Professional Documents
Culture Documents
VanDyke, Virtues and Principles
VanDyke, Virtues and Principles
VanDyke, Virtues and Principles
doi:10.1093/jmp/jhaa013
*Address correspondence to: Jorge L. A. Garcia, PhD. Stokes Hall North Room 229.
Morrissey College of Arts and Sciences. Gasson Hall. Philosophy Department. 140
Commonwealth Avenue. Chestnut hill, MA 02467. E-mail: JLAGarcia@aol.com
In the seventh and most recent edition of their classic book, Principles of
Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress define a virtue as a character
trait that is “socially valuable and reliably present” and a moral virtue as a
trait that is also both “dispositional” and “morally valuable” (2013, 31, 377).
© The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy Inc.
All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
472 Jorge L. A. Garcia
(Hereafter, I use “B&C” to refer to this edition or, sometimes, to its au-
thors.) The virtues that they single out as “focal” within biomedical ethics are
compassion, discernment, trustworthiness, integrity, and conscientiousness
(2013, 37–44).
Their discussions both of the virtues and of their proper place within moral
theory have several significant merits (B&C, 2013, esp., ch. 2 and 9). First,
its corresponding vice. In these ways, then, even brief but somewhat close
attention to all three theoretical approaches that B&C present as alternatives
to one in which virtues are basic ultimately leads back to the virtues.2
There is a second path to the same result: that virtues are basic in moral
theory when it is properly understood. For the virtues’ fundamentality is
also revealed when we begin to analyze each of B&C’s four main principles.
As their book’s title, retained through many expanded editions, suggests, prin-
ciples are central to the approach to understanding and theorizing bioethics
that Beauchamp and Childress take in their classic text. Their chief tasks are
to understand the four principles of Beneficence, Non-Maleficence, Justice,
and Respect for Autonomy (by, for example, distinguishing them from rules),
to determine their place and role in bioethics (relative to, say, virtue, obliga-
tions, and rights), and to draw out their implications for some of the field’s
issues and controversies, both those that are traditional and those that have
only recently arisen. Figuring out how a biomedical actor should behave in
a situation is, for them, a matter of applying those principles by interpreting
them and weighing their comparative significance in the case, a process they
identify as first specifying and then balancing the principles. Here, in con-
trast, I both sketch and make a case for a conception of the ethical, including
the bioethical, within which concepts of virtue are central and fundamental.
Virtues and Principles in Biomedical Ethics 475
Near the end, I offer some suggestions on how this approach might fruitfully
be applied to some current controversies.
Rather than begin with the moral virtues of persons, that is, with traits of
character, let us start with morally virtuous responses. It is important to re-
member that we predicate virtue-terms (V-terms) of people’s (sometimes mo-
mentary) feelings, desires, and resolutions, of their decisions, actions, and so
As we have just indicated, B&C are correct to see other virtues as deriva-
tive “expressions of caring” (2013, 37), and to see compassion, caring (and,
thence, the biomedical phenomena of caring about someone, caring for her,
taking care of her, and providing care to her) as basic, with goodwill consti-
tuting what we can call the general form, shape, or structure of fundamental
moral virtues.8
476 Jorge L. A. Garcia
is what moral virtue–that is, what morality, what avoiding moral vice–de-
mands and requires of her.12 This, then, constitutes her duty within the role.
When she acts contrary to what being virtuous in action, acting virtuously
as an R, demands of her, she cannot but act badly (as an R).13 Any role, of
course, is always a role in something, whether it is a play, a game, a plan,
or some other undertaking. As suggested above, the roles that are central
her, or killing her for no reason, or cheating her, or stealing her property.
That is the truth behind the claims that, morally, we must not kill willy-nilly,
may never lie, are not permitted to cheat anyone, and so on.
Any wrongdoing is a wronging of someone, i.e., treating her badly as
her R and therein failing her in the agent’s role as her R, for example, vic-
timizing her as her physician or nurse (or as her spouse, or her brother,
toward her being a good nurse to S1, a bad doctor to S2, a poor, vicious
researcher for us in the biomedical inquiry that she wrongly undertakes or
pursues. That implies that what chiefly counts towards an action’s being vir-
tuous or vicious (and therein wrong, duty-violating) is, in the first instance,
its connection not to a categorical imperative (pace Kant), nor to the greater
happiness (pace traditional utilitarians), nor to the best available outcome
reveals what is already intuitively true: that what is morally virtuous and
even necessary derives from what benefits the patient, advancing her needs
and welfare, unlike categorical imperatives, rather than from what serves the
agent’s. In addition, Patient Focus theorizes that the idea of morally wronging
someone–an important topic that Elizabeth Anscombe, Thompson, and a
few others have begun to explore–is central to all wrongdoing.
An Internal Medical Ethics. As viewed here, virtues and their various vices
provide the advantage of continuity between the biomedical professions’
“ideals” and their “duties.”26 Virtue is aspirational, an ideal, while duties are
defined in terms of such distance from virtuous motivation as to constitute
vice. Someone can fall short of an ideal without violating her duty, but there
is nonetheless strong continuity between ideals, which engage what is good,
and duties, which involve what is bad. These are not concepts from different
parts of ethics; to the contrary, they have a common source. Moreover, this
approach allows us to dispense with B&C’s (very odd) notion of a separate
“virtue of nonmalevolence” (2013, 31) and, more broadly, with the (equally
odd) concepts of both “negative duties” (2013, 365) and “negative rights”
(2013, 370f).
Rather, we can say that malevolent actions are vicious because they stand
opposed to the virtue of benevolence. Murder, for example, is vicious in
violating our virtue-based requirement to care for anyone’s life by revering
it and, when feasible, striving to protect and preserve it, and therein it is
482 Jorge L. A. Garcia
with commands that add the vice of disobedience to those actions’ ante-
cedent vice and wrongness.28
Recall our point above, that each of B&C’s own four major principles of
biomedical ethics are, in fact, best understood as pointing back to some
virtue as foundational. Beneficence, doing good, takes on moral import from
its connection to the virtue of benevolence, willing well by willing what is
That justice depends on respect can be supported in two ways. First, the
justification of our injustice-claims is best understood as invoking respect.
We often think of need as a ground for claims of justice and injustice, and
the approach here advocated can well accommodate this by noting that our
egregiously neglecting your basic needs often manifests our lack of respect
for you in your personhood. My thus leaving your basic needs unmet is pro
B&C wisely place caring for someone at the heart of health care. What
physicians and nurses do in providing care to some patient is to take care
of her and to care for her, and all these derive from the more fundamental
wrong, and others less.44 In fact, it may be revealing that we freely shift here
from the deontic to explicitly evaluative talk, as when we say, for example,
that stealing is wrong but teaching children to steal is worse, meaning it is
even more wrong. Third, we can adapt proposals from Slote and Zagzebski
and treat the morally licit/permitted/allowed those actions by doing which,
in her circumstances, the agent treats no one in a way that is flatly, finally,
dealing”) as judgments about what holds pro tanto. These may not survive
full consideration of the situation since, for example, my giving the medicine
you need to her, who also needs it, is not genuinely inconsiderate of you in
these circumstances. Sometimes, however, the pro tanto judgment survives.
Lying to someone is still duplicitous (of you in regard to her), after all, even
if done to help her (or someone else). Further, this virtues-based approach
Ethical method and metatheory matter chiefly for their implications for our
moral judgments. In my view, however, we need to supplement bioethical
method with a philosophy of medicine in order adequately to justify such
judgments. Space does not permit me to supply and defend such a phil-
osophy here. Instead, let me indicate what more is needed, and how I think
the relevant questions should be answered, before I propose some applica-
tions. As I understand virtues, they are features that, in certain ways, help
make someone a good physician, good as a nurse, or that help her do her
medical research well. What is it to be or do these things? It should be largely
uncontroversial that a physician is as such a healer, that is, someone who
works to restore or maintain her patient’s health. To deny that a physician is
to heal is like saying a teacher need not instruct or construction has nothing to
do with building. Beyond that conceptual point, though, are there additional
goals and tasks internal to medicine and nursing? What is it to be healthy?
Who and what is the patient? Some conceptions of health are so broad that
Virtues and Principles in Biomedical Ethics 491
Truth-telling
A healthcare professional’s lying to her patient is, as such, manipulative of
that patient, mendacious to her, deceitful, prevaricating, tergiversate, and,
especially, is unavoidably duplicitous. These are normally vicious, because
they are opposed to the virtues of truthfulness, openness, forthrightness,
candor, etc. Of them, I think duplicity (double-dealing, being two-faced,
mendacious, and fraudulent) gets a kind of (negative) pride of place be-
cause of the way the liar as such both presents herself as doing one thing
and then acts in a way that is, in its motivational structure, diametrically
opposed to that.49 The lying medical professional does not merely mislead
(and therein behave in ways that are deceptive and mendacious) but, in
492 Jorge L. A. Garcia
nothing to do with physicians and nurses qua physicians and nurses. Rather,
they involve dangerous distortion of their professional self-understanding.
There is no reason grounded in genuine respect for persons to “respect”
(that is, to defer to) a person’s preference except insofar as that preference
itself shows appreciation of and respect for her own (and others’) dignity as
persons. Someone’s suicidal death wish, e.g., cannot reflect due respect for
Integrity
Pace B&C, what is called integrity is not simply, or even chiefly, a self- regarding
virtue. For in acting in regard to a given patient in a way contrary to medicine’s
nature, the physician fails (in her role-relationship with) that patient. Conscience
protection is misconceived in much current discussion: acting from conscience
in many controversial cases is merely insisting on acting in accord with (vir-
tuously within) one’s role as an M.D., nurse, researcher, and consistently with
medicine’s (and nursing’s) nature(s). At least, such protection is needed in order
to limit the healthcare professional’s departure from her role’s inherent tasks.
Being conscientious here is not, as some assume, a private, internal affair, even
a kind of self-indulgence. Rather, it is a matter of keeping faith with what one
has solemnly and quite publicly professed herself to do and to be for others.
All this makes for a bold, contrarian, and much needed bioethics, one
that, by speaking truth to power, challenges the community of bioethicists,
the biomedical professions and institutions, and the larger society to reform
themselves. In some earlier writing, I contrasted this with what I called a
“biophobic” bioethics, meaning an approach that is averse to human life,
denigrating and depreciating it, treating it as merely a means to various
ends. That remains an accurate characterization, but here I prefer to put
the point more positively and call for a life-friendly bioethics, one that con-
sistently cares for and affirms the life of human persons. Such a renewed
and reformed biomedical ethics would spurn today’s nightmares of the
posthuman, and strive instead to be proudly human, deeply humane, and
pervasively humanist.
VII. CONCLUSION
My suspicion is that the approach here advanced can illuminate many other
fields of practical health care as well, including public health, hospital ad-
ministration, medical and nursing education, pharmacology, epidemiology,
Virtues and Principles in Biomedical Ethics 495
and others. As a child of parents who both worked blue-collar service jobs
in a hospital and grew up in a nearby slum building that the same hos-
pital owned for a while, let me add that I think badly neglected aspects
of healthcare ethics concern the roles of the healthcare institution as em-
ployer, as landlord, and as neighbor. Recognition of the various persons
in whose lives these institutions play crucial parts might illuminate and de-
NOTES
1. On “thickness,” see Scheffler (2002, Ch. 11). On “transparency,” see Richardson (1990).
2. I think this is not true in the reverse direction. That is, I do not believe that consideration of the
nature or logic of virtues must likewise lead us to the intrinsic value and disvalue of states of affairs, nor
to duty, nor to rights. However, I do not try to show that asymmetry here.
3. Some argue that justice is fundamentally a feature of states of affairs and that a just person is just
only in a derivative way, being someone disposed to act so as to bring about or maintain such states of
affairs (see Williams, 1981, Ch. 6). I think the reverse true. Any mere state of affairs is just only either
metaphorically, as bitterly cold weather may be called cruel or otherwise vicious, or because it is a state
of affairs of the sort that someone’s justice will incline her to endorse it or, a little differently, of the sort
that it will be just of someone to endorse.
This approach has the advantages of keeping justice closely tied to respect, and thus to persons,
whose dignity merits them alone full moral respect, and also of capturing the essence of injustice as a
kind of arrogance wherein the agent disrespectfully arrogates to herself what is owed to another.
4. Also see Thomson (2008, Ch. 5).
5. “A virtue is a dispositional trait that is socially valuable and reliably present in a person, and a
moral virtue is a dispositional trait of character that is morally valuable and reliably present” (2013, 31).
This, I maintain, does not go deep enough. A moral virtue is valuable in that it counts toward the person
having it being a morally good person in some more specific way, e.g., being a good friend in that she
is a devoted one or a good neighbor in that she is considerate. Further, to analyze virtue in terms of the
valuable (or the desirable), as B&C here do, gets things backwards. For something to be valuable is for
someone’s valuing or desiring it to be virtuous of and in her.
6. Thus, we here repudiate the claim, variously made in Slote (2003), Adams (2006), Hurka (2000),
and Zagzebski (1996), among others, that virtues are “intrinsically good” in the ways that philosophers
use that term.
7. We have more to say on some of these below, especially on truthfulness and justice, which latter
figures quite prominently in B&C’s account.
8. Contrary to B&C, goodwill is not quite the same as the sentiments of “compassion” or “sympathy”
(2013, 37). The first, as its name indicates, is a state of the will and of related desires, while the latter two
are matters of feeling, emotional occurrences or states.
9. A little more precisely, we should say that a permitted action is one whose agent is not vicious
in performing it, a prohibited one is an action whose agent therein acts viciously. Note that we think of
some actions as morally necessary, that is, obligatory, and others as morally impossible, that is, forbidden.
Adopting our understandings thus brings the moral use of these concepts into accord with Aristotle’s
definition of the necessary as that without which some evil–here, the action itself–cannot be avoided
(Aristotle, 1924, Bk. V, Ch. 5).
496 Jorge L. A. Garcia
10. On wrongdoing as victimization, see Thompson (2008); on “thick” and “thin” moral terms and
concepts, see Scheffler (2002); on transparent norms, see Richardson (1990).
Perhaps some of her wrongdoing, especially such self-regarding actions as wasting time or eating
imprudently, would more intuitively be classed as failing oneself, letting oneself down, than “victimizing”
oneself. (I owe this point to Anthony McCarthy.) However, this difference seems to me largely termino-
logical, because we can still identify a victim, oneself, who is the person whom the agent failed, let down,
and therein wronged in her behavior.
Let me add a remark or two in support of some of my claims about the content, implications, and
to someone S. This view is at some distance from the view usually attributed to Aristotle, but notice that,
if we emphasize his famous claim that we are social animals, and interpret this as meaning that, fully to
thrive, we need to be in certain kinds of relationships with various persons, then we come to the idea
that an agent’s acting so as to fulfill her humanity may reduce to her acting in ways consistent with her
living up to and fulfilling each of those relationships.
17. Here I prescind from the sometimes important differences between being a registered nurse, a
licensed practical nurse, and a licensed nurse practitioner; and also between being a primary care doctor,
a specialist of one or another kind, a surgeon, and so on. Their fundamental virtues, and consequent
22. See, especially, Epstein (2018, Ch. 6). Epstein frames his discussion in terms of grounding and
anchoring “principles,” but I think it better to think of these as relations holding between facts and prop-
erty instantiations of various categories.
23. This might seem to be what Slote (2003) calls “hyper agent-basing,” which treats virtue as
more basic than being good. However, Virtues Basing claims only that virtue is internal to the way in
which, for example your being healthy is impersonally good–good, that is, in a way that goes beyond
its being good for you and your intimates–and your being sick impersonally bad, not that it is internal
to all forms of being good. In fact, the latter suggestion is viciously circular if, as I think we should, we
29. It is worth remarking that beneficence for each does not necessarily require aggregating bene-
fits and harms across persons, although utilitarians insist on such aggregation. Further, willingness to
harm, some in order to benefit others, threatens injustice. V-BMT, in insisting that an agent abandon no
one when she strives to help, captures an insight gleaned when we take seriously the experience of op-
pressed minority groups. (See Garcia, 2017a)
30. Early utilitarians were on to something important when they stressed benevolence in action.
Some of them may have wanted to stress utilitarians’ (to my mind, confused) continuation of the Christian
moral tradition of love and goodwill. Acts of maleficence are morally objectionable chiefly for their motiv-
in regard to a stranger. (This helps illuminate the centrality of partiality and relationships, including
what are called “special relationships,” within morality.) And, forms of goodwill that are often mor-
ally optional for me may become mandatory in certain situations where the other person is especially
dependent on my assistance.
By the way, there may also be a sense in which we can say that you care about me–you are not
indifferent to me–if you hate me and wish me ill. However, that is not the sense or sort of caring about
someone that is closely related to providing someone care, taking care of her, and caring for her. The
latter sense and sort of caring are what concern us here.
wrong acts to be “more wrong”–to put it better, it allows them to be more vicious–than are others, be-
cause more distant in their motivational input from the relevant virtue.
49. See B&C’s chief discussion of deception that comes under the rubric veracity and its obligations
(2013, Ch. 8, 301–311). Thomas Cavanaugh kindly cited to me the famous verse, “What a tangled web
we weave when first we practice to deceive.” (Walter Scott, “Marmion,” Canto VI, stanza xvii). That can
assist us in keeping in mind the snarl of complication in which our lies often implicate ourselves.
50. Contrast B&C on healing. “When, in the patient’s assessment, the burdens of continued attempts
to cure outweigh their probable benefits, the caring physician should redirect the course of treatment so
in ways of her choosing, let alone a right that they act on her body so as to kill her. That it is largely up
to me to decide how I will live, and up to you to decide how you will, does not at all entail that either
of us has domain over whether to live.
REFERENCES
McCarthy, A. 2016. Ethical Sex: Sexual Choices and Their Nature and Meaning. South Bend,
IN: Fidelity Press.
Mendus, S. 2002. Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy. Oxford, United Kingdom:
Oxford University Press.
Pellegrino, E., and D. Thomasma. 1993. Virtues in Medical Practice. Oxford, United Kingdom:
Oxford University Press.