1. MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES, G.R. NO.

111097

Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created
by P.D. 1869 to regulate and operate all games of chance in the Philippines. In 1992, PAGCOR
decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City and leased a portion of a building
owned by Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. (PPCI). The city council of Cagayan de Oro City
enacted two ordinances prohibiting the issuance of business permits and the operation of
casinos within the city. PAGCOR and PPCI filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with the
Regional Trial Court, which ruled in their favor. The city mayor and the city council appealed
to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the city ordinances are valid and constitutional.
Held: No, the city ordinances are invalid and unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled that the
ordinances contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein, which grants PAGCOR
the authority and franchise to operate casinos nationwide. The Court also held that the
ordinances violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution, as they discriminate against
PAGCOR and PPCI without any valid basis. The Court further held that the ordinances are
not justified by the police power of the local government, as they are not reasonable, necessary,
or conducive to the general welfare.
Ratio: The Court explained that P.D. 1869 is a special law that prevails over the general Local
Government Code, which grants local governments the power to regulate gambling. The
Court also noted that P.D. 1869 has a declared national policy of promoting tourism and
generating revenues for social impact projects, which cannot be defeated by local
ordinances. The Court also rejected the argument that the ordinances are based on moral
grounds, as gambling is not illegal per se in the Philippines.

The constitutional provision on the legislative department that is relevant to the case of
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties is Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:

Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its
own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to
such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and
charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
This provision grants local government units the power to enact ordinances for the promotion of
the general welfare and the power to tax within their respective jurisdictions. However, this
power is not absolute and must be exercised in accordance with the guidelines and limitations
set by Congress.

In the case of Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, the Supreme Court ruled that the ordinances enacted
by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City prohibiting the operation of casinos
within its territory were invalid and ineffective. The Court held that the ordinances contravened
Presidential Decree No. 1869, which created the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) and granted it the franchise to operate and regulate gambling casinos. The Court also
held that the ordinances violated the principle of local autonomy, as they effectively prevented
the national government from implementing its policies and programs through PAGCOR.

The Court reasoned that PAGCOR was a government-owned and controlled corporation that
performed governmental functions as an instrumentality of the national government. As such, it
was not subject to the regulatory powers of local government units except to the extent that
Congress may allow. The Court also noted that PAGCOR’s operation of casinos was intended to
generate revenues for the national government’s socio-civic and national development
programs, as well as to provide recreation and entertainment to foreign tourists and thereby
stimulate tourism. The Court concluded that these objectives were not antagonistic to the
general welfare of the people of Cagayan de Oro City, and that the city council had no power to
prohibit what the national law allowed.
2. AQUINO, JR. V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. L-40004

Facts: Benigno Aquino, Jr., a senator who was detained during martial law, filed a petition for
prohibition to nullify some presidential decrees issued by President Ferdinand Marcos. He
claimed that Marcos had no legal authority under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution and
that the latter was not validly ratified by the people.

Issue: Whether Marcos was a de jure president under the 1973 Constitution.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of legal personality and merit. The
Court ruled that Marcos was a de jure president under the 1973 Constitution, which was validly
ratified by the people in a general referendum. The Court also affirmed the validity of Martial
Law Proclamation No. 1081 and the power of Marcos to continue in office beyond 1973 as
authorized by the sovereign people. The Court said that the question of who is the lawful
president is a political question that is beyond the scope of judicial inquiry.

The case of Aquino, Jr. v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-40004, was a petition for prohibition filed by
former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and others to nullify the presidential decrees calling for a
referendum on February 27, 1975¹. The petitioners challenged the authority of President
Ferdinand E. Marcos to issue the decrees, claiming that he did not hold any legal office or
possess any lawful authority under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution¹.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld the validity of the presidential decrees
and the referendum. The Court ruled that President Marcos was a de jure president under the
1973 Constitution, which was validly ratified by the sovereign people on January 17, 1973¹. The
Court also affirmed the validity of Martial Law Proclamation No. 1081 issued by President
Marcos on September 22, 1972, based on the factual bases of lawlessness and rebellion in the
country¹. The Court further held that the referendum was a valid exercise of the people's right to
express their will on matters of public interest¹.

The constitutional provision on the legislative department is found in Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. It states that the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines,
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four senators who shall be elected at large by the
qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
The Constitution also provides for the qualifications, term of office, powers, functions, and
privileges of the members of Congress.
3. PIMENTEL V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 161658

Facts: Pimentel, a senator and a candidate for re-election in the May 2004 elections, filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 to nullify Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486, which
require mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office. He argued that these provisions impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator, which is not authorized by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 are constitutional.

Held: No, they are not constitutional. The Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution only prescribes a maximum
of five qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. These are: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Neither Congress nor COMELEC can
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it would amount to an unauthorized
revision or alteration of the Constitution.
The Court also held that the mandatory drug testing for candidates does not constitute a valid regulation of the
exercise of the right to run for public office. It is not reasonably related to the enhancement of the electoral
process or the promotion of public health, safety, or welfare. It is also not narrowly tailored to meet any
compelling state interest.

The Court declared Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as unconstitutional and void.
The constitutional provision on the legislative department that is relevant to the case of Pimentel v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 161658, is Article VI, Section 3, which states the qualifications of senators. According to this provision,
no person shall be a senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election,
is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

In this case, Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. challenged the constitutionality of Section 36 (g) of RA 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, which requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, as well as COMELEC Resolution No. 6486, which implements this provision. He argued that these
issuances impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator that is not authorized by the Constitution.
He also claimed that mandatory drug testing violates his right to privacy and the presumption of innocence.

The Supreme Court agreed with Pimentel and declared Section 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 unconstitutional. The Court held that the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five qualifications for
one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate, and that Congress and COMELEC cannot
expand or modify these qualifications by requiring a senatorial aspirant to undergo a mandatory drug test. The
Court also ruled that mandatory drug testing infringes on the right to privacy and the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, as it compels a person to surrender his bodily fluids for chemical analysis without prior
judicial or quasi-judicial authorization.

The constitutional provision on the legislative department that is relevant to the case of Pimentel v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 161658, is Article VI, Section 3, which states the qualifications of senators.
According to this provision, no person shall be a senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write,
a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately
preceding the day of the election.

In this case, Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. challenged the constitutionality of Section 36 (g) of RA 9165 or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, which requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, as well as COMELEC Resolution No. 6486, which implements this provision. He argued that these
issuances impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator that is not authorized by the Constitution.
He also claimed that mandatory drug testing violates his right to privacy and the presumption of innocence.

The Supreme Court agreed with Pimentel and declared Section 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 unconstitutional. The Court held that the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five qualifications for
one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate, and that Congress and COMELEC cannot
expand or modify these qualifications by requiring a senatorial aspirant to undergo a mandatory drug test. The
Court also ruled that mandatory drug testing infringes on the right to privacy and the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, as it compels a person to surrender his bodily fluids for chemical analysis without prior
judicial or quasi-judicial authorization.
4. GALLEGO V. VERRA, G.R. NO. L-48641

Facts:
Pedro Gallego, the petitioner, was elected as the municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the general elections of December
1940. Vicente Verra, the respondent, filed a petition to oust him from office on the ground that he did not have the
residence qualification. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Verra, finding that Gallego was a legal
resident of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, where he worked as a nurseryman in the chinchona plantation of the Bureau of Forestry
from June 1938 to September 1940. Gallego registered and voted as an elector in Malaybalay in 1938, and obtained his
residence certificate there in 1940. He visited his family in Abuyog only twice during his stay in Malaybalay.
Issue:
Whether Gallego was a legal resident of Abuyog, Leyte at the time of his election as municipal mayor.
Held:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and declared Gallego as the duly elected mayor of
Abuyog. The Court held that Gallego did not abandon his domicile of origin in Abuyog when he went to Malaybalay for
employment. He did not intend to establish a permanent residence there, as shown by the fact that he did not take his
family with him, he did not acquire any property there, and he visited his home town whenever he had a chance. His
registration and voting as an elector in Malaybalay were not conclusive evidence of his change of domicile, since they could
have been done out of ignorance or mistake. The Court also considered the fact that Gallego had a large majority of votes
over Verra, indicating the popular will of the people of Abuyog.
The case of Gallego vs. Verra (G.R. No. L-48641) is a legal dispute over the residence qualification of
Pedro Gallego, who was elected as the municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte, in the general elections of
December, 1940. His opponent, Vicente Verra, filed a petition to oust him from office, alleging that he
was a resident of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and not of Abuyog, Leyte, at the time of his election. The
Court of First Instance of Leyte and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Verra and declared Gallego’s
election illegal and void. Gallego then appealed to the Supreme Court, invoking the constitutional
provision on the legislative department.

The constitutional provision on the legislative department that Gallego relied on was Article VI, Section 1,
paragraph 3, which states:
The term of office of the members of the National Assembly shall be six years and shall commence on
the thirtieth day of December next following their election. No member of the National Assembly shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
he was elected.

Gallego argued that this provision implied that a candidate for any elective office must have resided in the
municipality where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately preceding the election. He claimed that he
had resided in Abuyog, Leyte, for more than one year before the election of December, 1940, and that his stay in
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, was only temporary and for purposes of employment.

The Supreme Court, however, rejected Gallego’s argument and affirmed the decision of the lower courts. The
Supreme Court held that the constitutional provision on the legislative department did not apply to municipal
elections, but only to national elections. The Supreme Court also held that Gallego had lost his residence in Abuyog,
Leyte, when he registered as an elector and obtained his residence certificate in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The Supreme
Court said:

Residence is a term used in its ordinary and usual sense to denote a person’s actual place of abode or
dwelling place. It is not synonymous with domicile which imports not only residence in fact but also
an intention to make it one’s permanent home or to remain there indefinitely. Residence implies an
intention to live in a given place for some length of time; domicile implies an intention to make it
one’s fixed and permanent abode. Residence may be lost by absence; domicile is not lost until another
is acquired.

The Supreme Court concluded that Gallego did not have the residence qualification required by law to be elected as
municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte.
5. SEMA V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 177597
FACTS: The ARMM Regional Assembly enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201)
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of
Maguindanao. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 renaming the legislative district combining the said
province with Cotabato City as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." Sema, a candidate for
Representative of the said district, challenged the validity of the resolution and the creation of the province.

ISSUES: Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly has the power to create provinces and legislative districts.
RULING: No. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a plebiscite in the areas affected,
as required by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Moreover, the power to create legislative districts is
vested exclusively in Congress by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. The delegation of this power to the
ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Thus, MMA Act 201 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 are null and void.

RATIO: The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government
Code and not in any other law, including RA 9054. One of these criteria is that a province must have a population
of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Shariff Kabunsuan failed to meet this requirement,
having a population of only 140,000 based on the 2000 census. Another criterion is that such creation must be
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. This was not
complied with since no plebiscite was conducted in Cotabato City, which is part of Maguindanao's first legislative
district.
The power to create legislative districts involves the power to make laws and thus falls within the province of
legislative power. Under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Congress is granted the power to reapportion
legislative districts based on standards provided therein. There is no provision in the Constitution that
authorizes any other body to exercise this power. Hence, Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, which delegates to
the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, necessarily includes the power to create
legislative districts as well. This delegation is unconstitutional because it violates Section 5(1), Article VI and
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.

The case of Sema v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177597, involves the constitutional provisions on the legislative department,
specifically the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives. The main issue in this case was
whether Congress validly delegated to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) the power to create provinces and cities, which necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts.
The Supreme Court ruled that such delegation was invalid, and that only Congress can create provinces and cities
because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only
Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The case arose from the enactment of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) by the ARMM
Regional Assembly, which created the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of eight municipalities in the first
district of Maguindanao. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 7902, which renamed the
legislative district combining Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
City." Bai Sandra Sema, a candidate for Representative of that district in the 2007 elections, challenged the validity
of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and sought the exclusion of Cotabato City from the district. Perfecto Marquez,
another candidate for Representative of that district, intervened and questioned the constitutionality of MMA Act
201.

The Supreme Court declared MMA Act 201 unconstitutional and void for being contrary to Section 5, Article VI and
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. The Court held that Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 (RA
9054), which delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is also
unconstitutional and void. The Court explained that under Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, Congress is
vested with the exclusive authority to reapportion legislative districts based on established standards. The Court
also noted that under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution, only Congress can create provinces and cities because
such act involves not only the drawing of boundaries but also the determination of elective officials who will
constitute their governing bodies.

The Court further ruled that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid insofar as it maintained
Cotabato City as part of Maguindanao's first legislative district. The Court reasoned that since
MMA Act 201 is void from its inception, it did not validly create Shariff Kabunsuan as a province
separate from Maguindanao. Thus, Cotabato City remains part of Maguindanao's first legislative
district as originally provided in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
6. BAGABUYO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 176970

Facts: Republic Act No. 9371 increased the legislative district of Cagayan de Oro City from one to
two, and apportioned the barangays accordingly. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
issued Resolution No. 7837 to implement the law in the May 2007 elections. Rogelio Bagabuyo, a
candidate for councilor in the first district, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus to nullify the law and the resolution, arguing that they were unconstitutional for not
providing for a plebiscite to divide or convert the city.

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 are unconstitutional for not requiring a
plebiscite.

Held: No, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The Supreme Court ruled that legislative
apportionment, which involves the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the
population, does not require a plebiscite and does not involve the division of a local government
unit. The creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of boundaries of local government
units, on the other hand, requires a plebiscite in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code. The Court also held that R.A. No. 9371 complied with the constitutional
requirement of population and contiguity for the creation of legislative districts.

The constitutional provisions on the legislative department that are relevant to the case of
Bagabuyo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 176970 are as follows:

Article VI, Section 5(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Article VI, Section 5(3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that each legislative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
Article VI, Section 5(4) of the 1987 Constitution provides that within three years following the
return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standards provided in this section.
The Supreme Court ruled that R.A. No. 9371, which increased Cagayan de Oro’s legislative district
from one to two, is constitutional and does not require a plebiscite. The Court held that legislative
apportionment is a power vested in Congress by the Constitution and is subject to judicial review
only in case of grave abuse of discretion. The Court also held that legislative apportionment does
not involve the division or conversion of a local government unit that would require a plebiscite
under Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution. The Court explained that legislative districts are not
territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays; they are
merely areas for representation in Congress. The creation of new legislative districts does not
change the boundaries or identity of the local government unit concerned; it only affects its
representation in Congress.
Therefore, R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7837 implementing it are valid and
effective.
7. BANAT V. COMELEC, G.R. NOS. 179271 & 179295
Facts: The case involves two petitions challenging the allocation of party-list representatives
in the Philippines. The first petition, filed by Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT), questions the resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) denying their petition to proclaim the full number of party-list representatives as
mandated by the Constitution. The second petition, filed by Bayan Muna, Abono, and A
Teacher, challenges the COMELEC’s resolution that made a partial proclamation of party-list
organizations based on the Veterans formula.
Issue: Wether or not should the party-list seats be allocated among the qualified parties,
organizations, and coalitions?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the allocation of additional party-list seats should be
based on the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition. The two
percent threshold in the distribution of additional seats is unconstitutional. Major political
parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections.
Ratio: The Court applied the constitutional intent of providing genuine representation to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society through the party-list system. The
Court also considered the practical difficulties and mathematical absurdities that would result
from applying the Veterans formula. The Court adopted a simplified method of allocating
party-list seats that would ensure a more proportional and equitable representation of
different interests.

PROVISIONS:
Article VI, Section 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution states that "[t]he House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations."12345
Article VI, Section 5 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or
election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector."12345
These provisions are the basis for the enactment of Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System
Act, which governs the election of party-list representatives in Congress. The Supreme Court
interpreted these provisions and the law in its decisions on BANAT v. COMELEC and related cases.
Some of the main issues and rulings are:

The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of
additional party-list seats as found in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. The Court held that this provision
violates the constitutional mandate to give proportional representation to the party-list
groups.1234
The Supreme Court adopted a new formula for allocating party-list seats based on the percentage
of votes obtained by each qualified party-list group. The Court also ruled that major political
parties are disqualified from participating in the party-list system.1234
The Supreme Court affirmed that there is a maximum of three seats per qualified party-list group
and that there is no minimum vote requirement to be entitled to a party-list seat.12
The Supreme Court clarified that there are only 219 legislative districts and not 220 as claimed by
the House of Representatives. Thus, the number of party-list seats should be 54 and not 55.2
The Supreme Court ordered the COMELEC to proclaim all the winning party-list groups and
nominees based on its decision.
8. ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 203766
Facts: 52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions with the Supreme Court (SC) to reverse the resolutions
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) that disqualified them from participating in the May 2013 party-list elections.
The COMELEC based its disqualification on the grounds that the petitioners failed to represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, their nominees did not belong to such sector, or they were not truly representative of their sector.
The petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion and violated the criteria for party-list
participation laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT cases.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioners.
Held: No. The SC held that the COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT cases.
However, the SC also provided new guidelines that abandoned some of the principles established in those cases. The SC
clarified that the party-list system is not only for sectoral parties, but also for non-sectoral parties, as long as they field
candidates who come from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The SC also ruled that national and regional
parties can participate in the party-list system, and that major political parties can also join if they form coalitions with
sectoral parties. The SC remanded the cases to the COMELEC for proper application of the new guidelines.

The case of Atong Paglaum v. Comelec, G.R. No. 203766, is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippines that
redefined the criteria for participating in the party-list system of representation in Congress. The party-list system is a
constitutional provision that allows marginalized and underrepresented sectors to have at least 20% of the seats in the House
of Representatives. The case involved 54 petitions from various party-list groups and organizations that were disqualified by
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) for failing to meet the requirements set by previous jurisprudence, namely Ang Bagong
Bayani v. Comelec and BANAT v. Comelec.

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous en banc decision promulgated on April 2, 2013, reversed the Comelec resolutions and
remanded the cases to the Comelec for proper application of the new guidelines. The Supreme Court held that the party-list
system is not only for sectoral parties, but also for non-sectoral parties, such as political parties and coalitions of parties. The
Supreme Court also abandoned the major political party rule, which disqualified political parties that are members of major
coalitions from participating in the party-list system. The Supreme Court also relaxed the requirement that nominees of party-
list groups must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent.

The Supreme Court summarized the new criteria for participating in the party-list system as follows:

The party or organization must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA No.
7941. These groups include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals.

While even major political parties can participate in party-list elections, they must comply with the declared statutory policy
of enabling Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be elected to the House of
Representatives.

Religious groups and organizations are prohibited from registering under the party-list system.

A party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA No. 7941, which enumerates the grounds for
disqualification as follows:

a) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; b) It advocates violence
or unlawful means to seek its goal; c) It is a foreign party or organization; d) It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or
indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; e) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections; f) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; g) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or h)
It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

The party or organization must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9
of RA No. 7941 provides that the nominees must be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties. The nominees must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

The nominee must likewise be qualified as a member of Congress under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:

No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the
day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
9. TOLENTINO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 148334

Facts:
Senator Guingona was appointed as Vice-President, creating a vacancy in the Senate. The Senate
passed a resolution calling for a special election to fill the vacancy, to be held simultaneously
with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. The candidate with the 13th highest number of votes
would serve the unexpired term of Senator Guingona. COMELEC issued resolutions proclaiming
the 13 elected senators, with Recto and Honasan ranking 12th and 13th, respectively.
Petitioners challenged the validity of the special election, claiming that COMELEC failed to
comply with the requirements of R.A. No. 6645, which provides for the manner of holding
special elections.

Issue: Whether the special election was validly held.

Ruling:
Yes, the special election was validly held. The Court held that R.A. No. 6645 did not apply to the
case because it only covers special elections where no regular elections are held simultaneously.
The Court also held that COMELEC’s failure to give notice of the time and position to be filled in
the special election did not invalidate the election, because the law itself fixed the date and
operated as the call for the election. The Court further held that COMELEC did not need to
require candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they were running for
the regular or special election, because all candidates were deemed to have filed their
certificates for both elections. The Court also held that COMELEC did not need to specify in the
Voters Information Sheet the candidates for the regular or special election, because there was no
distinction between them and the voters were free to choose any 12 candidates.
The case of Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148334, is a petition for prohibition filed by Arturo Tolentino and Arturo
Mojica, who challenged the validity of the special election for the 13th senatorial seat in the 14 May 2001 elections.
The petitioners argued that the COMELEC failed to comply with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6645, which
provides for the holding of special elections for vacant congressional seats. The petitioners claimed that the
COMELEC did not notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the special election, did not require the
senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they were running for the regular or
special election, and did not specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates for the special election.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld the validity of the special election. The Court ruled that the
COMELEC substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 6645, and that there was no confusion or
deception in the conduct of the special election. The Court held that the electorate was sufficiently informed of the
existence of a vacancy in the Senate and the need to fill it through a special election, as evidenced by the Senate
Resolution No. 84, which was published in two newspapers of general circulation, and by the COMELEC Resolution
No. 3300, which was posted in all polling places. The Court also held that there was no need for the senatorial
candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they were running for the regular or special
election, since all of them were qualified to run for either election. The Court further held that there was no need to
specify in the Voters Information Sheet the candidates for the special election, since all of them were also candidates
for the regular election, and that the voters were free to choose any 12 candidates from among them.

The constitutional provisions on the legislative department that are relevant to this case are Article VI, Sections 4
and 9, which state:

Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law,
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called to fill
such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus
elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.

These provisions provide for the term of office of Senators and for filling vacancies in Congress through special
elections. The Court applied these provisions in upholding Resolution No. 84, which called for a special election to
fill the vacancy created by Senator Guingona’s appointment as Vice-President, and Resolution No. 01-005, which
proclaimed Honasan as the winner of such special election with a term ending on 30 June 2004.
10. POBRE V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, A.C. NO. 7399
Facts: Antero J. Pobre filed a complaint against Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
for her derogatory statements against the Supreme Court and Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban in a speech she delivered on the Senate floor. Senator Santiago claimed
parliamentary immunity as a defense, arguing that her statements were made in the
discharge of her duty as a member of Congress.

Issue: Whether Senator Santiago’s statements were covered by parliamentary

immunity and whether they constituted grounds for disbarment or disciplinary
action.

Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, recognizing the importance of
parliamentary immunity but expressing concern about the language used by Senator
Santiago and its effect on the administration of justice. The Court upheld the
principle of parliamentary immunity, which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every legislative assembly. However, the Court emphasized that parliamentary
immunity should not be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the
reputation of the court and its magistrates. Lawyers, including members of Congress,
have a duty to maintain the respect due to the courts and to observe ethical
standards.

The case of Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399, involves a complaint filed by
Antero J. Pobre against Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago for her derogatory
statements against the Supreme Court and Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban1. Senator
Santiago claimed parliamentary immunity as a defense, arguing that her statements
were made in the discharge of her duty as a member of Congress or its committee1.

The constitutional provisions on the legislative department that are relevant to this
case are Article VI, Section 11 and Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the 1987 Constitution.
Article VI, Section 11 states:

“A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable

by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress
is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.”

Article VI, Section 16 (3) states:

“Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members,
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed
sixty days.”

The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint against Senator Santiago, ruling that her
speech was covered by parliamentary immunity under Article VI, Section 11. The Court
also held that the proper recourse for Pobre was to file a resolution before the Senate
to discipline its member under Article VI, Section 16 (3)1. The Court emphasized that it
had no jurisdiction to interfere with the internal affairs of a co-equal branch of
government.
11. LIBAN V. GORDON, G.R. NO. 175352
FACTS:
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners)filed with
the Supreme Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as HavingForfeited His
Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of theQuezon City Red
Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the PhilippineNational Red Cross (PNRC)
Board of Governors.During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the
Philippines,1 hewas elected Chairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the
PNRCBoard of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the
PNRCBoard of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as providedin
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that
the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in
accepting and holding theposition of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
has automaticallyforfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon, which held that
incumbentnational legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to
anothergovernment office.
ISSUE:
Whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in agovernment-
owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section13, Article VI of the
Constitution.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It held that the office of the PNRC Chairmanis not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporationfor purposes of
the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) is not government-owned but privately owned.To ensure and maintain its autonomy,
neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannotbe owned or controlled by the government.
Indeed, the Philippine government does notown the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government
assets and does not receive anyappropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is
financed primarily bycontributions from private individuals and private entities obtained
through solicitationcampaigns organized by its Board of Governors, as provided under Section
11 of thePNRC CharterHowever, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as
a privatecorporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the Corporation Code and register
withthe Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.

The case of Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, involves the question of whether Senator Richard J. Gordon forfeited
his seat in the Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors. The petitioners argued that the PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) and that
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution prohibits Senators from holding any other office or employment in
the government or any GOCC during their term.
The Supreme Court, in its decision dated July 15, 2009, ruled that the PNRC is not a GOCC and that the office of the
PNRC Chairman is not a government office for purposes of the constitutional prohibition. The Court reasoned that
the PNRC is a sui generis organization that is governed by international humanitarian law and that its charter does
not grant it corporate powers or subject it to government control.
However, the Court also declared void certain provisions of the PNRC charter (Republic Act No. 95, as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643) that create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate
powers. The Court held that these provisions violate Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which states
that "Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private
corporations." The Court ordered the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
The respondent and the intervenor (the PNRC) filed motions for reconsideration of the Court’s decision, arguing
that the issue of constitutionality of the PNRC charter was not raised by the parties and that the Court went beyond
the case in deciding such issue. They also contended that the PNRC is neither a private nor a governmental
corporation, but a unique entity that performs public service in compliance with international treaty obligations.
The Court, in its resolution dated January 18, 2011, denied the motions for reconsideration and affirmed its decision
with modifications. The Court clarified that it did not declare the entire PNRC charter unconstitutional, but only
those provisions that are inconsistent with the Constitution. The Court also reiterated that the PNRC is not a GOCC
and that its chairman does not hold a government office. The Court further explained that its declaration of
voidness of certain provisions of the PNRC charter does not affect the validity of the other provisions or impair the
existence and operations of the PNRC as a humanitarian organization.
12. OSMEÑA V. PENDATUN, G.R. NO. L- 17144
Facts: Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr. delivered a privilege speech in the House of
Representatives, accusing the President of the Philippines of bribery and corruption.
The House passed a resolution creating a special committee to investigate the truth
of his charges and to require him to substantiate them or face punishment. Osmeña
filed a petition in the Supreme Court, claiming that the resolution violated his
parliamentary immunity.
Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives has the power to discipline its
members for speeches delivered in the exercise of their parliamentary privilege.
Held: Yes, the House of Representatives has the power to discipline its members for
unparliamentary conduct or disorderly behavior, even if such conduct consists of
speeches protected by parliamentary immunity. Parliamentary immunity
guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being
made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside of the Congressional Hall, but it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by
the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. The House of
Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior and it may
impose sanctions such as censure, suspension, or expulsion on its erring members.
The courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of the legislature unless there
is a clear violation of constitutional rights or the exercise of arbitrary power.

The constitutional provisions on the legislative department that are relevant to the case of Osmeña
v. Pendatun, G.R. No. L-17144, are as follows:

Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution, which states that “for any speech or debate in Congress,
the Senators or Members of the House of Representative shall not be questioned in any other place.”
This is the provision that grants parliamentary immunity to the members of Congress for their
utterances in the exercise of their legislative functions12.
Section 16, Article VI of the Constitution, which states that “each House may determine the rules of
its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-
thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall
not exceed sixty days.” This is the provision that authorizes each House to discipline its members for
unparliamentary conduct or breach of order12.
The case of Osmeña v. Pendatun involved a petition by Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., who
delivered a privilege speech in the House of Representatives accusing the President of the
Philippines of bribery and corruption. The House passed a resolution creating a special committee
to investigate the truth of his charges and to require him to substantiate them or show cause why
he should not be punished by the House. Osmeña challenged the resolution as an infringement of
his parliamentary immunity and sought to enjoin the special committee from proceeding with its
investigation. The Supreme Court dismissed his petition and upheld the power of the House to
discipline its members for disorderly behavior or unparliamentary conduct123. The Court ruled
that parliamentary immunity does not protect a member of Congress from responsibility before the
legislative body itself, and that the House is the sole judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior
or breach of order. The Court also held that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the internal
rules or proceedings of the House, as long as they do not violate any constitutional provision1
13. TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, G.R. NO. 115455
Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of
the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on
various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of
the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that
S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.

Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a
bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in theHouse of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To
begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and
not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the
law must substantially be the same as the House billwould be to deny the Senate’s power not
only to concur with amendmentsbut also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the
Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills
authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of localapplication must
come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from
the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local
needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a
substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the
Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on
separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were
done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent.
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President
the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can
be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 is a landmark case in Philippine constitutional
law. The case challenged the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law in a
14-1 decision, with only Justice Davide dissenting1. The case is notable for its discussion of the
origination clause of the Philippine Constitution, which requires all revenue bills to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives1. The Court held that the Senate’s version of the bill did
not violate this clause because it was a substitute bill that retained the essence of House Bill No.
111971. Unfortunately, I am not able to provide a short case digest for this case as it is a complex
legal issue that requires a detailed analysis of the facts and legal arguments presented in the case.
14. ARROYO V. DE VENECIA, G.R. NO. 127255
FACTS: Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
“constitutionally mandated” so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to
raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. On the
same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having
been finally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

ISSUES: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House;

HELD: After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that
Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore
dismissed.

To disregard the “enrolled bill” rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the
other two departments of our government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void
because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those
defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be
acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to
do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can
seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of
anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the
good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body.

Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255 is a case decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines on
June 26, 19981. The case was brought by members of the House of Representatives against
respondents charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
“constitutionally mandated” so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution1. The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was
approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the
Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 19962. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House
and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the
House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 19962. After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court
finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A.
No. 82401. This case is therefore dismissed.
15. BONDOC V. PINEDA, G.R. NO. 97710
FACTS: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and EmigdioBondoc
of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga.
Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the
remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1
member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over
Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles
of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter
informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the
Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur
to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET
received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of
Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura to the HRET.

ISSUES: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of t e dominant political
party therein, may h change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation
of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein.

HELD: The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions
with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which
they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a
member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote in
favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of
the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a
violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and
void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates
Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional
election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure
under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such
as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from
the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for
other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of
proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction to judge election contests and qualifications concerning members of
Congress For HRET to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction, it must be independent and impartial, a separate body
from the legislative HRET members are entitled to security of tenure regardless of any change in their political
affiliations HRET members cannot be removed for disloyalty to a party.

Here is a short digest of the case BONDOC VS PINEDA, GR NO. 97710. In the elections held on May
11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the
position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner1.
The case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the
dominant political party therein, change that party’s representation in the House Electoral
Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election
contest pending therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House? The
use of the word “sole” in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935
Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives.
16. REYES V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 207264
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 filed by petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes, assailing
the Resolutions dated 27 March 2013 and 14 May 2013 issued by public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-053. The assailed Resolutions ordered the cancellation of the Certificate of
Candidacy of petitioner for the position of Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
FACTS:
On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of
Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations,
specifically: 1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas; 2)
that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the
residence of her husband, and at the same time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa,
Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of Representatives; 3) that her
date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960; 4)
that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or an immigrant of the
United States of America; and 5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.
ISSUES: In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner
and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
lone congressional district of Marinduque.
2. Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Respondent Tan’s alleged "newly-discovered evidence" without the
same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence which became the basis for its Resolution of
the case without giving the petitioner the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence, in
violation of Petitioner’s right to due process of law.
3. Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency requirement
for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
4. Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional
qualifications to the qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
RULING:
The petition must fail. At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC
vis-a-vis that of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) appears to be a non-issue. Petitioner is
taking an inconsistent, if not confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before this Court, she is asserting that
it is the HRET which has jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits that the issue on her eligibility and qualifications
to be a Member of the House of Representatives is best discussed in another tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
It appears then that petitioner’s recourse to this Court was made only in an attempt to enjoin the COMELEC
from implementing its final and executory judgment in SPA No. 13-053. Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the
petition, and consider each of the issues raised by petitioner. The need to do so, and at once, was highlighted
during the discussion En Banc on 25 June 2013 where and when it was emphasized that the term of office of
the Members of the House of Representatives begins on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.

This is a case digest of Reyes v. Comelec (G.R. No. 207264; October 22, 2013)123. The case is about
Regina Ongsiako Reyes, who was proclaimed as the winner and took her oath of office as a member
of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. The Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) cancelled her certificate of candidacy on May 14, 2013, which led to her
proclamation on May 18, 2013 being without any basis1. Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration
of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013 which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division1. The
motion raised the issue whether or not Respondent COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner
who is duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque1. The
Supreme Court held that petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC is not bound
to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence.
17. GUINGONA V. GONZALES, G.R. NO. 106971
FACTS:: The mathematical representation of each of the political partiesrepresented in the
Senate for the Commission on Appointments (CA) is as follows: LDP—7.5; LP-PDP-LABAN–.5;
NPC—2.5; LAKAS-NUCD—1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one Senator by adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able
to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other party’sfractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the CA to less than their
proportional representation in the Senate.
ISSUES: Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18
is vacated.
HELD: The respondent’s claim to membership in the CA by nomination and election of the LDP
majority in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the Constitution and
therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that 12
senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political
parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the
political parties in the CA by adding together 2 halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on
proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing
the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a
representation. The provision of Sec. 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in
character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey
or disregard the rule on proportional representation.

The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 senators be elected to the
membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect
12 senators to the CA. The overriding directive of Art. VI, Sec. 18 is that there must be a
proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the CA and that the
specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of
the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the
membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of
the parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations. Even if the
composition of the CA is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully
constituted, so long as it has the required quorum.

This case is about the interpretation of Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution which creates a
Commission on Appointments. The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is
mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to
disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation. The Constitution does not
contemplate that the Commission on Appointments must necessarily include twelve (12) senators
and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives. What the Constitution requires is that
there be at least a majority of the entire membership. The Commission on Appointments may
perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) senators are elected thereto as
long as a quorum exists.
18. STANDARD CHARTERED V. SENATE, G.R. NO. 167173
FACTS: SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro
Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA
8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in
aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The
respondent Committee then set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB
stressed that there were cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry,
thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with the
inquiry.
ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon
the judicial powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.

RULING:Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as
initiated in the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal
practices committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the
conclusion of the said speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to
prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."

The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body
should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign legislative
authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.

The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not be
enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the
committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even there
is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating
amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend measures to
address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although
it may include in its Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may
appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such Report
would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to
determine the liabilities of the offender.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1

Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) and its officers filed a petition for prohibition
against the Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, as represented by its
Chairperson Edgardo J. Angara. The petition seeks the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) to enjoin respondent from (1) proceeding with its inquiry pursuant to Philippine Senate (P.S.)
Resolution No. 166; (2) compelling petitioners who are officers of petitioner SCB-Philippines to
attend and testify before any further hearing to be conducted by respondent, particularly that set
on March 15, 2005; and (3) enforcing
19. SENATE V. ERMITA, G.R. NO. 169777A
Facts: This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for them to
appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Senate President
Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford said officials ample time and
opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its
investigation.” Senate refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that “all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive
and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the
lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both
faced court marshal for such attendance.
Issue:
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
Ruling:
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions of the Legislature:
The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during question hour.
Question Hour:
The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either
House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to
their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.”
The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. When
Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it had issued, the
department heads’ appearance is merely requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department heads during
question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
In aid of Legislation:
The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6, section21 of
the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in, or
affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change. And
where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information, recourse must be had to others who do
possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which
exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the government to withhold information
from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only to certain types of information of a sensitive
character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
official may be exempted from this power -- the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view thereof, whenever an
official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress
that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is
privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the
matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the
privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under
E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official possesses information that is covered
by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested
information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has
determined that it is so.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is
merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an
announcement that the President has not given her consent.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive
privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for
invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to
consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time,
neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure
of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section 1(a) are however
valid.
20. BELGICA V. OCHOA, G.R. NO. 208566

ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles
of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislati

FACTS: Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The
Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA
of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds,
such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and
null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court
issue a TRO against respondents

DECISION: Partly Granted

RATIO DECIDENDI: Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures
which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle
of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined
to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action
or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation
or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation
of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

Belgica, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19,
2013 is a landmark case in the Philippines that challenged the constitutionality of the pork barrel
system1. The term “pork barrel” refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for
localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative’s district1.
The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known as
the Public Works Act of 19221. The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued when martial
law was declared. It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General Appropriations Act (“GAA”)
called “Support for Local Development Projects” (“SLDP”). SLDP started the giving of lump-sum
allocations to individual legislators1. In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide
Development Fund” (“CDF”). The CDF was meant to cover small local infrastructure and other
priority community projects1. In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the release of funds
was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by individual
legislators1. The case challenged the constitutionality of these funds and their allocation,