IO01 NFZ Y RA 0001 Rev.04 1

IOOC Gas Export Pipeline System
Integrity Management System
04 31/08/2019 Issued for Approval S. Pirsiavash R. Fallahzadeh M. Hajiarab
03 25/08/2019 Issued for Review S. Pirsiavash R. Fallahzadeh M. Hajiarab
02 11/08/2019 Issued for Review S. Pirsiavash S. Pirsiavash M. Hajiarab
01 24/07/2019 Internal Document Review S. Pirsiavash R. Fallahzadeh M. Hajiarab
Revision Date Reason for issue Prepared Checked Approved

Title/Description Responsible party
NFZ/ISCO
Integrity Status of IOOC 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri Gas
No. of pages
Export Pipeline System
135
Document Number
Project Originator Discipline Doc type Sequence Area System
code code code code number code code
IO01 NFZ Y RA 0001 - -
IO01-NFZ-Y-RA-0001 - -
NORAN ENERGY Page 1 of 135 ISCO MIDDLE EAST

www.noranenergy.com www.isco-me.ir
Integrity Status of IOOC 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri
Gas Export Pipeline System
CONTRACT No. FG2-97-5248
CLIENT: Iranian Offshore Oil Company (IOOC)

Integrity Status of IOOC Gas Export Pipeline System Doc. No. IO01-NFZ-Y-RA-0001
Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Distribution List
Soft Hard
Company Department Recipients
Copy Copy
Offshore Installation Maintenance and Repair
IOOC Ali Khavasfar ✓ ✓
head, Integrity team leader
IOOC Senior Integrity Engineer Sadegh Momeni ✓ -
Contact Details
Contractor: Client:
Norway office: Iranian Offshore Oil Company (IOOC)
Noran Energy Norge AS, Olav Brunborgsvei 6, 4 etg., No.12, Tooraj street, Vali-e-asr,
1396, Billingstad, Norway
Tehran, Iran
Tel: +47 9866 5991
Tel: +98 (21) 23942000
Iran office:
ISCO Middle East, No.29, Abbas Pour St., Vanak Sq.,
Tehran
Tel: +98 (21) 88771289
Email: Email:
info@pipeline-technologies.com akhavasfar@iooc.co.ir
r.fallahzadeh@iscogroup-ir.com
mh@noranenergy.com

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Table of Contents:
LIST OF REPORT ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS ............................................................................. 11
1 INTRODUCTION (FIELD/ASSET OVERVIEW) ............................................................................... 13
1.5.1 Landfall Coordinates ............................................................................................................. 17
2 PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS .............................................................................................................. 22
3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. 23
4 DATA QUALITY, ACCURACY AND CONFIDENCE ....................................................................... 25
5 PIPELINE INSPECTION TECHNIQUES .......................................................................................... 26
5.1.1 Generic Inspection Techniques............................................................................................. 26

5.1.2 Inspection Categories ........................................................................................................... 26
5.2.1 Generic Pipeline Inspection Techniques ............................................................................... 27

6 THREAT IDENTIFICATION .............................................................................................................. 28
6.1.1 Generic Defect Assessment Methodologies for Subsea Pipelines ....................................... 29
7 RISK ASSESSMENTS (SEMI-QUANTITATIVE APPROACH) ....................................................... 31
7.6.1 Credible Threats .................................................................................................................... 38
7.7.1 Top of the Line Corrosion...................................................................................................... 39

7.7.2 Bottom of the Line Corrosion ................................................................................................ 39
8 FAILURE MODES ............................................................................................................................ 41
9 ASALUYEH-SIRRI PIPELINE SEGMENTATION ............................................................................ 42
10 ILI DATA ANALYSIS AND FITNESS FOR PURPOSE (FFP) ASSESSMENT ............................... 44
10.1.1 ILI Tool Tolerances ........................................................................................................... 44

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10.2.1 Distribution of Features with Respect to their Types ........................................................ 46

10.2.2 Distribution of Metal Loss Features with Respect to Clock Position and Distance ........... 47
10.2.3 Summary of Anomaly Features Reported in ILI 2016 ....................................................... 49
10.2.4 Other Features .................................................................................................................. 51
10.4.1 Parameters Used in the FFP Assessments ...................................................................... 55

10.4.2 Assessment Method .......................................................................................................... 56
10.4.3 Design Factor .................................................................................................................... 56
10.4.4 Defect Assessment Results .............................................................................................. 57
10.4.5 Calculation for the Minimum Existing Wall Thickness....................................................... 58
11 ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................... 62
11.1.1 Internal Corrosion Distribution........................................................................................... 62

11.1.2 Pitting Corrosion ................................................................................................................ 63
11.1.3 General Corrosion ............................................................................................................. 63
11.1.4 MIC .................................................................................................................................... 63
11.2.1 External Corrosion Distribution ......................................................................................... 65

11.2.2 External Corrosion Root Cause Analysis and Mechanisms ............................................. 65
11.2.3 Dents ................................................................................................................................. 65
11.2.4 Manufacturing Features .................................................................................................... 66
12 ROV................................................................................................................................................... 67
13 FACILITIES INTEGRITY STATUS ................................................................................................... 69
14 IOW ................................................................................................................................................... 70
15 ASSESSED CORROSION RATE (ACR) ......................................................................................... 73
15.3.1 Corrosion Coupons ........................................................................................................... 77

16 REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN .............................................................................................................. 79
17 OPERATIONAL PIGGING AND DEBRIS ANALYSIS ..................................................................... 84
18 LAND SURVEYS .............................................................................................................................. 85
18.2.1 Recommendation for Shore Approach Segment .............................................................. 86

19 IN-HOUSE PROCEDURES TO BE UPDATED OR DEVELOPED .................................................. 87

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20 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................ 88
21 RECOMMENDATION ....................................................................................................................... 89
22 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................. 93
23 APPENDIX A: SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION ................................................................................ 94
23.4.1 Pin-Hole Clamp ................................................................................................................. 96

23.4.2 Steel Sleeve Type B .......................................................................................................... 96
23.4.3 Bolted Repair Clamp ......................................................................................................... 97
23.4.4 Composite Repair.............................................................................................................. 97
23.4.5 Patch Clamp ...................................................................................................................... 97
23.4.6 Coupling ............................................................................................................................ 97
23.4.7 Connector .......................................................................................................................... 97
23.5.1 General Procedure ............................................................................................................ 98
23.11.1 Coating Survey ................................................................................................................ 101

23.11.2 Cathodic Protection Surveys ........................................................................................... 104
23.11.3 Trans-rectifier Settings History for Onshore Section....................................................... 106
24 APPENDIX B: LIST OF 200 MOST SIGNIFICANT ERF AND DEPTH ......................................... 107
25 APPENDIX C: DATA SHEET AND INSPECTION FORM FOR BVS ............................................ 111
26 APPENDIX D: DATA SHEET AND INSPECTION FORM FOR PIG TRAPS ................................ 117
27 APPENDIX E: PARSPIMS TM ENTERPRISE SOFTWARE SNAPSHOT FOR ASALUYEH-SIRRI

PIPELINE ................................................................................................................................................ 123

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List of Figures:
Figure 1.2-1, 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline overview ............................................................................. 13

Figure 1.5-1, Zone 39N (Asaluyeh landfall) & 40N (Sirri landfall), Asaluyeh-Sirri Pipeline ...................... 16
Figure 1.5-2, UTM Grid zones on Iran ...................................................................................................... 17
Figure 9.1-1, Schematic view of segmentations in 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline ................................. 43
Figure 10.2-1, Distribution of features with respect to their types............................................................. 46
Figure 10.2-2, Distribution of metal loss features Vs Orientation from km 0 to 4.5 .................................. 47
Figure 10.2-3, Distribution of metal loss Vs. Orientation for km 7.9 to 11 ................................................ 47
Figure 10.2-4, Distribution of defects for Depth>=40% ............................................................................. 48
Figure 10.2-5, Distribution of defects for Depth>=30%............................................................................. 49
Figure 10.4-1, Location class in 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline .............................................................. 56
Figure 10.4-2, Defects Graphical Plot based on DNVGL RP-F101 Part B with ILI tolerances................. 57
Figure 10.4-3, Defects Graphical Plot based on DNVGL RP-F101 Part B without ILI tolerances............ 57
Figure 10.4-4, FFP assessment results for corrosion features located at pipe joints with wall thickness <
19.5mm ..................................................................................................................................................... 58
Figure 10.5-1, RBA curve of 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline.................................................................... 59
Figure 10.6-1, Verified location (by DP2) .................................................................................................. 60
Figure 11.1-1, Internal corrosion distribution along the pipeline length .................................................... 62
Figure 11.1-2, Clock position of internal defects from top to bottom of pipeline ....................................... 62
Figure 11.1-3, Asaluyeh-Sirri Pipeline Elevation Profile (Offshore) .......................................................... 63
Figure 11.2-1, Distribution of External defects along the pipeline length ................................................. 65
Figure 12.1-1, Pipeline crossing with other pipeline(s) ............................................................................. 68
Figure 14.2-1, Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline pressure gradient at Asaluyeh ...................................................... 71
Figure 14.2-2, Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline pressure gradient at Sirri .............................................................. 71
Figure 14.3-1, Asaluyeh-Sirri Temperature gradient ................................................................................ 72
Figure 14.4-1, Asaluyeh-Sirri flow data ..................................................................................................... 72
Figure 15.3-1, Corrosion Coupon weight loss plot .................................................................................... 78
Figure 18.2-1, Landfall segment Sirri (segment #210) with predicted Geotextile protection .................... 85
Figure 18.2-2, Segment #210 profile with protection cover ...................................................................... 86
Figure 23.5-1, Above-Water Repair Procedure a) Side View, b) Top View .............................................. 99
Figure 23.11-1, Available methods for coating survey in subsea segment ............................................ 103
Figure 23.11-2, CP value of sacrificial anodes, ROV 2010 .................................................................... 105

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List of Tables:
Table 1.5-1, UTM system for Zone 39 & 40 .............................................................................................. 16

Table 1.5-2, Asaluyeh and Sirri Landfall Location .................................................................................... 17
Table 1.6-1, In-scope pipeline design and operational data*.................................................................... 18
Table 1.7-1, Sea State Parameters- Shore Approach segment ............................................................... 19
Table 1.7-2, Sea States Parameters- Offshore segments ........................................................................ 19
Table 1.8-1, Coating in 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline (Based on As-Built)............................................ 20
Table 1.9-1, Concrete coat thickness details for offshore section ............................................................ 20
Table 1.10-1, Summary of the past working fluid composition of 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline ........... 21
Table 1.10-2, Summary of the future working fluid composition of 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline ......... 21
Table 3.1-1, Proposed summary of the pipeline integrity status ............................................................... 23
Table 5.1-1, Inspection Techniques (DNV, 2009) ..................................................................................... 26
Table 6.1-1, Typical codified Subsea Pipelines Threats ........................................................................... 28
Table 6.1-2, Overview of Subsea Pipelines Assessment Codes/Guidelines............................................ 29
Table 7.1-1, 5x5 Risk Assessment Matrix (Semi-Quantitative Approach) with Work Selection Inspection
Intervals (years) ........................................................................................................................................ 32
Table 7.1-2, Risk Categories..................................................................................................................... 32
Table 7.2-1, Semi-Quantitative risk assessment of the shore approach section...................................... 33
Table 7.3-1, Semi-Quantitative risk assessment of the subsea section ................................................... 35
Table 7.4-1, Onshore Section threat identification (Risk Based) .............................................................. 37
Table 7.5-1, Summary of Risk ranking...................................................................................................... 37
Table 7.5-2, Summary of risk ranking in 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline ................................................. 38
Table 9.1-1, Pipeline Segmentation .......................................................................................................... 42
Table 9.1-2, Segmentation colour codes .................................................................................................. 43
Table 10.1-1, Detection and Sizing Accuracy of ILI tool ........................................................................... 44
Table 10.1-2, Detection and sizing accuracy for anomalies ..................................................................... 45
Table 10.2-1, Summary of detected manufacturing related features and anomalies ............................... 49
Table 10.2-2, Metal loss feature distribution with respect to their depth and ERF ................................... 50
Table 10.2-3, Generic list of features in ILI-2016 ...................................................................................... 50
Table 10.3-1, The most 30 significant defects based on highest ERF* .................................................... 52
Table 10.3-2, List of 20 deepest features ................................................................................................. 53
Table 10.4-1, Offshore Pipeline Input data sheet for DNVGL RP-F101 calculations module .................. 54
Table 10.4-2, Input data used for the immediate FFP assessments ........................................................ 55
Table 10.4-3, The pipeline safety factors .................................................................................................. 56
Table 10.6-1, Wall thickness readings for subsea verification .................................................................. 60
Table 10.7-1, Summary of Pipeline Structural Integrity Assessment........................................................ 61
Table 11.1-1 Chemical and Microbial Analyzed Results of Sediments Sample ....................................... 64
Table 11.2-1, List of dents......................................................................................................................... 66
Table 12.1-1, Observed Crossings - 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri Pipeline ....................................................... 67
Table 12.2-1, The most severe Free Spans (ROV- 2010) ........................................................................ 68
Table 14.1-1, Integrity Operating Window ................................................................................................ 70
Table 15.2-1, ECE Corrosion calculation for Past Super Dry Sour Gas Working Fluid Composition ...... 74
Table 15.2-2, ECE Corrosion calculation for Future Dry Sweet Gas Working Fluid Composition ........... 74
Table 15.3-1, Assessed Corrosion Rate (ACR), [mm/yr] for Past Super Dry Sour Gas Working Fluid
Composition .............................................................................................................................................. 75
Table 15.3-2, Assessed Corrosion Rate (ACR), [mm/yr] for Future Dry Sweet Gas Working Fluid
Composition .............................................................................................................................................. 76
Table 15.3-3, Corrosion Coupon retrieval report period Sep. 2016 to Jan. 2019 ..................................... 77
Table 16.1-1, Immediate 1-year Action Plan............................................................................................. 79
Table 16.2-1, Medium Term 3-Years Action Plan ..................................................................................... 81
Table 16.3-1, Long-term 5-year Action Plan ............................................................................................. 83
Table 23.4-1, Possible Generic Repair Methods ...................................................................................... 96
Table 23.11-1, 32-inch Asaluyeh – Sirri pipeline Max. & min. CP potential Value ................................. 105

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Disclaimer
This document is issued in accordance with an agreement between ISCO-Noran Energy consortium
(Contractor) and Iranian Offshore Oil Company (Client), which sets out the rights, obligations and liabilities
of the parties with respect to the content and use of this report.
This report is prepared for the Client only and Contractor accepts no liability for any loss or damage
suffered by any third party who may rely on the contents of this report. In this respect, third party means
any entity whom has no legal status towards National Iranian Oil Company and Contractor.
This report may contain material or information obtained from third party sources. In this regard Contractor
accepts no liability for any loss or damage suffered by any person, including the Client, as a result of any
error or inaccuracy in third party material or information which is included in this report.
Further, this report is prepared by Contractor based on documented information provided by Client. This
input information is evaluated and verified to Contractor’s best knowledge and any input assumption is
clearly outlined in the report. Hence, validity of this report is based on the stated inputs and assumptions.
This document is the property of Client and any information contained herein shall not be reproduced,
used, transmitted nor in any way made public without permission of the Client. No part of this document
shall be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the Client.

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List of Report Acronyms and definitions
% IR drop Percentage of potential drop due to solution resistance

3LPE Three Layer Polyethylene
4WD Four-wheel drive, also called 4×4
Abs Absolute Distance
AC Alternative Current
ACR Assessed Corrosion Rate (mm/yr)
AGM Above Ground Marker
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practical
Amb. Temp Ambient Temperature
APB Acid-Producing Bacteria
API American Petroleum Institute
ASA-SIR Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline
ASAP As soon as possible
ASME The American Society of Mechanical Engineers
AUT Automatic Ultrasonic testing
AUV Autonomous Underwater Vehicles
BOD Barrels of Oil per Day
BS&W Basic Sediment and Water
BVS Block Valve Station
CA Corrosion Allowance
CI Corrosion Inhibitor
CIPS Close interval potential survey
CoF Consequence of Failure
CRA Corrosion-Resistant Alloy
CVI Close Visual Inspection
CWC Concrete Weight Coating for offshore pipelines
DC Direct Current
DCVG Direct Current Voltage Gradient
DFI Design/Fabrication/Installation
DNV Det Norske Veritas
DP Dynamic Positioning like DP2
EC Eddy Current (NDT method)
ECDA External Corrosion Direct Assessment
ECE Electronic Corrosion Engineer software for quantitative estimation of corrosion
rates
EPRS Emergency Pipeline Repair Scheme
ERF Estimated Repair Factor
ERP Enterprise Resource Planning
FAT Factory Acceptance Test
FFP Fitness For Purpose (See FFS as well)
FFS Fitness For Service
FLRA Field Level Risk Assessment
GIS Geographical Information System
GVI General Visual Inspection
GVI XTD Extended Visual Pipeline survey/Inspection
GWT Guided Wave Testing
GWUT Guided Wave Ultrasonic Testing
HAT Highest Astronomical Tides
HIC Hydrogen Induced Cracking
HPS High Precision Survey
HR-MFL High Resolution Magnetic Flux Leakage
HSE Health, Safety and Environment
HVL Highly Volatile Liquids
HWM High Water Mark
ICCP Impressed Current Cathodic Protection

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ICDA Internal Corrosion Direct Assessment

ILI In-Line Inspection
IM Integrity Management
IOOC Iranian Offshore Oil Company
IOW Integrity Operating Window
IRB Iron Reducing Bacteria
IVMS In Vehicle Monitoring System
LARS Logistics And Resource System
LECC Local Emergency Control Centre
Long. Seam Longitudinal seam weld of line pipe
LRUT Long Range Ultrasonic Testing (See GWT)
MAOP Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure
Metocean Meteorology and (physical) Oceanography data
MFL Magnetic Flux Leakage
MIC Microbiologically-Influenced Corrosion
MMSCFD Million Standard Cubic Feet per Day
MoC Management of Change
MOP Maximum Operating Pressure
N/A Not Available
NDE Non-Destructive Examination
NDT Non-Destructive Testing, see NDE
OD Outside Diameter
PCC Repair of Pressure Equipment ASME standard
PDAM Pipeline Defect Assessment Manual
PIMS Pipeline Integrity Management Systems
POD Probability of Detection
POF Pipeline Operators Forum
PoF Probability of Failure
PRCI Pipeline Research Council International
PTD Permanent Total Disability (insurance term)
PTT Pull Through Test (for ILI tool)
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
RAP Remedial Action Plan
RBA Risk Based Assessment
RBI Risk Based Inspection
RCA Root Cause Analysis
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle
ROW Right Of Way
RTTM Real Time Transient Model
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SDV Shutdown Valve
Section Means either Onshore or Offshore sections
Segment A segment is defined as a sub-section of pipeline system within the pipeline
SMLS Seamless pipe
SMTS Specified Minimum Tensile Strength
SMYS Specified Minimum Yield Strength
SOL Safe Operating Limits
SOW or SoW Scope of Work
SRB Sulphate Reducing Bacteria
SSC Sulphide Stress Cracking
SW Seam welded pipe
TBA To Be Added
UT Ultrasonic Test
UTM Universal Transverse Mercator
VIV Vortex Induced Vibration
w/o Without
w.r.t with regards to

Asaluyeh-Sirri
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1 Introduction (Field/Asset Overview)
The Company
Iranian Offshore Oil Company (IOOC), is one of the world's largest offshore oil producing
companies with over a half century of experience. The Company shares one third of Iranian oil
export, operating in Iranian side of the Persian Gulf and Oman Sea.
The main operation area of Iranian Offshore Oil Company is the Persian Gulf where four other
oil producing countries are located in the other side (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and United Arab
Emirates). These Five countries totally possess 63 percent of oil reserves and 40 percent of
natural gas reserves of the world.
Gas Field and Asaluyeh-Sirri Pipeline

The subject IOOC Gas Field is an existing oil and gas producing complex in Iranian waters of
the Persian Gulf. This Gas Field Integrated development project is conceived for expansion of
current gas production and exploitation reservoir located in the Dalan Complex. This field is
capable of increasing the oil production by 50,000 BOD and producing and transporting 500
MMSCFD of export quality gas to Mubarak Platform via a compression facility in Sirri Island.
The vicinity of existing Complex is congested with many existing gas gathering and gas lift
pipelines. List of in-scope pipelines including gas gathering and gas export pipeline network is
provided in Chapter 1.4 of this report.
As depicted in Figure 1.2-1 the schematic of project area and pipeline route, Asaluyeh-Sirri gas
pipeline project is aimed at transferring produced gas from Asaluyeh in southern Iran to Sirri
island located 70 km in the Persian Gulf with total length of approximately 305 km.
The main component of the project is a 32-inch export pipeline of 500 MMSCFD capacity, that
is used to transport gas from compression facilities in Sirri to Asaluyeh (currently). The basis of
design of this pipeline (Document No. SA-000-4200-PL-DB-1001-D0) is for sour gas and flow
direction from Sirri island to Asaluyeh which in practice it is supposed (in near future) to be
reversed.
Figure 1.2-1, 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline overview

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Project Scope
IOOC is in process of setting up Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS) for its
organisation. In this regard a PIMS committee is established to coordinate and manage this
effort.
Noting the above and as an initial step in setting up PIMS in IOOC organisation, ISCO-Noran
Energy consortium (Contractor) is appointed by IOOC (Client) for the pipeline integrity status
study outlined in this report and implementation of PIMS platform in IOOC. However, this report
only covers the former.
To avoid any confusion in data entry and also for practical interpretations in ParsPiMS TM
platform (linked pipeline integrity viewer software), KP 0 is set in launcher Asaluyeh and KP
305 in Receiver Sirri island, therefore all inspection data and reports are projected in this
direction.
This report is prepared to give the latest integrity status of in-scope pipeline(s) system in IOOC
gas field. A course of remedial actions next to remnant lifetime of these pipelines is also
recommended.
IOOC intends to assess pipeline integrity status and to improve safety and reliability of in-scope
pipeline. This would be achieved in a phased manner. Below is detail of scope of work for this
study:
- Review of existing pipeline condition

- ILI data assessment
- Corrosion Rate Assessment
- Remaining life Assessment
- Risk Assessment and prioritization
- Recommendation of repair strategies
- Recommendation of long-Term integrity plans
- Integrity status report
- PIMS software and platform
A supplementary software (ParsPiMS TM) is prepared for this report. It is a platform to project
the GIS spatial and descriptive data for in-scope pipeline(s) and to present integrity status of
this pipeline system.
The scope of this report is to summarize the key findings and recommendations from the series
of detailed technical reviews carried out on the pipeline.
In-scope Pipelines
The Client is operator of two main pipelines under review in this project, namely:
I. 1x 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri, 305 km in length (onshore and offshore)

II. 1x 30-inch Sirri-Mubarak, 68.5 km in length (onshore and offshore)
This study covers the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline from in-scope pipelines. Assessment of
other pipelines is covered in separate report for each pipeline.
The 32-inch export pipeline with 500 MMSCFD capacity, transports the refined offshore
product from onshore gas treatment facilities in Asaluyeh which branched from phase 9 and 10
south pars pipelines (Fifth Refinery) to Sirri (with 3 compressor stations in Sirri Island).
IOOC plans to export sour gas from South Pars Refinery to customers as part of a long-term
contract and is intending to utilize the existing 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline which is currently

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operated by IOOC to transport sour gas from Siri Island to Asaluyeh as gas export line. Hence
the integrity of the 32-inch pipeline needs to be assessed to provide an indication of the
remaining life and required mitigation to demonstrate safe continued operation of the pipeline.
In order to ensure integrity of subject pipeline system, IOOC has requested ISCO-Noran
Energy consortium to perform a Risk Based Assessment (RBA) on the 32-inch pipeline based
on all available data at the time of writing this report.
This RBA study covers essential parts of structural integrity and supportive mechanisms such
as CP, etc. to conclude integrity status of the subject pipeline system.
See pipeline basis of design document No. SA-000-4200-PL-DB-1001-D0 for more information.

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Gas Fields Layout and System Diagram
Figure 1.5-1, Zone 39N (Asaluyeh landfall) & 40N (Sirri landfall), Asaluyeh-Sirri Pipeline
32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline is starting from Asaluyeh landfall in zone 39 (see Universal
Transverse Mercator – UTM- system) and ends in Sirri landfall and receiver in Zone 40 (UTM).
For more information about in-scope pipeline coordinates and relevant Grid zones, See Table
1.5-1, UTM system for Zone 39 & 40 and Figure 1.5-2 (in Datum Transformation WGS-84).
Table 1.5-1, UTM system for Zone 39 & 40
Zone Central Meridian Longitude

39N 51E 48E-54E
40N 57E 54E-60E

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Figure 1.5-2, UTM Grid zones on Iran
This report summarizes the pipeline integrity status, remaining lifetime and action plan for both
offshore and onshore section from the pig launcher in Asaluyeh to the pig receiver station in
Sirri island.
1.5.1 Landfall Coordinates

The two (2), Asaluyeh and Sirri island landfall point locations are presented in Table 1.5-2.
Table 1.5-2, Asaluyeh and Sirri Landfall Location
Asaluyeh Landfall Point Location
Geographical Coordinates Grid Coordinates Expected Water

Location
Latitude (N) Longitude (E) Easting (m) Northing (m) Depth (m)
Asaluyeh 27° 27’ 52.578” 052° 36’ 58.449” 659 709.90 3 038 977.78 0.0
Spheroid: Hayford International 1924, Datum: ED77, UTM Zone: 39N, CM: 51° E
Sirri Landfall Point Location
Geographical Coordinates Grid Coordinates Expected Water

Location
Latitude (N) Longitude (E) Easting (m) Northing (m) Depth (m)
Sirri 25° 53’ 39.081” 054° 32’ 42.876” 254 046.80 2 866 306.89 0.0
Spheroid: Hayford International 1924, Datum: ED77, UTM Zone: 40N, CM: 57° E

Asaluyeh-Sirri
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Pipeline Information
Table 1.6-1 shows a summary of design and operating information regarding the in-scope
pipeline.
Table 1.6-1, In-scope pipeline design and operational data*

W.t
W.t
for Shore
MAOP for offshore
Design Design approach
Size Pipeline Length Original/ section and
Pressure Capacity Material Section (partially)
(inch) Name (km) derated Onshore
(barg) (MMSCFD) and 3 pieces
(barg) section
subsea 5D bends
(mm)
(mm)
290 km Carbon
Subsea Steel
Asaluyeh-
32 and 15 114 114/93 500 SAWL 28.8 20.6
Sirri
km 450 I SF
Onshore (X65)
Max Year of min/Max availability availability
Coating Corrosion
Depth of Lining Fluid Construction/ design of of
type Allowance
water Operation Temp. As Builts ROV/ILI
6mm
Hot Super
-29 °C
Bitumen Dry 2008 /
1.5 mm 96 m No / Yes Yes/Yes
and Sour 2016
65 °C
90mm Gas***
CWC**
* This table is based on received information from IOOC and the operational data shall be checked and confirmed by
user of this report.
**Coating in onshore section is 3LPE and CWC varies along the pipeline length. (See Table 1.9-1).
***Working fluid is super dry sour gas (from Sirri island to Asaluyeh), however at the time of writing this report, it is
known that IOOC is intending to change the flow direction from Asaluyeh to Sirri island (MoC document is needed upon
this change noting that MoC document with authorized signature is essential for any change in operational
parameters).
Notes:
1: Wall thickness in onshore section including 8 pieces 5D bends is 28.8 mm in Asaluyeh and 20.6 mm in Sirri island.
2: Maximum operating temperature for entire pipeline is 50 °C.
3: Pipeline and cathodic protection design lifetime is 25 years.
4: Pig receiver barrel has 31.4 mm wall thickness (including design CA).
5: Shore approach segments was supposed to be with 28.8 mm wall thickness in design documents, but in practice
there are wall thicknesses less than this thickness. See Table 9.1-1, Pipeline Segmentation for more details.
6: Hydrotest pressure (at reference height), offshore and onshore Sec. is 125.7 and 159.6 barg respectively.
7: Design Code for Offshore section and onshore section is DNV-OS-F101 and ASME B31.8 respectively.
8: Delivery condition in Normal operating pressure shall be 76 bar min at the Asaluyeh
9: Pipeline tag in ParsPiMS TM GIS platform is “ASA-SIR”.
10: It is noted that working fluid in this pipeline is super dry with no water (from well, upstream, downstream, refinery or
any condensate water. Ref.: Signed Minutes of Meeting 10th July 2019 with Client’s focal point of this project.
11: Max. working pressure in last 12 months (2018-2019) was 80.5 barg.
12: For more information about Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline pressure gradient, temperature profile and flow data in last 12
months please see Chapter 13.
Source: Pipeline basis of design document No. SA-000-4200-PL-DB-1001-D0.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Metocean Data
Table 1.7-1 and Table 1.7-2 show sea state parameters for shore approach and offshore
segments of this pipeline.
Table 1.7-1, Sea State Parameters- Shore Approach segment
Environmental Condition
Sl No. Description
1 year 100 years
1 Highest Astronomical Tide (HAT), m 1.52 1.52
2 Lowest Astronomical Tide (LAT), m 0.00 0.00
3 Storm Tide, m 0.18 0.30
4 Total Tide, m 1.70 1.82
5 Current (Surface), m/s 1.036 1.310
6 Current (Bottom), m/s 0.366 0.400
7 Significant Wave Height, m Ref.: Glenn Report, Fig 10
8 Significant Wave Period, sec Ref.: Glenn Report, Fig 12
9 Maximum Wave Height, m Ref.: Glenn Report, Fig 9
10 Maximum Wave Period, sec Ref.: Glenn Report, Fig 11
11 Sea Water Kinematic Viscosity, m2/s 1.51 E-06 1.51 E-06
12 Sea Water Density, kg/m3 1027 1027
Variation of wave parameters with water depth is indicated in the Environmental report
(metrological-Oceanographic conditions affecting Design of Offshore petroleum facilities:
Approximately 250 31’07” N, 530 08’ 45” E, 67-foot chart depth, Persian Gulf by A.H. GLENN
and Associates) shall be considered for more details.
Table 1.7-2, Sea States Parameters- Offshore segments
Environmental Condition
Sl No Description
1 year 100 years
1 Highest Astronomical Tide (HAT), m 2.1 2.1
2 Lowest Astronomical Tide (LAT), m - -
3 Storm Tide, m 0.2 0.3
4 Total Tide, m 2.3 2.4
5 Current (Surface), m/s 0.8 1.1
6 Current (Bottom), m/s 0.3 0.5
7 Significant Wave Height, m 3.2 5.9
8 Significant Wave Period, sec 7.6 10.0
9 Maximum Wave Height, m 6.0 11.0
10 Maximum Wave Period, sec 8.5 11.0
11 Sea Water Kinematic Viscosity, m2/s 1.51 E-06 1.51 E-06
12 Sea Water Density, kg/m3 1027 1027
The shore approach wave and current data used for this report and analysis are extracted from
Salman project design basis (AH. GLENN and Associates report for Mubarak Field). These
data are fully applicable to this project owing to the small distance of approach location of
pipeline to Sirri Island.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Pipeline Coating
Table 1.8-1 summarizes external Coating detail of the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline.
Table 1.8-1, Coating in 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline (Based on As-Built)
Onshore section (Underground)

Type Three Layer Polyethylene
Density 980 kg/m3
Thickness 3.5 mm
Onshore section (Aboveground)
Type Paint
Offshore section (Straight concrete coated spool piece section)
Type Hot Bitumen Enamel
Density 1400 kg/m3
Thickness 6 mm
All bended spools
Type Three Layer Polyethylene
Density 980 kg/m3
Thickness 3.5 mm
Offshore Section Concrete Coating Thickness (Per Segment)

Table 1.9-1 presents CWC in the subject pipeline.
Table 1.9-1, Concrete coat thickness details for offshore section
Concrete
Pipeline Section
Thickness
KP 0 to KP 12 90 mm
KP 12 to KP 22 68 mm
KP 22 to KP 42 55 mm
KP 42 to KP 270 51 mm
KP 270 to KP 286 55 mm
KP 286 to KP 288 68 mm
KP 288 to KP 290 90 mm
Spool piece 51 mm
Density of concrete in all segments is assumed to be 3,040 kg/m3.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Working Fluid
Characteristics of the pipeline working fluid composition during its operation lifetime since start-
up is received from IOOC and outlined in Table 1.10-1. This data is from latest monitoring
activity in Asaluyeh and are used as the basis for tabulating this report.
Table 1.10-1, Summary of the past working fluid composition of 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline
Mole fractions
Component Early Life Early Life End Years End Years
Min Amb. Temp. Max Amb. Temp. Min Amb. Temp. Max Amb. Temp.
N2 0.0322 0.0320 0.0321 0.0321
CO2 0.0316 0.0315 0.0316 0.0316
H2S 0.0154 0.0155 0.0155 0.0155
C1 0.8376 0.8343 0.8354 0.8350
C2 0.0508 0.0509 0.0508 0.0509
C3 0.0181 0.0187 0.0185 0.0186
iC4 0.0040 0.0043 0.0042 0.0043
nC4 0.0044 0.0047 0.0047 0.0047
iC5 0.0019 0.0022 0.0021 0.0022
nC5 0.0015 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
nC6 0.0013 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017
C7+ (*) 0.0012 0.0024 0.0016 0.0016
H2O 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
Total 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0001
(*) Properties of C7+ Molecular Weight = 128.3 and Specific Gravity = 0.776
It is noted that IOOC is in preparation to use the subject pipeline for transportation of dry sweet
gas in the future with fluid composition outlined in Table 1.10-2. Upon implementation of such
change, this assessment shall be revisited including new ILI data.
Table 1.10-2, Summary of the future working fluid composition of 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline
Mole fractions
Component Assaluye Phase 9 & 10
Export Gas
N2 3.601
CO2 0.909
H2S 0
C1 92.978
C2 2.429
C3 0.079
iC4 0.002
nC4 0.002
Total 1.0000

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
2 Project Assumptions
- The working fluid in this pipeline is super dry sour gas from Asaluyeh to Sirri. For
working fluid composition see Table 1.10-1 for assumed composition of inlet. The
current assessment is performed based on this assumption and the results of this report
are pending this confirmation.
- MAOP equals 93 barg.
- Maximum operating temperature for entire pipeline is 50 °C.
- ILI 2016 is validated by IOOC and the existing ILI data is applicable for this study.
- Design life of pipeline is 25 years.
- Installation was started in 2008 and operation start-up year was in 2016.
- For the purpose of this assessment, the ILI tool accuracy for length, width and depth of
anomalies is as per Table 10.1-1.
- Since the shore approach segment in Sirri island is with the same wall thickness of
subsea section (20.8 mm), hence it is impossible to identify the Abs. distances of shore
approach segment now, therefore same length of 547 meter for shore approach section
of Asaluyeh has been assumed same for Sirri shore approach.
- Although the overall pipeline integrity is evaluated here, noting the available
information, corrosion defects are noted to be the most credible threat and this study
remains focused on assessment of corrosion defects in the form of metal loss caused
by exposure of the pipeline internal surface to seawater during commissioning and
produced gas during operation.
- It is noted that material of construction of the existing pipeline as specified in the Basis
of Design is compliant with NACE MR 0175/ISO 15156 for H2S cracking resistant
materials.
- All the defects reported in the 2016 ILI inspection were assessed except the
manufacturing anomalies which have been reported without any depth value. However,
these features are considered to have been introduced during the manufacturing and
construction phases. Consequently, they will have survived the pre-service hydrotest
and in the absence of a growth mechanism or additional axial loading, they are not
considered a threat to the integrity of the pipeline and assumed fit for service.
- All ERFs greater than or equal to 1 (one) in this report, are based on ILI company
calculation and might be different based on the DNVGL-RP-F101.
- For the onshore section of the pipeline, the same anomalies of existing ILI report for
offshore section is also assumed for the onshore section.
- Wall thickness in onshore section including 8 pieces 5D bends is noted to be 28.8 mm
in Asaluyeh and 20.6 mm in Sirri island. An erroneous record (wall thickness
measurement) is noted in the preliminary tabulated data available form 2016 ILI report
and is excluded in this study.
- Dent calculation is based on pipe ID.
- In the absence of any external coating survey, it was not possible to identify the
condition of the external coating on the onshore section of the pipeline. Similarly, no
information about the external coating for the offshore section of the pipeline can be
established as the pipeline is fully concrete coated.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
3 Executive Summary
Pipeline Integrity Status Summary

Noting that internal and external corrosion is the most credible threat to this pipeline, this
review has confirmed that Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline system is operating with no risk of failure with
current MAOP. This conclusion is based on the assumptions outlined in Chapter 2 of this report
and is only valid based on these assumed parameters.
The Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline system is therefore confirmed as fit for service at the time of writing
this report. Moreover, it is highly recommended to monitor the most significant defects
(reported in ILI 2016) in the next ILI (which is ongoing at time of writing this report) and to
conduct and update other inspection and maintenance activities as planned in the Integrity
Management Plan (IMP) of this pipeline followed by repeating this RBA study afterwards. This
is due to:
• The time gap between construction and operation and possibility of water ingress in this
period
• Medium level of confidence with 2016 ILI report
• The criticality of subject pipeline (exporting)
It is noted that IOOC is intending to run the next ILI (HR-MFL) at the time of writing this report
and pre-cleaning preparations before MFL run was in process with pipeline integrity team in
IOOC.
It is further noted that IOOC integrity team has routine PIMS meeting (monthly) in a separate
committee in the presence of asset owner, inspection team, operation team and Integrity team
and to update integrity status of this pipeline.
Table 3.1-1, Proposed summary of the pipeline integrity status
Pipeline name: 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri

Asset owner: IOOC
Pipeline tag in IOOC ParsPiMS TM GIS platform: ASA-SIR
Overall Integrity Status Green
Length: 305 km Service type: Super Dry Sour Gas*
Nominal Diameter: 32-inch Last intelligent pigging: Jan 2016
20.6 mm & Replacement costs for

Wall thickness (design): Estimated $ 1,281 million**
28.8 mm entire pipeline:
Internal
Material: 5L X65 (inhibited External
Status: scenario)
Date in service: 2016 Green Green
0.44 0.23
Design Pressure: 114 barg ACR:
mm/year mm/year
MAOP: 93 barg Remaining life (Yr): 2031
MOP It was in process at the time of

80.5 barg ILI Due Date:
(period of last 12 months): writing this report.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
*It is understood that working fluid in this pipeline is super dry with no water (from well, upstream, downstream,
refinery or any condensate water.
** US AID bulletin for offshore pipeline construction (Local cost factor is included). A proper and project specific cost
estimate to be performed to confirm this estimated value.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
4 Data Quality, Accuracy and Confidence
Contractor is provided with following data which were analysed and assessed as part of this
report:
- ROV 2010
- Anodes potential readings by ROV 2010
- Route for Asaluyeh to Sirri Island (design documents)
- Shore approach drawings for both Asaluyeh and Sirri Island (design documents)
- Engineering drawings and material selection
- ILI 2016 reports
- Sonar reports
- Corrosion coupons for Sirri onshore section
- CP reports of onshore section (only On-potential)
- Fluid composition data
- AUT inspection of hot spot location in onshore section
- Inspection of all BVSs in this pipeline
- Inspection of pig traps (launcher and receiver)
At the time of writing this report below action was in progress:
- CP survey of onshore section in Asaluyeh and Sirri island (DCVG and CIPS)
- ILI (HR-MFL)
Noting the above, this integrity status report is established on the basis of medium confidence
rating on the data available. The confidence rating is critical to determine the Assessed
Corrosion Rate, the Remnant Life and the next ILI inspection date for this pipeline. These
parameters can be improved by provision of some missing data and more accurate inspections
practices.
For ILI, the compliance check to API-1163 (ver. 2013 - Qualification standards for In-line
Inspection Systems) and Pipeline Operators Forum (POF ver. 2009-Specifications and
requirements for intelligent pig inspections of pipelines) shows that last ILI run in 2016 lack
attention to following areas :
- Clustering criteria (interaction criteria) is not followed (reference made to ASME B31G).
- Cluster reporting is not in accordance to POF.
- ILI raw data is not reported therefore, detailed analysis of defects is not possible.
- No software viewer provided to IOOC for ILI 2016.
- Dig-up Verification of ILI run in 2016 is not available and not adequate to determine the
Probability of Identification (POI) and Probability of Detection (POD). However, IOOC
integrity team has conducted a direct examination in chainage 16758.55 of this pipeline
to inspect and size the defect with depth of 38.6% (at the time of inspection) and it is
found 18% in July 2019. See 10.6.
- Version management of the ILI data from the vendor (marking on the CD) for latest
report is missing.
For the purpose of this assessment and considering the above limitations, the accuracy for
depth of defects is assumed 0.5 mm and for the length of defects 50 mm based on information
received from IOOC.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
5 Pipeline Inspection Techniques
As part of Pipeline Integrity Management Systems (PIMS), in-service pipelines shall be

inspected either planned (regularly) or unplanned in case of an emergency.
Offshore Pipeline Inspection Techniques
5.1.1 Generic Inspection Techniques

Inspection of subsea pipelines can be carried out with a wide range of inspection tools having
different capabilities and areas of applications. Capability of each technique should be known
at the time of selecting the most applicable technique. All these details will be considered by
the inspection professional and will be included in the inspection test procedures.
A summary of inspection techniques for detecting typical damages in subsea pipelines is given
in DNVGL-RP-F116 and re-produced in Table 5.1-1.
5.1.2 Inspection Categories

A description of typical inspection categories often used in connection with inspection planning
for subsea pipelines is given in Table 5.1-1.
Table 5.1-1, Inspection Techniques (DNV, 2009)
What can be measured/detected by this

Inspection Method Description
technique in IOOC?
Visual inspection (or any kind of

transmissions like Acoustic, RF, optical) Reveals most external condition threats to
General Visual carried out by ROV or divers. GVI will not the pipeline including coating/insulation
Inspection (GVI) include any cleaning. Anomalies found may anomaly, anode condition, leaks and
be subject to more detailed inspection - see gross damages to the system.
CVI below.
Inspection using a pipeline work class ROV GVI XTD will reveal the same type of
which will normally include: 3-view digital anomalies as GVI, but with the addition of
GVI Extended Visual
video (left/Centre/right), digital camera, giving detailed span profiles and depth of
Pipeline survey
seabed transverse profiles (such as side scan burial. It also has a higher degree of
(XTD)
or multi-beam sonar), CP (gradient and stab) precision with respect to positioning
and Pipe Tracker (depth of burial). pertaining to the pipeline KP system.
A high standard of cleaning is required for this
Reveals most external condition threats to
type of inspection; all hard and soft marine
the pipeline including coating/insulation
Close Visual growth should be removed. The purpose of
anomaly, anode condition, leaks and
Inspection (CVI) the inspection is to establish a detailed
gross damages to the system however
inspection of an area of specific interest.
with more details compared to GVI.
Requires either a diver or work class ROV.
A high accuracy positional survey. This is
achieved using a work class pipeline ROV (as
used for GVI), in conjunction with high
accuracy calibrated positional equipment (e.g.
high performance corrected DGPS, Absolute position and relative year to year
High Precision
transponders (USBL/ LBL systems), ROV lateral movement of the pipeline on the
Survey (HPS)
mounted survey quality gyro and motion seabed.
sensor, high frequency Doppler velocity log
etc.). Inspection rate can be expected to be
slower and will require more calibration time
than standard GVI.
Intelligent pigging inspection, of the pipeline

To measure continuous end to end
In-Line Inspection utilizing various non-destructive testing (NDT)
pipeline wall thickness loss or pipeline
(ILI) methods such as MFL, EC, tethered /
anomalies/defects.
umbilical UT tools.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
The frequency of the inspection actions should be established via a risk-based program and as
part of subsea pipeline IM activities. IOOC has a planned ILI and scheduled for Q3 2019 (it was
in progress at the time of writing this report) and this document will be amended/updated after
review of the new and updated inspection results.
Onshore Pipeline Inspection Techniques
5.2.1 Generic Pipeline Inspection Techniques

As part of Pipeline Integrity Management Systems, in-service pipelines shall be inspected
either on a planned (regularly) or unplanned basis in case of an emergency.
Due to the buried and covered nature of onshore section of 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline, in-
line inspection technique is the most optimal solution for defect identification.
Guided Wave Testing (GWT) is another alternative method in the field of non-destructive
evaluation (just for trending not for sizing). The method employs mechanical stress waves that
propagate along an elongated structure while guided by its boundaries. This allows the waves
to travel a long distance with little loss in energy. Nowadays, GWT is widely used to inspect
and screen many engineering structures, particularly for the inspection of non-piggable
pipelines. In some cases, 30m each direction of the sensors can be inspected from a single
location.
Although GWT is also commonly known as Guided Wave Ultrasonic Testing (GWUT) or Long-
Range Ultrasonic Testing (LRUT), it is fundamentally very different from conventional ultrasonic
testing. GWT uses very low ultrasonic frequencies compared to those used in conventional UT,
typically between 10~100kHz. Higher frequencies can be used in some cases, but detection
range is significantly reduced. In addition, this procedure is one of the available inspection
techniques to inspect pipelines underneath culverts without any direct access methods.
For leak detection next to all available techniques (such as Fibre Optics Cables, SCADA,
RTTM-based systems, Mass balance methods, Laser scanners, etc.), there is another
methodology by using what is commonly called a Geophone. This is an acoustic amplifier
system that allows the operator to hear extremely faint sounds at great distances using a
geophone probe which is placed in direct contact with the pipeline. This allows the operator to
pinpoint location of a leak.
Pressure test and other Direct assessments methods such as ECDA and ICDA are alternative
options to ILI.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
6 Threat Identification
Subsea section pipelines could experience various types of threats during their design life.
Threat is defined as an indication of an impending danger or harm to the system, which may
have an adverse influence on the integrity of the system. Subsea pipelines threats could result
in damages/anomalies to the pipelines some of which may result in a failure or an unsafe
defect which require mitigation, repair or replacement.
Generic Codified Threats and Expected Damage to Subsea Pipelines

DNVGL-RP-F116 identifies Seven (7) generic Threat Group (Design, Corrosion, Erosion, Third
Party, Structural, Natural Hazards and Incorrect Operations) and Twenty Six (26) Threats for
subsea pipelines as shown in Table 6.1-1. Not all these threats are relevant to in-scope
pipeline hence in next section, threats only applicable to this pipeline are discussed.
For each threat the list of expected anomalies or damages related to a threat are also given in
the same table.
Table 6.1-1, Typical codified Subsea Pipelines Threats
Threat Group Threat Anomaly/Damage
Design/Fabrication/ Design Errors Metal loss

Installation Dent
Fabrication Related
Crack
DFI threats Installation Related Gouge
Internal Corrosion
Metal loss
Corrosion/Erosion External Corrosion
Crack
Erosion
Trawling Interface Metal loss
Dent
Anchoring Crack
Gouge
Third Party Vessel Impact Local Buckle
Global Buckle
Dropped Objects Displacement
Exposure
Global Buckling - Exposed
Global Buckling - Buried Crack
Free-Span
End Expansion Local Buckle
Structural
On-Bottom Stability Global Buckle
Displacement
Static Overload Exposure
Fatigue (VIV, waves, or process vibrations)
Extreme Weather Crack
Free-Span
Earthquake
Local Buckle
Floods Global Buckle
Natural Hazards
Displacement
Lightning Exposure
Coating Anomaly
Land Slide Anode Anomaly
Incorrect Procedures
Procedures not Implemented Metal loss
Coating Anomaly
Incorrect Operation Human Errors Local Buckle
Global Buckle
Internal Protection System Related Anode Anomaly
Interface Component Related

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
6.1.1 Generic Defect Assessment Methodologies for Subsea Pipelines

When a potentially unacceptable anomaly or abnormality is observed or detected, a defect
(integrity) assessment shall be performed. The aim is to determine whether or not the MAOP
should be reduced. Calculations for predicating the pressure at which a pipeline may fail at the
location of the defect shall be based on worst case assumptions.
Table 6.1-2 summarizes the defect assessment techniques applicable to subsea pipelines.
Table 6.1-2, Overview of Subsea Pipelines Assessment Codes/Guidelines
Anomaly Code/Guideline Comments

For assessment of Subsea Corroded Pipelines (Grade X42 and
DNVGL-RP-F101
above). Applicable for all in-scope subsea section of IOOC pipelines
Including the modified version (RSTRENG) - Older grades such as
ASME B31G
Metal Loss Grade B, etc. – Applicable for all onshore section of IOOC pipelines.
Pipeline Defect
Assessment Manual Summarizes most common methods
(PDAM)
For design and assessment of subsea pipelines Acceptance criteria
DNVGL-OS-F101
and allowable dent depth are defined
DNVGL-RP-F113 Pipeline Repair Methodology for Subsea pipelines
For assessment of fatigue loading on subsea pipelines at presence
Dent DNVGL-RP-C203
of dents
Summarizes most common methods and acceptance criteria and
EPRG/PDAM
allowable dent depth
PDAM Summarizes most common methods
DNVGL-OS-F101 Detailed ECA analyses (Appendix A)

Guide to methods for assessing the acceptability of flaws in metallic
BS7910
structures
Crack
DNVGL-RP-F113 Pipeline Repair Methodology for Subsea pipelines containing cracks
PDAM Summarizes most common methods
Gouge PDAM Summarizes most common methods

For assessment of fatigue loading on subsea pipelines at presence
DNVGL-RP-C203
of free spans
Free-Span
For assessment of acceptable span size for the subsea pipelines
DNVGL-RP-F105
beyond which mitigation should be performed
For design and assessment of subsea pipelines Acceptance criteria
DNVGL-OS-F101
and allowable dent depth are defined
Local Buckle
For design and assessment of Pipeline Repair Methodology for
DNVGL-RP-F113
Subsea pipelines at presence of local buckles
For design and assessment methodology for Subsea pipelines at
Global Buckle DNVGL-RP-F110
presence of local buckles
Exposure DNVGL-RP-F107 For design and assessment of subsea pipelines exposures
For design and assessment of subsea pipelines displacements by
Displacement DNVGL-RP-F109
external sources
Coating
DNVGL-RP-F102 For repair of subsea pipelines damaged coatings
Anomaly
Anode DNVGL-RP- For design and assessment of Cathodic Protection using galvanic
Anomaly B401/F103 anodes)

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Generic Codified Threats and Expected Damage to Onshore Pipelines

As stated in ASME B318S, experience has indicated that the following are potential threats to
the integrity of onshore gas pipeline. The threats for gas pipelines that operators should
address can be characterized as follows:
1. External corrosion;
2. Internal corrosion;
3. Selective seam corrosion (external or internal);
4. SCC;
5. Manufacturing defects (defective pipe seams including hard heat-affected zones
and defective pipe including pipe body hard spots);
6. Construction and fabrication defects (including defective girth welds, defective
fabrication welds, wrinkle bends and buckles, and stripped threads/broken
pipe/coupling failure);
7. Equipment failure (including gasket or O-ring failure, control/relief equipment failure,
seal/pump packing failure, and miscellaneous);
8. Mechanical damage (causing an immediate failure or from vandalism);
9. Mechanical damage (previously damaged pipe causing a delayed failure or
vandalism);
10. Incorrect operations;
11. Weather and outside force (cold weather, lightning, heavy rains or floods, and earth
movement);
12. The growth of an initially non-injurious anomaly arising from any one of several of
the above causes into an injurious defect via pressure-cycle-induced fatigue
(including transit fatigue).
Threats 1, 2, 3, 4 and 12 are clearly time-dependent threats that should be addressed by

periodic assessment and monitoring. Threats 5, 6 and 9 are considered possibly time-
dependent threats because of the potential for their enlargement by pressure-cycle-induced
fatigue. For the latter threats, the pipeline operator will be called upon to judge the need for
continuing assessments or monitoring. Threats 7, 8, 10 and 11 are considered time-
independent because they involve random events for which the time of occurrence is usually
not predictable. Management of the latter class of threats involves employing preventive and
mitigative measures.
It is recognized that not all 12 may apply to the Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline and that pipeline
credible threats are discussed in detail in the Chapter 7.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
7 Risk Assessments (Semi-Quantitative Approach)
Different risk assessment approaches can be used for a specific pipeline. Risk can be
evaluated qualitatively and/or quantitatively as most feasible. Common for all the models is an
evaluation of the probability of an event and the consequences (based on impacts on Safety,
Assets, Environment and company Reputation) that this event will impose.
A levelled approach (among three options) can be used for assessing risk including:
- Assessments based on applying simple qualitative evaluations. The main objective is to

determine risk levels with minimum efforts through one or several workshops.
- Assessments that require more effort than what was outlined previously and may be
more appropriate to be done as a combination of workshops and individual efforts.
These assessments are based on applying qualitative and/or semi-quantitative
evaluations. Relevant documents and data are typically reviewed more thoroughly.
Documentation of this assessment may therefore be more comprehensive.
- Assessments that involve quantitative probabilistic calculations (w.r.t. to PoF and

possibly also w.r.t. CoF as well). Such an assessment should be considered if e.g.
serious failure has been positively identified.
Risk of the above threats to the shore approach and subsea sections of the 32-inch Asaluyeh-
Sirri pipeline is ranked based on semi-quantitative approach as per developed 5x5 risk matrix
given in Chapter 7.1 and based on the evidences from past inspections and information
gathered from the IOOC integrity team.
It is noted that IOOC has established a unique and well customized method (Developed in
collaboration with Petroleum University of Technology) for pipeline prioritization and ranking
(quantitively). It is highly recommended to use this document to prioritize the pipeline network
in future for RBA study.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Risk Assessment Matrix with Work Selection

Following 5x5 Risk assessment matrix is used for risk assessment of this pipeline following
workshops with asset owner. The risk matrix is developed based on DNVGL-RP-F116 with input
from IOOC.
Threat dependent, work selection recommended inspection intervals (in years) are outlined in
the risk assessment matrix.
Table 7.1-1, 5x5 Risk Assessment Matrix (Semi-Quantitative Approach) with Work Selection Inspection
Intervals (years)
Consequences categories Increasing Likelihood (Probability)

1 2 3 4 5
Environment
Has
Severity
Reputation
Has
happened in Has
Assets
People
happened at
the happened
Never heard the location
Heard of in Organization more than
of in the or more than
the industry or more than once per
industry once per
once per year at the
year in the
year in the Location
organization
industry
More
Massive Massive Massive
E than 3
damage effect impact
3 1 NA NA NA
fatalities
PTD or
Major Major Major
D up to 3
damage effect impact
5 3 1 NA NA
fatalities
Major
injury or Moderate Moderate Moderate
C health damage effect impact
8 5 3 1 NA
effect
Minor
injury or Minor Minor Minor
B health damage effect impact
8 8 5 3 1
effect
Slight
injury or Slight Slight Slight
A health damage effect impact
8 8 8 5 3
effect
Table 7.1-2, Risk Categories
Risk Description
Very High Unacceptable risk - immediate action to be taken
High Unacceptable risk - action to be taken
Medium Acceptable risk - action to reduce the risk may be evaluated

Low Acceptable risk - Low
Very Low Acceptable risk - Insignificant
Risk rankings performed for the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline are summarized in Table 7.2-1
for shore approach, Table 7.3-1 for subsea section and Table 7.4-1 for Onshore section of the
pipeline.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Shore Approach Section Risk Ranking
Table 7.2-1, Semi-Quantitative risk assessment of the shore approach section
Threat
Threat CoF PoF Risk Comments
Group
Design Errors B 3 B3
Shore Approach segment in Sirri island has same wall thickness as
Design/ Fabrication subsea section (20.8 mm), while it was supposed to be 28.8 mm as per
B 3 B3
Fabrication/ Related standards and design documents. This don’t seem to have been
Installation controlled or reported during commissioning. In any case the pipeline is
noted to have passed the hydrostatic test.
Installation
B 3 B3
Related
UT intelligent inspection of pipeline in 2016 revealed

803 defects all Internal corrosion in Asaluyeh shore approach segment
Internal
C 3 C3 (first 547 meter in Asaluyeh side) with maximum depth of 32% metal loss.
Corrosion
Assumed the same length of shore approach and same corrosivity
condition in the shore approach of Sirri island side.
Corrosion/
Erosion External There is no significant external metal loss in shore approach segment of
A 3 A3
Corrosion subject pipeline as per ILI 2016.
The velocity of fluid is in acceptance criteria. So, Erosion is not a credible

Erosion A 2 A2
threat for this pipeline.
Trawling
A 2 A2 Not applicable to this section of the pipeline. Assumed the area is under
Interface
control of security department (coast guard) in IOOC, moreover the
subject segment is under concrete coating with thickness of 90 mm.
Anchoring A 2 A2
Vessel Impact B 2 B2
Third Party For the borders of the Restricted Area (see Asaluyeh and Sirri Port
Regulations and Port Plan) under no circumstances must vessels enter
the Restricted Area unless accompanied or advised by an authorized.
Dropped Moreover, it is mandatory to use IOOC tugs to do vessel movements.

B 3 B3
Objects Also, in order to prevent damage to shore approach segment, anchors
are to be secured in the seagoing condition before the ship enters the
Restricted Area. Under no circumstances is the seagoing security of the
anchors to be altered whilst the vessel is moored to near the shore
approach segments.
Global Buckling
A 2 A2
- Exposed
No buckling is expected in the shore approach section of the IOOC

Global Buckling
A 2 A2 pipelines due to operation in low temperature and pressure; hence this is
- Buried
not a threat to the shore approach section of the IOOC pipelines.
End Expansion A 2 A2 Not applicable to this section of the pipeline.
Structural On-Bottom
A 2 A2 Not applicable to this section of the pipeline.
Stability
Static Overload A 2 A2 Not applicable to this section of the pipeline.
Fatigue (VIV,
No free-span or VIV is expected in the shore approach section of the
waves, or
A 2 A2 IOOC pipelines hence this is not a threat to the shore approach segment
process
of this pipeline.
vibrations)

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Threat
Threat CoF PoF Risk Comments
Group
Natural hazards, such as flood, earthquake, landslide, etc. could be a
Extreme
A 2 A2 credible threat to the shore approach segment of the pipelines exposed to
Weather
the environment or have with damaged concrete coating.
Earthquake B 2 B2
Natural
Hazards Floods B 2 B2 Natural hazards on the shore approach segment of the pipelines are
likely due to the exposure to the environment for the damaged and
broken concrete coating as well as not being subsea.
Lightning A 2 A2 See Table 1.7-1.
Land Slide A 2 A2
Shore Approach segment in Sirri island has the same wall thickness of
Incorrect or
subsea section (20.8 mm), while it was supposed to be 28.8 mm as per
Incorrect unimplemented
B 3 B3 standards and design documents. This don't seem to have been
Operation Procedures/
controlled or reported during commissioning. In any case the pipeline is
Human Errors
noted to have passed the hydrostatic test.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Subsea Section Risk Ranking
Table 7.3-1, Semi-Quantitative risk assessment of the subsea section
Threat Group Threat CoF PoF Risk Comments
The 32-inch pipeline was installed in 2008 with a design life of 25 years.
Design Errors B 2 B2 Due to inappropriate commissioning procedures contractor failed to
completely remove seawater from the pipeline after Hydrotest. An
Fabrication extensive pigging and chemical treatment were carried out after pipeline
Design/ B 2 B2 was transferred to IOOC in order to de-water and clean the pipeline. This
Related
Fabrication/ was followed by intelligent pigging runs in 2016 to establish a baseline
Installation Installation
B 2 B2 inspection record. Numerous internal corrosion features with various
Related depths and dimensions were identified by ILI. This finding was attributed
to the duration in which the pipeline internal surface had been exposed to
Commissioning B 3 B3 untreated seawater before start-up. It is concluded that most of the
defects in ILI 2016 is because of DFI not operation.
UT intelligent inspection of the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline in 2016
revealed many internal corrosions. A defect at log. distance 16,758.551 is
noted with depth of 38.6% where after positioning of DP2 and several
trial by IOOC divers the deepest metal loss in that location was noted to
Internal be 18% indicating that ILI results are over estimated. Based on this direct
C 3 C3
Corrosion examination of the subsea section, It was decided by IOOC Integrity
team not to continue the verification and wait for next ILI (which is in
progress at the time of writing this report).
In any case, internal corrosion is the most severe defect in this pipeline.
External corrosion, Anode damage or depletion and damage to the anti-
corrosion coating are expected threats to this pipeline. The reason for
this selection has been due to the fact that previous inspections
especially ILI report has identified minor external corrosion on this
Corrosion/ pipeline. Sources of external corrosion are typically damage to the anti-
Erosion corrosion external coating and malfunctioning of the CP system. Since
the IOOC pipelines are concrete coated, it is very difficult to assess
condition of the coatings due to lack of accessibility. Noting the ROV
External
A 3 A3 report, in many occasions anodes are also observed to be missing.
Corrosion
Although historical inspections on subject pipeline confirmed satisfactory
CP readings however, the source of external corrosion on this pipeline
needs to be further assessed by IOOC integrity team. The main focus
areas would be to review the ILI data on the pipeline, conducting new ILI
as soon as possible (in progress at the time of writing this report) and try
to match the location of the external corrosion’s readings with the missing
field joints or damaged concrete areas, etc. (See ParsPiMS TM software
as a reference)
Velocity of the pipeline medium fluid is within acceptable design criteria.
Erosion A 2 A2
Hence, erosion is not considered to be a credible threat for this pipeline.
Trawling It is understood that water around the IOOC subsea pipelines and
B 2 B2 specifically this pipeline (export line) is protected by IOOC and guarded
Interface
regularly in order to guarantee no fishing interference or impact with the
pipelines and the rest of the equipment. This means that trawling
Anchoring B 3 B3 interference is not a major threat to the subsea section of the IOOC
pipelines due to negligible likelihood.
The likelihood is negligible due to high level of protection and guarding in
Third-Party Vessel Impact B 2 B2
subject subsea area also depth of water.
It is understood that the waters around the IOOC subsea pipelines are
protected by IOOC and guarded regularly in order to guarantee no fishing
Dropped interference or impact with the pipelines and the rest of the equipment.
B 3 B3
Objects This is considered to be an appropriate mitigation measure towards risk
of third-party damage to the subsea section of the IOOC subsea
pipelines.
Global
IOOC pipelines operating at low temperature and pressure therefore the
Structural Buckling – A 2 A2
likelihood of global buckling for them is very low.
Exposed

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Threat Group Threat CoF PoF Risk Comments
Global IOOC pipelines are not operating at high temperature and pressure,
Buckling – A 2 A2 hence buckling (upheaval and lateral) are not expected and in this report
Buried are not a threat to the subsea section of 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline.
IOOC pipelines operating at low temperature and pressure therefore the

End Expansion A 2 A2
likelihood of end expansion for them is very low.
On-Bottom IOOC pipelines are fully concrete coated for on-bottom stability purpose.
A 2 A2
Stability Therefore, possibility of on-bottom instability is very Low.
Static Overload A 2 A2 It is not a credible threat in 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline.
Several free-span is observed in the subject pipeline from the 2010 ROV
report. In few occasions there are long free spans with length of up to 60
meters. All of these are noted to be fit for service at the time of writing
Fatigue (VIV, this report based on the 2015 free span correction report (See SA-000-
waves, or 4200-PL-PR-2015-0).
B 3 B3
process
vibrations) Noting the above VIV/free-span could be a credible threat to the subsea
section of the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri. However, this threat was mitigated
in 2015 by Free span correction that was performed at that time (SA-000-
4200-PL-PR-2015-0) for the subject pipeline.
Extreme Natural hazards, such as flood, earthquake, landslide, etc. are not
A 2 A2 credible threats to the subsea section of the subject pipeline as confirmed
Weather
by the IOOC.
Earthquake B 2 B2
In a meeting with the IOOC Marine Department and Integrity team on
July 29th, 2019 in Sirri yard, it was concluded that natural hazards, such
Floods B 2 B2
as floods, earthquakes, landslides, etc. are not credible threats to the
subsea section of the pipelines.
Lightning A 2 A2
Intense tropical cyclones like Gonu are extremely rare over the Persian
Gulf, since most storms in this area tend to be small and dissipate
quickly, and even in these cases (Cyclone Gonu June 2007) no damage
Natural
has been observed or reported on any subsea pipelines in IOOC.
Hazards
Although hydrographic surveys are supposed to be undertaken every five
years, and that Metocean data is supposed to be collected and analyzed
for any threats, but no Metocean data was made available from IOOC.
Land Slide A 2 A2 However researched weather patterns and precipitation are available
online for the Persian Gulf to confirm the above observations. See Table
1.7-2
Nevertheless, it was concluded that natural hazards are not a threat to

any of this gas field pipelines due to the subsea location; historical data
indicates that even 100-year storms such as Hurricane have minimal to
no impact on IOOC subsea pipelines.
Existence of water residue at the time of commissioning indicates that

Incorrect or
appropriate commissioning procedure was not followed by
unimplemented
Incorrect commissioning personnel. However, this pipeline has had no failure since
Procedures/ B 3 B3
Operation commissioning (according to IOOC integrity team) which suggests
Human Errors
appropriate management of the integrity of the pipeline during operation.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Onshore Section Risk Ranking
Table 7.4-1, Onshore Section threat identification (Risk Based)
Threat CoF PoF Risk Validation

Design/Fabricati According to the history of the pipeline and reported inspections, no DFI
on/Installation B 3 B3 defects have been noted, and due to the age of the pipeline there is
(DFI) little risk of DFI threats.
Internal corrosion, resulting from the corrosivity of the transported fluid.
Internal The likelihood and rate of attack depends on fluid composition, process
C 3 C3
Corrosion conditions and pipe material. This threat is considered to be a credible
threat for this section of subject pipeline.
External corrosion, due to the local environmental conditions
surrounding the pipeline. Since there is no ILI, DCVG or CIPS report
External
B 3 B3 available for this section of pipeline, External Corrosion is a concern in
Corrosion
this pipeline. At the time of writing this report, DCVG and CIPS was on
going in this pipeline.
Erosion A 2 A2 No evidence of erosion has been found.
Unauthorized third-party activities could pose a threat, but the likelihood
Third Party B 2 B2 is very low since the pipeline is buried and all crossings are protected in
culverts and casings with road crossings.
Crossings could pose a future threat as mechanical damage to the
Structural B 2 B2
structure of the pipeline.
Natural Hazards B 2 B2 It is not a credible threat in this pipeline.
Incorrect
C 2 C2 -
Operation
A Risk rating of higher than A4, B3, C2 and D1 is considered a credible threat to the continued
operation of the pipeline for the purposes of this RBA report.
Key Conclusion for Credible Threats and Risk Rankings

Following the proposed Semi-Quantitative risk assessment of threats in 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri
pipeline, a summary of credible threats are listed for the shore approach, subsea section and
onshore section in Table 7.5-1.
In summary, the only credible threat to this pipeline is internal corrosion.
Table 7.5-1, Summary of Risk ranking
Risk
Threat
Shore Approach Subsea Onshore
Segment Section Section
Design Errors B3 B2 B3
Fabrication Related B3 B2 B3
Installation Related B3 B2 B3
Internal Corrosion C3 C3 C3
External Corrosion A3 A3 B3
Erosion A2 A2 A2
Trawling Interface A2 B2 N/A
Anchoring A2 B3 N/A
Vessel Impact B2 B2 N/A
Dropped Objects B3 B3 N/A

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Risk
Threat
Shore Approach Subsea Onshore
Segment Section Section
Global Buckling - Exposed A2 A2 N/A
Global Buckling - Buried A2 A2 N/A
End Expansion A2 A2 N/A
On-Bottom Stability A2 A2 N/A
Static Overload A2 A2 N/A
Fatigue (VIV, waves, or process

vibrations) for offshore A2 B3 N/A
/ Third party for onshore
Extreme Weather A2 A2 B2
Earthquake B2 B2 B2
Floods B2 B2 B2
Lightning A2 A2 B2
Land Slide A2 A2 B2
Incorrect or unimplemented Procedures/

B3 B3 C2
Human Errors
A summary of credible threats (greater than A4, B3, C2 and D1) are listed in Table 7.5-2.
Table 7.5-2, Summary of risk ranking in 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline
Section Threat Risk

Shore approach section Internal corrosion C3
Subsea section Internal corrosion C3
Onshore section Internal corrosion C3
It is understood that there is a monthly Integrity Management committee meeting with

maintenance and operation departments in IOOC, followed by a quarterly PIMS meeting with
stakeholders and asset owners to update integrity status of pipelines and risk assessment
tables.
Other Design Prospective Threats

This chapter is mainly aimed to highlight any extra credible threats from design point of view
and selected material for transportation of the dry gas through the in-scope pipeline. This
chapter is to address corrosion concerns for the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline.
7.6.1 Credible Threats

Two main mechanisms of the sour system related corrosion as credible threats in these
pipelines is briefly mentioned in the following:
7.6.1.1 Sulphide Stress Cracking (SSC)

The NACE Standard MR0175 and ISO 15156 is taken as the guideline for defining the risk of
Sulphide stress corrosion cracking which may occur on susceptible materials if the partial

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
pressure of H2S exceeds 0.05 psi (0.0035 bara) and the total gas pressure exceeds 65 psi (4.5
bara). This definition applies to the condition of the pipelines in this project at which minimum of
1.5% H2S with a design pressure of 114 bar is envisaged.
32-inch Asaluyeh-Siri is constructed from material sour-service rated to NACE MR-0175/ISO

15156, therefore risk of SSC for this pipeline is mitigated by material selection.
7.6.1.2 Hydrogen Induced Cracking (HIC)

Another environmental cracking problem, which can arise in sour service, is HIC phenomena.
The critical partial pressure of H2S for hydrogen induced cracking to occur has been
experienced to be generally about 0.1 psi (0.0068 bara). Above this value there is a risk of HIC
occurring irrespective of total pressure of the system as specified for SSC, since HIC is not
stress dependant.
The susceptibility of carbon steel to HIC can be mitigated by controlling the chemical
composition, in particular reducing the concentration of manganese sulphide inclusions in the
steel. A reduction in inclusions is achieved by lowering the sulphur content of the steel to below
0.003%. Addition of trace elements, such as calcium, to the steel to give a residual Ca/S ratio
in the range 2 - 4 provides shape control of the manganese sulphide inclusions.
HIC is not a credible threat as the steel in this pipeline is X65 and typically called clean steel
which is free from MnS or other type of low melting point inclusions.
Location of Corrosions
There are two types of corrosion position that can generally be experienced in a pipeline
carrying gas. For information purpose they are mentioned here as:
a. Top of the line corrosion

b. bottom of the line.
7.7.1 Top of the Line Corrosion

When condensation in the wet gas system occurs, it starts from top of the line and flows down
the pipe wall towards the bottom of the pipe. Corrosion inhibitor does not reach the top of the
line after some distance and consequently this part is left uninhibited. However, the work
conducted by best practices shows that the top of line corrosion rate decreases with time and
conclusion was drawn by them that the corrosion rate in this part is very low due to saturation of
the condensed layer with FeCO3, hence not a significant issue.
7.7.2 Bottom of the Line Corrosion

If the gas is saturated wet and the system temperature falls below dew point, water condenses
and accumulates in the bottom of pipeline. This area becomes critical as corrosion may mainly
affect that part. By injecting corrosion inhibitor on a continuous base, the probability of the
condensed water to be inhibited is high provided that:
i. inhibitor is water soluble or dispersible and

ii. no slug is formed with the condensed water in order to prevent the penetration of
inhibitor into this part.
However, in the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline, the transferred gas is dehydrated, and
possibility of this event is unlikely hence, this type of corrosion cannot be a concern.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Corrosion Controlling Measures

The area of concern in the subsea pipeline is where pressure is high and the temperature has
fallen resulting in any vapours to condense, forming free water or for humidity to be sufficient
for hygroscopic salts to activate corrosion. Therefore, some preventative measures are
required to ensure corrosion mitigation. Some main methods are briefly discussed below.
Corrosion Inhibition
It is a common practise to use corrosion inhibition as a corrosion protection measure. This
practise can only be successful if it is ensured that the inhibitor is selected carefully with a high
efficiency > 90% and also it will reach at a place where corrosion can take place. Further, the
well programmed operation procedure shall ensure the pipeline will be kept clean and
monitored regularly.
Selection of the inhibitor should take into account a high probability of the accumulation of
condensed water in the low points of the pipe, highly water-soluble characteristic of the inhibitor
and its effective existence in the water of the bottom of line. The possibility of oxygen ingress
into the system during any prolonged shutdowns should also be considered. Inhibitor selection
must also take into account of the need for temperature stability and freedom from
polymerisation and blockage of the injection atomisers.
Since the pipeline is 305 km in length, for corrosion inhibitor selection, frequency and dosage; it
is highly recommended to take into account the length of pipeline in simulation and the
possibility of injection from Launcher (Asaluyeh) and Receiver (Sirri island) by bi-di pigging to
cover the entire length of subject pipeline.
In order to inhibit internal corrosion in the 32-in Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline, gas corrosion inhibitor
is injecting by continuous method. Ray-41B is already selected for this purpose with dosing
rate of 0.5-1.0 pint per MMSCF (8-17 lit/MCM) of gas for efficient inhibition.
Corrosion Monitoring
The corrosion monitoring is a primary corrosion evaluation method that will assist to evaluate
the efficiency of the inhibition system to predict that the design life will be met with the
corrosion control methodology. The most common type of corrosion monitoring is weight loss
coupon, Electrical Resistance Probe (ER), Bio-probe and Linear Polarisation Probe (LRP).
The first three methods are more practical and should be considered. However, these methods
are onshore operable and cannot be applied to the offshore section. It is important that the
corrosion monitoring fittings are located such that they are at locations where water will settle.
However, for subsea section of in-scope pipeline(s), this option will be impractical, and it should
be located onshore. Internal corrosion monitoring will be confined to the measurement of
general corrosion. Corrosion weight loss coupons together with ER probes are adequate.
Corrosion coupons and ER probe can be utilised at arrival at the onshore facilities. These
probes should be located preferably at 6 O'clock position where the condensed free water may
accumulate.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
8 Failure Modes
Generic Failure Modes for Pipelines

There are two main failure modes related to subsea pipeline's containment/structural function:
• A rupture (a large release of oil or gas and a large fracture in the pipeline);
• A leak (a small release of oil or gas from a small hole);
If a pipeline is ruptured the required course of action is relatively clear. The pipeline must be
isolated. This means the valves at each end must be closed, efforts must be made to contain
lost product, and a new section of pipe must be installed.
Where the pipeline has not failed, but has been damaged, assessment and possible repair is
required. Generic Defect Assessment methodologies for subsea Pipelines have been
discussed in Table 6.1-2 of this study.
In the following section, credible failure modes relevant to in-scope pipeline are discussed.
Credible Failure Modes for 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline, Offshore section

For the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline, one credible failure mode has been identified which is
only leak due to internal or external corrosion. Due to the nature and environment of the
pipeline, and the fact that the subject pipeline is not running maximum design pressure, the
likelihood of rupture is very low (negligible). There is another reason for rupture being not an
issue and that is the fact that the pipe material is X65 and has good toughness even at low
temperatures. Based on these facts, even incorrect operations, human error or equipment
malfunction will not easily lead to a rupture.
Furthermore, free-span has been identified as a threat (structural) in general for subsea
pipelines which can develop into full bore rupture if in excess of the acceptable limits defined in
DNVGL-RP-F105. Free span analysis has been conducted in this pipeline for the exposed and
un-buried areas by asset owner (document No. SA-000-4200-PL-PR-2015-0) and all Free
spans are fit for service at the time of writing this report. The next assessment is to be done at
2021 (5 years after start up).
Credible Failure Modes for 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline, Onshore section

With reference to the received data and information about in-scope pipeline, the possible
failure modes have been identified to be only leak, noting that:
• Noting the pipeline material specification, chances of rupture is minimal.

• This section of Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline has not yet been inspected by ILI, however IOOC
has conducted AUT inspection in this section and no major corrosion is reported. (AUT
final report was in progress at the time of writing this report)
• There is no available report for DCVG (coating status) and CIPS (CP protection level) in
this section. However, this action is ongoing at the time of writing this report to select a
contractor to execute it.
Since the pipe material is X60 with a good toughness in low temperatures, risk of ruptures is
found to be low due to operational pressure of the pipeline.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
9 Asaluyeh-Sirri Pipeline Segmentation
Segments List
Subject in-scope 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline is segmented as per Table 9.1-1.
Table 9.1-1, Pipeline Segmentation
Segment Wall
Segment Km Km
Section length thicknesses Description
ID Start End
(Km) Min/Max (mm)
#10 0 7 7 20.6 Asphalt Road (Km 4.270)
Asphalt Road (Km 6.950), Asphalt Road

Onshore (Km 7.900), Bend (IP05 Km 8.100), Old
Asaluyeh Bidkhon-Asaluyeh Asphalt Road (Km
#20 7 12.7 5.7 20.6
9.500), New Asphalt Road (Km 9.900),
Bidkhon-Asaluyeh Asphalt Road (Km
11.300)
Shore
#30 Approach 12.7 13.3 0.6 17.3 / 32 Land Fall with wt. 28.8 mm
Asaluyeh
SPD 21 to Asaluyeh Crossing (Km
#40 13.3 24 10.7 19.5 / 21.9
22.168), Concrete (90 mm)
#50 24 34 10 19.7 / 22.1 Concrete (68 mm)
#60 34 54 20 20 / 21.2 Concrete (55 mm)
#70 54 94 40 19.8 / 21.5 Concrete (51 mm)
#80 94 122 28 19.5 / 21.6 Concrete (51 mm)
Pipeline Crossing (Km 126.577),

#90 122 130 8 20.1 / 21.6
Concrete (51 mm)
#100 130 142 12 19.7 / 21.9 Concrete (51 mm)
Pipeline Crossing (Km 144.229-Km

#110 142 148 6 19.8 / 22.1
144.240), Concrete (51 mm)
Subsea Pipeline Crossing (Km 152.700),
#120 Section 148 156 8 19.7 / 21.6
Concrete (51 mm)
#130 156 195 39 17.9 / 21.8 Concrete (51 mm)
#140 195 235 40 19.4 / 21.9 Concrete (51 mm)
#150 235 275 40 19.7 / 22.2 Concrete (51 mm)
#160 275 282 7 22 / 22.1 Concrete (51 mm)
#170 282 286 4 19.8 / 22.1 Concrete (55 mm)
Pipeline Crossing (Km 290.232),

#180 286 292 6 19.7 / 22.8
Concrete (55 mm)
#190 292 298 6 19.5 / 22.9 Concrete (55 mm)
Concrete (68 mm), Land Fall with wt.

#200 298 301.4 3.4 18.6 / 32
20.62
Shore
Concrete (90 mm), Land Fall with wt.
#210 Approach 301.4 302 0.6 19.4 / 28.6
20.62
Sirri

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Segment Wall
Segment Km Km
Section length thicknesses Description
ID Start End
(Km) Min/Max (mm)
Onshore Azar Pad Street (Km 302.410), Street (Km
#220 302 305 3 20.6
Sirri 303.360), Street (Km 303.451)
The segmentation cut line is based on wall thickness change, pipeline location (on/offshore, shore approach), high way
crossing in onshore section, Pipeline crossing in subsea section, ROV report on concrete coat, maximum length of 40 km per
segment and other geographical features.
The cut line is for pre-set max 40 km length of segments as default criteria in ParsPiMS TM software. See Figure 8.1 1,
Schematic view of segmentations in 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline.
Segmentation method in ParsPiMS TM is dynamic segmentation method as per UPDM data

model requirements. Colour code used for segmentation in ParsPiMS TM is as below scheme.
Table 9.1-2, Segmentation colour codes
Brown Onshore segments

Light Blue Shore Approach segments
Dark Blue Subsea segments
In order to allow for insertion of new segments in future and to keep the same numbering,
segmentation ID is based on order 10. For example, if there is new section insretion in
segment #10 in future, these new segments can be called Segment #11 or #12 and so on.
Figure 9.1-1, Schematic view of segmentations in 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
10 ILI Data Analysis and Fitness for Purpose (FFP) Assessment
The 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri Pipeline was internally inspected in 2016 by EGP, MFL and UT
tool (combo report).
The following activities were performed during this study for subsea section of the pipeline:
- Re-calculation of ERFs and safe working internal pressure as per identified defects in the
last and the only available ILI report (at the time of writing this report) based on DNVGL-
RP-F101 for subsea section of the pipeline.
- Studying defect distribution along the pipeline route.
- Predict the corrosion threats affecting the pipeline under the current operating condition
- Investigation the probability of Internal and external corrosion root cause analysis in
Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline.
- Recommend improvements to be made to the pipeline integrity and for extending service
life if possible.
There is no ILI report available for onshore section of subject pipeline to be assessed as per
ASME B31G standard. However, AUT inspection for selected hot spot location has been
performed.
At this time the subject pipeline is not considered to be in risk now from the internal and
external corrosion. However, upon receipt of new ILI report, this RBA study shall be repeated.
It is also highly recommended to take all actions in immediate 1 year action plan (Table
16.1-1).
Any deviation from the input data assumed in this report may affect this conclusion and the
pipelines should be re-assessed accordingly.
The fitness for purpose study (FFP) at the design pressure of the pipeline (114 barg) and based
on ASME B31G was performed by ILI company and concluded that 65 features required repair.
However, with de-rated MAOP to 93 barg and assessment based on DNVGL-RP-F101 the
subject pipeline is fit for services as explained in this report.
This study remains focused on the assessment of the internal and external corrosion defects in
the form of metal loss caused by exposure of the pipeline surface to seawater during
commissioning (DFI threat).
Verification of ILI Data

IOOC has performed verification (Direct examination) in subsea segment, km 16 (with DP2
utilization and contractor’s divers) in July 2019.Vendor assumed tolerances as shown in Table
10.1-1 (as per received comment from client) is used for the purpose of current assessment.
Table 10.1-1, Detection and Sizing Accuracy of ILI tool
Depth at POD=90% N/A

Depth Sizing Accuracy 0.5 mm
Width Sizing Accuracy  50 mm
Length Sizing Accuracy  50 mm
10.1.1 ILI Tool Tolerances

Discan Co. (in cooperation with Rouge Co.) has reported inspection sizing Tolerances only for
EGP tool in the pipeline 2016 ILI inspection. For MFL and UT tool, data set provided in Table
10.1-2 was received from client and assumed in FFP calculations.

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Rev.04
It should be noted that due to lack of data it is assumed that the ILI tolerances are the same for
all type of anomalies, which might not be right.
Typically, these tool tolerances are added to the measured dimensions of an anomaly when
assessing its static strength.
FFP assessments were performed once with and once without consideration of ILI tool
tolerances.
ILI company classified features in accordance with the Pipeline Operators Forum (POF)
specification based on their aspect ratio (width x length), prior to applying the appropriate
tolerance.
Depth, length and width sizing inaccuracies are re-produced in Table 10.1-2 based on the
received information (see assumptions) for detection and sizing accuracy for anomalies in body
of pipe and near or on the long seam weld.
Table 10.1-2, Detection and sizing accuracy for anomalies
General Metal Axial
Pitting @ 2t x Circumferential Axial Slotting Circumferential
Accuracy / Loss @ 4t x 4t Grooving
2t (%wt) Grooving (%wt) (%wt) Slotting (%wt)
Defect type (%wt) (%wt)
SMLS SW SMLS SW SMLS SW SMLS SW SMLS SW SMLS SW
Depth at
Probability of
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Detection =
90%
Depth Sizing
Accuracy
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
(mm) at 80%
Confidence
Width Sizing
Accuracy
(mm) at 80% 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Confidence
(mm)
Length Sizing
Accuracy
(mm) at 80% 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Confidence
(mm)
Defects Distribution
Tables and figures in this section, show the list of anomaly features and distribution of
corrosion features along the pipeline obtained from ILI inspection.
For more details about distribution of imperfections along the pipeline, see Chapter 11 of this
report.

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10.2.1 Distribution of Features with Respect to their Types
Figure 10.2-1, Distribution of features with respect to their types

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Rev.04
10.2.2 Distribution of Metal Loss Features with Respect to Clock Position and Distance
Figure 10.2-2, Distribution of metal loss features Vs Orientation from km 0 to 4.5
Figure 10.2-2 shows metal loss distribution along and around the pipeline circumference mostly
distributed between 5 and 7 O’clock position including bottom of the line (6 o'clock position).
Figure 10.2-3, Distribution of metal loss Vs. Orientation for km 7.9 to 11
Figure 10.2-3 clearly shows the 5 and 5 o'clock position band pattern for KP of 7.9-11.

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Rev.04
Figure 10.2-4, Distribution of defects for Depth>=40%

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Rev.04
Figure 10.2-5, Distribution of defects for Depth>=30%
10.2.3 Summary of Anomaly Features Reported in ILI 2016

The summary of detected manufacturing related features and anomalies is given in Table
10.2-1.
Table 10.2-1, Summary of detected manufacturing related features and anomalies
Item Feature type Detected number
Anomaly
1 Metal loss 324,641
2 Slotting 23,328
3 Dent, circumferential dent 11
4 Girth weld anomaly 3810
5 Longitudinal weld anomaly 1
- Total 351,792
Construction features
1 Pipeline fixture, connection or welded element 22
2 Foreign object 142
3 Inclusion, surface anomaly 1,108
4 Bend 4
- Total (including unknown features) 1,283

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Rev.04
Metal loss feature distribution with respect to their depth and ERF (at the design pressure of
the pipeline and based on ASME B31G performed by ILI contractor) is given in Table 10.2-2.
Table 10.2-2, Metal loss feature distribution with respect to their depth and ERF
External Internal Total

Depth, % of wt. % of total
Number % of total number Number % of total number Number
number
0-10 725 81.83% 196,471 56.43% 197,196 56.49%
10-20 160 18.06% 148,887 42.76% 149,047 42.70%
20-30 1 0.11% 2,613 0.75% 2,614 0.75%
30-40 0 0 190 0.05% 190 0.05%
40-50 0 0 26 0.01% 26 0.01%
50-100 0 0 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
TOTAL 886 100.00% 348,187 100.00% 349,073 100%
External Internal Total Depth, % of wt. External Internal
ERF % of total
Number % of total number Number % of total number Number
number
0.6-0.8 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
0.8-0.9 74 45.96% 292,364 90.10% 292,438 90.08%
0.9-1.0 87 54.04% 32,043 9.88% 32,130 9.90%
≥1.0 0 0.00% 73 0.02% 73 0.02%
TOTAL 161 100.00% 324,480 100.00% 324,641 100%
Based on paragraph 6.7 of POF, the summary report of metal loss tools shall contain a listing
of Table 10.2-3.
Table 10.2-3, Generic list of features in ILI-2016
Item Feature type Detected number, unit
1 Total Anomaly 351,792
2 Longitudinal weld anomaly 1
3 Metal Loss 324,641
4 Slotting 23,328
5 Dent 11
6 Girth Weld 3,810
7 Foreign Object 142
8 Surface Anomaly 1,091
9 External Anomaly 888
10 Internal Anomaly 348,329
11 General Anomaly 125,611
12 Pitting 38,554
13 Circumferential Grooves 22,871
14 Longitudinal Groove 15,635

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Rev.04
10.2.4 Other Features

Other features include:
- It was observed several dents with maximum depth of 0.6% at log. distance
165,632.86 which all are fit for service.
- There is no Dent on top of the pipeline (12 O’clock) in ILI 2016 report.
- There was observed one long. seam anomaly with length of 163 mm at log.
distance 144,499.70 to be inspected and measured by inspection team.
- There is no gouge or Dent-and-gouge defects in subject pipeline as per ILI 2016.
- There is no crack-like anomaly in this pipeline as per ILI 2016.

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Rev.04
Selected Critical Defects

Table 10.3-1 is list of of most significant 30 defects based on highest ERF in ILI report 2016
Note that ERF calculations performed at the design pressure of the pipeline and based on
ASME B31G by ILI Contractor.
Table 10.3-1, The most 30 significant defects based on highest ERF*

Up
Abs. Joint Defect Defect Defect Defect
weld Pipe Clock Wt. ERF
Distance length length Width depth depth Comments
Dist. No. Posi. (mm) *
(m) (m) (mm) (mm) (%) (mm)
(m)
16758.55 0.40 13860 12.28 08:34 21.00 2229.00 539 38.57 8.10 1.14 metal loss under deposit
5121.23 1.84 4240 11.83 04:36 20.30 1602.00 248 33.99 6.90 1.09 metal loss
5864.79 9.72 4850 12.26 08:59 20.40 3643.00 283 30.39 6.20 1.08 metal loss
5161.97 7.78 4270 12.05 08:02 20.60 1928.00 366 30.10 6.20 1.06 metal loss
4942.97 6.20 4090 11.97 04:46 20.40 1197.00 350 30.88 6.30 1.06 metal loss
5012.01 2.35 4150 12.07 07:24 20.30 1093.00 350 30.54 6.20 1.05 metal loss
115249.54 7.50 95000 12.30 06:32 20.40 2072.00 1370 27.94 5.70 1.05 metal loss, ALW under deposit
5860.20 3.63 4850 12.26 09:06 20.40 1782.00 293 28.43 5.80 1.05 metal loss
5857.08 2.04 4850 12.26 08:58 20.40 1618.00 326 28.43 5.80 1.05 metal loss
5209.31 5.00 4310 12.31 07:24 20.40 596.00 324 33.33 6.80 1.05 metal loss
5856.68 0.77 4850 12.26 03:29 20.40 1140.00 249 29.41 6.00 1.04 metal loss, ACW
5864.07 7.76 4850 12.26 02:57 20.40 822.00 384 29.90 6.10 1.04 metal loss
4978.22 4.67 4120 12.27 04:48 20.40 1037.00 290 28.92 5.90 1.04 metal loss
metal loss, ACLW under
127839.96 2.73 105460 11.32 02:07 20.60 11289.00 1692 24.27 5.00 1.03
deposit
5140.91 9.82 4250 12.42 07:47 20.30 679.00 180 30.54 6.20 1.03 metal loss
4672.83 1.86 3870 12.15 08:18 20.70 1238.00 704 27.54 5.70 1.03 metal loss
124957.39 10.29 103040 11.90 05:59 20.30 628.00 853 30.05 6.10 1.03 metal loss
5842.68 10.38 4830 12.21 03:06 20.40 374.00 324 35.29 7.20 1.03 metal loss
5866.41 10.62 4850 12.26 02:46 20.40 1140.00 223 26.96 5.50 1.03 metal loss
5155.85 0.29 4270 12.05 03:14 20.60 1839.00 197 24.76 5.10 1.02 metal loss
5161.04 5.96 4270 12.05 03:14 20.60 998.00 375 26.70 5.50 1.02 metal loss
2494.52 6.00 2080 12.27 05:46 20.00 891.00 606 27.00 5.40 1.02 metal loss
897.66 4.55 760 11.99 04:53 20.00 895.00 1005 27.00 5.40 1.02 metal loss
5266.89 2.29 4360 12.20 04:56 20.30 861.00 128 26.60 5.40 1.02 metal loss
* ERF based on ILI report (might be different from DNVGL-RP-F101 calculations)
To have a better result for defect assessment, in this study the most 100 deepest point and the
most 100 highest ERF are taken from ILI-2016 and included in FFP study based on DNVGL-RP-
F101. See full list in Appendix B: List of 200 Most Significant ERF and Depth.

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Rev.04
List of 20 deepest features is tabulated in Table 10.3-2 as per ILI report 2016.
Table 10.3-2, List of 20 deepest features
Up
weld Pipe Clock Wt. ERF
Distance length length Width depth depth Comments
Dist. No. Posi. (mm) *
(m) (m) (mm) (mm) (%) (mm)
(m)
18542.70 0.58 15330 11.86 05:30 20.70 60.00 334 49.28 10.20 0.89 metal loss
11858.46 7.42 9810 11.89 02:54 20.10 16.00 9 48.76 9.80 0.87 metal loss
13661.90 3.69 11300 12.01 01:23 20.10 17.00 9 47.76 9.60 0.87 metal loss
6388.64 0.56 5290 11.94 01:42 20.40 59.00 85 47.55 9.70 0.89 metal loss
18015.35 7.20 14890 12.17 03:50 20.70 60.00 188 46.86 9.70 0.89 metal loss
19886.51 9.00 16430 12.21 03:52 20.70 46.00 77 46.38 9.60 0.88 metal loss
metal loss
14650.45 11.67 12110 12.23 05:03 21.00 29.00 60 46.19 9.70 0.87
under deposit
metal loss
14157.28 2.88 11710 12.11 04:38 21.00 84.00 104 45.71 9.60 0.91
under deposit
metal loss
6996.65 3.66 5790 11.90 06:39 20.00 176.00 478 45.50 9.10 0.99
under deposit
4894.30 4.87 4050 11.91 05:01 20.30 169.00 503 45.32 9.20 0.98 metal loss
5141.36 10.20 4250 12.42 04:40 20.30 116.00 324 45.32 9.20 0.94 metal loss
1532.94 3.55 1290 11.72 02:46 20.00 17.00 69 45.00 9.00 0.87 metal loss
11824.43 9.93 9780 12.26 02:58 20.10 16.00 9 44.78 9.00 0.87 metal loss
4934.79 9.01 4080 12.15 04:50 20.30 93.00 298 44.33 9.00 0.92 metal loss
6574.81 4.87 5440 12.34 03:37 20.10 50.00 26 44.28 8.90 0.88 metal loss
8923.00 4.94 7380 12.37 03:45 20.90 192.00 317 44.02 9.20 0.99 metal loss
6652.21 9.64 5500 12.21 05:12 20.90 16.00 61 43.54 9.10 0.87 metal loss
6543.70 9.92 5410 11.86 01:56 20.10 86.00 111 43.28 8.70 0.91 metal loss
13431.24 3.38 11110 12.27 01:16 20.00 173.00 129 43.00 8.60 0.98 metal loss
18965.97 11.00 15670 12.10 05:22 20.70 107.00 17 42.51 8.80 0.92 metal loss
* ERFs are based on ILI report and calculated at the design pressure of the pipeline (114 barg) and based on ASME
B31G by ILI Contractor and might be different from DNVGL-RP-F101 calculations.

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Rev.04
Defect Assessment for Offshore Section

This section of the report addresses the significance of the reported features considering only
metal loss, on the immediate integrity of the pipeline, i.e. at the time of the 2016 inspection. A
deterministic approach is used here with the aim to assess the latest ILI inspection
data in order to:
- Identify metal loss anomalies that require immediate repair (unacceptable anomalies);
- Identify metal loss anomalies that may remain in the pipe wall, but require monitoring;
- Identify any other anomalies which may impact pipeline integrity based on qualitative
evaluation; and,
- Determine immediate safe operating pressure of the pipeline and report if any de-rating
is required.
Table 10.4-1 presents pipeline input data for current FFP assessment.
Table 10.4-1, Offshore Pipeline Input data sheet for DNVGL RP-F101 calculations module
Total Pipeline Length (km): 290 Corrosion Allowance (mm): 1.5

Section of Offshore (km) that has
290 Mill Tolerance (%): 5%
been inspected by ILI:
Pipeline Outside Diameter (mm): 812.8 Design Safety Factor: 0.72
Pipeline Nominal Wall Thickness
20.6 Start Up Date: 2008
(mm):
Carbon
Pipeline Material: Design Life: 25 Years
Steel
Super Dry
Material Grade: x65 Service:
Sour Gas
NACE MR-
Suitable for Sour Service: Max. Operating (inlet) 96.6**
0175
Maximum operating pressure
*Design Temp. (Offshore) ºC: 65.0 104***
(MOP)
*Design Temp. (Onshore) ºC: 65.0 MAOP (bar): 93.0
Max. Operating Temperature
Design Pressure (bar) 114.0 50
(ºC)
* Ref.: Basis of Design Doc. No. SA-000-4200-PL-DB-1001-D0.
** Based on Maximum Inlet Pressure From SA-000-4200-PL-DB-1001-D0 and Maximum steady state
pressure for a flowrate of 500 MMSCFD.
*** Based on the maximum available delivery pressure from year 1 to year 25 from Basis of Design.

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Rev.04
10.4.1 Parameters Used in the FFP Assessments

The following pipeline data have been selected and used by the Consultants for conducting the
FFP assessment based on the reported features.
Table 10.4-2, Input data used for the immediate FFP assessments
Nominal diameter 32-inch (812.8 mm)
Type of pipe Longitudinal seam weld
Wall thickness nominal 20.6 mm as minimum wall thickness
SMYS 65,000 psi (448.1 MPa)
SMTS 77,000 psi (530.9 MPa)
ILI tool inspection

See Table 10.1-1
Tolerances
Internal static pressure (Pipe assumed not to be restrained therefore no additional

axial stress applies to the pipeline).
Loading Type
The governing stress is internal hoop stress.

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Rev.04
10.4.2 Assessment Method

A deterministic immediate integrity assessment of the 2016 ILI inspection has been carried out
by the consultants as outlined based on DNV GL RP-F101 methodology.
10.4.3 Design Factor

The design code for this pipeline is DNV GL OS-F101 for offshore section and ASME B31.8 for
onshore section of the pipeline.
The DNVGL (Part B) assessment is based on a “Total Usage Factor” which includes a
“modelling” factor of 0.9, whereas most other assessment methods calculate the safety factor
as (1/Design Factor). Result of DNV GL RP-F101 (Part B) and modified ASME B31G, is
summarised in Table 10.4-3 and Figure 10.4-1.
Table 10.4-3, The pipeline safety factors
Safety Factor
Design Safety Factor
(DNVGL-RP-F101 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline
Factor (f) (ASME B31G)
Part B)
For shore approach segment and
0.60 1.85 (=1/(0.9*0.6)) 1.67 (=1/0.6)
Onshore section
0.72 1.54 (=1/(0.9*0.72)) 1.39 (=1/0.72) For Subsea section
Figure 10.4-1, Location class in 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline

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Rev.04
10.4.4 Defect Assessment Results
Graphical representation of the DNVGL RP-F101 acceptance curve for internal corrosion
including ILI tool tolerances is given in Figure 10.4-2.
Fit for
Service
Figure 10.4-2, Defects Graphical Plot based on DNVGL RP-F101 Part B with ILI tolerances
Graphical representation of the DNVGL RP-F101 acceptance curve for internal corrosion
without ILI tool tolerances is given in Figure 10.4-3.
Fit for
Service
Figure 10.4-3, Defects Graphical Plot based on DNVGL RP-F101 Part B without ILI tolerances

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Rev.04
10.4.5 Calculation for the Minimum Existing Wall Thickness

As per design documents and available as built data, the minimum wall thickness in the 32-inch
Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline is supposed to be 20.6 mm.
There are the some locations with wall thickness less than 20.6mm (ILI-UT report 2016). To
have a comprehensive integrity study, all the wall thicknesses less than 19.5 mm is assessed
by individual abnormal wall thicknesses (min 18.5 mm) and all are fit for service at the time of
ILI 2016, See Figure 10.4-4.
There are also 245 joints with wall thickness less than 20 mm (66 joints with wall thickness of
19.8 mm) in subject pipeline.
Fit for
Service
Figure 10.4-4, FFP assessment results for corrosion features located at pipe joints with wall thickness <
19.5mm

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Defect Assessment for Onshore Section

Noting the available PAUT report for the onshore section of the pipeline as the ILI company
has used temporary pig traps and inspected only offshore section of the pipeline, for the
reporting purposes, the same defects sizes (Internal) for onshore section is assumed. Below
study is based on ASME B31G standard for onshore section of the Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline.
This assessment is done for same defects as offshore section but with design factor of 0.6 for
onshore section, See Figure 10.5-1.
See Appendix B for same data set of defects for onshore section.
However, AUT inspection has been completed for onshore section (selected hot spot location)
and it is observed that there is no major external or internal defect in onshore section (Final
report of AUT was in progress).
Fit for
Service
Figure 10.5-1, RBA curve of 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline
It is concluded that the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline is fit for service in MAOP 93 barg in
onshore section. All defects are below pipeline failure curve.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Verification
The preliminary UT reports was prepared on-board the vessel and presented to IOOC. See
Figure 10.6-1 and Table 10.6-1.
Figure 10.6-1, Verified location (by DP2)
Table 10.6-1, Wall thickness readings for subsea verification

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Summary of Pipeline Structural Integrity Assessment

Summary of Pipeline Structural Integrity Assessment at time of writing this report is outlined in
the Table below:
Table 10.7-1, Summary of Pipeline Structural Integrity Assessment
Pipeline/ System Description/ ID 32-inch Asaluyeh - Sirri

Pigging loop from pig launcher in Asaluyeh to pig receiver in
Sirri island.
Pipeline / System Boundary Limits
Above piping includes entire pipeline and connected facilities
up to first isolation valve in Sirri.
Fit for Service ☒
Fit for Service with
Status mitigations and/ or -
modifications
Not Fit for Service
Year Installed 2008 Product Super Dry Sour Gas*
Status Piggable (Yes/No) ☒ Yes ☐ No

In Service
(In/Out of Service) Date of last ILI JAN. 2016
Pipeline Validated? Inspection method for
☒ Yes ☐ No ILI (MFL and UT)
Last Validation Date Validation
HR-MFL
ROV Completed OCT. 2010 Next ILI Inspection & date
Q1, 2020
Next ILI tender formalities are
Remnant life 2031 ILI Runs ongoing. A follow on ILI to be run
by 2021.

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Rev.04
11 Root Cause Analysis
Internal Corrosions Root Cause Analysis
11.1.1 Internal Corrosion Distribution

Distribution of internal metal loss is shown in Figure 11.1-1 and Figure 11.1-2.
Figure 11.1-1, Internal corrosion distribution along the pipeline length
Figure 11.1-2, Clock position of internal defects from top to bottom of pipeline
Since the pipeline elevation is almost same and flat in subsea section, the reason for populated
internal metal loss in the first 140 km of subject pipeline might be sea water left over (DFI
incident in pipelaying barge at the time of construction- in km 140, location to be checked-) and
left in the sea without inhibitor.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Figure 11.1-3, Asaluyeh-Sirri Pipeline Elevation Profile (Offshore)
11.1.2 Pitting Corrosion

Localized attack and discrete meal loss are signs of pitting.
Results of the ILI-2016 showed 38,470 counts of internal pitting with maximum depth of 47.5%
and 8 counts of external pitting with maximum depth of 12.5%-in 2016. Most likely all these
pitting is from leftover sea water in DFI stage.
11.1.3 General Corrosion

General corrosion is usually defined as corrosion with a length and width greater than three
times the un-corroded wall thickness. Corrosion allowance (here 1.5mm) is usually considered
in the design to accommodate for uniform or general corrosion. General corrosion can be
observed in one of the following forms:
- Sour Corrosion: Sour corrosion is not valid since the gas is super dry and pipeline is
procured in compliance with NACE and therefore general/localised corrosion or cracking
as a result of H2S is not a threat to the pipeline.
- Under deposit corrosion: Water ingress leads to stagnancy of moisture content at low
spots, leading to under deposit corrosion if sand or debris is present. Since there is no
available report on pig debris analysis hence under deposit Corrosion is considered a
credible internal corrosion mechanism for this pipeline.
11.1.4 MIC
According to client’s letter No. 49477 about inspection result of microbial monitoring and
analysing of 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri sediments, it is concluded that MIC is not a threat in this
pipeline. See Report No. 54855 dated Aug 3, 2019 in IOOC and report No. YA18/0135/QC/507
by GL Lloyd Alman Kish where reference standard for this sampling is NACE TM 0194-2014.
11.1.4.1 Chemical and Microbial Analyzed Results of Sediments Sample

Table 11.1-1 shows MIC sampling results.

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Rev.04
Table 11.1-1 Chemical and Microbial Analyzed Results of Sediments Sample
Sample Name Elements Weight Factor (%)

C 6.62
O 22.15
32-inch Pipeline
S 29.2
Sediment
Ca 1.11
Fe 40.92
Sampling Location HB APB SRB IRB

32-inch Pipeline
1000 10 10 <10
Sediment, counts
11.1.4.2 Review and Analysis

Due to Chemical analysis results of sediment using the techniques XRD and EDX, the main
source of this sediments is composed of various compounds of sulphide and iron oxide (>92%)
with a small amount of calcium deposits which is mainly known as Black Powder in gas
pipelines.
• Iron Sulphides (FexSy)

The presence of iron oxides compounds can be due to the following two mechanisms:
I- Microbial pollution due to existence of SRB bacteria and producing corrosion production
includes Iron Sulphide.
This process can occur if the water is used without hydration for hydrotesting operation. In the
history of this pipeline and existing reports it is mentioned to microbial corrosion and also
composed of sulphide products. But this pipeline has been cleaned and the microbial purging
operation has been done before transporting dry gas. In case of remaining this sediment (Iron
Sulphides) in the pipeline during initial cleaning operations, in next pigging cleaning operation
mentioned sediments will be extracted gradually. Therefore, it is expected to see sulphide
sediments not only in the last ILI but also in the next ILIs. Also, with the results shown in Table
11.1-1 and low humidity in the pipeline, cultured specimens could not be an accurate measure
of the contamination rate of the studied environment. The reason for the high number of
heterotrophic bacteria can be due to the transmission of microbial contamination from the
environment at the time of sampling and inoculation in the culture medium.
II- Chemical reaction between H2S and the pipe body if the pipeline is wet.
Usually in dry sour gas transmission pipelines which the humidity is very low, the only
heterogeneous reactions between the H2S gas exist in the fluid and the steel wall of the
pipeline are possible. However, the rate of these reactions is very low which this pipeline is not
an exception of this rule. Due to the long length of the pipeline (above 305 Km), even the
creation of a very low-thickness sulphide layer can cause the sediments to form about one
cubic meter per micron.
• Iron Oxides (Fe3O4, Fe2O3, FeO)

As shown in above table, the second major constituent of sediment collected from the pipeline
is iron oxides which can be exist in various chemical forms. Iron oxides can be formed by the
reaction between the body of the pipe and the water in the presence of oxygen, which may be
due to hydrotest operations and the water remaining in the pipeline or possibly exposing the
transmission pipes to pre-construction at the project site and also the oxidation of hydrophobic
iron sulphur deposits.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
External Corrosions Root Cause Analysis
11.2.1 External Corrosion Distribution
The recent ILI inspection reported a total of 885 external corrosion features, the deepest of
which were reported with a depth of 27.4% wall thickness at longitudinal distance of
14,691.878 m.
Distribution of the external corrosion features is presented in terms of feature depth in
Figure 11.2-1.
Figure 11.2-1, Distribution of External defects along the pipeline length
11.2.2 External Corrosion Root Cause Analysis and Mechanisms
External corrosion can be due to external coating damage or corrosion under insulation due
to the ingress of water. This is typically seen for shore approach segment of the pipeline.
External corrosion at the near shore section of the pipeline could be again due to damage
to the coating of the pipeline, increase in temperature or CP system disruption especially at
isolation joints between onshore and offshore section of the pipeline. This is where offshore
sacrificial anode CP system and impressed current CP system for onshore are connected.
The available report for onshore section is On-potential Pipe to Soil readings. It is
recommended to conduct Off-potential next to On-potential in subject pipeline.
11.2.3 Dents
A ‘dent’ is a local change in the pipe surface contour which can be caused during or after
construction of pipeline. During construction, dents can happen while transporting, handling or
installing. While after construction, it can happen due to external interference or pipe
settlement. In general, a dent can fail due to static loading or fatigue loading.
Plain dents with depth up to 8% of the pipe diameter (when pressurized) have shown
reasonable static strength in experiments conducted by British Gas, Battelle, etc. and ASME

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
B31.8 allows plain dents of up to 6% pipe diameter. Furthermore, ASME B31.8 allows plain
dents of any depths provided the strain level associated with the deformation do not exceed
6% strain.
Distribution of the dents along the pipeline is plotted in ParsPiMSTM ILI platform. Depth of the
dents relative to nominal inner diameter of the pipeline versus distance along the pipeline is
plotted in Table 11.2-1.
In total 2016 ILI inspection reported 9 dents with a maximum reported depth of less than 0.6%
of pipe Diameter. Therefore, Dent is not considered a threat to the integrity of the pipeline.
Table 11.2-1, List of dents

Pipe Clock. Wt. Surface Psw.
Distance length length Width depth depth
No. Posi. (mm) loc. (Mpa)
(m) (m) (mm) (mm) (%) (mm)
165632.86 136640 12.65 04:04 20.90 216.00 259 0.60 4.90 ext. 11.40
278438.39 228860 12.44 05:39 21.80 216.00 376 0.50 4.10 ext. 11.40
276816.53 227540 12.26 04:49 21.60 126.00 116 0.43 3.50 ext. 11.40
276809.90 227530 11.95 04:53 21.80 99.00 161 0.43 3.50 ext. 11.40
276818.50 227540 12.26 04:52 21.60 109.00 107 0.42 3.40 ext. 11.40
277272.07 227910 11.63 05:04 20.00 153.00 179 0.33 2.70 ext. 11.40
250748.06 206280 12.50 04:38 21.30 109.00 143 0.33 2.70 ext. 11.40
339.42 290 12.50 08:14 28.60 209.00 286 0.33 2.70 ext. 11.40
35405.44 29170 12.47 04:07 20.70 229.00 125 0.23 1.90 ext. 11.40
It is assumed that dent sizing (%) is based on ID of pipe in ILI pipe tally.
The dents are distributed around the circumference of the pipeline between 4 to 8 O’clock
positions.
11.2.4 Manufacturing Features
Pipe mill anomalies are also detected in 2016 ILI run (17 counts). These features are
considered to have been introduced during the manufacturing and construction phases.
Consequently, they will have survived the pre-service hydrotest and in the absence of a growth
mechanism or additional axial loading, they are not considered a threat to the integrity of the
pipeline.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
12 ROV
Between the July and September 2010, the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline was inspected along
its full length (offshore section) in descending KP direction from the shallowest possible point of
Sirri landfall point (KP 289.354 depth 6.4 m), to the shallowest navigationally safe point towards
Asaluyeh landfall point (KP 1.006 depth 10.6). The 32-inch Pipeline was found to be generally
well supported by the seabed with occasional free spans and minor fish scours at the time of
ROV inspection (2010).
ROV Observation
- The 32-inch Pipeline has a total of six crossing locations with multiple pipes/cables at
each location. The names and KP’s of those crossings’ asset are listed in Table 12.1-1.
Table 12.1-1, Observed Crossings - 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri Pipeline
Separation distance,
KP Description
m
10.168 0.4 SPD 21 to Asaluyeh crossing over subject pipeline
114.577 0.2 Pipeline Crossing Under
- The pipeline crossing analysis is performed, and pipeline stresses are found to be within
the allowable stresses. The bottom of pipe at the existing pipeline crossings are
complying with the minimum clearance requirement of 200mm.
- Field joints observed during survey of the 32-inch Pipeline from KP 1.006 to KP 289.354
were in good condition, with intact wrappers exhibiting early stages of corrosion. Some
field joints were observed with loose wrap, broken banding or foam exposures.
- Few field joints were evented based on engineering design and as-laid information since
they could not be observed due to the pipeline partial burial, coverage of silt and marine
growth on the pipeline.
- Anodes observed during the survey of this pipeline from KP 1.006 to KP 289.354 were
in good condition and exhibited slight wastage in the 0-25% classification range.
- Between KP 1.006 and KP 2.018 the pipeline was observed to be partially buried.
- A total number of five hundred and thirty-two (532) free spans and five (5) burials were
observed during this survey. However, noting the free span analysis that was conducted
by asset owner in 2015 on this pipeline for the exposed and un-buried areas (document
No. SA-000-4200-PL-PR-2015-0), all Free spans were noted to be fit for service at that
time.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Figure 12.1-1, Pipeline crossing with other pipeline(s)
Fatigue Analysis of Free Spans

If free span length is found to be more than what is given in the scope of work for a
particular coordinate it may necessitate installation of additional grout support. The
decision on the number of additional supports will depend on the following:
- Actual length of free span in meters
- Allowable free span length in meters for that particular size of pipe where grout
bag is being placed and IOOC integrity team’s discretion.
The most severe Free spans are tabulated in Table 12.2-1 and all are fit for service as
per study and document No.SA-000-4200-PL-PR-2015-0 which is done by construction
contractor after as lay ROV survey.
Table 12.2-1, The most severe Free Spans (ROV- 2010)
Dimensions (m) Water depth

KP
Length * Height (m)
41 * 1.6 83.1 91.88
66 * 0.2 34.4 287
62 * 0.4 83.2 106.1
60 * 0.6 75.7 64
It is highly recommended to conduct new Free span inspection (ROV survey) by 2021.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
13 Facilities Integrity Status
BVS
Noting the available data, it is highly recommended to do testing the BVS(s) twice a year and
on an opportunity basis. The condition of the site, warning signs, fence, availability of keys and
fire extinguisher shall also be checked.
IOOC inspection shall ensure full open status of valves by regular inspection, See ParsPiMS TM
for inspection form for BVS and Appendix C: Data Sheet and Inspection Form for BVS.
Launcher and Receiver

It is highly recommended for IOOC to conduct frequent UT test on both Launcher based on
prescriptive approach (in Asaluyeh) and Receiver (in Sirri island) based on pre-selected
inspection points.
It is further recommended for IOOC inspection department to have a checklist for inspection of
Launcher and Receiver and all attached ancillaries and fittings. (See ParsPiMS TM for
inspection form of Pig Launcher and Receiver and Appendix D: Data Sheet and Inspection
Form for Pig Traps for this purpose.
Other Ancillary Piping(s)

There is no other connected ancillaries or facilities (other than Pig traps and main valves) to
carrier pipeline.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
14 IOW
The system pressure and temperature (Safe Operating Limits) during the period of interest is
within the design and safe operating limits according to design documents.
De-rated MAOP: 93 barg

Design temperature: 65 oC
Operating Window
Subsea and Onshore sections:
Maximum recorded Operating Pressure: 80.5 barg at Sirri (Q4 2018)
Maximum recorded Operating Temperature: 45 oC (Q2 2018)
Plots of the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline pressure and temperature from Q1 2018 through
Q2 2019 are projected in Figure 14.2-1 to Figure 14.4-1.
Table 14.1-1, Integrity Operating Window

Have Safe Operating Limits (SOLs) been defined and incorporated into
☒ Yes ☐ No
the pipeline operating procedures?
Operations/
Has the pipeline experienced any excursions from the SOLs, HVLs? If so,
Production ☐ Yes ☒ No
explain below
Summary
Are the pipelines operating procedures and method statements up-to-
☒ Yes ☐ No
date?

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Asaluyeh-Sirri Pressure Data Record Plot Last 12 Months
Pressure at Asaluyeh (Bar)

78.0
76.0
74.0
72.0
70.0
68.0
66.0
64.0
62.0
60.0
58.0
56.0
54.0
52.0
50.0
Mar-18
May-18
Oct-18
Mar-19
Apr-18
Jun-18
Jul-18
Feb-19
Aug-18
Sep-18
Nov-18
Dec-18
Jan-19
MIN PRESURE=58.9 MAX PRESSURE=76.6 AVERAGE PRESSURE=73.3
Figure 14.2-1, Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline pressure gradient at Asaluyeh
Pressure at Sirri (Bar)

82.0
80.0
78.0
76.0
74.0
72.0
70.0
68.0
66.0
64.0
62.0
60.0
58.0
56.0
54.0
Mar-18
Apr-18
May-18
Jun-18
Jul-18
Oct-18
Nov-18
Dec-18
Jan-19
Feb-19
Mar-19
Aug-18
Sep-18
MIN PRESURE=58.9 MAX PRESSURE=80.5 AVERAGE PRESSURE=76.5
Figure 14.2-2, Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline pressure gradient at Sirri

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Asaluyeh-Sirri Temperature Data Record Plot Last 12 Months
Temperature Asaluyeh (°C)

50.0
45.0
40.0
35.0
30.0
25.0
20.0
Mar-18
May-18
Oct-18
Mar-19
Apr-18
Jun-18
Jul-18
Feb-19
Aug-18
Sep-18
Nov-18
Dec-18
Jan-19
MIN TEMPRATURE=25 MAX TEMPRATURE=45 AVERAGE TEMPRATURE=37.2
Figure 14.3-1, Asaluyeh-Sirri Temperature gradient
Asaluyeh-Sirri Flow Data Record Plot Last 12 Months
Flow rate- Asaluyeh (MMSCFD)

180.0
160.0
140.0
120.0
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
Mar-18
Apr-18
May-18
Jun-18
Jul-18
Oct-18
Nov-18
Dec-18
Jan-19
Feb-19
Mar-19
Aug-18
Sep-18
MIN FLOW RATE=0.3 MAX FLOW RATE=155.7 AVERAGE FLOW RATE=120.3
Figure 14.4-1, Asaluyeh-Sirri flow data

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
15 Assessed Corrosion Rate (ACR)
The Assessed Corrosion Rate (ACR) is used to predict the amount of metal loss expected in
this pipeline over a certain period of time based on the available data from IOOC and expected
future operating conditions. The aim of this procedure is to set out the basic steps that should
be followed such that using qualitative aids the internal & external corrosion rate for Asaluyeh-
Sirri pipeline can be qualified or assessed.
ACRs are used in this current FFP assessment to determine the actual pipeline integrity status,
establish the next inspection dates, schedule for repairs and final replacement date.
Corrosion Rate Assessment Triggers

Next assessment of the ACR shall be carried out when one of the following conditions is met:
1. New verified ILI inspection data.

2. Change in the operating conditions > 20% of the design.
3. Unexpected leak has been reported.
4. One of the monitoring tools show one reading higher than normal by a factor of 10, or
when more than two consecutive readings show an increase in corrosion rate by a
factor of 3. Such readings shall immediately be flagged as Amber on the pipeline
integrity status reporting.
5. Each pipeline integrity review (RBA) which is the case in this study.
The following sections summaries all available information and that would be the basis for RBA
assessment. The assessed corrosion rate mainly driven from ILI data and other sources.
The corrosion rates are calculated based on process data sheet and other parameters including
operating temperature; operating pressure; partial pressures of CO2 and H2S; flow velocity;
water content of the gas, ionic strength of the formation water, Gas to Oil Ratio (GOR),
measured pH, the inhibitor efficiency/availability, etc.
This calculation is conducted by using ECE software.
It should be mentioned that the corrosion rate calculations are for General Corrosion purpose
only and pitting corrosion is not considered.
See Table 15.2-1 for ECE calculations result which is developed for calculation of CO2
corrosion rate.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
ECE-3 Corrosion Rate Calculation for Asaluyeh-Sirri Pipeline

The ECE corrosion calculation outlined in Table 15.2-1 is based on the past super dry sour gas
working fluid composition of the pipeline as outlined in Table 1.10-1.
Table 15.2-1, ECE Corrosion calculation for Past Super Dry Sour Gas Working Fluid Composition
Diameter 0.772 m
Wall thickness 20.6 mm
Length 290 km
Carbon steel content 0.1 %
Max Inlet temperature 50 °C
Inlet pressure (MAOP) 93 bar
CO2 3.16 mole%
H2S 1.55 mole%
Bicarbonate 110 mg/L (ppm)
Glycol injection rate 0 kgMMsm3
Inhibitor availability 98 %
Gas flowrate 530 MMSCFD
Maximum Corrosion rate (Uninhibited) 11.87 mm/y

Maximum Corrosion rate (inhibited) 0.335 mm/y
Lowest pH 3.77 -
Highest pH 4.52 -
Sour to NACE YES -

Sour to EFC YES -
Noting intention of IOOC to use the subject pipeline for transportation of dry sweet gas in the
future with fluid composition outlined in Table 1.10 2, a new ECE corrosion calculation is
performed which is outlined in Table 15.2-2.
Table 15.2-2, ECE Corrosion calculation for Future Dry Sweet Gas Working Fluid Composition
Diameter 0.772 m
Wall thickness 20.6 mm
Length 290 km
Carbon steel content 0.1 %
Max Inlet temperature 50 °C

Inlet pressure (MAOP) 93 bar
CO2 9.09 mole%
H2S 0 mole%
Bicarbonate 110 mg/L (ppm)
glycol injection rate 0 kgMMsm3
Inhibitor availability 98 %
Gas flowrate 530 MMSCFD
Maximum Corrosion rate (Uninhibited) 17.95 mm/y

Maximum Corrosion rate (inhibited) 0.457 mm/y
Lowest pH 3.62 -
Highest pH 4.19 -
Sour to NACE YES -
Sour to EFC YES -

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Assessed Corrosion Rate Summary

The Assessed Corrosion Rate for the past super dry sour gas working fluid composition of the
pipeline as referenced in Table 1.10 1 is outlined in Table 15.3 1 below.
Table 15.3-1, Assessed Corrosion Rate (ACR), [mm/yr] for Past Super Dry Sour Gas Working Fluid
Composition
External Internal
Weighting
Weighting
CR Evidences /
Factor Based on Weighting factor
factor
factor
parameter Observation
ACR ACR
Document High: - All data is available and audit able;

Hydrocorr N/A N/A 0 0 number: Medium: - All data is available as supplied by pipeline
9068G-000-RT- operator, but cannot be verified.
ECE-3 for
0091-02 Low: - Not all data are available, the available data
inhibited N/A N/A 0.1 0.335
(Note 1) cannot be verified.
scenario
ECE-3 for The weightage factor for uninhibited scenario has been
CR p unhibited Working fluid N/A N/A 0 11.87
(Prediction) composition assumed very low because of out of range result.
scenario
data (Dry gas)
Other
prediction N/A N/A 0 0
softwares
Base of
Design N/A N/A 0.05 0.11
document
Deepest metal - Highest wall High: Latest inspection is considered successful and
0 0 0 0 thickness loss defects have been verified within tool tolerance.
loss
(mm) / (Date Results can be compared with previous inspection
ILI2 - Date ILI1) data.
CR i short (year) Medium: The inspection is considered successful and
term for ILI General wall - General wall defects have been verified within tool tolerance, No
Comparison loss for UT 0 0 0 0 loss is based on previous inspection data to compare with. Or data does
only Frequency of not compare very well with previous inspection data.
distributions of Low: The inspection data is considered partially
CR i (ILI) wall successful and not all verified defects are within tool
thicknesses. tolerance. (Note 2)
Deepest metal largest changes
0.2 0.72 0.1 1.27 in wall thickness
loss
loss (mm) /
CR i long (Date of last
term for last ILI General wall inspection –
0.3 0.11 0.1 0.6 date of
loss
installation)
(year) (Note 3)
(Note 4)
High: - Tool is correctly positioned in the pipe where corrosion is likely to
occur, the data processing interpretation procedure is good. And the data
availability can be verified.
Medium: - Tool is correctly positioned in the pipe where corrosion is likely to
CR m Corrosion occur, however, the adequacy data processing, interpretation and the data
(Monitored CR m coupon weight N/A N/A 0.05 0.013 availability cannot be confirmed.
data) loss Low: Although the data is available however, the position of the tool is not
adequate. Human error in Corrosion coupon retrieval. The exposure
time is not as per NACE SP-0775-2013.
Since the exposure time was >1 year (instead of 90 days), this data is taken
into account with minimum weightage factor in ACR calculation.
Conventional
UT or AUT for
Internal and As per verification result in July 2019, it was observed one defect with size
CR f
digital pit of 18% which was reported 38.5% (overestimated in ILI report). Assuming
(Field CR f 0 0 0.45 0.46
gauge or laser this defect and verification (only available inspection) and assuming with 8
measurement)
scanner for years in-service, the corrosion rate is 0.46 mm/yr. (Note 5)
External metal
loss.
Corrosion
CR j Inspection data of the upstream and downstream on plot facilities and
CR j Engineering 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1
(Judgement) parallel pipeline, and where applicable adjacent facilities plus weight factors
judgement
Multivariable -
CR math regression
(Mathematical CR math Method. 0 0 0 0
model) (Patent
Pendign)
ACR Total - - 1 0.23 1 0.44 (Note 6)

Notes:
1: In case of changes in operational parameters, If the changes to previous study or design conditions are not known, the sensitivity toward 20% variance of the set
operating parameters shall be reviewed in input data. For inhibited systems Hydrocorr shall be used with different levels of inhibitor availability to predict corrosion rates,
at least two different scenarios should be tested, for example, the predicted corrosion rate in the untreated condition and with 95% inhibitor.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
2: Only verified ILI or External MFL data shall be used to derive the corrosion rate for the inspection history.
3: The short-term corrosion rate shall be used as the CRi, the long corrosion rate shall be used to examine and changes in the corrosion rate and if unexpected a
difference between the long and short corrosion rate is apparent an investigation shall be initiated to establish route cause.
4: It covers Ultrasonic techniques, Corrosion coupons, Electrochemical monitoring, Other corrosion rate monitoring devices e.g. , FSM-IT, Corrosivity data,
Microbiological (planktonic/sessile), Oxygen, Others chemical analysis, CP data including the Isolating joins checks, Soil resistivity, DCVG and CIPS data, Coating
rehabilitation data, potential readings from test posts, current output and condition of transformer rectifiers and ground beds.
5: This data concerns how the pipeline is operated and maintained in the field. Information should be available on the throughput of the line, change in operating
envelope, fluid corrosivity, quantity and quality of the pigging debris, availability of corrosion control chemicals, pigging frequency, condition of retrieved pigs, condition of
the pig traps and associated pipe-work, Excorr (not in this project) and other random wall thickness measurement in pipeline.
6: The highest of the external or internal corrosion shall be used as the final ACR. Only if there is clear evidence from inspection findings that active internal and external
corrosion at the same location the ACR shall be the sum of both the external and the internal.
An updated ACR calculation based on IOOC’s intention to use the subject pipeline for
transportation of dry sweet gas in the future with fluid composition outlined in Table 1.10 2 is
outlined in Table 15.3-2.
Table 15.3-2, Assessed Corrosion Rate (ACR), [mm/yr] for Future Dry Sweet Gas Working Fluid Composition
External Internal
Weighting
Weighting
CR Evidences /
Factor Based on Weighting factor
factor
factor
parameter Observation
ACR ACR
Document High: - All data is available and audit able;

Hydrocorr N/A N/A 0 0 number: Medium: - All data is available as supplied by pipeline
9068G-000-RT- operator, but cannot be verified.
ECE-3 for
0091-02 Low: - Not all data are available, the available data
inhibited N/A N/A 0.1 0.457
(Note 1) cannot be verified.
scenario
ECE-3 for The weightage factor for uninhibited scenario has been
CR p unhibited Working fluid N/A N/A 0 17.95
(Prediction) composition assumed very low because of out of range result.
scenario
data (Dry gas)
Other
prediction N/A N/A 0 0
softwares
Base of
Design N/A N/A 0.05 0.11
document
Deepest metal - Highest wall High: Latest inspection is considered successful and
0 0 0 0 thickness loss defects have been verified within tool tolerance.
loss
(mm) / (Date Results can be compared with previous inspection
ILI2 - Date ILI1) data.
CR i short (year) Medium: The inspection is considered successful and
term for ILI General wall - General wall defects have been verified within tool tolerance, No
Comparison loss for UT 0 0 0 0 loss is based on previous inspection data to compare with. Or data does
only Frequency of not compare very well with previous inspection data.
distributions of Low: The inspection data is considered partially
CR i (ILI) wall successful and not all verified defects are within tool
thicknesses. tolerance. (Note 2)
Deepest metal largest changes
0.2 0.72 0.1 1.27 in wall thickness
loss
loss (mm) /
CR i long (Date of last
term for last ILI General wall inspection –
0.3 0.11 0.1 0.6 date of
loss
installation)
(year) (Note 3)
(Note 4)
High: - Tool is correctly positioned in the pipe where corrosion is likely to
occur, the data processing interpretation procedure is good. And the data
availability can be verified.
Medium: - Tool is correctly positioned in the pipe where corrosion is likely to
CR m Corrosion occur, however, the adequacy data processing, interpretation and the data
(Monitored CR m coupon weight N/A N/A 0.01 0.013 availability cannot be confirmed.
data) loss Low: Although the data is available however, the position of the tool is not
adequate. Human error in Corrosion coupon retrieval. The exposure
time is not as per NACE SP-0775-2013.
Since the exposure time was >1 year (instead of 90 days), this data is taken
into account with minimum weightage factor in ACR calculation.
Conventional
UT or AUT for
Internal and As per verification result in July 2019, it was observed one defect with size
CR f
digital pit of 18% which was reported 38.5% (overestimated in ILI report). Assuming
(Field CR f 0 0 0.45 0.46
gauge or laser this defect and verification (only available inspection) and assuming with 8
measurement)
scanner for years in-service, the corrosion rate is 0.46 mm/yr. (Note 5)
External metal
loss.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Corrosion
CR j Inspection data of the upstream and downstream on plot facilities and
CR j Engineering 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1
(Judgement) parallel pipeline, and where applicable adjacent facilities plus weight factors
judgement
Multivariable -
CR math regression
(Mathematical CR math Method. 0 0 0 0
model) (Patent
Pendign)
ACR Total - - 1 0.23 1 0.46 (Note 6)

Notes:
1: In case of changes in operational parameters, If the changes to previous study or design conditions are not known, the sensitivity toward 20% variance of the set
operating parameters shall be reviewed in input data. For inhibited systems Hydrocorr shall be used with different levels of inhibitor availability to predict corrosion rates,
at least two different scenarios should be tested, for example, the predicted corrosion rate in the untreated condition and with 95% inhibitor.
2: Only verified ILI or External MFL data shall be used to derive the corrosion rate for the inspection history.
3: The short-term corrosion rate shall be used as the CRi, the long corrosion rate shall be used to examine and changes in the corrosion rate and if unexpected a
difference between the long and short corrosion rate is apparent an investigation shall be initiated to establish route cause.
4: It covers Ultrasonic techniques, Corrosion coupons, Electrochemical monitoring, Other corrosion rate monitoring devices e.g. , FSM-IT, Corrosivity data,
Microbiological (planktonic/sessile), Oxygen, Others chemical analysis, CP data including the Isolating joins checks, Soil resistivity, DCVG and CIPS data, Coating
rehabilitation data, potential readings from test posts, current output and condition of transformer rectifiers and ground beds.
5: This data concerns how the pipeline is operated and maintained in the field. Information should be available on the throughput of the line, change in operating
envelope, fluid corrosivity, quantity and quality of the pigging debris, availability of corrosion control chemicals, pigging frequency, condition of retrieved pigs, condition of
the pig traps and associated pipe-work, Excorr (not in this project) and other random wall thickness measurement in pipeline.
6: The highest of the external or internal corrosion shall be used as the final ACR. Only if there is clear evidence from inspection findings that active internal and external
corrosion at the same location the ACR shall be the sum of both the external and the internal.
15.3.1 Corrosion Coupons

Corrosion coupons provide a cost-effective means of monitoring that allows corrosivity trending
in a system in the most accurate manner. This is usually done through the observation of the
corrosion rate in mils per year of a coupon exposed in the system.
Coupons are pieces of metal that are available in varying shapes, sizes and materials. They are
composed of the same chemical composition as the equipment to be monitored. Corrosion
coupons are exposed to a corrosive solution similar to that in process facilities for a specified
period of time and can give visual signs of the corrosion rate and type.
Accurate monitoring of corrosion rates in any environment is critical when viewed in terms of the
maintenance and repair costs associated with corrosion and material failure. Test coupons
provide an inexpensive means of on-line monitoring that will allow operator to effectively
measure the corrosivity within pipeline system. By observing the mil-per-year corrosion rate of
an exposed coupon, valuable information can be concluded post FFP assessments regarding
the material's life expectancy.
As part of the regular condition monitoring of the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline, only one
corrosion coupon retrieval system is in place on the subject pipeline at the location of Sirri
island.
This coupon is installed in the pipeline and removed after almost one year, after which it is sent
to a third party to be analysed and to be measured the amount of metal loss due to internal
corrosion. Table 15.3-3 summaries the corrosion rates trends between Sep. 2016 to Jan. 2019.
It is recommended to have another corrosion coupon retrieval (intrusive or non-intrusive) in

Asaluyeh onshore section (3 years action plan).
Table 15.3-3, Corrosion Coupon retrieval report period Sep. 2016 to Jan. 2019
Installation date Removal date Exposure Time C.R (mpy)

Sep. 2016 Mar. 2017 176 days 0.032
Mar. 2017 Feb. 2018 345 days 0.511
Feb. 2018 Jan. 2019 342 days 0.013

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Corrosion coupon weight loss plot is summarized in Figure 15.3-1.
Figure 15.3-1, Corrosion Coupon weight loss plot
since only one corrosion coupon was installed on the pipeline, the corrosion rate results from
this source was given the lowest rating in Table 15.3-1.
For corrosion coupon report, it is highly recommended to report corrosion pattern shows on
coupons in details. In addition, photos shall be taken as received and after cleaning up, before
cleaning up if any scale present sample shall be taken for further analysis.
It is highly recommended to take sample from upstream of the pipeline. The analysis shall
consist of the as a minimum CO2, H2S, BS&W, bacteria counts and Sulphur species.
Exposure time must be considered when interpreting corrosion coupon data. Short-term
exposure (15 to 45 days) provides quick answers but may give higher corrosion rates than
long-term exposures. Aggravating conditions, such as bacterial fouling, may take time to
develop on the coupon. Short exposure times may be advantageous when evaluating inhibitor
effectiveness.
Longer exposures (60 to 90 days which recommended for subject pipeline) are often required
to detect and define pitting attack. Multiple coupon holders can be used so that both the short-
and long-term effects can be evaluated. Because exposure time affects test results, exposure
periods should be as consistent as practical. A tolerance of ± 7% allows a variation of ± 2 days
for every 30 days exposure. This is satisfactory for most applications. See para. 3.5 NACE SP-
0775-2013. In this regard highly recommended to IOOC to set the interval of corrosion coupon
retrieval for 90 ± 6 days.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
16 Remedial Action Plan
Based on the results of the current FFP assessments, various meetings with IOOC followed by
numbers of site visits, it is recommended that the following remedial actions to be taken
according to industry best practices, compliance with international standards and based on
product and service availability in the region and market.
These recommendations shall be reviewed and implemented by IOOC based upon the stock
currently available in-house, as well as IOOC’s current external contracts, both of which need
to be reviewed in detail. The recommendations may also need to be revised based on any new
information not available to the contractor at the time of writing this document.
Immediate 1-year Action Plan
Table 16.1-1, Immediate 1-year Action Plan
Action ID. Location Action type Action by Comments
one in
Chapter 13.1 and
16.1-1 Asaluyeh and Inspection of BVS INS
Appendix C
one in Sirri
Both ends of Chapter 13.2 and

16.1-2 Inspection of Pig traps INS
pipeline Appendix D
Asaluyeh and Corrosion Coupon retrieval, to revise the Chapter 115

16.1-3 INS
Sirri existing method statement NACE SP-0775-2013
To repeat ROV survey.

Note: CP anode potential readings by ROV
shall be updated. The latest available report
is ROV-2010. In accordance with DNV Chapter 12
16.1-4 Entire pipeline MAINT
recommended inspection practice, the To be done by 2020
interval for scheduled re-survey of all
pipelines and structures should be within
three (3) years.
Table 1.6-1
Pipeline inlet To check working fluid composition to be
16.1-5 OP Table 3.1-1
in Asaluyeh super dry gas.
(Ongoing)
To ensure control of the internal corrosion in

Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline, monitoring of the
product chemistry, operational parameters,
water content, and bacteria level along with
the produced water compositional analysis
shall be performed on a regular basis.
Sampling in It is highly recommended to IOOC pipeline

16.1-6 OP Ongoing
upstream integrity team to conduct sampling and lab
test to identify upset condition in working
fluid composition. The minimum interval is
every 3 months.
The analysis shall consist of the as a

minimum CO2, H2S, BS&W, bacteria
counts, Sulphur species.
It is highly recommended to IOOC integrity

team to outline the strategy and method
statement for Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline
16.1-7 - OP By 2020
cleaning pig with proper procedures and
contingency plans. It should be deterministic
approach for first 5 years. This is very

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Action ID. Location Action type Action by Comments
important action since the pipeline is 305 km

in one run.
This report shall be repeated by 2021 after INTG /

16.1-8 - -
accomplishing listed actions. AO
INTG: Integrity team, INS: Inspection department, AO: Asset Owner, OP: operation team, MAINT: Maintenance
*Absolute distances zero starts from temporary launcher in the beginning of offshore section in Asaluyeh landfall.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Medium 3-Years Action Plan (No priority lookup)
Table 16.2-1, Medium Term 3-Years Action Plan
Action
Action Action by Ref.
ID.
Chapter
16.2-1 Free Span analysis by 2021 MAINT
12.2
The next inline inspection should be carried out by 2021 using high-resolution MFL
tool.
16.2-2 INS -
The findings from the next in-line inspection should be reassessed to determine
condition of the pipeline.
16.2-3 To conduct DCVG and CIPS (combined survey) for onshore sections. INS -
It is highly recommended to conduct combined ON/OFF potential measurement in

Chapter
16.2-4 onshore section of subject pipeline and make it part of routine maintenance program INS
11.2.2
once every 6 months.
Chapter
16.2-5 Inspection of BVS and its ancillary piping (above ground and underground) INS
13.1
Chapter
16.2-6 Inspection of Pig traps and its ancillary piping (above ground and underground) INS
13.2
Chapter
16.2-7 Off potential readings for onshore KP points INS
11.2.2
16.2-8 Injection of CI INS / OP Chapter 7.9
16.2-9 To conduct Risk assessment (semi-quantitative or QRA approach) INTG Chapter 7
16.2-10 Vent valve in Sirri (V-2402) receiver shall be inspected and replaced if required. INS Chapter 13
End closure seal and bleed lock in pig traps shall be inspected before every pigging
16.2-11 INS Chapter 13
operation both at launcher (Asaluyeh) and receiver (Sirri).
Internal and external condition of barrel, end closure, and associated valves for pig
16.2-12 traps shall be visually inspected twice a year and maintained as indicated by the INS Chapter 13
inspection results.
16.2-13 Valves for pig trap operation shall be operated twice per year. OP Chapter 13
All piping (designed B31.8 in this pipeline) shall be inspected at points where
16.2-14 corrosion or erosion could occur on a yearly basis by visual means and UT INS Chapter 13
measurement in the location of launcher and receiver.
Buried piping for Pig traps and for BVSs shall be inspected when corrosive conditions
are confirmed in above ground piping or when deteriorating coating is suspected.
16.2-16 The electrical isolation capacities in pig traps shall be checked yearly. INS Chapter 13
16.2-17 Chemical injection facilities and sampling points shall be inspected yearly. OP Chapter 13
Pig trap instrumentation like control and protective equipment shall be inspected
16.2-18 yearly and checked that the setting concurs with the operating envelope of the OP Chapter 13
pipeline.
Relief valve in Receiver and Launcher shall be tested every 2 years increasing to 5
years depending on performance.
ESD valves shall be operated twice per year which can be done on an opportunity
16.2-20 OP Chapter 13
basis.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Action
Action Action by Ref.
ID.
To provide anode remaining life and anode current output in advance for next RBA
16.2-21 study. Important data which should be provided are but not limited to: Anode length INS -
(cm), Anode Radius (cm), Initial Anode Weight (kg), Anode consumption rate (kg/yr.)
For onshore section, Transformer output shall be checked on a monthly basis.

16.2-22 Potential reading at test points shall be checked every 3 months. On/Off potentials INS -
shall be taken every year.
It is recommended to IOOC pigging team to design tailor-made tool for this lengthy
16.2-23 pipeline. With consideration that working fluid is super dry and the likelihood and OP Chapter 17
amount of erosion in polyurethane cups shall be taken into account.
IOOC has well established and organized stock for repair spares. This needs to be
16.2-24 checked frequently and to complete all required spares. A technical audit of IOOC MAIN -
emergency stock and procedures is required
It is observed that in IOOC organization chart, there is no Asset integrity (or Pipeline
16.2-25 Integrity) department. It is highly recommended to IOOC to review the organization AO -
chart and to create this department.
It is highly recommended to have a system with method statement to apply for MIC
16.2-26 INS -
tests to identify the type and quantity of these microbes.
It is crucial to update 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline operation manual with pre-set

16.2-27 OP -
intervals for cleaning pigging, inspection, CP monitoring, etc.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Long Term 5-year Action Plan (No priority lookup)
Table 16.3-1, Long-term 5-year Action Plan
Action Action
Action Ref.
ID. by
After properly inspection plan for all pipeline system (including pipeline, BVSs, Pig traps,
ROW, HCA identification, etc.) based on deterministic approach, the inspection
16.3-1 INS
frequency can be optimized via yearly RBA report (shifting from deterministic and -
prescriptive approach to Performance based approach).
Highly recommended to run separate EPRS project or to be member of one of available

EPRS clubs for any emergency repair cases in 32-Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline (Specially for
Shore approach segments) or to form independent joint club with other offshore pipeline
owners like POGC, SPGC, IOTC, etc.
Existing IOOC Marine Resources (Fire services, Mooring Tugs, Maintenance crew
Vessels, Work Barges, Port and Jetty, Spares and Equipment’s, Oil spill equipment,
16.3-2 Medical services, Operations Support Emergency Team for the Pipelines, IOOC existing AO -
external support services, Diving services, Government assistance, other asset owners
assistance, Police coastguard, Aerial supports, Hyperbaric Diving Emergency, Oil Spill
Responses, National Oil Spill Contingency Plan Classification in different levels and oil
spill classifications, etc. ) to be identified and to renew contract with doers (it can be call-
off ad-hoc based, service charge, full time agreement, etc.).
Note: There is on-call contract for saturation diving, DP2, Vessel for any emergency
repair, ROV, etc. in IOOC.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
17 Operational Pigging and Debris Analysis
Data on sequence of cleaning pigging, debris analysis, etc. to be provided by IOOC and will be
assessed in next RBA study if received. Qualification of cleaning pigging and its interval shall
be checked. This is very important action since the pipeline is 305 km in one section (with no
pig trap in between) and it should be cleaned with cleaning pigs with interval of no later than 3
months.
Sudden increase in pigging debris, change in composition such as increase in Fe content,

inhibitor residue, bacteria count and etc. shall be investigated to determine the cause. An
increased pigging frequency shall be adopted until a remedial action has proved effective.
Sample of debris and contamination in Receiver (after each pigging) shall be sent to a third-
party lab test to be analysed. This needs to be done for all cleaning pigging runs.
It should be noted that pig should include tracking device and PDL (Pipeline Data Logger) to
get better idea about cleanness of this pipeline.
It is recommended to IOOC pigging team to design tailor-made tool for this lengthy pipeline.
With consideration that working fluid is super dry (as per minutes of meetings with IOOC) and
the likelihood and amount of erosion in polyurethane cups shall be taken into account.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
18 Land Surveys
ROW Survey (Onshore Section)

It is known that the right of way is surveyed on a ‘Routine’ basis in this pipeline.
Pipeline in environmentally sensitive areas like Asaluyeh section (like road crossings) and
urban area shall be patrolled by 4WD (with IVMS equipment) every week. For other locations,
the pipeline shall be patrolled by car every month, which can be covered by routine travel.
Detail ROW survey shall be performed on an annual basis or higher and cover changes in land
use and re-evaluation of population densities and habitation distances.
There is some missing marker(s) in onshore section of this pipeline. It needs an action to
reinstate kilometre markers.
Shore Approach Segments

Special points such as wave breaking phenomena in landfall segments (See Table 9.1-1,
Pipeline Segmentation for segments #30 and #210) shall be inspected more frequently e.g.
following heavy rain.
Below are findings in the field survey and document review:
- The pipeline laid entirely in seabed. When the winds blow from south and southeast
high tension comes from waves to the pipeline.
- Stabilization and coating of this pipeline with concrete mattress from 20 meter of
onshore area to 150 meter of offshore area is necessary. In 150 meters from shore
the depth of water approximately is in 5 meter of tide and the pipeline will be
preserved from the wave’s impact.
- It is observed that in design documents, 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline was
supposed to have Geotextile sand bag and concrete bag (See Figure 18.2-1 and
Figure 18.2-2) to be protected in high and low tide condition and wave breaking
phenomena, however based on ROV report and field inspection, it is observed that
there is no protection in this segment. At the time of writing this report, IOOC was
preparing tender documents for this correction action. It shall be finished until end of
2020.
Figure 18.2-1, Landfall segment Sirri (segment #210) with predicted Geotextile protection

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Figure 18.2-2, Segment #210 profile with protection cover
The maximum total tide in last 100 years (Metocean reports) has been reported 1.82 m in
Sirri shore approach segment and 1.52 m for Highest Astronomical Tides (HAT) in last 1
year.
The Geotechnical survey carried out for Mubarak to Sirri pipeline includes four bore samples
along the route. Assumed same data for Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline in the location of Sirri island.
Visual inspection of the area described the coastal soil properties as ‘dead coral’ covered by a
thin layer of sand. It has been assumed that the coral and calcarenite is of high strength that
conventional equipment could not be used to construct the trench or any repair. Other projects
in the vicinity reinforce this assumption.
18.2.1 Recommendation for Shore Approach Segment

Considerable hydrodynamic forces produced by breaking waves and near shore currents affect
the pipeline in the shore approach area. Consequently, a remedy should be made to protect
the pipeline against these forces and anchors and traffic of vessels and to guarantee the
pipeline stability.
Stabilization and coating of this pipeline from 20 meter of onshore area to 150 meter of
offshore area is essential. In 150 meters from shore the depth of water approximately is in 5
meter of tide and the pipeline will be preserved from the wave’s impact.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
19 In-house Procedures to be Updated or Developed
After studying in all available method statements and procedures for 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri
pipeline, below is the list of procedures which needs to be reviewed again from IOOC integrity:
- Pipeline Integrity Management plan

- Procedure for corrosion coupon retrieval
- Procedure for Pipeline cleaning pig selection and maintenance
- Procedure for Free span assessment
- Guideline for cleaning pigging
- Method statement for ILI
- Method statement for ROV
- Pipeline emergency repair manual
- Method statement for ROW survey
- Method statement for Valves inspection/checklist
- Method statement for pig launcher and receiver inspection/checklist
- Operation manual for pipelines
- Procedure for changes in pipeline state of operation (MoC)
- Guidelines on performance survey and testing of coating system
- Coating survey guideline
- Pipeline repair and modification guideline
- Pipeline defect evaluation / repair and modification guideline
- Guidelines for dent assessment
- Guidelines for Contractors on Block Valve Maintenance
- Permit to Work procedure
- Pipeline depressurizing Guideline

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
20 Conclusions
An In-line inspection (EGP-MFL-UT) was carried out in 2016 and has shown that the 32-inch
Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline has suffered from corrosion (few external corrosions and mostly
internal). The severe anomaly was mainly Internal corrosion with depth of 49.3% (the deepest
point) and 38.6% (the worst ERF) in subsea section at the time of ILI run (Jan 2016). However,
as per verification report (KP 16,758.551) it seems that anomaly sizing is overestimated in this
ILI report. Due to lack of ILI data for the onshore section of the pipeline, same metal loss
features were assumed for the onshore section.
The axial oriented corrosion features in the pipeline are found acceptable to DNVGL RP-F101
Part B with current MAOP.
All the defects reported in the 2016 ILI inspection were assessed except the manufacturing
anomalies which have been reported without any depth value. However, these features are
considered to have been introduced during the manufacturing and construction phases.
Consequently, they will have survived the pre-service hydrotest and in the absence of a growth
mechanism or additional axial loading, they are not considered a threat to the integrity of the
pipeline and assumed fit for service.
Credible threats to this pipeline are assessed through a risk assessment approach based on
available data from IOOC, See Table 7.5-2. As a result, internal and external corrosion is found
to be the most credible threats. As a result, only these threats are considered to be a driver for
integrity of the pipeline in this study. Significance of other threats shall be re-evaluated following
update of information as recommended in Chapter 21 below.
As a conclusion, the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline is fit for service with MAOP 93 barg at the
time of writing this report, subject to implementation of recommendation outlined in Chapter 21
and only if the conditions and assumptions listed in this reports are kept unchanged.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
21 Recommendation
Following are recommendations to improve integrity status of pipeline system and increasing
the data confidence rating of future integrity assessments:
General Recommendations
In general, it is recommended to:
- Monitor the most significant defects (reported in ILI 2016) in the next ILI. It is noted that
this recommendation is on-going at time of writing this report.
- Conduct and update other inspection and maintenance activities as planned in the
Integrity Management Plan (IMP) of this pipeline and to repeat the RBA study
afterwards.
- Review the organization chart and to create an Asset Integrity department since it is
observed that in IOOC organization chart, there is no dedicated Asset Integrity (or
Pipeline Integrity) department.
- Perform MoC requirements and processes in IOOC.
- To provide / Update required method statements for operation stage of subject pipeline.
- Perform another corrosion coupon retrieval (intrusive or non-intrusive) in Asaluyeh
onshore section as part of the 3 years action plan.
- Report corrosion pattern on coupons in details, for corrosion coupon report. In addition,
photos shall be taken as received and after cleaning up, before cleaning up if any scale
present sample shall be taken for further analysis.
- Take sample from upstream of the pipeline. The analysis shall consist of the as a
minimum CO2, H2S, BS&W, bacteria counts and Sulphur species.
- Set the interval of corrosion coupon retrieval for 90 ± 6 days.
- Develop and update a corrosion-monitoring programme. The program shall be
developed both for internal and external and to include location(s), type and frequency
the corrosion monitoring technique together with the location of chemical sampling
points to be identified. The purpose of the corrosion monitoring is to measure and
detect changes in the corrosivity of the process environment such as CO2, H2S, oxygen
contents, BS&W, bacteria counts, sulphur species, etc. and to provide an early warning
of potential loss of integrity. In this regard, fixed UT wall thickness measurement could
be applied (to be installed in selected hot spot location).
- Establish a system with method statement to apply for MIC tests to identify the type and
quantity of these microbes.
- Conduct sampling and lab test to identify upset condition in working fluid composition
since product sampling and composition report upstream of the pipeline and off-spec
event records are required to understand the corrosion behaviour of the pipeline. This
activity should be done by IOOC pipeline integrity team with minimum interval of once
every 3 months.
- Conduct Coating and sacrificial anode surveys with ROV in earliest possible to identify
extension of coating damage and adequacy of cathodic protection, noting the last
survey that was performed in 2010.
Operational
With regards to operation of the pipeline it is recommended to:
- Operate this pipeline below the gas dew point to avoid any condensation. Also working
fluid should routinely be sampled and analysed.
- Outline the strategy and method statement for Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline cleaning pig with
proper procedures and contingency plans by IOOC integrity team. This should be a
deterministic approach for first 5 years. This is a crucial action since the pipeline is 305
km in one run.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
- Design a tailor-made tool for this lengthy pipeline by IOOC pigging team. With
consideration that working fluid is super dry, the likelihood and amount of erosion in
polyurethane cups shall be taken into account.
- Run separate EPRS project or to be member of one of the available EPRS clubs for any
emergency repair cases in the 32-Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline (Specially for Shore approach
segments).
- Establish an access point in the head office to view all pipeline operating information
either in IOOC SCADA system, other ERPs or platform(s) such as ParsPiMS TM
integrity enterprise. This is based on the fact that at the time of collecting all required
information for the purpose of this study, it is observed that IOOC headquarter does not
have full access to principle operating parameters (Pressure, Flow, Temperature) and
they need to get all this information from different districts. Nevertheless, all data is
available in Asaluyeh and Sirri control room.
- Perform a Management of Change to officialise the change with all stake holders in the
organisation, noting de-rating the pipeline MAOP to 93 barg.
Ancillaries
As for the ancillaries it is recommended to:
- Take into account inspection data for the BVSs and ancillary piping of pig traps in the
next RBA study which should be updated by 2021.
- Perform testing the BVS(s) twice a year and on an opportunity basis. The condition of
the site, warning signs, fence, availability of keys and fire extinguisher shall also be
checked.
- Conduct frequent UT test on both Launcher based on prescriptive approach (in
Asaluyeh) and Receiver (in Sirri island) based on pre-selected inspection points.
- Have a checklist for inspection of Launcher and Receiver and all attached ancillaries
and fittings by IOOC inspection department.
- Inspect and if required, replace the vent valve in Sirri pig trap (V-2402).
- Inspect the end closure seal and bleed lock in pig traps before every pigging operation
both at launcher (Asaluyeh) and receiver (Sirri).
- Visually inspected the internal and external condition of barrel, end closure and
associated valves in pig traps twice a year and maintain them as indicated by the
inspection results.
- Operate the valves in pig traps twice per year.
- Inspect all piping (designed by B31.8 in this pipeline) in pig traps at points where
corrosion or erosion could occur on a yearly basis by visual means and UT
measurement.
- Optimise the inspection frequency after proper inspection based on deterministic
approach, using the annual RBA report.
- Inspect the buried piping in pig traps when corrosive conditions are confirmed in above
ground piping or when deteriorating coating is suspected.
- Excavate the buried piping in pig traps and in BVSs at selected locations as immediate
1-year action to check the integrity of the external coating. The frequency for this
activity is once every 10 years.
- Check the electrical isolation capacities annually.
- Inspect chemical injection facilities and sampling points annually.
- Inspect pig trap instrumentation such as control and protective equipment annually and
it should be checked that the setting concurs with the operating envelope of the
pipeline.
- Test the relief valve once every two years, increasing to once every five years
depending on performance.
- Test the ESD valves twice per year which can be done on an opportunity basis.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
CP
With regards to CP, it is recommended to:
- Conduct Off-potential next to On-potential in subject pipeline since the available report
for onshore section is On-potential Pipe to Soil readings.
- Conduct combined ON/OFF potential measurement in onshore section and make it part
of routine maintenance program once/6 months.
- Update CP anode potential readings by ROV. In accordance with DNV recommended
inspection practice, the interval for scheduled re-survey of all pipelines and structures
should be within three years.
- Provide these details of calculation of anode remaining life and anode current output in
advance for next RBA study, since calculation of anode remaining life and anode
current output is not possible as detail information of anodes are not available. The data
which should be provided are but not limited to: Anode length (cm), Anode Radius (cm),
Initial Anode Weight (kg), Anode consumption rate (kg/Yr.). Integrity approach for this
action is prescriptive approach with interval of three years for now. Normally anodes are
depleted after 15 to 20 years of service (30 CFR 250.155) and shall be replaced with
new ones.
- Check transformer output for onshore section on a three-month basis. Potential reading
at test points shall be checked every three months. On/Off potentials shall be taken
every year. For Onshore section, DCVG in subject pipeline is required which was on
going at the time of writing this report.
ILI
Following recommendations are made for the ILI:
- It is highly recommended to IOOC to ask ILI supplier to prepare and submit pigging tool
tolerances before any ILI run. Further, noting observations outlined in Chapter 4 of this
report, next ILI should be reported differently for every type of feature and not typically
the same for all features.
- Pull Through Test results for ILI as per API 1163 and POF requirements immediately
after ILI run. It is known that IOOC has conducted verification at chainage 16758.55 m
in July 2019 and the anomaly with depth of 38.6% was measured 18% (3.5 years after
ILI run). It indicates that the size of defects is overestimated in ILI reports 2016 and it is
concluded low level of confidence in ILI report.
- Reference point for ILI absolute distance correlation (AGM or Magnet for onshore
section and Pup joint or other features for offshore section (only for further offshore
pipeline constructions in IOOC)
- It is highly recommended to IOOC ILI focal team to check Magnetization level plot of
MFL run as part of tool operation and validation. (Action for Inspection department in
the next ILI run.)
- It is highly recommended to IOOC ILI focal team to check the sensor loss diagram (both
MFL and UT) as part of tool operation and validation. (Action for Inspection department
in the next ILI run.)
- Field Verification report to be conducted as per API 1163 (Unity diagram or Markov
probabilistic approach)
- It is highly recommended to conduct PTT, since the pipeline is subsea and it is difficult
to run verification in this section unless to select some dig-up points in onshore section,
(High priority Action for Inspection department for next ILI run).
- Tool Temperature plot should be checked in next ILI operational validation.
- It is highly recommended to have Above Ground Marker (AGM) or Magnet
(conventional magnet marker or plate) every 1 (one) km in onshore section (both
Asaluyeh and Sirri side)
- The ILI tool has been designed to magnetize up to 27 mm wall thickness (see EGP tool
specification page 17 of 521) where in 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline there are joints
with wall thickness of 28.8 mm. These joints cannot be saturated with magnetic field (if

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
same assumptions for MFL tool) at the time of pig passage; therefore, it will be another
error and uncertainty for depth of metal loss features in the location of these joints.
- There is no sizing accuracy for pitting and another type of corrosion such as grooving,
slotting, etc. in ILI report 2016. To be checked in next ILI.
- For accuracy of depth, it would be better to have these tolerances based on percentage
of wall thickness not fixed number for all wall thicknesses.
- Because of distributed internal metal loss between orientations 5 to 7 o’clock, it is very
important to check sensor loss at these o'clock positions.
- It is highly recommended (if possible, with by-pass ports of pig body) to adjust the pig in
a way to have a rotation (to compensate sensor loss in one angle).
- There are defects with length of +100 km in ILI 2016. Clustering cut for length of defects
is distance between girth welds. Meaning, that it should not be any defect with length of
more than pipe joint length (around 12 meter).In addition to the hard copy, a user-
friendly software package shall be provided to enable review and assessment of the
data collected by the inspection tool. (see POF chapter 6).
- The list of Anomalies shall contain the clusters (according to Chapter 2.3 in POF) and
the not-clustered (individual) anomalies. Additionally, the individual anomalies forming
the reported cluster shall be listed in the final inspection report whereby the relation
between the anomalies and clusters are indicated (e.g. numbered).
- Pipeline mapping tools can be applied as a single inspection tool, but currently units are
often attached to an MFL or other inspection tool, whereby the inspection unit has a
double functionality. Specific post survey interpretation may also allow detecting and
sizing of free spans, landslides etc. It is highly recommended to run mapping tool (geo
pig) as a single run or with other tools. The coordinates in ILI 2016 is not based on Geo-
pig and it is estimated (calculated) based on coordinated of Launcher and Receiver.
- It is recommended to check the scope of work for Contingency pig scenarios for stuck
pig before attempting any ILI or pigging run.
- It is recommended to put in the SoW of next ILI run to identify the location and
imperfections in cased segments (road crossing casings) of onshore section of subject
pipeline (specially Asaluyeh side with almost 15 km length with 5 main road crossings
and 1 crossing in Sirri island).
- The tool specifications shall be given. In addition, the following operational data shall be
provided, whereby each type of tool that has been used shall be described separately
including:
• Data sheet of used tool(s) with e.g. serial number, software version etc.
• The data-sampling frequency or distance
• The detection threshold
• The reporting threshold, normally taken at 90% POD if not specified otherwise
• A tool velocity plot over the length of the pipeline
• Optionally, a pressure and/or temperature plot over the length of the pipeline
• Defective transducer statistics and, in case of ultrasonic pigs, echo loss statistics
• In case of MFL tools, a plot of the magnetic field strength H in kA/m over the
length of the pipeline measured at the inner surface of the pipe.
• Tool operational data statement that can be used to consider a re-run.
- Take into account the length of pipeline in simulation and the possibility of injection from
Launcher (Asaluyeh) and Receiver (Sirri island) by bi-di pigging to cover the entire
length of subject pipeline.
Free Span
With regards to free span in is recommended to:
- Conduct a new Free span inspection (ROV survey) by 2021.

- Conduct side sonar survey for shore approach segments.
- Repeat the free span assessments performed in 2015 based on new survey data.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
22 References
- NACE SP0169:2013 - Control of External Corrosion on Underground or Submerged

Metallic Piping Systems
- NACE TM 0497 - Measurement Techniques Related to Criteria for Cathodic Protection
on Underground or Submerged Metallic Piping Systems
- ASME B31Q Personnel Qualification
- ASTM G 8, G 42 - Evaluating Cathodic Disbandment resistance of coatings
- DNV-RP-B401 - Cathodic Protection Design - Det Norske Veritas
- 30 CFR 250.155, Inspection requirements for pipelines
- NACE SP-0775-2013, Preparation, Installation, Analysis, and Interpretation of
Corrosion Coupons in Oilfield Operations
- DNV-RP-F113, Pipeline subsea repair - Rules and standards
- ROV report Horizon, 2010, Report No. RP-IOE-0527B - Survey Report - Vol 1 - Rev 1
- ILI MFL-UT report 2016, Report No. 279-850-2015 dated 30.03.2015, Ad.agr. #3 dated
25.11.2015
- Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline as-builts and drawings
- CP report of Sirri onshore section, received fax dated Aug 6, 2019
- Communication emails with IOOC Regarding historical inspection data for Asaluyeh-Sirri
pipeline, Received information from IOOC focal point.
- Petroleum and natural gas industries— Materials for use in H2S-containing
Environments in Oil and Gas production—NACE MR0175/ISO 15156-2 Cracking
Resistant Carbon and Low Alloy Steels
- ASME B31G Manual for Determining the Remaining Strength of Corroded Pipelines
- Kastner,W., Rohrich,E., Schmitt,W. and Steinbuch,R.; ‘Critical CrackSizes In Ductile
Piping’, International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping, Vol. 9, 1981, pp. 197-219.
- ASME B31.8, Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems, 2016
- Intech Consultancy, ECE 5.1 Electronic Corrosion Engineer 5, 1992 – 2011
- NORSOK M-506, “CO2 corrosion rate calculation model on public enquiry
- Corrosion coupon data Excel sheet Received through data collection
- American Society for Mechanical Engineers. Managing System Integrity of Gas
Pipelines: ASME B31.8S. New York: American Society for Mechanical Engineers;
January 2005.
- NACE SP 0502, Pipeline External Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA), 2010.
- ECP3 folder
- Linepipe specification for Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline, Document No.SA-000-4200-PL-SP-
1001
- Pipeline data sheet, Document No. SA-000-4200-PL-DT-1001
- Pipeline Basis of Design, Document No. SA-000-4200-PL-DB-1001
- Pipeline Wall Thickness and Material Grade Verification Report, SA-000-4200-PL-RT-
1004
- Offshore Pipeline General Layout, SA-000-4200-PL-DW-1002
- Sirri-Asaluyeh Pipeline Project Alignment Sheet SA-000-4200-PL-DW-1003
- Sirri Shore Approach Details, SA-000-4200-PL-DW-1008
- Process operating and control philosophy
- ParsPiMS TM technical achieve module for 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline
- Baldwin, R.M., 1998. Black Powder in Gas Industry-Sources, Characteristics and
Treatment. M.
- Carig, B., 2002. Corrosion product analysis – a road map to corrosion in oil and gas
productions. Master. Perform. 56e58.
- Final report of damaged pipe survey (verification), Dated 05-12-2019, Rev.:00

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23 Appendix A: Supportive Information
Free Span Correction

The following procedure will be adopted for free span anomaly correction by installation of
grout bags under the pipeline to create a support (after next ROV survey)::
1. Using the DGPS navigational system the DPII diving support vessel will locate itself to
the location as per co-ordinates provided by the integrity team.
2. Divers will be deployed either in saturation diving mode through diving bell or in air
diving mode through LARS to check the Free span location, identify, confirm and mark
the position where grout bag need to be placed.
3. Checks will also be done by the divers to confirm that the area where the grout bag will
be placed is free from any obstructions which could obstruct in even laying of the grout
bags under the pipeline.
4. The diver will inspect and measure the free span to confirm how many grout bag
supports would be needed to fulfil and satisfy the maximum allowable free span length
for that particular size of pipeline. (Although required grout bag is predicted before
operation)
5. Preparing the location for grouting operation, may involve clearing the location using
water jet etc. before installation of grout bags.
6. Once the location is prepared for placement of grout bag(s), Grout bags will be lowered
down to the diver.
7. The diver will adjust and secure the grout bag under the pipeline at the predetermined
location.
8. The grout bag under the pipeline is now ready to receive the grout. The grout mixing will
be as per grout mixing procedure. On receiving confirmation from the diver that the
grout bag is now ready to be filled up the grout hose will be lowered to the diver.
9. Diver will connect the grouting nozzle to the inlet connection of the grout bag. After the
clearance received from the diver for pumping, start pumping the grout.
10. The diver will witness the grouting operation and confirm to the Diving supervisor that
the bag is getting filled up with grout.
11. Once the bag is filled up and good grout starts coming out through the vent port, stop
the pumping for closing the vent port.
12. After closing the vent port, pumping to be continued for further 2 minutes, ensuring that
the grout bag is full of grout and any water inside the bag has been displaced and full
volume of the bag has been occupied by grout mix. Remove the nozzle and close the
filling port.
13. The diver then disconnects the grout injection hose for recovery to surface or if required
move to the next location if it is close by.
14. Still photos (post survey) and co-ordinates of the bag location will be taken as per the
scope of the work.
15. De-rig all gears and tools from the location and move to the next location.
Prior to commencement of grouting operations, all personnel shall be made fully aware with the
detail procedures and safety precautions.
Asaluyeh-Sirri Flow Assurance Data Record

Below is a brief summary of the Flow Assurance issues addressed during the period of interest:
- Black powder:
At the time of writing this report, IOOC was in process of cleaning pig for subject pipeline. It
was observed some amount of black powder and debris in this pipeline.

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It is also highly recommended to monitor the pipeline system, particularly upstream inlet lab
testing of working fluid to identify deviations or rising in system pressure drop that cannot be
explained by changes in rates, pressures, debris, ID reduction, etc. if any.
Further, it is highly recommended for IOOC integrity team to outline the strategy and method
statement for Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline cleaning pig with proper procedures and contingency
plans. It should be deterministic approach for first 5 years.
It is recommended to use tailor-made design for cleaning pigs in this pipeline (with
consideration of dry gas, 305 km length pipeline in one run and etc.)
There is no record for any incident and failure in this pipeline after commissioning.
- Hydrates:
No issues have arisen in the Asaluyeh-Sirri. However, it is recommended for IOOC integrity
team to outline the current Hydrate Management Strategy for Asaluyeh-Sirri.
- Wax:
No issues have arisen related to wax blockage in subject pipeline at the time of writing this
report.
- Shutdown(s):
There is no record for any planned or emergency shut down in the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri
pipeline and in history of this pipeline after commissioning.
Typical Emergency Repair Procedures for the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri Pipeline

In the event of pipe damage threatening the safe continuous transportation of oil; inspection,
reassessment, maintenance and repair actions are to be promptly taken by the IOOC team, as
mentioned below:
- Identify possible cause of damage

- Identify type of encountered damage (as mentioned in previous chapter)
- Define pipeline zone criticality and damage categorization (as illustrated in previous
chapter)
- Identify damage location and assessment techniques
- Outline repair techniques which may be applied to specific damage scenarios
Non-critical intervention work such as free-span correction, retrofitting of anode sleds and rock
dumping can usually be considered as planned preventive measures. For the localized repair
of non-leaking minor and intermediate pipeline damage, repair clamps may be utilized without
the necessity of an emergency shutdown to the Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline. For major pipeline
damage resulting in or likely to result in product leakage, immediate production shutdown and
pipeline isolation is invariably required, allowing the damaged pipe section to be retreated and
replaced.
The main repair scenarios considered in this report are based on two identified credible threats;
pipelines subject to external and internal metal loss caused by corrosion, for which the primary
failure mode would be leaking. In addition to these repair scenarios, the extent of the
deterioration or damage (i.e. localized or extensive) will also be considered when choosing the
repair methods and repair components. These repair scenarios are described further in the
following sections.
The emergency repair methodologies detailed in the following sections are based on
international standards and best practices. IOOC should review and apply them with regards to
the currently available stock and contracts within IOOC, which are to be reviewed and audited
as per the recommendations.

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Repair Methodologies
Emergency pipeline repair is mainly concerned with actions that have the objective to restore
compliance with requirements related to functionality, structural integrity and / or pressure
containment of the pipeline system within a very short amount of time to bring production back
up so as to minimalize shutdown. The most suitable method for pipeline repair depends on the
extent and mechanism of the damage, pipe material, pipe dimension, location of the damage,
load condition, pressure and temperature.
As such, for emergency repairs the most appropriate measures will usually be temporary
repairs, with permanent repairs happening at a later stage during planned shutdown. In case of
a temporary repair, it should be documented that the pipeline integrity and safety level is
maintained either by the temporary repair itself and/or in combination with other precautions
(e.g. reduced pressure or flow rate).
Cut-out and sectional replacement have not been considered as emergency repair options due
to the environment and operational parameters of the loading lines within scope. Rupture has
been identified as a very low risk, because the pipelines are run at hydrostatic pressure of
maximum 93 barg , they are not run at high temperature and the environment of the pipelines is
shallow water, so tides and current are not credible sources of threats to pipeline structure.
Not all repair methods are viable or preferable for all pipelines, there is no blanket approach to
pipeline repair. The requirements have been analysed and the applicable repair methods
identified for each of Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline as detailed in Table 23.4-1 for temporary (T) and
permanent (P) repair measures.
Table 23.4-1, Possible Generic Repair Methods
Repair Pin- Steel Bolted

Composite Patch Coupling (not Connector (not
Method/ Hole Sleeve Repair
Repair Clamp for emergency) for emergency)
Pipeline Clamp Type B Clamp
32-inch
Asaluyeh- T P P T X X P
Sirri
T – Temporary, P – Permanent, X – Unavailable
Couplings and Connectors are out of scope for this document, as they pertain to planned
sectional replacements, and are only included for the sake of completion.
Steel Sleeves Type B require wet welding (preferably SMAW) in order to be installed.
For all mentioned repair methods concrete coat removal will need to take place.
In reality, all of the abovementioned repair methods are not recommended due to several
factors, as detailed below:
23.4.1 Pin-Hole Clamp

It is recommended that pin-hole (cone/strap) clamps be considered for in-scope pipeline,
however, they are only viable for pin-holes up to a maximum diameter of 12mm as a temporary
repair measure.
23.4.2 Steel Sleeve Type B

It is recommended that Type B steel sleeves be considered for use on the in-scope pipeline as
an emergency repair method for emergency metal loss situations (before leak). Type B Steel
Sleeves are an accepted method for repair regarding offshore pipelines for pressure
containment. (Cosham & Hopkins, 2002) This method would require wet welding (preferably
SMAW) or a hyperbaric chamber for dry welding work in order to complete the installation.

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Hyperbaric chambers are not recommended due to the substantial commercial costs involved.
Wet welding is common in the industry both internationally and within the Persian Gulf.
(Grubbs, 1993) (Sanchez-Osio, Liu, Olson, & Ibarra, 1995) (Ibarra, Reynolds, Gabriel, &
Haymaker, 1996) (Kononenko & Paton, 2014)
23.4.3 Bolted Repair Clamp

Bolted repair clamps are available for a variety of diameters in the market, including IOOC
Salman field pipelines, however, they can be prohibitively expensive for the larger diameter
pipelines such as Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline. As such, it is recommended they only be considered
for outright purchase for the smaller diameter pipelines in IOOC not for 32-inch. For the larger
pipelines, based on criticality they can be acquired through a national EPRS Club contract with
contractors or similar operators in same field.
23.4.4 Composite Repair

Composite pipeline wraps are available for the repair of subsea pipelines, as well as for the
onshore and shore approach sections. It can provide a significant cost reduction compared to
Bolted Repair Clamps, however, due to past experiences by IOOC and unavailability in the
market, it is believed that this is not an attractive option.
23.4.5 Patch Clamp

It is not recommended that patch clamps be used, as they have been excluded as an option by
most pipeline operators and are not supported by any international standards. However, they
are available as an emergency option for very small leaks on small diameter pipelines.
23.4.6 Coupling
Weldless Hydraulic Couplings (or equivalent) can be considered for use in sectional
replacement scenarios instead of connectors for the smaller diameter pipelines, they are
available for pipe diameters of 2-inch to 24-inch, so are not applicable to 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri
pipeline. They represent a significant cost savings over conventional connectors, as no flanges,
bolting or welding is required. This repair method is further detailed in handbooks. However, in
IOOC pipelines sectional replacement would be a planned activity because of the extremely
low risk of a large-diameter rupture or leak, and therefore this information is only provided for
the sake of completion, and not as a recommendation for emergency repair.
23.4.7 Connector
Connectors can be considered for the larger diameter pipelines for the purposes of sectional
replacement. They are available for the smaller diameter pipelines but should be compared to
Couplings as mentioned previously from a commercial standpoint. However, in 32-inch
Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline, sectional replacement would be a planned activity because of the
extremely low risk of a large-diameter rupture or leak, and therefore this information is only
provided for the sake of completion, and not as a recommendation for emergency repair.
Above-Water Repair (Recommended shallow water sections)

For some cases, the easiest and the optimum way of fixing a pipe is to recover the pipe to the
dry surface and utilize welding technologies in order to connect the pipe ends or the new piece
of pipe in- between or connecting a flange to each end. Applicability of this technique is a
function of some parameters. For shallow waters and small size of pipes, technical parameters
are in favor of this cost saving management, and above-water connection is more justified.
Here is a list of those parameters:

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- pipe size, weight per unite length and the SMTS (Specified Minimum Tensile Strength)
water depth
- pipeline length (for dewatering possibilities)
- length of damaged section
- availability and cost of the proper construction vessel damage location (nearby third party
or a fixed installations)
The vessel hiring costs and the pipe weight are the most governing parameters.
23.5.1 General Procedure

Although for each case there can be special procedures, a general method can express at
least the common basic activities.
Depending on the case, the damaged section can be lifted together with the pipe itself or be
cut prior to the line lifting. Depending on the above parameters, subject pipeline can/shall be
dewatered to reduce the lifting load subsequently depending on the vessel size and ultimately
the cost.
Sometimes the costs for dewatering operations are considerable and further evaluation is
required.
A construction vessel with enough davit capacity comes in position over the pipe such that both
free-ended lines can be handled by the davits (or any other lifting tool). Divers assist to connect
rigging lines to the pipes Once the connections are done, the lines are lifted off the sea bottom
up to the surface, where the construction deck is facilitated to do repair related tasks: detail
inspection, cutting, pipe end preparation (bevelling, machining), alignment, etc.
A new piece of sound pipe (spool) is welded to the recovered ends on the construction deck. In
some cases, when lifting both ends is not possible or the damaged section is long or because
of any other reason, a flange is welded to the pipe end. It is done for both sides in two separate
go, then a flanged spool will be fabricated and installed in between.

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Figure 23.5-1, Above-Water Repair Procedure a) Side View, b) Top View
Following the welding, the quality of weld is examined by NDT methods before laying back the
repaired line on the seabed. The line configuration may be changed slightly due to
accommodating an extra length of spool piece. In case that the flange connection be the
solution, the flanged lines are laid on sea bed and the “closing” spool will be deployed and
installed in between by diver assistance. Upon the pipeline repair and securing in place,
generally a hydrostatic test will be performed to check the integrity prior to decommissioning
the line.
Advantages:
- fast response method
- facilitating the application of the most efficient connection (welding)
- cost effective method in some cases
Disadvantages:
- weather sensitive
- limited application in terms of pipe size, length and water depth risk of new buckle during
lifting and lowering
- vessel capability, availability and costs
Since the feasibility of such operation depends on a series of parameters, analysis shall be
performed for each case. Furthermore, the cost might be the governing parameter that requires
a cost analysis as well as to see how costly it is even though it is practicable.
Shore Approach Repair

The Geotechnical survey carried out for Mubarak to Sirri pipeline includes four bore samples
along the route. Assumed same data for Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline in the location of Sirri island.

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Visual inspection of the area described the coastal soil properties as ‘dead coral’ covered by a
thin layer of sand. It has been assumed that the coral and calcarenite is of high strength that
conventional equipment could not be used to construct the trench or any repair. Other projects
in the vicinity reinforce this assumption.
It is highly recommended to run separate EPRS project or to be member of one of available

EPRS clubs for any emergency repair cases in 32-Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline (Specially for Shore
approach segments).
Qualification of Repair Equipment

All repair clamps, sleeves and mechanical connectors, etc. should be qualified to governing
design premises and codes prior to installation and leak tested after installation.
For guidance on pipeline subsea repair, reference is made to DNV-RP-F113 (Pipeline Subsea
Repair), which gives descriptions of different pipeline repair equipment and tools, their
application, qualification principles to be used, pipeline interaction forces to be designed for,
design principles and guidelines, requirements related to mechanical sealing, welding, test
philosophy relevant for the different phases of repair equipment qualification and
documentation requirements.
Elements (such as fitting, coupling, etc.,) that are used for pipeline repair shall possess the
similar qualification as for pipe itself. There are some tests, to be performed on repair elements
prior to installation that can be categorized as Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) or basic test
(DNVGL-RP-F113, 2007):
- Materials,
- Combined effects,
- Galling tests
- Polymer decompression limits, Activation test,
- Pressure test,
- Seal test
- Deactivation test Appearance/tolerances examinations
The installation shall be simulated and verified (with combination of FAT) in factory.
After coupling installation in repair operation, installation verification test shall be conducted.
Final tests check if the completed installation meets the requirement and complies with the
criteria. Mostly, the final testing refers only to a leak tightness test. In some cases, the
verification comprises also monitoring and recording the important parameters by use of
sensors. This is for assurance of the prescribed criteria. The normal parameters shall be
monitored during installation are:
- Pipe surface and end-cut conditions, Pipe alignment,
- Gap between pipe end and couplings,
- Contamination,
- Displacement and movement of coupling onto pipe ends,
- Activation displacement/force (DNVGL-RP-F113).
Emergency Repair Spares and On-call Contractor (available in stock)

It is observed that IOOC has well established inventory for emergency repair including
Mechanical clamps, Connector, Leak clamps, DP2 vessel, Saturation system, in-place
contractor, etc.

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Method Statement for Repairs

Before any operation, a preliminary pre-survey shall be organized to detect and mark the
damaged pipe as per available data from the ILI report, As built and pipeline construction tally
report.
1. The selected location of pipeline shall be checked in ParsPiMS TM to verify the

coordinates.
2. After correlation (based on Pup joint (if any), Absolute distance from upstream and
downstream, Distance from and to Up/Down stream girth weld, Geo-Pig results,
Location of Anodes, Line pipes Longitudinal seal weld orientation, Joint length, other
evidences), diver shall identify any legible joint number or location of subsea anodes to
assure the location of repair.
3. Upstream and downstream joint lengths and longitudinal seam weld orientations shall
be checked (at least 10 joints) and shall be matched with ILI pipe tally.
4. Damaged pipe joint shall be measured for wall thickness using subsea UT equipment in
inspection area (like Elcometer UG20DL, Cygnus Dive Mk2-A-Scan and data logger,
Multigauge 3000, etc.). The equipment specification, calibration certificate, and divers
NDT qualifications shall be qualified prior to any inspection.
5. The location of repair shall be Identified and marked by diver.
6. Installation vessel shall be set up at pre-determined location.
7. Diver shall be deployed to inspect and check the 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri gas pipeline
location.
8. Field engineer and Supervisor shall review survey data and shall confirm the location.
9. The mud around the 32-inch pipeline (See ParsPiMS TM database to find the predicted
depth of mud) shall be excavated using air lift system (or similar methods such as water
jet) to make workstation space.
10. Concrete coating and Pipeline coating shall be removed in full circumference to bare
pipe metal.
11. Inspector (diver) shall measure wall thickness of selected pipe joint and shall generate
wall thickness measurement in pre-set generated mesh (matrix).
12. After getting approval from integrity team, Pipeline repair work can be started.
Corrosion Management
From the provided data, it was understood that IOOC has adopted the following corrosion
management strategy:
For internal corrosion management, the line is expected to operate in dry mode with continuous
operation. The line is cleaned by pigging in time of commissioning with dew point -40 °C.
For external corrosion management, the line is applied with 6mm Hot Bitumen and 90mm CWC
coating (see Table 1.9-1, Concrete coat thickness details for offshore section) as primary
corrosion barrier and was protected with sacrificial anodes as cathodic protection system.
External Corrosion Management
23.11.1 Coating Survey

DCVG stands for Direct Current Voltage Gradient and it is a survey technique used for
assessing the effectiveness of corrosion protection on onshore buried pipelines. In particular, oil
and natural gas pipelines are routinely monitored using this technique to help locate coating
faults and highlight deficiencies in their cathodic protection (CP) strategies. This action was
ongoing in Asaluyeh onshore section at the time of writing this report.

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DCVG technique is utilized in industry to check the external coating integrity, the coating defect
and severity is represented in %IR drop.
As a general guideline:
- Values greater than 35% require immediate attention.
- Values between 16% and 35% require attention under general maintenance.
- Less than 15% need not be repaired but requires monitoring.
DCVG is good indication for coating defects and severity but does not necessarily represent
any indication of external metal loss especially if CP is deployed.
It is highly recommended to conduct a combined Close interval potential survey (CIPS)/DCVG

along the line in onshore section of subject pipeline. Combined CIPS/DCVG surveys is costly
effective method which gives better understanding of coating integrity and confirms CP
protection adequacy at any given point/segment.
For offshore section (Segments #40 to #200, See Table 9.1-1) and for shore approach and land
fall segments of subject pipeline (segments #30 and #210), it is recommended to perform
cathodic protection inspections using the following techniques:
- Contact measurements, where feasible

- Potential profile through contactless technique close-to-remote
- Gradient of potential gradient profile
- Trailing wire

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Figure 23.11-1, Available methods for coating survey in subsea segment
There is instrumentation to be applied on the ROVs / AUV or manoeuvrable by divers and

qualified personnel employed in charge of the data acquisition on the survey vessels. With the
close-to-remote potential technique, the presence of an electric field is exploited between

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anodes and defects in the pipe coating, and the potential profile is reconstructed through
contact and gradient measurements between two electrodes, one in the pipeline proximity and
a second in a remote position. The inspection is carried out with the aid of a ROV or an AUV,
on which two probes and the electronics and a support vessel from which the measurements
are managed.
The technique of the gradient profile measures the potential difference between two electrodes
both near the pipe and allows to locate the possible defects in the coating as well as the peaks
in correspondence of the anodes. the designate method of the trailing wires involves a series of
applications that have in common the realization of a direct contact to the structure through an
electric cable through which potential profiles or measurements are performed opportunely
positioning the reference electrode. In the case of 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline, the profiles
can be carried out even with a single contact to the structure, for stretches of entire 290 km
subsea section.
23.11.2 Cathodic Protection Surveys

Close interval potential surveys (CIPS) are the backbone of pipeline integrity. They determine
the effectiveness of the cathodic protection system which provides protection against corrosion.
This technique involves the use of a long trailing wire that makes contact with a pipeline
(onshore section) and takes into consideration regular intervals rather than a specific fixed
point. By using data loggers and other sensitive equipment integrity team can develop an
accurate profile to properly assess the overall effectiveness of cathodic protection systems.
Typically, it is industry practices for routine maintenance to measure both ON/OFF potential by
interrupting the CP system. ON/OFF potential measurement gives, a clear picture when CP is
on and when is interrupted. The OFF potential will produce a "true" pipe-to-soil potential, free
from unwanted IR drop effects and before any significant depolarisation has occurred. This
offers a true measure of the level of protection afforded to the pipeline.
The general guidance for combined ON/OFF potential measurements is carried out once every
6 months. It helps to understand if pipeline (onshore section) is protected and interference is
avoidable. ON potential measurement alone is only give an idea that CP is ON, and the
pipeline is receiving current.
It is highly recommended to conduct combined ON/OFF potential measurement and make it

part of routine maintenance program once/6 months.
At the time of writing this report, there is no CIPS survey available for onshore section of 32-
inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline (segments #10 to #20 and segment #220). However, it is known
that this action was on going in IOOC at the moment of writing this report.
However, for offshore section, for below reasons there is no need to have CIPS;
- No IR Errors – virtually no ICCP on offshore lines
- No AC interference – no overhead power lines or ROW sharing
- No short-range resistivity changes
- No DC traction systems, or sources of stray current interference
- No problem sampling at 5-10 km intervals
The latest anodes potential readings survey in millivolts (mV) with respect to a silver/silver
chloride reference electrode is showing that entire 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline is under
protection with potential more negative than -1,000 mV.
The most negative pipeline potential value recorded was –1044 mV and the least negative
recorded was -1082. The potentials indicate that the pipeline is being effectively protected
throughout its entire length by its cathodic protection system at the time of last survey).

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Table 23.11-1, 32-inch Asaluyeh – Sirri pipeline Max. & min. CP potential Value
CP
Date KP Easting (m) Northing (m) Depth of water(m) Extremum
Value
23.07.2010 84.673 686,393.69 2,969,393.09 ‐1082 82.1
23.07.2010 85.135 686,638.31 2,969,001.19 ‐1082 84.2 Max. value
08.08.2010 172.415 755,540.47 2,918,028.26 ‐1082 94.7
08.04.2010 288.534 253,642.90 2,865,362.59 ‐1044 30.3
Min. value
08.04.2010 289.028 253,824.44 2,865,783.30 ‐1044 18.9
General potential levels between -900 mV and -1100 mV against Ag/AgCl for zinc anodes is
well protected pipeline. See Table 23.11-1.
No areas of cathodic activity or interferences were observed on this pipeline in time of survey.
The pipeline had a good level of corrosion protection afforded by its Cathodic Protection
system, with potentials more negative than –1044 mV.
The Anodes along the length of this pipeline are giving off very little activity. This is common
with longer lines; this tells us that the pipeline coating is good and that the line is well polarized.
Most anodes are giving us a very slight positive field gradient, which means the anodes are
slight corroding on themselves. This can be seen on the field gradient charts. This happens
when anodes are inactive. But the anodes are in good condition in this pipeline.
There were no cathodic spikes indicating no large coating defects on this pipeline.
The pipeline is protected by sacrificial anodes along its entire length and the integrity status is
Green colour (safe but needs to be monitored). It is recommended to repeat this survey by
2020.
Figure 23.11-2, CP value of sacrificial anodes, ROV 2010

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23.11.3 Trans-rectifier Settings History for Onshore Section

After studying all received readings and inspection data for Trans-rectifiers, it is known that this
need is well monitored and under control of CP department in IOOC. However, increased
voltage (2 times) and current (5 times) in July 21, 2018 needs more investigation. Possibility of
electricity drainage should be taken into consideration.
Transformer output shall be checked on a monthly basis. Potential reading at test points shall
be checked every 3 months. On/Off potentials shall be taken every year.
There are few minor cable disconnections, which needs continuous monitoring in next survey
and action from maintenance team to sort them out. Despite few required minor actions, this
discipline is acceptable from pipeline integrity prospect.

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24 Appendix B: List of 200 Most Significant ERF and Depth
Original Date of
Log. Original Original
Axial Int/ Mitigation - Clock
Distance Anomaly Width Depth
Length Ext With Position
(m) (mm) (mm)
(mm) Tolerances
18543 Circumferential groove 60.00 334 10.20 int. 21/06/2031 05:30

11858 stress corrosion 16.00 9 9.80 int. 21/05/2032 02:54
6389 pitting 59.00 85 9.70 int. 21/08/2032 01:23
14157 general 84.00 104 9.60 int. 21/11/2032 05:03
19887 pitting 46.00 77 9.60 int. 21/11/2032 04:38
4894 general 169.00 503 9.20 int. 21/10/2033 06:39
5141 general 116.00 324 9.20 int. 21/10/2033 05:01
8923 general 192.00 317 9.20 int. 21/10/2033 04:40
6652 circumferential slotting 16.00 61 9.10 int. 21/12/2033 02:46
6997 general 176.00 478 9.10 int. 21/12/2033 02:58
4935 general 93.00 298 9.00 int. 21/03/2034 03:37
4421 pitting 23.00 35 8.90 int. 21/06/2034 05:12
6575 pitting 50.00 26 8.90 int. 21/06/2034 01:56
18966 longitudinal slotting 107.00 17 8.80 int. 21/08/2034 01:16
6544 general 86.00 111 8.70 int. 21/11/2034 05:22
13431 general 173.00 129 8.60 int. 21/02/2035 10:00
4766 general 149.00 231 8.50 int. 21/05/2035 01:38
10014 general 94.00 77 8.40 int. 21/07/2035 00:28
4379 general 178.00 282 8.20 int. 21/01/2036 09:17
7918 general 195.00 334 8.10 int. 21/04/2036 04:08
16759 general 2229.00 539 8.10 int. 21/04/2036 07:14
5239 general 169.00 111 8.00 int. 21/06/2036 09:55
7675 general 112.00 121 8.00 int. 21/06/2036 03:13
4825 pitting 39.00 59 7.90 int. 21/09/2036 03:33
4694 general 124.00 358 7.70 int. 21/02/2037 03:10
5314 general 166.00 163 7.70 int. 21/02/2037 04:33
5409 general 205.00 282 7.70 int. 21/02/2037 00:13
9703 pitting 27.00 26 7.70 int. 21/02/2037 07:30

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Original Date of
(m) (mm) (mm)
(mm) Tolerances

5149 general 255.00 145 7.50 int. 21/08/2037 09:42
6350 pitting 33.00 59 7.50 int. 21/08/2037 04:28
7266 pitting 59.00 102 7.50 int. 21/08/2037 10:32
122170 general 152.00 255 7.50 int. 21/08/2037 06:33
4880 pitting 63.00 34 7.40 int. 21/11/2037 09:20
10011 pitting 27.00 43 7.30 int. 21/01/2038 07:31
14658 pitting 20.00 25 7.30 int. 21/01/2038 07:10
5843 general 374.00 324 7.20 int. 21/04/2038 04:29
6564 general 158.00 163 7.20 int. 21/04/2038 03:06
8641 general 92.00 102 7.10 int. 21/07/2038 09:01
4983 pitting 53.00 43 7.00 int. 21/10/2038 10:04
5879 general 295.00 436 7.00 int. 21/10/2038 03:14
8659 general 205.00 316 7.00 int. 21/10/2038 10:19
122154 general 191.00 231 7.00 int. 21/10/2038 03:41
5121 general 1602.00 248 6.90 int. 21/12/2038 02:30
5145 general 146.00 92 6.90 int. 21/12/2038 05:46
6579 general 143.00 102 6.90 int. 21/12/2038 04:36
7189 general 73.00 69 6.90 int. 21/12/2038 04:40
11378 pitting 39.00 52 6.90 int. 21/12/2038 10:24
122158 general 206.00 299 6.90 int. 21/12/2038 04:01
5209 general 596.00 324 6.80 int. 21/03/2039 03:22
6356 general 79.00 308 6.80 int. 21/03/2039 05:50
5181 general 345.00 214 6.50 int. 21/11/2039 08:02
4943 general 1197.00 350 6.30 int. 21/05/2040 04:46

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Original Date of
(m) (mm) (mm)
(mm) Tolerances
170 general 2181.00 1303 6.20 int. 21/07/2040 07:24

5012 general 1093.00 350 6.20 int. 21/07/2040 09:06
5141 general 679.00 180 6.20 int. 21/07/2040 06:32
5162 general 1928.00 366 6.20 int. 21/07/2040 07:24
5484 general 369.00 120 6.20 int. 21/07/2040 08:58
5865 general 3643.00 283 6.20 int. 21/07/2040 03:29
4997 general 487.00 282 6.10 int. 21/10/2040 01:03
5864 general 822.00 384 6.10 int. 21/10/2040 02:57
5860 general 418.00 265 6.10 int. 21/10/2040 04:48
124957 general 628.00 853 6.10 int. 21/10/2040 07:47
5857 general 1140.00 249 6.00 int. 21/01/2041 08:10
5868 general 461.00 248 6.00 int. 21/01/2041 02:07
4530 general 431.00 529 5.90 int. 21/04/2041 08:18
4978 general 1037.00 290 5.90 int. 21/04/2041 05:59
5140 general 514.00 316 5.90 int. 21/04/2041 02:46
5735 general 536.00 325 5.90 int. 21/04/2041 01:28
124401 general 417.00 1311 5.90 int. 21/04/2041 04:41
126642 general 484.00 1219 5.90 int. 21/04/2041 03:14
5173 general 504.00 119 5.80 int. 21/06/2041 05:46
5860 general 1782.00 293 5.80 int. 21/06/2041 04:53
5857 general 1618.00 326 5.80 int. 21/06/2041 03:14
5880 general 477.00 417 5.80 int. 21/06/2041 03:15
13825 general 1451.00 570 5.80 int. 21/06/2041 09:55
13903 general 512.00 306 5.80 int. 21/06/2041 04:56
4673 general 1238.00 704 5.70 int. 21/09/2041 04:36
5860 general 590.00 281 5.70 int. 21/09/2041 04:50
14659 general 600.00 197 5.70 int. 21/09/2041 10:14
115250 general 2072.00 1370 5.70 int. 21/09/2041 03:48
115374 general 802.00 686 5.70 int. 21/09/2041 04:21
115425 general 1432.00 478 5.70 int. 21/09/2041 03:40
5149 general 586.00 341 5.60 int. 21/12/2041 03:14
5896 general 692.00 724 5.60 int. 21/12/2041 08:31
8942 general 633.00 502 5.60 int. 21/12/2041 03:19
5161 general 998.00 375 5.50 int. 21/02/2042 04:45
5866 general 1140.00 223 5.50 int. 21/02/2042 04:20
898 general 895.00 1005 5.40 int. 21/05/2042 05:54
2495 general 891.00 606 5.40 int. 21/05/2042 02:56
5267 general 861.00 128 5.40 int. 21/05/2042 04:55
5909 general 785.00 478 5.40 int. 21/05/2042 04:33
13750 general 652.00 450 5.40 int. 21/05/2042 06:05
5197 general 984.00 197 5.30 int. 21/08/2042 07:28
13433 general 795.00 495 5.30 int. 21/08/2042 04:26
4396 general 895.00 529 5.10 int. 21/01/2043 03:31
4944 general 752.00 382 5.10 int. 21/01/2043 04:55
4991 general 1047.00 554 5.10 int. 21/01/2043 02:54
5156 general 1839.00 197 5.10 int. 21/01/2043 03:07
5181 general 802.00 674 5.10 int. 21/01/2043 07:36
5196 general 885.00 332 5.10 int. 21/01/2043 03:11
5869 general 686.00 283 5.10 int. 21/01/2043 04:33

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Original Date of
(m) (mm) (mm)
(mm) Tolerances
6429 general 713.00 372 5.10 int. 21/01/2043 03:36

6987 general 1020.00 885 5.10 int. 21/01/2043 05:47
23479 general 1029.00 401 5.10 int. 21/01/2043 08:37
5137 general 812.00 85 5.00 int. 21/04/2043 07:52
5863 general 832.00 231 5.00 int. 21/04/2043 02:39
127840 general 11289.00 1692 5.00 int. 21/04/2043 07:26
4945 general 1290.00 298 4.90 int. 21/07/2043 06:04
5874 general 1173.00 358 4.90 int. 21/07/2043 07:26
5189 general 1859.00 470 4.70 int. 21/12/2043 09:14
931 general 6693.00 2189 4.60 int. 21/03/2044 05:40
5138 general 1752.00 204 4.60 int. 21/03/2044 04:50
127366 general 12003.00 2554 4.50 int. 21/06/2044 04:45
123068 general 9082.00 2384 4.40 int. 21/08/2044 09:02
127247 general 10893.00 2554 4.40 int. 21/08/2044 08:46
115184 general 2161.00 2301 4.30 int. 21/11/2044 00:40
116046 general 10599.00 2336 4.30 int. 21/11/2044 03:06
129606 general 11097.00 2554 4.30 int. 21/11/2044 05:30
130709 general 11995.00 2554 4.30 int. 21/11/2044 05:48
130733 general 11801.00 2554 4.30 int. 21/11/2044 08:04
123044 general 11926.00 2554 4.20 int. 21/02/2045 07:08
124279 general 4902.00 1285 4.20 int. 21/02/2045 07:07
127761 general 6238.00 2554 4.20 int. 21/02/2045 06:13
128037 general 11480.00 2554 4.20 int. 21/02/2045 03:21
128632 general 11733.00 2554 4.20 int. 21/02/2045 02:57
129343 general 11003.00 2554 4.20 int. 21/02/2045 07:28
129355 general 11245.00 2554 4.20 int. 21/02/2045 04:19
132320 general 12057.00 2554 4.20 int. 21/02/2045 08:37
133851 general 11504.00 2554 4.10 int. 21/05/2045 03:04
118406 general 11753.00 2554 4.00 int. 21/07/2045 11:04
128006 general 6800.00 2554 4.00 int. 21/07/2045 06:18
128013 general 10988.00 2554 4.00 int. 21/07/2045 06:32
128025 general 11776.00 2554 4.00 int. 21/07/2045 04:30
128573 general 10824.00 2554 4.00 int. 21/07/2045 06:36
129282 general 11925.00 2554 4.00 int. 21/07/2045 02:23
130432 general 12074.00 2554 4.00 int. 21/07/2045 02:06
130721 general 11812.00 2554 4.00 int. 21/07/2045 06:13
133802 general 12058.00 2554 4.00 int. 21/07/2045 03:15
135327 general 11457.00 2554 4.00 int. 21/07/2045 00:58
130216 general 11561.00 2554 3.90 int. 21/10/2045 08:25
130252 general 11481.00 2554 3.90 int. 21/10/2045 04:04
130408 general 11706.00 2554 3.90 int. 21/10/2045 03:57

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
25 Appendix C: Data Sheet and Inspection Form for BVS
PIPELINE VALVE DATA SHEET

(GOV)
BALL VALVES
( 32-inch )
LOCK OPEN / LOCK CLOSE FACILITY
DESCRIPTION MATERIALS NOTES
TYPE Trunnion Mounted,Side Entry,Full Bore,Piggable 4
STANDARD API 6D / ASME B16.10 / ASME B16.34
RATING / DESIGN TEMP. ASME 900 LBS / -29˚C to +85˚C
OPERATING/DESIGN
97/113 barg
PRESS.
ENDS Flanged To ASME B16.47-Series A , RTJ A694 GR F65
FLG FACE FINISH 63Ra
BODY A216 WCB,SS 316L Overlay 1,3
BALL Trunnion Mounted A351 GR CF8M+TC 1,2
TRUNNIONS A351 GR CF8M+TC 1,2
STEM Anti Static & Blow Out Stem 17-4PH 1
SEAT RETAINER Spring Energized A351 GR CF8M+TC 1,2
SEAT Metal to Metal Seating
DYNAMIC & STATIC SEALS Elastomeric AED O'Ring + 2 anti-extrusion rings By Manufacturer 5,6
SEAT SPRING Inconel X750

A193 Gr. B7M / A194 Gr.
BOLTING Alloy Steel 2HM
OPERATING Gear Operated 7,8
MARKING According to Valve Specification
FIRE SAFE BS 6755-part 2 or API 607 or API 6FA

INSPECTION & TEST /
ACCEPTANCE
9
DOCUMENTATIO As per GS-PVV-142
N/ PREPARATION
SPECIFICATIONS As per GS-PVV-142
CERTIFICATIONS As per GS-PVV-142
Bi-directional, Anti static Device to BS-5351 Body cavity pressure self relief seat
DESIGN
design
CORROSIVE SERVICE Yes
VALVE SERVICE HC Gas Sour
CORROSION ALLOWANCE 3.0 MM
PAINTING As Per Painting Specification
PIPING CLASS
NOTES :
1) All material shall conform to NACE MR 0175.

2) Seating faces should be hard faced by 400 μm TC.
3) The valve shall be fitted with lifting eyes to facilitate maintenance for valves weighing 250 kg and over.
4)Bore Diameter:771.6 mm+1.6/0mm
5) Fire-safe graphite back-up seal required
6) Stem Graphit Packing shall contain a corrosion inhibitor to pervent oxidation of the stem
7) Valve shall be provided with locking facility.
8) See applicable motor/actuatuor/associated control station and accessories Specification.
9) Hydrostatic test pressure shall be based on rating as per ASME B16.34
Valve test acceptance criteria shall be as per BS 6755 Part 1, Rate A.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
PIPELINE VALVE DATA SHEET

(SIRRI)
Location: Onshore
VALVE DESIGN/OPERATING CONDITIONS
1 Tag No. Hold
2 Valve Type Ball valve, Trunnion Mounted,Side Entry,Bolted Body,Full Bore
3 Size 32-inch
4 Valve Class E
5 Piping Class Pipeline

API 6D-ANSI B16.34
6 Standard
(1)
7 Line Rating in 900 lbs
8 Line Rating Out 900 lbs
9 Corrosion Allowance mm 3.0
10 Design Temperature ºC -20/85
11 Steel Design Temperature ºC -29/95
12 Design Pressure Barg 114
13 Max. Operating temperature ºC 55

None Treated Natural Gas(Corrosive service conditions H2S+CO2) Dry H2S (NACE
14 Fluid Service Conditions
MR0175)
DESIGN MATERIAL
Body Construction : Full bore -Anti static design – Piggable (4) Body: A105N (1), (2)
Ball Type: Trunion Mounted Ball: A105N+75 µm ENP+ 400 µm Tungsten carbide (1),(5)
Stem Seal Type: Elastomeric AED O'Ring + 2 anti-extrusion rings (3) Stem : Structural steel as per Manuf. std + 75μm ENP (1)
Primary press. Containment seals : KALREZ or CHEMRAZ +
Gland Type : Manufacturer's design
2 anti- extrusion rings (6)
Operation: Gear Operated (7), (8) Stuffing box : NA
Seats: Metal to Metal Seating Seat : A105N + 75μm ENP + 400μm Tungsten carbide (5)
End Connection: Flanged ANSI B16.47-Series A (Formerly MSS SP-44)
Spring : Inconel X750
Facing RJ
Pressure Containing Bolts / Nuts : A193-B7M / A194-2HM-
Face-to-Face Dimension : API 6D
Zinc- Bichromate plated
Drain Connection - Vent connection with plug: Sized by manufacturer Bonnet Gasket : See primary pressure containment seals
Flushing inlet / outlet connections : Sized by Manufacturer Dynamic seals contact surfaces: INCONEL 625 overlay
DELIVERY
REQUIREMENTS
Test: API 598 + SP-TCS-142+Valve Specification SA-000-4200-PL-SP-1006 (9)
Marking: MSS SP-25 + SP-TCS-142 para. 12.1.2 +Valve Specification SA-000-4200-PL-SP-1006
Fire Test: BS 6755 - Part 2 or API 607 or API 6FA+Valve Specification SA-000-4200-PL-SP-1006
Certification : According to SP-TCS-142, para 11.2+Valve Specification SA-000-4200-PL-SP-1006
External Coating: Refer Project painting Speciifcation - Painting system N° 2 - Colour White
NOTES
(1) All material shall conform to NACE MR0175
(2) The valve shall be fitted with lifting eyes to facilitate maintenance for valves weighing 250 Kg and over.
(3) Fire-safe graphite back-up seals required
(4) Bore diameter: 771.6 mm + 1.6/0mm
(5) Seating faces should be hard faced by 400 μm TC.
(6) Methanol injection
(7) See applicable motor/actuator/associated control station and accessories specification in applicable document list.
(8) Valve shall be provided with locking facility.
(9) Hydrostatic Test Pressure shall be based on rating as per ASME B16.34,Valve Test acceptance criteria shall be as per BS 6755 Part1, Rate A.
(10) Valve body design and Stem calculations shall comply with the requirements of SP-TCS-142+Valve specification SA-000-4200-PL-1006

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Onshore Valves Mechanical

Data Sheets
Location: Onshore
VALVE DESIGN/OPERATING CONDITIONS
1 Tag No. All tag numbers to be confirmed (T.B.C) by onshore contractor
2 Valve Type Ball valve, Full bore
3 Size 32-inch
4 Valve Class E
5 Piping Class Pipeline
6 Standard API 6D-ANSI B16.34
7 Line rating in 900 lbs
8 Line rating out 900 lbs
9 Design temperature ºC -20 / 85
10 Steel Design Temperature ºC -29 / 95
11 Design pressure Barg 114
12 Max. Operating temperature ºC 55
13 Fluid Service Conditions Non-treated Natural gas(corrosive service conditions H2S+CO2) Dry H2S (NACE MR01.75)
DESIGN MATERIAL
Body Construction : Full bore (3) - Split body (2 or 3 Pcs) Anti-static design Body : Casting A216 WCB or Forging A105
– Piggable (6)
Valve specification SA-000-4200-PL-SP-1006 sec.5.11.3
Disc Type : Trunnion mounted ball Disc :A 216 WCB or A 105 - 75µm ENP + 40 0µmTungsten carbide (4)
Stem Seal Type : Elastomeric AED (1) O'Ring + 2 anti- Stem : Structural steel as per Manuf. std + 75µm
extrusion rings (3) ENP
Gland Type : Manufacturer's design Primary press. Containment seals :
KALREZ or CHEMRAZ + 2 anti-extrusion rings (2)
Operation : Gear Operated Valve Stuffing box : NA
Seats : Metal-to-Metal seating Seat : Structural steel as per Manuf. std - 75µm ENP
+ 400µm Tungsten carbide (4)
End Connection : Flanged to ANSI B16-47 - Series A (Formerly MSS SP-44) Spring : Inconel X750
Facing RJ
Face-to-Face Dimension : API 6D Pressure Containing Bolts / Nuts :
A193-B7M / A194-2HM-Zinc-Bichromate plated
Drain Connection - Vent connection with plug: Bonnet Gasket : See primary pressure containment Seals
Sized by manufacturer
Flushing inlet / outlet connections : Dynamic seals contact surfaces:

Sized by Manufacturer INCONEL 625 overlay
DELIVERY REQUIREMENTS
Test: API 598 + SP-TCS-142+Valve specification SA-000-4200-PL-SP-1006
Marking: MSS SP-25 + SP-TCS-142 Para. 12.1.2+Valve specification SA-000-4200-PL-SP-1006
Fire Test: BS 6755 - Part 2 or API 607 or API 6FA+Valve specification SA-000-4200-PL-SP-1006
Certification : According to SP-TCS-142, Para 11.2+Valve specification SA-000-4200-PL-SP-1006
External Coating: Refer Project painting Specification - Painting system N° 2 - Color White

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
VALVE DATA SHEET FOR

10-inch & 24-inch
BALL VALVES LOCK OPEN / LOCK CLOSE FACILITY 10-inch & 24-inch
DESCRIPTION MATERIALS NOTES
TYPE Trunnion Mounted, Side Entry, Bolted Body, Full Bore
STANDARD API 6D / ASME B16.10 / ASME B16.34
RATING / DESIGN TEMP. ASME 900 LBS / -20˚C to +85˚C
ENDS Flanged To ASME B16.5 , RTJ
BODY A105 N 1,2
BALL Trunnion Mounted SS 316 L 1
TRUNNIONS SS 316 L 1
STEM Anti Static & Blow Out Stem SS 316 L 1
SEAT RETAINER Spring Energized SS 316 L 1
SEAT PMSS (Primary Metal Secondary Soft ) 3
DYNAMIC & STATIC SEALS Elastomeric AED O'Ring + 2 anti-extrusion rings By Manufacturer 4,5
SEAT SPRING Inconel X718

A193 Gr. B7M /
BOLTING Alloy Steel
A194 Gr. 2HM
OPERATING To be equipped with electronic Actuator (MOV) and associated control station and accessories 6
MARKING According to Valve Specification SA-000-4200-PL-SP-1006
FIRE SAFE BS 6755-part 2 or API 607 or API 6FA

INSPECTION & TEST /
ACCEPTANCE
As per Project Specification SP-TCS-142 7
DOCUMENTATION/
PREPARATION
SPECIFICATIONS As per Project Specification SP-TCS-142
CERTIFICATIONS As per Project Specification SP-TCS-142
DESIGN Bi-directional, Anti-static Device to BS-5351 Body cavity pressure self-relief seat design 2
CORROSIVE SERVICE Yes
VALVE SERVICE HC Gas Sour
CORROSION ALLOWANCE 3.0 MM
PAINTING As Per Painting Specification
PIPING CLASS G03S
NOTES :
1) All material shall conform to NACE MR 0175.

2) The valve shall be fitted with lifting eyes to facilitate maintenance for valves weighing 250 kg and over.
3) Soft seat materials shall be suitable for design temp. and rating.
4) Fire-safe graphite back-up seal required
5) Stem Graphit Packing shall contain a corrosion inhibitor to pervent oxidation of the stem
6) Valve shall be provided with locking facility.
7) Hydrostatic test pressure shall be based on rating as per ASME B16.34
Valve test acceptance criteria shall be as per BS 6755 Part 1, Rate A.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Valve Inspection Report
Pipeline Identity: BVS No: Chainage Km:

Manufacturer Valve Type: Valve Size/Class:
Valve Serial No: Valve Tag: Actuator Serial
No:
Actuator Make: Actuator Model: Date:
PTW No: Procedure No:
Checked Status Remarks/
Inspection/ Action Points (YES/NO) (NA): ( ): Tick as applicable Parameters/Spares
Not Applicable OK Not OK Replaced
Check for availability of station signboard and valve
name plate
Check condition of fence, gates & locks
Check for sand accumulation and vegetation growth
inside the station
Check PCS coolant level and top up if required
Check valve pit, ladder & cover plates

Valve (underground or aboveground)
Check condition of external coating / painting and for
signs of corrosion
Check for any gas leaks from valve, flanges and
fittings
Check condition and number of pressure gauges /
transmitters. Replace pressure gauges if required
Check physical condition of valve and for external
leakages
Check the condition of stem seals and lubricate if
required
Valve actuator type ( : Tick as applicable) Manual
gear/ hand wheel
Manual hydraulic Hydraulic power unit-HPU
Carry manual gear actuator functional checks.
Lubricate gear actuators with low pressure hand
grease gun
Carry manual hydraulic actuator functional checks
and observe for any oil leaks (hand pump &
amplitorque)
Check the condition and level of hydraulic oil and
top up if required
Check and record HPU nitrogen pressure & check
for leaks
Carry HPU functional checks and observe for any
abnormalities.
Check the condition of position Indicator/ limit
switches
Check the condition of valve grease fittings and
record number/size of fittings
Check and record the condition / size of riser tubing
Grease main valve with lubricant Type- Quantity-

Check the condition of main valve body cavity vent
fitting and record type/size.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Checked Status
(YES/NO) (NA): Remarks/ Parameters/Spares
Inspection/ Action Points ( ): Tick as applicable Replaced
Not Applicable OK Not OK
Stroke main valve after ensuring bypass in
Stroking- 25%, 50%, 80% &100%
full open position (refer notes)
Holding
Check main valve sealing ability in full Check every 2nd maintenance
Passing Slightly
close position. Record passing rate if (Previous check date: )
Passing Heavily
possible
Drain off liquid from main valve body cavity if

any.
Mainline valve position pre and
post maintenance (open or close)
U/S
Pig signaler make/ type
D/S
U/S
Pig signaler flag / switch / Spindle /
body seal / trigger/ valve / bleed
screw D/S
Notes:
1. Lubricate valves and Inform Integrity team prior to stroking valves
2. Valves stroking operations (100% closing) that effect gas flow shall only be carried after approval/ clearance from concerned authorities
Corrective Action Required: Yes No (If Yes mention below the details)
Remarks:
INSPECTION/ MAINTENANCE CARRIED BY

Contractor / Technician Name: Sign: Date:
IOOC Sr. Mechanical Tech Name: Sign: Date:

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
26 Appendix D: Data Sheet and Inspection Form for Pig Traps
Pig Launcher Data sheet
Service: HC GAS Unit Description: Pig Receiver Number Of Units: 1 one Tag No.: 006 – L – 101
1 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
2 Design Code: ASME B31.8
3 Fluid: HC GAS Gas Density: 80.10 Kg/m3 Service: SOUR
4 Outside Diameter: 914.4 mm (36-inch) / 829.2 mm (32- Int. Diameter: 851.6/771.6 mm Length (T/T): 7010 mm (1) (3)
inch)
o
5 Operating Temperature (Min / Max): -15 / 55 C NOZZLE SCHEDULE (2)
o Proj. in
6 Design Temperature (Min / Max): -29 / 65 C Item No. Size Rate Face Type Service
(mm)
7 Operating Pressure (Max / Nor): 104 / 96.6 Bar g I 1 12” 900# RTJ WN 810 Bridge line
8 Design Pressure: 114 Bar g O 1 32” 900# RTJ WN --- Trap outlet
36” 900# Piping inlet with quick opening
9 Hydro Test Pressure: 171 Bar g G 1 --- --- ---
closure *
10 36” Barrel / Neck Thickness: minimum 31.4 /28.8 (1) mm PSV 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN 660 Pressure safety valve
11 Head Thickness: - mm V1 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN 660 Atmospheric vent
2” 900# Depressurizing / pressure
12 Corrosion allowance: 3 mm V2 1 RTJ LWN 615
equalizing line
13 Design factor: 0.5 - PG 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN 660 Pressure gauge (21)
14 Earthquake: Zone 2B, Z=0.2, UBC D1 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN 615 Drain
15 Fireproofing: NO D2 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN 660 Drain
16 Insulation: NO Z1 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN 615 Scraper/sphere position indicator
Painting:
As per project painting specification 2” 900#
17 SA-000-4200-ME-SP-1002 UC 1 RTJ LWN 660 Utility connection
18 Post Weld Heat Treatment: YES 2” 900# Connection for pressure
V3 1 RTJ LWN 660
19 Wind velocity at 10m height above LAT 43 m/s equalization line
20 Radiography X-Ray / UT: YES 100% (9) PT 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN 660 Pressure transmitter
22 Stamp: NO Note: Nozzle projections are measured from actual vessel centerline. Nozzle
projections are preliminary and vendor to take approval of purchaser before
23 Empty weight: 7 Ton (1) (11) construction.
24 Operating weight: 9 Ton (1) (11)
25 Test weight: 12 Ton (1) (11)
26 Capacity: 3.9 m3
27 CONSTRUCTION AND MATERIAL SPECIFICATION
28 Type of head: Flange+ quick opening / closure Support: FIXED AND SLIDING SADDLES
29 Orientation: HORIZONTAL (7) Earthing lugs: YES
30 Ladder platform clips: NO Lifting Lugs: YES
31 Insulation ring or clips: NO Name plate and bracket: YES – STAINLESS STEEL
32 Davit and support: YES
33 DESCRIPTION MATERIAL DESCRIPTION MATERIAL
34 Neck / Barrel API 5L X65 Nozzle flanges/body flanges A694 Gr. F65 (19)
35 Head 1 (closure) (4) (5) A694 Gr. F65 Gaskets RJ ARMCO MILD STEEL (8)
36 Head 2 (Neck flange) A694 Gr. F65 Studs A 193 Gr. B7 (20)
37 Saddles SA 283 Gr. C Nuts A 194 Gr. 2H (20)
38 Lining N.A. Earthing clips SS 304
39 Internals N.A. Reducer A694 Gr. F65
40 External attachments A516 Gr. 65 Nozzle reinforcement A694 Gr. F65
41 Internal attachments N.A. Nozzle neck A694 Gr. F65
42 Support wear plate SA 516 Gr. 70 Blind flanges A694 Gr. F65
43 NOTES:
To be confirmed by vendor. Vendor to submit design calculation to confirm wall thicknesses, weight and nozzle schedules. Pig launcher shall
44 (1)
be installed on a 32-inch pipeline. The ID of minor barrel of the launcher shall match pipeline inside diameter 771.6 mm.
45 (2) To be in accordance with documents SA-000-4200-ME-SP-1001, SA-000-4200-PL-SP-1005 and SA-000-4200-PR-PI-1001.
Pig launcher to be designed as per SA-000-4200-ME-SP-1001 for launching spherical and intelligent pigs (British Gas, LINALOG or
46 (3)
equivalent).
47 (4) The closure shall be designed as per code ASME VIII div. I, section UG 35 (b) and NACE MR 01-75 requirements (Sour service).
48 (5) Quick opening / closure shall have suitable pressure locking device to prevent opening when receiver is under any positive pressure and to
avoid release of hazard fluid.
49 (6) Neck internal diameter kept equal to pipe line ID (ID= 771.6 mm).
50 (7) To allow the handling of spheres. The barrel of the receiver should be inclined of 5o to horizontal.
51 (8) To be suitable for methanol. Gaskets for flanges shall be oval ring soft iron gasket (max. hardness 90 HRB) as per ASME B 16.20. Gasket for
quick opening closure shall be ‘O’ ring type with HNBR 90 shore (supplier confirmed suitability for service)

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
52 (9) NDT before and after PWHT.

53 (10) Flange design as per ASME B16.5 for diameter up to 24-inch and ASME B16.47 for diameter above 24-inch.
54 (11) Estimated weight and to be confirmed by vendor.
55 (13) The fluid handled is corrosive due to H2S (1.55 mol %), CO2 (3.2 mol %).
56 (14) Supplier shall maintain the bore for entire length on the minor barrel to a tolerance of +/- 2 mm.
57 (15) All inside welds shall be ground flush smooth. Nozzle ends shall be machined to inside curvature of shell.
58 (16) Design, fabrication and testing of pig receiver shall comply with requirements of code and project specification SA-000-4200-ME-SP-1001
59 (17) Supports shall be designed for all expected loads like wind, seismic, blast load, etc.
60 (18) All flanges and blinds shall comply requirements of Flanges Specifications SA-000-4200-PL-SP-1005.
61 (19) All nozzles except “PG” and “Z1” shall be blinded at time of delivery.
62 (20) Bolts and nuts shall be (Zinc coating) Hot Dip Galvanized to ASTM A153.
63 (21) Type of pressure gauges shall be se per document SA-000-2000-IN-DT-1001 (Pressure Gauge Datasheet).
Supplier to also supply 2 numbers of pig signalers for visual and remote indication. Remote indication shall be using potential free contact
(24V DC, 1A rated). One pig signaler shall be mounted on trap (Orientation – vertical, non retrievable type) and other (Orientation – vertical /
64 (22) horizontal, retrievable type) shall be supplied loose. Supplier’s scope of supply shall also include all branch fittings and special tools, etc.
associated with both the pig signalers. The design of loose supplied pig signaler shall allow maintenance while the line is in operation using an
extraction tool which shall be included in the Supplier’s scope of supply.
65 (23) Design of launcher shall allow complete venting, draining and purging when fully loaded.
66 (24) All materials for pressure parts and parts welded to pressure parts shall comply with the requirements of NACE MR0175.
67 (25) Nozzle projections whenever not specified shall be as per standard drawing SD PVV 213.
68 (26) Design, material, fabrication and testing of pig traps shall comply with requirements of code and specification SA-000-4200-ME-SP-1001.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Pig Receiver Data sheet
Service: HC GAS Unit Description: Pig Receiver Number Of Units: 1 one Tag No.: 100 – L – 102
1 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
2 Design Code: ASME B31.8
3 Fluid: HC GAS Service: SOUR
4 Outside Diameter: 914.4 mm (36-inch) / 829.2 mm (32- Int. Diameter: 861.8/781.8 mm Length (T/T): 8410 mm (1) (3)
inch)
o
5 Operating Temperature (Min / Max): -15 / 55 C NOZZLE SCHEDULE (2)
o
6 Design Temperature (Min / Max): -29 / 65 C Mark No. Size Rate Face Type Service
7 Operating Pressure (Max / Nor): 104 / 96.6 Bar g I1 1 12” 900# RTJ WN Bridge line
829.2
8 Design Pressure: 114 Bar g I2 1 900# RTJ WN Trap inlet
mm
9 Hydro Test Pressure: 171 Bar g G 1 36” 900# - - Quick opening / closure
10 36” Barrel / Neck Thickness: minimum 26.3 / 23.7 (1) mm PSV 1 4” 900# RTJ LWN Pressure safety valve
11 Head Thickness: - mm V1 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN Atmospheric vent
12 Corrosion allowance: 3 mm V2 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN Vent to flare
13 Design factor: 0.5 - PG 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN Pressure gauge (21)
14 Internals: - D1 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN Drain
15 Fireproofing: NO D2 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN Drain
16 Insulation: NO ZS1 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN Scraper/sphere position indicator
As per project painting specification
17 Painting: UC 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN Utility connection
SA-000-4200-ME-SP-1002
Connection for pressure
18 Post Weld Heat Treatment: YES V3 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN
equalization line
19 Radiography X-Ray / UT: YES 100% (9) PT 1 2” 900# RTJ LWN Pressure transmitter
20 Inspection: YES ZS2 1 ¾” 3000 NPT - Switch indicator door closed (12)
21 Stamp: NO
22 Empty weight: 7 Ton (1) (11)
23 Operating weight: 9 Ton (1) (11)
24 Test weight: 12 Ton (1) (11)
25 Capacity: 5.1 m3
26 CONSTRUCTION AND MATERIAL SPECIFICATION
27 Type of head: Flange+ quick opening / closure Support: FIXED AND SLIDING SADDLES
28 Orientation: HORIZONTAL (7) Earthing lugs: YES
29 Ladder platform clips: NO Lifting Lugs: YES
30 Insulation ring or clips: NO Name plate and bracket: YES – STAINLESS STEEL
31 Davit and support: YES
32 DESCRIPTION MATERIAL DESCRIPTION MATERIAL
33 Neck / Barrel API 5L X65 Nozzle flanges/body flanges A694 Gr. F65 (19)
34 Head 1 (closure) (4) (5) A694 Gr. F65 Gaskets RJ ARMCO MILD STEEL (8)
35 Head 2 (Neck flange) A694 Gr. F65 Studs A 193 Gr. B7 (20)
36 Saddles SA 283 Gr. C Nuts A 194 Gr. 2H (20)
37 Lining N.A. Earthing clips SS 304
38 Internals N.A. Reducer A694 Gr. F65
39 External attachments A516 Gr. 65 Nozzle reinforcement A694 Gr. F65
40 Internal attachments N.A. Nozzle neck A694 Gr. F65
41 Support wear plate SA 516 Gr. 70
42 NOTES:
43 (1) To be confirmed by vendor. Vendor to submit design calculation to confirm wall thicknesses, weight and nozzle schedules.
44 (2) To be in accordance with documents SA-000-4200-ME-SP-1001, SA-000-4200-PL-SP-1005 and SA-000-4200-PR-PI-1002.
45 (3) Pig receiver to be designed as per SA-000-4200-ME-SP-1001 for receiving spherical and intelligent pigs (British Gas, LINALOG or equivalent).
46 (4) The closure shall be designed as per code ASME Sec. VIII div. I (by VENDOR) and NACE MR 01-75 requirements (Sour service).
Quick opening / closure shall have suitable pressure locking device to prevent opening when receiver is under any positive pressure and to
47 (5)
avoid release of hazard fluid.
48 (6) Neck internal diameter kept equal to pipe line ID (ID= 771.6 mm).
49 (7) To allow the handling of spheres. The barrel of the receiver should be inclined of 5o to horizontal.
50 (8) To be suitable for methanol.
51 (9) NDT before and after PWHT.
52 (10) Flange design as per ASME B16.5 for diameter up to 24-inch and ASME B16.47 for diameter above 24-inch.
53 (11) Estimated weight and to be confirmed by vendor.
54 (12) Inductive type, contact rating 2 Amp-24 VCC as per document SA-000-2000-IN-DT-1003.
55 (13) The fluid handled is corrosive due to H2S (1.55 mol %), CO2 (3.2 mol %).
56 (14) Supplier shall maintain the bore for entire length on the minor barrel to a tolerance of +/- 2 mm.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
57 (15) All inside welds shall be ground flush smooth. Nozzle ends shall be machined to inside curvature of shell.
58 (16) Design, fabrication and testing of pig receiver shall comply with requirements of code and project specification SA-000-4200-ME-SP-1001
59 (17) Supports shall be designed for all expected loads like wind, seismic, blast load, etc.
60 (18) All flanges and blinds shall comply requirements of Flanges Specifications SA-000-4200-PL-SP-1005.
61 (19) All nozzles except “PG” and “ZS1” shall be blinded at time of delivery.
62 (20) Bolts and nuts shall be (Zinc coating) Hot Dip Galvanized to ASTM A153.
63 (21) Type of pressure gauges shall be se per document SA-000-2000-IN-DT-1001 (Pressure Gauge Datasheet).
Supplier to also supply 2 numbers of pig signalers for visual and remote indication. Remote indication shall be using potential free contact
(24V DC, 1A rated). One pig signaler shall be mounted on trap (Orientation – vertical, non retrievable type) and other (Orientation – vertical /
64 (22) horizontal, retrievable type) shall be supplied loose. Supplier’s scope of supply shall also include all branch fittings and special tools, etc.
associated with both the pig signalers. The design of loose supplied pig signaler shall allow maintenance while the line is in operation using
an extraction tool which shall be included in the Supplier’s scope of supply.
65 (23) Nozzle projections whenever not specified shall be as per standard drawing SD PVV 213.

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Pig Launcher and Receiver

Inspection form
Pig Trap Data

Pipeline Date
Pig Trap Tag No. in PiMS Procedure No.:
PTW No
Launcher: Receiver: ( ) Tick as applicable
Pig Trap Check
Checked (YES/ NO) Checked (YES/ NO)
Inspection / Action Points Inspection / Action Points
NA: Not Applicable NA: Not Applicable
Sign Board / Name Plate Earth Cable Connection
Fence, Gates & Locks Jib Crane
Sand Accumulation & Vegetation
Concrete Supports/ Pavement
Growth
Painting / Coating Platforms/ Walkway
Gas Leaks (Door/ Flanges/ Pressure Gauges/ Transmitters

Fittings)
Isolating Joint (I.J) Pig Signaler Make & Type
Pig Signaler Flag/ Switch/ Spindle/
Pig Tray Body seal/ Trigger/ Valve Bleed
Screw
Checked (YES/ NO)
Inspection / Action Points Remarks/ Spares replaced
NA: Not Applicable
Lubricant Type/ Qty:
Main-Online Isolation Valve and Actuator Valve Position(Pre & Post Maintenance):
Integrity Checks:(Yes/No), Status:
Upstream Isolation Valve and Actuator Valve Position(Pre & Post Maintenance):
Downstream Isolation Valve and Actuator Valve Position(Pre & Post Maintenance):
Bypass Valve and Actuator Valve Position(Pre & Post Maintenance):
Kicker Line and Valves Valve Position(Pre & Post Maintenance):
Door/ End Closure Check
Manufacturer Size/ Class
Type Serial/ Tag No
Defenitions: D- Damaged C- Corroded S- Satisfactory R- Replaced
Status Tick as
Checked (YES/ NO) NA: Not Remarks/ Spares
Inspection / Action Points applicable
Applicable replaced
D C S R
Door Seal
Seal Surface
Door
Bleed Screws & Plate
Door Thread
Dowty Seal
Hinge Pins/ Bushes
Locking Band (B.L)
Actuator Mechanism (B.L)
Locking Ring (R.L)
Draw bolts (R.L)
Swivels (R.L)

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
Sec. Safety Feature (B.L)

Safety Interlock
Davit Arrangement
Davit Screw & Nut
Grid UT Inspection Data
UT Equipment model: Major Grid size:
Probe Dia: Minor Grid size:
Probe Type: Number of Grids:
Calibration Block ID: Area Examined:
Ref. Procedure:
Grid Results
UT Reading (mm) UT Reading (mm) UT Reading (mm)
Grid # Remarks Grid # Remarks Grid # Remarks
Min Max Min Max Min Max
1 31 61
2 32 62
3 33 63
4 34 64
5 35 65
6 36 66
7 37 67
8 38 68
9 39 69
10 40 70
11 41 71
12 42 72
13 43 73
14 44 74
15 45 75
16 46 76
17 47 77
18 48 78
19 49 79
20 50 80
21 51 81
22 52 82
23 53 83
24 54 84
25 55 85
26 56 86
27 57 87
28 58 88
29 59 89
30 60 90
Certificate
Inspection Date Next Inspection Date
Technical Inspector Engineer Approved By

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
27 Appendix E: ParsPiMS TM Enterprise Software Snapshot for Asaluyeh-Sirri

Pipeline
ParsPiMS TM Login Menu

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
ParsPiMS TM Pipeline Selection

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
ParsPiMS TM Features Menu

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
ParsPiMS TM Pipeline Coordination System

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
ParsPiMS TM Pipeline Chainage

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
ParsPiMS TM Segments Management

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
ParsPiMS TM L/R Inspection Data

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
ParsPiMS TM Pipeline Integrity Outlook Setting

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
ParsPiMS TM ACR Setting

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
ParsPiMS TM Pipeline ACR Table

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
ParsPiMS TM Pipeline Integrity FFS Setting

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
ParsPiMS TM Pipeline Integrity FFS Charts
ParsPiMS TM Pipeline Integrity FFS Charts

Asaluyeh-Sirri
Rev.04
© All rights reserved.

Copyright 2019 by ISCO-Noran Energy consortium office in Olav Brunborgsvei 6, 4 etg., 1396,
Billingstad, Norway.

Dr. Mohammad Hajiarab Ref. No.: ZS-Nor-J001-00
Technical Director Z-Subsea Ltd.
The Chandlery Business Centre, 50
Noran Energy | Olav Brunborgsvei 6, 4etg. | 1396 | Westminster Bridge Road, London, SE1
Billingstad | Norway 7QY
Tel: +47 9866 5991 Website: www.z-subsea.com
Tel. (Direct): +44 207 953 7410
Tel.: +44 7527476612
Dear Dr Hajiarab, 31 August 2019
Z-Subsea Ltd (verifier) has verified the report No. IO01-NFZ-Y-RA-0001-Rev.04, titled “Integrity
Status of IOOC 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri Gas Export Pipeline System”, upon the request of ISCO-
Noran Energy consortium (Consortium from now on).
The report was technically verified based on the input data provided by the client and
assumptions made by the Consortium. The items verified were:
■ Design and operating input data selected and used by the Consortium in the
assessments and engineering judgements
■ Applicability of the assumptions made by the Consortium and their compliance with the
engineering common practice
■ Risk assessment methodology (likelihood of failure and consequence of failure selection)
performed by the Consortium for the credible threats to the pipeline
■ DNVGL RP-F101 Part B calculations performed by Consortium for the FFP assessment
of internal and external metal loss in the offshore section of the pipeline
■ Modified ASME B31G calculations performed by the Consortium for the FFP
assessment of the internal and external metal loss in the onshore section of the pipeline
■ Corrosion rate calculations for the internal and external metal loss features performed
by the Consortium, including ECE models
■ Recommendations provided to the client in the report regarding the integrity of the
pipeline for future operation
■ Recommendations for the repair and mitigation scenarios for the pipeline, if required
This endorsement letter remains valid if the operating condition of the pipeline remains within
the boundary of the input data listed in the report No. IO01-NFZ-Y-RA-0001-Rev.04 and used
by the consortium, and if the assumptions made in the same report represent the status of the
pipeline. Any deviation from the input parameters, assumptions, conclusions and
recommendations, in the report will make this verification or the analyses performed by the
consortium void and repeat assessment and verification will be required. We hope that the
above verification summary addresses the project requirements.
Yours Sincerely,
Dr. Afshin Motarjemi

Z-Subsea Ltd.
31-August 2019

IO01 NFZ Y RA 0001 Rev.04 1

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IOOC Gas Export Pipeline System

Integrity Management System

04 31/08/2019 Issued for Approval S. Pirsiavash R. Fallahzadeh M. Hajiarab

03 25/08/2019 Issued for Review S. Pirsiavash R. Fallahzadeh M. Hajiarab

02 11/08/2019 Issued for Review S. Pirsiavash S. Pirsiavash M. Hajiarab

01 24/07/2019 Internal Document Review S. Pirsiavash R. Fallahzadeh M. Hajiarab

Revision Date Reason for issue Prepared Checked Approved

IO01 NFZ Y RA 0001 - -

NORAN ENERGY Page 1 of 135 ISCO MIDDLE EAST

CONTRACT No. FG2-97-5248

CLIENT: Iranian Offshore Oil Company (IOOC)

NORAN ENERGY Page 2 of 135 ISCO MIDDLE EAST

IOOC Senior Integrity Engineer Sadegh Momeni ✓ -

NORAN ENERGY Page 3 of 135 ISCO MIDDLE EAST

This page is intentionally left blank

NORAN ENERGY Page 4 of 135 ISCO MIDDLE EAST

LIST OF REPORT ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS ............................................................................. 11

1 INTRODUCTION (FIELD/ASSET OVERVIEW) ............................................................................... 13

1.5.1 Landfall Coordinates ............................................................................................................. 17

2 PROJECT ASSUMPTIONS .............................................................................................................. 22

3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. 23

4 DATA QUALITY, ACCURACY AND CONFIDENCE ....................................................................... 25

5 PIPELINE INSPECTION TECHNIQUES .......................................................................................... 26

5.1.1 Generic Inspection Techniques............................................................................................. 26

5.2.1 Generic Pipeline Inspection Techniques ............................................................................... 27

6.1.1 Generic Defect Assessment Methodologies for Subsea Pipelines ....................................... 29

7 RISK ASSESSMENTS (SEMI-QUANTITATIVE APPROACH) ....................................................... 31

7.6.1 Credible Threats .................................................................................................................... 38

7.7.1 Top of the Line Corrosion...................................................................................................... 39

8 FAILURE MODES ............................................................................................................................ 41

9 ASALUYEH-SIRRI PIPELINE SEGMENTATION ............................................................................ 42

10.1.1 ILI Tool Tolerances ........................................................................................................... 44

NORAN ENERGY Page 5 of 135 ISCO MIDDLE EAST

10.2.1 Distribution of Features with Respect to their Types ........................................................ 46

10.4.1 Parameters Used in the FFP Assessments ...................................................................... 55

11 ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................... 62

11.1.1 Internal Corrosion Distribution........................................................................................... 62

11.2.1 External Corrosion Distribution ......................................................................................... 65

13 FACILITIES INTEGRITY STATUS ................................................................................................... 69

15 ASSESSED CORROSION RATE (ACR) ......................................................................................... 73

15.3.1 Corrosion Coupons ........................................................................................................... 77

17 OPERATIONAL PIGGING AND DEBRIS ANALYSIS ..................................................................... 84

18 LAND SURVEYS .............................................................................................................................. 85

18.2.1 Recommendation for Shore Approach Segment .............................................................. 86

NORAN ENERGY Page 6 of 135 ISCO MIDDLE EAST

23 APPENDIX A: SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION ................................................................................ 94

23.4.1 Pin-Hole Clamp ................................................................................................................. 96

23.5.1 General Procedure ............................................................................................................ 98

23.11.1 Coating Survey ................................................................................................................ 101

27 APPENDIX E: PARSPIMS TM ENTERPRISE SOFTWARE SNAPSHOT FOR ASALUYEH-SIRRI

NORAN ENERGY Page 7 of 135 ISCO MIDDLE EAST

Figure 1.2-1, 32-inch Asaluyeh-Sirri pipeline overview ............................................................................. 13

NORAN ENERGY Page 8 of 135 ISCO MIDDLE EAST

Table 1.5-1, UTM system for Zone 39 & 40 .............................................................................................. 16

NORAN ENERGY Page 9 of 135 ISCO MIDDLE EAST

NORAN ENERGY Page 10 of 135 ISCO MIDDLE EAST

List of Report Acronyms and definitions

% IR drop Percentage of potential drop due to solution resistance

NORAN ENERGY Page 11 of 135 ISCO MIDDLE EAST

ICDA Internal Corrosion Direct Assessment

NORAN ENERGY Page 12 of 135 ISCO MIDDLE EAST

1 Introduction (Field/Asset Overview)