Student number: 1019489

Popper and the issue of simplicity

Introduction

The concept of simplicity is widely adopted in the field of metatheoretical studies.

This concept falls under the category of quality: we predicate the property of simplicity referring to a

theory. This property appears as one of the principal criteria that define the value of a theory: as will be

shown further, it is common to prefer a theory which exhibits a higher grade of simplicity.

Nevertheless, this evaluation is usually carried out ingenuously, i.e., without treating the concept of

simplicity with the proper level of analysis.

This issue is recognized and addressed by Popper in the 7thchapter of The Logic of Scientific Discovery

([1935] 2002). The aim of the present paper is to investigate the issue of simplicity through the lens of

the analysis given by Popper, according to these three purposes: To identify the two core problems

regarding the concept of simplicity; to outline the debate concerning these two problems, and their

possible solutions; to trace the position assumed by Popper in the debate and its underlying reasons.

The paper will be structured in three paragraphs:

- Simplicity and its problems: A brief history of the origins and the development of the concept of

simplicity will be traced. The two core problems concerning the debate on simplicity will be

enucleated: The first one, to give a strict definition of the concept; the second one, to justify its

theoretical virtue.

- Definition: Popper’s definition of “simplicity” will be presented. He defines simplicity by means

of the number of free parameters of a theory. Then, the two main approaches to the definition

of simplicity will be presented. These two approaches, the syntactic approach, and the
 ontological approach, resemble the two wider positions to which the debate boils down.

Depicted a glimpse of this general debate, the position of Popper will be collocated in the ranks

of the ontological side, and the reasons he gives to refuse the syntactic approach will be traced.

- Justification: the blurry depiction of the debate on simplicity will be finally defined. The two

schools of syntax and ontology, on the side of definition, correspond to the ones of methodology

and epistemology on the side of justification. The solution provided by Popper will be analyzed

in its underlying arguments. It is, to recognize in simplicity a marker of truthfulness by identifying

it with falsifiability.

A brief conclusion will summarize the iter followed by this investigation, linking together the various

topics presented in the paper. A consideration will be made on the fact that this specific dispute suggests

the broader opposition between Popper and its declared opponent: conventionalism. I will argue that

the difference between falsification and conventionalism is to be found in Popper’s commitment to

realism.

Simplicity and its problems

Simplicity is one of the fundamental indexes mentioned in the definition of a good scientific theory.

Though its first appearance may be detected in the Posterior Analytics (Aristotles…), its most famous

occurrence can be found in the law known as “Occam’s Razor”, which reads as follows:

“Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.” (…)

This law states the obligation of a good theory to a criterion of parsimony – or economy, as it would have

been called later by Leibniz (…), which recognizes to simplicity the status of the fundamental principle

followed by the supremely rational act of the Cristian god: the creation of the best possible world.

Another example, nearer to our times, is this statement from Einstein:

“[T]he grand aim of all science…is to cover the greatest possible number of empirical facts by logical

deductions from the smallest possible number of hypotheses or axioms.” (…)

These two quotes, among others, are implicitly based on a principle of simplicity and can prove how this

principle is important to science. Nevertheless, none of those authors seems to have felt the urge to

treat further the concept, which due to its primitiveness has often been left unanalyzed.

Popper acknowledges this problem at the very beginning of his analysis, observing that it is not obvious

at all “what is meant, more precisely, by simplicity.” (LSD, 121) and decides to dedicate the entire chapter

7 of LSD to its discussion. The two core elements of this discussion can be extrapolated from one line of

this introduction of the matter of simplicity and divided into two different problems. The first problem

concerns “che cosa sia la semplicità”, the second, “perché dev'essere apprezzata”. (…).

To ask what simplicity is, is to require a strict definition of this concept. And to give a definition of

something is to provide a term of identity in an analytic equivalence (The term of identity can consist in

one other thing, or in a series of property). This matter will be discussed in the next paragraph.

To ask why simplicity is to be appreciated, is to require a justification for the value given to this property.

Since it is to admit that simplicity is in fact one of the most valuable features that lead scientists to prefer

a theory to another, the reasons of this preference are to be cleared. To this topic the second-to last

paragraph of this paper will be dedicated.

These two questions are deeply embedded in one another, so that answering to one of them, is giving

many elements to answer the other. Nevertheless, in this paper I made the effort to try and keep them

apart, committing to a principle of order and analytical profoundness.

Definition
A superficial analysis of the term of simplicity may state a trivial connection between it and the concept

of multiplicity. But multiplicity of what?

The position of Popper (shared by Jeffreys, Wrinch, and Weil) is to define simplicity by identifying it with

dimension. The dimension of a theory is the number of free parameters that a theory involves: the less

parameters are needed, the more a theory is simple. Free parameters are the values that are necessary

to determine the initial conditions of a theory: it means, the number of variables in a law, that need to

be filled to derivate a concrete prediction.

What are the other positions that appeared in the debate for a definition of simplicity?

The challenge to provide a definition to the principle of simplicity has generated proposals that can be

classified under two sets: “syntactic simplicity (roughly, the number and complexity of hypotheses), and

ontological simplicity (roughly, the number and complexity of things postulated).[2] These two facets of

simplicity are often referred to as elegance and parsimony respectively.” (SEF…).

The position of Popper is therefore keener to the first element of the dichotomy: parsimony. The key to

understanding this preference is to be found in this question in the third paragraph: “è possibile

distinguere teorie che non siano logicamente equivalenti rispetto al loro grado di semplicità?” (…). Two

logically equivalent theories imply the same set of singular assertions (thus, the same amount of

empirical content). Nevertheless, there is a field where they can be distinguished, and it is the syntactical

one. To change the capital delta with two “v”s and a minus in the numerator of acceleration’s physic

formula is to increase the number of symbols used to represent it, but the factors that influence our

result remain two, difference of speed and difference of time: the quantities addressed by the symbols

are not influenced by them. The kind of simplicity that interests Popper is one that defines a difference

between two non-logically equivalent theories: a simplicity in the structure of the theory and not in its

representation. The criterion he denies is the esthetical one of elegance: “escluderò dalla nostra

discussione l'applicazione del termine «semplicità» a tutto ciò che somigli a una presentazione o a
un'esposizione (…) in tutti questi casi la parola «semplice» può essere eliminata: l'uso che se ne fa è un

uso extralogico”. (…)

Justification
What are the reasons to prefer a theory which is simplier?

The same dichotomy outlined in the debate on definition is here resumed: the kind of justification

provided by the consideration of simplicity in terms of elegance, will appeal to practical reason: “It is

easy to see how syntactic elegance in a theory can bring with it pragmatic advantages such

as being more perspicuous, being easier to use and manipulate” (SEF). But another

perspective on simplicity is given by the possibility to analyze this phrase by Schlick: “ tutti gli

scienziati che sono riusciti a rappresentare una serie di osservazioni mediante una formula molto

semplice (…) si sono immediatamente convinti di aver scoperto una legge” (…) where the convintion of

the scientist proves something more than a mere practical interest: the possibility to consider

simplicity as an indicator of truthfulness of a theory. This kind of simplicity is called by

Popper “epistemic concept of simplicity”, and it may be confronted to the “methodological”

or gnoseological concept of simplicity. The difference may be resumed this way:

“epistemic principle: if theory T is simpler than theory T∗, then it is rational (…) to

believe T rather than T∗. (…) methodological principle: if T is simpler than T∗ then it is

rational to adopt T as one’s working theory for scientific purposes”. (SEF)

The solution given by Popper to this matter? It is to notice how the concept of simplicity

matches the cluster of properties of his concept of falsifiability, which is directly

proportional to dimensions, and therefore to identify the two concepts: “Quanto minore è il
numero delle grandezze richieste per determinare le condizioni iniziali, tanto meno composite saranno le

asserzioni-base che bastano per falsificare la teoria”. (…) Dimension is “il numero caratteristico d di una

teoria t, rispetto a un dominio di applicazione”. (…). The application domain of a theory is defined as the

ground level of complexity on which an assumption can be considered simple (basis-assumption). Given

the possibility of always regarding an assumption as the coordination of simpler ones, and of reducing

every assumption to these more fundamental constituents – possibility that leads to an infinite regress –

the election of a fundamental level, which is considered to be simple, is nothing more than a free

decision. The application domain serves as referent to classify composed assumptions by their grade of

complexity, which equals to the number of relative basis-assumptions cojoined in this complex one. On

the other hand, the characteristic number d of a theory is defined as “un dominio di asserzioni singolari

(…) tali che, per qualche numero d, la teoria t non può essere falsificata da qualsiasi d-upla del dominio

pur potendo essere falsificata da certe d+I-uple”. So, the characteristic number of a theory defines the

deadline above which an assertion is gratuitously permitted by the theory, because it cannot be

confronted to the law due to its non-sufficient complexity. To make an example: it is always true that a

circle can be traced through any three non-aligned points; on the other hand, it is not always true that a

circle can be traced through any four points. Thus, this deadline divides necessity and contingence of

sentences according to a theory – and to be necessary is not a feature that tends to be wanted from the

assertions of an empirical theory: everything above this line is something that the theory isn’t implying

in a legal way, but just necessarily admitting; something that escapes from falsification and is to be

considered metaphysic. So, the choice to prefer a simpler theory is that a simpler theory has a higher

empirical content: it is able to comprehend the explanation of a wider range of empirical facts.

Conclusions
After a presentation of the matter of simplicity in its general features, this paper has shown how Popper

answers to the main two questions in which this matter can be decomposed. He answers to the first

question providing a definition of simplicity in the terms of parsimony and denying the syntactic solution.

Because of this decision, he justifies the principle of simplicity according to an epistemic view, and not a

methodological one.

We can see how the debate between elegance and parsimony is here resembled in the terms of the

confrontation between methodological and epistemological approach, how this debate suggests the

wider one between conventionalism and realism, and how Popper joins the latter side. But the problem

of foundation remains: how is it possible to pretend the truth when we cannot ground the

correspondence of our theory to reality? The admitted impossibility to find the absolute atomic

assertions of the domain of a theory equals to expose the fact that the same free parameter can be

regarded as the composition of more fundamental parameters. Therefore, the access to the ontological

reign seems to be denied and every possible argumentation on simplicity to be confined in the reign of

syntaxis. The element of the free decision of a relative fundamental domain gets the position of Popper

closer to conventionalism, which, assuming the impossibility of foundationalism, recognizes a mere

instrumental and practical value to theories, without concerning for the correspondence between laws

and reality. Although it is in fact accurate to finally place Popper in the field of syntax, and although the

element of free decision relegates him at the side of methodology, however reality and truth can be

saved and restored at the end of the process, in the role of the never-achievable goal of science – and

these goals impose a real difference between conventionalism and Popper’s falsification, since they are

the orientation in methodology. The ratio between elegance and parsimony is one of contradiction: in

the scope of the same theory, a growth of the set of postulated entities can reduce the number of

hypotheses necessary to explain the phenomena involved; whereas the reduction of entities may require

a series of adjustments in the set of the hypotheses, to make phenomena square with the theory.
Therefore, a less ontologically committed theory is keen to be more syntactically complex. And this is

where conventionalism and falsification divide. Conventionalism is willing to postulate new entities to

save the elegance of its theory, while falsification is always ready to dismiss a theory which elegance

does not respond to parsimony. But the incrementation of the number of free parameters implies a

growth in the versatility of a theory, which can fit more and more states of affair, but less and less

empirical facts: theories that are less ontologically simply get closer to tautology every time they

implement a new ad hoc parameter. Since a tautology can imply every possible consequence,

tautological theories succeed to describe every possible world, but fail to describe our particular world:

their empirical content diminishes at the growth of their logical content. While conventionalism remains

locked in the domain of syntax, settling for a truth that is nothing but internal logical coherence,

falsification is instead stretched out to reality, strengthened by the trust that under the infinite possible

equivalences between different ways of representations there is yet one, real, object.

Here we have the justification for considering simplicity an index of truthfulness of a theory: it can

guarantee a best adherence of the theory to reality.

Conclusions

therefore, they must differ on another perspective: this is, precisely, the syntactic perspective. By
--In the first section, a brief history of the birth and development of the concept of simplicity will be

given; the two main facets of the interpretation of this concept, syntactical and ontological simplicity, will

be presented; at the end, the definition of simplicity formulated by Popper will be depicted, and put in

relation to the dichotomy of above.

In the second section, an example of the application of simplicity principle will be exposed; then, the two

principal positions to which the debate boils down will be clarified: these are the gnoseological approach

and the epistemological approach; it will be shown how Popper rejects the former approach and joins

the latter, stating the differences between his conception of science and the one of his declared

opponent, conventionalism; I will argue that this choice is to be linked to Popper’s commitment to

realism.

In the third section, various arguments to justify the importance of simplicity, and their confutation by

Popper, will be presented; then, the pars construes of the justification of Popper will be outlined: to

identify the property of simplicity to the one of falsifiability.

A brief conclusion will summarize the iter followed by this investigation, finally linking together the three

elements and presenting the truths achieved.

Definition
However, recently, a debate on simplicity has in fact raised.

Preliminary elements
Here are presented the main thesis that are developed by Popper in LSD, that will serve the reader as

conceptual devices to comprehend his arguments on simplicity, being their premises. Those elements

can be all reduced to the general constituents on what, for Popper, a theory is based: assertions.

Assertions can be universal or singular. Universal assertions are defined by the presence of a universal

concept as their subject; singular assertions are defined by the presence of a singular concept as their

subject. The distinction between universal and singular concepts is roughly the same that occurs

between kinds (general ontological classes, defined by essence) and tokens (space-time collocated

individuals of these classes, defined by existence). According to the Aristoteles’ square of oppositions, a

universal positive assertion is contradictory to a singular negative assertion (and a universal negative

assertion) having the same subject, and a singular positive assertion is contradictory to a universal

negative assertion (and as above) having the same subject.

For Popper, a scientific theory is a system that aims to cover the prediction of natural events by giving a

causal explenation to phenomena, and “Dare una spiegazione causale di un evento significa deddurre

un'asserzione che lo descrive, usando come premesse della deduzione una o piú leggi universali, insieme

con alcune asserzioni singolari dette condizioni iniziali”. So, the ingredients of a theory are both universal

assertions, in the form of general laws that state the conditional link between a cause and an effect, and

singular assertions, in the form of the modification of those laws by the application of space-time

indicals? that consent to predict a particular occurrence of that law in the world. A so-defined prediction
can be denied by experience, when experience is resembled in terms of another singular assertion that

is contradictory to the prediction. Finding a single counterexample that is contradictory to a singular

prediction is enough to contradict all the theory, via modus tollens, since the singular assertion that

stands by this prediction is inferred from the general assertion that stands by the law, and the negation

of the consequence of an inference is equal to the contradiction of its premise.

The general definition of a theory is, though, to be confronted with one problem: while the confutation

of a theory can be justified by the method exposed above, the final corroboration of a theory escapes

justification. That is because to ensure the overall validity of a universal assertion in something above

experience, which can only provide singular assertions, but cannot provide all the singular assertions

that correspond to all the possible facts that we can experience in this world. For Popper, a theory that

cannot be proven by experience has not the right to be called scientific and must be considered

metaphysical.

This is why Popper refuses to ever consider a theory verified and proposes to treat laws as negations of

singular positive assertions (assertions, the truth of which can be proven by experience) in order to save

science from its metaphysical drift. This is the famous proposal of the theory of falsification. A theory

with a high grade of falsifiability, is one that contains more empirical assertions; thus, it is to be

preferred, because it is more explanatory: “it has more empirical content” “dice di più” …sul mondo

(110).
Another important referent of this work is the voice “simplicity” on SDF (), which furnishes a broader

overview of the general debate on the matter. According to the Encyclopedia, three are the chore issues

concerning simplicity:

(i) Definition: how is simplicity to be defined?

(ii) Usage: What is the role of simplicity principles in different areas of inquiry?

(iii) Justification: Is there a rational justification for such simplicity principles?

I will show how easy and useful it is to scan like this the problematization of simplicity in LSD.

Thus, this paper will be structured in three sections, according to these three issues.