The Making of the Treaty of Sevres of 10 August 1920

Author(s): A. E. Montgomery
Source: The Historical Journal , Dec., 1972, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Dec., 1972), pp. 775-787
Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2638042

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access
to The Historical Journal

This content downloaded from

2.86.104.22 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 21:12:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Historical journal, xv, 4 (1972), pp. 775-787. 775
Printed in Great Britain

VIII. THE MAKING OF THE TREATY OF StEVRES

OF 10 AUGUST 1920

By A. E. MONTGOMERY
University of Birmingham

THE Treaty of Sevres was stillborn. It was signed on io August I920, as a treaty
of peace between the principal Allied Powers and Turkey, but was never
ratified. During the succeeding two years, the triumphs of Mustapha Kemal t
were to render the projected peace terms obsolete and to necessitate the negotia-
tion of an entirely new treaty. But the failure of the Treaty of Sevres cannot
be attributed to Kemal alone. The seeds of disaster lay in the conflicting interests
of the Allies themselves.
Although historians have long been aware of the dissensions between the
principal Allies, until recently the documentation for a detailed analysis of the
negotiations was unavailable.2
When A. J. Toynbee and Harry Howard wrote on this subject, in I922 and
1933 respectively, the archives were still closed. Lloyd George in his memoirs
quoted certain documents, but he selected his material subjectively with a view
to justifying his own policies. Now, however, through the publication of the
British Documents on Foreign Policy series i, vols. IV, vii and viii, we have for
the first time the full details of the Turkish peace negotiations. To the historian
these documents reveal an intense struggle within the framework of the
Entente. Britain and France, and to a lesser degree Italy too, were divided by
conflicting interests and bitter rivalry. They preserved the semblance of uni.ty.
But it was only by hard bargaining, jealous debate and reluctant compromise
that they were able to reach agreement. In the struggle to create a common
treaty they lost sight of the necessity to maintain a common purpose.
The Turks had sought an armistice in October I9I8, but it was not until
December Ii9I, that Britain and France, in tacit disregard of the Italians,
turned seriously to the question of devising a treaty of peace.3 They faced a

1 Mustapha Kemal Pasha (Atatiirk), a general of the Ottoman Imperial Army raised a rebellion
in Asia Minor during I9I9 and eventually overthrew the sultan and established the Turkish
Republic in 1923.
2 The principal published workers on the Turkish Peace Settlement are: A. P. Frangulis, La
Grece et la Crise Mondiale (2 vols., Paris, 1926); H. N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey
(Oklahoma, I93i); D. Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties (2 vols., London, I939
H. Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925 (London, 1934); A. J. Toynbee, The Western
Question in Greece and Turkey (London, 1922). The text of the Treaty of Sevres is printed in
Command Paper 964 (LI), 1920.
3 DBFP (Documents on British Foreign Policy, ser. I), IV, 589. 685.

This content downloaded from

2.86.104.22 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 21:12:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 776 A. E. MONTGOMERY

situation very different from that which had existed only seven or eight months
before. Then, the Turkish people, beaten and cowed, had awaited submissively
the imposition of a victor's peace. Now they had been shocked out of their
lethargy by foreign intervention in Anatolia. In April the Italians, claiming
territory promised to them by the Treaty of London, I915 4 had landed troops
at Adalia, and in May, Greek forces, upon the orders of the Allied Supreme
Council, had occupied the commercial entrepot of Smyrna and its extensive
hinterland. These incursions had fanned the sparks of incipient Turkish resist-
ance and by the autumn the effective control of central Anatolia had passed
from the effete government of the Sultan at Constantinople to the rebel general
Mustapha Kemal.5
These developments convinced many that the Allies should modify their
approach to the Turkish question. The government of France, still led by the
ageing Clemenceau, was regretting its initial support for the Greek expedition
to Asia Minor. France had suffered little at the hands of the Turks during the
war. Turkey was the repository of substantial French interests and vested
capital, notably the majori,ty holding in the Ottoman Public Debt.6 If the
Turkish State was partitioned, France stood to lose both securities and influ-
ence.7 When Clemenceau visited London on ii December I9I9 8 he urged the
British premier, David Lloyd George, to preserve Turkish integrity. The Allies
should abandon the project to create an independent Armenia, and induce
Greece to withdraw from Smyrna in exchange for the Thracian territories of
Turkey in Europe. Thus, the Turkish State would remain intact in the heart-
land of Asia Minor with secure control over the sources of revenue from which
the Ottoman Debt was serviced.
Lloyd George disagreed. Neither he nor the Foreign Office was prepared to
accept the argument that the rise of Kemalism necessitated any drastic modifica-
tion of allied plans. Turkey had cost Great Britain dearly in blood and treasure,
and she must be made to pay the price. Her barbaric treatment of her Christian
minority population had shocked the civilized world. For this too, she must be

4 Article 9 of the Treaty of London, 26 Apr. I9I5, states: '. . . if France, Great Britain or
Russia occupy any territories during the course of the war, the Mediterranean region bordering
on the province of Adalia . . . shall be reserved to Italy who shall be entitled to occupy it.'
Command Paper 67I (LI), I920. 5 DBFP, Iv, 3-
6 The Ottoman Debt Council was based upon the Decree of Mouharrem of i88i. This decree had
regulated the relationship between the Turkish Government and the European financiers (who
had raised a loan with a nominal capital of 5,297,676,500 francs) by establishing a European
Council with responsibility for the administration of the Debt and for safeguarding the interests of
the bond-holders. When this Debt Council had secured direct control of 50 per cent of the most
important state revenues, which were placed under lien for the servicing of the Debt, it had
become the most important economic institution in the Ottoman Empire. Since the French held
6o per cent of the bonds they exercised a predominant influence upon the Council. Archives de la
Service l'Historique de I'Armee, Vincennes, xxv, fo. i6, 5 Mar. I923.
7 Service l'Historique, I9/I755, Pichon to the ambassador in Washington, approx. 30 Oct. I9I9.
8 DBFP, II, 55-

This content downloaded from

2.86.104.22 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 21:12:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE TREATY OF SIVRES 777

punished. Lloyd George himself, a strange amalgam of Gladstonian Liberal

and Welsh visionary, envisaged a settlement based upon two complementary
principles: the Allies should suppress Turkish power, once and for all, by
depriving Turkey of her hereditary guardianship of the Straits; and they should
wrest from her control all territories which were not exclusively peopled by
Turks.9 It was to achieve this end that he had successfully contrived to ensure
British naval and military predominance at Constantinople, and had lent his
encouragement and support to the ambitions of the Greek premier, Venizelos.
He rejected Clemenceau's plan to restore Turkish integrity, rightly suspecting
that France aspired to an hegemony in post-war Turkey. Instead he upheld the
Greek claim to Smyrna and proposed to humble Turkey permanently by
depriving her not only of the Straits but of her Capital as well.
Four days later the Quai d'Orsay returned to the attack. In a detailed memo-
randum, Philippe Berthelot, the clever and subtle permanent head of the French
Foreign Service, elaborated the French case."' The corpus of Turkey he
reasoned, should be preserved, albeit emasculated: it should remain territorially
whole, but completely demilitarized, and subject to strict European financial
control exercised through the medium of the Ottoman Debt Council. France,
Greece and Italy should relinquish their quasi-territorial claims in Asia Minor
in return for economic advantage or territorial compensaton elsewhere. The
project for an independent Armenia was no longer a viable proposition. These
views the British Foreign Office under the watchful eye of Lord Curzon treated
with the utmost suspicion. Berthelot's stringent proposals for financial controls
appeared likely to jeopardize Turkish independence, by subjecting the Sultan's
government to French tutelage. It was impossible for Great Britain to allow the
implicit French claim to commercial and economic predominance in Turkey to
pass unchallenged." Yet the territorial proposals were not in principle un-
acceptable to the Foreign Office. However suspect French motives, the proposal
to eliminate the foreign presence in Anatolia was welcome for, unlike Lloyd
George, Curzon was anxious to see the Greek occupation of Smyrna commuted
to a sphere of indirect influence. On 22 December Berthelot and Curzon met
in London with the object of concerting a policy prior to the summoning of the
Supreme Council.'2 Since both were anxious to eliminate the Greek and Italian
presence in Asia Minor they reached a measure of agreement upon territorial
questions, but the thorny problem of financial controls was left to cause trouble
in the future. Upon two points Curzon appeared to have achieved a notable
success. He won French consent to the plan to establish an independent state
of Armenia in the eastern provinces of Anatolia - a plan, which, for humani-
tarian reasons, was dear to Curzon's own heart. Moreover, Berthelot accepted

9 The Times, ii Nov. I9I9. 10 DBFP, iv, 631.

11 French figures for trade with Turkey, I9IO: Eng
Italy 12%; France II%. Archives Nationales, Paris, F.1
12 DBFP, IV, 63I-4.

This content downloaded from

2.86.104.22 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 21:12:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 778 A. E. MONTGOMERY

Curzon's cardinal principle that Turkey should be deprived of her Capital. He

agreed that Constantinople, together with the Straits, should be established as
an independent State, having the Enos-Midia line as its European frontier.13
Curzon's success was short-lived. Within the British cabinet, opposition to the
Foreign Office plans had grown apace. At a cabinet meeting on 6 January I920,
the War Office and the India Office, pro-Turkish and fearful of the impact of
a harsh peace upon the restive Moslems of India, launched a bitter attack upon
Curzon's conduct of the Anglo-French negotiations of the previous December.14
Despite the support of the prime minister, Curzon's policy was reversed. The
cabinet resolved to leave Constantinople to the Turks.
The cabinet's decision remained secret, but the opposition of the Indian lobby
to Curzon's plans had been vociferous. The Quai d'Orsay took note. With
French public opinion, bitterly jealous of Great Britain, demanding a fair deal
for France in the east, Berthelot became more certain than ever that only a
policy which preserved Turkish integrity could adequately safeguard French
interests. In a memorandum of ii January 15 he re-opened many of the ques-
tions which had been deemed settled in December. He reverted to the original
French case for the Turkish retention of Constantinople and in an effort to make
the proposal more acceptable to the British, proposed limiting Turkish territory
in Europe to the area east of the Chataldga lines. By thus increasing the portion
of Eastern Thrace available for offer to Greece, he hoped to persuade the British
to agree to the elimination of Greek influence in Smyrna. Should the valuable
revenues of this most prosperous province fall into Greek hands, they would
cease to be available for the servicing of the Ottoman Debt. The Debt, indeed,
and the future operation of the Debt Council, comprised the nucleus of the
French proposals. France desired to increase the importance of the Council with-
in the Turkish state, by according to it the responsibility for initiating thorough-
going reforms of the entire Turkish financial structure. Thus she hoped, not
merely to ensure a just return to the French bond-holders, but to acquire an
impregnable position of political influence.
The British Government found some difficulty in answering B3erthelot's
memorandum. The prime minister, ignoring the Foreign Office, took the
unuLsual step of inviting the India Office together with the War Office to draft
a suitable reply."' The Secretary for India, Edwin Montagu, accordingly drew
up a plan which left Constantinople to the Turks, together with most of
Eastern Thrace. Although Montagu's document, which emphasized the advant-
ages of restoring Turkish sovereignty in Asia Minor, ran directly counter to
the principles which Lloyd George himself had advocated, he was about to

13 The Enos-Midia line had first been proposed as the Turco-Bulgarian frontier after the first
Balkan War of I9I2-I3. Though it took no account of the military geography of Eastern Thrace, it
had the merit of placing Constantinople beyond the range of modern artillery fire, and, moreover, it
constituted the shortest line between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
14 Cab. (Cabinet Papers in P.R.O.) 23/20/I (20), 6 Jan. 1920.
15 DBFP, Iv, 658- 16 DB3FP, Iv, 658-

This content downloaded from

2.86.104.22 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 21:12:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE TREATY OF SLVRES 779

dispatch the reply to the Quai d'Orsay when Curzon, realizing what was afoot,
protested and produced his own draft. But Curzon wished to reopen the issue
of Constantinople once again, and the cabinet rejected his proposals. Thereupon
the Foreign Office produced a revised version which sought to compromise
between the conflicting views of the prime minister, the foreign secretary and
the cabinet."7 This draft reply, though never endorsed by the cabinet, or dis-
patched to France, probably represents the closest approximation to a coherent
British policy at this time. In the matter of Turkish integrity the Foreign Office
went a long way to meet the French view. They accepted that Smyrna should
be returned to Turkey as a free port, the Greeks receiving in exchange both the
Dodecanese 18 and the province of Thrace up to the Chataldga lines. Italy, too,
should evacuate Asia Minor in return for economic concessions, but France
might retain her special position in Cilicia, provided that she accepted the full
responsibility of a mandatory power. Although it was no longer practical to
create a Greater Armenia in Eastern Turkey, yet an Armenian State of some
kind, albeit upon a much reduced scale, remained an important policy objective.
But if the British were now prepared to go far to meet France on the question
of Turkish integrity, they remained bitterly opposed to her schemes for the
financial domination of Turkey. The Foreign Office was particularly anxious to
limit the control of the Ottoman Debt Council. In the British view the claims
of the bond-holders were of minor importance. The first priority was to secure
from Turkey adequate reparation for the colossal expense of the eastern war
and reimbursement of the inordinate costs of military occupation of the con-
quered territories. Moreover, in political terms, though Turkey should be cut
down to size, her navy abolished, her army limited, and her internal admini-
stration subordinated to strict Allied supervision, yet Britain was totally opposed
to establishing a system approaching a protectorate, such as France appeared
to envisage.
There was therefore a sharp contrast between British and French policy at
this time. French policy was based firmly upon two principles: the preservation
of Turkish integrity; and the imposition upon Turkey of stringent controls
which would guarantee the security of French investments. On these two points
the French had not given ground, indeed they had if anything stiffened their
attitude by reopening the issue of Constantinople."9 The British objectives were

17 DBFP, IV, 665. Appendix D.

18 The Dodecanese is a chain of islands (of which the largest is Rhodes), inhabited by Greeks,
and situated off the shore of Asia Minor. During the course of the Italo-Turkish war of I9II-I2,
Italy had occupied these islands, and by the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne of i6 Oct. I9I2 had
promised to evacuate them when the last Turkish troops left Tripoli. Italy hoped to retain the
islands thus furthering her ambition to become a major mediterranean power. Although she
possessed no legal title to the Dodecanese, she resisted British pressure to relinquish her prize, and
through skilful prevarication, was still in possession when war broke out between the Entente and
Turkey in I9I4. See Richard Bosworth, ' Great Britain and Italy's acquisition of the Dodecanese
I9I2/I5 ', The Historical loturnal, xIII (1970).
19 DBFP, iv, 672, 676, 68o.

This content downloaded from

2.86.104.22 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 21:12:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
780 A. E. MONTGOMERY

far less clear. The one firm principle was the determination to open the Straits
a point upon which the French were in agreement with the British. Upon the
question of Turkish integrity, the cabinet was at loggerheads. A strong body of
opinion sympathized with the French view, but Lloyd George and Curzon,
despite differences on the issue of Smyrna, still aimed at crushing Turkish
power and enhancing the rights of minorities. These differences gave an air of
unreality to British policy which came to depend upon the determination of
Greece rather than that of the British cabinet.

It was not until I2 February that the Supreme Council finally reassembled to
draft the Turkish peace. They met in London. The British, disgusted at the
hostile atmosphere engendered by the French press, had refused to return to
Paris. The French (although they insisted that the Treaty must be signed in
France) had given way with a bad grace. This arrangement enabled the British
to control the conduct of negotiations.20 As chairman, Lloyd George with his
unrivalled experience and incomparable debating skill, was in a strong position.
By contrast, the French and Italian premiers, Millerand and Nitti, were new
to their posts and unfamiliar with the details of the negotiations.
Nonetheless, Lloyd George commenced the negotiations at a disadvantage.21
In accordance with the decision of the cabinet, he was obliged to concede that
the Turks should remain at Constantinople. Then in an attempt to regain the
initiative he proceeded at once to the issue of prime importance to Great
Britain, namely, the question of the Straits.22 To Britain the opening of the
Straits was the greatest achievement of the war against the Ottoman Empire.
For a century Britain had upheld the ' Ancient Rule of the Straits' which pro-
hibited the ships of war of foreign powers from entering the Straits of the
Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. But in II4 Turkey, by permitting the Ger-
man battle-cruisers Goeben and Breslau to enter the Dardanelles, had broken
that rule. Moreover her closure of the Straits to Allied shipping during the war,
had, in Lloyd George's estimation, prolonged the war by two years and con-
tributed materially to the collapse of Russia. Britain was resolved, as Lord
Curzon explained to the conference, that Turkey should remain at the mercy
of the Entente in future. The 'Ancient Rule' had become obsolete. The Allies
must, by measures of military and naval control, secure navigation through the
Straits. The French and the Italians accepted the British proposal in principle.
It suited their plans to restrict Turkish sovereignty and offered the most effec-
tive means of excluding the influence of Germany or Russia. It was true that
Britain with her superior naval power might enjoy some advantage, but she

20 L.G. (Lloyd George Papers, Beaverbrook Library) F.13/3/I2/2/Ir, prime minister to Curzon,
io Dec. i9i9. 21 DBFP, VII, 6.
22 DBFP, vii, 6. The decision to leave the Turks in Constantinople was speedily leaked to the
French press, who represented Britain's abandonment of her former negotiating position as a
triumph for French diplomacy.

This content downloaded from

2.86.104.22 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 21:12:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE TREATY OF SPVRES 781

could not deny her Allies parity upon the controlling commission. No one
offered the suggestion that 13ritain's major premise - the necessity of maintain-
ing communications with Russia - might have been invalidated by the rise of
Bolshevism.
To accomplish their purpose of opening the Straits, the Allies resolved to
appoint an International Control Commission which was to include the repre-
sentatives of the B3lack Sea littoral Powers.23 This commission would be fully
independent, with absolute jurisdiction over all shipping passing through the
Straits. For this purpose it would exercise complete authority throughout a
' Straits Zone' comprising the entire littoral of the Dardanelles, the Marmora
and the Bosphorus. The Commission would maintain its authority throughout
the zone by means of naval detachments and a permanent garrison to be pro-
vided by the Allied powers. Thus Britain, with the active co-operation of her
principal Allies, reversed the policy of a century and took her revenge for the
humiliation of Gallipoli.
Although the French had agreed to 13ritain's prime desiderata, the B3ritish
remained bitterly opposed to the main French aim of acquiring a special posi-
tion of direct financial and indirect political control in the Turkish State.
Curzon had left Berthelot in no doubt that Britain would oppose any overt
attempt to channel Turkish revenues directly through the French-dominated
Ottoman Debt administration. The French delegates had therefore decided to
accept Britain's alternative proposition that the Allies should create a new
Financial Commission to supervise the economic and fiscal recovery of
Turkey.24 They planned, however, to make the powers of this commission as
extensive as possible. Not only would it collect and allocate all Turkish revenues,
but, in addition, it would exercise an absolute control over the Turkish budget.
Lloyd George clearly foresaw that such extensive rights might pave the way for
France to interfere in Turkey's internal affairs. Nevertheless, Britain had
accepted in principle the necessity of some financial control in order to recoup
her wartime expenses. Lloyd George therefore reluctantly accepted the French
plan.25 He insisted, however, that the first obligation to be laid upon the
Turkish revenues must be the payment of wartime reparations not - as the
French had demanded - the outstanding interest on the Ottoman Debt.26 After
much debate the Allies reached a compromise, but when on 6 March French
financial experts arrived in London from Paris to advise the French negotiators
they protested that the projected arrangements would jeopardize not only the
rights of French bond-holders but also French political influence in Turkey.27
Shortly afterwards the French, withdrawing their previous concessions,
demanded a complete reconsideration of the problem, taking the B3ritish con-

23 DBiFP, vii, I4, 40. 24 DBiFP, vii, 9.

25 DlBFP, VII, 42. 26 DlBFP, VII, 20, 42.

27 Archives F.30/1156, President

M. Marsal (minister of finance), 4 Ap

This content downloaded from

2.86.104.22 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 21:12:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 782 A. E. MONTGOMERY

cessions as the starting point.28 It was only when the British consented to
further modification of their claims for war-reparations that agreement was
finally reached. France accepted the establishment of a Financial Commission,
and the ultimate extinction of the Ottoman Debt Council. But in return she
secured Britain's agreement that the Commission should continue to set aside
the hypothecated revenues of the Ottoman Debt to meet the claims of the bond-
holders. Moreover, although the British obtained a special arrangement that the
Turks should bear the costs of Britain's occupation of Syria and Cilicia, the
French insisted upon setting a ceiling upon the indemnity, thus ensuring that
adequate funds would be available for the servicing of the Debt.
The French were equally concerned to preserve their existing commercial
and economic privileges in Turkey. These were guaranteed, as were those of
the other Allies, by the system of the Capitulations.29 This machinery repre-
sented a direct derogation of Turkish sovereignty. The Committee of Union
and Progress had abolished the Capitulations in I9I4, but at the time of
the armistice, the Allies had reimposed the system. Although they recognized
that the piecemeal arrangements contained many anomalies, none of the Allies
were willing to gratuitously divest themselves of the advantages which the
Capitulations conferred. Only the Italians suggested taking some account of
the amour-propre of the Turks. The Allies agreed therefore to maintain the
existing system in force until an Allied commission should have reported upon
the best means of unifying and rationalizing the arrangements.30
The French believed that under the new system of stringent controls, they
would, by reason of their financial and economic interests, establish a political
preponderance throughout post-war Turkey. They were therefore prepared to
abandon their allotted sphere of occupation in Cilicia.3" In return for this
'concession', Berthelot suggested that the British should offer France satisfac-
tion on the questions of pre-war commercial concessions, the settlement of
debts, and the liquidation of former German assets in Turkey. But the British,
who knew that the French were under strong pressure from the Kemalists in
Cilicia, were undeceived. Curzon accused the French of wishing to relinquish
their responsibilities to the Christians and he forced Berthelot to admit that
although France had offered to withdraw her troops from Cilicia, she still
expected to maintain there a commercial monopoly, control of the gendarmerie,
and a pre-emptive right to supply advisers - in fact, a mandate in all but name.
Curzon refused to grant France new concessions, but he recognized her right

28 DBFP, VlI, 70, 77.

29 The Capitulations were a complicated system of bilateral arrangements governing

of the Porte with the outside world. They restricted Turkish trading rights; her righ
customs and harbour dues; and her right to export Turkish goods. They gave to foreig
wide range of extra-territorial privileges, including immunity from taxation, and sequ
rights of consular jurisdiction. See P.R.O., Confidential Print, 424/254/3886. Memorandum by
Institute for Historical Research, I922.
30 DBFP, VII, 44- 31 DBFP, vii, ii

This content downloaded from

2.86.104.22 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 21:12:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 TIHE TREATY OF SEVRES 783

to priority in Cilicia. He proposed that, to avoid antagonizing the United States,

who had insisted that the principle of the ' Open Door ' should be applied in
Turkey, the Allies should devise a ' self-denying' ordinance amongst them-
selves. Each would voluntarily recognize the others' priority within specified
spheres of influence.32
Curzon's proposal virtually guaranteed to France the monopoly of economic
and political influence in Cilicia, but it reserved no area of significance to
Britain. Berthelot therefore accepted the plan. The Italians, however, were
dissatisfied. They resented the fact that Curzon's scheme offered them no pro-
tection against the competition of third parties, e.g., the United States, Ger-
many, or Russia.3 Nitti protested that Italy had been treated unfairly: she was
entitled to a sphere of influence in Turkey commensurate with that accorded
to Britain and France in the Arab world. His complaints fell upon stony
ground. Berthelot pointed out that by the terms of the Treaty of London "
Italy was entitled not to equal treatment, but to equitable treatment - a nice
distinction which the British endorsed. It took several long sessions of negotia-
tion to draft an agreement.35 Both the French and the Italians tried hard to
extend their privileges to the utmost limit. The French in particular, proposed
that assets confiscated from the Germans should pass directly to the powers
within whose sphere of influence they were located - a transparent attempt to
secure a reparations bonus. But Curzon was adamant. He was fully prepared
to concede legitimate economic and political priorities to both France and Italy
in their allotted spheres of influence, but he refused to go further. Moreover, he
was insistent upon two points of principle: each -power must assume responsi-
bility for the safety of the minorities within its sphere of influence; and the
agreement must not be a corporate part of the Turkish Peace Treaty, but a
separate trilateral arrangement between the three Allies. Eventually the three
powers reciprocally conceded the priority rights of Italy, France and Britain in
the areas of Adalia (the C Zone of the St John de Maurienne Agreement),36
Cilicia (the non-Arab Blue Zone of the Sykes Picot Agreement) and in Kurdis-
tan respectively.
The Tripartite Agreement resolved French and Italian claims in Asia Minor,
but there remained the crucial question of the future of Smyrna, at that time
occupied by Greek forces. Prior to the conference both the British and French
foreign ministries had inclined towards the plan of inducing the Greeks to
leave by the offer of compensation in Thrace. Lloyd George, however, had
other ideas. Convinced that his friend Venizelos would fall from power unless
he realized his ambitions, and inspired by the vision of an anglophile Greece

32 DBFP, vIr, I2.

33 DBFP, vii, I5, i8.

34 See above, p. 776, notc 4.
35 Cmd. 963 (LI), 1920. DBFP, vii, 19. 29.
36 DBFP, iv, ch. iii.

H.J .-7

This content downloaded from

2.86.104.22 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 21:12:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 784 A. E. MONTGOMERY

standing guard over the Aegean and the Dardanelles, Lloyd George was deter-
mined to balk the objections of his Allies, and indeed of Curzon, too.37 When,
during a discussion of the problem on 14 February, Millerand reasoned that
the key to peace in Asia Minor lay in securing a Greek evacuation, Lloyd
George refuted the argument. He declared that the Allies could not make con-
cssions to placate the Turks.38 The Greek presence at Smyrna offered the Allies
security for the future - a bridgehead from which to launch punitive action
against a recalcitrant Turkey. On i6 February, Lloyd George, ignoring Miller-
and's previous objections, appointed a commission to hear Greek claims and
to make recommendations for the geographical boundaries of the district of
Smyrna upon the assumption that this district would be subject to Greek
administration, though not necessarily to Greek sovereignty.39 After due
deliberation, the committee reported that on the evidence of the figures avail-
able, Greece should be granted authority over an extended area in Asia Minor.40
Thereupon, Lloyd George won his colleagues' reluctant consent to the preserva-
tion of Greek influence at Smyrna. Millerand felt unable to deny the justice of
the Greek case, but he insisted that the Turks should retain nominal suzerainty
over Smyrna. Lloyd George agreed - but in return he demanded and won
Greek annexation of Thrace up to the Chataldga lines."
Through the Tripartite Agrecment and the assignment of Smyrna to Greece
the Allies had gone some way to protect the Christian minorities of Asia Minor
from a recrudescence of Turkish barbarism. The Allies were agreed, however,
that specific guarantees must be imposed upon the Turks to safeguard those
Christians who remained in areas beyond direct Allied control.42 They proposed
to establish a mixed police force under Allied officers; to appoint a mixed com-
mission under the auspices of the League of Nations to facilitate the liberation
of captives and forced converts; to reform the electoral system upon a basis of
proportional representation; and to provide for a reciprocal Grec&-Turkish
emigration upon a voluntary basis. Despite these measures, Curzon was con-
vinced that for the Armenians, who, in numbers and location, remained most
vulnerable to Turkish persecution, a more permanent solution must be found.
He still hoped to establish an independent Armenian State even though the
activities of the Turkish nationalists rendered the prospect of success exceed-
ingly dubious.43 But when the Allied negotiators attempted to delineate the
frontiers of the new State it was at once apparent that the task was, for the
moment at least, quite impractical. It was clear that the Turks constituted a

"I Cab. 21/174, conference in Paris, 15 Jan. 1920. Frangulis, op. cit. WI, 128.
38 DBFP, VII, 7-
3 9 DBFP, vii, 8.

40 I-he committee based its findings upon American figures regarded as the most impart
available: Moslems 325,000; Greeks 375,000; Armenians i8,ooo; Jews 4o,ooo- Cab. 29/29/
Smyrna Committee report, 2I Feb. 1920.
41 IBFP, vii, 14-
42 DBFP, VII, 57- 43 DBFP, VI', 4.

This content downloaded from

2.86.104.22 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 21:12:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE TREATY OF SEVRES 785

majority of the population and were in firm military control of Turkish

'Armenia '. In the view of the French expert, Colonel Chardigny, the Allies
would require a force of at least I5,ooo men to alter the situation.44 Faced with
these unpromising conclusions, the Allies decided to refer the question to the
League of Nations in the hope that the United States might answer a League
appeal.45
Thus agreement was reached upon all the principal issues. Lloyd George had
dominated the conference, taking full advantage of his position as chairman to
out-manoeuvre his Allies and at times his foreign secretary as well. He had
achieved the two objectives which he deemed most important - the opening of
the Straits and the aggrandizement of Greece. Curzon had proved a powerful
ally, lending his support to solutions with which he personally disagreed, and
bending all his weight to accomplish the vital negative aim of preventing an
extension of French power. Against these two neither Millerand nor Nitti had
been able to prevail. But Berthelot, assisted by the experienced ambassador,
Cambon, had ensured that French interests were not entirely eclipsed. Upon the
economic and financial issues, France, unlike Italy, had gained the substance of
her demands.
As the conference drew to its close the French demanded that the final nego-
tiations should revert to Paris. The B3ritish, however, had no intention of
allowing the initiative to pass to the French. They insisted that it was the turn
of Italy to act as host to the conference - a solution which, with the ready sup-
port of Italy they were able to foist upon the French. Thus it was decided that
the Supreme Council should meet again in April at San Remo, where it would
approve the terms of the Turkish peace as drafted by the technical experts.46

The Supreme Council reassembled at San Remo on I9 April. The principal

subject for discussion was that of German reparations and it had not been antici-
pated that the question of the Turkish Peace would require more than a formal
confirmation of the terms drafted at London. France and Italy, however, made
it clear that they would welcome some modification of the territorial arrange-
ments. Both had been impressed by the steadily growing power of the Kema-
list movement, and by the pessimistic report of the military experts concerning
the enforcement of the peace treaty.47 While the Allies had been discussing the
destruction of the old Turkish State, Kemal had not been idle. He had systema-
tically extended his control of the Anatolian heartland, and in February his
troops had launched a sharp attack against French forces in Cilicia inflicting
upon them a humiliating reverse.48 The Allies had retaliated by ordering the
military occupation of Constantinople but this action had merely served to

44 DBFP, vll, 34-

45 DBFP, Vll, 71-
46 DBFP, VI', 46, 7I-.

47 DBFP, VIii, 7- 4 DBFP, iv, 68i; VI', 46.

This content downloaded from

2.86.104.22 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 21:12:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
786 A. E. MONTGOMERY

destroy the last vestiges of the Sultan's authority, and had correspondingly
strengthened the position of Kemal, who showed less inclination than ever to
accept the Allies' terms.49 In view of these developments the Allied military
experts were of the opinion that the terms devised at London were unenforce-
able unless the Allies were able and prepared to field a large force of some
twenty-seven divisions to suppress the Turkish rebellion. Lloyd George rejected
these conclusions. It was his opinion that the Allies need only enforce the treaty
in those areas where they were themselves directly involved. It was up to each
power to safeguard its own interests as best it might. For her part Britain had
every intention of safeguarding her interests at the Straits and the Greeks were
confident of holding Thrace and Smyrna. The Italians were not convinced.
Nitti argued that the very presence of Greece in Asia Minor and at Gallipoli
was in itself a provocation which might precipitate war. But Millerand, anxious
for British co-operation against Germany, gave Nitti only weak support, and
Lloyd George rejected the arguments. The most he would concede was that the
provisional arrangements for the province of Smyrna should last for five years,
at the end of which period Greece might request permission of the League of
Nations to annex the province.
Thus in its final form the treaty did indeed stand very much as it had been
drafted in London. The terms were undeniably harsh. Later the Italians and
the French were to accuse the British of having insisted upon hopelessly unrealis-
tic terms which courted disaster. But in more than one respect Lloyd George
was highly realistic. He was content to see large sections of the treaty founder
provided that those sections which he valued, namely the Freedom of the Straits
and the aggrandizement of Greece, survived. His hopes rested upon the quality
and the will-power of the Greeks, and upon a reasonably accurate assessment
of Turkish power at this date. But there were fatal flaws in this policy. It was
dependent upon too many imponderables: the ability of Lloyd George to
manage his divided cabinet; the capacity of Venizelos to maintain an effective
army in the field; and the loyalty of allies who had already expressed their' dis-
taste for a grecophile policy. Lloyd George's very success in overriding the
objections of his opponents, provoked the opposition which led to the destruc-
tion of his policies. Neither his cabinet nor his country had the will to give his
plans the forceful backing which they required; Venizelos was to fall from
power, tarnished by his dependence upon foreign support; and the Allies were,
in time, to bend their efforts to the destruction of his schemes. France and Italy
were certainly no more realistic. It was true that they were anxious to eliminate
Greek influence and to withdraw foreign troops from Anatolia in order to
appe-ase the Turks, but both failed to appreciate the extent to which their own
economic and financial ambitions were repugnant to Turkey. The grandiose
schemes of financial and capitulatory control upon which they set such store,
were as vulnerable as the frontiers of Armenia or Smyrna unless backed by the

49 DBFP, Xiii, 48.

This content downloaded from

2.86.104.22 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 21:12:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 THE TREATY OF SEVRES 787

reality of Allied power. That power was not forthcoming. Unlike the British,
who in the last resort were to rely upon force at Chanak in order to preserve
the freedom of the Straits, France and Italy came increasingly to base their
hopes upon the goodwill of the Turks - a policy which was to prove singularly
unrewarding.
The making of the Treaty of Sevres provides an insight into the post-war
relations of the victors. The completeness of the victory had bred in them a com-
placency which led them to ignore both the dangers and the opportunities of
their position, while indulging in a fratricidal wrangle for poisition and power.
There were times when both sides showed restraint and goodwill - the French
in approving Britain's plans for the Straits, the British in conceding priority to
the claims of the French bond-holders. But too often, British arrogance and
French jealousy clashed head on, and both were quick to crush the timorous
pretensions of Italy. Undoubtedly the British presumed upon their advanta-
geous position in the east to press their allies to accept unpalatable arrangements.
But their success was the fruit of skilful negotiation rather than dictation.
The British had a right to demand the loyalty of their allies in enforcing a treaty
to which all had subscribed. Nevertheless, this was to demand too much.
France and Italy had been out-manoeuvred and knew it. They were resentful
of Greek aggrandizement and jealous of British power. In the months to come
they were to watch the crumbling of the Treaty of Sevres with a satisfaction
which had its roots in the London negotiations.

This content downloaded from

2.86.104.22 on Tue, 28 Mar 2023 21:12:28 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms