Role Theory in International Relations Approaches and Analyses (2011)

Role Theory in International
Relations
Role Theory in International Relations provides a comprehensive, up-to-date

survey of recent theoretical scholarship on foreign policy roles, and extensive
empirical analysis of role behavior of a variety of states in the current era of
eroding American hegemony.
Taking stock of the evolution of role theory within foreign policy analysis,
International Relations, and social science theory, the authors probe role
approaches in combination with IR concepts such as socialization, learning, and
communicative action. They draw upon comparative case studies of foreign
policy roles of states (the United States, Japan, PR China, Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, Poland, Sweden, and Norway) and international institutions
(NATO, the European Union) to assess NATO’s transformation, the European
Union as a normative power, as well as the impact of China’s rise on US hege
mony under the Bush and Obama administrations. The chapters also offer com-
pelling theoretical arguments about the nexus between foreign policy role change
and the evolution of international society.
This important new volume advances current role theory scholarship, offering
concrete theoretical suggestions as to how foreign policy analysis and IR theory
could benefit from a closer integration of role theory. It will be of great interest
to all scholars and students of international relations, foreign policy, and inter
national politics.
Sebastian Harnisch is Professor of International Relations and Foreign Policy

at the University of Heidelberg, Germany.
Cornelia Frank is Lecturer in Political Science at the Chair for Foreign Policy
and International Relations at the University of Trier, Germany.
Hanns W. Maull is Professor of Foreign Policy and International Relations at

the University of Trier, Germany.
Routledge advances in international relations and global
politics
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Analysis Knowledge, ethics and agency
France, Britain and Europe Martin Shaw
Henrik Larsen
9 History and International
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From ontology to empirical
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Gil Friedman and Harvey Starr International Relations
Robert M.A. Crawford
3 The Political Economy of
Regional Co-operation in the 11 National and International
Middle East Conflicts, 1945–1995
Ali Carkoglu, Mine Eder and New empirical and theoretical
Kemal Kirisci approaches.
Frank Pfetsch and
4 Peace Maintenance Christoph Rohloff
The evolution of international
political authority 12 Party Systems and Voter
Jarat Chopra Alignments Revisited
Edited by Lauri Karvonen and
5 International Relations and Stein Kuhnle
Historical Sociology
Breaking down boundaries 13 Ethics, Justice and International
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Constructing an international
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Edited by Jan W. van Deth
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Building a new European security CIS
order? Theories, debates and actions
Edited by Martin A. Smith and Nicole J. Jackson
Graham Timmins
25 Asia and Europe
16 Power, Postcolonialism and Development and different
International Relations dimensions of ASEM
Reading race, gender and class Yeo Lay Hwee
Edited by Geeta Chowdhry and
Sheila Nair
26 Global Instability and Strategic
Crisis
17 Constituting Human Rights
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Global civil society and the
society of democratic states
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Politics
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Survival, 1933–1991 continent
Of sanctions, embargoes and Edited by Ian Taylor and
economic warfare Paul Williams
Alan P. Dobson
28 Global Governmentality
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Richard McAllister and Edited by Wendy Larner and
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Analysing activism on the internet Citizenship Education under
Jayne Rodgers Conflict
The political socialization
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of Israeli and Palestinian
Contemporary World
youngsters
Walker Connor and the study of
Orit Ichilov
nationalism
Edited by Daniele Conversi
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Relations Edited by Jude Howell and
Edited by Peter Mandaville and Diane Mulligan
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Maurice A. East
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institutional design in divided
societies 42 Russia and NATO since 1991
Edited by Marc Weller and From Cold War through cold
Stefan Wolff peace to partnership?
Martin A. Smith
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Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 43 The Politics of Protection
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David M. Quinn and Victor Asal agency
Edited by Jef Huysmans,
35 Postcolonial Politics, the Andrew Dobson and
Internet and Everyday Life Raia Prokhovnik
Pacific traversals online
M.I. Franklin 44 International Relations in
Europe
36 Reconstituting the Global Traditions, perspectives and
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and Jeremy Bentham Safety of the People
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International Relations Nationalism in India
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Catrina Kinnvall
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Court 47 Culture and International
A global civil society Relations
achievement Narratives, natives and tourists
Marlies Glasius Julie Reeves
48 Global Civil Society 56 Civil Society, Religion and
Contested futures Global Governance
Edited by Gideon Baker and Paradigms of power and
David Chandler persuasion
Edited by Helen James
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Policy 57 War, Peace and Hegemony in a
Pitfalls, possibilities and Globalized World
paradoxes The changing balance of power in
Edited by David Chandler and the twenty-first century
Volker Heins Edited by Chandra Chari
50 International Cooperation and 58 Economic Globalisation as

Arctic Governance Religious War
Regime effectiveness and northern Tragic convergence
region building Michael McKinley
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Geir Hønneland 59 Globalization, Prostitution and
Sex-trafficking
Corporeal politics
51 Human Security
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Concepts and implications
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60 Peacebuilding
Anuradha Chenoy
Women in international perspective
Elisabeth Porter
52 International Relations and
Security in the Digital Age
61 Ethics, Liberalism and Realism
Edited by Johan Eriksson and
in International Relations
Giampiero Giacomello
Mark D. Gismondi
53 State-Building 62 Law and Legalization in

Theory and practice Transnational Relations
Edited by Aidan Hehir and Edited by Christian Brütsch and
Neil Robinson Dirk Lehmkuhl
54 Violence and Non-Violence in 63 Fighting Terrorism and Drugs

Africa Europe and international police
Edited by Pal Ahluwalia, cooperation
Louise Bethlehem and Jörg Friedrichs
Ruth Ginio
64 Identity Politics in the Age of
55 Developing Countries and Genocide
Global Trade Negotiations The Holocaust and historical
Edited by Larry Crump and representation
S. Javed Maswood David B. MacDonald
65 Globalisation, Public Opinion 74 The Securitization of
and the State Humanitarian Migration
Western Europe and East and Digging moats and sinking boats
Southeast Asia Scott D. Watson
Edited by Takashi Inoguchi and
Ian Marsh 75 Mediation in the Asia-Pacific
Region
66 Urbicide Transforming conflicts and
The politics of urban destruction building peace
Martin Coward Edited by Dale Bagshaw and
Elisabeth Porter
67 Transnational Activism in the
UN and the EU 76 United Nations Reform
A comparative study Heading North or South?
Jutta Joachim and Birgit Locher Spencer Zifcak
68 Gender Inclusive 77 New Norms and Knowledge in

Essays on violence, men and World Politics
feminist international relations Protecting people, intellectual
Adam Jones property and the environment
Preslava Stoeva
69 Capitalism, Democracy and
the Prevention of War and 78 Power, Resistance and Conflict
Poverty in the Contemporary World
Edited by Peter Graeff and Social movements, networks and
Guido Mehlkop hierarchies
Athina Karatzogianni and
70 Environmental Change and Andrew Robinson
Foreign Policy
Theory and practice 79 World-Regional Social Policy
Edited by Paul G. Harris and Global Governance
New research and policy agendas
71 Climate Change and Foreign in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin
Policy America
Case studies from East to West Edited by Bob Deacon,
Edited by Paul G. Harris Maria Cristina Macovei,
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72 Securitizations of Citizenship Nicola Yeates
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80 International Relations Theory
73 The Power of Ideology and Philosophy
From the Roman Empire to Interpretive dialogues
Al-Qaeda Edited by Cerwyn Moore and
Alex Roberto Hybel Chris Farrands
81 Superpower Rivalry and 87 The Contested Politics of
Conflict Mobility
The long shadow of the Cold War Borderzones and irregularity
on the twenty-first century Edited by Vicki Squires
Edited by Chandra Chari
88 Human Security, Law and the
82 Coping and Conformity in Prevention of Terrorism
World Politics Andrej Zwitter
Hugh C. Dyer
89 Multilayered Migration
83 Defining and Defying Organized Governance
Crime The promise of partnership
Discourse, perception and reality Edited by Rahel Kunz,
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90 Role Theory in International
84 Federalism in Asia Relations
India, Pakistan and Malaysia Approaches and analyses
Harihar Bhattacharyya Edited by Sebastian Harnisch,
Cornelia Frank and
85 The World Bank and HIV/AIDS Hanns W. Maull
Setting a global agenda
Sophie Harman
86 The “War on Terror” and the

Growth of Executive Power?
A comparative analysis
Edited by John E. Owens and
Riccardo Pelizzo
Role Theory in International
Relations
Approaches and analyses
Edited by Sebastian Harnisch,

Cornelia Frank, and Hanns W. Maull
First published 2011
by Routledge
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Role theory in international relations : approaches and analyses / edited by
Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank & Hanns W. Maull.
p. cm. – (Routledge advances in international relations and global
politics)
1. International relations–Simulation methods. 2. Role playing–Political
aspects. 3. United States–Foreign relations–2001-2009.
4. United States–Foreign relations–2009- I. Harnisch, Sebastian.
II. Frank, Cornelia. III. Maull, Hanns, 1947–
JZ1253.R65 2011
327.101–dc22
2010042921
ISBN 0-203-81875-X Master e-book ISBN
ISBN: 978-0-415-61484-9 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-203-81875-6 (ebk)
Contents
Notes on editors xiv

Notes on contributors xv
List of abbreviations xvii
Introduction 1
S ebastian H arnisch , C ornelia F rank , and
H anns W . M aull
Part I
Theories 5
1 Role theory: operationalization of key concepts 7

S ebastian H arnisch
2 Role theory research in international relations: state of the

art and blind spots 16
M arijke B reuning
3 “Dialogue and emergence”: George Herbert Mead’s

contribution to role theory and his reconstruction of
international politics 36
S ebastian H arnisch
4 Habermas meets role theory: communicative action as role

playing? 55
H arald M ü ller
5 Identity and role change in international politics 74

D irk N abers
xii Contents
Part II
Roles and institutions 93
6 NATO and the (re)constitution of roles: “self,” “we,” and

“other”? 95
T rine F lockhart
7 Reconsidering the European Union’s roles in international

relations: self-conceptions, expectations, and performance 113
R ikard B engtsson and O le E lgstr ö m
8 Comparing Germany’s and Poland’s ESDPs: roles, path

dependencies, learning, and socialization 131
C ornelia F rank
9 Does membership matter? Convergence of Sweden’s and

Norway’s role conceptions by interaction with the European
Union 147
R achel F ol z
Part III
US hegemony 165
10 Hegemony reconstructed? America’s role conception and its

“leadership” within its core alliances 167
H anns W . M aull
11 Terrorized America? 9/11 and its impact on US foreign

policy 194
R aimund W olf
12 Discord and collaboration in Franco-American relations:

what can role theory tell us? 213
U lrich K rot z and J ames S perling
13 Hesitant adaptation: China’s new role in global policies 234

J Örn - C arsten G ottwald and N iall D uggan
Contents xiii
14 Conclusion: role theory, role change, and the international
social order 252
S ebastian H arnisch , C ornelia F rank , and
H anns W . M aull
References 262
Index 306
Notes on editors
Cornelia Frank holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Trier,
Germany, and is Lecturer at the Chair of International Relations and Foreign
Policy. Her research interests encompass NATOization of East European
countries, war economy, and leadership research. Furthermore, she edited the
German armed forces’ “Security Policy Reader”.
Sebastian Harnisch is Professor of International Relations and Foreign Policy
at the University of Heidelberg. His research interests are in German and
American foreign policy, European affairs, theories of international relations,
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and Korean affairs.
Hanns W. Maull is Professor of International Relations and Foreign Policy at
the University of Trier. His research interests include US, German, and Japa-
nese foreign policy and theories of international relations. For the academic
year 2010/11, he is a Senior Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy, Washing-
ton, DC.
Contributors
Rikard Bengtsson is Associate Professor of Political Science at Lund Univer-

sity, focusing on global security, EU external relations, Russian foreign
policy, and global political economy.
Marijke Breuning is Professor at the University of North Texas. Her research
interests include (comparative) foreign policy analysis, development coopera-
tion, and foreign aid.
Niall Duggan is a Ph.D. student and project coordinator at University College
Cork, Ireland. He holds an MA in East and Southeast Asian Studies from
Lund University and currently works on Sino-African relations.
Ole Elgström is Professor of Political Science at Lund University, Sweden. His
research interests include the European Union’s role(s) in international relations.
Trine Flockhart, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for Inter-
national Security, Copenhagen. Her research interests include European
security, especially NATO and EU, liberal world order, state socialization
and social identity theory.
Rachel Folz, MA, is a doctoral student at the University of Trier, Germany, and
currently a research associate at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs,
Stockholm.
Jörn-Carsten Gottwald holds a Ph.D. in political science from the Free University
Berlin and is lecturer in University College Cork’s Chinese Studies department.
Ulrich Krotz holds a Ph.D. from Cornell University, and teaches international
relations and European politics at Brown University, Providence, Rhode
Island. He also taught at Oxford University, and held research positions at
Harvard University, the European University Institute, and Princeton
University.
Harald Müller is Professor of International Relations at the University of
Frankfurt and Director of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF ). He
has published widely on international relations theory, non-proliferation, and
arms control.
xvi Contributors
Dirk Nabers is Professor of International Political Sociology and Director of the
Institute of Social Sciences at the University of Kiel, Germany.
James Sperling is Professor of Political Science at the University of Akron,
Ohio. He has authored numerous articles on European, German, and regional
security. Current research projects include a theoretical treatment of NATO
and the prospect for trading public goods in the transatlantic region.
Raimund Wolf is a Ph.D. student at the University of Heidelberg. His research
interests include American, British and German foreign policy, security and
military studies, and theories of international relations.
Abbreviations
ABM anti-ballistic missile

ACP Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific
AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan
AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM Asia–Europe Meeting
AU African Union
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China
CA communicative action
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CCPCC Chinese Communist Party Central Committee
CDU Christian Democratic Union (Germany)
CFP comparative foreign policy
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMI Chiang Mai Initiative
CMIM Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPC Chinese Communist Party
CPG Comprehensive Political Guidance (NATO)
DG director-general
DOM Département d’outre-mer
DPJ Democratic Party of Japan
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EAS East Asia Summit
EDA European Defence Agency
EHGs European Headline Goals
ENP European Neighborhood Policy
EPA Economic Partnership Agreement
ERRF European Rapid Reaction Force
ESDP European Security and Defense Policy
ESS European Security Strategy
EU European Union
EUMC European Union Military Committee
xviii Abbreviations
EUMS European Union Military Staff
FDI foreign direct investment
FDP Free Democratic Party
FPA foreign policy analysis
FPRA foreign policy role analysis
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNP gross national product
GWOT Global War on Terror
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC International Criminal Court
ICI Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
ICJ International Court of Justice
IMF International Monetary Fund
IO international organization
IR International Relations
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
LDP Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
MAP Membership Action Plan (NATO)
MD Mediterranean Dialogue
MSDF Maritime Self-Defense Forces (Japan)
NAC North Atlantic Council
NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO non-governmental organization
NRC national role conception
NRF NATO Response Force
PfP Partnership for Peace
PNAC Project for the New American Century
PRC People’s Republic of China
PSC Political and Security Committee
SAFE State Authority for Foreign Exchange (China)
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIT social identity theory
SORT Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty
TCA theory of communicative action
TOM Territoire d’outre-mer
UN United Nations
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United Nation Secretary-General
WEU Western European Union
WTO World Trade Organization
Introduction
Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and
Hanns W. Maull
Will China rise to become the new superpower of the twenty-first century? Will
the United States be able to maintain its hegemony in international politics? Is
the European Union a new type of power, an “ethical” (Manners 2002) or “civil-
ian” (Duchêne 1972; Maull 2005) power? Do international organizations shape
their members’ behavior by establishing a division of labor? All these questions
aim at the roles states and international institutions play in world affairs.
There is an antecedent literature on roles in foreign policy analysis (FPA),
international relations theory and social science theory proper. The concept of
“role,” originally developed by sociologists, deals with the assumptions and
values individuals bring to their interactions with others. Depending on who
those others are, in what relationship they stand with the individual under con-
sideration, and in what specific social context the interactions take place, those
roles differ; individuals thus are regularly considered to play multiple roles
(Turner 2002).
Here, we borrow the concept to apply it to states, following a tradition estab-
lished by K.H. Holsti in his seminal 1970 article. While the analogy between
individuals and social collectives is not unproblematic, we hold that it is mean-
ingful as an analytical tool to explore both national foreign policy behavior and
developments in international relations as a social system. In fact, it has been
used time and again by scholars of International Relations following in the foot-
steps of Holsti (Walker 1987).
IR theory has long been replete with implicit national role concepts. For what
else differentiates Hans Morgenthau’s “revisionist powers” from “status quo
powers”? What else brought together Hedley Bull’s great powers or the concert
of European powers of Henry Kissinger? What accounts for hegemonic stability
or the functioning of a collective security system but the foreign policy roles
states define for themselves and play out? Yet until recently, role theory
remained underdeveloped in the increasingly convoluted building of contempor-
ary IR theory, except for abundant colloquial references to, for example, the
“role” the United States plays in NATO or the UN Security Council. In our
view, this lacuna is a pity, for role theory offers a promising avenue for resolv-
ing one of IR theory’s most intractable problems, the relationship between actors
and the system in international relations. Roles, as the notions of actors about
2 S. Harnisch et al.
who they are, what they would like to be with regard to others, and how they
therefore should interact in (international) social relationships, are at the inter-
section between those two levels of analysis, and they also serve as hinges
between the two. They therefore can help us not only to understand and explain
national foreign policies, but also to explore the patterns and evolution of inter-
national social order. To paraphrase Alexander Wendt, international social order
is what states make of it, and thus what roles they play. The resulting interna-
tional order thus shapes the social parameters within which individual states (and
non-state actors) pursue their individual ambitions and resolve their collective
problems. But this social order is also the result of myriad interactions between
actors trying to enact their foreign policy roles – be it within institutional con-
texts, multilaterally, bilaterally, or unilaterally.
This book is about the evolution and operationalization of role theory as an
approach to FPA. Like international relations theory itself, FPA has become
more diversified to account for changes in international relations and social
science theory. We take stock of this evolution of role theory within FPA, IR
and social science theory, and provide comparative case studies of international
institutions and US hegemony under the Bush and Obama administrations.
In this volume, we conceive of roles as social constructs and as rationalist
cognitive concepts. As social constructions, they are remarkably durable, as in
the case of American foreign policy. Here we treat them as what Ernest Renan
once called “daily plebiscites”: foreign policy roles are constantly being recon-
structed, hence recreated and thus often also subtly modified through the words
and (inter)actions of many individuals – some more, some less influential in
shaping social order. Thus, they constantly reverberate, oscillate, and also may
change, sometimes quite radically and dramatically – as, for example, after their
defeat in World War II in Germany and Japan. At the same time, we find that
some roles display a high degree of path dependency, which can be explained by
both material and immaterial forces.
Theoretically, we address three key questions: First, we track the regulative
and constitutive effects of roles in international institutions. In this perspective,
international institutions tend to stabilize national foreign policy role concep-
tions, but they may trigger role change if and when functionally differentiated
roles within institutions increase or shift, thus becoming incompatible with com-
plementary institutional roles or contending national roles. Second, we analyze
the mechanisms of role change and how they may create specific types of role
change. Third, we ask what impact the role of the United States as the hegemon
of the present international order has had on its allies. We are also interested in
how national role conceptions fit together, and how they evolve together over
time: are important foreign policy role concepts such as those of the United
States and the People’s Republic of China reconcilable, or in constant conflict?
To find answers to those questions, we have divided this volume into three
parts. Part I deals with role theory and its place in the broader context of social
theory. In Chapter 1, Sebastian Harnisch develops the conceptual framework of
role theory as we apply it throughout the volume and position it at the
Introduction 3
intersection of IR theory and foreign policy analysis. Marijke Breuning presents
an overview in Chapter 2 of the evolution of role theory – 35 years after Stephen
Walker’s seminal volume on role theory – and shows how role theory offers a
chance to bridge the gaps between IR theory and foreign policy analysis. She
also explores the tasks ahead by identifying four important blind spots of role
theory as it stands today, and thus puts up benchmarks for its future develop-
ment. In Chapter 3, Sebastian Harnisch rediscovers George Herbert Mead’s deep
insights into sociological role theory for our purposes, focusing on the relevance
of Mead’s concepts of “I” and “me” and their interactions with the “other.”
Harald Müller probes the relationship between role theory and Jürgen Haber-
mas’s theory of communicative action, arguing that the two are indeed compati-
ble; in fact, communicative action may be seen as one of the mechanisms that
can induce role change. Dirk Nabers, in Chapter 5, conceptualizes “identity” and
“role change” from an “ontological concept of lack” of individual actors. His
focus is on discourses and linguistic representations of meaning; he exemplifies
his arguments by exploring the concept of “leadership” as a central foreign
policy role concept.
Part II looks at one particularly important venue for role change in interna-
tional relations: international organizations. By focusing on the constitutive and
regulative impact of the European Union and NATO on national role concep-
tions and role behavior, our authors explore foreign policy changes in Western,
Northern, and Eastern Europe. Trine Flockhart, in Chapter 6, tracks changes in
NATO and its members and finds a two-way process of socialization: by con-
tributing importantly to changing role concepts in new member states, the old
member states and NATO itself also changed themselves. Chapter 7 deals with
the European Union: in it, Rikard Bengtsson and Ole Elgström compare the
Union’s self-perception with views about the Union in Eastern Europe and in
Africa. They find significant discrepancies between and also within those two
groups in their attitude towards the European Union, but also a marked contrast
between the Union’s self-image and its international legitimacy. Cornelia Frank
compares the policies of Germany and Poland towards the European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP) in Chapter 8; she finds that the differences in
approach are rooted primarily in different role concept elements about security.
Finally, in Chapter 9 Rachel Folz looks at the impact of the European Union and
the ESDP on the foreign policies of Sweden and Norway, explaining why those
two countries – one a member of NATO but not of the European Union, the
other a traditionally neutral EU member – have pursued rather similar policies
towards the ESDP.
Part III explores issues of hegemony, hierarchy, and leadership in the current
international social order. The United States thus inevitably looms large here: in
Chapter 10, Hanns W. Maull analyzes America’s changing hegemony through
the lenses of its two most important alliances, that with Europe in NATO and
the US–Japan Security Treaty, looking at mutual expectations and interactions.
He concludes with a paradox: the US-led alliance system, and thus American
hegemony, both remain firmly ensconced and are changing, driven not only by
America’s declining weight and influence beyond its alliance system, but also
because of divergent expectations within it. In Chapter 11, Raimund Wolf
explores how and why US foreign policy changed after the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001. His explanation focuses on the domestic context of foreign
policy role taking; he shows how domestic expectations and actors initially
enabled the Bush administration to drastically alter US foreign policy, but even-
tually forced it to return to more traditional policies in line with public expecta-
tions about the United States’ role in world politics. Ulrich Krotz and James
Sperling look at the complex relationship between France and the United States
in Chapter 12. Both countries have long held role concept aspirations to leader-
ship, in Europe and in the world. Krotz and Sperling show how very similar
national role concepts can and did engender both cooperation and conflict, but
also how national leaders were able to induce modifications, and thus change, in
those role concepts. And in Chapter 13, Jörn-Carsten Gottwald and Niall Duggan
look at China’s policy ambitions and its responses to US hegemony, using the
two case studies of China’s Africa policy, in particular Sudan, and its manage-
ment of the world financial and economic crisis.
In the final chapter, we draw together the main conclusions about the evolu-
tion of role theory within IR and social science theory in the past decades, reflect
upon the utility of the mechanisms driving role change, and offer our own per-
spectives for the future of role theory.
This project had a rather long gestation period. It started with a conference in
Trier, Germany, in 2008, which brought together many of the authors of this
volume, as well as a number of other scholars. We are very grateful to all parti-
cipants for their valuable contributions and their investment of time and intellec-
tual resources in this endeavor. The conference would not have been possible
without the generous support of the Fritz Thyssen Foundation, which we grate-
fully acknowledge. We also very much appreciate the support of the Foundation
in preparing for publication the manuscripts originating from the conference.
Our thanks also go to all authors of this volume, who have been willing to revise
their contributions in line with our sometimes very long and undoubtedly occa-
sionally nagging list of comments and suggestions. We thank them for their
patience and their good humor in putting up with our deadlines and the delays
along the way. David Rösch has provided invaluable editorial support, working
to a tight schedule and even tighter word count with great bravura. Finally, we
would like to thank the editors at Routledge, Craig Fowlie and Nicola Parkin, for
their encouragement and support.
Part I
Theories
1 Role theory
Operationalization of key concepts
Sebastian Harnisch
Introduction
Role theory first emerged in foreign policy analysis (FPA) in the 1970s when
scholars started to ascertain the regular behavioral patterns of classes of states in
the bipolar Cold War structure, e.g. “non-aligned,” “allies,” “satellites” (Holsti
1970). Since then, a growing number of role theorists have asserted the existence
of an expanding number of social roles – such as that of leader, mediator, initia-
tor – and counter-roles – such as that of follower, aggressor – as the social struc-
ture of international relations evolved (Wendt 1999).1 Early foreign policy role
scholarship focused on the ego part of roles, i.e. self-conceptualizations of a
state’s purpose by its leadership (Holsti 1970; Walker 1979, 1987b; Wish 1980).
As a consequence, this literature did away with much of the foundations of role
theory in sociology, social psychology, and anthropology, which stressed the
relational and social roots of the concept, for example the constitutive effects of
counter-roles and the recognition by others (Coser 2003: 340). In recent decades,
role scholarship in both FPA and IR theory has come to rediscover these roots. It
has thus started to transcend the individual or state level of analysis to investi-
gate the systemic dynamics of role change (Wendt 1999: 227f.). Moreover, it
has also commenced the analysis of more complex role sets (e.g. Jönsson’s
pioneering study on superpower role sets), which include more than one role,
and the stability of these role sets given the changes in the distribution of power
and institutions in the wake of the Cold War (e.g. Elgström and Smith 2006a; Le
Prestre 1997a; Maull 1990/91).
Today, leading role theorists differ with regard to the sources and factors shaping
national roles: whereas American role theorists tend to stress the actor’s material or
cognitive traits as determining factors, and the stability of roles as causes for action,
European scholars tend to employ a constructivist understanding that explores lan-
guage and social interaction and in which roles provide “reasons for action.”2 And
yet all role theorists seem to agree that roles in international relations cannot be
thought of or theorized about without reference to other roles and a basic recogni-
tion through society (Stryker and Statham 1985: 323; Thies 2010b: 6338).
In this volume, we build on both of these threads of current role theory, the
one that emphasizes cognitive or institutional structures as causes for certain
roles, and the other which posits that roles are “embedded” in certain social
orders or arrangements, which in turn give meaning and reasons for specific
action.3 Our authors and role theorists in general also use a variety of methods to
analyze ego and alter expectations that shape national roles. Nabers (this
volume) uses linguistic techniques based on the discursive approach of the post-
structuralist school of Laclau and Mouffe. Flockhart, Frank, and Bengtsson and
Elgström use a phenomenological approach of inductively analyzing texts to
recover roles Poland, Germany, NATO and other international actors play.
Müller, Maull, and Wolf use an interpretive method seeking the meaning of ego
and alter roles through textual analysis. James Sperling and Ulrich Krotz as well
as Jörn-Carsten Gottwald and Niall Duggan employ historical narratives and
process-tracing techniques to track core elements of the role expectations of the
United States, France, and the People’s Republic of China.
Defining roles and related key concepts

Roles are social positions (as well as a socially recognized category of actors)
that are constituted by ego and alter expectations regarding the purpose of an
actor in an organized group (cf. Thies 2010b: 6336; Andrews 1975: 529).4 The
position’s function in the group is limited in time and scope and it is dependent
on the group’s structure and purpose. Whereas some roles are constitutive to the
group as such, e.g. recognized member of the international community, other
roles or role sets are functionally specific, e.g. balancer, initiator.5
Role expectations for corporate actors, such as states or international organi-
zations, may vary considerably. On the one hand, they regularly comprise ego
expectations – that is, domestic and/or individual expectations as to what the
appropriate role is and what it implies – and alter expectations – that is, implicit
or explicit demands by others (counter-roles or complementary roles, audience
cues). On the other hand, role expectations differ with regard to their scope, spe-
cificity, communality and thus their obligation. Hence, roles, and even more so
role sets, entail a potential for conflict within a role (intra-role conflicts, e.g.
between ego and alter expectations) and between roles (inter-role conflicts) (Har-
nisch forthcoming).
Role conceptions refer to an actor’s perception of his or her position vis-à-vis
others (the ego part of a role) and the perception of the role expectations of
others (the alter part of a role) as signaled through language and action (Deitel-
hoff 2006: 66; Kirste and Maull 1996: 289). As such, role conceptions encom-
pass what Wendt has called the social identity of an actor and the actions and
perceptions of others (cf. Gaupp 1983: 109). Role conceptions are inherently
contested, because roles and their enactment are closely related to the roles of
other actors (counter- and complementary roles). This “structural environment of
roles” may put severe limits on the behavior (social choice) and properties
(social status) and even the very existence of others (Stryker 2006: 227). If, for
example, the European Union were to assume a predominant role in the foreign
policy making of its member states, finally displacing them, the resulting effect
Role theory: key concepts 9
might be that the constituting parts would fear for their very existence as “sover-
eign states.”
Changes in roles or role sets are important determinants for both role enact-
ment and identity formation. Role enactment, often taken as the dependent vari
able in role scholarship, refers to the behavior of an actor when performing a
role.6 Role performances regularly differ considerably from role expectations,
both ego and alter, and role enactment may also differ in its constitutive effect
for the role beholder and the respective social group. For instance, Mead (1934)
hypothesized that the number of roles performed by an actor in a group increased
the actor’s social capacity for interaction in that group (complexity of role set).
Conversely, complete non-performance in a possible role or set of roles implies
that non-performed roles may not have an impact on the process of self-
identification, as we shall see.
Whereas FPA role theory does not yet imply any particular assumption
regarding the number of roles and processes of self-identification, the research in
this volume suggests that the smaller the number of roles an actor performs, the
more likely it is that these roles shape the identity of that actor (Krotz and Sper-
ling, this volume).
Excursion: role and identity

The social categories role and identity are closely intertwined in the work of
most researchers, but hardly ever clearly defined and related to each other (Bre-
uning, this volume). Early role theorists modeled the relationship by equating
the ego part of a role with the social role itself. Roles therefore were defined as
self-conceptions, self-referent cognitions that agents apply to themselves as a
consequence of the social role positions they occupy (cf. Hogg et al. 1995: 256).
In this conceptualization, the social embeddedness of roles was mostly neglected,
as we have seen, but causal theorizing was retained as these (fixed) national role
conceptions could be interpreted as causing a specific role behavior. Identity,
then, is reduced to a social identity, meaning that agency primarily or exclusively
Role conception
Expectation of others
(significant or general)
I
as individual
disposition
Me
Perception of position Successful
replication
Behavior of others
vis-à-vis others (significant or general)
Figure 1.1 Role and identity in early role theory: Exogenization of corporate identity
(I-part).
defines itself through the eyes of others and vis-à-vis society. Drawing on
Wendt’s distinction between corporate and role identities,7 early role theorists
and comparative foreign policy (CFP) analysts tended to focus on role identities
only.
In the 1990s, social constructivist and discourse theorists were prone to dis-
tinguish role and identity more clearly by splitting national roles into distinct ego
and alter parts and by endogenizing both of them. Drawing on Wendt and Mead,
these later models refer to the ego part of a role as the self-conceptualization of
an actor’s social position with regard to a given social group (social identity or
role identity). This ego part is then endogenized in the process of role taking,
where a corporate identity meets the role identity – that is, anticipated attributes
of a social role as interpreted by the role beholder (cf. Harnisch and Nabers, this
volume).8
Changes in roles and their enactment come in two types: adaptation and learn-
ing. As defined here, role adaptation refers to changes of strategies and instru-
ments in performing a role. The purpose of that underlying role remains fixed.
Adaptation processes are often used as causal mechanisms in rationalistic role
approaches where roles primarily regulate behavior but are not interpreted as
having constitutive effects for an actor or social order. Within the FPA literature,
adaptation as defined here is similar to the first three levels of foreign policy
change in Hermann’s typology (1990, 2007): (1) increasing or decreasing the
use of certain instruments; (2) changing how and in what order certain instru-
ments are used (tactics); and (3) changing the way the problem is perceived
(strategy). In the scholarship on foreign policy learning, adaptation, in this sense,
resembles simple learning – that is, shifts in behavior prompted by failure in
which neither the values nor the goals of an actor are subject to reassessment
(Levy 1994; Ziegler 1993: 6).
Learning, as defined by Jack Levy, describes a change of beliefs (or the
degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills,
or procedures as a result of the observation and interpretation of experience.
Levy distinguishes diagnostic learning, which entails “the definition of the situ-
ation or the preferences, intentions, or relative capabilities of others” (1994:
285), from complex learning, which consists of changes in the actors’ own pref-
erence rankings or a transformation of the underlying understanding about the
nature of the political system within which the actor functions (cf. along these
lines Marfleet and Simpson 2006; Walker and Schafer 2004).
In general, Levy’s definition of complex learning is consistent with the behav-
ioral approach towards international roles. It focuses on the behavior and the
properties of an actor (i.e. identities, interests, and capabilities) but merely
touches upon the existence, the constitutive effects of social learning (cf. Jepper-
son et al. 1996: 41). Drawing on Wendt’s distinction between the corporate and
the social identity, however, we can also tie up Levy’s learning conceptualiza-
tion with a more constitutive understanding of learning. In such a reading of
learning processes, actors’ social identities and corporate identities can undergo
profound changes, changes that may even transform the actors’ self-perception
of who they are. In effect, this opening provides space for a structurationist
reconfiguration of agency, i.e. roles and identities as agency properties, and
structure, i.e. social order through social interaction (for a similar approach, see
Aggestam 2006: 14; Delori 2009).
Role making, i.e. “as if ” role taking, depicts the process of role learning from
a specific symbolic interactionist perspective (Harnisch forthcoming). On the
basis of differentiation between “I” and “me,” Mead conceives learning as a
“transformation” of the constitutive parts of the self (Herborth 2004: 78–80). In
routine situations, the “me part” of the self, like the “I part,” has been reconciled
with the perceptions of social norms through practices (routines) (Mead 1934:
199). Learning, then, takes place when the process of role taking results in a
transformation of the “I” and the “me.” In problematic situations, the “I part”
becomes more prevalent, because old routines do not promise to achieve the
anticipated effects, namely, material pay-offs and/or immaterial stabilizing
effects for the self. In these situations, the “I part” takes over and the self acts
“as if ” it were performing a new role. Thus, “as if ” role taking by definition
excludes the routines of the old role and does not reify existing social structures
(Mead 1934: 209–12, 214–18).
Significant and generalized others are central concepts in symbolic interac-
tionism because various roles cannot be conceived of without them.9 In this rea-
soning, the generalized other is a (theoretical) starting point only, because the
generalized other cannot be met in person. It can only be imagined as an abstract
reference point for the “I” to recognize itself as belonging to a special type (iden-
tity) or social category (e.g. human being) (Dodds et al. 1997). Mead’s concep-
tualization of the significant other is built upon this process because it
presupposes choice by agency. As Wendt notes, “not all others are equally signi-
ficant, however, so power and dependency relations play an important role in the
story” (1999: 327).
In interpersonal relationships, significant others are often associated
with primary socializing agents, such as parents and siblings. The latter assert
Role conception
Language as
a medium
I Me Reification
as individual Perception of position transformation
disposition vis-à-vis others
Process of role taking Behavior of others

Process of identity formation
Figure 1.2 Role and identity in later role theory: Endogenization of corporate identity
(I-part).
considerable leverage because children face significant material and immaterial,
e.g. emotional, barriers against withdrawing from the relationship. In interna-
tional relations, states or other actors do have considerably more choice. And yet
these choices are also shaped by tangible and intangible parts of their corporate
identity: their material extension and resources plus the (immaterial) notion of
the state’s identity and the “needs” that derive from it (Wendt 1999: 328).
Therefore, the selection or appearance of significant others in international
relations does not happen randomly. The choice or constitution of a significant
other is based on past experiences by the role beholder. The occurrence of signi-
ficant others, i.e. former colonial or occupation powers, is often tied to crisis or
(external) shock situations in which given role conceptions are challenged, either
materially or immaterially or both (cf. Folz 2008: 14). But role learning must not
be reduced to action and crisis. The transformation of significant others can also
be the result of not performing a role, i.e. undoing a significant relationship by
negligence (Herborth 2004: 80).
Role change: causal and constitutive modes

In the remainder of this chapter, I sketch out the repertoire of causal and consti-
tutive modes of role change. These five modes have been, to a varying degree,
subject to extensive research in the FPA and IR literature. Accordingly, this
survey is brief and focuses on their role-theoretical implication.
Broadly, role learning can be conceptualized in two ways: In rationalism and
cognitivism, learning depicts a causal process in which the role beholder changes
the structure and content of a role conception based on new (deviant) informa-
tion, i.e. experience. In social constructivism, learning is conceptualized as a
constitutive process in which the beholder acquires a new role (and identity) in a
given or evolving social group (cf. Harnisch forthcoming). The mode of learn-
ing, then, is not fixed, but its choice has important implications for the scope and
societal impact of role change. For example, social constructivism implies that
role learning goes hand in hand with the change of counter- or complimentary
roles. In this conceptualization, role learning has a “transformative ontology”
(Dessler 1989), because when actors acquire a new role and act according to
what they hold to be appropriate role behavior, they recreate the counter-roles
around them, rather than adapting to the latter. Also, in such a reading role,
learning in foreign policy is not restricted to socially accepted or even prescribed
behavior. It may (and actually does) also entail, to a varying degree, that actors
learn roles that are unacceptable to others or to society at large.10
In rational and cognitive designs, the modes of role change have often been
distinguished by their causal origin: whether roles are “ascribed” by society or
others or “achieved” by the beholder (Le Prestre 1997c: 7; Sarbin and Allen
1968: 496f.). Subsequent research has hypothesized that novices, as a class of
young states, hold only a few roles, and these roles are mainly ascribed. In con-
trast, mature states have few ascribed but multiple achieved roles. In addition,
mature states, as recognized members of a group, often ascribe roles to novices
(Thies 2010b: 6338). One of the modes by which roles are ascribed bilaterally
has been identified as “altercasting.” In cognitive role theory, altercasting may
thus be referred to as the conscious manipulation of one’s own role-taking
behavior to (re)shape the role of another actor, presumably a counter- or com-
mensurate role. As such, altercasting can be distinguished from socialization
because the former does not necessarily imply the adoption of group standards
(identities), as it may be directed to a bilateral relationship only (Malici 2006).
However, if there is a group consensus that one of its members should act as a
“teacher” of given group norms vis-à-vis a “pupil,” than altercasting may cross
over into socialization practices (see below). But altercasting, at least in this
reading, may also be directed towards an as yet unknown order in which group
norms are yet to be determined.
In the role literature, normative persuasion is by definition directed towards a
specific social order that is upheld or sought, among others, by normative entre-
preneurs (Arora 2006: 59f.). Based on Habermas’s theory of communicative
action, normative persuasion occurs when actors engage in linguistic interaction
to assess the appropriateness of roles in a situation of uncertainty. As Müller,
Risse, Deitelhoff, and others have argued, actors do not necessarily always want
to maximize their own fixed utility, but may also seek to arrive at a reasoned
consensus, succumb to the better argument, even if such behavior is in contra-
diction to their own well-formulated prior interests (Deitelhoff 2006; Müller
1994; Risse 2000).
Normative persuasion has demanding scope conditions. In particular, actors
communicating in negotiations of an agreement need a common stock of shared
understandings, i.e. a lifeworld. These lifeworlds are deemed to compensate
against the risk of dissent by defining the possible range of legitimate arguments.
They are thus depicted as a realm of trust in which a reasoned consensus among
arguing states can evolve.11 The current culture of multilateral diplomacy and
that of international public law establish only a very thin layer of a shared life-
world, so states are likely to refrain from engaging in communicative action at
this stage (Deitelhoff and Müller 2005).
Socialization, then, can be distinguished from both learning and normative per-
suasion as a mechanism of role change. It describes a process by which an outsider
internalizes the behavioral rules previously set by a community of insiders. Social-
ization theory, thus, assumes an intact social group or setting with a fixed norm-
ative structure and it leaves very little room for agency beyond the social identity
within the group. In contrast to the Habermasian ideal speech situation, socializa-
tion occurs in a highly asymmetrical power situation: between, on the one hand,
states or international organizations that act as socialization agencies, states that
hold the material and immaterial resources, and, on the other, the external state,
which lacks but is striving for those resources (Schimmelfennig 2003: 406).
Two avenues of state socialization have been identified in the literature. In the
first instance, socializees adopt community standards because socializing
agencies use a strategy of political conditionality based on “reinforcement
by material reward” (Schimmelfennig 2005b). In principle, this rationalist
interpretation of socialization is compatible with a process-oriented understand-
ing of socialization, but it is incommensurate with a results-oriented notion
because the latter assumes that socializees have internalized group rules and
norms and do not need material incentives to engage in appropriate behavior (cf.
Schimmelfennig 2003: 407).
In the second instance, socialization implicates the legitimacy of group norms
either in a modus that has been dubbed “social influencing” or by creating legiti-
macy through a process of normative persuasion (Flockhart 2006: 97). Socializa-
tion theorists assert that social influencing occurs in two distinctive patterns: on
the one hand, by way of imitation, in which the socializee imitates schemes and
rules of the socializing agency in a situation that is characterized by uncertainty
(Schimmelfennig 2003: 410); on the other hand, socializing agents elicit pro-
norm behavior by social rewards or punishment, or argumentative action that
does not allow for any form of coercion, either materially or immaterially.
By focusing on the internalization of group norms, socialization theory prom-
ises to enable role scholars to better understand and explain the importance of
international institutions, both formal and informal. However, socialization tends
to underestimate the saliency of agency, both in terms of creative learning and in
terms of the resilience of corporate identities vis-à-vis social identities. Indeed, if
socialization allows for persuasion, then socializees may well persuade socializ-
ing agents that new norms and rules should be created to better resemble the
groups’ collective identity.
Summary
There are important benefits from using role-theoretical and related concepts. By
providing clear definitions, we may be better prepared to capture complex inter-
national social relations across levels of analysis. The better we are able to integ
rate knowledge from diverse research fields, the greater the synthetic benefits of
role theory will be. Similarly, however, the larger the gains of synthesis are, the
greater the “losses” for each unique research tradition may be. Despite potential
gains, role theory may face considerable impediments to delivering on its syner-
gistic promises.
To anticipate some of our conclusions, I sketch out hypotheses based on the
above discussion: To begin with, in his seminal article Holsti mused that young
states may not develop cohesive role sets until they engage in regular and dense
interactions with their social environment (1970: 299). As a consequence, we
may find that role changes induce intense domestic debates, at least in democra-
cies, so that foreign policy issues may even become salient for electoral choices.
Second, recent advances in the institutionalization of world politics may explain
why more cohesive patterns of role sets occur (cf. Barnett 1995; Searing 1991).
However, we may also find that institutionalized roles lead to more inter-role
conflicts as institutions become competitors or pursue diverging purposes. Third,
democratization may also impact upon role cohesiveness. Democratic states
more often than other regimes engage in formal international organization
(Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006, 2008; Mansfield et al. 2002). They also trust
each other more than other regime types: wrong signaling is rare and identifica-
tion tends to be high. We thus may expect that different densities and contents of
social institutions will create variation in role cohesiveness and orientation.
Lastly, it is plausible to assert that national role conceptions do reflect the
social order(s) a state is living in and that the social stratification of world pol-
itics is reflected in the tensions within those role conceptions. On the basis of
recent studies on the social order of world politics – e.g. Wendt’s cultures
(1999), Adler’s security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998a), Frederking’s
social arrangements (2003) or Lake’s hierarchy (2009) – we may find that the
emergence of new actors – e.g. terror groups – substantially challenges estab-
lished role sets, as these address social relations with “peers” only.
Notes
1 For comprehensive reviews, see Walker (1987b), Breuning (this volume), and Thies
(2010).
2 Many role theorists, however, do not consider themselves as being in either of these
camps as they prefer a middle ground between positivism and post-positivism.
3 For a similar approach with regard to sociological role theory building, see Biddle
(1986: 68). Biddle argues that role theory has been occupied with roles as patterns of
behavior, identities to be assumed, and scripts or expectations for behavior that are
shared in a society, and that all of these foci should be kept.
4 For a definition of national role conceptions (NRCs), see Krotz (2008: 2): “NRCs are
domestically held political self-views or self-understandings regarding the proper role
and purpose of one’s state in the international arena” (see also Aggestam 2006: 19).
5 Holsti introduced a typology of some 17 major national roles which has been taken up
by Walker (1979) and Chafetz et al. (1996). Adigbuo (2007), Jönsson (1984) and Har-
nisch and Maull (2001a), and Elgström and Smith (2006a) have introduced typologies
of role sets for superpowers, civilian powers, and the European Union respectively.
6 Role behavior regularly involves speech acts, various foreign policy actions, such as
negotiations or air bombardments, and non-action, such as refusals to shake hands by
officials of allied nations. In this case, non-action, through gesturing, also structures
social relations by paying respect or displaying disrespect (Wolf 2008).
7 Wendt defines corporate identities as “the intrinsic, self-organizing qualities that con-
stitute actor individuality,” and social identities as the “sets of meanings that an actor
attributes to itself while taking the perspective of others, that is, as a social object”
(1994: 385).
8 Underlying these models is Mead’s understanding of the process of identity forma-
tion. In his reading, self-consciousness can only develop once one is able to relate
one’s own subjective feelings and experiences (what Wendt calls corporate identity
and Mead refers to as “I”) to the understanding of how one can also be understood to
exist as a separate person in the eyes of others (the “me,” or what Wendt defines as
social identity) (Greenhill 2008: 354; Mead 1967: 173–178).
9 In a nutshell, there is no “I” without a “me” and there is no “me” without an “other”
(Mead 1925: 268).
10 In this sense, the role of a “rogue state,” “aggressor,” “outsider” is a constitutive counter-
role for the “insiders,” civilized nations,” “defenders of democracy” or “protectors.”
11 In a first, rough cut, trust may be defined as the belief that one will not be harmed
when one’s fate is placed in the hands of others. As such, trust always entails a com-
bination of uncertainty and vulnerability (cf. Rathbun 2009: 349).
2 Role theory research in
international relations
State of the art and blind spots
Marijke Breuning
Introduction
Role theory promises to build an empirical bridge between agent and structure in
international relations. Agents, or individuals working singly or in groups, are
embedded in the social and cultural institutions of the states they represent as
foreign policy decision makers. Their perspective on the world has been shaped
by those institutions. These agents navigate the structure of the international
system, which can present both opportunities and constraints: there are times
when agents have ample opportunity to influence and alter the structure of the
international system. At other times, agents have little opportunity to reshape
preexisting roles.
Role theory centrally concerns itself with this interaction between agent and
structure. It is therefore rather surprising that role theory is largely absent from
the theoretical debates regarding the agent–structure problem (e.g. Wendt 1987,
1999), as well as from the scholarship that investigates norms, identity, self-
image, and collective identity. Although role theory has often drawn upon schol-
arship in these areas, its connection with these literatures is tenuous and
unidirectional. Role theory deserves to be better integrated, not only because it
provides the link between identity and behavior, but also because it provides the
tools that permit systematic empirical investigation of the relative importance of
agent and structure as determinants of foreign policy behavior.
This chapter situates current role theory under the broad intellectual umbrella
of social constructivism, but recognizes that constructivism takes multiple forms,
ranging from empirical efforts that seek to generalize (albeit within limited
domains) to interpretive work that largely rejects the notion of generalizability.
The chapter positions role theory under that corner of the large constructivist
umbrella that relies on systematic empirical investigation, hypothesis testing,
and falsification. In doing so, it exhibits an affinity with US role theory scholar-
ship, although it also seeks to suggest fruitful avenues for bridging the ocean
between US and European role theory scholarship (Keating 2009; Harnisch, this
volume).
This chapter will first review the early applications of role theory to the study
of international relations, then review the intersection between role theory and
Role research: genesis and blind spots 17
constructivism in international relations, and subsequently outline the “blind
spots” – the ignored and uncharted territory that provides a research agenda for
moving role theory forward.
Antecedents
The potential of role theory to contribute to the agent–structure debate has not
always been transparent. Early research often focused primarily on the way in
which the international system compelled states to adopt a specific role or roles
(Hollis and Smith 1986; Holsti 1970; Jönsson and Westerlund 1982; Shih 1988;
Walker 1979, 1981, 1987a, b; Wish 1980, 1987). In doing so, role theory-based
research remained closely connected to structural theories of international rela-
tions (e.g. Singer 1961; Waltz 1959), focusing on decision makers’ perceptions
of the constraints and opportunities presented by the international environment
rather than on domestic sources of role conceptions. These structural approaches
neglected the agent side of the agent–structure debate and, as a result, did not
sufficiently reveal the potential contribution that role theory could make to this
debate.
Additionally, early empirical work yielded mixed results. Walker (1979: 193)
found only a weak correlation between national role conceptions and foreign
policy behavior on the basis of a secondary analysis of data merged from two
separate datasets. He suspected his methodology to be at least partially respons-
ible (1979: 204; see also Walker 1987b: 92). Wish, on the other hand, found a
strong correlation between the “national role conceptions of political leaders and
the foreign policy behavior of their nations” (1980: 549). Her national role con-
ception data were based on an original sample of statements that was larger than
that used by Walker (1979). She then correlated the role conceptions with
foreign policy behavior data from an existing dataset (Wish 1980). She con-
cluded that national role conceptions “provide long-standing guidelines or stand-
ards for behavior. Their longevity and stability are assets when attempting to
explain long-term patterns of behavior rather than single decisions” (ibid.: 547).
Wish’s categories for both role conceptions and behavior were general, and the
former bore a strong relation to the state’s relative status in the international
system – a stratification that guides conventional expectations regarding the
behavior of states. Thus, Wish’s research also remained connected to the struc-
tural interpretation of role.
Another early strand of role theory criticized the work of both Walker and
Holsti as “unsociological” (Gaupp 1983: 90). One of the reasons for this assess-
ment was exactly their structural interpretation of role theory. Although Gaupp
antedates much of the work in political cognition, he interprets national role con-
ceptions in a manner that dovetails well with current developments. Gaupp wrote
in German and, unfortunately, his work received little attention from North
American scholars, who remained focused on structural concerns.
This emphasis on the structure (or stratification) of the international system
connected role theory with approaches that focused on the attributes of states,
18 M. Breuning
such as the theoretical propositions and empirical research that focused on the
connection between state size and foreign policy behavior (e.g. East 1973, 1978;
Hey 2003; Neack 1995; Thies 2001). East found that “there are profound and
significant differences in the behavior patterns of large and small states” (1973:
576). He attributed these differences to the lesser organizational capacity of
small states to collect and analyze intelligence. Elsewhere, East (1978; see also
Wish 1987) introduced the notion that differences in the “capacity to act” result
in differences in the foreign policy behavior of states.
For each of these authors, a state’s size provided insight into its foreign policy
behavior. In other words, a state’s size implies the role it plays in international
politics. On the one hand, size is readily recognized as a structural variable: size
determines a state’s place in the global hierarchy of great powers, middle
powers, and small states (Neack 1995). On the other hand, size is also a very
problematic concept. First, it can be operationalized in a variety of ways (such as
geography, population, economy, military) that do not necessarily lead to a
straightforward ranking, especially since it is not always clear what weight
should be attached to various ways of operationalizing size. Second, a state that
is relatively small in a global context may nevertheless play a significant role
regionally. Size (and power?) relative to the state’s relevant neighbors cannot be
ignored. Hence, even though there is broad recognition that size – or a state’s
location in the global structure – is a component of a state’s role conception,
foreign policy role conceptions are not exclusively determined by size.
In sum, national role conceptions are not necessarily or exclusively a struc-
tural variable (on the contrary, as Gaupp 1983 argued), but earlier work (espe-
cially in North American scholarship) often stayed very close to a structural
interpretation of the role concept. This has led Harnisch (this volume) to suggest
that US role theorists have tended to focus on material traits. This focus made it
difficult for US role theorists to capitalize on the strengths of role theory: its
ability to demonstrate not only that structure delimits perception and behavior,
but also that agency involves vision and interpretation – as well as behavior –
that has the potential to transform structures.
One of the noted role theorists in the United States, Walker (1987b: 256), has
characterized role theory as an extension of Waltz’s structural realism. In doing
so, he subscribed to a structural functionalist version of role theory, which its
critics have labeled a “static, normatively deterministic view of social life”
(Stryker and Statham 1985: 341). Indeed, criticisms of structural role theory
share much in common with criticisms of structural realism. One of the latter’s
major proponents, Waltz, argues that international politics can only be under-
stood “through some sort of systems theory” (1986b: 70), because structure is
the defining feature of the system. Waltz understood that such an emphasis left
“aside questions about the kinds of political leaders, social and economic institu-
tions, and ideological commitments states may have” (ibid.: 71). In this view,
the structure of the international system determines the interactions between
states, and domestic matters are therefore largely irrelevant – although Waltz
takes a more nuanced viewpoint in some of his writings (1967, 1991). Waltz’s
systems theory amounts to what Wendt has called “situational determinism”
(1987: 342). In addition, Ruggie has pointed out that the international system is
not static and that change can only be understood in the context of “unit-level
processes” (1986: 152).
Waltz acknowledged this. He wrote that “[c]auses at the level of units and of
systems interact, and because they do so explanation at the level of units alone is
bound to mislead” (1986a: 56, emphasis added). If so, explanations that focus
exclusively on the system level are equally likely to be problematic (something
that Waltz did not acknowledge). In short, neither a completely structural expla-
nation nor a wholly agent-based one can capture the interplay between decision
makers and the environment within which they function. Both agent and struc-
ture matter (Wendt 1987). Wendt focuses on this co-constitution at the interna-
tional system level rather than exploring unit-level processes, which would
require a foreign policy focus.
Earlier, Holsti recognized the interaction between agent and structure when
he theorized that foreign policy behavior derives “primarily from policymakers’
role conceptions, domestic needs and demands, and critical events or trends in
the external environment” (1970: 243, emphasis in original). In an era when very
few students of international relations considered decision makers’ cognitions or
understood rationality to be “bounded” (Simon 1985), Holsti (1970: 239) sug-
gested that the “perceptions, values, and attitudes” of decision makers matter. In
other words, Holsti adopted a position that may be classified as constructivist,
but he did so well before constructivism was part of the intellectual landscape of
international relations.
Interestingly, in light of the subsequent structural interpretations of role
theory, Holsti consciously emphasized the domestic sources of national role con-
ceptions, arguing that during “acute international conflict . . . self-defined national
role conceptions . . . take precedence over externally derived role prescriptions”
(1970: 243). Yet he also recognized that agency was not all that mattered, sug-
gesting that “it seems reasonable to assume that those responsible for making
decisions and taking actions for the state are aware of international status dis-
tinctions and that their policies reflect this awareness” (ibid.: 242). In other
words, Holsti favored domestic sources of national role conceptions, without
denying the significance of external influences.
The relative significance of domestic and international sources is ultimately a
matter for empirical research, which may show us that there is not one ultimate
answer to the agent–structure problem. It is likely that empirical work will show
that under specified sets of circumstances – and also over time – one or the other
contributes more to an explanation of foreign policy behavior. Specifying the
circumstances under which agents and structures provide stronger explanations
for foreign policy behavior is a task that largely still lies before us. In order to
undertake this empirical work, initial hypotheses may be derived from the liter-
ature on size and foreign policy behavior, which has suggested that the leaders
of small states are more likely to perceive that the international structure places a
large stamp on their foreign policy than are those of larger, more powerful states.
20 M. Breuning
In addition, crisis situations are likely to narrow the scope of agency and may
lead actors to perceive themselves as merely reacting to a structural imperative.
In addition, empirical investigation can help determine to what degree role
conceptions are constant or evolve over time (Thies 2010a). Are there core fea-
tures of national role conceptions that remain constant? Do role conceptions
evolve gradually or do they alter in response to traumatic events? Or are there
specific conditions under which role conceptions change in one or another
manner? Only empirical research, careful assessment of the generalizability of
findings, and periodic assessment of the implications of empirical findings for
theoretical propositions regarding role theory can advance our knowledge.
Although role theory is likely to perform only marginally better than structural
theories in the initial stages, as empirical findings lead to further refinements of
the propositions, role theory’s explanatory (and perhaps even predictive) power
is likely to advance well beyond structuralist theories – largely because it incorp-
orates both agent and structure. In sum, role theory is eminently suited to provid-
ing the framework for empirical evaluations of propositions about the relative
significance of agent and structure.
Constructivism’s implicit role theory

Role theory is closely connected to concepts such as identity and (self-) image
(Herrmann 2003). It is therefore surprising that references to role theory and/or
national role conceptions are largely absent from recent work on identity and
foreign policy (Wendt 1999: 227; cf. Nabers, Flockhart, this volume). Many
authors who grapple with norms, identity, self-image, or even culture use lan-
guage that is reminiscent of earlier work that utilized the role conception (see,
for example, Bergman 2007; Browning 2007; Cruz 2000; Hall 1999; Hopf 2002;
Kaplowitz 1990; Katzenstein 1996; Nau 2002). In each case, the effort is to
reach beyond the observable material characteristics of states – such as size, mil-
itary capability, or economic performance – and to make intelligible the perspec-
tive of decision makers within the context of their interpretation of the collective
self-understanding of the citizens of the state.
Such collective self-understandings are variously named norms, identities,
self-images, or culture. These concepts are not used interchangeably. Different
authors ask different questions that have in common only that all of them com-
fortably fit under the very large umbrella of the agent–structure problem.
However, these different concepts all form pieces of an interconnected web of
research questions that share in common the wish to move our understanding of
foreign policy decision making beyond material imperatives. Hence, rather than
being interchangeable, they are better understood as complementary.
The parallels of these various research endeavors with role theory are some-
times easily identified and at other times less straightforward. Among the former
is work by Kaplowitz, who describes national self-images as “an important
dimension of political culture” that is “transmitted by agents of that culture”
(1990: 47), and Chafetz et al., who cite the national role conception literature
and who suggest that role conceptions provide “a theoretical apparatus for cap-
turing variables like culture” (1996: 749). Using different terminology, both
suggest that culture is a component of a national role conception.
Hopf (2002) does not reference the literature on national role conceptions, but
he does reference the role conception. He implies that roles are templates, con-
sisting of externally predefined dimensions, whereas identities are more amor-
phous and more deeply psychological than a national role conception.
Interestingly, Hopf sees identities (ego) as separate and independent from roles
(alter). Wendt (1999) references the national role conception literature in a tan-
gential manner, but relies on some of the same sociological and social-
psychological literature that is also frequently cited in work on national role
conceptions (e.g. Biddle 1986; Stryker and Statham 1985).
For both Hopf (2002) and Wendt (1999), identity has value because it defines
something more intrinsic about an actor than a role conception. Both authors
discuss identity as existing independently – that is, they do not conceive it as
contingent upon the actor’s interaction with the environment in the same sense
as the relationship between self (ego) and other (alter) is defined in Mead’s
(1970 [1934]) symbolic interactionism. Beyond this, the two authors differ:
Wendt argues that agency (which appears to be akin to role performance and
separate from identity) and structure are “mutually constitutive and co-
determined” (1999: 184, emphasis in original; see also Jepperson et al. 1996),
whereas Hopf holds that identities can be entirely domestically driven, stating
that “there is no justification for assuming that the identity of a state can be con-
structed only vis-à-vis other states” (2002: 263). In other words, Hopf does not
see identity as interactive. A third position is taken by Browning, who argues
that identities “are intersubjectively negotiated in interactions with others. To be
able to act, selves need to construct narratives that locate themselves in time and
space and in relation to other actors” (2007: 29). Browning differs from Wendt
in that he conflates identity (apparently defined as role conception rather than a
deeper psychological “ego”) and role performance (agency), whereas Wendt
appears to treat the two as separate concepts. The latter two authors place their
focus on the relationships between agents and differ in their assessment about
the degree to which state identities are derived from domestic imperatives or
from interconnectedness with other entities. Figure 2.1 summarizes these inter-
actions. Wendt emphasizes the relationship that is depicted in the light ellipses,
Hopf ’s focus is represented in the darker ellipse, and Browning’s emphasis is the
rectangular box. Wendt (1999; see also Hall 1999) emphasizes that actors exist
within a structural framework that guides actors with its existing norms, but
argues also that structure is modified when agents successfully advocate norm
change. Norms are often understood to be regulative. Jepperson et al. (1996: 54),
however, use norms simultaneously in this way and also as rules that define an
identity. For them, norms are equivalent to identity or even role conceptions and
define the international structure. In essence, these authors each tap into various
aspects of the role theory framework: norms could be seen as constituting (a
system of ) role prescriptions, agency may be akin to role performance (although
22 M. Breuning
Structure ≈ international system

(or also norms that prescribe behavior)
Agency ≈ role performance

(or also used as synonymous with role conception)
Identity ≈ role conception

(or also element of role conception)
Figure 2.1 Intersections between structure, agent, and identity in constructivism.
it appears to be used as consistent with role conceptions as well), and identity is

often akin to national role conception (although it is sometimes also used as a
constitutive element of role conception).
The above is not meant to be an exhaustive inventory of the manner in which
these concepts have been used. It is, however, designed to illustrate several points:
1 Much of the constructivist work on identity, self-images, culture, and even

norms shares a close kinship with the literature on national role conceptions.
2 There is little agreement on definition of concepts across these literatures
(see Harnisch, this volume).
3 The potential contribution of role theory to understanding non-material
aspects of foreign policy behavior has not been sufficiently recognized,
particularly among US scholars.
The first point has been illustrated above. In the next section, I will address
the second point by suggesting how the various concepts interconnect and can be
defined in distinct ways. Subsequently, I will turn to a discussion of how role
theory can help us move forward from theoretical discussion to testable proposi-
tions and empirical investigation.
Roles, images, and identities

In the previous section, I argued that national role conceptions are closely con-
nected to concepts such as identity, self-image, and norms. Indeed, a number of
the authors who apply role theory allude to a kinship between these concepts,
without specifying that relationship (see, however, Nabers and Harnisch, this
volume). Nevertheless, their works provide useful guideposts for developing
greater specificity regarding the definitions and interrelationships between these
concepts
To start, Holsti’s original formulation defined national role conceptions as
follows:
the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kind of decisions, commit-

ments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any,
their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system
or in subordinate regional systems. It is their “image” of the appropriate ori-
entations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.
(1970: 245–6)
This definition separates national role conceptions, or the ideas about the scope
of foreign policy behavior that is appropriate for the state, from role perform-
ance, or the actual foreign policy behavior. National role conceptions, in other
words, delineate the scope of foreign policy behaviors that decision makers can
imagine and perceive as appropriate for the state to undertake. Holsti’s (1970)
definition does not, however, allude to the sources of these role conceptions in
values, norms, identity, or culture.
Note that Holsti defined national role conceptions with reference to individual
decision makers. Although Holsti did not address whether decision makers rep-
resenting one state share broad agreement on their state’s role in world politics,
his formulation can easily incorporate both agreement and disagreement among
various decision makers regarding their state’s most appropriate role. His own
empirical investigation did not address this question, as he utilized official, but
general, statements on foreign policy. These statements represent the outcome of
debate and discussion within a government, but do not permit assessment of the
degree to which there was a consensus on basic principles among decision
makers.
Wish did investigate the degree of concurrence between the decision makers
who collectively represent one state. She found that “there were greater similar-
ities among role conceptions expressed by leaders from the same nations than
from different nations” (1980: 549–50). Hudson (1999) suggests a reason for
such a finding when she posits that a “nation’s leaders rise in part because they
articulate a vision of the nation’s role in world affairs that corresponds to deep,
cultural beliefs about the nation” (ibid.: 769). In doing so, Hudson (1999; see
also Breuning 1997; Chafetz et al. 1996) implies that the national role concep-
tion is, in part, founded in a state’s cultural heritage.
Hopf (2002), Hall (1999), and Wendt (1999) each employ the psychological
concept of identity to investigate the (decision makers’) definition of the essen-
tial, core values of the state. Those core values may be rooted in, shaped by, or
associated with the state’s cultural heritage, but each leaves the possibility that
24 M. Breuning
identity derives (in part) from other sources as well. Whereas Hall and Wendt
are primarily interested in the relationship between agents (states) and structure
(the international system), Hopf (2002) is concerned with the relationship
between (individual) decision makers and the foreign policy behavior of the
state. In other words, Hopf seeks to “unpack” how individual decision makers
come to hold specific conceptions of their state’s role in the world. Hopf grap-
ples with the problem that, ultimately, the state is an abstraction and that decision
makers act on behalf of the state; he seeks to figure out how to bridge the indi-
vidual and the state levels of analysis.
He defines identity in terms of a “social cognitive structure” (2002: 1) and
asserts that “[e]very foreign policy decision maker is as much a member of the
social cognitive structure that characterizes her society as the average citizen”
(ibid.: 37; see also Breuning 1995; Vertzberger 1990). In other words, Hopf
would be comfortable with Hudson’s (1999) assessment that leaders are rooted
in their society, and that their leadership depends not only on understanding the
culture and identity of that society, but also on translating both into a national
role conception that resonates domestically.
In addition to resonating domestically, a national role conception (as differen-
tiated from identity) must also respond to the imperatives of the international
structure if it is to be useful as an instrument to define role prescriptions and
serve as the foundation for role performance. National role conceptions, in other
words, must simultaneously resonate with domestic audiences and be credible in
the state’s relations with other states. How decision makers bridge these simulta-
neous pressures is not yet well understood. There are multiple possibilities, and
the conditions under which one or another mechanism applies are a subject for
future empirical investigation:
1 Decision makers are socialized to accept particular role conceptions for their
state and act on the basis of that socialization. This leaves little room for
reinterpretation of the state’s role and suggests that historical patterns are
carried forward. If so, then aggregation from individual decision makers to
the state’s foreign policy is unproblematic and there should be substantial
continuity in foreign policy behavior across time.
2 Decision makers represent domestic constituencies (Moravcsik 1997, 2003,
2008). Rather than a unified and historically constituted national role con-
ception, foreign policy behavior is guided by the role conceptions of those
constituencies that have influence with a particular government. This implies
that foreign policy behavior changes as different groups attain power
(e.g. as the result of election cycles). Role conceptions are not broadly
shared within the society, but reflect identifiable constituencies within the
society.
3 Decision makers interpret national role conceptions and there is substantial
variation among individuals regarding the conception of the state’s role in
international politics. As the variation between the national role conceptions
of individual decision makers increases, the value of identifying national
role conceptions decreases. In this case, foreign policy behavior is contin-
gent upon the relative influence of various individuals on the decision-
making process at a given moment in time, rendering it highly idiosyncratic
and difficult to predict. Although this is theoretically possible, Hudson
(1999) suggests that high levels of variation between individual decision
makers are likely to be limited to specific conditions. More empirical work
is needed to confirm her findings and enhance our understanding of the use-
fulness and limitations of the national role conception.
At this point, we have a set of interconnections between concepts that sug-

gests that foreign policy behavior (or role performance) can be explained by
national role conceptions, and that the latter can be explained as the result of
identity and cultural heritage. However, national role conceptions are not purely
derived from identity and/or cultural heritage. Hopf (2002: 261) recognizes this;
he posits that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between identity and role.
To the degree that identity is based on domestic characteristics and/or domestic
cultural values and heritage, identity is focused on “who we are” rather than on
“what role we play.” Hopf (ibid.: 263) suggests that the former can be defined
without reference to other states in the system, although role theory more com-
monly accepts that self-definition is contingent upon comparison with others.
Kowert and Legro recognize this when they caution that “collective understand-
ings” do not exist in a “material vacuum” (1996: 491), but are instead contingent
upon the physical capabilities or material characteristics of the state. They are
careful to point out that the relationship between the two is not a direct one and
that the role of the latter (i.e. the material characteristics of the state) is “rarely
examined or explicitly theorized” in constructivist scholarship (ibid.: 490; see
also Sørensen 2008).
Role theorists have long recognized the shortcomings of the purely material
and/or structural explanations of the realist paradigm, and also readily under-
stand that norms and identity do not straightforwardly guide foreign policy
behavior. Role theorists agree with Wendt (1987, 1999) that agent and structure
are mutually constituted. Indeed, Harnisch (forthcoming) places role theory
squarely between an actor-dominant and a system-dominant perspective. Yet
role theorists also understand the critique of constructivism that “exactly how
one operationalizes mutual constitution is a dilemma” (Checkel 1998: 332; see
also Kuzma 1998). Whereas much of the constructivist literature has remained
focused on the genesis of norms in the international system (e.g. Barnett 1993;
Finnemore 1996; Hall 1999), role theorists have emphasized foreign policy
decision makers and sought to (systematically) evaluate their conceptions of
their state’s role in the international system (Breuning 1995; Holsti 1970; Walker
1979, 1987b; Wish 1980, 1987), and occasionally probed into the origins of
national role conceptions (Breuning 1997, 1998). A related literature on small
states as “norm entrepreneurs” (Bergman 2007; Browning 2007; Ingebritsen
2006) has investigated the connection between domestic values and the emer-
gence of international norms.
26 M. Breuning
In sum, role theory fits under the constructivist umbrella but also critiques
its emphasis on the systems level of analysis. Although many constructivists
are interested in ideas, norms, and their impact on change in the international
system, change ultimately derives from unit-level processes (Ruggie 1986).
The national role conception framework places its emphasis there: it seeks
to understand how actors fashion their role in the international system, navigat-
ing between domestic sources of identity and/or cultural heritage, taking advant-
age of the material resources at their disposal, circumnavigating as best as
possible the obstacles imposed by their position in the international structure.
More importantly, it accommodates both domestic and international sources of
national role conceptions by adopting a cognitive perspective: decision makers
form their conceptions of their state’s role on the basis of both their understand-
ing of the state’s identity and cultural heritage, and their perception of their
state’s place and possibilities within the international system. This cognitive
model of the agent–structure relationship is depicted in Figure 2.2, which shows
that national role conceptions function as a cognitive device that stands at the
intersection of the ideational and material aspects of international relations.
Hence, the national role conception brings together both agency and (perception
of ) the (material) international structure to explain foreign policy behavior.
The components of this model will be further elaborated in the next section of
this chapter.
Ideational
Decision maker’s perception
of state’s
• Identity (i.e. ego aspect of
role conception) National role Role enactment
• Cultural heritage (esp. ego conception (or role
aspects from the state’s performance)
history that are, or have
been, makers of identity) • Defined by • Foreign policy
• Domestic audience decision maker behavior
• Relevant to
issue area and
geographic
Material domain
Decision maker’s perception (roles may be
of state’s issue-specific
• Capability (i.e. usable power and linked to
resources, relative to geography)
revelant other states)
• Opportunity to act
(possibilities afforded by
circumstances, whether
temporary or enduring)
Figure 2.2 Role Theory as a Cognitive Model of the Agent–Structure Relationship.

Blind spots: a research agenda for role theory
Role theory conceptualizes the relationship between agent and structure. As
described above, earlier work tended to focus on the structural interpretations
that did not fully exploit role theory’s potential (see especially Walker 1979,
1981, 1987a, b; Wish 1980, 1987). Additionally, role theorists (especially in the
United States) tended to rely on systematic empirical investigation. Constructiv-
ist scholarship also sought to address the agent–structure problem, albeit from a
very different epistemological and methodological perspective. Constructivist
approaches to the agent–structure problem have ranged from highly abstract
theoretical treatments (e.g. Hall 1999; Wendt 1987, 1994, 1999) to detailed
inductive interpretations of specific cases (e.g. Hopf 2002). Despite the substan-
tial differences between the epistemological foundations of empirical role theo-
rists and constructivist investigations of the agent–structure problem, the two
share theoretical assumptions. Both have drawn on psychology and sociology for
core concepts, but they have drawn opposite lessons: empirical role theorists
have taken the effort to generalize too far, whereas constructivists have been too
little concerned with systematic empiricism and generalizability.
To mediate these extremes, role theory could benefit from, first, incorporating
more consciously the elements from prospect theory’s findings on the impor-
tance of perspective (or the decision maker’s vantage point); second, investigat-
ing more systematically the interconnection between the role conception(s) held
by decision makers and ideas prevalent among citizens; third, explicitly address-
ing issues of change and adaptation in national role conceptions; and fourth,
investigating the degree to which decision makers may hold multiple roles,
whether these are equally salient or perhaps issue area specific. These four sug-
gested areas of investigation set out a research agenda for role theory’s future.
The four interconnected themes suggest that role theory has a potentially rich
future, a point to which I will return in the conclusion to the chapter.
Perspective, problem representation, and role theory

While the work of Walker (1979, 1981, 1987a, b) and Wish (1980, 1987) has
relatively close ties to structural realism, more recent role theory research (e.g.
Breuning 1995; Brittingham 2007; Grossman 2005; Le Prestre 1997a) takes a
more explicitly actor-centered approach. This more recent work focuses its
empirical efforts more narrowly than the larger, cross-national quantitative
efforts of the earlier authors. In doing so, the latter authors are better able to
incorporate into their work the notions of bounded rationality (Simon 1985) and
perspective (Quattrone and Tversky 1988; Tversky and Kahneman 1981), as
Aggestam (2004) has noted. Tversky and Kahneman (1981; see also Ariely
2008; Quattrone and Tversky 1988) have identified systematic deviations from
objective rationality in human decision making, which depend on the actor’s
perspective. This makes the decision frame, defined as “the decision maker’s
conceptions of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular
28 M. Breuning
choice” (Tversky and Kahneman 1981: 453), important for understanding the
logic that informed decisions. In addition to the decision maker’s perspective,
James and Zhang (2005; see also Pierson 2004) found that prior events, or the
sequence of events in which the problem is situated, also affect the decision
frame. This makes sense, as prior events serve either to reinforce or to call into
question existing beliefs about other actors in the system or about the merits of
specific foreign policy actions or behaviors.
This makes it all the more important to realize that decision makers are “not
normally aware of the potential effects of different decision frames on their pref-
erences” (Tversky and Kahneman 1981: 457). On the contrary, they often con-
vince themselves that their framing of the situation is an objective representation
of it. Nevertheless, countless studies have shown that choice is affected by
decision frames (e.g. Farnham 1990; Levy 1992, 1996). Such studies focus on
how a known representation of a problem yields a predisposition to make a spe-
cific choice. A separate line of inquiry has tried to determine how and why
decision makers represent situations in specific ways. The resulting problem rep-
resentation is “the product of an individual’s knowledge level, experiences, and
beliefs,” each of which influence how (and what) new information is acquired
and how it is given meaning in causal interpretations (Sylvan and Haddad 1998:
189). A decision maker’s representation of a problem shapes her or his reason-
ing about it. A problem representation is specific to a given problem or situation,
whereas a national role conception denotes the decision maker’s understanding
of their state’s role in the world more generally (Sylvan and Voss 1998).
Although research in prospect theory has focused primarily on choice among
known alternatives (and often has focused on the propensity to accept risk, e.g.
McDermott et al. 2008), problem representation provides a useful foundation for
the study of national role conceptions. Studies trying to determine decision
makers’ problem representations have most often done so in an effort to under-
stand the logic and reasoning behind specific policy decisions. Rather than
assuming a specific perspective or level of risk acceptance, studies in problem
representation try to ascertain, first, how decision makers perceive their risks and
opportunities, and second, what trade-offs they perceive between domestic and
international incentives. Current role theory suggests that these calculations are
only partially based in the material structure of incentives presented by the situ-
ation. On the contrary, role theory suggests that the opportunities and risks per-
ceived by decision makers are highly contingent upon the ideational “baggage”
they bring to their assessment of the situation. Cumulatively, patterns in problem
representations may well serve to deepen our insight into decision makers’ role
conceptions.
National role conceptions, decision makers, and citizens

Role theory holds that national role conceptions are (in part) derived from
domestic values and cultural heritage. If so, decision makers and citizens of the
same society should be in broad agreement on these role conceptions (Hopf
2002: 37; see also Wendt 1999: 157). Whether such congruence does in fact
exist has rarely been the subject of investigation. Most often, empirical research
employs official policy statements, leaders’ speeches, historical documents, and
so on, to determine the content of the national role conceptions of decision
makers (Hudson 1999). If the objective is to explain foreign policy behavior, this
is an acceptable strategy. However, to validate the domestic origins and the
socially shared nature of national role conceptions, something more is required.
Wish (1980) took the first step in this direction when she tested for the con-
gruence of the role conceptions held by multiple decision makers of a single
state. She found that they largely agreed on their conceptions of their state’s role,
and she certainly found more agreement among decision makers representing the
same state than between those representing different states. Left unexplored by
this finding is whether decision makers’ role conceptions are congruent with
those held by citizens more generally.
Hudson (1999) does not explicitly link decision maker and citizens either, but
asks whether citizens recognize certain foreign policy behaviors as more appro-
priate for their state than others. In other words, her research concerns whether
national role conceptions – she calls them “action templates” – are indeed
broadly shared within a society and whether citizens of that society recognize
not only their own society’s role conceptions, but also those of others. She
employs an experimental design to examine this question across three countries:
Japan, Russia, and the United States. She finds the highest levels of homogeneity
in Japan and the lowest in Russia. Moreover, respondents were not very adept at
identifying the role conceptions of other societies (ibid.: 779).
Hudson also notes that the ability of citizens to identify role conceptions varies
across different types of issues. In particular, she finds that “certain scenarios of
long-standing national security concern elicited more homogeneous responses
than did scenarios dealing with the new problems of the post-Cold War world”
(1999: 775; see also Adigbuo 2007). These novel foreign policy situations are
apparently more difficult for citizens to evaluate than more familiar foreign policy
dilemmas. Interestingly, findings from previous studies indicate that decision
makers find historical analogies helpful and persuasive in novel foreign policy
situations when they resonate with their national role conception (Houghton
1996; Peterson 1997). Hudson’s findings imply that national role conceptions,
although rooted in identity and cultural heritage, are not “given.” This suggests
that decision makers have the opportunity to “translate” cultural symbols and/or
choose to emphasize certain aspects of national heritage into role conceptions for
their citizens and that citizens learn these templates as they observe their decision
makers’ actions on the world stage (Breuning 1997, 1998).
Maull’s (1990/91) work on Germany and Japan as civilian powers under-
scores the crucial role of leadership. History is not destiny, but the weight of
history is not always lifted without strong incentives. As Maull describes, both
Germany and Japan experienced dramatic shifts after World War II that are
attributable to the influence of the war’s victorious powers. In both societies,
it meant a “selective screening and weeding out of old elites” as well as
30 M. Breuning
democratic reforms (ibid.: 94). The changes that resulted reformed both soci
eties, causing them to become “civilian powers.” History is not destiny, but
neither do role conceptions change easily.
In sum, role theorists could profitably pay more attention to questions such
as: Are leaders’ national role conceptions indeed broadly shared by the domestic
population? To what degree, and under what circumstances, do leaders reinter-
pret historical national symbols rather than merely giving voice to existing (and
widely shared) symbols? To what degree do a country’s history and previous
experiences shape today’s national role conceptions? All these questions pertain
to the ideational aspects that influence national role conceptions (the upper left
box in Figure 2.2).
Explaining adaption and change

If history is not destiny, as was argued in the previous section, then national role
conceptions can change over time. Indeed, Grossman argued that “role theory
may prove to be a useful tool in forecasting changes in state behavior” (2005:
348; see also Chafetz et al. 1996; Le Prestre 1997a). In an effort to explain
foreign policy behavior change, Gustavsson (1999) drew on the public policy
concept of “policy windows.” He concluded that fundamental change is most
likely when three factors coincide: (1) change in the fundamental structural con-
ditions; (2) strategic political leadership; and (3) a crisis of some kind. The
second factor, strategic political leadership, suggests that decision makers may
have a unique opportunity to revise national role conceptions when the other two
factors are present. However, such revisions must resonate with domestic values
and be deemed acceptable by other actors in the international system in order to
take root (Hudson 1999: 770f.).
As discussed above, Maull’s (1990/91) work demonstrated that the leaders of
Germany and Japan completed a radical shift in their conceptions of their states’
roles in the post-World War II era. Hermann (1990; see also Auerbach 1986;
Gustavsson 1999; Holsti 1982) has described this as “international orientation
change,” which involves a change in the state’s overall orientation towards inter-
national affairs. It is the most radical reorientation of foreign policy in his
scheme, which also includes adjustment, program, and goal change. Adjustment
change is the most limited foreign policy shift, requiring only a quantitative
change in levels of effort or scope of recipients addressed by a policy (see Har-
nisch, this volume). Program change involves new instruments of statecraft and
is qualitative in nature, whereas goal change entails a change of foreign policy
objectives. International orientation change is the most radical – an all-
encompassing redirection of a state’s foreign policy.
Although adjustment and program change do not necessarily entail a whole-
sale change in national role conception, these types of change do possibly lead to
(role) adaptation, as is suggested by Harnisch (this volume). Whether or not
adjustment and program change are possible within the context of existing role
conception or require role adaptation is ultimately an empirical question. It
would, however, be difficult for decision makers to engage in goal or interna-
tional orientation change without some shift in their conception of their state’s
role in the international system. Previous work has often displayed a substantial
emphasis on the wholesale restructuring of a state’s foreign policy orientation
(Auerbach 1986; Gustavsson 1999; Holsti 1982), although there has also been
criticism of this emphasis (Hagan 1989a, 1994). Hermann’s (1990) classification
provides a nuanced understanding of foreign policy change, but does not address
whether foreign policy change, on average, is more likely to come in occasional,
but substantial, shifts or in gradual modifications. If the former is the case, we
should be able to observe clear break points between role conceptions held
before and after an intervening event. If the latter is the case, careful process
tracing might help us identify empirically the pattern of gradual adaption theo-
rized by Harnisch (this volume).
Both the patterns and the sources of changes in foreign policy behavior deserve
greater attention. Some authors have argued that foreign policy change originates
in change in the international system (Holsti 1991; Holsti et al. 1980; Le Prestre
1997a), whereas others (Goldmann 1988; Hagan 1989a, b, 1994; Rosenau 1981;
Skidmore 1994; Smith 1981) emphasize domestic factors. A third line of inquiry
emphasizes the role of decision makers and the decision making process in
explaining foreign policy change (Gustavsson 1999; Hermann 1990; Holsti 1982),
whereas Grossman (2005) and Chafetz et al. (1996) investigated changes in
national role conceptions as the source of foreign policy change. Of course, the
national role conceptions held by decision makers do not preclude international
and/or domestic factors as sources of change. Rather, the role conception frame-
work emphasizes that such changes are interpreted by decision makers and do not
have a direct and independent effect on changes in foreign policy behavior.
Chafetz et al. suggested that gradual change is normally most likely, stating that
“states do not usually abandon role conceptions outright. Instead they slowly
downgrade their centrality. Rapid shifts in role may, however, occur in states
undergoing internal upheaval . . . or in new states” (ibid.: 736; see also Gustavsson
1999). Hudson (1999: 771) suggested that when role conceptions are “shattered
irrevocably,” decision makers and citizens may confront ambiguity or chaos, but
that over time the ambiguity will be resolved and new role conceptions will arise.
Each of these authors suggests that the degree of change in both national role
conceptions and foreign policy behavior is contingent upon specified sets of cir-
cumstances. More empirical work is needed to determine what circumstances
give rise to change in national role conceptions. Additionally, more work is
needed to evaluate under what circumstances role conceptions change gradually
across time or, alternatively, in sudden shifts. Are shifts in national role concep-
tions resisted? Are they contingent upon changes in government? And, if so, is
there a difference in how change occurs in societies with elected as against
authoritarian governments? The area of adaptation and change in national role
conceptions is a fruitful one for further investigation. There are many questions
as yet unanswered that can contribute in important ways to our understanding of
the foreign policy behavior of states.
32 M. Breuning
Multiple roles
Although much of the research that employs national role conceptions focuses
our attention on one role and the attendant foreign policy behavior, role theory
easily incorporates the notion that decision makers hold multiple national role
conceptions that guide the foreign policy behavior of the state in distinct issue
areas. In his pathbreaking study, Holsti concludes that the “policymakers of most
states conceive of their state in terms of multiple sets of relationships and mul-
tiple roles and/or functions” (1970: 277). He demonstrates this by pinpointing
the average number of roles for different types of states. Although that may seem
simplistic to us now, the concept of multiple roles is well established in social
psychology (Burke 1980; Stryker and Serpe 1982; Stryker and Statham 1985). It
is therefore surprising that the earlier role conception literature in international
relations tended to focus on one national role and perhaps not so surprising that
Walker concludes that
the aggregation and correlation of rhetoric and behavior by means of an

overall valence index obscures more than it reveals. The correlation of role
conceptions and role enactment behaviors in a disaggregated form, by issue
area, and longitudinally by nation and dyad, might be more enlightening.
(1979: 204)
Indeed, Breuning (1995) delineates the role conceptions of a small group of

states in one specific issue area and found this to be a promising strategy for
explaining similarities and differences in the foreign aid policy behavior of those
states. Empirical work on issue-specific national role conceptions can help to
explain behavior in those narrowly defined issue areas only, but multiple studies
of such issue-specific role conceptions can help us understand better why certain
states exhibit a pattern of engagement in international affairs in specific issue
areas. Consider, for instance, the role that the Scandinavian states have played in
issue-specific areas, such as development cooperation or the global environment.
Ingebritsen (2006) defines these states as “norm entrepreneurs” because of their
international role in these issue areas. How do the national role conceptions –
and their attendant role performances – of such norm entrepreneurs compare to
role conceptions and foreign policy behavior of these same states in other issue
areas? How do their foreign policies compare to those of comparable (small)
states that do not play a role as norm entrepreneur? More research is needed to
be able to answer this.
Further research on the existence of multiple roles can also provide further
insight into adaption and change of role conceptions and foreign policy behavior
over time. Chafetz et al. (1996) imply the existence of multiple roles when they
suggest that role conception change entails that decision makers gradually reduce
emphasis on certain role conceptions and, presumably, simultaneously increase
the relative prominence of other role conceptions. Such rebalancing of relative
prominence of role conceptions is possible only if multiple role conceptions
coexist, albeit of different salience at specific times or in specific issue areas (e.g.
Hudson 1999). Only empirical research can help resolve whether, first, multiple
roles of different salience exist and, second, whether the mechanism theorized
by Chafetz et al. does indeed explain role conception change – and under what
circumstances such gradual role conception shifts are most likely.
In sum, the issue of multiple roles intersects with the issue of role adaptation
and change, as well as with the question of the relationship between role and
capabilities:
1 Material capabilities “bound” the possible range of national role concep-

tions, but our knowledge of the relationship between the material and idea-
tional is as yet rather crude. The distinction between small, middle, and
great powers is imprecise and often based on claims that do not differentiate
between material capabilities and ideational (role) aspirations (Neack 1995:
228).
2 Some roles are imposed (such as the label “rogue state”) or enabled (such as
the “civilian power” status of Germany and Japan in the context of the US
hegemonic role after World War II) by external factors and actors. Yet they
also represent choices by decision makers: the leaders of rogue states often
accept the imposed label and behave accordingly rather than seek to con-
vince the international community of the label’s poor fit.
3 Some (small) states actively seek out a specialized role (such as the Scan-
dinavian norm entrepreneurs), whereas other states do not. Here, too,
decision makers are making choices that must be grounded in the values of
– and support from – their domestic audience.
4 National role conceptions may be rooted in specific issue areas. For smaller
states, this creates the possibility of playing a relatively more substantial
role within a limited domain (such as the Scandinavian norm entrepreneurs’
role in development cooperation), but it also suggests that decision makers
may perceive multiple national role conceptions that are connected to
various issue areas and possibly also to foreign policy in different geo-
graphic domains (see Figure 2.2). These may coexist comfortably, or there
may be tension between the issue area-specific role conceptions. Since there
has been little work delineating multiple national role conceptions of spe-
cific states, this is largely uncharted territory. Its exploration may help
clarify whether role conception change is indeed a move to a new (and
unprecedented) role or whether it reflects a shift towards greater emphasis
on an existing role that had previously received less emphasis. Quite con-
ceivably, both forms of foreign policy role conception change occur, and
lead to different types of adaptation and change.
The empirical challenge

This chapter outlines many more questions than it answers. Indeed, my objective
has been to set out a research agenda for role theory in international politics. At
the core of that research agenda is a commitment to hypothesis testing and
34 M. Breuning
systematic empirical investigation, a project that benefits from clearly defined
key terms in order to permit the accumulation of research findings across time,
and may benefit from research strategies already developed in the study of
problem representation as well as other aspects of political psychology. The
accumulation of knowledge will benefit not only from clearly defined concepts
and “borrowing” of research strategies, but also from a much stronger and con-
sistently sustained dialogue between role theory scholars affiliated with institu-
tions in different geographic locations (primarily in Europe and North America).
Each point deserves a little elaboration.
The value of systematic empirical investigation and hypothesis testing

In recent years, role theorists have frequently borrowed from the constructivist
literature on norms and identity. Although these offer interesting puzzles, they
have offered few answers and are ultimately poorly positioned to advance our
knowledge. Consider Hopf ’s argument that theorizing is “a form of interpreta-
tion, and it destroys meaning. As soon as we begin to impose categories on evid-
ence, that evidence stops meaning what it meant in its earlier context” (2002:
25). That is true enough, but the implication is not to abandon systematic empiri-
cal research in favor of inductive methods and the implicit theories embedded in
them, as is Hopf ’s approach. Rather, we need to consider (and reconsider) very
carefully our empirical methods for evaluating the national role conceptions held
by decision makers. As Popper argued, “Observation is always selective. It
needs a chosen object, a definite task, an interest, a point of view, a problem”
(1992 [1962]: 148). Evidence from prospect theory (Ariely 2008; Quattrone and
Tversky 1988; Tversky and Kahneman 1981) has amply demonstrated this. Only
explicit hypotheses and clearly defined research designs based on meticulously
defined concepts can form the basis for a scientific dialogue aimed at the accu-
mulation of knowledge. Studying ideational (rather than material) variables in
this manner is a significant challenge, but one that must be confronted.
The inductive strategies of some constructivist scholarship on norms and
identities are not likely to advance our understanding of foreign policy decision
making and behavior. Those investigations are too idiosyncratic, and too depend-
ent on the expertise and insight of the individual scholars who pursue those
investigations. The problem lies not in case study research but in the lack of
transparency of much interpretive constructivist work, which renders it imposs-
ible to replicate its findings.
Empirical investigation allows us to ascertain (aspects of ) identity: roles leave
their mark in, for instance, decision makers’ speeches and statements. Coding
schemes may need to be improved to better capture the salient aspects of text.
This is a matter of devising better research strategies, not an argument for aban-
doning explicit coding schemes. Science is, ultimately, a collective endeavor that
proceeds best when our research strategies are transparent and replicable, when
we can be proven wrong, and when we try again with an improved empirical
strategy.
Clearly defined concepts and key terms
Clearly defined concepts and key terms are the foundation for explicitly stated
hypotheses and well-defined research designs. Such clarity also facilitates dia-
logue, not just about definitional issues but also about the nature of our findings.
Consider the above discussion about adaptation and change. We might use the
terms interchangeably, but considering the variety of ways in which role concep-
tions might change – and the variety of reasons why they might do so – lumping
all adaptation and change together deprives us of a more nuanced understanding.
Clearly defined concepts and categories help us improve our empirical investiga-
tions. Although this chapter has not offered a definitive categorization of adapta-
tion and change, it has pointed to existing schemes and to possible hypotheses.
The benefits of borrowing

In devising our research strategies and conceptual definitions, we may benefit
from research strategies already developed in the study of problem representa-
tion, as discussed above, as well as other aspects of political psychology. Con-
cepts and research strategies that have demonstrated their value will allow role
theory research to achieve progress faster. In contrast with the more interpretiv-
ist strands of constructivism, political psychological research has remained com-
mitted to empirical investigation and research design that lends itself to
replication.
Bridging the Atlantic and more

Science is, ultimately, a collective endeavor that depends not only on solid and
explicitly stated research design, but also on dialogue. This is nothing new. The
study of role theory in international relations, however, appears to have suffered
from isolated islands of scholarship on different continents, and it is time to (re)
connect these scholarly communities. This volume is pathbreaking in its effort to
bridge the Atlantic and bring together the scholarly communities that have been
working on role theory in relative isolation in Europe and North America.
In sum, this chapter sets out a research agenda for role theory, an agenda cen-
trally concerned with the interaction between agent and structure. This makes it
all the more remarkable that role theory has largely been absent from the theo-
retical debates regarding the agent–structure problem (e.g. Wendt 1987, 1999).
Much of the work that has grappled with the agent–structure problem has been
strongly interpretive in nature. Role theory, on the other hand, has its roots in
social psychology and shares with psychology an emphasis on empirical investi-
gation. As a result, the national role conception framework provides a promising
avenue for deepening our understanding of the relationship between agent and
structure.
3 “Dialogue and emergence”
George Herbert Mead’s contribution to
role theory and his reconstruction of
international politics
Sebastian Harnisch
Introduction
George Herbert Mead’s important contribution to social psychology and philo-
sophy has long been recognized (Cook 1993; da Silva 2007a, 2008; Joas 1980,
1985b), but his impact on role research in foreign policy analysis (FPA) has not
received the attention it deserves. As a consequence, this chapter examines
Mead’s analytical key concepts of dialogue and emergence as they apply to
“roles nations play in international politics.” It explores Mead’s own thinking on
foreign policy and international politics, as these aspects of Mead’s oeuvre have
garnered some attention in recent years (Aboulafia 2001; Baer 1999; Deegan
2008; Fischer 2008), and relates them to recent advances in role theory.
This chapter will argue that Mead’s contributions include three core premises
of the social constructivist approach to “foreign policy role analysis” (FPRA).
These core assumptions stretch the co-constitutive nature of the agent–society
relationship, the importance of shifts in state behavior through role taking and
making, and the sources of role change in increasingly complex societies. One
may add that Mead’s insistence on language as a social practice for and dialogue
as the central mechanism of social interaction have not been fully captured by
recent scholarship, either in foreign policy role analysis or in International Rela-
tions theory. This reading suggests that Mead’s early and innovative treatment of
agency and structure, which holds that “the social does not preclude agency, but
is a sine qua non for its emergence” (Baert 2009: 57), has been lost in the trans-
lation of the many insights Mead’s oeuvre offers. Thus, my claim is that a
Meadian understanding of foreign policy roles as emerging social objects and
Mead’s macrosociological thinking on war and international politics offer crit-
ical insights for contemporary role and IR theoreticians.
Despite a recent turn towards (American) pragmatism in international rela-
tions theory (Bauer and Brighi 2009; Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009; Hellmann
2009a, b), the interpretation and use of George Herbert Mead’s work on interna-
tional politics and foreign policy have only just begun. Some IR theorists,
notably Alexander Wendt, have based their argument for systemic change on
key elements of Mead’s social theory (Cederman and Daase 2003: 7–8; Wendt
1987, 1999). In a similar vein, Jürgen Habermas has appropriated Mead’s
Mead: “Dialogue and emergence” 37
symbolic interactionism selectively for his “theory of communicative action” (da
Silva 2008: 151–64; Joas 1985b). Yet it is argued here that these attempts have
reconstituted Mead’s oeuvre selectively (Herborth 2004), thereby corroborating
a tradition by leading sociologists of reinterpreting Mead in light of their own
research agenda (da Silva 2006).
Mead’s observations of the self, society, and the role of the “generalized
other” (Mead 1926, 1934) and his account of the social reconstruction of modern
society have all been discussed at length by students of sociology, psychology,
and philosophy (Hamilton 1992), but his analysis of foreign policy role taking
has not. Given Mead’s many references to politics in general and allusions to
foreign policy in particular, this omission is peculiar.1 International politics
loomed large in Mead’s mind, particularly in the mid-1910s and shortly before
he died, in 1931; he spent much time seeking to understand nationalism as a
source of war and thereby built central tenets of foreign policy role research.
Mead’s central finding that the individual is not autonomous but both a source
and an effect of society is quite revolutionary for FPA as such. Not only does it
allow for individual preferences to vary greatly, if density and structure of social
interaction vary, but it also implies that individuals may reconstruct social struc-
ture through practice. The most important implication of this argument is that
role researchers must not narrow their empirical analysis towards either agent or
structure but must engage in the analysis of their interaction (see Breuning, this
volume). Also, Mead’s interactionist framework opens up the intellectual space
to integrate FPA role theory with foreign policy learning literature (Harnisch
forthcoming). A further inference from Mead’s work is the increasing impor-
tance of the “quality of domestic deliberation” – although he stressed this line of
argument more with regard to social policy.
There are, of course, many variants of role research in foreign policy analysis,
but they may be roughly corralled into two groups. In the first group, role con-
ceptions are understood as “social facts” (Durkheim) which can be integrated in
a causal understanding of a nation’s foreign conduct – the view expressed by
Holsti when defining them as
including the policymaker’s own definitions of the general kinds of

decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the
functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the
international system or ins subordinate regional systems. It is their “image”
of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state towards or in the
external environment.
(1970: 245f.)
This representation of roles informs many of the current accounts of roles in

international politics, including those by Gaupp (1983), Walker (1987b), Kirste
and Maull (1996), Le Prestre (1997a), and Kirste (1998), as well as some of
those in the volumes by Harnisch and Maull (2001a) and Elgström and Smith
(2006a).
38 S. Harnisch
In the second group, roles are conceived of more as emerging social objects
which, according to Ole Elgström and Michael Smith, can be understood as “in
part an effect of learning and socialization in interactive negotiation processes
. . . where self-conceptions are confronted with expectations” (2006b: 5). This
evolutionary role conceptualization itself takes many forms: from Barnett’s take
on national roles as “how the individual (or state) participates in society accord-
ing to a particular identity and comes to modify behavior accordingly” (1993:
274) to the sophisticated treatment of the Habermasian “practice of reasoning”
within a role-theoretical framework (Arora 2006). To a greater or lesser degree,
they all emphasize the co-constitutive character of the self and society, the
(nation-) state and the international society (Jönsson 1984; Kite 2006; Tewes
1998).
Together, these approaches – including the causal and the co-constitutive
variants – share certain common assumptions: first, that roles emerge through
dense interaction and division of labor between nation-states; and second, that
they include both historically informed ego and alter expectations and that func-
tional differentiation between roles allows for hierarchy as well as supranational
integration in international politics.
This chapter does not seek to endorse Mead’s concepts of dialogue and emer-
gence without reservation, or pretend that his role conceptualization is the only
possible fruitful resource for further research; nor does it aspire to systematically
reconstruct Mead’s political engagement with US foreign policy and the League
of Nations. Rather, it is intended to be a systematic contribution to the intellec-
tual history of role research in foreign policy analysis and IR theory. The first
section will examine the key concepts of dialogue and emergence as they pertain
to role theory, focusing on the new issues (identity building), the new actors
(role beholders), and new interactions (role taking and making). The second
section will explore Mead’s conceptualization of the nexus between role taking
and society formation in more detail, focusing on the concept of “self-restraint”
and the consistency between different “generalized others.” The third section
will trace Mead’s work on roles in international politics in his writings on World
War I and the coevolution of an international community and international
organizations, most importantly the League of Nations. In the conclusion, I will
reconsider Mead’s role theory and describe its implications for current scholar-
ship in the field.
“Dialogue and emergence”: foundational elements of Mead’s

social theory
A driving concern of George Herbert Mead was the question of how to reconcile
the tension between an ever more individualistic self and an increasingly univer-
salistic social order (da Silva 2007a: 2). His central rationale for accommodating
this tension was the idea of dialogue. In fact, most of the concepts associated
with Mead in social psychology – the “I”–“me” distinction, the gesture and
significant symbol assertion, and the “taking the role of the other” process – are
closely related to the social process of dialogue (ibid.: 3). In addition, these
social mechanisms stretch his whole intellectual edifice, from his studies on the
nature and conduct of science, to social psychological scholarship and his ana
lysis of politics.
To begin with, the concept of the “self” is conceived by Mead as a social
process in which the self becomes an object only when an actor learns “to take the
role of other” and examines his or her self from that other perspective. The dia-
logue between the self and the other, as envisioned by the self through “taking the
role of the other,” i.e. the process of role taking, is considered constitutive for the
self as a social object (da Silva 2008: 116). Here, the contrast with the Descartian
individualistic notion of cogito, ergo sum could not be starker. While Descartes
locates the essence of the self within the body and mind of the actor, i.e. individu-
ally, Mead ascertains that the self cannot conceive itself as an object without the
other, i.e. socially. In this perspective, states, as the constitutive elements of the
international community, do not “exist as such” in the Median view, but are prod-
ucts of their own “role play as states” in their society (Wendt 1999: 327).
The “sociological turn” of the conception of the “self ” puts Mead squarely
between the poles of the debate between structuralism and individualism. Mead
establishes, thus, a third, generative variant of social theory that starts with
society but stresses the constitutive effects of interaction for the self and society
(Mead 1934: 134). This “practical turn” within the “sociological turn” of his
theory is important, because practices, both linguistic and other, become his
theoretical center of gravity for social order and change.2
Identity building: a dialogue of “I” and “me”

The dialogue between the self and society is based on Mead’s social psychologi-
cal construction of the “self ” as consisting of two aspects which themselves are
in constant conversation: the “I” and the “me.” Following William James’s con-
ceptualization of the “I” and “Me” as a stream of consciousness (James 1890),
Mead does not perceive the two as ontologically different but rather as different
phases of experience (Aboulafia 2001: 15). In this stream, the “I” represents the
impulsive, biologically irreducible and creative part of the self (Mead 1934:
352f.). It is unknown to its bearer and the other. And yet, while unknown prior
to action, the “I” is soon “objectified,” because in retrospect it becomes visible
through interaction, i.e. through the reactions of the other. The “I” can thus
become an object of observation, through the second aspect of the self, the “me.”
Self-reflection or the “self ’s construction” is therefore dependent upon the dia-
logue of the two parts of the self and the concrete situation in which the indi-
vidual interacts (Dodds et al. 1997: 491).
Philosophically speaking, this notion of the “I” and the “me” symbolizes the
co-constitutive relationship of “freedom” and “determination,” of the individual
and society, neither of which can exist, ontologically speaking, without the other,
because the prior conceptualization of the other facilitates the experience of the
“self.”
40 S. Harnisch
Self Society
(significant vocal gestures)
“I” “Me”
as individual Perception of position Language
disposition vis-à-vis others as a medium
Behavior of others
(non-vocal gestures)
Shaping of identity
Taking the role of the other
Figure 3.1 Self–Society Relation and Role-Taking Mechanism.
In contrast, the “me” consists of those internalized expectations that the “me”
envisioned when “taking the role of other.” In other words, the “me” pertains to
our self-image when we look at ourselves through the eyes of the other – that is,
when we import into our conduct the “perceived” attitudes of the other.
The dialogical nature of the “me” is crucial in this process. As Mead points
out in his famous play and game analogy, the self grows more “self-conscious”
as it increases the number of dialogue partners. During the play stage, a child
only takes the attitude of a particular individual, often the mother, father, or a
sibling (Mead 1934: 153). These specific others with whom the individual has a
“formative relationship” are called “significant others.” During the game stage,
for example during a soccer match, children have to take the role of all others in
their team, group, or community to coordinate its purposeful actions. While
playing, children may switch roles from mother to father. But during the game
stage they have to obey the rules and stick to a limited role, such as that of
defender (Mead 1925: 269). “The organized community or social group which
gives to the individual his unity of self may be called the ‘generalized other’ ”
(Mead 1934: 154).
The so-called generalized other requires a significantly greater amount of
communicative and dialogical competence from a self (Habermas 1988: 190).3
First, as the “generalized other” is no particular other anymore, the self must
represent an abstract “other” encompassing and organizing the attitudes of all
members of a social group. Second, there are as many “generalized others” as
there are social groups with which the self interacts. Therefore, a modern indi-
vidual under conditions of a highly differentiated society must incorporate a
multitude of “generalized others.”4 In such a setting, individuality, a sense of
uniqueness, arises from the inimitable mix of shared values in those social con-
texts that are represented through the “me” in the self.5
Dialogue also characterizes the social process by which a gesture becomes a
“significant symbol” and language the primary social mechanism for the devel-
opment of the human consciousness. Here, Mead distinguishes between “uncon-
scious gestures,” which include the most basic forms of social interaction
performed by primates and other animals, and “conscious gestures,” or signs. On
the basis of the linguistic pragmatist position of Charles Sanders Peirce that there
is no knowing without signs, Mead posits that gestures become significant ges-
tures, or signs, only when they carry a definite meaning – that is, signs must
have the same meaning for all individuals involved and they generate the same
or similar responses by these individuals (1934: 78). He holds that the only type
of gesture that potentially has that quality is a “vocal gesture,” because both
speaker and listener can hear the utterance.
For Mead, “listening to the same vocal gesture” facilitates the social process
of “taking the role of the other” more than any other gesture could. This implies
that gestures (and vocal gestures) may fail to develop into “significant gestures,”
because they do not “arouse in an individual making them the same responses
which they explicitly arouse, or are supposed to arouse, in other individuals, the
individuals to whom they are addressed” (1934: 47). In a nutshell, only through
language does the breadth of significant symbols similarly “understood” – the
“self,” society, and other “human accomplishments” – become possible. As
Mead explains, “For effective cooperation one has to have the symbols by means
of which the responses can be carried out, so that getting a significant language
is of first importance” (ibid.: 268).
The concept of emergent social objects

The concept of emergence is Mead’s second major contribution to role theory
and IR theory in general. In contrast to Parsons, Weber, and other contemporary
sociologists, Mead conceives central elements of his social theory as “emergents
of social processes” rather than substantive phenomena. Mead started out with
Darwin and evolutionary social science on this. However, he followed other
pragmatists such as William James and John Dewey much more closely when
applying evolutionary insights to psychological and social processes (Joas
1985a: 33–63).
For Mead, his central concept, the “self,” was an emergent social phenome-
non. He conceived it as an ideal type, emerging from a two-stage social process
in which the “I,” as the assertion of individuality and creativity, interacts with
the “me,” a socially structured self-image that we construct by seeing ourselves
through the eyes of others (see above). Selves, as they constantly play roles in
society, are therefore inherently social phenomena that cannot be reduced to
“individual” or material properties of an actor (Dodds et al. 1997: 487). There is
a dualism of “I” and “me” that is at the center of Mead’s “self ” conceptualiza-
tion, which he dissolves through the integration of Peircean language theory. For
Mead, language is the only medium of significant symbols through which the “I”
can gain self-reflectivity and thus the “me” can emerge. Hence, there is no self
without significant signs and its content is “only a development and product of
social interaction” (1934: 191).
Briefly, Mead’s understanding of linguistic development also signifies the
importance of the emergence of social objects. He identified four moods of
42 S. Harnisch
language that in turn describe phases of social advancement: First, the impera-
tive mood indicates social relations in which force and coercion are the predomi-
nant mechanisms of interaction; second and third, the subjunctive and optative
mood are related to deliberation and decision making, increasing the self-
consciousness of the self as it envisions various trajectories of action that will
lead to different outcomes. Weighing alternative courses of action not only
drives the inner dialogue of the self but also engages the self with others, as
deliberations about the coordination of actions within groups multiply. This
increase in “social interdependence” leads to the development of the last mood,
the indicative, in which the individual is well versed in indicating different
courses of action to itself and others. In sum, language does co-constitute social
development, as the evolution from imperative to indicative mood exemplifies.
In addition, language, or rather its appropriation, is the medium for the emer-
gence of the human mind. As Mead emphasizes, “Mind arises through commu-
nication by a communication of gestures in a social process or context of
experience – not communication through mind” (1934: 50).
By stressing this evolutionary, dialogical nature of the self, Mead rejects the
Cartesian model of the self as a passive recipient of social rules. In contrast, he
puts forward an interactionist model through which the self becomes an active
interpreter of social attitudes, for example when taking up the role of the “gener-
alized other” (da Silva 2007a: 52). This generic character of Mead’s theory and
the appropriation of language and symbols that already exist, however, create a
bias towards continuity or reification of social order. The strength of the “me”
creates a self-fulfilling prophecy for the existing social order.6
The reconstruction of the self: “as if ” role taking

And yet, Mead also allows for the reconstruction of the self: on the basis of the
Peircean concept of belief and doubt and the distinction between routine and
problematic situations by William James, he conceives learning as a “trans-
formation” of the constitutive parts of the self (Herborth 2004: 80–2). In a
routine situation, the “me” part of the self, like the “I” part, has been reconciled
with the perceptions of social norms through practices (routines). But in prob-
lematic situations, the “I” part becomes more prevalent because old routines do
not promise to achieve the anticipated effects, i.e. material pay-offs and/or
immaterial stabilizing effects for the self. In these situations, as the “I” part takes
over, the self acts “as if ” it were performing a new role that does not contain old
routines and thus does not reify existing social structures (Mead 1934: 209–12,
214–18). In the Meadian sense, taking up new roles, or role making, does not
imply a conscious act of manipulating one’s own role performance so as to
induce the alter to take on a new role.7 To the contrary, Mead’s theory of self-
identification seems to suggest that the self intrinsically seeks to foster its auton-
omy. This may be done by loosening the bonds to “significant others” and
bolstering its “social capital” through interaction with various “generalized
others.”
The emergence of learning in societies: democratic deliberation
To allow for learning in societies, Mead introduces “problematic situations” that
call into question instruments, strategies, or even goals used heretofore in the
interaction between individuals and various generalized others. For Mead, some
statesmen were ideal-typical incarnations of this dialogical process in the polit-
ical realm. On the one hand, these individuals were better prepared to take up the
role of the other – that is, they had a higher degree of the social resource of
“self-reflection.” In this reading, the capacity for self-reflection depicts the
varying ability to enter “into the attitudes of the group and to mediate between
them by making his own experience universal, so that others can enter into this
form of communication through him” (Mead 1934: 257). On the other hand,
these individuals may reconstruct political and moral problematic situations
more intelligently than others through “as if ” role taking so that these situations
can be resolved through joint action.
In a democratic society, “as if ” role taking by these individuals is thus a crea-
tive response to an indeterminate situation – that is, a situation of uncertainty
and even risk in which no appropriate role response is obvious or promising
against a given set of preferences. To counter this indeterminacy, the individual
acts as if he or she were performing a new role, thereby allowing for a new
shared meaning to emerge. In contrast to rationalist or cognitivist designs of
learning, which focus on information or cognitive processing, Mead thus stresses
the intersubjective, the social capacity to create new meaning, i.e. shared roles
and identities (Harnisch forthcoming).
On the individual psychological level, problematic situations mean situations
in which the “I,” the impulsive and unpredictable part, no longer subjects itself
to the “me.” This may occur when one’s actions are inhibited or there are con-
flicting imperatives to act in a pluralistic society with contradictory demands by
various “organized others.” In these cases, the creative “I” must use language to
reframe the situation by suggesting alternative courses for action (Mead 1934:
217). By reframing the situation, the “I” may choose to reprioritize given roles
under the circumstances, thus shifting the center of the self ’s identity from one
role to another, or it may take up a new role altogether that has not been part of
the self before. Moreover, the “I” may reinterpret the meaning of a given role
without abdicating it.
In Mead’s philosophy of action, the notion of an emerging new order through
self-reflexive discourse is not limited to democratic societies. It expands his
understanding of social science, social psychology, to moral and political think-
ing (da Silva 2007b: 297). In his moral philosophy, he contends that one can
either deductively reaffirm old meanings of a problem in question, such as
“explaining” poverty as a natural feature of human society, or one can induc-
tively “understand” it as a problem requiring solution and offering a chance for
“moral growth” (Mead 1900: 15). Using analogical reasoning, he equates the
moral agent with the social scientist: while the former has to do justice to all the
relevant values in the problematic situation, thereby constructing a “common
44 S. Harnisch
good” as the reference point for debate, the scientist must incorporate all the
facts to come up with a working hypothesis (da Silva 2007a: 56).
Mead holds that in the politics of modern societies “the most effective gov-
ernment is through public opinion” (quoted in da Silva 2007b: 297).8 Continued
and informed deliberation among competent and civically engaged citizenry is
the foundation of a democratic polity, because the individual can grow only
through active participation, and society can be sustained only through “critical
reflection.” Social criticism and personal reflections are thus two sides of the
same coin as they allow agency to creatively reconstruct the social and cultural
setting in which the actor lives.
In a nutshell, Mead’s concept of democracy merges the scientific ideal of a
rational exchange of arguments between equals, in which all “facts” must be
taken into account and in which every solution is necessarily provisional, with
his democratic ideal of a discourse between equals, in which all citizens are
capable of participating in deliberating social problems. What emerges from
Mead’s thinking is a radical democratic community in which violence and coer-
cion are the exception and the force of the better argument the rule.
Insofar as international politics and the roles nations play are concerned,
Mead established a central tenet of FPRA by suggesting that (international) roles
empower actors because they enable them to act trustfully, i.e. by consent.
Through roles in complex networks of division of labor, states may build up trust
as the belief grows that one will not be harmed when one’s fate is placed in the
hands of others. Trust as a product of role playing thus helps to clarify how role
taking enables actors to send costly signals (Kydd 2000) about their degree of
self-identification with the role and their future conduct within a role. In this
view, variance in role playing affects trust as a social resource, which in turn
impacts upon the capacity to overcome collective action problems. Mead’s
Mind, Self, and Society (1934) treated the nature and structure of (leadership)
roles as a basic element of an individual’s capacity to sustain allegiance. Vari-
ation in the actor’s capacity for role taking and making therefore helps explain-
ing the ability of a society (and individual) to grow.
Mead on self-restraint and social organization

As I have already noted, Mead purported that the “self-understanding” of an
actor depends on the ability to distance him- or herself from his or her self by
taking the perspective of the other. Consequently, he reasoned that the more
roles of others an individual or group can take up, the greater the capacity to
create and maintain lasting patterns of social organization (Mead 1934: 264).
Practicing norms and rules within an organization is not only consonant with
social order but may also “civilize” its members by teaching them self-restraint
through continuous role-taking (cf. Adler 2008 with reference to Elias 1994;
Williams 2001: 538f.). In Mead’s logic, an actor’s role-taking capacity thus
becomes a crucial indicator for his or her contribution to the stability of social
order. He argued that, apart from the actor’s capacity, the structure and stability
of a social organization depends upon three factors: first, the degree to which
actors can hold a common generalized other; second, the degree of consistency
among multiple generalized others; and third, the degree of integration among
types and layers of generalized others (Turner 1981: 144).
Mead acknowledged that the increased size and differentiation of a social col-
lectivity does not easily translate into stable social relationships (although he may
have been more optimistic than others). Rather, the consistency, or at least com-
patibility, between multiple “generalized others” becomes a crucial source ena-
bling the self to control and evaluate itself and thus to differentiate between the
roles to be taken in various contexts (Mead 1934: 322). If these generalized others
are in contradiction, conflict is likely and social organization may become anemic.
To tackle these challenges, Mead differentiated between “abstract generalized
others” and concrete “organized others” (1934: 264f.). He posited that the scope
of social organization is limited by the level of integration or compatibility
between the values and beliefs of the “abstract other” and the rules and doctrines
of the “organized others”:
Those social situations in which the individual finds it easiest to integrate

his own behavior with the behavior of the other individual are those in
which all the individual participants are members of one of the numerous
socially functional groups of individuals (groups organized, respectively, for
various special social ends and purposes).
In contrast, those social situations in which the individual finds it most
difficult to integrate his own behavior with the behavior of others are those
in which he and they are acting as members, respectively, of two or more
different socially functional groups: groups whose respective social pur-
poses or interests are antagonistic or conflicting or widely separated.
(ibid.: 321f.)
In contrast to Wendt and IR applications by others, Mead conceives self-restraint

“not as a capacity of the powerful to hold themselves back” (Wendt 1999: 359).
Rather, he posits that self-restraint is a potential quality of all actors. It refers to
the (social) capacity to take up various roles without giving in to the urge to feel
superior and superimpose oneself upon others. On the individual level, self-
restraint meant for him to balance the “creative I” with the various, even contra-
dictory expectations within the “me” and not to superimpose an inflated “I” upon
the “me” and society at large (Mead 1934: 307). It is worthwhile to note that
Mead, despite his optimism for social reconstruction through deliberations,
acknowledged and explained why and how an increase in societal demands, vari-
ation on the “me” component of the self, could induce (averse) effects on the “I”
component, resulting in dissociative behavior.
In a nutshell, for a highly organized society to exist and persist, its constitu-
tive members must be able to take up roles with multiple generalized others –
that is, in a Habermasian reading, to integrate lifeworlds of different universality.
These generalized others, abstract or specific, may or may not be conducive to
46 S. Harnisch
easy role taking and role making. Their values, norms, and rules may clash with
or contradict each other. Difficulties in role integration on the individual level
for those who are highly connected thus indicate challenges for social integration
at the societal level. Mead thus provided a first crucial conceptualization of the
interaction between agent and structure through the variation of an agent to take
the role of the other.
Mead and international politics

The initial seeds of Mead’s analysis of foreign policy roles in international pol-
itics were sown in the years preceding the US entry into World War I, a period
of intense nationalism that challenged many of the founding fathers of modern
sociology (Joas 1989, 2003). Starting with the “The Psychological Bases for
Internationalism” (1915), Mead elaborated his take on international politics,
particularly on war and nationalism, through a series of articles in the Chicago
Tribune (1917a, b) defending the US entry into World War I, systematizing his
thinking on internationalism in “National-Mindedness and International-
Mindedness” (1929) as well as in Mind, Self, and Society (1934). Nationalism,
which had earlier been considered a marginal phenomenon subsumed under
autocratic great power politics, suddenly gained prominence. Mead, who had
been working on identity formation on the individual and societal level for over
a decade then, was well positioned to contribute to the understanding and ameli
oration of this new phenomenon.
Mead and the emergence of adverse self-identification

Mead applied his theory of an emergent self to international politics first in “The
Psychological Bases for Internationalism.” He purported that “nations, like indi-
viduals, can become objects to themselves only as they see themselves through
the eyes of the other” (1915: 604). At the same time, he noted the paradox that
nations may destroy other nations that have enabled them to achieve “self-
consciousness” in the first place. Thus, a firm link was established between the
habit of an actor to define him- or herself in exclusive terms and the social prac-
tice of violent and deviant behavior.
To explain this new and disturbing phenomenon, Mead used an argument that
he developed in his writings on criminal justice. When investigating the effects
of the role of the criminal in society in the 1910s, Mead found that group identi-
ties could be based on adversity:
The consciousness of the self through consciousness of others is responsible

for a more profound sense of hostility – that of members of the group to
those opposed to it, or even to those merely outside it. And this hostility has
the backing of the whole inner organization of the group. It provides the
most favorable condition for the sense of group solidarity because in the
common attack upon the common enemy the individual differences are
obliterated. But in the development of these hostilities we find the same self-
assertion with the attempted elimination of the enemy giving way before the
larger social whole with which the conflicting groups find themselves.
(1918: 581f.)
Consequently, his pragmatist approach to social conflict led Mead to establish an

alternative and much more ambivalent understanding of the process of self-
reflection of nations. While he rejected William James’s assumption of a mascu-
line fighting instinct, Mead considered a certain type of national
self-consciousness inevitable (1915: 606). The puzzle for Mead was not why
nationalism could occur but why it could take such violent forms. The major
reason he found was militarism. In an argument typical of him, he held that
nations could legitimate war only for purposes of self-defense and that this self-
defense turns violent whenever nations are identified with the state as such rather
than with the people. If the state in an exclusive understanding of sovereignty
prevails over the human aspiration of its citizens, then war becomes possible. In
contrast, if a nation of citizens can identify with the international society at large,
then the exclusive identity could evolve into a more inclusive form of a com-
munity of nation-states. As Mead explains in an often-quoted portion of “The
Psychological Bases for Internationalism”:
Militarism is not simply an evil in itself. It is typical and conservative of a

state that is narrowly national in its attitude and that refuses to recognize
international society that after all has made the self-conscious state possible.
The problem then is a psychological problem, for it has to do with the
change of attitude, the willingness to accept the whole international fabric
of society, and to regard the states and the communities of which they are
instruments, as subject to and controlled by the life of the whole, not as
potential enemies for whose assault each state must be forever on the watch.
(1915: 607)
It is important to note here that Mead never envisioned the establishment of a

“world state.” Rather, he speaks in his own voice in articulating a dialogue
between “civilized” – that is, self-restrained – nation-states. Far from abolishing
the nation-state and merging one “national self” into another, cosmopolitan self,
he argues that state sovereignty must “evolve.” In his understanding, nations must
first abstain from a unilateral, exclusive right to self-defense (Fischer 2008: 514).
Universal communities were spreading, as Mead notes, in economics, reli-
gion, and through the League of Nations (1934: 281–94). But these communities
do not replace the nation-state as the premier place of their citizen’s self-
identification, he argues. When talking about the conduct between nations, Mead
refers to a “conversation in international terms” (ibid.: 271), and nowhere does
he suggest that these should evolve into a “dialogue in supranational terms.”
In short, Mead’s conception of the nation-state is both evolving and dialogi-
cal. His experience with rampant nationalism and widespread violence initiated
48 S. Harnisch
a scientific process of “problem solving” in his thinking on international
relations. Mead rejected an essentialist reading of the sources of World War I.
He argued instead that militarism and a closed understanding of sovereignty
must be overcome, so that a nation’s understanding of itself may “grow” and
encompass the “generalized other” as the embodiment of the “community of
nation-states.”
Mead’s “internationalism” is all the more important for his thinking on inter-
national relations because it reflects his dialogical concept of democracy and
sovereignty of the individual in the public sphere. The state is but an instrument
of the political community of individuals, who are increasingly aware of their
interdependence. As such, the state incorporates the values of the society itself
and is not an entity distinct from the collective will of the people. Democratic
political institutions thus embody the evolving psychological dynamism of their
constituent individuals by incorporating the principle of gradual change. Demo-
cratic institutions establish the conditions for rational dialogue, through struc-
tures and practices preventing the parts from having recourse to violent means.
But these institutions must be complemented and continuously reinforced by cit-
izens through active “citizenship” – that is, voting, petitioning, lobbying, and
discussing issues pertaining to the public (Deegan 2008: 22).
Mead, World War I, and the League of Nations as the arbiter of

international life
In a series of articles published in 1917, Mead tried to compose and refine a jus-
tification of the United States’ entry into World War I and the establishment of
the League of Nations. He first outlined the reasons for the outbreak of the war –
German militarism and the expansionism of its autocratic rule – and then placed
his argument for US intervention right in the middle of the American debate on
the war aims. Mead posited that the United States should neither align itself with
the coalition against Germany, as former president Theodore Roosevelt had
argued, nor should it stay neutral, as the Democratic presidential candidate
William Jennings Bryan had suggested (Baer 1999: 109).
In contrast, Mead claimed that the United States should intervene to safe-
guard democracy on the international level, because, he said, leaning heavily on
Kant here (Mead 1918: 160), democracy would be the best precursor for a peace-
ful evolution of international politics.
America finally entered this world war, because its issue became that of
democracy, democracy defined as the right of peoples to self-government,
the right of a people to determine the foreign policy of its government, the
right of the small nations to existence because they are nations, and the right
of the whole western world to be free from the threat of imperialistic milita-
rism. We are fighting for the larger world society which democratic attitudes
and principles make possible.
(Mead 1917a: 1)
In reflecting on the constructive and destructive effects of nationalism, Mead’s
lecture on Kant, peace, and democracy also explains why the “League of
Nations” became the central focus of his thinking on “internationalism” and
world order. In this lecture and in his later writings (Mead 1929), he did
not claim that the League would end all wars at once. Rather, he insisted
that the establishment of the principle that members of the League would
intervene if a member, no matter how small and powerless, had become the
victim of expansionism would be the impetus for an “evolutionary process” that
would eventually eradicate violence from international conduct altogether (ibid.:
389).
According to Mead, both nationalism and individualism are ambivalent in
their effects. Positively, they necessitate the agent to increasingly reflect upon
him- or herself from the position of others. Hence, self-awareness is the precur-
sor for the individual to grow into a community. Negatively, both individualism
and nationalism may evolve into violence-proneness if the agent elevates his or
her own sovereignty over that of others.
It [nationalism] has been a divisive factor in so far as peoples have come to

be conscious of themselves in their position to others, and especially in so
far as they have undertaken to break the yoke which has subjected them to
other peoples and to dynasties foreign to themselves. But there is no move-
ment which has so quickened the conscious life of the western world as this
growth of nationalism. It has brought together peoples found [sic] that in
their difference they had a common interest. It has awakened sympathetic
response in those who are of different tongue and race. Every increase in the
consciousness of the selfhood of a community has meant an increase in the
awareness of other groups and has laid the foundation for the community of
interest and endeavor which has had its greatest expression in the formation
of the League of Nations which is opposed to the central powers of Europe.
In a real sense nationalism has done in part what neither liberal institutions
nor socialism has accomplished. It has brought together the whole commun-
ity in a common interest, and made the whole community realize that they
were one.
(Mead 1918: 172)
Mead’s interpretation of the League’s functions should not be taken without a

grain of salt, though. In contrast to Jane Addams and other “progressive interna-
tionalists,” who castigated imperialism as the cause for war, Mead sided with
“conservative internationalists” in the pre-World War I debate. In their vision, a
“League to Enforce Peace” would be limited to a world body settling disputes,
excluding far-reaching economic and social reforms (Fischer 2008: 515). As a
consequence, Mead did not fully tackle the critical problem of how the indi-
vidual (or the state) may reconstruct a conflictual situation when expectations by
organized others diverge, when superiority feelings are inflamed to keep oneself
going. He pleaded for “intelligent statecraft,” and reiterated the demand that
50 S. Harnisch
“all of the interests that are involved should be taken into account” when recon-
struction was used to solve conflict by creating a “larger social whole.” But he
did not immerse himself in the delineation of the concrete social mechanisms of
peaceful reconstruction on the international level.9
Mead and the limits of “national-mindedness” on the eve of World

War II
In 1929, Mead penned his last major contribution to international politics,
“National-Mindedness and International-Mindedness.” It can be viewed as the
most articulate argument on the co-constitutive nature between the nation-state
and international order. Arguably, it is also the most sober and self-reflective
expression of his own thinking on international politics and foreign policy.
In the article, which was published in the International Journal of Ethics,
Mead first critically assesses his own interpretation of the causes of World War
I. He acknowledges that recent documents released by the British Foreign Office
had proven that “those who controlled public policies and finally mobilized
armies were utilizing fears and hatreds and cupidities and individual greed and
jealousies which were far from representing issues over which the communities
themselves wished to fight or thought they were fighting” (1929: 386). If we
compare this finding to his argument in the 1917 Chicago Tribune series, in
which he held that the war amounted to nothing less than a struggle between
democracy and autocracy, his openness is astonishing and brave.
The main thrust of “National-Mindedness and International-Mindedness,”
however, is the question what sort of national-mindedness is required to settle
differences peacefully in the League of Nations. Noting that the recently signed
Briand–Kellogg Pact and the League should be considered steps in the right
direction, Mead insists that the use of violence in settling domestic disputes is
the most important indicator that shows how far advanced the respective
“national-mindedness” really is (1929: 390–2).
National unity may occur quickly (and haphazardly) if the state resorts to
violent means, because citizens immediately identify their own good with the
common good. But “national-mindedness” that safeguards the interests of its
constituents must be able to balance common and conflicting interests in the
social fabric and tackle them through non-violent means. Hence, national-
mindedness can be distinguished from nationalism, according to Mead, because
the former would not compromise the basic rights of its constitutive parts, the
citizens, to establish a unity without legitimacy.
It follows that if we do think about national and international life, we can no

longer depend upon war for the fusion of disparate and opposing elements
in the nation. We are compelled to reach a sense of being a nation by means
of rational self-consciousness. We must think ourselves in terms of the great
community to which we belong. We cannot depend upon feeling ourselves
at one with our compatriots, because the only effective feeling of unity
springs from our common response against the common enemy. No other
social emotion will melt us into one. Instead of depending upon a national
soul we must achieve national-mindedness.
(1929: 400f.)
Quite frankly, Mead asserts in 1929, the United States does not possess the
necessary national-mindedness. Reversing an earlier claim that the United States
has never had and could never have imperialistic goals and that the Monroe Doc-
trine served only to prevent European powers from colonizing the Western hem-
isphere (Mead 1917b), Mead now views America’s conduct in Latin America
quite critically. He reasons that the doctrine is unintelligible and that there is no
common sense in it other than that it is worth fighting for (1929: 398).
Mead returns to dialogue and emergence as his central themes of social theory
in “National-Mindedness and International-Mindedness.” Furthermore, he
employs his analogical tripartite evolutionary argument spanning the self,
society, and the international community. His line of thought is straightforward:
the self emerges as a free self from a dialogue with the generalized other, i.e.
society, only. A nation capable of peaceful and reasonable conduct emerges from
the self-reflective dialogue among its citizens and the inclusion of the point of
view of other nations. Eliminating domestic violence through democratic prac-
tice and institutions is thus an essential dimension of achieving international
peace, because identification with the common cause will emerge from rational
discourse rather than “soul searching.”
Reflections on a dialogue with Mead

This chapter began by pointing out that George Herbert Mead’s potential contri-
bution to role theory in IR and FPA has been neglected for too long, and that his
reception in the literature has been partial at best. The chapter therefore explored
the contribution of Mead’s oeuvre to the understanding of roles nations play in
international politics. It was demonstrated that Mead’s contribution not least
spans the ontological and epistemological foundations of role theory, the intrica-
cies of ego–alter interaction in democratic polities, the causes of nationalism and
war, and their consequences for international order. The chapter also argued that
he helped to establish three core premises of FPRA: the co-constitutive nature of
the agent–society relationship, the importance of shifts in state behavior through
role taking and making, and the sources of role change in increasingly complex
societies.
To conclude, four contributions can be identified when considering Mead’s
conception of role taking in society and international politics. First, Mead makes
an important contribution to social theory and foreign policy analysis with his
prime mechanisms of dialogue and emergence. Through his conceptualization of
the “I” and “me,” he establishes the core premise of role theory that the indi-
vidual cannot be thought of as autonomous. An important implication of this, of
course, is that variation of the actor’s ability to take up the role of the other does
52 S. Harnisch
affect the density and structure of societal development. Dialogue and emer-
gence stress the social relationship between role beholder and society, and open
up the various causal pathways of socialization, imitation, learning, etc. between
the two. In Mead’s oeuvre, we are thus presented with both an analytical frame-
work for understanding the prominent part language and practices (symbols)
play in role taking, and societal construction. As the study of roles in foreign
policy analysis moves forward, students of IR theory and FPA should take into
account both trajectories equally.
Second, Mead opened a substantive field of inquiry by specifying key terms of
role theory and integrating them in a consistent framework that reaches beyond the
individual–society nexus. In doing so, Mead’s oeuvre brings substantial benefits
for the intra- as well as interpersonal or intersocietal level of role analysis.
Two specific findings on the co-variation of an actor’s capacity for role taking
and the structure of society are of particular interest here: First, many role theo-
reticians have found that shifts in emphasis between the ego and the alter part of
a role can be identified as distinct sources of role change and transformation
(Harnisch, this volume). Mead teaches us, however, that the ego part of a role
should be thought of as consisting of an irreducible core: the I and the percep-
tion of societal expectations within the self, the “me,” which are in constant dia-
logue with each other. Some scholars, such as Jürgen Habermas, in
“Postmetaphysical Thinking,” interpret the “me” as a conservative force and
bearer of moral consciousness, whereas the “I” stands for “self-affirmation” and
preservation of the self ’s life story. Mead’s play and game analogy and his treat-
ment of nationalism, however, do suggest a different, more coevolutionary
reading: he sees the dual structure of the self itself as a process and sensitive to
the socio-historical context (da Silva 2008: 159). In contrast to Habermas’s, the
Meadian “me” is not primarily a controlling, repressive force that rules through
sanctions. Rather, the “me” is also a constitutive, enabling force in the first place
that allows for self-identification.
Second, Mead illustrates the fragility of the individual–society nexus by intro-
ducing the concept of the generalized other and distinguishing two types of
“others”: the generalized and the organized other. In his conceptualization, role
taking becomes a “double-edged sword”: on the one hand by enabling the “I” to
objectify itself; on the other hand, by allowing for role conflict through diverg-
ing expectations by “organized others” or incoherent “generalized others.” In
this respect, Mead regards religion and trade as important social processes
feeding cooperation, but he does not foresee a linear or cumulative “civilianiza-
tion process.” His thinking on process – how to organize and structure public
deliberation so as to constitute a reflective “democratic public” – remained
vague. But his thinking on the socio-political dynamics of nationalism was not.
In this respect, a plausible argument can be made that recent findings by Mans-
field and Snyder (2005) on the war-proneness of democratizing states can be
rooted in Mead’s earlier investigations on the sources of World War I.
Third, Mead goes beyond merely showing that meticulous definitions and
conceptualization of causal mechanism matter. As discussed in the section on
Mead and World War I, he theorizes astutely about possible adverse effects of
self-identification, thereby helping us to improve our understanding about
national role taking and the emergence of international society. Specifically, he
warns of the limits “national-mindedness” places on the evolution of
“international-mindedness.” In addition, he discusses personal leadership, the
anomic effects of militarism and the beneficial consequences of rational dialogue
and creative problem solving, all of which do specifically relate to variation in
the causal mechanisms of recent role scholarship.
Finally, Mead’s academic contribution and his social commitment also
contain a number of interesting insights with regard to theory building in both IR
and foreign policy analysis. It may help to demystify the epistemological ten-
sions within FPRA and between theory building in FPA and IR by focusing on
“problem solving and practices.” He may also encourage role research to engage
more openly with other disciplines as he reminds us of the potential of creativity,
reflexivity, and imagination individuals as role takers have and may employ as
decision makers. In this sense, Mead strongly supports an “ethical turn” in role
research and IR theory by highlighting “problem solving,” “the reconstruction”
of society and emancipation of the individual. In the end, Mead’s dedication to
the “res publica” invites scholars to leave the ontological, epistemological, and
methodological battlegrounds of scholasticism behind, and address the key chal-
lenges for contemporary IR: the dilemmas of social order in the developing
world and the difficulties of effective multilateralism in the developed world.
Notes
1 Walker (1992) describes Mead’s conceptualization of mind, self, and society briefly,
and touches upon the Chicago and the Iowa schools as the main “descendants” of
Mead’s thinking. However, his main focus lies with the operationalization of sub-
sequent role scholarship for FPA.
2 In this respect, Mead is also one of the intellectual founding fathers of the recent prac-
tical turn in International Relations theory (Büger and Gadinger 2008; Schatzki et al.
2001; Wenger 1998; Pouliot 2008).
3 As Norman Denzin noted, Mead did not posit that every individual would pass auto-
matically from one stage (play) to the other (game). Rather, he suggested that “some
persons may never progress to the generalized other phase of taking the other’s atti-
tude” (Denzin 1977: 81).
4 Robert K. Merton defined the sum of all reference groups of a role as the “role set” (1957).
5 Rose L. Coser held that the complexity of modern societies could embolden the indi-
vidual, because it could use the diverging expectations between groups as a “seedbed
of individual autonomy” (1975).
6 Later on, Ralph Turner introduced the distinction between “role taking” and “role
making” to signify the latitude of the “I” in changing and modifying a role through
(non-) role playing (1962).
7 Thus, processes of altercasting may be differentiated from “as-if ” role taking. The
former implies that the individual already “knows” its own preferences for the alter’s
future role behavior and thus can shape its own “role making” accordingly (Malici
2006). The later cannot imply conscious manipulation, as the “I,” the creative element,
becomes apparent only through the interaction with the other and thus cannot claim
ontological priority.
54 S. Harnisch
8 Thereby mirroring John Dewey’s conception of a deliberative democracy (Dewey
1927; Westbrook 2000).
9 Mead and Dewey, as progressives, believed that democracy would be self-destructive
if it did not safeguard certain economic, social, and judicial standards. And yet, they
consistently declined, despite heavy criticism, to fix concrete, universal standards. In
their view, the democratic public itself had to continually define and redefine these
standards (cf. Shalin 1991: 51–4).
4 Habermas meets role theory
Communicative action as role playing?
Harald Müller
The question
Many scholars look at role theory as a concept that emphasizes structural con-
straints upon actors. Role scripts tell actors how to behave, reducing their crea-
tivity and autonomy to a minimum. Communicative action (CA), in contrast,
emphasizes the sovereign rational subject, i.e. agency engaging in intersubjec-
tive practice in order to produce norms and rules for achieving common objec-
tives. Structural constraints are viewed (at least in the original conception of the
theory) as attributes of the “system,” which, in turn, is the constellation in which
strategic action is the dominant mode for the realization of preferences, while
“lifeworld” is the environment in which CA blossoms. As an heir of Frankfurt
School theory, Habermas invested unmistakably negative connotations in the
system with its dehumanizing effects, and positive connotations in the “life-
world” where freedom and authenticity have their home (Habermas 1981).
The question, then, is whether the two conceptions can be sensibly reconciled
and fruitfully applied to empirical issues in international relations (Deitelhoff
2006; Deitelhoff and Müller 2005; Müller 1994, 1995, 2001, 2004a, 2007; Risse
2000). An answer to this question requires an in-depth inquiry into the agency–
structure conception of either approach with a view to determining their compat-
ibility. This is what this chapter endeavors to do.
I will first discuss the concept of “role” in a way that liberates it from a
strictly structuralist understanding and puts it rather between structure and actor.1
I will then restate the case for applying communicative action analysis to inter-
national relations in the same way as to any other field of human action even
though it was conceptualized as a theory for deducing valid universal norms in a
post-transcendental environment – that is, for non-empirical purposes. Next, I
shall try to explain why we can use the concept even in today’s world of cultural
diversity, which seems to obviate the requirement of theory of communicative
action (TCA) for a shared normative background embedded in the common life-
world of actors. In the fifth section, I will differentiate between an institutional
and an actor-related argument about how communicative action becomes pos-
sible in the seemingly hostile environment of international power politics and
then enumerate a sample of non-state and state actors that could be particularly
56 H. Müller
inclined to use communicative action in their external operations. Coming back
to the question of structuralist stasis (Sending 2002), I will then elaborate how
communicative action works to make change possible in role scripts, and what
other factors could initiate such a change. I conclude that globalization might,
over time, be rather favorable to a growth of communicative action in interna-
tional relations and that role theory and TCA go well together.
On the concept of “role”
Role or roles?
Most approaches to sociological role theory envisage a multiplicity of roles for a
given actor. Somebody can be a businesswoman, a mother, a Texan, an Amer
ican, a member of the Southern Baptist Church, and so on. Each role has its par-
ticularities, which may have nothing to do with those of any other role. As a
consequence of this conception, individuals may end up without any significant,
distinctive profile other than what results from the addition of all these roles.
While this is already uncomfortable with regard to individual humans, it is com-
pletely unsatisfactory as regards collective actors. As the notion of “role” is
meant to do some explanatory if not prognostic work, one should be able to
identify a “hard core” of the multiplicity of roles that gives the actor some dis-
tinctive “ego” – that is, the individuality of role interpretation or enactment
which shows in whatever particular role she is playing. How, without such an
“ego,” would a collectivity be in a position to instruct their representatives in
such a way that they would be able to act for this collectivity in the many envi-
ronments in which it is expected to act?
Indeed, the notion of the “ego part” of a role, what the actor believes herself
about what she is – a notion close to, or the same as, what is meant by “identity”
– has filled this gap in advanced role theory and has an important function in
Hanns Maull’s conception of “role.” This provides a powerful leverage on
empirical inquiry in three different aspects.
First, it opens the possibility to ask for role coherence as an empirical proof
for the role model the scholar has constructed for the actor concerned: Under the
assumption that the actor strives to keep a coherent role profile throughout her
fields of action, contradictions point to some error in the construction of the role,
or else must be accompanied by indicators of stress on the part of the actor as
she strives to reconcile the divergent expression of role enacting. The psycho-
logical mechanisms of cognitive consonance or dissonance apply here and can
be made fruitful for role research.
Second, we can conceive of representatives of collective actors to do their job
in what in German military tradition has been coined Auftragstaktik: the role
prescribes behavior, values, and objectives in a general frame, but the individual
representative is given some leeway – occasionally considerable leeway – to
enact the role in ways fit for the particular environment in which she has to
operate.
Habermas meets role theory 57
Third, we can use the concept to inquire into the relationship between the
public and the political elite. The basic assumption is that there is some congru-
ence between the “ego part” of the role as seen by the ruling elite and by the
public, and that the public demands the enactment of the “ego part” by the gov-
ernment; identities are the result of long historical developments, but they must
be negotiated constantly as to what they mean for a given situation. This can
lead to role stress, as the “alter part” can deviate from the “ego part” – that is,
when significant “others” develop expectations towards a state which would run
counter to what is believed by publics to be appropriate, given their understand-
ing of identity. This tension might notably arise when partners change their pol-
icies or when international circumstances undergo fundamental change, as in
1990–91. When external and domestic demands for role enactment diverge, the
government is hard put to preserve role coherence (e.g. Müller 2003). Another
constellation is when elites hold identities that are significantly different from
those that publics believe them to hold. This divergence is not uncommon in
countries run by minorities, or in great power democracies where bureaucracies
are socialized into acting in great power style while publics prefer more pedes-
trian foreign policies (such tensions exist, for example, in the United States and
in the United Kingdom). Governments – notably those in democracies – are thus
forced to engage in a two-level discourse (Müller 2004a) towards external actors
who demand what is incompatible with domestic identity, and the domestic
public, which wants to preserve essential identity traits in a difficult international
environment.
Escaping the circular reasoning trap

How do we know a role when we see it? Roles live in and through their enact-
ment. To watch a role enactment life, we have to watch what actors do.
However, “role” is also meant as an explanans – if not for the specific action,
then at least for why that action was one of a limited number of possible or likely
options for that specific actor. We are thus in danger of circular argumentation as
we would conclude from the explanandum back to the explanans; this would, of
course, lead to the fallacy of immunization, as it would become impossible to
refute our hypothesis concerning the role.
There are methods to circumvent this trap. First, there is a wealth of studies
on the domestic politics and foreign policy of almost every country. Even if
these studies have not used the role conception, they are likely to lend them-
selves to an exegetic exercise which would help establish a solid description of
the role that this actor plays, according to these studies, in international
relations.
Second, one could deduce the role played by a specific state from different
policy fields other than the one under research and then apply and test this recon-
structed role conception in the field in which one is particularly interested. For
example, in a major project by Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, we derived
the role conceptions of a group of democracies from their practices in the United
58 H. Müller
Nations and towards international law and the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) and applied the result to another field: arms control (Becker et al. 2008).
Naturally, it makes sense to combine the two methods: to derive the role concep-
tion from the secondary literature, to pre-test it in one or two policy fields, and
only then to use it for in-depth analysis as a tool for explaining or interpreting
behavior.
Role is conceived here as a “superscript” that applies across fields, with par-
ticular enactment in each specific policy field. Subcollectivities (such as offices
in a foreign ministry) have some leeway to write their specific role script on the
basis of this “superscript” – and are supervised in this regard by their superiors –
but they possess a certain flexibility in application. Role, in my perspective on
the concept, is no straitjacket, either for the collectivity as a whole or for the
subcollective or individual actors. While their enacting of the role must resonate
with the general understanding of what the role means, they are rewriting and
newly writing the script as they go along.
Moral versus explanatory theory

As I have stated, role conception is meant here as an explanans for specific polit-
ical action. This opens the question, critically posed by skeptics towards the
applicability of the TCA in international relations, whether a theory that was
conceived as a post-transcendental explication of moral principles can be used
for explanatory purposes (Keck 1997). Normative theory is contraposed to
empirical or explanatory theory: One has either the one or the other.
It appears to me that the two forms of theory are by no means mutually exclu-
sive; it needs a lot of positivist dogmatism to maintain this categorical division.
Normative theorists strive for normative orders that can have a site in the “real
world.” Real circumstances that offer opportunity structures to realize moral
requirements have attracted the attention of moral philosophers at all times, and
particularly in the tradition that stretches from Kant to Habermas. Kant started
from deduction, arrived at principles that he deemed to have universal validity,
and then looked for real-world phenomena which might indicate or facilitate a
historical evolution through which these principles could be realized. Habermas,
in his many interventions into practical-political debates, but also in some of his
major works, such as Between Facts and Norms (1996) has used the same
approach, with even more dedication to the detailed analysis of the real political
world than his great intellectual ancestor. As soon as we find indications in real
politics that indicate the anchoring of rudimentary moral principles, then we can
use the principles in their philosophically deduced, idealized form as a standard
against which reality can be measured in the sense of Weberian ideal-type meth-
odology. As a result, we gain an assessment of the “state of the world,” meas-
ured by the moral philosopher’s yardstick. Obviously, the Chinese wall that
some positivists want to build between empirical-analytical and normative
theory does not stand scrutiny once we tackle the gap with this methodological
toolbox.
A second objection is that this comparison of ideal type and reality is in vain
in international politics, as this field of research is all about power, security,
interest, and relative gains and is not affected by morale other than as window
dressing for hard-nosed realpolitik motivations. Such a proposition, however,
ignores the increasing body of empirical studies which have proven that moral
principles and values matter a good deal in international relations – for better
and worse. While compassion and humanitarianism motivate some governments
to help fellow humans in distress and misery (Finnemore 1996; Lumsdaine
1993), and abhorrence of cruel weapons can help with taboos regarding their
use, and prohibition of their possession and production (Finnemore and Sikkink
1998; Price 1998; Price and Tannenwald 1996; Tannenwald 2007), justice con-
siderations, which are quite powerful in international negotiations (Albin 2001),
can lead to war (Welch 1993), and humanitarian concerns can even seduce states
into using military force (Hasenclever 2001) in situations where the remedy,
military intervention, may be worse than the disease. Moral considerations and
interests, rather than being superstructure and basis in the Marxian sense, are
intimately interwoven; morale thus has a safe place in international relations.
The third objection relates to the important condition Habermas requires for
pure communicative action to succeed: the ideal speech situation in which all
those affected by the subject of the communication can participate without power
interfering in the proceedings. Of course, critics object that this situation can never
exist in international relations, the realm of power (Keck 1997). However, once
more, Weberian methodology helps with the problem. Clearly, the ideal speech
situation, as its name indicates, is an ideal type of a social constellation that will
rarely be met in any reality. As an ideal type, it is a standard for measurement how
far real-world constellations are removed from the ideal type, or how close they
are. Rather than either/or, hence, the distinction is between more and less. We do
not talk about a dichotomy here but about a continuum between a situation where
power asymmetry distorts communication completely, such as in the Melian Dia-
logue which Thucydides reports in his Peloponnesian War, and a threat-free
debate among equals respecting each other mutually. Habermas, in Between Facts
and Norms (1996), has analyzed the institutions of a democracy, notably parlia-
ment, the courts, and the public sphere, and shown that institutional conditions in a
functioning democracy make meaningful communicative action possible even
though they are still different from the ideal speech situation. Nicole Deitelhoff
(2006) has worked out institutional conditions under which the same can happen
in international negotiations. In other words, behavior approaching CA is possible
under relatively, not just absolutely, favorable circumstances. There is, however,
one fundamental condition that cannot be undercut: actors must afford each other
recognition as actors entitled to enter dialogue (Haacke 2005; Honneth 1992). The
politics of non-recognition or of ostensible condescension exclude communicative
action for good. A minimum of mutual respect is indispensable (Wolf 2008). Like-
wise, the at least hypothetical possibility of revising one’s position in light of the
better argument requires some intrinsic capability of self-constraint that is not
inherent in all actors we meet in world politics.2
60 H. Müller
Subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and role conception in IR
There is another problem of a different kind: While TCA places the production
of norms in the intersubjective constellation, it still roots them in – subjectively
defined but allegedly universal – moral standards (the presuppositions of
communication). International relations, however, proceed in a space of
ethical pluralism based on cultural diversity. For one, the need for a post-
transcendental foundation of norms is alien to all those who are believers in, or
still live in, traditional cultures and their respective polities. Universalism is an
essentially contested concept, and the stubborn Western insistence that the
West’s own values have to be accepted by everyone here and now has become a
major source of tension, as communities not sharing Western notions of values
feel cornered and threatened; that Western universalism occasionally takes
on the form of a violent crusade has not been lost on others, notably through
the George W. Bush years (Smith 2007). The problem, then, consists in
successful communicative action requiring at least some shared norms in order
to have a reference system for the arguments used. Can such shared norms be
found in an essentially multicultural world? There are three related answers to
this question:
First, there is no denying that international society already disposes of a thin
layer of moral (and legal) norms. These norms have been undergoing contesta-
tion and reinterpretation as many new state actors have entered international
society since the Charter of the United Nations was adopted by what today is
only a minority of states, but they do exist (Jackson 2000) and thus present the
opportunity for participants in international discourse to hang their justifying
narratives on them. Thus, even latecomers are bound to use existing norms, and
while they might wish to enact normative change, this is a drawn-out process
that involves both bargaining and communicative action, as it needs the consent
of the vast majority, the current “normative hegemons” included.
Second, there may be deeply sited cultural elements that are shared among
the mainstreams of world cultures, despite the undeniable differences and dis-
putes that exist between them. Such commonalities have been emphasized by
proponents of intercultural dialogue such as German theology professor Hans
Küng (1993). Besides norms adopted through diplomatic debate and bargaining,
such deeper cultural norms might be helpful in their capacity as a reference
background to communicative action.
Third, one must not underrate the productive and creative capabilities of com-
munication itself. Norms that did not exist before have emerged from the dia-
logue among quite unequal partners. Language is a living thing, and human
actors are of incredible flexibility and creativity. As there is already this thin
layer of a normative international framework, this creativity helps to spin a wider
and denser network out of these beginnings. Research on “norm entrepreneurs”
has uncovered the mechanisms and processes by which determined agency
brings about this evolution (Björkdahl 2002; Finnemore 1993; Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998; Ingebritsen 2002; Johnstone 2007).
If we accept these propositions, there is still a precondition for these pro
cesses to start: they require actors willing, capable, and ready to take the initi-
ative to engage others in communicative action, as well as constellations
favoring the respective type of behavior. This points us back to the initial ques-
tion of the relevance of the role conception as a bridge between actor and institu-
tion: to what degree is CA included in the role scripts and related to specific
institutional environment?
Communicative action in international politics: institutional

or actor centered?
In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas has unambiguously emphasized the
central importance of appropriate institutions for enabling the approach to com-
municative understanding (1996). Nicole Deitelhoff ’s seminal study of interna-
tional negotiations (2006) followed this lead and – using the International
Criminal Court (ICC) as her case – found a couple of institutional environments
favorable to CA: first, regional pre-negotiations built on a larger body of life-
world commonality; second, track two meetings, where interlocutors are relieved
from taking responsibility for national positions and from working under strict
instructions and in the formal straitjacket of official negotiations and where
power relations are no more than a shadow over the deliberations; and third,
negotiations with a modicum of transparency which prevents actors from relying
on crude power.3
The notion, frequently held by rationalist academics, that international nego-
tiations are the realm of bargaining only is much too simple. In empirical
research, there is strong evidence that in international relations, strategic and
communicative action are closely intertwined and not categorically separated in
practice. The distinction between the two, nevertheless, remains a necessity for
analytical and theoretical purposes. No diplomat is castigated for showing his or
her share of bargaining skills and strategic cunning. On the contrary, diplomats
are expected to engage precisely in this type of behavior. It is appropriate – in
the sense of the “logic of appropriateness” – for diplomats to represent the inter-
ests of the state for which they work as agent and to strike the best bargain they
can. At the same time, genuine arguing and processes of persuasion have been
identified (Müller 2004a). Obviously, engaging in communicative action is as
much part of diplomats’ daily work as is bargaining till they are blue in the face.
If the “appropriate behavior” of negotiators, then, encompasses either mode of
action, the question is how actors know when to engage in the one or the other.
This points us back to the key question of “role scripts.”
One can discuss role scripts in two different ways here. The first is actor inde-
pendent, the second is actor specific. I will briefly go through actor-independent
scripts before devoting more space to the actor-specific alternative.
Actor-independent role scripts would deal with strategic and communicative
action as morally equal (one should never forget that in TCA both start from
the same purpose: to achieve desired results. Communicative action is not
62 H. Müller
purpose-free!). The diplomat’s script probably falls in this category. The degree
of appropriateness of the one or the other mode of action varies with situational
and institutional variables. A situationally oriented script would suggest that one
tries with strategic action, but when this leads into a blind alley, a transition to
CA is in order. The modes of action would be judged for their situational utility,
but this, in turn, would be understood as appropriate behavior (Müller 2004a).
The institutional variant of actor-independent role scripts would prescribe a
preference for communicative action in the institutional settings identified by
Nicole Deitelhoff, namely regional and track two contexts. I would add certain
in-camera environments, as soon as the first, situational rule applied. One could
also surmise that security communities (Adler and Barnett 1998a) should offer
ample opportunity for nation-state actors to engage in communicative action.
Resting on bonds that surpass mere rationalist interests and extend to common
values, a shared identity – therefore “community” – and extraordinarily dense
institutions, these groupings offer an ideal framework in which communicative
action should thrive. As, by definition, the use of force against each other is
beyond imagination in security communities, power asymmetries weigh much
less than in ordinary international relations, which takes participants a long way
towards the ideal speech situation. Be that as it may, the institutionalist variant
has been exhaustively worked out by Deitelhoff. I focus here on the second, less
well researched aspect, that of communicative action-fostering role scripts – that
is, on actors.
Actor-specific role scripts
Conceptualization
The notion that role scripts leading to CA might be actor-specific starts from the
assumption that certain types of actors appear to be more prone to engage in CA
than others. Their role scripts, I assume, give some moral preference to CA.
Independent of situational and institutional conditions, they try to realize this
preference. They would deviate from this practice only under conditions of risk.
It is this second type of role script, obviously, that brings TCA and role theory
closely together: TCA is inscribed as a preferential appropriateness rule into
actors’ roles.
In searching for candidates for that sort of role script, it makes sense to look
at the following variables: what are the constellations of interests, worldviews,
and value orientations that might produce a role script in which CA maintains
pride of place? We would thus look for variables along two different dimen-
sions: the dimension of rationalistically founded interests and the dimension of
moral values.
From a rationalist perspective, we must focus on the incentive structure to
which actors are exposed. Are they more likely to realize their preferences by
using their hard power resources and sturdy bargaining techniques, or are they
shaped in such a way as to require persuasion techniques? Persuasion may still
be tried in the form of rhetorical action or manipulation, but it takes two to tango
– if the target does not play, authentic communicative action may be the only
way to proceed towards the desired objectives. In an age of ever-growing inter-
dependence, these problematic situations rise steadily. Communicative action
might thus not infrequently emerge out of rationalist necessity. Over time, actors
would cease to choose consciously communicative strategies for rational goal
achievement. It is more likely that this behavioral trait has been internalized and
habitualized to a degree as to count as “appropriate behavior” in international
conflicts and debates. I assume, thus, that rational motivations translate into
behavioral traits that trespass the boundaries of rationalist individualism.
On the moral plane, actors’ attitudes are to be seen as a consequence of the
particular historical-cultural trajectory a country has traveled through. This path
has led to the sedimentation of certain moral convictions, principles, and objec-
tives that have come to occupy a significant if not dominant segment in the col-
lective role script and incline the actor to engage preferentially in communicative
action. “Interests,” then, are not absent, but are framed by and interpreted
according to identity and the role script.
Such “candidates” could be among non-state actors NGOs, leaders of interna-
tional organizations, epistemic communities such as that of diplomats (the latter,
of course, acting as representatives of states), and, among state actors, small
states, middle powers or moral entrepreneurs, and “civilian powers.”
Non-state actors
Non-state actors are – compared to the state actors mentioned – relatively poor
in material resources, though a few of them dispose of sizable financial assets.
Strategic action, based on the employment of power resources, thus offers little
prospect for goal attainment in a rationalist perspective.
Non-governmental organizations
Most NGOs,4 and notably their memberships on which they thrive, are morally
motivated and pursue common good goals. Their reputation – maybe the most
effective instrument of goal attainment – relies heavily on their expertise and
their moral authority. These assets – knowledge, morale, and authenticity (credi-
bility) – correspond nicely to the three aspects of communicative action: reach-
ing understanding about what is the case (the true facts of the outside world),
about what is right (the moral values that should guide behavior and the estab-
lishment of norms), and about the authenticity of what is being said (that the
speaker means what he or she says).
Empirical studies hint that these assumptions are largely correct; however,
NGOs rely frequently on strategic actions to move their state partners, using
their assets instrumentally and relying on their specific form of power (mobiliza-
tion power in the sense of Hannah Arendt) and on blaming and shaming strat-
egies in order to threaten the domestic legitimacy of governments and their
64 H. Müller
international reputation if they do not engage in the production of common
goods as requested by civil society. In terms of communicative action, the major
contribution in international relations is to help create institutional conditions
that make it easier for states’ representatives to engage in CA (Deitelhoff 2006;
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Martens 2005; Risse et al. 1999).
UN Secretaries-General (UNSGs) and other leaders of

intergovernmental organizations
The UNSG possesses symbolic and some organizational power, but has to rely
on the consent of the membership, notably the P-5 (the five permanent members
of the Security Council, namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and
the United States), to pursue goals. His funds go through the intricate process of
UN budgeting, and again he is dependent on the goodwill of the membership to
obtain what he needs. This calls for argumentative strategies. Likewise, the
agenda-setting and mediation functions that come with the office as probably its
most significant policy output are best served – in the absence of larger power
resources – by persuasion. In the world community, expectations are great that
the UNSG will serve as a “moral authority.” This requires establishing credibil-
ity and an aura of authenticity.
In the past, some UNSGs have pursued moral roles and focused heavily on
persuasive strategies, some have not. Hammarskjöld, Boutros-Ghali, and Kofi
Annan fall in the first group, while U Thant and Pérez de Cuéllar were more
concerned with organizational survival in difficult times, and Waldheim was
fully focused on fostering his own career (Chesterman 2007).
What applies to the UNSG can also be said, with some qualifications, about
the heads of other international organizations. To give an example, directors-
general (DGs) of the semi-independent International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), though at first glance a more technical agency than the UN Secretariat,
have always been confronted with moral issues such as nuclear disarmament or
the human disaster that can emerge from nuclear radiation. They, too, need
membership consent to fulfill their task. IAEA DGs have also varied in their per-
sonal attitudes: The first DG, Cole, worked more as defender of his personal
power and of US positions; Eklund was a technocratic institution-builder; Blix
and El Baradei were mostly moral entrepreneurs – the latter being rewarded with
the Nobel Peace Price, which was shared between the Agency and him
personally.
The disposition ascribed to the chief office of intergovernmental organization
does not determine the attitude and behavior of the office holder, as the exam-
ples show. It serves more as opportunity structure to be used or not, depending
on the choice of the individual office-holder. The ego part of the role script
appears to be more decisive than the (institutionalized) alter part: the office
holder is relatively, though not absolutely, free to pursue his (or her) own
reading of what the organization should do, and the membership is not totally
positioned to constrain this proactive agency.
The “epistemic community” of diplomats
It might seem strange to think of diplomats as anything other than the agents of
their principals – national governments – and to put them under the heading of
non-state actors. This is meant to draw attention to the fact that, apart from being
agents, they also belong to an epistemic community whose members share dis-
positions that make them more capable of engaging in CA than other state repre-
sentatives. Most importantly, they have a shared understanding of how to
achieve agreement and how to prevent the emergence of agreement in negotia-
tions. The diplomatic role contains the following dispositions: Diplomats are
supposed to serve their countries. This mission includes achieving agreements
with other states. This can be achieved by bargaining or by communicative
understanding. Knowing how to do both, and when to change from one to the
other, should thus be part of the diplomat’s role script.
Diplomats, wherever they come from, live in a specific international culture
characterized by modes of behavior, rituals of interaction, a code of honor, and
even a special language with its own semantics (Jönsson 2002; Neumann 2005).
This creates a lifeworld that helps CA: Diplomats gain experiences in other
countries and become acquainted with the way their peers from other parts of the
world think, speak, and act. In this way, they learn to become intercultural bridge
builders and translators; they develop the capability to decipher the meanings of
transcultural signals, and develop standards for assessing the authenticity of the
utterances of their interlocutors. Most diplomats have a fairly sharp understand-
ing of when their counterpart is posturing and when he or she is genuinely
engaged in serious exchange; when he or she is speaking the truth and when he
or she is lying. All these are professional skills that develop during a diplomat’s
career – and they all help the diplomat to engage in CA once the opportunity or
necessity arises.
Studies on international negotiations have found shifts by states on substan-
tial positions that cannot be traced back to power asymmetries, to promises of
rewards, or to blaming/shaming campaigns. Excluding these alternative explana-
tion, the plausibility is high that they were results of “the better argument”
(Deitelhoff 2006). There is the striking fact that agreement is less likely when
professional diplomats are replaced by political appointees or representatives of
ministries not well versed in international affairs (Cohen 1997, 2000).
Diplomats, thus, are certainly not the chief protagonists of pure communica-
tive action. But this capability is part of their role script, and they apply it once
in a while when it is appropriate. Appropriateness is probably signaled by the
institutional and situational conditions discussed earlier (Müller 2004a).
State actors
It might seem surprising that there should be state actors whose role script points
them to communicative action as their preferred mode of operating. In the
power-ridden world of states, such actors should have a very short half-life – or
66 H. Müller
so neorealists believe. Nevertheless, we find within the species of states three
subspecies, or role types, ranging from very weak to relatively powerful states to
which this surprising disposition applies.
Small states
The definition of small state used here differs from the one used by, for example,
Bergman (2007) or Breuning (1995). Small states are states that are so poor in
power resources as to lack both the opportunity and the ambition to make an
impact in the international environment beyond their permanent efforts at assur-
ing their immediate vital needs; Tonga, Nepal, Swaziland, and Luxembourg are
examples.
It is clear, therefore, that small states lack the opportunity structure of suffi-
cient power resources to pursue their preferences by threat, pressure, and sanc-
tion. The “mouse that roars” has no impact without the ability to brandish a
doomsday weapon, as the classic Peter Sellers movie demonstrated so amus-
ingly. Small states (provided they are less eccentric than North Korea, a true
“roaring mouse”) are thus forced to seek the agreement, by means of persuasion,
of more powerful states whenever they need it for the purpose of reassessing
essential preferences.
They are helped in this endeavor by the paradoxical fact that being small con-
tains a moral asset that can easily be woven into a persuasion discourse: It is
exactly the helplessness of the powerless actor that in many cultural settings
entitles her to make her wishes heard. Strong actors, then, bear an obligation not
only to protect the existence of the weak ones, but to contribute to their realizing
at least a part of their legitimate interests. This balancing of weakness with an
increased obligation of stronger actors to help is part of the notion of fairness
that looms large in international negotiations (Albin 2001).
The most striking empirical evidence supporting this thesis is the conduct of
the AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States) states in the context of the climate
convention. It is one of pure moral suasion. Their right to survival has been used
by this group of small island states whose existence is threatened by rising sea
levels to make fairness arguments that aim at persuading major powers to con-
strain their energy consumption. The condition of reciprocal readiness to be per-
suaded as the key ingredient of communicative action does not apply, as the
situation is so asymmetrical as not to permit reciprocal arguments.
Another striking example is the general conviction that rich countries have to
give development aid to the very poor ones. Even though the majority of
developed states fail to reach the suggested threshold of 0.7 percent of their GNP
for development aid, the mere fact that this aid per se (not its level) is virtually
uncontestedly taken as being a national duty shows that weak actors gain lever-
age by seeking recourse to moral arguments (Lumsdaine 1993).
Middle powers: moral entrepreneurs
There is another group of states that permanently punch above their weight in
terms of their international proactivism. These are countries like Canada,
Sweden, Ireland, Norway, New Zealand, and Switzerland, which are – compared
to truly small states – relatively resource-rich, but not major powers. They take
moral positions in key international questions (disarmament, environment,
human rights, development aid; see, for example, Becker et al. 2008) with a loud
voice, surprising determination and continuity, and a high degree of success with
regard to goal attainment. Their role conception combines the consciousness of
their not being great powers – many of them accept gladly the title “middle
power” – with the desire to act as “good international citizens.” Proactivism
regarding policies that they view as “the right thing to do” is part of the under-
standing of “appropriateness” of how this role should be implemented.
These countries are not sufficiently resource-rich to make an impact on the
basis of crude power. While they do dispose of financial, economic, and even
military resources, these would not suffice to achieve anything unilaterally. But
the fact that they dispose of them adds to their ambition: unlike small states, they
are ambitious to make an impact beyond their own most vital interests. Persua-
sion on the basis of moral positions, then, is their best instrument for achieving
international status. Once they have persuaded enough of their peers – or even
enough of the great powers – to follow the proposed course, the effect of their
own resources is multiplied by the pooling with those of their partners (Folz et
al. 2009).
Morality in the external policies of these countries, however, must not be mis-
understood as a strategic ploy to foster traditional objectives of statecraft. It is
far from being a mere instrumental tool. Rather, these countries tend to believe
in the values they promote. Spending for values – they are relatively resource-
rich in economic terms – is one way to achieve moral satisfaction. Since they
need the assent of more powerful actors on many issues, they are, again,
impelled to use persuasion.
In their political practice, these countries cultivate a highly persuasive style
with a strong ingredient of moral suasion. Canada and Sweden are probably the
two most successful and high-profile such countries. Canada, for most of its
post-World War II history, has defined itself as a “good international citizen”
with a broad proactive agenda of supporting and implementing multilateralism
and strengthening the United Nations and international law. This role enjoys
enduring support from the Canadian public; the recent neoconservative policies
conducted by Prime Minister Harper (elected almost exclusively for domestic
policy reasons) will most probably remain a temporary aberration. Sweden
thinks of itself as a “moral superpower,” an amalgam of Lutheran Protestantism
and social democracy that reaches far into the ranks of the centrist parties and,
again, is firmly rooted in supportive public opinion. The Swedish policy agenda
is close to the Canadian one, except that the occasional restraint that Canadian
governments show because of their close alliance relationship with the United
68 H. Müller
States is absent in the Swedish case; proactivism in particularly contested fields
such as nuclear disarmament is thus even more pronounced (Becker et al. 2008).
Switzerland lives on the social capital of being the mother country and head-
quarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and has developed a
targeted engagement in humanitarian policies, using this social capital (Goet-
schel 1999, 2006).
Switzerland, like Norway, is also prominent for the mediating role it has
played in many conflicts. In this role, communicative action is the only ready
tool available: lacking the possibility to coerce conflict parties into compromise
positions, the power of persuasion is the only means which they can use.
Because of the distinct “moral entrepreneur” role chosen by the “middle
powers,” it is no accident that they use to work closely with the NGO commun-
ity, another type of moral entrepreneurship in international relations.
Civilian powers
“Civil power” is a role model largely connected to the work of Hanns Maull and
has been developed with the template of post-World War II West Germany in
mind (Kirste and Maull 1996; Maull 1990/91, 2000). Civil powers can be states
with strong power resources that choose multilateralism, soft power instruments,
and largely peaceful means of foreign policy conduct. Germany, which figures
in the Correlates of War power index ahead of the United Kingdom and France,
behaves distinctly different from these two great powers. Two lost world wars
and the shadow of the crimes committed during the second one have led to a
certain degree of humility in Germany’s self-appreciation.
For this reason, the incentive structure contains, as an overarching element,
the need to prove time and again that today’s Germany is different from the
Germany of the past. Germany, naturally, has “national interests,” like any other
country, but these are embedded in a deep-seated morality that permeates
German thinking and foreign policy operations. Other civil powers (e.g. Japan)
might share these characteristics in part or have a different moralistic foundation
(like Sweden, which combines the attributes of middle power and civil power).
Basing their actions on a moralistic aversion against the traditional ways of
carrying out power politics, frequently combined with pacifist or near-pacifist
inclinations, civil powers strive to develop sophisticated soft power skills. On
this basis, communicative action appears very attractive: It puts soft power skills
to good use, and it is an intriguing alternative to the pushing and shoving of con-
ventional power politics, which civil powers dislike.
Empirical studies of Germany’s diplomacy have credited the country with a
distinctively persuasive style in its foreign policy (Smyser 2003). Most interest-
ingly, Germans tend to adjust positions in response to their interlocutors’ argu-
ments (Arora 2006), thereby heeding the decisive prescription of the TCA.
Recently, the hypothesis that this style is evaporating as a consequence of “nor-
malization” has been put forward (Baumann 2006; Hellmann 1999). The empiri-
cal foundation for this proposition depends largely on analysis of Chancellor
Schröder’s foreign policy. It now appears doubtful, as Chancellor Merkel has
returned to a more traditional style in line with the practices of the “old” Federal
Republic. Schröder, then, appears to have been more of a temporary, idiosyn-
cratic aberration than a seminal change. But whatever may be the case, it has
been proven for at least 50 years that it is possible for a major power to prefer
communicative action in its foreign policy as the best mode for making its
impact in international relations, thereby proving the specific role conception of
“civil power” to be realistic and relevant.
Deliberations on the role script for role change

A major issue in the connection between role theory and TCA is the notion of
change. As was stated in the introduction, role as part of “structure” has been
credited with a rather static influence on actors’ behavior (Sending 2002). Com-
municative action, in contrast, is a mode in which actors can jointly change the
social world in which they live, even though this same world gives them the ref-
erence system on which they hang the justifications for their propositions (Har-
nisch, this volume).
First, role scripts are normative in character. As long as they have not yet
degenerated into stiff rituals, they retain the attribute, common to most norms
(notably those given in language), of being ambivalent, or at least loaded with
meanings that require continuous interpretation (Müller 2004a; Müller and Wolff
2006). Actors must not only interpret the norm as it stands but also deal with the
consequences of norm collision in the role script. One example is the conflict
between pacifism, the prevention of genocide, and duty towards one’s allies in
Germany’s civil power role script, as documented during the Kosovo war (Maull
2000).
Second, actors might be hard put to mediate between their own political
culture (the “I” part of the role) and alter-expectations. This is very visible in
the positions taken by some of NATO’s non-nuclear allies, which on the one
hand prefer determined steps towards nuclear arms control and disarmament as
part of their “have-not” role script, but feel equally compelled to show loyalty to
their nuclear-armed close partners, which resist such pressures (Becker et al.
2008).
Third, actors must adapt the role script to a changing environment. Roles are
structural elements and thus must have a degree of stability. However, the world
does not stand still. Circumstances change, and unless the role script is adapted
to new constraints and opportunities, actors will fail in their new environment if
they follow the old role script. The Soviet Politburo in the late Brezhnev and
early post-Brezhnev era is a case in point. Of course, the end of the Cold War
was such a defining moment, one that changed the international environment
profoundly. New external demands had to be recognized – in the case of
Germany, for example, the request to participate in out-of-area military mis-
sions. In the case of Russia, the issue is whether the new role would be that of
a junior partner of the West, a member of an anti-American counter-coalition,
70 H. Müller
or an independent world power. Such momentous changes necessitate a new
internal understanding how the country’s role should be defined. We can expect,
in these constellations, strong communicative action in domestic politics – at
least at the elite level – to explore possibilities, weigh options, and define new
rules of appropriateness. An alternative would be a determined group with huge
domestic power resources that is willing to push forward its already fixed
agenda. Given the fluidity of the situation and the necessity to define anew what
social capital means in a setting with high degrees of uncertainty, the emergence
of this sort of agency is not highly probable, as the abortive coup d’état against
Mikhail Gorbachev in the summer of 2001 illustrates. Rather, we would expect
general uncertainty and insecurity and a shared desire to arrive at a consensual
redefinition of what the mission of the country is in the new world.
Fourth, rather frequent change of the role script is possible in polarized polit-
ical cultures. They are characterized by the availability of different, sometimes
even antagonistic, identities and role conceptions that are carried by competing
social and political forces. They develop most easily in political systems with
majority voting. The protagonists of the “poles” are hard put to mobilize their
followers in elections. Whereas in consensus democracies, parties struggle for
the vote at the center ground, in polarized democracies mobilizing one’s own
supporters is the primary prescription. As a consequence, role scripts at the poles
tend to diverge strongly: there is considerable distance between the Bush and the
Obama agendas for US foreign and security policy (see Maull, this volume). The
shift in role scripts thus signals dramatic role change. While this happens without
true communicative discourse between the antagonists – rather, rhetorical action
towards the domestic audience dominates – foreign policy partners must adapt to
quite different reference systems, with appropriate justification and argumenta-
tion, when the new partner government starts arguing.
International social order and communicative action

The seminal trend in the world is globalization. With it comes the expansion of
the market, of the middle class of owners with a strong interest in the rule of
law, and of increasing numbers of educated people who discuss politics and
develop ambitions of participation. While this trend is not equally strong in all
regions, and can take different trajectories with many bumps in the road, it is
likely that it will produce, over time, more democratic polities – as has been the
case in the past. Democracies may differ considerably from our model, with
some putting more emphasis on harmony and less on dispute and conflict, and
others pursuing a different relationship between state and religion, but they will
be systems with more discussion, participation, and freedom of expression. The
more democratic dyads emerge and the progressively more intense interdemo-
cratic institutions become, the more communicative action in interstate relations
is likely, as interdemocratic relations make up a higher proportion of the total
volume of international relations. The overall effect on the international system
will be mitigated by the risk that not all democracies will pursue a cooperative
and communicative strategy towards all other states. Some younger democracies
might develop militant political cultures, like some current democracies, and
thus be inclined to take a confrontational attitude towards the non-democratic
“other,” even to the point of missionary zeal to democratize others by force. As I
have shown elsewhere, this is not a necessary development, but contingent on
history, specific constellations in the international environment, domestic dis-
course and balance of domestic power, and proactive agency (Müller 2004b;
Müller and Wolff 2006).
The existence of more democracies means more demand for, and more actors
prone to, applying communicative action, for several reasons:
• In democracies, policies must be justified. Reasons must be given for the

course pursued, and these reasons, in turn, are anchored in common refer-
ence systems of the polity.
• Democracies open political space for NGOs. NGOs, as discussed, are candi-
date actors for pushing communicative action as a preferred mode of
operations.
• All civil powers and all middle powers and moral entrepreneurs are demo-
cracies. We can thus expect that, as the number of democracies grows, so
will that of these state actors with their particular role orientation towards
communicative action.
As a consequence, the number of CA-prone actors is likely to grow.

Moreover, globalization enhances the need for common rules and norms, as
common problems arise that cannot be solved on a national basis. Likewise, the
need for the production of common goods is increasing. To meet these require-
ments, actors must reach agreement. In order to reach agreement, communica-
tive action will be needed whenever hard bargaining leads actors into a
stalemate.
Global rules and norms, once established, need administration and supervi-
sion. This opens the demand for more international organizations, which, in turn,
enhances the number of communicative action-prone actors, as the leaders of
these organizations have to employ this mode of action in order to do their job
well.
Finally, the growth in the number of democracies, combined with the per-
ceived need to solve problems together, makes the emergence of security com-
munities more likely: while security communities can evolve among
non-democratic states or between democracies and non-democracies – as in
Southeast Asia – democracies generally show a greater inclination to enter these
more intimate and value-based international entities. Since the common value
base, the mutual respect, and the deliberative habits of democracies facilitate
communicative action, this mode of operation is likely to grow.
Altogether, these trends are leading the world slowly away from a Hobbesian
order, which has no place for CA, to a Lockean order where CA is occasionally
needed to overcome deadlock and – through to the increase in the rule of law
72 H. Müller
and of actors prone to engage in (and normatively prefer) CA – to a Kantian
order in which communicative action might dominate the rank order of appropri-
ate behavior (Wendt 1999). In this world, the two conditions favoring communi-
cative action would flow together: on the one hand, a large number of actors
wedded to this course of operating; on the other hand, institutions, notably law-
based ones, which, if we follow Habermas’s arguments in Between Facts and
Norms, create an institutional environment favorable to communicative action,
as legal procedures rely on sophisticated argumentation in the framework of a
shared and binding system of reference (Habermas 1996).5
Conclusions: can Habermas meet Hanns Maull?

To answer this question, we have first to be clear about the concept of role: It is
a constraint, but not just a constraint. Role is also – in Giddens’ sense – a source
and an opportunity structure. It gives actors an ideational corpus of assets to
work out policy, and it must be permanently applied, interpreted, and shaped.
Just as Hamlet can be played in an indefinite number of ways, so too can civilian
power, superpower, or rogue roles. The concept of role gives actors much more
dignity as the drivers of world policy, pushing and shoving the environment in
which they operate, than the structuralist reading of the concept would lead one
to believe. Roles must be enacted, and enacting is a highly activist undertaking.
And role is disposing, not determining: the actor maintains a high degree of
freedom of choice (Hollis and Smith 1990).
If we accept that there is evidence that communicative action takes place –
side by side with strategic action – in international relations, then it makes sense
to hypothesize that it is – to different degrees – inscribed into the role scripts of
those actors which apply it if the opportunity, or the necessity, arises.
Accepting that either mode of action is appropriate under certain circum-
stances, and thus – in varying proportions – part of actors’ role scripts – we can
then drop the schematic and dichotomic connection of communicative action to
the lifeworld, and strategic action to “the system.” The diplomat epitomizes a
role where both modes of action are part of the lifeworld. A fruitful distinction
for further empirical research appears to be the one between actors whose role
script is neutral as to the two modes of action, and actors that give continuous
preference to one of the two modes.
How well communicative action functions in international relations and how
frequently it will be met with can then be described as a function of two con-
ditions: the institutional setting and actor characteristics. Figure 4.1 illustrates
this function: We would expect communicative action to flourish the better, the
more actors’ role script is morally informed, and the more the setting deviates
from the anarchical competition for power and approaches a lawful relationship
and, beyond that, a community of values such as a security community (Adler
and Barnett 1998b).
So, we can safely arrive at the final conclusion: If Habermas and Maull were
to meet, they could shake hands without mutual fear.
Moral
entrepreneurs
n
tio
ac
ive
at
ic
Actors
un
m
m
co
of
y
nc
lie
Sa
Rogues
Unmitigated Dense institutional
anarchy environment
Figure 4.1 Saliency of communicative action as a function of actor attributes and institu-

tional setting.
Notes
1 For the structural leanings of many role theorists, cf. Marijke Breuning’s contribution
in this volume.
2 I owe this observation to Sebastian Harnisch.
3 However, I found in participating observation that negotiators are more likely to
exchange real arguments in a deliberative form in camera than in the public domain,
where incentives to engage in “rhetorical action” to edge out rivals before an audience
are very strong (Deitelhoff and Müller 2005).
4 For the purposes of this article, I define NGOs as non-profit, non-violent organizations
that pursue a vision of the common good. This “good guy” definition excludes other
inhabitants of the non-governmental transnational space such as enterprises, mafias, or
terrorist groups.
5 As this chapter seeks to relate Habermas to international relations, I do not tackle the
issue of intrastate conflict here.
5 Identity and role change in
international politics
Dirk Nabers
Introduction
To employ role-theoretical insights in the field of International Relations (IR),
specifically for the analysis of international politics and foreign policy, it is
helpful to draw on sociological, anthropological, and social-psychological
sources. On that basis, I will outline a number of shortcomings stemming from
“confusion and malintegration” (Biddle 1986: 68) within the sociological field of
role theory, before analyzing the theoretical nexus between role and identity as
two major and interrelated concepts in social theory. Drawing on newer insights
of political theory and discourse studies, especially those developed by the Essex
School of discourse theory under Ernesto Laclau, particular attention will be
paid to how roles and identities change, for this aspect is identified as one of the
major shortcomings of previous role-theoretical work. I will maintain that iden-
tity supplies an actor with an angle through which to interpret his or her social
situation and the expectations of appropriate behavior that come with it. In this
perspective, an identity is a set of meanings that characterizes an actor in a role.
To illustrate how roles are connected to identities and how they are transformed,
leadership in international politics will be introduced as an exemplary case. I
shall conclude that an over-mechanistic account of roles relying on fixed expec-
tations of appropriate behavior has to be avoided. Instead, it is interesting to see
how roles change in times of crises. As discourse plays a significant part in the
transformation of meanings, discourse analysis is seen as a suitable tool with
which to gain traction on roles in international politics.
Role theory: confusion and malintegration
Sociological approaches
Sociological role theory posits that actors are guided by expectations held by the
self and a corresponding other. These expectations are learned through experi-
ence, based on social interaction (Biddle 1986). The results are characteristic
behavior patterns or roles. This view is rooted in a Humean account of causation
that rests on regularities and, hence, predictability.1 Roles represent so-called
Identity and role change 75
independent variables in this perspective, requiring thoughtful, socially aware
actors that behave rationally. As we will see later on in this chapter, this concep-
tion of science is also widespread in IR approaches to roles (Breuning, this
volume), but by no means indispensable.
Recapitulating previous efforts at establishing role theory as a main strand of
social theory, Ivan Nye divided the field into two general approaches in the mid-
1970s: structural and interactionist (1976). However, during the past century at
least three other perspectives have evolved in the field: functional, organiza-
tional, and cognitive role theory. The different approaches can be summarized as
follows: While a structuralist position holds that roles are social positions, con-
stituted by societal norms that bring about certain expectations of appropriate
behavior (Linton 1945; Lopata 1991), a functional standpoint conceives of roles
as shared, normative expectations that prescribe and proscribe behavior. In that
sense, roles are “parts” or “positions” of a stable social system (Bates and
Harvey 1975). The symbolic interactionist view holds that agents assume, repro-
duce, and perform roles during interaction (Goffman 1959; Mead 1934; Har-
nisch, this volume), and in organizational role theory (Allison and Zelikow
1999), roles are taken as being associated with fixed social positions, and are
easily identifiable because of their preplanned and hierarchical quality. Finally,
cognitive role theory highlights the relationship between role expectations and
behavior. Perceptions, methods for measuring the salience of expectations, the
imitation of roles and cultural environments are central to this approach (e.g.
Walker 1982, 1987b).
Different objections have been raised with regard to these five sociological
perspectives on roles: While the structuralist position has developed no vocabu-
lary to deal with non-conforming actors, deficient systems, or systemic change,
it also remains questionable from a functional position whether social systems
can be seen as stable and whether norms formulate precise expectations of
appropriate behavior; in fact, there may be more to social life than just norm-
oriented behavior (Reckwitz 2006: ch. 2). On the other hand, symbolic interac-
tionist role theory has been blamed for neglecting the contextual factors
impacting on actors’ interactions, thus also disregarding structural constraints
upon expectations and roles that are focused on by functionalists (Biddle 1986:
72). Finally, organizational role theory seems to suggest that all organizations
are stable entities that work logically and that conflict occurs between fixed
social positions called roles, while cognitive role theory treats culture as an inde-
pendent variable that triggers behavior, without allowing conceptual space for
dynamism and the contingent character of culture and identities. It is from this
angle that the organizational actor model has been criticized in IR (e.g. Hollis
and Smith 1990: 147–9; Smith 1980).
Thus, the main shortcoming of so-called sociological role theory so far is that
it is not a theory but a set of interrelated, yet sometimes contradictory, concepts.
Early proponents of role theory such as Georg Simmel, George Herbert Mead,
Ralph Linton, and Jacob Moreno differed in how they used the term “role” (for
an overview, see Biddle 1986). While the notion of characteristic behavior is a
76 D. Nabers
dominant strand (e.g. Burt 1982) and is widely accepted among role theorists,
the theatrical metaphor of performing “parts” or “scripts” has also gained popu-
larity in the discipline (Bates and Harvey 1975). Whereas these different defini-
tions can be synthesized as long as certain preformulated expectations are met
and a characteristic pattern of behavior is exposed by the actors under scrutiny,
the conflation of the role conception with other essentially contested terms such
as norms, beliefs, attitudes, preferences (ibid.; Turner 1979), subject positions
(Allen and van de Vliert 1984), and – most significantly – identities (Biddle
1986) is troublesome. Some of these concepts originate well beyond role-
theoretical thinking and have broader relevance for all social sciences per se.
In that context, the reference to norms is one dominant ingredient of role con-
ceptions. Most prominently, Bates and Harvey (1975: 106) have defined roles as
“a particular set or norms that is organized about a function,” while Allen and
van de Vliert (1984: 3) have depicted them as “behavior referring to normative
expectations associated with a position in a social system.” These are highly
cryptic definitions that make sense only when other complex concepts, such as
norms, functions, and positions in a social system, are defined in turn. What is
more, these definitions each include at least one new element not given in the
other. In addition, a reference to identities is prevalent in the literature on roles
(Stryker 1968; for a summary, see Stets and Burke 2000). In this strand of think-
ing, it is widely suggested that roles are constituted by ideas about self and other,
shared norms and identities. As with identities, an actor can assume multiple
roles at the same time. As I will argue later in more detail, it is unclear where the
analytical boundary between roles and identities is to be found, and what
the added value of the role conception in comparison to the concept of identity
could be.
Given these conceptual foci and related shortcomings, one might assume that
theoretical research on roles in recent decades would have focused on clarifying
the relationship between norms and roles, identities and roles, and a general dis-
cussion of basic notions such as social position or mutual expectations. Interest-
ingly, however, role-theoretical research has taken a different direction. As
Bruce Biddle observed, as long ago as the mid-1980s, “much of role research
has concerned practical questions and derived concepts such as role conflict, role
taking, role playing, or consensus” (1986: 69f.). All of these concepts matter for
empirical research, as will be illustrated later, but they often lack the conceptual
groundwork that consists in clarifying the role of norms, expectations, beliefs,
identities. and so on.
For example, role conflict arises when significant others have inconsistent
expectations of their leaders or when leaders’ self-conceptions diverge from the
expectations of their surroundings. Role expectations can, however, range from
very specific to an indistinct idea within which the actor can define its own
method. Moreover, as will also be demonstrated later on, role conflict can derive
from role ambiguity (when the specificity of a norm is low), role malintegration
(when multiple roles do not interlock), role discontinuity (when different sequen-
tial contexts require different disjointed roles), and role overload (when too
many role expectations exist) (Biddle 1986: 83; see also Fisher and Gitelson
1983), and – as we will see later – from the unstable and incomplete character of
identities.2 In any case, solving role conflict requires transcending the “norms-
as-independent-variables” vocabulary and digging a little deeper into the polit-
ical process that generates norms and their interpretation. After all, as Hall
showed in the 1970s, role conflict can be resolved in three ways: an actor can
communicate with others so that they alter their expectations, he can reflect on
his own position and change his own role conception, and he can temporarily
adjust his behavior according to the expectations of others (Hall 1972). All three
ways of role conflict resolution are process and meaning based. Before analyzing
more deeply the relationship between roles, norms, and identities and the possi-
bility of their transformation in the political process, let us scrutinize in more
detail how role theory has performed in the field of IR.
IR approaches
Several shortcomings, especially a widespread silence with regard to how roles
and identities change, are also conspicuous in the field of IR role theorizing. The
tone was set by K.J. Holsti, who introduced the concept of role into the analysis
of foreign policy in 1970, triggering numerous articles and edited volumes on
the subject (Barnett 1993; Chafetz et al. 1996; Kirste and Maull 1996; Walker
1987b, 1992). Holsti reflects the ego part of the role (also Chafetz et al. 1996),
depicting national attributes, as the basis of roles and system attributes, as
leading to balances and imbalances between states or groups of states (1970:
234). Holsti aims to develop a typology of roles that offers a detailed description
of international political processes. While he follows previous work in social
theory, he also puts expectations of appropriate behavior center stage, though
very carefully outlining problems related to different degrees of expectations,
objectivity of social position, and subjectivity of interpretation. Eventually, it
seems that his explanation of national role conceptions becomes over-complex,
as it requires looking at almost all available sources:
location and major topographical features of the state; natural, economic and
technical resources; available capabilities; traditional policies; socio-
economic demands and needs as expressed through political parties, mass
movements, or interest groups; national values, doctrines, or ideologies;
public opinion “mood”; and the personality or political needs of key policy-
makers.
(Holsti 1970: 246)
Holsti adds that “national role conceptions are also related to, or buttressed by,
the role prescriptions coming from the external environment” (ibid.). Undoubt-
edly, a number of problems that have been haunting IR role theory ever since
stem from this vast, liberally inspired concept. Summing up the dominant view
of the discipline since Holsti’s pathbreaking work, a role conception has been
78 D. Nabers
defined by Lisbeth Aggestam as “a set of norms expressing expected foreign
policy behavior and action orientation” (1999). Role conceptions constitute the
ego part of the role equation, while role expectations denote the alter part and
role performance the actual foreign policy behavior. Although this is a neat defi-
nition of the single parts of a role conception, I shall argue later that it is worth-
while to integrate the three elements of roles, as one is unthinkable without the
other. In the tradition of roles-as-independent-variables vocabulary, Aggestam
conceives of roles as road maps that makers of foreign policy use to judge and
make political decisions. In her reading, roles are shaped by institutionalized
contexts, both domestic and international. However, it remains unclear where the
real impetus for action lies:
The actors in foreign policy are thus not simply confined to acting according
to the roles prescribed in a script (rule-based behavior). Indeed, they may be
actively involved in reconstructing the identities within these structures
through their interaction with other international actors. . . . Whilst foreign
policy role conceptions are primarily shaped within the broader political
culture of a state, the interaction and elite socialization taking place on the
European level may influence and change their perceptions.
(ibid.)
Now, it remains a pressing question what it is that matters for foreign policy.
Roles, rules, identities, perceptions, and culture all seem to play their part. While
Aggestam goes on to conceptualize “role identities” as “mutual responsiveness
and compatibility of interests,” she maintains “that the state is the role-beholder”
who is ontologically prior to any meaningful social interaction. Again, this
approach is rooted in a Humean conception of science that is primarily interested
in regularities and prediction and leaves little room for the transformation of
identities through meaningful interactions. Glenn Chafetz has promoted this
understanding of roles widely in the field of IR (e.g. Chafetz 1995; Chafetz et al.
1996), while also including all potential factors and embracing the widest pos-
sible theoretical understanding in social sciences. They are not to blame, for an
all-inclusive concept of roles has a long tradition in IR, with Holsti embracing a
myriad of domestic and international factors in his theory, several contributors to
Walker’s edited volume conceiving of roles referring to material capabilities and
culture at the same time (Sampson and Walker 1987; Wish 1987), and Michael
Barnett considering the interplay of international institutions and domestic
factors (1993).
The work of Hanns Maull and his colleagues takes us further in this respect
(e.g. Kirste and Maull 1996; Maull 2000). Maull sees roles as constituted by
socially constructed values and ideas, which define appropriate behavior in the
first place and do not take predefined norms for granted (2007). In his work with
Knut Kirste, Maull also reflects critically the status of nation-states within a
theoretical field that has so far been dominated by sociological and psychologi-
cal approaches, concluding that the state consists of individuals who share a
certain role conception (Kirste and Maull 1996: 287). Directing our attention at
the mutual constitution of agent and structure, Kirste and Maull maintain that
while individuals constitute and transform roles through their actions, these
actions are also influenced by intersubjectively shared role conceptions. This is
taken further in the volume on German foreign policy (Harnisch and Maull
2001b), which argues that role conceptions such as the one of civilian power are
“inherently complex and multi-dimensional, bundling several specific and dis-
tinctive role conception elements into a whole” (ibid.: 139). This leads to a diffi-
cult reconciliation of different norms in specific contexts.
In a quite similar vein, Martin Hollis and Steve Smith bring the dynamics and
indeterminacy of roles to the fore. Like Maull and Kirste, they conceptualize
roles as social constructs and point to their inconsistencies and indeterminacies.
Moreover, they throw new light on the concept of role distance by claiming that
judgment and interpretation are inherent to any role play (Hollis and Smith 1990:
156f.). Norms as independent variables leave no room for an interpretation of
such a kind. Standard versions of role theory seem to ignore how the mind
works, how ideas are universalized and identities transformed. Of course, as
Hollis and Smith themselves concede, “too much flexibility may threaten
Hume’s aim of founding a science” (ibid.: 159, emphasis in original), but what
social science is it that does not account for at least some complexities and
meaningful interactional processes of social life? If actors’ preferences are
entirely generated by social positions defined as normative expectations, this
picture misses a lot of what social theory has to say about roles. Of course, not
all role theorists have fallen for this kind of structural determinism – Harnisch
and Maull (2001a) with their complex-sensitive work on Germany as a civilian
power being a notable exception – but a genuine debate on the agent–structure
problem that also sheds light on the mutual constitution of roles and identities
seems conspicuously absent from the literature.
In a major contribution to our thinking about roles, Hollis and Smith have
managed to build a bridge between roles and what I will henceforth call identi-
ties. Reasoned beliefs about structural positions as opposed to “objective
demands” connected with positions describe this phenomenon best. In Hollis and
Smith’s words:
Our role-player is not a self-contained processing device whose inputs are

supplied by a bureaucracy. Roles call for judgment, which involves rea-
soned belief, self-monitoring of aims, and a general shrewdness. These ele-
ments are not covered by “information processing”.
(1990: 161)
Instead, “our actors interpret information, monitor their performance, reassess

their goals” (ibid.: 165). Here, an in-built subjective dimension of roles slowly
comes into play, which was thereafter further developed in the discipline. Build-
ing on the work of Stephen Walker (1987b) and Michael Barnett (1993), Alex-
ander Wendt has made an intriguing effort to analytically disentangle the
80 D. Nabers
concepts of role and identity. Reiterating dominant definitions of role concep-
tions, Wendt argues that “identity” is constituted by two kinds of views, namely
“those held by the Self and those held by the Other” (1999: 224). He goes on to
differentiate between role identities and roles, contending that role identities are
fundamentally a social concept and do not rest on intrinsic properties of actors
and are constituted by an ego part as well as an alter part. Moreover, role identi-
ties are enacted by occupying a position in a social structure. Thus, they are
always dependent on relevant counter-identities and cannot be performed auto
nomously. Like roles as defined in traditional role theoretical approaches, they
rest on shared expectations (ibid.: 27). It is the intersubjective representation of a
role that matters for role identities. Roles are structural positions, and have there-
fore to be differentiated from role identities: “Role-identities are subjective self-
understandings; roles are the objective, collectively constituted positions that
give meaning to those understandings” (ibid.: 259). What Wendt suggests here is
that roles are objectively defined structural positions that do not rest on intersub-
jective beliefs or representations. Roles can be enacted, but this is no necessity.
A country can play the role of a balancer, but it does not need to. Once the role
starts coming into conflict with the identity of a country, a structure (what Wendt
calls a “culture”) – such as a balance of power – is apt to collapse. The more
deeply a role is internalized, the more it will have a self-fulfilling tendency.
This makes sense and reflects the mainstream of traditional sociological role
approaches. For example, Burke and Reitzes (1981: 84) maintain that “[identi-
ties] are meanings one attributes to oneself in a role (and that others attribute to
one).” Hence, although the differentiation between the objective and the subject-
ive dimension of social structures takes us a step further, Wendt’s concepts of
role and role identity have been severely criticized in the field of IR for other
reasons. First, Wendt’s concept of change is hard to grasp. It seems as if in
Wendt’s account, the causal power of a static reality (the roles of enemy, rival,
or friend) guides states’ behavior. Although he advocates the idea that his model
“can be readily extended to situations in which culture already exists” (Wendt
1999: 328), some authors contend that the underlying conservative nature of a
cultural structure represents an impediment to change (e.g. Sárváry 2006). Once
structures constituted by roles and identities are enacted, the social system gains
the quality of an objective social fact and is hard to change (see the second and
third arguments, which build on each other).
Second, if we assume that cultural structures always exist through process,
then we have to go a step further and ask what process actually is about. To start
with, process is constituted by meaningful acts of social agents, and can thus be
grasped only by analyzing meaning. Then again, the epistemological question
remains how meaning can be known by social scientists. Wendt argues that
social relationships are constituted by discursive structures (1999: 84), and that
contestation occurs through communication. Surprisingly, though, his arguments
offer no concept of language, as Maja Zehfuss has commented (1998, 2002; see
also Guzzini and Leander 2001). His model of “complex learning” does not rely
on language and discourse, but seems to be reduced to physical gestures (Zehfuss
2002: 48). How, one might ask, can we analyze the expectations that underlie
roles if not by looking at language and discourse?
Third, having no concept of language and discourse makes it impossible to
think of identity transformation. If we understand identity as a fundamentally
social phenomenon depending on differential social relations and, hence, trans-
ported by the meanings we ascribe to these relations, the epistemological ques-
tion of how meanings can be known becomes crucial. Following newer theories
of discourse in this context, I strongly maintain that there is nothing societal that
is determined outside the discursive (Laclau 1977; Laclau and Mouffe 1985:
107; for a discussion, see also Howarth 1995: 119; Norval 2004; Smith 1998),
which indicates that the social per se is discourse, or discourse is “co-extensive
with the social” (Torfing 1999: 94). Discourse, then, must be defined as a struc-
ture, but the structure never reaches full closure. Politics exists because struc-
tures are never complete; if a structure were fully closed, politics would have
found its final designation. Every object, every subject position is constituted by
discourse and depends on specific discursive conditions of possibility. Discourse
constitutes culture, which consists in the meanings its subjects produce and
reproduce.
It will thus be argued in the following that we have to change our conception
of foreign policy and see states as constructed through concrete meanings pro-
duced through political articulations (Campbell 1998; Zehfuss 2002), thereby
continuously shaping roles and identities. The assumption that roles and identi-
ties are relatively stable is of no help in this respect, as moving from a situation
of enmity to one of friendship is obviously crucial in international politics. As
Wendt admits in his reply to his critics,
it seems reasonable to expect my approach at least to permit reflexivity, and

even to speak to its conditions of possibility. In this Social Theory is only
partly successful. On the one hand, its distinction between role identities and
roles – the I and the Me – creates distance between the subjective and objec-
tive aspects of identity, enabling states in principle to reflect on and change
their behavior. But the subjective aspect of this picture is inadequately theo-
rized – in part because Understanding has an ambiguous status within Social
Theory, and in part because dualism is not an adequate metaphysical foun-
dation for consciousness.
(2006: 207)
The “subjective” and “objective” aspects of identity will be disentangled in the

following section, a dynamic picture of social life that incorporates both roles
and identities will be developed, and mutual process between structure and actor
will be delineated. This means that a meaning- or discourse-based notion of
structure in which roles operate has to be presented.
82 D. Nabers
Role, identity, and change
Role and identity

In role-theoretical discussions, it is often stated that roles are linked to identities.
On one side of the spectrum, it is argued that “roles provide individuals with a
stable sense of identity” (Chafetz et al. 1996: 733); on the other side, it is con-
tended that identities supply roles with meaning, as it is the intersubjective rep-
resentation of the role that is called role identity (Wendt 1999). Identities and
roles are therefore to be seen as co-constitutive. Taking this finding as a starting
point, two criticisms can be extracted from the above discussion: First, treating
roles merely as independent variables misses a lot of what social theory might
have to say about the formation of state identities. Instead, as David Campbell
has put it,
states are never finished as entities; the tension between the demands of iden-
tity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the
performative nature of identity can never be fully revealed. This paradox
inherent to their being renders states in permanent need of reproduction: with
no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute
their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming.
(1998: 12)
This entails the impossibility of permanently fixed roles and is directly related to
the second problem – that is, how can role change be conceptualized on the basis
of identity change? In the view of role theory, in continually taking on roles in
social interactions, individuals are attributed certain social positions and identify
with them. For example, the interaction of a professor with her students confirms
her identity as a university teacher. However, to define roles as social positions
is only the beginning. Like identities, roles are impossible to specify to a degree
that makes actors’ behavior mechanical (see Hollis and Smith 1990). This
section therefore has a simple objective: It will be shown how roles and identi-
ties are co-constituted and that thinking about role change means thinking about
the intersubjective structures that supply roles with meaning. In the next section,
an approach to role change will be delineated.
Talking about role and identity, the basic link between the two concepts is
one of reciprocity or co-constitution, as has already been hinted at when discuss-
ing Wendt’s approach. On the one hand, actors have to formulate plans and
perform certain activities within the boundaries of their roles that in turn rein-
force, support, and confirm their identities (Burke and Reitzes 1981: 84). The
consequential logic follows a strict direction, as shown in Figure 5.1.
Role Behavior Identity
Figure 5.1 Role, Behavior, Identity.

On the other hand, an identity provides an actor with a standpoint or frame of
reference for interpretation of the social position the role supplies the actor with.
Figure 5.2 hence delineates a somewhat modified picture.
In social psychological identity theory (see Stets and Burke 2000), an identity
consists of actors’ ideas about their position in a society. They exist only in rela-
tion to other social categories. Again, as in Figure 5.1, these social categories
precede the identity of actors but are in constant interpretative exchange with
these roles.
Taking the two arguments together, we are probably better advised to call the
relationship between roles and identities a two-way process that reflects the reci-
procity of agent and structure. An actor operates in choosing behaviors within
the confines of the role, while this behavior both is influenced by identities and
feeds back on them. Methodologically, the frame of reference for both identities
and roles is their meaning transported by discourse, while these meanings are
logically identical in a given situation. We will see in the next section that a
notion of discourse is also essential for thinking about change.
Before showing how roles and identities can change, we are now able to sum-
marize that an identity supplies an actor with a standpoint or frame of reference
in which to interpret his or her social situation and the expectations of appropri-
ate behavior that come with it. An identity – or, in Wendt’s terms, a role-identity
– is a set of meanings that characterizes an actor in a role. It is once again worth
accentuating the interpretative character of role behavior, as Wells appositely
points out:
[S]elf-conception is fundamentally an interpretative process and it is rele-

vant to the explanation of behaviors as it relates to the meanings that those
behaviors have for the enacting person. While self-concept may be theoreti-
cally linked to “objective” states or outcomes, this linkage is indirect and
mediated through interpretative events.
(1978: 198)
Roles are therefore the basis of identities, but are at the same time filled with
meaning through identity, or – as we will see in the next section – identification
(see Harnisch on Mead’s conceptualization of identity formation). Identity
means the incorporation of the meanings and expectations associated with a role
into the self. The following will thus aim at bringing together the different theo-
retical strands that have been touched upon so far: it needs to combine a theory
of roles with a theory of identities to account for social change; it has to take
interpretation and meaning seriously; and it has to come up with an idea of how
to study roles in international politics.
Identity Role Behavior
Figure 5.2 Identity, Role, Behavior.

84 D. Nabers
Role, identity, and change
Role change is classically understood “as a change in the shared conception and
execution of typical role performance and role boundaries” (Turner 1990: 88). It
has to be distinguished from deviance, which is behavior not connected with the
role, thus falling outside its frame. Although the standard literature on roles does
not devote much attention to role change, a number of aspects that can trigger
role and identity change can quickly be identified in the field, among them the
above-mentioned role conflict, role ambiguity, role discontinuity, and role over-
load. While all of these dimensions imply role change but otherwise treat roles
as given, none of them connects role change with identity change. On the one
hand, this facet of change goes beyond mere behavioral change as outlined by
Harnisch in the chapter on key concepts (p. 10); on the other hand, it touches on
the sources of roles. The issue at stake is a reworked model of roles as “reasoned
role playing” (Hollis and Smith 1990: 165), which might eventually explain why
balancers are balancers, leaders are leaders and civilian powers are civilian
powers.
In a nutshell, role change can arise when the performance of a role does not
correspond to an identity. Erving Goffman (1961) has called this phenomenon
role distance – a sort of detachment from a role which goes with dissatisfaction
and estrangement. This kind of distance can also occur between roles and norms,
a factor that is widely ignored in role-theoretical work.
Again, it is argued here that we need to search for a “thicker” explanation of
social relations, which will bring us back to the concept of identity. Building on
the role-conceptual work of Turner (1970, 1990) and Lipman-Blumen (1973),
and linking it with the poststructuralist work of Laclau (1977, 1990, 1996, 2005;
Laclau and Mouffe 1985), a theory of role change on the premise that crisis or
dislocation of a social system offers the most favorable condition for swift and
pervasive role transformation will be outlined. As I have argued elsewhere
(Nabers 2009), this view links up with the discussion on “formative events” and
“windows of opportunity,” though within a strictly discourse-theoretical frame-
work. The main question that will be treated in this section is how more radically
interpretative social theories such as poststructuralism can help to overcome role
theory’s blind spots and numerous persisting shortcomings. Some of these theo-
retical strands have already gained ground in IR (for an overview, see Nabers
2009).
To start with, in fields such as psychology and sociology it is widely recog-
nized that roles do not remain static but change and evolve over time (e.g. Turner
1990). Roles develop and crystallize when they are broadly recognized and
deemed essential by those who share a culture (Nye 1974). This does not neces-
sarily entail long-term stability. On the contrary, roles can destabilize over time,
especially in times of social instability. Among others, it was Laclau who endea-
vored to establish a theoretical link between social instability and social change.
It is maintained here that his work can be useful for a broader understanding of
role change on the basis of identity change.
In their seminal work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), Laclau and
Chantal Mouffe develop a fully constructivist concept of identity. The social
structure in which roles as structural positions are located is defined as discourse;
the social, and culture, are constituted entirely within discourse. Discourse is
necessarily about change and is defined through articulation, as Laclau and
Mouffe explicate: “We will call articulation any practice establishing a relation
among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory
practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will
call ‘discourse’ ” (ibid.: 105).
In this understanding, human beings, the “human subject,” “man” and
“woman,” material conditions of possibility and social roles are constructed dif-
ferently in different religious, ideological, or constitutional discourses. Any
physical constraint has to be endowed with meaning by humans for them to be
able to act on it. Taking poststructuralist thought in the tradition of Jacques
Lacan and Jacques Derrida as their starting point, Laclau and Mouffe argue that
the social is pervaded by undecidables rather than governed by structural deter-
mination. Referring to Hegel’s modernity (in detail, see also Butler 2000), “iden-
tity” is conceptualized as a precariously negative term, never closed in itself,
ephemeral in character and relying on the constant movement of differential
relationships (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 95; Smith 1998: 87). The undecidability
of structure leads to the incompleteness of identities. Laclau and Mouffe are seen
as belonging to a group of theorists who favor an ontology of “lack,” asserting
the incompleteness of any identity, as individual subjects never accomplish com-
plete self-consciousness In Lacan’s psychoanalytic view, which Slavoj Žižek
outlines, every effort to resolve a lack will unavoidably fail, giving identity “the
name of what we desire but can never fully attain” (Stavrakakis 2005: 70,
emphasis in original).3
Hence, identity remains partial; it can never be full or complete. It can there-
fore only be established by difference, by drawing a line between something and
something else. All identity is relational, formed by social practices that link
together a series of interrelated signifying elements. All principles and values,
therefore, receive their meaning from relationships of difference and opposition
(Laclau 1990: 21, 58). Laclau and Mouffe originally employed the terms
“subject” and “subject position” within a discursive structure to describe this
phenomenon. The subject is seen as an attempt to fill structural gaps, or subject
positions, within a structure. Hence, Laclau’s (1990: 60–3; 2000: 58) differentia-
tion between identity and identification unveils the basic ambiguity at the heart
of identity. The individual cannot completely identify with the subject position
the discourse supplies, “but is forced into filling the structural gaps through iden-
tification” (Andersen 2003: 52).
It is here that the root of identity change lies. As Williams (2007: 114f.) has
noted, identity must not be misunderstood as a fixed quality but rather must be
seen as a fluid process of identity formation. The lack of a fully constituted iden-
tity has to be resolved through naming. Role-theoretical thinking has also
emphasized that identities are social products that are formed and maintained
86 D. Nabers
through naming – that is, “locating the self in socially recognizable categories”
(Burke and Reitzes 1981: 84). Role-beholders name one another and themselves,
thereby constructing each other as subjects in the first place. In that literature, it
has been stressed that identities are symbolic and reflexive in nature and that this
reflexivity becomes visible through meaningful interaction: “This naming
invokes meanings in the form of expectations with regard to others’ and one’s
own behaviors” (Stets and Burke 2000: 225).
In a nutshell, identities evolve through filling structural positions with
meaning. Something is crucially missing in the structure of society, and the
answer must be to find a name for the absent. Without this “absent,” without an
initial crisis, however small it may be, there is no conflict in society, and, con-
sequently, no politics. In a radical crisis, such as a major war or the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001, when people are confronted with a situation of
fundamental anomie, the urge for some kind of answer becomes more acute than
the actual ontic content of that order:
The Hobbesian universe is the extreme version of this gap: because society
is faced with a situation of total disorder (the state of nature), whatever the
Leviathan does is legitimate – irrespective of its content – as long as order is
the result.
(Laclau 2005: 88)
In the next section, I will show how leaders in international politics are capable
of playing this role.
However, before being able to completely understand how roles can trans-
form identities and vice versa, we have to develop the already mentioned concept
of “crisis” more fully. Role and identity change, so the argument goes, works
best in a situation of disintegration and indeterminacy of articulations of differ-
ent identities (Laclau 1977: 103; 2005: 122; Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 7, 13), or
in a situation of dislocation. As crisis is a constant political phenomenon, so is
societal dislocation. As Norval maintains, “if the structure is dislocated und thus
incomplete, an intervention by a subject is needed to re-suture it” (2004: 142).
This is the logical basis of all politics. Previous political logics are put into ques-
tion by a crisis, while more and more actors have to open themselves up for
innovative discourses, and hegemonic strategies can be successful. The network
of existing social structures is increasingly considered an obstacle on the path to
one’s “true self,” which leads to the attempt to break with the status quo; the
evolving hegemonic discourse, on the other hand, reinforces a specific actor’s
identity crisis by offering alternative identity concepts. The ultimate goal of this
process is to establish order where there was anomie and dislocation (Turner
1970: 205).
In the field of IR, Chafetz et al. contend that
states do not usually abandon role conceptions outright. Instead they slowly
downgrade their centrality. Rapid shifts in role may, however, occur in
states undergoing internal upheaval such as revolution or in new states such
as those formed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union.4
(1996: 736)
Quite problematically for our argument, the crisis or dislocation itself does not
determine the political path to be taken in an “undecidable terrain.” A crucial
question is how a political project has to look to be successful. Why does one
social group carry more weight than others? It will be argued later that this is
because one individual, group, or state plays the role of a leader. The battle
between discourses to become the leading interpretative structure brutally
reveals the configuration of power relations in a given historical moment. Power
is uneven, not stable or static, but is rearticulated continuously, and new concep-
tual perspectives are opened up by subversive practices (Butler 2000: 14; Laclau
2005: 115; Smith 1998: 57).
To understand the leadership role exemplified next, we quickly have to intro-
duce Laclau’s notion of credibility.5 Laclau argues that one predominant inter-
pretation of a social position will evolve as a result of its linkages with residual
institutions. Put differently, if the new political project clashes with the “ensem-
ble of sedimented practices constituting the normative framework of a certain
society” (Laclau 2000: 82; 1990: 66), it will likely be rejected. While a political
project has to be connected with certain political traditions that subjects identify
with, this argument will lose weight with the extent of the crisis. The more far-
reaching the dislocation of a discourse is, the less will principles still be in place
after the crisis.
Once a particular social force becomes hegemonic, however, it might be able
to prevail for some time. Laclau argues that when a discourse reaches the stage
of establishing a dominant perception of reality for all those participating in the
communicative process, it reveals a lot about the course of action in collective
identity formation. If the same “reality” is reflected in the speech acts of all
interacting agents, one can call it a shared culture. Different actors are compet-
ing for hegemony by offering their specific “systems of narration” as a compen-
satory framework for a crisis (Laclau 1977: 103; 2005: 106, 115), trying to fix
the meaning of social relations. Hegemony therefore reproduces our daily life; it
starts to be hegemonic when our everyday understanding of social relations and
the world as a whole starts to alter according to the framework that is set by the
hegemonic discourse. It is an act of power because it makes the world intelligi-
ble: “The power of discourse to materialize its effects is thus consonant with the
power of discourse to circumscribe the domain of intelligibility” (Butler 1993:
187). In a final step, the discourse produces and reproduces specific roles by
institutionalizing them into principles, norms, rules, and decision-making pro
cedures. It acquires material objectivity by becoming institutionally fixed. On
that basis, it is now possible to turn to our example of a role in international
politics.
88 D. Nabers
Leadership as a role in international politics
Leadership can be depicted as one particular, though very significant, function in
international politics (Holsti 1970; also Chafetz et al. 1996). It serves to exem-
plify here that role and identity change are significant features in international
politics. As Joseph Nye has put it, emphasizing the interpretative dimension of
the political process, “Leaders and followers learn roles and change roles as their
perceptions of situations change” (2008: 21). “To lead” is not a fixed state of
being but an act that has to be unveiled by looking at political processes. It will
thus be taken as what it is in the first instance: a verb. This seems necessary, as
traditional accounts of IR theory, such as various versions of rationalism, center
on the distribution of material capabilities, while constructivist and poststructur-
alist approaches in IR have only recently started to approach process-related con-
cepts such as a power and hegemony in international politics (e.g. Nabers 2009).
Steven Lukes’s (2005 [1974]) famous definition of the term “power” supplies
us with a helpful starting point in thinking about leadership. Lukes argues that
power is most effective in its unobservable form – that is, how willing com-
pliance with the wishes of the powerful is secured by influencing others’ “per-
ceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in
the existing order of things” (ibid.: 11). In that perspective, an actor exercises
power over another by influencing, shaping, or determining his or her wants,
beliefs, and understandings about his or her role or objective position in the
world. Subtle forms of power, such as the control of information and the process
of socialization, fall into this category. Rationalist approaches to international
politics, such as institutionalism and liberalism, widely ignore this relational and
processual perspective on power, owing to their statist ontology (Kratochwil and
Ruggie 1986). As Lukes (2005 [1974]: 12) has maintained, power does not
necessarily have to be exercised. As a capacity, it can be turned into leadership,
hegemony, or domination, but this is not a conditio sine qua non. Power does
not equal leadership (Nye 2008: x; Tucker 1995).
I argue in the following that to understand the role conception of leadership
as a role and its transformable disposition, we have to take a closer look at the
process- and meaning-driven character of international politics. In that sense,
James MacGregor Burns’s definition of the concept of leadership is still the most
sophisticated, functional, and influential,6 as it puts the complex relationship
between the roles of leaders and followers and the interpretative character of that
process center stage. It involves persuasion, exchange, and transformation. It is a
form of power, but it implies mutuality. To quote Burns:
Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain

motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, insti-
tutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse,
engage, and satisfy the motives of followers. This is done in order to realize
goals mutually held by both leaders and followers.
(1978: 18, emphasis in original)
In his socio-psychological leadership model, Peter Northouse in a similar fashion
emphasizes the process-driven character and the underlying mutuality of leader-
ship (1997). Nye follows up on the aspect of reciprocity by depicting “leaders as
those who help a group create and achieve shared goals” (2008: x).
Leadership approaches must thus embed the concepts of leaders and follow-
ers (self and other) within a broader theory of social and political roles, develop
a model of social change, account for physical constraints of social interaction,
and recognize the difficult interplay between objectivity and subjectivity (Burns
1978: 3f.). To put it in the vocabulary of traditional role theory, role senders
play a significant part in constituting the role of a leader in international politics.
Other actors carry with them certain expectations about the role of leaders, based
on experience. Leaders are influenced by the signals they receive from role
senders to a varying degree, depending on their sensitivity to the people around
them. Role conflict is a prevalent incidence in relations between leaders and fol-
lowers, as expectations regarding the behavior of a powerful state are often
incompatible.
Several authors in IR theory have tried to develop a more comprehensive,
interactive model of leadership and power during the past two decades. Young
explored the concept of leadership from a behavioral perspective, differentiating
between three forms of leadership – structural leadership, entrepreneurial leader-
ship and intellectual leadership – proposing a way to understand leadership in
international bargaining that can be of great help when analyzing states as
leaders in international affairs. Young’s contribution with regards to the role of
leadership in international politics is considerable. He puts forward three basic
arguments: First, leadership is essentially relational; structural leadership aims at
translating relative power capabilities into bargaining leverage by making use of
material threats and promises. Forming effective coalitions can be crucial in this
process. Second, a leader will be able to act as agenda setter, showing innovative
solutions to overcome deadlocks or operate as broker to gain support for salient
solutions. Third, leadership is a reflective process necessitating a deliberative
process of exchanging arguments. It implies the “power of ideas to shape the
intellectual capital available to those engaged in institutional bargaining” (Young
1991: 300).
In a similar vein, Ikenberry and Kupchan argue that
there is also a more subtle component of hegemonic power, one that works
at the level of substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs. Acquiescence
is the result of the socialization of leaders in secondary nations. Elites in
secondary states buy into and internalize norms that are articulated by the
hegemon and therefore pursue policies consistent with the hegemon’s notion
of international order.
(1990: 283)
This is a statement that gets much closer to reality than the static assumptions
presented by materialist approaches to leadership. It refers to the mechanisms that
90 D. Nabers
make leadership possible, to the sustainability of compliance by secondary states
and the likelihood of leadership failure. To accommodate exogenous sources of
leadership in the model developed here, one has to ask how material sources are
turned into power in international negotiations, since it is assumed that the mater-
ial power base has no intrinsic significance in itself. This is not to say that mater-
ial incentives do not play a role in international politics; it rather addresses the
question of how material capabilities are used in international politics.
Following Ikenberry and Kupchan, there are two basic ways to exercise
leadership: The first refers to material incentives, falling in the range from eco-
nomic sanctions to military strikes at the negative end and promises of reward at
the positive end. These methods aim at changing the costs and benefits of poten-
tial followers in pursuing alternative policies. The second means of exercising
leadership relies on the modification of basic beliefs of leaders in other nations
(Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990). The two ways of exercising leadership are inter-
related and reinforce each other in the political process. While the first form has
been described as hard power by Nye, resting on positive incentives (carrots)
and threats (sticks), the second is a form of soft power, portraying “the ability to
shape the preferences of others to want what you want” (2008: 29; also xii,
29–32, 39, 142f.). In reality, coercion and persuasion take place at the same time.
As has been said before, the first method works through external inducement
(Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 290), relying on economic and military incen-
tives to induce followers to change their policies. The second implies a reflexive,
discourse-based conception of power, allowing for a complex reformulation of
interests and identities. The possibility of “learning” is crucial in this process,
referring to what Risse (2000: 6) called a “logic of truth seeking and arguing.”
This implies that actors seek a communicative consensus about their understand-
ing of a certain situation, being open to persuasion by the better argument (see
also Müller, this volume).
Multilateral negotiations constitute the key method by which states address
joint problems and develop standard behavioral norms in world politics. In mul-
tilateral negotiations, the more universal in character an issue is, and the greater
the number of the participating states tends to be, the more important effectual
leadership is in order to make the debate move forward towards an accord. This
is because the greater the number of nation-states that join the negotiations, the
more diverse can be the things that are regarded as national interests by each
country, and the more complicated can be the relationship between those inter-
ests of the countries. Although it is not a sufficient condition, the presence of
leadership is a necessary condition for reaching an agreement (Young 1991:
302). In other words, as Lindberg and Scheingold argued, “leadership is the very
essence of a capacity for collective action” in multilateral negotiations (1970:
128). Likewise, Underdal argues that the more multifaceted the negotiation
setting – that is, the larger the number of actors and the number and “intricacy”
of issues – the more likely it is that some actors will emerge as leaders and
others as followers. In this process, leadership becomes a critical determinant of
success (1994: 179f.).
What all these approaches to define leadership as a role conception in IR have
in common is an emphasis on the process character of the role, its intersubjective
dimension, and, hence, its co-constitution with identities. Among a variety of
good examples for the exercise of leadership in international politics is the strug-
gle between Japan and China after the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 to gen-
erate a new interpretative framework for regional institutionalization. It
highlights the most important theoretical elements outlined above: Power and
the ability to endow a role with meaning will depend on an actor’s skill at pre-
senting his or her own particular worldview as compatible with the communal
aims. This, as we have also seen, works best in a situation of disintegration and
indeterminacy of articulations of different identities, or in a situation of disloca-
tion. In the years following the Asian crisis, a dialectic and fundamentally con-
tingent quest for leadership developed, mainly involving China and Japan but
also including some members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN)7 and South Korea. Deeper integration and community building can be
identified as the dominant interpretative framework used to overcome the pre-
dicament, with the institutionalization of ASEAN+38 and the East Asia Summit
(EAS)9 representing the institutional materialization of the hegemonic process
(Nabers 2003). While some observers argue that “China and Japan possess the
most significant ‘regional leader actor’ capacity in East Asia” (Dent 2008: 3),
these two countries also played a major role in the single stages of shaping a
“new Asian identity.” In the first years after the crisis broke out, Japan quickly
embraced a leadership role that included material incentives as well as vision
and entrepreneurial skills (Nabers 2003; Terada 2004). The role of leadership,
social change, and identity transformation fall together.
In conclusion, three aspects that shed some light on the nexus between role
and identity are underscored by this short empirical illustration (for details, see
Nabers 2010): First, leadership as a role is essentially relational, hence situated
in a complex structure of differential relationships. Second, leadership may have
particular “objective” sources; this may involve translating relative power cap-
abilities into bargaining leverage, but not necessarily. Materially weaker states
sometimes act as brokers to gain support for salient solutions, which is to suggest
that objectivity is always discursively constituted. Third, leadership involves the
continuous contestation over different representations that we call politics; it
requires communication and social interaction, and thereby serves as a constant
reminder that role can never be thought of without identity. Finally, it is the
identity as a set of meanings that characterizes an actor in a role.
Conclusion
In this chapter, it has been argued that an over-mechanistic account of roles
relying on fixed expectations of appropriate behavior has to be avoided. Instead,
reason and judgment lie at the core of roles, making them co-constitutive with
identities. On that basis, a process- and meaning-based account of role and iden-
tity change was developed. Finally, leadership as one particular example of a
92 D. Nabers
role in international politics was introduced. It was shown that leadership
depends on mutuality and intersubjectivity, and is highly contingent.
A final word on practical research: If we take the widespread reference to
norms as a starting point for a methodological discussion of role theory, an
initial concern lies in the ways that make the identification of norms possible.
Actors have to verbalize norms so that the expectations of appropriate behavior
that are so dominant in role research can actually develop. Hence, language
matters. Thus, following Hollis and Smith in this respect, “by stressing the way
in which roles have to be played within the terms of the prevailing language, we
hope to leave the itch bearable and analysis-by-role systematic enough” (1990:
167). This means that discourse analysis would provide an appropriate tool for
analyzing roles in international politics. This discussion has to be laid to rest
here, as it goes beyond the scope of this chapter.
Notes
1 Deep philosophical rifts exist in the social sciences in general and in IR in particular
with regard to causal and non-causal forms of scientific analysis. It would go well
beyond the scope of this chapter to reiterate this discussion at this point. See Kurki
(2008) for an in-depth treatment.
2 I am grateful to Sebastian Harnisch for highlighting the significance of imperfect iden-
tities as a possible source for role conflict.
3 Linda M.G. Zerilli (2004: 100) has argued that identities are indelibly shaped in the
public sphere and that psychoanalysis cannot account for these processes.
4 The notion of crisis thus assumes a central role in Laclau’s work, and he is very clear
about what he actually means by it: “A globalized capitalism creates myriad points of
rupture and antagonisms – ecological crises, imbalance between different sectors of the
economy, massive unemployment, and so on – and only an overdetermination of this
antagonistic plurality can create global anti-capitalist subjects capable of carrying out a
struggle worth the name” (2005: 150).
5 I am grateful to Frank A. Stengel for extensive and illuminating discussions of this
aspect.
6 Burns’s great impact can, for example, be seen in Nye’s book The Powers to Lead
(2008: 42, 64, 158, 160, 165, 166, 168, 175, 179).
7 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos,
Myanmar, and Cambodia.
8 The members of ASEAN plus China, Japan, and South Korea.
9 ASEAN+3 comprises the ASEAN countries plus Australia, New Zealand, and India.
Part II
Roles and institutions
6 NATO and the (re)constitution of
roles
“Self,” “we,” and “other”?
Trine Flockhart
Introduction
The popular perception of NATO’s role was famously summarized by its first
secretary-general, Lord Ismay, as “keeping the Russians out, the Americans in
and the Germans down.” Essentially, NATO’s mission remains to keep its
members safe from outside threats, to ensure the cohesion of the transatlantic
relationship, and to transform relations between former foes. However, behind
this alluringly simple description of NATO and its respective role lie complex
“self,” “we,” and “other” definitions and perceptions of roles and relevant func-
tional tasks. This chapter seeks to unravel some of the complex processes of
constituting and reconstituting NATO’s roles and associated perceptions of iden-
tity in NATO as an organization (the “self ”), its member states and prospective
member states (the “we”), its “partners,” and in its perception of “other.”
From a role and identity perspective, NATO has been engaged not only in
constructing the “self ” through the continuous development and maintenance of
a self-identity, but also in defining a role set, seen here as a collection of specific
functional tasks that are perceived to be in keeping with, and supportive of, the
self-identity. This process is currently undergoing significant change, with
NATO’s self-identity changing from a “defense alliance” to a “security manage-
ment institution”1 with an increasingly complex role set. Furthermore, NATO
has also been engaged in reconstituting a collective we-identity. The “we-
identity” refers to the shared feeling of “we-ness” supported by “we-doing”2 in
NATO’s functional tasks contained in the role set. The “we-identity” encom-
passes members and prospective members, gradually reconstructing the latter’s
identities through socialization of a norm set defined by NATO and its members,
thereby promoting an identity that is in accord with the collectively shared iden-
tity of NATO’s member states.
However, a growing number of states without membership potential and
without influence on NATO’s role see self-identity as participating in some of
NATO’s functional tasks – especially in the missions in the Balkans and Afghan-
istan. This behavioral and functional dimension has effectively added a new
grouping to NATO’s complex constituting and reconstituting of identities and
associated role set. The new group is referred to in this chapter as “partners,”
96 T. Flockhart
a group that is not part of NATO’s overarching self-identity and may not share
all of NATO’s core values or fulfill membership criteria, but which nevertheless
cooperates within part of NATO’s role set. By distinguishing between NATO’s
self-identity (defense alliance or security management institution), two different
“we-identities” (the collective identity of member states and prospective member
states), and a third category (“partners”) of states with which NATO has con-
structive relationships, it becomes apparent that NATO has from its earliest
history been an active agent in defining and promoting certain roles and identi-
ties among an ever-increasing number of states.
This process is in many ways very much like the one described by Mead,
where the initial process within the organization is defining the “I” and the “me,”
with the “I” representing the irreducible creative self and the “me” representing
the perception of the “self ” vis-à-vis the expectations of others concerning the
“(functional) role” of the self (Harnisch, this volume). Initially, this process con-
centrates on defining appropriate behavior for the organization and its members.
Although individual members have at times clashed in the struggle over defining
NATO’s role and role set, a fragile consensus has been maintained.3 However, in
response to both material and ideational changes in the international system,
especially following the end of the Cold War and 9/11, NATO’s perception of
the “other” and of its own role has changed significantly. It is no longer self-
evident that NATO is “merely” a defense alliance with a well-defined member-
ship, role set, and area of operation; structural changes in the international
system have caused NATO’s internal role construction and norm-promoting
activities to become increasingly externalized, as the focus has gradually shifted
away from internal processes of role and identity construction to the engagement
with states that had previously been part of the “other” or defined as “out-of-
area.” In doing so, not only did the roles of the norm receivers change along with
their change from “other” to “prospective we” or “partner,” but NATO’s role
also changed fundamentally. In other words, the history of NATO has been a
continuous process of role and identity construction of “self,” “we,” and “other”
through the internal adoption and external diffusion of the norms, values, and
associated practices that constitute NATO’s “self,” “we,” and “other.”
This chapter will seek to outline the complex process of intentional identity
construction within NATO and vis-à-vis the different “wes,” as well as the
ongoing and unintentional processes of reconstituting the “self,” “we,” and
“other” in response to changes in the structural environment and agent-led pro
cesses of changed behavior. Employing role theory and social identity theory
(SIT), the chapter will analyze the dynamics of multiple role constructions in
NATO and its member states, prospective member states, and partner countries.
It will proceed in four steps, starting with a review of role theory and SIT, their
connections, and their application to NATO. I shall then sketch the construction
of roles and identities, focusing on the “self ” (NATO). This will be followed by
a section on the “we” – the construction of roles and identities in the “partners”
group. Both sections will be structured around three different phases of NATO’s
history, defined by crisis and change at the structural level in the periods
NATO and the (re)constitution of roles 97
1945–49, 1989–91 and 1999–2001. Finally, this chapter will assess the roles of
NATO and its prospects for continued development under the new conditions of
globalization.
Role theory and social identity theory

Role theory essentially concerns itself with the interaction between agent and
structure, and the interaction between different agents. This chapter applies both
strands of role theory outlined by Sebastian Harnisch earlier in this volume – one
emphasizing material structures as providing resources for certain roles (role
adaption), one seeing roles as embedded in certain social arrangements and pat-
terns of interaction between different agents (constitutive interdependence) –
conceptualized here as constitutive interaction. This understanding is closely
related to Lord Ismay’s definition of NATO’s role, whose first component
(keeping the Russians out) displays a material and structural understanding of
threats and the subsequent adoption of specific strategies to counter it. Changes
at the structural level have on several occasions given rise to role adaptation,
where strategies and instruments have changed although the overall goals of the
organization have stayed fixed. NATO’s development from a defense alliance to
a security management institution can be seen in this light. However, the other
two roles mentioned by Lord Ismay (keeping the Americans in and the Germans
down) have more to do with social relationships between different agents and
their ideational basis than with material structures. Both are concerned with
transforming social relationships through complex processes of interaction and
identity construction. Through Mead’s “constitutive interdependence of self and
other” (1934), NATO can be conceptualized as an agent of socialization, actively
promoting a specific norm set and associated behavioral practices because
NATO (or those agents acting on behalf of NATO) sees itself as such – and
because this is accepted by states on the receiving end of norm promotion (Har-
nisch, this volume).
These two forms of role behavior – constitutive interaction and role adapta-
tion – coexist simultaneously, and can be connected through mutual constitution
and dependence. Role adaptation can occur only if all member states agree, yet
NATO actively facilitates agreement on role adaptation through interactive pro
cesses of socialization, including bargaining, social influence, and persuasion.
Similarly, in external relations, NATO can only become a socializing agent if
NATO sees itself in that role. This, of course, requires agreement from NATO’s
highest decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Social rela-
tionships and the interaction between agents will to a large extent be influenced
by structural material conditions and by individual agents’ choice of strategies
and instruments. Conversely, these choices will have an influence on the social
relationships.
The relationship between the different agents in the construction of roles is
summarized in Figure 6.1. The focus is on the constitution of the role of NATO,
defined here as the “self,” on the member states, defined here as the “we-1,” and
98 T. Flockhart
“Self”
“We-1”
NATO
“Other”
“Partners” “We-2”
Figure 6.1 Role prescriptions – lines of influence.
on the constitution of roles in a group of prospective members states, defined here

as “we-2.” I use the term “reconstitution” to highlight the procedural and contin-
gent dimension of identity (Schlag 2009), suggesting that an identity is not some-
thing an agent merely inherits, but includes “a set of reproductive practices and
structures of signification which are able to change” (ibid.: 2). As indicated above,
the following also addresses NATO’s impact on the constitution of roles in a
fourth category of states that have constructive relationships with NATO through
partnership or dialogue, but for which membership is not on the agenda. NATO’s
impact on this group of states is perhaps the most puzzling and challenging, as
this group does not easily fit into either of the we-categories or the “other.” Yet
the secretary-general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, listed relations with this group as
one of only four priorities in his first speech as secretary-general (2009).
Role theory cannot account for every aspect of foreign policy behavior,
because it allows for individual interpretations and definitions of rights, duties,
privileges, and appropriate forms of behavior (Holsti 1987: 7). As was suggested
by Hollis and Smith (1990: 14), roles involve judgment and skill, albeit such
judgment and skill are practiced within a structure. Hence, there is considerable
room for agency in role theory, allowing for behavior that may seem inconsist-
ent with the actor’s role. In times of structural change, the role set is likely to
become unstable, leading to a redefinition of roles and intensification of learning
and socialization processes, as agents become more open to adopting different
norm sets and different practices. These periods of time are defined in this
chapter as “extraordinary moment[s] when the existence and viability of the
political order are called into question” (Ikenberry 2008: 3). According to Iken-
berry, such moments may leave the existing rules and institutions intact, or lead
to transformation, adaptation, or breakdown (ibid.: 12). In both cases, however,
learning takes place, as agents change their behavior and their guiding norm set.
In this chapter, the emphasis is on resolution and adaptation. The structural
changes following World War II, the Cold War, the Kosovo war, and 9/11 did
indeed speed up processes of new identity construction and the redefinition of
roles in response to changes in expectations vis-à-vis the role set and role per-
formance. Because of the importance of “extraordinary moments” for inducing
change, the following focuses on them.
Role theory is useful for explaining the interactive processes between agents
and the structural conditions affecting the individual agent, but in the end the
outcome of the influence exercised through structure and interactive processes is
the agent’s own role conception. Holsti (1987: 8) outlines the sources of role
conceptions as a variety of factors including history, culture, norms and values,
needs, and interests. In other words, whereas expectations for role performance
and the role set take place in the space between different actors, role conception
is a process that takes place within the individual agent – in this case NATO.
These internal processes can broadly be termed identity construction processes.
The question is, however, how we account for differences in role conception
between agents subjected to similar structural constraints, histories, and cultures,
and similar expectations for role performance.
For example, how do we account for the difference in role performance and
role conception between Ukraine and Belarus, or between Croatia and Serbia, or
Georgia and Azerbaijan? The answer was given above: role theory gives plenty
of scope to agency and acknowledges that agents’ choices, preferences, and
ability influence role conception and performance. And yet this is an unsatisfac-
tory answer if we want to understand why agents choose certain options over
others. If we want to be able to understand why similar agents sometimes make
different choices, it is therefore necessary to supplement role theory with an
agent-level theory accounting for differences between otherwise similar agents.
A useful theoretical perspective for this puzzle is SIT, particularly self- and other
categorization processes.4
SIT provides a theory of the agent that is not dependent on assumptions of
rationality but focuses instead on agents’ inherent desire to maximize their own
self-esteem. SIT assumes that an individual’s self esteem cannot be maintained
in isolation, but is derived from, and maintained through, social relationships
that occur in social groups that are psychologically significant for the members
and to which they relate themselves subjectively for social comparison with
other social groups (Turner 1987: 1). In SIT, all agents belong to a social group
and are arranged hierarchically within a similar realm between a shared “other,”
which is what defines what the “self ” is not and what it seeks to distance itself
from, and a shared “significant we,” which defines what the “self ” admires and
strives to become (Flockhart 2006: 94). Social groups therefore acquire a central
position within SIT, because it is through differently ordered and categorized
social groups that individuals acquire their norms and values, and achieve and
maintain their self-esteem. Interactive processes are therefore as important for
SIT as they are for the constitutive interaction strand of role theory.
100 T. Flockhart
Agents are continuously categorizing social groups within a specific realm
(such as European security) and their position and possibilities within this similar
realm. Agents prefer membership of the social group that is categorized as the
“significant we,” or as close to the “significant we” as possible, because the higher-
ranking the social group, the more likely it is that group membership will generate
the desired self-esteem. Membership, however, is not open to all, but depends on
an agent’s willingness and ability to adopt the norms, values, and practices of the
social group it wishes to join, and on the group’s willingness to accept new
members. Agents that regard NATO as a “significant we” are more easily social-
ized than agents that do not. Agents that regard NATO as part of the “other,” or
are indifferent to NATO, are unlikely to be socialized voluntarily. The govern-
ment of Ukraine has changed and the new government no longer regards the
West as a “significant we.” Differences in agents’ choice, as in the example of
Ukraine and Belarus, can be explained through different conceptions of what con-
stitutes the “significant we” and the “other.” In the case of Belarus, the “significant
we” is regarded as Russia, whereas in the case of Georgia the “significant we” is
regarded – by the government at least – as the West, i.e. NATO and the European
Union. NATO therefore is likely to have much more influence through interactive
processes on Georgia because Georgia aspires to join and is more likely to adopt
the norms and practices of the in-group (NATO) and to work very hard to achieve
the desired group membership.5
SIT shows that identities are constructed through self- and other categoriza-
tions: the “self ” is located as far away as possible from the “other” and as close
as possible to what is considered the “significant we.” During the process of
identity constructions, agents learn about the dominant norm set and associated
practices through socialization and mimicking, and are likely to learn to behave
in accordance with the dominant norm set of the desired social group. In the
case of NATO, the norm set, which “we-1” and “we-2” agents are required to
learn and adopt, is a form of liberal internationalism. NATO and the other insti-
tutions of the liberal order established after 1945 have gradually acquired the
role of “keepers of the norm set” and as the main norm-promoting agents. An
important precondition for an organization to be able to act as norm socializer
is agreement within the organization on what constitutes the “self ” and appro-
priate conduct.
By combining elements of role theory with SIT, it is possible to trace changes
in the construction and reconstitution of roles and identities in NATO and in the
agents with which NATO interacts. The following analysis is organized around
three extraordinary moments in NATO’s history: 1945–49, 1989–91 and
1999–2001. The defining feature of these moments is structural change inducing
ideational change and changes in NATO’s strategic documents.6 It must be
pointed out, however, that the use of these specific dates is indicative, suggesting
that new ways of thinking followed in their wake. The dates are by no means
meant to indicate that change has only occurred during these periods: gradual
change and reconstitution has been a characteristic of NATO throughout its
history. The use of both role theory and SIT facilitates a holistic approach
allowing for both structural and material factors, as well as social and ideational
factors. This means that it is possible to trace subtle changes in role conception
and self-identity, role adaptation, and constitutive interaction patterns in NATO
through time.
Constructing and reconstituting the “self ”

The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington on 4 April 1949 pro-
vided the basic contours of the Atlantic Alliance, although the precise role, rela-
tionships, and strategic documents still needed to be completed. However, what
constituted appropriate behavior within NATO was from the beginning not com-
pletely straightforward, and behavior and rhetoric have at times appeared illogi-
cal and contradictory. To understand apparent contradictions in NATO’s
rhetoric, it is necessary to look at the key strategies formulated after World War
II. As was suggested by Ikenberry (2001), the postwar period has been charac-
terized by two parallel foreign policy strategies – containment and institution
building – leading to a liberal order. The existence of two foreign policy strat-
egies, which in many ways can be seen as contradictory, has given rise to two
parallel processes of role and identity construction. NATO’s special position as
an important instrument in the strategy of containment, and as an important part
of the new institutional architecture, has from the beginning problematized the
construction of “the self,” because NATO always had to contend with “two
selves.”
Within the strategy of containment, NATO’s “self ” was based on a material
“other” – the Soviet Union – and the concrete and material threat of nuclear war.
The “significant we” was conceptualized as “the free world,” which allowed
inclusion of dubious contenders for that title such as Spain and Portugal (the
latter a founding member of NATO). Within the strategy of liberal order, on the
other hand, “the self ” was based on an ideational “other” – Europe’s own
warring past (Wæver 1998) – and a rather vague threat in the shape of the danger
of a return to great power rivalry in Europe, while the “significant we” was a
community of liberal states in which conflict would be resolved peacefully.
During the whole postwar period, the two strategies have coexisted, although
with differing degrees of emphasis and with parallel role conceptions and
prescriptions.
Throughout NATO’s history, the construction of the “self ” has taken place
through socialization processes based on persuasion and negotiations and the
use of force, e.g. the interposition of NATO forces between Greece and Turkey,
or the deployment of NATO forces in Germany. An important part of the
process has been the almost constant search for consensus on all policy
decisions in the NAC. Agreeing on strategic documents has traditionally been
especially slow and arduous. In these internal processes of persuasion and
negotiation, the role of the United States as primus inter pares has allowed that
country to establish itself as the organization’s agenda setter and internal
socialization agent.
102 T. Flockhart
Vague values but a concrete “other,” 1945–89
During NATO’s early existence, its primary role conception was based on the
concrete and menacing “other” in the form of the Soviet Union and an over-
whelming nuclear threat. As a result, the role position of NATO during the Cold
War became that of a military defense alliance with the specific task of ensuring
that the containment strategy worked, and avoiding nuclear war. This role was
expressed most clearly in article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and was gradu-
ally specified further in a number of strategic documents7 aimed at providing the
alliance with strategic direction and codifying decisions taken in its day-to-day
management (Rynning and Ringsmose 2009). The protracted negotiations over
the 1957 strategic document outlining Massive Retaliation and the 1968 docu-
ment outlining Flexible Response were constitutive for how socialization was to
take place by establishing expectations for negotiations to take place until agree-
ment could eventually be reached.
NATO’s “secondary self,” based on the strategy of liberal order, always lurked
in the background, as underscored in article 2 of the Atlantic Treaty. It specifies
that the alliance will contribute towards peaceful and friendly international rela-
tions by strengthening their free institutions and by bringing about a better under-
standing of the principles upon which these institutions are founded. The
commitment to the second foreign policy strategy of building a liberal order was
not a priority in the first years of NATO’s existence, when events such as the first
Soviet nuclear explosion and the Korean War cemented the Soviet Union as
NATO’s “other.” The construction of a self-conception based on the strategy of
the liberal order did not start until the agreement of the Harmel Report in 1967.
The Harmel Report was the turning point for acknowledging the liberal order strat-
egy as part of NATO’s self-conception and for acknowledging article 2 of the
treaty. It concluded that “the way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particu-
lar on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of détente” (Harmel
Report 1967). Nevertheless, during the Cold War, containment lay at the heart of
the dominant role conception and the raison d’être of the Alliance. As a result,
NATO’s Cold War role definition was as a military defense alliance.
A vanishing “other” and testing tasks, 1989–99

The waning of the Soviet threat robbed NATO of the source of its most obvious
role prescription and much of its self-conception. After the Cold War, the alli-
ance therefore faced the task of refocusing on the ideational “other” of Europe’s
own warring past and the ideational “significant we,” now conceptualized as a
“security community.” NATO had to adapt if it were to “stay in business,” and it
quickly did so by adopting a New Strategic Concept in November 1991. The
new document emphasized dialogue, partnership, and cooperation, and stressed
that the threat was now political instability and ethnic unrest on the European
fringe. This proved to be true. But as NATO had not yet redefined its role to go
“out of area,” it could play only a marginal role in the Balkans. This was despite
the fact that a role in crisis management was part of the New Strategic Concept,
which provided for “the management of crises affecting the security of its
members.”8 NATO’s involvement in the Balkan crises therefore started out
slowly and tentatively in 1992 by monitoring and enforcing the UN-imposed
arms embargo. However, in 1995 NATO intervened militarily, cementing the
organization’s role in conflict prevention and crisis management.
The task of reconstructing the “other” from a material “other” to an ideational
“other,” and of the reconstruction of the “significant we,” now conceptualized as
a security community, was not easy. Both concepts were abstract and conceptu-
ally demanding because of the difficulty in defining the “self” without a distinct
material “other.” Also, no logical or material borders could be constructed for the
“self,” with the values defining the “self ” being increasingly shared by states
outside of NATO – many without a real potential for becoming members. It was
difficult to delimit the “self ” purely on the basis of values such as liberal demo-
cracy. As demands for membership and association with NATO increased,
NATO had to consider much more carefully its criteria for membership.
However, in order to formulate precise criteria for membership, it was also neces-
sary to better define the “self.” The result was a gigantic project of state socializa-
tion in which NATO became a major agent of socialization of liberal democracy
and associated behavioral standards in the entire New Europe (Schimmelfennig et
al. 2006). Although most of the socialization process was directed at constructing
the “we” through norm promotion, the process became self-transforming and con-
tributed to the reconstitution of NATO’s “self ” by constructing the alliance as a
norm promoter and socializer. Within a short time, NATO had established a
network of institutional structures for socialization purposes, including the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Partnership for Peace (PfP), etc. NATO
has taken its new role as socialization agent extremely seriously and has come to
define the promotion of liberal norms and associated practices as one of its
primary roles. As a result, NATO’s post-Cold War role definition can be
described as more than a defense alliance, with additional responsibilities for con-
flict prevention and crisis management being included and NATO increasingly
coming to be seen as a promoter of liberal norms.
The emergence of new threats and practical tasks, 1999 and beyond
On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary, and amid the beginning of the
bombing campaign in Kosovo, the first former Warsaw Pact countries were wel-
comed into the Alliance, and the 1991 New Strategic Concept was revised by
removing the word “new” from the title and adding crisis management and part-
nership, cooperation, and dialogue in the North Atlantic area as a fourth strategic
priority (Rynning and Ringsmose 2009). As for articulating a self-representation,
the new strategic concept was vague at best, stating that future challenges and
risks were likely to stem from “in and around the Euro-Atlantic area” (NATO
1999) and that the Allies had to take into account “risks of a wider nature” and
the “global context” (Flockhart and Kristensen 2008). However, on this occasion
104 T. Flockhart
the strategic document is perhaps not the best way to gauge NATO’s self-
conception for the period after 1999, as the Strategic Concept very clearly
describes the situation as it was before 1999.
Since the 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO has been “through the mill”!
Important events that have shaped NATO include the Kosovo campaign, which
despite the success of the mission displayed American and European differences
over how to handle the war, as well the considerable gap in military capability.
The inability of Europeans to fully participate in the Kosovo air campaign seri-
ously challenged NATO’s self-conception as a military organization able to deal
effectively with crisis management and conflict prevention. The negative self-
conception was further increased when NATO, following 11 September 2001,
decided to invoke article 5, only to have the offer of help in Afghanistan politely
declined by the United States (Maull, this volume). European allies felt snubbed,
and the chance for the Bush administration to reassure the European allies that
NATO was still valued by the United States had been lost. Amid rhetoric of “the
axis of evil” and “pre-emptive strikes,” the transatlantic chill grew to such an
extent that some foresaw “the end of the negotiated international order” (Peter-
son 2004). The chill turned into “a near-death experience”9 when the NAC
refused to authorize advanced military planning to help defend Turkey in the
event of war in Iraq in February 2003. Hence, by the spring of 2003 NATO had
been through nearly four years of continuous crisis over a whole range of issues
(Pond 2004). As suggested by Hitchcock (2008: 54), crises at the beginning of
the twenty-first century – especially Iraq – continue to loom large, preventing
the process of adaptation, rule making and compromise from being successfully
implemented. The unfortunate coincidence of structural change necessitating
adaptation brought about by 9/11 and several crises in the Atlantic political order
has meant that NATO has been unable to reach agreement on adaptation or reso-
lution. NATO was at a point where it simply had to turn the tide. By then,
however, Ikenberry’s (2008) two options, “resolution” or “adaptation,” had been
substituted with a new discourse on “transformation.”10
Rynning and Ringsmose (2009: 16) suggest that there are two competing
visions of NATO. One is “come home, NATO” which calls for a regionally
anchored organization emphasizing article 5 issues. The other is “globalize,
stupid,” arguing that NATO should become a more global organization.
Although the question is not settled, and is more a matter of emphasis than
either–or, NATO has taken a number of decisions that can be seen as gradually
redefining the organization as one that is able to act globally. In practice, the
decision on 11 August 2003 to take over responsibility for the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF ) in Afghanistan – a mission that has subse-
quently broadened significantly in both geographical and operational scope –
meant that NATO had now, for better or for worse, moved not only “out of area”
but out of the Euro-Atlantic region altogether (Flockhart and Kristensen 2008).
The transformation of NATO towards a more global and more expeditionary
security actor can also be seen in the development of the NATO Response Force
(NRF ). This consists of smaller and more agile forces geared towards meeting
threats where threats occur, rather than the traditional reliance on territorial
defense. Transformation is also visible in the 2006 Comprehensive Political
Guidance (CPG), which can be seen as an interim strategic concept outlining the
likely threats as terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
Although NATO has only recently adopted a new strategic document, it has
been involved in a number of activities that all seem to indicate the dominance of
a role conception that emphasizes the “globalize stupid” vision. NATO’s military
involvement in Kosovo and Afghanistan, its anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of
Aden, disaster relief in Pakistan, and assistance to the African Union (AU) in
Darfur all point towards a role conception as a security organization with a wide
portfolio of tasks and a wide geographical reach. On the other hand, the “NATO,
come home” vision seems to be gaining strength, not least since the Russian–
Georgian war and the cyber attack on Estonia in 2007. Following NATO’s suc-
cessful adoption of its new strategic concept in November 2010, it seems that
both visions are still in play as the new document skillfully has managed to
deterritorialize article 5, so that the important article now can be seen as both
refering to those who see NATO as a regional defense alliance and those who
see NATO as a much more global security management institution. As such, it is
able to act globally and regionally, militarily and politically, and in cooperation
with other international organizations and with a large number of partners and
special relationship countries, not just in the Euro-Atlantic region but as far afield
as Australia and New Zealand. Although by no means a completely settled ques-
tion, the development of NATO’s changing conceptions of “other,” “significant
we,” as well as role conception and role sets are roughly outlined in Figure 6.2.
• “Other” – Soviet threat

• “Significant we” – Free World
• Role – defense alliance
1945–1989 • Role set – defending the North Atlantic area
• “Other” – vague past

• ”Significant we” – security community
• Role – defense alliance, norm promoter and peacekeeper
1989–1999 • Role set – defending the North Atlantic area, promoting democracy, rule of law,
and liberal values, participating in peacekeeping in the Balkans
• “Other” – vague past/instability

• “Significant we” – security community and democratic states
• Role – security management institution, norm promoter, defense alliance
1999– • Role set – defending the North Atlantic area, promoting democracy, rule of law,
human rights and liberal values, active security management where NATO’s
interests are at stake, disaster relief and rapid reaction
Figure 6.2 NATO – conceptions of “other,” “significant we,” and role.

106 T. Flockhart
The figure shows that the development of NATO has been towards an ever-
enlarging and ever more complex role set, with a corresponding change in
NATO’s role conception.
Transforming relations: the reconstitution of “we” and

partners
The founders of the liberal order and of NATO were, as indicated by Lord
Ismay, fully aware that NATO’s role could not only be to “keep the Russians
out”; it also had to be to transform the relations between states that only recently
had been bitter enemies, or had been content with an isolated existence protected
by the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. From a role-theoretical perspective, the
transformation of relations, which have gradually constituted the “we” and part-
ners, has taken place through constitutive interaction parallel to the processes of
role adaptation I have described. These have been continuous processes through-
out NATO’s history, although changes in their patterns have been influenced by
the same extraordinary moments that defined the role adaptation.
It must also be recalled that NATO is an alliance of sovereign states with dif-
fering interests and different cultural and historical backgrounds, and that NATO
is built around a promise of nuclear protection, which, if honored, would almost
certainly lead to the destruction of the protector – the United States. As a result,
cohesion has always been regarded as particularly important for NATO, because
disunity could jeopardize the credibility of the nuclear guarantee. All member
states have therefore been subjected to substantial moral pressure to agree to
decisions that would lead either to “resolution” or to “adaptation,” as it was
believed that “transformation” or “breakdown” would indicate a lack of cohe-
sion. In reality, there have been many examples where the diverging interests of
member states have prevented the reaching of either resolution or adaptation. In
such situations, NATO has developed a fifth option, “ambiguity,” a position
where all members tacitly agree not to publicly disagree and not to push for
clarity, hence being able to maintain the appearance of cohesion.
Constitutive interaction and community building

NATO has been characterized by bargaining and negotiation among its members in
order to maintain consensus. Strategic issues, burden sharing, the role of nuclear
weapons, the credibility of the nuclear guarantee, and German rearmament and
enlargement have been particularly important. In all the consensus-building proc-
esses, the United States has been privileged in its ability to define the shared values
and expected codes of conduct. The United States has therefore performed the
internal role as socializing agent vis-à-vis existing members. The privileged posi-
tion of the United States as the main socializing agent is a product of two historic
bargains between it and Europe. One is that the United States provided the Europe-
ans with protection and access to US markets, while the Europeans in turn accepted
American leadership and agreed to be reliable partners by providing diplomatic,
economic, and logistical support to American leadership (Ikenberry 2008). The
other is that the United States agreed to operate in and be constrained by an institu-
tional system, while the Europeans accepted the American blueprint for this
institutional order. The bargain was accepted by most members, although France
has never fully accepted the Uniteed States’ leading position, and has doubted the
credibility of the security guarantee (Krotz and Sperling, and Maull, this volume).
The practice of patient consensus making within NATO under the leadership of
the United States has been constitutive of the identity of the member states and has
over time generated a growing sense of “we-feeling,” which has gradually forged
the alliance into a community of states based on shared values and a collective iden-
tity and shared conceptions of the “other.” While it is unlikely that the architects of
the Atlantic Alliance set out to establish a “security community,” they appear to
have put in place precisely what Karl Deutsch et al. (1957) later identified as the
necessary ingredients for establishing a pluralistic security community. Deutsch et
al. argued that a leading power was needed to help construct a security community
with a shared threat perception, and that its maintenance depended on a sense of
shared values and a firm commitment to talk and bargain rather than to polarize and
fight (Hall 2008). Furthermore, Deutsch maintains that community building is
advanced by a plurality of interests and crises. This is precisely what happened
during the Cold War, where individual self-interested states gradually became a col-
lective “we” and value community through the established practices of interaction
in NATO.
The role construction through constitutive interaction therefore took place
against a clear “we”-conception (NATO members) and a hierarchy within the “we-
group” whereby the US voice carried greater weight than the rest – on condition
that it stayed within the parameters of the agreed institutional order. Furthermore,
constitutive interaction took place vis-à-vis a shared “other” and with agreed prac-
tical procedures for interaction based on persuasion and negotiation around a joint
enterprise (Wenger 1998). All new members had to accept these conditions, which
have been a continuing characteristic of all constitutive interaction within the “we-
1,” and the basis on which all decisions have been taken. Through the institutionali-
zation of persuasion and negotiation, agents have become emotionally attached to
both the practice and the shared enterprise, making it very difficult and emotionally
costly to redefine or break old routines (Adler 2008). However, it was precisely the
established practices of persuasion and negotiation around a shared enterprise that
were disrupted during the Bush presidency – especially in relation to the war in
Iraq. Hence, established patterns of constitutive interaction within the “we-1” group
were disrupted, with profound consequences for the ability of the alliance to tackle
the necessary role adaptation in response to the structural changes of 9/11.
Constitutive interaction and norm socialization

Following the end of the Cold War, the tightly knit relationships within the
“we-1” were challenged by persistent demands from former foes to become part
108 T. Flockhart
of this “we.” NATO members were initially unenthusiastic about enlargement,
which was seen as potentially undermining the alliance’s cohesion. However,
politically the pressure for closer relationships with former Warsaw Pact
members could not be resisted, and in July 1990 NATO agreed to “extend the
hand of friendship” to its former Warsaw Pact opponents. Almost immediately,
constitutive interaction processes in NATO changed and the circle of interacting
agents increased significantly. As argued by Alexandra Gheciu (2005), NATO
systematically engaged in projecting a liberal democratic norm set into Central
and Eastern Europe, where NATO became an agent of socialization outside the
confines of NATO itself. In doing so, the role conception of the “self ” changed
to an external norm socializer, which entailed considerable change in role defini-
tion within the states on the receiving end of NATO’s socialization efforts, and
in the conceptualization of NATO’s “we.”
Initially, NATO had no blueprint for the extensive institutional network that
was to develop following the decision to “extend the hand of friendship,” and
even where such a blueprint existed, the breath-taking speed of events meant
that plans had to be altered frequently. This was especially true for NATO’s
first major initiative: the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) changed
fundamentally when the Soviet Union dissolved during the inaugural session
in December 1991. What was supposed to have been a manageable group of
23 states suddenly included all the successor states of the Soviet Union. The
unexpected growth of the NACC resulted in such a diversity of interests that
those states bent on membership felt that their needs could not be addressed
adequately in this new institution. The Central and East European countries –
in particular, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (and later the Czech
Republic and Slovakia) – categorized themselves as closer to their “significant
we” (NATO) than some of the former Soviet republics. They argued persua-
sively for differentiation between NACC members, which resulted in a new
institutional initiative for managing socialization in 1994: the Partnership for
Peace (PfP).
While it remains doubtful that NATO had a clear idea of whether PfP was a
tactic for gaining time or whether it was a first step towards full membership,
from a role construction perspective PfP was a stroke of genius. The PfP initi-
ative was based on the twin principles of self-differentiation and self-financing,
which meant that the individual PfP country set the pace and the goals. Thus,
NATO effectively left the responsibility of categorization to the PfP countries
themselves, while its own role was restricted to defining membership conditions.
This method of self-categorization was further developed in the Membership
Action Plan (MAP), in which prospective member states work towards fulfilling
all the necessary criteria judged by NATO to be required. Ten countries have
signed up for MAP, of which all but Macedonia have now achieved member-
ship. Over time, as NATO became more used to and adept at its new role as
norm socializer, specific accession criteria were added based on the emerging
constitutive rules of the Western community (Schimmelfennig et al. 2006) and
increasingly based on NATO’s own needs in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Indeed,
prospective members were notified that they were expected to behave as security
producers and not simply as consumers of NATO assistance (Moore 2009).
Since the PfP process started in 1994, 12 countries have moved from the
“we-2” group to the “we-1” group by gaining full membership of NATO. Hence,
the group of prospective members has shrunk significantly, while NATO’s mem-
bership has increased to 28 members. In the process, the role conception of the
“we-1” has barely changed, as NATO’s collective identity is still viewed as a
community of democratic states conceptualized as a security community. In con-
trast, the role and self-conceptions of those states that have moved from the
“we-2” to the “we-1” group have changed significantly, involving both practical
and rhetorical adaptation as well as more deep-seated changes in their overall
identity as a part of a new social grouping – NATO. This suggests that NATO
has had considerable success in its new role as a socializing agent. Moreover,
the new member states also influence NATO’s role conception as the main pro-
ponents of the “NATO, come home” vision, and key supporters of a greater
emphasis on article 5 issues.
Constitutive interaction and partnerships

One of the firm beliefs that have developed in NATO since the end of the Cold
War is that NATO’s own territory cannot be truly secure if its periphery is unsta-
ble (Moore 2009). Although most attention has been focused on NATO’s eastern
flank, the southern flank has also long been recognized as an area of instability,
with many unresolved security issues. Therefore, building on the success of the
PfP program, NATO decided in 1994 to promote other partnership initiatives
(Adler 2008) with states whose membership potential was regarded as minimal or
non-existent. In 1994, NATO established the so-called Mediterranean Dialogue
(MD) with seven states (Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Jordan, and
Algeria), none of which had aspirations to become a member of NATO, or had
been invited to become one. In 1997, the NATO–Russian Permanent Joint Council
was established, along with a decision to upgrade the NACC to the Euro-Atlantic
Partnership Council (EAPC), which was designed to be a forum for political con-
sultation complementary to the PfP’s practical cooperation (Flockhart and
Kristensen 2008). At the same time, specific membership preparation was moved
into the MAP, thereby separating PfP and EAPC from the issue of membership.
Since 1997, further institutional initiatives have included closer institutional
arrangements with Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia in recognition that these states
have special issues that cannot be resolved within the existing partnership and
cooperation arrangement. The process of establishing relationships with states
outside NATO received new impetus with the 11 September terrorist attacks,
with NATO gradually abandoning its Eurocentric focus by establishing the
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) in 2004 and by declaring its intention to
transform the MD into a genuine partnership (Moore 2009). Finally, at the 2006
summit in Riga, NATO opened up yet further to “global partners,” “triple nons”
(non-NATO, non-partner, non-European), or simply “other partners across the
110 T. Flockhart
globe.” These “other partners” include, inter alia, Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
and South Korea.
As a result, NATO now has a network of differentiated relationships with
states unlikely ever to become a part of either the “we-1” or the “we-2” groups,
but at the same time not part of the “other.” These states, here referred to as part-
ners, can be divided into five subgroups:
• PfP countries with no membership potential (e.g. some of the Central Asian
former Soviet Republics).
• PfP countries with no current wish to achieve membership (Finland,
Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland, and Austria).
• MD and ICI countries, none which seek membership or are likely to be
invited to join.
• “Global partners,” such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea,
with which NATO shares fundamental values, and several interests, but
which are not considered potential members.
• A group of countries continue to have special institutional relationships with
NATO, including Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia. They have very different
issues and very different relationships with NATO. Only Georgia has mem-
bership aspirations, although the 2008 Russo-Georgian war has delayed
Georgian NATO membership indefinitely.
From a role theory and SIT perspective, NATO’s relationship with these states is
complicated because role adoption and constitutive interaction are more than
usually interlinked, and NATO’s (and partners’) rhetoric is shrouded in a veil of
diplomatic talk. However, it is clear that the renewed impetus for developing the
various forms of partnerships can be seen as a reaction to the structural changes
in the international environment following 9/11. This is not least the increasing
need for contributions to NATO’s costly operations in Afghanistan, where
contributions from countries such as Sweden and Australia are highly
welcome. Moreover, the MD and the ICI emphasize political dialogue and par-
ticipation in PfP activities and other training, as well as courses at NATO
schools (Moore 2009). These two relationships were elevated during the Bush
presidency and amid rhetoric of democracy promotion in the Middle East and
around the Mediterranean. However, it is difficult to see that these countries
have the same potential for democracy promotion, as they are not seeking and
are not being offered NATO membership. Nor do they categorize NATO as their
“significant we,” which is likely to severely limit the possibilities for socializa-
tion. Nevertheless, relationships with the MD and the ICI have been elevated to
a special area of priority by NATO’s current secretary-general, Anders Fogh
Rasmussen. This emphasis on the MD and the ICI must be seen as a conscious
attempt by the SG to enter into new relationships of constitutive interaction with
Muslim countries to counteract the negative impact of Rasmussen’s handling of
the Danish cartoon crisis in 2006 and ensuing negative perceptions in those
countries.
As outlined in Figure 6.1, the lines of influence between NATO and “part-
ners” are likely to remain fragile. This is likely to continue to be the case despite
their elevation to special status, because the conditions for significant influence
in either direction are simply not there. Nevertheless, relationships with global
partners clearly provide a much-needed contribution to the operation in Afghani-
stan at a time when NATO resources are stretched to the limit. Similarly,
enhancing relations with the MD and ICI countries is likely to have positive
(albeit limited) effects on diplomatic relations between NATO and Muslim
countries, which may see NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan in negative terms
and whose view of NATO’s new secretary-general was formed during the
cartoon crisis. Notwithstanding the functional attributes of NATO’s partnerships,
NATO will need to address the question of the form and function of partner-
ships, because, as suggested by Rebecca Moore (2009), “partnership is really a
debate over the very purpose and identity of the Alliance.”
Towards a mature alliance with multiple roles and

constitutive relationships
The question of what NATO’s role is has been debated ever since NATO’s foun-
dation in 1949. Implicitly or explicitly, it has always been clear that NATO has
multiple roles that extend beyond merely “keeping the Russians out.” Yet as the
security environment changed and NATO’s roles became more complex and
overlapping, a sense of confusion and frustration took root, portraying crises as
being caused by having too many, and excessively complex, roles. NATO is a
complex organization built on a complex set of compromises and bargains that
necessitate multiple roles. NATO has successfully managed this complexity
through an established set of practices based on persuasion and bargaining
around a joint enterprise (Wenger 1998) within the “we-1” group, where the
recurrent crises throughout NATO’s history have almost always led to resolution
or adaptation.11 As the security environment has changed, NATO has adapted its
role and changed its constitutive relationships with other agents. This is what a
healthy and mature organization needs to be able to do, and meets the require-
ments for establishing a security community (Hall 2008). A crisis of the danger-
ous kind – that is, one that does not lead to resolution or adaptation – has
occurred only during the Bush presidency, in particular in the run-up to the Iraq
War. The end of persuasion and bargaining in NATO was therefore the real
threat – not the wars in Iraq, Kosovo, or Afghanistan.
A mature organization such as NATO can and should encompass multiple
roles and complex interactions with other agents – both as norm taker and norm
giver, and as a more broadly defined security management institution. Hence,
this chapter effectively takes issue with proponents who see NATO’s multiple
roles as a sign of weakness, a desperate search for a raison d’être, arguing that
multiple constantly evolving roles are hallmarks of maturity and development.
Just as complex societies tend to have many layers of roles and identity (Mennell
1994), so a mature organization is likely to have multiple roles and layers of
112 T. Flockhart
relationships. What is important is not what role(s) and relationships NATO has,
but whether they are compatible with the overall values underpinning the iden-
tity of NATO itself, its member states, prospective member states, and partner
countries, and whether they complement established practices. On the whole,
NATO has managed to stay within these limits, although difficult questions lie
ahead in deciding on relationships with non-democratic regimes and in questions
of when and where to intervene in future crises and conflicts. These are
challenges that to some extent are catered for in NATO’s new strategic concept,
although the strategic concept itself has maintained some element of “construc-
tive ambiguity” with regard to new relationships and to developing what has
been called “global connectivity.”
Notes
1 Haftendorn et al.’s term (1999). They distinguish between a defense alliance with the
role of responding to a specific threat, and a security management institution whose
role is to address a variety of risks.
2 We-ness is a concept that was originally used by Karl Deutsch and associates (1957)
as one of the essential elements of a security community. ‘We-doing’ is a later refine-
ment introduced by Emmanuel Adler (2008) denoting a higher level of integration
where NATO is now a community of practice.
3 At times the consensus has only been skin-deep, where member states have agreed to
disagree under a veil of ambiguity.
4 For a fuller description of self- and other categorization processes, see Flockhart
(2006).
5 However, since the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, Georgian membership has been
moved off the agenda for the time being, which may well have repercussions for its
socialization.
6 Although the adoption of MC14-3 in 1967 (Flexible Response) certainly was a major
achievement, and could be seen as a critical moment in NATO’s history as France left
the integrated military structure, 1962–67 is not counted as a critical juncture because
the adoption of MC14-3 was extremely drawn out, and the document in effect only
codified existing strategic thinking. Furthermore, despite the defection of France, no
overall structural change took place in the international system.
7 During the Cold War, NATO agreed four strategic documents: DC 6/1(1949), MC3/5
(1952), MC14/2 (1957), and MC14/3 (1968).
8 www.nato.int/issues/crisis_management/index.html#role.
9 An unnamed NATO diplomat is reported to have described the refusal of the NAC to
honor article 4 in those terms.
10 The word “transformation” appears frequently in NATO’s discourse after 2003.
Although it is unlikely that the term is used in the same way as here, its frequent use
does signify an understanding that major change – not just adaptation – is necessary.
11 The withdrawal of France from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966 is the
exception.
7 Reconsidering the European
Union’s roles in international
relations
Self-conceptions, expectations, and
performance
Rikard Bengtsson and Ole Elgström
Introduction
The European Union aspires to play a leading role in global politics. It engages
in negotiations, cooperation schemes, and conflict resolution processes with a
vast number of actors, utilizing an expanding set of tools. Owing to its unique
nature, the Union is often said to be a different kind of great power. The degree
to which it succeeds in its great power ambitions is a complex matter, however,
depending both on the issue area (for instance, in terms of EU competence and
resources and the relative strength of other actors) and on how the Union is per-
ceived by others on the international scene.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the European Union’s role(s) as an
international actor. We do so by analyzing both the Union’s own role conception
and the role expectations held by others. We are thus interested in the constitu-
tive elements of a common EU role conception, but also in possible role com-
petition and in the coherence between role conception and role performance.
While initially focusing on the Union’s generalized role – its meta-role – as a
normative power, we also acknowledge that roles may differ across both issue
areas and geographical arenas. We therefore discuss variations between policy
fields and include case studies of the Union’s roles in its relations with two
important actor constellations: its eastern neighbors, notably Russia, and its
“partners” in the developing world, specifically the ACP countries (the African,
Caribbean, and Pacific states).
Throughout the chapter, we emphasize the impact of role coherence, but also
of outsiders’ expectations, of perceived legitimacy, on the effectiveness of EU
role performance. We also take into account the interplay, alluded to in our
initial remarks, between the Union’s roles and the roles played by its perhaps
most significant other, the United States. The chapter is based on a review of
existing literature and on previous empirical research carried out by the two
authors (Bengtsson 2008, 2009a, b; Elgström 2007a, b, 2009).
114 R. Bengtsson and O. Elgström
Role theory
Roles refer to patterns of expected, appropriate behavior. Following Harnisch (in
this volume), role conceptions encompass both an actor’s own considerations of
its place, position, and appropriate behavior vis-à-vis others in a given social
environment (cf. Wendt 1999; Breuning, this volume) and the expectations, or
role prescriptions, of other actors, as signaled through language and action (cf.
Holsti 1970: 238f.; Kirste and Maull 1996). Role performance is the actual
policy behavior of the actor in this social context. An actor’s role conception
tends to be persistent, but is reshaped through confrontations with others’ expec-
tations, for example during international negotiations (Aggestam 2006: 16). In
such contexts, anticipated attributes of a social role are constantly in a process of
interpretation by the role beholder at the same time as external expectations are
shaped by the actor’s role performance.
An actor’s foreign policy, while being to a large extent driven by internal
ideas and processes, is also partly shaped in response to others’ expectations and
reactions (Herrberg 1998). Thus, others’ role prescriptions, related to actor
characteristics and to the social context at hand, contribute to the development of
specific international roles. Third-party understandings of an actor and its roles
form a part of an intersubjective international structure that helps shape the prac-
tices of this actor; in a dynamic fashion, it is the recognition by others that
shapes role performance, in turn affecting future recognition (Bengtsson 2009a:
ch. 2). For example, external expectations of leadership, linked to a formal posi-
tion (holding the chair) or to great power status, have to be responded to; what-
ever you do or don’t do will have consequences for your position in that
particular environment. Conversely, an actor that aspires to be a leader needs
followers; it has to be perceived as a legitimate provider of guidance: “a leader is
not only a party that fulfils theoretical criteria; a leader is one that is perceived as
a leader” (Gupta and van der Grijp 2000: 67; see also Nabers, this volume).
Roles are often associated with certain social positions (cf. Holsti 1970:
239f.), and are thus contextually determined. In this chapter, we distinguish
between meta-roles and context-specific roles. A meta-role is a generalized role,
often based on an actor’s material or immaterial power resources, that entails
expectations of consistent role behavior across issue areas and/or over time. A
superpower, for example, is commonly expected to pursue global interests and
to have a relatively high propensity to rely on coercive foreign policy instru-
ments, while small state status is linked to regional interests, adaptation, and a
reliance on defensive alliances and international norms (Handel 1985; Ingebrit-
sen 2006). Context-specific roles, on the other hand, are associated with expecta-
tions of behavior that are particular to a certain policy area or geographical
region. The extent to which meta-roles and context-specific roles coincide is a
matter of empirical inquiry. Incoherence may lead to role conflict and to prob-
lems in terms of, for example, decreased legitimacy.
This twofold distinction is reflected in the structure of our chapter. We start
by detailing and assessing a meta-role closely associated with the European
Reconsidering the EU’s roles 115
Union: that of a normative great power. In the following section, we scrutinize
the context-specific role conceptions and the role performance of the Union in
relation to two distinct geographical and political environments, those of Eastern
Europe/Russia and the ACP states.
The European Union as a normative great power

In both academic and political circles, it has become standard practice to label
the European Union a normative power. Politicians commonly refer to the values
that the Union stands for – such as peace, human rights, and democracy – and
often also profess a European mission to spread these values throughout the
world (Bengtsson 2008, 2009a). In academic circles, following Duchêne (1971),
Manners (2002), and others, the notion of EU actorness as normative has been
readily adopted. In the context of role theory, we can thus posit that the notion of
a normative great power is a meta-role referred to not only by EU representa-
tives themselves but also by analysts and practitioners outside of the Union.
What is a normative great power?

In short, a normative great power is an actor that influences the thinking of other
actors in the international system, rather than acting through coercive means to
achieve its goals. The normative great power seeks to promote values that are
deemed desirable by the actor, and to gain acceptance for these from other
parties. It thus has the ability, to paraphrase Manners (2002: 240; Manners and
Whitman 2003: 389), to shape conceptions of “normality.” By publicly promot-
ing core values, defining key concepts, and “framing” other actors and processes
in certain ways, an actor may come to occupy a key position in a given policy
area. A good example in the context of the European Union – not least because
of its manifest form – is the European Security Strategy (European Council
2003). What is decisive here, however, is whether other actors internalize the
ideas and conceptual meanings put forth, so that the strategy has an ideational
impact which in turn affects the power projection capabilities of other relevant
actors. Not all attempts at normative power projection will necessarily succeed;
not all actors that want to be normative great powers are seen as normative great
powers by others. An actor attempting to be a normative great power may see its
role conception as ethically and normatively superior, but this need not be mir-
rored by others’ role expectations. In the context of the European Union, it is
worth noting that the degree to which the Union is a normative great power is
determined not only by the Union’s ambition to influence the meaning attached
to different concepts, but ultimately by the degree to which others internalize
these ideas.
The power resources used in the process of normative power projection can
be material as well as immaterial, civilian as well as military in character. In
consequence, the common distinction between civilian, military, and normative
power is misleading: whereas civilian and military power refer to resources,
normative power concerns the ambition or agenda of an actor (see also Sjursen
2006: 170). Neither the Union’s core values nor the ambition to spread them are
uniquely European, however; they are shared by other actors, notably the United
States. But in promoting these values, the Union frequently seems to rely more
on a civilian approach, while the United States appears to prefer a comprehen-
sive approach.
Understood in this way, normative power is related to what Barnett and
Duvall term “productive power,” defined as the ability to define and/or interpret
terms, symbols, events, and actors according to one’s own belief systems or
frames of reference. This stands in contrast to compulsory power (one actor’s
direct control over another), institutional power (an actor’s ability to impact on
future outcomes through institutional design choices), and structural power (the
power of an actor to define another actor in a dialectic manner) (Barnett and
Duvall 2005: 9–22). Productive power is ideational in character: “The imposi-
tion of meanings on the material world is one of the ultimate forms of power,
and this is where constructivism’s added value with regard to power lies” (Adler
2002: 103). Productive power is thus constitutive and diffuse in nature, in sharp
contrast to conventional notions of power as control (e.g. Barnett and Duvall’s
compulsory power). Normative and productive power thus concern the power of
ideas and over opinion (Manners 2002: 239).
Playing the role of normative great power

Two points regarding power need further elaboration at this juncture. One is that
it can be hypothesized that a combination of power resources may contribute
positively to the success of power projection. Actors that are not only in posses-
sion of rhetorical means but also in a position to use, for instance, international
institutions, technical assistance, or military practices to further their interests
can be expected to have greater opportunities for influence than those that can
draw on few power bases. Moreover, different forms of power may reinforce
each other. Thus, the success of EU enlargement was dependent on the ability of
the Union to combine socialization (expressing European values and practices)
and positive conditionality (the promise of further rewards if adjustments are
made); in parts of the world where membership is a non-issue, the Union is in a
much weaker position.
The second – and contrary – point is that different forms and means of power
may actually contradict each other. For instance, the use of military or coercive
economic means compromises the recognition by others of the ideas promoted
by the actor in question. This is obviously sometimes the case with American
foreign policy, for instance in Kosovo or Iraq. Regarding the European Union, it
thus becomes an intriguing question whether – in the eyes of others – the trend
towards militarization of the Union brought about by the Treaty on the European
Union in 1992, and specifically the creation of the ESDP in 1999, weakens the
ideational impact of the Union. Drawing on the idea by Manners (2002: 252)
that what ultimately contributes to the international profile of the Union is not
what it says or what it does but what it is, militarization may contribute to a per-
ception of the Union as more of a conventional power in international politics.
Zielonka, for one, argues that militarization weakens the Union’s distinct civil-
ian international identity (1998: 229; cf. Manners and Whitman 2003: 389). The
increasing territorialization that the Schengen arrangement and the search for
internal security imply for the Union may have similar effects (Bengtsson
2009b).
Which of these two logics will prevail for the European Union as a normative
great power is, of course, still an open question. We can conclude, however, that
power projection always will feed back into the status of the normative great
power European Union through the recognition by others, either strengthening
or weakening its power.
Normative power and international leadership

To be a normative power requires leadership. Leadership may be defined as “an
asymmetrical relationship of influence in which one actor guides or directs the
behavior of others towards a certain goal over a certain period of time” (Under-
dal 1994). This definition signifies that the leader needs to have a vision, or at
least clear objectives. The values and ideas that are enshrined in the notion of the
European Union as a normative great power may constitute such a vision. On the
other hand, not all leadership is intellectual; leadership is performed by provid-
ing visions and inspiration, but also – and perhaps even more so – by a construc-
tive formulation and implementation of solutions to problems (Young 1991).
Structural leadership is closely linked to the material and immaterial resources
of the leader, as translated into negotiating strength. Entrepreneurial leadership
works through the use of informational advantages and by shaping procedures
and institutional frames.
Leadership is basically a relationship between a leader and followers (Under-
dal 1994: 181). This relationship is shaped by the responsiveness of followers as
well as by the supply of leadership services by a leader (cf. Tallberg 2006). The
emphasis on the need for leaders to have followers brings other actors’ expecta-
tions and perceptions to the fore. Other governments have to acknowledge the
leader’s vision of international order, but also the values and regime principles
that it seeks to pursue (Nabers 2008). More generally, leadership aspirations
have to be perceived as legitimate. Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and defini-
tions” (Hurd 1999). Legitimacy is typically seen as based on “inputs” (the extent
to which decisions are deemed to reflect the will of the people or the correctness
of the decision-making process) or “outputs” (the extent to which decisions
satisfy the demands of the constituents). It may, however, also rest on percep-
tions of fairness or, more generally, of an evaluation of the values and norms a
certain actor is associated with (Cottrell 2009; Hurd 2007: 69–70). If an actor is
widely perceived as acting in accordance with principles of fairness, and if it is
seen as behaving in line with widely accepted ideas and norms, its leadership
potential increases.
The notion of what we propose to call “ideational legitimacy” creates a link
between the European Union’s potential leadership role in specific international
negotiations and its role as a normative power. While EU legitimacy in interna-
tional negotiations may partly be due to outputs produced (linking favorable out-
comes to the Union’s contribution of resources or to its prominence in the
decision-making process), we assume that its reputation as a normative power
may be an even more valuable asset. EU leadership may thus be based on exter-
nal expectations that associate EU actions with fairness and the promotion of
noble goals.
Consider two empirical examples: international trade and environmental
negotiations. In trade, the Union is generally recognized as one of the most
powerful actors in the World Trade Organization. Along with the United States,
it is portrayed as a “superpower” in trade negotiations. This corresponds to the
Union’s self-conception: “The EU is one of the key players in the World Trade
Organisation . . . [and] one of the driving forces behind the current round of mul-
tilateral trade negotiations” (European Commission 2005). However, perceived
power does not automatically translate into leadership. While the Union does
exert structural leadership (Young 1991), derived from its economic importance
and presence, as well as from its function as a role model, it is hardly credited
with visionary intellectual guidance and leadership (Elgström 2007a). The reason
is mainly perceived inconsistency: its protectionist approach, notably in agricul-
tural trade policy, diminishes its credibility. The Union is seen as acting with
double standards (ibid.); its output legitimacy is in this case not supported by
ideational legitimacy. Instead, perceived incongruity between the Union’s pro-
claimed normative free trade ideal and its actual role performance makes effect-
ive leadership problematic. Furthermore, the Union’s efforts to introduce notions
of democracy, labor rights, and environmental protection into global trade policy
have met with skepticism or outright rejection. In trade, the Union’s normative
concerns thus have acted as an obstacle, rather than a lubricant, for leadership. In
the words of Meunier and Nicolaïdis (2006: 922), “since legitimacy is the main
currency of an aspiring normative power, the EU cannot effectively become a
power through trade without addressing what many in the rest of the world per-
ceive as unsustainable contradictions.”
In international environmental negotiations, the European Union is widely
described both as a central actor (Delreux 2006; Sbragia 2005; Vogler 2005) and
as playing a leadership role (Gupta and Grubb 2000; van den Brande 2008;
Vogler and Bretherton 2006). The Union’s “rescue” of the Kyoto Protocol in the
absence of US leadership, and the embedding of its precautionary principle into
the global agreement on bio-safety, have been cited as prominent examples of
EU leadership (Reischl 2009: 13; Vogler 2005). This scholarly assessment is
seconded by EU spokespersons, who seldom miss a chance to present a self-
conception of the Union as a green leader. In Commission president Barroso’s
words,
[w]e are one of the most important, if not the most important, normative
power in the world. . . .] Look at climate change. We are the ones who are
setting the benchmark. . . . It is in fact the EU that sets standards for others
much of the time.
(UACES News 2007; cf. Vogler and Bretherton 2006)
In this policy realm, it is particularly interesting to compare the role of the Euro-
pean Union with that of the United States. The United States was a powerful and
progressive leader in the 1970s and the 1980s, as exemplified by its decisive
influence in the negotiations on the Montreal Protocol to protect the stratospheric
ozone layer, with the European Union appearing divided and insecure. “In the
ensuing years, this position has been radically changed. It is now the EU that
self-consciously claims the mantle of environmental leadership and the United
States that is cast in the role of ‘veto state,’ obstructing international environ-
mental policy” (Vogler and Bretherton 2006: 2).
External actors, and especially other developed countries, seem to widely share
the “EU as leader” role conception (Lucarelli 2007). In a recent investigation based
on interviews with participants in the 2008 meeting of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change in Poznań, Poland, Kilian (2009) confirms
that this picture still holds true. The Union is unanimously perceived as a leader in
climate politics by respondents from developing as well as developed countries,
especially in its potential to set standards for other countries. A large majority of
“outsiders” do not see a loss of standing for the Union in recent years and have an
optimistic outlook regarding EU leadership in the future. Some respondents do,
however, complain about EU hypocrisy, based on a perceived mismatch between
actions and rhetoric. Interviewees from developing countries in this context
mention the Union’s perceived reluctance to provide enough financial support and
technology transfers to developing economies. Several respondents also predict a
future role competition between the European Union and the United States, with
the United States trying to regain its position in climate change issues (ibid.).
In environmental negotiations, the ideational legitimacy of the Union thus
still seems to be high, facilitating a leadership role. The Union is seen as credible
in its commitment to a greener world even by those who are against its policy
recommendations. Although some observers predict that this will soon change,
owing to a growing gap between its rhetoric and its actual policy behavior,
environment is still an issue area where the Union’s normative power ambitions
seem to have been successfully transformed into a leadership role.
Case study I: the European Union, the eastern neighbors,

and Russia1
Point of departure: normative superiority and strategic partnership

While the impact of the European Union on international relations at a global
scale is a matter of considerable dispute, in the European context the Union is
often acknowledged as a normative great power. This is most obvious in the
enlargement process, in which perceived EU normative superiority and leader-
ship against various other forms of power discussed above is central. This case
study deals with the wider European context beyond enlargement and seeks to
demonstrate what the substantive components of the Union’s normative power
role are, to what extent the Union can be said to perform a leadership role, and
how it is perceived by other actors in the area.
EU interaction with this region follows two different but interrelated tracks.
One concerns the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the
other the so-called strategic partnership with Russia. The ENP can be traced
back to a communication from External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten
and High Representative Javier Solana to the Council in 2002 about the need for
the Union to “fully exploit the new opportunities created by enlargement to
develop relations with our neighbours” (Patten and Solana 2002: 1). The ENP
was initially focused on Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia, but countries
south and east of the Mediterranean were later included too, as the ENP took
form, their inclusion being formally endorsed by the Council in 2004. The
Council then also decided to include Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in the
process, thereby sending a significant signal about increased EU engagement in
the southern Caucasus. Russia, on the other hand, voluntarily opted out of the
process. The ENP is thus a common framework for 16 partners, but substantive
cooperation essentially rests on individual so-called Action Plans that mirror the
rather diverse nature of cooperation – varying from a relatively advanced level
(as in the case of EU–Ukraine interaction) to more or less non-existent (as in the
case of the relationship between the Union and Belarus, which has yet to con-
clude an Action Plan to put the ENP into effect at all) (Bengtsson 2009a: chs. 3,
4, 6).
EU–Russian cooperation has a longer, more complex history. While still
based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1997, practical coopera-
tion is based on the Four Common Spaces agreed to in 2003 and implemented
from 2005 onwards; they cover economic matters, societal cooperation, and
internal and external security matters. The relationship is quite heavily institu-
tionalized, with the biannual summit between the Russian president and the EU
Troika being the politically most important channel for interaction.
The European Union’s role conception in relations with the eastern

neighbors
In essence, the Union’s own role conception in relation to the Eastern neighbors
(here Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) can be
summarized as that of a normatively superior, potent leader. This fundamentally
rests on three interrelated elements. One concerns the Union as the primary con-
tributor to European peace. This is mainly linked to the successful Eastern
enlargement – “the greatest contribution to sustainable stability and security on
the European continent,” to quote Commission president Romano Prodi (2002)
– and points to the leading role of the Union in the transformation of post-Cold
War Europe. Along the same lines, external relations director General Eneko
Landaburu later stated, “We are a ‘pole of attraction’ for our region – countries
along our borders actively seek closer relations with us” (2006: 5), and in the
same vein, ENP commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner noted the Union’s
“growing role as an anchor of stability and modernization, which is the logical
consequence of . . . enlargement” (2006b). A second aspect focuses on the Union
as a value community centered on a set of core norms. To judge by official EU
documents, EU values encompass democracy, respect for human rights, the rule
of law, human dignity, liberty, equality, and good governance (European Com-
mission 2003: 4; 2004: 12; Council 2003; Ferrero-Waldner 2005, 2006b). These
values also are at the center of the conditionality aspects of the ENP.
The third element is about the moral imperative for promoting these values in
the region, as well as on a global scale (Ferrero-Waldner 2006a). In short, this
can be interpreted as the civilizing element of the normative great power; the
European Union seeks to export its ideals and practices to outside parties against
the background of the perceived success of the Union, the need in the Eastern
neighbors for further security and welfare, and the moral obligation of the Union
to help out. The ENP framework, built on socialization and positive conditional-
ity, is an obvious illustration of how the EU role conception is expressed and
translated into regional policy. In conclusion, then, EU representatives consider
the Union as a normative great power in relation to the Eastern neighbors
(Bengtsson 2008, 2009a).
The eastern neighbors’ role conceptions of the European Union

To what extent is this role conception mirrored by the countries on the eastern
rim of the Union? In short, there is no uniform perception among the six coun-
tries. Rather, a fundamental distinction can be drawn between Belarus and the
other five countries. Belarus does not acknowledge the normative superiority of
the Union and takes little or no interest in concrete cooperation with it. The
Union has attempted several times to draw on its standard incentives – promises
of better trade agreements, substantial economic assistance, easing of travel
restrictions – to secure improvements in the fields of democracy and rule of law,
but has so far been unable to induce change in Belarus. Indeed, the Belarusian
president, Alexander Lukashenko, sees the situation in a radically different light,
as the following interview passage displays:
Belarus helps to protect its [the European Union’s] borders in the East. We
catch most of the illegal migrants and criminals, streaming into the EU from
the East and send them back to where they come from. We use a considera-
ble amount of financial resources for this end and form a protective barrier
for Europe. . . . And how does the EU thank us for that? It imposes economic
sanctions and withdraws preferential tariffs.
(Die Welt 2007)
In sharp contrast, the other five countries readily recognize both the great power
status of the Union and the attractiveness of its normative agenda. This means
that the civilizing mission of the Union is perceived in positive terms as a contri-
bution to a desirable transformation (at least, to judge from government policy
responses), and that the Union is the undisputed leader in the different bilateral
relationships. The values promoted by the Union can also be found at the center
of regional initiatives by the states themselves, such as in the GUAM initiative
by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova in 2006 and the “Borjomi Decla-
ration” by the Georgian and Ukrainian presidents in 2005, establishing the Com-
munity of Democratic Choice (Bengtsson 2009a: ch. 4).
That said, there are nevertheless also interesting variations among the five
countries. Ukraine stands out as the country that has the most advanced relation-
ship with the European Union, not only in terms of comprehensive and close
bilateral cooperation with the Union but also in frequently aligning itself with
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) statements by the Union – a sign,
it could be argued, of both value compatibility and EU leadership. The same
kind of positive recognition of the Union can be found within Georgia. There,
the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia made Georgia move even
closer to the Union and readily recognize the importance of the Union, both in
terms of the latter’s policy stance vis-à-vis Russia and regarding its policies
towards Georgia. The two governments also have publicly repeatedly expressed
the ambition of their countries to become EU members. As for the remaining
three countries in the group, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, the main dif-
ference compared to Ukraine and Georgia is that domestic developments have
not progressed as far and that the three countries lack administrative capacity to
interact with the Union in the same way as Ukraine and Georgia (Bengtsson
2009a: ch. 4). It can be concluded, however, that all five countries under con-
sideration share the role conception of the Union as an anchor of security and
prosperity.
The European Union’s role conception in relation to Russia

Turning now to the EU–Russia relationship, the Union’s own role conception
again builds on the same elements of normative leadership. From that perspec-
tive, the Union’s role is to promote ideas and frameworks of interaction that
reflect EU core values and contribute to liberal democracy, good governance,
market economy, etc. What complicates this role conception is that the Union
also recognizes its dependence on Russia, especially in the energy sector. In con-
sequence, the Union is aware that it has to balance its normative ambitions with
the realities of interdependence. Moreover, as EU representatives readily
acknowledge the great power status of Russia – reflected in the notion of “stra-
tegic partnership” – another aspect of the Union’s own role conception is that of
great power partner to Russia in global political matters, such as combating ter-
rorism or trying to improve the situation in the Middle East through the UN
quartet. Finally, regarding European/regional security, the two powers are at
odds, as the Union’s role conception as a promoter of values implicitly chal-
lenges Russian interests (the case of Georgia is an obvious example of this). In
conclusion, in this complex and partly contradictory context, the Union’s own
role conception is that of a liberal (and hence normative) great power that inter-
acts with a Russia that is driven by a different set of interests and values. As
explained by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner (2008), “while we pursue our
common interests with Russia, we must nevertheless remain clear and firm on
democracy and human rights.”
Russia’s role conception of the European Union

Russia’s role conception of the European Union rests on two partly contradictory
elements. On the one hand, Russia recognizes the Union as a great power and
strategic partner with which Russia enjoys a set of common interests, not least
regarding international security, and a bilateral relationship based on advanced
interdependence. As President Vladimir Putin noted (2006),
[i]n the past few years, the EU and Russia have become important political
and economic partners. . . . I do not see any areas that are not open to equal,
strategic co-operation based on common objectives and values. . . . We will
not be able to turn a new leaf in the history of our cooperation if we
succumb to fear of growing interdependence.
After the Russia–EU summit in Mafra, Portugal, in late 2007, he concluded that
the “main thing is that the immutability of the strategic partnership between the
European Union and the Russian Federation could be reaffirmed” (Putin 2007).
This is significant not only because it mirrors the Union’s own role conception,
but also because here we find obvious signs of a changing Russian understand-
ing of EU actorness, which in recent years has attached much more weight to the
Union than some years back, while still considering individual member states as
significant in their own right (Bengtsson 2004, 2009a: ch. 6).
On the other hand, the Russian leadership also perceives the European Union
as a competitive actor with a normative agenda that clearly contradicts Russian
key interests, interferes in domestic Russian affairs, and is insensitive to Russia’s
sense of historical uniqueness. In the eyes of Russian leaders, EU claims to ideo-
logical leadership are not acceptable – as argued by President Putin: “When
speaking of common values, we should also respect the historical diversity of
European civilization. It would be useless and wrong to try to force artificial
‘standards’ on each other” (2006). In consequence, the Union’s support for the
Orange Revolution in Ukraine, its siding with Georgia in the conflict culminat-
ing in the August war of 2008, and its criticism of the domestic political situ-
ation inside Russia, to take but a few examples, contribute to the Russian
perception of the Union as a normatively aggressive actor.
Comparing EU role conceptions in Greater Europe
What do these short analyses tell us about EU role conceptions? Three main con-
clusions can be drawn. First, the Union tries to play the role of the normative
great power in all its Greater European relations from Russia to Eastern Europe
(as well as in the Middle East and North Africa). It portrays itself as a promoter
of a set of core values and a potent actor that can make a difference in the
Greater European context.
Second, this role conception is shared by a majority of the neighbors under
analysis here. Thus, Ukraine and Georgia, but also Armenia, Azerbaijan, and
Moldova, have repeatedly expressed their commitment to EU values and interact
with the Union through institutions designed by the Union. In contrast, the role
conception held by Belarus is one of the Union as hostile and disrespectful. Rus-
sia’s EU conception is ambiguous, involving the image of the Union both as a
great power partner and as a normative competitor.
Third, in terms of role performance the Union utilizes a spectrum of
resources, such as institutional power (through the design of the European
Neighborhood Policy) and structural power (in the form of economic and techni-
cal assistance). Perhaps most important, at least in a long-term perspective, may
be the Union’s productive power of arguing, framing, and attaching meaning to
ambiguous concepts such as democracy, human rights, good governance, and so
on – which may involve shaping conceptions of “normality.” The Union also
occasionally tries to utilize coercive economic power in relation to individual
countries, such as Belarus, or even Russia after the Georgia war. Put differently,
the Union exercises intellectual, structural, and entrepreneurial leadership in
relation to the Eastern European neighborhood, with the exception of Belarus. In
relation to Russia, however, EU leadership is much weaker, owing to Russia’s
strength as a great power and EU concerns over energy dependence, but also
because individual EU member states frequently pursue national policies that
undermine a common approach.
Case study II: the European Union, the African, Caribbean,

and Pacific countries, and economic partnership agreement
negotiations2
The history of the European Partnership Agreement negotiations

For almost 30 years, the so-called Lomé conventions have constituted the most
significant part of the European Union’s relations with the Third World (Grilli
1993; Holland 2002; Lister 1997; Ravenhill 1992). These aid and trade agree-
ments were considered to be of major importance for the development efforts of
a large number of countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP). In
these agreements, trade was used as an instrument to promote growth and devel-
opment, notably by abandoning the otherwise sacred General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) principle of reciprocity. The ACP group thus enjoyed
non-reciprocal preferential access to the EU market, at least in principle. The
Lomé regime mirrored a European partnership identity that emphasized the
special ties between the European Community and its former colonies, its his-
toric responsibility and the interdependence between rich and poor. The result
was a rhetorical emphasis on Lomé as a contractual relationship between equal
partners (Elgström 2005: 188; Grilli 1993: 93; Ravenhill 1992).
In the early 1990s, however, as a result of growing skepticism over the effec-
tiveness of the existing Lomé regime, the Union’s positions in the negotiations
that led to the Cotonou agreement in February 2000 came to reflect a new norm-
ative framework (Babarinde and Faber 2005; Holland 2002: 186–9). The Union
now fully and emphatically adopted liberal principles of free trade and demo-
cracy. In consequence, it now insisted on the abandonment of the principle of
non-reciprocity, on WTO compatibility, and, in general, on the introduction of a
trade regime based on liberal principles and on good governance (Holland 2002:
167–86). On all these points, the Union prevailed: the parties to the Agreement
agreed “to conclude new WTO-compatible trading agreements, progressively
removing barriers to trade between them and enhancing co-operation in all areas
relevant to trade” (article 37.5 of the Agreement), leading to negotiations on
regional Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). These negotiations between
the Union, represented by DG Trade, and six ACP regions started in 2002. The
idea was to have EPAs in place no later than 1 January 2008, when the WTO
waiver that covered the preferential aspects of the trade chapters of the Cotonou
agreement was to expire. In the end, the Commission realized that full-fledged
EPAs would be impossible to achieve within the time limit set. Interim agree-
ments, which almost totally reflected the EU offer, were initialed with most of the
ACP partners in December 2007.3 The interim agreements focused on trade in
goods; they removed all remaining tariffs and quotas to the Union for all exports
from the ACP, but with transition periods for sugar and rice. They also stipulated
a gradual liberalization in ACP countries, excluding a number of sensitive prod-
ucts, and included chapters on development that endorsed a range of development-
supporting measures. Commitments on financial assistance in specified forms,
quantities, and time-frames were not, however, part of the agreements.
The European Union’s own role conceptions in the EPA negotiations

The self-image of the European Union, expressed primarily by the Commission
(which represented the Union in these negotiations), included two major, though
interrelated, contextual roles. The first is that of a partner for development, the
second that of a promoter of norms. Both are consistent with the meta-role of the
EU as a normative power.
The “partner” aspect is both a heritage from the “spirit of Lomé” and a
response to current themes in development theory, such as “local ownership”
and “dialogue.” With its colonial legacy in its mind, it has always been import-
ant for the Union to portray agreements with the ACP countries as the result of
negotiations between equal, sovereign actors.
Partnership is the basis of the Cotonou Agreement and it is the foundation
of the EPAs. . . . If we are going to do something about this, we have to work
together. The word Partnership in the “Economic Partnership Agreement” is
not there by accident.
(Mandelson 2006)
The European Union sees itself as “sharing responsibility and accountability” for
development with the developing countries (article 15, European Consensus on
Development). The aim is to make the development process “not Brussels led,”
but rather to have the ACP “call the shots” and “act in their own interest” (Man-
delson 2005a).
At the same time, in the EPA negotiations the Union was not acting as if they
were “traditional” trade negotiations (Sheahan 2009). In Trade Commissioner
Mandelson’s words, “the EPAs are not typical, hard-nosed free trade agree-
ments. I see them as tools for development and the promotion of regional eco-
nomic integration” (Mandelson 2005b; cf. 2007a, b). The main difference,
according to the Commission, was that EPA negotiations were not about pro-
moting EU self-interests. While ACP regions would open their markets among
themselves, and the Union would remove fully all tariffs and quotas on ACP
exports, the Union was “not seeking commercial advantage” (Mandelson 2005c):
“Our EPA agenda is emphatically not about opening markets to our own
exports” (Mandelson 2005d). At the same time, DG Trade officials took care to
emphasize the development aspect of EPAs, which were presented as “pro-
development, pro-reform instruments” (ibid.) and backed with very substantial
development assistance packages (Mandelson and Michel 2006). Mandelson
even proclaimed that his “driving mission as Commissioner [was] to put trade at
the service of development and to ensure [that] the needs of the poorest are at all
times at the forefront of our European policy” (2005b).
Besides being a “partner for development,” the Union also portrayed itself as
a promoter of norms and values. The stated goals of the Union in the EPA
process were to encourage a process of “economic reform, regional integration
and progressive trade opening” (Mandelson 2007b). Behind these goals lay some
overarching principles that seem to guide DG Trade: a belief in the develop-
mental potential of free trade and liberalism, combined with an equally strong
belief in the benefits of regional integration, stemming from the Union’s own
experience. According to Mandelson, “my overall philosophy is simple: I believe
in progressive trade liberalization. I believe that the opening of markets can
deliver growth and the reduction of poverty” (2005b; cf. 2005c). Regional inte-
gration, meanwhile, would build markets where economies of scale and
enhanced competition could stimulate employment and development (Mandel-
son 2005c). In brief, the Union’s own role conception includes being a cham-
pion of global free trade and, as trade liberalization is hypothesized to lead to
poverty reduction, a champion of development. It also comprises being a model
for and a promoter of regional integration.
The ACP countries’ role conception of the European Union in the
EPA negotiations
The picture of the European Union’s role drawn by its counterparts, the ACP, is
much more complex and heterogeneous than the uniformly positive EU self-
conception. ACP role expectations include images of the Union as a benevolent
contributor to development and a generous donor but also of the Union as a
patronizing, potentially dangerous, and even imperialist great power (cf. Sheahan
2009: 44f.). In their characterization of the view of the Union in the Pacific,
Chaban and Holland indicate a perception that is “very different to that often
presumed in Brussels,” namely that of the Union as “Buddha”:
It is always there, it is remote, big and powerful, it is watching closely,

guiding, caring if you obey, but at the same time it is able to harm if you are
not following the directions given from above, teaching, pushing, punishing.
You do not argue with Buddah – you either worship, or show that you do,
but then secretly practice your own faith.
(2009: 5)
Such a perspective is rather different from the notion of “partnership” so

typically found in the Union’s own rhetoric on its relations with the developing
world. Far from being seen as an equal partner, the Union is thus perceived as a
benign master, a friendly great power that is confident that its own visions and
policies are “correct” and does not really listen to you in negotiations and
dialogues.
The European Union is also widely perceived as a leading aid donor with
good intentions (Sheahan 2009: 44f.), and is often favorably compared to other
aid givers. In the Pacific, the Union is seen as “very benign” compared with
China, Australia, and New Zealand (ibid.: 45). At the same time, criticism of the
Union’s role behavior in the EPA negotiations has been intense. In December
2007, just after the agreements had been initialed, the ACP Council of Ministers
collectively “deplore[d] the enormous pressure that has been brought to bear on
the ACP States by the European Commission . . . contrary to the spirit of the
ACP–EU partnership” (ACP 2007). Many other statements echoed disquiet and
frustration over “undue pressure” by the Union and a “rushed process” (Elgström
2009; cf. Stevens et al. 2008: 70–85). In the eyes of many ACP officials, the
Union is clearly driven by commercial concerns, and its main goal is to safe-
guard (notably against Chinese competition) and open up ACP markets (Elg-
ström 2009). DG Trade is claimed to have carried out EPA negotiations with a
narrow trade approach, giving scant attention to the ACP’s development agenda
(ibid.). The Union is thus seen as a self-interested actor that utilizes its superior
power to further its own “mercantilist interests” (ACP 2007). The partnership
ideal is fine, but there cannot be a partnership “between a horse and a horse
rider” (Elgström 2009).
Although the Union is generally acknowledged as a “promoter of develop-
ment and regional integration,” development and integration do not necessarily
mean the same thing to ACP as to EU decision makers (Sheahan 2009). Whereas
the Union assumes a direct link between trade liberalization and poverty reduc-
tion, ACP representatives are generally much more skeptical, emphasizing that
ACP countries first needed assistance to build development-enhancing structures
before free trade could be to their advantage. Thus, they saw the need for very
substantial investments in infrastructure, as well as for resources to meet adjust-
ment costs caused by more trade competition. As a result, during the negotia-
tions the ACP side was mainly preoccupied with an increase of development
assistance (to be cynical, “more money”). In a similar vein, the type of regional
integration agreement favored by the Commission, advocating an “EU model”
for ACP regions, was not met with enthusiasm.
Comparing EU and ACP role conceptions

In the EPA case, we see a relationship where the role conceptions of ego and
alter may seem to coincide – but do so only on a superficial level. The Union has
a conception of itself as a partner for development and as a promoter of norms:
of free trade, of regional integration, and of good governance. The ACP coun-
tries hold high expectations of the Union as a contributor to development and
officially give their blessing to the norms pursued by the Union. Auspicious con-
ditions for a shared role conception thus seem to exist. If one looks behind the
scenes, however, another picture emerges. The symmetrical partnership image of
the Union clashes with ACP experiences indicating an asymmetrical master–
servant relationship. The Union’s conception of a harmonious relationship
between trade liberalization, regional integration and economic development,
and poverty reduction contrasts with ACP images of a relationship where devel-
opment assistance is prioritized and trade liberalization has to be postponed for
as many years as possible to enable the creation of more favorable circumstances
for trade-driven development. And the ideal of a benign, generous partner is
challenged by a “bargaining reality” where the Union is perceived by the ACP
countries as a patronizing, condescending, and tough negotiator.
We can thus discern fundamental incongruities regarding perceptions both of
basic values and of role performance. The fact that different meanings and con-
notations are attached to basic values such as development increases the risk of
misperceptions and unmet expectations (on both sides) and diminishes the prob-
ability of effective norm transfer. The perceived inconsistency between partner-
ship rhetoric and “actual behavior” in terms of pressure and bullying tends to
weaken the legitimacy of the Union, indirectly affecting its ambitions to be a
norm entrepreneur.
Concluding remarks
This chapter has investigated the roles of the European Union as an international
actor. Employing the notion of normative great power as a potential meta-role
for the Union, our empirical analyses focused on the Union’s interaction with
East European countries and the ACP group of countries. The resulting picture
leads to a number of conclusions.
First, the Union’s own role conception rests on a set of central elements that
are devoid of empirical context. The Union sees itself as a normative great
power, with the interest, capacity, and obligation to impact on developments in
the various empirical settings. It actively seeks to promote a set of core values
through utilizing a combination of power resources, in drawing on institutional
structures (partly of its own creation), structural means (such as trade centrality
and economic and technical assistance), and discursive framing of central con-
cepts (such as development and security).
Second, this role conception is only partly mirrored by conceptions of the
Union held by its partners. In most East European countries – but, importantly,
not in Russia and Belarus – there is indeed a high degree of similarity in role
conceptions: the Union is readily acknowledged as a normative leader and
effectively becomes part of the transition in these countries towards democracy
and market economy; indeed, it is seen as an anchor of security and prosperity.
In Russia and Belarus, on the contrary, the normative approach of the Union is
perceived in hostile terms (while Russia also entertains a conception of the
Union as a great power partner in issues external to the relationship itself ). In the
ACP group of countries, the role conception of the Union is rather complex, in
that the Union is seen simultaneously as a friendly great power with good inten-
tions and a willingness to contribute to development, but also as patronizing, or
at least self-confident, convinced that its own conceptualization and rationality
are superior. Thus, in effect the ACP group views the Union as a benign master
rather than an equal partner.
Third, the EU role performance is only partly legitimate in the eyes of many
other countries. This is a consequence of incoherent role performance (pursuing
a protectionist trade policy in agriculture while in principle promoting free trade)
and contradictory elements in the development of EU integration (for instance,
the militarization and territorialization of the Union weakens its normative credi-
bility). This, in turn, negatively affects the effectiveness of the Union as an inter-
national actor.
Fourth, and final, there is a complex relationship between the meta-role of
normative great power and some of the context-specific roles, especially in rela-
tion to countries where EU leadership legitimacy is low or problematic. As there
is a strong need for political actors to seek cognitive balance (Vertzberger 1990:
137–43), persistent role incoherence may in the end lead to role change, in this
case endangering the Union’s role as a normative power.
Notes
1 The empirical material for this section primarily consists of official documents from
the European Union, Russia, and relevant East European countries as well as speeches
by and printed interviews with EU representatives and leaders of the various countries.
Additionally, approximately ten semistructured interviews were conducted with EU
officials and representatives of the Russian mission to the Union.
2 The account of EU perceptions in this section is based on speeches by, and published
interviews with, EU representatives and on five interviews with Commission officials.
The description of ACP images is mainly based on seven interviews with ACP ambas-
sadors to the Union, on interviews with Pacific elites (see Chaban and Holland 2009),
and on printed interviews with ACP officials.
3 The only full EPA agreement was concluded with the Caribbean ACP states.
8 Comparing Germany’s and
Poland’s ESDPs
Roles, path dependencies, learning,
and socialization 1
Cornelia Frank
Introduction
Since the start of the twenty-first century, Germany’s and Poland’s European
Security and Defense Policies (ESDPs) have converged with regard to the use of
force, cooperation within the ESDP, and its geographical scope. Nevertheless,
differences over the European Union’s finality and ambivalences in their respec-
tive ESDPs persist. This chapter argues that national role conceptions explain
the German and Polish ESDPs. The following assumes that “how the policy-
maker imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is” (Sprout and Sprout
1957: 328) is crucial to understanding a state’s foreign policy. It is argued that as
an actor-centered approach, role theory is especially useful in explaining German
and Polish decision makers’ role behavior: First, the observed convergence
resulted from changes within role conceptions due to crisis learning from
Kosovo and Iraq and socialization through EU institutions, especially the Polit-
ical and Security Committee (PSC). Second, continuing differences between
both states’ ESDPs can be traced back to their role-beholders’ divergent under-
standings of statehood, international institutions, and the use of force.2 Third,
ambivalences in the German and Polish ESDPs are symptoms of unresolved ten-
sions between different role elements within their overarching role conceptions.
The analysis of Germany’s and Poland’s ESDPs will proceed as follows: The
first section will define key concepts and introduce crisis learning and socializa-
tion as two mechanisms for role change. With few exceptions (Harnisch 2001,
2010; Maull 2000), role theory has so far neglected causal mechanisms for role
change (Harnisch and Folz, this volume). Thus, I employ learning and socializa-
tion theories to fill these theoretical gaps. The second section will outline the
foreign policy role conceptions of a civilian power and a transforming Atlanti-
cist. In the third section, I will compare German and Polish role behavior in the
ESDP with regard to transatlantic cleavages over ESDP realization. In the fourth
section, I shall argue that the two role conceptions provide a convincing
explanation for Germany’s and Poland’s positions towards the ESDP. Taking the
convergence of their foreign policy roles as a starting point, the fifth and final
section will discuss whether we can expect an increasing harmonization of both
states’ positions towards the ESDP.
132 C. Frank
Continuity and change of foreign policy roles: historical path
dependencies, crisis learning, and socialization
Following Krotz, national role conceptions can be defined as “domestically
shared views and understandings regarding the proper role and purpose of one’s
own state as a social collectivity in the international arena” (2002: 3). Role con-
ceptions comprise the ego part – that is, foreign policy makers’ collective self-
conception – and the alter part, which refers to external actors’ expectations of
the national role-beholders’ appropriate behavior (Holsti 1970: 238–9; Kirste
and Maull 1996: 289). These other actors are mainly other states or international
institutions.
Generally, role theory assumes that the role conception and the role behavior
it engenders are consistent. Role conceptions determine foreign policy behavior
because they include specific expectations about state actions (Kirste and Maull
1996: 289). Governmental decision makers are considered the crucial national
role-beholders (Aggestam 2004) and, as a rule, have internalized several differ-
ent roles, reflecting their relationships in different situational contexts (Elgström
and Smith 2006b: 5; Holsti 1970: 277). The marked differences between these
context-specific roles can cause ambivalent role behavior. This also applies to
tensions between different role elements or their altered hierarchy within the
national role conception.
With regard to continuity and change of foreign policy roles, role theory con-
siders national role conceptions as relatively stable over time, and thus as only
gradually and partially changeable (Maull 2006: 418). Nevertheless, change can
occur through rearranging, modifying, or swapping role elements of the foreign
policy role conception. Moreover, the context-specific role that is active changes
with the situation at hand (Kirste and Maull 1996: 285). This allows us to distin-
guish between three types of foreign policy role change: change for external
reasons, i.e. altered role expectations of allies and/or international institutions;
change for internal reasons, i.e. altered role expectations of society; or change
resulting from a combination of the two (Harnisch 2000b: 21). In analyzing these
processes, I focus on political decision makers as the crucial actors choosing
which domestic and/or international influences to incorporate into the foreign
policy role. Both altered rhetoric and practices indicate the onset of foreign
policy role change.
Two mechanisms, crisis learning and socialization, are central to explaining
the convergence of Germany’s and Poland’s foreign policy roles within the
ESDP. Crisis learning refers to debates triggered by international crises such as
Kosovo or Iraq, especially over collective norms governing the use of force and
relations with the United States (Meyer 2006: 34–6). As Meyer argues, new
norms that are backed up by lessons learned from the triggering crisis are estab-
lished in these debates (ibid.: 34). Pace Meyer, who primarily focuses on new
lessons learned, I argue that crisis learning can also reconfirm and further but-
tress old lessons. Socialization refers either to the adoption of the norms of an
established community of insiders by prospective members (Johnston 2001:
Comparing Germany’s and Poland’s ESDPs 133
494), as could be seen in the accession process of Eastern European countries to
the European Union or NATO, or to the establishing of collective norms among
member states in international institutions, particularly the Brussels-based insti-
tutions and committees (Howorth 2002). With regard to ESDP, the PSC is a
crucial socialization arena for national representatives. Indeed, the frequent inter-
actions within the PSC offer ample opportunities for both normative persuasion
of individual decision makers and adaptation pressures on national governments,
which have led to normative convergence (Meyer 2006: 136).
As for the effects of crisis learning and socialization, there are two degrees of
change with which we can evaluate the extent of foreign policy role change:
First, an adaptation process encompasses behavioral change – that is, changes of
strategies and instruments – without the modification of foreign policy goals
(Levy 1994: 286; Schimmelfennig 2001: 62). National role-beholders adapt to
modified or new norms without internalizing them. In contrast, complex learning
refers to a more profound change, including changes of foreign policy goals
(Harnisch 2000a, and in this volume) and even identities. National role-beholders
abide by new norms “because they are now part of their self-understandings”
(Adler and Barnett 1998a: 424). If this is the case, a conceptual foreign policy
role change has occurred.
Germany’s and Poland’s foreign policy role conceptions

Having outlined the theoretical framework for the analysis, I shall now outline
Germany’s and Poland’s respective foreign policy role conceptions.
Germany: a civilian power

“Civilian power” has been suggested as a German national role conception and
role behavior (Harnisch 2000b; Kirste 1998; Kirste and Maull 1996; Maull
1992), which comprises values, goals, principles, and modes of influencing and
exercising power aimed at civilizing international relations (Kirste and Maull
1996: 300; Maull 2006: 418). This depiction has been challenged after the
Kosovo conflict of 1999 (Hellmann 2004), which saw Germany participate in
military operations originally not mandated by the United Nations (Dyson 2007:
1). This chapter takes the position that even though “the parameters of ‘accept
able behavior’ for Germany in the security realm have been considerably
stretched” (Hoffmann and Longhurst 1999: 162) after the end of the Cold War,
its role conception has not changed fundamentally (Maull 2000; Rudolf 2005).
German foreign policy is still characterized by multilateralism, a skeptical atti-
tude towards military power, the support of supranationalization within the Euro-
pean Union, a commitment to civilizing international politics even if this does
not correspond to short-term national interests (Kirste 1998: 460–2), and the
equation of national with European preferences (Wagner 2002; Gross 2007:
129). The equation of national preferences and European responsibility,
however, faces the risk of erosion (Paterson 2010).
134 C. Frank
Germany’s foreign policy practices can be traced back to the maxims “Never
alone again” (multilateralism), “Never again Auschwitz,” “Politics before force,”
and the “culture of restraint.” The foreign policy “culture of restraint” (Berger
1998) refers to behavior patterns of German decision makers whereby striving
for national interests and the claiming of leadership are avoided in favor of close
cooperation with partners in institutional contexts. Based on the principle “Never
alone again,” the so-called Sowohl-als-auch policy – meaning close relations
with France and the United States – is another pattern of German foreign policy,
necessitating the reconciliation of significant alters’ different expectations. With
French and American expectations in the field of security and defense policy
diverging, Germany’s traditional role element as a bridge has been contested fre-
quently during recent years, most prominently in the Iraq conflict (Miskimmon
2007: 149). A second tension within the German role conception arises in turn
from pacifist and belligerent interpretations of “politics before force.”
Besides this continuity in Germany’s role conception, it has also been modi-
fied as a result of crisis learning from Kosovo and Iraq, as well as socialization
within the ESDP. During the German debate on NATO’s Kosovo intervention,
the normative reinterpretation of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer gained dis-
cursive hegemony (Maull 2000). According to Fischer, the lessons learned from
German history were not simply “never again war,” but rather “never again
Auschwitz” (Meyer 2006: 95). Consequently, the use of military force on
humanitarian grounds has been increasingly accepted among Germany’s polit-
ical elite, thus converging with Poland’s foreign policy role. Throughout the Iraq
crisis, a conflict between Germany’s roles as “American ally,” “France’s
partner,” and “promoter of international law” could be observed. Berlin’s lessons
learned from the European Union’s split and the transatlantic rift have resulted
in reinforcing the importance of further European integration and cooperation
with the United States (ibid.: 103, 106). Whereas the Red–Green government
attached greater importance to Paris’s expectations in the field of security and
defense policy (Overhaus 2007: 21), the United States as significant alter was
valued more highly during the chancellorship of Angela Merkel. Owing to this
resurgent Atlanticism, Germany’s foreign policy role became more similar to
Poland’s.
Poland’s emerging role conception: from an “instinctive” to a

Europeanizing Atlanticist?
The emerging Polish role conception has been characterized by the coexistence
of seemingly contradictory role elements: as a victim and as a regional power.
These two role elements have their roots in Polish history (Frank 2003: 21–35):
The “heroic history” (Breuning 1997: 110) of Poland as an Eastern European
great power in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and the rise of the Polish-
Lithuanian Aristocratic Republic as a leading power in Eastern Europe from the
sixteenth to the eighteenth century. From this golden age comes the maxim
“Poland’s voice must always be listened to” and Warsaw’s claim to being at eye
level with the West European heavyweights (Frank 2005: 11). Further, national
role conceptions are influenced by the “founding of the state” (Breuning 1997:
111). In particular, the three partitions of the Polish state in the course of the
eighteenth century and the legacy of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact have shaped
the collective consciousness (Tazbir 1995). From the experience that superior
states betrayed Polish interests in international arrangements several times
follows the maxim “No victim of foreign decisions.”3 Lastly, the “turning point
events” (Breuning 1997: 112) World War II and the end of the Cold War have
influenced Polish role-beholders’ foreign policy thinking decisively (Onyszkie-
wicz 2002: 215).
What Jerzy Maćków (1998: 116f.) once called the “messianism of the subju-
gated” and the “megalomaniac messianism” are mutually reinforcing.4 This was
especially true during the communist era, in which the Poles were oppressed by
the Soviets but perceived themselves as pioneers of freedom and democracy in
the freedom movement Solidarność.5 The occasionally harsh pursuit of Poland’s
national interests in its foreign policy can be traced back to this tension between
the role elements “victim” and “regional power.” Both have found their expres-
sion in the aforementioned foreign policy guidelines. This conglomeration mani-
fested itself inter alia in the notorious “Nice or death” dictum put forward by
Polish politicians during the negotiations on the proportion of votes in the Euro-
pean Council of Ministers in the run-up to the European constitutional contract
and the Treaty of Lisbon.
Poland’s “instinctive atlanticism” (Longhurst and Zaborowski 2003: 1010) in
its foreign policy can be traced back to the traumatic historical experiences of
Polish society, which has repeatedly faced existential threats during past centu-
ries. The centuries-long struggle for survival has led to a very distinct security
need, from which the guideline “primacy of national security” results. Closely
akin to the fixation of the country’s geopolitical location is the militarily focused
understanding of security, which is equated with territorial defense. Regarding
foreign policy, Polish decision makers’ willingness to contemplate the use of
military force is due to the fact that Poland repeatedly fell prey to neighboring
states’ aggression (Malinowski 2006: 42). In 1939, Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union took the place of Prussia, Russia, and Austria-Hungary in the eighteenth
century. Because of the perception of Poland as militarily weak, the belief that
Poland is dependent on powerful states’ or alliances’ protection prevailed among
decision makers (Osica 2002: 83). Thus, from Warsaw’s point of view, a strong,
US-led NATO is the only way to meet its traditional security needs reliably. This
conviction is reflected in the foreign policy maxim “primacy of the transatlantic
bond” and the role element “faithful ally.”
Warsaw’s strive to become “America’s new model ally” (Dunn 2003: 63) was
boosted further by crisis learning from Kosovo, which led it to conclusions com-
pletely opposite to those of West European states (Frank 2003: 67). From the
Polish perspective, Western Europe’s hesitancy and Washington’s resoluteness
in the run-up to NATO’s intervention once more confirmed the preexisting con-
viction that only the United States meets Warsaw’s criteria for allies’ credibility
136 C. Frank
(Nowak-Jeziorański 2000). Moreover, the Kosovo conflict fostered Polish skep-
ticism towards the European Union in security and defense policy (Górka-Winter
and Posel-Częścik 2001: 133).
Poland’s instinctive Atlanticism and unconditional solidarity with the United
States, however, was questioned by its crisis learning from Iraq. Despite stand-
ing shoulder to shoulder with Washington on Iraq, Warsaw’s expectation of
becoming a top-tier American ally has not been fulfilled.6 Rather, the expected
dividend failed to materialize at all, and thus America ceased to be a benevolent
hegemon for Poland (Roguwska and Wenzel 2008: 105). Poland’s subsequent
disappointment and skepticism towards America’s leadership role stems from
several sources: First, American visa requirements for Polish citizens have not
been eased as expected (Gadziński 2004). Second, the promised offset invest-
ments in connection with the purchase of the American F-16 fighter aircraft
came in only slowly (Osica 2004c). Third, Polish companies gained far fewer
contracts in the course of Iraq’s reconstruction than expected (Whitmore 2003).
In consequence, Polish approval of the United States’ global leadership role fell
from 64 percent in 2002 to 34 percent in 2008 (German Marshall Fund 2008:
6f.).
The war in Iraq has also been a daunting experience for Poland insofar as it
found itself perceived as a perpetrator rather than a liberator by a growing
number of Iraqis – which obviously does not conform with its role element as a
“pioneer.” Through crisis learning from Iraq, Polish role-beholders became
aware that their instinctive Atlanticism may be extremely costly, including the
alienation from West European partners (Meyer 2006: 106; 108). As a result of
this learning process, the role element as a “faithful ally” was redefined,
approaching the German understanding. Instead of Poland unconditionally acting
as the United States’ ally, a new realism in Polish US policy has emerged.7 It
stands for a more self-assured way of communication with the US government,
as could be seen during the Polish–American negotiations over the deployment
of the US ballistic missile defense shield in Poland (Dylla 2008).
Moreover, a second change within the Polish role conception has occurred
during recent years. Before Poland joined the European Union in May 2004, a
“complex of conspiracy” towards EU security and defense policy prevailed
among its decision makers (Osica and Zaborowski 2002: 14). While Poland’s
distrust towards Western Europe in security matters has not completely disap-
peared, the role element as a “victim” has become less dominant. Instead, the
role element as a “European partner” has emerged through socialization within
the European Union and crisis learning from Iraq. Discussions and cooperation
in the ESDP institutions, especially in the PSC, have alleviated Polish decision
makers’ suspicions and strengthened confidence in the reliability of its European
partners. In particular, Britain’s co-leadership of the ESDP has contributed con-
siderably to this. Moreover, the degree of identification, which socialization the-
ories assume to be crucial for normative persuasion (Johnston 2001: 497), has
increased among Polish role-beholders. In getting used to Brussels’ “code of
conduct” and the rules regulating ESDP, Polish diplomats’ sense of belonging to
the Union has become stronger (Roguska and Wenzel 2008: 102). Thus, the “us”
and “them” paradigm has diminished (Pomorska 2007: 37). Parallel to the
Union’s increasing importance as Poland’s positive significant alter in the field
of security and defense, other member states started to perceive it as a natural
member of a European vanguard – though often irritated by Polish role-
beholders’ behavior and sledgehammer rhetoric. In this regard, former president
Aleksander Kwaśniewski’s performance as a mediator in Ukraine’s “Orange
Revolution” in late 2004 was looked upon favorably. Also, Poland’s participa-
tion in the EU-led operations in Congo and Lebanon evoked considerable inter-
est among West European EU officials (Fidos and Pomorska 2007: 17).
Besides the socializing effects of EU membership, crisis learning from Iraq
influenced the emergence of a role element as a “European partner” within
Poland’s role conception as a Europeanizing Atlanticist in two respects. First,
Warsaw began to realize that it could play in Europe’s “premier league” because
of its prominent role in Iraq (Longhurst and Zaborowski 2007: 55). Second, the
previously held conviction that the keys to Brussels could be found in Washing-
ton was questioned, because Poland became alienated from its European partners
as a result of its unconditional Atlanticism. As a consequence, a new normative
reference point was established among Polish role-beholders: gaining access and
influence within the European Union takes place in Brussels.
Now that I have compared Germany’s and Poland’s ESDPs, I will show that
both states’ role conceptions offer a convincing explanation for increasing simil-
arities as well as differences and ambivalences.
Germany’s and Poland’s role behaviour within the ESDP

The following analysis of Germany’s and Poland’s role behavior within the
ESDP will focus on transatlantic cleavages over the ESDP’s realization. Fre-
quently, disputes have been about the ESDP’s relationship with NATO, the pri-
oritization of military or civilian instruments, geographical scope and the
spectrum of tasks, deepened cooperation within the ESDP, as well as the Euro-
pean Union’s finality in security and defense matters.
Comparing German and Polish perspectives on EU–NATO relations

Traditionally, Germany’s attitude towards the ESDP has been shaped by the
endeavor to maintain good relationships with both France and the United States
through avoiding a decision between the French claims of independence and US
expectations of followership. Berlin has thus supported the development of the
ESDP as a bridge between the European integration process, and security coop-
eration with the United States and NATO (Overhaus 2004: 38). According to the
Defense Policy Guidelines (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2003: 8), the
ESDP “shall not substitute, but rather complement NATO.” Whereas NATO still
occupies a preeminent position in questions of territorial defense and military
crisis management, the European Union is seen as especially suitable for
138 C. Frank
carrying out civil–military operations (White Paper 2006: 48). Although official
German policy rates close coordination with Washington highly (ibid.: 29) and
has frequently asserted that it wants to avoid unnecessary duplications with
NATO (Coalition Agreement, 11 November 2005), duplications exist in the
form of the PSC, the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the EU Military Staff
(EUMS) and the European Command Cell. By supporting the development of a
European Security and Defense Union (e.g. Bundesministerium der Verteidi-
gung 2003: 12), the Federal Government’s position has shifted considerably
towards Europe – that is, France. Though Germany still considers transatlantic
ties vital, its European vocation has become stronger. In particular, the European
Union represented an important reference point for the former Red–Green coali-
tion, whereas the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Free Democratic
Party (FDP) have traditionally focused more on the transatlantic relationship
(Gross 2007: 129–130).
According to the maxim “primacy of the transatlantic bond,” the reference
point of Poland’s position vis-à-vis the ESDP is the triad of American demands
commonly known as the “3 Ds.”8 Referring to this, Poland’s former foreign
minister Daniel Rotfeld claimed that the ESDP “should neither replace NATO’s
functions and tasks nor duplicate them” (2004), because, as Foreign Minister
Radosław Sikorski explained, “we [the Poles] do not want to choose, we want to
have two complementary insurance policies” (2008). Consequently, Warsaw
rejected the establishment of a European Commando Cell outside of SHAPE in
2003 (Osica 2004a: 312). According to Poland’s latest National Security Strat-
egy (2007: 12), the crucial question is how a permanent and institutionalized
cooperation between NATO and the European Union can be developed in order
to ensure that the strengthening of the ESDP does not weaken NATO. Poland
considers NATO the most important form of multilateral cooperation in the field
of military security, and a vital pillar of stability on the European continent
(ibid.: 10).
Prioritization of military or civilian instruments

Reflecting its traditional culture of restraint, Berlin has emphasized the impor-
tance of the ESDP’s civilian dimension (Miskimmon 2007: 143). During its
presidency in 1999, the Red–Green government spoke out in favor of formulat-
ing a civilian goal in addition to the military task force, so that police units,
judges, and public prosecutors could be sent to conflict regions (Wagner 2007).
Moreover, the report’s annexing of the civilian crisis management capabilities,
which the EU members accepted on their summit in Nice in December 2000,
essentially results from German proposals (Schmalz 2001: 569). In particular,
Germany’s former foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, sought a strong civilian
and crisis prevention dimension to defense and security through multilateral
agreements (Dyson 2007: 164–5). This lies within the role conception of a civil-
ian power, in which the use of military force is not excluded but accepted only
as a means of last resort (Maull 1992: 779).
In contrast, whether the ESDP creates an added benefit for territorial defense
is decisive from the Polish perspective. Official Polish documents and statements
constantly underscore that Warsaw does not feel threatened by any state at this
time, but the assessment that “there is however no guarantee, that a black sce-
nario would not materialize in 10 or 20 years time” (Onyszkiewicz 2002: 218) is
still dominant among Polish decision makers. While German thinking on secur-
ity policy is shaped by the absence of external threats and a deep trust in its
neighbors, these two factors are absent in Polish thinking (Reiter 2001: 42), with
a vast majority of Polish politicians being far more skeptical: “Poland, due to
geography and history, believes in a Hobbesian world, rather than a Kantian par-
adise” (Osica 2004a: 310). Consequently, the use of military force – if necessary
against international law – is considered far less odious in the Polish capital
(Osica 2003).
Beyond these divergent positions, German and Polish role behavior within
the ESDP also have common traits: Both share a significant gap between obliga-
tions, and supply of financial and military resources. With regard to Germany,
explanations pointing to budget or domestic constraints are hardly convincing.
Rather, the allocation of public money indicates established priorities that again
reflect the importance of military means in foreign policy (Overhaus 2004: 45).
Referring to the cost-intensive adaptation of Poland’s armed forces to NATO
standard, many Polish politicians justified the country’s difficulties in being able
to contribute adequately to the ESDP (Górka-Winter and Posel-Częśik 2001:
133). The argument that NATO–ESDP cooperation must use the available
resources efficiently (National Security Strategy 2007: 12) has to be viewed in
this context. Financial stringency and contested priorities between territorial
defense and international crisis management have meant a tedious process of
reforming Poland’s armed forces. In the case of Germany, the armed forces are
confronted with two problems: first, an insufficient willingness to commit finan-
cial resources; and second, the culture of restraint, which sets limits to the
participation of Germany’s armed forces in out-of-area operations (Meiers
2005: 153).
Geographic scope and remit

Both in the EU convention on the constitution and in the formulation of the
European Headline Goals (EHGs) in 2010, Germany belonged to those states
supporting the expansion of functions beyond the conventional Petersberg tasks
(Aposkitis 2006: 82f.). Certainly, the Defense Policy Guidelines do not refer
directly to German forces’ participation in ESDP operations, but future opera-
tions “can neither be limited in their intensity nor their geography” (Bundesmin-
isterium der Verteigung 2003: 13). During the European Rapid Reaction Force
(ERRF ) contribution conferences, Germany committed 13,500 ground forces,
more than any other EU member (Giegerich and Wallace 2004: 174). But there
is no shortage of ground forces, and Germany does not contribute much towards
plugging the persistent qualitative capability gaps, including gaps in strategic
140 C. Frank
transport, reconnaissance, and military command. Rather, the German armed
forces primarily participate in EU missions in the lower spectrum of the Peters-
berg tasks, which corresponds to the more civilian-oriented German security role
(Overhaus 2004: 46). Among these are the European Union’s military operation
in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR Althea) with initially 2,400 German soldiers,
the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) with up to 90 policemen,
the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFG) with roughly 40 police-
men and 10 experts, and the European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)
with more than 100 policemen.9
Poland committed 1,500 soldiers to EU forces (Miszczak 2007: 19). Until
recently, Warsaw considered the former USSR and its expansive regional secur-
ity interests as key challenges for European crisis management (Osica and Trza-
skowski 2005: 2). Owing to adaptation pressure within the PSC, Poland agreed
to extend the ESDP’s geographic scope. Indeed, Warsaw demonstrated its will
to contribute to the ESDP by participating in most EU civil and military opera-
tions (Miszczak 2007: 22f.), including those outside Europe. These include
EUFOR Althea, in which Poland participated with up to 190 soldiers; EULEX,
with a Polish special police unit (about 120 persons); the EU–UN cooperation
for supervising the election process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to
which Poland contributed one of the biggest military contingents (approximately
130 persons); and participation in the European Union’s mission in Chad, with
roughly 400 Polish soldiers. Although Warsaw was initially skeptical towards
EU battle groups, fearing competition between them and NATO’s Response
Force (NRF ), it eventually supported the initiative. Poland was a framework
nation in one of the European Union’s battle groups in 2010, with Germany,
Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovakia also participating. Furthermore, Poland will take
over the function as a lead nation within the battle group II/2012 in the format of
the Weimar Triangle, namely Poland, Germany, and France (Frank 2007).
Given Poland’s commitments to the NRF, the question is whether the EU or
NATO commitments will be rated higher when the worst comes to the worst.
The National Security Strategy (2007: 11) stressed the overriding importance of
NATO for Polish security. With regard to territorial defense, the foreign minis-
ter’s annual speech takes the same stance (Sikorski 2010: 18). In 2010, however,
Sikorski referred to the importance of the European Union and NATO for Polish
foreign policy in the same breath, deviating from the traditional “NATO first”
aproach. In contrast to this, Germany’s former foreign minister Joschka Fischer
and former defense minister Peter Struck made German support for the NRF
conditional on its compatibility with the ERRF. This was a remarkable departure
from the traditional German policy based on the principle “NATO first” (Over-
haus 2007: 21). At the same time, Struck established the ESDP within the trans-
atlantic partnership in the Defense Policy Guidelines, brokering tensions
between Atlanticists and Europeanists among German decision makers. None-
theless, a disjointed discourse prevailed among German politicians, in which the
Foreign Ministry was closer to French positions and the Defense Ministry to
British positions (Dyson 2007: 176). Meanwhile, the Atlanticism in Germany’s
ESDP has been resurgent under the governing CDU and FPD, with their tradi-
tional focus on NATO.
The European Union’s finality: civilian power or junior partner of

the United States?
Polish and German discussions over the European Union’s security and defense
political finality gravitate around the question: “Who is this actor at present, and
who should it be and can it be in the future?” This discussion has to be examined
together with the European Security Strategy (ESS), the deepened cooperation
within the ESDP, and collective defense.
By incorporating a mutual assistance clause in the Treaty of Lisbon (art.
42 § 7 EUT), the European Union formally constituted itself as a defense alli-
ance. Following the evolution clause, the European Council can gradually lay
down a common defense policy (art. 24 § 1), which might lead to a common
defense. Across parties, German decision makers see the ESDP as a process that
might lead to a European Security and Defense Union with a common army and
a common defense, in the course of which restrictions on sovereignty would be
accepted (Giegerich 2006: 132). Certainly, the inclusion of a mutual assistance
clause is in line with Poland’s security interests (Miszczak 2007: 20), but Poland
rejects the idea of a European defense union because NATO’s traditional defense
function could be eroded (Malinowski 2009: 621). Rather, from the Polish point
of view, the military capabilities of the European Union should be developed in
utmost harmony and convergence with NATO (Sikorski 2006).
Germany favors a deepened cooperation within the ESDP because of its
strong Europeanized national identity. Across party lines, German interests are
perceived as almost fused to European interests, which is why foreign policy
should no longer be conducted purely on a national level.10 In contrast, Polish
decision makers initially objected to all forms of flexibility within the ESDP
(Olechowski 2004). Deepened cooperation was perceived as a Franco-German
instrument to exclude the new, pro-American EU members from decision
making in the Union by establishing military convergence criteria they could not
meet (Osica 2004a: 316). Poland rejected – according to the former foreign
minister Daniel Rotfeld – “the idea of a ‘European Directorate’ or a ‘nucleus
Europe’ vehemently” (Rotfeld 2004).11 Meanwhile, Polish decision makers have
developed an affirmative attitude towards deepened cooperation within the
ESDP in the course of their socialization process. Polish role-beholders now per-
ceive themselves “amongst the leading European players in many areas where
decisions are taken to determine the policy direction of European institutions”
(Sikorski 2010: 1).
With regard to the European Union’s ability to become an effective interna-
tional crisis manager, the Polish stance is much more skeptical than Germany’s.
Insufficient military capabilities and the EU members’ lack of willingness to
enter into a political-military conflict with Russia, if necessary, shape this stance
(Żurawski vel Grajewski 2005: 105). Accordingly, Western European attitudes
142 C. Frank
towards Russia have been the litmus test of any European foreign policy for
Polish politicians. Warsaw criticized the ESS for referring to Russia as a partner
but not a potential threat, even though the threats enumerated in the document,
e.g. bad governance, apply to Russia (Osica 2004b: 12). Further factors imped-
ing the ESDP’s effectiveness from the Polish perspective include the missing
European power to lead, heterogeneous priorities in members’ security and
defense policies, the lack of “European patriotism,” and insufficient solidarity.
National role conceptions and similarities, differences, and

ambivalences in Germany’s and Poland’s role behaviour
Let us recall the questions posed at the outset: Which interests have Germany
and Poland pursued with regard to the relationship towards NATO, the prioriti-
zation of military and civilian instruments, the geographical radius of action and
the spectrum of tasks, the deepened cooperation, and the European Union’s final-
ity? Can their ESDPs be explained by their respective national foreign policy
role conceptions?
Both states’ interests converge to a considerable degree around the ESDP–
NATO relationship. According to its role element as a bridge, Germany’s ESDP
has been shaped by reconciling France’s preference for “l’Europe puissance” on
the one hand and NATO’s transatlantic vocation on the other (Miskimmon 2007:
147). In contrast to its lip service regarding the compatibility of the ESDP and
NATO, Europe, i.e. France, has been the priority, at least under the Red–Green
government. This is clearly evidenced by calls for a European Security and
Defense Union or the demand that the NRF should be developed in close
coordination with the ERRF. Nevertheless, Berlin’s temporary flirtations with
European initiatives do not equate to a substantial departure from its policy of
equidistance but rather are short-term temporal concessions to France. Accord-
ingly, Germany’s ESDP has been described as “fence-sitting,” with Berlin
caught between transatlantic commitments and European rhetoric as far as
strengthening Europe’s foreign policy is concerned (Gross 2007: 122). Germany
has found itself confronted with divergent expectations from France and the
United States, whose strictly Atlanticist interpretation of the ESDP stands in
sharp contrast to the French Gaullist position. Berlin also wants to promote the
ESDP as an important step towards establishing a political union. By taking into
consideration both external actors’ expectations through the alter part and the
norms incorporated in the ego part, role theory offers a convincing explanation
for Germany’s sometimes ambivalent behavior within the ESDP.
Moreover, inconsistencies have emanated from the principle of ministerial
autonomy, which encourages diverging ministerial European policies (Bulmer
2009: 4). This coexistence of ministerial ESDPs has been accentuated by the
persistence of coalition governments. Thus, not only do the Foreign and
the Defense Ministry coordinate Germany’s security and defense policies, with the
chancellor having the power to intervene and override, but they are also led by
ministers from different parties. As a result of the ESDP decision-making
process, more precisely within the General Affairs and External Relations
Council, the foreign minister has more influence on Germany’s position towards
the ESDP. In Germany, there is an institutional split between the Foreign Office,
which presses for a stronger European Union, and the Defense Ministry’s strong
Atlanticist orientation. Especially within the ministry’s executive staff, the EU
structures in security and defense policy were seen as a challenge to NATO’s
primacy (Dyson 2007: 173).
Even more so than Berlin, Warsaw claims that the ESDP has to strengthen
the transatlantic partnership and has to be developed in close coordination with
the United States. Unlike in Germany, there is no discrepancy between verbal
commitments to an Atlanticist ESDP and operational security policy in Poland.
Rather, the practice of standing shoulder to shoulder with the United States has
dominated Polish ESDP, going back to its role conception as an Atlanticist. That
Warsaw’s position towards ESDP is almost congruent with that of Washington
cannot be explained by external expectations on the part of the United States
alone. It is, rather, motivated intrinsically. In comparison with Germany, Poland,
in this regard, seems to be an “introverted” state, leaning on the only reliable
security guarantor – owing to its self-perception as a victim.
As for the prioritization of military or civilian instruments in the ESDP, we
can discern substantial divergence between Germany and Poland. Whereas
German policy makers have pushed hard for civilian crisis management capacit
ies, the European Union’s value added for military operability and its defense
has been crucial for Poland. Their respective role conceptions shed light on this
difference: As a civilian power, Germany accepts the use of military force only
as the last resort. According to its maxim “Never Auschwitz again,” it advocates
civilization both within and beyond the Union, wanting it to be(come) a civilian
power. In contrast, owing to Poland’s repeated loss of statehood, the Polish role
conception focuses on external threats and defense, which includes a positive
attitude towards the use of military force (Malinowski 2006: 42).
Initially, the greatest divergences between Germany and Poland were over the
deepened cooperation in the ESDP and the European Union’s finality.12 Whereas
Berlin spoke out – and still does – in favor of integration in the field of security
and defense policy, Warsaw rejected any kind of flexibility. Through socializa-
tion within the Union and crisis learning from Iraq, Polish role-beholders
developed the role as a European partner, which resulted in a more positive
outlook on the ESDP and its deepening. Although occasionally critical in declar-
atory terms, after Poland’s EU accession its position towards the ESDP has
almost been enthusiastic in deeds (Fidos and Pomorska 2007: 16). Thus, com-
pared to the late 1990s, Germany’s and Poland’s ESDPs have seen a substantial
rapprochement with regard to deepened cooperation, geographic scope, and the
use of military means.
Evaluating the degree of foreign policy role change, we can observe an adap-
tation process in Poland, in the course of which foreign policy goals have not
changed. Maximizing Poland’s own ends, especially national security and influ-
ence in European and international politics, is still of overriding importance.
144 C. Frank
According to Foreign Minister Sikorski (2010: 2), “Poland’s strategic goal is to
play an increasingly important role in the European Union and NATO.” The
strategy and instruments through which to realize these goals, however, have
changed. Whereas previously Washington was thought to be the back door to
Brussels, nowadays Warsaw pursues the opposite strategy, seeking to increase
its influence in Washington via Brussels and using the Union as a “power multi-
plier” for its national interests. This, however, requires a more profound integra-
tion of Poland within the Union, which so far has not yet been accepted by
Polish decision makers. Rather, Warsaw perceives its participation in ESDP
operations as the most important instrument for establishing its place in Brus-
sels’ premier league. Germany’s most important learning process during the
1990s included changing attitudes and practices regarding the use of force,
induced by its significant alters’ expectations. They expected Germany to engage
militarily more intensively. The Greens and the SPD in particular went through
intra-party learning processes, changing the hierarchy of the collective norms
embedded in the role conception (Maull and Stahl 2002: 101). Based on the
maxim “Never again Auschwitz” and the Federal Constitutional Court’s 1994
verdict, creating a robust legal basis for the German participation in NATO’s
out-of-area operations, the Bundeswehr took part in the alliance’s Kosovo inter-
vention. This reevaluation of foreign policy strategies and instruments was
henceforth accepted by the majority of German decision makers. Yet Germany’s
foreign policy goal of civilization and institutionalization of both European and
international politics remains intact.
Civilian power meets Europeanizing Atlanticist: further

convergence of foreign policy roles within the ESDP?
According to role theory, a further convergence of Germany’s and Poland’s
foreign policy role within the ESDP can be expected if the national role concep-
tions continue to adjust to each other. This depends on the role-beholders’ will
and foreign policy learning.
Recently, the revitalization of the Weimar Triangle has raised hopes that the
two states’ positions towards the ESDP may converge further in the future.
Indeed, since the liberal “Civic Platform” under Donald Tusk came to power, it
has struck a much more conciliatory tone towards Western Europe and Germany.
As a result, we can expect more constructive cooperation between Germany and
Poland over security matters. In the short run, however, I do not expect any
harmonization with regard to the European Union’s substantial question of its
finality. This is because the overwhelming majority of German and Polish
decision makers have persistent and divergent understandings of the character of
statehood, sovereignty, and international institutions. Whereas German govern-
ments since the end of the Cold War have followed the leitmotif “security
through integration,” Polish governments have stuck to “security through sover-
eignty” (Miszczak 2005: 105). According to the maxim “no victim of foreign
decisions,” Warsaw continues to insist on intergovernmental cooperation within
the ESDP. Maximizing security by retaining full sovereignty is a sine qua non
condition in Poland’s foreign policy – a belief at odds with German pushes for
communization within the ESDP. Moreover, Poland subordinates further inte-
gration to militarily strengthening the European Union.13 In marked contrast,
German role-beholders remain deeply influenced by a “reflexive commitment to
institution building” (Meiers 2005: 162).
Nonetheless, two gaps have opened up in the Polish role conception, gaps that
could strengthen the Europeanization of Poland’s foreign policy role in the long
run. The first gap is the one between political decision makers and the public; the
second exists within the political elite itself. Both developments have to be
viewed in connection with the increasing degree of identification with the Euro-
pean Union. According to Roguwska and Wenzel (2008: 102), Poles “are losing
their self-doubt . . . and feel more and more European” because of their country’s
EU membership. Whereas most Polish decision makers emphasize the over-
whelming importance of the United States as guarantor of military security and
stability in Poland, especially vis-à-vis Russia (Horolets 2008: 51), the public
would prefer to see the European Union as a global political leader (ibid.: 103).
This indicates that the public’s conception of global leadership has begun to
change from one based on the military dominance of the United States to one
based on economic strength (ibid.: 103). Moreover, a majority of the Polish public
are in favor of a European Security Policy replacing national security policies.
The second gap pertains to the Polish decision-making elite itself. Although
the strongly Atlanticist orientation still prevails, some opinion leaders scrutinize
its underlying assumptions, challenging the perception of Washington as a relia-
ble ally and the equation of Polish with American interests (Horolets 2008: 51).
The former defense minister and current foreign minister Sikorski warned that
we should “not . . underestimate how much the Polish perception of the US has
changed. In the past, when decision-time arrived, Polish politicians said: on
security issues, America can be trusted. But after Iraq . . . we will watch Wash-
ington’s proposals more carefully” (cited in Horolets 2008: 59).
Owing to the Obama administration’s wavering stance on deploying com-
ponents of ballistic missile defense in Poland, critics of reflexive Atlanticism feel
further vindicated. Also, in light of America’s new Eastern policy, which is seen
by many as a “Russia first” policy, Poland’s new distrust is growing. Accord-
ingly, a new breed of realistic Euroatlanticists within the Tusk administration
claim that Poland should be more in step with Europe. To what extent the
modest Polish enthusiasm for President Obama makes a further Europeanization
of Poland’s security and defense policy more likely remains to be seen.
Notes
1 I would like to thank Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull for their valuable com-
ments on an earlier version of this chapter.
2 In accordance with the majority of role-theoretical studies, the political elite is con-
sidered to be the main role-beholder.
146 C. Frank
3 The incantation “Nic o nas bez nas” is literally translated “Nothing about us without
us.”
4 Author’s translation.
5 The self-perception as a pioneer is reflected in the battle cry “Dla naszej i waszej
wolności” (For our and your freedom).
6 According to former US national security advisor Zbigniew Brzeziński, Poland has
even been relegated to the third league of America’s allies.
7 This new realism is reflected, for example, in the interview with Poland’s foreign
minister Radosław Sikorski in Dziennik, 12 March 2008.
8 According to former secretary of state Madeleine Albright (1998), the removal of
European decision structures from NATO’s decision structures (no decoupling); the
duplication of armed forces planning, commando structures and procurement (no
duplication), or an insufficient participation of non-EU NATO states (no discrimina-
tion) are unacceptable.
9 See www.zif-berlin.org for Germany’s contributions to civil and military ESDP
missions.
10 Wagner (2002) shows the lack of distinction between national European interests by
analyzing parliamentary debates on foreign, security, and defense issues.
11 Author’s translation.
12 Compared with the Treaty of Nice, the Lisbon Treaty extends the possibility of deep-
ened cooperation in the ESDP, which requires the participation of at least nine
member states and the council’s consensual decision. Additionally, it introduces the
so-called permanent structured cooperation, which aims at proceeding with military
capability development. See Biscop (2008) for a detailed analysis.
13 See, for example, the speech of Poland’s former foreign minister, Anna Fotyga, in the
Sejm on 11 May 2007 (www.msz.gov.pl).
9 Does membership matter?
Convergence of Sweden’s and
Norway’s role conceptions by
interaction with the European Union
Rachel Folz
Introduction
It seems that since the end of the Cold War, the role conceptions of Norway and
Sweden have converged. Before 1989/90, the states represented extreme cases
on opposite ends of the spectrum. Norway was a founding member of NATO in
1949, while Sweden has maintained a policy of neutrality since 1814 and did not
join the European Union until 1995. This chapter argues that the inception of the
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999 has been the crucial
“trigger” for the changes in both Sweden’s neutral and Norway’s Atlantic role
conception. The Norwegian case in particular indicates that membership in the
European Union is not a necessary precondition to trigger role change; rather,
interaction with the Union seems sufficient for role change to occur.
Several in-depth descriptions and some explanations of the convergence of
Nordic security policies after 1989 have been proffered to date (Archer 2008;
Bailes et al. 2006; Græger et al. 2002; Rieker 2006b). This chapter builds on and
expands on the available theoretical and empirical literature by applying the innov-
ative theoretical perspective of role theory to it. This is challenging because role
theory has so far neglected the methodological analysis of role change and of the
necessary conditions for international organizations (IOs) to trigger it. The chapter
attempts to fill these theoretical gaps, first by distinguishing between two levels
and degrees of role change (behavioral versus conceptual role change), and second
by deducing scope conditions for the impact of IOs (i.e. uncertainty, identification,
resonance) from the research on international socialization. Following Zürn and
Checkel (2005: 1055), I define scope conditions as conditions under which IOs are
able to trigger certain forms of role change. Accordingly, I argue that uncertainty
of the target state is sufficient for behavioral role change to occur. For IOs to
trigger conceptual role change, however, identification, resonance, and the uncer-
tainty of the target state are necessary conditions. I then apply this theoretical
framework to answer two empirical research questions: (1) How pronounced are
the three scope conditions in Norway and Sweden and are they favorable for the
European Union and its ESDP to trigger conceptual role change? (2) How relevant
is membership in the European Union for role change? This will be addressed by
comparing the Union’s impact on a member and a non-member state.
148 R. Folz
This chapter has four sections. In the first section, I shall define important
theoretical concepts. Furthermore, I shall deduce three scope conditions for the
impact of IOs on role change from the research on international socialization,
and generate expectations of how they apply to the cases at hand. In the second
section, I shall compare the national role concepts of Norway and Sweden before
1989/90 and after 1999 and assess their change. In the third section, I shall dem-
onstrate that the different degrees of role change (behavioral versus conceptual)
triggered by the European Union and its ESDP depends on the extent to which
the three scope conditions are met. To this end, I shall analyze and draw upon
secondary literature, speeches by administration officials, newspaper articles,
and survey data. In the fourth and final section, I shall summarize theoretical and
empirical findings and evaluate the utility of the theoretical framework proposed
in this chapter.
Role change and interaction with IOs

The “role conception” is a crucial notion and in most cases the point of departure
for empirical case studies in role-theoretical analyses (Aggestam 2004; Breuning
1995; Kirste and Maull 1996; Krotz 2002). Krotz (2002: 3) defines national role
concepts as “domestically shared views and understandings regarding the proper
role and purpose of one’s own state as a social collectivity in the international
arena.” The role conception entails some national characteristics, since it devel-
ops from “history,” “memory,” and “socialization.” The majority of previous
studies consider the political elite to be the main role-holder, and directly
involved in the process of forming the national role conception. This then gradu-
ally becomes the “standard of appropriate behavior,” prescribing a particular
behavior in certain situations. Thereby, it offers a guideline for policy makers,
which is highly valuable, for example, in foreign policy crises, where the uncer-
tainty as to what constitutes acceptable behavior is high (Aggestam 2004; Kirste
and Maull 1996). Thus, role concepts determine the scope of state actions that
are legitimate (Krotz 2002: 5f.). In general, role theory assumes that the role
conception and role behavior flowing from it are consistent. Role concepts deter-
mine foreign policy behavior because they include specific expectations about
state actions (Biddle 1986: 69; Kirste and Maull 1996: 289). Concerning these
expectations, role theory differentiates between the ego part and the alter part of
the role. The ego part is the self-expectation a role-holder has of its own role and
role behavior in international relations (see Harnisch, this volume). The alter
part, on the other hand, describes the role other actors expect the role-holder to
act upon. These other actors are mainly other states or IOs. However, a national
role conception is jointly formed by the ego and the alter part through their inter-
action, and comprises several distinct roles. These are policy specific in terms of
having a regulative and constitutive impact on distinct policy areas. The role
conception itself is assumed to be stable and only gradually changeable. Never-
theless, individual roles can be rearranged, modified, and even exchanged,
depending on the specific policy situation at hand (Kirste and Maull 1996: 285).
Does EU membership matter? 149
A core of roles, however, has to remain stable in order for the role-holder to
adhere to a specific role conception and to enable it to distinguish between
appropriate and inappropriate behavior (Krotz 2002: 4f.). This core of stable
roles is unaffected by domestic upheaval such as government changes or acced-
ing to IOs. But the change of either single roles or the entire role conception may
occur. The literature proposes that either the occurrence of role conflicts or the
interaction with other actors may trigger role change (Aggestam 2004: 67–71;
Harnisch, this volume; Schimank 2007: 56–9).
This chapter aims to analyze role change caused by the interaction between
states and IOs. To do so, I differentiate between two different levels and degrees
of role change: When states interact with IOs, this may lead to behavioral or
conceptual change. Behavioral change describes the adaptation of the role
behavior, i.e. of strategies and instruments, without modifying the role concep-
tion itself (Harnisch, this volume). Conceptual change, on the other hand,
implies a change of major concepts and foreign policy goals of decision makers
and thus of either single roles or the entire role conception. Methodologically,
role change can be observed through before–after comparisons. Thus, this
chapter assumes that the ESDP is a crucial trigger for role change and compares
Norwegian and Swedish role concepts and role behavior before and after the
inception of the ESDP in 1999.
Combining role theory with the research on international

socialization
To date, role theory has paid only scant attention to the conditions necessary for
IOs to trigger behavioral or conceptual role change in states. In order to fill this
gap, I use international socialization theory as a supplement (for a similar argu-
ment, see Harnisch and Maull 2001a: 148f.). Current research on international
socialization focuses on how the transfer of international norms triggers pro
cesses of change in states and focuses particularly on the actors, mechanisms,
and conditions conducive to this transfer (Schimmelfennig 2003: 405). Harnisch
(this volume) considers socialization a “mechanism of role change, because it
describes a process by which an outsider internalizes the behavioral rules previ-
ously set by a community of insiders.” Hence, during the socialization process
new norms are incorporated into the national role conception, leading to “a new
understanding of the collective self ” (Gheciu 2005: 977) and, thus, to conceptual
role change, since the compliance with community norms mostly “occurs
through interest/identity redefinition” (Checkel 1999). Thereby, socialization
scholars consider both the European Union and NATO as institutions with the
potential to initiate socialization processes in both member and non-member
states (Flockhart 2006: 97; Gheciu 2005: 977f.; Schimmelfennig 2005a: 832f.;
Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 5f.). However, this chapter neither wants to measure
the success of IOs as socialization agencies nor wants to compare the socializa-
tion processes in Norway and Sweden respectively. Rather, it is concerned with
the conditions within the two states necessary for the European Union and the
150 R. Folz
ESDP to trigger conceptual role change. Thus, among the multitude of scope
conditions discussed in the literature on international socialization (for an over-
view, see Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1050), I consider three crucial for application
in my analysis:
Uncertainty
Socialization scholars argue that it is much easier for an IO to impact on a state
if the latter feels uncertain because it finds itself in a novel environment and is
thus “cognitively motivated to analyze new information” (Checkel 2005: 813).
Owing to a desire to diminish uncertainty, the target government appreciates the
IO for possessing certain knowledge, experience, or competence in a policy field
and, thus, for providing orientation and leadership. Assigned the role of leader
and agenda setter, the IO is able to take over the acting part in the interaction
process, pushing ideas and issues encouraging the target government to follow
and to change role(s). Accordingly, I empirically investigate whether the rhetoric
of Norwegian and Swedish decision makers suggests a certain degree of uncer-
tainty and drift concerning their role as neutral or Atlanticist state, respectively,
in the post-1989/90 security architecture, motivating them to assign leadership to
the European Union and to follow its ideas.
Identification
It is much easier for an IO to have an impact on the national role conception if
the target state wants to be a “member of the club”:
[T]he agent being socialized must identify positively with the social group
to which the norm promoter belongs and have a desire for inclusion in that
group; it is not possible to socialize agents who do not wish to belong to the
group of the socializer.
(Flockhart 2006: 97; for a similar argument, see Gheciu 2005: 982f.;
Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 60)
The degree of identification is evident in self/other constructions (Diez 2005;

Neumann 1999). I assume that if identification with an IO is high, a state will
include the community norms in its self-definition and demarcate them from
other norms that are perceived as negative and subordinated to community
norms. Accordingly, I empirically examine the identification with the European
Union (and in the Norwegian case also with NATO) by focusing on self/other
constructions in the reasoning of Norwegian and Swedish decision makers.
Resonance
Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990: 314) maintain that “socialization is principally an
elite not a mass phenomenon.”1 Hence, during the socialization process the elite
is socialized first and then “sells” the new norms to the public. However, recent
studies on socialization have claimed “to bring the domestic back in” (Zürn and
Checkel 2005: 1045) by highlighting the relevance of subnational factors for the
socialization process and, thus, conceptual role change. Flockhart (2006: 98)
focuses on the extent to which the norm achieves a status as “structure of
relevance” within the recipient society. Others (Checkel 2005: 813; see also
Schimmelfennig 2003: 412; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 23, 60) see the comple-
mentarity of international and domestic norms as crucial, stating that the transfer
of international norms is more likely if “the target has few prior, ingrained
beliefs that are inconsistent with the socializing agency’s message.” Hence, if
the mass in the target state esteems the IO and the norms it represents, it is much
easier for decision makers to “sell” international norms domestically and to push
for conceptual role change.
The complementarity of international and domestic norms and possible elite–
mass splits with regard to the European Union and NATO are clearly indicated
in opinion polls. Both in Norway and in Sweden, the political establishment and
the public are regularly asked for their opinion on the Union and its ESDP, and
on NATO.
To summarize, interaction between states and IOs may lead to conceptual role
change if certain conditions (i.e. uncertainty, identification, resonance) prevail in
the target state. I consider conceptual role change to be more profound and sus-
tainable than behavioral change. Whereas uncertainty may suffice to trigger
short-term behavioral change, identification and resonance of international and
domestic norms are also necessary to trigger conceptual change. What does this
imply with regard to the empirical cases at hand and the thesis that the ESDP
was the crucial trigger for role change in Norway and Sweden? From the three
scope conditions, I deduce the following expectations:
Through the ESDP, the European Union will impact on the national role con-
ceptions of Norway and Sweden if (1) decision makers want to diminish the
uncertainty concerning their roles in the post-1989/90 security architecture, (2)
decision makers positively identify with the Union as security policy actor, and
(3) the Norwegian and Swedish public hold the Union in esteem as a security
policy actor and there are no elite–mass splits as regards participation in the
ESDP. Additionally, changes in the relationship with NATO must be considered
for the Norwegian case, since they could be an important impetus for Norway to
embrace the Union despite not being a member.
The role conceptions of Norway and Sweden: role change in

the post-1989 security environment
Norway: from a conservative Atlanticist to a partner of the European

Union?
Throughout the Cold War, Norway had a distinct Atlantic role conception, which
was organized around the special relationship with the United States and the
152 R. Folz
United Kingdom and particularly focused on its NATO membership (Knutsen
2000: 20; Rieker 2006b: 254). After plans for establishing a Scandinavian
Defense Union collapsed, owing to Norwegian hesitation, Norway became a
member of NATO in 1949. As a small state and an immediate neighbor to the
USSR, Norway considered close ties with both the United States and NATO as
crucial for its own security. Whereas Norway initially was a cautious NATO
member, rejecting the deployment of foreign troops on its soil (Archer 2005:
135; Rieker 2006b: 153), it quickly became a conservative member that “felt a
need to demonstrate itself to be a loyal member” (Knutsen 2000: 24; Tiilikainen
2006: 53). The Atlantic role conception was very stable and regulative, provid-
ing precise instructions for proper security policy role behavior. Even the appli-
cations for European Community/European Union membership in 1972 and
1994 – which were eventually turned down by negative referenda – did not
endanger the predominance of the Atlantic role conception, since they followed
pragmatic considerations, with crucial cooperation partners such as the United
Kingdom applying for membership, too. Unlike its Nordic partners Sweden and
Finland, Norway had neither economic (a wealthy export economy due to off-
shore oil and gas sources) nor security-related (NATO membership provided
security against USSR) reasons to join the Union (Ingebritsen and Larson 1997:
213f.).
Nevertheless, shortly after the end of the Cold War Norway felt insecure
about its future role; it feared a resurgent Russia and wanted to make sure that
it had the support of the United States and NATO (Archer 2005: 139;
Rieker 2006b: 154–6). However, the United States and NATO focused
mainly on the developments in Eastern Europe and the looming conflicts in the
Balkans. Oslo regarded NATO’s new regional focus and the gradual transforma-
tion of NATO’s self-image (from a collective defense alliance to a collective
security alliance) with suspicion and took it as a possible indication of reduced
US interest in the transatlantic security partnership. Although Norway
was reluctant to adjust to the new international security environment, the
“pure” Atlanticist role conception came under pressure. The political establish-
ment hoped that it would be able to adhere to it by combining NATO member-
ship with the associated membership in the Western European Union (WEU),
which granted Norway broad participation rights (Tiilikainen 2006: 57).
Moreover,
history and experience has left the Norwegians with an image of the EU as a
loose organisation, in which Norway to a certain extent has been allowed to
be an à la carte member in areas of the EC/EU that have been of concern to
Norway.
(Tofte 2003: 8)
However, the necessity to adopt and modify the Atlantic role conception hit the
political establishment with vehemence when the European Union decided to
initiate the ESDP in 1999:
The speed with which the EU was advancing the European Security and
Defence Policy thus, once again, forced the Norwegian Government to take
a stance on important EU matters without guidance from an agreed strategy
on Norway’s relations with the Union.
(Udgaard 2006: 323)
Thus, the question where to put the “partner of the European Union” role and
what relevance it should have in the Atlantic role conception became pressing
issues for the political establishment. As a non-member, the government feared
marginalization and exclusion from the emerging European security structure.
The Nice European Council in 2000 underscored these fears, with the EU
member states granting non-EU states only marginal consultation and participa-
tion rights in the decision-making, planning, and preparation process of ESDP
operations (Rieker 2006b: 162f.). Nevertheless, the Norwegian will to particip-
ate remained strong, and thus the Labor government decided to pursue a “troops
for influence” strategy in March 2000 (Græger 2002; Rieker 2006a: 288).
Norway offered to contribute up to 3,500 troops to the Helsinki Headline Goal
and participated in several ESDP operations in Bosnia (EUPM: 8 police officers
and experts; Althea: 20 soldiers) and Macedonia (Concordia: 5 soldiers).2 More-
over, Norway contributes 150 soldiers to the Union’s Nordic Battle Group. In
March 2006, Norway as the first non-EU member entered into an agreement
with the European Defence Agency (EDA) (Gahr Støre 2007). On the rhetorical
level, Norway aligned itself with the majority of political statements issued by
the European Union. But overall, the “troops for influence” strategy has not been
an effective means of influencing EU decisions:
But even if Norway contributes with a considerable number of troops to an

EU-led operation and is granted the same rights and commitments in the
daily running of the operation, the committee of troop contributing nations
is formed after the initial political decisions defining the scope and the
mandate of the operation have been taken by the EU member states.
(Græger 2002: 73, emphasis in original; see also Archer 2005: 145)
Hence, it seems puzzling that Norwegian decision makers are still willing to
contribute actively to the ESDP. However, Norway’s interest in the ESDP
becomes comprehensible when one considers NATO’s regional and institutional
transformation since the end of the Cold War. The political establishment in
Oslo sees the ESDP as “an emerging supplement” to NATO (Archer 2005: 141).
Norway hopes that a credible and capable ESDP will assure future US interest in
European security matters and will also strengthen the European pillar of
NATO.
Overall, the Norwegian role conception still appears to be in a state of flux.
As Græger (2002: 38) puts it, “Norway’s room for manoeuvre may be seen as a
triangle, where Russia, the US and the EU form each of the corners.” If the role
as partner of the European Union gains more relevance in the still prevailing
154 R. Folz
Atlantic role conception, then this might lead to a new application for EU
membership.
Sweden: from a neutral state to a military non-aligned activist in the

ESDP
The last time a war was fought on Swedish territory was in 1814. Since then,
Sweden has maintained a role as a neutral state, which means a policy of “non-
alignment in peace and neutrality in war” (Aggestam 2001: 182; Malmborg
2001). During both world wars, Sweden remained neutral, and after World War
II it further adhered to its self-imposed neutral security policy. Despite neutral-
ity, Sweden clearly preferred NATO over the USSR-led Warsaw Pact during the
Cold War (Karlsson 1995; Tunander 1999). After the end of the Cold War and
the reconciliation of the two hostile blocs, Sweden initially continued to adhere
to neutrality:
Amidst the spontaneous initial euphoria of the end of the Cold War, there
was considerable uncertainty among Swedish foreign policy makers about
the stability of the new developments in Eastern Europe, the Baltic and the
Soviet Union. This did not encourage an immediate abandonment of the
policy of neutrality.
(Aggestam 2001: 188)
Alongside welfare policy, the strong domestic consensus on Sweden’s neutral

stance was the biggest impediment preventing the country from applying for EC/
EU membership (Miles 1997; Rieker 2006b: 68f.). Because of economic prob-
lems at the end of the 1980s, the center-right government led by Prime Minister
Carl Bildt decided to rate the economic benefits of EU membership higher than
Sweden’s security concerns (Aggestam 2001: 186–8; Ferreira-Pereira 2006: 104;
Mouritzen 1993: 386–9). This decision was approved when 52.3 per cent of
Swedes voted for EU membership. Hence, the social democratic government
under Ingvar Carlsson led Stockholm into the Union on 1 January 1995. Never-
theless, the first – albeit slight – change of the Swedish role conception had
already occurred before EU accession with the so-called 1992 formula of “non-
participation in military alliances, with the aim of making it possible for the
country to be neutral in the event of war in the vicinity” (Ferreira-Pereira 2006:
110, 112). Accordingly, decision makers increasingly replaced the term “neutral-
ity” by “military non-alignment” in their statements and speeches (Agius 1998:
161; Ojanen 2002: 155; Rieker 2006b: 69). At the time, this change seemed suf-
ficient since the Union lacked military capabilities and could not be considered a
serious and independent security actor. The military arm of the Union was the
WEU, in which Sweden had gained observer status. Together with Finland,
Sweden in 1996 launched an initiative to integrate the Petersberg tasks into the
Treaty of Amsterdam and, thus, to prevent the Union from developing a common
defense capability: “[T]hroughout the second half of the 1990s, the militarily
non-allied EU members ardently abhorred any undertaking potentially conducive
to a common defence pillar” (Ferreira-Pereira 2006: 104f.). Accordingly,
Sweden initially perceived the inception of the ESDP in 1999 as a “challenge to
its security policy tradition” (Lee-Ohlsson 2009: 123f.) but then gradually
included the role as “activist in the ESDP” within its role conception as a mili-
tarily non-aligned country. The Swedish government rapidly recognized that it
had to include this role and, thus, to take an active stance towards the ESDP if it
wanted to prevent the Union from evolving into a military alliance with a col-
lective defense capability, and thus from endangering the credibility of military
non-alignment. At present, it seems that the two roles – “non-aligned country”
and “activist in the ESDP” – complement each other neatly. Sweden currently
performs the role of a military non-aligned activist in the ESDP. This may
appear contradictory at first glance, but the activism in the ESDP is possible
owing to the broad definition of military non-alignment: “Sweden’s policy of
non-alignment is retained although the only thing which this policy nowadays
interpreted to exclude is mutual defence guarantees” (Borg and Herolf 2006: 8).
During its Council presidencies in 2001 and 2009, the Swedish government
focused mainly on the development of the civilian dimension of the ESDP by
initiating the establishment of civilian rapid reaction groups and the Civilian
Headline Goal 2008 and by pushing European conflict prevention (Björkdahl
2007; Elgström 2002: 186; Lee-Ohlsson 2009: 128f.; Sundberg and Nilsson
2009: 5). But Sweden has also cooperated in the development of credible mili-
tary capabilities, for instance by contributing 1,900 soldiers to put the Union’s
“military headline goal” into action (Rieker 2006b: 80; Schüngel 2005: 17).
Moreover, Sweden contributes 2,000 soldiers to the European Battle Groups,
and even leads the 1,500-strong Nordic Battle Group, comprising troops from
Sweden (1,100 soldiers), Finland, Estonia, and Norway. So far, Sweden has been
very active in matters of ESDP operations, as it has contributed to all of them,
including the military operations Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the maritime mission Atalanta (Lee-
Ohlsson 2009: 129–31).3
The change from the former “neutral state” role conception is now complete.
The combination of non-alignment and active contribution to ESDP (operations)
seems to fit the small Nordic state perfectly.
Role change triggered by the interaction with the European

Union?
In the last section, I demonstrated that new roles emerged in Norway (“partner
of the European Union”) and Sweden (“activist in the ESDP”) after the inception
of the ESDP. In this section, I analyze whether the scope conditions discussed in
the theoretical section (i.e. uncertainty, identification, and resonance) are met in
Norway and Sweden. If so, conditions would be favorable for European Union
and its ESDP to trigger conceptual role change, with both states being prepared
to incorporate new roles into their national role conceptions.
156 R. Folz
Norway: the ESDP as trigger for behavioral role change?
Uncertainty
The changes within NATO in the 1990s reinforced Norway’s feeling of uncer-
tainty concerning its future role in the international and European security archi-
tecture and its fear of marginalization. Instead of being a special ally of the
United States, Norway felt that it was no longer part of the “inner circle” of
NATO (Berglund 2006a). Moreover, Norway feared that Washington would
prefer to negotiate directly with the European Union as a newly emerging,
powerful security actor, bypassing NATO and thus Oslo:
The moment we get an axis between Washington and Brussels within secur-
ity policy, this means that the four NATO countries that stand outside [the
European Union] . . . fall completely on the sideline in efforts to put their
mark on this transatlantic cooperation.
(Foreign Minister Jan Petersen, quoted by Græger 2005a: 414)
By gaining influence and participation rights in the Union and ESDP, decision
makers hope to reduce uncertainty and to increase Norway’s value for the United
States and within NATO. While the Norwegian government initially tried to
negotiate on an equal footing with the Union, it had to accept that it is the EU-27
that decides whether certain decision rights on ESDP matters are granted to non-
members (Archer 2005: 145). Because of its constant wish to participate in the
club as a “special partner” and its fear of being sidelined in the Union and
NATO, the Norwegian government awarded the Union the role of leader. Nor-
way’s current dilemma is that it is more dependent on the Union than vice versa:
“Norway has a much weaker hand than the EU, and it is also the EU that is
dealing the cards” (Tofte 2003: 10). From an EU perspective, bilateral coopera-
tion with Norway on ESDP matters is not considered a priority issue (Rieker
2006a: 285). Overall, by pursuing a “troops for influence” strategy Norway
attempted – somewhat desperately, and so far unsuccessfully – to make itself an
attractive partner to the Union and, in so doing, to utilize ESDP participation to
regain the attention of United States and other NATO allies.
Identification
As staunch Atlanticists, Norwegian decision makers traditionally identify posi-
tively with NATO, which is also their most important arena for security and
defense cooperation with the United States. Nevertheless, in recent years there
have been signs of a decreasing transatlantic identification and of increasing
embrace of the European Union and the ESDP (Berglund 2004). The declining
enthusiasm for NATO has above all been due to growing alienation from the
United States as Norway’s formerly most important ally. The reasons for aliena-
tion are twofold and interrelated: the neoconservative shift in US foreign and
security policy under George W. Bush led to interpersonal difficulties between
the governments and to differences in substance. While Prime Minister Kjell
Magne Bondevik, who led a center-right government (1997–2000, 2001–05),
generally supported the policy of the Bush administration (Græger 2005a: 413),
it was impossible for him to officially support the US-led war against Iraq
because of strong criticism and protests from both the opposition parties and the
public (Berglund 2004, 2006a; Erickson 2006: 2–26). As in many other EU
countries, including Sweden and Finland, Bush’s approach “created a gap
between Europe (including Norway) and the US on several issues linked to inter-
national security” (Rieker 2006a: 295). Nevertheless, as a kind of compensation
for its non-participation in the war, the Bondevik government decided to contrib-
ute an engineering squadron of 113 soldiers and 23 staff officers to the US-led
stabilization force in occupied Iraq (Græger 2005b: 99). Moreover, in late 2004
“word spread that the government had secretly sent military equipment to help
with the March 2003 invasion, in spite of its official opposition to war” (Erick-
son 2006: 25). Hence, Bondevik lost public confidence, and the pro-European
and Bush-skeptical Jens Stoltenberg was elected prime minister in September
2005. The center-left Stoltenberg government decided to pull Norwegian troops
out of Iraq, and in doing so put a damper on relations with the United States
(Berglund 2006a). The interpersonal difficulties in the Stoltenberg–Bush rela-
tionship went hand in hand with the growing normative differences with US
foreign policy goals, concepts, and visions. There are clear divergences between
the United States and Norway concerning the legal basis for military inter-
vention, multilateralism, threat assessments, the approach to fighting terrorism as
well as the relevance of NATO, given the new US preference for acting together
with “coalitions of the willing.” Hence, Norwegian decision makers have started
to lean against the European Union as a reference point for Norway’s foreign
policy identity. As the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs Jonas Gahr Støre
(2007) pointed out in a speech, “[t]he EU and its member states are our closest
partners and our neighboring countries. . . . Let me reiterate: for reasons of
history, values and interest, Norway’s foreign policy goals are close to those of
the EU and its member states.” The Union’s intention to deploy ESDP troops in
consultation with the United Nations and to focus battle groups’ operations
mainly on Africa fits well with Norwegian foreign policy traditions, “in which
development aid, disaster relief and the promotion of human rights and demo-
cracy, especially in Africa, have traditionally been an important part” (Græger
2005b: 96).
Resonance
The domestic acceptance of the role “partner of the European Union” cannot be
taken for granted, since it challenges the prevalence of the traditional role as
Atlanticist. As discussed above, parts of the political elite have gradually moved
away from Atlanticism and embraced the role as partner of the Union. The
foreign minister, Gahr Støre (2007), argues:
158 R. Folz
This is not the time . . . for another debate on Norwegian accession to the
European Union. But let me add – just on a personal note – that it is pre-
cisely these political dimensions that underpin my own conviction that
Norway should have become a full member of the EU – and of this political
process.
Currently, EU supporters clearly dominate the Storting (the Norwegian parlia-

ment), as the three biggest parties – the Labor Party, the Progress Party, and the
Conservative Party (which account for 135 out of the 169 members) – all more
or less support future EU membership (Udgaard 2006: 326f.).4
However, the public clearly favors NATO membership over interaction with
the European Union and the ESDP. In September 2007, 69 percent of Norwe-
gians declared that NATO membership would secure their country (Beadle Eid
2007: 22),5 whereas Norway’s rapprochement with the Union is criticized
(Rieker 2006b: 154). It was also the public that voted down the Norwegian
application for EU membership twice in referenda (1972: 53.5 percent “no”
votes; 1994: 52.2 percent “no” votes) and still reject accession (Berglund 2006b;
Tisdall 2005a). Ingebritsen and Larson (1997: 215–17) argue that skepticism
towards the Union is due to the comparatively short period of national independ-
ence: Norway was first subordinated to the Danes (before 1814) and then formed
a union with Sweden until 1905. Hence, EU membership is perceived as a threat
to “Norwegianness” and state sovereignty. Norway’s continued economic pros-
perity additionally hampers the public’s enthusiasm for the Union. Researchers
have found out that the “EU appeals when times are bad” (Tisdall 2005b, 2007).
Regarding the ESDP, the government’s “troops for influence” strategy is harshly
criticized by the public: “[I]t would be wrong to extend ‘cooperation without
political participation’ to a field whose ultimate question concerns the life and
death of Norwegian citizens” (Udgaard 2006: 327; see also Archer 2005: 145;
Græger 2005b: 94). In September 2007, 61 percent of Norwegians thought that
security policy cooperation with the Union should complement NATO member-
ship, with only 25 percent stating that cooperation with the Union could be an
alternative to NATO membership (Beadle Eid 2007: 15).
Because of the values of the scope conditions, I conclude that the European
Union and its ESDP have clearly affected Norwegian security policy. Neverthe-
less, it is difficult to determine whether the ESDP really triggered conceptual
role change or, rather, caused the adaptation of role behavior. On the one hand,
the current government led by the Labor Party seems to identify with the secur-
ity policy goals of the Union, while it clearly distanced itself from the foreign
and security policy goals of the Bush administration. On the other hand, decision
makers attempted to utilize participation in the ESDP to compensate for the
perceived loss of influence in the transformed NATO and to regain attention
from Washington. Despite the disappointment with the failure of the “troops
for influence strategy” to diminish uncertainty about Norway’s future role,
gaining full participation and decision rights by applying for EU membership
has so far not been considered an option. Hence, in my opinion there are three
constraints on the ESDP as a trigger for conceptual role change, which under-
score my conclusion that, so far, interaction with the Union and the ESDP has
caused only behavioral adaptation in Norway: (1) The sustainability of Norwe-
gian decision makers’ identification with the Union is doubtful: the slowdown of
transatlantic identification was related to alienation from the administration and
policy of George W. Bush. Thus, the subsequent government and policy change
in Washington might provoke a renewed rapprochement (see Maull, this
volume). (2) The second constraint is the elite–mass split on the Union: the
public still favor NATO as security provider over the ESDP and reject future EU
membership. (3) Because it is not an EU member, Norway is excluded from
important discussions on ESDP issues as it does not participate in the almost
daily meetings of representatives of EU member states in Brussels. As Riecker
(2006b: 176) argues, complete Europeanization “requires a certain level of
participation.”
Sweden: the ESDP as trigger for conceptual role change?
Uncertainty
The Swedish case exemplifies how EU membership can gradually diminish
uncertainty and how even reluctant and skeptical members are encouraged to
become activists in interaction processes such as European Council negotiations.
Throughout the Cold War, Sweden successfully maintained a neutral security
policy and perceived itself as “teacher” and “role model,” coaching not only the
Nordic states but the entire world in its concepts of security, welfare, and inter-
national solidarity (Browning 2007: 31–6; Mouritzen 1995). After 1989–90,
Sweden’s role as a neutral state was no longer appreciated, owing to the modi-
fied international and European security architecture. In the early days of its EU
membership, Sweden still felt insecure about its future security policy role.
Hence, Sweden rejected advice from the European Union in order to protect its
autonomous and sovereign decision making on security and defense issues, and
was a reluctant and reactive participant in the EU club. However, uncertainty –
especially with regard to the ESDP – gradually diminished as Swedish decision
makers quickly learned how important it is to take an active stance to shape and
regulate decision-making processes on ESDP issues. The role as leader and
agenda setter is especially important for Sweden as a small state with limited
security and defense capacities eager to protect its non-aligned status. But
Council negotiations also create a kind of peer pressure, sometimes forcing
Sweden to follow the ideas and suggestions of others and to accept concessions:
“[I]f the EU needs troops, the question is posed all around the table: the country
that does not raise its hand will count as a lightweight even in other political
issues” (Urban Ahlin, former Swedish chair of the Riksdag’s Committee on
Foreign Affairs, quoted by Strömvik 2006: 212). Currently, Sweden considers
the European Union, along with the United Nations, its “most important foreign
policy arena” (Sundberg and Nilsson 2009: 2).
160 R. Folz
Identification
Holding the Union’s Council presidency for the first time in 2001 was a crucial
experience for Swedish decision makers, since the responsibility for and external
representation of the Union boosted their identification with the European inte-
gration process in general and with the plans to build a common security and
defense policy in particular (Lee-Ohlsson 2009: 129). Sweden identifies with the
civilian dimension of the ESDP as well as with the comprehensive security
approach outlined in the ESS, which it considers compatible with its own ideas
of security policy and with its self-perception as a “force for good” (Aggestam
2001: 191; Bergman 2004: 1f.).
[T]he founding principles of the EU are compatible with the underpinning

values of their [Sweden’s and Finland’s] foreign and defense policies. Seen
from this perspective, the Union has become an additional forum for their
pursuit of international peace, justice and solidarity in the international system.
(Bergman 2004: 2)
Moreover, ESDP operations so far have all fully met Swedish expectations. Lee-
Ohlsson (2009: 130f.) mentions Operation Concordia in Macedonia and espe-
cially Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as perfectly matching
Swedish security policy motives and the profile of the then foreign minister
Anna Lindh: Artemis was requested by United Nations, had an autonomous
character, and was located in Africa, the continent Sweden is traditionally very
willing to provide assistance to. Hence, at present the activist role towards the
military ESDP dimension is perceived as compatible with the role of military
non-alignment: “[P]articipation in EU led crisis management has provided an
ethical purpose to their [Sweden’s and Finland’s] security policies which is con-
sistent with their current policies of non-alignment” (Bergman 2004: 2).
Nevertheless, it is difficult to judge for how long this identification will last.
Sweden constantly has to be wary that the European Union does not establish
mutual defense guarantees or develop common European armed forces. At the
Helsinki summit in 1999, Sweden and like-minded partners insisted that the
presidency conclusions should mention that the ESDP process “does not imply
the creation of a European army” (quoted by Lee-Ohlsson 2009: 129). If the
Union became a military alliance comparable to NATO, then identification with
the ESDP would hardly be possible, as it would require the abandonment of mil-
itary non-alignment. The majority of the political establishment and especially
of the public still view NATO as “the other” – that is, as a purely military organ-
ization differing strongly from the ESDP (Winnerstig 2006; see also the next
section). The Swedish government, indeed, is a strong advocate of close cooper-
ation between the European Union and NATO and of a strong US military pres-
ence in Europe (Aggestam 2001: 199). But it is crucial that NATO and the ESDP
continue to differ in their goals, mandates, and operations, as this enables
Sweden to distinguish itself from the “bad, military Atlantic cop,” and to identify
with the “good, civilian European cop.”
Resonance
Actually, the chances that the role as “activist in the ESDP” would find domestic
resonance were rather low since it contradicts the traditional role of “neutrality.”
It is therefore at first sight remarkable that, overall, the new role conception as
military non-aligned activist in the ESDP is widely embraced not only in polit-
ical circles but also by public opinion. Sweden has been contributing to UN-led
peace keeping missions since 1948 (Jacobsen 2006; Ojanen 2002: 167), and
current military contributions to ESDP operations are seen as a continuation of
this tradition (Rieker 2006b: 71).6 For instance, the Swedish contribution to the
military ESDP operations Artemis in Congo and Althea in Bosnia and Herze-
govina did not lead to controversial domestic debates (Bergman 2004: 14; Lee-
Ohlsson 2009: 129–31). Nevertheless, opinion polls show clearly that the
majority of Swedes reject the idea of Sweden joining a common European mili-
tary defense force (Stütz 2007: 60f.). The Swedish contribution to the European
Union’s battle groups is in general favorably valued (2007: 58 percent positive;
2006: 58 percent; 2005: 57 percent). But respondents have been more cautious
when it comes to the Swedish responsibility as lead nation of the Union’s Nordic
battle group (2007: 49 percent positive; 2006: 42 percent) (ibid.: 58f.). These
attitudes become comprehensible when one considers the strong public popular-
ity military non-alignment and even the traditional neutrality policy still enjoy:
Over the years, neutrality became as close to the Swedish heart as the
famous smorgåsbord, or the traditional celebrations of Midsummer. A good
Swede was a neutral Swede; politicians and academics who for various
reasons chose to challenge the sanctity of neutrality faced harsh social
punishment.
(Dahl 1997: 183; see also Rieker 2006b: 73)
The strong public adherence to military non-alignment and neutrality also limits
the government’s freedom of action:
One of the reasons that the door to neutrality is still being kept open – if not
the only one – is the strong position that neutrality and Swedish nonalign-
ment enjoy in Swedish public opinion. Even though the Cold War is over
and Sweden is now a member of the EU, the Swedish public has obstinately
refused to heed either the siren songs or reproaches of those who want to
abolish nonalignment and take Sweden into NATO.
(Dagens Nyheter 2002)
As regards the social democratic government led by Göran Persson (1996–2006),

the room for maneuver in foreign and security policy was additionally hampered
by the European Union and, especially, NATO skepticism towards its two coali-
tion partners (the Green Party and the Left Party) as well as its own rows
(Ferreira-Pereira 2006: 111f.). Since autumn 2006, Sweden has been governed
162 R. Folz
by the liberal–conservative party coalition “Alliance for Sweden.” This coali-
tion, led by the Moderate Party, is much more open towards the abandonment of
military non-alignment and even towards future NATO membership than its
predecessors had been (Herolf 2007: 51; see also Dagens Nyheter 2003; Miles
2006: 80; Petrone 2008; Schüngel 2005: 13, 21f.). But statistics exemplify that
public opinion sharply opposes NATO membership:
The terrorist acts on 11 September and the war in Afghanistan which fol-
lowed have not diminished Swedes’ opposition to membership of the NATO
defence alliance. Instead, the percentage opposed to Sweden joining NATO
has grown to a record high of 49 per cent. The percentage that wants to join
NATO has declined to 22 per cent. Support for Swedish neutrality is just as
strong as ever.
(Dagens Nyheter 2002; cf. Bjereld 2009; Luif 2003: 74)7
Whereas public opinion embraces Swedish participation in UN and ESDP mis-

sions, the support for the contributions to the NATO operations in Kosovo and
Afghanistan was much lower (Stütz 2007: 57).
In the Swedish case, all three scope conditions are met, providing some
indication that conceptual role change has been triggered by EU membership,
and especially by the inception of the ESDP, leading to the inclusion of the
role “activist in the ESDP” in the national role conception. Thereby, the
diminishing uncertainty during the course of EU membership went alongside
the identification of the political elite with the Union as a security policy
actor. Additionally, both the Swedish establishment and the public esteem
their new role as “military non-aligned activist in the ESDP.” It is remarkable
that even the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which includes clauses on
mutual defense and permanent structured cooperation on ESDP matters, did
not lead to controversial public debates. On the contrary, then-President of
the Council of the European Union Reinfeldt concluded after the Irish
approval of the treaty in October 2009, “Today is a good day for Europe”
(Hernadi 2009, my own translation). The reaction to Lisbon might be taken as
an indication for the already advanced internalization of the new role concep-
tion, which also expands Sweden’s scope of foreign and security policy
actions and goals.
Conclusion
This chapter examined – from both a theoretical and an empirical angle –
whether interaction with international organizations impacts on national role
concepts and what conditions have to prevail in target states in order to enable
the IO to trigger role change. In the theoretical section, I differentiated between
behavioral and conceptual role change and argued that the latter is more pro-
found and sustainable. Furthermore, I suggested combining role theory with
assumptions taken from the research on international socialization, as the latter
provides three scope conditions (i.e. uncertainty, identification, and resonance)
for conceptual role change. I argued that while uncertainty suffices to trigger
behavioral change, identification and resonance are additionally necessary to
trigger conceptual change.
In the empirical section, I first demonstrated how the national role concep-
tions of Norway and Sweden have changed. These processes of change began
in 1989/90, but have accelerated considerably since the European Union’s
decision to initiate the European Security and Defense Policy in 1999. The
ESDP provided a challenge for the traditional role conceptions as it led to the
emergence of new roles: “partner of the European Union” (Norway) and
“activist in the ESDP” (Sweden), respectively. I then applied the scope con-
ditions as analytical tools and found that conditions for conceptual role change
triggered by the ESDP were more favorable in Sweden than in Norway. In
Stockholm, the gradual diminishing of uncertainty in the course of EU mem-
bership went along with the identification with the Union as a security policy
actor, with decision makers positively demarcating the civilian ESDP from the
military NATO. Moreover, both the public and the political establishment in
Sweden are at ease with the role of “military non-aligned activist in ESDP.”
By contrast, Oslo’s rapprochement with the Union has been spurred mainly by
the regional and institutional transformation of NATO as well as modifications
of US foreign and security policy under George W. Bush. Norway’s attempts
to adapt its Atlantic role conception to the modified security architecture by
gaining decision rights in the ESDP have so far been rejected by the Union.
Despite the current Labor government’s identification with the Union’s foreign
and security policy, a third referendum on EU membership is unlikely, owing
to the elite–mass split on this issue. The public still favors the traditional
Atlantic role and rejects Norwegian contributions to the ESDP. It is remarka-
ble that it is public opinion in Norway and Sweden that adheres to the tradi-
tional role conception, whereas the political establishment is much more
open-minded as regards role changes.
Because of these empirical findings, I have to refine my initial thesis:
membership in an IO “does matter,” as it is an important factor for triggering
conceptual role change. The Norwegian case shows that the European Union
has limits as a potential trigger of conceptual role change in a state with rather
low membership ambitions. Beyond doubt, the ESDP toned down Norwegian
Atlanticism and Swedish neutrality, and thus had an impact on the security
policies of both states as an alternative to neutrality (Sweden) or supplement to
Atlanticism (Norway). But whereas it triggered conceptual role change in
Stockholm (with the role “activist in the ESDP” now being included in the
national role conception), it only triggered behavioral change in Oslo (adapta-
tion to the role as “partner of the European Union”). This means that during
the 1990s, and especially since the inception of the ESDP in 1999, we have not
been witnessing a convergence of the Norwegian and Swedish national role
conceptions, but rather a convergence between Norway’s role behavior and
Sweden’s role conception.
164 R. Folz
Notes
1 Role theory emanates from a similar assumption. Most studies regard the state as a
black box and the political elite as the only role-holder. However, Harnisch (2000b:
24–8) considers the neglect of domestic factors to be the major blind spot of role
theory. He claims to open up the black box in order to be able to investigate the source
of role change more precisely.
2 The data are taken from the websites of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence and the
Norwegian armed forces.
3 In detail, 14 lightly armed soldiers to Concordia, 80 soldiers to Artemis, 200 to EUFOR
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 24 peacekeepers (at first, in January 2005,
Sweden deployed 64 persons but decreased its contribution to a current total of 24) to
the European Union’s current Althea operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as a rifle
company consisting of 205 people to EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic, and
three warships with a crew of 153 soldiers to Atalanta (cf. Grevi et al. 2004: 3; Borg
and Herolf 2006: 3; Herolf 2005: 3; website of the Swedish armed forces).
4 The two smaller coalition partners, the Socialist Left Party and the Center Party, as
well as the opposition parties, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Liberals, are
rather EU-skeptic.
5 Statistical series (from November 1966 to September 2007) show that support for
NATO as security guarantor mostly was over 60 percent. The support reached its peak
shortly after the end of the Cold War with 77 percent in 1991, 1992, and 1994 (Beadle
Eid 2007: 22).
6 The United Nations traditionally enjoys great popularity among the Swedish public. A
poll conducted by the National Board of Psychological Defense (SPF ) showed that in
2007 59 percent (2006: 59 percent, 2005: 61 percent, 2004: 60 percent) of Swedes sup-
ported Swedish participation in UN missions even if it meant that Swedish soldiers
might be attacked or killed (Stütz 2007: 54f.).
7 Statistical series from 1997 to 2007 show that public opinion favors staying outside
NATO. During this period, an average of 59 percent of the respondents rejected NATO
membership, 23 percent favoured membership, and 18 percent had no opinion on
NATO membership (my own calculations, based on Stütz 2007: 67f.).
Part III
US hegemony
10 Hegemony reconstructed?
America’s role conception and its
“leadership” within its core alliances
Hanns W. Maull1
Introduction
America’s global hegemony has taken serious damage since George W. Bush
launched the “Global War on Terror” in the fall of 2001. Clearly, the tenure of
George W. Bush dramatically undermined America’s standing in the world (Pew
2004) and threw the Atlantic alliance – perhaps the most important pillar of US
hegemony – into deep disarray (Allin et al. 2007; Gordon and Shapiro 2004).
The election of Barack Obama, however, was greeted with almost universal
approval. Much of the damage of America’s global standing seems to have dis-
sipated, and thus its capacity to lead internationally may have increased (German
Marshall Fund 2009).
But is the damage to US global hegemony the result of the misguided and
badly executed foreign policies of one of the worst presidents of the United
States (Singh 2008), or the result of deeper changes in international relations that
have eroded US hegemony and will continue to do so (Buzan 2008)? This
chapter takes a different line: it assumes that both questions are misleading and
argues that there has in fact been more continuity than change in US foreign
policy from Bill Clinton to Barack Obama. Specifically, the three most
recent US administrations operated within one US foreign policy role concep-
tion, rather than pursuing different role conceptions. But presidents also have
considerable leeway to impose their own interpretations and specifications on
this role conception – indeed, they will want to pursue their own political prior-
ities, while also having to respond to changing domestic and international envi-
ronments. In the reconstruction, reaffirmation and modification of the US foreign
policy role conception from 2001 to 2010, adjustments initiated by the presidents
and their inner circle of advisors were substantively as important in 2004/05 as
in 2008/09 after the election of Obama. The impression of a major change, or
even a “revolution,” in US foreign policy (Daalder and Lindsay 2003) was
created by the very different personal approaches and styles of the last three
presidents, but also by subtle but important substantive differences in their
respective reconstructions of the US foreign policy role conception. These dif-
ferences, however, do not add up to a change of, but only to changes within, that
role conception.
168 H.W. Maull
In this view, US national leadership – or US global hegemony, as defined
here – thus has an important element of personal leadership style; the specific
political personalities of George W. Bush and his national security team are thus
related to his administration’s exercise of global leadership (Shannon and Keller
2007), and the same holds true for Obama. Political personality can also help
explain differences in respective interpretations of and modifications in this role
conception. But we were not witnessing a relearning of basic assumptions about
the United States’ role in the world. From the perspective of our central ques-
tion, the sustainability of US global hegemony, the issue, then, is to what extent
this role conception – and US role enactment – is compatible with others’ expec-
tations concerning US behavior, as well as with their assumptions about their
own role concepts in the context of their relationship with the United States.
The chapter will analyze this question in the context of America’s two core
alliances, NATO and the US–Japan Security Treaty. My main conclusion is that
the respective role conceptions remain compatible, but for all the wrong reasons,
namely deeply ingrained role elements of dependence and followership in both
Europe and Japan, and a perceived lack of alternatives to deference to the United
States. This type of compatibility seems increasingly problematic, because it
does not reflect the fundamental changes in international relations, and it does
not meet changed US expectations and demands in terms of substantive contri-
butions from America’s allies. Thus, the apparent compatibility in fact seems
likely to impede effective cooperation within the US alliance system.
Our understanding of the concept of hegemony makes the term almost synon-
ymous with the concept of “leadership”: Hegemony and leadership both depend
on consent by followers, hence on legitimacy, which in turn enables hegemons
to lead (Nye 2008). But “leadership” is closer to individual human beings; the
concept has been explored perhaps most intensively in business administration,
organizational sociology, and in psychology (von der Oelsnitz and Busch 2010).
Our concept of hegemony and leadership links the individual and the collective
perspective: we are interested in the qualities of and preconditions for US
hegemony, but also in how it arises out of individual efforts by the president of
the United States.
America’s remarkably stable foreign policy role conception

The belief in American exceptionalism has perhaps been the most pervasive
element in US political culture (Bacevich 2002; Mead 2002, 2005: 17 and
passim; Walt 2005). It has also deeply influenced the United States’ foreign
policy role conception.2 Since America sees itself as an exceptional society and
polity, it has developed a distinctly “American” approach to foreign policy – a
specific role conception that defines its purpose in the world, as well as its
approach towards realizing its ambitions. This role conception has always
involved a strong sense of mission; over time, it evolved into a comprehensive
set of beliefs, norms, principles, and values that have guided American foreign
policy since the early twentieth century.
US hegemony reconstructed? 169
In our own work of analyzing foreign policies using the tools of role concep-
tion, we first analyzed America’s foreign policy role conception during the mid-
1990s. We employed the role conception of an ideal-type civilian power as the
analytical framework (Fraenkler et al. 1997). We concluded then that America’s
role conception was highly ambivalent from this particular analytical perspec-
tive: while it contained important elements of a civilian power, other aspects of
US foreign policy rhetoric and behavior were fundamentally incompatible with
this role conception. Overall, we characterized the core norms of this role con-
ception as follows (ibid.: 33ff.):
• America as leader. It expects of itself that it will lead the world, and cer-
tainly its allies, but consistently refuses to be bound by others, rejecting any
notion that its actions should be determined by others. In short, the US con-
ception of leadership was “exclusive,” though there was considerable vari-
ance as to how this was interpreted: leadership by carefully crafted
consensus reflecting US preferences, or leadership by imposition.
• America as a pragmatically internationalist power in global order. In prin-
ciple, America supports international institutions and regimes, but consist-
ently refuses to be formally bound by their rules. Consequently, the United
States has always reserved the right to act alone if it deems it necessary. (As
President Clinton once put it, “together, if we can; alone, if we must”.) The
US role conception thus is internationalist in nature but not supranationalist.
• America as an ego-centric maximizer of national interest. America is
inclined to define its interests in national terms, rather than as interdepend-
ent with those of others. Hence, alter expectations do not play a significant
role, except in a generalized way (that is, the United States would some-
times consider the implications of its own preferences on global order in the
abstract and conclude: what is good for America is also good for the world
as a whole). By implication, the contribution of any kind of cooperative
management of international affairs to the US national interest is paramount.
In a nutshell, US internationalism thus in the last analysis is instrumental,
rather than principled.
• America as enforcer. The United States consistently reserved the right to
resort to the use of force unilaterally, and displayed a tendency to do so
fairly frequently.
• America as democratizer. Finally, our analysis found a strong normative
component: America should promote the spread of democracy and human
rights, spreading its own ideals in the world.
Overall, America’s role conception seemed best characterized by the labels

“pragmatic internationalism” and “selective engagement” (ibid.: 32–5).
Foreign policy role conceptions are broad and open to interpretation, but they
are not trivial for foreign policy analysis. First, they have to be specified by those
in charge of foreign policy making. Foreign policy decision makers will have to
interpret the international environment and the opportunities and challenges it
170 H.W. Maull
holds for them, and spell out second-order objectives, strategies, and instru-
ments. This may often also involve the specification and prioritization of core
principles and norms in role conceptions, since these may well be in tension with
each other. Second, role conceptions are complex with regard to different social
contexts in which the US government enacts its role, each with its specific pat-
terns of interaction. Thus, there are expectations formulated both by the United
States itself and by respective “others” in relationships with allies, with other
partners, and with other major powers, including actual or potential opponents,
but also in the context of international institutions such as the UN Security
Council.
Through their speech acts of defining and reinterpreting role expectations and
role behavior in any given situation, US presidents and their foreign policy teams
specify how American foreign policy should realize its national role conception
in given circumstances. Given his position in the American political system, the
president will play a key role in this. It implies vast opportunities to exert leader-
ship – but also to fail. The existence of a foreign policy role conception that is
malleable but also confining in terms of options available to foreign policy
decision makers in fact confronts every American president with an important
political task: to reconstruct this role conception and frame the foreign policy
debate within the country and internationally in ways that allow foreign policy
adaptation and innovation in line with changing circumstances. This is his role
in the context of US foreign policy making. In enacting that role, presidents may
follow their own instincts and convictions (as Obama clearly does), or be heavily
influenced, perhaps even manipulated (as George W. Bush was). By enacting
that role, their answers reflect first of all the constitutive logic of politics (who
are we?), which then guides (and thus helps to explain) foreign policy actions.
The more far-reaching the reinterpretation of role conceptions is, and the
more it moves away from previously established consensus, the more difficult
will it become to reorient collectives in this sense. Thus, one would expect
dissent within an administration, intra- and inter-party contestation, and possibly
even public mobilization – all amply displayed in the foreign policy “revolution”
launched by the first administration of George W. Bush (Daalder and Lindsay
2003; Woodward 2007, 2009).
US foreign policy role conception(s), 2000–10

US foreign policy has been characterized by a remarkable degree of continuity
around a few central themes: (1) an exclusive international leadership role, gen-
erally involving renunciation of imperialism; (2) the pursuit of US global power
and purposes, based on broad domestic political support and the willingness to
commit substantial national resources; (3) propagation of democracy, human
rights, rule of law, and market economics – the “American ideology” – as a
universally applicable and a morally and practically preferable social order;
(4) pragmatically internationalist policies that emphasize efficiency and
effectiveness, resulting in a functional rather than a principled approach to
multilateralism; and finally (5) a propensity for military intervention and, if
deemed necessary, unilateral action – as an enforcer of international/regional/
national “order” as defined by the United States. Enforcement preferably was to
be based on formal authorization through the UN Security Council and imple-
mented through a broad coalition, but could also be done alone and without
formal legitimacy simply in pursuit of interests that the United States considered
vital. Overall, this foreign policy role conception reflects a dominance of ego
expectations, both normative (the rejection of empire and the desire to lead by
consent) and pragmatic (the cost-effectiveness of alliances and international fol-
lowers), while alter expectations were subordinated, if taken up at all.
Reconstructing the foreign policy role conception: President Obama’s

new approach
Foreign policy role conceptions are fairly broad policy guidelines. Decision
makers thus can and must interpret those guidelines, and presidents are particu-
larly influential in this process. George W. Bush and his advisors had done this
extensively in their foreign policy “revolution”; and so did Obama. The follow-
ing section therefore will look more closely at the personal foreign policy role
conception the latter has brought to the office of president of the United States.
There are two particularly useful sources to assess Obama’s concept of Amer-
ica’s role in the world and his own responsibilities as president. In his book The
Audacity of Hope (2006), Obama spelled out his own perspective on world pol-
itics and his program for the presidency. The second source is his programmatic
article in Foreign Affairs (2007), summarizing his foreign policy positions as a
candidate. This text probably reflects not only Obama’s personal views but also
those of his foreign policy advisors; as such, it incorporates some domestic alter
expectations, such as those of the Democratic Party, its political supporters, and
the attentive public (electorate) as a whole. After all, his foreign policy program
was part of Obama’s effort to win the elections.
One of the nine substantive chapters of the book is titled “The World beyond
Our Borders.” In this, Obama assesses the problems facing America, and criti-
cizes the foreign policy performance of his predecessor. One of his key criti-
cisms is what Obama calls “a failure of conception”: the Bush administration
refused to spell out “a coherent national security policy” and “guiding princi-
ples” (2006: 302). Obama then proceeds to spell out some of those guidelines for
his own foreign policy – in other words, he sketches his own foreign policy role
conception as he then saw it, enumerating these core principles (ibid.: 303–23):
• First, America must remain engaged internationally and recognize the

“occasional need to deploy U.S. troops.” While the security environment
since the end of the Cold War and 9/11 is “fundamentally different” from
that of even ten years ago, the world continues to be a dangerous place, and
“the threats facing the Unites States today are real, multiple, and potentially
devastating”; thus, “if we want to make America more secure, we are going
172 H.W. Maull
to have to help make the world more secure” (ibid.: 304). To do so, the
United States must assume global leadership.
• Second, this would require a fundamental restructuring of the US military
and military expenditure, while maintaining “a strategic posture that allows
us to manage threats posed by rogue nations like North Korea and Iran and
to meet the challenges presented by potential rivals like China.” Thus,
defense expenditure would probably have to rise somewhat (ibid.: 307).
• Third, on the use of military force, the Unites States enjoys – as does any
nation – the right of self-defense, and was thus entirely justified in its cam-
paign – preferably with the support of allies, but if necessary alone – against
Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. This included the right to
take unilateral military action “to eliminate an imminent threat to our secur-
ity” (ibid.: 308, emphasis in the original).
• Fourth, beyond matters of self-defense, it would “almost [!] always be in
our strategic interest [!] to act multilaterally rather than unilaterally” (ibid.:
309). This, however, does not necessarily imply the authorization of the UN
Security Council, but the United States should make sure that most of the
world supported its actions, and that those actions would “serve to further
recognize international norms” (ibid.: 309). The reasons given by Obama
are instructive for his pragmatic approach to multilateralism. He argues that
(1) “nobody benefits more than we do from the observance of international
‘rules of the road’ ” (ibid.: 308); and (2) it would allow the United States “to
carry a lighter load” (ibid.: 308) and serve as a “force multiplier” (ibid.: 309.
Moreover, multilateralism would (3) induce the United States to listen to
other points of view and therefore “look before we leap” (ibid.: 309. And,
finally, (4) engaging the allies would give them a stake in the joint project,
thus presumably making their effort more serious and, hence, valuable to
the common objective.
• The final dimension of this interpretation of the US foreign policy role con-
ception goes “beyond a more prudent use of military force.” Quoting John
F. Kennedy’s inaugural address, Obama argues that US foreign policy
should “help reduce the spheres of insecurity, poverty, and violence around
the world” (ibid.: 315) and accepts the notion that “the ideals of free markets
and liberal democracy,” which include free trade, open markets, unfettered
flow of information, the rule of law, and democratic elections, will benefit
the world’s poor (ibid.: 315).
In sum, this reconstruction of the US foreign policy role conception is transfor-

mational – as the conception itself tends to be. US foreign policy should “move
the international system in the direction of greater equity, justice, and prosper-
ity” (ibid.: 316). This implies an ambition to fundamentally transform interstate
relations and the international order in ways that are compatible with American
core values (individual freedom, rule of law, democracy, and free enterprise).
Where Obama primarily differs from his predecessor is the relative importance
given to international legitimacy, on the one hand, and to military force, on the
other. Obama also emphasizes the notion of leadership by example, including by
efforts to perfect American democracy to enhance its international credibility
and legitimacy. It is also clear that Obama’s strategy rests on a markedly differ-
ent worldview, in which American power is much more circumscribed, and the
problems are much less amenable to military solutions. Credibility and legiti-
macy are thus key concerns of US foreign policy. With this, Obama’s role con-
ception is entirely consistent with the role conception collectively projected by
his new administration, but also compatible with the traditional US foreign
policy role conception sketched above.
Bush and Obama: comparing foreign policy role conceptions

Close analysis of key foreign policy documents of the three most recent US
administrations (those of George W. Bush, 2000–04 and 2004–08; and Obama,
2008–12) also suggests that the core elements of the US foreign policy role con-
ception identified earlier can be found in all three administrations. The most
salient norms to emerge from this analysis were (1) US leadership in sustaining
and developing a stable international order conducive to US interests; (2) Ameri-
ca’s historical responsibility to build this international order through the propa-
gation and promotion of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and open
market economies, both nationally and globally; (3) commitment to sustain the
dominant power of the United States in the international system, not least in mil-
itary terms; and (4) commitment to strengthen US alliances and international
institutions as “force multipliers.” Yet the emphasis in the interpretation of this
norm is generally on the effectiveness and the efficiency of cooperation in con-
taining the inherent risks and vulnerabilities of interdependence and its uses to
benefit America. All three administrations have reserved the right to act unilater-
ally, including by way of using military force. Finally, (5) all three administra-
tions have similarly emphasized the importance of a pragmatic pursuit of
American interests and of diplomacy as the primary instrument of US foreign
policy.3
At the level of core norms, principles, and policy guidelines, the similarities
in major foreign policy statements by the three administrations are much more
striking than the differences between them. Moreover, the latter appear more as
differences in degree than in kind; they concern, for example, the specific
mixture of unilateral reservations against the expression of support for multilat-
eralism, the relative weight given to alliances versus other forms of international
cooperation, or the specific assessments of risks and opportunities resulting from
deepening and broadening interdependence (“globalization”), for example with
regard to climate change. Table 10.1 lists some representative statements to
illustrate the argument.
This analysis does not claim that actual policies (i.e. role behavior) of
the three administrations were necessarily very similar. The argument is
rather that foreign policy differences between US administrations tend to remain
within the broad parameters set by the traditional US national role conception.
Table 10.1 Representative statements by the George W. Bush and Obama administrations concerning US foreign policy
Role conception element G.W. Bush I G.W. Bush II Barack Obama
(a) U.S. claim to “We understand that history has called “We seek to shape the world, not “The best way to advance America’s
leadership role/mission us into action. . . . The world’s going to merely be shaped by it; to influence interest in reducing global threats and
in world affairs be more peaceful as a result of events for the better instead of being at seizing global opportunities is to
America being strong and resolved . . . their mercy” (NSS 2006). design and implement global
out of the evil done to this country, is solutions” (Clinton 2009).
going to come some incredible good –
a more secure America, a more
peaceful world” (Bush 2002c).
(b) Manifest destiny to “America must stand firmly for the “The United States must defend liberty “We see it as fundamental to our own
build democracy, nonnegotiable demands of human and justice because these principles are interest to support a just peace around
human rights, rule of dignity: the rule of law; limits on the right and true for all people the world – one in which individuals,
law. and free markets absolute power of the state; free everywhere. . . . Economic freedom is a and not just nations, are granted the
speech; freedom of worship; equal moral imperative. The liberty to create fundamental rights that they deserve
justice; respect for women; religious and build or to buy, sell, and own . . . we are promoting universal values
and ethnic tolerance; and respect for property is fundamental to human abroad by living them at home, and
private property” (NSS 2002). nature and foundational to a free will not seek to impose these values by
society. Economic freedom also force” (NSS 2010).
reinforces political freedom” (NSS
2006).
(c) Reserved right to act “The United States has long “[W]e must be prepared to act alone if “I will not hesitate to use force,
unilaterally maintained the option of preemptive necessary, while recognizing that there unilaterally if necessary, to protect the
actions to counter a sufficient threat to is little of lasting consequence that we American people or our vital interests
our national security. . . . To forestall or can accomplish in the world without whenever we are attacked or
prevent such hostile acts by our the sustained cooperation of our allies imminently threatened. . . . But when
adversaries, the United States will, if and partners” (NSS 2006). we do use force in situations other than
necessary, act preemptively” (NSS self-defense, we should make every
2002). effort to garner the clear support and
participation of others” (Obama, 2007)
(d) Instrumental “The U.S. national security strategy “[T]hese relations [with our allies and “Today, we need to be clear-eyed
multilateralism will be based on a distinctly American partners] must be supported by about the strengths and shortcomings
internationalism that reflects the union appropriate institutions, regional and of international institutions . . . and the
of our values and our national global, to make cooperation more shortage of political will that has at
interests” (NSS 2002). permanent, effective, and wide- times stymied the enforcement of
reaching. Where existing institutions international norms. Yet it would be
can be reformed to meet new destructive to both American national
challenges, we, along with our security and global security if the
partners, must reform them. Where United states used the emergence of
appropriate institutions do not exist, new challenges and the shortcomings
we, along with our partners, must of the international system as a reason
create them” (NSS 2006). to walk away from it” (NSS 2010).
(e) Pragmatism “The United States is committed to “Effective multinational efforts are “The President-Elect and I believe that
lasting institutions like the United essential to solve these problems. Yet foreign policy must be based on a
Nations, the World Trade history has shown that only when we marriage of principles and pragmatism,
Organization, the Organization of do our part will others do theirs. not rigid ideology. . . . We must use
American States, and NATO as well as America must continue to lead” (NSS what has been called “smart power,”
other long-standing alliances. 2006). the full range of tools at our disposal –
Coalitions of the willing can augment diplomatic, economic, military,
these permanent institutions” (NSS political, legal, and cultural – picking
2002). the right tool, or combination of tools,
for each situation” (Clinton 2009).
Sources: National Security Strategies (NSS) 2002, 2006, 2010; Obama (2007, 2009); Clinton (2009); Bush (2002c).
176 H.W. Maull
The differences fall mostly in the realm of how best to interpret and to pursue
the role conception, rather than concerning the role conception itself. They were
not about core norms, but about what they should mean. Such differences of
interpretation usually exist not only between but also within administrations –
between different factions and branches of the executive branch, as well as
between the branches of government – and between an administration and the
attentive public. Differences may also exist between the publicly projected role
conception and actual individual role conceptions4 and role behavior of key
decision makers; in the Bush administration (notably the so-called neocons),
such differences were particularly relevant during the first administration of
George W. Bush, but continued into the second (Mann 2004; Woodward 2007,
2009). This gap between what the administration claimed and what it actually
wanted to do necessitated a huge public relations campaign in which the admin-
istration tried to reconcile, ultimately unsuccessfully, its actual behavior of delib-
erate and unprovoked regime change by force (motivated by a role conception of
US dominance built on superior military power which seemed imperial, rather
than hegemonic; cf. Gaddis 2005a) with its publicly projected foreign policy role
conception.5
Beyond differences in interpretation and implementation strategies of the
American foreign policy role conception, the differences between the three
administrations also concerned different perceptions of America and the world.
Thus, actual policy changes between 2000 and 2010 can also be explained by:
• Differing perceptions of American power in world politics and the utility of

military force between different presidencies. This also affected the defini-
tion of the political agenda and policy objectives: the first Bush administra-
tion pursued regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq and an ambitious
agenda of reordering the Middle East because it saw those objectives as
achievable, while the Obama administration, with its more modest assess-
ment of US power, sought a new modus vivendi with Iran and the Islamic
world.
• Differing assessments of the relative utility of international organizations
and multilateralism in general as force multipliers in the pursuit of Ameri-
can purposes in world politics, with the first Bush administration close to
one pole (dismissal of formalized multilateralism and international organi-
zations in favor of unilateralism and/or ad hoc coalitions), while both the
second Bush administration and particularly that of Obama have been more
inclined to work within and through international institutions.
• A marked difference in terms of US relations with other actors (alter).
While the first Bush administration focused on enemies (first, briefly, China
as a “strategic competitor,” then the “axis of evil”), but also on recalcitrant,
rather than on submissive, allies (cf. policies towards Germany under the
Red–Green government of Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer with
those towards Tony Blair’s Labour government in the United Kingdom),6
the emphasis shifted to courting those allies that might provide critical
material and political support during the second Bush administration and the
first 18 months of President Obama. Obama also pursued an entirely differ-
ent approach towards potential adversaries of America, such as Iran.7
Of those differences in perceptions, at most one, the attitudes towards friends

and foe, arguably represents a significant change within the US foreign policy
role conception – that is, an important reinterpretation of a core norm; the other
differences all clearly lie below the level of role conception. That does not neces-
sarily make them any less important even from the perspective of role analysis,
let alone in terms of their impact on foreign affairs: role conceptions in this view
are persistently constructed and reconstructed, and in those processes enhanced
or modified through language and social practice.
Yet it is also obvious that this remarkably persistent role conception has given
rise to widely different policies. But different policies towards Iran, Russia, or
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict did not differ in their fundamental objectives, but
rather in emphasis (unilateral national security policies versus international
cooperation as the best way to secure US national security interests; extensive
use of superior force to shape the international order versus use of force as one,
rather subsidiary policy instrument in “smart” strategies) and in their strategies
of implementation (confrontation versus offers of cooperation; NATO expansion
versus arms reductions; a low profile versus active mediation efforts; Rudolf
2010).
Relations with the European Union: the transatlantic alliance

During the past decade, transatlantic relations have been through ups and downs
that were dramatic by any standard.8 The Kosovo crisis in 1998/99 had seen
NATO act together reasonably effectively (though not without substantial bick-
ering, back-stabbing and mutual recriminations) as an alliance that, with some
luck, was up to the job of settling the crisis through joint military action and
effective diplomacy (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000). Then came the rapid deterio-
ration in transatlantic relations following the election of George W. Bush, whose
administration from the beginning emphasized unilateral action. The 11 Septem-
ber attacks reversed the deterioration in alliance relations dramatically, if only
momentarily: for the first time in its history, NATO invoked the article V alli-
ance clause. But tensions quickly resurfaced after the war in Afghanistan, fought
by Washington with a “coalition of the willing,” and escalated over the presid-
ent’s determination to invade Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein (Gordon and
Shapiro 2004).
The war in Iraq split the alliance and the European Union, culminating in one
of NATO’s worst crises. But during the remainder of 2003, relations within
NATO were patched up. Cooperation – which, in any case, had continued effect-
ively in some areas (e.g. internal security against terrorist threats, or even mili-
tary targeting9) – continued to improve during the second Bush administration
(2005–09) to what might be considered levels approaching normality: a mixture
178 H.W. Maull
of public displays of unity (e.g. the NATO summits in 2002 and 2004), internal
disagreements (e.g. over the future of Kosovo or the fundamental mission of
NATO), and more or less effective cooperation (e.g. enlargement in 2004 and
2009).
Behind those ups and downs lay three important sources of continued cooper-
ation and one major problem for the alliance’s future. The three factors uphold-
ing the alliance are as follows:
1 The irrefutable logic of cooperation, i.e. that America and Europe can
expect to achieve more (or anything at all) only by pooling their resources.
In terms of respective role conceptions and role behavior, this requires
acceptance of mutual dependence, perceptions of compatible interests, and,
hence, of mutual benefits from cooperation, and a division-of-labor approach
in implementation.
2 Past success and path dependency, which in role-theoretical terms allowed
the reconstruction of mutually compatible role conceptions around the
notion of America as the legitimate leader of the Western alliance.
3 The dense web of material (economic) and immaterial (shared values, solid-
arity) ties, which in turn supported the social reconstruction of mutually com-
patible and supportive role conceptions in both Europe and the United States.
Yet the logic of cooperation is becoming increasingly complex, memories of

past successes fade, and the dense web of ties across the Atlantic competes polit-
ically with domestic concerns and demands for decision makers’ attention. Fur-
thermore, the alliance’s most important raison d’être has disappeared: the Soviet
threat has vanished, creating a vacuum that still has not been filled persuasively.
European national role conceptions and the United States

From a role-theoretical perspective, alliances rest on mutually supportive role
conceptions among members. Analytically, such mutually supportive role con-
ceptions encompass both ego and alter expectations, which need to be compat
ible to allow for effective cooperation. The categories “compatibility” or
“incompatibility” of national role conceptions within alliances differ from the
categories similar/different: substantively similar role conceptions – for instance,
role conception built around notions of national sovereignty as autonomy – may
well be incompatible with effective cooperation, while different role conceptions
can be compatible if they involve different roles and contributions (i.e. division
of labor) within common policies and actions.
How compatible, then, are European and American role conceptions within
NATO? The European Union’s role conception of itself as an actor in interna-
tional relations closely resembles the role conception of an ideal-type civilian
power (Maull 2010). The ESS (2003) spells out a transformative role conception
which aims at the comprehensive “civilizing” of international relations (Elgström
and Bengtsson, this volume), and thus suggests similarity, but also compatibility,
with the US role conception. Moreover, the ESS (2003: 13) also puts consider
able emphasis on cooperation with the United States.
The European Union and its CFSP, however, are hardly representative of
Europe in the Atlantic alliance; member states still dominate EU external rela-
tions in general and transatlantic relations in particular. We therefore also have
to consider national foreign policy role conceptions and their compatibility or
incompatibility with that of the United States. Relations with the United States
occupy an elevated position in practically all European national role concep-
tions. One important reason for this was the existential importance of US secur-
ity guarantees during the Cold War, which continues to linger; other reasons
include increasingly dense economic and social ties, and cultural and normative
affinities. As Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney argue in their trenchant yet
insightful analysis of transatlantic relations (2009), European attitudes towards
the United States are characterized by a pervasive and enduring sense of depend-
ence and deference, which no longer corresponds to today’s realities. Rather,
those attitudes appear to reflect historically formed collective attitudes, such as
fear of Russian imperialism and a sense of security provided by US commit-
ments during the Cold War, but also resentment about the loss of standing and
autonomy that American hegemony in Europe during that time inevitably
implied. They summarize attitudes towards America as follows (ibid.: 8):
• The United States is still critically important to European security.

• The United States and the European Union share a core of common inter-
ests. Europe should strengthen US awareness where this is lacking.
• The need to maintain harmonious relations trumps individual interests and
objectives.
• “Ganging up” against the United States would be improper, even counter-
productive, given the “special relationship” that many European countries
believe they have with the United States.
Hence, in principle, the national role conceptions of all EU member states

(though not the role conception of the European Union as a whole!) contain, as a
core element, acceptance of a leader–follower relationship between America and
Europe, i.e. hierarchy and division of labor. The only exception seems to be
France, which strives for a global role similar to – and commensurate with – that
of the United States.
From the European perspective, the key issue is not subordination under
American leadership, but rather how this leadership is exercised in terms of its
substantive directions and its procedures and conduct. When American leader-
ship policies were, in European eyes, substantively misguided and/or imposed in
unacceptable ways, the United States would face opposition and sometimes, as
during the Suez and Iraq crises, even defection (Gordon and Shapiro 2004).
France’s role conception is covered elsewhere in this volume, by Krotz
and Sperling; suffice it here to note that France’s role conception also has
far-reaching – and paradoxical – implications for the effectiveness, coherence,
180 H.W. Maull
and consistency of European role behavior: while France increasingly recognizes
the need to rely on the European Union as its resource base and “force multi-
plier,” its role conception also impedes cooperation with and integration into
common European policies whenever they are incompatible with France’s
notions of its own importance within the Union and in the world. It thus faces a
dilemma within Europe that the United States faces in a similar way at the global
level: while France recognizes the need for closer cooperation and integration, it
is reluctant to accept the constraints on its national freedom of action.
The Federal Republic of Germany’s role conception approximated the ideal-
type civilian power, and by and large this has remained true since unification in
1990. For post-unification Germany, this role conception contained three major
tensions between key norms, namely that between its European and its Atlanti-
cist orientations, between its abhorrence of the use of force and the exigencies of
preventing mass murder in its neighborhood, and – perhaps most profoundly –
between European solidarity and domestic capabilities and preferences. The first
and second tensions were resolved within a few years after unification: it quickly
became clear that united Germany still considers transatlantic ties vital, but also
secondary to its existential European vocation. Overall, Germany’s changing
attitudes and policies regarding the use of force represent the most important
learning process in Germany’s foreign policy after 1990, but no major and quali-
tative discontinuity in its role conception (Maull 2000; Rudolf 2005). The most
fundamental tension in Germany’s postwar role conception, that between Euro-
pean responsibility and national preferences, is also the one that became visible
most slowly. The process of domestication (Harnisch 2009), or, from the outside
perspective, of an erosion of “Germany’s European vocation” (Paterson 2010;
cf. also Schieder 2010), has become apparent only in recent years but may well
represent the most difficult tension to resolve.
For the United Kingdom, Labour prime minister Tony Blair provided import-
ant new impulses for British foreign policy, but “New Labour” ultimately failed
in its ambition to redefine the British foreign policy role conception (Wallace
2005). Inherent tensions provided both the motives for such an ambition and the
vulnerabilities for New Labour: above all, Britain’s “special relationship” with
the United States sided uneasily with its – internally still strongly contested and
profoundly ambivalent – membership in the European Union. Yet there was also
the structural tension between Britain’s global aspirations and its shrinking
power base and resources. To this, New Labour added a third element of norm-
ative tension, that between its ambition to conduct an “ethical foreign policy”10
and the exigencies of other, more traditional norms favoring a realpolitik
approach. The government initially made some progress towards a more credible
EU policy by supporting, at the bilateral Franco-British summit at St.-Malo
1998, the project of a European Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP),
but it ultimately failed to resolve that tension when the United States and “old
Europe” parted ways during the alliance crisis of 2002–03. This crisis all but
destroyed the credibility of Tony Blair’s and his New Labour government’s
efforts to develop an “ethical foreign policy.”
In a nutshell, from a European perspective the end of the Cold War has
complicated the exercise of legitimate American hegemony in several ways
(cf. Mauer 2010). First, it removed the shared policy focus of a common
existential threat. From a role-theoretical perspective, this made it much more
difficult to reconstruct mutually compatible, supportive, and effective role con-
ceptions within the alliance. Even if there was agreement on the principal
security threats confronting all NATO members in similar ways, it was still far
from obvious how they could and should be dealt with through established pat-
terns of division of labor, let alone how much effort of what kind was needed
and how the costs incurred should be distributed. Second, the end of the Cold
War pushed the European Union into a search for a new global role; this gave
rise to a new, properly European role conception that aspired to the status of a
(civilian) world power and thus appeared to challenge the global leadership of
the United States (cf. ESS 2003). Third, the new international environment
produced new challenges for international and, specifically, transatlantic rela-
tions that were often opaque and unclear, making it difficult to construct self-
evident or even plausible justifications for transatlantic cooperation. This new
environment also encouraged, fourth, the intrusion of domestic concerns into
foreign policy in ways that widened the gap between elite and mass percep-
tions of the alliance and thus tended to undermine, or at least complicate, both
the commitment to international cooperation and their diplomatic conduct. It
thus became much more difficult to conceive and implement an effective
division of labor in transatlantic relations through compatible, mutually
supportive, effective, and domestically legitimate role conceptions and role
enactment.
America and its European allies

From the American perspective, attitudes and policies towards transatlantic rela-
tions have changed substantially since the Cold War, and particularly since 2001.
American interest in Europe encompassed (1) possible sources of threats to core
American values or material objectives, and (2) possible sources of support for
America’s global aspirations. Depending on the specific interpretations of the
context and the different strategies pursued by different US administrations, this
could produce policies supporting or trying to contain further advances in Euro-
pean integration, and approaches ranging from attempts at unilateral policy
imposition to deference to European requests. During the Cold War, America’s
priority in transatlantic relations overall was NATO cohesion; during the 1990s,
priorities shifted to the management of economic interdependence and the
reinvention of NATO as a multipurpose security institution for crisis manage-
ment in the Balkans, enlargement and pan-European stability (Flockhart, this
volume).
After the 2000 election, the new George W. Bush administration set out to
reshape transatlantic relations and the international system by capitalizing on
what was seen as an overwhelming advantage in US power through “an assertive
182 H.W. Maull
nationalist approach in relations with other states, including erstwhile allies, and
the pre-emptive/preventive use of force” (Kanet 2008: 348). This strategy failed,
and was modified significantly in Bush’s second term after 2005 (Wolf, this
volume).11 This also concerned relations with the Europeans, in which the United
States now tried to return to a more traditional, consensual style of leadership. It
also shifted its policy from its previous divide-and-rule tactics towards support-
ing European integration, including the ESDP (Keller 2010: 22; Rice 2005). The
principal reason was pragmatic: the United States now recognized the urgent
need for support from others, and sought to gain it from its European allies –
with regard to the rebuilding of Iraq, the stabilization of Afghanistan, and the
containment of Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
With the inauguration of Obama, the atmosphere in transatlantic relations
improved dramatically. The new American president’s style differed from that
of his predecessor, as Constanze Stelzenmüller observed: “In a populist age,
Obama’s style reset standards of rational public discourse about foreign affairs
to a level of civility, seriousness and intellectual complexity not seen in years –
and not just in America” (2010: 5). This new style was cultivated consciously as
a means to repair the damage done to America’s standing, influence, and power.
Yet in substance, policies towards Europe changed remarkably little. The new
administration clearly recognized the limitations of American power, and there-
fore was interested above all in mobilizing support wherever it could find it (Nau
2010; Rudolf 2010). The principal areas of concern for the Obama administra-
tion in transatlantic relations during its first year in office were the war in
Afghanistan, the management of the global economy, and nuclear non-
proliferation.
Afghanistan
European reactions to the 11 September attacks displayed sympathy for and
solidarity with America. A few days later, NATO collectively activated article
V of its founding treaty. Decision makers in London, Paris, and Berlin had
already decided at that point that they would participate in military action
against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan if the United States so desired. But
Washington declined any formal NATO support in its war in Afghanistan,
relying instead largely on the Afghan Northern Alliance. NATO, and hence
America’s European allies, were called upon only after the Taliban regime had
collapsed, to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan and help rebuild the Afghan
state and economy. The deployment of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF ) was formally requested by the new Afghan government and
decided on by the NATO council. For European governments, the single most
important motive for participation in the mission was a sense of solidarity with
the United States; beyond that, they also recognized the threat Al-Qaeda repre-
sented to their own societies and the need to help build viable socioeconomic
and political structures in Afghanistan so as to prevent a return of Al-Qaeda and
the Taliban.
In 2005, EU allies contributed about 5,000 soldiers to ISAF; this figure rose
to almost 17,000 in 2007 and close to 28,000 (or well over a quarter of total
NATO forces in Afghanistan) as of October 2009 (IISS 2010: 345); about 500
European soldiers had lost their lives in Afghanistan by that time. From 2002 to
2010, the European Union committed a total of about €8 billion in development
aid (Shapiro and Witney 2009: 52). In mid-2006, the military situation began to
deteriorate, gradually turning the stabilization mission into a war against a
nationwide insurgency. Yet overall, European governments and the Union have
been in denial, resisting pleas for more military resources and greater flexibility
in their deployment, but also failing to produce sustained civilian efforts in
Afghanistan.12
Despite the significant contributions of European allies to the collective
NATO effort, changes in military strategy were made by the Americans, with
little, if any, input from allies under either President Bush or his successor (see
Rudolf 2010: 165f.). European governments generally did not persuasively
portray their military involvement in Afghanistan as one motivated by national
or collective European interests, and thus had great difficulty in justifying addi-
tional military efforts vis-à-vis their increasingly skeptical domestic audiences.
Overall, European governments initially clearly have been role takers, rather
than role makers, responding to US expectations and their own notions of how
best to express solidarity and ingratiate themselves with America.
The war in Afghanistan was one of the painful inheritances George W. Bush
left his successor. Obama increased the relative importance of that war in the
context of its overall foreign policy, but simultaneously downgraded US objec-
tives and expectations. As Henry Nau (2010) pointed out,
Obama is clearly pulling back from this freedom agenda [pursued, at least
rhetorically, by G.W. Bush]. The objective is no longer to transform
domestic society and establish democratic states in unstable countries but to
prevent al Qaeda or other extremist elements . . . plot[ting] and carry[ing]
out violence against the United States.
Obama narrowed this goal even further when he announced his second new
strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in December 2009:
We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven. We must reverse the Taliban’s

momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government. The goal is
no longer defeating al Qaeda but denying it a safe haven and denying the
Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government
(ibid.)
Obama also changed NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan unilaterally and without

serious consultations with America’s allies, though he did so in the direction of a
comprehensive civil–military strategy, which is something that had long been
demanded by some European allies, such as Germany (Hippler 2010).
184 H.W. Maull
Economic crisis management
The first challenge the new Obama administration faced was not Afghanistan but
another inherited problem: the global financial and economic crisis. This crisis,
which was caused by excessive rises in real estate prices in America and else-
where and a very rapid expansion of credit, threatened to destroy the interna-
tional financial system by shutting down credit flows between financial
institutions, necessitating massive bailouts by governments. In the case of the
United States, that bailout provided government support to banks and consumers
through various programs worth up to $356 billion.13 As the real-world implica-
tions of those upheavals in global financial markets became clear late in 2008,
the new US government – as well as other governments worldwide – decided on
massive injections of public funds to sustain economic activities threatened by
the contraction of consumption and the tightening of credit. Those financial and
economic upheavals required coordinated policy responses to secure maximum
effectiveness and avoid counterproductive effects. It quickly became clear,
however, that, while transatlantic policy cooperation was still necessary, it was
no longer a sufficient framework for such coordination. Even the G8 was no
longer satisfactory, and was therefore replaced by a new format of international
economic cooperation, the G20 summit meeting, which first met in London in
November 2008 (Nanto 2009).
While the new American administration in principle was willing to secure
support from the European Union as a whole (as its predecessor also had been
in the first phase of the crisis), this often turned out to be difficult or even
impossible, owing to major policy differences within Europe over a whole
range of important foreign economic policy issues (Jones 2009). As a con-
sequence, the US government fell back on strategies of “disaggregation”
(Richard Haass), working with individual EU member states around and some-
times against others (Shapiro and Witney 2009: 12). When a new crisis over
Greece’s debt burden erupted in spring 2010, the Obama administration tried to
work through national governments, with the president himself calling the two
most important European actors, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France and
Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany, at a critical juncture in negotiations.
Clearly, the administration was worried about the economic and social fallout
arising from a crisis affecting the European common currency, and once more
tried to orchestrate the responses.
Arms control and disarmament

In the area of arms control and disarmament, over the past decade the Europeans
were confronted with profoundly different US approaches. The Bush administra-
tions disdained anything that even remotely seemed to threaten US military
superiority, and consequently pursued an arms control policy “lite”: they aban-
doned American support for multilateral arms control and disarmament agree-
ments, unilaterally abrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the
Soviet Union, and in 2003 settled on a largely meaningless bilateral agreement
with Russia to reduce nuclear warheads (the Strategic Offensive Reduction
Treaty, SORT). President Obama, on the other hand, with a speech in Prague in
April 2009, launched a high-profile nuclear disarmament initiative. Both admin-
istrations also pursued very different strategies to stem the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
Both approaches posed problems from the European perspective (Gormley
et al. 2009). The Bush policies towards arms control, disarmament, and prolif-
eration bluntly contradicted the traditional European preference for formal mul-
tilateral agreements, and the United States’ disdain for international norms in
2003 produced the worst transatlantic crisis since the Suez War in 1956, as the
United States proceeded with its plans for regime change through military inter-
vention in Iraq (Mauer 2010). Nevertheless, the European side basically tried to
accommodate those policies as much as possible so as not to cause further ten-
sions within the alliance. The Obama administration’s rather different, much
more European approach, including the popular “nuclear zero” initiative, basi-
cally came as a great relief to the Europeans but also gave rise to difficult issues
in the context of NATO’s strategy of extended nuclear deterrence, which relied
on nuclear security guarantees for non-nuclear European allies against certain
kinds of threats and nuclear burden sharing (Ingram 2010). Again, those prob-
lems essentially were caused by old thinking and old responses to a new secur-
ity environment: there was concern in Europe that a complete withdrawal of
(militarily essentially useless) US tactical nuclear warheads from Europe would
leave non-nuclear European countries vulnerable and abandoned by America.
At the same time, publics in those non-nuclear European states that still had
nuclear warheads on their territory clamored to have those weapons removed.
Thus, parliaments in Germany and the Netherlands supported complete with-
drawal, and the German Free Democratic Party adopted that cause in its elec-
tion platform in 2009, and subsequently also managed to insert it into the new
government’s coalition agreement. A further complicating factor was that the
European carrier systems for the delivery of those nuclear warheads were
approaching obsolescence, and thus needed to be replaced at considerable addi-
tional cost if those nuclear options were to be retained. Again, the Europeans
therefore presented a spectacle of deference, indecision, and contradictory
expectations.
Relations with Japan: the uneasy bilateral alliance

American–Japanese relations and the policies of the two governments towards
each other were shaken at the beginning of the decade by the terrorist attacks on
11 September 2001. The Bush administration’s reaction challenged Tokyo’s will-
ingness to demonstrate loyalty and solidarity. When the Japanese government, led
by Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) prime minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi, delivered
what Washington expected, the alliance seemed to have redeemed itself. George
W. Bush had come to office with a promise to strengthen America’s traditional
186 H.W. Maull
alliances in East Asia, against his predecessor’s alleged neglect of Japan in a
futile search for a “strategic partnership” with the People’s Republic of China,
which President Bush initially referred to as a “strategic competitor.” While his
administration later on considerably softened its policy stance on China, it did
continue to work for a close relationship with Japan.
The principal issues during those eight years were (1) Japan’s contributions
to the “Global War on Terror” in Afghanistan, and later in Iraq; (2) dealing with
the North Korean nuclear program and missile threat through close military
cooperation in developing and deploying a joint missile defense system and
coordination of diplomacy towards North Korea in the Six-Party Talks in
Beijing; and (3) the Japanese push for a permanent seat in the UN Security
Council. On all those issues, the relationship was basically managed success-
fully, although among close observers of the relationship there was a persistent
sense of underlying tensions, even drift due to a lack of shared purpose and stra-
tegic visions vis-à-vis the most important challenge facing the US–Japan alli-
ance, the rise of China (Pyle et al. 2010).
The stance of the Obama administration towards Japan in its first 18 months
in office has remained largely the same as that of his predecessor. Only the
style has changed – there were no images of personal intimacy and informality
between Obama and his Japanese interlocutors, which President Bush and
Prime Minister Koizumi had cultivated. As the administrations of his prede-
cessor, the Obama administration expected Japan to help America (1) to
support its struggle against terrorism and for the construction of viable and
friendly states in Afghanistan and Iraq; (2) to work closely with Washington in
its efforts to contain and reverse the nuclear weapons programs of North Korea
and Iran; and (3) to continue to underwrite in general terms US global hegem-
ony. Most urgently, however, the new US government needed Japanese
support to overcome the worst global financial and economic crisis since the
1930s in ways that would ensure American predominance, for example through
continued support in financing the huge (and growing) American “twin deficits”
(Godement 2010).
Japanese governments, and more broadly the foreign policy elite, expected
America to remain a strong, reliable, and supportive ally. They were worried
about what were perceived in Tokyo as protectionist tendencies within the
Democratic Party being adopted by the new administration, about Washington
under Obama practicing “Japan passing” in favor of a closer relationship with
China, and about a lack of American understanding for Japan’s specific concerns
with regard to North Korea (e.g. the abductee issue). A particularly awkward
problem was the realignment of US bases in Okinawa and Japan’s “host nation
support” for the move. The assessment of the state of the relationship between
America and Japan under President Obama until September 2009, before the
arrival of the new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government in Japan, was
therefore very similar to that under his predecessor: superficially, the alliance
seemed to work reasonably smoothly, but experts on both sides shared uneasi-
ness about its real strength.
American and Japanese role conceptions
This uneasiness becomes more understandable once we look beyond the
day-to-day activities into the foundations of the alliance from the perspective of
national role conceptions. Those role conceptions share some aspects (though
not all of those are in fact supportive of close cooperation built on mutual trust);
others are different yet compatible, while yet other elements are conflictual.
First, American and Japanese national role conceptions seem to share some
basic assumptions that are implied, rather than explicitly spelled out in foreign
policy statements: the assumption that foreign policy should be conducted auton-
omously as that of a sovereign nation (with the one important exception of
Japan’s reliance on the United States for basic security). This broadly shared
concept of sovereignty, however, is not necessarily conducive to close coopera-
tion, and it certainly sits uneasily on the dense ties of interdependence that have
grown between the two economies and societies. And it is a particularly prob-
lematic assumption in the case of Japan, whose foreign policy has been built on
existential reliance, hence dependence, on US security guarantees, rather than on
autonomous Japanese defense efforts.
Other elements of the respective role conceptions are clearly very different:
the United States assumes it has a natural position of leadership in the interna-
tional system, while Japan sees itself as a country in a precariously marginal yet
also exposed geopolitical location. Where the United States sees itself as an
expansive power, Japan perceives itself as vulnerable and insecure; where
America trusts its ability to impose its will on the rest of the world, Japan feels it
has to rely on adaptation and learning. In her comparative analysis of the
national role conceptions of Germany and Japan, Alexandra Sakaki-Wittig iden-
tified seven major role conception elements for Japan, four of which directly or
indirectly concerned its relationship with the United States: (1) Japan should
export security on a global scale in close partnership with the United States;
(2) Japan should promote “universal” (i.e. American) values; (3) Japan should
be a reliable partner and oppose unilateral action; and (4) Japan should help
to stabilize its region, working primarily through the US–Japan security alliance.
Against this, Japan also perceives its role as that of a non-militarist country
and as a contributor to regional cooperation (which could also exclude the
United States), and it wants to be a respected and trusted country (Sakaki-Wittig
2010).
Thus, as in the case of transatlantic relations, we find in Japan a foreign policy
role conception which at first glance seems highly compatible with that of the
United States. The United States expects Japan to contribute to its own defense
against external military threat, but not to the extent of taking up an autonomous
defense posture, since this would end Japan’s dependence on American security
guarantees. Japan should remain a faithful ally, and as such help sustain US
regional and global policies through material, financial, and political contribu-
tions. Japan, in turn, expects the United States to provide protection while allow-
ing Japan to remain a pacifist country, as well as to sustain the regional security
188 H.W. Maull
architecture in East Asia and the basic framework of the present open, global
international economic setup.
Closely related to those role conceptions is the classical alliance dilemma of
entrapment versus abandonment. From the Japanese perspective, there is an
underlying concern that the United States might abandon Japan if push came to
shove and “American national interests” demanded it. Historical experiences,
such as those of the early 1970s, when Washington unilaterally opened diplo-
matic negotiations with China, devalued the dollar, and imposed a soybean
export ban (in Japan, those two events are remembered as “Nixon shokkus”),
seemed to confirm those concerns. From a role-theoretical perspective, this sug-
gests that Japan finds it difficult fully to trust the compatibility of its own expec-
tations with the ego expectations of the United States. But Japan was also
constantly worried about “entrapment”: the possibility that US demands for
solidarity could draw Japan into military conflicts against its own will. Historical
experience seemed to confirm such fears: Washington did indeed put pressure on
Japan for military support it in its wars in Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, and Iraq, and
with regard to possible future contingencies on the Korean peninsula and in the
Taiwan Strait. Again, a role-theoretical perspective would discover elements of
distrust about the United States (Japan’s most relevant alter) and uncertainty
about the compatibility of mutual role expectations by ego and alter.
While until 1990, fears of abandonment or entrapment were focused on the
Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, attention
has now shifted towards the triangular relationship between the United States,
Japan, and China. Finally, among the elite in Japan there has been growing frustra-
tion with America over what is perceived as a lack of recognition and appreciation
of what Japan has done to support US leadership internationally.14
In the United States, there is irritation with Japan over its hesitation to provide
logistical military support for operations in Afghanistan, and about what efforts
Japan is willing to make to provide for its own self-defense and extend military
support to the United States beyond self-defense efforts. There is a widespread
perception in the United States that Japan is still a free-rider, and that it may not
share American values and concerns sufficiently. Most fundamentally, there are
doubts about Japan’s loyalty and reliability as an ally. Thus, Japan coveted, but
could not acquire, F-22 fighters, America’s most advanced fighter aircraft, owing
to a US law prohibiting the sale of such technology to foreign countries.
A survey of major contested issues in American–Japanese relations in recent
years shows that many of them touch on those underlying incompatibilities
between respective role conceptions. With regard to Japan’s military role in the
region, increasingly strong local opposition to US bases in Okinawa eventually
forced an agreement between the two governments to relocate some of those vast
US facilities, and thus evacuate some of the land claimed by the US military on
the islands.15 There also was considerable opposition in Japan to naval
deployment of Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF ) ships to refuel America’s
war in Afghanistan in the Indian Ocean, and to the deployment of Japanese
soldiers in a peacekeeping and state-building mission in Iraq. As a consequence,
the deployment was hedged with legal constraints and failed to make a significant
contribution to reconstruction in southern Iraq; the contingent was withdrawn
somewhat hastily in 2007 (Hughes 2009: 80f.), while in the case of the deploy-
ment in the Indian Ocean, the new Japanese government in 2009 almost immedi-
ately cancelled the operation. Negotiations were held about who would do what
within the bilateral military alliance in contingencies in “areas surrounding Japan”
(i.e. in a possible crisis on the Korean peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait), diplo-
matic attempts to defuse the tensions on the Korean peninsula through the Six-
Party Talks, where Japan feels that the United States has not been sufficiently firm
on North Korea with regard to the issue of Japanese abductees, while Washington
sees Japan as unduly preoccupied with what it considers a side issue. Washington
is also irritated about what it considers a (given Japan’s general stance on nuclear
weapons) rather surprising lack of enthusiasm in Japan’s support for Obama’s
nuclear zero initiative (Smith 2010). Similar differences frequently exist between
the two with regard to relations with and diplomacy towards China.
Are US–Japan role conceptions changing? If so, how?

How have the role conceptions of the United States and Japan in their bilateral
relationship evolved in recent years? Are there indications that change might
acquire momentum in the future? As in the case of Europe, there has been very
little change within the role conception of US foreign policy towards Japan from
George W. Bush to Obama, and indeed more broadly since 1955. We also find
few signs of adaptation, except for the style of foreign policy conduct, and only
minor changes in emphasis.
The situation is more complicated for Japan, for two reasons. First, Japan
generally is in a much more exposed position than the United States, and has
tended towards adaptation and adjustment. Second, an opposition government
came to power in Japan in late 2009, dethroning the LDP, which had held the
reins of power since the beginnings of postwar democratic politics, with only
two brief interludes in 1947–48 and 1993–94. The change in government repre-
sented a major political upheaval in Japanese politics, which suggests that far-
reaching change might be possible in foreign policy conduct, possibly including
Japan’s foreign policy role conception. Indeed, some programmatic statements
by incoming prime minister Hatoyama seemed to point in this direction:
Hatoyama appeared to favor a fundamental realignment of Japan’s international
position, seeking to distance Tokyo from the United States and moving towards
closer relations with China and the region, for which he proposed to form an
“East Asian community” (Hatoyama 2009):
I believe that regional integration and collective security is the path we

should follow toward realizing the principles of pacifism and multilateral
cooperation advocated by the Japanese Constitution. It is also the appropri-
ate path for protecting Japan’s political and economic independence and
pursuing our interests in our position between the United States and China.
190 H.W. Maull
The article also cited the decline of US power, lamented the ills of US-style
capitalism, and spoke of the need for Japan to strengthen bonds in Asia as a
means of securing its political and economic independence as a nation positioned
between the United States and China. There was one reference to the importance
of the US–Japan relationship but it included the phrase “close and equal alli-
ance.” The term “equal” was undefined, but widely interpreted as indicating a
greater willingness by the Japanese government to express grievances and play a
less “subservient” role in the alliance (Green and Szechenyi 2009b: 19). During
the campaign, Hatoyama had promised to end the MSDF refueling mission in
the Indian Ocean, to renegotiate the bilateral agreement on the relocation of the
Marines base on Okinawa, and to declassify secret documents from the 1950s
and 1960s pertaining to US nuclear weapons policy in Japan, all of which the
new government promptly implemented.
Yet a move away from the close alliance with the United States towards a
position of equidistance between America and China, and/or the integration of
Japan in a regional community, which would imply a change in Japan’s role
conception, seem highly unlikely today. The Japanese foreign policy role con-
ception appears particularly complex and potentially contradictory, and those
contradictions are likely to become more pronounced as the center of gravity in
international relations continues to shift towards Asia and the other newly indus-
trializing countries: Japan sees itself as a Western country and a close ally of the
United States, but also as an Asian country; it expects to accommodate both the
United States and China; it cultivates both a pacifist tendency and a desire to
pursue autonomous policies; and it is confronted with the rise of China and the
relative decline of US power, status, and influence.
The implications for Japan’s national role conception are potentially far-
reaching, yet also very uncertain, and the Japanese people do not seem to be in
the mood to support a major reorientation of Japanese foreign policy. Still, in
this situation the new political leadership may have considerable leeway to rede-
fine Japan’s foreign policy role conception through reinterpreting key norms and
shifts in relative emphasis – for instance, away from the US–Japan Security
Treaty and towards greater efforts at good neighborhood relations.
Conclusions
What conclusions can we draw from our analysis of America’s national role con-
ception? First of all, American hegemony over its principal allies has been
remarkably constant both in terms of role conceptions and role enactment of all
states concerned, and seems likely to remain so, despite the deep Euro-Atlantic
crisis of 2002–03 over Iraq (Mauer 2010). America, Europe, and Japan are all
reluctant to revise those core norms in their respective role conceptions, which
sustain a leader–follower relationship and voluntary dependency on the United
States as a (benign) hegemon.
What explains this persistence of US hegemony? First, there is of course
America’s material power preponderance, which has grown since the end of
the Cold War relative to that of Japan and even Europe. Second, both Japan
and – with much less reason – Europe still feel dependent on America’s
(nuclear) security guarantees. Third, there are the ingrained habits of inter-
action and the increasingly deep ties of interdependence between the econo-
mies and societies of America and its allies. Fourth, and last, neither Japan nor
the European Union appears able and willing to conceive of alternative solu-
tions for providing global public goods through an alternative international
order. For all those reasons, America’s allies are still willing to underwrite US
hegemony in many ways.
The findings of this chapter also suggest that the US foreign policy role con-
ception is quite malleable. The macroscopic line of continuity represents the
sum of significant microscopic oscillations around this trend line, between and
even within presidencies. From this perspective, agency and language assume
major importance in reconstructing and modifying foreign policies through
ambitious strategies of political communication. The president, owing to his
(or her) ability to shape the agenda and dominate discourses on American
foreign policy, is the most important single actor – not only in his own right,
but also because of his capacity to appoint people close to his own foreign
policy convictions into key positions in the executive branch. Every president
reconstructs his administration’s understanding of America’s national role con-
ception, and in doing so reinterprets and reshapes it in line with changing
external circumstances and his policy preferences. President Bush and his team
tried this on a massive scale; in doing so, they not only diminished America’s
influence in the world but also demonstrated that there are limits to the presi-
dential reinterpretation of national role conceptions. Audiences at home and
abroad eventually came to recognize that his administration’s reorientation of
US foreign policy was based on a deeply flawed assessment of America’s
power and the realities of international politics, and in some ways even came
close to a fundamental departure, if not from the conception itself,16 then at
least from prior strategies and tactics of role enactment. President Bush never-
theless was able to win reelection, but also recognized the need to adjust his
foreign policies in the face of catastrophic failure and rapidly declining legiti-
macy both domestically and internationally (Wolf, this volume). The Obama
administration took those adaptations further. Yet there clearly has been much
more adjustment in the sense of “simple learning” than the kind of “complex
learning” that would enable America to cope with the huge changes in the
international environment during the last decade (Harnisch, this volume; cf.
Levy 1994: 285). In a world that has changed beyond recognition, America
thus continues to follow the trajectory of international hegemony on which it
launched itself in 1917, and again in 1941.
It would be surprising, however, if that old foreign policy role conception,
with only modest updates and repair works, turned out to be adequate to meet
the challenges America now confronts. These include the relative decline of
US material power vis-à-vis the rising powers China, India, Brazil, and
others; its enormous dependence on external finance to service the gaps
192 H.W. Maull
between tax revenues and public expenditure and between imports and
exports, which now is largely supplied by China, rather than by Japan; and
also the enormous tasks confronting the present international order, from
energy transition through climate change to nuclear proliferation and state
failure. As a consequence, America will need more support than in the past if
it wants to sustain the Pax Americana effectively. Yet it is far from certain
not only whether the support of its traditional allies will be sufficient for the
tasks at hand, but also whether those allies would be willing to help. This is
the third conclusion to be drawn from this analysis: US hegemonic leadership
is precarious. Role conceptions may appear complementary, but they are so
only up to a point: as America’s expectations and demands on its allies are
likely to grow, the ability and also the willingness of those allies to respond
effectively seems destined to erode, as domestic and regional claims on
resources will undermine the ability to provide effective support, while less-
ened needs for protection and growing doubts about the legitimacy of US
hegemony will affect the allies’ goodwill. The next US presidents will have
their work cut out.
Notes
1 I am grateful to Jan Martin Vogel for his extensive research support on this chapter.
2 The term “political culture” defines the principles, norms, and attitudes of a people to
its political system. “Foreign policy culture” depicts the segment of that culture which
relates to external relations.
3 Using the framework for role conception analysis built around the civilian power ideal
type, we have analysed a list of key foreign policy documents of the three administra-
tions, using a detailed set of specific role elements (see Fraenkler et al. 1997: 26ff.).
4 Individual role conceptions are, of course, difficult to assess and not readily available
for the inner circle of the neocons; moreover, they no doubt differ somewhat from
person to person. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that role conceptions for
the United States held by the group collectively may have differed substantially and
qualitatively from that of the mainstream foreign policy establishment (Berdal 2003:
17).
5 This also caused considerable tensions within and defections from the administration
and, more fundamentally, eventually led to challenges to those policies by Congress,
the courts, and the electorate, which understood that the United States’ image abroad
needed to be improved (see CCGA 2008).
6 Recall Condoleezza Rice’s famous (if never acknowledged) phrase “punish France,
ignore Germany, forgive Russia” (see Gordon 2007).
7 I am grateful for this point to Sebastian Harnisch.
8 For previous crises, recall the fallout between France and Britain and the Eisenhower
administration over the Suez War in 1956, or the confrontation between the United
States and the European Community during the October War in the Middle East and
the first oil crisis in 1973–74.
9 Apparently, German intelligence sources provided information to help US forces in
Iraq to target their strikes against opposition activities (cf. Spiegel Online 2008).
10 The concept of an ethical foreign policy, particularly as espoused by Tony Blair
himself, showed remarkable similarities with the ideal-type civilian power role con-
ception. See, for example, Blair (1999), Daddow (2009), and Dunne and Wheeler
(2001).
11 In a significant modification of its 2002 National Security Strategy (Bush 2002a), in
the 2006 National Security Strategy the second Bush administration argued that the
United States “must be prepared to act alone if necessary, while recognizing that there
is little of lasting consequence that we can accomplish in the world without the sus-
tained cooperation of our allies and partners” (cf. Kanet 2008).
12 A telling detail here is the woefully inadequate European efforts to build and train the
Afghan National Police force (Shapiro and Witney 2009: 52).
13 Actual costs to the US taxpayer seem to have been rather less than expected (Reuters
2010).
14 For example, there was irritation in Tokyo that US Treasury Secretary Timothy
Geithner failed to acknowledge publicly Japan’s $100 billion contribution to the IMF
and its passage of two stimulus packages (Green and Szechenyi 2009a: 1).
15 This agreement was finalized with the last LDP administration, led by Prime Minister
Taro Aso, in 2006; it foresaw the relocation of most of the base to a less populated
(but beautiful and environmentally sensitive) part of Okinawa, while the smaller part
of the base and its soldiers were to be withdrawn to Hawaii. The first DPJ prime
minister, Yukio Hatoyama, had promised during the election campaign to find a new
solution but eventually had to accept the previously negotiated settlement, with some
minor amendments. He therefore resigned.
16 Arguably, this administration violated one of the basic tenets of this role conception
through its dismissal of the importance of international organizations and cooperation
with allies, thus in fact pursuing an imperial rather than a hegemonic foreign policy. It
also was willing to violate key international and national norms in the pursuit of its
ambitions (cf. Shannon and Keller 2007).
11 Terrorized America?
9/11 and its impact on US foreign
policy
Raimund Wolf
Introduction
The terrorist attacks on 11 September 20011 and the succeeding Global War on
Terror (GWOT) marked a watershed in US foreign policy (Bolton 2008: 171). In
the eyes of many observers, America became unbound (Daalder and Lindsay
2003): Multilateralism and soft power as elements of foreign policy were put to
one side, whereas plurilaterism or unilateralism and military means came to the
fore. Against this backdrop, the Iraq War in 2003 constituted the high tide of the
new foreign policy, its turning point, and the beginning of the end of the “Bush
revolution” (Gordon 2006). As long-standing allies followed these unexpected
changes in George W. Bush’s first term with considerable irritation (Davies et
al. 2008: 309; Malone and Khong 2003), they are also puzzling from a theoret-
ical point of view. Since America’s unipolar power position remained unchal-
lenged, reference to the international system cannot explain the foreign policy
excursion. Furthermore, the changes coincide neither with an important election
nor with a significant shift in public foreign policy preferences. Thus, they also
escape an easy domestic explanation.
In a sociological reading, the post-9/11 behavior indicates a change in the US
foreign policy role. Terrorism offered an antagonistic pole, a decade after Amer-
ica’s long-standing role opposite the evil empire became obsolete (Hils and
Wilzewski 2004: 193; Le Prestre 1997b). The GWOT dispelled strategic uncer-
tainty and provided a new foreign policy consensus as well as a new focal point,
unifying domestically and guiding internationally. Therefore, it is possible to
conclude that the role change was caused by the terrorist attacks. Yet in this
chapter it is argued that 9/11 is best described as a trigger rather than a source of
temporary behavioral role change. The extraordinary situation after the attacks
helped heave a domestic minority position with roots preceding the events into a
temporarily superior position to influence the US role formulation in the direc-
tion of their views (Robinson 2006).
This argument, based on Andrew Moravcsik’s differentiation of ideational
and republican liberalism (1997), holds that societal actors’ role conceptions
require representation in government to become influential. In this reading, state
actors will only pursue the role conception of those societal actors that are able
Terrorized America? 195
to capture or recapture the state as representative institution. In the case at hand,
a small coalition of assertive nationalists and neoconservatives within the execu-
tive captured foreign policy formulation and implemented their long-developed
positions. This is all the more striking as public opinion shows a high degree of
continuity in spite of the attacks. But superior access to policy formulation
helped the coalition to outplay the majoritarian position as well as external role
expectations.
In this context, 9/11 was a crucial trigger for a behavioral change since it pro-
vided the assertive nationalists and neoconservatives with an opportunity for
change by altering the international patterns of security policy interdependence
and creating a domestic state of emergency, which temporarily disconnected the
executive from democratic representation. Backed by a public rally-around-the-
flag effect and unchecked by a submissive Congress, the executive could domi-
nate the legitimating discourse and was de facto free to rewrite the US role. Not
only was the Iraq invasion the crucial test for the new role, but also it met a
long-held demand. Yet the decision to invade Iraq, the least risky and most pub-
licly controversial target on the axis of evil, also reveals that the executive was
careful not to politically overplay its hand. Ironically, the successive Iraq occu-
pation crucially contributed to the delegitimation of the new foreign policy role
and enabled the conservative realists to recapture the state.
The argument will proceeds as follows: The next section will present the theo-
retical perspective in more detail and develop a framework for analysis. The third
section will summarize the redirection towards unilateralism and robust means
since 2001, justifying the claims of foreign policy role change. The following
section will take a look at the impact of 9/11 on public opinion and the continuity
of role conception within the American public. The fifth and sixth sections will
present the necessary ingredients for a role change after 9/11: the extended execu-
tive power and detachment from public scrutiny after the attacks, as well as the
failure of the realist role conception and the emergence of an alternative role
within the Republican Party. The last section will then show how these factors
came together and resulted in a temporary redefinition of US foreign policy.
The representation of role conceptions

This chapter holds that the changes during the Bush administration’s first term
mark a substantial departure from the post-Cold War foreign policy trajectory.
They indeed constitute a behavioral role change. According to Holsti (1970),
role conceptions are largely stable results of socialization processes influenced
by history, cultural, and societal characteristics. Yet roles “are sensitive to situa-
tional context and time” (Aggestam 2006: 22), and thus the possibility for
change is not excluded. Dramatic crisis situations such as the 9/11 attacks can
call into question the existing role conceptions of foreign policy decision makers
and initiate a search for a more appropriate role. This is even more likely if a
current role is in limbo or not proved over the long term, as has been argued for
the American role after the Cold War (Haass 1995; Le Prestre 1997b). When a
196 R. Wolf
role fails, new role conceptions rooted in society can fill the gap (cf. Harnisch on
the mechanism for role change/transformation in this volume).
To account for the role change in the ego part of the United States, this
chapter employs a liberal reading of role theory as recently called for by Cantir
and Kaarbo (2010). Moravcsik’s ideational liberalism (1997: 525–8) provides a
helpful bridge to constructivist role theory. Moravcsik himself indicates the
potential complementarity of the social identity-based ideational liberalism with
constructivist theories and argues that in his conception, “[c]ultural or sociologi-
cal arguments that privilege collective social beliefs, either domestic or trans-
national, as sources of social preferences are not excluded” (2003: 162). In fact,
as social identities can hardly be seen as an individual property, the claim of ide-
ational preferences seems easier to operationalize within a constructivist per-
spective. It is more plausible to treat them as characteristics of society that are
carried on, shared, and interpreted intersubjectively.
In this sense, role conceptions are introduced here as ideational preferences
by domestic actors. The liberal perspective stresses that societies are not harmo-
nious entities sharing one ideational preference, but inevitably are characterized
by competition (Moravcsik 1997: 517). With regard to the preferred US role in
international affairs, public heterogeneity and competition are also to be
expected. Unfortunately, role theory so far lacks a coherent framework to open
up society and offer a connection between potentially competing societal role
conceptions and the actual role shift on the state level (Breuning in this volume;
Cantir and Kaarbo 2010). In contrast to most analyses guided by role theory,
which resort to discourse analysis to fill this gap, this chapter will employ
Moravcsik’s republican liberal perspective, emphasizing representative institu-
tions as a crucial link between society and decision makers. It cautions against
the assumption that changing societal role conceptions are immediately and fully
reflected in the state’s role conception. Governments keep in view only a subset
of society. Thus, the formal and informal ways in which actors can transmit their
positions onto the state level are of crucial importance for the understanding of
role change.
These assumptions provide a new analytical framework that helps to clarify
the relationships between the terrorist attacks, representation, and the US role
and guides the way for further analysis. In an ideal-type perspective, in the sense
that democratic institutions provide for a broad transmission of publicly held
preferences that are acted upon by responsive decision makers, the majority’s
role conception and the state’s role conception are highly congruent (Doyle
2008: 61). If there is only a little congruence between the societal and the state
position, one has not only to find the reason for the dysfunction of the transmis-
sion belt, but also to identify the actors that have captured the state instead.
In this analysis, external role expectations as a source of the US role change
are not considered. This focus on the ego part is justified for several reasons.
First, in his seminal work, Holsti (1970: 243) argues that the ego part of a
national role is more influential than the alter part, since international relations
provide only weak role prescriptions. One may argue that this particularly holds
for – in a material sense – powerful states that can actively shape international
society more easily and fear less sanction for departing from alter expectations.
Second, the most plausible way for terrorists to affect the US role leads through
the role conception of the ego part. Terrorism as a strategy is different from other
acts of politically motivated violence. Although terrorist destruction can be hor-
rific, it is not sufficient to directly achieve political ends. Rather, violence is used
as a means to cause widespread fear and create a sense of insecurity that pro-
vides the central leverage by which terrorists coerce governments into acceding
to their demands (Daase 2007; Pape 2003: 346). Therefore, the success of terror-
ism is highly dependent on the public, which functions as a resonator. Downes-
Le Guin and Hoffman (1993: 1) stress, “Public opinion is an essential factor in
the dynamics of terrorism because without public attention, ‘only’ the victims
are terrorized.” Thus, if the devastating terrorist attacks are indeed the cause for
a new US role, the most likely way leads through society.2 Third, there is no
obvious international dynamic that would justify an alter-driven role change. In
fact, the irritation about the US behavior in foreign affairs on the part of long-
standing international partners suggests that the new role is more at odds with
their role expectations than before. International opinion polls clearly document
the rapid decline of Washington’s global image as well as a decreasing accept-
ance of the hegemonic US position and its foreign policy behavior after 2001
(Lake 2008; Walt 2005: 62–71). This shrinking international approval points to
a “home-made” redefinition of the foreign policy behavior.
Continuity and change in US foreign policy after 9/11

The claim that the Bush administration’s foreign policy after 9/11 is a departure
from earlier administrations is far from trivial. As US foreign policy positions
since 2001 arguably rest upon long-held traditions that frame the American role
in the world, a detailed analysis with regard to goals, strategies, and instruments
is warranted (Hils and Wilzewski 2004; Jervis 2005: 37–58; McCormick 2005:
205–43).
With regard to goals, President Bush’s agenda prior to 9/11, emphasizing
economic prosperity and selective military engagement based on a narrow defi-
nition of national interests, did not fundamentally differ from that of his prede-
cessor’s government. These mostly realist foreign policy positions were altered
after 9/11. While economic prosperity became a less prominent foreign policy
goal, the GWOT combined the struggle for security with the export of values. A
week after the Al-Qaeda attacks, the president is reported to have told one of his
advisors, “We have an opportunity to restructure the world toward freedom, and
we have to get it right” (Bush quoted in Jervis 2003: 368). President Bush did
not settle for a reactive and passive role as a shining – yet well-fortified –
example of democracy, but took a much more active position. The 2002 National
Security Strategy makes this point clear: “Given the goals of rogue states and
terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we
have in the past” (Bush 2002a: 15). The commitment to proactive security is
198 R. Wolf
most evident in the broadly defined option of preemptive military strikes even in
the absence of an imminent threat, more accurately described as preventive war
(Singh 2006: 18). This option constitutes a clear departure from international
law and American foreign policy tradition (Gaddis 2005a). As Khong (2008:
261) has argued, the Bush administration followed what could be termed a 1
percent doctrine after 9/11: “[E]ven with a one per cent chance of a grave threat
materializing, the US should treat that threat as a certainty and act to eliminate
it.” Since comprehensive protection of the homeland was impossible, the only
way to guarantee security for the American people was “bringing the war to the
bad guys” (Bush quoted in Woodward 2002: 281). Furthermore, the Bush
administration in its first term combined the proactive security approach with the
goal of bringing democracy and freedom to the world. Since transnational terror-
ism is elusive and hard to trace, Washington focused on regime change of non-
democratic states in order to eradicate terrorist safe havens. In his State of the
Union Address in 2002, President Bush (2002b) accused North Korea, Iran, and
Iraq of supporting terrorism and seeking nuclear weapons: “States like these, and
their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the
world.”3 Through the “axis of evil” speech, the Clinton administration’s rogue
state rhetoric (Lake 1994) was blended with the threat of terrorism and nuclear
proliferation, leading to a proactive role conception.
In 2003, the Bush administration’s new foreign policy approach culminated
in the war with Iraq, which Washington accused of secretly pursuing weapons of
mass destruction and supporting terrorism. Despite there being only thin evid-
ence, which later turned out to be false or wrongly interpreted, Washington was
unwilling to take any chances (Pillar 2006). Since overthrowing the Iraqi dicta-
torship would not only eliminate a national security threat but also liberate the
Iraqi people, Iraq was the perfect test case for its new foreign policy goals.
While the way in which the Bush administration merged security and mission
and pushed them to their extremes constitutes a remarkable innovation, the goals
themselves are not new in historical comparison (Leffler 2004). From a role-
theoretical perspective, the administration’s foreign policy positions resembled a
mixture of traditional conservative realist and Wilsonian liberal role conceptions
(Wilzewski 2004: 26). Yet the ways and means with which Washington pursued
these goals resembled a new mix of previous foreign policy role conceptions.
In terms of strategy, the Republican administration in Washington early on
proved its unwillingness to support international institutions and agreements that
impose potential constraints on US foreign policy (Daalder and Lindsay 2003:
13). Despite George W. Bush’s campaign promise of a humble America in the
world, the explicit rejection of international constraints was a continuous element
of the Bush administration’s foreign policy in word and deed. However, as
national security and the GWOT moved to the top of Washington’s agenda, the
foreign policy strategies took a further turn (ibid.: 2). The Bush administration
more than ever emphasized unilateralism over multilateralism, and the rejection
of international agreements became stronger, because Washington saw limita-
tions to its international options as a luxury it could not afford. In December
2001, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty4 and rejected any efforts
to strengthen the biological weapons convention. In May 2002, the government
announced its withdrawal of all support for the International Criminal Court, and
opposition to any jurisdiction over American citizens by the court. Concerns
over loss of sovereignty and politically motivated prosecutions of American offi-
cials or military personal, which had provoked the Republican Congress to
oppose earlier ratification, became even more palpable as the country prepared
for the GWOT (Amann and Sellers 2002). In the eyes of Bush’s administration,
the unconventional enemy justified unconventional means largely unconstrained
by international agreements such as the Geneva Conventions. Again, the com-
mitment to plurilateralism climaxed in the Iraq War, which perhaps dealt the
heaviest blow to the international legal framework. The US willingness to chal-
lenge the authority of the UN Security Council in war matters shook the US-
built international institution. Furthermore, the administration only relied on
states that were willing to support the United States on its own terms, as Rums-
feld (2001) famously stressed: “In this way, the mission determines the coali-
tion; the coalition must not determine the mission.” Thus, plurilateral coalitions
of the willing were forged in the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns in which the
United States ensured that no other actors could interfere with its planning.
Many states hoped to prove their solidarity by offering all kinds of help for the
war effort, especially in Afghanistan, but the Bush administration was careful to
keep the involvement of other actors as small as possible (Prestowitz 2003: 7). It
increasingly relied on its own power, and international partners and organiza-
tions lost influence on the hegemon’s decisions (Malone 2003: 33). Although no
US administration ever ruled out the option of acting unilaterally if it considered
it necessary, the categorical refusal of international constraints and second
thoughts by traditional allies under the Bush presidency constitutes a departure
from former administrations. The US role became more than ever ego-centered.
With regard to instruments, George W. Bush and his team were already
during the 2000 election campaign clearly committed to the preservation and
potential expansion of military supremacy (Bush 1999). But the only slightly
increased military budget prior to 9/11 arguably aimed at a realist-inspired
supremacy, deterring rivals and providing the means to defend narrowly defined
national interests. While the early Bush administration indicated great care con-
cerning the use of military power, the global mission after the terrorist attacks
was strongly based on a new robustness relying on coercion and military
supremacy. The term “war on terror” already implies the importance of military
means (Jervis 2005: 47), and the Bush administration firmly followed the belief
that “an America unbound should use its strength to change the status quo in the
world” (Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 13). Thus, the military became a much more
prominent and active tool of US foreign affairs after 9/11. The Pentagon’s mili-
tary transformation and other armament projects capable of raising American
capabilities even further above other nations’ means were significantly pushed
after Congress opened the floodgates for a massive military buildup under the
stimulus of the attacks on New York and Washington (Wirls 2008).5 The same
200 R. Wolf
can be said about the creation of a national missile defense, which was even
more forcefully pursued after the terrorist attacks, despite ambivalent interna-
tional reactions. To further underline American global military dominance, the
military presence in Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa was
expanded significantly (IISS 2002: 13–14, 122–6). And Washington was willing
to use its military means. The willingness to isolate and threaten authoritarian
states rather than engage in direct negotiations or make concessions marked the
relations with Iran after 2002, in which the new robustness arguably complicated
a diplomatic solution to the nuclear question (Harnisch 2008; Thränert 2006).
The long-time adversarial relations became increasingly tense after Iran’s secret
nuclear program was uncovered in 2002. Although the mullahs’ regime made
some efforts to improve relations with the United States, the “axis of evil”
speech, which included Iran in the description, and the administration’s succes-
sive refusals of Iranian overtures rendered these efforts futile. Yet the Iraq War
in particular shows that the Republican administration did not merely threaten
military intervention. As a war of choice only 15 months after the Afghanistan
War, Iraq clearly demonstrates Washington’s new emphasis on military power
(Haass 2009).
In sum, while the goals of proactive security and democratic transformation
were merged in an innovative way after 9/11, they do not in themselves appear
like a full departure from foreign policy traditions. Yet the Bush administration’s
US role clearly differed from that of prior administrations in its determination to
pursue these goals – if necessary – with unilateral strategies and with an empha-
sis on robust instruments. From the theoretical point of view, the role change
during the Bush tenure indicates a change in ideational preference representa-
tion. The following sections will seek to uncover its underlying process.
The impact of 9/11 on domestic role conceptions

Decision makers and, especially, the media treated the attacks as a formative
event that “changed everything” (Brady 2001), leading to a whole new thinking
within the country (Birkland 2004). Yet an assessment of the numerous public
opinion polls after 9/11 shows that this claim is inaccurate with regard to foreign
policy role expectations. To be sure, polls leave no doubt about the impact of the
terrorist attacks on the public sense of national and personal insecurity, which
reached enormous heights in the immediate aftermath.6 Thus, in a CBS/New
York Times Monthly Poll (2001) sampled between 20 and 23 September 2001,
78 percent of the questioned persons expected another terrorist attack on the
United States within the next few months, and almost one-third reported personal
fear. Another CBS News/New York Times Poll (2002) a year later, in which
only 70 percent and 22 percent respectively reported fear, reveals the fugacity of
threat perceptions as reported from earlier terrorist attacks (Downes-Le Guin and
Hoffman 1993; Huddy et al. 2002).7 Nonetheless, five years after the attacks, 71
percent of people questioned in an ABC News Poll still thought about the attacks
and 46 percent of the same group named 9/11 as the single most significant event
that had happened in their lifetime in terms of its importance for the United
States and the world (Langer 2006). The threat of further attacks remained
inconsequential for domestic role expectations, however, since it did not trigger
societal responses with regard to the general US role in foreign affairs. Several
trends are of importance for this analysis.
Domestically, the challenge by terrorism strengthened the in-group identity.8
Li and Brewer (2004: 728) observed “immediate, visibly evident increases in
expressions of national identification and unity throughout the United States.”
Thus, the proportion of Americans flying US flags jumped from 25 percent to 65
percent shortly after the terrorist attacks (Davies et al. 2008: 309). Even more
striking are the results of a survey drawn up within two weeks of the attacks in
which 97 percent of the questioned people agreed with the statement “I would
rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world” (Smith et
al. 2001: 4; see also Pei 2003).9 The strong group dynamics were accompanied
by a “rally around the flag” effect which is well documented for many previous
crisis situations. Approval rates for the president and trust in government
increased decisively after 9/11 (Chanley 2002; McDonald Ladd 2007), thereby
supplying the Bush administration with political capital until the public increas-
ingly grew concerned over the Iraq situation in 2004 (Mueller 2005).10
In terms of foreign policy, the public showed a clear demand for an active US
role in the world after 9/11 (Hils and Wilzewski 2004: 206). The attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon moved terrorism to the top of the national
agenda (CCFR 2002a: 19), which fostered strong support for military action against
states harboring terrorism (Huddy et al. 2002: 447f.). As was seen in earlier terrorist
incidents (Simon 1987: 110), the public wanted the perpetrators punished and there-
fore generally supported the GWOT and military action, especially in Afghanistan.
100
Approve
90
Disapprove
80
70
Percentage
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
01
01
02
02
03
03
04
04
05
06
06
07
2/
9/
3/
4/
5/
9/
4/
7/
10
11
12
11
Figure 11.1 Presidential approval rates from February 2001 to September 2007 (source:
Langer (2008)).
202 R. Wolf
However, the support for the government and the call for retaliation did not
change the publicly preferred US role conception. The fundamental understand-
ing concerning appropriate behavior in the world remained unchanged (Holsti
2003; Page and Bouton 2006). Polls showed that the public still preferred diplo-
matic measures over violent means and emphasized the importance of multilat-
eralism and international agreements. In the CCFR opinion poll (2002a), 77
percent of respondents held that the United Nations should be strengthened and
56 percent of Americans still said that NATO was essential to their own secur-
ity, and even its expansion was supported by a majority. Furthermore, clear
majorities supported US participation in international initiatives and treaties,
such as the International Criminal Court11 and the Kyoto Agreement. The CCFR
opinion poll (ibid.: 27) also found that even soon after the horrors of 9/11, a
clear majority of Americans (61 percent) stated that the United States should not
respond unilaterally to international crises if it does not have the support of its
allies. While a total of 85 percent supported the use of US forces to overthrow
Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2002, 65 percent said that the United States should
invade Iraq only with UN approval and the support of its allies (ibid.: 28). In
fact, a majority of the people questioned named the need to work more closely
with other countries to fight terrorism as an important lesson of 11 September.
Regime change in Iraq still promised to become an endeavor with little political
risk for the administration, since the strong support for regime change was not
significantly affected by the terrorist attack.
Interestingly, even after the terrorist attacks the US public turned out to be
generally skeptical about military instruments to achieve foreign policy goals.
90
80
70
60
Percentage
50
40
30
20
Support
10
Oppose
0
91
92
93
94
98
99
01
3
/0
0
4/
2/
1/
2/
2/
3/
10
11
11
Figure 11.2 Support for military action against Saddam Hussein (source: Everts and
Isernia (2005: 290–1)).
Note
The chart is based on polls by Gallup, Gallup/CNN/Time Magazine, and ABC/Washington Post/
TNS.
Instead, diplomatic means to fight terrorist organizations gained very high
ratings. Thus, 89 percent favored “diplomatic efforts to apprehend suspects and
dismantle terrorist training camps” and 80 percent supported “diplomatic efforts
to improve U.S. relations with potential adversary countries” as tools in the
GWOT (CCFR 2002a: 35). The public even supported diplomatic relations with
the most prominent states of the axis of evil: 65 percent favored diplomatic rela-
tions with North Korea, 58 percent with Iran, and still 49 percent with Iraq.
Comparisons with pre-9/11 polls show that societal support for multilateral-
ism and international institutions as well as the preference for diplomatic means
is by and large constant over the years (for long-term data, see CCFR 2006,
14).12 In a study on lasting effects of the 11 September attacks concerning patri-
otism and internationalism, Furia (2004: 22) concludes: “On balance then, it
seems clear that 9/11 was not a critical event in the formation of foreign-policy-
relevant core values in the United States.” From a theoretical perspective, two
aspects of this review are of particular importance. First, a major shift in public
opinion occurred with regard to presidential approval, which skyrocketed after
9/11. Second, public opinion has hardly changed with regard to the ways and
means of foreign policy, and therefore the US role change cannot be traced back
to a shift in public opinion. In fact, the administration’s foreign policy even
moves away from ideational preferences shared by domestic majorities. In other
words, the diffuse public support for the administration stands in clear contrast
to the gap between society and administration with regard to foreign policy strat-
egies and instruments. This is not to say that the disconnection between public
majority opinion and US foreign policy was complete. In the decision to focus
on Iraq instead of any other opponent, the executive could bank on a long-held
public preference for regime change.
Preparing the field: the public’s self-imposed disconnect and

the failure of the realist role conception
While the attacks on Washington and New York did not create a new public role
conception, they provided “the rationale and the opportunity” (Daalder and
Lindsay 2003: 13) to realize a role whose intellectual roots date back to long
before the Al-Qaeda plot. The events of 9/11 changed the patterns of public rep-
resentation and influence within the administration and enabled the implementa-
tion of this role.
As was shown above, the attacks had a decisive short-term impact on the
societal threat perception, triggered a demand for action, and caused a rally-
around-the-flag effect. The high public approval rates provided the executive
with extensive political power that dwarfed congressional influence and over-
sight. Congress, including the Democratic majority in the Senate, which had pre-
viously used any chance to challenge the Republican administration, quickly
rallied behind the president (Wilzewski 2003). This contributed to a far-reaching
executive leverage, particularly in foreign affairs and national security. The
strong in-group dynamic made it easy for the government to monopolize the
204 R. Wolf
transmission belt, discrediting critical voices as unpatriotic. The administration’s
careful construction of the post-9/11 public discourse and the framing of the
attack as an act of war instead of a crime further extended executive dominance
in foreign affairs and legitimized far-reaching executive action (Jackson 2005;
Krebs and Lobasz 2007; Mackiewicz Wolfe 2008).
Yet the leverage of the administration went even further, as the public and Con-
gress rendered their powers to the executive, resulting in a broken transmission
belt. Within days after the attacks, Capitol Hill authorized the president “to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons”
(Senate Joint Resolution 23, PL 107-40, 13 September 2001) A year later, Con-
gress provided President Bush with a broad mandate to use military force against
Iraq without major controversy. The subservient behavior of the legislative and the
unconditional public approval of the president after the attacks made changes in
the foreign policy role conception without vocal opposition possible.
Furthermore, the immediate boost of executive power after 9/11 coincided
with an intragovernmental power shift. When Bush assumed office, his team
included at least three potent groups with distinct foreign policy perspectives and
role conceptions (Keller 2008: 167–72): conservative realists, assertive national-
ists, and neoconservatives. Bush’s foreign policy prior to 9/11 can best be
described as the result of a compromise between the realists’ and the assertive
nationalists’ role conceptions (Haass 2009: 183f.). During the election campaign,
Bush’s close confidante and later national security advisor Condoleezza Rice
was already proposing a pragmatic realist trajectory based on national interests
(Kessler 2007: 18f.; Rice 2000). This position, which turned away from Bill
Clinton’s humanitarian and nation-building military engagements, had a long
tradition among US presidencies and within the Republican Party, and gained
new prominence after the Cold War. In particular, the military, which had close
ties to the Republican Party, supported a foreign policy focusing on narrowly
defined national interests as stated in the so-called Powell Doctrine. The election
campaign largely echoed these traditional realist positions, emphasizing military
power to extend the unipolar moment, deterrence of potential aggressors, and
reduced international engagement. Yet, as foreign policy was considered his
weak spot, Bush’s election campaign focused on domestic issues and left foreign
policy positions vague. Nonetheless, a realist foreign policy position dominated
the internal debate (McCormick 2005: 210–13). The early commitment to
supremacy and unilateralism arguably also points at some influence by Vice
President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the most
prominent assertive nationalists – often called Jacksonians – within the govern-
ment. The emergence of assertive nationalist positions reflects a general move to
more right-wing conservative positions within the Republican Party during the
1990s (Hacker and Pierson 2006).
In this situation, 11 September constituted the decisive turning point that del-
egitimized the traditional realist role and weakened its supporters. According to
Robinson (2006), the president’s speeches prior to 9/11 allow his characteriza-
tion as a rather traditional conservative leader with a positive and cooperative
worldview. In contrast, speeches after 11 September reveal a much more negat-
ive worldview and an inclination towards conflict-oriented foreign policy strat-
egies. Bush (quoted in Woodward 2002: 62) expressed it rather bluntly: “This is
a new world.” Thus, Robinson (2006: 123) speculates that “following 9/11, the
hawks’ philosophy started making more sense in Bush’s eyes, and the doves
looked more like naïve idealists than truly constructive counselors.” In fact, the
focus within the administration rather suddenly turned away from traditional
realists. Secretary of State Powell, the realist heavyweight within the administra-
tion, was increasingly marginalized, not least by the failure of National Security
Advisor Rice to realize her function as honest broker (Baker 2008; Burke 2005).
The inability to prevent or even foresee the plot marked the failure of the domi-
nantly realist course (Leffler 2004: 26).
With the realist position discredited, a coalition of assertive nationalists and
neoconservatives seized the opportunity to connect the dots and provide a coher-
ent new role conception. Based on their long-developed perspective on the US
role in the world, neoconservatives – now with presidential consent – were quick
to identify terrorism as the latest manifestation of the evil against which the
United States has to stand its ground. Merged with the threats of rogue states and
weapons of mass destruction, neoconservatives saw 9/11 as a challenge by a new
totalitarian ideology, and even the starting point for a world war not unlike
World War II and the Cold War, in which coexistence was no option (Khong
2008: 256; Podhoretz 2007). In this gloomy situation, the hegemon should not
rely on deterrence and international regulations, but actively and in an uncon-
strained way use its power not only to defeat the terrorist enemy but to reshape
the world into a freer and more democratic, and therefore more secure and better,
place.
The seeds of change: the rise of neoconservatism within the

Republican Party
After the failure of the realist role conception of the early days of the Bush
administration, “neoconservatism seemed to offer the most plausible explanation
of the new reality and the most compelling and active response to it” (Krautham-
mer 2005: 26). The conception of neoconservatism13 and assertive nationalists
allowed for a proactive mission which seemed the most suitable answer to ter-
rorism (Schmidt and Williams 2008: 209). Thus, while the public remained
largely constant in its foreign policy role conception, despite its fear and anger,
the Bush administration adapted an ideational coalition’s minority position that
placed the immediate post-9/11 reactions in a broader context.
The rise of terrorism as a major challenge to the United States and state capture
were only the last chapters of the neoconservative success story, which is marked
by the group’s successive capturing of influential positions within the Republican
Party. According to Irving Kristol (2003), one of the major protagonists of
206 R. Wolf
neoconservatism, the group originated “among disillusioned liberal intellectuals
in the 1970s.” While the Democratic Party moved to the left and embraced the
Great Society as a result of the breaking domestic consensus in the wake of the
civil rights and anti-war movement, the early neoconservatives rejected the lib-
erals’ “moral self-flagellation” (Khong 2008: 253) and defended the moral supe-
riority of American values (Gould 2003: 397f.; Kirkpatrick 2004). Early
members focused more on domestic issues, but distinct foreign policy positions
were always part of this intellectual group (Halper and Clarke 2004). Kristol
(2003) summarizes the continuous foreign policy core beliefs as follows (see
also Plesch 2005; Stelzer 2004): endorsement of patriotism; deep suspicion of
international institutions that pave the way for world government; ability to dis-
tinguish clearly between friend and enemy; and recognition of the extensive
national interest of a great power such as the United States, which includes not
only material but also ideological concerns. In this vein, neoconservatives pro-
moted democracy and US moral superiority while condemning global commun-
ism.14 Furthermore, they called for a strong military to restore American
greatness and defend its interests. While they found allies in the Republican
hawks, who also called for military strength, neoconservatives rejected the deep-
rooted conservative realism for its lack of moral purpose.
Still low in numbers and not fully arrived within the Republican Party, some
neoconservatives worked in the Reagan administration, supporting the rhetoric
of good and evil and the tough-minded stance towards communism (Greven
2004: 190). The end of the Cold War marked the transition from the first to the
second generation of neoconservative intellectuals.15 While many thinkers of the
first generation concluded that the dissolution of the Soviet Union constituted
the end point of an American global mission and left the neoconservatives
without an external focus, the second generation quickly identified a new moral
purpose for the vast US capabilities. The export of American exceptional values
became the new vision (Kristol and Kagan 2004). But in contrast to the Wilso-
nian liberal tradition, neoconservatives considered soft power insufficient to
pursue global ends. They argued that the United States could achieve its goals
best by maintaining military superiority and avoiding the constraints of interna-
tional allies and agreements (Krauthammer 2002). Neoconservatives were con-
vinced that the sudden hegemony after the Cold War was good not only for the
United States but also for the world. Hence, they called for a unipolar era in
which the United States would shape the world and assure peace and interna-
tional order.
During the presidencies of George H. Bush and Bill Clinton, which rested on
a strong realist and liberal foreign policy perspective respectively, neoconserva-
tives were pushed to the political margins.16 This did not end their campaign for
the representation of neoconservative preferences, however, as demonstrated in
the drafting of the Defense Planning Guidance in 1992. The then-undersecretary
of defense, Paul Wolfowitz, supervised the preparation of this document, which
called for continuous US military primacy to frustrate any aspirations of poten-
tial competitors (Gellman 1992; Tyler 1992).17 Even more important work for
the later success of neoconservative ideas was done outside the government.
Neoconservative intellectuals actively and vocally contributed to the discussions
about US foreign policy after the East–West conflict, thereby framing much of
the future neoconservative foreign policy agenda (e.g. Kristol and Kagan 1996).
Additionally, the intellectual activity of neoconservatives during the 1990s
increased their hold on the Republican Party, the vital transmission belt for their
later capture of the state. The unconditional support for Israel and clear moral
commitments yielded support for their positions among the Christian Right,
which became a central base for George W. Bush’s electoral success (Halper and
Clarke 2004: 196–200).18 Even more important, the neoconservative commit-
ment to US supremacy, the willingness to use force, as well as their tough stance
towards potential rivals appealed to the assertive nationalists within the Republi-
can Party, who also called for the United States to seize the hegemonic oppor-
tunity more aggressively (High 2009: 484; Keller 2008: 168–70). While these
hawks on the right of the Republican Party saw democratization of rival states in
largely instrumental terms, the focus on a dominant US role made them sympa-
thetic to neoconservative positions (Staack 2008: 10). Hence, the Project for the
New American Century (PNAC), which called for a military strategy to over-
throw the Iraqi regime, includes, along with William Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz,
Richard Perle, Elliott Abrams, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Dick Cheney, and Donald
Rumsfeld, prominent neoconservatives and assertive nationalists.
Hence, the neoconservatives were in a promising position when the attacks
provided an opportunity to capture the state. Over the years, they had taken on
influential positions and had attracted allies and supporters within the Republi-
can Party. Furthermore, their role conception for the United States was far
developed and well known within that party. Thus, as 9/11 cast doubt on the
realist role conception, the neoconservatives could introduce their ideational
preferences as replacement. According to Halper and Clarke (2004: 183), “they
were like a coiled spring before 9/11 and simply needed the right moment to
translate the attacks into their frame of reference.”
Bringing in the harvest: the temporary state capture after

9/11
Especially during the heated debate concerning the Iraq War, many comment-
ators blamed President Bush’s “ignorance and inexperience” (Lind 2003: 13) for
the rise of neoconservative ideas or suspected a plot by which these intellectuals
had hijacked the national security system. While it is certainly true that the pres-
ident was a foreign policy novice and therefore relied on advice by his more
experienced team, it seemed unlikely that the neoconservatives would have been
able to capture the state with their role conception prior to 9/11.
In fact, the starting point for neoconservative positions was rather disadvanta-
geous. The relationship between neoconservatives and the president was hardly
sympathetic. The Weekly Standard magazine, a central organ of neoconservative
opinions, supported Bush’s challenger John McCain as the Republican candidate
208 R. Wolf
during the primaries and blamed the Texas governor for a weak stance on North
Korea and China (High 2009: 488). Furthermore, many traditional Republicans
still considered “neocons” to be masked liberals and regarded them with consid-
erable suspicion. Accordingly, no neoconservative gained a place in the front tier
of foreign policy decision making. Yet they had two powerful allies in the asser-
tive nationalists Cheney and Rumsfeld, both central figures within the Republi-
can Party and “all blooded veterans of the Washington wars” (Baker 2008).
Thus, neoconservatives gained influential positions, especially in Rumsfeld’s
Department of Defense and Cheney’s staff for the vice president. Paul Wolfow-
itz, who had served under Defense Secretary Cheney in Bush senior’s adminis-
tration, returned to the Pentagon as deputy secretary of defense and thus the
highest-ranking neoconservative. Douglas Feith joined him as undersecretary of
defense for policy, a highly important position for policy formulation. Richard
Perle became head of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee. Vice Pres-
ident Cheney’s chief of staff, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, is another prominent pro-
tagonist in neoconservative circles. Undersecretary of State John Bolton, a
conservative hawk, and Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley can
be counted as occasional supporters of neoconservative ideas (Drew 2003).
Hence, an alliance between assertive nationalists and neoconservatives was in
place to challenge the realists’ position and influence Washington’s foreign
policy.
The 9/11 events were crucial for their success, as Krauthammer (2002: 7)
states: “Without September 11, the giant would surely have slept longer.” When
the realists’ influence declined after 9/11, the neoconservative role conception,
merging the conservative vision of a militarily strong America with the liberal
program of democratic regime change, came into play (Robinson 2006). The
previously controversial Weekly Standard became one of the most influential
opinion magazines in the Bush administration (Carr 2003). And Krauthammer
(2005: 22) proudly claimed, “The remarkable fact that the Bush Doctrine is,
essentially, a synonym for neoconservative foreign policy marks neoconserva-
tism’s own transition from a position of dissidence . . . to governance.” It is hard
to tell what definite stance President Bush himself took, but he publicly turned
towards major elements of this coalition’s role conception (Robinson 2006).19
Thus, his speeches in the aftermath of the attacks reveal a clear distinction
between good and evil, strong Christian rhetoric, and a commitment to a moral
mission not unlike the neoconservative perspective. He contended that Al-Qaeda
and its allies constituted the antagonistic pole of all the values America repre-
sented. Backed by overwhelming public support for the president, neither the
dominance of the coalition of assertive nationalists and neoconservatives was
questioned nor President Bush’s public interpretation of the world challenged.
The failure of public scrutiny becomes most apparent in the Iraq decision,
which the newly empowered coalition of assertive nationalists and neoconserva-
tives quickly brought into play. Three days after the attack, Paul Wolfowitz
argued that the attacks were too big to be carried out without a state sponsor and
the United States should therefore focus on Iraq (Haass 2009: 192). Merged with
the threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the coalition of neocon-
servatives and assertive nationalists created an overwhelming case for preventive
war, and neither their opponents within the administration nor Congress nor the
public effectively challenged this perspective (Kaufmann 2004). In fact, while
the public’s preferences were hardly in agreement with the Bush administra-
tion’s choice of strategies and instruments, both groups overlapped in their
support for regime change in Iraq. Thus, the hostility towards the Iraqi regime
within US society proved a fertile ground for the test case of the new role con-
ception without major risk of reviving the transmission belt and ideational pref-
erence competition.
Ironically, the aftermath of the Iraq War initiated the successive demise of the
post-9/11 coalition. As the Iraq occupation became increasingly costly and
unpopular, the tide started to turn in favor of the traditional realists, who recap-
tured the state during Bush’s second term (Ikenberry 2004). While Bush was
able to secure reelection in 2004, the unconditional public acceptance of the
executive’s foreign policy trajectory was clearly gone. Despite a brief reversal
during the Iraq War, public support for President Bush declined continuously
from the 9/11 high, reaching a low of 27 percent in fall 2008 (Jones 2008). The
neoconservatives and their aides were the first to be held to account. Wolfowitz,
Feith, and Bolton lost their influential positions and were replaced by more prag-
matic actors in Bush’s second term (Gordon 2006). When the Republicans suf-
fered a defeat in the 2006 mid-term elections, in which the Iraq War was the
overwhelming issue of public concern (CBS News/New York Times 2006;
Jacobson 2009), Defense Secretary Rumsfeld took the blame and left office. By
then, his position within the administration was severely undermined by his han-
dling of the Iraq situation, which had increasingly alienated the armed forces and
allowed Secretary of State Rice to increase her influence (Ricks 2009: 37–42,
76–9). He was replaced by the realist Robert Gates, who took a more coopera-
tive position.
While the mid-term elections of 2006 can be read as the first clear public dis-
approval of Bush’s foreign policy (Drezner 2008: 19; Jacobson 2007), there is
also good reason to interpret the election of Barack Obama as a late societal
rejection of the Bush administration’s interpretation of the US global role.
Although the economic crises dwarfed all other issues during the presidential
election in fall 2008, a CCGA (2008: 9) study in July found that 83 percent con-
sidered “improving America’s standing in the world” as a very important foreign
policy goal. Furthermore, John McCain clearly struggled with the public distrust
towards a Republican candidate. Despite the traditional public perception of
Republicans as more effective national security managers (Campbell and
O’Hanlon 2006), John McCain could not capitalize on issues such as Iraq and
terrorism (CBS News/New York Times 2008). There is good reason to argue
that a public majority had no confidence in the Republicans’ ability to define a
US foreign policy role in accordance with societal ideational preferences after
the Bush excursion.
210 R. Wolf
Conclusion
This case study shows that exceptional events can cause temporary role changes
in behavior by allowing minority groups with departing ideational preferences to
capture the state. The integration of role theory into a liberal framework contrib-
uted to these insights in important ways and therefore improves our understand-
ing of ego-driven role changes. It not only accounts for the domestic competition
of role conceptions but also highlights the crucial importance of the transmission
belt between society and state. The question of who is in a position to capture or
recapture the state is as central as the identification of existing role conceptions
in society. Under certain conditions, representation can even in long-standing
democracies be highly asymmetric. Therefore, foreign policy does not always
resemble the role conception of domestic majorities.
In the case at hand, the terrorist attacks created a situation in which the plural
democratic transmission belt broke and a minority position implemented its pref-
erences. Society and Congress unconditionally ceded their powers to the presid-
ent and thus refrained from influencing the reformulation of the US role
conception. At the same time, the conservative realists within the administration
whose role conception had failed to prevent the attacks lost their influence
(Schmidt and Williams 2008). Thus, 9/11 cleared the way for neoconservatives
and assertive nationalists to capture the state without electoral competition.
Whereas the elections in 2000 brought the assertive nationalists and their neo-
conservative allies to an influential but still checked position, post-9/11 they
were able to fill the vacuum.
The Bush administration’s role change is the conclusion of a revolution
within the Republican Party which slowly evolved over many years. It is
marked by an increasing departure from moderate conservative positions and
the rise of the neoconservative ideology. The Iraq War was not only the clearest
expression of the new role but also the beginning of its subsequent demise. Its
aftermath publicly discredited the new role conception and enabled the realists
to recapture a power position. Thus, under public pressure, important neocon-
servatives and assertive nationalists were forced out of government during
Bush’s second term. It is not surprising that a role conception which strongly
departs from democratic majority positions and fails to meet external expecta-
tions cannot last very long. The Bush administration’s role conception after
9/11 was short-lived indeed. Hence, this case study also shows the fundamental
merit of the liberal transmission belt which allows democracies to adjust their
foreign policy course.
Notes
1 Hereinafter also called “9/11” or “the attacks of 11 September.”
2 A role change following terrorist attacks does not necessarily indicate that the terrorist
plot has been successful. Terrorist actions are successful only if the state’s behavior
changes in a way demanded or expected by the terrorists. It is open to discussion
whether the changes in US foreign policy after 9/11 were intended by Al-Qaeda.
3 In May 2006, Washington added Cuba, Libya, and Syria to its “axis of evil” list.
4 The dissolution was agreed on with Russia before 9/11, however.
5 In fact, while the Pentagon proclaimed military transformation and terrorist related
armament, most money was spent on hugely expensive conventional weapon projects,
some of which had been around for more than a decade (Alach 2008; Cordesman and
Kaeser 2008). In his attempt to cancel so-called legacy programs, Rumsfeld failed to
overcome resistance by Congress and the armed services.
6 Personal threat represents the fear of becoming personally affected by, or a victim of,
terrorism. Instead, national threat covers the more remote fear of the nation being
attacked by terrorists. Studies have shown that this distinction is meaningful (Huddy
et al. 2002).
7 The poll was taken on 2–5 September 2002. Answers are based on the same variables
as in 2001. Both polls were acquired from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political
and Social Research database.
8 While the in-group identity became stronger, out-groups were regarded with suspi-
cion. Several opinion polls show an increased caution concerning Islam regardless of
the general relative ignorance of the religion (CCFR 2002a; Langer 2006). In a CCFR
poll (2002a: 49), almost four in ten respondents said that the 9/11 attacks represent
the true teachings of Islam to a great or at least some degree and 77 percent favored
restricting immigration in order to combat terrorism. After examining a range of
opinion polls, Nisbet et al. (2009: 164) came to the following conclusion: “[S]ince
September 11 many Americans have come to see Muslims as dangerous, violent, and
hateful fanatics.”
9 Although the United States had one of the highest levels of patriotism in the world
even before 9/11, the findings of Smith et al. (2001: 1–2) reveal a 7 percent increase
immediately following the terrorist attacks.
10 Approval for Bush’s handling of the war on terror fell below 70 percent in September
2003 for the first time since 9/11 (Langer 2006).
11 Support fell only slightly when the question included the central arguments of
supporters and opponents: “Some say the United States should not support the
court because trumped up charges may be brought against Americans, for example,
U.S. soldiers who use force in the course of a peacekeeping operation. Others say
that the U.S. should support the court because the world needs a better way to prose-
cute war criminals, many of whom go unpunished today. Do you think the U.S.
should or should not support the permanent International Criminal Court?” (CCFR
2002a: 34).
12 The same conclusion holds for opinion leaders, which were leaning slightly more
towards military means and were more skeptical about international institutions and
agreements, but overall clearly supported multilateralism and diplomatic means
(CCFR 2002b).
13 Because of their many divergent beliefs and a lack of organizational structure, neo-
conservatives reject the characterization as a movement.
14 Neoconservatives were influential in the revival of the Committee on the Present
Danger in the 1970s (High 2009: 484). This foreign policy lobby group promoted a
security policy based on military power and warned against increasing international
involvement and cooperation. The committee was an important platform for neocon-
servatives and their ideas, and it furthered their cause within the Republican Party and
helped them into the Reagan Administration.
15 The most important figures in the second generation include Robert Kagan, Charles
Krauthammer, Francis Fukuyama, Paul Wolfowitz, Elliott Abrams, Daniel Pipes,
Joshua Muravchik, and Irving Kristol’s son William Kristol.
16 The disagreement between the realists around George H. Bush and the neoconserva-
tives was so strong that some neoconservatives called for the election of Bill Clinton
in a New York Times advertisement in 1992 (Greven 2004: 196).
212 R. Wolf
17 After the document leaked to the press and provoked strong criticism, the administra-
tion withdrew the plan.
18 While neoconservatives supported Israel as a democracy surrounded by authoritarian
regimes, the Christian Right considered the existence of a Jewish state as a crucial
condition for the fulfillment of biblical prophecy. Neoconservatives also allied with
the Christian Right on domestic issues such as cloning, abortion, and school prayer.
19 There is some reason to argue that Bush’s beliefs made him particularly susceptible to
a post-9/11 role conception that characterized America as the guardian of everything
good and dear. Commerce Secretary Donald Evans, a close friend of the president,
said that belief “gives him a desire to serve others and a very clear sense of what is
good and what is evil” (quoted in Fineman 2003).
12 Discord and collaboration in
Franco-American relations
What can role theory tell us?
Ulrich Krotz and James Sperling
France and the United States have enjoyed a set of complex relationships since
the founding of the American and French republics. Sometimes the Franco-
American relationship has taken on the character of rival siblings: each has
claimed that its revolutionary heritage best embodies the verities of the Enlight-
enment. At other times, the Franco-American relationship has been characterized
by mutual admiration sustained by an American infatuation with French culture
into the early twentieth century and by French paternalism first found in the writ-
ings of de Tocqueville. The relationship deteriorated after World War II, as the
contours of the Yalta settlement solidified. The United States refused to support
French ambitions during the 1956 Suez crisis and its efforts to retain Algeria as
an integral part of France. Similarly, France chafed under the institutional and
material hegemony that the United States enjoyed in Europe after 1945, and was
unwilling to support American foreign policy when it violated French interests,
particularly in the Middle East, in Vietnam after 1954, and increasingly in
Europe after 1958.
The complexity of the Franco-American relationship can be ascribed to
respective social constructions of American and French power and their interre-
lationship. When the United States entered the world stage as an industrial and
military power in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, France looked
back on the glories of Napoleonic France and faced a rising Germany that threat-
ened to eclipse France. The course of the twentieth century further diminished
France’s standing in the world and its estimation in the American mind: the
quick defeat in World War II was compounded by the collaborationist Vichy
regime; and France’s postwar constitutional instability was conjoined to military
failures in Southeast Asia and Algeria. What was perceived as a terminal French
decline was matched by the seemingly inexorable rise of the United States.
As America harnessed its postwar economic, military, and cultural hegemony
to implement containment, French and American strategic interests began to
diverge as a result of national role conceptions (NRCs), which define national
interests and the legitimate purposes of foreign policies.
French and American NRCs have three major components: the meaning of
their relative position in the international system; their foreign policy’s over
arching purpose; and the conceptualization of the “other.” Their NRCs are also
214 U. Krotz and J. Sperling
inherently oppositional: just as the United States has viewed itself as a benevo-
lent hegemon that deserves the obedience of its European and Asian allies,
France viewed itself as a great power capable of challenging and balancing the
American hegemon and leading an autonomous Europe. Correspondingly, the
United States viewed NATO allies (including France) as subordinates that ought
to defer to American preferences, while France acknowledged the reality of
American hegemony but did not accept that it was benevolent or that it required
French obeisance where interests diverged.1
The purposes of American policy, beyond the seemingly self-evident sys-
temic requirement of containing Soviet power, were the maintenance of global
order, the creation of an international system consistent with American values,
and the perpetuation of American military-strategic dominance globally and a
liberal hegemony regionally, particularly in Western Europe (cf. Ikenberry and
Kupchan 1990). Although the French foreign policy elite recognized the impera-
tive of containing Soviet influence in Europe, it rejected Europe’s perpetual sub-
ordination to American power and strove to restore Europe’s “natural” role as a
global force. More generally, the American and French NRCs shared a common
“other” (Soviet power) and a common “we” (the Atlantic community), but the
French “othering” of the United States – a necessary complement to the other
elements of its NRC – was eventually reciprocated and accounts for the some-
times oppositional logic plaguing Franco-American foreign policy disputes.2
This chapter investigates the contribution that role theory can make to our
understanding of Franco-American relations since the 1950s. We are particularly
interested in Hubert Védrine’s formulation that France is allied, but not aligned,
with the United States (2002); and the reciprocal American treatment of France
as an undependable or nettlesome “other” within the alliance despite France’s
consistent material and diplomatic support of the United States, particularly
during the Cold War. The inquiry will proceed in two steps: first, we present
defining components of the French and American NRCs in the postwar period
and their domestic origins where they are relevant to our argument. We then
assess, second, the impact of those NRCs across three dimensions (attitudes
towards the postwar status quo; the purpose of NATO and each state’s position
within it; and the symbolic and strategic purposes of national nuclear deterrents).
In the conclusion, we assess the salience and relevance of domestic elements of
role and purpose in shaping the trajectory of Franco-American relations into the
second decade of the twenty-first century.
Critical elements of the French and American role

conceptions: competition and contestation
Rooted in national meta-narratives and socially dominant historical recollec-
tions, NRCs both shape and constrain the formation of national interests and the
formulation of foreign policies. In our view, a state’s NRC represents an import-
ant independent (or at a minimum intervening) variable shaping the national
understanding of the external environment as well as the normative prescriptions
Franco-American relations and role theory 215
and proscriptions governing foreign policy behavior. They encapsulate “what we
want and what we do as a result of who we think we are, want to be, and should
be.” Historically shaped and frequently deeply rooted, NRCs cannot be reduced
to the interests or ideologies of dominant groups, parties, or individuals in
power, nor to organizational features of state and society. NRCs result from
national historical experiences and memories and from the dominant interpreta-
tion of what these remembered experiences mean or imply. They may be broken
down into a few core components that define self-views. Typically, they come
with a characteristic vocabulary that both reflects and substantiates these core
elements. An NRC’s substance can be captured by extracting the key com-
ponents and the characteristic set of prevailing vocabulary that together make up
the role at a given time and place.3 As domestically anchored historical con-
structs, NRCs are neither invariably fixed nor immutable across time. They
appear, develop, change, and become dominant during one time period. Yet they
are neither epiphenomenal, nor do they exert transient influence on policy or
preferences. Frequently, they display great tenacity and prove amazingly durable
“attitudinal attribute[s]” (Holsti 1970).
French grandeur and independence

From the late 1950s, with the establishment of the Fifth Republic, until the first
years of the twenty-first century, the remarkably stable basic elements of
France’s NRC were “independence,” “activism,” and “global presence” (or at
least the potential for it). Descriptions of French foreign policy norms routinely
include words such as greatness, rank, and glory, as well as pride, prestige, and
dignity. This “Gaullist consensus” reaches deep into French history, but it was
fused by President de Gaulle into a more or less coherent NRC that largely
endured after he left power.
Independence
The first of these key role-components prescribes the greatest possible foreign
policy independence: the “ideal of autonomy of decisions” (Gordon 1993: xv). It
views the self as standing proud and alone, able to act externally “on one’s own
terms and without endangering a dependent relationship with any other country,”
and endowed with a “dogged interest in maintaining . . . national separateness”
(Walker 1987b: 270). As a constituent NRC component, “independence” does
not preclude cooperation. But it does rule out cooperation on disadvantageous
terms. An “active-independent” role conception “emphasizes at once independ-
ence, self-determination, possible mediation functions, and active programs to
extend diplomatic and commercial relations to diverse areas of the world”
(Holsti 1970: 262). This “set of principles” defines interests and policies that
help to “make sure [that] all bases are covered, that all options are considered so
as to insure no loss in independent status” (Hermann 1987: 136). Some consider
“ ‘independence’ the leading notion” of the Fifth Republic’s foreign policy
(Rouget 1989: 68). Although predating the Fifth Republic as a French role
element, “insisting on independence and autonomy has remained a firm dogma
of French parties: communists, socialists, and Gaullists alike” (Nonnenmacher
1986: 6).
Activism
The second role-component, activism, expects France to participate in the man-
agement of international affairs and to help shape world politics, if necessary
through the use of military force. Referring to all world regions and key interna-
tional institutions, Charles de Gaulle succinctly summarized the activism com-
ponent: “In each of these areas, I want France to play an active part,”
emphasizing that he “was convinced of France’s right and duty to act on a world
scale” (1970: 177, 180). In the same vein, some four decades later Foreign
Minister Védrine described a “French will to will” (1996: 7).
(Potential) presence
“France, the only West European nuclear power along with Great Britain,
present on five oceans and four continents,” the Loi de Programmation Militaire
for the years 1990–93 proudly states, “has chosen to ensure her security by
herself to guarantee her independence and maintain her identity” (quoted in
Gordon 1993: 1). France has traditionally understood itself as a power with
global reach for at least the past two centuries (DePorte 1991: 253). France’s
overseas départements (DOMs), which are integral parts of the “motherland,”
and its other territorial holdings of varying political-administrative statuses
(TOMs), underscore this role component (de Montbrial 1989: 288–90; Savignac
1995: 210–16).
France’s NRC vocabulary, too, relates intimately to a historically shaped and
domestically anchored conception of its self in international affairs. Grandeur is
perhaps the key term, but some hold that all the terms (grandeur, rang, gloire)
together best summarize Gaullist foreign policy, the “politics of greatness” (e.g.
Cerny 1986; Kolodziej 1974; Vaïsse 1998). The notion of rang typically comes
in formulations such as: France has to “take its rank,” live up to its rank, or
“keep its rank”; France must occupy “a place in the front rank” – “its traditional
place in Europe and the world as a nation”; and the impossibility of being satis-
fied with a secondary global, not to mention regional, role for France (DePorte
1991: 254; Kramer 1991: 962). Gloire, now probably the least common term of
the three, frequently appears when looking back at French history or the French
army.
In a text passage that became part of a national canon, de Gaulle delineates a
national self-categorization and role: “France cannot really be herself but in the
first rank. . . . France cannot be France without greatness.” He then talks about “a
sense of France’s dignity,” “a certain anxious pride regarding our country,” and
having been struck by the “the symbols of our glory.” Next to greatness, rank,
and glory, de Gaulle also elevated dignity, pride, and prestige as key terms defin-
ing the French NRC (1954: 5–7).
The historical reference points refer to the indivisible model republic, the first
nation with a grande armée, conquering and ordering Europe, and bringing to it
a civil code and Cartesian clarity. It is a self-view of a collectivity always at the
forefront of political, social, scientific, technical, cultural, and moral progress
and sophistication (cf. for example Rémond 1982; Sauder 1995: chs. 7, 8).
The purpose of American power

There has been also a remarkable consistency of purpose in the exercise of
American power. American foreign policy rhetoric since the founding of the
Republic has always conflated the sacred and the profane; Americans have tradi-
tionally underscored the special providence protecting the United States and pro-
viding the raison d’être for its foreign engagements, while at the same time they
have crafted strategies maximizing American power, influence, and autonomy
(see Maull, this volume). Those formulating American foreign policy have strug-
gled to reconcile, in Robert Osgood’s felicitous phrase, ideals and self-interest
(1952). The postwar American role vocabulary varied in its precise formulation
but inevitably incorporated three role elements: American leadership of the “free
world,” American responsibility for creating and defending global order, and
American exceptionalism legitimizing those self-ascribed global roles. These
elements grew out of America’s historical experience of westward expansion
and the belief in a “manifest destiny” that legitimized American continental
expansion and suzerainty over Central America and Latin America in the nine-
teenth century, and global dominance in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
(McDougall 1997; Stephanson 1996).
Leadership
For the United States, American leadership of the “West” was self-evident after
the onset of the Cold War. The United States emerged from World War II with
its industrial base and social contract intact, and as the world’s only nuclear
power. American leadership was thrust upon the United States owing to its pre-
ponderance of wealth and power, and a newly confident American foreign policy
elite seized the opportunity to harness Europe’s future for American power and
purposes.
Postwar American leadership was institutionalized in postwar economic and
military-strategic settlements, including the European Recovery Program (the
Marshall Plan), the North Atlantic Treaty, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization, which institutionalized American leadership of the alliance and put
European power and diplomacy into the service of the American policy of con-
tainment (Ferguson 2004; Gaddis 2005b; Milward 2006).
Responsibility for global order
American leadership had as its corollary a responsibility to maintain global
order, largely defined as preventing Soviet encroachments on areas critical to
American or allied interests. The same factors requiring American leadership
generated the expectation that the United States was responsible for maintaining
world order, albeit a world order that protected American interests and values.
The United States assumed this responsibility not only because of its preponder-
ance of power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Europe, and Asia, but also because of
two perceived “lessons” of history: first, Europe and Asia require an American
presence to avoid great power rivalry; and second, pernicious ideologies threaten
a liberal international order consistent with American interests and values.
Exceptionalism
Virtually every major power makes claims to exceptionalism, but the American
variation has not only suffused the purposes of American foreign policy, but also
erased the line between values and interests, while claiming universality for both
(Sperling 2007, 2010). This Wilsonian compulsion conflates a high-flown uni-
versalistic rhetoric with the national interest; the legitimizing rhetoric of Ameri-
can foreign policy substitutes the defense of national interests with the selfless
task of building a just world order, spreading democracy, and ensuring global
prosperity.
The self-ascribed (but externally contested) role assessment – that the United
States has acted and continues to act as a benevolent hegemon – was the com-
bined product of the three dominant NRC components leadership, responsibility
for global order, and exceptionalism. The first two components virtually require
its European and Asia allies to defer to American policy preferences and abne-
gate policy independence. The third component, embodying Kantian optimism
(suffused with religious certainty) about the perfectibility of national govern-
ments and interstate relations, has compelled the United States to cling to its
leadership role and responsibility for guaranteeing global order.
French and American (dis)satisfaction with the postwar

status quo
In their foreign policies, states pursue milieu goals in order to shape conditions
beyond their national borders (Wolfers 1962: 73–7).4 The American and French
NRCs produced convergent and divergent milieu goals in the postwar period.
The exigencies of the Cold War created a largely congruent set of milieu goals,
namely the containment of Soviet power, particularly in Europe. Those same
NRCs, however, implied divergent milieu goals in North Africa, the Middle
East, and Southeast Asia. The American NRC as the state responsible for sup-
porting the spread of democracy and national self-determination clashed with the
French NRC as a privileged colonial power in those regions. By the early 1960s,
French and American role conceptions left the United States in the unpalatable
position of a conservative power seeking to preserve the status quo, while France
emerged as a revisionist power challenging it: France staked a claim to a leader-
ship for an emancipated Europe operating as a third force in international pol-
itics, while the United States similarly claimed an uncontested leadership role
for itself in a hierarchical, two-pillared Atlantic community dedicated to the
policy of containment.
France: Europe as a third force

After the dust of World War II had settled and the Cold War’s “Yalta world” had
taken shape, France found itself in an international milieu and regional political
order at odds with its NRC. Although endowed with a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council, it soon became clear that France would not enjoy equality of
status or influence with the world’s two extra-European superpowers. Given
France’s historically rooted role conception, it was thus in France’s interests to
overcome Yalta, which divided Europe between the two superpowers, thereby
reducing Europe to a mere object, a prize, and an arena for bipolar strategic com-
petition. Despite the Cold War’s pervasiveness and ubiquity in security affairs,
France’s longer-term milieu and institutional order goals – overcoming the Cold
War’s superpower duopoly, removing US (and “Anglo-Saxon”) dominance
within the West, and establishing a France-led Europe as a third major power in
world politics – clearly did not derive solely from Cold War situational impera-
tives or contextual pressures.
France’s long-term objectives have not fundamentally changed. They com-
bined a certain vision of Europe in the world on the one hand with a particular
view of France within Europe and acting through it in foreign policy and secur-
ity affairs on the other. As for “Europe in the world,” France was decisively
guided by all three of its core NRC elements (“independence,” “activism,” and
“(potential) presence”). Overcoming Yalta would ideally have meant removing
superpower strategic “duopoly” and establishing continental Europe, under
French leadership, as a major international actor on a par with the superpowers
(Kolodziej 1974: chs. 1, 3, 5, 11). From the early 1960s onward, de Gaulle
“envisioned Europe as an independent entity. This entity would be led by France
. . . and would converse on equal footing with America on the one side, and
Russia on the other” (Schmidt 1987: 306). This Europe would be neither fully
integrated in a wider North Atlantic frame nor constrained by US policy choices.
Such a Europe might develop into an international political actor and could more
or less closely side and cooperate with the United States. Yet it would remain
distinct and independent from the tutelage of the occidental superpower.
As for “France within Europe” and “France through Europe,” the prescriptive
impact of the “independence” role element in particular guided French interests
in promoting this important aspect of the international milieu and institutional
order. The state would remain the cornerstone of a “European confederation”;
European integration would submerge neither nations nor national sentiment
(Sauder 1995: 136–57). The independence and grandeur NRC elements, in par-
ticular, proscribe deeper integration as undermining French statehood, especially
in foreign and security affairs (Wæver 1990).
However, French domestic role construction rather prescribed the objective
“to minimize dependence within interdependence.” This milieu and order goal
involved safeguarding the ability “to freely choose one’s dependencies” in such
a way as to retain fully the capacity for autonomous initiative and action
(Howorth 1996: 22). To be sure, these NRC-governed longer-term milieu and
political order goals have frequently been hard to maintain and difficult to trans-
late into policy. They have been heavily constrained and at times sabotaged by
political circumstances, competing interests of other states, Cold War rigidities,
or the exigencies of European integration. At times, they have also lacked preci-
sion as a coherent diplomatic project. Yet France has never lost sight of these
designs for the European order, either during or after the Cold War.
Just as Cold War France sought to substitute multipolarity for bipolarity
(Kolodziej 1974: 54–65), post-Cold War France promoted the idea of strength-
ening Europe’s coherence and autonomy as a foreign policy and security actor,
thus at least indirectly challenging America’s (two-decade long) “unipolar”
moment. A proud and independent France, acting in the world through Europe
and with Europe, thus is not an ad hoc invention of the 1990s or the twenty-first
century but a long-term French blueprint. The longevity of the project speaks to
the tenacity of French strategic interests, which are driven by domestic construc-
tions of self that are rooted deeply in national history and therefore fairly resist-
ant to changing external political contexts.
The United States: the unrelenting logic of hegemony

The American postwar grand strategy of containment was paradoxically predic-
ated upon the legitimization of the very same Yalta order – and the explicit hier-
archy of states it generated – that so vexed France. That grand strategy not only
reflected the compulsions of the Soviet–American competition to achieve Euro-
pean hegemony but was intrinsic to the postwar American NRC: the quasi-
religious foundation of American exceptionalism placed beyond contestation
American leadership prerogatives in Europe and the wider responsibility for
ensuring the post-Yalta global order. The American milieu goals for Europe (and
the broader international environment) reflected the ambitious twin purposes of
replicating and consolidating in Europe (and beyond) liberal democracy and
capitalism, and expanding and protecting the American-defined liberal interna-
tional economic order regionally and globally. The American strategy antici-
pated the construction of institutions enhancing the economic, diplomatic, and
strategic interdependence of the allied nations with one another without compro-
mising American leadership or freedom of action (Calleo 1982).
This envisioned liberal economic order was not entirely consistent with the
continental European economic cultures: it privileged the market and individual
economic agents instead of the state, and thus conflicted with the French statist
tradition. Yet Americans believed that their model was an essential ingredient in
the strategic task of containing the Soviet Union. For the United States, Europe’s
economic rejuvenation served the goals of easing the military burden placed on
the United States to contain the Soviet Union in Europe; removing the material
basis for communist electoral successes, particularly in France and Italy; and
creating a web of interdependencies within Europe that would ease US leader-
ship and support the American-designed international order.
The end of the Cold War, and dissolution of the Yalta order, exacerbated the
tensions generated by the divergent aspirations and expectations of the American
and French NRCs. Whereas France chafed under American leadership when
interests diverged during the Cold War, it had been palatable so long as the
Soviet Union retained hegemonic ambitions in Europe. With the implosion of
those ambitions in 1992, the structural features of the “new” international system
no longer unequivocally supported the argument for American leadership or the
viability of an American-scripted international order. The American notion of
the unipolar moment stood in opposition to the French view of an American as
hyperpuissance and expectation that Europe could and should emerge as a
coequal center of influence and power in a multipolar world, but its internal logic
defined the content and form of the emergent post-Cold War order (Calleo 2009;
Krauthammer 1990; Védrine 2000: 9). American milieu goals for the post-Cold
War European system replicated the same pattern characterizing the period of
Soviet–American competition: there was an expectation that the newly democra-
tizing nations of Central and Eastern Europe would join the American-designed
liberal economic order, would become material contributors to the American-
dominated security system underpinned by NATO, and would thereby preempt a
future potential Russian challenge to American hegemony in Europe (cf. Sper-
ling 2007).
France, America, and NATO: same diagnosis, different

prescription?
In 1966, the key French NRC elements propelled France’s withdrawal from the
NATO integrated military command; nonetheless, France remained within
the North Atlantic Treaty. France thus would keep its strategic alliance with the
United States. For the United States, however, the French withdrawal from the
integrated military command was an empty gesture, given the presence of allied
troops in Germany and the American nuclear deterrent. Worse, it also consti-
tuted a challenge to American dominance and leadership in Europe and beyond
(Hunt 1966). Just as French autonomy and independence were inconsistent with
the subordination of French military forces to an American supreme allied com-
mander, French independence from NATO lessened American control over the
future trajectory of the European order. By providing a “third way,” France
threatened American dominance in an area of enduring strategic importance. The
strategic implications of French and American NRCs were similar, if not identi-
cal: both France and the United States understood that continued American
dominance or leadership in Europe required the continuation of an institutionally
unchallenged and unchanged NATO.
With the end of the Cold War, however, the strategic implications of a less
central and cohesive NATO for the American and French NRCs paradoxically
coalesced: just as the United States flirted with the notion that NATO had
become a disposable alliance, France began to view its reintegration into the
military command – paradoxically – as a possible complement to an autonomous
European military capability and a perhaps necessary vehicle for preserving, if
not enhancing, France’s external influence.
France: “allied, but not aligned”

States endeavor to increase their security by aligning with other states. At the
same time, alliances often express the kind of groupings in which states wish to
involve themselves and through which they want to act. During the Cold War
decades, France’s alliance goals and policies crystallized in its relations with the
Atlantic alliance. According to Raymond Aron (1983: 439), France’s withdrawal
from NATO in 1966, preceded by pulling first its Mediterranean and then its
Atlantic fleet out of the integrated NATO command, constituted the epitome of
Gaullist diplomacy. Springing from France’s goal of “total independence” and
its desire to elevate itself to great power status of “global rank,” this choice cor-
responded with its unwillingness to situate itself fully within one of the two
blocs (ibid.: 447f.; Soutou 1996: chs. 5–6). Whereas France remained politically
committed to the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, French diplomacy
intermittently flirted with idea of “equidistance” from the two superpowers and
their respective security organizations.
French attitudes towards the North Atlantic alliance remained little changed
for the rest of the century; for some three decades after de Gaulle’s NATO
exodus, French alliance reflexes persisted. For example, after President Chirac
and Chancellor Kohl had disclosed the common Franco-German strategic
concept in December 1996 – located outside of NATO, to be sure – communists
and socialists in the French national assembly sharply criticized the agreement
for an alleged secret “Natoization” of French defense policy (Vernet 1997).
Whereas in Germany the paper was warmly welcomed as increasing and deep-
ening security and defense cooperation with Germany’s closest partner, in
France former prime minister Laurent Fabius warned against the danger of
an indirect “subjugation under the USA” (Frankfurter Rundschau, 31 January
1997: 26).
The “independence” NRC component particularly affected French alliance
inclinations. Together with the notion of “greatness,” it proscribed full French
immersion into a tightly integrated Cold War NATO (Croenen and Molle 1997:
49f.). Full NATO integration would have encumbered too much its independent
formulation of strategic objectives and undermined its desire to act swiftly and
autonomously in times of existential threats to France’s territorial integrity and
physical survival.
France’s refusal to immerse itself fully within NATO perhaps crystallized
most sharply in its independent nuclear deterrent. The French nuclear posture
has served the purposes of national independence and autonomy; consequently,
it could not be subordinated to a common deterrence strategy. Yet, given
NATO’s integrated command structure, these considerations also applied to con-
ventional defense planning and strategy, and sometimes even to general foreign
policy conduct. As Jolyon Howorth perceptively observes:
The integrated command structure of NATO is seen both as an unacceptable

element of European subordination to the United States, but also, in some
ways more seriously, as a demotivating element which prevented the various
nations of Europe from taking defence as seriously as they should.
(1996: 31; see also Yost 2006)
The steps toward possible rapprochement with NATO during the course of the
1990s, according to one historian of France–NATO relations, included “the
attempt at deconstruction of the SACEUR system”; that is, the transatlantic
system of integrated defense headed by the Europe’s supreme allied commander
– typically an American general (Cogan 1997: ch. 8). To be sure, French alliance
interests and policies did not rule out cooperation with or military support of
other states, particularly with the United States to ensure the operational effec-
tiveness of the force de frappe in the 1970s and 1980s. But bilateral, ad hoc
cooperation provided France the ability to decide autonomously on a case-by-
case basis when to cooperate and with whom, which would not have been pos-
sible with institutionalized multilateralism. The former kind of collaboration
would not come at the expense of autonomy; it would instead serve the purpose
of preserving it (Croenen and Molle 1997: 49ff.; Sauder 1995: 183–206).
Beginning with the anchoring of a “common foreign and security policy” in
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, France successively worked towards strengthening
the security and defense aspects of European integration. From a French per-
spective, however, these alliance-type structures are not to be located within or
attached to NATO, but next to NATO; they may in the future function autono-
mously from NATO (Pichler 2004: 25–46). In this view, increasing European
cooperation in foreign, security, and defense policy does not mean supranation-
ally integrating political authority, but keeping procedures and decision making
in these domains as intergovernmental as possible (Sauder 1995: 136).
America in NATO: owner, manager, and player

During the postwar period, NATO was the institutional manifestation of Amer
ican power and purpose in Europe. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the United States has
performed simultaneously the roles of alliance owner, manager, and player since
NATO’s founding in 1949. These US roles within the alliance, in turn, are
variations on the three core elements constituting the American NRC. The
United States can credibly claim to “own” NATO: the North Atlantic Treaty was
a creature of American diplomacy and has been sustained over time by Ameri-
ca’s substantial and long-term material and diplomatic investment in it.5 Ameri-
can ownership of the alliance also allowed the institutionalization of American
leadership and the prerogative of creating a regional order servicing American
interests. The fact that the United States has been and remains, by any measure,
the major military and diplomatic player in the alliance has reinforced its mana-
gerial prerogatives in defining the purpose of the alliance; moreover, it also has
made Europe vulnerable to global entrapment in exchange for avoiding regional
abandonment (Snyder 1984).
NATO has served three major purposes for the United States over the course
of the postwar period: it acted as an institutionalized mechanism for exerting
control over its European allies within and outside Europe; it provided a means
whereby the United States could fulfill its providential mission of consolidating
democracy in Western Europe after World War II and then spreading it to the
newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe and beyond; and it
enhanced the collective defense capabilities of the alliance, initially to contain
the Soviet Union and later to create an effective expeditionary force.6 These pur-
poses required continued American dominance of the alliance as well as Euro-
pean acceptance of American expectations, particularly as these pertained to the
knotty problem of burden sharing.
The United States has also periodically endeavored to prevent the institution-
alization of a single “European” voice within or outside NATO since this would
have challenged American dominance, while at the same time encouraging
deeper European integration as a component of the American grand strategy for
ensuring global order before and after the Cold War. But the American strategy
for a European pillar of the alliance produced a policy paradox appreciated in
Washington and Paris: although American postwar leadership championed Euro-
pean integration and the eventual emergence of Europe as a second, equal pillar
of the Atlantic Community, the emergence of such a pillar could enable, if not
compel, Europe to reject or severely qualify both American leadership and stra-
tegic design for the European security order. An enhanced European capability
to act independently of the United States was unwelcome in Washington, as this
would contradict a core element of the American NRC, namely the right to
leadership and the right to shape an international order consistent with American
ideals and interests.
The reality of the Cold War made defection from the American-dominated
alliance an unrealistic option for any Western state, including France. Yet the
end of the Cold War virtually transformed NATO overnight from a compulsory
alliance into a voluntary one; this enabled the Europeans to challenge the mana-
gerial prerogatives of the United States (e.g. on defense spending, on the pace of
transformation, or on the acquisition of force projection capabilities). But it also
made the United States less interested in NATO ownership: thus, after 2001 the
Bush administration even briefly flirted with the idea that America could rely
upon “coalitions of the willing” not only within, but perhaps entirely without,
NATO. The administration’s working assumption was that NATO had become
superfluous – a notion that was eventually invalidated as the situation in Afghan-
istan deteriorated (see Sperling and Webber 2009: 509f.).
Two developments particularly illustrate the growing tensions between the
NATO alliance and the American NRC: the “out of area” debate begun in the
1990s, and the institutional relationship between NATO and the European Secur-
ity and Defense Policy (ESDP). As soon as the Europeans and Americans began
to take advantage of the peace dividend, there were calls in the US Congress for
NATO to “go out of area or go out of business.” Although NATO had enumer-
ated non-Article 5 defense responsibilities in the 1999 Strategic Concept to
provide an official rationale for conventional out-of-area operations, America
raised new demands for greater European defense efforts later on, this time
driven by the transformational ideology and policies attending the so-called
Revolution in Military Affairs. Thus, the Americans have set the terms of
the debate, have assumed droit de regarde with respect to what is and is not
a duplicative acquisition of capabilities, and have retained the prerogative to
define what constitutes “modernization” (Missiroli 2003; Sperling 2006). The
European allies have generally accepted the American critique of NATO’s con-
dition and have allowed themselves to be pushed into adopting policies they
cannot afford and opting for capabilities that do not meet their foremost security
concerns.
The transformational agenda, which has increased the global reach and
lethality of American military power, has continued apace with apparent disre-
gard for its consequences for the alliance. The creation of Allied Command
Transformation in 2003 committed the Europeans – at least at the level of rheto-
ric – to a Rumsfeld-inspired reorganization of their militaries (Webber 2009).
Such a transformation would inevitably compromise European defense sover-
eignty in two ways: first, budgetary constraints would force the Europeans to
engage in cooperative arms programs and perhaps adopt intra-European special-
ization out of necessity rather than choice; and second, European influence vis-
à-vis the United States is unlikely to improve, owing to the continuing one-way
street called alliance politics.
The European Union’s progressive ability to act independently in defense and
security policy has challenged American NRC implications within NATO. Until
the late 1990s, not only did the Union lack an autonomous military planning
capability, but NATO membership and the American fear that a militarily auton-
omous European Union would undermine the alliance created a significant
barrier to developing one. Of particular significance in this context is the crea-
tion of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), which represents an embry-
onic European general staff and is responsible, inter alia, for coordinating EU
military planning with NATO. The Americans viewed this development with
suspicion because it created an institutional basis for the creation of a European
caucus within NATO (or European independence from NATO) that would
provide an effective challenge to American dominance and leadership; Washing-
ton reacted with marked hostility to the 2004 “Gang-of-Four” proposal to estab-
lish an independent EU planning cell and headquarters at Tervuren, Belgium.
The ostensible American concern was the alleged duplication of NATO assets.
But underlying that objection was the desire to prevent an institutional shift in
power and authority relationships within the alliance, an outcome assumed to be
intrinsic to any French initiative on strengthening European defense or security
autonomy (Heisbourg et al. 2003: 32).
The middle ground between American dominance and the French ambition
for greater European autonomy was found in the Berlin-plus arrangements,
which left the United States with a potential veto over the use of certain categor-
ies of NATO assets but provided Europe with guaranteed access to NATO plan-
ning assets in those cases where the European Union rather than NATO (read
the United States) wished to undertake a crisis management operation. The
Berlin-plus arrangements effectively stipulated that for the Europeans as NATO
member states, an autonomous EU military planning capability was redundant
and wasteful, but that for them as EU member states the acquisition of an auton-
omous planning capability was essential for undertaking military missions inde-
pendently of the United States. By forestalling the development of an
autonomous EU planning capability outside NATO, the Berlin-plus agreements
relaxed the tension between maintaining the integrity of NATO (from the Ameri-
can perspective) and enabling the European Union to progress towards a
common security and defense policy.7 The jointly endorsed assumption that
Europe could have security and defense interests independent of the United
States validates key elements of both the French NRC (particularly the need for
European autonomy and influence commensurate with Europe’s geopolitical
weight in the international system) and the key American NRC as the guarantor
of global order.
Nuclear deterrence: style versus substance?

The United States emerged from World War II as the world’s only nuclear
power. As such, it possessed an extraordinary strategic advantage vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union and could thus provide a credible deterrent against Soviet aggres-
sion in Europe. Postwar France had to deal with the humiliations of defeat and
collaboration, as well as loss of its overseas empire. Core elements of their
respective postwar NRCs generated meaning and political implications for both
sets of circumstances. For the United States, nuclear weapons and the nuclear
umbrella provided to Europe both consolidated and validated the American
leadership role in Europe; it also created a contested conflation of European and
American strategic interests, particularly with respect to possible tactical (as
opposed to strategic) nuclear responses to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.
For de Gaulle, the possession of a credible national nuclear deterrent was integ-
ral to the reemergence of France as a great power that would “command its own
destiny” (Freedman 1983: 313). French nuclear pretensions were dismissed in
American foreign policy circles as a form of strategic vanity, whereas French
strategists, notably Pierre Gallois and André Beaufre, developed plausible
strategic rationales for an independent nuclear deterrent, notably the concepts
of proportional deterrence and “triggering” to solve the problem of strategic
abandonment by the United States in the event of another European war (Beaufre
1965; Gallois 1961). Yet for both the United States and France, the possession
of nuclear weapons was an indispensable implication of each state’s NRC. It
also provided a source of muted discord between the two.
France: force de frappe and strategic independence

France’s force de frappe is paradigmatic of the effects that national role views
have on the perceptions of particular interests and the design of policies. For
France, it is normal, natural, and intuitively plausible to possess a nuclear force
and to formulate a national strategic doctrine independently of its allies (Calleo
1970; Kohl 1971). This normality has been firmly established and rarely con-
tested domestically since the late 1950s. France’s obsession with its force de
frappe is all the more striking as, during the Cold War, it was anything but
evident that the nuclear stance would increase the country’s security: whether
France’s independent nuclear force and deterrence doctrine during these decades
increased its security, or in fact decreased it, has been a hotly debated issue
among nuclear strategists (Sagan 1996).
National nuclear weapons, sometimes officially referred to as “jetons de
présence,” were the most compelling admission ticket to the high table seating
the world’s major powers (Heuser 1998: 100f.). Possession of national nuclear
capacity derives most notably from the independence aspect of the French NRC
but also from the activism and potential presence components, and affects
French nuclear postures through the prescription and process and style mechan-
isms (Rouget 1989: 69; Sagan 1996). And indeed, national nuclear forces are
close to coterminous material expressions of domestically held understandings
of “rank,” “greatness,” “glory,” and “prestige.” “History obliges,” as Beatrice
Heuser puts it with respect to the connections with these elements of domesti-
cally constructed self-view and consequential French nuclear attitudes (1998:
97–115).
At the same time, nothing in France’s NRC prevented it from acquiring a
national nuclear deterrent. The constraints to be overcome in moving from the
fundamental interest in nuclear forces to the policies establishing such forces
were technological and financial, rather than political or moral. In the decades
following the initial decisions to go nuclear, France acquired a “nuclear triad” of
land-based ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and
bombers.
Perhaps General Ailleret’s 1967 nuclear doctrine of tous azimuts (“in all
directions”) constituted the culmination of France’s nuclear policies (Clauß and
Krafft 1988). In addition to deriving from the “independence” role element, the
force de frappe and its concomitant deterrence doctrine are also strategic expres-
sions of potential global presence and of potential active engagement in any
political matter and issue related to this most powerful and most destructive type
of weapon. Scott Sagan, for example, reasoned that
[t]he repeated Gaullist declarations that French nuclear weapons should
have worldwide capabilities and must be aimed “in all directions” are seen
not as the product of security threats from all directions, but rather because
only such a policy could be logically consistent with global grandeur and
independence.
(1996: 79)
France’s basic nuclear orientations were not simply the product of the par-
ticular Cold War situation in Europe, and, accordingly, they have not fundament-
ally changed with the Warsaw Pact’s collapse and the Soviet Union’s implosion.
At the onset of the twenty-first century, France consolidated and reduced its
nuclear weapons stockpile to some 300 nuclear warheads and phased out the
land-based component of the triad. In order to reserve the option of more gradu-
ated threat and potential use, France may install only one nuclear warhead per
missile, in addition to the regular configuration of six warheads. Nonetheless,
President Chirac, praising the nuclear deterrent as preserving France’s security
and independence in 2006, enlarged the “vital interests” protected by its nuclear
weapons: he announced that such weapons could be used against states consider-
ing the use of weapons of mass destruction or attacking France via terrorist
means. Upholding the force de frappe is expensive – it costs some €3 billion a
year. Yet France’s national nuclear deterrent remains domestically largely
uncontested, at least so far. Jolyon Howorth has concluded that “France’s ‘inde-
pendent’ nuclear capability was the lynch-pin of Gaullist grandeur and is now
deeply embedded in the defence culture” (1996: 7; see also Tertrais 2007).
United States: from simple to complex deterrence

Two central American NRC components reinforced the American self-defined
responsibility for providing a nuclear deterrent for its European allies: both
“America as leader of the free world” and “American exceptionalism” impelled
the United States to protect the free world from the encroachments of commun-
ism. At the end of World War II, the United States emerged with a nuclear
monopoly that allowed American policy makers to offer the Europeans unilat-
eral nuclear guarantees. Once that monopoly was broken, however, the credibil-
ity of the American guarantee became increasingly questioned both by the
beneficiaries and by Americans themselves.
The evolution of nuclear doctrine reflected ongoing American efforts to
ensure the credibility and value of the deterrent to the Europeans, as a means
both of guaranteeing the postwar order and of preserving the American claim to
the rightful and unchallenged leadership of NATO.
The advent of the post-Cold War peace intensified rather than eased the
problem of nuclear and conventional deterrence. When the Cold War ended, the
task of global deterrence did not evaporate: the Russian Federation retained a
considerable nuclear arsenal, and the rise of China was perceived as a potential
constraint on future American prerogatives in the Pacific. The rise of assertive
regional powers, particularly in the Persian Gulf region, and the terrorist attacks
of 11 September 2001 led the Department of Defense to identify two additional
tasks for American military power in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review:
transnational deterrence (the ability to deter attacks by non-state actors or engage
those actors in counterinsurgency warfare) and regional deterrence (the ability to
maintain regional stability by retaining the ability to engage in conventional
warfare) (US Department of Defense 2006: 38).
The tasks of regional and transnational deterrence – a natural product of the
critical elements of the NRC in a more complex strategic environment – have
also elevated the importance of America’s allies. After 1989, North Korea, the
Russian Federation, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, and China were identified as those
states representing the greatest potential threats to American security. Iraqi and
Iranian nuclear ambitions were considered unlikely to evaporate. North Korea
emerged as the greatest threat to Northeast Asian stability and the relatively ami-
cable relations between South Korea, Japan, and China (Jacoby 2004).
The 2005 National Military Strategy concluded that the United States military
required a force structure capable of defeating “a wide range of adversaries –
from states to non-state actors.” The strategy called for a “diverse portfolio of
capabilities” enabling the United States to destroy terrorist networks, effect
regime change, “swiftly defeat” an adversary, or undertake a prolonged occupa-
tion that entailed a “significant investment” of blood and treasure (US Depart-
ment of Defense 2005: 3, 12). Military preemption and the downgrading of
traditional alliances in American foreign policy calculations were central fea-
tures of the new “deterrence strategy.”
The transition from simple to complex deterrence that has occurred since
1989 implicitly places an even greater claim on the resources of the NATO allies
and demands greater strategic cohesion. These twin pressures, in turn, pose a
barrier to greater European (and French) autonomy and influence outside the
contractual geopolitical ambit of the North Atlantic Treaty. At the same time,
however, the French independent nuclear deterrent has become both a less and
potentially a more contentious strategic issue. It has become less contentious
because French nuclear pretensions no longer impinge upon a non-existent
balance of terror between the United States and Soviet Union (or Russian Feder-
ation) or complicate the American strategic preoccupation that China will even-
tually emerge as a peer competitor in the Pacific Basin. It has become potentially
more contentious insofar as the considerable resources devoted to the French
nuclear deterrent rival resources that could be devoted instead to the task of force
modernization and an improved expeditionary capability consistent with current
American doctrines of regional and transnational deterrence.
Conclusion: France and America from the Cold War into the
twenty-first century
The ‘long unipolar moment’ initiated at the end of the Cold War reinforced
rather than softened the salience of the key elements of the American and French
NRCs. A focus on historically shaped and domestically rooted aspects of
national role and purpose helps us grasp an important source of underlying long-
term national foreign policy orientations. In the case of France and the United
States, NRC elements account for the patterns of discord and collaboration in
Franco-American relations since the end of World War II. Although modulated
by available power resources, systemic constraints, or the foreign policy vision
of specific national leaders, key elements of the self-ascribed foreign policy roles
engendered bilateral foreign policy conflicts that have bridged the great postwar
divide demarcating the Cold War and post-Cold War international systems.
The resilience of the French and American NRCs raises an important ques-
tion for role theory: Why has there been so little change in national role concep-
tion despite the dramatic and shared changes in the strategic and geopolitical
contexts since 1989? This chapter’s findings suggest that American and French
NRCs were little affected by the end of the Cold War. These NRCs thus appar-
ently have little to do with the bilateral relationship, its inherent dynamic, or the
particular personalities or parties in power in either Paris or Washington. Instead,
they are rooted in historically shaped self-conceptions tied to domestically domi-
nant interpretations of the meaning and the implications of national historical
experiences.
The empirical analysis presented in this chapter strongly suggests that
domestic role construction in the French and American experience has had signi-
ficant implications for national interest formation and longer-term policy goals
over the past half-century. It has also underscored how the dominant interpreta-
tions of national historical experiences and their political meanings, as sources
of interest and policy, can both exist and persist fairly isolated from even dra-
matic external political changes or fundamental shifts in the international system.
Perhaps there is even an element of solipsism in the way that major powers view
themselves and understand their appropriate roles and purpose in the world.
During the Cold War decades, the Soviet–American competition for Euro-
pean dominance and the subordination of Europe to these two extra-European
powers provided the strategic context within which the French and American
NRCs took shape and their respective milieu goals, alliance attitudes, and
nuclear stances became defined. Although the sharp edges of the “Gaullist con-
sensus” may have been dulled, the key ingredients of France’s NRC have
resisted a fundamental transformation despite the radical redrawing of the
regional (and global) geopolitical map. The post-Cold War international context
proved conducive to Europe’s emergence as a significantly more coherent and
cohesive international actor than during the rigid political-military division of
Europe prior to 1989. The emergence of the European Union as a regional and
increasingly global actor – and the key role of France in that development – has
enhanced rather than diminished the military and political purposes, and the
symbolic significance of France’s nuclear deterrent.8
The impact of the end of the Cold War on the American NRC, rather than
softening the key elements of the American NRC, through the “long unipolar
moment” actually reinforced their salience. Not only did the United States
emerge in the 1990s as the only credible guarantor of global order, but history
seemed to have validated the inexorable march to a global democratic revolu-
tion. As a consequence, the deeply held domestic view that American exception-
alism justified and required unquestioned American leadership remained
unchallenged. The United States thus retained its interest in dominating the
transatlantic alliance, minimally to prevent the emergence of another pole of
power that could challenge American interests or limit American freedom of
action in regions of the world of critical strategic interest, particularly in the
eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf. An American-led
NATO extended American influence and strategic dominance to the borders of
the former Soviet Union. It continues to provide a forum for addressing common
security and defense concerns inside and outside Europe, and it provides a pool
of military personnel and matériel to support the American-led global order. The
strategic nuclear deterrent remains a critical component of the overall American
defense posture, but the focus has shifted from maintaining the postwar “balance
of terror” to limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and material to state
and non-state actors.
The conflicts generated by the French and American NRCs were put into
stark relief by the French withdrawal from NATO in 1966 and the French
unwillingness to align itself tightly with the American foreign policy agenda.
The importance of NATO in Franco-American foreign policy disputes, either as
cause or as metaphor, at first glance might suggest that the French return to
NATO in 2009 reflected either a transformation or a rapprochement of the
American and French NRCs. On closer inspection, however, the French decision
to reenter NATO’s integrated military command (while continuing to keep
France’s nuclear force strictly national and outside the NATO Nuclear Planning
Group) does little to suggest a Pauline conversion on the road to Mons. While
Nicolas Sarkozy may be the most unequivocally pro-American president pro-
duced by the French Fifth Republic, and the conciliatory statements from the
Sarkozy Élysée Palace may facilitate a more productive and cooperative Franco-
American relationship with the Obama White House as compared to the mutual
antipathy plaguing relations between Presidents Chirac and George W. Bush,
France’s new-found Atlanticism is anything but a U-turn in France’s longer-term
milieu goals and intentions vis-à-vis the alliance. Rather, adjusting France’s rela-
tions to NATO is more likely to be a means toward realizing the traditional long-
term French objective of enhancing European autonomy. As Sarkozy put it in
his speech before the US Congress on 7 November 2007, France will be “an
upright friend, independent ally, and free partner” (quoted in Vaicbourdt 2009:
10). France’s continued formal dissociation from NATO after 1989 increasingly
undermined France’s standing in Europe and beyond. Since 2003, France has
participated regularly in NATO out-of-area operations, made substantial military
contributions to those missions, and provided finance for the tasks of reconstruc-
tion and stabilization. Given its formal status outside the integrated command
structure, however, French forces were not part of the standing chain of
command, and no French general officer occupied a senior command post.
France’s NATO return advances the goal of transforming Europe into a full-
spectrum foreign policy actor operating on a global scale, thereby boosting the
Europe de la défense, as President Sarkozy likes to put it, including the ESDP.
NATO membership also serves to rebuild trust and reinforce security and
defense relations with some of the staunchly Atlanticist Central and Eastern
European states. For France, reintegration therefore represents a strategic orien-
tation to overcome the current limitations of Europe and move towards the long-
term emergence of the European Union as a capable military and diplomatic
actor (Soutou 2005). Despite the American willingness to assign the major
NATO command to a French general officer, there is no indication that France
has abandoned the underlying Gaullist strategy of maximizing and defending
French influence in Europe and through Europe.
Through NATO reentry, France also seeks effective leverage for shaping the
alliance’s future evolution, for example by influencing the 2010 NATO new
Strategic Concept. In particular, France wants to inhibit NATO’s consolidation
as an institutional vehicle legitimizing American military engagement around the
globe. Thus, France will be well positioned to curb the American ambition to
transform NATO from a regional collective defense arrangement into a collect-
ive security organization with a global reach (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet 2009:
102). France favors a more delimited role for the alliance that also involves an
overall scaling down of NATO’s military apparatus. These aims reflect the core
objective of redressing the asymmetries within the alliance that currently favor
the United States.
While the foreign policy posture of Sarkozy has remained contested domesti-
cally, it indicates neither a transformation of dominant French self-views nor a
renunciation of longer-term goals tied to them. In some ways, French member-
ship in NATO may now be considered as consistent with the tenets of Gaullism:
it will strengthen France’s international influence inside and outside Europe.
NATO membership also has been made more palatable for France because it
poses a relatively weak threat to French autonomy on two counts: NATO is
likely to become a significantly less important actor in the twenty-first-century
European security landscape than it was during the second half of the twentieth
century; and since the mid-1990s the alliance has become considerably looser
than the tightly integrated Cold War military machine.
However, the Achilles heel of French foreign policies lies elsewhere, namely
in the tension between the ambitions inherent in the French national role concep-
tion and the increasingly severe resource constraints on their realization (see
Gordon and Meunier 2002). It remains to be seen whether fiscal stringencies will
altogether threaten the viability of the military manifestations of historically
deeply rooted elements of French self-view that have become dominant over the
past half-century. Although NRCs help shape budgetary allocations, fiscal con-
straints have kept France from fully translating domestically shared purpose into
foreign policy, and have driven it to embrace and deepen European security
cooperation. This seems likely to continue into the foreseeable future, however
cumbersome and difficult working through the ESDP may be.
Unlike France, the United States has not yet faced a significant resource
constraints generating a gap between its NRC and foreign policy goals and
ambitions but the deteriorating American fiscal position will inevitably place
significant constraints on US foreign policy in the future. The historic key
elements of the NRC remain intact: national foreign policy elites remain
convinced that America remains entitled to a position of leadership within the
Atlantic Alliance and responsible for the maintenance of global order and
security. There has not been a reconsideration of American exceptionalism, in
terms of either the benevolence or the beneficence of American leadership.
There has been a recognition, however, that the United States requires allies, not
only to impart diplomatic legitimacy for American actions but also to supply
material support, however marginal it may be (Maull, this volume). But this
recognition of the limits on American power in a turbulent and globalized
security disorder does not yet translate into a commensurate willingness to
abnegate American leadership, and is unlikely to do so anytime soon.
Notes
1 For in-depth treatments of the Cold War era, compare Katzenstein (2005), Lake (1999),
and Lundestad (2003).
2 On European anti-Americanism and American anti-Europeanism, respectively, see
Garton Ash (2005), Katzenstein and Keohane (2007), and Markovits (2007).
3 On various conceptual and methodological aspects underlying this chapter’s notion of
NRCs, see Krotz (forthcoming: chs. 1, 2). For research on the causal implications of
this kind of domestic construction of role and purpose over extended periods of time,
see the same source. For a study of the causal dynamics of such a type of domestic
construction in combination with other domestic as well as interstate-level factors, see
Krotz (2011). For the case of considering role views’ actor-based attributes, see also
Walker (2004).
4 Policies targeting milieu goals seek to shape the external context in a way that enhances
security by either “promoting or undermining particular kinds of global or regional
institutional orders, international organizations, or legal environments” (Wolfers 1962:
74).
5 On the early history and origins of NATO, see Osgood (1962) and Kaplan (1999).
6 The challenges confronting NATO as a global military actor, particularly the Europe-
ans’ asymmetrical contribution to that ambition, are discussed by Bialos and Koehl
(2005: 2) and Keohane and Blommestijn (2009: 1–4).
7 For a brief assessment, see Howorth (2003).
8 For broader consideration regarding France’s milieu goals, France within Europe,
Europe in the world, as well as the role and significance of the French nuclear forces,
see Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes (2008) and Courmont (2007).
13 Hesitant adaptation
China’s new role in global policies
Jörn-Carsten Gottwald and Niall Duggan
The rise of the People’s Republic of China (the PRC; China) has triggered a
broad debate among academics, policy makers, and the interested public. The
economic fallout from the global financial and economic crisis has added intens-
ity to the question of how China’s growing role in world politics will affect the
current international political and economic order. For Europe and the United
States, earlier debates over whether to contain or to engage the emerging super-
power (Mills 1996; Shambaugh 1996) have become obsolete: after more than
three decades of high-level economic growth, social change, and modernization
of its one-party state, China has moved to the center stage of the new global
order (Breslin 2007).1 Thus, for the United States the real question seems to be
whether China will become “a responsible stakeholder in world politics” in the
American sense (Christensen 2006).
For the Chinese leadership, these changing external role expectations resem-
ble the realization of their ambition to return China to its former glory (Yong
2008). However, the implications of China’s rise are ambiguous for China’s
leaders: While increased power and prestige enhance their reputation at home
and abroad, they also impose new constraints. Domestic and foreign expecta-
tions hardly ever match. We argue that these divergent role expectations increase
the complexity of policy making in Beijing at a time when leadership and society
still predominantly view China as a developing country.
On the international stage, the negation of democratic norms and practices by
the Chinese leadership supports views that a “Beijing Consensus” (Ramo 2004)
is undermining political, economic, social, and cultural norms, values, and insti-
tutions supporting the US-led international order. The combination of “might,
money, and minds” (Lampton 2008) causes anxiety in the United States and
elsewhere about the impact of China’s (re)emergence into the existing global
political economy (Congressional Research Service 2008). On the basis of an
analysis rooted in neorealist, balance-of-power-oriented thinking, many US and
European observers perceive China’s rise as a challenge to an existing world
order. China-watchers paint a different picture: a Communist Party battling the
effects of its reform policies, a party-state rife with internal groups and factions
requiring crisis management and negotiations, muddling through on the basis of
learning and adaptation.
Hesitant adaptation: China’s new role 235
Taking a moderate social constructivist approach, this chapter argues that
China’s foreign policies are currently characterized by an adaptation of its his-
torical role conception as a “leading developing country” to that of a “respons-
ible care taker” in international, especially economic affairs. In its own
perceptions – developed in constant exchange with external perceptions of China
– as well as in its actions, the PRC finds itself drawn into a complex web of
global governance. This does not imply, however, that the PRC is adapting uni-
laterally to an existing set of international institutions, norms, and values. In
joining and creating regional, multilateral, and global orders, the PRC is actively
pursuing their recalibration on Chinese terms. We hold that contradictions within
the Chinese leadership, conflicting themes in public discourse, and incoherent
actions highlight the difficulties even for a technocratic one-party elite with a
limited – albeit real and important – need to assure domestic support and legiti-
macy in defining the global role of an “emerging great power.”
We demonstrate the trajectory and difficulties of “China’s role adaptation” in
two case studies: China’s Africa policy and its response to the global financial
and economic crisis. Our two examples specifically address the global dimen-
sions of the US–China relationship, focusing on both their competitive and their
cooperative aspects. Analyzing actions and debates in the past decade, a limited
change of the self-definition of China’s role in Africa and its cooperation with
the United States and Europe can be identified. Without giving up on its clear
priority for securing access to resources and building up influence, the Chinese
leadership has started to implement less confrontational, more proactive
policies.
In the global efforts to handle the financial and economic crisis, China had to
give up its traditional role as a bystander to global cooperation. Facing domestic
expectations regarding China’s new international significance, the Chinese
leadership has to strike a balance between increased integration into global gov-
ernance and preservation of its room for maneuver. While rhetoric and actions
show a certain degree of adaptation to new circumstances, it would be overopti-
mistic – or naïve – to mistake them as a clear commitment to the existing order
and division of labor between the United States and other great powers.
Thus, the jury is still out on whether or not China’s engagement will actually
reinforce US and European notions of global governance, or turn out to be one
more cornerstone in establishing a new model for political and economic gov-
ernance. China’s strong support for the G20 might result more from its non-
binding unanimous decision making than from an acceptance of multilateral
institution building for global governance.
China’s rise as a challenge to political and academic analyses

When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) initiated reforms in the late 1970s, it
introduced elements of a market economy into a socialist state. Its subsequent
phenomenal economic growth, equaling roughly 10 percent of GDP per year
over three decades, created an urgent demand for energy, raw materials, and
236 J.-C. Gottwald and N. Duggan
access to foreign markets and capital. Dismantling imperative economic central
planning resulted in a loss of control over Chinese society. Ideologically, deviat-
ing from Marxism-Leninism raised the issue of legitimacy of one-party rule. To
rebuild its power after Mao’s death, the CCP promoted nationalism, thereby
transforming societal expectations as to China’s rank and status in world pol-
itics. This transformation of societal expectations, however, intertwined with the
Party’s identity with China’s overall national identity and economic success.
Socialism was thus redefined as raising the living standards of the people and
facilitating China’s return to international “great power” status.
Acknowledging the potential negative impact of its growing international sig-
nificance on the stability of its economic environment, the Chinese leadership set
out to develop a foreign policy to address these issues. Zheng Bijian, former vice
principal of the Central Party School, proposed that in today’s new world the
PRC would develop peaceably, and in turn help to maintain a peaceful interna-
tional environment (Zheng 2005). He called this position “China’s Peaceful
Rise.” As “rise” was considered too aggressive, the concept was subsequently
renamed “China’s Peaceful Development” (Luo 2006). “Peaceful development”
dovetails nicely with the discovery of “soft power” as another tool with which to
alleviate foreign unease about China’s growing importance. Both concepts
assume that good relations with China’s neighbors will enhance the PRC’s com-
prehensive national power. Besides, soft power and peaceful development reso-
nate well with both the long-standing tradition of imperial status-quo policies
and the “five principles” (Wen 2004) of “mutual respect for sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence” (Liu 2003: 107).2
Sensitive issues, such as Sino-Taiwanese relations, a rivalry that has defined
Chinese foreign policy since the founding of the PRC (Chen 2005; Henderson
2006), or Sino-Japanese relations, have the potential to threaten this peaceful
path to development (Johnston 2006: 340). The cross-cutting role expectations
of the resulting rise of nationalism (Hughes 2006; Yahuda 2000; Zheng 2002),
particularly anti-Japanese nationalism, threaten the benefits China reaps from its
role in the East Asian economic system (Liao 2006: 41). Maintaining stable rela-
tions with important economic partners and suppliers of raw materials is con-
sidered vital to the survival of the one-party state as it is the prerequisite for high
growth rates, new urban employment, and social stability in the “fragile super-
power” (Shirk 2007).
The unitary rational actor approach

China’s rise is most commonly analyzed by recounting the aims and calculations
of China as a state or Beijing as a government, a trademark of the rational actor
model of international relations (Legro 2008; Roy 1994). In contrast, early schol-
ars took a long historical perspective on imperial reincarnations, emphasizing
continuity (Fairbank 1968; Gelber 2007). The “Middle Kingdom” supposedly
resided on top of a hierarchical world and was the center of tributary regional
relations. In this school, China is seen in the world as the most civilized and
greatest power. Its rise since overcoming foreign imperial rule in 1912 consti-
tutes a return to this long-established position. Interaction with the rest of the
world is limited and follows terms set by China, the rule setter and creator of the
norms of state-to-state interaction. Even though the policies of opening up and
reform since 1978 are considered to have discredited these views (Wang 2008;
Yuan 2008), they still highlight the relevance of Chinese traditional values and
norms for integrating into a global community. In official statements, the PRC
itself usually stresses the significance of its past (State Council of the PRC
2005). They follow the Maoist tradition of interpreting Chinese foreign policies
as a result of the unique mixture of its imperial history and orthodox Marxist-
Leninist ideologies (Hunt 1984; Liao 1986; Mancall 1984) as defined by the key
Chinese leader (Reynolds 2007; Ming 2007). Both the historical and the com-
munist view of China argue that the key drivers of China’s foreign behavior are
domestic and not international forces.
Today, the dominating (neo)realist school of international relations sees
China as negotiating an anarchic international environment. Like all rising
powers, it confronts the existing structure of international politics as part of its
quest for survival (Morgenthau 1985 [1948]; Waltz 1979). Most foreign and
domestic media follow this analysis (Castle 2008; Odgaard 2007; Rozhnov
2010; Scalapino 1974). Some observers, however, stress the domestic expecta-
tions to preserve the conditions for China’s modernization – that is, a preserva-
tion of the current international order. Reaping massive benefits from its
increased integration into the global economy (Gu et al. 2007; Keith 2004), the
PRC participates in global governance and multilateralism to maintain that status
quo (Chung 2008; Hughes 2005; Johnston 2003: 11–14). All of these perspec-
tives on China’s rise have a common feature: they treat China as a unitary actor,
influenced either by its own traditions and communist ideology or by some
rational calculation as if China were a single individual and able to access the
environment, make decisions, and react accordingly to outside stimuli. As a
result, a strategy based on China’s best interests is executed as foreign policies
within a stable preset international environment.
The domestic politics first approach

Contrary to the predominant neorealist view, most domestic experts and students
of policy making in the PRC consider social and political stability the number
one priority for the Chinese leadership. Thus, all Chinese foreign policy
addresses domestic expectations first. But domestic policies exhibit a growing
number of conflicting interests within and around the CCP (Teufel Dreyer 2010),
thus questioning the concept of the PRC as a single unitary actor. Within the
Chinese leadership and in the increasingly complex and pluralistic society,
various groups pursue their particular interests, define specific preferences and
create power bases within the Chinese leadership. Group interests and thus
Chinese actions in the field of foreign affairs can differ widely. In addition,
institutions matter in China’s foreign policy making (Breslin 2006). In this per-
spective, the PRC’s global position is shaped primarily by its domestic political
structure as well as secondary-level institutions (Lampton 2001, 2008). Institu-
tional interests of these key domestic actors affect the overall direction of
China’s actions on the global stage.3 Different perceptions among elites affect
international actions (Yan 2001, 2006; Yong 2008; Zhang 2008), particularly on
issues such as Taiwanese independence (Yang 2006), as do social trends and
issues (Buzan 2010). Although the perceptual approaches and institutional
approaches look at China’s rise in very different ways, they share a common
point of reference: they open up the black box of the Chinese state and bring in
bureaucratic policies, intra-elite conflict and processes of political bargaining.
Furthermore, they complement the state-centric view by adding state-controlled
and non-state actors such as enterprises, regulatory agencies, or the emerging
civil society in China to the picture.
The conception of role models and the analysis of China’s

international behavior
China’s rise is taking place within an existing, yet dynamically developing, inter-
national order. It provides an additional stimulus for change. Hence, China’s role
in this process is the result of actions by Chinese leaders and non-state actors
reacting to domestic and external expectations following individual interests and
preferences. We conceptualize China’s position in global politics as a foreign
policy role (Harnisch, this volume) that is based on both domestic and external
role expectations as to what “appropriate behavior” should guide China’s role-
taking and role-making behavior. The role model conception, as understood
here, bears certain similarities with the English School approach, which has been
successfully used as a framework for the mutual interdependence between
China’s policies towards the international order and the impact of the order on
China’s policies (Buzan 2010).
We hold that the benefits of examining China’s ascendancy with the role
approach are threefold: first, it brings together external perceptions of China by
state and non-state actors alike, thus addressing all possible causal alleys for
adaptation and learning; second, it opens up the domestic dimension by incorpo-
rating the expectations of the domestic constituency; and finally, it allows for
ideas, notions of historical traditions, and interests to be integrated through the
self-perception of the Chinese leadership regarding its role in foreign policy. Our
approach thus highlights the early signs of change as a form of partial role adap-
tion in an increasingly challenging global environment.
In our view, domestic policies and the management of globalization are inter-
connected via national political orders, perceptions, and actions (Maull and
Wagener 2009: 9). Therefore, our approach promises insights into whether
China’s rise actually leads to a transformation of its international role, to “role
making,” as it is called by Harnisch (this volume), or simply an adaptation to
new circumstances. In the following, we discuss China’s emerging role in global
politics from three perspectives: domestic expectations, foreign expectations,
and the specific self-expectations vis-à-vis China’s role in Africa and the new
architecture for financial services regulation.
China’s new role in Africa between domestic and external

expectations
Sino-African relations date back to antiquity (Li 2005; Gao 1984). From
the establishment of the PRC in 1949 to the early reform era, China’s African
policy was heavily influenced by the ideology of socialist internationalism and
anticolonial struggle (Li 2007: 70):
What imperialism fears most is the awakening of the Asian, African and
Latin American peoples, the awakening of the peoples of all countries. We
should unite and drive U.S. imperialism from Asia, Africa and Latin
America back to where it came from.
(Mao 1960: 10)
China assumed a prominent role in the anticolonial movements. However, once

China started concentrating on its domestic reforms after 1978, it reduced its
involvement in Africa (cf. Taylor 1998, 2001). The past decade, however, has
witnessed a surge in China’s interest in Africa. In 2006, Beijing launched a new
China–Africa Policy (FMPRC 2006) accompanied by a remarkable Africa
Summit in Beijing. By 2010, China had become Africa’s second largest trading
partner (Taylor 2009: 1), a key supplier of development aid (Bräutigam 2008a;
Tjønneland et al. 2006), and a major source of foreign direct investment (FDI;
Bräutigam 2008b). A growing number of Chinese citizens have taken up resi-
dence in Africa (Dobler 2009; Mung 2008). “In the last sixty years, no country
has made as big an impact on the political, economic and social fabric of Africa
as China has since the turn of the millennium” (Moyo 2009: 103). In short,
China has become deeply involved with Africa in terms of both economics and
culture, and in ways that encompass state, semi-state, and non-state actors (Raine
2009: 60).
The foreign view of China’s role in Africa has frequently been negative.
China’s actions in Africa have often been criticized for their negative impact on
a number of areas, including the environment, labor standards, economic restruc-
turing, democratic development, or human rights (Chan-Fishel 2007; Lee 2009).
Regarding the unconditional provision of finance (Askouri 2007; Hare 2008),
arms (Curites and Hickson 2006; Taylor 2008), and investment, and the protec-
tion from international sanctions, the PRC finds itself in a negative corner of
international public opinion. Critics accuse the PRC of instrumentalizing its tra-
ditional emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference to carve out economic
deals (Holslag 2006), thus acting like a neocolonial power.
From an African perspective, China uses Africa as a resource in terms of both
raw resources and international influence. Through doing so, China has damaged
many of the rights won through independence, such as workers’ rights and a free
press. From this point of view, China has simply replaced the old colonial
powers, even though this is in clear conflict with its self-proclaimed role as
leader of the developing world (Kim 1994). The view of China as a new colonial
power in Africa has often been highlighted with regard to Sudan, where Chinese
involvement is seen as supporting the government (Andersson 2008), as a case
in point (Shichor 2008; Srinivasan 2008).
Within China, the predominant view of its role in Africa perceives the PRC
as Africa’s “all-weather friend,” whose presence in Africa creates a win–win
situation for both (He 2008; Xu 2008). Beijing defines its role in Africa by a
number of key principles outlined in the 2006 White Paper. Most notable is the
principle of respect of state sovereignty (cf. Zheng 2009: 42–5). Owing to the
complex relationship between state and society in African nations, local elites
emphasize the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign
states by external actors, too (Taylor 2010). For countries that have found the
restructuring programs under the Washington Consensus very harsh, and for
governments that have been marginalized by Western criticism of their human
rights records, China’s position on sovereignty is particularly attractive. Along
with the shared experience of colonialism and imperial oppression, China seems
to provide an alternative role model providing a new source of political legiti-
macy for autocratic African polities (Sicular et al. 2007).
In contrast to the official view, many within China have a less favorable per-
ception. They insist that large foreign aid projects need to benefit the Chinese
economy, since these funds could have been used domestically to help lift people
out of poverty. For this reason, development projects must create “win–win”
situations in substance and not only in rhetoric. Consequently, Chinese involve-
ment in Guinea decreased in line with the fall of prices for copper and other raw
materials, a fall that highlighted the need for its external involvement not to
produce costs at home (Polgreen 2009). The Chinese government also needs to
be seen as protecting its interests abroad, resulting in Chinese interventions in
the domestic affairs of sovereign states. Although this could best be described as
soft intervention, with little formal action being taken, the Chinese state has
acted resolutely on a number of occasions to protect Chinese multinational cor-
porations in Africa. In Namibia, the Chinese government pushed for the release
of a CEO who had been charged with corruption (Grobler 2010). In Zambia, the
PRC government threatened to pull out its investment if presidential candidate
Michael Sata, who was accused of calling for anti-Chinese policies, won the
election (BBC 2006).
In the case of Sudan, Beijing substantially altered its role behavior over the
course of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. The PRC started with an obstruction-
ist role in the Security Council, but eventually dispatched peacekeeping forces
under a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate (Huang 2008). This
shift in China’s Sudan policy rested on an as-if role-taking behavior that tried to
reconcile external role expectations with its own role conception of a “peaceful
development” (Hunter 2009; Kurlantzick 2007). As was noted earlier, China’s
Africa policy was originally based on its traditional role conception as a “leading
developing country.” On this basis, China in 2004 effectively diluted Washing-
ton’s sanctions policy in the UNSC.
However, in January 2005, after the “Comprehensive Peace Agreement” and
under heavy criticism from non-governmental groups and the Bush administra-
tion, the PRC leadership started to reconsider this policy. China’s abstention on
Resolution 1593 – which allowed for ICC investigations in Darfur – signaled for
the first time that China would not always align with the Sudanese leadership
and the Arab League on Darfur. Instead, and despite the establishment of the
China–Arab Cooperation Forum the preceding year, Beijing even supported
UNSC Resolution 1679, which strengthened the African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS), and justified its vote “on the basis of our political support for the
AU” (UN-Doc. S/PV.5439, 16.5.06). While Beijing was still hesitant to fully
embrace the AU position, it launched a “Darfur initiative,” appointing a Special
Representative, pressuring the Bashir government, and finally offering 275 engi-
neers in support of the hybrid AU/UN mission in Sudan (Evans and Steinberg
2007).
China’s policy shift in Africa eventually also led other actors to reconsider
their conduct (Large 2008: 74). First, the personal intervention by the Chinese
president Hu Jintao appears to have been instrumental in persuading the Suda-
nese leadership to take on a more constructive role towards the AU/UN mission.
Second, the Chinese abandonment of its obstructionist policy in the Security
Council may have added to the pressure on Arab regimes to moderate their
support for Khartoum. Thus, right after China’s policy shift ten Arab states
started funding the AMIS operation substantially. In addition, the League itself
persuaded the Sudanese government to accept the AU/UN force at the Arab
League summit meeting in March 2007. Subsequently, Qatar, as a key member
of the Arab League, also voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1769, which man-
dated the AU/UN mission in Darfur.
Other factors in the broader context of Sino-Sudanese relations, such as the
growing restlessness of the Southern Sudanese government, also had an import-
ant impact on China’s role adaptation. In January 2011, a referendum on inde-
pendence is due to take place in Southern Sudan under the terms of the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This could create a new country on the
African continent, one that possesses the vast majority of Sudan’s oil reserves
(Srinivasan 2008). The growing Chinese engagement in Juba thus appears to be
motivated by two factors: one, to address its acknowledged unpopularity; and
two, to gain a more strategic political foothold in Southern Sudan (Large 2009)
Chinese involvement in persuading Khartoum to accept the AU/UN Mission can
thus be interpreted as an attempt to position itself vis-à-vis the future govern-
ment of an oil-rich South Sudan as a positive influence in the region.
In sum, this brief analysis of China’s Sudan policy shows that a host of
factors have contributed to this role adaptation which involved a shift from a
broadly ego-based to a more comprehensive foreign policy role conception com-
bining both ego and alter expectations. Increasing international pressure moved
Africa higher up the policy agenda of the central leadership, which beforehand
had left much of its Africa policies to the various ministries and bureaucratic
units. In this role conception modification, significant others, most notably the
African Union, played an important role. Moreover, China’s increasingly proac-
tive role (rhetoric, veto suspension, the appointment of a special representative,
the dispatching of peacekeepers) also suggests that Beijing’s role making has
become “firmer” over time and will probably stabilize if counter-roles by signi-
ficant others (the United States, the African Union, the Arab League) evolve
accordingly.
As China’s trade and economic interests grow in Africa, its interaction with
the continent has become more complex. The international pressure for the PRC
to become a more proactive member of the global community, a “responsible
stakeholder” in the promotion of global standards and ethics, is now more influ-
ential than the pressure to maintain China’s role as an anti-establishment actor.
This can be best seen in the willingness of the Chinese leadership to qualify
adherence to its core principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sov-
ereign states: President Hu Jintao has pointed out that China is now willing to
intervene in other nations’ internal affairs to protect its national interests, hinting
at an incipient departure from the soft interventionism of the recent past. Thus,
China’s leadership is changing China’s international behavior to meet the role
expectations of its domestic audience to protect Chinese interests abroad.
However, at the same time, China’s growing willingness to engage in interna-
tional conflict settlement and its participation in peacekeeping missions indicate
that it is increasingly aware of external expectations, too – at least as long as
they can be sold to its domestic audience as beneficial for China’s long-term
socioeconomic development.
Reluctant crisis manager: China’s new role as a stabilizer and

initiator of global financial governance
The interplay of external and domestic expectations with the self-perceptions
and preferences of the Chinese leadership became almost irritatingly obvious
during the current financial crisis. When the insolvency of American investment
bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 triggered a chain reaction of global
financial turmoil, governments all over the world struggled to cope with the huge
risks of a meltdown of their financial systems. In the end, most national govern-
ments had to support or nationalize banks and financial service providers to
avoid a breakdown. Sovereign debt defaults loomed over European countries,
threatening the successful Keynesian anti-cyclical monetary policies employed
to hedge the downturn in the global economy. When the crisis hit, it soon
became obvious that only a well-coordinated international effort could provide
an effective response. This proved to be a major challenge for the Chinese
leadership, which as a result was drawn into the efforts to recalibrate the global
governance of financial services – with, potentially, a new and very substantial
role for the PRC (Godement 2010: 19).
After 30 years of economic, social, and political reform, the PRC has been
aptly described as a learning, adaptive authoritarian system, with the state domi-
nated by its Leninist one-party system. Learning from its own history, from
Western market economies, and from the results of extensive experiments, the
CCP managed to strengthen its hold on the Chinese polity while at the same time
introducing fundamental economic and social reforms (Heilmann 2008; Zheng
2009). The global financial crisis that erupted in 2008, however, provided a new
and fundamental risk that could not easily be dealt with through the established
channels of policy learning: First, there was no “best practice” in dealing with
this unprecedented event – either in Chinese history or in US or European pol-
icies. And time was too short for trial-and-error policies in China itself. Second,
a breakdown of the global economy threatened the core of China’s economic
growth strategy, namely, using FDI to develop highly competitive industries to
sell goods to world markets. Finally, it threatened China’s traditional role as
benevolent bystander and generally non-committal supporter of multilateral
global governance. Unsurprisingly, it took Beijing some time to come up with a
political reaction. The Chinese leadership had to recognize that the “[g]lobaliza-
tion of the crisis requires a globalized response” (Bergsten and Subramanian
2008, including a revision of China’s traditional role in global governance.
China’s initial role in global crisis management: defending its role as

benevolent bystander
In macroeconomic terms, China was in a much better position than most OECD
economies when the crisis hit (Sheng 2010). Its banking and financial services
system is still government controlled, partly state owned, and comparatively
little exposed to global markets. Some of the most destructive creations of finan-
cial markets, such as derivatives, were banned inside China. Thus, Chinese
banks have in essence escaped the financial crisis with comparatively minor
losses. The balance sheets of the main banks are regularly propped up by the
state coffers, and its securities markets offer only limited access to foreign inves-
tors, while Chinese savers still face hurdles if they wish to keep their deposits
outside the Chinese system (Zeihan 2010: 2). China’s exchange rate is tightly
controlled, linked to the US dollar and backed up by vast foreign exchange
reserves.4 Its “economic miracle” has created a growing middle class and an
emergent consumer culture. So, even though exports have been the main driver
of China’s boom, its domestic market still has to realize its full potential, and
therefore could be expanded easily. A government that wanted to foster private
consumption as part of a domestic demand boost thus clearly had powerful tools
with which to fight any economic slowdown. The Chinese government had
gained a reputation for its high-quality technocrats running the show in close
cooperation with think tanks and organizations, providing an example of suc-
cessful and efficient policy implementation. While many voters in Europe turned
their heads away from at least some of their elected leaders, the Chinese popula-
tion had little reason to doubt the expertise of a CPC with an impressive record
of policy learning. The vast foreign exchange reserves managed by the State
Authority for Foreign Exchange (SAFE), low public debt, and the absence of
any real parliamentary or social opposition to challenge government policies also
offered an excellent basis for boosting domestic demand. From a Chinese per-
spective, the financial crisis met an economy that was well prepared to meet the
challenge (Sun 2009).
Therefore, in the summer and early autumn of 2008, the sub-prime crisis in
the United States seemed to carry only limited direct risks for the PRC. This led
to the misjudgment in Beijing that the crisis was a purely Western and capitalist
issue (Warden and Stanway 2008). Thus, the Chinese leadership first reassured
its domestic audience of the strength of the Chinese economy and the limited
effects of a Western financial (!) crisis. But having invested state funds in US
and European financial service companies and in bonds from the US government
and large mortgage providers such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, it soon
emerged that the PRC could easily end up in serious trouble. Then the global
economic crisis began to trigger an unprecedented fall in Chinese exports.
Acknowledging the fundamental threat of the crisis to the Chinese export-led
growth model, the Chinese leadership finally accepted the need for political
action and started work on a specific response soon after the collapse of Lehman.
Traditionally, China’s approach to global governance can best be described as
that of a benevolent bystander to global governance that will adopt international
norms and standards à la carte (Walter 2010: 161f.). Its admission into the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, when Beijing came to accept the obliga-
tions arising from the detailed mechanism for conflict resolution within the
WTO, was the watershed for the PRC. As Fewsmith (1999) has argued, China’s
desire to be in a position to influence the future development of global rules and
standards outweighed its traditional skepticism regarding multilateral engage-
ment even in the face of strong opposition within the Chinese government and
society to the terms and conditions negotiated. China’s global economic role
taking continued to evolve, with its active participation in the Cancún confer-
ence on world trade and its key contributions to the multilateral approach to
contain and roll back North Korea’s nuclear weapons program through the Six-
Party Talks in Beijing highlighting this increasing adaptation. Initiating the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization also indicated another “multilateralist turn”
towards “multilateralism with Chinese characteristics” (Wu and Landsdowne
2007).
China’s selective approach towards multilateralism was initially intended pri-
marily to strengthen its regional position (Wu and Landsdowne 2007: 6). Sup-
porting the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) of bilateral swap-agreements and its
subsequent evolution into a multilateral institution of financial cooperation in East
Asia underscores China’s more positive approach to regional governance. In fact,
the evolution of the CMI into the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization
(CMIM) in 2009 can be viewed as an attempt to hedge against monetary risks by
Asian creditors of the United States – an attempt that has now been backed up
with an incipient regional reserve fund (Hyoun-Kyu, 2009: 459, 462f.).
When the global crisis hit, the Chinese leadership initially voiced their
support for global coordination, but at first refused to become too engaged
(Wang 2007; Zheng 2008). Only after intensive domestic debate, and bowing to
growing external pressure, did the government, in a first revision of its initial
positions, announce a 4 trillion renminbi yuan package to boost its domestic
demand, on 9 November 2008 (Xinhua News 2008). The announcement
addressed both audiences: the domestic one, by reassuring it of government
action against the fallout from dwindling exports; and the foreign one, by stress-
ing the willingness of the Chinese leadership to preserve China as a center of
global economic activity (Niquet 2009: 5ff.). At the same time, the central gov-
ernment loosened constraints on local government investments (Wu 2010: 28)
and ordered the state-controlled banks to facilitate cheap credit (Chan and Zhu
2009). The international reaction was euphoric (Branigan 2008). Only a few
observers raised concerns, pointing to the paucity of information provided on the
planned use of the funds. Some asked how much of the package constituted
additional spending and how much of it was just a repackaging of measures that
had been planned and budgeted beforehand. China also refused to take steps to
address what many perceived as a gross imbalance of the exchange rate between
the managed renminbi and the fully convertible US dollar, referring only to the
need to tackle global macroeconomic issues. It stressed its reluctance to decrease
the control of its currency when it announced an increase in exchange rate flexi-
bility shortly before the Toronto summit but then had its large commercial banks
buy US dollars in order to limit the appreciation of the renminbi.
The Chinese leadership attempted to declare the stimulus package the key
element of China’s contribution to the global crisis response. Leading cadres
such as Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao reiterated that the measures would keep China
growing and that a growing China provided a substantial resource for the more
advanced economies in their attempts to rein in the economic downturn (Xinhua
News 2009a). The main points of reference, and by far the most important part-
ners for the PRC to develop and to revise their position in the global fight against
the fallout from the financial crisis, were the United States and the European
Union (Gottwald 2010).
At the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit in Beijing, China and the Euro-
pean Union hammered out a joint position for the G20 summit in Washington in
November 2008. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced his support for the EU
position on regulating global financial markets, highlighting a growing conver-
gence between the two economic superpowers. From an internal perspective, Hu
Jintao’s speech in Washington defined the official approach of the PRC towards
future regulation (FMPRC 2008). On Wen Jiabao’s visit to Europe in January
2009 and during the preparatory meeting of the G20 ministers of finance and
governors of central banks, China sought actively to coordinate its position with
those of the United States and Europe.
The Group of 20 leading industrial and developing countries, the G20,
quickly superseded the old G8 to become the focal point for global crisis
management. As they reached beyond that contested exclusive club, the G20
became “de facto. . . the main global grouping of countries that is driving
responses to the crisis” (Prasad and Sorkin 2009: 2). A China that “was very
cautious about joining any multilateral or regional arrangements” (Yu 2005: 5),
to avoid any limitation of its sovereignty, was now proud to be a leading member
of the G20.
China reluctantly adapting its role in the G20

For China’s role in global crisis management, the London summit in 2009
became a turning point. Some observed a triumphant appearance on the global
stage (The Economist 2009). The United States, the European Union, and fellow
emerging markets all explicitly called on the Chinese to take a leading role
beyond the stimulus package and “responsible investment” by joining the work
of rewriting global governance rules for financial markets. This led to an
increased debate in China about its dawning dominance in the new world order
(cf. Caijing 2008).
Defining China’s policy, however, proved difficult and complex. In theory,
the centralized structure of the Chinese one-party state allows for coordinated
decision making. China’s position in the G20 was decided at the highest level of
the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC) Politburo. The pre-
paratory documents were prepared under crucial involvement of the political
strategy research department of the CCPCC.5 At a meeting of 50 economists, the
acting vice-head of the political strategy research department, Zheng Xinli, con-
firmed the official view that China’s integration into the global economy, includ-
ing global governance institutions such as the WTO, was following the internal
imperative of domestic reform and opening up. In this regard, the financial crisis
was expected to further strengthen China’s reform policies.6
Vice-Prime Minister Wang Qishan, the leading executive in the State Council
in financial affairs, and even more so the finance ministry, were initially side-
lined.7 Positioning China for the meeting of the finance ministers in London in
March 2009, Wang Qishan stressed that keeping China’s economy on a sustain-
able growth course would constitute a major contribution to global crisis man-
agement. Implicitly quoting Hu Jintao’s remarks at the Washington summit, he
again underlined China’s willingness to join hands with the global community to
contain the effects of the downturn.8 He added that China was now ready to take
a more active role within the International Monetary Fund (IMF ) under the
implicit condition of a clear timetable for IMF reform to the benefit of emerging
market member states (Wang 2009). China raised its profile within the Bretton
Woods institutions by delegating and promoting highly qualified experts. While
this is a strong indicator concerning the growing importance of the IMF for
Chinese policies, the exact reform plans are still under discussion. Even the offi-
cial denunciation of a G2 global order is qualified by open expressions of disap-
pointment regarding the European role, which is predominantly perceived as
weak and incoherent. Thus, the loose structure and non-binding nature of the
G20 help to avoid a premature definition of Chinese positions.
For the Chinese foreign ministry, global crisis management was the number
one priority in 2009. It called for a better structured and fairer global financial
order.9 Together with Brazil, Russia, and India, it also claimed a stronger
representation in the emerging new governance of global financial markets (Mo
2009). The top candidate for the future secretary-general of the CCP, Xi Jinping,
was sent out on a tour to Latin America and Malta that was described in the offi-
cial Chinese media as a major contribution to defining the Chinese position
regarding the global crisis, the limited role of its host countries in the world
economy notwithstanding.10 When Wen Jiaobao expressed his dissatisfaction
with the American safeguards for PRC investment in treasury bonds, he trig-
gered a global discussion and a quick response by the Obama administration. In
various meetings and phone calls, the new US government promised to protect
China’s interests.11 According to Hong Kong news media, Wen needed to
assuage his domestic constituency, who were becoming increasingly irritated at
the high exposure of the PRC to American bonds. Even the top central leader-
ship was supposedly shocked when it was informed about the investments made
by the Chinese state vehicles in US financial institutions.12 On the other hand,
Chinese analysts emphasize the opportunities the crisis offers to improve
Chinese investments abroad.13 In the run-up to the London summit, the central
bank stirred up confusion among observers with its call for a replacement of the
US dollar as the global lead currency through a reform of the IMF special
drawing rights, a little-known instrument.14
With the London summit, the G20 clearly took over the key role in
coordinating the global response and in reforms of global financial governance.
It defined steps towards a comprehensive reform of principles and organization
guiding the IMF and World Bank, something China had called for long before
the crisis. The push by the UK government to set up the G20 as a leading organ-
ization, calling the IMF a supporting infrastructure (Norman 2010), further cor-
responded with traditional Chinese preferences regarding sovereignty and
intergovernmental cooperation. The PRC duly strengthened its involvement. The
G20 offers the Chinese government its preferred mechanism for decision making
(Garrett 2010): unanimity, thus providing a de facto veto power against any
measure deemed unacceptable. Committing to a club, rather than to a multilat-
eral organization with supranational elements, allows the leadership to preserve
considerable autonomy within the G20 while at the same time selling its new
higher profile to its domestic audience as a symbol of strength and to the interna-
tional audience as enhanced responsibility.
This policy was reflected in China’s preparations both for the G20 summit in
Pittsburgh and for Toronto in 2010, where Hu Jintao reiterated three main issues:
the G20 should continue to coordinate macroeconomic stimulus to secure sus-
tainable economic growth, it should implement the reform package for global
financial regulation agreed at the London summit, and it should also address
imbalances in the global economy rooted in the wide gap in development
between the North and the South (FMPRC 2009a). His final point again deflected
criticism of China’s state-managed exchange rate, which is considered by
Western observers to be one of the causes of the crisis. Hu stressed the signifi-
cance of China’s domestic policies and reiterated China’s substantial contribu-
tion to the global response in spite of its severe domestic challenges. The official
English language report did not refer to multilateralism or China’s increased role
in setting the rules for global governance (FMPRC 2009b), but the stronger rep-
resentation within the IMF and the World Bank, and the enhanced influence on
the future of global governance for the emerging states, were hailed as major
successes, even though the details of the reform still need further consideration
(Xinhua News 2009b).
At the G20 meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors before
the Pittsburgh summit, the Chinese delegation provoked criticism at home and
by foreign media for its refusal to hold press briefings. Instead, key statements
were disseminated via official Xinhua news bulletins (Poon 2009; Zhang 2009).
However, Chinese delegations held press meetings when Hu Jintao participated
in meetings. This indicates the strict limits on the ministry of finance and the
central bank in terms of their being allowed to produce statements on key eco-
nomic policy issues; these are reserved to the top echelon of the party-state. At
the same event, the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries did not follow
their tradition of holding a separate meeting of finance ministers leading to a
joint communiqué. Instead, only vice-ministers of finance came together, without
an official document being produced. This was interpreted as a sign that the
rather effective cooperation among the most important emerging economies
during the crisis was beginning to fade away (Poon 2009). China’s attempt to
position itself as a leading representative of emerging and developing countries
suffered from its reluctance to discuss exchange rates, which the leadership only
changed shortly before the Toronto summit.
After the Pittsburgh summit, optimistic foreign expectations of China’s com-
mitment were disappointed. The willingness of the PRC leadership to cooperate
was publicly called into question. The IMF complained that a progress report on
national stimulus packages was being blocked by China. Five heads of govern-
ment took the unusual step of addressing the members of the G20 in a joint letter
containing hardly disguised criticism of China’s vanishing enthusiasm for the
G20 and its reluctance to honor its commitments (Giles and Beattie 2010).
In Toronto, then, the official Chinese position comprised four proposals:
first, that the summit should send out a loud and clear signal to keep the
global economy on track for recovery; second, that the summit should come to a
shared understanding regarding the reform of global financial governance,
strengthening the representation of emerging markets and developing countries;
third, that it should increase its support for the least developed countries; and
finally, that it should come up with a substantial push for the global trade talks to
prevent a return to more protectionist trade policies (Zheng 2009). Strengthening
of the voice of developing countries in the Bretton Woods organizations was
explicitly named as one of China’s own objectives for the work of the G20. In
addition, the BRIC countries, including China, called for a fairer representation
at the highest level of management in the IMF and World Bank (ibid.). The
summit itself, however, was dominated by the rift between US and European
governments on the phasing out of loose fiscal policies to sustain economic
recovery. In sharp contrast to earlier events, the Chinese position and statements
from Chinese leaders hardly figured in international press reports after the
summit.
In 2010, a rapidly inflating property bubble and growing social disparities at
home reduced the resources the Chinese leadership had at its disposal for global
cooperation. Thus, the G20 seem to have dropped down the list of priorities of
the central leadership. The government of the PRC is now caught between a rock
and a hard place: a domestic audience expecting tough actions on social and eco-
nomic development, including the maximum use of national resources for the
development of China’s economy on the one hand, and increasingly critical
American and European audiences pushing for China to tackle issues of market
openness, the exchange rate, and adherence to international norms and
standards.
Conclusion
By adopting a role-theoretical perspective, we have tried to show how internal
and external expectations are shaping China’s ascent in international politics.
The dynamic and evolving mixture of supportive and competitive PRC policies
towards the United States will, in turn impact on the United States’ (and
others’) policies towards China and thus carry important implications for the
world’s future economic, political and, ultimately, also its security order, as
well as for China itself. In our view, China’s role taking and role making both
sustain and modify regional and global patterns of cooperation and division of
labor with the United States that cannot be explained well by using realist or
liberal approaches.
China’s national role conception includes, as we have shown, elements of
both cooperation and conflict with the United States and other key international
actors. To the extent that China’s domestic development, and thus the security of
the CCP regime is concerned, Beijing’s role taking is a function of expectations
by a host of different and diverging domestic political actors, both within the
government and beyond. Understood in this way, China’s response to the global
financial crisis highlights the difficulties for the leadership in dealing with its
strong involvement in the US economy while at the same time rejecting notions
of becoming one half of a G2. A young urban population is increasingly calling
for a policy of using Chinese resources for the benefit of the PRC and for coun-
teracting a perceived US supremacy. The US government and European govern-
ments, however, are pressuring and lobbying the Chinese leadership to take on a
more cooperative and proactive role in global governance. While China’s gov-
ernment clearly sees the benefit of increasing its influence on the reform of
global financial markets, it has gained enormously from the “old” US-backed
form of globalization. Defining a coherent strategy of reshaping the global order
in finance seems to be beyond Beijing’s resources at the moment. Hence, its
policy so far rather follows the traditional step-by-step learning-by-doing
approach that has been implemented so successfully in domestic reforms over
the past three decades.
Most of the public debate and considerable parts of the academic debate on
China’s role in global policies turn around the impact of its rise on the existing
world order. Most China watchers would be wary of projecting past successes in
socioeconomic modernization into the foreseeable future. In the realm of inter-
national relations, however, the question all too often seems to be when China
will be the next superpower, rather than whether it will manage to obtain this
status or how it will “play the superpower role.” A world ruled by China
(Jacques 2010) is perceived as an explicit departure from Western norms, stand-
ards, and experience. Using a role model approach provides a different picture.
The unitary state PRC with its CCP leadership finds it increasingly difficult to
navigate between external and domestic expectations. Demands from domestic
audiences quite often do not fit overoptimistic foreign expectations and chal-
lenge the decision making and diplomatic stamina of the Chinese leadership.
In the reform of the global governance of financial markets, the Chinese
leadership thus had to revise its position on several occasions: from flatly refer-
ring the crisis to Europe and the United States first, via creating its own huge
stimulus package and taking a lead in the reform of the IMF and World Bank
(while committing only limited financial resources), and then significantly tuning
down its cooperative stance again after the Pittsburgh summit. While the
domestic audience may welcome China’s higher profile as a sign of return to
superpower status and of the decline of the United States, the property bubble,
the debt burden of local authorities, and growing social imbalances are all
leading to calls from the domestic audience for a clear focus on China’s
economy rather than on the reform of global governance. A Chinese specialist
put it bluntly recently: “We do not have the time to care much about G20. Our
domestic problems are too demanding.”15 An attempt to balance these conflicting
sets of expectations is becoming increasingly difficult for the Chinese leadership.
Yet the traditional priority to put domestic issues first has not changed.
In its Africa policies, China finds itself in transition between presenting itself
as guardian of the developing/third/non-aligned world and becoming a leading
member of the club of the most powerful nations. Its power base, however, still
lies with the developing and newly emerging world, particularly with the other
BRIC countries. China has moved towards meeting some international norms
and standards, particularly in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics. This in itself is
not, however, necessarily a positive development as it has brought about increas-
ingly open and proactive interventions in other nations’ domestic affairs. When
protecting the interests of state-owned and state-controlled enterprises, the PRC
often fails to live up to its rhetorical commitments on sovereignty.
If we look ahead, the difficulty of creating and executing a coherent set of
policies to tackle the challenges of China’s increasing integration into the global
economy, society, and polity will grow further: China’s CCP increasingly
encompasses conflicting social interests and political tendencies. In the run-up to
the next National Party Congress in 2012, at least two main groupings have been
identified so far, and competing efforts by party leaders to position themselves
for future leadership posts have already had an impact on key policy issues (Li
2009). No matter how these personnel and policy issues are resolved, the
coexistence of divergent interests within the leadership is going to add further
complexity to the challenge of revising China’s role in global affairs.
Notes
1 For the impact of the crisis on China’s role in global regulation, see Helleiner and
Pagliari (2010).
2 These principles are easily identifiable as the five principles for engagement with
African and Arab countries laid out by the former Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai
during a trip to Africa in 1963–64.
3 Unfortunately, these approaches use a rather broad, unspecific definition of institu-
tions without a clear separation of actors and institutions.
4 These assets are mostly denominated in US dollars, thereby creating the so-called
dollar trap, because their value will most likely diminish as the United States has to
face its growing public deficit.
5 See Zhongguo zhongyang zuzhi tu, at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64163/6418742.
html (accessed 20 March 2009).
6 See “Zhonggong zhongyang zhengce yanjiu sh fuzhuren Zheng Xinli yanjiang,” at
http://finance.sina.com.cn/hy/20090216/19575861569.shtml (accessed 20 March
2009).
7 Interview with Chinese analysts, 19 March 2009.
8 ‘Wang Qishan huijian Ying shou xiang te shi maoyi yu touzi guowu da chen Dai-
weisi’, in Zhongyang zhengfu menhu wangzhan, 13 February 2009, at www.gov.cn/
ldhd/2009-02/13/content_1230684.htm (accessed 19 February 2009).
9 According to Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi at a press conference in Beijing on 7
March 2009. See Zhongyang zhengfu menhu wangzhan, at www.gov.cn/2009lh/
content_1254270.htm (accessed 10 March 2009).
10 “Vice FM: Chinese VP’s visit boosts consensus, friendship, co-op,” 24 February
2009, at www.gov.cn/misc/2009-02/24/content_1240628.htm.
11 According to some experts in China, pressure from Beijing supposedly contributed to
the decision to give a state guarantee to the biggest provider of mortgages in the
United States. Interviews in Beijing and Shanghai, May and June 2009.
12 See ‘Wen Jiabao yu hanhua shengdun’ at http://cn.chinareviewnews.com/crn-webapp/
search/allDetail.jsp?id=100919047&sw=20%E5%9B%BD%E9%9B%86%E5%9B%
A2 (accessed 20 March 2009).
13 See, for example, Zheng Xinli as quoted in sohu.com at http://news.sohu.com/20090305/
n262610819.shtml (accessed 20 March 2009).
14 According to some Chinese sources, this move constituted a brilliant deflection from
thornier issues in the preparation of the summit (Anderlini 2009; Eichengreen 2009).
15 Interview at the Development Research Center, Beijing, May 2010.
14 Conclusion
Role theory, role change, and the
international social order
Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank, and
Hanns W. Maull
States, and to some extent also international organizations such as the European
Union and NATO, now hold a host of national and international roles that con-
stitute their identity, regulate their behavior, and shape the international social
order. The chapters in this volume situate role theory within social and IR theory
and describe recent patterns of role change by states (the United States, China,
Germany, Poland, Sweden, Norway), both nationally and within the social
context of international organizations (the European Union, NATO) of which
they are members, with a particular focus on the role of the United States as the
current hegemon in international relations.
The preceding chapters have focused upon the post-Cold War era, a period of
manifest change of power relations (military unipolarity) and regime character-
istics (the third wave of democratization). Patterns of enacting foreign policy
roles in this period have been complex and varied even for the inevitably limited
number of countries that we have covered here. This concluding chapter will not
try to summarize the findings of the preceding chapters. Instead, we will focus
on the three research questions raised in the introduction: (1) the nature and
extent of role change and its causation, (2) role conflicts and their management,
and (3) the future of US hegemony from the perspective of role theory.
Role change: dimensions, degrees, and causation

In assessing this volume’s findings, we distinguish between three types of role
change, ranging from instrumental and strategic adaptation via learning (includ-
ing the change of foreign policy goals) to transformation, implying a change of
identity and thus interests (Table 14.1).
This conceptual typology obviously resembles established categories of
foreign policy change in foreign policy analysis (FPA; Hermann 1990; Levy
1994; Medick-Krakau 1999; Rosati et al. 1994). But it also allows for causal and
constitutive reasoning (or even a combination of the two),1 enabling us to bridge
the rationalist/constructivist gap – something that has repeatedly been demanded
in the debate in IR theory (Jupille et al. 2003: 20–4).
This volume’s empirical chapters focused on different dimensions and
degrees of role change and on identifying different mechanisms that explain this
Conclusion: roles and international order 253
Table 14.1 Typology of role change: dimension, degrees, mechanisms and findings
Degree of role Dimension of role Mechanism of role Findings

change change change
Role adaptation Change of Crisis learning; Poland, US, Norway,

(1st degree) instruments and socialization via France
strategies with social influence
stable foreign
policy goals
Role learning Change of foreign Crisis learning; Germany,
(2nd degree) policy goals socialization via Poland, Sweden, China
normative
persuasion
Role transformation Change of identity Identity NATO as an international
(3rd degree) and thus interests (re-)formation; organization;
socialization via NATO’s new member
internalization states
change. The sources for these role changes may be internal, external, or both;
they may occur bottom-up/inside-out within states and societies, as well as top-
down/outside-in through interaction of states and societies with others.
Domestic factors have played an important role in assessing role change. The
first mechanism producing role change is the growing democratization of foreign
policy. Of course, in a democratic polity we will more frequently find multiple –
and often competing – internal foreign policy role conceptions, and instrumental
and strategic changes in role enactment will often reflect a change in government
(Folz, Frank) or the rise of one particular faction within an administration
(Maull, Wolf ). China, although not a democratic polity, displays a similar adap-
tation of role conception and role enactment in a proactive effort by the govern-
ment to sustain and enhance its domestic legitimacy (Gottwald and Duggan).
A second mechanism leading to role change is persuasion through communi-
cative action. Persuasion may be particularly powerful as a means of outside-in
role change in the context of a community of democracies. Thus, Müller claims
that democracies (and their offspring: transnational non-governmental organiza-
tions) can use “communicative action” to influence others’ foreign policy roles
because democratic governments must regularly justify their actions in elections
(or at least through somewhat similar ratification procedures). They also tend to
allow for non-governmental participation in foreign policy (role) making
to foster their legitimacy, thus laying themselves open to persuasion. According to
Müller, the growing number of international organizations adds to the power of
communicative action because their representatives, for example the UN
secretary-general, frequently cannot but recur to the logic of deliberation and
persuasion if they want to enact their mandated roles.
We also found considerable evidence for role change through socialization,
which in fact implies complex two-way interactions. In the wake of the Cold War,
international organizations such as NATO und the European Union have initiated
socialization processes in prospective member states and partner states, producing
substantial changes in foreign policy roles. Those interactions have led to a new
equilibrium of role relationships encompassing fragile (NATO–Russia, EU–
Russia), eroding (EU–ACP), and reified role relationships. However, as Trine
Flockhart, Ole Elgström, and Rikard Bengtsson show in their respective chapters,
the interaction between old and new members within NATO and the European
Union changed not only the new members’ foreign policy roles but also the organ-
izations themselves and even their established members. Collectively, the
members’ ability to take up new (and potentially even diverging) roles can be seen,
with Mead, as rooted in a growing capacity for differentiated self-identification
with a rising number of “significant others” (see Harnisch, this volume).
Regarding the influences of international organizations on the (re)constitution
of foreign policy roles, institutionalism suggests the following: The higher the
(internal and external) institutionalization of a role, the higher the costs of non-
implementation, because institutions – through information, centralized control,
and the capacity to sanction – are able to affect cost/benefit calculations and thus
role behavior. Sociological role theory similarly suggests that the more salient
the principles and norms of international institutions, and the more important
this institution (or partnership) is to an actor’s identity, the more reluctant that
actor will be to deviate from role expectations (Stryker 2006: 228).
Yet states will usually be members in many international institutions and thus
will conduct relations with many states and non-state actors. Role conceptions
are therefore not only inherently very complex but often also at least potentially
contradictory. An institutionalist perspective portends here that cost/benefit cal-
culations can be conducted in different ways, and that their results will depend
on the assumptions and priorities of decision makers vis-à-vis institutions in any
given situation. Thus, defiance of expectations may well be entirely rational even
in heavily institutionalized settings. Sociological role theory similarly suggests
that the more complex a role (and the broader and more diverse the respective
group of alter role expectations), the greater the role-beholder’s freedom to
neglect certain expectations and follow others, thus resulting in an expectations–
performance gap (Turner 2006: 250).
Role change may, fourth, also result from divergence between role concep-
tion and role enactment – the well-known “conception–performance gap” (Elg-
strom and Smith 2006a: 248). Divergence between role conception and actual
role behavior has been detected by many role scholars (Aggestam 2004; Gross-
man 2005; Harnisch and Maull 2001a; Walker 1987b, 2004; Wish 1980); this
divergence may concern a gap between actual behavior and ego expectations,
but also perceptions and expectations by others. In this line, Elgström and
Bengtsson in their chapter have argued convincingly that alter expectations can
substantially impact on the successful enactment of specific roles, in their case
the normative great power role of the European Union. They found that the same
core values that resonate well domestically within EU member states, such as
democracy, human rights, and rule of law, have led externally to the European
Union being perceived as a patronizing or proselytizing actor by states such as
Russia and Belarus, but also in Africa, impeding European policies towards
those countries and affecting European self-perception. Gottwald and Duggan
have offered support for this argument with regard to China’s Africa policy,
where lesser powers regularly criticize China’s resource extraction policy as
neocolonial and act accordingly to frustrate China’s designs.
The willingness to “assert oneself ” represents a fifth important source of role
change. From a social constructivist perspective, self-assertive behavior reflects
a loss of restraint about the self (identity) and the scope of its responsibilities. As
Ulrich Krotz and James Sperling, and Raimund Wolf have shown in their chap-
ters, it was precisely the competitive self-assertion of France and the United
States that underpinned and legitimated foreign policy role conceptions encour-
aging conflictual behavior among close allies. In their contribution, Krotz and
Sperling have devised what could be called the “power–identity gap hypothesis,”
which explains inter-role conflicts by a collision between rather stable, similarly
deeply anchored (i.e. “history-rich identities”) role conceptions and dramatic
changes in relative power positions.
Competitive self-assertion conflicts need not preclude effective cooperation,
as Franco-American cooperation in NATO and elsewhere showed throughout
the crisis years 2002 and 2003. But as Raimund Wolf found for the Bush admin-
istration’s Iraq policy, self-assertion by an unrestrained executive branch corrob-
orated suspicions – domestically about claims by the Bush administration to
know best how to protect and enhance US national security, and internationally
about a US government claiming to act as the “guardian of the UN Security
Council.” Lack of self-restraint thus eventually undermined the foundations of a
permissive domestic and international environment for US self-assertion, pro-
ducing a growing gap between role conception and performance.
Finally, a severe crisis situation and the uncertainty and emotional pressure it
implies may also change role conceptions and role enactment. In the Iraq
decision, the crises caused by the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington
on 11 September 2001 helped one specific group within the Bush administration
with a coherent role conception to capture the policy process despite substantial
alternative role conceptions within the administration itself, among the US elec-
torate, and in some of America’s closest most trusted allies (Wolf, this volume).
But although it was thereby possible for a small group to achieve significant
foreign policy role change, this does not mean that it is easy to sustain such
change. As the Iraq example shows, the capture of national foreign policy by a
minority group hinges upon their capacity to convincingly argue that traditional
role behavior (e.g. deterrence) is no longer “viable” or “appropriate” in the face
of the uncertainties at hand, and that new strategies (e.g. preemption) must be
used to realize core role expectations. However, as it became ever more obvious
that few Iraqis felt “liberated” as international protest mounted, and more and
more American voters felt that more US self-restraint and more Iraqization were
in order, US role behavior reverted to a more traditional line after the 2006 mid-
term elections (Maull, this volume).
Role conflicts and their management: findings and
explanations
A recurrent theme of the preceding chapters is that role changes may occur when
states face intra- or inter-role conflicts (see also Harnisch 2010; Thies 2010b).
Actors change their role conception and role behavior to maximize utility (e.g.
by adapting instruments and strategy), to retain or regain legitimacy by finding
“appropriate” responses, or after arguing about (new) standards of appropriate-
ness, i.e. norms and values (Harnisch, Müller, and Nabers, this volume).
“Change” thus represents a response to tensions within or between role concep-
tions and role enactments, and “change” will in turn produce new tensions within
and between role conceptions. Foreign policy role conflict therefore has to be
taken as a pervasive phenomenon both within and between states. From our
analysis, we can affirm the simple typology of intra- and inter-role conflicts out-
lined above (Harnisch, this volume), albeit with a slight modification:
• Intra-role conflicts. These conflicts are the result of the complexity of

foreign policy role conceptions, which inevitably incorporate several
important core precepts and principles, norms, and values, as well as an
extensive set of individual role elements. Shifting internal and external cir-
cumstances will require frequent revalidation and revision of role concep-
tions. This, in turn, opens up considerable space for political leaders. They
will have to fill this space, but can also use it as an asset to enhance their
own positions, for example by promoting their own agenda as US president
(Maull, this volume).
• Second, there is inter-role conflict, i.e. a conflict between non-compatible,
competing, or clashing role expectations about self and others between
states and non-state actors. Those conflicts are about domestically and/or
internationally generated expectations; they include mutual perceptions and
assumptions about what the other expects of oneself, and about domestically
generated expectations of the self vis-à-vis the other. Inter-role conflicts will
often also produce intra-role conflicts (domestic contestation of role concep-
tions) and they also might have considerable impact on the international
social order. A specific case of these conflicts is inter-role conflicts with sys-
temic relevance – that is, situations in international relations in which
national role conceptions relating to international order are broadly incom-
patible and conflicting. International relations will then be in upheaval,
pitting actors supportive of the status quo against those demanding funda-
mental changes, including a large-scale redistribution of power and privi-
leges as well as the reorganization of international institutions.
Intra-role conflicts figure in our empirical case studies on the United States and
China (Duggan and Gottwald, and Maull, this volume). In both countries, role
change has been limited and basically confined to the adaptation of strategies
and instruments. In the United States, adaptation became increasingly contested,
pushing the role conflict beyond the confines of the executive branch. Thus, the
election of Barack Obama was in part the result of electoral disapproval of the
role enactment of the administrations of his predecessor, George W. Bush. In the
case of China, there also is at least a latent dimension of contesting the role con-
ception itself, as the communist leadership is acutely aware of its need to ensure
its domestic legitimacy.
Some of our case studies focused on role conceptions of states nested within
a strongly institutionalized social context. The role conflicts here concerned both
types of role conflict mentioned above, but one can also detect an element of
systemic role conflict here, albeit only at a regional level: How would NATO
member states redraw and revise NATO’s collective role in the post-Cold War
world (Flockhart, this volume)? How would Poland’s, Norway’s, and Sweden’s
traditional national role conceptions fit into a regional order dominated by the
European Union (Frank and Folz, this volume)?
The management of those role changes was, as our authors have shown, by
and large very successful; it appears that socialization can play an important role
in promoting such change, as Trine Flockhart points out with regard to NATO’s
Eastern European member and partner states. But variance in successful role
socialization also suggests that the direction and degree of socialization very
much depend on the way those processes are managed politically, both at home
and within the institutional context (Folz, this volume).
Frank and Folz develop a causal pathway for role change that is social rather
than material. In this view, role beholders are socialized into a new understand-
ing of what the appropriate mix of roles in a given role set is: In Poland’s ESDP
policy, the Polish elite “realized that it could play in the European Union’s
premier league” while “learning that its traditional role as America’s staunchest
continental ally” did not bring the benefits expected; in the Norwegian case, the
Bush administration’s drifting role concept and its implications for NATO
induced a reconsideration of Norway’s traditional Atlanticism. However, in both
cases governments tried to shift role conceptions, but they ultimately were con-
fined by what their societies would accept in respective national processes of rat-
ification. As a consequence, our authors find that the probability of large-scale
role modification, let alone transformation, towards a strong, supranational Euro-
pean role conception is quite low.
To explain role change, we found that uncertainty about roles – resulting from
shifts in relative power capabilities and/or from changes in national role concep-
tions – can play a particularly important role not only empirically but also con-
ceptually. In a (causal) rationalist role design, uncertainty is created by the dearth
of information about the role conceptions or role enactment of others, and the
resulting costs and risks this creates for one’s own role performance and its
results (Rathbun 2007). In a constitutive (constructivist) understanding of role
theory, uncertainty refers to a social condition of indeterminacy, a situation in
which the actor does not (immediately) know which role to play, and in which
others will consequently also become uncertain about their own behavior
towards this other actor. In Krotz and Sperling’s analysis, power differentials
and role conflicts between the United States and France, and by extension
between the United States and the European Union, might even result in an “ide-
ational security dilemma” (Brittingham 2007: 148), where the role taken by one
actor deprives the other of a coequal (or at least an acceptable complementary)
role.
The degree of (mutual) “understanding of the ‘other’ ” by the role beholders
may help to alleviate the conflict in terms of role behavior, but as long as these
cross-cutting roles persist, any fundamental transformation of the competitive
relationship seems unlikely. Similar observations apply to the even more import-
ant relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China
(Duggan and Gottwald, this volume).
Role conflict – as is conflict in general – is thus ubiquitous in international
relations, but this does not mean that it will inevitably be destructive. On the
contrary, role conflict management can even be productive in the sense of
enhancing the welfare of all parties involved. Role conflict management and its
consequences are quintessentially political in nature, and thus depend crucially
on political actors and decision makers. A key issue in both rationalist and con-
structivist conceptualizations of role change is how role-beholders and decision
makers “frame” situations of great uncertainty or risk, how they evaluate out-
comes of their role behavior, and what specific options they develop and choose
in their role reconstitution and role enactment. Decision makers, a point stressed
by Marijke Breuning, may, as prospect theory suggests, deviate from “objective
rationality” and, by misperceiving the situation they confront or miscalculating
the responses by others to their own reactions to that situation, produce unex-
pected and unintended consequences. Such misperceptions and miscalculations
cut both ways, of course: decision makers may act in a loss-averse way and thus
miss opportunities to improve their own position and that of their country.
Foreign policy decision makers, and especially political leaders, have a key
task to fulfill in this regard, one that presents them with enormous opportunities
but also great risks. In discharging this task, they will be confined by their
respective national role concepts, but they also have considerable leeway in
reinterpreting those concepts (Nabers and Maull, this volume). The parameters
for political action therefore are, as our empirical findings have shown,
considerable.
Goodbye, hegemony? The United States and its counter and

complementary role takers
Role expectations of the United States, as the current hegemon, are particularly
important for the future evolution of international order. As we argued earlier,
conflicting roles may acquire systemic importance if and when they concern core
aspects of international order – and in today’s world, those will often concern
US leadership and hegemony. There is considerable evidence (some of it pre-
sented in this volume) that this hegemony’s foundations are eroding both at
home and abroad. This raises questions whether, and if so, to what extent and
under what circumstances, US leadership will continue to be accepted by its own
society, by its most important allies (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the
European Union, and Japan), and China as an emerging and status-seeking great
power. The answers to those questions will depend on the complex interplay of
domestic and international expectations along the two dimensions of inside-out
and outside-in role-taking processes that we have sketched above.
As Dirk Nabers, Hanns Maull, and Raimund Wolf stress in their contribu-
tions, US leadership differs in its domestic and international foundations. Fol-
lowing Nye (2008), Nabers conceptualizes US leadership as first and foremost
relational, depending on domestic and international followership, but also
involving continuous contestation both abroad and at home. While US material
power, especially military power, is still superior in most areas, the findings by
Maull, Wolf, and Gottwald and Duggan suggest that its other material (e.g.
technological, economic, and financial) and social resources (such as the United
States’ reputation abroad) have been eroding since the end of the Cold War.
Similarly, the weakening of the domestic authority of the executive branch vis-
à-vis US society – exemplified by the low capacity to extract sufficient financial
resources domestically and the growing polarization of the political parties –
suggests that the international and domestic roles of future US governments will
become increasingly intertwined.
Moreover, it will become harder and harder for the American political process
to strike a sustainable balance between domestic and foreign expectations. A key
issue here will be the management of the extraordinary co-dependency that has
developed between the United States and China in recent years, not only eco-
nomically, financially, and commercially but also in a host of political and even
security issues, ranging from nuclear non-proliferation to international climate
policy. In particular, the management of this crucial co-dependency will be com-
plicated by respective expectations governments in Washington and Beijing face
domestically with regard to sustaining their respective socioeconomic develop-
ment models: spending and borrowing versus trading and lending (Maull, and
Gottwald and Duggan, this volume).
Maull, Wolf, and Gottwald and Duggan agree that President Obama has taken
US role adaptation vis-à-vis domestic and international expectations further. But
their analyses also suggest that the simmering economic crisis, unresolved budg-
etary problems, and shifting electoral expectations may deprive future US
administrations of the political will and the means to commit themselves to a
liberal, i.e. institution-based, role conception of US leadership. Hence, we
suspect that the “paradox of US hegemony” (Cronin 2001) – that is, the tensions
between superior material capabilities, a propensity to act unilaterally, and the
desire to assure long-term systemic stability through legitimate leadership – is
growing.
But if the material and social foundations of US hegemonic leadership are
eroding, then (at least) two very different kinds of responses are conceivable: The
United States might become “isolationist,” reducing external exposure, focusing
on its own domestic agenda, and neglecting the tasks of international leadership.
Alternatively, the United States might again shift towards self-assertive role
behavior aimed at extracting more material resources and ideational support from
its allies and strategic partners so as to underpin its hegemonic position at lower
costs to American society.
At present, we observe an uneasy in-between situation: an America chastened
by its Iraq and, increasingly, Afghanistan experiences that has reverted to its tra-
ditional course of global leadership built on legitimacy and voluntary support.
Since 2005, US administrations have sought and received more “followership”
by its allies and growing (if reluctant) cooperation by the emerging great power
China, which seeks a peaceful and stable international environment to promote
its own domestic agenda (but also increasingly demands respect for its own role
model and an equal say in international institutions). In the wake of the global
financial crisis, this has clearly helped to restabilize US hegemony. Yet this
restabilized hegemony appears distinctly precarious.
For the purpose of our analysis of international social order, it is interesting to
note that the current US predicament stems from deficiencies both of its domestic
economic strategies and of their foreign corollaries, as the current international
institutional order was originally designed to correspond with the US domestic
model (Ikenberry 2001, 2009). We suspect, therefore, that reform in one arena –
be it the domestic or the international context of US hegemony – will require
corresponding measures in the other.
Taking stock: pushing the research frontier

Role taking has long been a natural feature of international relations. But its
importance has been heightened recently, because growing challenges to national
governments necessitate more functional specialization in national policies in the
context of enhanced international cooperation. States (and other international
actors) thus are playing a rapidly increasing number of roles.
In this volume, we have shown that role theory has made important advances
since Stephen Walker (1987b) took stock of the findings of its first generation of
scholarship (see also Le Prestre 1997a). Walker did so, first, by providing a rich
vocabulary, combining concepts from sociology and cognitivist and rationalist
FPA approaches. In this volume, we have suggested a consolidated set of defini-
tions (Harnisch, this volume) and analytically related the term “foreign policy
role” to other prominent concepts from social constructivism, such as identity
and communicative action (Nabers, Flockhart, and Müller, this volume). Second,
the first generation provided a plausible analytical framework to bridge the
domestic and systemic levels of analysis. In this context, we have offered a
typology of different forms of role change – adaptation, learning, transformation
– by states in their bilateral interactions with each other as well as in the social
contexts of international institutions (Frank, Folz, Elgström and Bengtsson,
Maull, Gottwald and Duggan, this volume). Third, earlier role theory had already
developed hypotheses on role change. In this volume, we expanded on this body
of knowledge by linking role theory with other approaches (such as prospect and
discourse theory, and theories of communicative action, identity formation, and
socialization), and we tested several causal pathways to explain role change. In
addition, our contributions have been situated both in the rationalist and in the
social constructivist traditions, thus demonstrating the potential of role theory to
help bridge this gap.
In this volume, we also found that while role changes are ubiquitous in
today’s international social order, this does not mean this order will necessarily
be well ordered or even harmonious. Today, there probably are far more indi-
vidual role elements to mold in one foreign policy set, and far more role sets
(friend, partner, enemy) than current scholarship suggests. The (still) dominant
liberal international order structured by US hegemony has resulted in a growing
number of cases of role contestation not only by states and societies but also by
transnational non-state actors, most dramatically by transnational terrorist groups
in the Middle East and Central Asia.
This volume focused on foreign policy role change, national roles in and of
institutions and the US role as a hegemon in current world politics. As role
theory further develops, we suggest a much broader menu for research: To begin
with, we feel that this volume has far from exhausted the conceptual, let alone
the empirical, study of causation mechanisms that promote or impede role
change. Second, and related to this, future role studies may tackle the scope con-
ditions under which role change occurs, differentiating between circumstances
or events that will catalyze or “trigger” change, and those conditions that create
– or impede – contexts in which role change might occur. To this end, we submit
that an integration of role theory with both rational and constructivist institution-
alism may offer a particularly promising research agenda. Third, in our view it
would be worthwhile to specify the behavioral and speech practices that specific
political entrepreneurs (“change agents”) use to promote and pursue role change.
Here, we particularly invite others to cross the bridge linking role theory with
the theory of communicative action (see Müller, this volume). Fourth, we would
of course be happy to see more individual and comparative research on national
role conceptions and role enactment, as well as on roles of international organi-
zations and non-state actors, in particular those that challenge the current inter-
national social order. Finally, role conflicts and political role conflict
management in the three dimensions of conflict we have sketched above appear
to be promising avenues for future research, including studies on individual
decision makers and political entrepreneurs attempting to reframe roles of states,
non-state actors, and international institutions.
Note
1 Thus, in the following we use the term “explanation” as comprising both causal and
constitutive reasoning.
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Index
Page numbers in italics denote tables, those in bold denote figures.
Aboulafia, M. 39 Amann, D.M. 199

action templates 29 ambiguity, NATO 106
activism, French 216 ambivalence: of nationalism and
actor-specific role scripts 62–9 individualism 49; role behavior 132;
actors: incentive structure 62–3; non-state role scripts 69
63–5; relationship with system 1–2; and Andersen, N.A. 85
structure 21 Andersson, H. 240
adaptation 10, 133; and change 30–1, 32; Andrews, B. 8
role scripts 69–70 anticolonialism, China 239
Addams, Jane 49 Aposkitis, S. 139
adjustment change 30–1 appropriate behavior 61–3
Adler, E. 15, 62, 107, 116, 133 Archer, C. 147, 152, 156, 158
adverse self-identification 46–7 Ariely, D. 27, 34
Afghanistan: NATO 104, 110; transatlantic Armenia 120, 122, 124
relations 177; US and Europe arms control and disarmament 184–5
involvement 182–3; US foreign policy Aron, R. 222
199 Arora, C. 13, 38, 68
Africa: Chinese aid and intervention articulation 85
240–2; see also Sino-African relations “as if ” role taking 43
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) ascription, of roles 12–13
countries, relations with European Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit
Union 124–8 245
agency 98; and structure 16, 21, 36 Asian financial crisis, leadership roles 91
agent-structure problem 27 Askouri, A. 239
Aggestam, L. 27, 78, 114, 132, 148, 149, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
154, 160, 195, 254 (ASEAN) 91
Agius, C. 154 Auerbach, Y. 31
Ahlin, U. 159 Auftragstaktik 56
Albin, C. 59, 66 autonomy 42
Allen, V. 12, 76 axis of evil 198
Alliance for Sweden 162 Azerbaijan 124
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
66 Babarinde, O. 125
Allison, G. 75 Bacevich, A.J. 168
alter-expectations, and political culture 69 Baert, P. 36
alter part 80, 132, 142, 148, 196–7 Baeufre, A. 226–7
altercasting 13 Bailes, A.J.K. 147
Index 307
Baker, R. 205, 208 Bush, George W. 157, 167, 181–2, 205;
Balkan crisis 102–3 Afghanistan 182–3; after 9/11 197–200;
Barnett, M. 14, 15, 25, 38, 62, 77, 78, 79, arms control and disarmament 184;
116, 133 foreign policy 191; neoconservatism
Barroso, Manuel 118–19 208; press attitudes to 207–8; public
Bates, F.L. 75, 76 support 209; relations with Japan 185–6
Baumann, R. 68 Butler, J. 85, 87
Beadle Eid, C. 158 Buzan, B. 167, 238
Beattie, A. 248
Becker, U. 58, 67, 68, 69 Calleo, D.P. 220, 221, 227
behavioral change 149 Campbell, David 81, 82
“Beijing Consensus” 234 Canada 67–8
Belarus, relations with EU 121, 129 Cantir, C. 196
belief and doubt 42 capacity to act 18
Bengtsson, Rikard 3, 8, 113, 113–29, 114, Carr, D. 208
115, 117, 121, 122, 123, 178, 254–5, case studies: European Union, African,
260 Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries
Berger, T. 134 124–8; European Union, Eastern Europe
Berglund, N. 156, 157, 158 and Russia 119–24
Bergman, A. 25, 66, 160, 161 Castle, S. 237
Bergsten, C.F. 243 CBS News/New York Times 209
Between Facts and Norms 59, 61, 72 CCFR 201, 202
Biddle, B.J. 21, 74, 75, 76, 77, 148 Chaban, N. 127
Birkland, T.A. 200 Chafetz, G. 20–1, 23, 30, 31, 32–3, 77, 78,
Björkdahl, A. 60, 155 82, 86–7, 88
Blair, Tony 180 Chan, E. 245
Bolton, J. 208, 209 Chan-Fishel, M. 239
Bolton, M.K. 194 change: and adaptation 30–1, 32; patterns
Bondevik, Kjell Magne 157 and sources 31; Wendt’s concept 80
Borg, S. 155 Chanley, V.A. 201
Borjomi Declaration 122 Checkel, J.T. 25, 149, 151
bounded rationality 27 Chen, Z. 236
Bouton, M.M. 202 Cheney, Dick 204, 208
Brady, E. 200 Chesterman, S. 64
Branigan, T. 245 Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) 244
Bräutigam, D. 239 China: anticolonialism 239; changing
Breslin, S. 234, 238 societal expectations 236; defining
Bretherton, C. 119 policy 246; domestic politics first
Breuning, Marijke 3, 9, 16–35, 23, 24, 25, approach 237–8; domestic view of role
27, 29, 32, 66, 75, 114, 134, 135, 196, in Africa 240; economic conditions
258 243–4; expectations 249; external view
Brewer, M.B. 201 of role in Africa 239–40; five principles
BRIC countries: G20 248; global crisis 236; foreign aid and intervention
management 246–7; and US power 240–2; as future superpower 250; G20
191–2 245–6, 247–9, 250; global crisis
Brittingham, M.A. 27, 258 management 246–7; global financial
Browning, C.S. 21, 25, 159 governance 242–9; global governance
Bull, Hedley 1 244, 250; globalization 250–1; national
Bulmer, S. 142 role conceptions 249; nationalism 236;
Burke, P.J. 32, 76, 80, 82, 83, 86, 205 overview 234–5; political and academic
Burns, J. 89 analyses 235–8; relations with Japan
Burt, R.S. 76 91; role change and adaptation 257;
Busch, M. 168 role expectations 234, 235; role in
Bush, George H. 206 global policies 234–51; role in global
308 Index
China: continued 69–70; small states 66–9; state actors
politics 238–9; role models and 66–9; subjectivity, intersubjectivity and
international behavior 238–49; Sino- role conception 60–1; summary and
African relations 239–42, 250; conclusions 72
sovereignty 240; Sudan and Darfur Community of Democratic Choice 122
240–2; summary and conclusions compatibility 178
249–51; traditional values and norms complex learning 10, 80, 133
236–7; unitary rational actor approach complexity: Franco-American relations
236–7; see also under Sino; US-China 213; NATO 111; of role set 9
relationship Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG),
China foreign policy: adaptation 234; NATO 104–5
learning, adaptive authoritarian system, compulsory power 116
243; role in Africa 234 conception–performance gap 254
“China’s Peaceful Development” 236 conceptual change 149
Chirac, J. 228 Congressional Research Service 234
Christensen, T. 234 congruence 29
Chung, C.P. 237 conscious gestures 41
circular reasoning 57–8 consensus building, NATO 106–7
Civic Platform 144 consensus democracy 70
civilian powers 68–9; Germany 29–30, 68, conservative internationalism 49
69, 133–4 consistency, of role conceptions 132, 148
Clarke, J. 206, 207 constitutive interaction 97
Clauß, M. 227 constructivism 257; implicit role theory
climate convention 66 20–2
Clinton, Bill 204, 206 constructivist approaches: to agent-
“coalitions of the willing” 224 structure problem 27; to role theory 196
Cogan, C.G. 223 containment 101–2
Cognitive Model of the Agent–Structure context-specific roles 114–15, 129
Relationship. 26 cooperation, logic of 178
cognitive role theory 75 core values 254–5; of state 23–4
cognitivism 12, 13 Correlates of War power index 68
Cohen, R. 65 Coser, L.A. 7
coherence 56–7 costs and benefits, in leadership 90
cohesion 14–15; NATO 106 Cotonou agreement 125
Cold War, competition for Europe 230 Cottrell, P. 117
collective self-understandings 20 credibility 87
collective understandings 25 criminal justice 46–7
communication, productive and creative crisis 86–7
capabilities 60 crisis learning 132, 134, 135, 136, 137
communicative action 3, 13, 37, 55–73, crisis situations 255; representation of role
253, 261; actor independent role scripts conceptions 195
61–2; actor-specific role scripts 61, Croenen, S. 222, 223
62–9; civilian powers 68–9; Cronin, B. 259
conceptualization, actor-specific role cultural diversity 60
scripts 62–3; definition and overview culture 20
55–6; diplomats 65; favorable culture of restraint 134
environments 61; fundamental condition Curites, M. 239
for 59; intergovernmental organizations
64; in international politics 61–2; in da Silva, F.C. 37, 38, 39, 42, 44, 52
international relations 58; and Daalder, I.H. 167, 170, 177, 194, 198, 199,
international social order 70–2; middle 203
powers 67–8; non-governmental Daase, C. 197
organizations (NGOs) 63–4; non-state Dagens Nyheter 161, 162
actors 63–5; role script for role change Dahl, R.A. 161
Index 309
daily plebiscites 2 Duggan, Niall 4, 8, 234–51, 253, 255,
Darfur 240–2 256–7, 258, 259, 260
Davies, P.G. 194, 201 Dunn, D.H. 135
de Gaulle, Charles 216–17, 219, 226 Durkheim, Emile 37
de Montbrial, T. 216 Duvall, R. 116
decision frames 27–8 Dylla, D.W. 136
decision makers, perceptions of dynamics 79
opportunities and risks 28 Dyson, T. 133, 138, 140, 143
decision making, possible future research
24–5 East Asia Summit (EAS) 91
Defense Planning Guidance (US), 1992 East, M.A. 18
206 Eastern Europe: socialization, EU 133;
Deitelhoff, N. 8, 13, 55, 59, 61, 62, 65 socialization, NATO 108
deliberation, democratic 43–4 economic crisis 184
democracy 44, 48, 70 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)
democratic deliberation 43–4 125
Democratic Party (US) 206 ego 7, 56–7
democratization 14–15, 70–2, 169, 253 ego-centricity, American 169
Dent, C.M. 91 ego part 77, 80, 132, 142, 148, 196–7
DePorte, A.W. 216 Elgström, Ole 3, 7, 8, 38, 113, 113–29,
Derrida, J. 85 118, 125, 127, 132, 155, 178, 254–5,
Descartes, Réné 39 260
Dessler, D. 12 emergence 41–2; and dialogue; see also
Mead, G.H.
determination, and freedom 39
emergent social objects 41–2
deterrence 229; see also nuclear
empirical investigation 34
deterrence
empirical role theory 27
Deutsch, K. 107
enforcement, American 169
development aid 66
English School approach 238
deviance 84
entrepreneurial leadership 117
diagnostic learning 10 environmental negotiations, European
dialogue: accommodating tension 38–9; Union 118–19
and emergence (see also Mead, G.H. environmental policy, Europe and US 119
identity building 39–41); and social EPA negotiations, EU role conceptions
interaction 36 125–6
Diez, T. 150 Erickson, J. 157
diplomacy: Germany 68; US public ESS 178, 179, 181
support 202–3 Essex School of discourse theory 74
diplomats 61–2, 65 ethical foreign policy 180
disarmament and arms control 184–5 ethical pluralism 60
discourse 81, 85, 87 EU–Russian cooperation 120
discourse theory 10 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
divergence, role conception and behavior 109
254 Europe: Cold War 230; and US in NATO
Dobler, G. 239 106–7
Dodds, A.E. 11, 39, 41 European Commission 118
domestic politics first approach 237–8 European Defence Agency (EDA) 153
domestic role conceptions: France and US European integration 223, 224
230; US after 9/11 200–3 European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)
Downes-Le Guin, T. 197, 200 120, 121
Doyle, M.W. 196 European Partnership Agreement (EPA)
Drew, E. 208 124–5
Drezner, D.W. 209 European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF)
Duchêne, F. 1, 115 139
310 Index
European Security and Defense Policy Evans, G. 241
(ESDP) 3; civilian and military exceptionalism, of US 168, 218
dimensions 138–9, 143; convergence of expectations 254–5; of US 258
foreign policy roles 144–5; impact on explanatory theory vs. moral theory 58–9
role conceptions of Norway 151–4; extraordinary moments 99
impact on role conceptions of Sweden
151, 154–5; Political and Security Faber, G. 125
Committee (PSC) 131, 133; relationship Fabius, L. 222
with NATO 225; role behavior of Fairbank, J.K. 236
Germany and Poland 137–42; scope and fairness 66, 117–18
remit 139–41; as trigger of role change Feith, D. 208, 209
155–62 Ferreira-Pereira, L.C. 154, 155, 161
European Security Strategy 115 Ferrero-Waldner, B. 121, 123
European Union 3, 113–29; in Afghanistan Fewsmith, J. 244
183; African, Caribbean and Pacific Fidos, I. 137, 143
(ACP) countries 124–8; attitudes Finnemore, M. 25, 59, 60
towards US 179; as benign 127; as Fischer, Joschka 134, 138, 140
Buddha 127; as crisis manager 141–2; Fischer, M. 49
Defense Policy Guidelines 139; Eastern Fisher, C.D. 77
Europe and Russia 119–24; eastern five principles, China 236
neighbors’ role conceptions 121–2; Flockhart, Trine 3, 8, 14, 20, 95–112, 99,
environmental negotiations 118–19; EU 103, 109, 149, 150, 151, 181, 254, 257,
and ACP role conceptions 128; 260
European Partnership Agreement (EPA) Fogh-Rasmussen, Anders 98, 110
124–5; German and Polish perspectives Folz, Rachel 3, 67, 131, 147–63, 253, 257,
141–2; independence 225; legitimacy 260
118, 129; militarization 116; national force de frappe 227
role conceptions and US 178–81; as Foreign Affairs 171
normative great power 115–19, 124; foreign aid, Chinese view 240
normative power and international foreign policy: democratization of 253;
leadership 117–19; normative ethical 180; France 219–20; shaping
superiority and strategic partnership 114; and state size 18; United States; see
119–20; Norwegian skepticism towards also US foreign policy
158; overview 113; partner for foreign policy analysis (FPA): diversity 2;
development 125–6; Poland 136–7; emergence of role theory 7; roles in 1
Political and Security Committee (PSC) foreign policy behavior, patterns and
131, 133; post-Cold War 230; promoter sources of change 31
of norms 125–6; relations with US foreign policy roles: continuity and change
177–84; relevance for role change 147; 132–3; convergence within ESDP
role conception in EPA negotiations 144–5; Mead’s analysis 46–51; reasons
125–6; role conception in relation to for change 132
Russia 122–3; role conception in foreign policy strategies, postwar 101
relations with Eastern Europe 120–1; France: atlanticism 231; domestic role
role conceptions 129; role conceptions conceptions 230; European integration
in Greater Europe 124; role performance 223; force de frappe 227–8; foreign
124; Russia’s role conception 123; policy objectives 219–20; independent
shared role conception 124; summary nuclear deterrent 223; national role
and conclusions 128–9; Sweden in 154; conceptions 179–80, 213–14; NATO
as third force 219–20; trade 118; as 221–6, 231–2; relations with US; see
trigger of role change 155–62; US also Franco-American relations
interests 181 resilience of national role conceptions
European Union Military Staff (EUMS) 230; resource constraints 232; role in
225–6 Europe 219–20; see also Franco-
European Union-NATO relations 137–8 American relations
Index 311
Franco-American relations 213–33, 257–8; Gitelson, R.J. 77
activism 216; competition and global crisis management 246–7
contestation 214–18; Europe as third global economic crisis 184; China’s role
force 219–20; France, America, and 242–9; Chinese response 245
NATO 221–6, 231–2; France as allied, global financial governance, China’s role
not aligned 222–3; grandeur 216; 242–9
independence 215–16, 220, 222; nuclear global governance, Chinese approach 244,
deterrence 226–9; overview 213–15; 250
post-Cold War 221; post-war status quo global order, US responsibility 218
218–21; presence (potential) 216–17; Global War on Terror (GWOT) 194
purpose of American power 217–18; globalization 70–1; China 250–1; and
summary and conclusions 229–33; see domestic politics 238; NATO 104–5
also France; US foreign policy gloire (glory) 216
Franco-German strategic concept 222 goal change 30, 31
Frank, Cornelia 3, 8, 131–45, 134, 135, Godement, F. 242
140, 253, 257, 260 Goetschel, L. 68
Frederking, B. 15 Goffman, Erving 75, 84
Freedman, L. 226 Goldmann, K. 31
freedom, and determination 39 Gordon, P.H. 177, 179, 194, 209, 216, 232
Frenkler, U. 169 Górka-Winter, B. 136, 139
functional role theory 75 Gormley, D.M. 185
Furia, P. 203 Gottwald, Jörn-Carsten 4, 8, 234–51, 245,
253, 255, 256–7, 258, 259, 260
G20 245–6, 247–9, 250 Gould, L.L. 206
Gaddis, J.L. 176, 198 Græger, N. 147, 153, 157, 158
Gadziński, M. 136 grandeur, French 216, 220
Gahr Støre, J. 153, 157–8 Great Society 206
Gallois, P. 226–7 Greece 184
Gao, J. 239 Green, M.J. 190, 240
Garrett, G. 247 Greven, T. 206
Gates, R. 209 Grilli, E.Z. 124, 125
Gaullist consensus 215 Grobler, J. 240
Gaupp, P. 8, 17, 18 Gross, E. 133, 138, 142
Gelber, H.G. 236 Grossman, M. 27, 30, 31
Gellman, B. 206 group norms 14
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gu, J. 237
(GATT) 124 GUAM initiative 122
generalized others 11–12, 40, 45–6, 52 Gupta, J. 114
Georgia, relations with EU 122, 123, 124 Gustavsson, J. 30, 31
German Marshall Fund 136, 167 Guzzini, S. 80
Germany: as civilian power 29–30, 68, 69,
133–4, 143; diplomacy 68; foreign Haacke, J. 59
policy role conceptions 133–4; national Haass, R. 184, 195, 200, 204, 208
role conceptions 142–4, 180; Habermas, Jürgen 3, 13, 36–7, 40, 52,
perceptions of EU 141–2; perspective 55–73, 58, 59, 61, 72
on EU-NATO relations 137–8; Hacker, J. 204
prioritization of military or civilian Haddad, D. 28
instruments 138–9; role behavior within Hadley, S. 208
ESDP 137–42; scope and remit in EU Hagan, J.D. 31
defense 139–40; see also European Hall, D.T. 77
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) Hall, J.A. 107, 111
gestures 40–1 Hall, R.B. 21, 23–4, 25, 27, 207
Gheciu, Alexandra 108, 149, 150 Halper, S. 206, 207
Giles, C. 248 Hamilton, P. 37
312 Index
Handel, M. 114 Hunt, M.H. 237
hard power 90 Hunter, A. 240
Hare, P. 239 Hurd, I. 117
Harmel Report 102 Hyoun-Kyu, C. 244
Harnisch, Sebastian 3, 7–15, 8, 10, 12, 16, hypothesis testing 34
18, 23, 25, 30, 36–53, 37, 43, 52, 75, 79,
84, 96, 114, 131, 133, 148, 149, 180, I, and me 39–41, 96
191, 196, 200, 238, 254, 256 ideal speech situation 59
Harvey, C.C. 75, 76 ideal-type perspective 196
Hasenclever, A. 59 ideal types 58–9
Hatoyama, Y. 189–90 ideational legitimacy 118
He, W. 240 ideational liberalism 196
Hegel, Georg 85 ideational security dilemma 258
hegemony 3, 87; see also United States identification 150; and behavioral role
hegemony change 156; and conceptual role change
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 85 160; international organizations 150
Heilman, S. 243 identities 20; roles and images 22–6
Heisbourg, F. 226 identity: conceptualizing 3; construction of
Hellmann, G. 68 21; as fluid process 85; formation 9;
Henderson, J. 236 in-group 201; incompleteness 85;
Herborth, B. 42 meaning of 83; and role 9–12; as set of
Hermann, C.F. 10, 30, 31, 216 meanings 74; as social cognitive
Herolf, G. 155, 162 structure 24; value of 21
Herrberg, A. 114 identity and role change 74–92; leadership
Herrmann, R.K. 20 as role in international politics 88–91;
Heuser, B. 227 overview 74; role and identity 82–3;
Hey, J. 18 role, identity and change 84–7;
Hickson, C. 239 summary and conclusions 91–2
hierarchy 3 identity building 39–41
High, B. 207, 208 identity change, triggers 84
Hils, J. 194, 201 identity theory, social psychological 83
Hippler, J. 183 IISS 200
historical-cultural trajectory 63 Ikenberry, G.J. 89–90, 98, 101, 104, 106,
Hitchcock, W. 104 150, 209, 214, 260
Hoffman, B. 197, 200 images, roles and identities 22–6
Hoffmann, A. 133 imitation 14
Hogg, M.A. 9 incentive structure, actors’ 62–3
Holland, M. 124, 125, 127 incentives, in leadership 90
Hollis, M. 17, 72, 75, 79, 82, 84, 92, 98 incompatibility 178
Holslag, J. 239 incompleteness, of identity 85
Holsti, K.H. 1, 7, 14, 17, 19, 23, 25, 31, independence: European Union 225;
32, 37, 77, 78, 88, 98, 99, 114, 132, 195, French 215–16, 220, 222
196–7, 202, 215, 216 indeterminacy 79
Honneth, A. 59 individualism, ambivalence 49
Hopf, T. 21, 23–4, 25, 27, 28, 34 Ingebritsen, C. 25, 32, 60, 114, 152, 158
Horolets, A. 145 Ingram, P. 185
Howarth, D. 81 instability, of role set 98
Howorth, J. 132, 220, 223, 228 instinctive atlanticism, Poland 135–6
Hu Jintao 241, 242, 245, 246, 247 institution building 101
Huang, C.H. 240 institutional power 116
Huddy, L. 200, 201 institutionalism 254
Hudson, V.M. 23, 25, 29, 30, 31, 33 inter-role conflicts 14, 256
Hughes, C.W. 188–9, 236, 237 interaction, agent and structure 16
Hunt, K. 221 interdemocratic relations 70–2
Index 313
intergovernmental organizations 64 Jepperson, R.L. 21
internal orientation change 30 Jervis, R. 199
International Atomic Energy Agency Joas, H. 46
(IAEA) 64 Johnston, A.I. 132, 136, 236, 237
international negotiations, Deitelhoff study Johnstone, I. 60
61 Jones, E. 184
international norms, and domestic values 25 Jönsson, C. 7, 17, 38, 65
international organizations: identification
150; resonance 150–1; and role change Kaarbo, J. 196
148–51, 162–3, 254; see also Norway; Kagan, R. 206, 207
Sweden role change in 3; socialization Kahneman, D. 27, 28, 34
133, 149; uncertainty 150 Kanet, R.E. 182
international orientation change 30, 31 Kant, Immanuel 58
international politics, identity and role Kaplowitz, N. 20
change: see identity and role change Karlsson, B. 154
leadership as role in 88–91; Mead on Kaufmann, C. 209
46–51 Keating, M. 16
international relations (IR) approaches, to Keck, O. 58, 59
role theory 77–81 Keith, R.C. 237
international relations (IR) theory, role Keller, P. 168, 182, 204, 207
concepts 1–2 Kessler, G. 204
international roles 114 key concepts, operationalization 7–15
international social order, and key questions 2
communicative action 70–2 Khong, Y.F. 194, 198, 205, 206
international socialization theory 149–50 Kilian, B. 119
internationalism 48, 49 Kim, S.S. 240
interpersonal relationships, significant Kirkpatrick, J. 206
others 11–12 Kirste, K. 8, 68, 77, 78–9, 114, 132, 133,
intersections between structure, agent, and 148
identity in constructivism 22 Kissinger, Henry 1
intersubjectivity, subjectivity and role Kite, C. 38
conception 60–1 Knutsen, B.O. 152
intra-role conflicts 256–7 Kohl, W. 227
Iran, US relations with 200 Koizumi, Jun’ichiro 185–6
Iraq: Japanese involvement 188–9; Kolodziej, E. 219
Norway’s attitude to 157; Polish Kosovo 69, 104, 133, 135, 177
involvement 136, 137; public opinion Kowert, P. 25
209; transatlantic relations 177; US Krafft, U. 227
invasion 198, 199, 208–9 Kratochwil, F. 88
Ismay, Lord 95, 97 Krauthammer, C. 205, 206, 208, 221
issue-specific role conceptions 32 Krebs, R.R. 204
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) 109, Kristensen, K.S. 103, 109
110 Kristol, I. 205–6, 207
Krotz, Ulrich 4, 8, 107, 132, 148, 149, 179,
Jackson, R.H. 60, 204 213–33, 255, 257
Jacobsen, P.-V. 161 Küng, Hans 60
Jacobson, G.C. 209 Kupchan, C.A. 89–90, 150, 214
Jacoby, L.E. 229 Kurlantzick, 240
Jacques, M. 250 Kuzma, L. 25
James, P. 28 Kydd, A. 44
James, W. 39, 42
Japan: as civilian power 29–30; relations Lacan, J. 85
with China 91; relations with US Laclau, E. 74, 81, 84, 85, 86, 87
185–200; role conceptions 187–8 Lake, D. 15, 197
314 Index
Lampton, D.M. 234, 238 Lumsdaine, D.H. 59, 66
Landaburu, Eneko 121 Luo, J. 236
Landsdowne, H. 244
Langer, G. 201 Maastricht Treaty 223
language: development 41–2; identity McCain, John 209
transformation 81; as living 60; moods McDonald Ladd, J. 201
42; reframing 43; as social mechanism McDougall, W.A. 217
40–1; as social practice 36; use of 20 MacGregor Burns, James 88
Large, D. 241 Mackiewicz Wolfe , W. 204
Larson, S. 152, 158 Maćków, Jerzy 135
Le Prestre, P.G. 7, 12, 27, 30, 31, 194, Malici, A. 13
195, 260 Malinowski, K. 135, 141, 143
leadership 3; American 169, 179, 217, Malmborg, M. 154
259; behavioral perspective 89; defining Malone, D.M. 194, 199
117; expectations of 114; models of Mancall, M. 237
88–9; as role in international politics Mandelson, P. 126
88–91 Mann, J. 176
leadership roles 44 Manners, I. 1, 115, 116–17
League of Nations 48–50 Mansfield, E. 15, 52
“League to Enforce Peace” 49 Mao, T. 239
Leander, A. 80 mature states 12–13
learning 10–11, 90; emergence in societies Mauer, V. 185, 190
43–4; as transformation 42 Maull, Hanns W. 1, 3–4, 7, 8, 29–30, 56,
Lee, C.K. 239 68, 69, 70, 77, 78–9, 79, 104, 107, 114,
Lee-Ohlsson, F. 155, 160, 161 131, 133, 138, 144, 148, 149, 167–92,
Leffler, M.P. 198, 205 178, 180, 217, 233, 238, 253, 254,
legal norms 60 256–7, 258, 259, 260
legitimacy 117–18, 168; European Union me 52; and I 39–41, 96
129 Mead, G.H. 3, 9, 10, 11, 21, 36–53, 75, 96;
Legro, J.W. 25, 236 adverse self-identification 46–7;
Levy, Jack 10, 133, 191 ambivalence of nationalism and
Li, A. 239 individualism 49; concept of self 39;
Li, C. 250–1 conservative internationalism 49;
Li, Q. 201 contribution to role theory 51; core
Liao, K.S. 237 assumptions 36; on criminal justice
Liao, X. 236 46–7; democracy 44; dialogue 38–9;
Libby, L. 208 effective government 44; elements of
liberal internationalism 100 social theory 38–44; emergence of
lifeworlds 13, 45–6, 72 learning 43–4; emergent social objects
Lind, M. 207 41–2; on foreign policy role taking 37;
Lindberg, L.N. 90 identity building 39–41; and
Lindsay, J.M. 167, 170, 194, 198, 199, 203 international politics 46–51;
Linton, Ralph 75 internationalism 48; language moods 42;
Lipman-Blumen, J. 84 leadership roles 44; League of Nations
Liu, G. 236 48–50; linguistic development 41–2; on
Lobasz, J.K. 204 militarism 47–8; moral philosophy 43;
logic of cooperation 178 nation state 47–8; national mindedness
Loi de Programmation Militaire 216 50–1; overview 36–8; philosophy of
Lomé conventions 124–5 action 43; play and game analogy 40;
Longhurst, K. 133, 135 reconstruction of self 42; self-restraint
Lopata, H.Z. 75 and social organization 44; theory of
Lucarelli, S. 119 self-identification 42; World War I
Lukashenko, Alexander 121 48–50
Lukes, Steven 88 Mead, W.R. 168
Index 315
Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), NATO National Military Strategy (US), 2005 229
109, 110 national mindedness 50–1
Meiers, F.-J. 145 “National-Mindedness and International-
Membership Action Plan (MAP), NATO Mindedness” 46, 50–1
108 national role conceptions 1, 17; American
Merkel, Angela 69 169; defining 132, 148; derivations 25;
meta-roles 114–15, 129 domestic and international contexts 24;
Meunier, S. 118, 232 domestic sources 19; Franco-American
Meyer, C.O. 132, 134, 136 relations 213–14; functions 214–15;
Michel, L. 126 Germany and Poland 142–4; issue-
middle powers 67–8 specific 32; multiple 32; and problem
Miles, L. 154 representation 28; and role performance
militarism 47–8 23; see also role conceptions
military non-alignment, Sweden 154, 161 national role conceptions, convergence
military supremacy, United States 147
199–200, 207, 225 National Security Strategy (US) 2002 197
Mills, J.D. 234 nationalism: ambivalence 49; rise in China
Mind, Self, and Society 44, 46 236
Ming, X. 237 NATO 3; 1945–89 101–2; 1989–99 102–3;
Miskimmon, A. 134, 138, 142 1999 onwards 103–5; Balkan crisis
Missiroli, A. 225 102–3; community building 106–7;
Miszczak, K. 140, 144 competing visions 104–5; complexity
Mo, H. 247 111; Comprehensive Political Guidance
Moldova 124 (CPG) 104–5; and constitution of roles
Molle, S. 222, 223 95–112; constructing and reconstituting
Moore, R. 108, 109, 110 the self 101–5; containment 101–2;
moral agent 43–4 crises 104; Europe in 106–7; European
moral norms 60 and US role conceptions 178; European
moral principles, in international relations Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
59 225; Franco-American relations 221–6,
moral theory vs. explanatory theory 58–9 231–2; institutional structures 103;
morality, middle powers 67 mature alliance 111–12; Mediterranean
Moravcsik, A. 24, 194, 196 Dialogue (MD) 109; membership 103,
Moreno, Jacob 75 108–9; Membership Action Plan (MAP)
Morgenthau, H.J. 1, 237 108; New Strategic Concept 104–5;
Mouffe, C. 81, 84, 85, 86 norm socialization 107–8; Norway in
Mouritzen, H. 154, 159 152, 156–7; Norwegian popular support
Moyo, D. 239 158; overview 95–7; partners 95–6;
Mueller, J. 201 partnership groups 110; partnerships
Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G. 231 109–11; Poland in 138, 140–1; post-
Müller, Harald 3, 8, 13, 55, 55–73, 56, 57, Cold War 222, 224, 257; reconstructing
61, 62, 65, 69, 71, 90, 253, 256, 260, other 103; role conception and role set
261 105; role prescriptions 98; role theory
multilateral negotiations 90 97–9; secondary self 102; security 109;
multilateralism 203, 244 as security community 107; self-
multiple roles 32–3 conception 104; self-identity 95; self,
Mung, E.M. 239 we and other 96; “significant we” 101;
social identity theory (SIT) 99–100; as
Nabers, Dirk 3, 8, 10, 20, 23, 74–92, 84, socializing agent 97; Strategic Concept
88, 91, 114, 117, 256, 258, 259, 260 103–4; structural changes 99; supporting
NAC 104 factors 178; tensions 177;
naming 85–6 transformation of relations 106–11; US
Nanto, D.K. 184 in 223–6; Warsaw Pact countries 103,
nation state 47–8 108; we-identity 95–6
316 Index
NATO Response Force (NRF) 104, 140 nuclear deterrence 226–9; see also
NATO–Russian Permanent Joint Council deterrence
109 nuclear protection 106
Nau, H. 182, 183 Nye, F.I. 75, 84
Neack, L. 18, 33 Nye, Joseph 88, 89, 90, 168, 259
negotiations, multilateral 90
neoconservatism, United States 205–9 Obama, Barack 167; Afghanistan 183;
Neumann, I.B. 65, 150 arms control and disarmament 184–5;
neutrality, Sweden 154, 161 economic crisis management 184; effect
“Never alone again” 134 on US-European relations 182; foreign
New Strategic Concept 102, 103 policy 171–3, 191; relations with Japan
Nice European Council 153 186
Nicolaïdis, K. 118 Odgaard, L. 237
Nilsson, C. 155, 159 O’Hanlon, M.E. 177
9/11 194–210; and deterrence 229; effect Ojanen, H. 154, 161
on US foreign policy 197–200; Olechowski, A. 141
European reactions 182; overview Onyszkiewicz, J. 135, 139
194–5; public role conception 203–5; operationalization, key concepts 7–15
state capture 207–9; summary and opportunities 28
conclusions 210; US domestic role organizational role theory 75
conceptions 200–3; US-Japanese organized others 45, 52
relations 185–6; see also US foreign organized society 45–6
policy Osgood, R. 217
Niquet, V. 245 Osica, O. 135, 136, 138, 139, 140
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) othering, Franco-American relations 214
63–4 others: significant and generalized 11–12;
non-recognition 59 taking role of 41, 44; understanding of
non-state actors 63–5 258
Nonnenmacher, G. 216 “out of area” debate 225
norm entrepreneurs 25, 32, 60 Overhaus, M. 134, 137, 139
Norman, L. 247
normative great power 114–19 pacifism 68
normative persuasion 13 Page, B.J. 202
normative theory 58 Pape, R.W. 197
norms 20, 25, 60, 76, 151, 173, 176 paradox of US hegemony 259
North Atlantic Cooperation Council partners, NATO 95–6
(NACC) 108 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 108, 109, 110
Northouse, Peter 89 Paterson, W.E. 133, 180
Norval, A.J. 81, 86 path dependency 178
Norway 147–63, 257; Atlantic role Patten, Chris 120
conception 152–3; attitude to Iraq war patterns, of change 31
157; ESDP as trigger for behavioral role Pei, M. 201
change 156–9; European Defence Peirce, Charles Sanders 41, 42
Agency (EDA) 153; identification 156; People’s Republic of China (PRC) see
impact of ESDP on role conception China
151–4; mediating role 68; in NATO Perle, R. 208
152, 156–7; popular support for NATO perspective 27
158; relations with US 157; resonance Persson, Göran 161
157–8; role change post 1989 151–4; persuasion 13, 62–3, 253
skepticism towards EU 158; troops for Petersen, Jan 156
influence strategy 153, 156; uncertainty Peterson, M.J. 104
156 Pevehouse, J. 15
novice states 12–14 Pichler, L. 223
Nowak-Jeziorański, J. 136 Pierson, P. 28, 204
Index 317
Pillar, P. 198 prospect theory 27, 28, 34, 258
Plesch, D. 206 public opinion 44; after 9/11 200–2; and
plurilateralism 199 terrorism 197
Podhoretz, N. 205 public role conception, United States
Poland 257; “America’s new model ally” 203–5
135–6; European Union 136–7; foreign punishment, and reward 14
policy role conceptions 134–6; national Putin, Vladimir 123
role conceptions 142–4; perceptions of Pyle, K.B. 186
EU 141–2; perspective on EU-NATO
relations 137–8; prioritization of Quattrone, G.A. 27, 34
military or civilian instruments 138–9;
role behavior within ESDP 137–42; Raine, S. 239
scope and remit in EU defense 140; see Ramo, J.C. 234
also European Security and Defense rang (rank) 216
Policy (ESDP) Rathbun, B. 257
polarized democracy 70 rationalism 10, 12, 257
policy windows 30 rationalist cognitive concepts. 2
Political and Security Committee (PSC) Ravenhill, J. 124, 125
131, 133 rebalancing, of role conceptions 32–3
political culture, and alter-expectations 69 Reckwitz, A. 75
politics of greatness 216 recognition 59, 114
Pomorska, K. 137, 143 reconstitution 98
Pond, E. 104 reframing 43
Poon, T. 248 regional deterrence 229
Popper, Karl 34 Reiter, J. 139
Posel-Częścik, E. 136, 139 Reitzes, D.C. 80, 82, 86
post-war status quo 218–21 Renan, Ernest 2
“Postmetaphysical Thinking” 52 representation, of situations 28
Powell, C. 205 republican liberal perspective 196
power: asymmetrical 13; hard and soft 90; Republican Party (US), neoconservatism
Lukes’ definition 88; relative 18; types 205–7
of 116 research agenda 27–33
power–identity gap hypothesis 255 research, possible future 260
practice of reasoning 38 resonance 150–1, 157–8, 161–2
pragmatic realism 204 Revolution in Military Affairs 225
pragmatism 36; American 169, 182 reward, and punishment 14
Prasad, E. 246 Reynolds, P. 237
presence (potential), French 216–17 Rice, C. 182, 204, 205, 209
presidential approval ratings, United States Ricks, T.E. 209
201 Rieker, P. 147, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157,
Prestowitz, C. 199 158, 161
preventive war 198 Ringsmose, J. 102, 103, 104
Price, R.M. 59 risks 28
proactivism 67–8 Risse, T. 13, 55, 90
problem representation 28 Robinson, S. 194, 205, 208
problematic situations 42, 43 Roguwska, B. 136–7, 145
process 80 role: applying to states 1–2; concept of
Prodi, Romano 120 56–8; ego part 56–7; and identity 9–12;
productive power 116 origin of concept 1
program change 30–1 role adaptation 10, 97
progressive internationalists 49 role ambiguity 76
Project for the New American Century role and identity: in early role theory 9; in
(PNAC) 207 later role theory 11
proportional deterrence 227 role, behavior, identity 82
318 Index
role change 12–14; classical understanding role theory and research in international
84; conceptualizing 3; domestic factors socialization 149
253; and identity 74–92; and interaction role theory research 16–35; antecedents
with international organizations 148–51; 17–20; borrowing 35; as collective
in international organizations 3; endeavor 35; concepts and key terms,
management 257; role scripts for 69–70; clear 35; context and overview 16–17;
triggers 84; typology 252–3, 253 empirical challenge 33–5; hypothesis
role coherence 56–7 testing 34; systematic empirical
role cohesiveness, and democratization investigation 34
14–15 roles: ascription of 12–13; defining 8;
role conceptions 38; change 32; dynamics and indeterminacy 79; as
congruence 29; defining 8–9, 114; empowering 44; images and identities
definition 78; European Union (see also 22–6; imposed 33; multiple 32–3;
European Union evolution 20); multiplicity 56; as opportunity structures
identification 29; mutually supportive 72; as rationalist cognitive concepts. 2;
178; national 15; national differences as social constructs 2; stability 69
99; norms 76; rebalancing 32–3; Rosenau, J.N. 31
representation of US 195–7; sources of Rotfeld, Daniel 138, 141
99; subjectivity and intersubjectivity Rouget, W. 216, 227
60–1; see also national role conceptions routine situations 42
role conflict 76, 256–8; leaders and Roy, D. 236
followers 89; management 256–8; Rozhnov, K. 237
typology 256 Rudolf, P. 133, 180, 182, 183
role discontinuity 76 Ruggie, J.G. 19, 26, 88
role distance 84 Rumsfeld, D. 199, 204, 208, 209
role enactment 9 Russia: as great power 122; role change
role expectations 76, 114; defining 8 69–70; role conception of EU 123, 129
role identities 78, 80 Rynning, S. 102, 103, 104
role learning 12
role making 11 SACEUR system 223
role malintegration 76 Sagan, S. 227–8
role models 238 Sakaki-Wittig, A. 187
role of the other 41 Saliency of communicative action as a
role overload 76–7 function of actor attributes and
role performances 9, 23, 99, 114 institutional setting 73
role prescriptions 114 Sampson, M.W. III 78
role scripts: actor independent 61–2; actor Sarbin, T. 12
specific 61, 62–9; adaptation and change Sarkozy, N. 231, 232
69–70; as normative 69; for role change Sárváry, K. 80
69–70 Sauder, A. 220, 223
role senders 89 Savignac, J.-C. 216
role set 9 Scalapino, R.A. 237
role theorists: national differences 7–8; Scheingold, S.A. 89, 90
United States see US role theorists Schieder, S. 180
role theory: advances 260; constructivist Schimank, U. 149
approaches to 196; emergence in Schimmelfennig, F. 13–14, 108, 133, 149,
foreign policy analysis 7; European 150, 151
Union 114–15; international relations Schlag, G. 98
(IR) approaches to 77–81; liberal Schmalz, U. 138
reading 196; NATO 97–9; perspectives Schmidt, B. 205
75; and research in international Schmidt, H. 210, 219
socialization 149–50; within social Schröder, Helmut 69
theory 2–3; sociological approaches Schüngel, D. 155
74–7, 254 Searing, O.J. 14
Index 319
secondary self, NATO 102 small states 66–7
Security and Defense Policies (ESDPs): Smith, A.M. 81, 85, 87
Germany and Poland 131–45; overview Smith, M. 7, 38, 132
131; see also Germany; Poland Smith, S. 17, 31, 72, 75, 79, 82, 84, 92, 98,
security community, NATO as 107 254
self 38–42; and society 40 Smith, T. 60, 201
self-assertive behavior 255 Smyser, W.R. 68
self-conceptualizations 7 Snyder, J. 52, 224
self-identification 42 social capital 42
self-identity, NATO 95 social cognitive structure, identity as 24
self-images 20 social constructivism 10, 16; role learning
self-reflection 43 12
self-reflexive discourse 43 social constructs, roles as 2
self-restraint, and social organization 44–6 social facts 37
Self–Society Relation and Role-Taking social groups 100
Mechanism 40 social identity theory (SIT) 99–100
self-understandings: of actors 44; social influencing 14
collective 20 social instability, and social change 84
Sellers, M.N.S. 199 social objects 38, 41–2
Sending, O.J. 56, 69 social order, and self 38–9
Serpe, R.T. 32 social organization, and self-restraint 44–6
Shambaugh, D. 234 social roles, expanding number 7
Shannon, V.P. 168 socialization 13–14, 132–3, 134, 136–7,
Shapiro, J. 177, 179, 183, 184 149–50, 253–4, 257
shared understandings 13 socialization theory 14
Sheahan, L. 126, 127, 128 sociological role theory 74–7, 254
Sheng, A. 243 soft power 90, 236
Shichor, Y. 240 Solana, Javier 120
Shih, C.-Y. 17 Sørensen, G. 25
Shirk, S. 236 Sorkin, I. 246
Sicular, T. 240 sources, of change 31
significant alters 134, 137; see also Soutou, G.-H. 222
significant others sovereignty 48, 158, 187, 240
significant gestures 41 Soviet Politburo 69
significant others 11–12, 40 Soviet Union, dissolution 108
significant symbols 40 Sowohl-als-auch policy 134
“significant we” 99, 100 speech acts 170
signs 41 Sperling, James 4, 8, 107, 179, 213–33,
Sikkink, K. 59, 60 218, 225, 255, 257
Sikorski, R. 138, 140, 144, 145 Sprout, H. 131
Simmel, Georg 75 Sprout, M. 131
Simon, H. 19, 27, 201 Srinivasan, S. 240
Singer, J.D. 17 Staack, M. 207
Singh, R. 167, 198 stability 84; roles 69
Sino-African relations 239–42, 250 Stahl, B. 144
Sino-European relations 245 Stanway, D. 244
Sino-Japanese relations 236 state actors 66–9, 67–8, 68–9
Sino-Sudanese relations 240–2 state, core values 23–4
Sino-Taiwanese relations 236 state size 18
Sino-US relations see US–China state socialization 13–14, 103
relationship Statham, A. 7, 18, 21, 32
situations, routine and problematic 42 status quo, post-war 218–21
Sjursen, H. 116 Stavrakakis, Y. 85
Skidmore, D. 31 Steinberg, D. 241
320 Index
Stelzenmüller, Constanze 182 theory of communicative action (TCA) see
Stelzer, I. 206 communicative action
Stephanson, A. 217 Thies, C. 7, 8, 13, 18, 20, 256
Stets, J.E. 76, 83, 86 Thränert, O. 200
Stevens, C. 127 Tiilikainen, T. 152
Stoltenberg, Jens 157 Tisdall, J. 158
Strategic Concept 103–4 Tofte, S. 152, 156
strategic partnership, EU and Russia 122 Torfing, J. 81
stream of consciousness 39 transformation of relations, NATO 106–11
Struck, Peter 140 transformative ontology 12
structural functionalism 18–19 transnational deterrence 229
structural leadership 117 Treaty of Lisbon 141–2
structural power 116 triggering 227
structural role theory 18, 75 troops for influence strategy 153, 156
structure 16, 21 trust 44
Stryker, S. 7, 18, 21, 32, 76, 254 Trzaskowski, R. 140
Stütz, G. 162 Tucker, R.C. 88
subject 85 Tunander, O. 154
subjectivity, intersubjectivity and role Turner, J.H. 45, 76, 84, 86, 99
conception 60–1 Turner, R.H. 1
Subramanian, A. 243 Tversky, A. 27, 28, 34
Sudan, Chinese role 240–2 Tyler, P.W. 206
Sun, M. 244
Sundberg, A. 155, 159 Udgaard, N.M. 153, 158
Sweden 147–63, 257; ESDP as trigger for Ukraine, relations with EU 122, 123, 124
conceptual role change 159–62; in UN Security Council (UNSC) 64, 199
European Union 154; identification uncertainty 43, 147, 150, 156, 159, 257
160; impact of ESDP on role unconscious gestures 40–1
conception 151, 154–5; as military Underdal, A. 90, 117
non-aligned activist 161; military non- understandings, shared 13
alignment 154, 161; neutrality 154, unilateralism, United States 198–9
161; political practice 67–8; resonance unit-level processes 26
161–2; role change post 1989 154–5; unitary rational actor approach 236–7
uncertainty 159 United Kingdom 180
Switzerland, mediating role 68 United Nations Secretary General 64
Sylvan, D.A. 28 United States: domestic role conceptions
symbolic interactionism 11, 21, 37, 75 230; and European Allies 181–5;
system, relationship with actors 1–2 European integration 224;
systems theory 18–19 exceptionalism 168, 218; global order
Szechenyi, N. 190 218; leadership role 169, 179, 217, 259;
military supremacy 199–200, 207, 225;
Tallberg, J. 117 national role conceptions 213–14;
Tannenwald, N. 59 NATO 106–7, 223–6; neoconservatism
Taylor, I. 239, 240 205–9; nuclear deterrence 228–9; post-
Tazbir, J. 135 Cold War national role conception
Terada, T. 91 230–1; presidential approval ratings
terrorism see 9/11 201; public support for diplomacy
Tertrais, B. 228 202–3; public support for
Teufel Dreyer, J. 237 multilateralism 203; purpose of power
Tewes, H. 38 217–18; relations with China 247;
The Audacity of Hope 171 relations with France (see Franco-
The Economist 246 American relationsrelations with
“The Psychological Bases for Norway 157); representation of role
Internationalism” 46–7 conceptions 195–7; resilience of
Index 321
national role conceptions 230; resource von der Oelsnitz, D. 168
constraints 233; role adaptation 259; Voss, J.F. 28
role change and adaptation 256–7;
support for military action against Wæver, O. 101, 220
Saddam Hussein 202 Wagener, M. 238
United States hegemony 167–92, 213, 214, Wagner, W. 133, 138
220–1, 258–60; overview 167–8; and Walker, S.G. 3, 7, 17, 18–19, 25, 27, 32,
personal leadership 168; post-Cold War 75, 77, 78, 79, 216, 254, 260
181 Wallace, W. 180
universal communities 47 Walt, S.M. 168, 197
universalism 60 Walter, A. 244
US–China relationship 234, 247, 249 Waltz, K.N. 17, 18–19, 237
US foreign policy 4; Afghanistan 182, 199; Wang, L. 245
after 9/11 197–200; aims 214; continuity Wang, Q. 246
and change 167; core norms 169; Wang, Y. 237
declining power 191–2; EU role Warden, G. 244
conceptions 178–81; explanations of Warsaw Pact countries, NATO 103, 108
policy change 176–7; G.W. Bush and we-identity, NATO 95–6
Obama compared 173–7; interests in Webber, M. 225
Europe 181; Iraq 198, 199, 208–9; 9/11 Weekly Standard 207, 208
194–210 (see also separate headingnorms Welch, D.A. 59
173, 176); Obama administration 171–3; Wells, L.E. 83
perspectives 204; plurilateralism 199; Wen, J. 236, 245, 247
post-Cold War goals 221; pragmatic Wendt, Alexander 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 11–12,
realism 204; public opinion 209; relations 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23–4, 25, 27, 29, 36,
with European Union 177–84; relations 39, 45, 72, 79–80, 81, 82, 83, 114
with Iran 200; relations with Japan Wenger, E. 107, 111
185–200; representative statements Wenzel, M. 136–7, 145
174–5; role conceptions 170–7, 191–2; Westerlund, U. 17
role of presidents 170; stable role Western universalism 60
conception 168–70; themes 170–1; Whitman, R. 115, 117
unilateralism 198–9; see also Franco- Whitmore, B. 136
American relations; 9/11; US-China Whitney, N. 179
relationship; US-Japanese relations; US Williams, L. 85
relations with Europe Williams, M.C. 205, 210
US-Japanese relations: changing role willing compliance 88
conceptions 189–90; role conceptions Wilzewski, J. 194, 198, 201, 203
187–9; summary and conclusions 191; Wirls, D. 199
see also US foreign policy Wish, N.B. 7, 17, 18, 23, 25, 27, 29, 78, 254
US relations with Europe: arms control Witney, N. 183, 184
and disarmament 184; financial crisis Wolf, Raimund 4, 8, 59, 182, 191,
184; see also US foreign policy 194–210, 253, 255, 259
US role theorists 18–19 Wolfers, A. 218
Wolff, J. 69, 71
values: American 206; in international Wolfowitz, P. 206, 208, 209
relations 59 Woodward, B. 170, 176, 205
van de Vliert, E. 76 World Trade Organization 118, 125
van der Grijp, N. 114 World War I, Mead on 48–50
Védrine, H. 214, 216, 221 World War II, France in 213
Vernet, D. 222 Wu, G. 244, 245
Vertzberger, Y. 24
violence 49, 50 Xi, J. 247
vocal gestures 41 Xinhua News 245, 248
Vogler, J. 119 Xu, W. 240
322 Index
Yahuda, M. 236 Zeihan, P. 243
Yalta, effects of dissolution 221 Zelikow, P. 75
Yan, X. 238 Zhang, E. 28
Yang, P. 238 Zhang, H. 248
Yong, D. 234, 238 Zhang, Y. 238
Yost, D. 223 Zheng, B. 236, 248
Young, O. 90, 117, 118 Zheng, X. 245, 246
young states see novice states Zheng, Y. 240, 243
Yu, Y. 246 Zhu, H. 245
Yuan, J.K. 237 Ziegler, C. 10
Žižek, Slavoj 85
Zaborowski, M. 135, 136 Zürn, M. 149, 151
Zehfuss, Maja 80–1

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Role Theory in International

Role Theory in International Relations provides a comprehensive, up-­to-date

Sebastian Harnisch is Professor of International Relations and Foreign Policy

Hanns W. Maull is Professor of Foreign Policy and International Relations at

1 Foreign Policy and Discourse 8 Politics and Globalisation

20 Spatializing International Politics 29 Political Learning and

37 International Relations, Security 45 The Empire of Security and the

38 Interregionalism and 46 Globalization and Religious

50 International Cooperation and 58 Economic Globalisation as

53 State-­Building 62 Law and Legalization in

54 Violence and Non-­Violence in 63 Fighting Terrorism and Drugs

68 Gender Inclusive 77 New Norms and Knowledge in

86 The “War on Terror” and the

Edited by Sebastian Harnisch,

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2011.

© 2011 Selection and editorial matter, Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia

ISBN 0-203-81875-X Master e-book ISBN

ISBN: 978-0-415-61484-9 (hbk)

Notes on editors xiv

1 Role theory: operationalization of key concepts 7

2 Role theory research in international relations: state of the

3 “Dialogue and emergence”: George Herbert Mead’s

4 Habermas meets role theory: communicative action as role

5 Identity and role change in international politics 74

6 NATO and the (re)constitution of roles: “self,” “we,” and

7 Reconsidering the European Union’s roles in international

8 Comparing Germany’s and Poland’s ESDPs: roles, path

9 Does membership matter? Convergence of Sweden’s and

10 Hegemony reconstructed? America’s role conception and its

11 Terrorized America? 9/11 and its impact on US foreign

12 Discord and collaboration in Franco-­American relations:

13 Hesitant adaptation: China’s new role in global policies 234

Rikard Bengtsson is Associate Professor of Political Science at Lund Univer-

ABM anti-­ballistic missile

Defining roles and related key concepts

Excursion: role and identity

Process of role taking Behavior of others

Process of identity formation

Role change: causal and constitutive modes

Constructivism’s implicit role theory

Structure ≈ international system

Agency ≈ role performance

Identity ≈ role conception

Figure 2.1 Intersections between structure, agent, and identity in constructivism.

it appears to be used as consistent with role conceptions as well), and identity is

1 Much of the constructivist work on identity, self-­images, culture, and even

Roles, images, and identities

the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kind of decisions, commit-

At this point, we have a set of interconnections between concepts that sug-

Figure 2.2 Role Theory as a Cognitive Model of the Agent–Structure Relationship.

Perspective, problem representation, and role theory

National role conceptions, decision makers, and citizens

Explaining adaption and change

the aggregation and correlation of rhetoric and behavior by means of an

Indeed, Breuning (1995) delineates the role conceptions of a small group of

1 Material capabilities “bound” the possible range of national role concep-

The empirical challenge

The value of systematic empirical investigation and hypothesis testing

The benefits of borrowing

Bridging the Atlantic and more

including the policymaker’s own definitions of the general kinds of

This representation of roles informs many of the current accounts of roles in

“Dialogue and emergence”: foundational elements of Mead’s

Identity building: a dialogue of “I” and “me”

Role Theory in International Relations provides a comprehensive, up-to-date

53 State-Building 62 Law and Legalization in

54 Violence and Non-Violence in 63 Fighting Terrorism and Drugs

Notes on editors xiv

1 Role theory: operationalization of key concepts 7

5 Identity and role change in international politics 74

12 Discord and collaboration in Franco-American relations:

13 Hesitant adaptation: China’s new role in global policies 234

ABM anti-ballistic missile

1 Much of the constructivist work on identity, self-images, culture, and even

Mead on self-restraint and social organization

In contrast to Wendt and IR applications by others, Mead conceives self-restraint

Mead and the emergence of adverse self-identification

Mead and the limits of “national-mindedness” on the eve of World

Actor-specific role scripts

UN Secretaries-General (UNSGs) and other leaders of

As a consequence, the number of CA-prone actors is likely to grow.

Figure 4.1 Saliency of communicative action as a function of actor attributes and institu-

Our role-player is not a self-contained processing device whose inputs are

[S]elf-conception is fundamentally an interpretative process and it is rele-