WILL, RESPONSIBILITY, AN ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNTS OF Ia gRANCE NTS OF INCONTINENCE 1. PROBLEMS FROM AnistoTLE Aristode is familiar with two diferent accounts of Aer ns eof mine. On in incontinence conflicts with other resonable beliefs thout pearinal reason, motivation, and action, and that these other belie, under- mine our belie in incontinence. When we think we at incontinent we reilly act on our essentially rational desire for the good, combined with fale beliefs about the good. On the other hand, Plat, in Repub- lic IV, argues that incontinence should be explained and not desied. The triparttion of the soul seeks to show, contrary to Soctates, that itis intelligible for us to act agai : inst our beliefs about what we have overriding reason to do.' We have essential d ly rational desires guided by beliefs about the good, but we also have non-rational desires that ‘may move us against our rational desires, Aristotle's account of incontinence is difficult to understand partly because he accepts elements of both the Socratic and the Platonic approaches.” He agrees with Plato, in so far as he seeks to explain incontinence, not to deny its existence. But he also agrees with Socrates, in so far as he traces incontinence to an error in practical reason, not simply to the weakness of practical reason in motivation. His opening comments on Socrates anticipate his eventual account of incontinence. According to Socrates, no one fails to do what is better 1. Lave derived some of my discussion of Aristotle from my ‘Some rational aspects ofincontinenc’, Southern Journal of Phibsophy, 27 Supp. (1988), 49-88, which includes more details, My remarks about Plato andthe ‘Platonic’ view of incontinence involve 2 fasysuperticial and oversimplified description ofthe views inthe Republic. 22 The Ptonicclements in Arsod' account ate stesed in N. Dab, Pct Knowledge, Arisa, and Weakes of Will, Minneapolis 1984, and in D. Cates, Arist Philophy af Action, London 1984. The Socratic elements are prominent in R. Robinson, ‘Arsole ‘on Alas in: Aviles on Aristark, vol. 2, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sori, London 1977, 79-91; D. Wiggins, "Weaknes of wil in: Esay on Arise Eis, ‘A-Oksenberg Rory. Berkeley 1980), 241-65; and J. McDowell, 'Virue and aso, Mons {62 (1979), 331-50, ax 334-peRENCE H- IRWIN pane Bil chose | 0 aac Oe ote aE peretone sect ie loi ira pune ane there mabe oi oS et denies BE POS ees) a000 Id mand that Socrates y.. “! oe we Mporance Hence he cong pea og for would s€ i aliquo particularARISTOTELIAN ACCOt WUNTS OF IN INCONTINENCE 33 italy have thought. On so ine of deliberation about whats bee ans ne © consider the shout the reliability of this deliberation in thee on th out views sometimes reasonable to elect to a these circumstances. It is warently correct rational deliberation, Ineo to the conclusions of fallow the mistaken suggestion of thei paaions mn ooh lee fey would not follow if the pasion had goons tection that ‘They cannot fairly be blamed simply beca fot suggested it to them. passion; for that may sometimes be a Sas they ten to thir cure Peau because they allow themselves to be penn der gegen fo follow their passion here and now, th Detsuaded that they ought spe of ie object ofthe panion han Se oo ne ‘xeon ofthe good. Sine ther conrpon af aero n they do not abandon it, they do not act rane eee is correct and con the suggestion of a passion that they dentate _ They act to their conception of the good, aor Sten pean, If incontinents make this mistake, thei ; not completely correct; Aquinas een bi media BF pen pasvonicoteesly prepa doouasiens pg eens Ie cacrrevinthelomioalthanbeanitonhasolemorie ia aS racting on thei passions rather than thee ceaon, If they had a hal coec grasp ofthe good they wos seth his ocak ficient excuse for abandoning, their rational judgment about what is best in these particular circumstances. It would be too simp, then, «suppose that incontnen people make eosin pact racnktg nly inthe specific circumstances where chey are subject song passions. These circumstances reveal a more permanent weakness in their practical reasoning, If this is Aquinas’ view, his account retains enough of the Socratic elements of Aristotle's account to give counterintuitive results on some point, We may be inclined to protest that an incontinent may be well aware of the wrongness of following his passions on this occa- sion, but follow them nonetheless; whatever judgment of goodness or ac pablty we atribute tothe incontinent i sems posible or aero make the contrary judgment, but to act incontinenty nonetheless. 1a: SUEVY lec. 10 (1273-74), Leon 4712, 3732-6 24-53._xunce 1 “Aa f 110 tno know what ty ee Eee de He cei i vo i igh wea ined why we te sg rea 2 against an ey Ss ee rt a a in onc “pina mua gre dag 89 focused dite on thesis ian re ey disingush this judges’ fn hat AR cee ee ae their deli ares wih hepa volun) 2 igen ces 0 mee ns on et right 10 80 8 along.” aeion judgment 08 In Aquinas Once we sce the diffs Seah Ss ster than te action. deliberation abou 4 tee oer eae cio co cole perven deliberton ‘common ort, gon i eon en i oe acu ‘edo Sten, as reply the dds Aviso, things ‘a Se ea hae coe somethin, is of coke en nee de, incontinen, het repre we need a erie ee not know that itis noe jnat po’ eer though they Se ase Pa do is worse a of along with their pasions of them to do is 0g along lines ; ir ee tnd gadis account in way i ee Sek incontinent personis choice, ; thar alow a beter analysis 7 CONSENT: AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION oF INCONTINENCE? So far ‘Suggested ear pli endor ‘tion in Bad I) Vy oh Mel uf It for vo "8 have have tried to unders ier that Ar stote leaves this Possibili ng it. To see wh, lat other Possibilities might be open, © consider One that Agu’ : We are "sponsible for Pt Wil consents € mig tand the account that Aquinas develops po be asunption tt incon ij i : nents elect their Mcontinent actions. ty open without 2S Sugpests, acting on {0 the action (g HII, g. 10, take Aristo to ao Th 1 4 ; acting on Passion is peat because PaSion is an internal Ale a View of AristotlesARISTOT TELIAN ACCOUNTS OF INCONTINEN ce 55 ims about Ou respons een i needed, so that Hv fr ating om pasos; some Furi ei ; Aquinas suggests that the further onda ire to eta wl consent ‘By ineroducing consent into his account of rat an the Stoic conception of voluntary action Teagan, Aquinas draws ar Aso offers no clear necessary and «Stole pethaps notice stun action; they fill the gap he leaves ufc condton for ion with action chat rests on assent (ovate me voluntary ic appearance (phantasa). Augustine takes re) ache than phe opps and Damascene combine it with the J this Stoic analy. rd Aquinas follows their lead the Aristotelian analysis, How does Stoic asent differ ‘Gina to ack ewo characteristics of Genie tion essentially involves preference for one eee tons no simply mean that in choosing one thing we ore we ye means that when we ect we a ona vew bebe chine course of ation 2s oppoved vo another, 2 cote IS fhinks election requires deliberation; for debra eae pe fon of the comparative meris of different cee debulvTH saad not make cither ofthese Features prominent in Coes ee otfeeion and consideration of altematives. When we have dairand serving apprehensive appearance it ‘al bux grabs us by the bar and aaa eto assent." And if we are uncial and 100 easly ipesed by appearance, we may Yel them wthour pope aaron. Assent seems to be present in many stations whee we do 19, SLE ee. 4 (428), Leon. 47/1, 1300-b, I. 67-75: Fo no ma how much anger or appetite grows a human being does not rh ive action, unless the consent of srl dete i added, Further, ce fist claim seems nappPe in the same Way, dy someones saying that goods that one ought cde Fn accordance with passion fowl [as rational deste] are nat voluntary Fr reason Teads us through wil co desire those things thar we ought to." og Ha © Lenin ‘Lapsychologie de ate burma chet saint Jam Damascéne ets théologiens du XIII sicle occidental, ychaleee¢ morale es XIF XP sites, Gambloux 71957, 393-424 at 421-25. me TI12a15-17s BE 122625-9; E Nemesius, De nate bons 2? 33> IVR. Moncho, Leiden 1975, 129 I, 76-81 22, Sextus Empiricus, Adversus icos 1 (= Adversus. Mathematics VID) 9. 257s ed. HL Marschmann, Leiprg 1914, 05 27-29 ol. G. VerbekeIN -eRENCE H. IRWI 1 ising, then, a TE oF ce sig Aig yen ba : ses se af seine pot on fase OF a ioc with his Stoic-inspired soy. int ss cob te agrees .d voluntary Action, Con. ty fe et ao cists something y, Ae re movement lication is an action thar Presypat “plan of Ts ap fdestre/iaridihence Hon-ration movement ish consent from election, Agu oeNTS TT adéeaesiia Promote oupts cases where seve! being satisfactory, whereas Clee them all a ther (ST I-H, g. 15, a, Siadan as better than satisfactory, the same action i ber eta seinen orn hye only in definition (na t iy sent and election, aro! moons teen coment and deton i 2 comple, This distinction ts that when only one MME Appears sari. convincing. Aquinas suggest aly if we also act on election. If we acy on Gexury neectiba cobsentil deliberation, But ie does not seem of; ries et a ad of action and», Setesadnambnniceeae Nor is ic obviea pan este Dai IK 4, CL 47,292 I 60-62; p. 263, I 98-102; De nupi, ‘mapicenia I, 31, 3, CSEL 42,247, I. 17-21, JA STEM 915 4.2:*.. concn implies ay application of the movemen: of ‘kin someting sw be donc Now ‘pply the movement of desire to the doing of rh it Blogs the abject hat ar ae ore ett OF deste in its powers that ituch Ronis nection suitable go, eh but apply the stick so chhe it touch the dons hae 1 One wh has the pon of moving the stick. Bue Pon-rational animals ovement of desire in their is is Y that movement wo any jo 0" se apply nani roe And for thig feason it is noe Properly said co consent “0 Hin ich bse ‘ovement of desire in its power 4 Sad 3:4 . ome is oak i on. Fo it may hy ‘selected, ang therefo th in tos n end and, le oth dlbexion teen ee 17 o thems bug e f ogc Bi ind that ae sa aaa Brann Waceh, ween wa iy, by a ti at ome thead of the others by ut or ‘in ch; . he icone en (non 0 tar ici caqese tt And election do nc, but i ig “onsent in the respect lect P “tfiag.» ed election 9 the respect that it iARISTOTELIAN acc *OUNTS OF INCONTINENCE , par we must have judged that itis bes all eh thats he opportunity eo even eco. Aq Spent roan action that seems permis weston eagon bout what is best all things considered. But h tather than a conviction this opporcunity. ' does not explicitly ta ‘What might we say about incontinence if d shar Aquinas offers in his remarks about consent re PPO Seructan alternative to the suggestion that iat ‘We might try to con- ing but not from election’. We noticed tha the ene 8 ee Sfvoluntary action in so far asthe will convene atons ate sources sncontinent consents tothe action that pation them.2 Perhaps the he thinks iti permissible, even though itis wone eset ees ‘We can understand this attitude by tide ase ee fa child asks a parent for another sweet the peront or eee itis bene overall not to give the sweet, bt nonethclen onsen ip allright to give way to the child’s Beenie eae Bese wuts sclcivi\right cinace hs rete dere ta SMe ws vive ray td 8 pac ub -with ce ul that it would ea 3¢ nuisance, and she payee bara of hs buh moment sh may eo fe mi te ' complains that she thinks itis all ight wo give way ‘We might take cis role for consent tobe preferable to Aquinss demand for an election in every case where we choose one ation over nother. Alternatively, we might say that it gives the minimal condi- ions in which we elect one action over another; we count as electing over y provided that we consent to x when our pasion suggest doing x This role for consent explains how the wil of incontinent isengiged, even if they donor view the incontinent action 3 the bes available in the circumstances. “Aquinas account of consent suggests yet a further posible role fo thew We have assumed that consent requires the judgment thatthe tation consented to is satisfactory of acceptable, But he does not alvays require consent to include this positive judgment. Sometimes 26. STH 9. 774.7: "Sometimes, ower the pasion a eH HEA couke away ihe se of etson altogether and den reason cn shu owe Ne POT by curing to otber thoughts, or i an preven it fom having is fe. Doan 1 Timbs are not Ipplie o scion except by he consent of eon, 5 suc abv “And so such a pasion doesnot excuse from sin altogethet.”sana HBSIN imply by failin, co xsimply by failing to gi... anescn ct a a he pve the OPPO che will in incontinent acy,“ x wher pear fc te To not judge t Best OF ven all igh, might rat Pes? O** Capable of intervening to prey, pet, his Wil ening consents tO the acy." sn Oe nd be C00 weak if We cou” Re aon Te hie that ress in ng, ce ala 9 IRCTNEDE A esult from inattention, psy" Pr ee good, But none of thea jae ines oe Consent requires non-intene eile. Aqua assumes that incon, chemseles the badness of felony ee ow ee the suggestions ele by sppesis i the, ce rcumstances. Incontinents would not that the follow, 7 clearly seen what is wrong with the policy that they follow, ite, ye wet conse a a basis vOlUAaTy action tha, ote delieratin and dacion, weaddl a Stoic element to Agus Anorn acount of voluntary acon. This roe for conse lees an important ple for ignorance, and to that extent retains Seca apc of rss azount. But consent is nonethele.¢ fal in so far as it suggests a more complex account of voluntary action than w might dei from Aquinas remarks about election, I electio ate lama come in degrees, they help us to exp i ie difficulties th: in tyi i io finn a esha face us in trying to Bive a credible accoun, Terence H. IRwiy, Cornell Universiny Ithaca, NY Wes Rot by weak will) Ct participation 1D writing, and |