A Liberal Theory of International Politics:

Emphasizing Preferences
A Summary of Two International Journals: Liberalism and International Relations
Theory and Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics
by Andrew Moravcsik Harvard University

Liberal theory in international relations can be grounded in social scientific

assumptions, overcoming the disjuncture between empirical research and language
used in the field. Liberal hypotheses, which stress variation in state preferences, are
increasingly important, but the conceptual language of IR theory has not kept up with
contemporary research. Leading liberal IR theorists have proposed core assumptions
and three major variants of liberal theory: ideational, commercial, and republican
liberalism. Liberalism assumes individuals and societal groups act rationally to
pursue interests through political exchange and collective action, but conflict arises
due to scarcity and differentiation. State officials define state preferences and act
based on the interests of individuals and groups. Interdependent state preferences
shape behavior, with each state seeking to realize its distinctive preferences under
varying constraints imposed by other states. Ideational liberalism, drawing on a
tradition dating back to John Stuart Mill, views domestic social identities and values
as a fundamental determinant of state preferences and international conflict and
cooperation.
The fundamental types of social identity that affect foreign policy. The first
type is the societal preferences regarding the nation's scope, which can lead to
conflicts over borders and citizenship. The second type is the commitment to political
institutions, which can cause conflicts when the realization of legitimate domestic
political order in one jurisdiction threatens its realization in others. The text provides
historical and modern examples to support these claims and suggests that these
factors are important determinants of international conflict and cooperation.
 The nature of legitimate socioeconomic regulation and redistribution is a
fundamental social identity relevant to foreign policy. National regulations on public
goods, such as immigration, social welfare, taxation, and environmental protection,
affect international economic negotiations. Regulatory pluralism limits international
cooperation, particularly in economic liberalization. Commercial liberalism explains
state behavior based on market incentives facing domestic and transnational
economic actors. Aggregate welfare gains from trade result from specialization and
functional differentiation, but economic interdependence can create national policies
that diverge from foreign economic and security policies that would maximize those
gains. The distributional conflict arises when national policies' costs and benefits are
not internalized to the same actors, leading to rent-seeking efforts that seek personal
benefit at the expense of aggregate welfare. Global market imperfections can create
international conflict, as firms engage in predatory dumping abroad while seeking
domestic protection and subsidization, imposing costs on domestic consumers and
foreign producers.
Commercial liberalism asserts that trade is more cost-effective than coercion,
while Republican liberalism highlights unbiased representation as the key to avoiding
policies that impose costs and risks on a broad range of social actors, ultimately
reducing the likelihood of costly international conflict. Democratic peace theory
argues that liberal democratic institutions tend to avoid wars. Liberal theory provides
explanations for foreign policy change and historical change in the international
system, which realism and institutionalism cannot predict.
Liberal theory explains the emergence of modern international politics,
characterized by reliable expectations of peaceful change, domestic rule of law, stable
international institutions, and intensive societal interaction. This is due to the
emergence of a pacific, interdependent, and normatively satisfied bloc of states,
which is a precondition for such politics. On the other hand, functional regime theory,
often referred to as neoliberal institutionalism, has relatively little in common with
liberal theory. While liberals attribute peace to societal sources of state preferences,
institutionalism takes state preferences as fixed or exogenous and focuses on how
anarchy leads to suboptimal outcomes.
The assumptions of liberalism differ from those of institutionalism. Liberal
theory explains policy as a function of societal context and focuses on how domestic
conflict imposes suboptimal outcomes. Liberal theory contributes to the analysis of
international regimes in two distinctive ways, by explaining when and why
institutionalist assumptions emerge and by deepening the institutionalist account of
regime stability. Liberal theory suggests that international regimes are stable when
societal individuals and groups adjust to make domestic policy reversal costly. The
liberal view of regimes as "socially embedded" can be extended to suggest
endogenous causes of regime change over time.
This article discusses the importance of including liberal hypotheses in social
scientific theories to avoid omitted variable bias. Empirical studies tend to exclude
liberal hypotheses, leading to incomplete and biased analysis. Two examples are
cited, one from realist theory and one from constructivist theory, to demonstrate the
impact of this bias. The article argues that liberal hypotheses are necessary to provide
a reliable theoretical understanding of phenomena in world politics. It also suggests
that liberal variables are more fundamental than constructivist ones and may explain
both peace and transactions. The article concludes by advocating for a more rigorous
empirical confrontation between constructivism and liberalism or a synthesis of the
two.
Theoretical restatement in IR emphasizes treating liberalism as a fundamental
baseline against which realist or constructivist hypotheses are tested to control for
underlying variation in state preferences. Failure to do so poses a significant threat to
empirical inference. Liberal theory remains important, even primary, even in cases
with direct threats to national security, high levels of interstate conflict, and non-
liberal states. The theoretical restatement also offers a clearer and more internally
consistent model for multicausal theory synthesis by reversing the universal
presumption that "liberalism makes sense as an explanatory theory within the
constraints pointed out by realism." Liberal theory has analytical priority in any
synthesis since the assumption of state rationality central to realism implies action
based on a prior, specific, and consistent set of preferences.
The analytical priority of liberalism is important in multicausal synthesis,
particularly in the investigation of national motivations. The priority of liberalism in
multicausal models of state behavior suggests that collective state behavior is
analyzed as a two-stage process of constrained social choice. Wilson's proposal for
the League of Nations was a pragmatic, two-stage liberal view that rested on a
multicausal liberal analysis. The post-World War II U.S. policy of containment was a
multicausal liberal grand strategy that recognized the links between the European
threat and the nature of the Soviet regime. Liberal IR theory generates related
propositions about world politics and has the potential for theoretical extension.
Liberalism is a social scientific theory of international relations, in contrast to
orthodox and commonly labeled "Liberal" theories. The author argues that Liberalism
is an explanation of what states do, rather than what they should do and that it can
provide a promising synthesis with Realism. The essay illustrates how the Liberal
model can be applied to international institutions, although Realist critics have often
dismissed Liberal claims as normative ideals. The author argues that Liberalism is
often treated as more normative than explanatory, but it can be a guide to normative
choice. The lack of a paradigmatic rival to Realism and the artificial contrast between
the real and the ideal are concerns for both intellectual historians and social scientists.
The lack of clear micro foundations in international relations theory has led to
semantic confusion between Realism and Liberalism, with some theories appearing
uncategorizable. The lack of a coherent Liberal counterpart has discouraged the
derivation and testing of more sophisticated Liberal hypotheses, reducing our
empirical knowledge about the validity of Liberal claims. To develop a positive
theory of international relations from classical Liberal writings, it is necessary to
detach Liberal statements about social reality from their normative context and focus
on rational behavior by self-interested individuals. This approach reflects the practice
of normative Liberal philosophers themselves, who have increasingly grounded their
prescriptions in generalizations about social reality.
Classical Liberal philosophers like Kant, Smith, Hume, and Constant
grounded their political philosophy in a theoretical understanding of individual
interests and social context, rather than divine or human existence. They emphasized
social theories that predict variation in interstate conflict and cooperation, depending
on social conditions. The three core assumptions of their theory are that the
fundamental actors in politics are members of domestic society seeking to promote
their independent interests; social and political order results from the aggregate
interactions of such individuals; and the most fundamental determinants of politics lie
in society itself. Liberals reject the notion of automatic harmony of interests between
individuals or nations and instead focus on the successful management of social
conflict through the restriction of the arbitrary use of public and private power.
Liberal international relations theory assumes that private incentives can be
channeled towards social goals through institutions that encourage legally guaranteed
individual rights and competition in political and economic affairs. The doctrine
admits the possibility of evolutionary social progress and emphasizes that the state
represents some segment of domestic society whose interests are reflected in state
policy. Imperfect representation of social interests may lead to concentrations of
power that extract private gains from international conflict at the expense of society
as a whole. The behavior of states and the levels of international conflict and
cooperation are determined by the nature and configuration of state preferences,
which reflect the social context of the state. Liberals view events in world politics as
a two-stage process of social choice, where individual states first define their
preferences and then engage in a process of interstate strategic interaction to reach a
common outcome.
Realism and Liberalism differ in their emphasis on domestic preference
formation and interstate bargaining. Realists focus on the latter, explaining state
behavior and international outcomes based on external political constraints. In
contrast, Liberals argue that variations in the pre-strategic purposes of states,
grounded in their changing relationship with domestic and international civil society,
are the most fundamental determinant of variations in foreign policy behavior and
international diplomacy. Liberals reject the dogma that state interests are "naturally"
either convergent or conflictual and specify the social conditions that determine
variations in underlying conflicts and convergences between state preferences. While
Liberalism is, in the first instance, a theory of preference formation, it also offers
predictions about the outcomes of interstate strategic interaction.
Before applying Liberal theory, it's important to understand how state
interactions are influenced by the convergence and divergence of preferences.
Liberals suggest that interstate interactions depend on the level of convergence or
conflict between national preferences. This is known as "maximalist Liberalism,"
which predicts the outcome of interstate interactions from patterns of interests, rather
than based on threats or incentives based on independent sources of power. While
Realists may view maximalist Liberalism as naive, it retains more explanatory power
than may appear at first glance. The plausible stake in bargaining often determines
whether any agreement is possible at all. Therefore, the predictions of systemic
outcomes are compatible with maximalist Liberal theory.
The minimalist Liberal position acknowledges relative power resources as
important but subordinate to preferences. Minimalist Liberals argue that Liberalism
must be the prior part of any synthesis with Realism, and the definition of rationality
implies action based on a consistent set of preferences. Empirical investigations to
resolve the issue of whether the explanation of international relations is primarily
attributable to Liberal factors, Realist factors, or some combination of the two will
require more precise specifications of Liberal theory. The three assumptions that lay
the foundation for the Liberal approach to international relations are that society
consists of self-interested individuals with potentially convergent interests, states are
representative, and interstate behavior reflects the pattern of state preferences. These
assumptions suggest variables that influence the level of international conflict and
cooperation, including the representativeness of domestic institutions, the level of
social equality and cohesion, and the extent of transnational economic interaction.

Liberal arguments suggest that international conflict can arise from domestic
social group conflicts. The foreign policy preferences of governments are influenced
by formal representative institutions linking state and society, and accurate
representation of social interests in politics is problematic. Liberal democracies are
less likely to engage in the strategy of war, and military aggression among great
powers tends to be associated with small-group interests in non-representative states.
Effective management of domestic distributional conflicts is necessary for
maintaining free trade, and distortions in political institutions and differential social
power may permit special interests to influence decision-making. National identity is
viewed as a socially constructed institution.
Disjunctures between borders and allegiances can lead to conflicts of interest
and political unrest, with ethnic conflicts potentially leading to violence and war.
Nationalist uprisings and attempts for autonomy or blocs for ethnic groups have been
the primary cause of wars in the past century and a half. Economic nationalism,
cultural identity, and national norms of social justice can impede international
cooperation. A society with a dynamic balance between various forms of social and
political allegiance can be more resistant to international conflict. Economic
development, including transnational commerce, communication, and prosperity, can
discourage interstate conflicts and increase the stake of individuals and private groups
in society, reducing the willingness to assume the risk of war. Transnational
interdependence, both through private political pressure and market pressure from
mobile factors of production, can influence foreign policy.
Modern production networks make it difficult to extract resources from
conquered territories due to the private option of exit. It also discusses determinants
of foreign economic policy, international institutions, and their role in international
relations theory. The author uses Wilson's proposal for the League of Nations as a
"critical case" example and argues that collective security was only possible among
countries with republican governments and national self-determination. The text
explores Wilson's conception of how the League would function with non-
democracies and preconditions for it to work effectively. Finally, the article suggests
that changes in preferences may provide a better explanation for variance in regime-
based international economic cooperation.
Liberalism and Realism are theories that explain both economic and military
phenomena in international relations. While Realism focuses on the effect of the
strategic environment on interstate bargaining, Liberalism is a theory of state
preference formation and interaction. Minimalist Liberalism can integrate both
theories by emphasizing the importance of analyzing underlying preferences before
the bargaining environment. To establish which theory provides a more accurate
explanation, direct tests between hypotheses from both are necessary.