a.

Doctrine: Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the

family as a basic social institution. The Family Code defines marriage
and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the
grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.

b. Case Title: Ong Eng Kiam a.k.a. William Ong vs. Lucita Ong, GR. No.
153206; (J. Austria-Martinez); October 23, 2006

c. Facts: William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20
years when Lucita filed a complaint for Legal separation under Article 55
par. (1) of the Family Code.

Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her husband
William subjected her to physical violence like slapping, kicking and
pulling her hair and bang her head against the concrete wall and been
violent towards their three children. He would scold them using his belt
buckle to beat them. One day after a violent quarrel wherein William hit
Lucita on several different parts of her body, pointed a gun at her and
asked her to leave the house which she did.

Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive behavior were corroborated

by her sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the
day after she left her conjugal home also testified about her injuries.

The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal separation which the CA
affirmed
 William then filed this petition for review on certiorari.

On the decision denying all of Lucita’s allegations and that he never

inflicted physical harm on her or their children.

He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the
complaint is to deprive him of his control and ownership over his
conjugal properties with Lucita.

That the CA overlooked some facts of the case which warrant an

exception to the general rule that questions of fact cannot be the subject
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita her sister and their
parents’ doctor Dr. ElinZano since their testimonies are tainted with
relationship and fraud and since Lucita abandoned the family home she
has also given a ground for legal separation and therefore should NOT-
be granted one pursuant to Art. 56 par. 4 of The family code – Where
both parties have given ground for legal separation

d. Issue: Whether or not Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal

separation.

e. Held: Yes. The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for
her family to take control of the conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left
because of her husband’s repeated physical violence and grossly
abusive conduct. That the physical violence and grossly abusive
conduct were brought to bear upon Lucita have been duly established.
He can derive no personal gain from pushing for the financial interests of
her family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and the
companionship of her husband and children

The assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses is

given great respect. Relationship alone is not enough to discredit and
label a witness’ testimony as biased and unworthy of credence.
Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed and straightforward
testimonies the court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with
bias.

The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment

without justifiable cause for more than one year. Lucita left William due
to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated in the said provision

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against

petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the
entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively
participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other
spouse’s written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity.

b. Case Title: Mario Siochi vs. Alfredo Gozon, GR. No. 169900; (j. Carpio);
March 18, 2010

c. Facts: Elvira Gozon filed with the RTC Cavite a petition for legal
separation against her husband Alfredo Gozon.

Then, while the pending case of Legal Separation of both parties,

Alfredo and Mario entered into Agreement of Buy and Sell involving their
conjugal property for the price of 18 million pesos. Mario pays the partial
payment of the said price and he took the possession of the property.

When the Court granted the legal separation of Elvira and Mario, their
property was dissolved and liquidated. Being the offending spouse,
Alfredo is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is
awarded to their child Winifred R. Gozon whose custody is awarded to
Elvira.

On Oct, 26, 1994 Alfredo sold that property into Inter Dimensional Realty
Inc. for 18 million pesos in his favor by Winnifred. And the IDRI paid it in
full payment.
 Because of that Mario, filed a complaint with RTC Malabon for specific
performance and damages, annulment of donation and sale, with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction and/or temporary
restraining order.

The Court held, the agreement between Alfredo and IDRI is null and
void for their attempt of commission or continuance of their wrongful
acts, further alienating or disposing of the subject property. Also, the
agreement of Alfredo and Mario is null and void, for the absence of
written consent of Elvira Gozon for her property rights to the undivided
one-half share in the conjugal property of this case.

d. Issue: Whether or not the offending spouse, Alfredo Gozon has right to
sell their conjugal partnership without the consent of the other spouse,
and share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership.

e. Held: No. The absence of the consent of one of the spouse renders the
entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining
to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse actively
participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other
spouse’s written consent to the sale is still required by law for its validity.
And the offending spouse in an action for legal separation is deprived of
his share in the net profits of the conjugal properties.

Under Article 63 (2) of the Family Code, the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending
spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited
in accordance with the provisions of article.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitions. We AFFIRM the 7 July 2005

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74447 with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

1. We DELETE the portions regarding the forfeiture of Alfredo

Gozon’s one-half undivided share in favor of Winifred Gozon and
the grant of option to Winifred Gozon whether or not to dispose of
her undivided share in the property; and

2. We ORDER Alfredo Gozon and Winifred Gozon to pay Inter-

Dimensional Realty, Inc. jointly and severally the Eighteen Million
Pesos (₱18,000,000) which was the amount paid by Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. for the property, with legal interest
computed from the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to
live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and the sanction
therefor is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife
and not any legal mandate or court order to enforce consortium.

b. Case Title: In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of

Potenciano Ilusorio Erlinda K. Ilusorio-Bildner, GR. NO. 139789; (J.
Pardo); July 19, 2001

c. Facts: Potenciano is about 86 years of age, possessed extensive

properties valued at millions of pesos. He was, for many years, the
Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. Erlinda
and Potenciano are married couple but they separated from bed and
board for undisclosed reasons. They have six (6) children (co-
respondents).

On December 30, 1997, Potenciano arrived coming from USA here in

the Philippines. He stayed for five (5) months with Erlinda in Antipolo
City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda, alleged that during such time,
Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdosed amount of Zoloft (instead of
100mg, she gave 200mg); thus, Potenciano’s health deteriorated. On
February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Antipolo a petition for
Guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to latter
advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. On
May 31, 1998, After attending a corporate meeting, Potenciano did not
return to his wife in Antipolo but rather he went and lived at Makati with
his children. Because of such event, Erlinda filed a petition with the CA
 for habeas corpus to have the custody of her lawyer husband,
Potenciano. CA denied such petition.

d. Issue: Whether or not habeas corpus may be availed by Erlinda to

compel Potenciano to live with her in conjugal bliss.

e. Held: Marital rights including overture and living in conjugal dwelling may
not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. No court is
empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his
wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other means process. That is a
matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s
free choice.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At

any rate, the case has been rendered moot by the death of subject.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Article 73 – Family Code. Either spouse may exercise any
legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the
consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and
moral grounds.

b. Case Title: Nancy Go and Alex Go vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals,
GR. No.114791; (J.Romero); May 29, 1997

c. Facts: Private respondents, spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong, were

married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The video coverage of the
wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1,650.00.
Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of
their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the United
States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice they failed
because the tape was apparently not yet processed. The parties then
agreed that the tape would be ready upon private respondents’ return.

When private respondents came home from their honeymoon, however,

they found out that the tape had been erased by petitioners and
therefore, could no longer be delivered.

Furious at the loss of the tape which was supposed to be the only record
of their wedding, private respondents filed on September 23, 1981 a
complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners,
 which was granted by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, hence, this
petition.
d. Issue: Whether or not Nancy and Alex Go should be held liable for the
damages sought.

e. Held: Yes. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, it is contrary

to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video
coverage of their wedding; the fact that private respondents filed a case
against petitioners belies such assertion. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of
actionable delay for having failed to process the video tape. Considering
that private respondents were about to leave for the United States, they
took care to inform petitioners that they would just claim the tape upon
their return two months later. Thus, the erasure of the tape after the
lapse of thirty days was unjustified.

In this regard, Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that “those who in
the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or
delay, and those who is any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable for damages.”

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September 14, 1993 is

hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Alex Go is
absolved from any liability to private respondents and that petitioner
Nancy Go is solely liable to said private respondents for the judgment
award. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: A married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use
her husband’s surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from
continuously using her maiden name because when a woman marries,
she does not change her name but only her civil status.

Once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her

passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in
cases of: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity
of marriage.

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law

recognizes the passport applicant’s constitutional right to travel.
However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the
integrity and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding
from it as a Philippine passport remains at all times the property of the
Government. The holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long
as it is valid.

b. Case Title: Ma. Virginia V. Remo vs. The Honorable Secretary of

Foreign Affairs, GR. No. 169202; (J. Carpio); March 5, 2010

c. Facts: Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is married to Francisco R.

Rallonza. In her passport, the following entries appear: “Rallonza” as her
surname, “Maria Virginia” as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle
 name. Prior to the expiry of the validity of her passport, petitioner, whose
marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.,
with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the
replacement passport. However, the petitioner’s request was denied.
Petitioner thus appealed, arguing that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act
of 1996) conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the
Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her maiden name
upon marriage.

d. Issue: Whether or not Maria Virginia change her surname “Rallonza” to

her middle name “Remo” in her replacement passport despite the
subsistence of her marriage.

e. Held: A married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her
husband’s surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from
continuously using her maiden name because when a woman marries,
she does not change her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does
not conflict with this principle.
RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not
prohibit a married woman from using her maiden name in her passport.
In fact, in recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first
time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt
her husband’s surname.
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt
her husband’s surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she
chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport, the DFA
additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the
marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her
maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from
continuously using her maiden name.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname

in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name,
except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1)
death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.
Since Remo’s marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume
her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a
married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be
based only on the severance of the marriage.

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the civil code, the provisions of
RA 8239 which is a special law specifically dealing with passport
issuance must prevail over the provisions of title xiii of the civil code
which is the general law on the use of surnames. a basic tenet in
statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 May 2005

Decision and 2 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 87710.
 SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages

which are declared void abinitio under Article 36 of the Family Code,
which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties. In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent
was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under
Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned
in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership.

b. Case Title: Alain M. Diño vs. Ma. Caridad L. Diño; GR. No. 178044; (J.
Carpio); January 19, 2011

c. Facts: Alain Dino and Ma. Caridad Dino were childhood friends and
sweethearts who started living together in 1984, separated in 1994, and
lived together again in 1996. In 1998, they were married before Mayor
Vergel Aguilar of Las Pinas City. In 2001, Alain filed for the Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of the Caridad’s psychological
incapacity. Alain alleged that Caridad failed in her marital obligation to
give love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to
the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting
with her friends that depleted the family assets. He further alleged that
Caridad was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt
him.
 The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio. It, however, ruled
that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be
issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.

d. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation,
partition, and distribution of the parties' properties.

e. Held: Yes. The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in
a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147
or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void, such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must
be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each

other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage
is void.
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between
petitioner and respondent.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article
50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void
without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

Since the property relations of the parties in Articles 40 and 45 are

governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of
gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties
before a decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the
marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under

Article 36 of the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and
respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that
the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses
should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, “[p]artition may be made by
agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x.” It is not
necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same
proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the

MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
issued upon finality of the trial court's decision without waiting for the
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties under Article
147 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Article 76. Family Code -In order that any modification in the
marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the
celebration of the marriage, subject to the provision of Articles 66, 67,
128, 135 and 136.

b. Case Title: Efren Pana vs. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Jr., GR. No. 164201;
(J. Abad); December 10, 2012

c. Facts: Efren Pana, his wife Melecia and another person were charged
with murder before the RTC of Surigao City. On 1997, the RTC rendered
its Decision acquitting Efren of the charge but finding Melecia and
another person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of
death. The RTC also ordered those found guilty to pay civil indemnity
and damages to the heirs of the victim.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, it affirmed the conviction of both but

modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary
awards, the Court also affirmed the award of civil indemnity and
damages with modification.
 Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC
ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties
registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.

Hence, Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution, claiming that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not
paraphernal assets of Melecia. The RTC denied the motion. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals, the CA dismissed the petition.

Thus, Efren filed the instant petition arguing that his marriage with
Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains; given
that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and
that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement.

On the other hand, the heirs of Juanite Sr and Juanite Jr argued that the
regime of absolute community of property governs the marriage of Efren
and Melecia since the transitory provision of the Family Code gave its
provisions retroactive effect if no vested or acquired rights are impaired,
and that the property relation between the couple was changed when
the Family Code took effect in 1988.

d. Issue: Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and

Melecia can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of
Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case?

e. Held: Court of Appeals affirmed with modification. The RTC of Surigao

City shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution on the
conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the
satisfaction of the indemnities imposed by final judgement on the latter
accused for crime of murder, the responsibilities enumerated in Article
121 of the Family Code have been covered.

Article 121 allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his

wife Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before this liquidation.
Indeed, it states that such indemnities “may be enforced against the
partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding
article have been covered. “No prior liquidation of those assets is
required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that “at the
time of liquidation of the partnership, such offending spouse shall be
charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned.”

Whereas, it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their

conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership of gains and therefore, none of them can be said to
have acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article
256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically
convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal
partnerships of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with
prenuptial agreements.

The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements

cannot be modified except prior to marriage. Clearly, the conjugal
partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and
Melecia who were married 1988 cannot be modified except before the
celebration of marriage.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the

Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 77198 dated January
29, 2004 and May 14, 2004. The Regional Trial Court of Surigao City,
Branch 30, shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution on
the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the
satisfaction of the indemnities imposed by final judgment on the latter
accused in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233, the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the
case may be, of the Family Code

b. Case Title: Antonio A.S. Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102,
Quezon City, GR. No. 122749; (J. Vitug); July 31, 1996

c. Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They
begot 5 children. In 1992, Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The trial
court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void.
It also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to
comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted

that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage".
 In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly
provides that the property acquired by both parties during their union, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been
obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by
them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home'
and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares. In the
liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the
plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply."

Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was denied.

Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147 of the Family Code does
not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated; (2)
Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family
Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases where a
marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by
reason of the psychological incapacity of the spouses; (3) Assuming
arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on
the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, the same may
be read consistently with Article 129.

d. Issue: Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the disposition of
property in the case.

e. Held: Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the

property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the
case may be, of the Family Code.

Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal

impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband
and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. Under
this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.
Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate
in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of
gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the
co-ownership.

When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry

or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and
wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie
presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the
case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party who has
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall
be forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of
the parties' common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently
nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a
nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental
and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling
that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all
their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in
the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them,
the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51
and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should
aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property
regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case
until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common law spouses.

The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, applying

paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit
terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under
Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the
latter is judicially declared void.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30

October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED. No costs.
 SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: That property acquired by a man and a woman who are

capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife[.]without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry;

b. Case Title: Virginia Ocampo vs. Deogracio Ocampo, GR. No. 198908;
(J. Peralta); August 3, 2015

c. Facts: On January 22, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision

declaring the marriage between Virginia and Deogracio Ocampo as null
and void from the beginning under Article 3 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity.

On March 31, 1999, the trial court directed the parties to submit a project
of partition of their inventoried properties having failed to agree on a
project of partition of their conjugal properties, hearing ensued and the
trial court rendered the assailed Order stating that the properties
declared by the parties belong to each one of them on a 50-50 sharing.
d. Issue: Whether or not Deogracio should be deprived of his share in the
conjugal partnership of gains by reason of psychological incapacity,
caused their marriage to be declared null and void.

e. Held: While Virginia and Deogracio tied the marital knot on January 16,
1978, it is still the Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships,
which will govern the property relations between Deogracio and Virginia
even if they were married before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code
shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code
without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code
or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are
acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal.
Hence, the burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not
conjugal.

The Court held that in a void marriage, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147
or Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless
void, as in this case. Article 147 of the Family Code provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to

marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under avoid
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
 equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through
their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they

lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,

suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live
together as husband and wife under avoid marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate,
the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other;
(2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void, as in
the instant case. The term "capacitated" in the first paragraph of the
provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage.
Any impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the
part of either Virginia or Deogracio. They lived exclusively with each
other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to be
void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

From the foregoing, property acquired by both spouses through their

work and industry should, therefore, be governed by the rules on equal
co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
 did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered
as having contributed to the same jointly if said party's efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family household.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 11,

2010 and the Resolution dated October 5, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 82318 are AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to
the trial court for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the

contrary is provided.

Article 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.

b. Case Title: Brigido B. Quiao vs. Rita C. Quiao, GR. No. 176556; (J.
Reyes); July 4, 2012

c. Facts: Petitioner Brigido Quiao was married to respondent Rita Quiao in

1977 and got four children. They had no separate properties prior to
their marriage.
In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for
cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a
decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to
Article 55, thereby awarding the custody of their three minor children in
favor of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between

them subject to the respective legitimes of their children; however,
Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall
be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article
129 of the Family Code.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was
granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the
earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.

After more than nine months, Brigido filed a motion for clarification
asking the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held
that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties
after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and
debts.”

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous

decision stating that net profit earned shall be computed in accordance
with par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code. However, it later reverted
to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
d. Issue: Whether or not the offending spouse acquired vested rights over
½ of the properties in the conjugal partnership.

e. Held: In the case at bar, since it was already established by the trial
court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to
return to any of them.

The listed properties are considered part of the conjugal partnership.

Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the listed properties should be divided
equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However,
since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from
the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

So, as not to be confused, like in the absolute community regime,

nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership
regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted
for in the guilty party’s favor.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion
for Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order
dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED
in accordance with the above discussions.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The disposition of conjugal property of one spouse sans the
written consent of the other is void.

b. Case Title: Dolores Alejo vs. Spouses Ernesto Cortez, GR. No. 206114;
(J. Tijam); June 19, 2017

c. Facts: Petitioner Alejo are the owners of the parcel of land where te
residential houses built upon. On March 29, 1996, Jacinta executed a
Kasunduan with Dolores for the sale of the property for Php 500,000.00
which must be fully paid before the end of the year 1996. Thereafter,
Jorge sent two letters to Dolores: one informing her that he did not
consent to the sale; and the other, demanding that Dolores pay the
balance of Php 200,000.00 on or before October 5, 1996.
 Dolores offered to tender her balance but Jorge refused to accept the
same and instead filed cases for ejectment and annulment of sale,
reconveyance and recovery of possession against her. Pending to the
case, Jorge and Jacinta sold the subject property to Spouse Cortez.

Dolores learned the transaction made by spouses, she filed a case

against the spouses Cortez for the annulment of the deed of sale and
damages. RTC ruled in favor Dolores declaring the Kasunduan as a
perfected contract. Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the CA declared
the Kasunduan as void absent Jorge’s consent and acceptance.

d. Issue: Whether or not the Kasunduan entered by Petitioner Jacinta

without Jorge’s consent is valid.
e. Held: No. The Supreme Court held that Sale of Conjugal Real Property
is void without the written consent of the other spouse. The law is
unequivocal when it states that the disposition of conjugal property of
one spouse without the written consent of the other is void. Here, it is an
established fact that the Kasunduan was entered into solely by Jacinta
and signed by her alone. By plain terns of the law, therefore, the
Kasunduan is void.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 3,

2012 and Resolution dated February 26, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. CV No. 95432 which (1) declared void the Kasunduan dated 29
March 1996; (2) declared valid the title issued in the names of Spouses
Cortez and San Pedro; (3) ordered the reimbursement of PhP300,000
with legal interest to Dolores Alejo; (3) ordered the Spouses Leonardo,
 at their option, to indemnify Dolores Alejo of her expenses on the useful
improvements or pay the increase in value on the subject property, with
retention rights until indemnity is made; and (4) remanded the case to
the RTC for purposes of receiving evidence and determining the amount
of said indemnity are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: The conjugal partnership property, upon its dissolution due to

the death of either spouse, should be liquidated either in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased or, in the
absence thereof, by the surviving spouse within one year from the death
of the deceased spouse. That absent any liquidation, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property is void.

The sale by co-owner of his one-half undivided share in the subject

property was not necessarily void. A co-owner could sell his undivided
share.

b. Case Title: Rafael C. Uy vs. Estate of Vipa Fernandez, GR. No. 200612:
(J. Reyes); April 05, 2017
c. Facts: Vipa Fernandez Lahaylahay is the registered owner of a parcel of
land situated in Jaro, Iloilo City. Vipa and her husband Levi Lahaylahay
have two children, Grace Joy and Jill Frances.

In 1990, a contract of lease was executed between Vipa and Rafael Uy

over the subject property and the improvements thereon to which Rafael
bound himself to pay the amount of P 3,000/mo with provision for a 10%
every year thereafter.

On 1995, Vipa died leaving no will or testament whatsoever, Grace Joy

became the de facto administrator of the estate of Vipa. In 1998, Rafael
stopped paying the monthly rents. Consequently, the estate of Vipa filed
a complaint for unlawful detainer with MTCC against Rafael.
Accordingly, at the time of the filing of the complaint, unpaid rents
amounted to P271,150.00.

MTCC rendered a decision ordering Rafael to vacate the premises and

to pay the amount of unpaid rents with 12% interest per annum.

On appeal, RTC reversed the decision of MTCC and dismiss the

complaint for unlawful detainer. According the RTC, Grace was the
plaintiff not the estate and it had failed to the bring the dispute to the
barangay conciliation; that the property is part of conjugal property and
after Vipa’s death the conjugal partnership was terminated. Levi sold his
property to Rafael, thus making him co-owner of the property.
 Estate filed a petition for review to CA and reinstated the decision of
MTCC.

d. Issue: Whether or not the property is part of the conjugal property and
Rafael can be considered as co-owner of the property.

e. Held: Yes, YES, petition is partially granted. Rafael bought Levi's one-
half share in the subject property in consideration of P500,000.00 as
evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated December 29, 2005. At that time,
the conjugal partnership properties of Levi and Vipa were not yet
liquidated. However, such disposition, notwithstanding the absence of
liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, is not necessarily void.
It bears stressing that under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains,
the husband and wife are co-owners of all the property of the conjugal
partnership. Thus, upon the termination of the conjugal partnership of
gains due to the death of either spouse, the surviving spouse has an
actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties, which does
not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation
and partition of the conjugal partnership. With respect, however, to the
deceased spouse's share in the conjugal partnership properties, an
implied ordinary coownership ensues among the surviving spouse and
the other heirs of the deceased.

Thus, upon Vipa's death, one half of the subject property was
automatically reserved in favor of the surviving spouse, Levi, as his
share in the conjugal partnership. The other half, which is Vipa's share,
was transmitted to Vipa's heirs – Grace Joy, Jill Frances, and her
husband Levi, who is entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate
child.

The ensuing implied co-ownership is governed by Article 493 of the Civil

Code, which provides: Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.
(Emphasis ours) Although Levi became a co-owner of the conjugal
partnership properties with Grace Joy and Jill Frances, he could not yet
assert or claim title to any specific portion thereof without an actual
partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by
judicial decree. Nevertheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share;
hence, Levi had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest. Thus, the sale by Levi of his one-half undivided share in the
subject property was not necessarily void, for his right as a co-owner
thereof was effectively transferred, making the buyer, Rafael, a co-
owner of the subject property. However, Rafael became a co-owner of
the subject property only on December 29, 2005 – the time when Levi
sold his one-half undivided share over the subject property to the former.

Thus, from December 29, 2005 Rafael, as a co-owner, has the right to
possess the subject property as an incident of ownership. Otherwise
stated, prior to his acquisition of Levi's one-half undivided share, Rafael
was a mere lessee of the subject property and is thus obliged to pay the
rent for his possession thereof. Accordingly, Rafael could no longer be
directed to vacate the subject property since he is already a coowner
thereof. Nevertheless, Rafael is still bound to pay the unpaid rentals
from June 1998 until April 2003 in the amount of P271,150.00. Rafael
could no-longer be directed to vacate the subject property since he is
already a co-owner thereof.

Nevertheless, Rafael is still bound to pay unpaid rentals from 1998 to

2003.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for

review on certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
November 26, 2010 and Resolution dated January 24, 2012 issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04481 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rafael C. Uy is hereby directed to pay the
Estate of Vipa Fernandez the following:

1. The amount of P271,150.00, representing the unpaid rentals, with

interest at the rates of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the
date of the last demand on May 3, 2003 until June 30, 2013, and
six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid;

2. Reasonable rent for the use and occupancy of the subject property
from May 2003 until December 28, 2005 at the rate of P3,000.00
per month with interest at the rates of twelve percent (12%) per
annum from the date of the last demand, i.e., the filing of the
 complaint for unlawful detainer on June 12, 2003, until June 30,
2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully
paid; and

3. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: The requirement under Republic Act No. 6713 and similar laws
that the sworn statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth (SALN) to
be filed by every government official must include assets, liabilities, and
net worth of the spouse of the filer is construed not to include the assets,
liabilities, and net worth of spouses whose property regime during the
marriage is by law or by agreement prior to the marriage one of
complete separation of property.

Article 38 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws specifically defines their

regime of property relations as Muslims to be one of complete
separation of property. In view of Section 38 of the Code of Muslim
 Personal Laws, the exemption of Babano from the disclosure
requirement should be clear and undisputed.

b. Case Title: Estrella Abid-Babano vs. Executive Secretary, GR. No.

201176; (J. Bersamin); August 28, 2019

c. Facts: In its decision issued on October 19, 2007, the Office of the
President upheld the recommendations and findings of the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) that Estrella Abid Babano, Regional
Director, Department of Education-Region XII, is guilty of Simple Neglect
of Duty for her failure to disclose in her Statement of Assets, Liabilities
and Net Worth (SALN) certain real properties and motor vehicles.

Babano appealed the decision of the OP by petition for review on the

ground, among others, that both petitioner and her husband were
Muslims whose property regime was that of complete separation of
property as provided by Presidential Decree No. 1083 (Code of Muslim
Personal Laws)

The CA denied the petition for review on October 21, 2011, and affirmed
the ruling of the OP in toto.

d. Issue: Whether or not the regime of separation of property will govern

the property relations of Babano and her husband despite absence of a
marriage settlement.
e. Held: Yes. Both petitioner and her husband were Muslims. She was his
second wife. Article 38 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws specifically
defines their regime of property relations as Muslims to be one of
complete separation of property, to wit: Article 38. Regime of property
relations. The property relations between the spouses, in the absence of
any stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlements or any other
contract, shall be governed by the regime of complete separation of
property in accordance with this Code and, in a suppletory manner, by
the general principles of Islamic law and the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In view of Section 38 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
the exemption of petitioner from the disclosure requirement should be
clear and undisputed. As such, petitioner's non-disclosure in her SALN
of the properties pertaining to her husband and held by her husband
outside of her own household with him was not actionable.

WHEREFORE, the Court (a) GRANTS the petition for review on

certiorari; (b) REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated
on October 21, 2011 and the resolution promulgated on February 24,
2012 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02163; and (c)
DISMISSES the administrative charge against petitioner, without
pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear
violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the
perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was
one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license
a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine
union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.

Article 77. Family Code. In case two persons married in accordance with
law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations, rites, or
 practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary
to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any
ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious
ceremony.”

b. Case Title: Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado vs. Luis Anson, GR. No. 204494; (J.
Reyes); July 27, 2016

c. Facts: On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson filed a Complaint against Jo-

Ann Diaz-Salgado and Gerard Salgado(Spouses Salgado) along with
Maria Luisa Anson-Maya and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking
the annulment of three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate of the deceased Severina De Asis.

Luis claimed that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina. He

alleged they were married in a civil ceremony on December 1966. Prior
to this, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa while Jo-Ann
is Severina’s daughter from a previous relationship. During their marital
union, they acquired real properties in San Juan, Manila. Luis claims
that since there was no marriage settlement between them, and the
properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. However, without his
knowledge and consent, Severina executed Unilateral Deeds of Sale
transferring the properties in favor of Jo-Ann. When Severina died,
Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
Severina, adjudicating herself as Severina’s sole heir. Luis claimed that
because of this, he was divested of his share in the conjugal properties,
and inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina.
 Jo-Ann countered that she did not know about the marriage between her
mother and Luis, and that all they had was a common-law relationship.
This was terminated through a Partition Agreement executed in
November 1980. Luis then already received the properties apportioned
to him. Maria Luisa also claimed that she was not aware of any
marriage. In the Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina were described
as single and they acknowledged that they were living together as
common-law spouses.

Luis presented a marriage contract with Severina during trial. The

Spouses Salgado disputed the validity of the marriage on the ground of
lack of marriage license. Luis also admitted the existence and execution
of the Partition Agreement. The RTC ruled in favor of Luis, upholding the
validity of marriage despite the lack of the marriage license number. The
CA affirmed this.

d. Issues: Whether there was a valid marriage between Luis and Severina.

Whether Luis is entitled to properties from Severina’s estate under

Articles 147 or 148.

e. Held: The marriage of Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, hence the applicable law is the Old Civil
Code.
The reason cited by Luis as to why there was no marriage license is the
exception under Article 77 of the Old Civil Code, stating that “In case two
persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in
conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or
religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements
of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be
considered as a purely religious ceremony.” However, it is clear that
they were not married to each other prior to the civil ceremony, and this
was affirmed by Luis in his testimony.

On the issue of the co-ownership, the Court held that in a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties
during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article147 or Article 148. As there is no showing that the parties were
incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and
considering that their marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a
valid marriage license, Article 144 in relation to Article 147 of the Family
Code are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property
relations.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through

their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. And since Luis has admitted the existence, due execution
and authenticity of the Partition Agreement, it remains uncontroverted
that he already received his share as stipulated in the Partition
Agreement. As such, the Court finds no reason to have the said
 agreement declared null and void or annulled, in the absence of any
circumstance which renders such contract invalid or at least, voidable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6,

2012 and the Resolution dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 69611 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not
inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-owner of the decedent’s
property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-
ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs.

Under the Family Code, family relations, which is the primary basis for
succession, exclude relations by affinity.
 Art. 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children; (3) Among other ascendants and
descendants; and (4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or
half blood.

b. Case Title: Antipolo Ining vs. Leonardo R. Vega, GR. No. 174727; (J.
Del Castillo); August 12, 2013

c. Facts: Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the

owner of a 3,120-square meter parcel of land (subject property) in
Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived
by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining
(Gregoria), who are now both deceased.

Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson,

herein respondent Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased).
Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and children Restonilo I.
Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the
substituted respondents.
Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners
Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon (Dolores),
Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and Amando. Natividad is survived by
Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea, Amparo Ibea-
Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus
Rimon, Cesaria Rimon Gonzales and Remedios Rimon Cordero.
Antipolo is survived by Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-
Francisco (Teodora), Camilo Francisco (Camilo), Adolfo Francisco
(Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.), Milagros Francisco,
Celedonio Francisco, and Herminigildo Francisco (Herminigildo). Pedro
is survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died
without issue. As for Jose, it is not clear from the records if he was made
party to the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.

In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles)

and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or
spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs).

In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to

him as Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case No. 5275 for partition, recovery
of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. In
his Amended Complaint, Leonardo alleged that on several occasions, he
demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs refused to
heed his demands; that the matter reached the level of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification to file a court action
sometime in 1980; that Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole ownership of the
property; that portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and
Tajonera, which portions must be collated and included as part of the
portion to be awarded to Gregoria’s heirs; that in 1979, Lucimo
Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband of herein petitioner Teodora,
illegally claimed absolute ownership of the property and transferred in
his name the tax declaration covering the property; that from 1988,
Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have deprived him (Leonardo) of the fruits of
 the property estimated at 1,000.00 per year; that as a result, he incurred
expenses by way of attorney’s fees and litigation costs. Leonardo thus
prayed that he be declared the owner of half of the subject property; that
the same be partitioned after collation and determination of the portion
to which he is entitled; that Gregoria’s heirs be ordered to execute the
necessary documents or agreements; and that he (Leonardo) be
awarded actual damages in the amount of 1,000.00 per year from 1988,
attorney’s fees of 50,000.00, and lawyer’s appearance fees of 500.00
per hearing.

The RTC dismissed the petition.

The CA reversed the RTC.

d. Issues: 1. Whether or not the respondents have rights or entitled to a

share over the property in question.

2. Whether or not Lucimo Sr. can inherit from the decedent and can
become a co-owner of the decedent’s property.

e. Held: The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA’s
Decision and Resolution declaring 1/2 portion of the subject property as
the share of the respondents as successors-in- interest of Romana
Roldan; and declaring 1/2 portion of the said property as the share of the
petitioners as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining. The SC
held that the finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had
long been settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to
appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leon’s estate. Since Leon
died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who
thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn, Romana’s and
Gregoria’s heirs – the parties herein – became entitled to the property
upon the sisters’ passing.

Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death. SC elucidated that, having
succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners
and respondents became co-owners thereof. As co-owners, they may
use the property owned in common, provided they do so in accordance
with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to
injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners
from using it according to their rights. They have the full ownership of
their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may
alienate, assign or mortgage them, and even substitute another person
in their enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Finally, no prescription shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against
the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership. While it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that
may be characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is,
he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of
Gregoria. Under Article 150 of the Family Code, family relations include
those: between husband and wife; between parents and children;
among other ascendants and descendants; and among brothers and
 sisters, whether of the full or half blood. Thus, family relations, which is
the primary basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity.
Consequently, he cannot validly affect a repudiation of the co-
ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did
not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to seek a partition of
the property has not been lost.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 14, 2006

Decision and the September 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74687are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: When the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied

by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the registered owner does not
thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged deed
acquire any right or title to the property.

b. Case Title: Consolacion D. Romero vs. Engracia D. Singson, GR. No.

200969; (J. Del Castillo); August 3, 2015
c. Facts: petitioners Consolacion Domingo Romero and Rosario S.D.
Domingo and respondent Engracia Domingo Singson — are siblings.
Their parents, Macario and Felicidad Domingo, own a 223-square meter
piece of property (the subject property) located at San Juan, Metro
Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title which was issued in 1953.
It appears that petitioners and their other siblings, Rafael and Ramon
Domingo, are the actual occupants of the subject property, having
stayed there with their parents since birth. On the other hand,
respondent took up residence in Mandaluyong City after getting married.
On February 22, 1981, Macario passed away, while Felicidad died on
September 14, 1997.

On June 7, 2006, a new certificate of title was issued in respondent's

name, by virtue of a notarized "Absolute Deed of Sale" ostensibly
executed on June 6, 2006 by and between Macario and Felicidad — as
sellers, and respondent — as buyer. And this despite the fact that
Macario and Felicidad were then already deceased. Soon thereafter,
respondent sent letters to her siblings demanding that they vacate the
subject property, under pain of litigation.
d. Issue: Whether or not the respondents have better rights than the
petitioner.

e. Held: Determination of ownership should have been resolved in

petitioners' favor. It is perfectly obvious that the signatures of the
vendors therein, Macario and Felicidad, were forged. They could not
have signed the same, because both were by then long deceased:
Macario died on February 22, 1981, while Felicidad passed away on
September 14, 1997. This makes the June 6, 2006 deed of sale null and
void; being so, it is "equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and
it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation." And while it
is true that respondent has in her favor a Torrens title over the subject
property, she nonetheless acquired no right or title in her favor by virtue
of the null and void June 6, 2006 deed. Verily, when the instrument
presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate
certificate of title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title,
and neither does the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or
title to the property. In sum, the fact that respondent has in her favor a
certificate of title is of no moment; her title cannot be used to validate the
forgery or cure the void sale. Since respondent acquired no right over
the subject property, the same remained in the name of the original
registered owners, Macario and Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners,
petitioners and respondent thus became, and remain co-owners — by
succession — of the subject property.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The February 29, 2012

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 114363 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 11, 2009 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160 in SCA No. 3144 is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Noncompliance with the earnest effort requirement under
Article 151 of the Family Code is not a jurisdictional defect which would
authorize the courts to dismiss suits filed before them motu proprio.
Rather, it merely partakes of a condition precedent such that the non-
compliance therewith constitutes a ground for dismissal of a suit should
the same be invoked by the opposing party at the earliest opportunity,
as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer.
 For Article 151 of the Family Code to apply, the suit must be exclusively
between or among "members of the same family." Once a stranger
becomes a party to such suit, the earnest effort requirement is no longer
a condition precedent before the action can prosper.

b. Case Title: Jose Z. Moreno vs. Rene M. Kahn, GR. No. 217744; (J.
Perlas-Bernabe); July 30, 2018

c. Facts: Jose alleged that since May 1998 and in their capacity as
lessees, he and his family have been occupying two (2) parcels of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 181516 and 181517
(subject lands) co-owned by his full-blooded sister, respondent
Consuelo Moreno Kahn Haire (Consuelo) and his nephews and nieces
(Consuelo's children), respondents Rene M. Kahn (Rene), Rene Luis
Pierre Kahn (Luis), Philippe Kahn (Philippe), and Ma. Claudine Kahn-
McMahon (Claudine; collectively, respondents). Around April or May
2003, through numerous electronic mails (emails) and letters,
respondents offered to sell to Jose the subject lands for the amount of
US$200,000.00 (US$120,000.00 to be received by Consuelo and
US$20,000.00 each to be received by her children), which Jose
accepted. Notably, the agreement was made verbally and was not
immediately reduced into writing, but the parties had the intention to
eventually memorialize the same via a written document. Over the next
few years, Jose made partial payments to respondents by paying off the
shares of Rene, Luis, Philippe and Claudine, leaving a remaining
balance of US$120,000.00 payable to Consuelo. However, in July 2010,
Consuelo decided to "cancel" their agreement, and thereafter, informed
Jose of her intent to convert the earlier partial payments as rental
payments instead. In response, Jose expressed his disapproval to
Consuelo's plan and demanded that respondents proceed with the sale,
which the latter ignored. He then claimed that on July 26, 2011, without
his consent, Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine sold their shares
over the subject lands to Rene, thereby consolidating full ownership of
the subject lands to him. Consequently, TCT Nos. 181516 and 181517
were cancelled and new TCTs, i.e., TCT Nos. 148026 and 148027, were
issued in Rene's name. Upon learning of such sale, Jose sent a demand
letter to Rene, and later on to Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine,
asserting his right to the subject lands under the previous sale agreed
upon.

As his demands went unheeded, Jose brought the matter to the

barangay lupon for conciliation proceedings between him and Rene
only, since Consuelo, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine are all living abroad.

As no settlement was agreed upon, Jose was constrained to file the

subject complaint for specific performance and cancellation of titles with
damages. In an Order dated January 18, 2012, the RTC motu proprio
ordered the dismissal of Jose's complaint for failure to allege compliance
with the provision of Article 151 of the Family Code which requires
earnest efforts to be made first before suits may be tiled between family
members. In an Order dated October 11, 2012, the RTC denied Jose's
motion, ruling, inter alia, that Article 151 of the Family Code applies,
despite the fact that Consuelo had other co-defendants (i.e., her
 children) in the suit, as the dispute, which led to the filing of the case,
was mainly due to the disagreement between full-blooded siblings, Jose
and Consuelo. Aggrieved, Jose filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA. However, the CA affirmed.

d. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC
which motu proprio dismissed the cased on the ground that Article 151
has not been complied with?

e. Held: The Court held in Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales that non-
compliance with the earnest effort requirement under Article 151 of the
Family Code is not a jurisdictional defect which would authorize the
courts to dismiss suits filed before them motu proprio. Rather, it merely
partakes of a condition precedent such that the non-compliance
therewith constitutes a ground for dismissal of a suit should the same be
invoked by the opposing party at the earliest opportunity, as in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer. Otherwise, such ground is deemed waived.
In this case, a plain reading of the records shows that the RTC ordered
the dismissal of Jose's complaint against respondents for his alleged
failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code – even before
respondents have filed a motion or a responsive pleading invoking such
non-compliance. As such ground is not a jurisdictional defect but is a
mere condition precedent, the courts a quo clearly erred in finding that a
motu proprio dismissal was warranted under the given circumstances.

Even assuming arguendo that respondents invoked the foregoing

ground at the earliest opportunity, the Court nevertheless finds Article
151 of the Family Code inapplicable to this case. For Article 151 of the
Family Code to apply, the suit must be exclusively between or among
"members of the same family." Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3)
Among other ascendants and descendants: and (4) Among brothers and
sisters, whether of the full or half-blood. In this light, case law states that
Article 151 of the Family Code must be construed strictly, it being an
exception to the general rule.

Hence, any person having a collateral familial relation with the plaintiff
other than what is enumerated in Article 150 of the Family Code is
considered a stranger who, if included in a suit between and among
family members, would render unnecessary the earnest efforts
requirement under Article 151.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The express mention of one

person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. In this instance,
it is undisputed that: (a) Jose and Consuelo are full-blooded siblings;
and (b) Consuelo is the mother of Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine,
which make them nephews and niece of their uncle, Jose. It then follows
that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine are considered "strangers'' to
Jose insofar as Article 151 of the Family Code is concerned. In this
relation, it is apt to clarify that while it was the disagreement between
Jose and Consuelo that directly resulted in the filing of the suit, the fact
remains that Rene, Luis, Philippe, and Claudine were rightfully
impleaded as co-defendants Jose’s complaint as they are co-owners of
the subject lands in dispute. In view of the inclusion “strangers" to the
 suit between Jose and Consuelo who are full blooded siblings, the Court
concludes that the suit is beyond the ambit of Article 151 of the Family
Code. Perforce, the courts a quo gravely erred in dismissing Jose's
complaint due to non-compliance with the earnest effort requirement
therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated

September 24, 2014 and the Resolution dated March 17, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129232 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 12-004 is REINSTATED
and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch
205 for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

a. Doctrine: The movant's claim that his/her property is exempt from

execution for being the family home is not a magic wand that will freeze
the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final and executory
ruling. It is imperative that the claim for exemption must be set up and
proven.
b. Case Title: Felicitas L. Salazar vs. Remedios Felias, GR. No. 213972;
(J. Reyes, Jr.) February 5, 2018

c. Facts: Respondent Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of Catalino

Nivera (Heirs of Nivera) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership,
Possession and Damages against the Spouses Romualdo and Felisa
Lastimosa. The former sought to recover from the latter four parcels of
land in Pangasinan. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the
Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate the lands and to surrender the possession
thereof. The Heirs of Lastimosa filed a motion to order the sheriff to
desist from making the demolition. On the other hand, the Heirs of
Nivera filed a Motion for Execution and Demolition, which was granted.
Felicitas elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. She contends that
the execution cannot continue as the Writ of Execution is being enforced
against property that is exempt from execution, as what is sought to be
demolished is her family home. In this regard, Art. 155 of the Family
Code ordains that the family home shall be exempt from execution.

d. Issue: Whether or not the execution proceed against the petitioners’

family home?
e. Held: Yes. It is not sufficient for the claimant to merely allege that the
property subject to execution is a family home. The claim for exemption
must be set up and proved. It is imperative that the movant’s claim must
be backed with evidence showing that the home was indeed (i) duly
constituted as a family home, (ii)constituted jointly by the husband and
wife or by an unmarried head of a family,(iii) resided in by the family (or
 any of the family home's beneficiaries), (iv) forms part of the properties
of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the
exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or
property of the unmarried head of the family, and (v) has an actual value
of Php300,000.00 in urban areas, and Php200,000.00 in rural areas.

The law also explicitly mandates that the occupancy of the family home,
either by the owner thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries, must be
actual. This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as opposed to
something merely possible, or that which is merely presumptive or
constructive. Felicitas' argument that the property subject of the writ of
execution is a family home, is an unsubstantiated allegation that cannot
defeat the binding nature of a final and executory judgment.

Thus, the Writ of Execution and Demolition issued by the court must
perforce be given effect.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for

lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated December 6, 2013 and
Resolution dated August 7, 2014, rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 97309 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
a. Doctrine: Parties who have validly executed a contract and have availed
themselves of its benefits may not, to escape their contractual
obligations, invoke irregularities in its execution to seek its invalidation.
 Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced
sale or attachment except (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution.

b. Case Title: Florante Vitug vs. Evangeline A. Abuda, GR. No. 201264; (J.
Leonen); January 11, 2016

c. Facts: Abuda loaned to Vitug and his wife, Narcisa Vitug. As security for
the loan, Vitug mortgaged to Abuda his property in Tondo, Manila. The
property was then subject of a conditional Contract to Sell between the
National Housing Authority and Vitug. Spouses Vitug failed to
pay their loans despite Abuda's demands. Abuda filed a
Complaint for Foreclosure of Property before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.

The RTC rendered decision in favor of Abuda, thereby ordering the

defendants to pay the former and immediately vacate the subject
premises. Vitug appealed the RTC Decision before the Court of
Appeals. He contended that the real estate mortgage contract he
and Abuda entered into was void on the grounds of fraud and
lack of consent under Articles 1318, 1319, and 1332 of the Civil Code.
He alleged that he was only tricked into signing the mortgage contract,
whose terms he did not really understand. Hence, his consent to the
mortgage contract was vitiated.

The CA ruled in favor of Abug but found the Interest imposed by the
RTC as iniquitous. Vitug filed a Motion for Reconsideration averring that
 the subject property was exempt from execution because it was
constituted as a family home before its mortgage.

The CA denied Vitug's Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, Vitug filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

d. Issue: Whether petitioner's property is a family home that is

free from execution, forced sale, or attachment under the Family Code.

e. Held: The contention of the defendant that the subject mortgaged

property is their family home is irrelevant as the debt secured by
mortgages on the premises before or after the constitution of the family
home does not exempt the same from execution (Rule 106 of the Rules
of Court).

Even though petitioner's property has been constituted as a family

home, it is not exempt from execution.

Article 155 of the Family Code explicitly provides that debts secured by
mortgages are exempted from the rule against execution, forced sale, or
attachment of family home: (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision

dated October 26, 2011 and its Resolution dated March 8, 2012 are
AFFIRMED. The interest rate for the loan of Php 600,000.00 is further
reduced to 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.