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Religion ChapterText Fall2021 20210906 Ub02c8
Religion ChapterText Fall2021 20210906 Ub02c8
Religion
E
Sociology of Religion
MELISSA J. WILDE, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
PATRICIA TEVINGTON, HARTFORD INSTITUTE FOR RELIGION
RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
What is religion?
Complex religion
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INTRODUCTION
What is religion?
For a really good definition of religion, we need to go back to the work of Émile
Durkheim. Durkheim wrote about religion in his classic book, The Elementary Forms of Religious
Life, which examined what he saw as the most traditional or primal forms of religion. Durkheim
defines religion as “A unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to
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say, things set apart and forbidden, which unite into one single moral community called a
Church, all those who adhere to them.”1
If we break down this definition, we uncover a few crucial characteristics. First, religion
has “a community.” It’s not just what you or I believe in our own hearts and minds; religion
must be “an eminently collective thing.”2 Thus, religions have congregations—groups of
followers who worship together.
Followers are those who believe in the principles of a religion. They are often devoted
to a prophet, an individual who is seen as particularly holy to a religious group. Prophets are
often believed to be endowed with special powers, especially the ability to communicate
directly with God or the gods.
One way to understand how important the collective is for religion is to think about the
difference between religion and magic. Like religion, magic could be described as a “unified
system of beliefs and practices” in which things are “set apart and forbidden.” But unlike
religion, Durkheim pointed out that magic is usually practiced individually. Individual people
cast “spells.”
Although there is a religion of magic
today, called Wicca, the fact that we
consider this to be a “new” religion
demonstrates just how important the
collective is to religion. Wicca has become a
religion because more and more people are
practicing it together.3 Someone practicing
what they consider to be a new religion alone
is likely to be deemed unstable..
Second, as Durkheim’s definition
implies, all religions have things that are “set
apart and forbidden”—or sacred. Sacred Handfasting ceremony at Avery England, Beltane
things have special power, deserve special 2005. (Source: ShahMai Network via Wikimedia
attention, and are not “everyday objects,” or Commons)
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Importantly, Durkheim describes religion as both beliefs and practices. In other words, it
is not just something we think or feel in common, but something we work together to carry out.
Religion, for our purposes, is a belief system about what is sacred that is held by a group
of people. Many people have deep and powerful religious experiences—feelings of extreme
religiosity, or “an extraordinary height of exaltation.”5 Durkheim argues that religious
experiences result from collective effervescence, when “a sort of electricity is generated
among worshippers.” In this experience, people feel connected with the larger social group.
Think about a time you felt energized and
connected to a larger group. Some people say they
feel it powerfully during the seventh inning stretch at
baseball games, when fans often join together to sing
“Take Me Out to the Ballgame.” They feel energized—
and like part of a larger community of baseball fans.
Others feel it when watching a presidential candidate
they admire make a powerful speech; they feel
connected to the larger message and their political
party. Collective effervescence becomes a religious
experience when it happens within a group of people
worshiping together, celebrating something sacred. It
focuses everyone’s attention on the sacred and brings
them together as a group.
A charismatic church. (Source) Some religions generate more collective
effervescence than others. Think about the different
types of religious services you may have seen or read about. Some are quiet, some are
bustling. Some have high energy while others are more reverent. Which styles do you think
generate the highest levels of collective effervescence? Why do you think there is such a
difference? To answer these questions, we need to study religion sociologically.
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believes in a supreme being but doesn’t believe God actively intervenes in the world). Franklin
is famous for saying things like “A penny saved is a penny earned” and “Time is money, money
begets money.”6 Weber contrasts these views, which fit well with capitalism’s emphasis on
investment, with the “traditional” view of money: that it is there to make your life comfortable,
to help you survive, but not to make more and more of it.7
Many sociologists believe you can still see the influence of the Protestant ethic on
American capitalism today, even though relatively few people would be considered Ascetic
Protestants now.
What are the major world religions’ similarities? Where do they diverge?
How are the various world religions dispersed around the globe?
Where are religious states found, and which states have become more secular?
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Religions generally have very strong geographic roots, and yet they can travel widely.
Figure 2 shows the majority religion in each country, with countries shaded in darker tones if a
larger share of the population follows the primary religion. For instance, more than half of
Americans are Christians, so the United States is red on the map, even though there are also
many Jewish and Muslim residents. Mexico is a shade darker than the U.S. because an even
larger percentage of Mexicans are Christian. The map also shows that religions are dominant
in some geographic regions and not others. For instance, Christians are the major religious
group across North, Central, and South America, Europe, and Southern Africa (although many
of these places are also quite diverse, as we will see in a bit). Islam dominates the Middle East
and Northern Africa. Hinduism is the most common religion in India, while Buddhism is the
primary religion across many other countries in Asia.
In some nations a particular religion is established, or officially supported by the state
(Figure 3). Approximately 22% of countries have an official state religion. For instance,
Buddhism is the state religion of Cambodia and Christianity (specifically, the Church of
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Norway) is the official religion in Norway. In most cases, countries fund activities of their official
religion. Around the world, Islam is the most common state religion.16
Source: “Many Countries Favor Specific Religions, Officially or Unofficially: Islam Is the
Most Common State Religion, but Many Governments Give Privileges to Christianity.”
Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. 2017.
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attend religious services as well as the proportion of the total population that does so.
Someone may have a religious affiliation (for instance, saying they are Catholic) but have low
levels of religiosity because they rarely attend church.
Across much of Europe, churches and other religious monuments dot the landscape.
But if you were to tour the continent’s countries, you’d find these places of worship in very
different levels of use and disuse. Countries in northern Europe, like Denmark, Iceland, and
Sweden, are well-known for being secular, with very few people professing a faith or attending
religious services. Other countries, like Ireland and Italy, have higher levels of religious
attendance.
Source: “The Age Gap in Religion around the World: By Several Measures,
Young Adults Tend to Be Less Religious than Their Elders; the Opposite Is Rarely
True.” Pew Research Center, Washington, D.C. 2018.
Why some countries and religions see declining religiosity and others don’t is a question
that interests many sociologists of religion. Sociology helps us to understand how and why
religion spreads, declines, and changes, both around the world and in the United States.
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unalienable rights.” And we know that hundreds of years later, the vast majority of Americans
report that they believe in God, and most identify as Christian.
On the other hand, the U.S. is the most religiously diverse country on the planet. While
most of the population of Ireland is Christian, there is relatively little diversity in Christian
denominations—most of the Christians in the Republic of Ireland are Catholic. This is not the
case in America, where hundreds of denominations and traditions are represented within
Christianity. We also have many non-Christian religions, as well as a growing proportion of the
population that doesn’t identify with any religion.
Researchers place the thousands of religious groups in the U.S. into seven large
categories: Evangelical Protestants, Black Protestants, Mainline Protestants, Catholics, Jews,
other religions (including Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists), and those who do not affiliate with
any religion.17 Figure 5 shows the relative proportions of each of these categories, as well as
some additional groups.
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You’re overwhelmed. Your whole life has revolved around the color blue, but suddenly
you’re exposed to people who prefer different colors. You had never realized there were
options other than blue. What if blue isn’t so special? How could everyone have so many
different opinions about colors? Maybe no color was really the best after all?
This is how Berger thought that religion and secularization (the loss of religion’s social
and cultural significance) would work. People would question their own beliefs when they
were exposed to others who thought differently. Modernization brought more contact with the
outside world and exposure to different religions. For instance, as roads were built and
transportation between places grew, people encountered more strangers from foreign lands.
These strangers brought more exposure to other belief systems. Berger thought that
secularization would happen most quickly in places with religious pluralism, or many different
religions. He thought that the existence of many religions in one society would create a
plausibility crisis for all religions, because people would begin to question the believability of
the core principles of their religion.18 Imagine all of the different places of worship in a big city
like New York—hundreds of churches, synagogues, temples, mosques, and more. Exposure to
all of those options might make you think twice about your own religion, or about the entire
idea of religion.
Although secularization theory was
widely accepted by sociologists of religion
until recently, there is mixed evidence that
this process is actually happening. In fact,
the United States is a powerful contradiction
to the theory. Even though there are many,
many religious institutions in New York City,
religion hasn’t disappeared; lots of New
Yorkers still worship at those places.
In fact, as Figure 4 showed, even
though the U.S. is one of the most pluralistic
religious countries in the world, it also has
American dollar bill. (Source) high rates of religious attendance compared
to other industrialized countries.
Religious competition
Why is the U.S. so religious? Secularization theory predicts that it shouldn’t be, because
there are so many different religions. But what if the number of religions didn’t discourage
people from participating, but did the very opposite?
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Imagine again that you’re in an isolated small town. Every Wednesday, you, your
family, and everyone else in the town gathers together to dance. You dance the same dance
every Wednesday and have never been exposed to another style of dance.
When newcomers arrive in your town, they dance different dances. Suddenly, there are
many options for what to do on Wednesdays. Dance halls start advertising so they can attract
potential converts to their type of dance. You’re excited by all of the options and shop around
at the different dance halls to see which one you like best. Dancing happens more often now
than it did when there was just one option on Wednesdays because people are choosing to
participate and dance halls are advertising heavily to attract people.
Sociologists Roger Finke and Rodney Stark argue that the high level of religiosity in the
U.S. is a result of the different religions competing for members. Rather than diminish religion in
general, the presence of so many options drives those religions to compete with one another.
They vigorously market their religion to current and potential members. This is called religious
competition theory. Its primary claim is that Americans are more religious than people in most
other industrialized nations because our religious groups make religion more interesting and
useful than it is in other countries; as a result, people are more likely to worship regularly, just
like the residents of the small town who suddenly had many different types of dancing at their
feet.
Religious competition theory might lead us to believe that lots of people are actively
shopping around for different types of religion and frequently picking new ones. Let’s go back
to our small town. Sure, there are many types of dancing available. But after looking around
and trying some out, you decide the dance that you’ve always danced is really the best. You
become more committed to the traditional Wednesday dance because you’ve decided to
stick to that option after all.
Sociologist Christian Smith points out that religious pluralism doesn’t weaken American’s
religiosity because religious people believe that they’ve personally chosen whether or not to
be religious and what religion to believe. Given the number and variety of religious options in
the U.S., it’s absolutely true that Americans have many religious choices. However, it’s also true
that 80% of those raised in a religion will remain in that religion for life. While choice exists, the
vast majority of Americans don’t actually exercise it.
Why don’t more Americans change their religion, given the choices that exist and their
freedom to select new options? Even though there are many choices, religion is closely linked
with other aspects of social identity. It can be difficult to dance a completely new dance
when none of your loved ones have also made this choice.
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Complex religion
One reason religion didn’t wane as people expected it would in the U.S. and around
the globe is that it is deeply intertwined with every other dimension of social life, especially
race, ethnicity, and social class.
Since early waves of immigration, sociologists have noted that religion is often part and
parcel of racial or ethnic identity; it also influences how our racial or ethnic identity is
understood by others. The racialization process is the way racial and ethnic boundaries are
drawn around a practice or a social group by others outside of that group.19 For instance,
physical appearances or certain names are often associated with particular religions, even if
those assumptions are inaccurate. Recent research shows that whether or not they are
actually Muslim, men with Arab last names are much less likely to get called back for a job
interview because employers associate them with negative stereotypes.20 President Trump’s
ban on people from several Muslim-majority countries, which we discuss below, is an example
of racialization that depends on religion. In this case, religion is a key marker determining
whether a group of people—in this case, citizens of entire nations—will be allowed to enter the
country.
The theory of complex religion21 argues that we can’t understand religion unless we
understand the complex ways it intersects with other features or identities of social life,
especially those related to inequality, like race, class, and gender. Different religious groups
hold varying degrees of power, influence, and status in America. Complex religion theory
views religion as deeply linked to inequality because of social reproduction, the structures and
activities that transmit social inequality and forms of stratification from one generation to the
next.22
There is a great deal of religious inequality in the U.S. Some religious groups tend to
have high levels of education; others do not.23 Figure 6 provides a very simple but powerful
illustration of social class differences between America’s religious groups by showing the
educational background of members of major religious groups in the U.S.
Mainline Protestants consist of denominations such as Episcopalians and Presbyterians
that were established earlier and tend to be more socially liberal and more reserved in how
they practice than Evangelical Protestants. Mainline Protestants have been privileged since
the founding of the U.S. The majority of the signers of the Declaration of Independence—
typically respected and relatively wealthy leaders of their communities—were members of
denominations that would now be considered Mainline Protestants.24 Mainline Protestants
continue to have higher levels of education than other groups. The least-educated Mainline
Protestants tend to be from groups that immigrated to the U.S. after the older Mainline groups;
even these groups have slightly higher educational levels than Roman Catholics (25% of
whom have bachelor’s degrees).
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Source: “Religious Landscape Study.” Pew Research Center. Washington, D.C. 2015.
In American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving, Christian Smith argues that one
reason Evangelical Christians have such strong religious identities and remain engaged in
American politics is that they have a strong religious subculture—a group identity based on
religion that clearly differentiates insiders from outsiders.26 The Evangelical subculture is strong
because it is “engaged with distinction” from the rest of society. This engagement comes
about from Evangelicals’ active political work and efforts to convert nonbelievers, and results
in feelings of distinction when they encounter others whose views strongly differ from their own.
Evangelicals have had an increasingly important influence on American politics, which we will
return to below. The tendency of Evangelicals to engage with the wider society is not the only
way a religious group can express its distinct identity, however. Other groups, like the Amish
and Hasidic Jews, intentionally withdraw from secular society and avoid engaging with it as
much as possible.
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An Amish community (Source); Hasidic Jews at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem (right). (Source)
In addition to class diversity between religious groups, there is incredible ethnic and
racial diversity within American religion as well. Figure 8 presents the racial and ethnic
composition of different religious groups. Much of this variation is a result of immigration and
settlement patterns over time. Roman Catholics are a great example of how ethnicity and
changes in immigration patterns are important to religion in the U.S.
At the turn of the 20th century, many elite Americans were deeply concerned about
Catholic immigrants. At the time, these immigrants (mostly Irish and Italian) were not
considered White. And as Catholics, they were often viewed with suspicion and disapproval,
especially because their fertility was higher than that of many Protestant groups.27 Today, the
descendants of Irish and Italian immigrants have assimilated into the U.S. and many have
largely achieved middle-class White status.28 A key part of White Catholics’ assimilation into
the middle class was access to higher education. More recent Latino immigrants are generally
much less educated.29
Not all recent immigrants have low levels of education. Due to changes in immigration
laws, recent immigrants from other areas of the world, who are mostly non-Christian, are
among the most educated Americans today.30 Almost 77% of American Hindus have at least
a bachelor’s degree, nearly three times the percentage of Catholics who do. However, just as
Italian and Irish Catholic immigrants were not seen as White in the early 1900s, being non-
Christian today has implications for racial and ethnic identity. For example, many Muslim
immigrants from Arab nations identify as Caucasian (see Figure 8). It remains to be seen
whether these Muslim immigrants will be seen as White by other Americans.
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Source: “Religious Landscape Study.” Pew Research Center. Washington, D.C. 2015.
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Why did the vast majority of American Evangelicals vote for Donald Trump for President?
How many elections for a government office can you remember? Was religion part of
the surrounding debate? Whether it’s a discussion about religious rights or a debate about the
candidates’ personal religious preferences, the issue of religion is almost always central to
conversations about politics.
By politics, we mean everything from direct political activity, including voting behavior
and party affiliation, to views on politically important issues, such as abortion, gay and lesbian
rights, helping the poor, and even war.31
Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt demonstrations in front of the Supreme Court. (Source)
Exit polls showed that more than 80% of Evangelicals voted for Donald Trump in the
2016 U.S. presidential election, despite his lackluster religious reputation.32 Analysts say that
Evangelical support for President Trump was a result of his anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant
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rhetoric, his commitment to nominate a judge who opposes abortion to the Supreme Court,
and his acknowledgment of the economic frustrations of many White working-class
Evangelicals.33 Each of these issues provides an important perspective on the ways in which
religion, race, and class are intertwined in American politics.34 Many scholars argue that
together, they are resulting in a “culture war” between Evangelical Protestants, who are
increasingly affiliated with the Republican Party, and progressives, who tend to support the
Democratic Party and who are less and less likely to be affiliated with any organized religion.35
Most Americans are aware of President Joe
Biden’s Catholic faith. Only the second president to
be Catholic, President Biden frequently attends Mass
and references his faith in public often.36 Yet his
support of abortion rights and his position on the
LGBTQ community place him out of step with Catholic
social teaching. This has resulted in debates as to
whether or not he should be able to participate in
Holy Communion.37
(Source)
Robert Wuthnow argues that growing
educational differences within American religious denominations created more polarized
religious groups after World War II. This process has been key to our culture wars,
disagreements over lifestyles, sex, and gender issues that increasingly differentiate American
politics.
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Anti-religion billboard. (Source: Wikimedia Commons) Atheists United highway sign. (Source)
Evangelical Protestants are now the majority of American Protestants because they
had greater fertility, and thus larger families, nearly a century ago.41 Those with no religion,
often referred to as “Nones,” are now 20% of the American population.42 Mike Hout and
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Claude Fischer found that Nones are more and more likely to be Americans who were raised
religiously but now reject religion as a reaction to the growth of the Religious Right.43
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compound in Waco, Texas, which he had witnessed. The Branch Davidians were a Christian
sect led by prophet David Koresh. In 1993, the federal government raided their compound,
resulting in a siege that lasted 51 days and ultimately in the deaths of David Koresh and 82 of
his followers.49
Many Christian Identity Movement members saw the
devastation in Waco as an indication of the government’s
desire to suppress religion, militia movements, and white
supremacy. The Christian Identity Movement believed it was
their responsibility to bring about both a Christian state and an
Aryan Nation and to put an end to the “Jewish-UN [United
Nations] conspiracy” they believed was running the world.50
Members of any religion that is used by some to justify
violence often argue that those engaging in violence are not
“true believers,” or believe in a “perverted” form of the religion.
But the truth is not that simple. Just as religion is deeply tied to Mugshot of David Koresh,
former leader of the Branch
race, ethnicity, and economic struggles in the U.S., it is also tied
Davidians. Source: McLennan
up with those social structures around the globe. Religion County Sheriff’s Office. Public
becomes entwined with other struggles, whether cultural, anti- Domain.
colonial, political, or economic. When religious beliefs become
intertwined with a feeling of being embattled or oppressed, it’s easy for believers of any
religion to justify violence.
Remember, religion is “eminently social.” It’s shaped by people and the times and
places they live in, and it, in turn, shapes people, sometimes separating groups while at other
times bringing believers together to fight for a common cause. In the U.S., the changing nature
of religious affiliation, particularly the rise of those who are not affiliated with a religion and
increasing immigration from non-Christian countries, will likely have an enduring effect on the
future shape of religion in America.
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REFERENCES
1 Durkheim, Emile. 1996. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York, N.Y.: The Free Press. (Originally Published
1912), p. 44.
2 Durkheim. 1996, p. 44.
3Berger, Helen A. 1999. A Community of Witches: Contemporary Neo-Paganism and Witchcraft in the
United States. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press.
4 Durkheim, Emile. 1996, p. 38.
5 Durkheim, Emile. 1996, p. 217.
6 Weber, Max. 2002. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: And Other Writings. Edited and translated by P.
Baehr and G.C. Wells. New York, N.Y.: Penguin Classics. (Originally Published 1930).
7 Weber, Max. 2002, p. 23-24.
8 PBS. 2008. “The Story of India.” Retrieved Nov. 30, 2017 (http://www.pbs.org/thestoryofindia/teachers/lessons/
9 Foreign Policy. 2007. “The List: The World’s Fastest Growing Religions.” Retrieved Sept. 27, 2017
(http://foreignpolicy.com/2007/05/14/the-list-the-worlds-fastest-growing-religions/); Gledhill, Ruth. 2015. “Islam is
World’s Fastest-Growing Religion, Will Equal Christianity by 2050.” Christianity Today. Retrieved Sept. 27, 2017
(https://www.christiantoday.com/article/islam.is.worlds.fastest.growing.religion.will.equal.christianity.by.2050/51321.
htm); Lipka, Michael, and Conrad Hackett. 2017. “Why Muslims are the World’s Fastest-growing Religious Group.”
Pew Research Center. Retrieved Sept. 27, 2017 (http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/06/why-muslims-
are-the-worlds-fastest-growing-religious-group/); Young, Gayle. 1997. “Fast-growing Islam winning converts in
Western World.” CNN. Retrieved Sept. 27, 2017 (http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9704/14/egypt.islam/); Hannamayj.
2011. “2.2 Billion: World’s Muslim Population Doubles.” Time. Retrieved Sept. 27, 2017
(http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/01/27/2-2-billion-worlds-muslim-population-doubles/); Longhurst, John. 2015.
“Religion in No Danger of Disappearing.” Winnipeg Free Press. Retrieved Sept. 27, 2017
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n334986); Pew Research Center. 2011. “The Future of the Global Muslim Population.” Retrieved Sept. 27, 2017
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Fastest Growing Religion in the World.” Learning English. Retrieved Sept. 27, 2017.
(https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/islam-fastest-growing-religion/2733147.html)
10 Pew Research Center. 2015. “The Future of the World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050.”
Retrieved Sept. 27, 2017. (http://www.pewforum.org/files/2015/03/PF_15.04.02_ProjectionsFullReport.pdf);
Whitehead, Nadia. 2015. “A Religious Forecast for 2050: Atheism is Down, Islam is Rising.” NPR. Retrieved Sept. 27,
2017. (http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2015/12/25/460797744/a-religious-forecast-for-2050-atheism-is-
down-islam-is-rising)
11 Lipka, Michael, and Conrad Hackett. 2017; Pew Research Center. 2011; Johnson, Todd M., and Brian J. Grim.
2013. The World’s Religions in Figures: An Introduction to International Religious Demography. West Sussex, UK: John
Wiley & Sons.
12 Encyclopedia Britannica. “Shia.” Retrieved Sept. 27, 2017 (https://www.britannica.com/topic/Shiite)
13 Corbin, Henry. 1993. History of Islamic Philosophy. Translated by Liadain Sherrard. London and New York: Kegal
Paul International.
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22 Doob, Christopher B. 2016. Social Inequality and Social Stratification in U.S. Society. New York, N.Y.: Routledge.
23 Bourdieu, Pierre. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste. Translated by Richard Nice. New
York, N.Y.: Routledge.
24 Davidson, James D. and Ralph E. Pyle. 2011. Ranking Faiths: Religious Stratification in America. Lanham, M.D.:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
25 Steensland, Brian Steensland, Lynn D. Robinson, W. Bradford Wilcox, Jerry Z. Park, Mark D. Regnerus, and Robert
Woodberry. 2000. Social Forces 79(1):291–318. We employ the most widely used categorization scheme of religious
traditions, called “RelTrad,”. However, we do not display the “Other Religion” category, as this is a “catch-all”
category which includes a wide array of religious groups such as Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Pagans, etc.
Instead, we break out some important individual religious groups, such as Hindus, Buddhists, and Muslims.
26 Smith, Christian. 1998. American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
27 Wilde and Danielsen. 2014.
28 Greeley, Andrew M. 1978. American Catholic: A Social Portrait. New York, N.Y.: Basic Books.
29According to the 2014 Pew Religious Landscape survey, 87% of American Catholics in the “other” category are
Latino. Pew Research Center. 2015. “America’s Changing Religious Landscape: Christians Decline Sharply as Share
of Population; Unaffiliated and Other Faiths Continue to Grow.” Washington D.C.: Pew Research Center.
30Cadge, Wendy, and Elaine H. Ecklund. 2007. “Immigration and Religion.” Annual Review of Sociology 33(1): 359–
379. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131707
31Brooks, Clem and Jeff Manza. 1997. “Social Cleavages and Political Alignments: U.S. Presidential Elections, 1960 to
1992.” American Sociological Review 62(6):937–46; Evans, Geoffrey. 2000. “The Continued Significance of Class
Voting.” Annual Review of Political Science 3:401–17; Manza, Jeff, Michael Hout, and Clem Brooks. 1995. “Class
Voting in Capitalist Democracies since World War II: Dealignment, Realignment, or Trendless Fluctuation?” Annual
Review of Sociology 21:137–62; Guth, James L., Lyman A. Kellstedt, Corwing E. Smidt, and John C. Green. 2006.
“Religious Influences in the 2004 Presidential Election.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36(2):223–42; Kohut, Andrew,
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Cover Photos by Artem Beliaikin, Billeasy, Adli Wahid, and Marco Ceschi.
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