BRIEFING PAPER

MAY 2019

Players of many parts:

The evolving role of
smugglers in West Africa’s
migration economy
Researched and written by: Ekaterina Golovko,
May 2019.

Editors: Vanessa Leigh, Johannes Claes.

Reviewers: Bram Frouws, Roberto Forin.

Copy-editing: Anthony Morland.

MMC graphic designer: Simon Pegler.

Suggested citation: Golovko, E. (2018), Players of many

parts: The evolving role of smugglers in West Africa’s
migration economy. Dakar: Mixed Migration Centre,
available at: http://www.mixedmigration.org/regions/
west-africa/.

Cover photo credit: Jean-Baptiste Joire.

Bus station in Dakar, Senegal.

Back cover photo credit: Jean-Baptiste Joire.

 Mixed Migration Centre / Briefing Paper

Notes on terminology
MMC uses the phrase “refugees and migrants”
when referring to all those in mixed migration flows,
unless referring to a particular group of people with
a defined status within these flows.
MMC works with the following understanding
of mixed migration: Mixed migration refers to
cross-border movements of people, including
refugees fleeing persecution and conflict, victims
of trafficking and people seeking better lives and
opportunities. Motivated to move by a multiplicity
of factors, people in mixed flows have different
legal statuses as well as a variety of vulnerabilities.
Although they may be entitled to protection under
international human rights law, they are exposed to
multiple rights violations along their journey. Those
in mixed migration flows travel along similar routes,
using similar means of travel – often travelling
irregularly and wholly or partially assisted by
migrant smugglers.
Smuggled migrants are people, including refugees,
who travel under the control of smugglers with
whom they enter into voluntary agreements to
irregularly cross international borders by land, sea
and air. 1
Victims of human trafficking, by contrast, are
people who have been subjected to the use of
force, coercion, threats, abduction or fraud (without
necessarily having crossed a national border) for the
purposes of exploitation.2 They may be international
migrants who have been smuggled and/or refugees
who during their journeys become subject to forms
of exploitation that amount to human trafficking.

1 For futher details, and links to relevant international law, see: UNODC - Migrant smuggling
2 For futher details, and links to relevant international law, see: UNODC - Human trafficking

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Contents
Executive summary 5

1. Introduction: the evolving

role of smugglers in West
Africa’s migration economy 7

2. Migration context:
migration and smuggling
patterns in West Africa and
between West and North Africa 10

3. Smugglers in West Africa 13

3.1. Smuggler profiles 14
3.2. Smuggling networks 20

4. How smugglers treat

refugees and migrants 26

5. Conclusion 30

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Executive Summary
The trade and smuggling of people and goods
have long played an important part in Sahelo-
Saharan livelihoods. There are established patterns
of migration between the Sahel and North Africa,
including seasonal, temporary and circular
movements.
The so-called migration economy involves not only
those facilitating the movement of people across
borders, but also other aspects of the economy,
such as hotels, restaurants, businesses offering
phone calls, mobile credit and internet access, as
well as food and water vendors.
The Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism
Initiative (4Mi) carried out a total of 153 interviews
with smugglers and 3,406 interviews with refugees
and migrants in Mali and Niger between August
2017 and August 2018. The surveys provide unique
insight into the role of smugglers and their interaction
with refugees and migrants. 4Mi survey data was
complemented by semi-structured interviews and
focus groups, and a literature review.
Key findings:
• Profiles of smugglers: Of the 153 smugglers
interviewed, 142 were men and 11 were
women, and the average age of the smugglers
interviewed was 38. Smugglers interviewed in
Mali originated mainly from Mali (68%), Algeria
(14%), Mauritania (6%) and Cote d’Ivoire (5%),
while in Niger they were for the most part from
Niger (87%). Most reported to have started
smuggling because they make more money
with smuggling than their previous job (90% in
Mali; 77% in Niger). While some reported that
smuggling was their only job (32% in Niger; 19%
in Mali), most said they had other jobs alongside
their smuggling activities.
Players of many parts: The evolving role of smugglers in West Africa’s migration economy
5
• Nature of smuggling networks: West African
smuggling networks are predominantly
horizontal and rely on regional connectivity.
Smugglers carry out one or several roles, and
some have young assistants helping them,
suggesting a more informal collaboration
between different members of the network rather
than a fixed chain of command. 4Mi data shows
that in Niger smugglers have multiple roles and
commitments within their networks. However,
particularly in the region of Agadez, restrictive
measures against smuggling implemented since
2016 have led to networks becoming more
professional and less accessible for new players,
with more fixed roles for those operating within
these networks. In Mali, the modus operandi of
smuggling networks is defined by state absence
and the important role of armed groups in
the political economy of the north. Networks
operating in northern Mali are characterized by
more professional and criminal-like activities
and by the single allegiance and fixed roles of
their members.
• Refugees and migrants starting their journey
with a smuggler: in Niger 20% of refugees and
migrants said that smugglers had helped them
start their journey, compared with 8% in Mali.
Refugees and migrants interviewed in Niger
who reported starting their journey with the
help of a smuggler were mainly from Nigeria
(26%), Guinea (12%) and Cote d’Ivoire (13%). In
Mali they were mostly citizens of Guinea (28%),
Burkina Faso (20%) and Cote d’Ivoire (12%).
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• Role of smugglers in encouraging migration:

4Mi data suggests that smugglers are not
instigators of migration. Only 6% of refugees
and migrants interviewed by 4Mi in Mali and
5% interviewed in Niger said they had been
encouraged to migrate by a smuggler. A much
greater role in decision-making is played by
friends (46% Niger; 37% Mali) and/or relatives.
In many cases (51% Mali; 24% Niger) migrants
made the decision alone.

• Services provided by smugglers: the services

provided by persons involved in the migration
business in Mali and Niger are diverse. Most
smugglers interviewed by 4Mi reported that they
mainly provided accommodation (86% in Mali;
80% in Niger). This is followed by transportation
to a holding place (71% in Mali; 52% in Niger),
recruitment of clients (52% in Mali; 74% in Niger)
and transit across a border (40% in Mali; 46% in
Niger).

• Protection incidents attributed to smugglers:

according to refugees and migrants interviewed
in Niger, smugglers were responsible for almost
half (45%) of the 424 protection incidents
reported. Other groups, such as thugs/criminal
gangs and security forces were identified to
a lesser extent as perpetrators (10% and 8%
respectively). By contrast, in Mali, respondents
attributed just 6% of all (648) protection
incidents to smugglers, compared with 30% to
security forces.

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Briefing Paper
Players of many parts:
The evolving role of smugglers in
West Africa’s migration economy

1. Introduction
Every day in West Africa thousands of people
move intra- and inter-regionally. Intra-regional
movement is regulated by a protocol adopted by
the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) in 1979.3 While this instrument in
theory allows citizens of the 15 member states of
ECOWAS to freely move within the bloc’s territory
(which covers some 5.1 million km²), in practice,
border crossings often create numerous difficulties.
As a consequence, both intra- and inter-regional
movement is often facilitated by smugglers, who
are widely called passeurs in the region.4
The West African migration business is complex
and multifaceted: its actors include not only those
who help refugees and migrants to move and cross
borders, but also people who provide or own the
accommodation used by migrants while waiting for
the next leg of their journey north (known, particularly
in Niger, as ‘ghettos’), coxeurs, (touts), middlemen/
intermediaries, travel agents, transporters, and
vendors of different kinds of goods.
Building on first-hand empirical data collected
in Mali and Niger from smugglers, refugees and
migrants (see methodology below), this Briefing
Paper describes various profiles of smugglers and
explains the range of services they provide. It also
discusses the networks in which they operate,
including links with organized crime, and formal
or informal political structures. In a final section,
it discusses smugglers’ role in violence and other
forms of abuse reported by refugees and migrants.
The research takes into account the broader
security, socio-economic and policy context in Mali
and Niger.
Methodology and limitations
The data informing this paper was collected by
the Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism
Initiative (4Mi) through a network of field monitors
situated along frequently used routes and in major
migration hubs. 4Mi aims to offer a regular,
standardized, quantitative and potentially
globalized, system of collecting primary data on
mixed migration flows. 4Mi monitors conduct
in-depth interviews on a continuous basis with
men, women and youths on the move, as well
with smugglers. Monitors approach refugees and
migrants in transit, predominantly at bus stations.
Questionnaires are anonymous and confidential.5
4Mi monitors use a smartphone app to record and
transmit completed interviews to regional MMC
hubs for storage and analysis.

3 ECOWAS (1979) Protocol A/P.1/5/79 Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment.
4 There is a semantic difference between the French word ‘passeur’, which is largely perceived positively in West Africa, and the English word
‘smuggler’, which has a more negative connotation. Unless otherwise specified, throughout this paper “smuggler” is used in reference to the
smuggling of refugees and migrants and peripheral activities.
5 The interviewed refugees and migrants do not include beneficiaries of DRC programs.

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A total of 153 smugglers (142 men and 11 women)
and 3,406 refugees and migrants (1,208 women
and 2,198 men) were interviewed by 4Mi in Mali
and Niger between August 2017 and August 2018.
The data was collected through two surveys in
main transit hubs in Niger (Niamey and Agadez)
and Mali (Mopti, Ber, Gao and Timbuktu). The 4Mi
smuggler survey includes information on smuggler
profiles, including how they entered the smuggling
business, services they provide and their means
of communication with refugees and migrants.
The 4Mi migrant survey includes questions on
the interaction between smugglers and migrants,
such as assistance and services received, and the
role of a smuggler during the journey, among many
other questions. 4Mi predominantly uses closed
interview survey questions to invite respondents to
anonymously self-report on a range of issues. Both
4Mi surveys include yes/no questions, closed-ended
questions with one possible response, and multiple-
choice questions. For multiple-choice questions,
the total percentages analysed in this paper may
exceed 100 where respondents have chosen more
than one answer.
While 4Mi in West Africa also collects data in
Burkina Faso, monitors there did not encounter
smugglers. For this reason, this study does not
include 4Mi data from Burkina Faso.
The 4Mi survey data was complemented by a focus
group with 4Mi monitors in the northern Malian city
of Gao in November 2018 and by semi-structured
qualitative interviews with researchers and
journalists working on migration and smuggling
in Mali and Niger conducted between September
and November 2018. The findings were further
complemented by a review of secondary sources,
including academic and grey literature.
4Mi is based on a non-randomized sampling
and as such cannot be considered statistically
representative of all smugglers and all people
transiting through Mali and Niger. The 4Mi data
used for this report was collected in Mali and
Niger and the answers provided by refugees and
migrants relate to their journey up until the place of
interview. Still, the significant number of interviews
provide important insights on the profile and role of
smugglers in West Africa.
Smuggling activities by their nature are difficult to
document, and understanding the scale of irregular
movement of people is therefore a challenge.6 In
particular, the clandestine and irregular nature of
population movements, the sensitivity of information
shared by the smugglers, and the involvement
of government officials and non-state actors are
some factors that contribute to the complexity of
analysing smuggling activities.

6 Irregular migration can be defined as movements that take place outside the regulatory norms of countries of origin, transit or destination. Not
all irregular migrants use smugglers. For further details, see: UNODC (2018) Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants (p. 20).

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Map

Tunisia
Morocco

Algeria
LIBYA

Sebha

Madama

Seguedine
NIGER
Mauritania
MALI Kidal Arlit
Dirkou

Ber
Agadez

Ch
Timbuktu
Gao

Mopti
Zinder

Niamey Maradi
Burkina
Bamako
Faso
Guinea
Benin

Nigeria
Sierra
Togo

Leone Ivory
Coast Ghana
Liberia Afr
Cameroon

Equatorial
Guinea Republic
Gabon of the
Players of many parts: The evolving role of smugglers in West Africa’s migration economy
Congo
9
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2. Migration context
Migration and smuggling patterns in
West Africa and between West and
North Africa
There are established patterns of migration
between the Sahel and North Africa that include
seasonal, temporary and circular journeys.7 These
movements may be facilitated by well-organised
networks operating across the region. While
such movements are often defined as ‘irregular’,
they generally enjoy social acceptance and are in
fact informally regulated. Migration is a resilience
strategy employed by many communities for
survival, livelihood protection and as a way to
create new economic opportunities. 8
The trade and smuggling of people and goods have
played an important part in Saharan livelihoods for
centuries. Two-way flows between North Africa and
sub-Saharan Africa are widespread and intricately
interconnected. 9 Migration is perceived as a driver
of economic development for communities on the
migration routes. The so-called migration economy
engages not only those facilitating the movement
of people across borders but also other aspects of
the local economy, including hotels, restaurants,
businesses offering phone calls and mobile credit,
internet access, food and water vendors, as well
as the families of those who migrate seasonally
as a strategy to cope with the dry season.
These dynamics are critical to understanding
contemporary Sahelian and Saharan mobility and
its local impacts.10
After Qaddafi
The security landscape in North and West Africa
significantly changed with the fall of Muammar
Qaddafi’s regime towards the end of a NATO-led
military intervention in Libya in 2011. In 2012, the
National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
(MNLA) started an insurgency in northern Mali.
This destabilized the security situation in the
country provoking a military coup in the south.
The escalation of violence and the risk of further
destabilization prompted military intervention by
France (with Operations Serval and then Barkhane)
and the establishment of the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
Mali (MINUSMA). In June 2015 a peace agreement
was signed in Algiers which brought some calm
to Gao and Kidal, although security in central Mali
deteriorated.
Amid the destabilization of Mali and Libya, irregular
movement to and through Libya became an
increasingly popular way to reach the Mediterranean
and Europe. Niger emerged as the main transit
country for West African refugees and migrants,
with a peak in 2016.11 While data on arrivals of
refugees and migrants in Italy indicates that many
passed through Niger, the numbers and flows
significantly changed over time.12 Furthermore, 4Mi
data suggests a significant difference in preferred
destination countries between those who migrate
through Niger and those who travel through Mali.
While almost half (48%) of the refugees and

7 For a detailed account of African and Saharan mobility, see: McDougall, J. & Scheele, J. (eds) (2012) Saharan Frontiers. Space and Mobility in
Northwest Africa (Indiana University Press, Bloomington).
8 Reitano, T. Adal, L. & Shaw, M. (2014) Smuggled Futures: The dangerous path of the migrant from Africa to Europe Global Initiative against
Transnational Organized Crime; Reitano, T. & Shaw, M. (2014), People’s perspectives of organised crime in West Africa and the Sahel Institute
for Security Studies; Molenaar, F. (2017) Irregular migration and human smuggling networks in Niger Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of
International Relations; Raineri, L. (2018), Human smuggling across Niger: state-sponsored protection rackets and contradictory security
imperatives Journal of Modern African Studies.
9 Tinti, P. & Westcott, T. (2016) The Libya-Niger corridor: smugglers’ perspectives Institute for Security Studies/Global Initiative Against Transna-
tional Organized Crime.
10 Brachet, J. (2012) Movements of People and Goods. Local Impacts and Dynamics of Migration to and through the Central Sahara, in McDougall,
J. & Scheele, J. (eds) op. cit. (p. 238).
11 While it is very difficult to calculate how many refugees and migrants transited through Niger, UNHCR figures for arrivals to Italy give some
indication: there were 42,925 in 2013, 170,100 in 2014, 153,842 in 2015, 181,436 in 2016 and 119,369 in 2017.
12 Arrivals to Italy have dropped dramatically in 2018: that year they totalled 23,370. Sea arrivals to Spain meanwhile, rose from 22,103 in 2017
to 58,569 in 2018, according to UNHCR.

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migrants interviewed traveling through Niger said
Europe was their preferred destination, less than a
third (31%) of those travelling through Mali intend to
go to Europe.13
Europe responds
In response, the European Union drew up new
migration policies, including by forging agreements
with African countries, specifically Niger, Chad
and Sudan.14 Disrupting the business model of
smugglers in North Africa and the Sahel became a
key objective of these policies.15 Efforts to dismantle
smuggling networks included EU police training and
border management missions. Some 22% of the
newly established EU Emergency Trust Fund was
allocated to migration management,16 including
approximately €137 million allocated to Niger
under these objectives.17 As part of these external
policies, the EU urged Niger to criminalize migrant
smuggling (see below). This approach underscored
the presumption by European policy makers that
smugglers are the main driver of migration and
among the major perpetrators of violations of
human rights of refugees and migrants.
Niger’s smuggling law
The region of Agadez has long been a major transit
hub for sub-Saharan migrants travelling to North
Africa and to Europe. The fast growth of the migration
business was linked to an increasing demand
for transportation towards North Africa. Motives
driving migration to the north included reaching the
gold mines in Niger, finding employment in Algeria
and Libya, and travelling to Libya in an attempt
to cross the Mediterranean to Europe. In 2013,
as many as 3,000 people per week were passing
through Agadez and using smugglers to move
toward Libya.18 The International Organization for
Migration (IOM) registered a total of 111,000 people
in incoming flows to Niger and 333,000 people in
outgoing flows in 2016, with as many as 170,000
migrants, mostly from West Africa, passing through
Agadez.19 In 2017, IOM registered 99,000 people
in incoming flows, with recorded outgoing flows
reducing to 69,000.20
In 2015, Niger passed Law 2015-36 to outlaw the
smuggling of migrants.21 The aim of this law is to
“prevent and fight against all kind of illicit migrant
smuggling” (Article 1). It defines migrant smuggling
as “the act of ensuring, in order to make a [profit],
the illegal entry in a country of a person who is
neither a national nor a permanent resident of
this country” (Article 3). Convicted smugglers face
penalties of five to thirty years of incarceration, a
fine of up to 30 million CFA francs (US$51,000) and
the impounding of the vehicle used to transport
migrants (Articles 10, 17, 18). Even “the attempt to
commit the abovementioned offences is liable to the
same punishments” (Article 13). The enforcement
of the law started in mid-2016. According to a
2018 study by the Clingendael Institute, between
mid-2016 and April 2018, nearly 10,000 foreigners
were expelled from Niger, 282 drivers were

13 This can partly be explained by the fact that Algeria is traditionally a destination country for migrants seeking employment, facilitated by a visa
free regime between Mali and Algeria.
14 For an overview on the repercussions, see: Tubiana, J., Warin, C. & Saeneen, G. (2018) Multilateral Damage. The impact of EU migration policies
on central Saharan routes. Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of International Relations (p. 9.)
15 European Council (2017) Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external aspects of migration: addressing the Cen-
tral Mediterranean route; European Commission (2015) Managing migration better in all aspects: A European Agenda on Migration.
16 Kervyn, E. & Shilhav R. (2017) An emergency for whom? The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa – migratory routes and development aid in
Africa. Oxfam.
17 €47 million have been committed to migration management projects under the EUTF in Niger. In addition, among the €96 million committed
under the objective of ‘improved governance and conflict prevention’, €90 million have been allocated to supporting justice, security and border
management, including countering smuggling and trafficking, in Niger. For details, see: European Commission (2017) Contrat relatif à la Recon-
struction de l'Etat au Niger en complément du SBC II en préparation / Appui à la Justice, Sécurité et à la Gestion des Frontières au Niger
18 Reitano, T. , Adal, L. & Shaw, M. (2014) op. cit.
19 IOM (2018) Flow Monitoring Point Statistics Overview 2016-217: Niger. See also: Destrijcker, L. (2016) Welcome to Agadez, the smuggling
capital of Africa, Politico.
20 IOM (2018) op. cit. IOM partly attributes the reduction to migrants taking alternative routes to avoid the new government controls.
21 For the text of the legislation, see: Loi 2015-36 du 26 mai relative au traffic illicite de migrants. See also : Massalaki, A. (2015) Niger passes law
to tackle migrant smuggling, first in West Africa. Reuters.

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arrested, and 300-350 vehicles confiscated in
Agadez and on the road to Libya.22 Some reports
state that only ninety local men were jailed under
the law 36 and all of them have been given light
sentence and paroled early.23 The intensity of the
law-enforcement activity reportedly decreased
since 2017, which was “in part to provide the region
with some breathing space”.24
While some statistics point to a decrease in the
numbers of refugees and migrants transiting
through Agadez,25 it is not possible to accurately
measure this, particularly as refugees and migrants
have taken to circumventing Agadez and Dirkou and
now use more dangerous and less visible routes.26
According to IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix, in
February 2019 outgoing flows at the Madama Flow
Monitoring Point represented 66% of all outgoing
flows from Niger, and 33% of incoming flows passed
through the city of Seguedine; 13% of incoming and
28% outgoing flows were observed in Arlit.27
Studies on the implementation of the law suggest
that anti-smuggling measures have led to changes
in migration routes in order to escape military
controls;28 departing at night and transporting fewer
migrants;29 the merging of drug smuggling and
human smuggling routes;30 the professionalization
of the migration business; former migrant smugglers
entering the business of trafficking tramadol
between Nigeria and Libya; and an overall negative
impact on stability.31 Other reported effects of the
law include an upsurge of banditry linked to the loss
of income-generating activities by many people
previously involved legitimately in the migration
business. Repressive measures against smuggling
have also been linked to an increase in prices and
bribes that migrants and refugees have to pay.32 In
2017 the IOM also recorded a “marked increase” in
the number of migrants abandoned in the desert
and related deaths.33
Mali: moving through conflict
As in Niger, in Mali mobility takes a variety of forms
of seasonal and circular inter- and intra-regional
migration, including that of people aiming to reach
North Africa and Europe.34 In 2017, migration
through Mali was estimated to be six to eight times
less than that through Niger.35 Unlike in Niger,
there is no region in Mali that is as economically
dependent on facilitating migration.36 IOM reports
that during the period between June 2016 and
April 2018 more than 125,642 migrants (36,981
incoming and 88,661 outgoing) were observed at
flow monitoring points in Mali.37 In 2017 more than
7,000 migrants were estimated to have passed

22 Tubiana, J., Warin, C. & Saeneen, G. op. cit. pp 23-24.

23 Ford, P. (2018) In high stakes experiment, EU migration policy moves front lines to Niger, The Christian Science Monitor.
24 Micallef, M., Horsley, R. & Bish, A. (2019) The Human Conveyor Belt Broken – assessing the collapse of the human-smuggling industry in Libya
and the central Sahel. The Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime/Clingendael (p.57).
25 IOM (2018) op. cit. The flows reduced by 75% in 2017 compared with 2016.
26 REACH (2018) Libya: Understanding the impact of EU migration measures on refugees and migrants.
27 IOM (2019) Niger – Flow Monitoring Report (February 2019)
28 Reidy, E. (2018) Destination Europe: Desperation. IRIN News (Renamed as The New Humanitarian since this article was published.) According
to Reidy, ‘The EU-backed crackdown on irregular migration has not so much stopped the movement of people from Niger to Libya as forced it
underground.’
29 Micallef, M., Horsley, R. & Bish, A. (2019) The Human Conveyor Belt Broken – assessing the collapse of the human-smuggling industry in Libya
and the central Sahel. The Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime/Clingendael (p.7).
30 Ibid. (pp. 56-57).
31 Tubiana, J., Warin, C. & Saeneen, G. op. cit.
32 Ibid.
33 IOM (2017) Rapport de mission sur l’évaluation des routes migratoires du 19-25 Juillet. It is difficult to establish the extent of any causal
relationship between enhanced surveillance and shifting routes/higher desert death rates. For further details, see: Bergmann, J., Lehmann, J.
Munsch, T. & Powell, W. (2017) Protection Fallout. How Increasing Capacity for Border Management Affects Migrants’ Vulnerabilities in Niger
and Mali. Global Public Policy Institute, RMMS West Africa and Danish Refugee Council (p. 44).
34 Cantens, T. & Raballand, G. (2016) Fragile Borders: rethinking borders and insecurity in northern Mali. The Global Initiative Against Transna-
tional Organized Crime.
35 Molenaar, F. & Van Damme, T. op. cit.
36 Bergmann, J., Lehmann, J. Munsch, T. & Powell, W. op. cit. (p. 37)
37 IOM (2018) DTM Flow Monitoring Mali, Results Snapshot #30

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through foyers (houses where migrants wait for

onward passage) in Gao.38
In 2012 Mali adopted a Law on Combating, Trafficking
in Persons and Similar Practices. The law includes
offence provisions on human smuggling, which it
considers as an “assimilated practice” to trafficking.
Both trafficking and smuggling offences carry the
same sentence of 5-10 years imprisonment. In 2018
the police has started to exert controls and arrested
several smugglers in Gao; nine people with minor
smuggling roles were briefly detained. This has led
to a change in the security situation for refugees
and migrants and made access more difficult for
different actors, such as NGOs and 4Mi monitors.
Traffic of illicit or irregular goods in Mali generates
insecurity at different levels, including attacks
against individuals, state officials and traders,
as well as conflicts among traffickers and armed
groups.39 In this context, irregular migration cannot
be understood as a mere consequence of conflict but
should be seen through larger dynamics of crime,
coping and resistance resulting from competing
networks of informal governance.40 The conflicts
in Mali, the presence of a number of armed groups,
some of them Islamist, as well as international
actors such as MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane,
might have an impact on the overall situation of
trafficking and smuggling in the region, although
the trafficking routes seem to not have significantly
changed since the eruption of the conflict.41
3. Smugglers in
West Africa
International law defines migrant smuggling as
“...the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of
the illegal entry of a person into a state party of
which the person is not a national” or permanent
resident.42 The understanding of smugglers,
however, varies according to the context in a given
country, including the demand for mobility, the role
of authorities, as well as interaction with organized
crime, if applicable.
In West Africa, the word passeur’43 is a catch-all
term applied to a variety of actors in the migration
business, including “facilitators, intermediaries,
guides, [and] connection men”.44 4Mi monitors
interviewed for this paper provide different views on
how they perceive smugglers in West Africa, ranging
from persons transporting refugees and migrants
from one point to another,45 to businessmen or even
benevolent persons who help migrants.46
Refugees and migrants interviewed by 4Mi mostly
perceived passeurs as professional smugglers
(69% in Mali and 74% in Niger) or as travel agents
(25% in Mali and 10% in Niger). Views varied
according to the cities where interviews took place:
in Agadez, refugees and migrants mainly defined
their smugglers as professional (81%) and only
8% described them as informal/ad hoc smugglers

38 Security Council (2018) Final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali (§ 135)
39 Ibid (p. 2)
40 Bøås, M. (2015) Crime, Coping, and Resistance in the Mali-Sahel Periphery . African Security, Vol. 8.
41 Molenaar, F. & Van Damme, T. (2017) Irregular migration and human smuggling networks in Mali. Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of Inter-
national Relations (p. 4).
42 United Nations (2000) Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime. See also: Carling, J., Gallagher, A., & Horwood, C. (2015) Beyond Definitions: Global migration and the smug-
gling–trafficking nexus. Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat.
43 Vernacular terms used in Niger, such as an-sùmo- gàl in Hausa, afrod in Tamasheq, sahib al-frûd in Arabic, and even fraudeur in French, have
traditionally been used in reference to the smuggling of goods rather than people. Historically, the smuggling of people tended to be a side
activity carried out by such traders. For more details, see: Brachet, J. (2018) Manufacturing Smugglers: From Irregular to Clandestine Mobility in
the Sahara. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 676. (pp. 16-35)
44 Translated from the original French: “Ils sont facilitateurs, intermédiaires, guides, relais, c'est un véritable business.” 4Mi monitors interviewed in
Mali in November 2018.
45 Translated from the original French: “Pour moi les passeurs ce sont des personnes qui s'occupent de faire passer les migrants d'un point à une
autre. C’est des gens ordinaires.” 4Mi monitor Timbuktu.
46 4Mi monitor in Gao.

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(8%), while in the capital, Niamey, many defined
their smuggler as a travel agent (51%) and only
42% as a professional smuggler. In Gao, 44% said
they perceived their smugglers as professional
compared to 33% as travel agents. This difference
in perceptions between Niamey and Agadez can
be explained by the fact that migrants mostly use
regular buses between the two cities, and are also
interviewed at bus stations, whereas from Agadez
they need to use a smuggler to travel northward. The
answer options suggested by the 4Mi questionnaire
can be affected by interviewers’ and respondents’
interpretations as well as by the local context. For
instance, within ECOWAS a “travel agent” can be
perceived as a facilitator who is simply providing a
travel service.
While some of the interviewed smugglers reported
that smuggling was their only job (32% in Niger; 19%
in Mali), most said they had other jobs alongside
their smuggling activities. Among those who said
they had other jobs, some reported that smuggling
was their main job but they also had side jobs (26%
in Niger; 46% in Mali); a higher percentage reported
that smuggling was a side job to their main jobs
(41% in Niger; 35% in Mali).
Becoming a smuggler
Most smugglers interviewed by 4Mi in Mali and
Niger reported to have started smuggling because
they make more money with smuggling than with
their previous job (90% in Mali; 77% in Niger). 10%
of the smugglers interviewed in Niger indicated that
they resorted to smuggling because it requires less

3.1 Smuggler profiles effort than other jobs.

This is what some smugglers told 4Mi monitors

Of the 153 smugglers interviewed, 142 were men
about their motivations:
and 11 were women. Ten of the women were
interviewed in Agadez and one in Timbuktu. The
average age of the smugglers interviewed was 38, “I am involved because I have no other
which is 10 years older than the average age of activity to survive.” 47
refugees and migrants interviewed during the same
Male smuggler, Timbuktu .48
period.

“My smuggling activity is dangerous but

The smugglers interviewed by 4Mi in Mali originated
mainly from Mali (68%). Others originated from
Algeria (14%), Mauritania (6%) and Cote d’Ivoire
(5%). In Niger, the smugglers interviewed were
for the most part from Niger (87%), with some
originating from other countries in West Africa,
including Senegal (3%), Ghana (3%) and Togo (3%).
Most smugglers reported to have reached some
level of education, including primary education
(38% in Mali; 26% in Niger), religious education
(37% in Mali; 3% in Niger) and secondary education
(12% in Mali; 54% in Niger).
profitable for my whole family and my
community, so I take the risk.”
Male smuggler, Timbuktu.49
“I was a migrant myself. I passed through
here and spent more than five years in
Libya, so I had knowledge. When I returned,
I started selling food at the bus station and
that’s how it all started. Now that the law
against this kind of [smuggling] work has

47 Translated from the original French: “Je suis impliqué parce que je n'ai aucune autre activité pour survivre.”
48 To protect the identities of interviewees cited in this paper, their names, ages and nationalities have been withheld. Most interviewees spoke in
French; English translations include minor editing for clarity and ease of reading.
49 Translated from the original French: “Mon activité de passeurs est dangereuse mais profitable à toute ma famille et ma communauté, donc je
prends le risque. ”

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been adopted, I am continuing my main Refugees and migrants do not necessarily need a
activity, but I am doing this job to help the smuggler until they reach the desert. Before arriving
in northern Mali and northern Niger, refugees and
migrants because I have seen how other
migrants in theory can freely move and use regular
passeurs scammed the migrants. I have my means of transportation. A 4Mi monitor interviewed
own son in Italy, so this job pays off.” 50 in Timbuktu said that some refugees and migrants
Female smuggler, Agadez nevertheless use smuggler services before the desert
so as to circumvent the various checkpoints where
there are higher risks of being detained or subject to
“It's my dad who's been here for a while
bribes. This is also true for Niger where refugees and
doing this work. When I got here and migrants have started to use more smugglers than
wanted to go to Libya he made me stay regular public transport, since the implementation
here to help him. Now I am my own boss of the Law 2015-36.52 Another reason is that they
and I am proud because I help my brothers require guidance in an unknown environment and
the smuggler, whose details are often given to them
a lot. […] Things are pretty good.”
by people they know, is their only point of contact.53
Male smuggler, Agadez. 51

4Mi interviews with refugees and migrants indicate

Many smugglers interviewed by 4Mi reported to
have started working as smugglers by connecting
migrants to smugglers (41% in Niger; 51% in Mali).
Some reported to have directly started working in
a smuggling network (45% in Niger; 30% in Mali).
A smaller share of respondents reported to have
started a job that was unrelated to smuggling and
to have subsequently been assigned smuggling
activities by their employer (6% in Mali; 7% in Niger).
Smugglers along migration routes
The 4Mi migrant survey provides insight on refugees’
and migrants’ various interactions with smugglers:
at the start of their journey, en route between their
country of origin and the last city before reaching
the Sahara desert, finding a smuggler, and making
contact with smugglers in a new place. 4Mi data
suggests that there is no single typical scenario, but
rather different cases that make up a broader picture.
that smugglers operate in coastal West African
countries (Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Nigeria) to facilitate
those bound for the central Mediterranean route
from their point of departure up until the desert. This
suggests that smuggling networks operating from
these countries are more developed and involved in
the recruitment of potential migrants in villages and
small and medium cities. Their role tends to be one
of coordination rather than of hands-on assistance
in irregular border crossings. This is an important
feature of the migration business in West Africa:
smugglers have a “connectivity” function within
the business and very often the smuggler connects
migrants with people present on the ground for the
next steps of the journey. While much attention has
been dedicated to smuggling networks in key hubs
located just before the desert, there is a need for
more research on smugglers operating in and from
coastal countries.

50 Translated from the original French: “Avant j'étais une migrante parce que je passais par ici donc j’ai fait plus de 5 ans en Libye donc j’avais
de connaissances, de mon retour j’ai commencé à vendre la nourriture à l'autogare et la que tout a commencé. Maintenant que cette loi a été
voté de ne faire plus ce travail je continue mon activité principale, mais moi je fais ce travail pour aider les migrants parce que j’ai vue comment
d'autre passeurs escroquaient les migrant et actuellement j’ai mon propre fils en Italie donc ce travail me paye.”
51 Translated from the original French: “Moi c’est papa qui est ici depuis et il fait cette activité donc à mon arrivée ici j’ai voulu rejoindre la Libye
il m’a empêché pour que je reste pour l’aider. Maintenant je suis mon patron de moi-même et je suis fier parce que j'aide beaucoup mes frères
sénégalais. Voilà que je suis marie ici avec une nigérienne j’ai même deux enfants donc c’est déjà bon.”
52 Micallef, M., Horsley, R. & Bish, A. (2019) The Human Conveyor Belt Broken – assessing the collapse of the human-smuggling industry in Libya
and the central Sahel. The Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime/Clingendael (p.59).
53 Interviews with 4Mi monitors.

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Migrants’ influences
4Mi data on who encouraged refugees and migrants
to migrate suggests very few were enticed to do
so by smugglers (6% in Mali; 5% in Niger). A much
greater role in decision-making is played by friends
(46% Niger; 37% Mali) and/or relatives (see chart
below), and in many cases (51% Mali; 24% Niger)
migrants made the decision alone. With regard
to the facilitation of their journey, in Niger 20% of
refugees and migrants said that smugglers had
helped them start their journey, compared with 8%
in Mali.

Who encouraged you to migrate?

Social media
Mali

Niger

Spouse

Smugglers

No, I made the decision alone

Parents

Friends

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

Figure 1. Source: 4Mi migrant survey Niger n=1161 Mali=2241

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Initial contacts with smugglers Use of smugglers en route

According to 4Mi data, in Niger and Mali, refugees
and migrants encounter smugglers in different
ways. In Mali, for the most part (75%) they
approach smugglers themselves, and many (69%)
are referred to smugglers by mutual friends, family
or acquaintances. In Niger, most (74%) refugees
and migrants are referred to smugglers by other
smugglers and many (65%) approach smugglers
themselves and/or have mutual friends/family/
acquaintances who refer them to smugglers (61%).54
Refugees and migrants interviewed in Niger who
reported starting their journey with the help of a
smuggler were mainly from Nigeria (26%), Guinea
(12%) and Cote d’Ivoire (13%). In Mali these were
mostly citizens of Guinea (28%), Burkina Faso
(20%)55 and Cote d’Ivoire (12%). Most respondents
who started their journey with the help of a smuggler
continued it with the facilitation of a smuggler (95%
in Niger and 75% in Mali). A very small number
of respondents who started their journey with a
smuggler continued their journey without further
help (0.1%: 30 respondents interviewed in Mali and
one in Agadez).
Among the refugees and migrants surveyed by 4Mi,
some said the leg of their journey to the location of
their interview had not been facilitated by anyone
(47% in Mali; 16% in Niger), while others reported
it had been facilitated by a smuggler (36% in Mali;
39% in Niger) and/or by a friend or relative (26%
in Mali; 42% in Niger). Very often, the decision to
seek assistance from a smuggler (for a part or the
entire route) is dependent on existing connections
with other migrants and with smugglers.56 In some
cases, smugglers provide refugees and migrants
with package deals covering entire journeys.
These can include contact information for coxeurs
at every stop along the way who put travellers
in touch with ghetto owners and drivers. Such
package deals are an illustration of how networks
for example in Agadez are linked to wider networks
operating all along a smuggling route, often linked
to ethnolinguistic ties between communities.57

54 Many percentages in this section derive from multiple choice questions where respondents were free to select as many answers as they wish.
Aggregates may therefore exceed 100 percent.
55 4Mi monitors have never encountered migrant smugglers in Burkina Faso. The quoted data could be explained by Burkinabe refugees and
migrants having started their journey outside of Burkina Faso or having encountered a smuggler in another country by phone.
56 There is no difference based on gender of refugees and migrants.
57 Molenaar, F. op. cit. (p. 22).

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Services provided by smugglers

The services provided by persons involved in the
migration business in Mali and Niger are diverse.58
The broad category of “smuggler” include drivers,
coxeurs, ghetto owners, intermediaries between
transporters, and network coordinators. There
are also a number of other economic activities
supporting the migration economy, for instance
water sellers, operators of call/internet shops and
money transfer agencies.59 These activities do not
technically constitute migrant smuggling but form
part of the wider migration economy.
The charts below provide an overview of services
that smugglers provide in Mali and Niger based on
4Mi interviews. The charts compare information
about services provided and received according to
smugglers and refugees and migrants.

Services provided by smugglers and used by refugees and migrants in Mali

Liaising with authorities

Smugglers

Refugees and migrants

Provision of documents

Recruiting clients to migrate

Safe transit across border

Collecting clients from a

meeting point

Accommodation

Transportation to
holding place

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Figure 2. Source: 4Mi smuggler and migrant surveys Smugglers: n=84. Migrants: n=854.

58 Interview with 4Mi monitor.

59 Molenaar, F. op. cit. (p. 2).

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Services provided by smugglers and used by refugees and migrants in Niger

Liaising with authorities

Smugglers

Refugees and migrants

Provision of documents

Recruiting clients to migrate

Safe transit across border

Collecting clients from a

meeting point

Accommodation

Transportation to
holding place

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Figure 3. Source: 4Mi smuggler and migrant surveys. Smugglers: n=69. Migrants: n=549.

Accommodation, transportation to holding places,
and collecting clients from meeting points are
some of the main smuggling services cited by
all respondents. Most smugglers interviewed
by 4Mi (86% in Mali; 80% in Niger) reported that
accommodation was the main service they provided
. This is followed by transportation to a holding
place (71% in Mali; 52% in Niger), recruiting clients
to migrate (52% in Mali; 74% in Niger) and safe
transit across a border (40% in Mali; 46% in Niger).
Refugees and migrants also reported that the main
smuggler services they used was the provision of
accommodation (42% in Mali; 89% in Niger). They
also cited collecting clients from a meeting point
(40% in Mali; 72% in Niger), safe transit across a
border (17% in Mali; 76% in Niger), and recruiting
clients to migrate (19% in Mali; 61% in Niger).
There are some notable differences between
smugglers’ and migrants’ answers relating to “safe
transit across the border” in Niger (76% of refugees
and migrants said that they had received this
service, while only 46% smugglers said they provide
it). This could partly be explained by the reluctance
of smugglers to discuss facilitating entry or exit
from Niger in light of the new legislation. It could
also be due to the common practice of smugglers
taking refugees and migrants right up to the border
but leaving them to cross it unaccompanied (see
below). Finally, it can also be attributed to the fact
that the smugglers interviewed by 4Mi are not
necessarily the same as those used by the refugees
and migrants interviewed by 4Mi.

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There were also differences observed between Niger
and Mali with regard to “liaising with authorities”. In
Mali very few respondents (5% of smugglers; 12% of
refugees and migrants) mentioned this service, while
in Niger 43% of refugees and migrants considered
it an important service provided by smugglers. This
can be explained by the fact that across Mali there
is less need for help liaising with the authorities, as
authorities are absent in some parts of the country
through which main migration routes pass. In
contrast in Niger, collaboration between state actors
and smuggling networks is well established (as
explored in further detail below).
3.2 Smuggling networks
In the media, smugglers are often portrayed as
operating within large-scale, transnational criminal
networks which include human traffickers and
which organise and oversee every stage of migrants’
journeys. Such portrayals imply that the networks
are associated with organized crime and complex
criminal organizations boasting a large presence on
the ground and hierarchical coordination.60
While this assumption has been absorbed
into migration response politics,61 the reality of
smugglers’ modus operandi on the ground in West
Africa is more nuanced and complex, with the social
and anthropological literature providing evidence of
networks being loosely organised and fragmented.
This section discusses 4Mi data on smuggling
networks within the broader political and social
context of Mali and Niger.
Smuggling networks in Niger
Smuggling networks in Niger operate in a context
where the state, although weak, has a military
presence in areas through which migration
routes pass. On the road(s) between Agadez and
Madama this presence does not impede smuggling
activities. Prior to the anti-smuggling measures
implemented since mid-2016, the migration
business was described as “a state-sponsored
protection racket”.62 Smuggling was largely
tolerated, normalized and even institutionalized.63
The routes were well-defined and standardized;
they were known to everyone, military vehicles
escorted weekly convoys of trucks travelling
between towns and villages in northern Niger,
and transporters of migrants and refugees tagged
along in these convoys, which was tolerated by the
security forces.64 Many studies report state officials
turning a blind eye to these activities, which were
an important source of income for them.65 These
dynamics were a defining feature of smuggling
networks’ modus operandi.
Before the implementation of Law 2015-036,
Nigerien migrant smuggling networks were
described as rather fragmented and uncoordinated
chains of actors66 guided by the connectivity
principle, that is to say, organized in a horizontal
and interconnected manner across borders.67 They
have also been described as segmented and loose
rather than hierarchical.68 Where hierarchy did exist,
for example among drivers where a boss owned
several trucks, it rarely culminated in an ultimate
network head or kingpin. These informal networks

60 Tinti, P. & Westcott, T. op. cit. (p. 3)

61 The EU describes its migration policy as having three main axes of action: 1) Saving and protecting the lives of migrants and refugees; 2)
Breaking the business model of smugglers and traffickers; and 3) Providing legal pathways of migration. See: European Commission (2018)
Central Mediterranean Route: Protecting Migrants and Managing Irregular Flows
62 Snyder, R. & Duran-Martinez, A. (2009) Does illegality breed violence? Drug trafficking and state sponsored protection rackets. Crime Law and
Social Change, vol 52, issue 3. The authors refer to ‘informal institutions through which public officials refrain from enforcing the law or, alter-
natively, enforce it selectively against the rivals of a criminal organization, in exchange for a share of the profits generated by the organization’.
See also: Raineri, L. op. cit.
63 Raineri, L. op. cit.
64 Molenaar, F., Tubiana, J. & Warin, C. (2018) Caught in the middle - A human rights and peace-building approach to migration governance in the
Sahel Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
65 International Crisis Group (2015) The Central Sahel: A Perfect Sandstorm (p. 16)
66 Brachet, J. op. cit. (p. 29)
67 Molenaar, F. & Van Damme, T. op. cit. (p. 20)
68 Author’s interview with Julien Brachet.

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were fluid, accessible and easy for prospective
smugglers to join.
Since the crackdown began in 2016, the nature of
these networks has changed; they have become
less accessible and more professional.69 The
anti-smuggling measures taken by the Nigerien
government have mostly targeted low-level
migration facilitators (e.g. drivers and guides) rather
than influential businessmen involved in larger
smuggling networks whose links with the political
establishment and armed groups reduces the
likelihood of their being targeted.70 This has led to
“the concentration of the smuggling business in the
hands of more criminal elements with transnational
ties”.71 As a result of the enforcement of the Law
2015-36, there are reports that smugglers are using
alternative and riskier routes to circumvent Agadez72
and that these routes may be merging with those
used for drug smuggling.73 It is difficult however
to directly correlate criminal behaviour with the
consequences of the implementation of the law.
Smuggling networks in Mali
The modus operandi of smuggling networks in Mali
is defined by state absence and the important role
of armed groups in the political economy of the
north and by insecurity in the centre of the country.
In northern Mali, migrant smuggling is a node in
broader relationships between smuggling networks,
authority, and the empowerment of non-state
armed actors.74 In this context, different types of licit
and illicit trade merge, and organizations controlling
them often have criminal and transnational links.
Military activity, including France’s Operation
Barkhane, which has a counter-terrorism mandate,
may also influence the way smuggling networks
operate, for instance in their choice of alternative,
less visible routes.75
The migration economy in Mali, especially in the
north, is part of a larger criminal sphere. In order to
operate, smugglers need access to armed groups
controlling migration routes. Access to smuggling
routes is possible through good connections with
other members of smugglers’ networks, as well as
with armed groups and their affiliates. These ties are
secured either through specific agreements, and/or
personal connections.76 While information on these
connections is scarce, interviews with 4Mi monitors
suggest that the most common type of relationship
between armed groups and migrant convoys is a
droit de passage granted to smugglers.77 Human
smuggling is not the most lucrative business in the
region where other forms of smuggling proliferate.
For this reason, armed groups mostly organize
corridors for human smuggling but do not control
the business itself.78 The migration business in Mali
cannot therefore be considered to be low-barrier to
entry, as it was in Agadez before the crackdown on
migration.79

69 Refugees and migrants interviewed by 4Mi in Niger in 74% of cases considered their smugglers to be professionals. This percentage rises to
81% for those interviewed in Agadez.
70 Molenaar, F. (2018) Why the EU should help former smugglers get a job Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of International Relations. (p. 4)
71 Ibid.
72 Molenaar, F., Tubiana, J. & Warin, C. op. cit.
73 Tubiana, J., Warin, C. & Saeneen, G. op. cit.
74 Security Council op. cit. (section V)
75 One example is Operation Fildjo, carried out by the Malian military forces and MINUSMA with the support of Barkhane to the secure the city
of Gao in the wake of a January 2017 car bomb there. It entails ‘security operations around the city, identity checks, the reinforcement of check
points as well as day and night patrols in the city.’ See: Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New York (2017) Fight Against
Terrorism in Mali: the operation Fildjo
76 Focus group with 4Mi monitors in Gao, November 2018.
77 The going rate for passage through a checkpoint is reportedly 5,000 CFA francs (US$ 8.5) per migrant. Very little information exists about
migrant journeys, smuggling dynamics, or abuses and extortion that occur beyond Gao and Timbuktu to the Sahara desert. Transporters are
known for their specialization: from Gao, mostly Tuareg transporters take migrants to Niger (Agadez and Madama) or to Algeria. From Timbuk-
tu a network of mostly Arab transporters links to Algeria. This route is becoming increasingly popular. Focus group with 4Mi monitors in Gao,
November 2018.
78 Micallef, M., Horsley, R. & Bish, A. (2019) The Human Conveyor Belt Broken – assessing the collapse of the human-smuggling industry in Libya
and the central Sahel. The Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime/Clingendael (p. 80-81).
79 Molenaar, F. & Van Damme, T. op. cit.; see also: Molenaar, F. op. cit.

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Smuggling networks in Gao

Coxeurs or apprentice smugglers intercept migrants in Wabaria, a checkpoint before Gao, or at bus
stations. 80 Coxeurs are often contracted by ghetto owners or collaborators of a smuggler or are paid
by the migrant directly. 81 They act as a first point of contact for those aiming to travel north. Many
migrants already have contact details or referrals for coxeurs when they arrive in Gao, while others
find them in situ. These different actors often know each other and have established links, including
family connections. These personal links make networks stronger, and more difficult to access and
dismantle. 82

Different hosting facilities exist in Gao. Apprentice smugglers or former migrants rent accommodation
to newcomer migrants while they are looking for a smuggler to organize their onward journey. There
are also foyers run by smugglers who own houses and vehicles to take migrants across the desert
to the Algerian border. 83 These are mainly run by former migrants who have settled in Gao and have
lived there long enough to establish connections with passeurs and local authorities.

Smugglers in Gao often control access to migrants and limit their freedom of movement. There
are reports of migrants being confined to closed ghettos until their departure for Algeria or other
destinations. 84 This exemplifies the potential blurring of lines between smuggling and trafficking en
route: some refugees and migrants fall into a situation of dependency and potential exploitation at
some point after the start of their journey.

Nature of smuggling networks: loose
and flexible
According to 4Mi data, some smugglers carry
out one or several roles, and some have young
assistants helping with the recruitment of migrants
or other relatively menial tasks. This suggests that
there is more of an informal collaboration between
different members of the network than a fixed chain
of command.
Most smugglers interviewed reported that they
predominantly work alone, more so in Niger
(86%) than in Mali (69%). ‘Working alone’ can be
interpreted as a type of involvement in a larger
migration economy as opposed to ‘being part of
a network’. This does not mean that they do not
cooperate with others; but rather that they have
several allegiances, with a multiplicity of working
relationships in flexible and loosely structured
networks. 85 This can also be corroborated by 4Mi
data showing that the majority of those who say
they work alone have two or more roles (74% in
both Mali and Niger). This confirms the hypothesis
on multiple allegiances and collaboration with other
members of the business. By contrast, the minority
who reported to be working in a network in Mali
(65%) said they provided only one service. This
suggests that within a network, smugglers tend to
have more of a fixed role and perform it regularly
than having multiple allegiances. In this sense,
similarities can be drawn with criminal networks
where members have fixed roles.

80 4Mi monitors interviewed for this paper.

81 Author interview with journalist specializing on migration in the Sahel.
82 Focus group with 4Mi monitors in Gao, November 2018.
83 The price of stay in foyers is reportedly 2,000 CFA francs (US$ 3.4) per day.
84 Interviews with 4Mi monitors.
85 In contrast to criminal activities where allegiances are typically unilateral. Studies suggest that those who work between Niger and Libya also
claim to work alone and define themselves as self-employed entrepreneurs. See, for example, Tinti, P. & Westcott, T. op. cit. (p. 13.)

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Prospective smugglers first get involved in these
activities through their personal connections and
families. For example, young drivers may initially
be involved as helpers on the route or accompany
drivers, before becoming drivers themselves. 86 They
may also have several collaborators if they are part
of horizontal and loose networks. According to 4Mi
data, most smugglers started as coxeurs and were
then integrated in larger networks where they took
on more important roles.
4Mi interviews with smugglers in Mali suggest that
those who work alone tend to be more engaged in
the recruitment of migrants (62% compared to 31%
of those who say they work in a network) and in
the provision of accommodation (33% compared to
15%). Moreover, many smugglers interviewed in Mali
reported to be highly involved in the transportation
of migrants regardless of whether they were
working in a network (71% of those working alone;
77% of those working in a network).
In Niger, fewer differences in the types of services
were identified between those reporting they
worked in a network and those who said they
worked alone. A high percentage of both those
working alone (66%) and in a network (70%)
report that they were involved in the recruitment
of migrants. 55% of those working alone and 50%
working in a network reported to be providing
accommodation. 87
86 Tinti, P. & Westcott, T. op. cit. (p. 13)
87 Since respondents were permitted to choose more than one answer total percentages can exceed 100.
88 The example comes from Tinti, P. & Reitano, T. (2016) Refugee, migrant, smuggler saviour Oxford University Press, Oxford. (p. 66).
89 Molenaar, F. op. cit. (p. 21).
Players of many parts: The evolving role of smugglers in West Africa’s migration economy
23
Connections between smugglers
along the journey
According to 4Mi data and other existing literature,
West African smuggling networks are predominantly
horizontal and rely on regional connectivity. This
may involve indirect relationships that function in a
similar way to how hawala money transfer systems
operate between people in different locations who
do not necessarily know each other but who have
common contacts. 88 The principle can be applied
to some loosely organized smuggling networks:
a smuggler may not know a person in the place
where a migrant wants to go, but he or she is more
likely to know someone who knows the right person
and thereby connects a future client to the future
service provider. These kind of connections link
cities within the same country – in Mali, for example
many coxeurs operate from Bamako or Mopti and
connect refugees and migrants to coxeurs and
smugglers in Gao – as well as in different countries.
Such connections and modalities of collaboration
between different parts of the chain also affect
aspects such as payments for the journey.
Most smugglers reported that they did not personally
accompany refugees and migrants across a border
(73% in Mali; 74% in Niger). However, 71% of the
smugglers interviewed in Niger and 48% in Mali
said someone was on the other side of the border to
receive their clients, which suggests a link between
smugglers operating on both sides of the border.
Together with other 4Mi data and separate studies,
this also suggests that networks going through
Niger are much more extended to other countries (at
least those from coastal countries) than networks
operating in Mali. 89
While several studies detail the connections
between transporters (mainly from the Tubu
community) who travel from Agadez to Sebha
in southern Libya (a distance of some 2,400 km),
 Mixed Migration Centre / Briefing Paper

there is much less information available concerning 4Mi monitors in Gao suggest there are transnational
links between Malian and Algerian smugglers, or links between smugglers in Gao and smugglers on
between smugglers in coastal countries and major the other side of the border in Algeria.
transit hubs in Mali and Niger. Focus groups with

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 Mixed Migration Centre / Briefing Paper

Photo credit: Sven Torfinn / Panos

A man from Niger about to board a truck with about 150 other migrants
travelling between Agadez and the border, bound for Libya or Algeria.
Young men from all over West Africa travel by truck through the Sahara
desert to North Africa. Crossing the desert takes about a week.

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 Mixed Migration Centre / Briefing Paper

4. How smugglers treat refugees and migrants

Overall perceptions
Findings from the 4Mi smugglers’ survey suggest
that, overall, smugglers believe that they do not
exploit migrants (only 17% of smugglers in Niger
and 16% in Mali believe that smugglers do exploit
migrants). Most (69% of smugglers surveyed in
Mali; 93% in Niger) believe that they are providing
a good service to refugees and migrants. Many
(89% in Mali and 57% in Niger) stated that they
explained the risks of the journey to their clients. In
Niger, 23% of the smugglers interviewed said they
did not explain risks and 20% declined to answer to
the question.

Do you think smugglers exploit migrants?

100%

90%
Mali

Niger
80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
Yes No

Figure 4. Source: 4Mi smugglers survey. Mali n=84 Niger n=69. 90

90 The chart shows responses to the question: ‘Do you think smugglers exploit migrants?’

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 Mixed Migration Centre / Briefing Paper

Do you feel your smugglers intentionally misled you?

100%

90%
Mali

Niger
80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
I was not misled by Yes, about the Yes, about the routes Yes, about costs
smugglers conditions in which
I travelled

Figure 5. Source: 4Mi migrants survey Mali n=1010 Niger n=786. 91

Most (69%) of the refugees and migrants “This trip I did thanks to my sister who is
interviewed in Mali who had used one or more
in Europe. Whenever she sends me money
smugglers reported that they had not been misled
my smuggler goes to collect it, but in the
by smugglers, while in Niger only 40% shared
this opinion. Of those interviewed in Niger who end he took off and abandoned me, as
felt misled by a smuggler, subjects of deception we are not from the same country. He is a
included costs of services (47%), routes to be Guinean; we met in Bamako.”
taken (25%), and conditions of travel (19% ). In Malian woman, 23, interviewed in Agadez. 92
Mali, the corresponding figures were 11%, 12%
and 18% respectively. Several refugees and
migrants interviewed in Mali and Niger said that
they had been defrauded by smugglers, with some
smugglers taking their money and disappearing
without providing promised services:

91 The chart shows responses to the question: ‘Do you feel your smuggler(s) intentionally misled you?’
92 Translated from the original French: ‘Ce voyage je l’ai fait grâce à ma sœur qui est en Europe. Quand elle m'envoie [l’argent] c’est mon passeur
qui part prendre de l'argent mais à la fin il est parti et m’a laissé, comme nous ne sommes pas de même pays. Lui c’est un guinéen on s’est
rencontré à Bamako.’

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 Mixed Migration Centre / Briefing Paper

Abuse en route
4Mi collects data on protection incidents reported robbery. 93 The chart below illustrates the range and
or witnessed by refugees and migrants, including relative prevalence of such incidents as well as the
instances of sexual abuse, physical abuse and type of alleged perpetrators.

Reported incidents of abuse and their perpetrators

Mali - Robbery Mali - Physical Abuse Mali - Sexual Abuse

228 interviews 281 interviews 139 interviews

Niger - Robbery Niger - Physical Abuse Niger - Sexual Abuse

169 interviews 185 interviews 70 interviews

Security forces Single unknown individuals Smugglers

Other migrants / non-related Groups of thugs / criminal gangs
persons on the move

Figure 6. Source: 4Mi surveys of migrants and refugees Robbery: Mali n=228 Niger n=169; Physical abuse
Mali n=281 Niger n=185; Sexual abuse Mali n=139 Niger n=70. 94

93 Other reported protection incidents, such as detention and kidnapping, are not included in this analysis.
94 The chart reflects responses to the survey questions: ‘Have you ever been robbed during your journey?’ ‘Did you experience any physical abuse
or harassment (of a non-sexual nature) during your journey?’ ‘Did you witness or experience any sexual assault or harassment during your
journey?’

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 Mixed Migration Centre / Briefing Paper

Refugees and migrants interviewed in Niger said Several refugees and migrants interviewed by
smugglers had carried out almost half (45%) of all 4Mi also spoke of exploitation of female refugees
the 424 incidents of abuse they reported (and 56% and migrants for prostitution, including cases of
of 70 reported cases of sexual abuse). Other groups, trafficking:
such as thugs/criminal gangs and security forces,
were identified to a lesser extent as perpetrators “The coxeur falsely promised that I would
(10% and 8% respectively). Among 185 cases of
get work in a clothing factory in Italy. Once
physical abuse, 51% were reportedly committed by
we arrived in Agadez, he forced me to
smugglers and 46% by security forces. Among 169
cases of robbery, 36% were reportedly committed prostitute myself to pay back the 7 million
by smugglers, compared with 32% by other CFA francs (US$12,000) he’d spent on me.
migrants and 27% by single unknown individuals. I did not have [the money] so I had to go
into prostitution to pay him back.”
By contrast, in Mali, respondents attributed just
Female migrant interviewed in Mali. 97
6% of all (648) reported protection incidents to
smugglers, a figure that reflects the fact that most
refugees and migrants travel through Mali without
the help of smugglers until they reach Gao (beyond
Gao, however, cases of smugglers ill-treating their
clients, including with physical abuse, are reportedly
more common.)95 Respondents blamed security
forces for 30% of overall protection incidents, 49%
of the 281 reported cases of physical abuse, and
37% of the 139 cases of sexual abuse. Among 228
cases of robbery, 50% were reportedly committed
by unknown individuals. Several publications
have reported that Malian security forces often
perpetrate abuses against local populations. 96 A
higher prevalence of protection incidents identified
in Mali are linked with the insecurity prevalent in the
central part of the country where cases of armed
banditry and attacks on civilians occur very often.

95 Focus groups and interviews with 4Mi monitors. Participants in one focus group spoke of an association in Gao that is led by a smuggler who
extorts money from and abuses refugees and migrants.
96 Human Rights Watch (2017) Mali: Unchecked Abuses in Military Operations - Mali, Burkina Faso Troops Commit Killings, “Disappearances,”
Torture; see also: Human Rights Watch (2018) Mali: Deaths, Torture in Army Detention. Justice Ministry Should Conduct Investigations in the
Mopti Region
97 Translated from the original French: “Le coxeur m’a fait une fausse promesse que je vais travailler dans une société des fabrications des habits
en Italie. Une fois arrivée à Agadez il ma obliger de me prostituer pour lui rembourser 7 000 000 qu'il ma payer. Je n’avais pas de quoi est j’étais
obligée de faire la prostitution pour le rembourser.”

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 Mixed Migration Centre / Briefing Paper
5. Conclusion
This Briefing Paper aims to provide insight into the
profile and role of smugglers and the networks
they operate in, partly based on unique primary
data from smugglers and taking into account
the socio-economic, legal and political context of
Mali and Niger. The picture that emerges shows
that smugglers have different roles, services and
activities. These include the facilitation of irregular
border crossing but also other activities such as
running ghettos or foyers for migrants and other
support services such as selling food and carrying
out money transfers. This reflects the multifaceted
nature of smugglers in West Africa: the smuggling
business is fragmented with many different players
interconnected and interacting with each other. Not
every person involved in the migration economy
strictly falls within the scope of smuggling activities
defined under the UN Smuggling Protocol.
This briefing paper has evoked the notion of
connectivity characterizing the smuggling
business in West Africa. Longstanding trade
patterns rely on intricate long-distance personal
and commercial connections, as well as ethnic
and kinship ties, and all this underpins the
transnational nature of smuggling networks. 98
In the context of the existing migration economy
linking West and North Africa, connectivity is the
basis of relations between different individuals
and their networks. For instance, existing research
shows that smugglers remotely coordinate the
journeys of refugees and migrants by linking them
to “downstream” counterparts. According to 4Mi
data, such connections take different forms and are
often informal and very fluid. The finding that 74%
of refugees and migrants were put in touch with
a smuggler by other smugglers also reflects the
overall connectivity between individuals and their
networks throughout the entire migrant journey.
98 Molenaar, F. & Van Damme, T. op. cit. (p. 7)
Players of many parts: The evolving role of smugglers in West Africa’s migration economy
30
This paper argues that access to smuggling
networks can be high or low-barrier, thereby
regulating who can join the business and how
such entry processes takes place. These and other
characteristics of smuggling networks can change
over time and are influenced by factors such as
the criminalization of migration and the overall
political and security context. In Niger, particularly
in the Agadez region, an apparent shift has taken
place regarding the accessibility of the migration
business, as a consequence of the implementation
of anti-smuggling legislation. The criminalization of
migration has often been linked in existing literature
to the professionalization of the migration economy
and its “closure” to outsiders. While this process
may be underway in Niger, 4Mi data suggests
that many smugglers still have multiple roles and
commitments within networks. In Mali, there is also
a significant difference between smugglers working
in the south of the country and those working in the
north. Fewer refugees and migrants use a smuggler
while travelling to and through Mali than those
travelling to and through Niger. This may explain
why refugees and migrants interviewed by 4Mi
reported fewer protection incidents committed by
smugglers in Mali than in Niger. Networks operating
in northern Mali are by contrast characterized by
more professional and criminal-like activities and
by members having single allegiances and fixed
roles. While 4Mi data does not allow for longitudinal
observations on the changes in the structures of the
smuggling networks, there are still some indications
of the professionalization of smuggling networks
as a consequence of the criminalization of the
migration business.
The smuggling economy is driven by both a
demand for mobility, lack of legal pathways
and the opportunities for profit arising from this
 Mixed Migration Centre / Briefing Paper

demand. 4Mi data shows that smugglers are not

the primary instigators of such movement, but
rather its facilitators. Needs for smugglers arise
especially in zones where regular transport services
are unavailable, in the north of Mali and Niger.
The informal nature of the travel facilitated by
smugglers leaves room for increased extortion,
theft and other abuses.

Criminalizing smuggling activities without offering

alternative measures to increase legal pathways
overlooks the reality that the demand for mobility
will continue. Evidence in Niger already shows
that this can have a negative impact both on local
livelihoods and refugees and migrants who are
taking alternative and more dangerous pathways to
circumvent checkpoints. As smuggling activities are
pushed underground, the networks become more
closed, less accessible and more professionalized.

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The Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) is a global network consisting of
six regional hubs (Asia, East Africa, Europe, Middle East, North Africa &
West Africa) and a central unit in Geneva. The MMC is a leading source
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on mixed migration. The MMC aims to increase understanding of mixed
migration, to positively impact global and regional migration policies,
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and to stimulate forward thinking in public and policy debates on
mixed migration. The MMC’s overarching focus is on human rights and
protection for all people on the move.

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While its institutional link to DRC ensures MMC’s work is grounded in
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analysis and policy development on mixed migration for policy makers,
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position of the MMC does not necessarily reflect the position of DRC.

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