ARRESTS

SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

CC Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages:

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures

ARTICLE 124. Arbitrary Detention. — Any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person, shall
suffer:

1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, if the detention has
not exceeded three days;

2. The penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the detention has continued more than three
but not more than fifteen days;

3. The penalty of prisión mayor, if the detention has continued for more than fifteen days but not more than six months;
and

4. That of reclusión temporal, if the detention shall have exceeded six months.

The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the compulsory confinement of the patient in
a hospital, shall be considered legal grounds for the detention of any person.

ARTICLE 125. Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities. — The penalties provided in
the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of one hour.

ARTICLE 126. Delaying Release. — The penalties provided for in article 124 shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who delays for the period of time specified therein the performance of any judicial or executive order for the
release of a prisoner or detention prisoner, or unduly delays the service of the notice of such order to said prisoner or the
proceedings upon any petition for the liberation of such person.

RULE 113 Arrest

Section 1. Definition of arrest. — Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. (1)
Section 2. Arrest; how made. — An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
 A. Arrest Under Warrant

RULE 112 Preliminary Investigation

Section 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. — (a) By the Regional Trial Court. — Within ten (10) days from the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused
has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or
when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice
and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.

RULE 113 Arrest

Section 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. — When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant, the
officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and of the fact that a warrant has been
issued for his arrest, except when he flees or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or
when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at
the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as
soon as practicable. (7a)

G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L.

MANZANAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35,
UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY
FISCAL OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.

G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, THE
HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE
WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.

G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.

LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,

vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ,
UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F.
GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court,
at Manila, respondents.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.

Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 82827 and 83979.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due
process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima
facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not
the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or
not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners
through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining
the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the
Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners'
contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the
preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due
process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the
preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to
submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the
1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently
convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.

On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.

It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's
filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under
the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from
suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive
of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided
attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in
which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so
minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that
cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged
character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the
trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.

As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press
freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.

The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as
to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order
to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the
Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.

Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article
38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.

The facts are as follows:

 xxx xxx xxx

1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn
statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged
petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:

04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at

nagbibigay ng salaysay.

S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay

ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. — Horty
Salazar — 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.

05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa

iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?

S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.

06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?

S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha

ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card
ko.

2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was
assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:

YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA

ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR.
ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE
CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.

4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment
agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND
SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:

HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No.
1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O.
Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being
used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that
you have —

(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to
recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor
Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.
 Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.

5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued
an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro
as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the
group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and
Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance
Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs.
Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the
team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However,
when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team
chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more
waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs.
Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:

Gentlemen:

On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we respectfully
request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately
returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner
thereof. Among our reasons are the following:

1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and
Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law"
guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.

2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which
guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose."

3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2
policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as
well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her
consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave
abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under
Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.

Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS

(P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned
within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all
legal action, civil and criminal, to protect our client's interests.

We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.

7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant petition; on
even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as
IS-88-836.1

On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are
already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the
grave public interest involved.
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the
Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is
also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution.

Under the new Constitution, which states:

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. 2

it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared that mayors may not
exercise this power:

xxx xxx xxx

But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the law as
it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No longer does the mayor have at this
time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143
of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated,
rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of
its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides
that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that
thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants
of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the
elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from
judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4

Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:

We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise,
prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to
determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a
prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice
is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably,
as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed,
warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That
makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5

Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential
Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the
exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then
Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers:

(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to recommend
the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. 6

On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more
teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:

(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of
such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper investigation it is determined that his
 activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of
job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to
be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or
authorized to do so. 7

On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister search
and seizure powers as well:

(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the
power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after
investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public
order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the
office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used
in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be
engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or
authorized to do so. 8

The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.

The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence,
the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the
Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case,
governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We
have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly
authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however,
because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11

xxx xxx xxx

The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S.
549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive
"when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice
Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued
presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express
law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch
Dick, 38 Phil. 41).

The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to
public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of
Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12

The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to
order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole
domain of the courts.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is
clearly in the nature of a general warrant:

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No.
1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O.
Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being
used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that
you have —
 (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to
recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor
Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. 13

We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is
that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to
be seized in this wise:

1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters,

cabinets, tables, communications/ recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper
and any and all documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to
the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to

promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and

3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,

1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;

3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;

4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and

5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong
Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records,
pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments
concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in Texas,"
was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to
"seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held
too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia
which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing
with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The
description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be
characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English history; the
era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown
were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the
literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode would
not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication
 that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state
security. 14

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue
warrants of arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or
the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the
purpose of deportation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result
of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 258,
HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch
259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUÑO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR.,
ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE
AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274,
respondents, LAURO VIZCONDE, intervenor.

G.R. No. 121245 August 23, 1995

MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 258,
HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch
259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, respondents.

G.R. No. 121297 August 23, 1995

ANTONIO L. LEJANO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 258,
HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch
259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUÑO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR.,
ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE
AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch
274, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
Before the Court are petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to: (1) annul and set aside the Warrants of
Arrest issued against petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No.
95-404; (2) enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3)
dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein.1

From the records of the case, it appears that on June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with
the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J.
Lejano and six (6) other persons,2 with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the Department of Justice
formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuño to conduct the
preliminary investigation3 of those charged with the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde;4 her
mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde,5 and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer6 in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St.,
BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila.

During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following: (1) the sworn statement dated May 22, 1995 of
their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission of the crime;7 (2) the sworn
statements of two (2) of the former housemaids of the Webb family in the persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila
S. Gaviola;8 (3) the sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9, 1991 he was a passenger
of United Airlines Flight No. 808 bound for New York and who expressed doubt on whether petitioner Webb was his
co-passenger in the trip; (4) the sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who
narrated the manner of how Biong investigated and tried to cover up the crime at bar;9 (5) the sworn statements
of Belen Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids, and the sworn statements of Normal White, a
security guard and Manciano Gatmaitan, an engineer. The autopsy reports of the victims were also submitted and
they showed that Carmela had nine (9) stab wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer nineteen (19).10 The genital
examination of Carmela confirmed the presence of spermatozoa.11

Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for Production And
Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce the following:

(a) Certification issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the admission to and stay of Hubert
Webb in the United States from March 9, 1991 to October 22, 1992;

(b) Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 of the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, M.D.;

(c) Sworn Statements of Gerardo C. Biong (other than his Sworn Statement dated October 7, 1991);

(d) Photographs of fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde residence taken during the investigation;

(e) Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo Aguas, et al.;

(f) List of names of 135 suspects/persons investigated by the NBI per Progress Report dated September 2,
1991 submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela, Supervising Agent;

(g) Records of arrest, interview, investigation and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro (other than the
May 22, 1995 Sworn Statement) conducted by the NBI and other police agencies;

(h) transmittal letter to the NBI, including the report of the investigation conducted by Superintendent
Rodolfo C. Sison, Regional Deputy Director, NCRC;

(i) The names of NBI officials/agents composing the Task Force Jecares, including their respective positions
and duties;

(j) Statements made by other persons in connection with the crime charged.

The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted photocopies of the documents. It alleged it lost
the original of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro. This compelled petitioner Webb to file Civil Case No.
951099 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Br. 63, for the purpose, among others, of obtaining the original
of said sworn statement. He succeeded, for in the course of its proceedings, Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., produced
a copy of said original in compliance with a subpoena duces tecum. The original was then submitted by petitioner
Webb to the DOJ Panel together with his other evidence. It appears, however, that petitioner Webb failed to obtain
from the NBI the copy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Report despite his request for its production.

Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime at bar as he went to
the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27, 1992. 12 His alibi was
corroborated by Honesto Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo
Venture and Pamela Francisco.13 To further support his defense, he submitted documentary evidence that he bought
a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car while in the United States on said dates14 and that he was issued by the State of
California Driver's License No. A8818707 on June 14, 1991.15 Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated
July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records tending to confirm,
among others, his arrival at San Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger in United Airlines Flight No.
808.

The other respondents — Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Peter
Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Gerardo Biong — submitted sworn statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss
denying their complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes.16 Only the respondents Joey Filart and Artemio "Dong"
Ventura failed to file their counter-affidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last known address.17 In
his sworn statement, petitioner Gatchalian alleged that from 11 o'clock in the evening of June 29, 1991 until 3
o'clock in the morning of the following day, he was at the residence of his friends, Carlos and Andrew Syyap, at New
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa watching video tapes. He claimed that his co-petitioner Lejano was with him.

On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold respondents for
trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners and their co-
respondents,18 On the same date, it filed the corresponding Information19 against petitioners and their co-accused
with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-404 and raffled to
Branch 258 presided by respondent judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, the respondent judge Raul de Leon,
pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. On August 11, 1995,
Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his
employment with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by
Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused. On August
11, 1995, petitioner Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Bicutan,
Taguig. Petitioners Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions
before us.

In their petitions at bar, petitioners contend: (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them: (2)
the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the
crime of rape with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation; and (4) the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge
Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused.

We find the petitions bereft of merit.

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist that the May 22, 1995 sworn
statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and uncorroborated. They hammer on alleged material
inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They assail her credibility
for her misdescription of petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blonde. They also criticize the procedure followed by
the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities and inconsistencies in
the sworn statements of the witnesses for the NBI.

We start with a restatement of the purpose of a preliminary investigation. Section 1 of Rule 112 provides that
a preliminary investigation should determine " . . . whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-
grounded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
 respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." Section 3 of the same Rule outlines the
procedure in conducting a preliminary investigation, thus:

Sec. 3. Procedure. — Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits
of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of
copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be
sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or,
in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the
affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss
the same if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, or issue a subpoena to the respondent,
attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents. Within ten (10)
days from receipt thereof, the respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and other supporting
documents. He shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.

(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent shall also be
sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof and copies thereof shall be furnished by
him to the complainant.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits
within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence
presented by the complainant.

(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the
parties so desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter may
propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.

(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer shall
resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating
officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.

Section 4 of Rule 112 then directs that "if the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the respondent for trial,
he shall prepare the resolution and corresponding information. He shall certify under oath that he, or as
shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses, that
there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof . . ."

The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right of the people to be secure
in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature . . ."20 An arrest without a
probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be
intruded by the State.21 Probable cause to warrant arrest is not an opaque concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing
accretions of case law reiterate that they are facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.22 Other
jurisdictions utilize the term man of reasonable caution 23 or the term ordinarily prudent and cautious man.24 The terms are legally
synonymous and their reference is not to a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the street.25 It ought to be
emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of
evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance.

Applying these basic norms, we are not prepared to rule that the DOJ Panel gravely abused its discretion
when it found probable cause against the petitioners. Petitioners belittle the truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2)
grounds: (a) she allegedly erroneously described petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blond and (b) she
committed material inconsistencies in her two (2) sworn statement, thus:26

xxx xxx xxx

To illustrate, the following are some examples of inconsistencies in the two sworn statements of
Alfaro:

On whether Alfaro knew Carmela before the incident in question

First Affidavit: She had NOT met Carmela before June 29, 1991.

Second Affidavit: "I met her in a party sometime in February, 1991."

On whether Alfaro saw the dead bodies

First Affidavit: She did not see the three dead persons on that night. She just said "on
the following day I read in the newspaper that there were three persons who were
killed . . ."

Second Affidavit: "I peeped through the first door on the left. I saw two bodies on top
of the bed, bloodied, and in the floor, I saw Hubert on top of Carmela."

On the alleged rape of Carmela Vizconde

First Affidavit: She did not see the act of rape.

Second Affidavit: She saw Hubert Webb "with bare buttocks, on top of Carmela and
pumping, her mouth gagged and she was moaning and I saw tears on her eyes."

On how Webb, Lejano, and Ventura entered the Vizconde house

First Affidavit: "by jumping over the fence, which was only a little more than a meter
high."

Second Affidavit: They "entered the gate which was already open."

On whether Alfaro entered the Vizconde house

First Affidavit: She never entered the house.

Second Affidavit: "I proceeded to the iron grill gate leading to the dirty kitchen."

In its Resolution, the DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and inconsistencies did not erode
the credibility of Alfaro. We quote the pertinent ruling, viz.:27

xxx xxx xxx

As regards the admissibility of Alfaro's statements, granting for purposes of argument merely that
she is a co-conspirator, it is well to note that confessions of a co-conspirator may be taken as
evidence to show the probability of the co-conspirator's participation in the commission of the crime
(see People vs. Lumahang, 94 Phil. 1084).

Furthermore, it is a well-established doctrine that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence
of prior agreement to commit the crime. Indeed, "only rarely would such a prior agreement be
demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only rarely documented by
 agreements in writing. Thus, conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime, showing that the several accused had acted in concert
or in unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design." (Angelo vs. Court of Appeals,
210 SCRA 402 [1992], citations omitted; People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 699).

Neither can we discredit Alfaro merely because of the inconsistencies in her two sworn statements.
In Angelo, the Court refused to discredit the testimony of a witness accusing therein petitioner for the
slaying of one Gaviano Samaniego even though said witness failed to name Angelo in his affidavit
which was executed five (5) months earlier. Granting, the Court continued, that a part of the witness'
testimony is untrue, such circumstance is not sufficient to discredit the entire testimony of the
witness.

On August 7, 1995, another counsel for respondent Webb submitted his memorandum suggesting
that the instant complaint "should not be decided within the month to give time to the NBI to
coordinate with the FBI on the latter's inquiry into the whereabouts of Hubert Webb . . . and to check
on our U.S.-based witnesses."

In said memorandum, counsel for respondent Webb calls for the application of the maxim falsus in
uno, falsus in omnibus arising from the inconsistencies of Alfaro's statements, among others. This is
untenable. As held in Angelo:

There is no rule of law which prohibits a court from crediting part of the testimony of a
witness as worthy of belief and from simultaneously rejecting other parts which the
court may find incredible or dubious. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is
not a rule of law, let alone a general rule of law which is universally applicable. It is
not a legal presumption either. It is merely a latinism describing the conclusion
reached by a court in a particular case after ascribing to the evidence such weight or
lack of weight that the court deemed proper.

In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having reservations when she
first executed the first statement and held back vital information due to her natural reaction of
mistrust. This being so, the panel believes that the inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements
have been sufficiently explained especially specially so where there is no showing that the
inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth. Consequently, the probative value of
Alfaro's testimony deserves full faith and credit. As it has been often noted, ex parte statements are
generally incomplete because they are usually executed when the affiant's state of mind does not
give her sufficient and fair opportunity to comprehend the import of her statement and to narrate in
full the incidents which transpired (People vs. Sarellana, 233 SCRA 31 [1994]; Angelo vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has been committed and what is
clear before us is that the totality of the evidence submitted by the complainant indicate a prima
facie case that respondents conspired in the perpetration of the imputed offense.

We note that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro was given with the assistance of counsel28 and consists of
six (6) pages, in single space reciting in rich details how the crime was planned and then executed by the
petitioners. In addition, the DOJ Panel evaluated the supporting sworn statements of Nerissa Rosales and Mila
Gaviola, former housemaids of the Webbs, Carlos J. Cristobal, a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808 and
Lolita Birrer, a paramour of Gerardo Biong. The Panel assayed their statements as follows:29

xxx xxx xxx

According to Nerissa E. Rosales, a former housemaid of the Webb family, on June 29, 1991,
between 7:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Hubert was at home inside his room with two
male visitors. She knew it because she and her co-housemaid, Loany, were instructed by Hubert to
bring them three glasses of juice. It was the last time she saw Hubert and was later told by then
Congressman Webb that Hubert was in the United States.

While Mila S. Gaviola, another former housemaid of the Webb family and who served as a laundry
woman, claims, aside from corroborating the statement of Nerissa Rosales, that on June 30, 1991,
she woke up at around 4:00 in the morning and as what she used to do, she entered the rooms of
the Webbs to get their clothes to be washed. As a matter of fact, in that early morning, she entered
Hubert's room and saw Hubert, who was only wearing his pants, already awake and smoking while
he was sitting on his bed. She picked up Hubert's scattered clothes and brought them together with
the clothes of the other members of the family to the laundry area. After taking her breakfast, she
began washing the clothes of the Webbs. As she was washing the clothes of Hubert Webb, she
noticed fresh bloodstains in his shirt. After she finished the laundry, she went to the servant's
quarters. But feeling uneasy, she decided to go up to the stockroom near Hubert's room to see what
he was doing. In the said stockroom, there is a small door going to Hubert's room and in that door
there is a small opening where she used to see Hubert and his friends sniffing on something. She
observed Hubert was quite irritated, uneasy, and walked to and from inside his room.

On that day, she noticed Hubert left the house at around 1:00 in the afternoon and came back at
around 4:00 in the same afternoon and went inside his room using the secret door of the house. It
was the last time that she saw Hubert until she left the Webb family.

On the other hand, Carlos J. Cristobal alleged that on March 9, 1991, at about 10:00 in the morning,
he was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as he was then scheduled to take the United
Airlines Flight No. 808 at 2:00 in the afternoon for New York. At the airport's lobby, he saw then
Congressman Freddie Webb with a male companion. He greeted him and Webb answered: "Mabuti
naman, at ito, ihahatid ko ang anak ko papuntang Florida." He knew Freddie Webb because he often
watched him then in a television show "Chicks to Chicks." He observed that the man whom Freddie
Webb referred to as his son, was of the same height as Freddie. The son referred to has fair
complexion with no distinguishing marks on his face. He (son of Webb) was then wearing a striped
white jacket. When he and his children were already inside the plane, he did not see Freddie
anymore, but he noticed his son was seated at the front portion of the economy class. He never
noticed Freddie Webb's son upon their arrival in San Francisco. He claims that, while watching the
television program "DONG PUNO LIVE" lately, he saw the wife of Freddie Webb with her lawyer
being interviewed, and when she described Hubert as "moreno" and small built, with a height of five
feet and seven inches tall, and who was the one who left for United States on March 9, 1991, he
nurtured doubts because such description does not fit the physical traits of the son of Freddie, who
left with him for United States on the same flight and date.

Lolita Birrer, alleged that she know Gerardo Biong because she had an affair with him for almost
three (3) years and in fact, she had a child with him who is now four (4) years old. Their relationship
started in February, 1991 until she broke up with him in September 1993. She recalls that on June
29, 1991, at around 6:00 p.m., Biong invited her to play mahjong at the canteen of a certain Aling
Glo located at the back of the Parañaque Municipal Hall.

At about 2:30, in the early morning of January 30, 1991, the radio operator of the Parañaque police
told Biong that he has a phone call. Before Biong went to the radio room, she was instructed to take
him over and after somebody won the game, she followed Biong at the radio room where she
overheard him uttering, "Ano?, Saan? Mahirap yan, Paano, o sige, aantayin kita, O ano?, dilaw na
taxi, o sige." When he put the phone down, Biong told her, "Mayroon lang akong rerespondehan,
ikaw muna ang maupo" and then, he went outside the canteen apparently waiting for somebody.
Twenty minutes later, a taxi, colored yellow, arrived with a male passenger sitting at the backseat
and parked near the canteen. After it made some signals by blinking its headlight, Biong rode thereat
at the front seat beside the driver and then, they left. She was not able to recognize the male
passenger because the window of the taxi was tinted. Biong came back at around 7:00 of the same
morning and when he arrived, he immediately washed his hands and face, and took his
handkerchief from his pocket which he threw at the trash can. She asked him why he threw his
handkerchief and he answered, "Hmp . . . amoy tae." She inquired what happened in BF Homes and
he replied, "Putang inang mga batang iyon, pinahirapan nila ako."

Biong later invited her for breakfast, but they first went to his office where she observed him doing
something in his steel cabinet while he appeared to be uneasy. Moments later, Galvan, another
policeman of Parañaque, arrived and said, "Oy Biong, may tatlong patay sa BF, imbestigahan mo" to
which Biong answered, "Oo susunod na ako." Biong went to the office of Capt. Don Bartolome who
 offered to accompany him and with whom she asked permission to go with them. Before they
proceeded to the place where the killings happened, she asked Biong if he knew the exact address
and the latter immediately responded, "Alam ko na yon." She was surprised because Galvan never
told him the place of the incident.

As soon as they arrived at the Vizconde's residence, Biong instructed the housemaids to contact the
victim's relatives, while the security guard fetched the barangay chairman and the president of the
Homeowners Association. When all these persons were already in the house, Biong started
recording the wounds of the victim. Inside the master's bedroom, she saw Biong took a watch from
the jewelry box. Because she could not tolerate the foul odor, she and Capt. Bartolome went out of
the room and proceeded to the dining area. On top of the dining table, she saw the scattered
contents of a shoulder bag. Moments later, Biong came out from the room and proceeded to the
front door to remove the chain lock; asked the keys from the housemaid and it was only then that the
main door was opened. Biong noticed a stone in front of the broken glass of the door and requested
Capt. Bartolome to go inside the servant's quarters as he doubted the housemaids' claim that they
heard nothing unusual. Using the handle of his gun, Biong broke the remaining glass of the door
panel. Bartolome then came out of the room and told Biong that he can hear the sound of the glass
being broken. At the garage, Biong also noticed same marks on the hood of the car.

On the following day, at around 12:00 noon, Biong arrived in her house together with the Vizconde
housemaids. When Biong was preparing to take a bath, she saw him remove from his pocket the
things she also saw from Vizconde's residence, to wit: calling cards, driver's license, ATM card, a
crossed check worth P80,000.00, earrings, a ring, bracelet, necklace, and the watch he took from
the jewelry box inside the room of the Vizcondes. These jewelry items were later pawned by Biong
for P20,000.00 at a pawnshop in front of Chow-Chow restaurant in Santos Avenue, Parañaque. The
next day, she saw Biong took from his locker at the Parañaque Police Station an imported brown
leather jacket, which the latter claimed to have been given to him by the person who called him up in
the early morning of June 30, 1991.

Since then, Biong has been wearing said jacket until they broke up sometime in 1993. She observed
that Biong seemed not interested in pursuing the investigation of the Vizconde case. In fact, when
Biong and this group picked up Mike Gatchalian and brought him to the Parañaque Police Station,
she was surprised that Biong halted the investigation when Gatchalian was profusely sweating while
being interrogated. After the father of Gatchalian talked to Colonel Pureza, the latter called up and
instructed Biong to bring Gatchalian to him (Colonel Pureza) and that was the last thing she
remembered regarding this case.

The DOJ Panel then weighed these inculpatory evidence against the exculpatory evidence of petitioners. It ruled: 30

xxx xxx xxx

The voluminous number of exhibits submitted by respondent Webb to support his defense of denial
and alibi notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful and thorough evaluation of the records, believes
that they cannot outweigh the evidence submitted by the complainant. Alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification made by a prosecution witness. Verily, alibi deserves scant consideration in
the face of positive identification especially so where the claim of alibi is supported mainly by friends
and relatives (People vs. Apolonia, 235 SCRA 124 [1994]; People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316 and a
long line of cases).

Similarly, denial is a self-serving negative which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters (People vs. Carizo, 233 SCRA
687 [1994]). Indeed, denial, like alibi, is weak and becomes even more weaker when arrayed against
the positive identification by the witness for the prosecution (People vs. Onpaid, 233 SCRA 62
[1994]).

Surprisingly, Gatchalian's defense of alibi was not corroborated by Lejano, whom he claimed was
with him watching video tapes at the Syyap residence. Other than claiming that he "was not and
 could not have been at or near the area of the Vizconde residence at the time of the alleged
commission of the crime," respondent Lejano proffered no evidence to substantiate his claim of alibi.

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, respondent Webb seeks to enhance the acceptability of his alibi in the form of
documents tending to show that he was thousands of miles away when the incident occurred. We
have carefully deliberated and argued on the evidence submitted by respondent Webb in support of
his absence from the country since March 9, 1991 to October 26, 1992 and found the same wanting
to exonerate him of the offense charged. The material dates in this case are June 29 and 30, 1991.
While respondent Webb may have submitted proof tending to show that he was issued a California
driver's license on June 14, 1991, there is no showing that he could not have been in the country on
the dates above mentioned. Neither do we find merit in the allegation that respondent Webb
personally bought a bicycle on June 30, 1991 in California in view of his positive identification by
Alfaro and the two (2) househelps of the Webb family who testified that he was here in the country
on said dates. Additionally, the issuance of receipt evidencing the purchase of a bicycle in California
is no conclusive proof that the name appearing thereon was the actual buyer of the merchandise.

Given these conflicting pieces of evidence of the NBI and the petitioners, we hold that the DOJ Panel did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and
was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States,31 while probable cause
demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause, we
also hold that the DOJ Panel did not, gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call the NBI witnesses for
clarificatory questions. The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound
discretion of the investigator and the investigator alone. If the evidence on hand already yields a probable
cause, the investigator need not hold a clarificatory hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies
probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of
trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel
correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory
hearing was unnecessary.

II

We now come to the charge of petitioners that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge
Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary
examination. Petitioners support their stance by highlighting the following facts: (1) the issuance of warrants
of arrest in a matter of few hours; (2) the failure of said judges to issue orders of arrest; (3) the records
submitted to the trial court were incomplete and insufficient from which to base a finding of probable cause;
and (4) that even Gerardo Biong who was included in the Information as a mere accessory had a "NO BAIL"
recommendation by the DOJ Panel. Petitioners postulate that it was impossible to conduct a "searching
examination of witnesses and evaluation of the documents" on the part of said judges.

The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with individual liberty and is regulated by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The aforequoted provision deals with the requirements of probable cause both with respect to issuance of
warrants of arrest or search warrants. The similarities and differences of their requirements ought to be
educational. Some of them are pointed out by Professors LaFave and Israel, thus:32 "It is generally assumed
that the same quantum of evidence is required whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or
probable cause to search. But each requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and
circumstances, and thus one can exist without the other. In search cases, two conclusions must be
supported by substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected
with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched. It is not also necessary
that a particular person be implicated. By comparison, in arrest cases there must be probable cause that a
crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without
any showing that evidence of the crime will be found at premises under that person's control." Worthy to
note, our Rules of Court do not provide for a similar procedure to be followed in the issuance of warrants of
arrest and search warrants. With respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that
"upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused." In
contrast, the procedure to be followed in issuing search warrants is more defined. Thus, Sections 3, 4 and 5
of Rule 126 provide:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the facts upon
which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must
issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.

We discussed the difference in the Procedure of issuing warrants of arrest and search warrants in Soliven
vs. Makasiar,33 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

The second issue, raised by Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires
the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the
 complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusions as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts.

Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law34 repudiate the submission of petitioners
that respondent judges should have conducted "searching examination of witnesses" before issuing
warrants of arrest against them. They also reject petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an order
of arrest before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of
Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.

In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2) sworn
statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita Birrer35 as well as the counter-
affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital and analysis of the parties' evidence made in
the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against
petitioners. Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the
probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the
review process cannot be measured by merely counting minutes and hours. The fact that it took the
respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm the probable cause determination of the DOJ Panel
does not mean they made no personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case.36

Petitioners' reliance on the case of Allado vs. Diokno37 is misplaced. Our Allado ruling is predicated on the
utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Not even the corpus delicti of the
crime was established by the evidence of the prosecution in that case. Given the clear insufficiency of the
evidence on record, we stressed the necessity for the trial judge to make a further personal examination of
the complainant and his witnesses to reach a correct assessment of the existence or non-existence of
probable cause before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused. The case at bar, however, rests on a
different factual setting. As priorly discussed, the various types of evidence extant in the records of the case
provide substantial basis for a finding of probable cause against the petitioner. The corpus delicti of the
crime is a given fact. There is an eyewitness account of the imputed crime given by Alfaro. The alibi defense
of petitioner Webb is also disputed by sworn statements of their former maids. It was therefore unnecessary
for the respondent judges to take the further step of examining ex parte the complainant and their witnesses
with searching questions.

III

Petitioners also complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their
right to an impartial investigation. They decry their alleged hasty and malicious prosecution by the NBI and
the DOJ Panel. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

We reject these contentions. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary
investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause
against them. The fairness of this opportunity is well stressed in the Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor
General, viz.:

Again, there is no merit in this contention. Petitioners were afforded all the opportunities to be heard.
Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary investigation by appearing in the initial
hearing held on June 30, 1995 and in the second hearing on July 14, 1995; and by filing a "Motion
for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents" on June 27, 1995 (p. 4, Petition), a
"Reply to the compliance and Comment/Manifestation to the Motion for Production and Examination
of Evidence" on July 5, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), a "Comment and Manifestation" on July 7, 1995 (p. 6,
 Petition), his "Counter-Affidavit" on July 14, 1995 (pp. 6-7, Petition) and a "Motion to Resolve" on
August 1, 1995. Numerous letter-requests were also sent by the petitioner Webb's counsel to the
DOJ Panel requesting the latter to furnish him a copy of the reports prepared by the FBI concerning
the petitioner's whereabouts during the material period (Annexes "L", "L-1" and "L-2" of the
Supplemental Petition dated August 14, 1995). In fact, not satisfied with the decision of the DOJ
Panel not to issue subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., petitioner Webb filed a
"Petition for Injunction, Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus" with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
63 of Makati in order to compel said Atty. Mercader, Jr. to produce the first sworn statement of Alfaro
for submission to the DOJ Panel. (p. 4, Petition) The said court dismissed the petition after Mercader
produced and submitted to the DOJ Panel the first sworn statement of Alfaro, without ruling on the
admissibility and credence of the two (2) conflicting and inconsistent sworn statements of the
principal witness, Alfaro. (Attached hereto is a copy of the order of Judge Ruben A. Mendiola, RTC-
Makati, Branch 63 dated July 28, 1995) marked as Annex "F."

It must also be pointed out that despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the preliminary
investigation was to be terminated after the hearing held on July 14, 1995, the panel continued to
conduct further proceedings, e.g. comparison of the photo-copies of the submitted documents with
the originals on July 17, 1995. (p. 7, Petition) The panel even entertained the "Response" submitted
by accused Miguel Rodriguez on July 18, 1995. (p. 17 Resolution) In addition to these, the panel
even announced that any party may submit additional evidence before the resolution of the case. (p.
8, Petition) From the time the panel declared the termination of the preliminary investigation on July
14, 1995, twenty-seven (27) days elapsed before the resolution was promulgated, and the
information eventually filed in the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque on August 10, 1995. This
notwithstanding the directive of Section 3(f) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court that the
investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days from the termination of the preliminary
investigation. The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf
and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. This directly disputes the allegation of
the petitioners that the resolution was done with indecent haste in violation of the rights of the
petitioners. During the period of twenty-seven (27) days, the petitioners were free to adduce and
present additional evidence before the DOJ Panel.

Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the conduct of the
preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ Panel promulgated the adverse resolution and
filed the Information in court against them.

Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the Information in court against them for rape with
homicide on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the
Secretary of Justice. The filing of said Information is in accord with Department of Justice Order No. 223,
series of 1993, dated June 25, 1993. We quote its pertinent sections, viz.:

Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. — No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the
Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable
cause except upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the
showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the
appellant had already been arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the
appeal, said appeal shall be dismissed motu propio by the Secretary of Justice.

An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not
hold the filing of the information in court.

Sec. 2. When to appeal. — The appeal must be filed within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the questioned resolution by the party or his counsel. The period shall be interrupted only by the
filing of a motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution and shall
continue to run from the time the resolution denying the motion shall have been received by the
movant or his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)
Without doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223 allows the filing of an Information in court after the
consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the accused can still exercise the right to seek a
review of the prosecutor's recommendation with the Secretary of Justice.

Next, petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including Alfaro in the Information considering her alleged
conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with homicide. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on
Republic Act
No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And Benefit Program And For Other
Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its Section 10, which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and
desires to a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the
Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:

(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the R.P.C. or
its equivalent under special laws;

(b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

(c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;

(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and

(f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may
be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may
upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act.
Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused so that he can be used as a Witness
under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates her non-inclusion in the
criminal Complaint or Information, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. — The certification of admission
into the Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit by the provincial or city
prosecutor who is required NOT TO INCLUDE THE WITNESS IN THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION and if included therein, to petition the court for his discharge in order that he can be
utilized as a State Witness. The court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the said accused
from the information.

Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from criminal prosecution
for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or used and all the rights and benefits
provided under Section 8 hereof.

The validity of these provisions is challenged by petitioner Webb. It is urged that they constitute ". . . an
intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the power under the Rules on Criminal
Procedure to discharge an accused as a state witness." The argument is based on Section 9, Rule
11938 which gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an accused to be a state witness.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is
a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth,
the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute
our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide
range of discretion — the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends
on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not
constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the
power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from
prosecution.39 Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be
a state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court, is given the power to
discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.
The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent
judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never been interpreted to be beyond change by
legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice system. R.A. No. 6981 is one of the much
sought penal reform laws to help government in its uphill fight against crime, one certain cause of which is
the reticence of witnesses to testify. The rationale for the law is well put by the Department of Justice, viz.:
"Witnesses, for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse to appear and testify in the
investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases
have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more effective administration of criminal
justice, there was a necessity to pass a law protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and
benefits to ensure their appearance in investigative bodies/courts."40 Petitioner Webb's challenge to the
validity of R.A. No. 6981 cannot therefore succeed.

Further, petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery proceedings during their preliminary
investigation by suppressing the April 28, 1995 original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI
Report. The argument is novel in this jurisdiction and as it urges an expansive reading of the rights of
persons under preliminary investigation it deserves serious consideration. To start with, our Rules on
Criminal Procedure do not expressly provide for discovery proceedings during the preliminary investigation
stage of a criminal proceeding.41 Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 117 do provide an accused the right to move for
a bill of particulars and for production or inspection of material evidence in possession of the
prosecution.42 But these provisions apply after the filing of the Complaint or Information in court and the
rights are accorded to the accused to assist them to make an intelligent plea at arraignment and to prepare
for trial.43

This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not, however, negate its
use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect his constitutional right to life, liberty and
property. Preliminary investigation is not too early a stage to guard against any significant erosion of the
constitutional right to due process of a potential accused. As aforediscussed, the object of a preliminary
investigation is to determine the probability that the suspect committed a crime. We hold that the finding of a
probable cause by itself subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or diminution. In
the case at bar, the risk to the liberty of petitioners cannot be understated for they are charged with the
crime of rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when the evidence of guilt is strong.

Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary investigation.
Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high
duty is to be fair and impartial.44 As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals,45 "the right to
have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense, and
hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a
substantive right." A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage. We uphold
the legal basis of the right of petitioners to demand from their prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of the
April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report during their preliminary investigation
considering their exculpatory character, and hence, unquestionable materiality to the issue of their probable
guilt. The right is rooted on the constitutional protection of due process which we rule to be operational even
during the preliminary investigation of a potential accused. It is also implicit in section (3) (a) of Rule 112
which requires during the preliminary investigation the filing of a sworn complaint, which shall ". . . state the
known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as
well as other supporting documents . . ."
In laying down this rule, the Court is not without enlightened precedents from other jurisdictions. In the 1963
watershed case of Brady v. Maryland 46 the United States Supreme Court held that "suppression of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."
Its progeny is the 1935 case of Mooney v. Holohan 47 which laid down the proposition that a prosecutor's intentional use of perjured testimony to
procure conviction violates due process. Thus, evolved jurisprudence firming up the prosecutor's duty to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence in
its possession.48 The rationale is well put by Justice Brennan in Brady49 — "society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials
are fair." Indeed, prosecutors should not treat litigation like a game of poker where surprises can be sprung and where gain by guile is not punished.

But given the right of petitioners to compel the NBI to disclose exculpatory evidence in their favor, we are not
prepared to rule that the initial non-production of the original sworn statement of Alfaro dated April 28, 1995
could have resulted in the reasonable likelihood that the DOJ Panel would not have found probable cause.
To be sure, the NBI, on July 4, 1995, upon request of petitioners, submitted a photocopy of Alfaro's April 28,
1995 sworn statement. It explained it cannot produce the original as it had been lost. Fortunately,
petitioners, on July 28, 1995, were able to obtain a copy of the original from Atty. Arturo Mercader in the
course of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 951099.50 As petitioners admit, the DOJ Panel accepted the
original of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn statement as a part of their evidence.51 Petitioners thus had the fair
chance to explain to the DOJ Panel then still conducting their preliminary investigation the exculpatory
aspects of this sworn statement. Unfortunately for petitioners, the DOJ Panel still found probable cause to
charge them despite the alleged material discrepancies between the first and second sworn statements of
Alfaro. For reasons we have expounded, this finding of probable cause cannot be struck down as done with
grave abuse of discretion.52 On the other hand, the FBI Report while corroborative of the alibi of petitioner
Webb cannot by itself reverse the probable cause finding of the DOJ Panel in light of the totality of evidence
presented by the NBI.

Finally, we come to the argument of petitioner that the DOJ Panel lost its impartiality due to the prejudicial
publicity waged in the press and broadcast media by the NBI.

Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing
preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the
substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.

In floating this issue, petitioners touch on some of the most problematic areas in constitutional law where the
conflicting demands of freedom of speech and of the press, the public's right to information, and an
accused's right to a fair and impartial trial collide and compete for prioritization. The process of pinpointing
where the balance should be struck has divided men of learning as the balance keeps moving either on the
side of liberty or on the side of order as the tumult of the time and the welfare of the people dictate. The
dance of balance is a difficult act to follow.

In democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its
excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure,
few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary
investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even
today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime.
Indeed, even the principal actors in the case — the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers — have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a
fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and the public. In the
seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,53 it was wisely held:

xxx xxx xxx

(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice
demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials
both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of
participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community
therapeutic value of public trials was recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community
reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice
serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and
emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process "satisfy the appearance of
 justice," Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided
by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported
by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v.
United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.

(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment,
share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the
functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First
Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to
those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the
context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from
summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First
Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded
not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First
Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by
the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally — and representatives
of the media — have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to
enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.

(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the public
the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been
recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trials
is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which
people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could
be eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can
deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al.,54 we
held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content, of the publicity that attended the investigation
of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on
the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to
consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-
page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-
record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was
conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery
motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity.

It all remains to state that the Vizconde case will move to a more critical stage as petitioners will now have to
undergo trial on the merits. We stress that probable cause is not synonymous with guilt and while the light of
publicity may be a good disinfectant of unfairness, too much of its heat can bring to flame an accused's right
to fair trial. Without imposing on the trial judge the difficult task of supervising every specie of speech relating
to the case at bar, it behooves her to be reminded of the duty of a trial judge in high profile criminal cases to
control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice.55 The Court reminds judges that our ability to
dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always
stands as a silent accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the
judiciary is to assure fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done — and that is the only
way for the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed for lack of showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondents. Costs against petitioners.
 SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 171188 June 19, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JESSIE B. CASTILLO and FELICITO R. MEJIA, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition seeks a review of the Resolution1 dated October 10, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
27789, dismissing the criminal complaint against the respondents, and its Resolution2 dated January 18, 2006
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

Complainant Cesar Sarino is one of the registered owners of a piece of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-4502783 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite, located in front of SM Bacoor, Cavite. The property is leased to
Pepito B. Aquino and Adriano G. Samoy who are in turn subleasing it to several stallholders.

In September 1999, respondent Felicito R. Mejia, Municipal Building Official of Bacoor, sent to the stallholders
Notices of Violation4 of the National Building Code on the grounds that the structures they were occupying were
erected without building permits and occupied by them without the necessary certificates of occupancy having been
first secured.

On January 17, 2000, Mejia’s office sent letters5 dated January 10, 2000 to the stallholders informing them that
because of their repeated failure to comply with the National Building Code and its implementing rules and
regulations and the Business Permit and Licensing Office Requirements, their stalls will be closed down on January
24, 2000.

On February 16, 2000, a task force from the Bacoor Municipal Hall effected the closure of the stalls through the
installation of galvanized iron fences.

Lessees Aquino and Samoy thereafter filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint against respondent
Jessie B. Castillo, in his capacity as Bacoor Municipal Mayor, respondent Mejia and two other municipal officials for
violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, as amended.6 The case was docketed as OMB-1-00-0537.

On October 20, 2000, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed OMB-1-00-0537, ruling that the respondent local
officials acted in good faith in effecting the closure of the stalls.7

On September 6, 2001, Sarino filed a Complaint8 against respondents Castillo and Mejia before the Office of the
Ombudsman charging them criminally for violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of Rep. Act No. 3019 and Rep. Act No.
6713,9 and administratively for oppression, grave misconduct and for committing acts contrary to law. According to
Sarino, the construction of the galvanized fence in February 2000 is tantamount to an unlawful taking of their
property causing them undue injury and that despite his verbal and written demands, respondents refused to
remove said fence.

Respondents countered that Sarino’s complaint was anchored on the same set of facts that had been the subject of
OMB-1-00-0537 that was dismissed by the Ombudsman.

On March 10, 2003, the Ombudsman dismissed the administrative complaint for being moot and academic due to
Castillo’s re-election as mayor in the May 2001 elections and pursuant to Section 20 of Rep. Act No.
677010 because the act complained of happened more than one year before the complaint was filed.11
On May 7, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed an
Information12 against respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan. The
case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27789. The Information reads:

That in or about February 2000, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Bacoor, Cavite, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JESSIE B. CASTILLO, a high ranking
public officer, being the Municipal Mayor, and FELICITO R. MEJIA, the Municipal Building Official, of Bacoor,
Cavite, as such taking advantage of their positions and committing the offense in relation to office, conspiring and
confederating together, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to one CESAR SARINO by blocking and fencing off the
latter’s property by installing and erecting a galvanized iron sheet fence on the front portion of the said property
facing the SM Bacoor thereby depriving him of the full use and enjoyment of his property, and despite repeated
demands from the said land owner, the accused, without valid justification, refuse to remove the said fence to the
damage and prejudice of said Cesar Sarino in the amount of Seven Hundred Ninety Thousand and Nine Hundred
Twenty Pesos (Php 790,920.00), more or less, representing lost income from the rentals of the stalls and parking
fees derived therefrom.

CONTRARY TO LAW.13

In a Resolution14 dated August 15, 2003, the Sandiganbayan declared that probable cause exists against
respondents for violation of Section 3(e). Accordingly, it directed the issuance of the corresponding warrants of
arrest and hold departure orders against respondents.

On August 20, 2003, respondents voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and posted their respective bonds
for their provisional liberty.15 Respondents moved for the reinvestigation of the case which the Sandiganbayan gave
due course.

After the reinvestigation, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, upon approval of the Ombudsman, filed a Motion for
Leave to Admit Attached Amended Information.16 The respondents then filed a Comment thereon with Motion for
Judicial Determination of Probable Cause.17

In a Resolution18 dated November 3, 2004, the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information which reads:

That in or about February 2000, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Bacoor, Cavite, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JESSIE B. CASTILLO, a high ranking
public officer, being the Municipal Mayor, and FELICITO R. MEJIA, the Municipal Building Official, of Bacoor,
Cavite, as such taking advantage of their positions and committing the offense in relation to office, conspiring and
confederating together, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to CESAR N. SARINO, EVELYN S. MANIQUIS, FLORA
JANET S. GARCIA, CLAUDETTE N. SARINO, STEPHEN N. SARINO and PRISCILLA N. SARINO, by blocking and
fencing off their property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-450278, which was then being leased by
PEPITO B. AQUINO and ADRIANO G. SAMOY for TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) a month, by
installing and erecting a galvanized iron fence on the front portion of the said property facing the SM Bacoor,
thereby depriving them of the full use and enjoyment of their property and effectively decreasing its value for
commercial purposes, and despite lawful demand from CESAR N. SARINO, the accused, without valid justification,
refuse to remove the said fence to the undue damage and prejudice of said landowners in the amount of SEVEN
HUNDRED NINETY THOUSAND and NINE HUNDRED TWENTY PESOS (Php 790,920.00), more or less,
representing (1) lost rentals of said property, (2) unpaid compensation for the portion of the property on which the
fence was installed, and (3) the decrease in value of the property for commercial purposes.

CONTRARY TO LAW.19

In a Resolution20 dated May 9, 2005, the Sandiganbayan denied the respondents’ Motion for Judicial Determination
of Probable Cause.

On October 10, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, upon motion for reconsideration filed by respondents, reversed its May 9,
2005 Resolution and dismissed the case. The Sandiganbayan likewise set aside the arrest warrants it previously
issued. It held that the instant criminal case is a mere rehash of the previously dismissed criminal case filed by
complainant’s lessees against respondents. It also ruled that there was no evident bad faith, manifest partiality or
inexcusable negligence that can be attributed to respondents. Neither did complainant’s claim of undue injury have
any leg to stand on.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on January 18, 2006.
Hence this petition, with the following issues:

I.

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN CONDUCTING A
SECOND JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 27789, LONG AFTER IT
ISSUED THE WARRANTS OF ARREST AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS.

II.

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT CONSIDERED
EVIDENTIARY MATTERS SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS’ DEFENSE WHEN IT CONDUCTED THE SECOND
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE.

III.

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT
THE RESPONDENTS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH WHEN IN TRUTH RESPONDENTS HAD NO LEGAL BASIS IN
FENCING OFF THE PRIVATE PROPERTY OF THE COMPLAINANT AND HIS SIBLINGS.

IV.

[WHETHER OR NOT] THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION
OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT IGNORED AND
DID NOT DISCUSS IN ITS RESOLUTIONS OF OCTOBER 10, 2005 AND JANUARY 18, 2006 THE ISSUE
RAISED BY THE PROSECUTION THAT COMPLAINANT AND HIS SIBLINGS SUFFERED UNDUE INJURY
BECAUSE, AMONG OTHERS, A PORTION OF THEIR PROPERTY WAS EFFECTIVELY TAKEN BY THE
RESPONDENTS WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION AND THE VALUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR
PURPOSES OF COMMERCE WAS GREATLY REDUCED IN VIEW OF THE HIGH GALVANIZED IRON FENCE
THAT COVERED AND HID THE PROPERTY FROM THE HIGHWAY AND THE PUBLIC. 21

The foregoing issues simply boil down to whether the Sandiganbayan erred in overturning the Ombudsman’s
determination of probable cause resulting in the dismissal of the case against respondents.

Petitioner contends that after the Sandiganbayan issued the arrest warrants against respondents, the responsibility
of making a new determination of probable cause shifted back to the Ombudsman as prosecutor when respondents
moved for the reinvestigation of the case and such motion was granted by the court. The Ombudsman must then
decide whether respondents shall continue to be held for trial in light of any additional evidence presented during
reinvestigation. This responsibility, petitioner submits, belongs to the Ombudsman alone and the court is bereft of
authority to overturn the former’s findings as the judicial determination of probable cause is only for the purpose of
determining whether the arrest warrant should be issued. Petitioner further argues that there are only two instances
when the court can intervene in the Ombudsman’s action – first, when the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of
discretion; and second, when the prosecution makes substantial amendments to the information – both of which are
wanting in the instant case.
1av vphi1

Respondents counter that the amendments made to the information are substantial in nature and not merely formal
as they pertain to the inclusion of additional injured parties and specification of the amount of damages. And even
assuming the amendments were merely formal, the Sandiganbayan was correct in exercising its judicial prerogative
when it determined for itself the existence of probable cause considering the inconsistency of the positions taken by
the Ombudsman in OMB-1-00-0537 and the instant case.

After seriously considering the submission of the parties, we are in agreement that the petition is meritorious.

There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of
probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom
he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such
official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.22 Whether
or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a
correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and
may not be compelled to pass upon.23

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.24 If
the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.25

Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there
is no probable cause for doing so, the judge in turn should not override the public prosecutor’s determination of
probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance
of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor
exercises a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and that courts
must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person charged is valid on its
face, and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor.26

Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the prosecutor committed manifest error or
grave abuse of discretion, a judge’s determination of probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for the
purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants should be issued against the accused.

In the instant case, there is no question that both the original27 and amended28 Informations were valid on their face
because they complied with Section 6,29 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Also, a scrutiny of the Resolution30 dated
August 22, 2002 of the Ombudsman which precipitated the filing of the original Information and the subsequent
Memorandum dated August 4, 2004 recommending the amendment of the Information would likewise show that the
finding of probable cause against the respondents were sufficiently supported by substantial evidence. As a matter
of fact, in the Resolution dated August 22, 2002, the Ombudsman took pains to mention each element of the crime
of violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 and then one by one adequately explained how and why those
elements were satisfied. Hence, as the amended Information was valid on its face and there is no manifest error or
arbitrariness on the part of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan erred in making an executive determination of
probable cause when it overturned the Ombudsman’s own determination. And this is true even if the
Sandiganbayan was no longer satisfied with the evidence presented to sustain the effectivity of the arrest warrants
previously issued for the original Information. The Sandiganbayan could have just revoked the previously issued
arrest warrants and required the Ombudsman to submit additional evidence for the purpose of issuing the arrest
warrants based on the amended Information.

Moreover, it was clearly premature on the part of the Sandiganbayan to make a determinative finding prior to the
parties’ presentation of their respective evidence that there was no bad faith and manifest partiality on the
respondents’ part and undue injury on the part of the complainant. In Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan,31 we held
that "it is well established that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a
matter of defense that may be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits."32 Also, it would be unfair to
expect the prosecution to present all the evidence needed to secure the conviction of the accused upon the filing of
the information against the latter. The reason is found in the nature and objective of a preliminary investigation.
Here, the public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
person charged; they merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.33
The Sandiganbayan and all courts for that matter should always remember the judiciary’s standing policy on non-
interference in the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. This policy is based
not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well, considering that otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions regarding complaints filed before it, and in much the same way that the courts
would be extremely swamped if they were to be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the
prosecutors each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.34

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan’s challenged Resolutions dated October 10, 2005
and January 18, 2006 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Information against the respondents is
hereby REINSTATED. Let the records of this case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

B. Warrantless Arrest

RULE 113 Arrest

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112. (5a)

Section 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant. — When making an arrest without a warrant, the officer shall
inform the person to be arrested of his authority and the cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in
the commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, has escaped, flees or forcibly resists
before the officer has opportunity so to inform him, or when the giving of such information will imperil the arrest. (8a)

Section 9. Method of arrest by private person. — When making an arrest, a private person shall inform the person to
be arrested of the intention to arrest him and cause of the arrest, unless the latter is either engaged in the
commission of an offense, is pursued immediately after its commission, or has escaped, flees, or forcibly resists
before the person making the arrest has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving of such information will
imperil the arrest. (9a)

Section 13. Arrest after escape or rescue. — If a person lawfully arrested escapes or is rescued, any person may
immediately pursue or retake him without a warrant at any time and in any place within the Philippines. (13)
G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and
RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD,
T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.

G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA.
VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO. ALFREDO
NAZARENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT.
JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO
AROJADO, respondents.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.

Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.

Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Association for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.

Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.

PER CURIAM:

The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons named therein and to explain why they should not
be set at liberty without further delay.

In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not
available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are detained by virtue of valid informations filed in
court against them.

The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and, that no
preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed against them are null and void.

The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings, and it finds that the
persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, and
that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.

The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The occasions or
instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
as amended, which provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.

An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense;
or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated
by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:

To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of
his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the
shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances.

The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas corpus have
been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests
without a warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed
against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in order.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence
Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the
NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital
records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the
killing of two (2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively
identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired
at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.

As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who
conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging
Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in
Authority." The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15
February 1988, the information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the
original information, was still unidentified.

Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Roberto
Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and
the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February
1988.

On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were
accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are concerned, is now moot
and academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a
criminal case who has been released on bail. 2

As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day
after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.

However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can
be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an
earlier case:

From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially arrested illegally
is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the
furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart
from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within the bounds of the law and
existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.

2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in
the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
 existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of
bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any
other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and other acts of violence against the rebels
find justification in the exigencies of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or
insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them
while any of these contingencies continues cannot be less justified. . . . 3

The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for "Double
Murder, etc." was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and
Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the
sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him. For, as
held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4

In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains that the
defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on March 29, when a complaint sufficient in
form and substance was read to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and
in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if there were
irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he could have been released on a writ
of habeas corpus or now has a civil action for damages against the person who arrested him we
need not inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.

II

In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, without warrant, is
also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila,
Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and
other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the National United Front
Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the house of her sister
in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for which she had no
permit or authority to possess.

The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a member of the
NPA, who had surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents about the operations of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his former
comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member of the Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff
member in charge of finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka
Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound,
Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse of the National United Front
Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.

In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988,
pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the
house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal Investigation
Service, National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the
search, the following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:

a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;

b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;

c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;

d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;

e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;

f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903

g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;

h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);

i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;

j) Voluminous Subversive documents.

When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or authority to possess the firearms,
ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to the CIS Headquarters for
investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff
member of the executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International Department of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra arrived at the house of
Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he readily admitted to the military agents that he is a
regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato
Constatino, and other members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he is known as "Ka
Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the
following:

(1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated August 11, 1988;

(2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated August 11, 1988;

(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11, 1988.

Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written but jumbled telephone number of
Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City. Acting on the lead
provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the given address the next day (13
August 1988). They arrived at the place at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning. After identifying themselves as
military agents and after seeking permission to search the place, which was granted, the military agents conducted
a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.

The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They found ledgers, journals,
vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive documents as well as live ammunition
for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle,
and a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house were brought to the
PC-CIS Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators
that the voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of the house had no knowledge of
them. As a result, the said other occupants of the house were released from custody.

On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after which an information
charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The case is
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal
Case No. C-150458.

An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo Buenaobra before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at
P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP
Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. According, the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is now moot
and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque remains for resolution.

The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers and/or members of the National
United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or traversed by said petitioners. The contention
must be deemed admitted. 5 As officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was
justified for the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque was
additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license to
possess them.

III

In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without
warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC and,
when apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino, they had a bag containing subversive materials, and both
carried firearms and ammunition for which they had no license to possess or carry.

The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13 August 1988, Domingo T.
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constatino at Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was
still under surveillance by military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When
frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or license
to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC
Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:

a) Voluminous subversive documents

b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing
ten (10) live ammunition of same caliber;

c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one (1) magazine containing
five (5) live ammunition of same caliber.

At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted", and Ramon Casiple as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP,
by their comrades who had previously surrendered to the military.

On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary evidence were forwarded to the
Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila. The cases are docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 ad 74387, respectively. No bail was
recommended.

On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Domingo Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully arrested without a warrant and that the
informations filed against them are null and void for having been filed without prior hearing and preliminary
investigation. On 30 August 1988, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a
Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.

The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested because there was no previous
warrant of arrest, is without merit The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying
unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when they were apprehended.

There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are null and void for want of a
preliminary investigation. The filing of an information, without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
 Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information
may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a
lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice.
Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the
accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a
preliminary investigation with the same right to adduced evidence in his favor in the manner
prescribed in this Rule.

The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed against them, the prosecutor made
identical certifications, as follows:

This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary investigation was conducted because the accused
has not made and signed a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended; that based on the evidence presented, there is reasonable ground to believe that the
crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.

Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had been filed against them in court.
Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their constitutional right to due process.

IV

In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is justified under the Rules, since
she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The record of this case shows that on 12 May
1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search warrant
issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house
located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito
Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera.
Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya.
As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky
Ocaya could not produce any permit or authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her with
violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.

On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera.
It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained, and denied the right to a preliminary
investigation.

It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her arrest without a warrant is
justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was arrested without a warrant and she refused
to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of Court,
as amended.

V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque claim that the firearms,
ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession when they were arrested, did
not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.

The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no
evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause the said arresting officers in these cases to
accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do not appear to be
seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is
absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of Battle with
a reward of P150,000.00 each on their heads.'" 6 On the other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth
surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel
movement.

The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:

. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and
Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure conducted by the military at the residence of Renato
Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at
Constantino's residence, was not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the military. It
was a result of an in-depth military surveillance coupled with the leads provided by former members
of the underground subversive organizations. That raid produced positive results. to date, nobody
has disputed the fact that the residence of Constantino when raided yielded communication
equipment, firearms and ammunitions, as well as subversive documents.

The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino that other members of his
group were coming to his place, reasonably conducted a "stake-out" operation whereby some
members of the raiding team were left behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the raid
and Constantino's arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's residence. He acted
suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the military authorities, found in his person were
letters. They are no ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only that,
Buenaobra admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to deliver the letters to Constantino.

Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino and Buenaobra, petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino's place. Would it be unreasonable for the military
agents to believe that petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit
Constantino's residence considering that Constatino's information was true, in that Buenaobra did
come to that place? Was it unreasonable under the circumstances, on the part of the military agents,
not to frisk and search anyone who should visit the residence of Constantino, such as petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy and bare
assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were
arrested thereat?

As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to effect her arrest without
warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who provided the leads on her identity? It cannot be
denied that Buenaobra had connection with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of
the latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque's telephone number as written on a piece of paper
taken from Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra have not offered any
plausible reason so far.

In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably, under the time, place
and circumstances of the events in question, especially considering that at the time of petitioner's
arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents were found
in their possession.

Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently visiting a camp, but were
arrested in such time, place and circumstances, from which one can reasonably conclude tat they
were up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.
 IV

In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias Espiritu, who is
detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not warranted.

The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng
Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of drivers and operators of public service vehicles in the
Philippines, organized for their mutual aid and protection.

Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he was sleeping in his home
located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a
group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was immediately put under
arrest. When he asked for the warrant of arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and
placed him in their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany
him, but the men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.

He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila where he was
interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he was brought before the respondent
Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought to the
General Assignment Section, Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A.
Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7

The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of the Information filed against
him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with
violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).

The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of arrest since
petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, during
a press conference at the National Press Club.

Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide
strike on November 23, 1988, to force the government to give into their demands to lower the prices
of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the president of the
PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias
Espiritu taking the place of PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of
the Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988. 8

Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order to investigate him, but he gave the lawmen
the slip. 9 He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the
corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil
hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts,
bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 10 (emphasis
supplied)

The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for questioning and brought to
police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against
him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11

Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of
the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid information filed with the competent court,
he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon posting bail as recommended.
However, we find the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00
only.
 VII

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the submission of Narciso
Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this case shows that at about 8:30
o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of
T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil
Regal who was arrested by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regal pointed to Narciso Nazareno
as on of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers, without
warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police headquarters for questioning. Obviously, the
evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989, an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil
Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion was denied by the trial court in an
order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was
granted by the same trial court.

On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13
January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve
the petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in
the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said
Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).

The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna are based upon the facts and the
law. Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police without
warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil
Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People vs. Ancheta: 12

The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does not presuppose
as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the
detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest
has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the characteristics of a
crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person sought to be detained participated
therein.

VIII

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts
against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, of if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section
4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:

Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with a convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and, thereafter, abandon its pronouncement
in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after an information is filed against the
person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of commitment, is issued by the court where said information
has been filed. 14 The petitioners claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial
regime to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under the present democratic dispensation and collides
with the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out that the said doctrine makes
possible the arrest and detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against them, and, most often, it is
only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court that the military authorities file the criminal information
in the courts of law to be able to hide behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert,
stands as an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits lawless and arbitrary State action.

We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express provision of the
Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not really
unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan
case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to limit the function of the habeas
corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order of commitment
or before whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or order or to
take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all
petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-from the
moment petition was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and
"only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been
satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be done in
all future cases of habeas corpus. In Short, all cases involving deprivation of individual liberty should be promptly
brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and disposition.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond
for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan C.J., Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and
RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD,
T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.

G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA:
VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.

G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,

vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.

G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO
NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT.
JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MALTRO
AROJADO, respondents.

Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.

Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82

Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.

Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.

The Solicitor General for the respondents.

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:p

Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions, seeking reconsideration
of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the
following dispositive part:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the
bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No
costs.

The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the decision did not rule — as
many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army member is
a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual
situations obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in
this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected
representative of the people — not the Court — that should repeal, change or modify them.

In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:

1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without warrant, and
in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the
fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested;

2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;

3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New
People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch
as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;

4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;

5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.

The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and

It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3

effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of the special proceedings
of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.

In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their
questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from
such arrests also in accordance with law.
 The law expressly allowing
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6

arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which
a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.

In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which
read:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrest has committed it; and

. . . (Emphasis supplied).

The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is justified
it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an offense, when
arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization,
where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a
continuing offense, thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other
crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy
of nationwide magnitude. . . .

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of
organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST,
simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of
several persons who the day before his arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2)
CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his
mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity, would have
shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It is in this
sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-
called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion
and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and
violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in
the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts that will be shown hereafter.

Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of
Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a
valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the
arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is
the one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based
on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private person.

It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in

A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled

themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10

with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.

In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been
admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about
12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South
City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12

Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named
hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly
in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong
Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second — a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in
St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot wound; third — as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were fictitious
and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.

believe that the

In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, 13

confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital
was actually received from the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the
law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by the officers who
make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the
same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The
records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore
clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs (a) and
(b) of Section 5, Rule 113.

Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without warrant, an information
charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed against Dural in the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as
distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.

As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R.
Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were
searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives
and/or ammunition in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright
arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that
a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby
placing them within judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas
corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in
the custody of the authorities.

More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:

1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA about the operations
of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one Renato Constantine, located
in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their
safehouse; that in view of this information, the said house was placed under military surveillance and on 12
August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted; that
when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms,
ammunitions, radio and other communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking member of
the CPP. 16
 2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier
and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.

3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents
and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18

4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them, subversive
documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19

5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search
warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20

It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without
warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used
by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.

And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the
military agents that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant
was duly issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a
ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their possession were
unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after
their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in
the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or irregularly performed.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no
prudent an can say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of
official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment

An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is
therefor. 21

without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an
overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set forth in Section
5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for
which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the
peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without
warrant. 23

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the
arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24
But if they do not strictly comply with the said
conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of
the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.

In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis of the attestation of certain
witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and
Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other
things:

Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)

and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of
jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28
Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense,"
but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as falling within free speech
guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits,
that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the
authority of the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter,
is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has,
in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that
the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.

Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic. For Espiritu had
before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Because of this
development, the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case
against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.

In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was
killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28
December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso
Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December
1988), the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29

Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under
Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the
arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.

As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as
follows:

. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo
Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.

On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post
bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.

On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus,
retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the
petition.

At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas
corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the
evidence against him).

This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were
based on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.

Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of
conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).

Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30
that he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque,
she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her
arrest, belonged to her.

The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA, as
well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these
admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting
officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons arrested were probably
guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these
admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their
warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is
not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be abandoned, this Court finds no
compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions where national security
and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that
everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court. will promptly look into —
and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same — the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the
conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee
shall forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish
in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or convicted, with the least
delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party member or a
subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity
of the questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on
compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for
stress, are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of, as the
records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or
palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED. This denial is
FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NOEL TUDTUD y PAYPA and DINDO

BOLONG y NARET, Accused-Appellants.
 DECISION

TINGA, J.:

. . . . It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evidence should be used. It also is
desirable that the government should not itself foster and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the
evidence is to be obtained. If it pays its officers for having got evidence by crime, I do not see why it may not as well pay
them for getting it in the same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations of disapproval if it knowingly accepts
and pays and announces that it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

So wrote Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Olmstead v. U.S. 1 On this occasion, this Court is made to choose between
letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government play an ignoble part.

Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a
"civilian asset" named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. 2 Solier related that his neighbors have been
complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. 3

Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, 4 all members of
the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance in Solier’s neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao
City. 5 For five days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. 6 According to his
neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana. 7

On August 1, 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with
new stocks of marijuana. 8 Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. 9 At around 4:00 in
the afternoon that same day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves
at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtud’s arrival. 10 All wore civilian clothes. 11

About 8:00 later that evening, two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton 12 marked "King
Flakes." 13 Standing some five feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit
Tudtud’s description. 14 The same man also toted a plastic bag. 15

PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. 16 PO1
Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. 17
The man who resembled Tudtud’s description denied that he was carrying any drugs. 18 PO1 Desierto asked him if he
could see the contents of the box. 19 Tudtud obliged, saying, "it was alright." 20 Tudtud opened the box himself as his
companion looked on. 21

The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag 22 and
another in newspapers. 23 PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. 24 They contained what seemed to the
police officers as marijuana leaves.25cralaw:red

The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station.
26 The two did not resist. 27

The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. 28
Forensic tests conducted by Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region
XI, on specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers’ suspicion. The plastic bag contained
3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890 grams. 29 Police Chief Inspector Austero
reduced her findings in her report, Physical Sciences Report No. D-220-99 dated 2 August 1999. 30

Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged 31 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs. 32 Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. 33 The
defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them.
34

Trial ensued thereafter.

The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely, arresting officers PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta, their civilian
informant Bobong Solier, forensic chemist Police Chief Inspector Noemi Austero, and SPO3 Nicolas Algabre, exhibit
custodian of the PNP Crime Laboratory. Said witnesses testified to the foregoing narration of facts.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary

The accused, denying the charges against them, cried frame-up.

Noel Tudtud recalled that on August 1, 1999 he had gone to Kabacan, North Cotabato to sell pairs of Levi’s pants, which
was his "sideline." 35 At about 5:00 in the afternoon, he returned to Davao City by bus. 36 Upon reaching Toril, Tudtud,
along with less than ten passengers, got down the bus. 37

Suddenly, a man who identified himself as a police officer approached him, pointing a .38 caliber revolver. 38 The man
told him not to run. 39 Tudtud raised his arms and asked, "Sir, what is this about?" 40 The man answered that he would
like to inspect the plastic bag Tudtud was carrying, and instructed Tudtud to open the bag, which revealed several pairs of
Levi’s pants. 41

The man then directed Tudtud to open a carton box some two meters away. 42 According to Tudtud, the box was already
there when he disembarked the bus. 43 Tudtud told the man the box was not his, but proceeded to open it out of fear after
the man again pointed his revolver at him. 44 Tudtud discovered pieces of dried fish, underneath which was something
wrapped in cellophane. 45

"What is that?" the man asked. 46 Tudtud replied that he did not know. 47 Without even unwrapping the cellophane, the
man said it was marijuana and abruptly handcuffed Tudtud. 48

Simultaneously, another man was pointing a firearm at Dindo Bolong at the other side of the street, some eight meters
from Tudtud. 49

Bolong recounted that he was on his way to a relative in Daliao after attending a cousin’s wedding in Hagonoy, Davao del
Sur when he was accosted. 50 After alighting the bus, Bolong crossed the street. 51 Someone then approached him and
pointed a gun at him. 52 The man ordered him not to move and handcuffed him. 53 Bolong asked why he was being
arrested but the man just told him to go with them. 54

The suspects were then taken to the police station where, they would later claim, they met each other for the first time. 55

Assailing the credibility of informant Bobong Solier, the defense offered the testimonies of Felicia Julaton, 56 Branch 3
Clerk of Court, Claudio Bohevia, 57 Branch 7 Clerk of Court, and Mercedita Abunda, 58 Branch 9 Utility Clerk, all of the
Davao City Municipal Trial Circuit Court. They testified and presented court documents showing that one "Bobo" or
"Bobong" Ramirez was charged in their respective branches with various crimes, specifically, light threats, less serious
physical injuries and robbery. The defense asserted that the "Bobo" or "Bobong" Ramirez accused in these cases is the
same person as the informant Bobong Solier. 59

Swayed by the prosecution’s evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused as
charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. 60

On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana
leaves, which they claim were seized in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which
states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the places to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and
seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the above-quoted constitutional provision, and any evidence
secured thereby, will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any proceeding." 61 Section 3 (2), Article III of the
Constitution explicitly provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

The proscription in Section 2, Article III, however, covers only "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The following
instances are not deemed "unreasonable" even in the absence of a warrant:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);

2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable
cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. 62

The RTC justified the warrantless search of appellants’ belongings under the first exception, as a search incident to a
lawful arrest. It cited as authorities this Court’s rulings in People v. Claudio, 63 People v. Tangliben, 64 People v. Montilla,
65 and People v. Valdez. 66 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in arguing for the affirmance of the appealed
decision, invokes the cases of People v. Maspil, Jr., 67 People v. Malmstedt, 68 and People v. Bagista. 69

A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Prior to its revision in 2000, Section 12, 70 Rule
126 of said Rules read as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.

Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules, in turn, allows warrantless arrests:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

x x x

It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must
precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. 71 Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 72 The
question, therefore, is whether the police in this case had probable cause to arrest appellants. Probable cause has been
defined as:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith of the peace officers making the arrest. 73

The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that "reliable information" alone is
not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused
perform some overt act that would indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the leading case of People v. Burgos, 74 this Court held that "the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view." 75 In Burgos, the authorities obtained information that the accused had
forcibly recruited one Cesar Masamlok as member of the New People’s Army, threatening the latter with a firearm. Upon
finding the accused, the arresting team searched his house and discovered a gun as well as purportedly subversive
documents. This Court, in declaring then Section 6 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court inapplicable, ruled that:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came
in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the appellant’s
wife.

At the time of the appellant’s arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was
he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a
most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is
strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is
manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or
extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set
back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection. 76

Consequently, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the accused’s constitutional
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In People v. Aminnudin, 77 this Court likewise held the warrantless arrest and subsequent search of appellant therein
illegal, given the following circumstances:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to
do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was
no outward indication that he called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the former pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. 78

Thus, notwithstanding tips from confidential informants and regardless of the fact that the search yielded contraband, the
mere act of looking from side to side while holding one’s abdomen, 79 or of standing on a corner with one’s eyes moving
very fast, looking at every person who came near, 80 does not justify warrantless arrest under said Section 5 (a). Neither
does putting something in one’s pocket, 81 handing over one’s baggage, 82 riding a motorcycle, 83 nor does holding a
bag on board a trisikad 84 sanction State intrusion. The same rule applies to crossing the street per se. 85

Personal knowledge was also required in the case of People v. Doria. 86 Recently, in People v. Binad Sy Chua, 87 this
Court declared invalid the arrest of the accused, who was walking towards a hotel clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. For
the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Reliable information alone
is insufficient.

In the following cases, the search was held to be incidental to a lawful arrest because of "suspicious" circumstances:
People v. Tangliben 88 (accused was "acting suspiciously"), People v. Malmstedt 89 (a bulge on the accused’s waist),
and People v. de Guzman 90 (likewise a bulge on the waist of the accused, who was wearing tight-fitting clothes).

There is, however, another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information" sufficient to justify a search incident to a
warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113, thus deviating from Burgos. To this class of cases belong People v.
Maspil, Jr., 91 People v. Bagista, 92 People v. Balingan, 93 People v. Lising, 94 People v. Montilla, 95 People v. Valdez,
96 and People v. Gonzales. 97 In these cases, the arresting authorities were acting on information regarding an offense
but there were no overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit the same. Significantly, these cases, except the last two, come under some other
exception to the rule against warrantless searches. Thus, Maspil, Jr. involved a checkpoint search, Balingan was a search
of a moving vehicle, Bagista was both, and Lising and Montilla were consented searches.
Nevertheless, the great majority of cases conforms to the rule in Burgos, which, in turn, more faithfully adheres to the
letter of Section 5(a), Rule 113. Note the phrase "in his presence" therein, connoting personal knowledge on the part of
the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own
body and any deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception
to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended beyond the cases
specifically provided by law. 98

The cases invoked by the RTC and the OSG are, therefore, gravely misplaced. In Claudio, 99 the accused, who was
seated aboard a bus in front of the arresting officer, put her bag behind the latter, thus arousing the latter’s suspicion. In
Tangliben and Malmstedt, the accused had also acted suspiciously.

As noted earlier, Maspil, Jr., Bagista and Montilla were justified by other exceptions to the rule against warrantless
searches. Montilla, moreover, was not without its critics. There, majority of the Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box should not elicit the
slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things
that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus, the officers
could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so
informed them, that the drugs were in appellant’s luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if now downright
absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing
the quarry.

Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search were already
constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded
and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that
probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited
drug. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the
search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified. 100

While concurring with the majority, Mr. Justice Vitug reserved his vote on the discussion on the warrantless search being
incidental to a lawful arrest. Mr. Justice Panganiban, joined by Messrs. Justices Melo and Puno, filed a Separate Opinion.

Although likewise concurring in the majority’s ruling that appellant consented to the inspection of his baggage, Justice
Panganiban disagreed with the conclusion that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. He argued that
jurisprudence required personal knowledge on the part of the officers making the in flagrante delicto arrest. In Montilla, the
appellant "did not exhibit any overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in their minds suspicion that he
was embarking on some felonious enterprise."cralaw virtua1aw library

Law and jurisprudence in fact require stricter grounds for valid arrests and searches without warrant than for the issuance
of warrants therefore. In the former, the arresting person must have actually witnessed the crime being committed or
attempted by the person sought to be arrested; or he must have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested perpetrated the crime that had just occurred. In the latter case, the judge simply determines personally from
testimonies of witnesses that there exists reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed by the accused.

x x x

To say that "reliable tips" constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search is in my opinion, a dangerous
precedent and places in great jeopardy the doctrines laid down in many decisions made by this Court, in its effort to
zealously guard and protect the sacred constitutional right against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures.
Everyone would be practically at the mercy of so-called informants, reminiscent of the makapilis during the Japanese
occupation. Any one whom they point out to a police officer as a possible violator of the law could then be subject to
search and possible arrest. This is placing limitless power upon informants who will no longer be required to affirm under
oath their accusations, for they can always delay their giving of tips in order to justify warrantless arrests and searches.
Even law enforcers can use this as an oppressive tool to conduct searches without warrants, for they can always claim
that they received raw intelligence information only on the day or afternoon before. This would clearly be a circumvention
of the legal requisites for validly effecting an arrest or conducting a search and seizure. Indeed the majority’s ruling would
open loopholes that would allow unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures. 101

Montilla would shortly find mention in Justice Panganiban’s concurring opinion in People v. Doria, supra, where this Court
ruled:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Accused-Appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. PO3
Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his
(PO3 Manlangit’s) query as to where the marked money was. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his
associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant Doria
may have left the money in her house, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria’s word, the
Narcom agents had no showing that the person who affected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of
facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. 102
[Italics in the original.]

Expressing his accord with Mr. Justice Puno’s ponencia, Justice Panganiban said that Doria "rightfully brings the Court
back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless arrests and searches, which have seemingly been modified through an obiter
in People v. Ruben Montilla." 103

Montilla, therefore, has been seemingly discredited insofar as it sanctions searches incidental to lawful arrest under
similar circumstances. At any rate, Montilla was a consented search. As will be demonstrated later, the same could not be
said of this case.

That leaves the prosecution with People v. Valdez, which, however, involved an "on-the-spot information." The urgency of
the circumstances, an element not present in this case, prevented the arresting officer therein from obtaining a
warrant.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a suspicious manner that would hint that a crime
has been, was being, or was about to be, committed. If the arresting officers’ testimonies are to be believed, appellants
were merely helping each other carry a carton box. Although appellant Tudtud did appear "afraid and perspiring," 104
"pale" 105 and "trembling," 106 this was only after, not before, he was asked to open the said box.

In no sense can the knowledge of the herein arresting officers that appellant Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be
described as "personal," having learned the same only from their informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he
obtained his information only from his neighbors and the friends of appellant Tudtud:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q — What was your basis in your report to the police that Tudtud is going to Cotabato and get stocks of marijuana?

A — Because of the protest of my neighbors who were saying who will be the person whou [sic] would point to him
because he had been giving trouble to the neighborhood because according to them there are [sic] proliferation of
marijuana in our place. That was the complained [sic] of our neighbors.

Q — Insofar as the accused Tudtud is concerned what was your basis in reporting him particularly?

A — His friends were the once who told me about it.

Q — For how long have you know [sic] this fact of alleged activity of Tudtud in proliferation of marijuana?

A — About a month.

x x x

Q — Regarding the report that Tudtud went to Cotabato to get stocks of marijuana which led to his apprehension
sometime in the evening of August 1 and according to the report [which] is based on your report my question is, how did
you know that Tudtud will be bringing along with him marijuana stocks on August 1, 1999?

x x x

A — Because of the information of his neighbor. 107

In other words, Solier’s information itself is hearsay. He did not even elaborate on how his neighbors or Tudtud’s friends
acquired their information that Tudtud was responsible for the proliferation of drugs in their neighborhood.

Indeed, it appears that PO1 Floreta himself doubted the reliability of their informant. He testified on cross-
examination:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q — You mean to say that Bobot Solier, is not reliable?

A — He is trustworthy.

Q — Why [did] you not consider his information not reliable if he is reliable?

A — (witness did not answer).

ATTY. CAÑETE:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Never mind, do not answer anymore. That’s all. 108

The prosecution, on re-direct examination, did not attempt to extract any explanation from PO1 Floreta for his telling
silence.

Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own "surveillance." This
"surveillance," it turns out, did not actually consist of staking out appellant Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his
illegal trade, but of a mere "gather[ing] of information from the assets there." 109 The police officers who conducted such
"surveillance" did not identify who these "assets" were or the basis of the latter’s information. Clearly, such information is
also hearsay, not of personal knowledge.

Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant,
PO1 Desierto’s assertions of lack of time 110 notwithstanding. Records show that the police had ample opportunity to
apply for a warrant, having received Solier’s information at around 9:00 in the morning; Tudtud, however, was expected to
arrive at around 6:00 in the evening of the same day. 111 In People v. Encinada, supra, the Court ruled that there was
sufficient time to procure a warrant where the police officers received at 4:00 in the afternoon an intelligence report that
the accused, who was supposedly carrying marijuana, would arrive the next morning at 7:00 a.m.:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20, 1992 at his house, there was sufficient time to
secure a warrant of arrest, as the M/V Sweet Pearl was not expected to dock until 7:00 a.m. the following day.
Administrative Circular No. 13 allows application for search warrants even after office hours:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"3. Raffling shall be strictly enforced, except only in case where an application for search warrant may be filed directly with
any judge whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located, after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays, in which case the applicant is required to certify under oath the urgency of the issuance thereof after office
hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays;." . . .

The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular No. 19, series of 1987, entitled "Amended
Guidelines and Procedures on Application for search warrants for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Other Serious
Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts with Multiple Salas" :jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle, in acting on applications for search warrants in the
campaign against loose firearms and other serious crimes affecting peace and order. There is a need for prompt action on
such applications for search warrant. Accordingly, these amended guidelines in the issuance of a search warrant are
issued:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Anti-subversion Act, crimes against public order as
defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunition and violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, shall no longer be raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance of and
acted upon by the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under
whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located.

2. In the absence of the Executive Judge, the Vice-Executive Judge shall take cognizance of and personally act on the
same. In the absence of the Executive judge or Vice-Executive judge, the application may be taken cognizance of and
acted upon by any judge of the Court where application is filed.

3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, shall likewise be taken cognizance of and
acted upon by any judge of the Court having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant shall
certify and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that its issuance is urgent.
4. Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without delay personally conduct the examination of the
applicant and his witnesses to prevent the possible leakage of information. He shall observe the procedures, safeguards,
and guidelines for the issuance of search warrants provided for in this Court’s Administrative Circular No. 13, dated
October 1, 1985." 112 [Italics in the original.]

Given that the police had adequate time to obtain the warrant, PO1 Floreta’s testimony that the real reason for their
omission was their belief that they lacked sufficient basis to obtain the same assumes greater significance. This was PO1
Floreta’s familiar refrain:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q — When Solier reported to you that fact, that Tudtud will be coming from Cotabato to get that (sic) stocks, you did not
go to court to get a search warrant on the basis of the report of Bobot Solier?

A — No.

Q — Why?

A — Because we have no real basis to secure the search warrant.

Q — When you have no real basis to secure a search warrant, you have also no real basis to search Tudtud and Bulong
at that time?

A — Yes, sir.

x x x

Q — And Bobot Solier told you that Tudtud, that he would already bring marijuana?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — And this was 9:00 a.m.?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — The arrival of Tudtud was expected at 6:00 p.m.?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — Toril is just 16 kilometers from Davao City?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — And the Office of the Regional Trial Court is only about 16 kilometers, is that correct?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — And it can be negotiated by thirty minutes by a jeep ride?

A — Yes, Sir.

Q — And you can asked [sic] the assistance of any prosecutor to apply for the search warrant or the prosecutor do [sic]
not assist?

A — They help.

Q — But you did not come to Davao City, to asked [sic] for a search warrant?

A — As I said, we do not have sufficient basis. 113

It may be conceded that "the mere subjective conclusions of a police officer concerning the existence of probable cause is
not binding on [the courts] which must independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence of probable
cause" and that "a court may also find probable cause in spite of an officer’s judgment that none exists." 114 However, the
fact that the arresting officers felt that they did not have sufficient basis to obtain a warrant, despite their own information-
gathering efforts, raises serious questions whether such "surveillance" actually yielded any pertinent information and even
whether they actually conducted any information-gathering at all, thereby eroding any claim to personal
knowledge.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and seizures if the following requisites are
present:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. It must appear that the rights exist;

2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;

3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 115

Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers
introduced themselves as such and requested appellant that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly
containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said "it was alright." He did not resist and opened the box himself.

The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to constitute a valid
waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to
be presumed. 116 The fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto.

. . . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the
citizen in the position of either contesting an officer’s authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead
they hold that a peaceful submission to all search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. 117 [Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag 118 or the chairs 119 containing marijuana to the
arresting officer, this Court held there was no valid consent to the search.

On the other hand, because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it
cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to the accused the burden of proving that the
search was unconsented. 120

In any case, any presumption in favor of regularity would be severely diminished by the allegation of appellants in this
case that the arresting officers pointed a gun at them before asking them to open the subject box. Appellant Tudtud
testified as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q — This person who approached you according to you pointed something at you[.] [What] was that something?

A — A 38 cal. Revolver.

Q — How did he point it at you?

A — Like this (Witness demonstrating as if pointing with his two arms holding something towards somebody).

Q — This man[,] what did he tell you when he pointed a gun at you?

A — He said do not run.

Q — What did you do?

A — I raised my hands and said "Sir, what is this about?"

Q — Why did you call him Sir?

A — I was afraid because when somebody is holding a gun, I am afraid.

Q — Precisely, why did you address him as Sir?

A — Because he was holding a gun and I believed that somebody who is carrying a gun is a policeman.

Q — When you asked him what is this? What did he say?

A — He said "I would like to inspect what you are carrying. [" ]

x x x

Q — What did you say when you were asked to open that carton box?

A — I told him that is not mine.

Q — What did this man say?

A — He again pointed to me his revolver and again said to open.

Q — What did you do?

A — So I proceeded to open for fear of being shot. 121

Appellants’ implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive
or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
122 Consequently, appellants’ lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. 123

As the search of appellants’ box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the
marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay
testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.

The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as human
beings, democracy cannot survive and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained
as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on
governmental power. 124

The right against unreasonable search and seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy of rights, 125 next only to, if not on
the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, which is protected by the due process clause. 126 This is as it
should be for, as stressed by a couple of noted freedom advocates, 127 the right to personal security which, along with
the right to privacy, is the foundation of the right against unreasonable search and seizure "includes the right to exist, and
the right to enjoyment of life while existing." Emphasizing such right, this Court declared in People v. Aruta:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection.
While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient
importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of
order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some
criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a
law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 128

Thus, given a choice between letting suspected criminals escape or letting the government play an ignoble part, the
answer, to this Court, is clear and ineluctable.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED. Appellants Noel Tudtud y Paypa
and Dindo Bolong y Naret are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is
ordered to cause the immediate release of appellants from confinement, unless they are being held for some other lawful
cause, and to report to this Court compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt hereof.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 200370, June 07, 2017

MARIO VERIDIANO Y SAPI, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Through this Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 Mario Veridiano y Sapi (Veridiano) assails the Decision2 dated November
18, 2011 and Resolution3 dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33588, which affirmed his
conviction for violation of Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165. 4

In an Information filed before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Laguna,5 Veridiano was charged with the crime
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The Information read:

That on or about January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being permitted or authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 2.72 grams of dried marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6
On October 9, 2008, Veridiano was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial on the merits ensued. 7

During trial, the prosecution presented PO1 Guillermo Cabello (PO1 Cabello) and PO1 Daniel Solano (PO1 Solano) to
testify.8

According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves,
police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain alias "Baho," who was later identified as
Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. 9

PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO2 Alvin Vergara (PO2 Vergara) who were both
on duty.10 Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay
Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.11

The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano. They allowed some vehicles to pass through after
checking that he was not on board.12 At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney
coming from San Pablo, Laguna.13 They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark. 14 The police
officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the
contents of their pockets.15

The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana." 16 PO1 Cabello
confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials.17 Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional
rights.18 He was then brought to the police station.19

At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who also placed his initials.20 PO1
Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with the seized tea bag to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory.21 The contents of the tea bag tested positive for marijuana.22

For his defense, Veridiano testified that he went to the fiesta in San Pablo City on January 15, 2008. 23 After participating
in the festivities, he decided to go home and took a passenger jeepney bound for Nagcarlan. 24 At around 10:00 a.m., the
jeepney passed a police checkpoint in Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan. 25 Veridiano noticed that the jeepney was being
followed by three (3) motorcycles, each with two (2) passengers in civilian attire. 26

When the jeepney reached Barangay Buboy, Nagcarlan, the motorcyclists flagged down the jeepney.27 Two (2) armed
men boarded the jeepney and frisked Veridiano.28 However, they found nothing on his person.29 Still, Veridiano was
accosted and brought to the police station where he was informed that "illegal drug was . . . found in his possession."30
In the Decision dated July 16, 2010,31 the Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of illegal possession of marijuana. Accordingly, he was sentenced to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00. 32

Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested." 33 He argued that the tea bag
containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a poisonous tree.'" 34 Veridiano further argued that
the police officers failed to comply with the rule on chain of custody.35

On the other hand, the prosecution asserted that "[t]he legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
[the person of the accused]."36 Thus, by entering his plea, Veridiano waived his right to question any irregularity in his
arrest.37 With regard to the alleged illegal warrantless search conducted by the police officers, the prosecution argued that
Veridiano's "submissive deportment at the time of the search" indicated that he consented to the warrantless search. 38

On November 18, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 39 affirming the guilt of Veridiano.40

The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in flagrante delicto" of having marijuana in his
possession.41 Assuming that he was illegally arrested, Veridiano waived his right to question any irregularity that may
have attended his arrest when he entered his plea and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. 42 Furthermore, the
Court of Appeals held that Veridiano consented to the warrantless search because he did not protest when the police
asked him to remove the contents of his pocket.43

Veridiano moved for reconsideration, which was denied in the Resolution dated January 25, 2012. 44

On March 16, 2012, Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.45

Petitioner argues that the tea bag containing marijuana leaves was seized in violation of his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.46 He asserts that his arrest was illegal.47 Petitioner was merely seated inside the jeepney at the
time of his apprehension. He did not act in any manner that would give the police officers reasonable ground to believe
that he had just committed a crime or that he was committing a crime. 48 Petitioner also asserts that reliable information is
insufficient to constitute probable cause that would support a valid warrantless arrest.49

Since his arrest was illegal, petitioner argues that "the accompanying [warrantless] search was likewise illegal." 50 Hence,
under Article III, Section 2,51 in relation to Article III, Section 3(2)52 of the Constitution, the seized tea bag containing
marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the fruit of a poisonous tree." 53

Nevertheless, assuming that the seized tea bag containing marijuana is admissible in evidence, petitioner contends that
the prosecution failed to preserve its integrity.54 The apprehending team did not strictly comply with the rule on chain of
custody under Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165. 55

In a Resolution dated June 13, 2012, this Court required respondent to file a comment on the petition.56 In the
Manifestation and Motion dated August 1, 2012,57 respondent stated that it would no longer file a comment.

The following issues are for this Court's resolution:

First, whether there was a valid warrantless arrest;

Second, whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner; and

Lastly, whether there is enough evidence to sustain petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The Petition is granted.

The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search incident to the arrest
becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally inadmissible.

Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised through a motion to
quash before an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived and an accused is "estopped
from questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest."58
The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation during trial cures
any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest.59 The reason for this rule is that "the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused." 60

Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an accused from questioning the
admissibility of evidence seized.61 The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when an accused fails to question the
court's jurisdiction over his or her person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the
constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest.

As a component of the right to privacy,62 the fundamental right against unlawful searches and seizures is guaranteed by
no less than the Constitution. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.63
To underscore the importance of an individual's right against unlawful searches and seizures, Article III, Section 3(2) of
the Constitution considers any evidence obtained in violation of this right as inadmissible. 64

The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and seizures. 65 It is only directed against those that
are unreasonable.66 Conversely, reasonable searches and seizures fall outside the scope of the prohibition and are not
forbidden.67

In People v. Aruta,68 this Court explained that the language of the Constitution implies that "searches and seizures are
normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest." 69 The requirements of a
valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and reiterated in Rule 126, Section 4 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure.70

However, People v. Cogaed71 clarified that there are exceptional circumstances "when searches are reasonable even
when warrantless."72 The following are recognized instances of permissible warrantless searches laid down in
jurisprudence: (1) a "warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest,"73 (2) search of "evidence in 'plain view,'" (3) "search
of a moving vehicle," (4) "consented warrantless search[es]," (5) "customs search," (6) "stop and frisk," and (7) "exigent
and emergency circumstances."74

There is no hard and fast rule in determining when a search and seizure is reasonable. In any given situation, "[w]hat
constitutes a reasonable . . . search . . . is purely a judicial question," the resolution of which depends upon the unique
and distinct factual circumstances.75 This may involve an inquiry into "the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence
or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and
the character of the articles procured."76

II

Pertinent to the resolution of this case is the determination of whether the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful
arrest. The Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto of having marijuana in his
possession making the warrantless search lawful. 77

This Court disagrees. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is made. Otherwise
stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be reversed." 78 For there to be a lawful arrest, law
enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a warrant.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this warrantless arrest requires
compliance with the overt act test79 as explained in Cogaed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer." 80
Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the
warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did not exhibit an overt act within
the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the time he was apprehended.81

The warrantless search in People v. Racho82 was also considered unlawful.83 The police officers received information that
a man was in possession of illegal drugs and was on board a Genesis bus bound for Baler, Aurora. The informant added
that the man was "wearing a red and white striped [t]-shirt."84 The police officers waited for the bus along the national
highway.85 When the bus arrived, Jack Racho (Racho) disembarked and waited along the highway for a
tricycle.86 Suddenly, the police officers approached him and invited him to the police station since he was suspected of
having shabu in his possession.87 As Racho pulled out his hands from his pocket, a white envelope fell yielding a sachet
of shabu.88

In holding that the warrantless search was invalid, this Court observed that Racho was not "committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers" at the time he was apprehended.89 Moreover, Racho's arrest was solely based on a
tip.90 Although there are cases stating that reliable information is sufficient to justify a warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest, they were covered under the other exceptions to the rule on warrantless searches. 91

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest.92 The rule requires that an offense has just
been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time."93 That a crime was in fact committed does not automatically
bring the case under this rule.94 An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails a time element from
the moment the crime is committed up to the point of arrest.

Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime. However, they must have personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested committed it.

People v. Gerente95 illustrates a valid arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court. In Gerente, the accused
was convicted for murder and for violation of Republic Act No. 6425. 96 He assailed the admissibility of dried marijuana
leaves as evidence on the ground that they were allegedly seized from him pursuant to a warrantless arrest. 97 On appeal,
the accused's conviction was affirmed.98 This Court ruled that the warrantless arrest was justified under Rule 113, Section
5(b) of the Rules of Court. The police officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the
accused killed the victim:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw
Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece
of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina
Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that
Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his
arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did. 99 (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement that law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts surrounding the commission of an offense was
underscored in In Re Salibo v. Warden.100

In Re Salibo involved a petition for habeas corpus. The police officers suspected Datukan Salibo (Salibo) as one (1) of the
accused in the Maguindano Massacre.101 Salibo presented himself before the authorities to clear his name. Despite his
explanation, Salibo was apprehended and detained.102 In granting the petition, this Court pointed out that Salibo was not
restrained under a lawful court process or order.103 Furthermore, he was not arrested pursuant to a valid warrantless
arrest:104
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his name and to
prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of
Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit an offense. The police officers had no
personal knowledge of any offense that he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee
prisoner.105 (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit
any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest,
the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless
arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed.106

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had just
committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based
on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable
cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

III

The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop and frisk" searches.

A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v. Chua107 as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband."108 Thus, the allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" search is
limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for weapons." 109

Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement measure specifically directed towards crime
prevention, there is a need to safeguard the right of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. 110

Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While probable cause is not
required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch. 111 Law enforcers must have a
genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and the particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity
may be afoot.112 Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search. 113

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,114 the police officers conducted surveillance operations in Caloocan City Cemetery, a
place reportedly frequented by drug addicts.115 They chanced upon a male person who had "reddish eyes and [was]
walking in a swaying manner."116 Suspecting that the man was high on drugs, the police officers approached him,
introduced themselves, and asked him what he was holding.117 However, the man resisted.118 Upon further investigation,
the police officers found marijuana in the man's possession.119 This Court held that the circumstances of the case gave
the police officers justifiable reason to stop the man and investigate if he was high on drugs.120

In People v. Solayao,121 the police officers were conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence of
armed persons within Caibiran.122 They met a group of drunk men, one (1) of whom was the accused in a camouflage
uniform.123 When the police officers approached, his companions fled leaving behind the accused who was told not to run
away.124 One (1) of the police officers introduced himself and seized from the accused a firearm wrapped in dry coconut
leaves.125 This Court likewise found justifiable reason to stop and frisk the accused when "his companions fled upon
seeing the government agents."126

The "stop and frisk" searches in these two (2) cases were considered valid because the accused in both cases exhibited
overt acts that gave law enforcers genuine reason to conduct a "stop and frisk" search. In contrast
with Manalili and Solayao, the warrantless search in Cogaed127 was considered as an invalid "stop and frisk" search
because of the absence of a single suspicious circumstance that would justify a warrantless search.

In Cogaed, the police officers received information that a certain Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana. 128 A
passenger jeepney passed through the checkpoint set up by the police officers. The driver then disembarked and signaled
that two (2) male passengers were carrying marijuana. 129 The police officers approached the two (2) men, who were later
identified as Victor Cogaed (Cogaed) and Santiago Dayao, and inquired about the contents of their bags.130

Upon further investigation, the police officers discovered three (3) bricks of marijuana in Cogaed's bag. 131 In holding that
the "stop and frisk" search was invalid, this Court reasoned that "[t]here was not a single suspicious circumstance" that
gave the police officers genuine reason to stop the two (2) men and search their belongings. 132 Cogaed did not exhibit any
overt act indicating that he was in possession of marijuana.133

Similar to Cogaed, petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would give
police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. Reasonable persons will act in a
nervous manner in any check point. There was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal knowledge that
would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious.

IV

Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the warrantless search.
Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered through a valid waiver, the
prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and convincing evidence. 134 Consent to a warrantless
search and seizure must be "unequivocal, specific, intelligently given . . . [and unattended] by duress or coercion."135

The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of the circumstances. 136 This may involve an
inquiry into the environment in which the consent was given such as "the presence of coercive police procedures."137

Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which amounts to no
consent at all.138 In Cogaed, this Court observed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Cogaed's silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the
police officer's excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that
the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such
waivers are not to be presumed.139
The presence of a coercive environment negates the claim that petitioner consented to the warrantless search.

Another instance of a valid warrantless search is a search of a moving vehicle. The rules governing searches and
seizures have been liberalized when the object of a search is a vehicle for practical purposes. 140 Police officers cannot be
expected to appear before a judge and apply for a search warrant when time is of the essence considering the efficiency
of vehicles in facilitating transactions involving contraband or dangerous articles.141 However, the inherent mobility of
vehicles cannot justify all kinds of searches.142 Law enforcers must act on the basis of probable cause.143

A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle.144 Due to the number of cases involving warrantless
searches in checkpoints and for the guidance of law enforcers, it is imperative to discuss the parameters by which
searches in checkpoints should be conducted.

Checkpoints per se are not invalid.145 They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the lives of individuals and
ensure their safety.146 They are also sanctioned in cases where the government's survival is in danger. 147 Considering that
routine checkpoints intrude "on [a] motorist's right to 'free passage'"148 to a certain extent, they must be "conducted in a
way least intrusive to motorists."149 The extent of routine inspections must be limited to a visual search. Routine
inspections do not give law enforcers carte blanche to perform warrantless searches.150

In Valmonte v. De Villa,151 this Court clarified that "[f]or as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be
regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search[es]." 152 Thus, a search where an "officer merely
draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or
flashes a light therein" is not unreasonable.153

However, an extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law enforcers have probable cause
to believe that the vehicle's passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an offense.154

Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if they are limited to a visual search. This
holds especially true when the object of the search is a public vehicle where individuals have a reasonably reduced
expectation of privacy. On the other hand, extensive searches are permissible only when they are founded upon probable
cause. Any evidence obtained will be subject to the exclusionary principle under the Constitution.

That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle does not justify an extensive search absent
probable cause. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still
hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other
circumstance that will arouse suspicion.

Although this Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based on tipped information, there have been
other circumstances that justified warrantless searches conducted by the authorities.

In People v. Breis,155 apart from the tipped information they received, the law enforcement agents observed suspicious
behavior on the part of the accused that gave them reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed.156 The accused attempted to alight from the bus after the law enforcers introduced themselves and inquired
about the ownership of a box which the accused had in their possession. 157 In their attempt to leave the bus, one (1) of
the accused physically pushed a law enforcer out of the way.158 Immediately alighting from a bus that had just left the
terminal and leaving one's belongings behind is unusual conduct. 159

In People v. Mariacos,160 a police officer received information that a bag containing illegal drugs was about to be
transported on a passenger jeepney.161 The bag was marked with "O.K."162 On the basis of the tip, a police officer
conducted surveillance operations on board a jeepney. 163 Upon seeing the bag described to him, he peeked inside and
smelled the distinct odor of marijuana emanating from the bag. 164 The tipped information and the police officer's personal
observations gave rise to probable cause that rendered the warrantless search valid. 165

The police officers in People v. Ayangao166 and People v. Libnao167 likewise received tipped information regarding the
transport of illegal drugs. In Libnao, the police officers had probable cause to arrest the accused based on their three (3)-
month long surveillance operation in the area where the accused was arrested. 168 On the other hand, in Ayangao, the
police officers noticed marijuana leaves protruding through a hole in one (1) of the sacks carried by the accused. 169

In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits of warrantless
searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except for the tip they received. They
did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover,
the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

There are different hybrids of reasonable warrantless searches. There are searches based on reasonable suspicion as
in Posadas v. Court of Appeals170 where this Court justified the warrantless search of the accused who attempted to flee
with a buri bag after the police officers identified themselves.171

On the other hand, there are reasonable searches because of heightened security. In Dela Cruz v. People,172 the search
conducted on the accused was considered valid because it was done in accordance with routine security measures in
ports.173 This case, however, should not be construed to apply to border searches. Border searches are not unreasonable
per se;174 there is a "reasonable reduced expectation of privacy" when travellers pass through or stop at airports or other
ports of travel.175

The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag containing marijuana seized
from petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
There being no evidence to support his conviction, petitioner must be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 16, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 16976-SP and the
Decision dated November 18, 2011 and Resolution dated January 25, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CR. No.
33588 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Mario Veridiano y Sapi is hereby ACQUITTED and is ordered
immediately RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

Pastor v people
https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/12089/