ALONTE v SAVELLANO G.R. No.

131652, March 09, 1998

FACTS:
An information of rape was filed against petitioner Mayor Bayani Alonte and Concepcion,
predicated on a complaint filed by Juvielyn Punongbayan. The case was assigned under the
sala of Judge Pablo B. Francisco. A petition for change of venue filed with the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), to have the case transferred and tried by any of the Regional
Trial Courts in Metro Manila. However, during the pendency of the petition for change of
venue, Juvielyn executed an affidavit of desistance. Petitioners thereby moved to have the
petition for change of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become moot in view of
complainant's affidavit of desistance. The assigned prosecutor prayed for the denial of the
motion to dismiss of the petition for change of venue, explaining that he was not aware of
the desistance of private complainant and that in any case, such desistance would not
produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who had direction and control of
the prosecution of the criminal action. OCA Order. Subsequently, the OCA granted the
petition for change of venue that to prevent possible miscarriage of justice is a good excuse
to grant the petition to transfer the venue. Thus, the case now transferred to Judge Savellano
of RTC Manila.
Before the Judge Savellano, private complainant reiterated her decision to abide by her
affidavit of desistance. However, Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of
warrant of arrest of the petitioners, but without prejudice to the court’s separate
determination of the voluntariness and validity of the private complainant’s desistance in
light of the opposition of the public prosecutor.

Meanwhile, petitioner voluntary surrendered himself and his co-accused posted the
recommended bail. Thereafter, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded “not guilty” to
the charge. The parties manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. What transpired
immediately after the arraignment was the determination of the validity and voluntariness of
private complainant of her affidavit of desistance. In the light thereof, public prosecution
moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereupon the case was submitted for decision. Petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to
Admit to Bail." And the public prosecutors interposed no objection thereto. Respondent
judge did not act on the application for bail.

On the date of promulgation, Alonte could not attend due to mild hypertension and
Conception appears not to have been notified. Nevertheless, the promulgation of decision
proceeded in absentia

The trial court finds the two (2) accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
In this appeal before SC, petitioner contended that respondent Judge committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a Decision in the
case a quo without affording the petitioner his Constitutional right to due process of law.
That there was no order of trial being conducted prior to promulgation of judgement.

Respondent however contended that after the waiver by the parties of the pre-trial stage, the
trial of the case did proceed on the merit. The two (2) accused did not present any
countervailing evidence during the trial.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner denied of due process
RULING:
(1) Yes. There has been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings. Due process,
rightly occupies the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined
and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving. Jurisprudence
acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, requires:
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

In this case, there has been a deviation from what otherwise should have been the
regular course of trial:
(1) Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor
have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose;
(2) the parties have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor
have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; and
(3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any
modification in the order of trial.

PEOPLE vs. DAPITAN G.R. No. 90625, May 23, 1991

FACTS:

On 7 August 1986, accused-appellant were charge on an information filed for the crime of
Robbery with Homicide with the Regional Trial Court of Rizal.

When arraigned on 25 November 1986 with the assistance of counsel de oficio, Atty.
Magsanoc, accused entered a plea of not guilty.

At the schedule hearing, counsel de oficio for the accused, Atty. Gabriel Alberto of the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) of San Mateo, Rizal, manifested that the accused
had expressed to him the desire to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The Prosecuting
Fiscal made no objection but also manifested that he has to look into the penalty
applicable. Hence upon joint motion, the trial reset to another date.

On the scheduled date, upon motion of the prosecution and the defense in view of the
projected settlement of the civil liability of this case, the hearing was again reset. On
that
date, however, counsel de oficio for the accused did not appear, hence no settlement was
made and the hearing was reset again to later date.

Subsequently, the trial ensued and on various dates thereafter, hearings were had until
the
parties completed the presentation of their evidence. After trial, the trial court
promulgated a decision convicting the accused for the crime of Robbery with Homicide
and suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal, manifesting therein that he was appealing
the decision to this Court.

Before SC. Petitioner is deemed to be in complete agreement with the findings and
conclusion of facts by the trial court. He argued however that the imposition over him of
the penalty of reclusion temporal by the trial court is "tantamount to deprivation of life or
liberty without due process of law penalty, In addition, he erred the trial court in not
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

For the People, OSG argued among others that the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death; with the abolition of the death
penalty by the 1987 Constitution, the only penalty imposable upon a person found to
have
committed such complex crime is the single penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is an
indivisible penalty. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, it should be applied
regardless of the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
As regards the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the People submits that the accused-appellant
cannot avail of it since Section 2 of the law (Act No. 4103) specifically provides that it shall
not apply to, among others, persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life
imprisonment.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether there was no denial of due process in this case

RULING:
(1) NO. There was no denial of due process. Due process is satisfied if the following
conditions are present: (1) there must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over
the person of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3)
the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered
upon lawful hearing. All the requisites or conditions of due process are present in this
case.
Sen. Leila M. De Lima vs. Hon. Juanita Guerrero – G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017

Facts:
The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on the
proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting
inmates who executed affidavits in support of their testimonies. These legislative inquiries
led to the filing of three complaints with the Department of Justice against Senator
Leila M. De Lima, et al.;

On February 17, 2017, three Information were filed against petitioner De Lima and
several co-accused before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. One of the Information was
raffled off to Branch 204, presided by respondent judge. This Information charging
petitioner for violation of Section 5 in relation to Section (jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28
of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165.

On February 23, 2017, respondent judge issued an Order finding probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest against De Lima and her co-accused. Accordingly, the
Warrant of Arrest which contained no recommendation for bail, was issued against
petitioner.

On February 24, 2017, the PNP Investigation and Detection Group served the Warrant
of Arrest on petitioner and the respondent judge issued an Order committing petitioner
to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center.

On February 27, 2017, petitioner repaired to the Supreme Court via the present petition,
praying for annulling and setting aside the Warrant of Arrest of the Regional Trial
Court – Branch 204, Muntinlupa City as the said court lacks jurisdiction over the
petitioner;

Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information in the Criminal Case, the
Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She posits that the
Information charges her not with violation of RA 9165 but with Direct Bribery-a felony
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan given her rank as the former Secretary
of Justice with Salary Grade 31. For the petitioner, even assuming that the crime described in
the Information is a violation of RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive
jurisdiction to try the case considering that the acts described in the Information were
intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice. Some justices of this Court
would even adopt the petitioner’s view, declaring that the Information charged against the
petitioner is Direct Bribery.

Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan not RTC has jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner?
Held:
No, The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the
rules provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain
reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is
exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation of the
RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is apparent in
the following provisions where it was expressly mentioned and recognized as the only
court with the authority to hear drug-related cases. Notably, no other trial court was
mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take cognizance of drug-related cases.
In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to “exclusively
try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165).” This is an exception, couched in the
special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as
amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law
prevails over a general law and the latter is to be considered as an exception to the
general.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HENRY T. GO G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014

Fact:
An Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court’s which nullified the
various contracts awarded by the Government. Subsequent to the Decision, a certain
Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several
individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein
respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly
conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a
contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein
respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding
of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died
prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause. The Sandiganbayan
issued an Order to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private
person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already
deceased, and not an accused in this case. The Sandiganbayan grants the Motion to
Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.
Hence this case.

Issue:
Whether the death of a Public Officer in a crime extinguishes the Liability of his co-
conspirators

Held:
No, It is true that by reason of death, there is no longer any public officer with whom
respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that
the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of public
officer is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove
the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated
differently, the death of a public officer does not mean that there was no public officer
who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019, that there was probable cause to the
public officer for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his
death, he should have been charged. The requirement before a private person may be
indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private
person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law,
however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together
with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer be
charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private
person may be indicted alone.

G.R. No. 158763

(March 31, 2006)
JOSE C. MIRANDA vs. VIRGILIO M. TULIAO

FACTS:
On 8 March 1996, the burnt cadavers of Vicente Buazon and Elizer Tuliao (son of
respondent, Virgilio Tuliao) was discovered at Ramon Isabela, two informations for murder
was filed at the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela against SPO1 Wilfredo Leano,
SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel
Maderal and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez due to it. The venue was later transferred to RTC
Manila. On 22 April 1999, RTC of Manila convicted the accused and sentenced them two
counts of reclusion perpetua, except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time,
being at large.

The case was appealed at the Supreme Court and the accused were acquitted on the ground
of reasonable doubt. After the issuance of warrant of arrest to SPO2 Maderal he confessed
that petitioners Jose Miranda et, al., were the ones responsible for the said murder,
respondent Virgilio Tuliao then filed a complaint against the petitioners. Upon the issuance
of warrant of arrest petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Complete Preliminary
Investigation, to Reinvestigate and to Recall and/or Quash the Warrants of Arrest. During the
hearing of the said motion, Judge Tumaliaun noticed the absence of the petitioners, he then
issued a joint order denying the motion on the ground that since, the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. Judge
Tumaliuan was then replaced by Judge Anghad and the latter reversed the order of the
previous judge thereby dismissing the case against the petitioners. Upon appeal of the
respondent to the Court of Appeals, the said court reinstated the order of Judge Tumaliuan
and ordered the criminal cases of murder against petitioners to be reinstated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.

HELD:
Yes, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived (you
submit yourself to the jurisdiction of the court) by the accused when he files any pleading
seeking san affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction over
his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke
the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor
custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies
for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law. In cases not involving the so-
called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law.

Therefore, upon issuance of the warrant of arrest to Petitioners Jose Miranda et al., and
upon petitioners filing of Motion to Complete Preliminary Investigation, to Reinvestigate
and to Recall and/or Quash the Warrants of Arrest, the court has already acquired
jurisdiction upon them as accused.

DAVID VS. AGBAY

G.R. No. 199113. March 18, 2015.

FACTS:

Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon

their retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines. Sometime in 2000, they
purchased a 600- square-meter lot along the beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro
where they constructed a residential house. However, in the year 2004, they came to know
that the portion where they built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.
Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the
DENR at the CENRO. In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino
citizen. Private respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application on the ground that
petitioner, a Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint
for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC. Meanwhile, petitioner
reacquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of RA 9225. The Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor issued its Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner for
violation of Art. 172 of the RPC and recommending the filing of the corresponding
information in court. CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that
petitioner’s subsequent reacquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his
MLA which was void ab initio. MTC concluded that petitioner was at that time still a
Canadian citizen.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a
Filipino in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of RA 9225.
HELD
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of
R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph
of Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the
new law allows dual citizenship, he was able to reacquire his Philippine citizenship by taking
the required oath of allegiance.
For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it
is not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such
reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost
Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became
foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the
policy that considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship, should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which
clarifies that such policy governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.

Alva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157331, 12 April 2006

Chico-Nazario, J:

Facts:
An information charging Alva having committed the crime
of estafa. It was alleged Alva induced Yumi Veranga to give
120,000.004 processing her US visa which is not genuine. The
RTC found petitioner guilty of estafa and direct the promulgation
of its decision in absentia and issuance of arrest warrant against
petitioner for his failure to appear before it despite due notice.
However, the record of the RTC a document personal bail bond
issued by mega Pacific insurance corporation that it appeared
that Alba admitted to bail anew after his conviction. The motion
for reconsideration was denied by the RDC. On appeal, the CEO
dismissed it stating that appellant has failed to submit himself
under the jurisdiction of the court since his conviction in 1999.
There was no valid but bail bombed in place Cohen appellant
took his appeal. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner failed to submit himself to
the jurisdiction of the court despite posting of jail time
.
Held:
Jurisdiction once acquired, is not lost at the instance of
parties, as when an accused escapes from the custody of the law
but continues until the case is terminated. Evidently, petitioner is
correct that there is no doubt that the RTC already acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused petitioner when he
appeared at the arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime
charge notwithstanding the fact that he jumped bail and is now
considered a fugitive. We cannot say that petitioner has placed
himself under the custody of the CIA, for being in the custody of
the law signifies restraint on the person who is deprived of his
own will and liberty binding him to become obedient to the will
of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of
the accused. Here, the additionally being fugitive, he cannot be granted any relief.