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Wöll, Steffen

WS 2012/2013

History of philosophy

A brief history of positivism in the 19th and 19th centuries

20th century (Dr. Thomas Wendt)

House work

Basic principles of Mach's cognitive and

Philosophy of science

March 18, 2013

Length: 15,314 characters (2,313 words)

Table of contents

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………ヱ

1. Mach's theory of knowledge………………………………………………………………………………………ヲ

1.1 The subjectivistic dissolution of the object…………………………………………………….ヲ

1.2 The world as sensory perception………………………………………………………5

1.3 The subjectivistic dissolution of the ego……………………………………………..Β

2. Mach's theory of science………………………………………………………………Γ

2.1 The economy of thought………………………………………………………………..Γ

2.2 Axiomatization and empiricism……………………………………………………..ヱヰ

Summary……………………………………………………………………………………………ヱヱ

bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………….I
1

Introduction

Ernst Waldfried Josef Wenzel Mach was born in 1838 in Chirlitz-Turas near Brno

Moravia, where he was born in 1848 as the son of a free-thinker

Revolution-sympathizing teacher grew up.

At the age of fifteen he came across KantsProlegomena to everyone

future metaphysicsinto his hands, about which he later reported that he had it

“Diﾐgaﾐ siIh”appeared to be idle, while in return he saw the outside world

and perceived the I as a mass of sensations.1In this

The basic features of Mach's sensualism are already hidden from the statement

and positivism, as well as its anti-metaphysical and monistic

Basic attitude. Nevertheless, the name Machs remains largely with us to this day

whose achievements in the field of physics are connected, which in addition to the

Mach number named after him, the discovery of the Doppler effect and
essential insights into gas dynamics and heat theory
include.2

The context of Mach's work as well as the broad spectrum of his work
outgoing effective impulses – including on Bahr, Musil and Einstein –
ranges from theoretical and experimental physics to psychology and
Sensory physiology to scientific and epistemological
Considerations.3The latter two areas form the core of the present one
Work, even if Mach always denied having developed his own philosophy
have by using hisAnalysis of sensationsas “Aperҫu”4and itself
as a mere “Sunday hunter”5considered in philosophical realms.

1JT Blackmore: Ernst Mach: His Work, Life, and Influence, p. 26 f.

2H. Hönl in J. Bradley: Mach's philosophy of natural science, p. IX.
3 D. Hoffman: Ernst Mach: Studies and documents on life and work, p. 13.
4E. Mach: Analysis of sensations, p. 39.
5E. Mach: Knowledge and Error, p. VII.
2

1. Mach's theory of knowledge

1.1 The subjectivistic dissolution of the object

As a point of reference for the systematic understanding of Mach

Epistemology recommends first a historical review
philosophical coordinate system of epistemology. The Cartesian
Metaphysics fundamentally distinguishes between two types of substance:

Thinking (mind) and extended substance (body). Write to the bodies

Descartes both mathematically determinableprimary qualities(Figure,
Shape, movement, number) as wellsecondary qualities(smells, colors,
Weight), which affect the sensory organs.6This division into
a visible and a hidden order of bodies contradicts Berkeley,
whose principle “eat est perIipi”the existence of a material entity alone
dependent on their subjective perception.7Berkeley thus replaces that
Cartesian dualism of body and mind through a dualism of
the perceiver and the perceived.

Mach, on the other hand, excludes any kind of dualism by opposing it

traditional idea of a static self and constant bodies
applies.8thHe does not deny the existence of a knowing subject
and recognized object, but there is a fundamental separation betweenres

cogitansandres extensa.9The boundaries between the spiritual and physical worlds

According to Mach, they are rather fluid: On the one hand, the I can be influenced by its own

The environment cannot be completely separated; on the other hand, they hang

Appearances of the body in turn depend on the subjective

point of view.

6R. Descartes: The Principles of Philosophy, p. 18 f.

7G. Berkeley: Principles of Human Knowledge, p. 10; 12; 54; 210.
8thJ. Bradley: Mach's philosophy of natural science, p. 3.
9A. Berlange: Sensation, ego and language around 1900, p. 18.
3

This Machian cognitive space of I and becomes particularly clear

Outside world at the of Mach for theAnalysis of sensationsdesigned
Illustration that this┘ This follows the line: “In one through the
The frame formed by the arch of the eyebrows, the nose and the mustache

A part of my body appears, as far as can be seen, and its surroundings.

Meiﾐ LeiH uﾐtersIheidet siIh ┗oﾐ deﾐ aﾐdereﾐ ﾏeﾐsIhliIheﾐ LeiHerﾐ […]
“Because he is only partially seen and seen in his head.”10
Through its recognition of Mach, one's own body becomes a body of
The outside world, which is nevertheless experienced completely differently than the other objects.

This self-portrait and the stated observations on the field of vision

However, monocular vision is not just an expression of machismo
Anticartesianism and monism, but already outline the basics
Mach's theory of sensation.11So the person lying down can only do certain parts

his body – optically distorted – perceive; while standing and straight

Head posture, however, would not be one's own body, but exclusively
external objects visible, leaving a solid separation between indoor and outdoor

outside world no longer seems possible.12

Accordingly, Mach has a 'Doubledthe world into an in-itself

existing and a second one in the subject (as an image or representative), analogous

and with reference to the Zurich philosopher and parallel founder of

Empirio-criticism, Richard Avenarius, back.13Consequently, appearances and

Reality, impression and reality are fundamentally indistinguishable, as if they were

Ptolemaic and Copernican worldviews coexist on an equal footing

exist.The Fallacy of “ﾐai┗eﾐ 'ealisﾏus”14According to Mach, consists in the

10Mach: Analysis of Sensations, pp. 14-15.

11 M. Anders: The dissolution of the concept of body, p. 32.
12See ibid., p. 33
13Mach: Analysis of sensations, p. 38 ff.
14Mach: Knowledge and Error, p. 110.
4

Aﾐﾐahﾏe one 'Driﾐﾐeﾐけ ふSuHjektぶ and one 'Outsideﾐけ ふOHjektぶ.15Despite the

However, Mach distances himself from the similarities in content

Ernst Haeckel and Wilhelm Ostwald propagated monism and its origins
Theology and church criticism of adult substitute religious functions.16

Mach's resolution of the opposition between subject and object or

Consciousness and matter run the risk of solipsism or themselves
To slip into spiritualism, where an unbounded self encompasses the entire world

constitutes the sole reality with its conscious contents.17Do it yourself

however, completely rejects the conception of the self as a unified entity and

explains that you can onlysIh┘erliIh ┗orstelleﾐ “the whole world sat deﾏ IIh

anotherTo see my own eyes.”18Instead

he tries to escape the solipsistic consequences by
Puts the physical, psychological and spiritual on the same level, whereby I and

For their part, external egos become changeable components that change

mutually influence each other: “Because I know the feelings of the neighbors

are no more directly given to them than mine are to them, then I am
justified,the sameElements into which I have dissolved the physical,
also to be viewed as elements of the psychological. ThePhysicaland that
Psychiccontainsi.e. common elements[…]”19This concept in mind
a festering ﾐIIhけreminds me stronglyaﾐ Berkele┞s “soﾏe eterﾐal spirit”
and advances Mach's philosophy through the reductionist equality of
Is with what he has experienced in a “ﾏexcruciatingHermaphrodite position between

Materialism and Idealism”.20In contrast, Mach der leads

Cartesian dualism, “that there is a connection between the physical

15M. Diersch: Empirio-criticism and impressionism, p. 26.

16 A. Berlange: Sensation, ego and language around 1900, p. 14.
17Ibid., p. 19.
18Laaß in D. Hoffmann: Studies and Documents, pp. 218-19.
19Mach: Knowledge and Error, p. 7.
20P. Kampits: Between appearance and reality, p. 119.
5

and psychological […]It's no longer possible to imagine what it's made of

wUﾐderliIheﾐ ﾏoﾐtroublyﾐ theoryﾐ“ of metaph┞sics her┗orgiﾐgeﾐ.21

1.2 The world as sensory perception

Mach ultimately derives his ideas from this epistemological worldview

The need for a scientific reflection on what we do
actually perceive.22But this perception comes from the senses
dependent and therefore determined by sensation.23Mach describes in his 1886

published (already available as a manuscript since the end of the 1860s)

Analysis of sensationsthe presence of sensations
or so-called 'elementsけas constitutive factors:

“The world consists of colors, sounds, warmth, pressures, spaces, times, etc.

[…] We ﾐeﾐﾐeﾐ them […]elements. Capturing the flow of these elements, whether

ﾏittelHar or uﾐﾏittelHar, is the real goal of nature. […]

With this in mind we designateallElements provided we consider them dependent

of [our body], assensations. That the world is one

If you are smart, this situation is doubtful.”24

According to Mach, these sensations are the product of the analytical activity of

of the mind and, in their entirety, form the horizon of humanity

Experience and therefore the basis of all knowledge.25In other words, are

the objects of knowledge therefore certain connections about the

elements recorded in the senses. Furthermore, there is no need for one
Mediation between the knower and the known and thus also the

21Mach: Knowledge and Error, pp. 6-7.

22 A. Berlange: Sensation, ego and language around 1900, p. 19.
23Ibid.

24Mach: Popular scientific lectures, p. 239 f.

25J. Bradley: Mach's philosophy of natural science, p. 4.
6

Division between type and content of knowledge, which is achieved through the monistic

Uniformity of sensations can be abolished.26“Not the bodiesr

generate sensations, but complexes of sensations (complexes of elements)

Hildeﾐ the bodies.”27Uﾐd ┘eiter: “Not the IIh is the primary, but the one
Elements (sensations). The Elementsformthat I.Ifeel green, want
say that the element green is in a certain complex of others
Eleﾏeﾐteﾐ ふEﾏpfiﾐduﾐgeﾐ, Eriﾐﾐeruﾐgeﾐぶ ┗orkoﾏﾏt.”28This is where it lies

the essential basic idea of the empirio-critical philosophy, according to which

the objective reality in the form of the body is not independent of the cognizer

Subject (I) can exist. Consequently, objective reality cannot

be the subject of adequate knowledge, since their existence lies exclusively in the

Perception manifests itself in the form of complexes of sensations.29

This is where the mind's analytical approach to sensations takes place

to a certain extent in a natural way through participation in one
organic whole. This whole thing will gradually and gradually get to this point

analyzed until such elements are reached that do not split any further
let.30Mach arranges these elementsふ‚Eﾏpfiﾐduﾐgs particlesけぶin three groups31:

ABC= Elements of the ordinary physical world

C= The shape of a table

KLM= elements of human body

M= The blue color of Mach's eyes

αβγ=Memory, acts of will and feelings

γ=The joy of a compliment

26 A. Berlange: Sensation, ego and language around 1900, p. 20.

27Mach: Analysis of Sensations, p. 20.
28Mach: Analysis of Sensations, p. 17.
29M. Diersch, Empirio-criticism and Impressionism, pp. 24-25.
30J.
Bradley: Mach's philosophy of natural science, p. 4.
31Mach: The analysis of sensations, p. 6 ff.; see J. Bradley: Mach's philosophy of natural science, p. 5.
7

However, the elements of these groups did not exist in isolation, but in one

complex mutual interplay. Consequently I can think of something (α),

that makes me blush (K), or reminds me to set the table (A).32
Mach describes this relationship┘ This follows: “A color is a ph┞sical thing

Object as soon as we, for example, notice its dependence on the illuminating light source

[...] aIhteﾐ. If you look at their adherence to the retina […], this is how it is

she is a ps┞IhologisIhes OHject.”33This relationship between the physical and

Psychological (somewhat misleading aspsychophysical parallelism

referred to as it does not focus on the parallelism between the examined

objects) forms the core point of Mach's critique of knowledge.34

Machsche is ultimately based on this sensualistic positivism
Methodology of science, whose three central disciplines are physics,
Physiology and psychology for the study of the elements of each
group (ABC = physics etc.) are responsible.

Mach illustrates his element theory using the example of sensory illusions:

“Eiﾐeﾐ pencil, deﾐ ┘ir iﾐ the air ┗or uﾐs holdﾐ, seeﾐ ┘ir straight; tauIheﾐwe

If we put it crookedly in the water, we see it bent. One says in the latter
Trap: the pencilappearskinked, but is inrealitystraight. What
but entitles us toonefact ofothersopposite for reality
explainﾐ uﾐd the other toﾏ Sireﾐ heraHduIkeﾐ?”35After Machs
Understandingthere is no '┘irliIheﾐけ pencil behind theﾏ ﾏoﾏeﾐtaﾐ through them

senses perceived. Therefore, sensory perception never can

is wrong: “Even the worst dream is a fact as good as any other.”36
There is therefore no objective criterion for the correctness of a finding.

32See J. Bradley: Mach's philosophy of natural science, p. 5.

33Mach: Analysis of Sensations, p. 13.
34M. Diersch, Empirio-criticism and Impressionism, p. 26.
35Mach: Analysis of Sensations, p. 8.
36Ibid., p. 9.
8th

1.3 The subjectivistic dissolution of the ego

The complex of elements that, according to Mach, constitutes inner and outer reality

ultimately constituted the impossibility of a clear demarcation

ego from the outside world. Similar to the perceived elements
is the IIh aHer “no euﾐ┗eräﾐderliIhe, sIharf Hegreﾐzte Unity”37, rather
breaks down into individual perception particles and thereby becomes itself

a mere bundle of sensations.38

This leads to a subjectivist worldview in which the world is broken down into elements

Objects are apperceived by an ego, which in turn is merely an an

is a collection of elements bound to a specific body. There
these elements are subject to constant changes over time,
There can no longer be any talk of a coherent self.

Iﾏ Opposite part ┘the IIh will be “saved” by this39that it is used as a container “constantly

changing sensations and contents of consciousness a fluid being

receives,whose coﾐstitutioﾐ ﾐaIh associati┗eﾐ lawsﾐ takes place.”40Do it
The statement that it is not the I but the elements that are primary means that

Above all, the content of the ego is crucial; but this is by no means based on that

Iﾐdi┗iduuﾏ Hesihräﾐkt uﾐd HleiHt “Attention to a small amount of personal information

Eriﾐﾐeruﾐgeﾐ […] ﾐaIh deﾏ Deaths of Iﾐdi┗iduuﾏsiﾐ aﾐderﾐ receiveﾐ.”41

37Mach: Analysis of Sensations, p. 18.

38Lorenz: Viennese Modernism, p. 112.
39Mach: Analysis of Sensations, p. 18.
40M. Diersch: Empirio-criticism and impressionism, p. 43.
41Mach: Analysis of Sensations, p. 18.
9

2. Mach's theory of science

2.1 The economy of thought

Under the principles of scientific research represented by Mach

The economic principle takes a central position and forms the core point

Mach's methodology. As early as 1876, Avenarius described in his

Habilitation thesis this principle of the smallest measure of force: the mind

“It leads to an apperception, it has more power than it does, and it gives hotness

Majority of possible apperceptions give preference to those which are the same

Performance with less effort, or with the same

Force exerts a greater performance.”42This demand for the
Profitability and economy of thought in the Ockhams traditionlex
parsimoniaealso includes the rejection of metaphysical conceptions,
since these only complicated the human relationship to reality
and therefore merelya “red) number in the balance of the ┘isseﾐsIhaftliIheﾐ

“Continuation” representedﾐ.43Against this background, the rejection of the

Atomic and molecular physics through Mach to understand atoms and molecules

as uﾐsiIhtHare “‘ealityﾐ behind deﾐ ersIheiﾐuﾐgeﾐ” and so ontherefore almost as

a prime example of metaphysics.44

These considerations in conjunction with theDar┘iﾐげsIheﾐform evolutionary theory

because also the foundation for Mach's term of the economy of thought,

which of those as one from the vulgar reality of life to science

transferred and every “z┘exclusive activity excluding “pra┝is”.describes.45

The Mach biographer JT Blackmore distinguishes no fewer than eleven conceptual ones

Gradations┗oﾐ ““Economy” in Mach, who sees this only in the realm of nature

42 R. A┗eﾐarius, Philosophy as Deﾐkeﾐ of the World…, p. III.

43H. Lübbe, Consciousness in Stories, p. 38.
44Mach: Popular scientific lectures, p. 237.
45Do: The guiding principle of a nature and its economic theory of knowledge..., p. 4.
10

excluded because there is no conscious choice between different ones

opportunities take place.46This makes the purposeful human activity
in the context of a selection situation as a prerequisite for Mach
Economy of thought, whateverthe first step occurs “┘eﾐﾐ eiﾐ and the same

The destination can be reached in several alternative wayst.”47Meet these

conditions, the economic regulative allows us to use the variant

to recognize the best ratio between effort and result and
to select. This rational-economic selection principle is ultimately
essential to science per se, as the scientific modes
of gaining knowledge and experience than the (think) more economical ones

are preferable to non-scientific ones.48

2.2 Axiomatization and empiricism

As a consequence of these considerations, the scientist has the task of

the empirical values gained through experiments in the form of theoretical ones

Sentencesﾐ Hz┘. 'lawsけto hold on. These represent the most practical ones

Instruments for the economization of knowledge, which results in a further

ontological or transcendental breakdown of the conditions of their

Possibility rendered unnecessary by philosophy.49By laying down the
Knowledge in the simplest and most uniform (aesthetic) sentences possible

Sensory experiences can be substituted, the same experiences saved and

even unknown phenomena can be predicted. So science is

HestreHt “through the supervisibility and ┗complete detection of the AH┘arteﾐ

“To make new experiences unnecessary.”50As the pinnacle of economization

46JTBlackmore: Ernst Mach: His Work, Life, and Influence, p. 173 f.

47Laitko in D. Hoffmann: Studies and Documents, p. 254.
48Laitko in D. Hoffmann: Studies and Documents, p. 254.

49H. Lübbe, Consciousness in Stories, p. 39.

50Mach: Mechanics in its development, p. 6.

11

Finally, in Mach the organization of the theoretical sentences is within

of systems through axiomatic representation.51The key element to
Mach ultimately sees the realization of this ideal in language and
especially in the formula language of mathematics, which is the “ﾏit her iﾐ

Interdependent conceptual thinking, fixing the most important thing, that

Equally valid viewsto be expressed with the utmost economic succinctness

able.52

Summary

Ernst Mach's philosophy of knowledge and science was developed

judged and assessed in many different and controversial ways: Some
saw it as an expression of reductionism, anti-metaphysics and
anti-idealism; Albert Einstein polemicized against Mach's rejection of the

Relativity theory, Max Planck criticized his rejection of atomism. Lenin

rejects in his workMaterialism and empirio-criticismthe Machsche
Philosophy as idealistic revisionism.

Nevertheless, Mach's thinking exemplifies the basic mood of the

Turn of the century in that it laid down the theoretical foundations of a
unique synthesis of positivism and impressionism
Influences reached far into the literary circles of Young Vienna.

“The IIh is uﾐrettHar”,Mach's famous sentence became the title of an essay

by Hermann Bahr and beyond the motto of the Viennese Impressionists,

which contained the essence of her art, which no longer wanted to differentiate between

Sensation, consciousness and reality, saw embodied.53

51Laitko in D. Hoffmann: Studies and Documents, p. 256.

52Mach: Popular scientific lectures, p. 222.
53See P. Kampits: Appearance and Reality, foreword.
I

bibliography

Anders (2002): Anders, Martin / Grätzel, Stephan (eds.), Thinking about presence:

The dissolution of the concept of the body and solutions

Body concepts with Ernst Mach, Robert Musil and Paul Valéry, St.

Augustin: Itschert, 2002.

Avenarius (1876): Avenarius, Richard, Philosophy as Thinking of the World

according to the principle of the smallest measure of force: Prolegomena to one

Critique of the One Experience, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1903.

Berkeley (1710): Berkeley, George, Principles of Human Knowledge,

London: Penguin, 1988.

Berlange (1994): Berlange, Andreas, sensation, ego and language

1900: Ernst Mach, Hermann Bahr and Fritz Mauthner in

Connection, Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1994.

Blackmore (1972): Blackmore, John T., Ernst Mach: His Work, Life, and

Influence, Los Angeles: Berkeley, 1972.

Bradley (1974): Bradley, J., Mach's Philosophy of Natural Science,

Stuttgart: Hirzel, 1974.

II

Descartes (1644): Descartes, René, The Principles of Philosophy:

Latin-German, Hamburg: Meiner, 2007.

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About relationships between philosophy, aesthetics and literature

1900 in Vienna, Berlin: Rütten, 1977.

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Lorenz (2007): Lorenz, Dagmar, Viennese Modernism, Stuttgart: Metzler, 2007.

Lübbe (1972): Lübbe, Hermann, Consciousness in Stories: Studies on

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Wittgenstein, Freiburg: Rombach, 1972.

Mach (1883): Mach, Ernst, mechanics in its historical development -

critically presented, Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1883.

III

Mach (1903): Mach, Ernst, The Analysis of Sensations and That

Relationship between the physical and the psychological, Jena: Gustav Fischer,

1903.

Mach (1910): Mach, Ernst, popular scientific lectures: 4.

enlarged and revised edition, Leipzig: JA Barth, 1910.

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Contemporaries, Leipzig: JA Barth, 1919.
Declaration of independence

I hereby certify that I have created this work without any third parties

with help and only with the permitted aids.

Leipzig, March 18, 2013