SECTION 10. Non-suability of the State.

—No suit shall lie against the State except with its consent as
provided by law.

SECTION 11. The State’s Responsibility for Acts of Agents.—(1) The State shall be legally bound and
responsible only through the acts performed in accordance with the Constitution and the laws by its
duly authorized representatives.

(2) The State shall not be bound by the mistakes or errors of its officers or agents in the exercise of their
functions.

Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. The Philippine government
consents, through Republic Act (RA) 3083, to be sued upon any money claim involving liability arising
from contract, expressly or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties.

Republic v. Feliciano, G.R. No. 70853, 12 March 1987

First Division

[YAP, J.]

FACTS: Respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The claim of ownership by Feliciano was derived from
deed of sale of the property traced from informacion posesoria. However, the said property was subject
of Proclamation No. 90 by President Magsaysay for resettlement purposes.The Proclamation contained
the reservation clause” subject to private rights, if any there be. “Feliciano asserts that the subject
property must be excluded from the coverage of the resettlement project. The trial court dismissed the
case on the ground of non-suability of the State.

ISSUE#1: Would the doctrine of non-suability of the State find application in an action for recovery and
possession of parcel of land?

HELD#1: YES.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded
the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who is claimed to be usurping a
piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam.
It is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party
or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by
Republic Act No. 3844.

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By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under
settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued,
either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be
misinterpreted.There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege
the existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should have
been dismissed.

ISSUE#2: Would the invocation of Proclamation No. 90 be considered as a waiver of State Immunity?

HELD: NO.

No such consent can be drawn from the language of the Proclamation. The exclusion of existing private
rights from the reservation established by Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a waiver of the
immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be
inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a
legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of
State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.

PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. vs LICHAUCO

G.R. No. 142362 (2006)

Tinga, J.
Immunity from Suit

The doctrine of the state’s immunity from suit will not apply if the government official invoking it is
being sued in a personal capacity and if the decision will not result to any pecuniary liability against the
State.

FACTS:

In 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was entered into by a consortium of private

telecommunications carriers and the DOTC relative to the launching, ownership, operation and
management of a Philippine satellite by a Filipino-owned or controlled private consortium or
corporation. Pursuant to the MOU, the consortium formed a corporation and adopted the corporate
name Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI).

In 1996, PASI requested the DOTC for official government confirmation of the assignment of Philippine
orbital slots 161 E (E is short for East Longitude) and 153 E to PASI for its AGILA satellites. DOTC
Secretary Lagdameo confirmed the assignment. PASI then undertook preparations for the launching,
operation and management of its satellites.

However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for Communications, allegedly “embarked
on a crusade to malign the name of Michael de Guzman (PASI’s President and Chief Executive Officer)
and sabotage the business of PASI.”

In a meeting with the members of the PASI BOD, she uttered disparaging and defamatory comments
against de Guzman.

De Guzman informed Jesli Lapuz (President of Landbank) that PASI will apply for a loan, Lapuz then
wrote Lichauco for confirmation. She falsely asserted that only orbital slot 161 E was assigned to
plaintiff, orbital slot 153 E was not. She made defamatory remarks against plaintiffs during a
telecommunications forum held in the presence of public officials and business executives. She said that
plaintiff corporation will never pay its contractors. Coup de’ grace: she offered and awarded orbital slot
153 E to other parties despite the prior assignment to PASI of the said slot. RTC: In 1998 a civil complaint
(Injunction of the award, declaration of nullity of award, and damages) was filed against Lichauco and
the “Unknown Awardee” who was to be the recipient of orbital slot 153E. Lichauco prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint primarily on the grounds: The suit is a suit against the State which may not
be sued without its consent; The complaint stated no cause of action; The petitioners had failed to
exhaust administrative remedies by failing to seek recourse with the Office of the President. RTC denied
the motion to dismiss. The allegations in the complaint regarding the ultimate facts sufficiently
presented an ultra vires act of Lichauco, and that she was being sued in her personal capacity. COURT
OF APPEALS: The CA sustained the contention that the complaint is a suit against the State: The notice of
offer signed by herein petitioner allegedly tainted with bad faith was done in the exercise of and in
pursuance of an official duty. Since the petitioner is directly under and answerable to the DOTC
Secretary, we can conclude that her official acts such as the said “notice of offer” was with the blessing
and prior approval of the DOTC Secretary himself. Being an official act, it is also protected by the
presumption that the same was performed in good faith and in the regular performance of official duty.

ISSUES:

Whether or not USEC Lichauco is immune from suit?

RULING:

No.

Sometimes, it is obvious that a suit is one against the State. The suit is directly initiated against the
Republic of the Philippines, any foreign government, or an unincorporated government agency.

The present action was denominated against Lichauco and the unknown awardee. Lichauco was
identified in the complaint as “acting Secretary of the DOTC”.

General rule:

A suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of the government by a
private citizen which would result in a charge against or financial liability to the government must be
regarded as a suit against the State itself, although it has not been formally impleaded.

Exception:

(1) If the government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit;

(2) If the liability of the officer is personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of
his/her duties.

The Court of Appeal’s rationale is pure sophistry and must be rejected outright. The presumption of
regular performance of duty is disputable.

On the prayer for injunction of the award and declaration of nullity of the award:

The defense of state immunity from suit do not apply, these causes of action do not seek to impose a
charge or financial liability against the State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers
attached to these two causes of action are for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of
the purported award, nothing more. Had it been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in
relation to said causes of action, the suit would have been considered as one against the State. Had the
petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself,
the suit would have been considered as one against the State.

On the prayer for Damages:

The complaint alleges that Lichauco uttered several disparaging and defamatory remarks against
petitioners and Land Bank President.

The rule is that if the judgment against government officials will require the state itself to perform an
affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been
formally impleaded.

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of
state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.”

If the complaints are proven, they would establish liability on the part of Lichauco that is not shielded by
the doctrine of state immunity from suit. To establish such assertions as facts, a full-blown trial on the
merits would be necessary.

Petition is granted. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to try and decide the case on the merits with
deliberate dispatch.

Sayson v. Singson,G.R. No. L-30044, 19 December 1973

Second Division

[FERNANDO, J.]

FACTS: Petitioner Sayson was the Highway Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways who found
overpricing in the procurement of spare parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer. Singson as sole
proprietor of Singkier Motor Service, filed a complaint in the lower court against the Auditor claiming for
the payment of the balance, amounting to P8,706, which was withheld due to alleged overpricing. The
lower court adjudged Singson as entitled to collect the balance. Hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Is the lower court correct in taking cognizance of the case filed by Singson for contractual money
claims against the government?

HELD: NO.

Actually, the suit disguised as one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for
payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with
the consent of the State. In other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General
Auditing Office, under the provisions of Commonwealth Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under
which money claim against the government may be filed.

It is true that once consent is secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State,
however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative proceedings be had and be
exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would
be taken by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General. Even had there been
such, the court to which the matter should have been elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not
legally act on the matter. What transpired was anything but that. It is quite obvious then that it does not
have the imprint of validity.

Republic v. Purisima, G.R. No. L-36084, 31 August 1977

Second Division

[FERNANDO, Acting C.J.]

FACTS: The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose from the failure of respondent
Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of-
reiterated doctrine of the non-suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit without its
consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a
pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an
alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
ISSUE: Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn Administration and Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
operate as a waiver of the national government from suit?

HELD: NO.

The consent to be sued, to be effective must come from the State thru a statute, not through any
agreement made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration.Apparently respondent Judge was
misled by the terms of the contract between the private respondent, plaintiff in his sala, and defendant
Rice and Corn Administration which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract
within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise. The consent, to be effective though, must
come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil.
Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no binding force on
the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority.

Philippine National Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations G.R. No. L-32667, 31 January 1978

Second Division

[FERNANDO, J.]

FACTS: What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation deposited at petitioner’s branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court
which had become final and executory. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V.
Manansala had previously been issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite
Employees and Laborers Association, in the aforementioned case. The validity of the order assailed is
challenged on the ground that the funds subject of the garnishment “may be public in character.” In
thus denying the motion to quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part of respondent Court
a failure to abide by authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Are the funds of People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation exempt from garnishment?

HELD: NO.
The premise that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that
the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity. It does not follow
though that they were exempt from garnishment.

It is worth noting that the decision referred to, the Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank, was
promulgated by the American Supreme Court as early as 1824, the opinion being penned by the great
Chief Justice Marshall. As was pointed out by him: “It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a
government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the
transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen. Instead of
communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with
whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to the business
which is to be transacted. Thus, many states of this Union who have an interest in banks, are not suable
even in their own courts; yet they never exempt the corporation from being sued. The state of Georgia,
by giving to the bank the capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily strips itself of its sovereign character,
so far as respects the transactions of the bank, and waives an the privileges of that character. As a
member of a corporation, a government never exercises its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator,
and exercises no other power in the management of the affairs of the corporation, that are expressly
given by the incorporating act.”

Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41299, 21 February 1983

En Banc

[MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.]

FACTS: Spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate loan
by the SSS with their residential lot located at Lozada Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal. Claiming that
the conditions of mortgage have been broken, SSS filed an application for foreclosure of real estate
mortgage.

The Cruz spouses, together with their daughter Lorna C. Cruz, instituted before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal an action for damages and attorney’s fees against the Social Security System (SSS) and
the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal alleging, among other things, that they had fully and religiously paid their
monthly amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment.

ISSUE: Can the SSS, exercising governmental functions, be held liable for damages?
HELD: YES.

There should be no question on this score considering that the SSS is a juridical entity with a personality
of its own. It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the Government. SSS’ own organic act
specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court. These words “sue and be sued” embrace all
civil process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity
from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the
aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the
SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has given to the private-citizen
a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit
to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSS
performs governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that
waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain
compensation in damages arising from contract and even for tort.

Farolan vs. Court of Tax Appeals

GR No. 42204, January 21 1993, 217 SCRA 298

FACTS:

On January 30, 1972, the vessel S/S “Pacific Hawk” arrived at the Port of Manila carrying, among others,
80 bales of screen net consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading (Bagong Buhay).

Said importation was declared through a customs broker which was classified under Tariff Heading No.
39.06-B of the Tariff and Customs Code at 35% ad valorem.

Since the customs examiner found the subject shipment reflective of the declaration, Bagong Buhay paid
the duties and taxes due which was paid through the Bank of Asia.

Thereafter, the customs appraiser made a return of duty.

Read: Republic vs. Villasor

Acting on the strength of an information that the shipment consisted of “mosquito net” made of nylon,
the Office of the Collector of Customs ordered a re-examination of the shipment which revealed that the
shipment consisted of 80 bales of screen net, each bale containing 20 rolls or a total of 1,600 rolls.

The value of the shipment was re-appraised.

Furthermore, the Collector of Customs determined the subject shipment as made of synthetic
(polyethylene) woven fabric classifiable under Tariff Heading No. 51.04-B at 100% ad valorem.

Thus, Bagong Buhay Trading was assessed P272,600.00 as duties and taxes due on the shipment in
question.

Since the shipment was also misdeclared as to quantity and value, the Collector of Customs forfeited the
subject shipment in favor of the government which was also affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs.

Back to case

REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

Benedict Victa

1 month ago

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Summary:
A complaint has been filed by PCGG against the Bong Bong and Imelda Marcos for recovery of several
properties allegedly ill-gotten by the former President, Ferdinand Marcos. However, one property was
not included in the complaint prompting the respondent to file a motion to cancel the notice of lis
pendens on such property. PCGG filed several amendments, until the fourth amended complaint. The
said amended complaint included the property sought to be released through the motion.
Sandiganbayan denied admission of the said amended complaint. PCGG assails the order of the
Sandiganbayan in denying admission of its fourth amended complaint. The SC ruled that Sandiganbayan
should have been more lenient in application of rules.

Doctrine:

1) Executive Order No. 14, which defines the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth
of Former President Marcos and his family, associates, dummies, agents, and nominees,
specifically states that the technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied
to the civil cases filed under it. Thus, this Court has emphasized this provision and pointed out
that strict adherence to technical rules will hamper the efforts of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government:

We note that the law governing the issues raised in this petition calls for the setting aside of technical
rules when necessary to achieve the purposes behind the PCGG’s creation.

It is to be reiterated that paragraph 2 of Section 3, of Executive Order No. 14 reads:

“The technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to the civil cases filed
hereunder.”

Section 7 thereof also provides:

“SECTION 7. The provisions of this Executive Order shall prevail over any and all laws, or parts thereof, as
regards the investigation, prosecution, and trial of cases for violations of laws involving the acquisition
and accumulation of ill-gotten wealth as mentioned in Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2.”
 2) RULE13; SEC. 14. Notice of Lis Pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of possession
of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer,
may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province hi which the property is situated
a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the parties and the
object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that province affected
thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer
of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the
action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by their real names.

The notice of Lis Pendens hereinabove mentioned may he cancelled only upon order of the court, after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.

Facts:

Respondents Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos, Jr. (Marcos, Jr.), Maria Imelda R. Marcos (Imee), and
Irene Marcos Araneta (Irene) appear to be the registered owners of a parcel of land located in the
Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna (Cabuyao property) and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-85026.

The petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government,
filed before the Sandiganbayan a Complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting, and
damages against Former President Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, their children, Marcos, Jr., Imee, and
Irene, and their sons-in-law, Tomas Manotoc and Gregorio Ma. Araneta III.

Marcos, Jr. filed a Motion praying for the cancellation of the notice of Lis Pendens and pointing out that
the Cabuyao property was not specifically mentioned in the original and amended Complaints.

Therafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Fourth Amended Complaint. The Fourth
Amended Complaint was substantially identical to the admitted Complaint, but with the amended annex
List of Assets and Other Properties of Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and Immediate Family. The
list specifically mentioned the Cabuyao property as one among the assets of the Marcoses.
The Sandiganbayan did not admit the Fourth Amended Complaint and ordered the cancellation of the
annotation of Lis Pendens. It held that because the admitted (original)Complaint did not specifically
mention the Cabuyao property, the Cabuyao property was not involved in the Civil Case; therefore,
petitioner has over the property no actionable claim that needs to be protected via a notice ofLis
Pendens.

Petitioner filed a review before the SC seeking reversal of the order of the Sandiganbayan.

Issues Ratio:

Whether or not, the Fourth Amended Complaint should have been admitted and notice of lis pendens of
the question property should have been granted.

The Sandiganbayan should have admitted the fourth amended complaint. According to the SC, Executive
Order No. 14, which defines the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-gotten wealth of Former
President Marcos and his family, associates, dummies, agents, and nominees, specifically states that the
technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to the civil cases filed under it.
Thus, the Court has emphasized this provision and pointed out that strict adherence to technical rules
will hamper the efforts of the Presidential Commission on Good Government.

In other words, Sandiganbayan should have relaxed the rules in admitting the amended complaint.

Dispositive:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated January 11, 2010
and December 1, 2010, insofar as they direct the cancellation of the notice of Lis Pendens, are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Register of Deeds of Cabuyao, Laguna is ORDERED to re-annotate the
notice of Lis Pendens on TCT No. T-85026

Doctrine of State Immunity

Title :
Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.

Citation:

G.R L- 6060, September 30, 1954

I.

Facts:

Defendant Pan Oriental took possession of the vessel in question after it had been repossessed by the
Shipping Administration and title thereto reacquired by the government, following the original
purchaser, Fernando Froilan’s, default in his payment of the unpaid balance and insurance premiums for
the said vessel. Pan Oriental chartered said vessel and operated the same after it had repaired the vessel
and paid the stipulated initial payment, thereby exercising its option to purchase, pursuant to a
bareboat charter contract entered between said company and the Shipping Corporation. The Cabinet
resolved to restore Froilan to his right sunder the original contract of sale on condition that he shall pay
a sum of money upon delivery of the vessel to him, that he shall continue paying the remaining
installments due, and that he shall assume the expenses incurred for the repair and by docking of the
vessel. Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Froilan’s right sunder the contract of sale, for the
reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of
said authority to the property, Froilan having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon.
Froilan paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the
vessel, he filed an action for in the CFI of Manila to recover possession thereof and have him declared
the rightful owner of said property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil
case praying for the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be
foreclosed. II.

Issue: Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is immune from suit.

III.

Ruling:
No, because the moment when the government filed its complaint in intervention which in effect
waived its right of non-suability.

The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private parties in its own
courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to private litigants. In
short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders its privileged
position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires, within certain
limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the state.

Lim v. Brownell,G.R. No. L-8587, March 24, 1960,Facts:The property in dispute consists of 4 parcels of
land in Tondo, Manila. The lands were, after the last world war, found by the Alien Property Custodian
of the US to be registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, a national of an enemy country, Japan. On
March 14, 1946 the Alien Property Custodian issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading with
the Enemy Act of the United States, as amended, vesting in himself the ownership over two of the said
lots – Lots No. 1 and 2.On July 6, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator under the authority
of the same statute issued a supplemental vesting order, vesting in himself the title to the remaining lots
– Lots No. 3 and 4.On November 13, 1950 the claimant Benito E. Lim, as a administrator of the intestate
estate of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
Philippine Alien Property Administrator for the recovery of the property in question with back rents. The
complaint was later amended to include Asaichi Kagawa as defendant.

Issues:- Whether or not Intervenor-Appellee (Republic of the Philippines) be sued.

Ruling: The court states that in view of the foregoing, it dismisses the complaint with respect to Lots No.
1 and 2 and the claim for damages against the Attorney General of the United states and the Republic of
the Philippines, is affirmed, but revoked insofar as it dismisses the complaint with respect to Lots No. 3
and 4, as to which the case is hereby remanded to the court below for further proceedings

Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

SANTIAGO vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. L-48214 December 19,
1978FERNANDO,

J .:

The Case

The plaintiff sued the government for revocation of a donation on the ground of failure of the defendant
to complywith the stipulated conditions. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of its consent to be
sued. The SupremeCourt denied the motion, holding that the suit could prosper because it did not
involve a money claim against theState. As what the plaintiff was seeking was the return only of the
properties donated, he did not even need to filehis claim first with the Commission on Audit under the
provisions of C.A. No. 327.

Facts

1. Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago filed on August 9, 1976 an action in the Court of First Instance
ofZamboanga City naming as defendant the government of the Republic of the Philippines
represented bythe Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry for the revocation of a deed of
donation executed by him andhis spouse in January of 1971 with the Bureau of Plant Industry as
the donee2. As alleged in such complaint, such Bureau, contrary to the terms of the donation,
failed to “installlighting facilities and water system on the property donated and to build an
office building and parking lotthereon which should have been constructed and ready for
occupancy on or before December 7, 1974

2. The lower court in its Order dated October 20, 1977, sustained a motion to dismiss on the part
of thedefendant Republic of the Philippines, now named as one of the respondents, the other
respondent

Being the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II on the ground that “the state cannot
besued without its consent”

3. Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, in the comment on the petition filed with this Court, is for
theaffirmance of the order of dismissal of respondent Court precisely to accord deference to the
abovecategorical constitutional mandate

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the governmentnot the government of the Republic of the Philippines can be
sued
2. Held: 1. Yes Ratio Decidendi: To rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being
the donee, is entitled to go to court in case of analleged breach of the conditions of such
donation. He has the right to be heard. Under the circumstances, thefundamental postulate of
non-suability cannot stand in the way. It is made to accommodate itself to the demandsof
procedural due process, which is the negation of arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in
the finalanalysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby manifests its adherence to the highest ethical
standards, which can only beignored at the risk of losing the confidence of the people, the
 repository of the sovereign power. The judiciaryunder this circumstance has the grave
responsibility of living up to the ideal of objectivity and impartiality, the veryessence of the rule
of law. Only by displaying the neutrality expected of an arbiter, even if it happens to be one
ofthe departments of a litigant, can the decision arrived at, whatever it may be, command
respect and be entitled toacceptance.WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted
and the order of dismissal of October 20, 1977 isnullified, set aside and declared to be without
force and effect. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City,Branch II, is hereby directed to
proceed with this case, observing the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.No costs.

Amigable v. Cuenca (G.R. No. L-26400) Case Digest

Posted byPingSeptember 24, 2018Posted inUncategorizedTags:Law Notes

Amigable v. Cuenca

G.R. No. L-26400

February 29, 1972

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant, vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees

Facts:

Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City. She had a
transfer certificate title issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in
favor of the government of any right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate.
Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, 6,167 square meters of land was used for the
construction the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

On March 27, 1958, AMigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting the payment
for her lot. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor General and was disallowed it in his 9thIndorsement
dated December 9, 1958.

Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of the portion of the lot used. In answer, the
defendants interposed the following defenses:

1. The action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the office of the Auditor
General

2. The right of action for the recovery of the any amount which might be due to Amigable had already
prescribed.

3. The action being a suit to the government, the claim for moral damages and other costs have no
valid basis since the government did not give its consent to be sued.

4. Since it was only the province of Cebu who had misappropriated the lot, Amigable has no cause of
action against the defendants.
Issue:

Can Amigable properly sue the government?

Ruling:

Yes. In its decision, the Court cited Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, which also involved a
claim for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the widening of Gorordo Avenue in Cebu
City. Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain
a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from
suit without its consent.

TORIO v. FONTANILLA

September 14, 2016

Case Digest

Article 44, 45 & 46

GR No. L-29993; October 23, 1978

TORIO v. FONTANILLA

FACTS: On October 21, 1978, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed Resolution No. 156
whereby it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and 23,
1959. Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the town fiesta committee with Jose Macaraeg as
Chairman. The amount of P100.00 was also appropriated for the construction of two stages, one for the
zarzuela and the other for the cancionan. On January 22, while in the midst of the zarzuela, the stage
collapsed, pinning Vicente Fontanilla who died thereafter. The heirs of Fontanilla filed a petition for
recovery of damages. Defendant councilors contend that they are merely acting as agents of the
municipality.

ISSUE: 1) Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a governmental or a

corporate function of the municipality? 2) Are the councilors liable for the death of Fontanilla?

HELD: The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality was an exercise of a private or
proprietary function of municipality. The provision on Section 2282 of the Revised Administrative Code
simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a
duty to observe one. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent-superior, the municipality is held
liable for damages for the death of Fontanilla. Since it is established that the municipality was acting a
proprietary function, It follows that it stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation
where officers are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation merely because of their official
relation to it. Thus, the municipal councilors are absolved from any criminal liability for they did not
directly participated in the defective construction of the stage.

The restrictive doctrine

Under the restrictive approach, immunity is only available in respect of acts resulting from the exercise
of a sovereign power. As such, states may not claim immunity in respect of commercial activities or over
commercial assets.

THE HOLY SEE vs.

THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61
and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC.

G.R. No. 101949 • December 1, 1994

FACTS:

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land, Lot 5-A, located in the Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila and registered in the name of petitioner. Said Lot 5-A is contiguous to Lots 5-B
and 5-D registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The three lots were sold to
Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned
his rights to the sale to private respondent, Starbright Enterprises.

The squatters refused to vacate the lots sold to private respondent so a dispute arose as to who of the
parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters occurred. Complicating the
relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation (Tropicana).

Private respondent filed a complaint for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific
performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other
defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner Holy See is immune from suit.

RULING:

YES.

The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of
business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or
transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an
incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was
made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of
residence of the Papal Nuncio.

The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for
the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations.

In Article 31(a) of the Convention, a diplomatic envoy is granted immunity from the civil and
administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable
property situated in the territory of the receiving state which the envoy holds on behalf of the sending
state for the purposes of the mission. If this immunity is provided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the
more reason should immunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in this case is the
Holy See.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER,
petitioners,

Vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN &
CO., INC., respondents.

G.R. No. L-35645 | May 22, 1985 | En Banc | Justice Abad Santos

Political Law | Constitutional Law | State Immunity

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated
differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

FACTS:

United States invited the submission of bids for projects for the repair of wharves and shoreline. Eligio
de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Thereafter, a letter was sent
saying that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous
unsatisfactory performancerating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings of the U.S.
Naval Station in Subic Bay. The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E.
Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S.
Navy. The complaint is to order the plaintiff to allow the company to perform the work on the projects
and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the defendants to pay
damages. The company also asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
defendants from entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects. The Trial court
issued the writ.

ISSUE:

Whether the company has the capacity to sue the plaintiff.

RULING:

NO.The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private,
commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to
acts jure imperii.

The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom
and other states in western Europe. That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the
conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez.

Further, the latter case ruled that the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the
contracts notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for
the reason that the contracts were for jure imperii and not for jure gestionis.

Case Digest: KHOSROW MINUCHER vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO (G.R. No. 142396
February 11, 2003)

Facts

Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust
operation” conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents accompanied by Scalzo in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been seized. Minucher was later acquitted
by the court.

Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur
Scalzo.

Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the discharge of his official duties as being merely an
agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice.

Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He
attached to his motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy addressed to DOJ of the
Philippines and a Certification of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a true and
faithful copy of its original. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE

Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

RULLING

YES.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.

The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the undisputed facts in the case.

The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries

Certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States
Embassy

Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted
at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo

These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic status” of the latter but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities
within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.

The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and,
after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make
the arrest.

In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,

Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA vs. JAMES VINZON [G.R. No. 154705. June 26, 2003]

FACTS: Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The maintenance
agreement includes the following specific equipments: air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical
facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4 years.

The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory and not in
compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the agreement with
the respondent. The latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot
be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.

ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court’s decision that petitioners have waived their
immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

HELD: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as
the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of
the inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The
state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment
of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into
a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of
Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its
immunity from suit.

Political Law Digests

Monday, February 2, 2015

DFA vs NLRC Case Digest

Facts:

On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against Asian
Development Bank. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through
the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as
well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for
borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement
Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the “Charter”) in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the
Agreement Between The Bank and The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank’s
Headquarters (the “Headquarters Agreement”).

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its
diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor Magnayi. The ADB did not
appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its
referral, the DFA sought a “formal vacation of the void judgment.” When DFA failed to obtain a
favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit

2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies, ADB has
descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of
its immunity from suit

3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition

4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this case

Held:

1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of
every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the
purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Bank’s officers, on their part, enjoy immunity
in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the
Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and
commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected.
Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent
of the municipal law. “One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from
local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the
country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to
the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government
may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the
organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to
discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.”

2. No. The ADB didn’t descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which
should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts
with different private companies. “There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity,
each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another
sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is
recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to
private act or acts jure gestionis.

“Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the
ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign
state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged
regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the
act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially
when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.”

The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or
gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.

3. Yes. The DFA’s function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and
institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged, entitles
it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country’s foreign
relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable
it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the international community.
When international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise
accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded. In our
country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the highest executive department with the
competence and authority to so act in this aspect of the international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon.
Rosario, Jr., this Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:
“In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or
diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to
convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

“In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of ‘suggestion,’ where the foreign state or
the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a
determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant
is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a ‘suggestion’ that the
defendant is entitled to immunity.

“In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first
secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the
Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic
Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter
directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer
could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48
SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer vs.
Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor
General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City,
Zambales, a ‘suggestion’ to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the ‘suggestion’ in a
manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae.

“In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with
this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department
to file its memorandum in support of petitioner’s claim of sovereign immunity.

“In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the
respondents through their private counsels. In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office,
the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and
transactions involved.”

4. Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court has, under
special circumstances, so allowed and entertained such a petition when (a) the questioned order
or decision is issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or (b) where the order or decision is a
patent nullity, which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to obtain in the present case.
When an adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter before him, his action that assumes
otherwise would be a clear nullity.
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August 1993 is
VACATED for being NULL AND VOID. (DFA vs NLRC, G.R. No. 113191, 18 September 1996)

Political Law Digests

Monday, February 2, 2015

WHO vs Aquino Case Digest

Facts:

Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of
Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12) crates, were allowed free entry from
duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates “contain large
quantities of highly dutiable goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the
COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects
of Verstuyft.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to
immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic
missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant be suspended. The
Solicitor General accordingly joined Verstuyft for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent
judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.

Issue:

Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the
diplomatic immunity.

Held:
Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic
immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent
judge of the Philippine Government’s official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of
the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner’s right to diplomatic immunity and asked
for the quashal of the search warrant.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity
is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion.
Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarrass the
executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic
immunity of petitioner Verstuyft. (World Health Organization vs. Aquino, G.R. No. L-35131, November
29, 1972, 48 SCRA 243).