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Contents
Vestil vs IAC...........................................................................................................................................1
Iligan Cement vs CA............................................................................................................................6
Caedo vs Yu Khe.................................................................................................................................12
Casupanan vs Laroya........................................................................................................................19

Vestil vs IAC

G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989

PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and TERESITA
UY, respondents.

Pablo P. Garcia for petitioners.

Roberto R. Palmares for private respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Little Theness Tan Uy was dead at the age of three. Her parents said she
died because she was bitten by a dog of the petitioners, but the latter denied
this, claiming they had nothing to do with the dog. The Uys sued the Vestils,
who were sustained by the trial court. On appeal, the decision of the court a
quo was reversed in favor of the Uys. The Vestils are now before us. They
ask us to set aside the judgment of the respondent court and to reinstate
that of the trial court.

On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a
child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of
Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu
General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on
the forehead" 1 and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio
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Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week
later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August 15, 1975,
the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3

Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils
were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and
eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting
that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame
animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After
trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained
the defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4

The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when the case was
appealed. 5 It found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the
dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the
injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of
the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the
appellees. Accordingly, the Vestils were ordered to pay the Uys damages in
the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Theness, P12,000.00 for medical
and hospitalization expenses, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.

In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the
owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet
been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the logic
of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held
responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's
heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the
possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question,
regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.

Article 2183 reads as follows:

The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the

same is responsible for the damage which it may cause,
although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease
only in case the damages should come from force majeure from
the fault of the person who has suffered damage.

Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored

him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for
damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the
caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one,
including himself.
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Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's house is
hardly credible. She said that the occupants of the house left by her father
were related to him ("one way or the other") and maintained themselves out
of a common fund or by some kind of arrangement (on which, however, she
did not elaborate ). 7 She mentioned as many as ten of such relatives who
had stayed in the house at one time or another although they did not appear
to be close kin. 8 She at least implied that they did not pay any rent,
presumably because of their relation with Vicente Miranda notwithstanding
that she herself did not seem to know them very well.

There is contrary evidence that the occupants of the house, were boarders
(or more of boarders than relatives) who paid the petitioners for providing
them with meals and accommodations. It also appears that Purita Vestil had
hired a maid, Dolores Jumao-as, who did the cooking and cleaning in the
said house for its occupants. 9 Her mother, Pacita, who was a nursemaid of
Purita herself, categorically declared that the petitioners were maintaining
boarders in the house where Theness was bitten by a dog. 10 Another
witness, Marcial Lao, testified that he was indeed a boarder and that the
Vestils were maintaining the house for business purposes. 11 And although
Purita denied paying the water bills for the house, the private respondents
submitted documentary evidence of her application for water connection
with the Cebu Water District, which strongly suggested that she was
administering the house in question. 12

While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still
part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband
were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only
heir residing in Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the
property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover,
there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the
house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, 14 and used it
virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in
the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The dog
itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973
and until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy
that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization
expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. 16

The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors
of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a
result thereof. On the contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she
died of broncho-pneumonia, which had nothing to do with the dog bites for
which she had been previously hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself
in an extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the
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dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first, Theness
developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites,
and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her
death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water
after she was bitten by the dog is established by the following testimony of
Dr. Tautjo:

COURT: I think there was mention of rabies in the report in the

second admission?

A: Now, the child was continuously vomiting just before I

referred to Dr. Co earlier in the morning and then the father,
because the child was asking for water, the father tried to give
the child water and this child went under the bed, she did not
like to drink the water and there was fright in her eyeballs. For
this reason, because I was in danger there was rabies, I called
Dr. Co.

Q: In other words, the child had hydrophobia?

18
A: Yes, sir.

As for the link between rabies and broncho-pneumonia, the doctor had the
following to say under oath:

A: Now, as 1 said before, broncho-pneumonia can result from

physical, chemical and bacterial means. ... It can be the result of
infection, now, so if you have any other disease which can lower
your resistance you can also get pneumonia.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Would you say that a person who has rabies may die of
complication which is broncho-pneumonia?

A: Yes.

Q: For the record, I am manifesting that this book shown the

witness is know as CURRENT DIANOSIS & TREATMENT, 1968 by
Henry Brainerd, Sheldon Margen and Milton Chaton. Now, I
invite your attention, doctor, to page 751 of this book under the
title "Rabies." There is on this page, "Prognosis" as a result of
rabies and it says: Once the symptoms, have appeared death
inevitably occurs after 2-3 days as a result of cardiac or
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respiratory failure or generalized paralysis. After a positive

diagnosis of rabies or after a bite by a suspected animal if the
animal cannot be observed or if the bite is on the head, give
rabies vaccine (duck embryo). Do you believe in this statement?

A: Yes.

Q: Would you say therefore that persons who have rabies may
die of respiratory failure which leave in the form of bronco-
pneumonia?
19
A: Broncho-pneumonia can be a complication of rabies.

On the strength of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds that the link
between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has beep
satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life
Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the death certificate is not conclusive
proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the
evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died
because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a
different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be
expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact,
Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal
should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does
not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame
and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not
speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they
cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that
Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can
hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.

It is worth observing that the above defenses of the petitioners are an

implied rejection of their original posture that there was no proof that it was
the dog in their father's house that bit Theness.

According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil

Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of
the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on
natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which
such animal may cause. 21

We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary
awards except only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which
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are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint. While there is no

recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child they
have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to
which they are entitled.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above modified. The

petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Iligan Cement vs CA

G.R. No. 103437 November 25, 1994

ILIGAN CEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Manila and BETA Electric
Corporation, respondents.

Roco, Buñag, Kapunan, Migallos & Jardeleza for petitioner.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for private respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 27189, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
58, Manila in Civil Case No. 15634.

We deny the petition.

The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

In 1981, the Iligan Cement Corporation (ICC), started

undertaking its "Plant Rehabilitation" program of power
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requirements which had to be implemented on a phase-to-phase

basis. Phase I of this program consisted in the installation of
power factor correction equipment. Based on the study made by
the ICC safety engineer and electrical engineering consultant,
Engineer Fernando Munasque, the ICC decided to have installed
in the plant a combination of the group and the total power
factor correction substations. With the general specifications
furnished to prospective suppliers, the ICC requested the former
to give their respective price quotations for the equipment. Of
the four would-be suppliers the ICC considered the quotation of
the BETA Electric Corporation (Beta) as the most reasonable.
The quotation was for either a six-step power factor corrective
equipment or for a three-step corrective power equipment.
Subsequently, or on August 19, 1983, Beta electric likewise
submitted a cost estimate with regard to the installation,
commissioning and testing of the equipment together with the
supply of wires, lugs and foundation. After a thorough evaluation
of these proposals, the ICC, through the recommendation of
Engr. Munasque and Engr. Pachler, a Swiss consultant, decided
on the purchase of a three-step power factor correction
equipment. It likewise accepted the Beta proposal for the
installation, commissioning and testing of the power factor
equipments. Purchase orders were sent to Beta by ICC to cover
these transactions on October 14, 1983. These were however
cancelled and superseded by the purchase orders filed on
November 7, 1983, to take into account the increase in prices of
material components of the power factor equipment. It appeared
from these purchase orders that the equipment cost
P654,000.00 while the installation, commissioning and testing
would amount to P39,947.00.

On November 21, 1983, Beta submitted to ICC its proposed

construction and wiring diagram for the latter's comment and
approval.

The equipment was delivered to Iligan at plaintiff's cement plant

there. This equipment upon the approval of the plaintiff, was
installed. On November 2, 1985, in the presence and with the
approval, of ICC engineering staff, the equipment was switched
on. Thereafter, a chattering sound was heard, and fire ensued.

An assessment of the extent of the damage showed that

equipment loss amounted to P8,577,581.84 (Exhs. I and I-2).
This however did not include the power factor correction
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equipment installed and switched on that day since it proved to

be intact and undamaged despite the fire.

No one claimed responsibility for the fire. Thus, both parties

decided to form a technical committee to study the technical
causes of the fire. The committee, as agreed upon, was
composed of five members, two from each party and the fifth
member, to be unanimously chosen by the parties, who would
also act as the chairman. The parties chose
Engr. Alejandro Jimenez as chairman, a noted electrical
engineer.

On April 30, 1986, the committee submitted its report. Its

findings showed that the fire was "caused by arcing faults and
restrikes arising from overvoltage produced by switching the 600
KVAR capacitors into the 4160-volt system which is susceptible
to arcing faults and whose equipment are not well protected
against overvoltage. The fire and the damages it caused was due
to the fact that oil circuit breakers were used indoors" (Records,
p. 128).

Despite this report, the parties were unable to pinpoint which

should shoulder what cost. Thus, on December 29, 1986, the
ICC filed a complaint for damages against Beta. It was plaintiff's
theory that part of the defendant's duty as the entity
commissioned by the ICC to manufacture, install, commission
and test the equipment was the making of a prior technical
audit. This stemmed from a comment made by the committee
stating that the fire could have been avoided "had a technical
audit been made before the capacitors were considered."

Defendant contended that plaintiff had no cause of action against

it inasmuch as:

a.) Defendant performed all its obligations to plaintiff under their

contract.

i.) The design and specifications for the power factor

corrective equipment were made exclusively by
plaintiff which had in its employ an expert, a safety
engineer and electrical engineering consultant.
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ii.) The power factor correction equipment delivered

and installed by Beta was in accordance with
plaintiff's own design and specifications.

iii.) Plaintiff approved the construction and wiring

drawings for the equipment delivered by Beta.

iv.) Plaintiff inspected and accepted the power factor

equipment delivered by Beta.

v.) The equipment passed all the tests required by

the plaintiff.

vi.) The energization and switching on the equipment

was previously cleared with and approved by
plaintiff.

vii.) The equipment suffers from no defect or

deficiency whatsoever (Records, pp. 31-32).

Furthermore, defendant asserted that "plaintiff itself made a

study of its electrical system and on the basis of such study,
decided on a power factor corrective equipment which (it) itself
designed." Thus, it cannot be faulted if plaintiffs own study did
not reveal the weakness and deficiency of its electrical system.

After a series of hearings, the trial court decided for the

defendant. It held:

To the mind of the court, BEC has not at all breached

its capacitor contract with ICC, let alone could such
alleged breach of the contract be considered as the
proximate cause of the November 2, 1985 fire that
damaged ICC's major substation and other power
utilization equipment at its Iligan cement plant. It
must be noted that BEC's contract with ICC caused
only the supply, installation, commissioning and
testing with the 63 step (sic) power factor capacitor
at ICC's Iligan plant. The transaction itself came into
being as a brainchild of ICC's own safety and
consultant professional electrical engineer, Fernando
Munasque who (in coordination with ICC's projects
group composed of foreign and local engineers)
studied, designed and recommended the acquisition
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of the capacitor in 1981 admittedly for cost saving

purposes. In fact, Engineer Munasque even provided
the design, specifications and diagram of the
capacitor and discussed its details with BEC's
engineers. Furthermore, ICC supervised the
manufacture of the capacitor as BEC had to submit
to ICC for approval all construction, drawings,
wirings and other details relative thereto (Rollo, pp.
34-37).

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, dismissing the
complaint and ordering the plaintiff (herein petitioner) to pay the defendant
(herein private respondent) the sum of P1,012,269.61 as actual damages
(representing the unpaid price of the power-factor correction equipment as
of November 30, 1989) and P150,000.00 as attorney's fees (Rollo, pp. 83-
84).

II

In this petition, petitioner insists that the proximate cause of the fire was the
negligence of private respondent in switching on the capacitor into the
electrical system of petitioner without first determining whether said
connection could be done safely. According to petitioner, if private
respondent took said precaution, it could have found that it was not safe to
do so and that there was no need for said equipment to be switched on
because the cement plant's power factor had reached the desired level even
without the use of said equipment.

III

The relations of the parties is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines on contracts for a piece of work.

Article 1713 of said Code provides:

By the contract for a piece of work the contractor binds himself

to execute a piece of work for the employer, in consideration of a
certain price or compensation. The contractor may either employ
only his labor or skill, or also furnish the material.

A contractor is responsible for the damages caused by the defects in the

work or by the use of materials of inferior quality or due to any violation of
the terms of the contract (cf. Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1723;
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines 291 [1992]).
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Petitioner failed to present evidence that there was a defect in the capacitor
it ordered from private respondent; that the latter used materials of inferior
quality; or that it had violated the terms of the contract for the supply of
said equipment.

The Court of Appeals was categorical that private respondent "did not at all
break its contractual obligation with plaintiff-appellant (petitioner)" (Rollo,
p. 40).

Another point to consider is that after the fire, the capacitor was still in good
condition, which could only mean that private respondent had complied with
the design made by the engineers of petitioner.

Based on the findings of the Technical Committee, the trial court concluded
that the overvoltage, caused by the weak and inadequate electrical system
of the cement plant, generated the sparks which ICC's circuit breakers failed
to isolate or neutralize. Hence, the sparks spread to other bigger-sized
circuit breakers of the cement plant's electrical system, heated the poorly
insulated electrical wiring and ignited the oil in the circuit breakers and
transformer equipment.

The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the overvoltage was
caused by the weak and deficient electrical system, including the lack of
protective relays, of the cement plant itself (Rollo, p. 40).

The installation of the equipment prior to its switching on into the electric
system of the cement plant was made under the supervision of the
engineers of petitioner. The wiring lay-out plans were also approved by
petitioner (Rollo,
p. 41).

Petitioner has its own engineering staff and foreign consultants, who were
knowledgeable about the capacity and requirements of the electrical system
of the cement plant.

It was petitioner itself which made a study of its electrical system and on the
basis of such study decided on the specifications of the capacitor. Likewise, it
was petitioner itself that designed the equipment it ordered from private
respondent. The blame cannot be laid at the door of private respondent, if
petitioner's study did not take into consideration the deficiency of its
electrical system. Whatever defects or imperfections were extant in the
design were the responsibility of petitioner's resident engineers. It was
petitioner which formally communicated to private respondent in a letter
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dated July 25, 1982, requesting for a quotation for a power-capacitor bank
and attaching thereat a lay-out of said capacitor bank.

According to the Technical Committee, "had a technical audit been made

before the capacitors were considered, the system would have revealed its
weakness" (Rollo, p. 89).

It was petitioner's duty to conduct a periodic technical audit of the cement

plant. In this particular case, petitioner was remiss in its duty (TSN, March
4, 1988, pp. 52-54).

The "technical audit" is not included in the contract for commissioning,

installing and testing of the power capacitor. It was supposed to be the
subject of another contract between the parties but which did not push
through because of the fire.

Petitioner contends that there was no more need to switch-on the capacitor
prior to the accident because its power factor had already been raised to
93.3%, which was more than the desired 85% level. It was petitioner which
ordered the capacitor. It was in a better position to ascertain whether or not
it still needed the equipment. It was its duty to inform private respondent
that it had already achieved the desired power factor rating.

Finally, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals and the trial court
substituted their own judgment for the findings of fact of the Technical
Committee. The fact is that the Technical Committee only made these
conclusions as to what, not who, caused the fire. The two courts were the
ones which determined who was to be blamed for the fire on the basis of the
findings of fact of the Technical Committee. In brief, the two courts did not
alter the findings of fact of the Technical Committee, much less make their
own findings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Caedo vs Yu Khe

G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968

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MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and the Minors,

EPHRAIM CAEDO, EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE CAEDO, suing
through their father, MARCIAL T. CAEDO, as guardian ad
litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, defendants-appellants.

Norberto J. Quisumbing for plaintiffs-appellants.

De Joya, Lopez, Dimaguila, Hermoso and Divino for defendants-appellants

MAKALINTAL, J.:

As a result of a vehicular accident in which plaintiff Marcial Caedo and

several members of his family were injured they filed this suit for recovery of
damages from the defendants. The judgment, rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal on February 26, 1960 (Q-2952), contains the following
disposition:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court renders a judgment, one in

favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, Yu Khe Thai and
Rafael Bernardo, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs Marcial
Caedo, et al., the sum of P1,929.70 for actual damages; P48,000.00
for moral damages; P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, with costs against the defendants. The
counterclaim of the defendants against the plaintiffs is hereby ordered
dismissed, for lack of merits.

On March 12, 1960 the judgment was amended so as to include an

additional award of P3,705.11 in favor of the plaintiffs for the damage
sustained by their car in the accident.

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us
in view of the total amount of the plaintiffs' claim.

There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was
responsible for the accident? and (2) if it was defendant Rafael Bernardo,
was his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, solidarily liable with him? On the
first question the trial court found Rafael Bernardo negligent; and on the
second, held his employer solidarily liable with him.

The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 on
Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo
Village. Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in
Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a
 Page 14 of 29
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plane for Mindoro. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three
daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe
Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his
Parañaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars
were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the condition of the
road and the absence of traffic — the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per
hour, and the Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers).
Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the
Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned by a certain
Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short
rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the
other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.

Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig when he saw it in
front of him, only eight meters away. This is the first clear indication of his
negligence. The carretela was provided with two lights, one on each side,
and they should have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary
precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, as he claimed later on
at the trial, the carretela should anyway have been visible to him from afar if
he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights for a
considerable while.

In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the opposite
direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping altogether behind
the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As
he did so the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward
rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car
skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it collided with the oncoming
vehicle. On his part Caedo had seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he
slackened his speed, judged the distances in relation to the carretela and
concluded that the Cadillac would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided
to take a gamble — beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line
with the carretela, or else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a
risky maneuver either way, and the risk should have been quite obvious. Or,
since the car was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour (or 25 miles
according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too late to apply the brakes when
Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front of him, and so he had
to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of the oncoming car on the
opposite lane. As it was, the clearance Bernardo gave for his car's right side
was insufficient. Its rear bumper, as already stated, caught the wheel of
the carretela and wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected
situation, tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to
the right, but was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene show
 Page 15 of 29
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that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of the road at
the moment of impact.

There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to Rafael
Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the damages
suffered by the plaintiffs. The next question is whether or not Yu Khe Thai,
as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the driver. The applicable
law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which reads:

ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with
his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the
use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of
reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the
next preceding two months.

Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if
he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. The
rule is not new, although formulated as law for the first time in the new Civil
Code. It was expressed in Chapman vs. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374,
where this Court held:

... The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless the
negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as
to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to
direct his driver to desist therefrom. An owner who sits in his
automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a
violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has
had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the
driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. The
owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up the
Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any
effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to do
so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the
results produced by the acts of the chauffeur. On the other hand, if the
driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a
person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile,
although present therein at the time the act was committed, is not
responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of
must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of
time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver act his
own.
 Page 16 of 29
Choco Notes

The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but
rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely
correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order
to prevent injury or damage.

In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had
been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been employed by
Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During
that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No
negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master.
Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate
setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the
driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the
danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such
negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at
an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic
that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any
special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his
driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was
only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not
constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when
he did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's
sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that
another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element
was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess
the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered
his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only
make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought
that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law
to prevent the misfortune.

The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a
great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform
and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. In many
cases they refrain from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons
to drive for them precisely because they are not trained or endowed with
sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the
relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually
encountered on the road. What would be a negligent omission under
aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and
knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say,
of an old and infirm person who is not similarly equipped.
 Page 17 of 29
Choco Notes

The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of
skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of
traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence,
within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the
evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the
accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level
imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one
passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another.
Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment
of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have
real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.

We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with Rafael
Bernardo, is an error. The next question refers to the sums adjudged by the
trial court as damages. The award of P48,000 by way of moral damages is
itemized as follows:

1. Marcial Caedo P
20,000.00

2. Juana S. Caedo 15,000.00

3. Ephraim Caedo 3,000.00

4. Eileen Caedo 4,000.00

5. Rose Elaine Caedo 3,000.00

6. Merilyn Caedo 3,000.00

Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should have
granted them also actual or compensatory damages, aggregating P225,000,
for the injuries they sustained. Defendants, on the other hand maintain that
the amounts awarded as moral damages are excessive and should be
reduced. We find no justification for either side. The amount of actual
damages suffered by the individual plaintiffs by reason of their injuries,
other than expenses for medical treatment, has not been shown by the
evidence. Actual damages, to be compensable, must be proven. Pain and
suffering are not capable of pecuniary estimation, and constitute a proper
ground for granting moral, not actual, damages, as provided in Article 2217
of the Civil Code.

The injuries sustained by plaintiffs are the following:

 Page 18 of 29
Choco Notes

MARCIAL T. CAEDO:

A. Contusion, with hematoma, scalp, frontal left; abrasions,

chest wall, anterior;
B. Multiple fractures, ribs, right, lst to 5th inclusive. Third rib has
a double fracture; Subparieto-plaural hematoma; Basal disc
atelectasis, lung, right lower lobe, secondary;
C. Pseudotosis, left, secondary to probable basal fracture, skull.

JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1)frontal region, left; (2) apex of nose; (3) upper eyelid, left;
(4) knees.
B. Wound, lacerated, irregular, deep, frontal;
C. Fracture, simple, 2nd rib posterior, left with displacement.
D. Fracture, simple, base, proximal phalanx right, big toe.
E. Fracture, simple, base, metatarsals III and V right.
F. Concussion, cerebral.

EPHRAIM CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) left temporal area; (2) left frontal; (3) left supraorbital

EILEEN CAEDO:

A. Lacerated wound (V-shaped), base, 5th finger, right, lateral

aspect.
B. Abrasions, multiple:
(1) dorsum, proximal phalanx middle finger; (2) Knee,
anterior, bilateral; (3) shin, lower 1/3.

ROSE ELAINE CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple: (1) upper and lower lids; (2) left

temporal; (3) nasolabial region; (4) leg, lower third, anterior.

MARILYN CAEDO:

A. Abrasions, multiple: (1)shin, lower 1/3 right; (2) arm, lower

third
 Page 19 of 29
Choco Notes

C. Contusion with hematoma, shin, lower 1/3, anterior aspect,

right. (See Exhibits D, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, and D- 5)

It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the above-
mentioned injuries, the amounts of moral damages granted by the trial court
are not excessive.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of

declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and is
otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with costs
against the latter.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and

Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Casupanan vs Laroya

[G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002]

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs.

MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the

Resolution[1] dated December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari
and the Resolution[2] dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion for
reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac,
Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
 Page 20 of 29
Choco Notes

The Facts

Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for
brevity) and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for
brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for
brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed
a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other
hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-
delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its
preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a
motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering
the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the
Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the
civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the
criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order
of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court (Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas,
Tarlac, Branch 66,[3] assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.

The Trial Courts Ruling

The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of
dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and
therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC
further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that
the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of
judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas
RTC denied the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.

The Issue
 Page 21 of 29
Choco Notes

The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:

In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may
think and believe that the accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x
x [T]he first party, believing himself to be the aggrieved party, opted to file
a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the second party.On the
other hand, the second party, together with his operator, believing
themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case
for quasi-delict against the first party who is the very private complainant in
the criminal case.[4]

Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case

for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the
criminal case.

The Courts Ruling

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC
dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in
the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a
criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may
file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They
contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting
from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case
can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident.
They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil
case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out
that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action
based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle,
who was not a party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it
does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan
and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when
they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there
is no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final
and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises
the legal question of whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only
one action - the independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
 Page 22 of 29
Choco Notes

The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of
forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-
94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal [5] that the dismissal
was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal
is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal
expressly states it is with prejudice. [6] Absent a declaration that the dismissal
is with prejudice, the same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs
dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an action
without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to
file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states
that where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the
Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that
the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, to secure a favorable judgment. [8] Forum-shopping is present
when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of
action and reliefs sought.[9] However, there is no forum-shopping in the
instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and
Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they
have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal
punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on
culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code.These articles on culpa aquiliana read:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
 Page 23 of 29
Choco Notes

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by

preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the
fault or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused
can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the
law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may
invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused
to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the

accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been
the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis
supplied)

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the
accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules
for brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action
independently of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved
the right to file such civil action.Unless the offended party reserved the civil
action before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil
actions arising from the same act or omission were deemed impliedly
instituted in the criminal case. These civil actions referred to the recovery of
civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the
recovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code
on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict
under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal
action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was
deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action.Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules provided as follows:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is

instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
 Page 24 of 29
Choco Notes

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised

Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution
of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately
waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be
made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the accused.

x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1,

2000 and now provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal

action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be
made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under
circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.

xxx

(b) x x x

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application
with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of
both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (Emphasis supplied)
 Page 25 of 29
Choco Notes

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with
the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the
crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in
the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is
not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based
on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions
based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing
of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the
Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action deemed
instituted in the criminal action.[10]
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to
file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving
such right in the criminal action before the prosecution presents its
evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he
files a separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action
to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet
commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal
action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil
actions arising from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code.[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil
action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final
judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil action
was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if
still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final
judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the
separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply
to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the
criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
continues this procedure, to wit:

SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action
has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be
instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already
been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it
 Page 26 of 29
Choco Notes

may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall

last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil
action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated
with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be
deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to
the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional
evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and
decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of
prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose
proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.

x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that
the separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended
upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also
prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate
civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are
not the offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action
against the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules provides as follows:

SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided
in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended
1985 Rules, expressly allows the offended party to bring an independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance
 Page 27 of 29
Choco Notes

of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages

twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file
an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of
the present Rule 111 expressly states that the offended party may bring
such an action but the offended party may not recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of
Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the
accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs.
Cantos[12] where the Court held that the accused therein could validly
institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal
case filed his Answer with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that
time the Court noted the absence of clear-cut rules governing the
prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary
consequences and implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that the
trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case and
disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the
accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party after the
criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules which
may be promulgated. The Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim
or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate
the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the
2000 Rules precisely to address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under
this provision, the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim
or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision
states that any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a
separate civil action. The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed independently of
the criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated
in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with
the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even
without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles
of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers
 Page 28 of 29
Choco Notes

only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved
or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-
delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can
proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the
civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a
second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act
or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be
insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or
guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same
act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly
allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that
the counterclaim of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil
action. This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from
setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in
the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his
counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since
the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can
avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow
the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing
to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due
process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan
and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No.
2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial
court in the criminal case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the
independent civil action. This possibility has always been recognized ever
since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in
Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action
 Page 29 of 29
Choco Notes

may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of

the result of the latter. In Azucena vs. Potenciano,[13] the Court declared:

x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to

subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of
the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the
concept of a civil action separate and independent from the criminal action
although arising from the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet
to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts,
one hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-
delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more
apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies under the
Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on
December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on
December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the
well-settled rule that -

x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as

applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. [14]

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED.

The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special
Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.