LIELANIE B.
SABAY 1B-M6
MEANING OF WORDS AND PHRASES
It is well settled that the word "may" is merely
permissive and operates to confer discretion upon
a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term
"may be" connotes possibility; it does not connote
certainty. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating
liberty, opportunity, permission or
possibility. (Capati v. Ocampo, 113 SCRA 799
(1982)
The word “may" in a statute is permissive. The rule,
however, is not absolute. (PCFI v. NTC and PLDT, 131
SCRA 200 (1984) (But see dissent of Abad Santos,
J.)
WORDS & PHRASES MEANING OF WORDS AND PHRASES
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the
work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court
order setting the time for initial hearing. The said
word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the
mandatory character of a statute. While
concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute
rule in statutory construction, as its import
ultimately depends upon its context in the entire
provision, we hold that in the present case the term
must be understood in its normal mandatory
meaning. (Director of Lands v. CA, 276 SCRA 276
“May” vs. “Shall”
(1997)
The word "shall" be mandatory. The rule, however,
is not absolute. (PCFI v. NTC and PLDT, 131 SCRA
200 (1984) (But see dissent of Abad Santos, J.)
The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory
or directory depending upon a consideration of the
entire provisions in which it is found, its object and
the consequences that would follow from
construing it one way or the other (cf. De Mesa v.
LIELANIE B. SABAY 1B-M6
It seems to us clear from the language of the
enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752
intended that an employer with a provident plan or
an employee housing plan superior to that of the
fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the
law had intended that the employee [sic] should
have both a superior provident plan and a housing
Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case at
bench, there is no basis to justify the construction
of the word as mandatory. (Berces v. Guingona, 241
SCRA 539 (1995)
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that
Congress may either propose amendments to the
Constitution or call a convention for that purpose,
but it cannot do both, at the same time. This theory
is based upon the fact that the two (2) alternatives
are connected in the Constitution by the disjunctive
"or." Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the
LIELANIE B. SABAY 1B-M6
plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have
used the words “and” instead of “and/or.”
(Romulo, Mabanta, et al. v. HDMF, G.R. No. 131082,
June 19, 2000) In its elementary sense, "or", as
used in a statute, is a disjunctive article indicating
an alternative. It often connects a series of words
or propositions indicating a choice of either. When
"or" is used, the various members of the
enumeration are to be taken separately. (Hda.
Luisita Inc. v. PARC, G.R. No. 171101, Resolution,
November 22, 2011)
Principally/Primarily means “mainly,
principally, mostly, generally.” Thus, not all
reclamation projects fall under PEA’s authority of
supervision, integration, and coordination. Although
PEA was designated under E.O 525 as the agency
primarily responsible for integrating, directing and
coordinating all reclamation projects, its charter
does not mention that it has the exclusive and sole
power and authority to reclaim lands of public
domain. (Chavez v. NHA, G.R. No. 164527, August
15, 2007)
absence of other circumstances — and none has
brought to our attention — supporting the
conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact, the
term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and,"
or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of the law
“Or” vs. “And” warrants it. (Gonzales v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-28196,
November 9, 1967)
The use of the word "exclusively” is a further
confirmation of the exclusory provision of the Act,
subject only to exceptions which may be provided
in the Act itself. The act is compulsory as to
employees in 'all industrial employment' and
“Principally”/” Primarily” vs. employees of the territory and its political
“Exclusively” subdivisions. (Sections 7480-7481, S.S., Vol. 1, p.
713.) When the act is applicable the remedy
thereunder is exclusive (Sec. 7483, S.S., p. 714.)
(Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp., G.R. No. L-30642,
[April 30, 1985], 220 PHIL 533-576)
LIELANIE B. SABAY 1B-M6

The word ‘term’ describes the period that an
officer may hold office and upon the expiration of
such term, his rights, duties and authority as a
public officer must cease. It is necessary to
interpret the word ‘term’ within the purview of the
statute as to effectuate the statutory scheme
pertaining to the office under examination. In this
“Term” vs. “Tenure”
case, the term of office is not fixed by law, but by
the board. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal
but an expiration of the term of office of Aparri.
(Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 231 (1984))
The statute is clear If the words and phrases are
not obscure or ambiguous its meaning and
intention must be determined from the language
employed. There is no room for construction. The
courts may not speculate as to the probable intent
of the legislature apart from the words. The
legislature must be presumed to know the meaning
of the words, to have used words advisedly and to
have expressed its intent by the use of such words,
as are found in the statute. (Aparri v. CA, G.R. No.
L-30057, January 31, 1984)

Section I of Article XII-B, Constitution uses the ‘Every’ means each one of a group without
word "every" to modify the phrase "government- exception. It means all possible and all taken one
owned or controlled corporation." by one. (NHC v. Juco, G.R. No. L-64313 January 17,
1985)
"Every" means each one of a group, without
exception It means all possible and all taken one by
“Every”
one. Of course, our decision in this case refers to a
corporation created as a government-owned or
controlled entity. It does not cover cases involving
private firms taken over by the government in
foreclosure or similar proceedings. We reserve
judgment on these latter cases when the
LIELANIE B. SABAY 1B-M6

appropriate controversy is brought to this Court.

(NASECO vs. NLRC G.R. No. L-69870 November 29,
1988)

Since, as heretofore stated, the danger of

The term "foreigner" is limited only to natural
persons. Neither is there any provision in the same
Revised Election Code expressly or impliedly
suggesting that the circumstances of an artificial
person in law are not identical to those of natural
persons covered by the prohibition in the Revised
“foreigner”
Election Code. On the contrary, there is greater
reason to believe that the law-maker feared more
the assistance and influence of artificial persons in
the elections than the aid of natural persons.
Hence, the law utilizes it more generic term
"foreigner". (Gatchalian v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 435
1970)
desecration of the sanctity of the ballot is greater
from artificial persons by reason of their vastly
superior financial and other resources including the
combined voting power of their members and
employees, the term "foreigner" in Sec. 56 should
be understood to include artificial persons and
other organized groups, without distinct legal
personality. (Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-
32560-61, October 22, 1970)

The main objective of the Government is to develop
our domestic industries so that the country will be
economically self-sufficient. And both
Commonwealth Act 138 and Republic Act 912 aim
to contribute to the realization of the aforesaid
We have to declare, therefore, that the NAWASA,
like any other corporation exercising proprietary or
“government” governmental functions should be deemed
embraced within the term "Government" found in
Republic Act 912, and in the repair or construction
LIELANIE B. SABAY 1B-M6
nationalistic policy by requiring, the use of
Philippine made products or materials, whenever
available, practicable and usable in government
construction work or repair projects. The alleged
conflict between the two laws is more apparent
than real, and should not be allowed to defeat the
purpose of these laws. (C & C Commercial
Corporation v. National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority. G.R. No. L-27275, November 18, 1967)
The term "National Government" may not be
deemed to include the Central Bank. Under the
Administrative Code itself, the term "National
Government" refers only to the central
government, consisting of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the government, as
distinguished from local governments and other
“National government”
governmental entities and is not synonymous,
therefore, with the terms "The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines" or "Philippine
Government", which are the expressions broad
enough to include not only the central government
but also the provincial and municipal governments,
chartered cities and other government-controlled
of their works or projects or the purchase of
materials therefor, local materials should be given
preference when available, practicable and usable.
(C & C Commercial Corporation v. National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority. G.R. No. L-
27275, November 18, 1967)
To be sure the Central Bank is a government
instrumentality. But it was created as an
autonomous body corporate to be governed by the
provisions of its charter, Republic Act 265, "to
administer the monetary and banking system of the
Republic." (Sec. 1) As such, it is authorized "to
adopt, alter and use a corporate seal which shall be
judicially noticed; to make contracts; to lease or
own real and personal property, and to sell or
otherwise dispose of the same; to sue and be sued;
and otherwise to do and perform any and all things
that may be necessary or proper to carry out the
purposes of this Act. The Central Bank may acquire
and hold such assets and incur such liabilities as
result directly from operations authorized by the
LIELANIE B. SABAY 1B-M6
corporations or agencies, like the Central Bank.
(Central Bank v. CA, 63 SCRA 431 (1975)
The general term "employer," which includes in its
coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s
employer. Where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g)
applies to all employers, whether private or
government. (Republic v. Yahon, supra)
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Tordesillas
decision did not bar Basco from running for any
elective position. As can be gleaned from the
decretal portion of the said decision, the Court
couched the prohibition in this wise: . . . AND WITH
PREJUDICE TO REINSTATEMENT TO ANY POSITION
IN THE NATIONAL OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
INCLUDING ITS AGENCIES AND
INSTRUMENTALITIES, OR GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
provisions of this Act, or as are essential to the
proper conduct of such operations." (Sec. 4)
(Central Bank v. CA, G.R. No. L33022, April 22,
1975)
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of
irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later
enactment must prevail, being the more recent
expression of legislative will. Statutes must be so
“employer” construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. However,
if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier
statute must yield to the later enactment. The later
law is the latest expression of the legislative will.
(Republic v. Yahon, G.R. No. 201043, June 16, 2014)
The term "reinstatement" had a technical
meaning, referring only to an appointive position.
(Grego v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997)
“reinstatement”
LIELANIE B. SABAY 1B-M6

CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS. (Grego v. COMELEC,

G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997)
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, act, or
consequence excludes all others. This rule is
expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to
others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the
legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been “expressio unius est exclusio alterius”
not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms
to those expressly mentioned.(Commissioner of
Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-
48886-88, July 21, 1993)
It will thus be seen that the word "national" before
the word "port" is inserted in the amendment. The
change in phraseology by amendment of a provision
of law indicates a legislative intent to change the
meaning of the provision from that it originally had
(Agpalo, supra, p. 76). The insertion of the word
"national" before the word "port" is a clear
indication of the legislative intent to change the
meaning of Section 2901 from what it originally
meant, and not a mere surplusage as contended by
petitioner, in the sense that the change "merely
affirms what customs authorities had been
observing long before the law was amended" (p. 18,
Petition). It is the duty of this Court to give meaning
to the amendment. It is, therefore, our considered
opinion that under Section 2901 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 34, only vessels berthing at national ports are
liable for berthing fees. (Commissioner of Customs
v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-48886- 88, July
21, 1993)