Proprietary Estoppel

In general terms proprietary estoppel protects a person who has done acts in reliance on an
expectation that they will receive an interest in the landowner’s land or an estate in fee simple. In
such circumstances the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, which has its roots in equity, has been
used by the courts to ‘mitigate the rigours of strict law’, and it will ‘prevent a person from
insisting on his strict legal rights—whether arising under a contract, or on his title deeds, or by
statute— when it would be inequitable for him to do so having regard to the dealings which have
taken place between the parties’ per Lord Denning MR, Crabb v Arun District Council.

Lord Scott in Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd explained the nature of proprietary
estoppel:

An ‘estoppel’ bars the object of it from asserting some fact or facts, or, sometimes, something
that is a mixture of fact and law, that stands in the way of some right claimed by the person
entitled to the benefit of the estoppel. The estoppel becomes a ‘proprietary’ estoppel—a sub-
species of a ‘promissory’ estoppel—if the right claimed is a proprietary right, usually a right to
or over land but, in principle, equally available in relation to chattels or choses in action.

The facts (or mixture of fact and law) that may give rise to a claim in estoppel in these circum-
stances tend not to be formal ones, that is, in the form of a contract, rather informal ones where
the intentions of the parties may not be clear. They could involve:

• a promise of gift in the form of an interest or an estate in land;

• both parties have a common expectation that one party will acquire an interest or land;
and

• one party is mistaken as to their rights.

Proprietary Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which enables someone who has relied to his
detriment on an assurance or expectation made or encouraged by a landowner to claim a remedy
in court. The court application may result in the award of an estate or interest in the land.

The criteria which had to be met to enable a claim to be made used to be extremely strict.
However, the ‘modern’ approach, in the last few decades founded on the concept of
unconscionability, the requirements of estoppel are more flexible.

This approach was set out by Oliver J in the following case.

Taylor’s Fashions Limited and others v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd

Promise of Gift

A good example to illustrate a promise of a gift is found in Dillwyn v Llewelyn. A father and
son had signed an informal memorandum which provided that the son would have rights in the
land so that the son could build a house. The son relied on this memorandum and built a house
having spent a vast amount of money. The court upheld the son’s claim to the land because he
had relied upon the promise of the land as a gift and incurred expenditure as a result of relying
on the promise.

Common Expectation

Lord Kingsdown (in his dissenting judgment) in Ramsden v Dyson, explained how the doctrine
of proprietary estoppel applies where the landowner has encouraged the expectation of an
interest in land at some point (at the present time or some time in the future):

If a man, under a verbal agreement with a landlord for a certain interest in land, or, what
amounts to the same thing, under an expectation, created or encouraged by the landlord, that he
shall have a certain interest, takes possession of such land, with the consent of the land- lord,
and upon the faith of such promise or expectation, with the knowledge of the landlord, and
without objection by him, lays out money upon the land, a Court of equity will compel the
landlord to give effect to such promise or expectation.

A good illustration of this can be found in Inwards v Baker. In this case Baker junior was keen
to build himself a bungalow, but he could not afford the price of an empty site. His father had
some spare land. Baker senior said to his son, ‘Why not put the bungalow on my land and make
the bungalow a little bigger?’ (This was an oral licence.) Baker junior did exactly that, and made
the bungalow his permanent home. Baker senior retained ownership of the fee simple to the land,
and so the house also became Baker senior’s property. All was well while both senior and junior
were still alive, but when Baker senior died his will (made long before the bungalow was built)
left the land in question not to Baker junior but to Inwards. Inwards brought proceedings to
recover possession of the bungalow. These proceedings failed.

The Court of Appeal held that since Baker junior had an expectation, which was induced and
encouraged by his father, it would be unconscionable for Baker senior to deny his son his rights.
The claimants were estopped (or prevented) from obtaining possession and Baker junior was
conferred the right to remain in the property for the rest of his life.

Mistaken Belief

Mistaken belief arises where the claimant is acting under a misapprehension of their entitlement
to their legal rights. The claimant then acts upon their mistaken belief to their detriment. The
other party merely stands by and does nothing to rectify the mistaken belief held by the claimant.
This is illustrated by an example given in Ramsden v Dyson where the Lord Chancellor said:
If a stranger begins to build on my land supposing it to be his own, and I, perceiving his mistake,
abstain from setting him right, and leave him to persevere in his error, a Court of equity will not
allow me afterwards to assert my title to the land on which he had expended money on the
supposition that the land was his own. It considers that, when I saw the mistake into which he
had fallen, it was my duty to be active and to state my adverse title; and that it would be
dishonest in me to remain wilfully passive on such an occasion, in order afterwards to profit by
the mistake which I might have prevented.

In dealing with this type of claim Fry J in Willmott v Barber, set out five criteria (known as
probanda) that need to be satisfied for estoppel to apply. Fry J stated:

A man is not to be deprived of his legal rights unless he has acted in such a way as would make it
fraudulent for him to set up those rights. What, then, are the elements or requisites necessary to
constitute fraud of that description? In the first place the plaintiff must have made a mistake as
to his legal rights. Secondly, the plaintiff must have expended some money or must have done
some act (not necessarily upon the defendant’s land) on the faith of his mistaken belief. Thirdly,
the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know of the existence of his own right which
is inconsistent with the right claimed by the plaintiff. If he does not know of it he is in the same
position as the plaintiff, and the doctrine of acquiescence is founded upon conduct with a
knowledge of your legal rights. Fourthly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must
know of the plaintiff’s mistaken belief of his rights. If he does not, there is nothing which calls
upon him to assert his own rights. Lastly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must
have encouraged the plaintiff in his expenditure of money or in the other acts which he has done,
either directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal right. Where all these ele- ments exist,
there is fraud of such a nature as will entitle the Court to restrain the possessor of the legal right
from exercising it, but, in my judgment, nothing short of this will do

Modern Approach Towards Proprietary Estoppel

The courts in determining whether there is a proprietary estoppel will consider: first, whether the
equity has arisen that will prevent the landowner from enforcing their legal rights, and, secondly,
the court may, if it is appropriate, ‘satisfy the equity’ using the traditional terminology: Crabb v
Arun DC. In satisfying the equity, the court has had a wide discre- tion and may grant an interest
in land or even an estate in land.

Cases involving mistake are rare, and the majority of cases involve ‘common expectation’. For
an equity to arise the following elements must exist:

• representation or expectation as to present or future rights in land;

• reliance; and

• detriment.

In considering these elements, the court will also consider whether the landowner has gone back
on their representation, that is, whether their actions are unconscionable. The court in Gillett v
Holt focused on unconscionability as an overarching principle through which it will determine
whether the equity is established.

The House of Lords approved Taylors Fashions requirements for proprietary estoppel in
common expectation cases. To bring a claim of proprietary estoppel it is important that the claim
is based on a property interest. Unconscionability is a factor which is taken into consideration in
a claim for proprietary estoppel, but such a claim will not succeed simply because the landowner
has behaved unconscionably.

To summarize so far:

• A claim for proprietary estoppel is normally based on a property interest in land.

• Proprietary estoppel: representation or expectation as to present and future interest in

land, reliance, and detriment; it must be unconscionable for the landowner to go back on
his promise.

Representation or Expectation/ Assurance

There are two elements to consider under this section: first, what is the nature of the expectation
which has arisen from the representation? Secondly, how has the expectation been created?

Nature of the Expectation

The landowner will normally make a representation to the claimant that they have or will acquire
an interest in land. In Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd, Cobbe orally agreed in
principle with Yeoman’s Row to buy a site in central London. Both parties knew that this
agreement was not a valid contract (it did not comply with s2 Law of Property (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1989). Nevertheless, Cobbe, with Yeoman’s Row encouragement, spent a lot of
time and trouble, spread over 18 months, obtaining planning permission to redevelop the site.
This planning permission enhanced the value of the site by several million pounds. Yeoman’s
Row then refused to enter into a formal contract to sell the land to Cobbe.

The House of Lords held that, despite his efforts, Cobbe had not acquired a proprietary estoppel
right. Lord Walker drew a distinction between commercial and domestic (or family) cases in
respect of the nature of the expectation.

Assurance

The first requirement for proprietary estoppel is that there must be an assurance or representation
by, or an expectation encouraged by the landowner. The nature of the assurance and the form it
should take was examined in the following cases.

Gillett v Holt

Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Limited

Jones v Watkins

Grundt v Great Boulder

Thorner v Major

Walton v Walton

Dan v Spurier

Ramsden v Dyson

Reliance

Reliance acts as a causal link between the representation and the claimant acting to their
detriment by altering their position. In Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v Texas
Commerce International Bank Ltd Goff J considered how this change in position could be
determined:

...the question is not whether the representee acted, or desisted from acting, solely in reliance on
the encouragement or representation of the other party; the question is rather whether his
conduct was so influenced by the encouragement or representation...that it would be
unconscionable for the representor thereafter to enforce his strict legal rights.

It is sufficient to show that the claimant was ‘influenced’, that is, induced by the representation,
and relied on the landowner’s representation to their detriment. Reliance cannot be viewed in
isolation; ‘reliance and detriment are intertwined’ (per Robert Walker LJ, Gillett v Holt). Issues
which arise in this section will also be relevant in the section dealing with detriment.

The change in the claimant’s position can be demonstrated by a positive act. The courts have
adopted a flexible approach towards determining the types of actions that would come within the
scope of reliance.

Expenditure of money or undertaking improvements to the property are clearly demonstrable

means by which a change of position can be shown Inwards v Baker; Dillwyn v Llewelyn.

Alternative methods have also been accepted by the courts. In Jones (AE) v Jones (FW), a son
left his job and house, and moved his family into his father’s house, and gave his father money
amounting to a quarter of the purchase price of the house, on the under- standing that the house
was his. He was granted a life interest in the property and a quarter share in the house.

There are instances where the courts have upheld a claim for proprietary estoppel where there is
a presumption that the claimant relied upon the assurances made. In Greasley v Cooke, Miss
Cooke, a maid, was assured by members of the family that she could stay in the property for the
rest of her life. She cohabited with one of the members of the family, she continued to look after
the house, and also cared for another member of the family who was mentally ill. Lord Denning
MR in the Court of Appeal held the defendant did not need to prove that she had relied upon
assurances given to her; it was presumed, based on her conduct.

Once the presumption has arisen then the burden shifts to the other party to prove that the
claimant did not rely on the promises Coombes v Smith.

Detriment

So not only must the claimant show a relevant assurance, he must also show that he has suffered
detriment. The issue of detriment was explored the following case where it was held that the
‘detriment’ need not be quantifiable in purely financial terms.

Detriment arises when the claimant has changed their position relying on an assurance. The
important factor here is the reliance on the promise to their detriment. It would at that stage be
unconscionable for the landowner to deny the rights in land to the claimant.

Detriment may arise through expenditure of money which is perhaps the most obvious form. For
example, in Inwards v Baker the son built a bungalow on his father’s land; in Pascoe v Turner
the claimant made improvements to the property.

Robert Walker LJ in Gillett v Holt explained the modern approach towards detriment:

The overwhelming weight of authority shows that detriment is required. But the authorities also
show that it is not a narrow or technical concept. The detriment need not consist of the
expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something
substantial. The requirement must be approached as part of a broad inquiry as to whether
repudiation of an assurance is or is not unconscionable in all the circumstances.

This indicates that the courts are not willing to restrict themselves in interpreting detriment; it
will depend on the circumstances but the detriment must be ‘something substantial’. Merely
moving into a property is not sufficient. In Coombes v Smith, the court rejected a claim for
proprietary estoppel and viewed the move as a benefit. Contrast this with the facts of the case in
Tanner v Tanner, where Mrs Tanner gave up a secured tenancy to cohabit with Mr Tanner.
This case was decided on the basis of a contractual licence, but if this was considered as a claim
for proprietary estoppel, Mrs Tanner would have arguably given up ‘something substantial’.

In Southwell v Blackburn [2014] which was decided on the basis of proprietary estoppel, Ms
Blackburn had given up a secured tenancy on a house, on which she had spent between £15,000–
£20,000 fitting out and furnishing the property, to move in with Mr Southwell. She had also
given up her job and moved her children in with them, and contributed a small amount to the
house Mr Southwell purchased. The property they lived in together was pur- chased by Mr
Southwell in his sole name. There was an assurance that Ms Blackburn would ‘always have a
home’ and ‘be secure’ in their house. The Court of Appeal viewed this as detrimental reliance
and consequently that repudiation of the promise was unconscionable.
In Davies v Davies the court considered that in assessing detriment it should not to be
undertaken in a manner which is similar to forensic accounting. The factual matrix of Davies v
Davies was complicated by the relationship Ms Davies had with her parents in the period from
1989–2012. She worked on her parents’ farm, initially for very little money. She was led to
believe that she would inherit the farm. After falling out with her parents on numerous occasions,
she moved in and out of the farm over a number of years, working and then ceasing to work on
the farm and gaining employment elsewhere. The court confirmed that when assessing detriment,
a wide range of factors are to be taken into account following the holistic approach in Gillett v
Holt.

In the following cases, the courts have recognized detriment which is of a personal nature:

• worked as a gardener and handyman for nothing after an assurance of house and
furniture: Jennings v Rice;

• looked after family members without payment: Greasley v Cooke;

• gave up accommodation and job: Jones (AE) v Jones (FW);

• companion, chauffeur, substantial help in running the businesses, and in return received
pocket money, living and clothing expenses: Wayling v Jones

• gave up the opportunity to continue education and had carried out duties beyond which
an employee would normally be expected to do: Gillett v Holt; and

• an aspiring actress gave up the opportunity to look for work to look after the landowner
and assist him in his attempt to battle against alcoholism: Ottey v Grundy

Campbell v Griffin

Wayling v Jones

Unconscionable

The final element to be considered is unconscionability. This would arise where it is

unconscionable for the land owner to enforce their strict legal rights where the claimant has
relied to their detriment on a representation made by the land owner. Whether unconscionability
is a separate element that needs to be satisfied in a claim for proprietary estoppel has been
commented upon by Lord Walker in Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd:

That argument raises the question whether ‘unconscionability’ is a separate element in making
out a case of estoppel, or whether to regard it as a separate element would be what Professor
Peter Birks once called ‘a fifth wheel on the coach’: Birks & Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust
(2002), p 226. But Birks was there criticising the use of ‘unconscionable’ to describe a state of
mind...Here it is being used (as in my opinion it should always be used) as an objective value
judgment on behaviour (regardless of the state of mind of the individual in question). As such it
does in my opinion play a very important part in the doctrine of equita- ble estoppel, in unifying
and confirming, as it were, the other elements. If the other elements appear to be present but the
result does not shock the conscience of the court, the analysis needs to be looked at again.

Proportionality
Satisfying the Equity

Once the three elements of proprietary estoppel have been fulfilled, the claimant is in a position
to bring a claim for proprietary estoppel (ie an equity has arisen) against the landowner or his
estate, and prevent him from asserting his rights. The court will consider how to satisfy the
equity by awarding the appropriate remedy.

In determining the type of remedy to award, the underlying principle was expressed by the Privy
Council in Plimmer v Mayor etc, of Wellingtonby Sir Arthur Hobhouse where he said

‘[t]he court must look at the circumstances in each case to decide in what way the equity can be
satisfied’.

The courts have a wide discretion in the type of remedy, for example it may involve the transfer
of property to the claimant Pascoe v Turner ; in Campbell v Griffin the court felt that it was
inappropriate to award Mr Campbell the property since he was a lodger, and instead awarded
him £35,000. Despite the wide discretion the courts must not use it in an arbitrary manner, ‘the
court must take a principled approach and cannot exercise a completely unfettered discretion
according to the individual judge’s notion of what is fair in any particular case’ (per Robert
Walker LJ, Jennings v Rice.

In doing so, the court when considering the ‘extent of the equity and the relief needed to satisfy
it’ would ask itself what is the ‘minimum equity to do justice to the plaintiff’? per Denning MR,
Crabb v Arun District Council. Implied in this, is that the court would seek to avoid greater
relief than the claimant’s expectation from the representation.

What remedy the claimant obtains can depend on the approach adopted by the court: first, this is
based on the loss from having relied on the assurance, and, secondly, fulfilment of the claimant’s
expectations.
Reliance loss is based on the premise of compensating the claimant for the loss suffered as a
consequence of relying on the assurance. The claimant would under these circumstances receive
financial compensation covering the amount spent.

Gillett v Holt, Robert Walker LJ said that the court would need to identify:

the maximum extent of the equity. The court’s aim is, having identified the maximum, to form a
view as to what is the minimum required to satisfy it and do justice between the parties. The
court must look at all the circumstances, including the need to achieve a ‘clean break’ so far as
possible and avoid or minimise future friction . . .

Once an estoppel is established, the courts have a discretion as to what remedy to award to
satisfy the equity. There have been two basic approaches, based on what the claimant expected to
receive, and on the detriment he suffered.

Jennings v Rice

Crabb v Arun DC

Pascoe v Turner

Sledmore v Dalby
Transaction Formality Effect of non- Unregistered titles Registered titles
compliance
Registration Effect of non- Registration Effect of non-
requirement compliance requirement compliance

Transfer The lease must The A lease which The transaction The transfer must The transaction
(assignment) be transferred transaction is has more than becomes void for be completed by has no effect at
of lease by deed: LPA void for the seven years to the purpose of registration: LRA law: LRA 2002, s
1925, s 52(1) purpose of run on the date transferring a 2002, s 27(2)(a) 27(1)
conveying a of the transfer legal estate; the
Note: The
legal estate: must be legal title reverts
exception in
LPA 1925, s registered (by to the transferor,
LPA 1925, ss
52(1) the transferee) who holds it on
52(2)(d) and
before the end trust for the
54(2), applies
of the transferee: LRA
only to the
registration 2002, ss 7(1), (2)
creation of
period: LRA (a)
leases; it does
2002, ss 4(1)(a),
not apply to
(2)(b), 6(1), (3)*
the transfer of
leases: Crago v
Julian
Grant The mortgage The The mortgagor The transaction The grant must be The transaction
(creation) of must be transaction is must register becomes void for completed by has no effect at
mortgage granted by void for the the estate the purpose of registration: LRA law: LRA 2002, s
deed: LPA purpose of charged by the creating a legal 2002, s 27(2)(f) 27(1)
1925, s 52(1) creating a mortgage before interest; it takes
legal the end of the effect as a
estate/interest: registration contract to create
LPA 1925, s period: LRA a mortgage: LRA
52(1) 2002, ss 4(1)(g), 2002, s 7(1), (2)
6(1), (2)* (b)
Note. This
requirement
applies only to a
‘protected first
legal mortgage:’
LRA 2002, s 4(1)
(g), (8)
Grant The easement The None - The grant must be The transaction
(creation) of must be transaction is completed by has no effect at
easement granted by void for the registration: LRA law: LRA 2002, s
deed: LPA purpose of 2002, s 27(2)(d) 27(1)
1925, s 52(1) creating a
legal interest:
LPA 1925, s
 52(1)

QUESTION
Jim was the freehold owner of a house. Six years ago, having experienced problems
with various tenants, Jim decided not to let the house again. However, given the high
incidence of adverse possession in the area, he did not want to leave the house vacant.
He said to his elderly uncle, Ted: “Why hold on to your pokey little flat, when you
can stay at the house?” Shortly afterwards, Ted gave up his council flat and moved
into the house. He immediately spent some of his savings on locks for the windows
and doors, and installed smoke and burglar alarms. Jim was pleased and said Ted
could consider the house his home for as long as he wanted.

Four years ago, Jim decided to sell all his investments and move abroad. He sold the
house to Cara. Jim told Cara about his arrangement with Ted. Cara told Jim she was
happy to continue that arrangement as she was buying the house as a long-term
investment. Cara visited Ted on several occasions before she bought the house and
assured him that he had nothing to be concerned about.

Eighteen months ago, Cara was very ill. Ted worried about what would happen if
Cara died before him. He talked to Cara about his concerns when her health improved.
She assured him that she would look after him and see her solicitor to revise her will.

A few months later, the house’s garden was damaged in a storm. A number of trees
were blown down. One of the trees damaged the garden shed as it fell. Ted spent the
last of his savings having the garden landscaped, the shed repaired, and a
summerhouse installed.

Cara died last week. Shortly before her death, she sold the house to Pippa. Pippa
wants to live in the house herself. She has asked Ted to leave.

Advise Ted.
This is a case where an estoppel may arise. An estoppel will give Ted the right to go
to court to claim a remedy, whether that remedy is proprietary or not.

Here define what P.E is?.......

It will be necessary for Ted to show that it would be unconscionable for him to be
evicted from Greenwood Lodge when he has been encouraged, or allowed to assume,
that he will be able to stay. He must show that he has relied on the assurances in such
a way that the reliance became detrimental when the assurance was, in effect,
withdrawn.

Need to apply the criteria in Taylor’s Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees
Ltd. All conditions must be met for an estoppel to arise.

1. There must be an assurance by the owner as to a right in the property. The

assurance must relate to a property right. The claimant must believe that the
owner is committed to this and will not back out. In family cases, there is quite a
bit of leeway / uncertainty tolerated as to the exact nature of the right which has
been promised.

Eg: in Griffiths v Williams the owner assured the claimant that she would have a
home for life. This was accepted even though the parties did not talk in terms of
property rights. The assumption can even be underlying as hardly spoken of.

Thorner v Major where claimant had worked for 30 years on a farm without
payment on the understanding that he would inherit. But if the owner has merely
promised money to help the claimant buy a house, that does not give rise to
proprietary estoppel because no land was involved in the promise.

2. There must be reliance by the claimant. The claimant has to show change of
position as a result of the assurance – so the change of position must come
about directly as a result of the assurance. If there is no causal link, then the
claimant cannot rely on that particular act of reliance – he or she will have to
find something else which can count as detriment.

3. The reliance becomes detrimental if the assurance is not acted upon or is

withdrawn. Reliance is not always detrimental per se.

4. It must be unconscionable for the owner to take advantage of the situation

Going through each of the events chronologically:

1) Jim’s assurance as to a right in the property

a) Jim’s initial assurance that Ted could live in the lodge may not be sufficient
depending on the context of the conversation – was it intended that he should stay
only for a short time until a reliable tenant could be found? We don’t know the nature
of the conversations here. This assurance does not seem to be talking, even obliquely,
about a proprietary right, therefore won’t ‘count’.

b) There is reliance (giving up his home, spending money etc), but not on anything
which counts as an assurance. Therefore this scenario will probably not substantiate
an estoppel claim.

2) Jim’s assurance that Ted had a home for as long as he wanted.

a) Does this amount to an assurance regarding a property right? It could amount to an

assurance of a life interest / equitable freehold; or a lease for life? It would probably
be enough, bearing in mind this is a family arrangement.

b) Ted gave up his home and spent money on locks etc. The problem is that he did
this before Jim made his assurance and independently of any relevant assurance by
Jim, so it will not substantiate a claim by Ted.

Therefore this scenario probably won’t form the basis for an estoppel claim either

3) Cara’s assurance that Ted had nothing to worry about.

a) Does this amount to an assurance regarding a property right? Possibly - as above.

b) But where is the reliance?

4) Cara’s assurance that she would see her solicitor and change her will.

a) This is an assurance Thorner v Major to the effect that Cara would leave the
property to Ted in her will – or at least give him a life interest in the property. It is
irrelevant that it is a promise of a future interest; it is irrelevant that a will is an
inherently revocable document…

b) Ted did have work done to the garden and installed the summerhouse. Did he do
this as a result of Cara’s assurance before she bought the house? On the facts it seems
to have been done as a result of the conversation he had with Cara about making her
will? Or did he do it simply because he wanted to make the garden more enjoyable
and not in expectation of an inheritance?

c) The expenditure probably becomes detrimental as we are told that Ted used the rest
of his savings – he has nothing to fall back on; he is elderly and cannot simply earn
money to replace his outlay. If the claimant only has a small amount of money then
the spending becomes detrimental if the assurance is not carried through (Pascoe v
Turner).

d) Unconscionability

Is it unconscionable for Cara to rely on her strict legal rights and sell the property to
Pippa?

It is not unconscionable to disappoint Ted’s expectations. But look at the situation in

the round – all the circumstances; conduct of both (eg: the lower price paid by Cara);
extent of the detriment; any advantage enjoyed by the claimant. There’s plenty of
scope for discussion. Perhaps the detriment for Ted has been compensated for by free
accommodation? (Sledmore v Dalby) But his position may be strengthened if he has
limited means; and is elderly or infirm?

Once Ted has ticked all the boxes/ satisfied all the elements of PE, an equity by
estoppel arises.

IS THE ESTOPPEL BINDING ON PIPPA?

Greenwood Lodge was sold to Pippa before Ted asked the court for a remedy, so we
need to show that Pippa is bound by Ted’s equity by estoppel. We need to consider
registered and unregistered alternatives…

REGISTERED LAND:

s.116 LRA 2002 makes it clear that an equity by estoppel takes effect as an interest
capable of binding successors, even though at the time the equity arises it is inchoate.
It is the right to make a claim which is binding. The equity can be protected by a s.32
notice on the Charges Register of Greenwood Lodge.

It is unlikely that Ted has done this! But the equity could amount to an overriding
interest if Ted is in actual occupation, Sched 3 para 2 confirmed in Lloyd v Dugdale,
as long as the conditions were met. Pippa would be bound by the equity and also by
the remedy the courts would award.
UNREGISTERED LAND:

The equity cannot be protected by a Land Charge as there is no appropriate category

Ives v High.

But the Doctrine of Notice applies – ie: it will be binding on everyone

Pippa presumably had a chance to inspect the land before purchase and would have
seen Ted in occupation – therefore having constructive notice of his equity. Pippa will
be bound by any remedy the court awards to Ted.

REMEDY?

Ted will have the right to go to court to ask for it to give effect to the assurances made
by Jim and/or Cara. The court has discretion as to what to award but the basic
principle is that the court will award the

‘minimum equity to do justice’ Crab v Arun – this could be the transfer of the
freehold Dillwyn v Llewellyn;

a life interest;

a lease for life Griffiths v Williams;

accommodation for life Inwards v Baker;

a licence to occupy free of charge until the money spent by Ted had in effect been
repaid Dodsworth v Dodsworth;

money…

The point is that the remedy does not necessarily match what was promised/expected.
The court must have regard to Pippa’s situation as well as to Ted’s and try to do what
is equitable. The court takes into account proportionality Jennings v Rice.

There is no correct answer to the question of what award would be made – but you
could have some lively discussion as to how on earth the court is going to balance the
interests of Ted and Pippa!

Remember your are not to see things only from Ted’s point of view but should be
encouraged to think more widely and creatively.
Perhaps accommodation for Ted for life? Or would money be better? Then Pippa and
the children could get straight into the property and Ted would have enough money to
rent somewhere suitable in the longer term. Any money paid out by Pippa could
presumably be recovered in a negligence action against her solicitors...