
the government and the judiciary would sustain tremendous losses, as these fees
"take care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of cost of supplies,
use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, etc., computed as to
man hours used in handling of each case."
The rule on after-judgment liens applies to instances of incorrectly assessed or

paid filing fees, or where the court has discretion to fix the amount to be awarded.
Nowhere in any of respondent's pleadings filed before any court did respondent
manifest its willingness, to the RTC or to the CA or to the SC, that it will be paying
additional docket fees when required. Its repeated invocation of Sun Insurance
Office is not a manifestation of willingness to pay additional docket fees
contemplated in United Overseas Bank and subsequent cases. In none of its
pleadings did respondent allude to paying any additional docket fee if so ordered;
instead, it left it to the courts to constitute a lien over a hypothetical award, to
which it was not entitled, as both lower courts have already held.
Under the circumstances, a liberal application of the rules on payment of filing fees
is unwarranted. In accordance with Manchester Development Corporation, the
RTC Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the Complaint due to respondent's
insufficient payment of filing fees.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes
Name of the DURISOL PHIL v COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 121106, February 20, 2002

Number
Allegations of the
petitioners
Defense of the
defendants
Topic Kinds of Jurisdiction - General Jurisdiction
Principle
Court Procedure August 21/1970: Respondent instituted a Petition for the Extrajudicial Foreclosure
of Mortgage.
Petitioner: Filed a complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure before

the then Court of First Instance (CFI)
CFI: rendered judgment upholding its validity
Petitioner: Appealed to the CA
CA: AFFIRMED the decision of CFI; the decision became final final on April 30,
1975
**Since Petitioner never returned the titles to DBP**
Feb 25/1977: DBP instituted a Petition for Surrender of the Owner’s Duplicate
Titles covering the Foreclosed Properties before the CFI
April 15, 1977: CFI ordered the petitioner to surrender the titles
Petitioner: Filed a Motion for Reconsideration
CFI: Denied the Motion
Petitioner: Appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
IAC: Rendered a decision ordering that the case be REMANDED to the lower court
for further proceedings.
- It held that it was improper for the trial court to render summary
judgment because there were genuine issues involved.
- This decision became final and executory.
Respondent: Filed before the lower court a motion to dispense with the
proceedings and, instead, to pronounce judgment based on the admissions
contained in the pleadings and the decision of the IAC.
- The motion was DENIED-
Nov 15/1988: the case was set for hearing. However, neither petitioner nor its
counsel appeared despite due notice. DBP was allowed to present evidence ex
parte.
Jan 10/1989: Issued a Resolution ordering the surrender and delivery of the titles.
16 days after the receipt of the Resolution: Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration , claiming that the ex parte presentation of evidence was done in
violation of its right to due process.
- this was Denied for having been filed out of time -
Respondent DBP: Filed a Motion for Execution which was Granted
- DBP sold the lots-
Sep 2/1994: Petitioner instituted before the CA a Petition to Annul the trial court’s
dated Jan 10, 7989. Alleging that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.
Jan 20, 1995: Dismissed the Petition
Petitioner: Filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was DENIED
**Hence this Petition**
Facts Petitioner Durisol executed a mortgage on two parcels of registered land as a

security for the loan it obtained from Respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). The latter’s default in the payment of the loans led the
Respondent to institute a Petition for the Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage,
and DBP emerged as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale. However, DBP was
not able to register the property to its name because petitioner never returned the
titles that the Petitioner’s president borrowed from the Respondent purportedly to
obtain new titles . Because of this, a series of petitions and motions were filed by
the two parties.
Issues Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of new
duplicate owner’s certificate of title
Ruling YES. The RTC, formerly the CFI, is a court of general jurisdiction. All cases, the
jurisdiction over which is not specifically provided for by law to be within the
jurisdiction of any other court, fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC. But the RTC is
also a court of limited jurisdiction over, among others, cadastral and land
registration cases. All proceedings involving title to real property, or specifically
land registration cases, including its incidents such as the issuance of owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, are matters cognizable by the RTC. It has been ruled
that the RTCs have jurisdiction over all actions involving possession of land, except
forcible entry and illegal detainer.
It should be noted, however, that when the CFI took cognizance of the
remanded case, the distinction between the CFI acting as a land registration court
with limited jurisdiction, on the one hand, and a CFI acting as an ordinary court
exercising general jurisdiction, on the other hand, has already been removed with
the effectivity of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529).The amendment was
aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes
Name of the MONTANER v SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. January 20,2009 (174975)

Number
Allegations of the The petitioners raise the following issues:

petitioners
Shari’a district court lack jurisdiction over petitioners who are roman Catholics
and Non-Muslims
Shari’a district court did not acquire jurisdiction over the estates and properties of
the deceased which is not a natural or juridical person with capacity to be sued
Defense of the Private respondents stress that the Shari’a District Court must be given the
defendants opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is a Muslim
in order to determine whether it has jurisdiction.
Topic Shari’a District Court
Principle All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of
deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or
appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the
aggregate value of the property
Court Procedure
Facts The petitioner Luisa Kho Montañ er, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro
Montañ er, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish., when Alejandro Montañ er, Sr.
died.
The private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S.
Montañ er, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties
before the Shari’a District Court.
In the said complaint, private respondents made allegations, stating that Alejandro
Montañ er Sr. is a Muslim and she is the first family of the deceased and a widow of
the decedent. Private respondents prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order the
partition of the estate of the decedent; and the appointment of an administrator for
the estate of the decedent.
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following
grounds that Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late
Alejandro Montañ er, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic.
The Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint. The
district court held that Alejandro Montañ er, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its
jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of
deceased Muslims.
The private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the Shari’a District
Court reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration.
The Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal and allowed private
respondents to adduce further evidence.
Issues Whether or not the Shari’a District Court lacks jurisdiction over the petitioners
who are Roman Catholics and Non-Muslims
Ruling NO.
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the

averments and character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition. The
designation given by parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the
courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa
descriptio or defective caption," courts are "guided by the substantive averments
of the pleadings."
Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not
depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant or result in having "a
case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple
stratagem. Indeed, the "defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a
question of fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction."
The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss. In the case at
bar, the Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because
petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The
Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine
whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the
deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the
deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction.
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the

averments and character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition. The
designation given by parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily bind the
courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa
descriptio or defective caption," courts are "guided by the substantive averments
of the pleadings."
Reference of the Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
case Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Shari’a District Courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. — (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of
deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or
appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the
aggregate value of the property
Important Notes Difference between Civil Action and Special Proceeding
Civil action -a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong necessarily has definite adverse parties, who
are either the plaintiff or defendant.
Special proceeding- by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a

particular fact has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a
status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party.
Name of the VERA v HON. ARCA

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. May 26, 1969 (L-25721)

Number
Allegations of the Petitioners in this special civil action seek the setting aside of the writ of
petitioners preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge and would restrain him
perpetually from further hearing the suit for prohibition and injunction pending
before him.
Petitioners predicate their plea on the allegation that respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction as the Tax
Census Act is valid and constitutional.
Petitioners likewise justify their contention that there was a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent Judge in the issuance of such writ of
preliminary injunction due to his failure to consider the serious injury it would
cause the paramount public interest.
Defense of the Respondents specially denied the allegations in the petition to the effect that
defendants Republic Act No. 2070 is valid and constitutional, reference being made to the
alleged violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination and against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Topic Supreme Court and Regional Trial Court
Principle
Court Procedure
Facts The other respondents, started a special civil action for prohibition and injunction
in the sala of respondent Judge, seeking to declare the Tax Census Act as
unconstitutional, illegal and invalid.
Reference was made to its first section, which would require of every resident of
the Philippines over 18 years of age within the month of February, 1962 and
thereafter within the same month every four years to file with the City or
Municipal Treasurer in a form prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of Finance, a statement under oath
containing personal data.
It was then alleged that the Tax Census Act has been enforced and implemented
since 1962 and that the parties who filed the suit, now respondents before us, "are
required to make and file Sworn Statements of Assets, Income and Liabilities" in
accordance with the Act.
The main portion of the petition before respondent Judge dealt with the alleged
infirmity of the Tax Census Act as being violative of the constitutional right to
liberty, to the guarantee against self-incrimination and the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
A writ of preliminary injunction was therein likewise sought, the argument being
advanced that the other respondents before us in the petition before respondent
Judge "would suffer great and irreparable damage arising from the non-filing of
their Sworn Statement of Assets, Income and Liabilities, as they are subject to
criminal prosecution under Section 5 of the Tax Census Law which is in clear
violation of herein petitioners' aforesaid constitutional and legal rights.
The present petitioners, as respondents in such special civil action, in their answer,
after denying specifically the allegations contained in the petition intended to
establish the unconstitutionality of the Tax Census Act, emphasized in the special
and affirmative defenses interposed that such an enactment was intended to
implement the governmental function "for a just, equal and efficient system of
collecting taxes.
Consequently, respondent Judge, issued a writ of preliminary injunction thus

restraining petitioners before us from requiring the other respondents and other
similarly situated to file their sworn statements of assets, income and liabilities
under Republic Act No. 2070.
Issues Whether or not respondent Judge ought to have issued the writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the enforcement of the Tax Census Act
Ruling NO.
Respondent Judge took into consideration purely legal arguments, no evidence

being introduced, both for and against the validity of the challenged statute.
Moreover, his attention was invited to the presumption of validity that every
legislative act has in its favor as well as the doctrine that the task of suspending the
operation of the law "is a matter of extreme delicacy because that is an
interference with the official acts not only with the duly elected representatives of
the people in Congress but also of the highest magistrate of the land." 27
Respondent Judge was deaf to the force of such cogent and persuasive
constitutional law doctrines. He issued the preliminary injunction nonetheless.
It is manifest that respondent Judge did overstep the bounds of discretion that set
limits to the authority he is entitled to exercise in the issuance of the preliminary
injunction to restrain the enforcement of a statute. There can be no dissent from
the proposition that where the action required of a lower court would be
tantamount, even if only for a temporary period, to disregarding the clearly
expressed will of the two branches of the government, the need for caution is
greatest. Here, respondent Judge was apparently oblivious of such a need.
Petitioners thus are clearly entitled to the writ of certiorari prayed for. Respondent
Judge did possess discretion to issue or not to issue a preliminary injunction. That
discretion, however, according to the circumstances disclosed, was abused, and
abused gravely. Even on a matter of less significance, this Court has not hesitated
to exercise its supervisory authority by correcting such failure to abide by
controlling legal principles with a petition for certiorari as the appropriate remedy.
There is much greater reason for a writ of preliminary injunction being set aside in
this case by the grant of the certiorari prayed for. It may serve to deter other
inferior tribunals similarly minded. It may serve to induce the conviction on the
part of a lower court judge that it is a matter of the utmost seriousness to stop the
enforcement of an act after it has been enacted by a bicameral legislative body
composed of the House and the Senate and approved by the President, two of the
coordinate branches of the government. The greatest care should thus be taken
before its operation is enjoined. Thereby, it would be manifesting not judicial
timidity but judicial wisdom.
Reference of the Section 1 of Tax Census Act

case
Section 5 of Tax Census Act which provides that
Any person who fails to file the statement required in this Act, or who intentionally
gives false or fraudulent information therein, shall, upon conviction, be punished
by a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more
than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court. Any responsible officer of
any corporation, joint stock company, partnership, joint account or association,
required by this Act to make and file such statement, who refuses or neglects to
make or file such statement within the time prescribed in this Act or who makes
any false or fraudulent statement, shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding four
thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not exceeding six months, or both, in the
discretion of the court. In case the offender is an alien, said offender, upon
conviction, shall be deported immediately without the necessity of further
proceedings in the Deportation Board.
Important Notes The issuance of an injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, the
exercise of which is controlled not so much by the then applicable sections of the
Code of Civil Procedure, now the Rules of Court, but by the accepted doctrines, one
of which is that it should not be granted while the rights between the parties are
undetermined except in extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury
will be done. For it is an action in equity appropriate only when there can be no
compensation in damages for the injury thus sustained and where no adequate
remedy in law exists. Such a holding reflected the prevailing American doctrine
that there is no power "the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires
greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion or more dangerous in a doubtful
case," being "the strong arm of equity, that never ought to be extended," except
where the injury is great and irreparable.
Name of the MENDOZA v MAYOR VILLAS

Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 187256. February 23, 2011

Number
Allegations of the Mendoza sought the advice of the Department of the Interior and Local
petitioners Government (DILG) as to who should exercise the powers of Punong Barangay of
Balatasan given the prevailing controversy. Petitioners prayed that the LBP be
directed to release the funds of Barangay Balatasan to them in order to render
necessary, basic public services to the inhabitants of the barangay.
Defense of the Villas and Herato filed an Answer dated May 16, 2008 interposing the following
defendants affirmative defenses: (1) that the petition for mandamus was defective, being
directed against two or more different entities and requiring to perform different
acts; and (2) that Mendoza does not have any clear and legal right for the writ of
mandamus.
Topic Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus, Quo
Principle This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is
shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts.
That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters
Court's docket
Court Procedure Thomas Pajanel, filed a petition for quo warranto with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC).
The MTC issued a Decision dated February 23, 2008, disqualifying Mendoza and
declaring that Herato was entitled to succeed him as Punong Barangay with Herato
garnering the highest number of votes as a Barangay Kagawad. Mendoza appealed
the MTC Decision to the COMELEC.
Petitioners filed a Petition dated May 5, 2008 for Mandamus with Damages and
Prayer for the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, docketed as Special Civil
Action No. 08-10 pending with the Regional Trial Court
Thereafter, Villas and Herato filed a Motion to Dismiss dated November 7, 2008. In
the Motion, a copy of the COMELEC Resolution dated September 8, 2008 in
COMELEC Case No. SPA-07-243-BRGY was attached. This case originated from a
disqualification case against Mendoza filed with the COMELEC by Senen Familara
before the conduct of the 2007 barangay elections. In the Resolution, the COMELEC
disqualified Mendoza as a candidate for Punong Barangay of Barangay Balatasan in
the 2007 barangay elections for having already served three (3) consecutive terms
for the same position. In response, Mendoza presented a Certification dated
February 27, 2009 10 from the COMELEC which stated that COMELEC Case No.
SPA-07-243-BRGY is still pending with the Commission.
RTC issued the assailed order dated February 2, 2009 dismissing the petition on
the strength of the COMELEC Resolution dated September 8, 2008 disqualifying
Mendoza from running in the 2007 elections. As stated, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated February 2, 2009 was denied in an Order dated
March 17, 2009
From such orders the petitioners went directly to this Court.
Facts In the 2007 barangay elections, Mendoza obtained the highest votes for the
position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Balatasan, Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro,
while respondent Liwanag Herato obtained the highest number of votes for the
position of Barangay Kagawad. Notably, Mayor Enrilo Villas was the incumbent
Mayor of Bulalacao, Oriental Mindoro at the time of the barangay elections.
After the elections, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) proclaimed Mendoza

as the duly-elected Punong Barangay of Balatasan. Thus, the losing candidate,
Thomas Pajanel, filed a petition for quo warranto with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Mansalay-Bulalacao which was docketed as Election Case No. 407-B. The
MTC issued a Decision dated February 23, 2008, disqualifying Mendoza and
declaring that Herato was entitled to succeed him as Punong Barangay with Herato
garnering the highest number of votes as a Barangay Kagawad. Mendoza appealed
the MTC Decision to the COMELEC.
On February 28, 2008, Villas administered the Oath of Office to Herato. 5 Then,
Villas issued Memorandum No. 2008-03-010 dated March 3, 2008, 6 directing all
department heads of the Municipal Government to act only on documents signed
or authorized by Herato. Meanwhile, Mendoza sought the advice of the Department
of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) as to who should exercise the powers
of Punong Barangay of Balatasan given the prevailing controversy.
In a letter dated April 11, 2008, 7 DILG Undersecretary Austere A. Panadero
responded to Mendoza's inquiry informing Villas that Mendoza should occupy the
post of Punong Barangay as there was no Writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the
MTC Decision dated February 23, 2008.
Nevertheless, the Bulalacao Municipal Administrator, Edezer Aceron, by the

authority of Villas, issued a letter dated April 23, 2008 8 to respondent Marlon de
Castro, Manager, Pinamalayan Branch, Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP),
requesting that transactions entered into by Mendoza in behalf of Barangay
Bulalacao should not be honored. In the same letter, Aceron dismissed the DILG
letter dated April 11, 2008, saying that it is merely advisory and not binding on the
municipal government of Bulalacao and the LBP.
In response, de Castro issued Villas and Mendoza a letter dated April 24, 2008,
advising both parties that the LBP shall not honor any transaction with regard the
accounts of Barangay Balatasan.
Issues (1) Whether or not that the petition for mandamus is defective, being directed
against two or more different entities and requiring to perform different acts;
(2) Whether or not Mendoza have any clear and legal right for the writ of
mandamus.
Ruling Nevertheless, even providing that the petition was not filed prematurely, it must
still be dismissed for having become moot and academic.
In Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners, The Commission on Elections, 16 the Court defined

a moot and academic case as follows:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground
of mootness.
With the conduct of the 2010 barangay elections, a supervening event has
transpired that has rendered this case moot and academic and subject to dismissal.
This is because, as stated in Fernandez v. Commission on Elections, 17 "whatever
judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in
the nature of things, can no longer be enforced." Mendoza's term of office has
expired with the conduct of last year's local elections. As such, Special Civil Action
No. 08-10, where the assailed Orders were issued, can no longer prosper. Mendoza
no longer has any legal standing to further pursue the case, rendering the instant
petition moot and academic.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes Case was filed MTC -> RTC -> Motion to Dismiss by respondents -> Appealed
straight to SC.
RTC appeals should go to CA and not directly to SC.

Name of the CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) v
Petitioner/ SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
Respondents
Date and G.R. G.R. No. 183409. June 18, 2010

Number
Allegations of the When the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, issued DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, he
petitioners included in the definition of agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988." In
effect, lands reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or
other non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural
lands for purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. In so doing,
petitioner avows that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction
as he has no authority to expand or enlarge the legal signification of the term
agricultural lands through DAR AO No. 01-02. Being a mere administrative
issuance, it must conform to the statute it seeks to implement, i.e., Republic Act No.
6657, or to the Constitution, otherwise, its validity or constitutionality may be
questioned.
In the same breath, petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was
made in violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 because it covers all
applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to other
agricultural uses, such as the conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have
been reclassified by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations, to
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses on or after 15
June 1988. According to petitioner, there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act
No. 6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction
or authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted
to its conversion authority. Thus, in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioner further asseverates that Section 2.19, 12 Article I of DAR AO No. 01-02,
as amended, making reclassification of agricultural lands subject to the
requirements and procedure for land use conversion, violates Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 7160, because it was not provided therein that reclassification by
LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or requirements, or that the DAR's
approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification. The said Section
2.19 of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the constitutional
mandate on local autonomy under Section 25, 13 Article II and Section 2, 14 Article
X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Petitioner similarly avers that the promulgation and enforcement of DAR AO No.
01-02, as amended, constitute deprivation of liberty and property without due
process of law. There is deprivation of liberty and property without due process of
law because under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that are not within DAR's
jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or restricted from
legitimate use on pain of administrative and criminal penalties. More so, there is
discrimination and violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because the aforesaid administrative order is patently biased in favor of the
peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of society.
As its final argument, petitioner avows that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is not a valid
exercise of police power for it is the prerogative of the legislature and that it is
unconstitutional because it suspended the land use conversion without any basis.
Defense of the
defendants
Topic Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus, Quo
Principle SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
must be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board
or officer.
A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where it has

the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are,
and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights
of the parties. Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies
to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies . . .
required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and
draw conclusions from as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion
of a judicial nature."
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is

necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or
property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with
power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of
the contending parties.
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance and
enforcement by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No.
01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 were done in the exercise of his
quasi-legislative and administrative functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. In issuing the aforesaid administrative issuances, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform never made any adjudication of rights of the parties. As such, it
can never be said that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and
enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never
exercised any judicial or quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative
and administrative functions.
Court Procedure This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by herein petitioner Chamber of
Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) seeking to nullify and prohibit
the enforcement of Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order
(AO) No. 01-02, as amended by DAR AO No. 05-07, 1 and DAR Memorandum No.
88, for having been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the
aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.
Facts The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97, 3
entitled "Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural
Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses," which consolidated all existing implementing
guidelines related to land use conversion. The aforesaid rules embraced all private
agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced,
and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by Local
Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.
Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO

No. 01-99, entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of
Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses," amending and updating the previous
rules on land use conversion. Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands,
to wit: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional
and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of
agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond — the effect of which
is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that
previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial,
industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 6657 5 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 6 of Republic Act No. 7160 7
and other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such uses.
On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another

Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules
on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO
No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR
AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-
agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.
Thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended certain

provisions 8 of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly
addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.
To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate
development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No.
88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of
all land use conversion applications.
Issues Whether or not DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in violation of Section
65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even those non-awarded lands and
reclassified lands by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations on or after
15 June 1988.
Ruling No. Section 65 of RA 6657 provides that “After the lapse of five (5) years from its
award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater
economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon
application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected
parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or
conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have
fully paid his obligation.”
Conversion and reclassification differ from each other. Conversion is the act of
changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as
approved by the DAR while reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural
lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and
procedures for land use conversion. In view thereof, a mere reclassification of an
agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use. He
has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the
agricultural land for other purposes.
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR’s conversion authority
can only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June
1988. The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassification or
rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance
or authority. Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to
DAR’s conversion authority. Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the
agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current
use of reclassified agricultural lands.
Reference of the
case
Important Notes This case was filed directly to SC and skipped hierarchy of courts (RC and CA).
Name of the
Petitioner/
Respondents
Date and G.R.

Number
Allegations of the
petitioners
Defense of the
defendants
Topic
Principle
Court Procedure
Facts
Issues
Ruling
Reference of the
case
Important Notes

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Name of the PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION (PCMC) v IGNACIO B.

Date and G.R. G.R. No. 191475 December 11, 2013

Name of the THE UNITED STATES v JOSE TAMPARONG

Date and G.R. G.R. No. 9527 August 23, 1915.

Topic Supreme Court

Name of the RAYOS v CITY OF MANILA

Date and G.R. G.R. No. 196063 December 14, 2011

(1) Ordinance No. 7949 is unconstitutional and;

Topic Hierarchy of Courts

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss

Issues 1. Whether or not a motion to dismiss is appealable

The Supreme Court ruled that an order denying a motion to dismiss is

SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final

No appeal may be taken from:

(c) An interlocutory order;

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is

That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a

Reference of the Section 1 (c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

(c) An interlocutory order;

Name of the UNITED CLAIMANTS ASSOCIATION v NEA

Date and G.R. G.R. No. 187107, January 31, 2012

Allegations of the Petitioners raise the following issues:

3. Resolution Nos. 46 and 59 were carried out in bad faith.

3. The assailed NEA Board resolutions were issued in good faith

Topic Hierarchy of Courts

Court Procedure The petitioners DIRECTLY APPEALED TO THE SC

Under PD 269, Section 5(a)(5), the NEA Board is empowered to organize or

Thereafter, the NEA implemented an early retirement program denominated as

Issues Whether or not the petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts

Date and G.R. September 11, 2013. G.R. No. 196200

Date and G.R. January 21, 2015. G.R. No. 205728

Observation of the hierarchy of courts is compulsory, citing Heirs of Bertuldo

Topic Hierarchy of Courts

The assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners' right to

If petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies

The repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute an

● when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed

● in cases of first impression;

Name of the HOME GUARANTY CORP v R-II BILDERS

Date and G.R. G.R. No. 192649, March 9, 2011

Principle Principle of non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal

Branch 24 of the Manila RTC initially issued a writ of preliminary injunction in

Court of Appeals Decision:

Name of the DAVAO LIGHT v COURT OF APPEALS

Date and G.R. G.R. No. 111685, August 20, 2001

Consequently, the trial court issued a Resolution dismissing petitioner's complaint

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated October 1,

The Article of Incorporation of YASCO (SEC Reg. No. 22083) states:

Venue is determined pursuant to Rule 4, section 2 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Name of the NOCUM v LUCIO TAN

Date and G.R. G.R. No. 145022. September 23, 2005

Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent Lucio Tan filed an

Aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint, respondent Lucio Tan filed an

(b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law;

We further restated the rules on venue in Article 360 as follows:

It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL ACTIONS arising from libel

Name of the PADLAN v DINGLASAN

Date and G.R. G.R. No. 180321. March 20, 2013.

On December 13, 1999, respondents moved to declare petitioner in default and

Topic Determined by the allegations in the complaint

After learning what happened, Elenita demanded Padlan to surrender possession

On December 13, 1999, respondents moved to declare petitioner in default and

Name of the GONZALES v QUIRICO PE