A Good Man Is Hard To Find

A Good Man Is Hard to Find
Author(s): Edwin Curley

Source: Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 65, No. 3 (Nov
., 1991), pp. 29-45
Published by: American Philosophical Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3130141
Accessed: 23-12-2015 03:49 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
American Philosophical Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Proceedings and
Addresses of the American Philosophical Association.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 138.253.100.121 on Wed, 23 Dec 2015 03:49:12 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
A GOOD MANIS HARD TO FIND [1]
EdwinCurley
ofIllinoisat Chicago
University
Presidential
Address
delivered theEighty-ninth
before AnnualCentral
DivisionMeeting
oftheAmerican Association
Philosophical in Chicago, April26, 1991.
Illinois,
-I-
Some of you,no doubt,willassociatemytitlewitha blues song made

famousbyBessieSmith.Forthosewhodon'trecallthatsong,thememory ofwhich
I do indeedintendto invoke,itmaybe justas wellto beginbyquotingsomeof its
lyrics:
A good manis hardto find
You alwaysgetanotherkind
Yes'n whenyouthinkthathe'syourpal
You lookand findhimfooling roundsomeold gal.
Thenyourage,youall crazed,
You wantto see himdownin hisgrave.
So ifyourmanis nice,takemyadvice:
Hug himin themorning, kisshimat night.
Givehimplentylovin'- treatyourgoodmanright.
Cause a goodmannowadays sureis hardto find.
Some of you,on the otherhand,mayassociatemytitlewitha shortstoryby
FlanneryO'Connor,in whichan old lady,identified onlyas "thegrandmother" or
"theold lady,"takesa tripfromAtlanta, for
heading Florida, withher his
son, wife,
and herthreegrandchildren, one a mereinfant, theothertwosomewhat olderand
veryunpleasant.
The story, whosememory I also intendto invoke,openswithan argument
betweenthegrandmother andhersonaboutwheretheyshouldgo on theirholiday.
He wantsto go to Florida;shewouldprefer Tennessee.She hashearda reportthat
a convict,
identified his "The
onlyby nickname, Misfit," hasescapedfromthefederal
and is
penitentiary heading for Florida.Whatexactly theMisfithasdoneto landin
prison,or afterhisescapefromprison,is leftvague. We are toldonlythatanyone
whoreadswhatthenewspaper "sayshe didto thesepeople"willwantto staywell
clearof him. She wouldn'ttakeherchildren "in anydirection witha criminal like
thataloose in it." She does notwinthisargument, however, and througha series
ofapparentaccidents windsup at theendofthestory ina gulch,bythesideofa dirt
road in ruralGeorgia,facingprecisely thatcriminal she so feared. Whenshe is
unwiseenoughto lethimknowthatsheknowswhohe is,he methodically killseach
member ofthefamily, beginning withthesonandgrandson, andendingwiththeold
29
30 APA PROCEEDINGS, VOL. 65,NO. 3
lady. A good manmaybe hardto find,butit'sonlytoo easyto findanotherkind,

as she learns.
It is,itseems,no accidentthatthesongandthestorybearthesametitle.
O'Connorwas apparently to writeherstorybya newspaper
inspired accountof a
sevenyearold girl,dressedina tutu,whohadwona talentcontestsinging theblues
song.[2] In a letterto her friends
Sally and Robert Fitzgerald,writtentwo years
beforethepublication ofthestory, O'Connorreports:
My mammasayswhatdo I thinkis funnyabout the enclosed
clipping?It killsme. (ibid.p. 907)
She does notexplainwhyitkillsher,butI supposeshefounditincongruous thata
girlso youngshouldbe singing a songdisplaying so muchworldly wisdom.
In thebluessong"man"meansman,thatis,an adultmalemember of the
humanspecies,andthesinger's problem is that men, in thatsense,are generallyno
damngood. If a womanis luckyenoughto findan exception, she'dbettergivehim
lotsof loving,bettertreathimright.In O'Connor'sstory, "man"does notmean
man in thatsense. Her storyexpresses a somewhat darkervisionof theworld,in
whichany decentmemberof the humanspecies,male or female,is veryhard,
perhapsimpossible, to find.
Therecan be littleargument, I think, thattheMisfithimself is nota good
man. We maynotknowwhathe didto thosepeople. He himself does notseemto
knowwhathe did to getintojail in thefirst place. We knowwhathe does to the
old ladyand herfamily, though. He kills them (or has themkilled)in coldblood.
He findsno pleasurein lifebutmeanness, and it'sa smallpleasureat that. But
thoughhe standsinthestoryas a symbol ofevil,itis doubtful thatanycharacter in
thestorycanbe saidtobe eventolerably good. Certainly nottheMisfit'stwofellow
escapees,whocollaborate withgleein hismurders.Nordo thegrandmother's son
or daughter-in-law or grandchildrenseemplausiblecandidates forgoodness,either
becausetheyaresketched toovaguely forus tobe ableto makeanyjudgment about
themor becausetheyare sketchedtoo unattractively forus to makea favorable
judgment.
Theinteresting caseisthegrandmother, who,through mostofthestory, has
been a rathersillyold woman,selfish, vainand racially prejudiced. As the story
movesinexorably towardsitshorrific conclusion, she pleadsforherlifein terms
whichbetrayhersuperficiality: "You wouldn't shoota lady,wouldyou?"she asks.
"I knowyou'rea goodman. You don'tlooka bitlikeyouhavecommonblood. I
knowyoumustcomefromnicepeople." (ibid.,p. 147)Andyetbeforeshediesshe
is granteda moment ofgrace.The Misfitis obsessedwithChristandwiththefact
that,nothaving beenpresent duringChrist's lifetime,hecannotknowwhether ornot
Christdid,in fact,raisethedeadto a newlife:
"Listenlady,"he said in a highvoice,"if I had of been thereI
wouldof knownand I wouldn'tbe like I am now." His voice
seemedaboutto crackand thegrandmother's headclearedforan
instant.She sawtheman'sfacetwisted closeto herown,as ifhe
weregoingto cryand she murmured, "Whyyou'reone of my
babies. You're one of myownchildren!"She reachedout and
touchedhimon theshoulder.The Misfit sprangbackas ifa snake
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES 31
had bittenhimand shotherthreetimesthrough thechest. Then

he put hisgundownon thegroundand tookoffhisglassesand
beganto cleanthem.(ibid.,p. 152)
I takeitthatwhatthegrandmother hasbeengranted, at theveryendofherlife,is
a momentof Christ-like love and thatshe is savedby divinegrace. Immediately
afterthepassagejustquoted,sheis described as halflying, "ina puddle
halfsitting,
ofbloodwithherlegscrossedunderherlikea child'sandherfacesmiling up at the
cloudlesssky."
Buttheauthorforbids us to sentimentalize theold lady.The Misfit hasthe
lastwordabouther: "Shewouldofbeena goodwoman... ifithadbeensomebody
thereto shoothereveryminute ofherlife."Thatis to say,I takeit,thatshewould
havebeena goodwomanhadshebeenconstantly awareofherownmortality. But
formostofherlifeshelackedthatconsciousness, andso,taking herforall inall,we
cannotcallhera goodwoman,savedthoughshemaybe. Andthoughthisthought
is putin themouthofa manwhomI havedescribed as a symbol ofevil,I thinkhis
judgment at thispoint reflectsthe author's own view.
Whetherthat'srightor not as an interpretation of thatparticular story
matters because
little, it seems clear in any case that O'Connor's fiction
in general
is informed bya strongsenseoforiginal sin,andit'sthatideawhichI'm interested
in today.O'Connoris oftenlabelledas a Catholicwriter, but thereis nothing
peculiarly Catholic,or even Christian, about her darkviewof humannature. In
RobertPenn Warren'sAll theKing'sMen the centralcharacter, WillieStark,a
politicalboss forwhomthenarrator of thenovelworks,a character modelledon
HueyLong,givesthenarrator an assignment:
Thatnight whentheBoss andI calledon JudgeIrwininthemiddle
ofthenightandwhen,burning theroadbackto MasonCityinthe
dark,thecarhurtled between thebackfields, he saidto me,"There
is alwayssomething."
And I said,"Maybenoton theJudge."
And he said,"Man is conceived in sinandbornin corruption and
he passethfromthestinkofthedidieto thestenchof theshroud.There
is alwayssomething."
Andhe toldmeto digitout,digitup,thedeadcatwithpatchesof
furstillclinging to thetight, swollen, dove-gray hide. It wastheproperjob
forme,for,as I havesaid,I was once a student of history.A studentof
history does not care what he digsout of the ash pile,the midden,the
sublunary dungheap, which is the human past. He doesn't carewhether it
is thedeadpussyor theKohinoordiamond.So itwasa properassignment
forme,an excursion intothepast.[3]
This last is a bit of self-deception, I think,forthe narrator, JackBurden,has
respected and even loved the Judge, who had actedlike a fatherto himin the
absenceofhisownfather.Whenhe findsthattheBoss is right, thatStark'slawof
universal depravity holdsevenin thiscase,he learnssomething he had not really
wantedto learn. He does carewhathe digsout of thesublunary dungheap,and
whenhe findsoutwhatis there,he becomesevenmoredisillusioned thanhe had
been at thebeginning ofhisassignment.
Whyhave I chosento beginthistalkby callingyourattention to these

artifactsofourculture, a bluessong,a shortstory, a novel?LatelyI havebeenvery
muchconcernedwithpoliticalphilosophy: translating Spinoza'spoliticalworks,
writing aboutthemand thinking aboutSpinoza'srelationship, in thisarea,to his
predecessors, notably Machiavelli and Hobbes. One thing which all threeof these
philosophers have in common is thatthey claim to base theirpoliticaltheories on a
realisticviewof humannature, whererealismimpliesholdingsomething verylike
thatdarkviewof humanbeingswhichI findin O'Connorand Warren. Unlike
O'ConnorandWarren, mythreephilosophers are notinclined to expressthatview
in terms of original sin. Spinozaexplicitly rejectsthe whole conceptof sin as a
fiction,generated by the illusionof free will. But theyare all certainly farfrom
optimism aboutwhatpeopleareactually like,as Machiavelli illustrates in a famous
passagefromThePrince:
Sincemyintention is to writesomething usefulforanyonewho
understands it,it seemedmoresuitableto me to go afterthereal
truthof thematter, ratherthanwhatpeoplehaveimagined about
it. Manyhaveimagined forthemselves republics and principalities
whichhaveneverbeenseenor knownto existin reality; forthere
is sucha gap betweenthewaypeopleliveandthewaytheyought
to livethatanyonewhoabandonswhatis doneforwhatoughttobe
done learnshisruinratherthanhispreservation; fora manwho
wishesto makea practiceof beinggoodat all timeswillcometo
ruinamongso manywhoare notgood. Henceit is necessary for
a princewhowishesto maintain himself to learnhownot to be
good,and to use thisknowledge or not,as necessity requires. [4]
Spinoza is not in the business of givingadviceto princes,but thereis in other
respectsa verysimilarpassageat thebeginning of hisPoliticalTreatise.Political
theory needs to be based on what experience teaches us is trueofhumannature, that
"therewillbe vicesas longas therearemen"(TP i,2) andthat"ineveryage virtue
hasbeenextremely rare."(TTP xii,7) Politicians knowthis,andtherefore theyhave
writtenthings about public affairswhichare actually useful. Philosophers don't,and
as a consequence, whattheyhavewritten hasnotbeenuseful.Ifmenwereas good
as somepoliticaltheoriesassume,therewouldbe no needforpoliticsin thefirst
place. Homagehereto Machiavelli, whomSpinozacountsas a politician ratherthan
a philosopher.
Humanwickedness, in mythreephilosophers, takestheformofegoism,an
overriding concern for your own at
interests, the expenseof theinterests of others
and ofanyobligations youmay have incurred. We can let Machiavelli speakforall
threehere,ina well-known passagedealing with the question whether it is betterfor
a princeto be lovedor to be feared:
...it is a good generalruleaboutmenthattheyare ungrateful,
fickle,liarsand deceivers, fearfulof dangerand greedyforgain.
Whileyou servetheirwelfare, theyare all yours,offering their
blood,theirbelongings, theirlivesand theirchildren's lives..,. so
longas thedangeris remote.Butwhenthedangeris closeat hand,
theyturnagainstyou.Then anyprincewho has reliedon their
wordsand has madeno otherpreparations willcometo grief...

People are lessconcerned with offending a man whomakeshimself
loved thanone who makeshimself feared... love is a linkof
obligation whichmen,becausetheyarerotten, willbreakanytime
theythinkdoingso servestheiradvantage; butfearinvolvesdread
of punishment, fromwhichtheycan neverescape... (Princexvii,
Adams,pp. 47-48)
It's a fairquestion,ofcourse,whether thisreallyis a realistic viewofhumannature.
Similarexpressions ofegoisminHobbes,whichcouldbe paralleledinSpinoza,have
oftenbeen thesubjectof sharpcriticism. BishopButleris usuallygivencreditfor
havingdefinitively refutedegoism,byarguing thatit can onlybe thought to be a
universal truththatpeopleinvariably actout of self-interest iftheconceptof self-
interested behavioris madeso elasticthattheclaimis a meretautology, as when
someonesays"All realAmericans love thesmellof battle,"and thendeals with
counter-examples byrefusing to countthemas realAmericans.So thesaintliness
of a MotherTeresais reducedto one moreexampleof egoism:she is simplya
womanwhoderivesherselfish pleasurefromactsofapparentaltruism.
But I don'tthinkmythreephilosophers canbe refuted so easily,becauseI
don'tthinktheyareinterested inmaking universal generalizations whichrequireto
be guardedagainstcounter-example in thatway. Again I thinkwe can take
Machiavellias representative.Here's an interesting passage on the practical
difficultiesof mounting a successfulconspiracy:
Experienceteachesus that,of manyconspiracies attempted, few
turnout successfully;becausea manwhoconspires can hardlydo
so alone, and can take as co-conspirators onlythosewhomhe
judges to be discontented. Yet as soon as youexplainyourplanto
someonewhois discontented, youhavefurnished himwitha means
to be verycontentindeed.For he has everything to gainbygiving
you away;and whenhe has everything to gainone way,and so
muchdangerand loss the otherway,he mustbe eithera very
specialfriend ofyours,or a bitterenemyof theprince,ifhe is to
keepfaithwithyou.(ThePrincexix,Adams,p. 52)
No doubtthisis an interesting passagefora number of reasons,butmyparticular
interest in it nowis thatit showsMachiavelli thinking, not in termsof universal
truths, butinterms ofqualifiedgeneralizations,andthekindsofrisksitisreasonable
to takein thelightof thosegeneralizations. It's notthatall menwillbetray youin
a conspiracy againsttheruler;a veryspecialfriend won't,or a bitterenemyof the
prince;ifthereweren'ttheseexceptions, conspiracies wouldneverbe successful; but
mostmenwillbetray you,giventheodds. So would-be can
conspirators rarely afford
to trustpotentialco-conspirators.
If itshouldbe objectedthatitis inappropriate to replyto Butler'scriticism
of Hobbes by citinga passagefromMachiavelli, it's easyenoughto findsimilar
passagesinHobbes. For example, inthePrefacetoDe civeHobbeslaysit downas
a principle
byexperience knownto allmen..,. thatthedispositions ofmenare
naturallysuch,thatexcepttheybe restrained through fearofsome
coercivepower,everymanwilldistrust and dreadeachother,and

as bynaturalright he may,so bynecessity hewillbe forcedto make
use ofthestrength he hath,towardthepreservation ofhimself. [5]
He imagines someoneobjecting thatthisprinciple presupposes, notmerely thatall
menarewicked, butthattheyarewickedbynature.Oftheweakerassumption, that
all menarewicked, Hobbesremarks this
that,though may seem a hard saying,"yet
we mustyieldto it,sinceit is so clearlydeclaredbyholywrit."But thestronger
assumption, thatallmenarewickedbynature, Hobbessayswe cannotgrantwithout
impiety. And he is anxious to insist that his argument does notrequireeventhe
weakerassumption:evenif
thewickedwerefewerthantherighteous, yetbecausewe cannot
distinguish them,there is a of
necessity suspecting, heeding,
anticipating, subjugating, self-defending, everincidentto themost
honestand fair-conditioned. (?12,p. 33)
If thisshouldseemsomewhat paranoid, we mightcitea passagein St. Augustine
whichmakesessentially thesamepoint:
peaceis a doubtful good,becausewe do notknowtheheartofour
friend, andthough we didknowittoday,we shouldbe as ignorant
ofwhatitmight be tomorrow. [6]
Augustine, forhispart,citesa passagefromCiceroto thesameeffect: a declared
enemyis mucheasierto dealwiththanone in theguiseof a friend.
Still,it maybe asked,evenifHobbesinsiststhathis argument does not
requiretheassumption thatall menarewicked,doesn'the nevertheless makethat
assumption whenhe saysthatwe mustyieldto thescriptural authority in favorof
thisproposition?I thinknot,sinceI takeHobbes'invocation of Scripture hereto
be ironic. Thisis in linewithmygeneralreadingof Hobbes,whichis thathe is
probablyan atheist,surelyno morethana Deist,forwhomthe authority of
revelation as suchis nil. He must,of course,pretendto be a theist,giventhe
penaltiesfordissentin his day,and he is, quitereasonably I think,not averseto
takingadvantage of hisaudience's belief in scripture whenit suitshispurposes.In
thisinstancehe citesno specific text,but there is an textwhichhe might
interesting
havecited,and in factdoes alludeto in anothernow-famous passage. Thisis the
psalm which begins:
The foolsaysin hisheart,"Thereis no God."
Theyare corrupt, theydo abominable deeds,
thereis nonethatdoesgood.
The Lord looksdownfromheaven,
uponthechildren ofmen,
to see ifthereare anythatactwisely,
thatseekafterGod.
Theyhaveall goneastray, theyare all alikecorrupt;
thereis nonethatdoesgood,
no,notone. (Ps. 14:1-3= Ps. 53:1-3)
I shouldemphasize here,I think, thattheonlypartofthispessimistic textwhichcan
be takenas theutterance of a foolis theline"thereis no God." The restis what
thePsalmistsays. And I gatherfromlearnedcommentary thattheHebrewterm
heretranslated "fool"impliesmoralas wellas intellectual deficiency: he is a vile

person,whodeliberately prefers evilto good,not(necessarily) becausehe does not
believeintheexistence ofGod,butbecausehe doesnotbelievethatGod careshow
menbehaveor thatGod willpunishthewickedand rewardtherighteous. [7]
Hobbes'pessimism abouthumannature, I suggest,is notso deepas thatof
the Psalmist. Scripture itselfis not usuallythatpessimistic, normally drawinga
distinction betweentherighteous and thewicked.But Hobbes'pessimism is deep
enough. FollowingGregKavkawe mightcall his view"predominant egoism,"
understood roughly as theidea thatformostpeople,mostof thetime,thegainto
otherswouldhavetobe largeinrelation to thelosstothemselves beforetheywould
be disposedto sacrifice theirowninterests to thoseofothers;thatformostpeople
the circleof othersforwhomtheywouldbe preparedto makeany significant
sacrificeis small,consisting mainly offamily, closefriends, andcloseassociates;that
largesacrifices of our personalinterests willbe rare;and thatour willingness to
makeevenlimitedsacrifices forothersmaydependon ourhavingattaineda stable
and satisfactory levelof well-being forourselves.Kavkais actuallyslightly cagy
about sayingthatthisreallywas Hobbes'view,sincehe knowsthatthe textual
evidenceforanyinterpretation ofHobbeson thispointisveryambiguous. [8] But
itseemsto mea formula Hobbeswouldbe likely to subscribe toifwe couldaskhim,
and indeed,I thinkitcapturesa viewsharedbyall threeofmyphilosophers.
Is itreallya realistic viewofhumannature?I'm inclined to thinkit is,and
to
myappeals song,story scriptureand are intended to make that plausible. It
seemsto me important to recognize thatthispessimism abouthumannatureis not
merelysomepeevishphilosopher's nightmare, buta viewreflected in muchof our
literature and religion.Had it seemedadvisable, I mighthavegivenmanymore
examples.I havenoteventouchedtherichveinoffilmnoir.ButI wouldpointout,
in concluding thisfirstsectionofthepaper,thateachofmythreephilosophers was
in somesignificant wayan historian as wellas a philosopher.Machiavelli wrotea
history of Florence;his mostimportant politicalworkis presentedas a seriesof
reflections on Livy'shistory of theRomanrepublic;and his bestknownpolitical
work is full of historicalillustrations both fromantiquity and fromhis own
experience as a Florentine diplomat.Hobbes'first publication was a translation of
Thucydides' history ofthePeloponnesian Warandoneofhislastwashisownhistory
of theEnglishCivilWar. Spinozawroteno specifically historicalwork,butwoven
intothefabricofhisTheological-Political Treatise,amidall thebiblicalcriticism and
politicaltheory, is a considerable historyof the Hebrew people. And of course,he,
likeMachiavelli andHobbes,received a classicalhumanistic education, whichmeant
thathe knewintimately theworksof suchhistorians as Livy,Tacitus,Sallustand
QuintusCurtius,not to mentionsuch modernsas Machiavelli, Van Hove, and
AntonioPerez. Indeed,thelineI quotedearlierfromthePoliticalTreatise - that
therewillbe vicesas longas thereare men- is itselfa quotationfromTacitus,who
is one of Spinoza'sfavorite authors.All threeofmyphilosophers werestudents of
history,inWarren's words,diggers in"thesublunary dungheap, which is thehuman
past." And I'm afraidthereis all too muchhumanhistory whichconfirms their
pessimism aboutman. Ifone ofmythreephilosophers couldcomebackto us today
to defendthispessimism, I supposehe might pointto therecentwarin thePersian
Gulf. We have been engagedin the last coupleof monthsin an orgyof self-
congratulationon the'successful'
conclusionofa warinwhicha greatmanypeople
died. Mostof the dead wereprobably as anyof us,buttheirdeaths
as innocent
somehowdidnotmatter, becausewe gainedourobjective withverylightcasualties
on our side. We ourselves,I suppose,areprobably,as a people,no betterand no
worsethananyother.Butourcapacity foridentification
withthesufferingofothers
notconnected to us bytiesoffamily,religion, or alliance
nationality political seems
to be extremelylimited.
-II-
Suppose,forthesakeofargument, thatmythreephilosophers arerightin

theirpessimism. What,ifanything, follows from thatabouthowweoughtto conduct
ourselvesas individualsor aboutwhatsortof society we can and shouldhope and
workfor? Mythreephilosophers drawsomewhat differentconclusions fromtheir
darkviewof humannature.
For Machiavelli itfunctions tojustify a ratherexplicit rejection ofChristian
morality. I hadoccasionrecently tovisitFlorence, andwaspleasedto discover there
thatMachiavelli's bones restin a place of honorin the churchof Santa Croce,
alongside thoseofDante,[9] andMichelangelo, andRossini.The inscription on his
tombreads:tantonomininullumpar elogium, "no epitaphis equal to so greata
name." Remarkably generous, I thought, considering whatMachiavelli had to say
about the Churchduringhis lifetime.Not onlydoes he blamethe Churchfor
makingtheItalianswickedandirreligious - thecloserpeopleare to Rome,and the
moretheyareableto see howtheprinces oftheChurchconductthemselves, theless
theyrespect the Church and its teachings (Discourses I, xii) - he also rejectsthe
teachings of theChurch itself, the
preferring religion of the ancient Romans:
Ancientreligion glorified onlymenwhowereendowedwithworldly
glory, such as generalsof armiesand rulersof republics;our
has
religion glorified humbleand contemplative menratherthan
as
activeones. It has established the supremegood humility,
abjectionand contempt forhumanaffairs, whileancientreligion
definedit as grandeur of spirit,strength ofbodyand all theother
thingslikelyto makemenmostvigorous.If it is truethatour
religion also requiresstrength, itis thekindofstrength thatmakes
you willingto suffer to
ratherthan undertake bold deeds. (The
Portable Machiavelli,ed.& tr.byPeterBondanellaandMarkMusa,
Penguin,1979,p. 298)
It'strue,ofcourse,thatMachiavelli herespeaksofChristianity as "ourreligion," and
elsewherein the samepassagesays that it has shown us "the true path." This
permits,I suppose,somedifference ofopinionaboutwherehisloyalties lay.[10] But
I taketheseexpressions ofallegiance to thereligion ofhisdaytobe merelipservice.
His adviceto princes- andto anyonesituated as princesare,withno earthly judge
overthem[11]- is to resisttheevilofothermen,notto do untoothersas youwould
havethemdo untoyou,butto do untoothersas youthinkthemlikelyto do unto
you,iftheygetthechance(butto do itfirst, beforetheygetthechance).
Mostof thetime,it seemsto me,thespiritof Hobbesis similar.In The

Elements ofLaw (I, xvii,15) hewritesthat"Thesumofvirtueis to be sociablewith
themthatwillbe sociable,andformidable to themthatwillnot,"hardlyan ethicof
unilateralbeneficence. his
Hobbes,too,pays respects to theteaching ofthegospel.
In each ofhis threepolitical he
works proposesthatwe usethegoldenruleas a test
ofwhether ourconductis consistent withthelawofnature.Buthe also holdsthat
we are not obligedto actuallyobeythe law of natureunlesswe have adequate
securitythatthepeoplewearedealingwithwillalsoobeyit. Normally thiscondition
willnotbe satisfiedin stateofnaturesituations; so normally thelawofnaturedoes
notrequirespecific conductofus,justa willto obeyin appropriate circumstances.
In exceptional cases,thecondition maybe satisfied.If it is,Hobbes'ethic
mayrequireof us conductwhichis primafacienotself-interested. For example, a
prisoner ofwar,trusted withthepayment ofhisransom, is obligedto payit,because
theotherpartyto thisstateofnaturecontract hasperformed whathe promised (EL
Hobbeshas somereservations
I, xv,13). Similarly, aboutaccepting themaximthat
in warthelawsare silent:takingan enemysoldier'slifewhenthereis no military
necessityforit,as whenhe is disarmed, is an actofcruelty whichviolatesthelawof
honor(EL I, xix,2).
The conceptof honorhas a similarrestraining influence on Machiavelli's
egoism.Generally he seems to admire those who pursuepower without anyconcern
forconventional morality, but it is possible goto too far even forMachiavelli. In
spite of his admiration for the virtuosity of Cesare Borgia, he draws the line at
of
Agathocles Syracuse:
It certainlycannotbe called virtuosity to murderyourfellow
citizens,
betray yourfriends, to be devoid of truth, pity,andreligion;
a manmaygetpowerbymeanslikethese,butnotglory.(Follow-
ingAdams,p. 26,butmodified)
Machiavelliis morean antiqueRomanthana Christian.Wherehe differs most
significantlyfromHobbes,I think, is in hisattitude towardpromisekeeping.He
would,I am sure,agreewithHobbesthatthereis no obligation to perform firstin
a covenant ofmutualtrustinthestateofnature.ButI findnothing to indicatethat
hewouldagreewithHobbesthatthereis an obligation to do whatyouhavesaidyou
wouldiftheotherpartyhas already performed hispartofthebargain.Ifyouwere
to ask himtheKantianquestion"Can youwillthemaximof youractionto be a
universallaw of nature?"I feelsurehe wouldsay thatthe maximof his action
alreadyis nearenoughto beinga universal lawof humanbehaviorthatthereis no
problemaboutconceiving a woridinwhichitwouldbe strictly universal, or about
willingtheexistence of sucha world.
In somerespects Spinoza,particularly inhispolitical writings, appearsmore
Machiavellian thanMachiavelli himself. He certainly presents himself inthoseworks
as a Machiavellianon thesubjectofpromise The
keeping. following is from Chapter
xvi of the Theological-Political
Treatise:
The universallawof humannatureis thatno one failsto pursue
anything whichhejudgesto be good,unlesshe hopesfora greater
good ... nordoes he submitto anyevilexceptto avoida greater
one... fromthisitfollows thatno one willpromiseto
necessarily
giveup therighthe has to all things

exceptwithintentto deceive,
and ... that no one will stand by his promisesunless he fears a
greaterevilorhopesfora greater
good... Supposea robberforces
me to promisehimthatI willgivehimmygoodswhenhe wishes.
Since ... my naturalrightis determinedonly by my power,it is
certainthatif I can freemyselffromthisrobberby deceptively
promisingwhatever he I am
wishes, permitted to do thisbynatural
right... no contractcan have any forceexcept by reason of its
utility.If theutility
is takenaway... thecontract
is nullandvoid
... (??15-20)
hismaysoundlikeHobbes,whodid,afterall,saythatin thestateof natureutility
is themeasureofright(DC i, 10),butitis infacta moreradicalview,as Spinoza's
rejectionofthepromise totherobberillustrates. Hobbesthinks youshouldkeepthe
promiseto therobber, eventhoughitwasmadeunderduress, to gainyourfreedom.
UnlikeMachiavelli andHobbes,Spinozaseemstohaverather mixedfeelings
abouttheconceptofhonor.In TheTreatise on theIntellect he writesthat
To pursue[honor]wemustdirect ourlivesaccording toothermen's
powersof understanding, fleeingwhattheycommonly flee and
seeking what theycommonly seek. (?5)
And he is too muchtheindividualist to be contentto puthimself in thepowerof
othersto thatextent.In theEthicshewillcondemn theloveof esteem,notmerely
becauseitputsyouat themercy oftheopinions oftheficklemultitude andleadsto
greatanxiety, but also because of the socialconflict it can cause:
to securetheapplauseofthemultitude, eachone gladlyputsdown
thereputation oftheother.Andsincethestruggle is overa good
thought to be the this
highest, gives rise to a monstrous lustofeach
to crushtheotherin anywaypossible.(E IVP58S)
Thisis worthy ofPascal. Still,he doesattachsomeinstrumental valueto thesense
of shame. The manwhoblusheswithshamebetrays a desireto livedecently, and
thoughshame is no virtue,sinceit essentially involves a sadness on the part the
of
personwhofeelsit,he is betterthantheshameless manwho has no suchdesire.
Mostreadersof mythreephilosophers, I think, feelSpinozato be a more
edifyingauthorthaneitherMachiavelli or Hobbes.[12] We might wonderwhy,and
whether theedifying sideof Spinozais consistent withtheegoism,is somehowan
expression of it,or is insteada residueof moreconventional moralviewswhich
Spinoza'sprinciples oughtto haveled himto abandon.
One reasonforthisfeeling, I think, is thatSpinozadoes notsimply accept
humanendsas theyaregiven. says, course,thathewilltreathumanemotions
He of
as dispassionately as a geometrician mighttreatthe lines and figuresit is her
businessto analyze But he cannot,in fact,refrain fromcriticizing them,as the
passagesjust cited illustrate.One of the fundamental themes of his ethical
thought
is the contrast between active and passive emotions, and the importanceof
diminishing the role thatpassiveemotionsplayin our lives. We muststrive,within
the limitsof our ability,to see to it thatwe are not controlledby externalcircum-
stances,whichis to say,I think,thatwe muststrivethatas manyas possible of our
actionsshould be intelligiblein termsof our mostfundamentaldesires:the striving
to persevere inexistence andto increase ourpowerofaction.Becauseemotions like

envy and hate are essentially destructive of our own peace of mind and of the
possibility of harmonious relationswithothers,we shouldstrive,in everyway
possible,to controltheseemotions inourselves.Andbecauseitis to ouradvantage
to liveamongotherswho are also, so faras possible,freeof thesepassions,we
shouldstriveto educateotherstoo to liveaccording to the commandof reason.
Similarly, we shouldtryto encourage, bothin ourselves and in others,theloveof
thosenon-competitive goodswhichone personcan enjoywithoutdiminishing the
supplyavailableforothers,suchas the knowledge of God. Because psychology
teachesus thathateis increased bybeingreturned butcan be destroyed bylove,a
personwholivesaccording to theguidanceofreasonwillstriveto repayhatewith
love.
All ofthisis uplifting andinspirational. I thinkthereis a goodreasonwhy
Spinoza,in spite of his theologicalunorthodoxy, has been attractive to many
Christians.When he saysin the Theological-Political Treatisethatone of our
fundamental requirements is topractice justiceandlovetowards ourneighbors (xiv,
27), I do not suspect him of irony. I think he really means it. But I do notthink
thereis anyinconsistency herewithhisegoism.The basicreasonhe givesus for
to
striving repay hatred with loveis notthatwe areexpected to havea disinterested
loveforourfellowhumanbeings,butthatthepersonwhowantsto avengewrongs
byhatingin return willlivemiserably.
He wouldalso say,I think, thatwe do notact impermissibly ifwe failto
followthisrecommendation. We havetherightto do whatever we wish. Natural
law forbidsnothing whichappetitemayurge. Butas a practical matter we cannot
expect to achieveour own well-being a of
byfollowingpolicy returning forhate.
hate
Not thatreturning love forhatewillalwaysconquerhate. It's just thatit is, in
general,a betterpolicythanthemorenaturalreaction.The personwho hatesus
has, likeanyof us, a desireto be loved. If he has actedin a waymoreapt to
generatehatein us,thatis likelybecausehispassionshavedominated his reason.
Our lovingresponsehasa betterchanceto counteract thosepassionsthana hateful
one would. Butifthecircumstances of a particular case indicatethatthepolicyof
returning goodforevilis likelyto fail,as itdidfortheold ladyinO'Connor'sstory,
I do notthinkSpinozawouldinsiston hisrecommendation.
Letmeturnnowfrom theproblems ofpersonalmorality tothoseofpolitical
philosophy.For thesakeofbrevity I shallconcentrate on Spinoza,and makeonly
passing referencesto Machiavelliand Hobbes. Like Hobbes (and unlike
Machiavelli) Spinozaspeaksthelanguage ofnaturallaw;butwhereasinHobbesthe
idea of a law of natureretainssome force,in the sense thatthereare some
circumstances inwhichit imposeson peoplerealrequirements foractionscontrary
to theirinclinations, it has no suchforcein Spinoza. Naturallaw forbidsnothing
whichappetitemayurge. Or as he also putsit,thenaturalrightof each thingis
coextensive withitspower. Whatit can do, it maydo. Thisappliesnotonlyto
humanbeings,butto anythingin nature.
Spinozahasvariousarguments forthis,buttheone I likebestrunslikethis.
If we couldmakesenseof thenotionof a naturallaw,a law independent of any
humandecisions andprescribing onekindofconductrather thananother, we would
haveto thinkof it as thecommand of a personaldeity.Now God, forSpinoza,is

not a personaldeity. On myinterpretation of Spinoza'smetaphysics, God is an
impersonal system of scientificlaws; but in the Theological-Political he is
Treatise
to
prepared speak the language of hisphilosophical and
opponents admit, the for
sakeof argument, theconceptof sucha deity.Still,he insists, ifwe ascribeto that
God theotherperfections traditionally ascribed to in
him, particular, theperfection
of omnipotence, we willbe in as muchdifficulty as ifwe conceivedof God as not
beinga personat all. For ifan omnipotent God expresses hiswillin a command,
it mustnecessarily be actedon; so no one,on theseassumptions, couldeverviolate
a naturallaw. But a law whichcannotbe violatedis not a law in the relevant,
prescriptive sense:itcan onlybe a lawin theimproper senseinwhichthattermis
appliedto theeternaltruths describing howthingsin naturein factact. Spinoza
concludesthatin thestateof naturewe havea rightto do whatever we can do, in
thesensethatin thestateof natureanything is permissible, thoughno one else,of
course,is underanyobligation notto interfere withwhatwe do whenwe act in
accordance withournaturalrights.ThismaysoundHobbesian, butifwhatI've said
earlieraboutHobbesis right, Spinozatakesthislanguagemuchmorestrictly than
Hobbeseverdoes.
If thenotionof a prescriptive naturallawis incoherent, Spinozacontends,
theonlymeaning we can giveto notionslikerightandwrong, justiceand injustice,
is inrelationto thelawsofcivilsociety.A wrongis a violation ofthoselaws;justice
is a constant dispositionto giveto eachpersonwhatbelongstohimaccording to the
laws.
Butwhatis thebasisofcivilsociety?Ifwe imagine peoplelivingin a state
ofnature, we mustimagine themas enemiesto one another. [13] Spinozadoes not
use theHobbesianrhetoric ofa warofall againstall,andheclearly thinksofpeople
prior to the formation of civil as
society living together in small groups. I think
But
thisis merelya rhetorical difference, not a substantive one, since I don'tthink
Hobbestakesthattalkliterally. Whatisinanycaseclearly commontobothHobbes
and Spinoza (and to Machiavelli as well) [14] is the idea thatlifepriorto the
formation of civilsocietyis a condition ofradicalinsecurity. Evenifnoteveryone
is literallyan enemyof everyotherperson,thereare enoughhostilepeople out
there,and enoughpowerful motives forconflict, thatsmallgroupswillnotbe able
to provideadequatesecurity fortheirmembers.Like Hobbes (and in thiscase
unlikeMachiavelli)Spinozaalso emphasizes strongly the economicadvantages of
civilsociety.The peoplewhomwe see living without an organized community lead
a wretched andbrutallife,becausetheassistance theyareableto giveone another
providesthemwithlittle.A trulyhumanstandard of livingrequiresan organized
community of some size, with considerable division of labor and specialization.
Spinoza adds thatitis only in such a community that itis possibleto developthearts
and scienceswhichare necessary forpeopleto attainthehighest levelofwell-being
theyare capable of. So theincentivesto formand maintaina civilsocietyare strong.
[15]
Like Hobbes (and again,unlikeMachiavelli)Spinoza couches his theoryof
terms. It involvesa surrenderof right
the formationof civilsocietyin contractarian
by the individual
to society,a commitment bythe individualto liveaccordingto the
dictatesof reason,and a transfer to thestateof therightto determine whatthe

dictatesof reasonare and of thepowerto enforcethem. But Spinoza'suse of
contractarian languageis highly paradoxical, givenhisMachiavellian attitude toward
promise-keeping. If no contract can haveanyforceexceptbyreasonof itsutility,
thenthe socialcontractcan haveforceonlyso longas the membersof society
perceiveit to haveutility.The merefactthatpeoplehavepledgedtheirallegiance
to thestatein itselfprovidesthemwithno reasonforobedienceto itscommands.
So theproblemofforming a society whichhasanychanceofenduring becomesthe
problemof designing a societywhosemembers willcontinueto perceiveit to be
usefulto them. And Spinozathinksthattheformof societywhichhas thebest
chanceto satisfy thatcondition is a democracy, understood as a society inwhicheach
citizentakespartin the decisionsof societyas a whole. Democracyis the most
naturalformofsociety, becausetheparticipation ofthepeoplemakesitnearerthan
any other form of government to the freedom of thestateofnature.[16] And itis
also themostprudentformof government, sincetheequalparticipation of all the
citizensin thedecision-making process is thebest way to insure that the decisions
willbe forthecommongood,rather thanforthegoodofsomeindividual or smaller
group. In thisinstanceSpinoza'smasteris Machiavelli, notHobbes. He believes
thatthewisdomof thepeopleas a wholeis greater thanthatof anysubgroup.In
a democracy thereis lessreasonto fearabsurdities, becausein a largeassembly it
is almostimpossible thatthemajority shouldagreeon an absurdaction.[17]
Thisseemssomewhat anomalous, givenwhatI havedescribedin the first
of
part mypaperas the pessimism Machiavelli and Spinozashareabouthuman
nature. That pessimism mightseem morenaturally to lead to the Hobbesian
conclusionthatabsolutemonarchy is preferable to democracy or to anysystem of
mixedgovernment. WhenMachiavelli arguesin theDiscourses thatthemassesare
wiserand moreconstantthana prince,he presents himself as arguing againstthe
viewofLivyandall otherhistorians, whoareagreedthat"nothing is morefutileand
inconstant thanthemasses."(I, Iviii,Walkertr.) In thePoliticalTreatise Spinoza
himself willwritethat
menare necessarily subjectto affects ... theyare so constituted
thattheypitythosewhoareindistress, andenvythosewhoarewell
off... thattheyaremoreinclined tovengeance thanto mercy...
and moreover, thateachone wantstheothersto liveaccording to
his mentality, so thattheyapprovewhathe approves,and spurn
whathe spurns... The resultis thatsinceall equallywantto be
first,theyfallintoquarrelsand exertthemselves as muchas they
can to suppressone another, andthattheonewhoturnsoutto be
thewinner gloriesmorethathe hasharmedtheotherthanthathe
has helpedhimself... And thougheveryoneis persuadedthat
Religion... teachesthateachpersonshouldlovehisneighbor as
himself, i.e.,thathe shoulddefendhisneighbor's rightjust as he
wouldhisown,still,we haveshownthatthispersuasion is able to
do littleagainstthe affects. . . It is strong,of course,at the point
ofdeath,whenillnesshasconquered
eventheaffects
anda manlies
or in housesofworship,
inactive, wheremenconductno business;
butitcarriesno weight inthemarketplace or inthecourt, whereit

wouldbe mostneeded.(i, 5, mytr.)
How, if all thatis true,can we expecta democracy to avoid absurddecisions?
Perhaps the answer is that we can't, and that Spinoza's view of democracy is notas
sanguine as what I have so far said about it might make it appear.
WhenMachiavelli, in thepassageI alludedto above,arguedagainstLivy's
lowviewofthemassesandcontended thattheywerewiserandmoreconstant than
princes, he was not necessarily giving them veryhigh marks for wisdom and
constancy. He was a
making comparative He
judgment. grantsLivy thatthe people
areapttobe unstable, ungrateful andunwise.But,he argues, princesareevenmore
susceptible to thesefaults.The essential thingin anyformofgovernment, whether
itis a principalityor a republic, is thatitshouldbe regulated bylaws. For a prince
who is able to do whatever he wishesmayact likea madman, whereasa people
whichcan do whatitwisheswillmerely actunwisely.
I thinkit mayhave been thispassagein Machiavellito whichHenry
Kissinger wasreferring whenhe saidinthecourseofdenying to OrianaFallacithat
Machiavelli hadexercised anyinfluence on himthat"theone thingI findinteresting
in Machiavelli is his estimate of thePrince'swill. Interesting, but not suchas to
influence me." [18] In anycase,I suspectit is thissideof Machiavelli, whichyou
don'treallygetifyouknowhimonlyfromThePrince, whichhascausedhimstillto
be honoredin hisowncountry.
PerhapsSpinozais likewise making a comparative judgment.There'snota
great deal about the different forms of government the Theological-Political
in
the
Treatise, primary concern of which is to justifyfreedomof thoughtand
expression. He reserved discussion of the different formsof government forthe
PoliticalTreatise, and thenhe didnotliveto finish thePoliticalTreatise.Our text
breaksoffjust as he is beginning his discussion of democracy.But some of the
things he saysaboutmonarchy suggest his
that treatment ofdemocracy wouldhave
been equallyMachiavellian:
Kingsarenotgods,butmen,whoareoftenenchanted bythesiren's
song.So ifeverything dependedon theinconstant willofone man,
nothing wouldbe stable. If a monarchy is to be stableit mustbe
organized so thateverything is donebytheking'sdecreealone(i.e.,
everylaw is theking'sdeclaredwill),butthatnot everything the
kingwillsis law.(TP vii,1,Wernham tr.)
If Spinozaappliedthislineof reasoning to democracy, he wouldsay. The people,
collectively,are likelyto be wiserand moreconstant thananyone personis as an
individual.Still,theyaremen,notgods,andtheyneedto be restrained bylaws. A
well-designed democracy requiresa fundamental law,which,likeall validlaw in a
democracy, expressesthe willof the people,but whichhas the effectthatnot
everything thepeoplewillsis law. Thatis to saythata well-designed democracy
requiresa constitution to actas a restraint on thepeople'spassions.[19]
I concludewitha fewwordsaboutthe contemporary relevanceof this
excursion intothepast. In the lasttwenty yearstherehas been a greatdeal of
interestinsocialcontract theory, muchofitinspired bytheworkofJohnRawls. It's
an interesting factaboutA Theory ofJustice thatit doesnotdrawmuchinspiration
fromHobbes,thoughI havebeentoldthatRawlswrotehisthesison Hobbes[20]

and thoughhe has guidedtheworkof students whohavedone excellent workon
Hobbes. For himthe historical figures in the social contracttradition who are
centralareLocke,RousseauandKant. Of Hobbes'Leviathanhe saysthat"forall
of itsgreatness ... [it]raisesspecialproblems." [21] So faras I knowthereare no
references in Rawlsto Spinoza'spolitical theory,certainly notinA Theory ofJustice.
I conjecture thatthereasonforthisis thatRawlsdoes notfindthemoral
psychology of eitherHobbesor Spinozaverycongenial.An adequatetheoryof
justicecannotascribeto peopleonlybasicdesiresor interests whichare definable
without reference to anymoralnotions; itmustassumethattheyhavebasicinterests
defined inmoralterms. [22] Iftheargument ofthispaperiscorrect, we might think
it morepromising to tryto developa politicaltheorywhichassumesa more
Hobbesianmoralpsychology, andwe shouldnotbe surprised to see theemergence
of suchtheoriesin thewakeofRawls'work.Butthebestknownofthesetheories
seemsto relyon a notionofindividual rights existingantecedently to theinstitution
of civilsociety.Anyonewhothinks thatsomething likea Hobbesianpsychology is
true,andwhofindsthenotionofnatural rights and
suspicious obscure, mightdo well
to lookto Spinoza.ButI leavethetaskofdeveloping a modern versionofSpinoza's
politicalphilosophy to others.I myself am merely a student of history,a diggerin
theash pilewhichis ourcommonpast.
Endnotes
[1] I have leftthe textof the talkas I deliveredit, mistakesand all.

Correctionsand additionswillbe givenin thenotes,noneofwhichwerepresentin
thatversion.
[2] See FlanneryO'Connor,CollectedWorks(The Libraryof America,
1988),p. 1266.
[3] All theKing'sMen,BantamClassicedition,1959,p. 157.
[4] ThePrince,ch. xv. Sometimes(as here) the translations I giveof
Machiavelliare an eclecticblendof thoseto be foundin Adams,Bondanellaand
Musa,Bull,Price,andWalker/Richardson. WhenI followone translatorclosely,I
indicatethatfact.
[5] ?10,p. 32 inWarrender's editionofDe cive(Oxford:ClarendonPress),
1983.
[6] TheCityofGod XIX,v (Dods tr.inBasic Writings ofSt.Augustine,
ed.
byWhitney Oates,NewYork:RandomHouse,1948,II, 479).
[7] See ThePsalms,text,translation and commentarybytheRev. Dr. A.
Cohen(London:The SoncinoPress,1982),p. 33.
[8] HobbesianMoraland PoliticalPhilosophy (Princeton Press,
University
1988),pp. 64-80. I have discussedthe questionof whetherit is reasonableto
interpretHobbesas a predominant egoistin "Reflections
on Hobbes:RecentWork
on his Moral and PoliticalPhilosophy," Journalfor PhilosophicalResearch
15(1990):169-250.
[9] Thisis a mistake.Although thereis indeed,in theChurchof Santa

a
Croce, sarcophagus bearing the name of Dante,it does notcontainhisbones,as
a numberofpeoplepointedoutto me afterthetalk.
[10] As RichardKrautpointedoutafterthetalk,Machiavelli's mostrecent
biographer takes him at face value when he pronounces Christianitybe thetrue
to
religion(see Sebastian de Grazia, Machiavelli in Hell, Princeton University Press,
1989),p. 89. ButI cannotsee thatde Graziahasanyevidence forthisstronger than
thatacknowledged and discounted in thetext.
[11] And hence,to menin a stateof nature,thoughhe does notuse the
conceptof a stateofnaturein hispoliticaltheory.
[12] The following paragraphs werewritten withAlanDonaganin mind,
sinceI knewthathe feltI had a tendency to makeSpinozasoundtoo Hobbesian.
In themI wishedto acknowledge someof the differences betweenSpinozaand
Hobbes. I gatherfromhiscomments after the talk thathe felt I had notgonefar
but
enoughin thatdirection, unfortunately he diedbeforewe had theopportunity
to discussthematter in properdetail.I regret hislossverymuch.
[13] Cf. TP ii, 14: "Becauseforthemostpartmenare subjectto these
affects... , bynaturetheyare enemies."
[14] See TheDiscourses I, i.
[15] The key passage, I think, is TTP v, 18-22.
[16] See TTP xvi,
36, cf. v, 22-23: Becausepeopleresentbeingcompelled
to do whattheydo notperceiveto be in theirowninterest, regimeswhichrelyon
violencedo notlastlong. People"canputup withnothing lessthanto be subject
to theirequalsand to be governed bythem... Fromthesefoundations it follows
thateitherthewholesocietyshouldholddominion as a body(ifthiscan be done)
so thateveryone is boundto be subjectto himself, and no one is boundto be
subject to his or
equal, else, ifa few people, or one man,has dominionalone,he
ought to have something above ordinary human nature (orat leasthe oughttostrive
withall hismightto persuadethemultitude ofthis)."
[17] Cf.TTP xvi,30.
[18] See TheNewRepublic,16 December1972,p. 21. It's ironic,given
Machiavelli's influence on Spinoza,thatin thesameinterview in whichKissinger
deniestheinfluence ofMachiavelli on him,he claimsSpinoza(alongwithKant)as
one of thetwophilosophers whoinfluenced himmost.
[19] A democrat who doubted the wisdomof the Gulfwar mightbe
discouraged by the factthat our 'victory' was so popularthatithas madePresident
Bushappearto manyto be unbeatable in 1992. Buthe might takeheartin thefact
thatwe stillhave sufficient attachment to our constitutional processesthatthe
President feltitnecessary togettheconsent ofCongress beforeengaging ourtroops.
the
Though majority supported the President's action, the existence of a substantial
andarticulate does
minority appear to have acted as some constraint on the waythat
actionwas carriedout. As I writethisnotein September 1991, thereseems to be
a widespread viewthat,ifthePresident wentwrongat all,itwas in exercising too
muchrestraint at theend of thewar. Unfortunately it maynotbe clear,evenby
nextfall,whetherthe war was the exercisein prudenceit was claimedto be.
[20] I don'trecallwhereI pickedup thismistaken butShellyKagan,

notion,
whohas readRawls'thesis, metells it is a version
preliminary ofthe materialwhich
appearedin"Outlineofa DecisionProcedure forEthics," Review1951.
Philosophical
[21] A Theory ofJustice (HarvardUniversity Press,1972),p. 11n.
[22] For thisformulation of theissueI am indebtedto SamuelFreeman.
See his "Reasonand Agreement in SocialContract Views,"Philosophy and Public
Affairs
19(1990):122-157.
NOTE: The following
abbreviated
references
are usedin thetext:
TTP = Spinoza'sTractatus
Theologico-Politicus
TP = Spinoza'sTractatus
Politicus
EL = Hobbes'ElementsofLaw

A Good Man Is Hard To Find

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

A Good Man Is Hard To Find

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

A Good Man Is Hard to Find

Author(s): Edwin Curley

Some of you,no doubt,willassociatemytitlewitha blues song made

lady. A good manmaybe hardto find,butit'sonlytoo easyto findanotherkind,

had bittenhimand shotherthreetimesthrough thechest. Then

Whyhave I chosento beginthistalkby callingyourattention to these

wordsand has madeno otherpreparations willcometo grief...

coercivepower,everymanwilldistrust and dreadeachother,and

heretranslated "fool"impliesmoralas wellas intellectual deficiency: he is a vile

Suppose,forthesakeofargument, thatmythreephilosophers arerightin

Mostof thetime,it seemsto me,thespiritof Hobbesis similar.In The

giveup therighthe has to all things

to persevere inexistence andto increase ourpowerofaction.Becauseemotions like

haveto thinkof it as thecommand of a personaldeity.Now God, forSpinoza,is

dictatesof reason,and a transfer to thestateof therightto determine whatthe

butitcarriesno weight inthemarketplace or inthecourt, whereit

fromHobbes,thoughI havebeentoldthatRawlswrotehisthesison Hobbes[20]

[1] I have leftthe textof the talkas I deliveredit, mistakesand all.

[9] Thisis a mistake.Although thereis indeed,in theChurchof Santa

[20] I don'trecallwhereI pickedup thismistaken butShellyKagan,

You might also like