Coping with the State

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

17

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of

collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of
Ottoman and Turkish studies. These scholarly volumes address
important issues throughout Turkish history, offering in a single
volume the accumulated insights of a single author over a career of
research on the subject.
 Coping with the State

Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman

Empire, 1550-1720

Suraiya Faroqhi

The Isis Press, Istanbul preSS

2010
Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA
www.gorgiaspress.com
Copyright © 2010 by The Isis Press, Istanbul
Originally published in 1995
All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright
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2010

ISBN 978-1-61143-134-6

Reprinted from the 1995 Istanbul edition.

Printed in the United States of America

 Born in 1941, Suraiya Faroqhi studied at the universities of
Hamburg/Germany, Istanbul and Bloomington/Indiana. In 1971, she began to
teach at Middle East Technical University, Ankara. She received the
'Üniversite Do^entligi' in 1980 and completed her 'Habilitation' at Ruhr-
Universität, Bochum/Germany in 1982. In 1986 she became a professor at
Middle East Technical University, and in 1988, she accepted a professorship at
Ludwig-Maximilians-l Iniversität, Munich/Germany.

Her books incljde Der Bektaschi-Orden in Anatolien (Vienna,

Oriental Studies Institute, 1981), Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, publ. in Turkish as
Osmanli'da Rentier ve Rentliler, Istanbul, Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayinlari, 1993,
tr. by Neyyir Kalaycioglu), Men of Modest Substance, House Owners and
House Property in Seventeenth Century Ankara and Rayseri (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1987), Pilgrims and Sultans, the Hajj under the
Ottomans (London, fauris Press, 1994) and Rultur und Alltag im
Osmanischen Reich (Munich, C. H. Beck, scheduled for Sept 1995). A
selection of her articles came out as Peasants, Dervishes and Traders in the
Ottoman Empire (London, Variorum, 1986) and apart from the present
volume, a further selcciion of her articles is being prepared by the Isis Press
under the title Making a Living in the Ottoman Lands, 1480 to 1820.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 7

1. "Political Initiatives 'from the Bottom up' in the Sixteenth and

Seventeenth-Century Ottoman Empire" in : Osmanische Studien
zur Wirtschafts und Sozialgeschichte. In Memoriam Vanco
ßoskov, ed. Hans Georg Majer (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz,
1986), pp. 24-33 25

2. "Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem

of Sultanic Legitimation (1570-1650)" Jl. of the Economic and
Social History of the Orient, XXXIV (1992), 1-39 37

3. ' Sainthood as a Means of Self-Defense in Seventeenth-Century

Ottoman Anatolia" in : Manifestations of Sainthood in Islam,
ed. Grace Smith and Carl Ernst (Istanbul, ISIS Press, 1993), pp.
193-208 67

4. "Town Officials, Timar-holders and Taxation : The Late

Sixteenth-Century Crisis as seen from £orum", Turcica, XVIII
(1986), 53-82 83

5. "Political Tensions in the Anatolian Countryside Around 1600 -

An Attempt at Interpretation" in : Türkische Misz,eilen. Robert
Anhegger Festschrift, Armagani, Melanges, ed. J. L. Bacque-
Grammont, Barbara Flemming, Macit Gökberk, liber Ortayh
(Istanbul, 1987), p. 117-130, Turkish transl. by Nail Satligan :
11. Tez, 1 (1987)

6. "Seeking Wisdom i i China : An Attempt to Make Sense of the

Celali Rebellions" in : Festschrift Felix Tauer, ed. Rudolf
Vesely (in preparation) 125

7. "Black Slaves ano: Freedmen Celebrating (Aydin, 1576)",

Turcica, XXI-XXII1 (1991), 205-215 ' 149

8. "Counterfeiting in Ankara" in : The Turkish Studies Association

Bulletin, 15, 2 (Sept. 1991), Issue in honour of Ronald
Jennings, 281-292 159
6 COPING WITH THE STATE

9. "The Life and Death of Outlaws in (Jorum", in: Armagan,

Festschrift fiir Andreas Tietze, ed. Ingeborg Baldauf, Suraiya
Faroqhi and Rudolf Vesely (Prague : Enigma Corporation,
1994), pp. 59-77 171

10. "Räuber, Rebellen und Obrigkeit im osmanischen Anatolien",

Periplus, 3 (1993", 31-46 189

11. "Robbery on the hajj road and political allegiance in the Ottoman
Empire (1560-1680)" (unpubl, 1995) 205
 INTRODUCTION

The articles reprinted in this volume are part of an ongoing discussion

c o n c e r n i n g the relations between O t t o m a n society and the state which
controlled it. 1 This discussion in a sense is as old as the study of Ottoman
history in a 'modern', or where the Turkish context is concerned, 'republican'
style. But it has taken a new turn in the last twenty-five years or so. From the
late 1960s o n w a r d s , particularly e c o n o m i s t s and social scientists have
attempted to figure out where the Ottoman case should be 'placed' in an overall
discussion of social systems the world over. Given the fact that Ottomanists,
if they knew anything a b o u t a non-Ottoman society, were familiar with
European developments only, scholarly effort has been mainly expended on
the comparison of Ottoman society with early modern Europe.

MODES OF PRODUCTION

In a first stage of historiography, discussion of the Ottoman place in

world history involved the debate whether the Ottoman socio-political system
should be regarded as a variant of feudalism. Sophisticated adherents of this
latter view defined feudalism in a wide sense, namely as a society of peasants
with independent access to their means of livelihood. Therefore these peasants
could be persuaded to hand over part of their product only by extra-economic
f o r c e . In addition, a society in w h i c h the feudal m o d e of production
predominated might include significant 'pockets' of other modes : in the
Mediterranean part of Europe, slavery continued to be important well into the
Middle Ages. Thus describing a given society as 'feudal' did not mean that all
human relations f o u n d within its c o m p a s s necessarily c o n f o r m e d to that
pattern.

Many misunderstandings were however caused by the fact that the term
'feudalism' is also used in i much narrower sense, namely for a society in
which the lordly class is tied together by the institutions of subinfeudation and

' w h i l e the articles in this v o l u m e have been entirely reset, and certain mistakes and
inconsistencies of spelling etc. ironed out in the process, it has not been possible to adjust the
format in all cases. Thus in most articles the references are given in full the first time they
occur in the notes, and later in abbreviated versions. In a fev texts however, the references can
be found in a separate list, and an abridged f o r m is used in all the notes. Some articles give the
names of the relevant publishers in their references, while others do not. I beg the reader to
excuse these inconsistencies. T h e index w a s prepared with a great deal of help by Mrs Christl
Catanzaro, for which I am g r a t e f u l
8 c o r I NG WITH THE STATE

homage, which obviously were absent f r o m Ottoman society. 1 M o r e o v e r

many participants in the debate had a very old-fashioned view of the European
Middle Ages, which was essentially derived f r o m studies published before
Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre or Georges Duby completely changed our ideas of
medieval and early modern society. 2 This difference of phase has made it easier
for opponents of the idea that the category of feudalism might be of any use to
Ottoman studies, to present their case in a convincing fashion.

Scholars who did not regard the notion of feudalism as relevant to

Ottoman history in the 19"'0s often adopted the concept of the 'Asiatic Mode
of P r o d u c t i o n ' . T h i s c o n c e p t , introduced by M a r x at o n e point but
subsequently discarded, w a s derived f r o m the — very limited and often
mistaken — notions which m i d - n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y E u r o p e a n scholars
possessed of Indian society. These involved the idea of isolated, self-sufficient
villages dominated by a slate apparatus which possessed few ties to society
apart f r o m the extraction of taxes, except in areas which needed m a j o r
hydraulic investments before they could be used for agriculture. Supposedly
the despotic rule normally encountered in societies where the Asian Mode of
P r o d u c t i o n ( A M P ) was d o m i n a n t , d i f f e r e d in kind f r o m the European
absolutism of the early modern period. T h e absence of a rurally based
aristocracy capable of restraining the Sultan's or emperor's despotic rule
appeared as the crucial difference. 3 In addition this mode of production was
considered to be incapable of evolution, so that it had to be broken down by
outside intervention b e f o r e the society in question could d e v e l o p other
initiatives.

Dubious as this model may sound in the bald summary given here, it
recommended itself to economists and social scientists of the 1970s by several
properties. First of all it s e e m e d a viable alternative to the discredited
assumption that all human societies must necessarily pass through the same
sequence of stages. More mportantly, the exaltation of the state involved in
this model, in the eyes of many social scientists seemed to nicely fit in with
the results of O t t o m a n i s t historians, w h o w e r e u n e a r t h i n g m o r e and
more material on the functioning of the kerim devlet,4 Needless to say, the

' F o r the discussion concerning feudalism, see the different studies of Halil Berktay, particularly
"The Search for the Peasant in Western and Turkish History / H i s t o r i o g r a p h y " , in : New
Approaches to State and Peasant in Ottoman History, ed. Halil Berktay, Suraiya Faroqhi
(London: Frank Cass, 1992), pp. 109-184. The present text owes a great deal to discussions with
Rifa'at A b o u - E l - H a j , Tulay Artan, Halil Berktay, Huri Islamoglu-inan, Ariel Salzmann and
Isenbike Togan ; but they are of course in no way responsible for the results.
2
I n addition, many participants in the debate thought, or pretended to think f o r reasons of
polemical convenience, that the arrangements analyzed by scholars such as Georges Duby for
the tenth to twelfth centuries, applied to the late fifteenth or early sixteenth centuries as well.
3
Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1974), p. 464.
^ T h i s convergence may explain why the studies of O m e r Liitfi Barkan were highly esteemed
and often quoted by Turkish defenders of A M P , even though Barkan, in his later years a
conservative 'anticlerical', had little in c o m m o n politically with this particular group of his
readers.
 I NTRODUCTION 9

exaltation of the state also seemed appropriate to an interpretation of socialism

which equated state (as o p p o s e d to social) control of the e c o n o m y with social
progress; to use a R u s s i a n a n a l o g y , s o v c h o s e s w e r e regarded as s o m e t h i n g
m o r e a d v a n c e d t h a n k o l c h o s e s . S c h o l a r s t r y i n g to e x p l a i n t h e lack of
indigenous capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t in T u r k e y w e r e also attracted by the AMP
c o n c e p t . A f t e r all, it a l l o w e d the s t a t e m e n t that the p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s of
O t t o m a n s o c i e t y h a d b e e n h e l d b a c k by t h e p r e v a i l i n g socio-political
o r g a n i z a t i o n . O n l y a c o m p l e t e t u r n o v e r c o u l d catapult society o u t of its
secular circle of centralization f o l l o w e d by decentralization and launch society
o n the road t o c a p i t a l i s m and ultimately s o c i a l i s m . 1 H o w e v e r t h e e x t r e m e
emphasis on the state, the neglect of social forces, the posited
incommensurability of AMP-dominated societies with c o n t e m p o r a r y European
developments all have contributed toward the increasing discredit of this model
in the 1980s and 1990s.

H i s t o r i a n s specializing in the O t t o m a n realm in the 1970s w e r e still

too m u c h involved with the e m e r g i n g riches of the Istanbul a r c h i v e s to pay
m u c h a t t e n t i o n to this d e b a t e . M o r e o v e r m a n y of t h e m w e r e e x t r e m e l y
conservative politically, and a debate informed by Marxian categories appeared
m o r e than suspect. M o r e legitimately f r o m m y p r e s e n t p o i n t of v i e w , the
immaturity of O t t o m a n historiography even in the 1970s p r o b a b l y m a d e it all
b u t i m p o s s i b l e f o r a d e b a t e on c o m p a r a t i v e history to b e f r u i t f u l , to say
nothing of a discussion a b o u t m o d e s of production. M o s t historians w o r k i n g
in the archives s i m p l y w e r e n o t yet able to present i n f o r m a t i o n o n O t t o m a n
state a n d society in s u c h a m a n n e r that c o m p a r a t i s t s could h a v e m a d e m u c h
use of it; the c h a p t e r on O t t o m a n 'despotism' in Perry A n d e r s o n ' s s e m i n a l
work is a good e x a m p l e of this c o m m u n i c a t i o n gap. 2

THE IMPACT OF HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY

Recent d e v e l o p m e n t s have h o w e v e r been m o r e encouraging. On the one

h a n d , at least c e r t a i n O t t o m a n h i s t o r i a n s h a v e d e v e l o p e d an interest in
discussing mutual c o n c e r n s not only with E u r o p e a n historians, but also with
m e m b e r s of the large and flourishing c o m m u n i t y of Indianists. 3 Indian history
of the M o g h u l a n d p o s t - M o g h u l periods is on the whole m o r e developed and
theoretically sophisticated than O t t o m a n history, but the gap is not s o great as
to p r e v e n t a c o n s c i o u s n e s s of c o m m o n p r o b l e m s . In m y v i e w , o n e of
the m o r e important lessons w e can learn f r o m Indianist historians is to take

' f a g l a r Keyder, Stale and Class ir, Turkey, a Study in Capitalist Development (London- Verso
1987). p. J 6-17, 26-28.
^Anderson, Lineages,pp. 361-396.
3
S e v e r a l c o n f e r e n c e s , organized principally by Tosun A r i c a n h , David Ludden and Ashraf
Gham m Cambridge M A , California, Istanbul, Munich and Philadelphia have been devoted to
these encounters.
10 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

cognizance of the model accounting f o r the importance of internal trade

supplying the capital and political elites. 1 This phenomenon w a s especially
significant in the Indian context, but it also has struck Ottomanist historians,
particularly when dealing with Istanbul. Since the provinces were obliged to
deliver large amounts of coin as taxes every year, and f e w regions had the
chance to supply themselves with gold or silver f r o m abroad, provincials
needed to earn back the m o n e y they spent on taxes by internal trade.
Supplying the political elite and the population of the capital meant tapping
the money supply accumulating at the centre every year, which, if it had not
been drawn o f f , would have tended to merely drive up prices. T h u s the
political structure partic ularly of very large states generated both a need and
opportunities for internal trade.

On the other hand new a p p r o a c h e s to history, which were first

developed in the borderland between history and sociology and are associated
particularly with Charles Tilly and his school, have provided inspiration to
Ottomanist historians. Very refreshingly, Tilly has moved a w a y f r o m the
glorification of rulers and state f o r m a t i o n so characteristic not only of
Ottoman history, but of many branches of European history as well. 2 Tilly
has steadfastly refused to accept the premise that once crimes are perpetrated on
a sufficiently large scale, they are part of the realm of politics and thereby
sacrosanct. French kings stand revealed as ordinary robbers and extractors of
protection money, engaging in organized crime. Moreover the image that has
impressed generations of their subjects, and latter-day historians as well, turns
out to be the product of conscious manufacture, of a type which one might
have believed impossible before the media age. 3 As a result, life has become
easier for Ottomanist historians w i s h i n g to escape the m y s t i q u e of the
Ottoman state, as this entity can now be studied without the attempts at
glorification inherent in such endeavours down to the 1980s.

More concretely, Tilly's work has inspired scholars concerned with the
cohesion of the Ottoman state, specifically the problem why peasant rebellion
failed to occur, even under the very trying circumstances of the late sixteenth
and early seventeenth centuries. Karen Barkey's recent work is based on Tilly's
studies of early modern French rebellions. 4 Charles Tilly's emphasis on social

' C A Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, North Indian society in the age of British
expansion, 1770-1870 (Cambiidge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 63ff.
^Charles Tilly, "War-Making and State-Making as Organized Crime", in: Bringing the Slate
Back In, ed. Peter B. Evans. Dietrich Rueschemeyer & T h e d a Scocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1985), |>p 169-191; As Sociology Meets History ( L o n d o n . New Y o r k :
Academic Press).
3
P e t e r Burke. The Fabricano i of Ijiuis XIV (New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
1992).
^ K a r e n Barkey. Bandits and Bureaucrats, The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press, 1994). On this issue see also Huri íslamoglu-tnan, State
and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire, Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic
Development in Ottoman Anal-ilia During the Sixteenth Century (Leiden: E.I Brill, 1994).
 ] INTRODUCTION 11

ties within groups of peasants or aristocrats, and on inter-class alliances as

preconditions for rebellion, has become the starting point for Barkey's own
work. It is her thesis that the low level of social organization in the Anatolian
countryside inhibited peasant uprisings. Her point is well taken where the
timar-holders are concerned. In the past, we have not sufficiently taken into
account that rimar-holders were frequently rotated and thus unable to form
close ties to 'their' peasants. 1 Moreover the fact that timar-holders were forced
to compete against one another for scarce positions made it impossible for
them to develop a group consciousness of their own, which might have
enabled them to rebel against their late sixteenth-century demotion in favour
of tax farmers.

However as usually happens with a stimulating model, some problems

emerge when one attempts to use it in practice. Bmphasizing the rotation of
ft'mar-holders is a good thing. But this should not get us back to the old —and
in my eyes at least— discredited notion that the Ottoman state of the sixteenth
century possessed a bureaucratic apparatus comparable to the bureaucracies of
modern states, complete with recruitment according to impersonal criteria,
merit promotion, and penalties in case of corruption. 2 In principle there is of
course no contradiction: we can perfectly well assume that Ottoman officials
of the sixteenth century believed that on account of their ulema training, their
descent from a former independent ruling family or from a father established ir
the Sultan's service (that is, due to membership in the askeri), they were
entitled to the benefits of high office. In the same vein, we can concede thai:
sixteenth-century Ottoman officials expected promotion only partially due to
their performance on the Job, and largely through the 'influence' of their
patrons.-' By making these assumptions, Ottoman officials presupposed a set
of criteria differing from those upon which modern bureaucratic careers are —
supposedly — based. At the same time we may accept that, as Barkan and
most recently Barkey have shown us, the frequent rotation of timar-holders
and other provincial administrators, in addition to their mutual competition,
prevented the organization as a class of this section of the Sultan's servitors.

But due to human imperfection, there exists a kind of mental drift. This
leads us to assume that if //mar-holders were frequently rotated, they thereby
became a more impersonal, 'modern' phenomenon, and the Ottoman
bureaucracy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a modern-style
bureaucracy. In my view, it is important to resist that temptation.

' ô m e r Lutfi Barkan, "'Féodal' Dfczen ve Osmanli Timari" in: Tiirkiye iktisat Tarihi Semineri,
Metinler/Tartqmalar .... ed. O s m a n Okyar, Unal Nalbantoglu (Ankara: Hacettcpe Univcrsitcsi
1975), pp. 1-32.
2
I t has been the great merit of R i f t ' a t Abou-El-Haj to point out this difference: Formation of the
Modern State, The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (Albany NY: SÙNY
Press, 1991).
-i
- Cornell Fleischer, "Secretaries' Dreams: Augury and Angst in Ottoman Scribal Service", in:
Armagan, Festschrift fur Andreas Tietze, ed. Ingeborg Baldauf, Suraiya Faroqhi, Rudolf Vesely
(Prague: Enigma Corporation, 1994), pp. 77-1 12, provides a graphic illustration of this point.
 12 COPING WITH THE STA TK

Another difficult} is involved in the concept of a peasantry deficient in

social organization. On one level, this concept is valid for peasantries the
world over; thus early Marxists saw peasants as people who, due to the nature
of their work, developed few social ties to one another. There even existed a
saying which compared the political structure of the peasantry to a sack of
potatoes. Moreover competition between peasant families has been stressed by
social historians dealing with early modern peasantries, particularly in Italy. 1
This competition was increased by the fact that in many parts of Italy
peasants' tenure was short-term and insecure, a feature absent from most parts
of Ottoman Anatolia. Yet Italy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
certainly had its share of uprisings in which rural dwellers played a part, to say
nothing of widespread banditry with villager support.

I would therefore emphasize the involvement of the Ottoman state in

village affairs as a significant factor in inhibiting rural rebellion, which is a
point that Karen Barkey repeatedly makes. 2 But I would place much less value
on a supposedly deficient peasant organization. For to be honest, we know
very little about the internal functioning of Anatolian villages. And in
addition, it would be a pity if the Asiatic Mode of Production, with its
attendant 'isolated villages' were to return by the back door after having been
chased out — for good reasons, or so it seems — by the front. But in spite of
these doubts, Barkcy's book is a major contribution to the state-society debate
of recent years. Its great merit is to have integrated an empirical study of rural
social structure with an cxiensivc discussion of historiographical problems. In
so doing, it demonstrates the increasing maturity of Ottoman history as a
field.

Tilly's study of the social cohesion of ordinary people vis-à-vis a

powerful state has inspired other Ottomanist historians as well. A problem
almost equally troublesome as the absence of peasant uprisings is the question
why the 'notables' of the eighteenth century, who for the most part had
obtained their positions as tax collectors of one sort or another, so rarely
attempted to set up separate states. For the most part they preferred to run the
territories they had carvec out for themselves with a considerable degree of
autonomy, while maintaining their allegiance to an often remote Sultan. And
even those who, like the Kgyptian ruler Mehmed Ali, went to war with their
legitimate sovereign, were still concerned about maintaining cultural ties to

' o n Italy compare Franco Saba. "Italien 1500 - 1650", in: Handbuch der europäischen
Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichic, ed. Wolfram Fischer et alii (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986), Vol.
3, pp. 692-693.
Peasant competition in a northern setting (Piémont) has been analyzed by Giovanni Levi, Das
immaterielle Erbe, Eine bäuerliche Welt an der Schwelle zur Moderne, tr. Karl F. Hauber and
Ulrich Haussman (Berlin: Klaus Wagenbach, 1985), p. 146ff.
^Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucru s. pp. 108-140.
 INTRODUCTION

Istanbul.' This applied even more to minor ayan for whom motifs from the
capital, immortalized on the walls of their houses, constituted an element of
prestige.

Ariel Salzmann has tackled this question in the spirit of Tilly's inquiry,
emphasizing the importance of economic and financial ties in holding the
empire together. 2 Because ayan as tax farmers participated in the Ottoman
enterprise, they had a material interest in its continued existence, and the
Sened-i Ittifak of 1808 demonstrated their will to become shareholders
politically and not just financially.

By making this point, Salzmann has shown how including the

Ottoman experience into comparative political studies can broaden our
understanding. In the past, political historians have been led astray by their all
but exclusive reliance on European cases. European experience has shown ever
increasing centralization of coercive power from the late Middle Ages to the
twentieth century. But other trajectories are equally feasible. By allowing
political decentralization while yet binding local powerholders to the state, the
Ottoman Empire achieved a resilience which allowed it to weather the storms
of the period after 1770, when increasing European intervention combined
with secular economic crisis to make the very survival of the Ottoman state
appear doubtful. Thus the ability of the Ottoman elite to judiciously 'privatize'
some state functions increased its capacity for action. For in this fashion it
was possible to mobilize the resources of local powerholders. As inalctk, Mc
Gowan and most recently Barkey have emphasized, these powerholders had
originally been called into being by the very manner of the state's
functioning. 3 Thus I see a certain convergence between the work of Barkey and
Salzmann : both stress the central political elite's capacity to negotiate the
inclusion of rivals emerging in the provinces, and thereby keep at bay the use
of force against the Sultan's subjects. The relatively low level of violence
against internal contenders in turn limited the need for an increasing
centralization of power, and this relatively low level of military organization
with its attendant flexibility may have allowed the empire to survive where
other, more rigid organizations would have collapsed. 4

' Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, E-;ypt in the reign of Muhammad Mi (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), p. 32.
2
Ariel Salzmann, "An Ancien Regime Revisited: "Privatization" and Political Economy in the
Eighteenth Century Ottoman Empire" Politics and Society, 2 1 , 4 (1993), 393-423.
% a l i l Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transition in the Ottoman Empire 1600 - 1700" Archivum
Ottoniamomi, Vf (1980), 283-337.
Bruce M c G o w a n , Economic Life in Ottoman Europe, Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Lam!,
1600-1800 (Cambridge and Paris: C a m b r i d g e University Press and Maison des Sciences de
l'Homme, 1981).
^Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrati, p. 241 : Salzmann, "Ancien Régime", p. 409.
14 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S I A T E

By emphasizing the similarities of the eighteenth-century Ottoman

setup to the French Ancien Régime before 1789, Salzmann has moreover
pointed to an aspect of Ottoman history which many specialists have tended to
brush aside: while the relationship b e t w e e n O t t o m a n state and society
certainly possessed features which differred strongly from what can be observed
in Europe, this is not the whole story. In addition, as a pre-industrial, non-
capitalist social system it also possessed a great many features in c o m m o n
with many states and societies of continental Europe, of which tax-farming
constitutes a good example. Only while in the Ottoman Empire, tax-farming
served to integrate into the ruling group at the centre rural elites that had
enriched themselves through state service, in France the rival elites integrated
into the state structure through tax-farming had 'capitalistic' sources of wealth
at their disposal as well as purely 'etatistic' ones.

S O M E B A S I C A S S U M P T I O N S

This difference between France and the Ottoman Empire is important,

but so are the similarities. I would see the major merit of the feudalism debate
in the fact that it has provided us with a f r a m e w o r k in which the similarities
between pre-industrial E u r o p e and the O t t o m a n E m p i r e can be rendered
theoretically relevant, i.nd thus do not need to be ignored any longer. On the
other hand, approaches stressing the unique features of Ottoman state and
society only allow us to make sense of the differences, an imbalance which
should at last be remedied. Parallel features between Ottoman and Ancien
Régime French societies have therefore become one of my concerns. Not that
the divergencies should be d o w n p l a y e d , quite to the contrary. But the
prevailing trend in the scholarly literature has been the q u e s t for the
'uniqueness of the West' on the European side, and the 'incommensurability of
the Ottomans' where Ouomanist historians are concerned.

Recent research n economic and social history has however shown that
in many areas the major divergencies between the Ottoman and the European
world begin quite late. Many historians now view the last quarter of the
eighteenth century as t i e crucial period in which the ways parted.' W e will
deal here with the time when, the technological level being as yet comparable,
m a n y life experiences of O t t o m a n s and - particularly M e d i t e r r a n e a n -
Europeans were compaiable as well.

' M e h m e t G e n ç , "XVIII YCizyilda O s m a n l i ì m p a r a t o r l u g u ve S a v a j " Yapil, Toplumsal

Arcqtirnialar Derisi (1984) 49, 4. 51-61; 50, 5, 86-93. Genç believes that the economic crisis
of the 1760s constituted a turning point, while A n d r é R a y m o n d , Artisans et commerçants du
Caire, 2vols (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas, 1973-74), p. lOOff. considers that the fin de
siècle crisis in Cairo began in 1780.
 I INTRODUCTION 15

Somewhere in these debates on Ottoman socio-political organization,

the articles contained in this volume should be situated. They are based on the
assumption that even though Ottoman state ideology ordained that legitimate
political activity was the province of the Sultan and his servitors the askeri,
Ottoman taxpaying sujects (reaya) carved out a realm of de facto political
activity for themselves. By using the benevolence of the ruler as a metaphor
for their own political aims, which were for the most part defensive, they were
able to legitimize their behaviour. But even when a member of the subject
class intended to m o v e aggressively against a fellow subject or against a
m e m b e r of the local askeri, rhetorical statements concerning the just and
protective ruler might prove serviceable.

T H E P O L I T I C A L A C T I V I T I E S O F O T T O M A N
T A X P A Y E R S

'Political initiatives "from the bottom up'", the first article in our
series, contains a cursory overview over the evidence available in the Registers
of Important A f f a i r s ( M i i h i m m e Defterleri) and Registers of C o m p l a i n t s
(§ikayet Defterleri). T h e l a i t section of the title, namely 'some evidence for
their existence' conveys the defensive tone of the article ; for it is concerned
not with mercenary or ayan rebellions, nor with mere humble petitioning, but
with the means used by Ottoman taxpayers to obtain responses f r o m the
Sultan arid his administration, and to have these responses applied in practice.
By official sixteenth-century standards, the subjects of the Ottoman ruler were
to pay their taxes and avoid infringing on the 'political' domain, monopolized
by the Sultan's privileged servitors. T h u s having the Sultan's decisions
translated into practice usually was no easy undertaking, particularly since the
governors and their mercenaries, against w h o m many of the complaints were
directed, were more powerful than the complainants.

Yet we find village aad small town taxpayers organizing themselves to

set up and sign a petition, collecting money to send a petitioner to Istanbul,
and taking recalcitrant governors to court. In the second article of this
sequence, we will deal with the manner in which this business was managed.
In order to obtain results, petitioners must have adopted a language which
Ottoman administrators at the centre found acceptable, and this manner of
speaking included references to the Sultan as protector of the reaya) Thereby
the complaint process, quite apart f r o m the practical results which it might
produce, engaged ruler and subjects in a dialogue which confirmed the Sultan's

On these problems compare Huri islamoglu-ìnan, "Introduction: 'Oriental despotism' in a world

system perspective", in: The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, ed. Huri ¡slamoglu-tnan
(Cambridge and Paris: C a m b r i d g ; University Press and Maison des Sciences de l ' H o m m e
1987), pp. 1-26.
 16 COPING WITH T HE STAT H

legitimacy. This confirmation was achieved, quite apart f r o m the private

thoughts individual pet tioners may have harboured about the weaknesses of
this or that ruler. It has seemed worthwhile to analyze the metaphors and
stereotyped expressions Ottoman subjects thought appropriate to use in this
context, particularly since certain expressions were not what we, with our late
twentieth-century standards of propriety, would expect. Thus it was common
to complain about the misdeeds of a local administrator by saying that if his
evildoing did not cease, the inhabitants of the district would flee the area.
Peasant flight, though widespread, was illegal by the standards of Ottoman
law. But obviously Ottoman etiquette under certain circumstances permitted
real life situations to obtrude in official speech. This paper tries to establish
an inventory of such occurrences, hoping that thereby the reader will be able
to see combinations and permutations which remain hidden as long as one
merely regards individual documents.

If asserting the role of the Sultan as a protector of the 'poor reaya' was
one way of shielding oneself against the exactions of the governors and their
men, the mediation of saints could be another. Within O t t o m a n Anatolia,
there existed quite a few dervish lodges inhabited by sheikhly families. Some
of the latter had been prominent under the pre-Ottoman rulers of the Seljuk
and post-Seljuk periods. These people, with more or less success, claimed to
be "nobody's subject (raiyet)' and attempted to establish themselves as tax-free
servitors of the Sultan, even though in many cases they were situated on the
outer limits of the asken class. In certain sixteenth and seventeenth-century
instances, vve find them pleading on behalf of fellow provincials. However a
modern study of supposed sheikhly mediators in Lebanon may induce a degree
of scepticism concerning the seriousness with which m a n y early modern
sheiks played their roles as mediators. 1

While the first three articles deal with the Ottoman Anatolian scene as
a whole, the fourth attempts to delineate political conflict in the more limited
environment of a country town. T h e scene is late sixteenth-ccntury (^orum,
whose local politics are covered by a single kadi register, albeit of exceptional
richness. But these limitations turn out to be advantages. Here we are able to
follow diverse events occurring at the same time as the m a j o r issue, namely
an attempt on the part of the townsmen to obtain the restitution of taxes
illegally collected by the local governor. Thus we can discern that 1595-97
were in fact crisis years, when a mediocre harvest caused certain suppliers of
grain to Istanbul to forage as far as land-locked Quorum. In addition, deliveries
of goods and services tc the I'alace and army started off major conflict among
the townsmen. Because of these disasters the court case against the governor,
along with the petitions which had preceded it, took on an urgency it would
not have possessed in other, more peaceful years.

' M i c h a e l G i l s e n a n , " A g a i n s t Patron C l i e n t R e l a t i o n s " , in Patron.v and Clients in Mediterranean

Societies, e d . E r n e s t Gcllner :ind J o h n W a t e r b u r y ( L o n d o n , 1977), pp. 1 6 7 - 1 8 2 .
 I N T R O D U C T I O N 17

Apart from the Ottoman-Austrian war going on at the time, f o r u m s

problems, and those of many other Anatolian towns, stemmed f r o m the fact
that these were the years of the Celali uprisings. Mercenaries of re ay a
background attempted to obtain j o b security and a place in the regular
Ottoman armies by being as disruptive as possible. 'Political tensions in the
Anatolian countryside around 1600' and 'Seeking wisdom in China' review
interpretations of these events which have appeared in the secondary literature.
Unfortunately Karen Barkty's book could not be included, as it was published
a f t e r these t w o articles had been c o m p l e t e d . 'Political tensions in the
A n a t o l i a n countryside' i<; c o n c e r n e d with the vexed question why the
discontents of Anatolian peasants did not result in rural uprisings. Barkey has
given a broadly e n c o m p a s s i n g answer to this question, e m p h a s i z i n g the
fluidity of human configurations both a m o n g provincial administrators and
village dwellers. My own response f o c u s s e s on a point which occurs in
Barkey's explanation as well, albeit as a secondary issue. Official prohibitions
to the contrary, it was easy for discontented peasants to leave the village, and
therefore, the inclination to take the more risky path of rebellion was probably
limited. T h e debt which both Karen Barkey and myself o w e to the seminal
work of James Scott will be obvious to the reader. 1

Ottoman m e r c e n a r i e s of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth

centuries gained a reputation for brigandage, particularly highway robbery.
N o w this latter phenomenon is known throughout the preindustrial world, and
even early industrial Europe had its fair share of highway robbers. 2 But Indian
and Chinese brigandage have also given rise to a number of thorough and
stimulating studies. 3 In the long run, systematic comparative work both in
the Ottoman-Southeast-Asian and the Ottoman-Chinese sectors hopefully will
be undertaken. In the Ottonian-Southeast-Asian instance, certain scholars have
already begun to test the waters, even though nobody has yet tackled bandits
and brigandage. 4

' j a m e s Scott, Weapons of the Weak, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, l')85).
2
T h e pervasive fear of highway robbers in the immediate vicinity of London around 1800 has
inspired magnificent chapters (Ch. 2 and 3) in Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities (New
York, 1974), p. 2 I f f .
3
D a v i d Arnold, "Dacoity and Rural Crime in Madras. 1860-1940", The Journal of Peasant
Studies, 6, 2 (1979), 140-167.
Elizabeth Perry, Rebels and Revo.'utionaries in North China 1845-1945 (Stanford Cal • Stanford
University Press, 1980).
Susan Naquin, Shantung Rebellion: The Wang Lun Uprising of 1774 (New Haven, London: Yale
University Press, 1981). Phil Bill ngsley, Bandits in Republican China (Stanford ' c a l • Stanford
University Press, ¡988).
4
S a n j a y S u b r a h m a n y a m , "Precious Metal Flows and Prices in Western and Southern Asia,
1500-1750, Some Comparative and Conjunctural Aspects" paper read at the Delhi Internationa!
Congress on Monetary History, A pril 13-15, 1989. This paper stresses the comparative angle in
monetary history. I thank the author for allowing me to see his manuscript.
 18 C <) P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

Ottoman-Chinese comparisons appear particularly intimidating, and

very little preliminary work exists. 1 This is a great pity, as the numerous
C h i n e s e b r i g a n d a g e studies c o n t a i n m a n y o b s e r v a t i o n s that are very
worthwhile for our purposes. Certain types of brigandage observed in China
strongly resemble phenomena known from the Ottoman context as well. But
at the present stage, rather than attempting a full-scale comparison for which I
am in no way prepared, I have simply imported the model of early twentieth-
century Chinese brigandage f o u n d in the study of Phil Billingsley. 2 For
reasons that as yet remain unknown, these b r i g a n d s show all the
characteristics w e have c o m e to associate with the Celali rebellions.
Moreover, since the Chinese bandits are much better documented than the
Celalis, we can use them to construct hypotheses concerning those features of
Ottoman brigand-mercenaries about which we know nothing. At present it
seems that this model imported all the way f r o m China may help us make
sense of our all too fragmentary sources. But only future research will tell.

C R I M E S T O R I E S A S E V I D E N C E O F S O C I A E

T E N S I O N

The second section of this book consists of a series of crime stories.

Crime stories in a twentieth-century setting have often been used as indicators
of the fault lines in a given society, Tensions between family members and
neighbours, between employers and servants, between members of politically
privileged groups and 'ordinary' subjects all occasionally lead to crime, and
some of the fissures shown up in crime stories are difficult to locate on the
basis of any other material. Yet Ottomanist historians have on the whole
rather neglected this route to a closer understanding of Ottoman society, even
though more than thirt\ years ago, Mustafa A k d a g pointed the way by using
an extraordinary case of crime on the road in his account of Anatolian society
at. the height of the Celcli rebellions. 3 Admittedly, sources for the study of
criminal behaviour are often scarce, and possibly we still retain traces of the
1940s view that idealized Ottoman society as a society without conflict, and
in which crime therefore had no place. Be that as it may, the time seems to
have come for a devotee of detective stories to make use of an off-duty interest
to better understand state society relations in Ottoman Anatolia.

' j a c k G o l d s t o n e , " E a s t a n d W e s t in t h e S e v e n t e e n t h C e n t u r y : Political C r i s i s in S t u a r t E n g l a n d ,

O t t o m a n T u r k e y a n d M i n g C h i n a " , Comparative Studies in Society and History, 3 0 , 1 ( 1 9 8 8 ) ,
103-142.
^ B i l l i n g s l e y , Bandits, pp. 1-3').
^ M u s t a f a A k d a g , CelaliIsyanl.in (1550-1603) ( A n k a r a : A U D T C F a k . Y a y i n l a r i , 1963), p. 8 9 .
 INTRODUCTION 19

All the stories analysed here in one way or another deal with conflicts
which involve the Ottoman state apparatus and the tax-paying subjects,
possibly in addition to third parties. I have deliberately excluded stories which
merely highlight intrafamilial tensions, or other conflicts in which the state
played but a minor part. Crimes and misdemeanours showing up faultlines
within the family might make the subject for a future book, as attempts to
deprive women and minors of their inheritances are standard fare in seventeenth
and eighteenth-century complaints from the provinces. But that is for another
day, in§a'allah.

THE SOURCES OF CRIME STORIES

Some of the sources used here are well-known to the historians of

Ottoman social life, namely the kadi registers and the Registers of Important
Affairs. When using these sources, we can be sure that we are dealing with
real-life cases, not with the scholastic exercises which sometimes may have
found their way into legal te tts. But the court records present disadvantages of
their own, as they often simply state the facts of the case as documented by
the testimony of witnesses, and tell us nothing of the punishment, if any.
However we have been fortunate in locating a very amply documented case of
what were probably former mercenaries turned robbers. The records of this
case, though found in a kadi's register, do give us an idea of the procedure
followed between the capture of a gang of robbers and their execution. This
material is especially valuable in that it shows once again that the execution
of a kadi's judgement was by no means automatic, but necessitated quite a few
démarches on the local level and even in the capital.

One of our tales is however based on material which to my knowledge

has not been used to date, namely one of the few nezir registers which have
been found in the Ottoman archives. 1 Normally, the term nezir belongs to the
religious life of individual people and not to the realm directly controlled by
the state. A person can promise to commit a certain act, which is religiously
permissible but not obligatory, a vow often contingent upon the occurrence of
a certain wished-for event. Freeing a slave or feeding a given number of poor
people in case of recovery from an illness might be cited as examples. But
between the closing years of the seventeenth century and the Tanzimat, that is
for practical purposes mainly in the eighteenth century, the Ottoman
authorities sometimes forced villagers to pledge large amounts of money
which would fall due in case they failed to turn in a bandit originating from
their village. Special register«, were devoted to these cases, each event recorded

' B a ç b a k a n l i k Arçivi, Maliyeden mudevver ( M M ) 4017. T h e second register I know of is M M

8 5 3 8 ( 1 1 6 4 1178/1750-1765).
20 COI'ING WITH THE STATE

in a larger or smaller number of documents, as the case might warrant. In the

s a m e register, we also sometimes find cases which do not visibly involve
nezir, such as the p a y m e n t of penalty a n d / o r compensation by a central
Anatolian tribal unit. This group appears to have fought a major battle with
the authorities, in the course of which a governor was killed. 1 Possibly the
affair was included because the nomads were also required to pledge a sum of
money in addition to the penalty or compensation, but I have been unable to
locate the relevant document. Thus the nezir registers constitute a unique
source for political conHict in the eighteenth-century Anatolian countryside,
and warrant a more detailed study.

TALKS OF CRIME AND MISDEMEANOUR

The first of our stories deals with the activities of African slaves and
f r e e d m e n in the Anatolian province of A y d i n , who w e r e in the habit of
organizing festivities for which they solicited contributions f r o m surrounding
landholders. Those thai refused to contribute were sometimes subjected to
physical attack, and as l result, the landholders asked for a sultanic command
to have the festivities forbidden. For the most part the article is concerned
with the identification of the festivities in question, by comparing the all too
brief account surviving in the Registers of Important Affairs with later reports
of slave feasting. But as we know, festive exuberance and delinquency were
and are closely connected, not only a m o n g Ottoman slaves. T h u s it seems
defensible to change the emphasis, and include this paper as an example of
slaves and former slaves affirming their identity and community not only vis a
vis their masters, but also with respect to the Ottoman state. For the latter
upheld the institution ol slavery, and demanded that servants show respect to
their masters. Slaves and freedmen sought release from their daily routines by
actions which at times became violent and thus occasioned repression. This
fact justifies our including the Aydin story a m o n g the tales of crimes which
possess, to use a modern expression, 'a political background'.

Our next tale took place in an urban setting, in the Sabuni quarter of
Ankara, and the crime in question was the manufacture of counterfeit coins.
As the accused figured the dyer Abdi b. Murad, who was caught practically red-
handed, as the small goldsmith's furnace which he kept in his house was still
warm. Abdi's crime was committed in a time of monetary instability, when
many ordinary people were hurt by the d e m a n d that they pay their taxes in
good-quality coin even though only debased akge were available in their
localities. Probably many who did not risk full-scale counterfeiting filed away
at better quality coins and saved the silver thus acquired, while money
changers profited by charging premiums on good-quality akge or guru$. Abdi

MM 4017, pp. 230-231.

 I INTRODUCTION 21

b. M u r a d tried a m o r e d i r e c t m a n n e r of c o p i n g with t h e s i t u a t i o n , and

c o n t e m p o r a r y records s h o w that he w a s not alone. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , this is one
of the instances in w h i c h the kadi register contains no record of w h a t happened
to the unlucky m a n .

In the f o l l o w i n g story, w h i c h takes us back to C o r a m , w e are dealing

with probably the b e s t - d o c u m e n t e d c a s e of b r i g a n d - c u m - m e r c e n a r y ( l e v e n d )
r o b b e r i e s w h i c h h a s b e e n l o c a t e d t o d a y . F o r t h e m o s t p a r t , the r e c o r d s
documenting the misdeeds of robbers provide f e w details and thus appear rather
stereotyped; it is hard to see the robbers and their victims as living people,
with hopes, fears, aspirations and disappointments. Even in the register entries
discussed here, e n o u g h gaps and contradictions remain to blur the outlines of
the story. B u t it still a rare piece of good f o r t u n e to find the c o m p l a i n t of a
small trader w h o had been travelling with his servant and his d o n k e y in the
vicinity of £ o r u m , c a r r y i n g a load of soap, and w h o s e g o o d s w e r e plundered
by the brigands. T h i s c a s e s also special in that it provides e v i d e n c e of the
m a n n e r in which s i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y O t t o m a n s e x p r e s s e d p e r s o n a l hostility.
T h u s the brigands, w h o regarded the kadi of S o r g u n as their special e n e m y ,
hacked the latter's h e a d g e a r to pieces with their swords, p r o c l a i m i n g that if
they had captured its owner, they would h a v e treated him in the s a m e manner.
N o w w e k n o w that h e a d g e a r had a special place in O t t o m a n culture, in that it
p r o c l a i m e d a person's status in society. B u t that it could be regarded as a
person's s y m b o l i c representation still remains w o r t h noting.

T h e b r i g a n d - m e r c e n a r i e s ultimately w e r e captured b e c a u s e they had

m a d e t o o m a n y e n e m i e s in the area. M o s t redoubtable was the e n m i t y of the
kadi of S o r g u n , a wealthy m a n with c o n t a c t s in Istanbul. M o r e o v e r the
bandits had d o n e s o m e t h i n g to enrage the legitimate soldiers stationed in the
area, w h e t h e r by c l a i m i n g a military identity to which they w e r e not or no
longer entitled, or possibly by the sheer tenacity of their resistance. Villagers
were enfuriated at h a v i n g been robbed of their provisions, at w o m e n molested
and boys kidnapped. T h i s latter factor probably was aggravated by the fact that
the brigands w e r e n o t local men, e v e n t h o u g h at least their leader and several
other chiefs c a m e f r o m the area in a w i d e r sense of the word. But they do not
s e e m to h a v e had a n y relatives w i l l i n g to p r o t e c t them, or else, the latter
regarded the c a p t u r e d bandits' situation as h o p e l e s s and preferred to not get
involved.

In other cases of b r i g a n d a g e , h o w e v e r , f a m i l y relationships between

accused bandits and 'ordinary' villagers w e r e of s o m e importance. A case from
the a r e a of Qa\ in t h e s u b p r o v i n c e of K u t a h y a , d a t i n g f r o m t h e early
eighteenth century, i n v o l v e s t w o villages w h i c h their n e i g h b o u r s accused of
collective brigandage. S i n c e a c o u r t h o u s e w a s attacked and set on fire, a kadi
and three other people murdered, and two hundred horsemen allegedly took part
22 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

in the affray, this was obviously a case with wide ramifications. After all it is
hard to believe that in two small villages, there should have been two hundred
horses available. P r o i a b l y s o m e of the villagers had ties to brigand-
mercenaries, w h o s e aid they could call upon, or else they were aided by a
group of nomads.

Apparently the Ottoman central administration took seriously the

allegations that the attack on the kadi and his courthouse involved the villages
as collectivities. The two places seem to have had a history of brigandage; for
back in 1700-01, some years before the murders, they both had been required
to pledge substantial sums of money as guarantees for future good behaviour.
Now the money was considered forfeit and had to be paid o v e r ; moreover in
1708, the two villages were required to pledge a further sum guaranteeing their
submissive behaviour in the future.

Nor was this remarkable story unique. Quite to the contrary, the
register in which it is recounted contains numerous instances of this kind f r o m
the early 1700s. This n e a n s that villagers were required to stand surety for
each other, as in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, they had stood surety
for one another where the payment of certain taxes was concerned. It was
probably assumed in official circles that the pledging of a sizeable sum would
give rise to considerable internal pressures in the village, with the more
cautious householders threatening to denounce to the authorities those w h o
were inclined to robbery and/or rebellion. Thus the Ottoman authorities seem
to have believed that considerable cohesion existed within villages, or in any
case could be generated by the pledges described here. This is one reason why
it does not seem appropriate to posit the model of an atomized village, in
which relations between householders were marginal to the survival of a
peasant family.

The last of our crime stories takes us out of Anatolia, into the Syrian
and Arabian deserts which Ottoman Anatolians encountered when they went
on the hajj. Here most of the robbers were not would-be mercenaries and their
village allies, but desert dwellers who in many years were unable to subsist on
camel breeding, and who received grants-in-aid f r o m the Ottoman central
administration so that they would refrain f r o m attacking the pilgrims. 1 But it
often happened that tin; grants, which were subject to negotiation, were not
paid in full, or the Bed jins had other reasons for believing themselves badly
treated. When there « a s political unrest in the Hijaz, the caravans were
particularly threatened, and of course the same applied in case of droughts.

'Abdul-Karim Rafeq, The l>,„vince of Damascus 1723-1783 (Beirut: Khayats, 1970).

 INTRODUCTION 23

But Beduins were not the only robbers who might attack the caravans.
Pilgrims were also threatened by the officials who should have ensured their
protection, and the central government had reason to treat local officials in
Syria with the same kind of distrust which charaterized the relations between
central and provincial administrators in Anatolia, particularly at the time of
the Celali rebellions. But even so, many officials seem to have got away with
very moderate punishment; it seems that some of the most blatant offenders
were, at the very worst, deposec.

Now Beduin brigands also often escaped punishment, if only because of

the difficulty involved in capturing them. But at least the rhetorical
condemnation of Beduin robbers was a good deal sharper, and if an expedition
was mounted against them, they were treated similarly to other external
enemies. Thus the documents concerning robberies on the hajj road can be
used to determine who was included in the protection of the Sultan, and under
what circumstances this right to protection might be lost. That Beduins living
close to the hajj road under normal circumstances were treated as highly
privileged subjects of the empire, may explain why they were regarded as
completely outside the pale once the Ottoman authorities considered that they
had broken their compact.

Obviously, the lessons which crime stories can teach us are by no

means exhausted by this brief sample, and other tales will hopefully be
written. Some of the stories have exemplified social tensions which we
already knew; in other cases, particularly in the account of the collective
guarantees demanded from the peasants of £al, the analysis of an individual
case has allowed us to grasp conflicts about which we previously knew very
little. If these case studies encourage other scholars to venture into the wide
and as yet barely charted territory of state-society relations in Ottoman
Anatolia, the present collection will have served its purpose.
 POLITICAL INITIATIVES 'FROM THE
BOTTOM UP' IN THE SIXTEENTH-
AND SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
OTTOMAN EMPIRE: SOME EVIDENCE
FOR THEIR EXISTENCE

Researchers dealing with the various Middle Eastern Empires have time
and again stressed the hypertrophy of the state, from which all initiatives
proceeded, and against which the ordinary villager, t o w n s m a n and even
religious scholar had little hope of redress. T o name one recent example: when
M. Chertf undertook to study the genesis of Tunisian nationhood 1 , he had
originally planned to f o c u s upon e c o n o m i c factors, such as P. Vilar had
analyzed with respect to the f o r m a t i v e period of C a t a l o n i a n national
c o n s c i o u s n e s s 2 . H o w e v e r , when Cherif b e c a m e more f a m i l i a r with the
primary sources for this period, he found himself forced to change his focus,
and concentrate instead upon Tunisian state structures and their evolution
during the eighteenth century. Thus what had been planned as an investigation
into the effects of economic change upon politics and the history of political
ideas turned into a study of straightforward political history, even though the
author had by no means given up the f r a m e w o r k derived f r o m Vilar's or
Braudel's work 3 .

Obviously, a reorientation induced by what can be learned from the

available documentation is in itself a good thing, and as long as matters
remain on that plane, there is no possible objection. However, many scholars
will go beyond such cautious and empirical approaches, and f r o m the
empirically recognizable hypertrophy of the Ottoman state will j u m p to the
conclusion that the Ottoman state should be considered as a kind of "Oriental
d e s p o t i s m " 4 . In such a political system, there was supposedly no "civil
society", that is a society organized so as to possess a certain degree of
independence vis-à-vis the state. When taking an extreme point of view, one
might even assume that in such a state there could be no economic or social
history, but that the problems normally dealt with by these branches of study-
should be regarded as part a r d parcel of an all-encompassing political history.

' M o h a m e d Hédi Cherif, Pouvoir et société dans la Tunisie de Hiisayn h. 'Ali (1705-1740),
Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines de Tunis, IV, XXIX 2 vois. (Tunis, 1984, 1986).
2
P i e r r e Vilar, La Catalogne dans l'Espagne moderne, Recherches sur les fondements
économiques des structures nationales (abridged edition) vol. 1 (Paris 1977) (no m o r e
published).
- Fernand liraudel, La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II 2
éd., 2 vols. (Paris 1966).
4
F o r a thorough discussion of these matters, compare Rifa'at Ali Abou-El-Haj, Formation of the
Modem State, The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (Albany N.Y., 1991)!
26 C ( ) I' I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

L O C A L L Y B A S I I) P O L I T I C A L I N I T I A T I V E S :
E V I D E N C E F R O M R E C E N T S E C O N D A R Y
L I T E R A T U R E

However in the recent past scholars have begun to feel some doubts
with respect to the supposed existence of an "Oriental Despotism" in the
Ottoman Empire, thus confirming Mohamed Cherif's shrewd remark: "Once
you look closely at a given society, it always turns out to be an exception" 1 .
Thus, there is considerable evidence that between the late sixteenth and the
early nineteenth centuries, Ottoman subjects, acting together in guilds, para-
military units, or other organizations, challenged the powers that be and
achieved certain political aims. This becomes particularly clear by contrast
with the period immediately following, when we look at the dramatic increase
of the Sultan's power in ihe first half of the nineteenth century. Ilber Ortayli
has recently stressed the fact that only Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1838) and his
successors were really able to function as absolute rulers 2 . This latter type of
rule only became possible after Mahmud II had eliminated the "constituted
power" of the janissaries, and moreover had begun to weaken the ulema, who
during the eighteenth century had often functioned as the latters' allies. For the
same period, Nikolaj Todorov has pointed out that successful textile
manufacturers, some of whom owned small-scale factories, were by no means
inclined to leave the guilds 3 . Quite to the contrary, these manufacturers played
leadership roles in the guilds and used them as a social base from which they
bargained with the Otioman central administration. Thus, even early
capitalists preferred guild organization to free trade, because these 'constituted
bodies' increased their bargaining power.

Concerning a slightly more remote period, similar evidence exists of

political power in the hands of people who, at least in most cases, were not
members of the Ottoman ruling group in the narrow sense of the word.
Studies by Halil Inalcik and Bruce McGowan have focused upon the provincial
notables (ayan) of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 4 : both these
authors have been able to show how the ayan, by assuming a leading role in
provincial tax collection, were able to accumulate appreciable political power.
With respect to the later seventeenth century, Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj has
dwelt upon the political alliances that forced a Sultan from the throne, when it

... "leur application à des cas concrets fait surtout ressortir les exceptions à la règle", sec
Cherif, P o u v o i r . . . , vol. 1, 12
2
i l b e r Ortayli, imparatorluguii •n Uzun YUzyäi (Istanbul 1983), 19-20, p. 35 and 88 ff.
% i k o l a y Todorov, "I9.cu Yii/.yilin IIk Yarismda Bulgaristan Esnaf Te§kilatinda Bazi Karakter
Degiçmeleri", I. Ü. iktisat Fakidtesi Mecmuasi, 27, 1-2 (1967-68), 1-36.
4
H a l i l Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation of the Ottoman State", in: Studies in Ottoman
Social and Economic History (London 1985). Bruce M c G o w a n , Economic Life in Ottoman
Europe (Cambridge, Bngl., Paris 1980).
 P O L I T I C A L I N III A T I V E S 21

appeared that he was, accidentally or by design, transporting the seat of power

from Istanbul to Edirne 1 .

For an even earlier period, namely the late sixteenth century, Ozer
Ergen? has shown that the notables of Ankara were able to organize a major
project, namely the construction of a wall around their city 2 . Moreover, the
same author has demonstrated that the inhabitants of this city were by no
means cut off f r o m one another in more or less isolated town quarters, but
showed a considerable degree of intra-urban cooperation. This cooperation was
achieved by informal means, as there existed no autonomous institutions
which might have served tc channel it. Similar processes have been observec
even in much smaller sett ements, such as the town of C o r u m during the
closing years of the sixteenth century. In this instance, we find the more
substantial inhabitants of the town getting together in order to lodge 3.
complaint against a provincial governor who had collected illegal taxes in the:
city 3 .

T h e (,'orum notables' undertaking was at least in part successful. This

shows that even without corporate towns, the townsmen of the Ottoman
Empire in certain instances were able to f o r m u l a t e political d e m a n d s and
ensure their acceptance. H o w e v e r w e do not know whether this political
influence was a new phenomenon, a result of the crisis in state and society
that occurred in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. Or else the political
impact of upper-level t o w n s m e n w a s part and parcel of the "political
constitution" of the "classical" Ottoman Empire as well. One feels inclined to
assume that the f o r m e r alternative is closer to the truth, given the fact that
political initiatives on the part of ordinary Ottoman t o w n s m e n are rarely
recorded for the period of Kanuni Suleyman and his predecessors 4 . However, it
must be kept in mind that our sources for these events are mainly the
M u h i m m e registers and provincial kadis' records, and materials of this type do
not become at all abundant before the second half of the sixteenth century.

'Rifaat Abou-El-Haj, The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics (Leiden 1984).
2
Ô z e r Ergenç, "Osmanh Çehirlerindeki Yônetim Kurumlannin Niteligi Uzerinde Bazi
Dùçunceler", in: VIII. Turk Tarih Kongresi, Sunulan Bildiriler, vol. 2, (Ankara 1981), 53-82
1265-1274.
Suraiya F;aroqhi, "Town Officials, »mar-holders and Taxation...", Turcica, XVIII (1986)
reproduced in this volume.
4
i t is possible that the 16th century Ottoman administration tried to bankrupt provincial notables
by appointing them butchers (kasrap) in Istanbul. These measures may be viewed as part and
parcel of a struggle between the centralizing state and these provincial notables: Suraiya
Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an
Urban Setting (Cambridge, Engl.. 1984), 221 ff.
28 C O 1' 1 N Ü W I T H T H E S T A T E

D E B A T E S C O N C E R N I N G T H E
" T R A N S F O R M A T I O N " O F T H E O T T O M A N S T A T E

Certain scholars have attempted to formulate, on a more general level,

what kinds of political initiatives were possible to Ottoman townsmen
between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. (As to the peasants, it was
usually their only recourse to abandon their lands, join the nomads, or become
the followers of a powerful individual.) Traian Stoianovich, employing an
urban typology somewhat similar to that used by Braudel, has expressed the
opinion that Ottoman towns, after having been "dependent" during the
sixteenth century, were able to considerably expand the range of their options
in later periods'. Thus, according to Stoianovich, by the eighteenth century,
they should no longer be classed as "dependent" but rather as "semi-
dependent". Ozer Hrgern. is of the opinion that Ankara was a "semi-dependent"
city even by the closing years of the sixteenth century 2 . Viewing the problem
from a different angle, Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj speaks of a "transformation" of the
Ottoman state during the seventeenth century. The fundamentally conservative
authors of the political treatises known as nasihatnames regarded this change
as a deterioration, a point of view readily adopted by European and Turkish
scholars of the twentieth century 3 .

The term "transformation" also has been adopted by Halil inalcik 4 .

This latter historian suggests that the "gunpowder revolution" made it
necessary for the Ottoman state to raise its revenues, so as to pay for the
services of gunners, who could not be supplied by the timar system. Thus, a
change in military technology led to changes in political structure, as the
timar system which had always been regarded as the most distinctive feature of
the Ottoman system during its formative period, lost much of its previous
importance. Inalcik insists upon the fact that provincial administrators were
made responsible for the, recruiting of gunners, which in view of their
intermittent tenure of office, they were able to do only in an erratic manner. In
Inalcik's view, it is also this military and fiscal change in the Ottoman
Empire that led to the long-lasting civil war period known as the Celali
rebellions, which once agiin made preoccupations related to security play a
major role in the concerns of Ottoman peasants and townsmen.

Traian Stoianovich, "Model am. Mirror of the pre-modern Balkan City", in: IM ville balkanique
XV-XIX i . V . , Studia Balkanica, < (Sofia 1970), 83-110. For Braudel's classification see Fernand
Braudel, Civilization matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe-XVItl siècle, 3 vols (Paris 1979),
vol 1 : Les structures du quotidiei, 453 ff.
^ E r g e n ç , "Yönetim Kurumlari" passim. The main point of Ergenç's work, based on Ankara
evidence, is parallel to the thrust of the present article.
Abou-El-Haj, unpublished manuscript.
^Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation".
 POLITICAL INITIATIVES 29

As a result of this transformation, in the eighteenth century there

emerged a society in which organizations possessing a corporate character
played a more significant role than had been true in the past. This has been
observed particularly by researchers dealing with Syria. Thus in a recent stud)'
of the political process in eighteenth and nineteenth century Damascus, Linda
Schatkowski-Schilcher has described Damascene society as made up of
"estates", among which the men admitted to paramilitary organizations, the:
ulema and the descendants of the Prophet played particularly prominent roles'
The "separateness" of these groupings is documented by the fact that they
settled in different parts of the city, so that armed men associated with these
estates often clashed in the border areas between territories controlled by the
respective factions. Certainly, Schatkowski-Schilcher uses the term "estate" in
a loose manner; partículaiy , the reader must beware of the erroneous
assumption that the estates of eighteenth or nineteenth-century Damascus
possessed as formal a juridical structure as their European homologues.
However, this is certainly a far cry from the direct confrontation between the
state and the individual person, often assumed to be a guiding principle of
Middle Eastern Islamic society.

POLITICAL INITIATIVES "FROM THE BOTTOM UP"

With respect to political initiatives "from the bottom up", for the late
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries — a period during which the
transformation of the Ottoman political system was as yet far from complete
— we possess some interesting if fragmentary documentation in the
Miihimme registers. During the first half of the sixteenth century, no separate
registers concerning only the responses to complaints (§ikayet Defterleri) had
as yet been established, so that the Miihimme registers still contain a fair
number of documents which fifty years later would have found a place in the
§ikayet Defterleri. For the later part of the period, there is the evidence of the
§ikayet registers themselves-.

Thus it would seem hat ordinary inhabitants of the Empire involved

themselves in the political mechanism mainly through the lodging of
complaints. These complaints might be directed against a given administrator,
and involve a demand for the restitution of taxes unjustly collected, or else for
the redress of other kinds of administrative malpractices. However, the persons
lodging the complaint might also draw the attention of the Divan-i humayun

' L i n d a Schatkowski-Schilcher, Families in Politics, Damascene Factions and Estates of the 18th
and 19th Centuries, Berliner Islamstudien Bd. 2 (Stuttgart 1985).
For a published e x a m p l e , c o m p a r e Das Osmanische Registerbuch der Beschwerden vom
Jahre 1675, ed. Hans Georg M a j e r (Vienna 1984), vol 1.
30 C O I' 1 N G W I T H THE STATE

to more general problems existing in their localities. Even though certain

persons or families might lodge complaints concerning strictly private
matters, it would be a mistake to overlook the political aspects of the
complaint mechanism, and regard it as purely a recourse open to private
persons.

In this context, it is of interest to establish what kinds of people might

lodge a complaint with the Divan. Certain texts remain vague, and simply
speak of the "population" (ahali) of a given town or village 1 . In some cases,
the persons demanding redress remain even more anonymous and shadowy,
because they avoided appearing in person and made use of the kadi to present
their complaints. Thus, one might refer to a document responding to a
petition from the kadi of Van 2 . This text contains such a wealth of details
concerning the misdeeds of a local beylerbeyi who expelled the non-Muslim
inhabitants of Van from their houses in order to lodge his troops, that the
information in question must have been furnished to the kadi by the families
who had been victimized by these proceedings.

In other cases the people lodging a complaint might be members of a

guild; thus, the taife of „he felt cap makers (kiilahgi) of Konya objected
against the monopolization of goatshair by wealthy engrossers (1089/ 1678-
79) 3 . In even more formal terms, another guild, namely the dyers of the town
of Tire in western Anatolia, couched their complaint against the cloth
merchants and dyers of Bolvadin, Denizli, Hamid and Manisa 4 ; for the text
explicitly states that the "elders of the dyers' guild" (sabbag hirfetinin pir ve
ihtiyarlari) appeared in court to present the craftsmen's grievances. Petitions
presented by craftsmen belonging to a variety of different guilds are also
recorded: thus, in 1018/1609-10 the grocers, bakers, sellers of barley, farriers
and "other tradesmen" of Uskiidar protested against the high contributions that
they were expected to pay the offical courier service 5 . However, while in the
case of the Tire dyers, it is clear that the craftsmen acted as a guild, in the
Uskiidar case it is equally possible that the petitioners took action purely as
individuals, for the text does not mention any involvement on the part of
guild officials.

Other documents refer to petitions on the part of provincial notables.

These people were sometimes referred to as ayan. Thus, the felt cap makers of
Konya, when naming the merchants whose activities were depriving them of

' f o r a n e x a m p l e s e e : O s m a n l i A r g i v i . I s t a n b u l , M u h i m m e D e f t e r i ( M D ) , 8 1 , p. 5 1 , n o . 113
(1025/1616).
2
M D 8 1 , p. 144, no. 3 1 4 ( 1 0 2 5 , 1 6 1 6 ) .
3
M D 9 6 , p. 7 5 , n o . 3 7 9 ( 1 0 8 9 / 1 6 7 8 - 7 9 ) .
4
M D 9 6 . p. 127, no. 6 3 9 (1089. 1 6 7 8 - 7 9 ) .
5
M D 7 8 , p. 2 9 9 . no. 7 8 2 ( 1 0 1 8 1609 1(1).
 POLITICAL INITIATIVES 31

needed raw material, call some of them simply by their names and/or
nicknames. But two people, bearing the title of §eyh, are also described as
ayan-i vilayet; unfortunately the text does not indicate any reason for giving
them this title. However, it is probably not wrong to assume that the people
described in one Miihimme document referring to the Anatolian town of
§ebinkarahisar 1 , as the ulema ve suleha ve sadat ve fukara ve zuefa were to
some extent coterminous v/ith the provincial ayan. (The text refers to the
ulema, pious people, descendants of the Prophet, the dervishes as well as other
poor and modest men, probably of some religious standing; for the ordinary
subjects, reaya ve beraya, v/ere named separatetly.) Thus it would seem that
the notables of early sevente3nth-century §ebinkarahisar were largely religious
dignitaries of some sort, which is not surprising, given the small size of the
town and the poverty of its agricultural hinterland.

A somewhat different group of locally prominent people can be

encountered in a document dated 998/1589-90 and relating to the Balkan town
of Manastir 2 : here they are called the ulema ve suleha ve zuema ve erbab-i
timar ve sair e^rafi ve fukarasi (the ulema, religious people, the men
assigned tax grants in return for military or administrative services, other
notables — or descendants of the Prophet — and dervishes). This would
indicate that men directly serving the Ottoman central administration played a
more significant role among the notables of Manastir, than they did in
§ebinkarahisar, while commercial interests were apparently not represented in
either of these groups.

At times, petitioners did not regard it as sufficient to ask the kadi to

forward their complaint, but turned directly to Istanbul. In the documents, this
situation is reflected by the phrase: "they sent a man and a petition" (adam ve
arzuhal gdnderub)i. How this was arranged is reflected in a rescript from the
year I089/1678-79 4 : the inhabitants of Ankara (Ankara ahalisi) had appointed
three men to travel to Istanbul on their behalf and supposedly promised to pay
them the sum of 300 guru.§. However, something went wrong, and the
inhabitants of Ankara refused to pay. When the matter was brought to the
attention of the judge, the parties decided to settle out of court and the Ankara
inhabitants promised to pay 200 guru$ — a promise which they again did not
keep.

' M D 7 9 , p. 112, no. 2 9 0 ( 1 0 1 9 / 1 6 1 0 - 1 1 ) .

2
M u h i m m e Z e y l i 4 , p. 2 1 3 ( 9 9 8 / 1 5 8 9 - 9 0 ) .
^ O s m a n l i Argivi I s t a n b u l , § i k a y e t D e f t e r i 1, p. 35 ( 1 0 5 9 / 1 6 4 9 ) .
4
M D 9 6 , p. 8 8 , no. 4 4 1 ( 1 0 8 9 / 1 6 7 8 7 9 ) .
32 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S F A T E

If the conflict was a long drawn-out one, it might become necessary to

send a representative to Istanbul more than once, and since we know that such
multiple visits did in fact occur, there must have been local arrangements for
the payment of the expenses involved.

P O L I T I C A L D E M A N D S F R O M P R O V I N C I A L
N O T A B L E S : A I H W E X A M P L E S

Apart from the social standing of the petitioners and the degree of
organization prevailing among them, the issues constituting a cause for
complaint to the Divan are also of s o m e interest. T h e notables of
§ebinkarahisar referred to above reminded the central administration of the
severe losses sustained during the period of the Celali rebellions, and of the
certainly limited recuperation that had taken place in the recent past. However,
the inhabitants of the province, but recently returned to their homes, were
being molested by the official in charge of preparing a new register of
taxpayers on behalf of the Ottoman central administration. The latter was aided
by his accomplice, a local kadi, and it was obvious the newly returned
inhabitants might easily disperse again. In response, the authorities in
§ebinkarahisar were ordered to send the two culprits to the vizier then on
campaign, in whose camp the case was presumably to be decided. There is no
indication as to the manner in which the process of taxpayer registration was
to be carried out under these circumstances; but we know from other sources
that it was in effect completed during those years'.

An even temporary interruption of the preparations for the Ottoman tax

register of §ebinkarahisar must be regarded as a matter of some political
importance. The complaint of the notables of Manastir also had wider
implications. According to the document in question, an attempt to increase
the silver content of the akge had resulted in the fact that now 7 0 akge were
exchanged for one guriq, while the previous rate of exchange had been one
hundred to the gurit$. This, according to standard Ottoman practice, meant a
promulgation of a new set of officially imposed prices, the so-called narh, and
since prices were at this time still mostly determined in akge, the new prices
should have been lower then the old ones 2 . However, the merchants, the
"people of the bedestun" and other tradesmen refused to comply with the new
official prices, and seem to have insisted on determining their own. These
actions ran counter to tiie principles of what might be called economic policy
in the classical Ottoman state, therefore it is not surprising that the notables

' L e i l a Erder, Suraiya Faroqh , "Population Rise and Pall in Anatolia, 1550-1620", in: S. Faroqhi,
Peasants, Dervishes and Traders in the Ottoman Empire (London 1986), IV, p. 339-40.
2
M i i b a h a t S. Kütükoglu. Oo-ianhlarda Narh Miiessesesi ve 1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri (Istanbul
1983).
 POLITICAL INITIATIVES

of M a n a s t i r a c h i e v e d theii goal: a rescript w a s p r o m u l g a t e d , a c c o r d i n g to

w h i c h the official prices w e r e to be e n f o r c e d , and m e r c h a n t s and t r a d e s m e n
refusing to c o m p l y w e r e threatened with exemplary punishment.

G i v e n the crucial i m p o r t a n c e of monetary p r o b l e m s in a period d u r i n g

w h i c h the value of the c u r r e n c y w a s notoriously unstable, it is not suprising
that m a t t e r s of this t y p e w e r e f r e q u e n t l y b r o u g h t u p in c o m p l a i n t s to t h e
D i v a n . N o t only w h a t m i g h t be called "consumer interests" w e r e active in this
f a s h i o n , but traders a n d c r a f t s m e n also a t t e m p t e d to m a k e their voices heard
T h u s , in 1 0 0 3 / 1 5 9 4 - 9 5 , the D i v a n r e s p o n d e d to a petition f r o m the kadi of
A n t a l y a w h o r e l a y e d a c o m p l a i n t f r o m t h e emins, amih, m e r c h a n t s and
t r a d e s m e n of this little A n a t o l i a n port. T h e petitioners c l a i m e d that as gold
and guru$ had been g a i n i n g value in C a i r o , A l e p p o , D a m a s c u s and Tripolis,
m e r c h a n t s had b e e n t r a n s p o r t i n g all s o u n d m o n e y t o w a r d t h e s e p l a c e s 1
T h e r e f o r e only locally minted coins of very poor quality r e m a i n e d available iri
t h e area, w h i l e gold a n d g u r u § could o n l y be f o u n d at a high price. T h i s
s i t u a t i o n m a k i n g b o t h trade a n d tax c o l l e c t i o n e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t , t h e
petitioners a s k e d f o r official redress. T h i s w a s in f a c t granted, n a m e l y by a
c o n f i r m a t i o n of the akge's official silver value and the c o r r e s p o n d i n g rates of
e x c h a n g e . B u t since n o t h i n g w a s attempted to r e m e d y the situation outlined
by the petitioners, it is d o u b t f u l whether the rescript issued had m u c h practical
effect.

A n o t h e r d o c u m e n t f r o m a slightly later period ( 1 0 1 8 / 1 6 0 9 - 1 0 ) reveals

that provincial n o t a b l e s c o u l d not only d e m a n d the e n f o r c e m e n t of c u r r e n t
legislation and the p u n i s h m e n t of delinquent officials, but also c o u l d mobilize
r e s o u r c e s n o r m a l l y a v a i l a b l e o n l y to the central state. A t t h e height of the;
Celali rebellions, the ayan of K a s t a m o n u (unfortunately the d o c u m e n t tells us
n o t h i n g a b o u t the social b a c k g r o u n d of t h e s e p e o p l e ) had d e m a n d e d the
construction of a wall "in a suitable p l a c e " 2 . N o t h i n g m o r e is said a b o u t the
site of the walled area, but since 3 , 0 0 0 zira had been projected ( a b o u t 2 , 4 0 0
m, if w e a s s u m e that t h e "builder's zira" w a s the t y p e of unit u s e d ) 3 , il
a p p e a r s p r o b a b l e that w e a r e d e a l i n g with a wall s u r r o u n d i n g all or m o s t of
K a s t a m o n u ' s built-up area. N o w m o s t of t h e 2 , 0 0 0 zira had been built, bul
s i n c e t h e O t t o m a n c e n t r a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n s i d e r e d the p r o j e c t to be
urgent, all kadis of the sancak of Kastamonu w e r e ordered to f u r n i s h carts and

*On problems of this type, see Halil Sahillioglu, "Osmanli Para Tarihinde Dunya Para ve Maden
Hareketlerinin Yeri 1300-1750", TUrkiye Iktisat Tarihi iizerine Arastirmalar, Gelisme D e r ™
1978 özelsayisi, 1-38.
2
M D 7 8 , p. 184, no. 477 (1018/16(19-10).
3
W a l t h e r Hinz, Islamische Maße und Gewichte, umgerechnet ins metrische System, in:
Handbuch der Orientalistik, ed. Bertold Spuler, Erg. Bd. 1 , 1 (Leiden 1955), p. 59.
34 COPING WITH THE STAT E

labourers to aid in the completion of the project 1 . Thus, one may conclude
that the demands of the ayan of Kastamonu had found full support in Istanbul,
and that resources from the entire province were placed at the command of the
man sent by the Ottoman administration to ensure the project's completition.

CONCLUSION

These few examples may suffice to show that Ottoman subjects of the
later sixteenth and of the seventeenth century could defend their own interests
(and sometimes those of their clients as well) through the device of a
complaint to the Divan. Such a complaint was not cheap, witness the 200 or
300 gunq which the inhabitants of A n k a r a had agreed to pay their
representative in Istanbul. T h e r e f o r e we can assume that most of the
individuals and families that attempted to find redress in this manner belonged
to the wealthier groups of society. However, the expenses involved were not
prohibitive, as villages and tribal communities also sometimes made use of
this mechanism. Moreover the frequency of these complaints to the Divan
indicates that they were not useless even though certain cases might
apparently be pushed back and forth between a local court and the authorities
in Istanbul. For if complaints had been completely ineffective, many of the
provincials flocking to Istanbul every year in person or by proxy would have
found better ways of using their money.

If the personal data on the petitioners recorded in the complaint register

of 1675 can be regarded as valid for the entire period studied, it would seem
that private individuals initiated a large part, if not the majority, of cases
reaching the D i v a n 2 . However, the share of towns, villages, guilds of
tradesmen and tribal units was not insignificant; moreover many cases
f o r m a l l y initiated by k i d i s had originally been brought to a local
administrator's attention by a collective petition of one sort or another. In
these collective petitions we can assume that the role of provincial notables
was always significant: not necessarily the formally recognized ayan of the
eighteenth century, but ulema, dervishes, low-level administrators, and at least
under certain conditions, merchants and tradesmen.

The importance of ulema and dervishes among locally-based notables

should not c o m e as a surprise. Q u i t e apart f r o m their religious
prestige, particularly the more important zaviyedar families often controlled

T h e text uses the word piyndc, which a c c o r d i n g to the usage of the time referred to the
(obsolescent) f o o t soldiers of peasant b a c k g r o u n d , also k n o w n as yaya. But since the text
recommends the use of carts, to be preferred wherever possible to the use of piyade, the sense
in this case may well be "porters in foot".
2
Rugisterbuch, ed. Majer, p. 23
 P O L I T I C A L I N I T I A T I V E S 35

substantial pious f o u n d a t i o n s . Unlike m o r e powerful figures directly

associated with the Ottoman central administration, they were able to retain
these sources of wealth over centuries 1 . Moreover, locally based ulema
controlled the resources supplied by mosque and medrese vakifs, and even
minor judicial offices; for it appears that ulema not aiming for the highest
ranks in the hierarchy were often appointed to kadiships in a geographically
limited area, such as for instance central Anatolia 2 .

All these observations indicate that in late sixteenth-century Anatolia

and the Balkans, there existed a locally-based society of notables who, even if
they did not possess any corporate organization, were by no means exclusively
dependent upon initiatives f r c m the centre. Possibly, but not certainly, this
provincial society — limited in wealth and political ambitions, but by no
means without the ability of ' getting things done" — was a product of the
contemporary transformation of the Ottoman state's relationship to society.

Given the notable, though certainly not dominant role of commercial

interests among these provincial men of wealth, we need to study more
closely the manner in which changes in the Empire's socio-political structure
were linked to its economic history. Huri islamoglu and (,'aglar Keyder have
addressed themselves to this problem 3 . They refer to the Ottoman ruling
group's attempts to further trade and at the same time keep traders under strict
political control: when merchants, increasingly involved in international trade,
largely emancipated themselves from state control, one would expect the
character of the state itself to be transformed. All this is certainly valid. But it
would seem that in the late sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth century,
even the non-commercial sectors of the provincial elite were showing a certain
amount of political initiative. Moreover, one even feels tempted to assume
that throughout the Ottoman Empire's whole period of expansion, this
initiative had never been entirely lost.

' S u r a i y a Faroqhi, "XVI-XVIII Yiizyillarda Orta Anadolu'da § e y h Aileleri", Turkiye /fctisuI

TarihiSemineri, Metinler, Tartqmalar, ed. Osman Okyar, Unal Nalbantoglu (Ankara 1975), p.

2
S. Faroqhi, "Town Officials".
3
H u r i Islamoglu, C^aglar Keyder, "Agenda for Ottoman History", Review, I, 1 (1977). 31-55.
 POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG
OTTOMAN TAXPAYERS AND THE PROBLEM
OF SULTANIC LEGITIMATION (1570-1650)

The present paper vv 11 be concerned with the methods that Ottoman

taxpayers used to bring their d e m a n d s to the ears of the Sultan, and the
reaction of the Sultan's administration. Official responses to the petitions of
townspeople and villagers needed to be motivated in some fashion or other,
whether the demands in question were ultimately met or rejected. Motivating
phrases indicate the manner in which Ottoman officials regarded their ruler,
and the reasons for which, in their opinion, his power was legitimate and
should continue. Thus the problems of 'political activity a m o n g Ottoman
taxpayers' and 'legitimation are closely connected in the texts that we will
analyze here.

Confronted with evidence pointing to political activity a m o n g Ottoman

taxpayers, the twentieth-century reader may assume that in the Ottoman
system of state and society, this type of activity had a recognized place.
H o w e v e r on the level of what we might call political ideology, this was
definitely not true. From the sixteenth century onwards, when statements on
Ottoman politics bccame more frequent and varied, both archival and literary
sources emphasized a sharp distinction between the taxpaying reaya and the
tax-free askeri, who managed the Sultan's business. T h e latter claimed to
possess a monopoly on legalized political activity; the reaya were meant to
produce and pay taxes, and Ottoman officials regarded reaya attempting to
take over the role of askeri as evidence for the worst kind of disorder.
M o r e o v e r Ottoman officials tended to view themselves as ideally a fairly
closed group.' Only in certain clearly specified cases were persons of reaya
background to be admitted into the askeri. And while 'passing' was more
common than political ideology was willing to acknowledge, the demand of
mercenaries of reaya background to be recognized as fully-fledged askeri
constituted a major source of socio-political conflict. 2

On the other hand, the Ottoman political system rested on the premise
that anyone, man or w o m a n , might turn to the ruler to ask for a redress
of grievances. However, given the vast distances involved, and the relative

'Cornell Fleischer, Bureaucrat anc' Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire. The Historian Mustafa
Ali 1541-1600 (Princeton, 1986). p. 201ff.
2
H a l i l Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal T r a n s f o r m a t i o n in the O t t o m a n F m p i r e 1600-1700,"
Archivum Ottomanicum, VI (1980) p. 284.
38 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

inaccessibility of the sixteenth-century Ottoman ruler, bringing a grievance

before the Sultan was already in itself a political feat. Very often provincial
personages got together to hire a messenger who was to convey their
complaint.' Once arrived in Istanbul, the messenger not only needed to find an
opportunity to hand over the letter entrusted to him, but also contacted
officials in the bureaus which might be concerned by his petition. Moreover,
even after the complainants had received a rescript in their favour, it was
probably in most cases impossible to get it implemented without further
activities that in our system of categorization would be considered political. In
response to most petitions, a rescript was sent out that ordered the local kadi
to investigate. But the kadi was also subject to a multitude of pressures, and
to ensure that he reported on the matter at all, and that his report was
favourable to the interests of the petitioners when finally it was sent out,
presupposed a certain amount of organization 2 . To generate pressure,
patronage networks had to be activated, and although we usually know almost
nothing about such networks, there exist scattered texts which allow us to
guess at their existence. Once negotiations had been completed, a rescript from
the ruler should have settled the matter once and for all. But this was by no
means always the case If, for instance, payments unjustly demanded by a
provincial governor were to be returned, or indemnity payments had been
ordered, the local kadi's court needed to be activated a second time 3 . Thus, in a
roundabout fashion, the process of petition and complaint made it possible for
at least the well-to-do among provincial reaya to engage in legitimate activity
which we would regard ;ts political.

The present paper is part of an ongoing project concerning popular

movements in the sixteenth and seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire. At this
stage, I intend to stud) certain phrases to be found in documents concerned
with complaints and recorded in the Miihimme Defterleri (Registers of
Important Affairs). By discussing these phrases in their social and political
context, we will be able to understand better why petitioners said certain
things about their own affairs and those of their opponents, and why Ottoman
officials who summarised these petitions in sultanic rescripts retained or
possibly even added certain remarks. These phrases will be studied because
they help us answer the following questions: How did Ottoman petitioners,
and/or the scribes the\ employed to formulate requests, present their cases?

^ B a j b a k a n l i k Ar§ivi (Istanbul) Miihimme Defterleri ( f r o m now MD) 96, p. 8 8 , no. 441

(1089/1678-79).
On the complaint process m general, compare the introduction by Hans Georg M a j e r in Hans
Georg M a j e r (ed.), Das o\n,anische Registerhuch der Beschwerden" (§ikayet Defteri) vom
Jahre 1675, ( V i e n n a , 1984). pp. 17-23. On legitimation, c o m p a r e Huri i s l a m o g l u - I n a n , '
Introduction: 'Oriental despotism' in world system perspective,' in Huri Islamoglu-lnan (ed.), The
Ottoman Empire and the World Economy (Cambridge, Paris, 1987), pp. 1-26.
3
F o r an example compare Suraiya Faroqhi, "Officials, n m a r - h o l d e r s and Taxation: the late
Sixteenth-Century Crisis as Seen from C o r a m , " Turcica, XVIII (1986), pp. 60-62, reprinted in
this volume.
 POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG TAXPAYERS 39

H o w did petitioners describe the persons and a f f a i r s of their o p p o n e n t s , that is,

w h a t was the repertoire of disparaging p h r a s e s ? W h a t w e r e the 'trump cards'
m o s t typically e m p l o y e d w h e n p e t i t i o n e r s set o u t to bargain directly with
m e m b e r s of the O t t o m a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ? A n d last not least, w h e n o f f i c i a l s
p h r a s e d the S u l t a n s ' r e p l i e s to these p e t i t i o n s , h o w did they p r e s e n t t h e
Sultan's a i m s and activities? B y answering these questions, it will be possible
to f i n d out s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n rulers a n d ruled in
O t t o m a n society, a matter w h i c h at present is still very little understood.

PETITIONERS A N E> OFFICIALS

T h e vast m a j o r i t y of petitions r e f l e c t i n g the relationship between t h e

ruler a n d his s u b j e c t s are k n o w n to us o n l y b e c a u s e it w a s c u s t o m a r y to
s u m m a r i z e the p e t i t i o n w i t h i n the rescript p r o m u l g a t e d as t h e S u l t a n ' s
r e s p o n s e . W h i l e it is p r o b a b l e that c e r t a i n e x p r e s s i o n s f r o m t h e original
petition w e r e taken o v e r into the rescript, n o c o m p a r a t i v e study of petitions
and rescripts has ever been m a d e . T h e r e f o r e w e can only g u e s s at the slant
given to petitions w h e n e v e r they were recycled by O t t o m a n o f f i c i a l s . W h e n
interpreting the petition s u m m a r i e s , one has to be a w a r e of the bias inherent
in t h e m , t h o u g h u s u a l l y it is not p o s s i b l e to c o m p e n s a t e f o r this bias b y
using alternative s o u r c e s . E'ifficulties a r e especially o b v i o u s w h e n the text
c o n t a i n s what p u r p o r t s to be a s t a t e m e n t q u o t e d v e r b a t i m ; t h e s e so-called
q u o t a t i o n s a r e very g r a p h i c , and it is t e m p t i n g to r e g a r d the often
conversational style as a m a r k of authenticity. B u t w h e t h e r t h e s e q u o t a t i o n s
have been m o r e or less f a i t h f u l l y rendered, or w h e t h e r their contrast with the
f o r m a l l a n g u a g e of t h e d o c u m e n t p r o p e r f u n c t i o n e d m a i n l y as a rhetorical
device, remains u n k n o w n . W h e n all is said and d o n e , our k n o w l e d g e is limited
to t h e s t a t e m e n t s m a d e b y O t t o m a n o f f i c i a l s , and t h e l a n g u a g e of the
petitioners f o r the most part eludes us.

At the s a m e time, a vast n u m b e r of original petitions survive, both in

the Topkapi Palace archives and in the central archives proper. H o w e v e r , most
d o c u m e n t s which h a v e c o m e to light deal with fairly routine matters. T h u s we
p o s s e s s a vast n u m b e r of sixteenth and s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y petitions which
introduce candidate tax f a r m e r s and s p e c i f y the a m o u n t s of m o n e y which they
p r o p o s e d to pay to t h e O t t o m a n t r e a s u r y 1 . F o r later p e r i o d s , e v e n m o r e
material survives; the a p p o i n t m e n t of f o u n d a t i o n administrators in m a n y cases
necessitated a petition frorr the local kadi to the relevant b u r e a u s of the
financial administration, and h u n d r e d s and p r o b a b l y thousands of these texts
still survive. H o w e v e r , n o n e of these petitions are concerned with complaints.
M o s t of the texts located to d;ite are so routine that very little trace remains of

*To be f o u n d in B a ç b a k a n h k Ar§ivi s e c t i o n s M a l i y e d e n m i i d e v v e r a n d K a m i l K e p c c i .
40 ( O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

the petitioner's manner of expressing himself, so that at present, the

summaries retained in the Miihimme and §ikayet (complaint) registers remain
quite irreplaceable 1 . Additional summaries of complaints can be gained from
local kadi registers, into which the scribes of the tribunal were expected to
enter the sultanic rescripts arriving from Istanbul. But while these copies in
the kadi registers often contain honorific formulas which cannot be found in
the central government's records, the petition summaries themselves are the
same in both types of registers.

P R E S E N T I N G T H E P E T I T I O N E R ' S C A S E : T H E

R O L E O F A N C I E N T U S A G E

In sixteenth and seventeenth-century Ottoman society, one of the most

powerful means of legitimating any kind of practice was by saying that it
conformed to precedent. In this respect Ottoman practice resembled that of
medieval and early modern Europe, and of many other human societies as
well 2 . As Muslims, both petitioners and officials placed a special religious
value upon all practice rightly or wrongly believed to go back to the times of
the Prophet Muhammad. After all, the movement of the Kadizadeliler during
the seventeenth century had once again reminded contemporaries that all
practices which were manifestly of more recent vintage could come under
strident attack^.

Thus it is not surprising that petitioners frequently dwelt upon the fact
that their rights went back into the distant part. As an example, one might
mention the villagers of Arguncuk, in the vicinity of Kayseri, w h o in
1056/1646-47 defended their users' rights over a stream against a medrese
teacher and sheik who was actively building up his landholdings in the area 4 .
This medrese t e a c h c , who at the same time claimed descent from the
Prophet, had diverted ¡.o his own use a water course which the villagers 'from
ancient times' (kadimiileyyam) had used to water their own fields and gardens.
The argument appears to have convinced the officials of the Divan; for in the
concluding pari, which contains the Sultan's resolution of the dispute, the
diversion of water thai had belonged to the villagers 'from time immemorial'
is explicitly condemned.

' T h e s e r i e s of § i k a y e t r e g i s t e r s , w h i c h c o n t a i n s r e s p o n s e s to c o m p l a i n t s , b e g i n s in t h e y e a r
1 6 4 9 . F o r a brief d e s c r i p t o n c o m p a r e A t i l l a £ e t i n , Ba^bakanlik Argivi Kilavuzu (Istanbul,
1979), p. 5 9 .
^ C o n c e r n i n g the value early m o d e r n Knglishmen placed upon ancient p r e c e d e n t , compare
K e i t h T h o m a s , Religion and the Decline of Magic ( H a r m o n d s w o r t h , 1978), pp. 4 6 1 - 5 1 7 .
^ M a d e l i n e Z i l f i , " T h e K a d i z a d e l i s . D i s c o r d a n t R e v i v a l i s m in S e v e n t e e n t h - C e n t u r y Istanbul,"
Journal of Near Eastern Studies. 4 5 , 4 (1986), 251 -269.
4
M D 91, p. 8 . no. 25 ( 1 0 5 6 / 1 6 4 6 - 4 7 ) .
 POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG TAXPAYERS 41

However, the past was also used as a means of legitimation in rather

m o r e surprising contexts. T h u s in 1018/1609-10 a n u m b e r of substantial
townsmen of Kayseri defended the right of Haci Ferhad, a military man (sipahi
oglani), to build a c o f f e e h o u s e adjacent to the city walls, even though the:
fortress commander objected. In their defense of Haci Ferhad's initiative, the:
townsmen claimed that for a long time a mosque, a school and shops had
stood right next to the city wall. Since these old structures had not done any
damage, presumably the coffeehouse would not cause any harm either 1 . T his
example shows us that using the past as a standard did not necessarily result in
a condemnation of every new initiative, even when a religiously debatable
kind of innovation, namely a coffeehouse, was the object under discussion
After all, the fortress commander, when he and his men moved against the
coffeehouse, had condemned this building as a source of damage to the fortress
walls, and not as a religiously illicit innovation. This is what one would
expect, since he was a military man and not a member of the ulema\ nor was
he an ordinary townsman or villager who needed to defend his rights mainly
by reference to ancient usage.

PRESENTING THE PETITIONER'S CASE:

RECOURSE TO WRITTEN DOCUMENTS

Even though the doctors of Hanefi §eriat law considered the testimony
of witnesses more valuable than written documents, in practice whenever
written evidence was available, people invoked it 2 . This seems to have been a
practice of the Ottoman central administration, which petitioners adopted in
their turn. In sixteenth-century registers of pious foundations, the contents of
the foundation deed typically were summarized, and only if no foundation
d o c u m e n t could be located, did the recording official have recourse to the
testimony of witnesses 3 . Obviously foundations, even of the most modest
kind, w e r e well placed when it c a m e to proving their rights by the
presentation of documents. A person in charge of a village dervish lodge
(zaviye) was more likely to read and write than the ordinary villager, and even
if he did not possess this skill himself, he would find it easier to obtain access
to those who did. It is quite remarkable how often the persons in charge of
provincial zaviyes presented official documentation. Zaviyes were often
exempted from taxes such as the avariz-i divaniye, but their administrators
typically had a great deal of trouble ensuring that these exemptions were in

*MD 78, p. 185, no. 4 7 9 (1018/1609-10).

^Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, 1964), p. 18ff.
•'Compare registration practice as apparent f r o m : Omer Liitfi Barkan, Ekrem Hakki Ayverdi
(eds.) Istanbul Vakiflan Tahrir Defteri, 953 (1546) Tarihli (Istanbul, 1970). In most cases date
and content of the foundation deed are specified. On p. 117 is an e x a m p l e of a foundation
w h o s e deed could not be located and whose existence was justified by a lost document and
'ancient usage'.
42 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S I A T E

fact respected. Thus we find the descendants of a sheik residing in the north
Anatolian town of §ebinkarahisar producing, in the reign of Sultan Ahmed I
(1603-1617), an exemption document which had been issued to their ancestor
by the father of the reigning Sultan's great-grandfather, namely Sultan
Suleyman I (1520-1566)'. Moreover, the petitioners were aware of the fact
that their ancestor's exemption had gained validity by being entered into the
provincial tax register (vilayet defteri), and they pointed out this fact in order
to strengthen their case. However, all this did not mean that the descendants of
the Karahisari sheik, or the scribes that drafted their petition, had lost sight of
the legitimizing role of 'the way things had always been'. Olagelmise mugayir
('against all precedent') was still a very effective phrase in weakening an
opponent's position.

Zaviye claims other than tax exemptions might also be based upon
sultanic rescripts. Thus the male and female followers of the Celveti sheik
Uftade Efendi (Uftade efendi fukarasi ve bacilari) had been granted the
privilege that after their deaths, their estates were to pass under the control of
their sheiks, who were to expend these resources in charitable works 2 . T h e
rescript granting this privilege, whose original date remains unknown, was
ultimately presented by Sheik Mehmed, halife of the influential dervish
Sheik Mahmud Uskiidari. It was confirmed with the proviso that the people
whose estates were .hus to pass under the control of the sheik should not
be merchants or craftsmen.

A frequently used tactic by which foundation administrators attempted

to strengthen their claims was to invoke the will of the founder (¡art-i vakif
mucebince). On the other hand, an arrangement of which these dignitaries
disapproved, they often called 'contrary to the conditions laid down by the
founder' (mugayir-i $art-i vakif)3. This language of approval and disapproval
was shared by officials of the central administration and petitioners; the
former, when forbidding abuses connected with sheiks and zaviyes, also liked
to invoke the will of the founders as the reason for intervention. Thus both
officials and petitioners took it for granted that it was incumbent on the
Sultan to enforce the tvill of long-dead founders of mosques, theological
schools and zaviyes.

Interestingly enough, even in the absence of documents it was

sometimes assumed t h a t the will of the founder was known. Thus most
Bektashi zaviyes are notorious for not possessing any kind of foundation
document, so that entries in the late fifteenth or sixteenth-century tax registers

' m D 7 9 , p. 6 7 , n o . 8 9 ( 1 0 1 9 / 1 6 1 0 11).
2
MD85,p.213 (1040/1630,W).
3
S e e f o r e x a m p l e B a § b a k a n l i < Ansivi M u h i m m e Z e y l i 10, f o l . 9 0 b ( 1 0 5 4 / 1 6 4 4 - 4 5 ) .
 POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG TAXPAYERS 43

often constitute our only evidence for their functioning during this period. But
in a rather exceptional document, the sheik of the central zaviye in Hacibekta§
was granted a confirmation :>f his right to propose to the Sultan the names of
the candidates applying f o r the position of sheik in a zaviye of the Bektashi
order. T h e rescript granting this privilege, dated 1019/1610-11, claimed that
the arrangement conformed to the conditions laid down by the founder 1 . Now
it is probable that regulations of this type were devised in the intensively
administered and bureaucratized O t t o m a n polity, and not in the m u c h less
developed states of the pre-Ottoman period. Since the fifteenth-century legend
of Haci Bekta§ does not mention any such privileges granted to the founder or
his i m m e d i a t e heirs, it is unlikely that they existed at that time, let alone
during the c o n f u s e d last years of the Seljuk sultanate, when Haci Bcktas
supposedly flourished 2 . Therefore it would appear that Bektashi sheiks of the
seventeenth century managed to persuade their official interlocutors that they
knew w h a t the will of the f o u n d e r was, although we d o not k n o w what
sources they claimed f o r their information. Strange though this case may
seem, it was by no m e a n s unique: In the eighteenth a n d early nineteenth
centuries, other Bektashi claims of d o u b t f u l historical validity were also
widely accepted by Ottoman officials.

H o w e v e r , zaviye administrators were not the only people to invoke

written d o c u m e n t s in their f a v o u r . T h e s a m e p r o c e d u r e is s o m e t i m e s
d o c u m e n t e d in the case of whole villages. D u r i n g the Cretan c a m p a i g n s
(1654-1669) certain settlements in the area of Urgiip and Nigde were granted
exemption f r o m the tekalif -i §akka taxes; in exchange f o r this exemption,
they p r o v i d e d f i r e w o o d and earth c o n t a i n i n g saltpeter, essential in the
manufacture of gunpowder. Subordinate commanders (suba$i) under the orders
of the Nigde governor did not abide by this exemption and even refused to
obey a sultanic rescript which protected the villagers 3 . T h e latter took their
c o m p l a i n t not to the kadi or the central administration directly, as was
c o m m o n procedure, but to the provincial governor of K a r a m a n , w h o was the
hierarchical superior of the Nigde governor. Through the mediation of the
provincial finance inspector, the complaint finally made its way to Istanbul,
and the exemption rescript was confirmed accordingly. Unfortunately we do
not know whether references to the exemption document had f o r m e d part of
the original c o m p l a i n t (which is probable), or whether this was a tactic
adopted only in the office of the Karaman finance director.

*MD 79, p. 345, no. 871 (1019/1610-11).

^Compare Abdiilbaki Golpinarli (t;d.) Manakib-i Haci Bekta$-i Veli "Vilayetname" (Istanbul,
1958) for the text of the Haci Bekta§ legend and the various stages of its composition.
3
M D 91, p. 48, no. 147 (1056/1646 47).
44 C O I ' I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

A special case is the employment of adaletnames in the complaint

process. As Halil ¡nalcik has demonstrated, the practice of promulgating
rescripts in order to rectify specific abuses goes back at least to the reign of
Sultan Selim I 1 . But such rescripts multiplied during the troubled years of the
Celali uprisings. One such text, promulgated in 1609 in the name of Sultan
Ahmed I, became especially famous, possibly at least in part due to the
rhetorical elaboration with which the text described the abuses of governors,
kadis and other officials in immediate contact with the subject population 2 . It
would appear that the rhetorical devices employed by the authors of late
sixteenth and early seventeenth-century adaletnames had some influence upon
the style of complaints composed by members of the subject population. This
style should have appeared quite accessible to many petitioners, for the authors
of the adaletnames abstained from the Arabic and Persian loanwords that were
so characteristic of the formal language of the period. At the same time, these
texts are extremely graphic and concrete, so that it should not have been too
difficult for scribes drafting petitions to substitute the abuse at issue for the
abuses mentioned in the adaletname. We may conclude that the multitude of
complaints concerning abuses inspired the adaletnames, while at the same
time the existence of adaletnames helped those who were oppressed by local
administrators to find a legitimate form of expressing their grievances.

However, apart from this indirect impact, we also encounter more direct
uses of the adaletname. In 1019/1610-11, a certain Sheik Ali, active in the
Denizli area and ranking as a halife of the Halveti sheik in charge of the
famous lodge of Koca Mastafa Pa§a in Istanbul, found himself involved in a
conflict with a tax collector 3 . This Halveti dervish presented himself as
'protecting, according k: the detailed adaletname sent out from my [the
Sultan's] fortunate Palace, the reaya and free citizens of the Muslim state
from oppression and the governor's men'. According to the single text which
preserves a record of Sheik Ali's activities, the Halveti dervish then went on to
state that he preached and gave good advice to Muslims. In this activity, he
seems to have fallen foul of an official collecting taxes from lands assigned to
a certain vizier. The latter attempted to remove his opponent by having him
exiled to Cyprus. It appears that the adaletname was viewed as a text which
authorized people such as Ali, whose social position on the margins between
reaya and askeri permitted them a certain amount of manoevering space, to

' Halil I nalcik, "Adaletnamclcr," Beigeler, II, 3-4 (1965), 4 9 - 1 4 5 . C o m p a r e also the s a m e
author's "The Ottoman Declinc ind its Effect upon the Reaya," in: Henrik Birnbaum and Speros
Vryonis (eds.). Aspects of the Balkans. Continuitv and Change, Contributions to the International
Balkan Conference held at UC / A. October 23-28 1969 (The Hague, 1972), pp. 338-354.
2
I n a l c i k , "Adaletnameler," no. X, p. I23ff ( M D 78, pp. 891-899). This text has also been made
available by Mustafa Cezar, ihmanli Tarihinde Levendler (Istanbul, 1965), p. 385ff. A very
similar text from the A n k a r a kadi registers has been published by M u s t a f a A k d a g , Celali
isyanlan (1550-1603), (Ankara 1963), p. 265ff.
3
M D 79, p. 323, no. 815 (1019/¡610-11).
 P O L I T I C A L ACTIVITY A M O N G T A X P A Y H R S 45

resist the demands of locil administrators in the name of the Sultan: By

mobilizing the influential sheik of Koca Mustafa Pa§a, Sheik Ali was able to
secure a rescript which promised him immunity fom persecution in the
future 1 .

A more roundabout fashion of using the adaletname is documented in

a rescript replying to the complaint of villagers from a settlement near Sivas.
Documents in hand, they asserted that from the time of 'Sultan Alaeddir'
onward, their village had formed part of the pious foundation of the Great
Mosque in Sivas 2 . However certain taxes had been assigned to the son of a
deceased vizier as a zeamel, or major tax grant, to remunerate the latter for his
services in the Palace. Giv3n the importance of the zeamet, no other official
had any rights to their dues. (In the case of smaller tax assignments or timar,
one half of the penalties demanded from convicted criminals generally went to
the governor of the provirce or sub-province). Now a military commander
(suba§i) had been found murdered in his tent while on a tax-collecting trip.
The murderer was not apprehended, and since the dead man was found in his
tent not inside but outside the village, a fetva ultimately absolved the
villagers from payment of blood money. In the meantime however, a cavu§ of
Sivas arrested the villagers, and robbed them of 600 guru§ and some textiles.
The villagers' manner of citing the adaletname in their defense is quite
intriguing; for this crucial document is only mentioned in passing.
Prominence is given to the exemption document, that forbade all officials,
except the foundation administrators of the Great Mosque and the holder of the
zeamet involved, to collect taxes from the villagers. One would have expected
direct mention of the adaletname, for the abuse of which the villagers
complained was explicitly denounced in the adaletname of Ahmed I. 'If on the
lands of a given village, a man freezes to death, falls from a tree and is killed,
drowns in a body of waier, or is found murdered, you [the provincial
governors] come to the village, claiming: 'The penalties for bloodshed and the
tithe of blood money are 3urs'. You remain in the village for many days,
mistreat and imprison the villagers, beat them and take large sums of gold
pieces and guru§ as your t the of the blood money'... 3 . It is hard to imagine
that the authors of the petition were not aware of this passage which fitted
their own case so well, and we can only assume that the adaletname'i;
provisions were so well known that in referring to this text, it was quite
unnecessary to be specific.

' o i l the context of this rescript compare Suraiya Faroqhi, "Sainthood as a M e a n s of Self
Defense in Seventeenth Century Ottoman Anatolia," in Grace Smith and Carl Ernst (eds.),
Manifestations of Sainthood in Islam (Istanbul, 1993), 193-208, reprinted in this volume.
2
M D 79, p. 492, no. 1262 (1019/1 i 10-11).
~Inalcik, "Adaletnameler." p. 126.
46 C (I P I N G WITH THE STATE

RECOGNIZED LAWLESSNESS: THE GOVERNORS

AND THEIR M KN

It is w o r t h noting that in the rescript c o n c e r n i n g S h e i k Ali's dispute

with the tax c o l l e c t o r o p p r e s s i o n and t h e g o v e r n o r ' s m e n (ehl-i drj) are
p r e s e n t e d as t w o c l o s e l y allied t e r m s . T h i s w a s by n o m e a n s a p e r s o n a l
opinion of Sheik Ali a n d / o r the scribe presenting his case, but a view that had
received official sanction in A h m e d I's adaletname and in other places 1 . W h i l e
c o m p l a i n t s a g a i n s t k a d i s a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y s t u d e n t s of t h e o l o g i c a l s c h o o l s
(suhte) w e r e by no m e a n s a b s e n t , lower-level g o v e r n o r s , their s u b o r d i n a t e
c o m m a n d e r s (subap) and the a d m i n i s t r a t o r s of c r o w n lands a p p e a r as the
quintessential villains. A l m o s t by d e f i n i t i o n , t h e s e p e o p l e a r e a s s u m e d to
o p p r e s s the reaya, sultanic rescripts e n j o i n i n g t h e m to protect the ' p e o p l e
entrusted to t h e m by (rod' being normally ignored 2 .

In this context, a rescript addressed to the governor-general of R u m and

the kadi of Divrigi is particularly illuminating: This text, dated 1018/1609-10,
d e s c r i b e s the activities of Yusuf bey, a f o r m e r g o v e r n o r of D i v r i g i 3 . A f t e r
stating that the inhabitants of the province had been reduced to misery because
of molestation by u n s p e c i f i e d 'robbers', t h e text continues: 'every m o n t h he
[the provincial g o v e r n o r ) s e n t t h e m a military c o m m a n d e r (suba$i) who
established himself [in the a r e a | a l o n g with thirty or forty m o u n t e d m e n and
took a w a y their f o o d and f o d d e r w i t h o u t p a y m e n t . F r o m e v e r y village he
d e m a n d e d forty to fifty guru$ in m o n e y , and in addition, m a n y times he m a d e
t h e m deliver h o n e y , fat and barley' ... T h e text is r e m a r k a b l e not because of
the events described, which were c o m m o n p l a c e , but b e c a u s e the m a n chiefly
responsible f o r all these illegal exactions, though no longer h o l d i n g o f f i c e in
Divrigi, w a s apparently still c o n s i d e r e d an official in good standing. In any
case, the scribes of the Divan did not deny him the honorific c u s t o m a r y w h e r e
m e n of his rank w e r e c o n c e r n e d , n a m e l y 'may his h o n o u r continue'. W e m a y
regard this text as a graphic illustration of the observation stated previously,
n a m e l y , that even in o f f i c i a l p a r l a n c e , o p p r e s s i o n and 'the g o v e r n o r ' s m e n '
constituted two closely linked p h e n o m e n a .

G i v e n these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , it is not surprising that Ottoman reaya,

and probably even lower-level kadis, v i e w e d a n y o n e w h o m a i n t a i n e d c l o s e
relations to the governor's e n t o u r a g e with s o m e suspicion. T h e very existence
of such ties m i g h t f o r m the f o c u s of a c o m p l a i n t , f o r it w a s a s s u m e d t h a t
w h o e v e r a p p r o a c h e d t h e g o v e r n o r ' s m e n , w o u l d d o so in o r d e r to a c c u s e
his fellow provincials, s o as to e n s u r e that f u t u r e exactions fell m o r e heavily

' C o m p a r e inalcik, "Adaletnsmeler," p. 126.

2
Ìnalcik, "Adaletnameler." p 122.
3
MD7<>, p. 250, no. 624 ( I () i 8/1609-10).
 POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG TAXPAYERS 47

upon hapless taxpayers than upon the accuser 1 . Or else the aim might be to
secure profitable tax farms; for even though the latter were in principle
assigned to the highest bidder, it is likely that useful advance information
could be obtained by people with the right contacts. Moreover, the negative
view that provincial taxpayers held with respect to any contacts between their
fellows and the governor's men was apparently shared by a considerable
number of officials in the Ottoman central administration. Otherwise it would
be hard to explain why complaining reaya continued to bring up this
accusation, even though it presented high-level administrators in such a
dubious light. In composing the Sultan's rescripts, Divan officials often
incorporated accusations that a given provincial was overly friendly with the
governor's men. If they had assumed these remarks irrelevant, they would
scarcely have repeated them.

That officials of the Ottoman central government ascribed very dubious

motives to their colleagues in the provinces also becomes apparent when we
examine the concluding sections of many rescripts in the Mtihimme
Defterleri. Typically the Ottoman Divan, in the name of the Sultan, followed
up its instructions to provincial officials with general admonitions of a more
or less stereotyped character. To cite one typical example: '...You should
studiously avoid protecting evil-doers out of a desire for illegitimate gain, or
oppressing and harming people out of excessive zeal or personal hostility.
You should not in any way deviate from the road of God and justice. If news
that you have been protecting evil-doing bandits reaches my royal threshold
and exalted throne, your answers and excuses will not find acceptance and you
will definitely be held responsible and reproved accordingly'... 2 . That certain
of these comminatory formulas can be traced back to the fifteenth century and
even beyond is immaterial in this context 3 . Much more important is the
observation that they were not regarded as meaningless routine. This is
apparent from the fact that the Miihimme registers record them in detail, while
the honorifics accompanying the addressees' names were left out. Moreover,
even though these comminalory phrases consist of stereotyped formulas ('you
will be held responsible and -eproved accordingly' etc.), they were put together
in ever-varying fashions. In some cases, the sheltering of evil-doers by corrupt
officials was stressed, while in other instances the motif that the Sultan's love
of justice would not tolerate oppression of the reaya is given special
prominence. Unfortunately, our information on most of these cases is limited
to what can be learned from a single text or at most a few rescripts. Therefore
we do not know whether .hese rhetorical variations had any conncction
with the facts of the case as the Ottoman central administration judged it, or

' M D 78, p. 351, no. 911 ( 1 0 1 8 / 1 6 0 ' M 0 ) ; M D 78, p. 552, no. 1416 (1018/1609-10).
2
M D 85, p. 6, no. 7 (1040/1630-31).
3
P a u l Wittek, "Zu einigen friihosmanischen Urkunden (V)," Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde
des Morgenlandes, 57 (1961), p. 104.
48 C O l'I N G WITH THE STATE

whether they were simply due to considerations of style. Be that as it may, it

is still remarkable that in rescripts which for the most part were accessible to
any Ottoman subject who could have them looked up in the records of a kadi's
court, senior provincial officials should habitually have been described as
inclined to all sorts of wrongdoing. It must be kept in mind that the scribes
who drafted the Sultan's rescripts, and the administrators whom they
denounced so persistently, were not locked in some perennial feud with the
governors and their men. Certainly an official such as Mustafa Ali, a medrese
graduate and litte'rateur of scribal background, made acerbic comments on the
lawlessness of governors especially in the frontier provinces 1 . But it is not
likely that a mere feud between two rival branches of the Ottoman
administration would have been endorsed by a series of Sultans. And yet this
assiduous description of the evil-doings mainly of governors and their men,
but also of kadis, is a constant feature not only of replies to humdrum
complaints, but also of (he most formal 'justice rescripts' 2 .

We are confronted here with a variant of an age-old legitimizing device,

found equally in Western Europe, namely the ruler whose good intentions are
thwarted by the abuses of his advisors 3 . At least during the later sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries, the scribes of the Divan, with the full
endorsement of their ruiers, presented the latter as constantly seeking to curb
their servitors' inclination toward all kinds of oppressive acts. Thereby it was
stated that the ruler was not a party to the depredations of his officials and his
role as a protector of the reaya was reasserted. In a civil war situation of the
kind which prevailed during the years around 1600, when in actual fact the
government in Istanbul was quite unable to control the doings of its agents in
the provinces, this device must have been used to salvage the ruler's prestige.
T o what extent the reaya were willing to accept this excuse is of course a
crucial question, but at present we are in no position to furnish an answer.

COMPLAINING ABOUT KADIS

Mustafa Akdag once observed that kadis were generally much closer to
the taxpaying population than the governors and their men, and that as a
result, kadis often supported the reaya in their struggles against members of
the military-administruiive service 4 . This must have happened particularly in
small towns and outlyir g districts. In the normal course of affairs, kadis of

'Fleischer, Bureaucrat ami Intellectual, p. 210.

Inalcik. "Adaletnâmeler." p 72.
-^Emmanuel Le Roy L a d u r i i . "I.es masses profondes: La paysannerie," in Emmanuel Le Roy
Ladurie and Michel M o r i i u a u (eds.) Histoire économique et sociale de la France, 4 vols.
(Paris. 1977), vol, 1, 2, p. XV .
^Akdag, Celali isyanlari, p 17.
 POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG TAXPAYERS 49

places such as Sorgun in central Anatolia or Seferihisar on the Aegean coast

had scant chance of ever reaching a high-level position in the ulema hierarchy.
Moreover, these low-level kadis often lived out their official lives within a
limited geographical area, so that they were familiar with their colleagues in
neighbouring districts and probably with the prominent families of a whole
region. However, since it was part of a kadi's official duties to j u d g e
complaints and if necessary pass them on to Istanbul, the documents at hand
tend to reflect a biased picture. Probably the composition of letters of
complaint addressed to the central administration provided many kadis with
opportunities to pose as protectors of the reaya, even though in real life, they
were no less rapacious than the governor's men. The adaletname of 1609 has
a good deal to say about the manner in which kadis might oppress the subject
population 1 . Moreover numerous complaints documented in the Mühimme
registers also make it clear that relations between kadis and the people whom
they administered were often anything but idyllic.

Under these circumstances, it is of interest to find out what low-level

administrators and taxpayers thought it politic to say about kadis with whom
they were dissatisfied. For the time being, we will disregard the almost
unanswerable question whether the complaints of which we know give us a
fair picture of the Ottoman judiciary, and if not, what kinds of biases were
likely to appear. Even if the available material conveys a completely false
impression, it is still worthwhile to know the categories in which
complainants expressed thei- grievances. T o a considerable extent, these
categories must have been shared by the central administration's officials to
whom the complaints were addressed. A preliminary attempt at classification
results in the following categories: (1) abuse of tax-collecting prerogatives for
personal enrichment (2) association with governors and their mercenaries (3)
association with robbers and rebels, a type of behaviour which in certain
cases, may be regarded as a variant of category (2).

Where kadis acted as t i x collectors, the misdeeds of which they were

accused normally resembled those reported of the governors and their men. The
abuses which kadis might commit were, however, limited by the fact that
most of them did not possess an armed force of their own, and thus could but
rarely quarter a large retinue upon hapless villagers. A rescript dated
1018/1609-10 accuses the former kadi of Ilgin (subprovince of Ak§ehir,
province of Karaman), who demanded siirsat payments in money, when they
should have been paid in kind. This constituted a major abuse in a countryside
ravaged by war, and in which the normal channels of marketing had
been disrupted 2 . Moreover, the kadi had supposedly profited from an increased

'inalcik, "Adaletnameler," p. 129.

2
MD 78, p. 479, no. 1228 (1018/1609 10).
50 COPING WITH THE STATE

d e m a n d f o r f o o d during these hungry years, by selling the grain he had

collected to local merchants. This latter accusation was very appropriate if the
authorities in Istanbul were to regard the offending j u d g e as an unregenerate
malefactor, for thus he was depicted as sabotaging the Ottoman war effort 1 .

Particularly w h e r e kadis w e r e i n v o l v e d , association with local

governors and their retinues was regarded as a serious reason for complaint.
Since kadis were apparently expected to check the abuses which provincial
governors might c o m m i t , any assimilation of their style of living and
behaviour to that of military men must have been regarded as a special threat
to provincial taxpayers. This motif is graphically expressed in the picture that
the kadi of Merzifon and 'people of the province' drew of a former judge. The
accused had publicly drunk wine with mercenaries and the governor's men,
and, moreover had cursed and beaten people 2 . This was only the introduction
to a complaint concerning more specific abuses of office. Supposedly, this
errant judge had demanded bribes before he would even consider a case, had
allowed his private resentments to cloud his judgement, and in addition, had
forged documents and with their aid, appropriated landed property. Moreover,
he had pocketed surtaxes greatly in excess of what he was entitled to demand
in compensation for his services as a tax collector. In other instances, the
f o r m e r kadi of Merzifon had probably acted in concert with his mercenary
boon-companions. Houses had been broken into and their contents plundered;
since a seal had been affixed on the houses in question, the kadi had in all
likelihood furnished in o f f i c i a l - s o u n d i n g pretext for the m e r c e n a r i e s '
depredations. In another rescript dating from the same year (1018/1609-10), w e
hear of an 'ignorant and brutal' kadi who had found himself confederates of the
same caliber, presumably mercenaries, and toured the countryside as a bandit-5.
According to the complainants, he had, when visiting a village, behaved in a
fashion that one had come to expect of the governors' men. In addition he had
used his knowledge of the law to levy a host of accusations against hapless
taxpayers, from whom he then proceeded to collect penalties. T h e s e cases
show how greatly a personage not belonging to the governor's entourage could
increase his capacity for illegal exactions if he was able to c o m m a n d the
services of mercenaries Since on the other hand, contact to mercenary troops
was most easily established in the e n t o u r a g e of a provincial governor,
complainants who focussed on such contacts were behaving in a perfectly
realistic manner.

' O n the r o l e of the kadi in ta i c o l l e c t i o n , c o m p a r e I n a l c i k , " A d a l e t n ä m e l e r , " p. 7 8 .

2
M D 7 8 , p. 154, no. 3 9 4 ( 1 0 1 8 / 1 6 0 9 - 1 0 ) .
3
M D 7 8 , p. 3 5 1 , no. 9 1 1 ( 1 0 1 8 / 1 6 0 9 - 1 0 ) .
 P O L I T I C A L ACTIVITY AMONG TAXPAYERS 51

In the general competition for revenue, certain kadis might find allies
not among the officially appointed provincial administrators, but among the
latters' unofficial competitors. Such a situation is documented in a rescript
replying to the complaints of various officials from the Aksaray-Nigde area,
namely the substitute kadi (kadi naibi) of Aksaray, the kadi of Eyiibeli, a
local military commander (alaybeyi) and a zeamet-holder by the name of
Bayezid £avu§.' The subject of the complaint was a former kadi of the rural
district of Eyiibeli, who had elected to hold his court sessions in the house of
a man whom the complainants described as a bandit and Celali. Here the
complaint focussed not so much on illegal levies upon taxpayers, although
these are also mentioned, but rather upon the competition among revenue
takers. The kadi claimed thai certain villages had not paid their siirsat dues in
full and demanded the shortfall from the zeamet-holder, whose carts loaded
with tax grains were plundered. 2 Presumably the so-called Celali had his hand
in the matter. But beyond these specific conflicts, we are again confronted
with a case in which the dividing line between kadis and military-
administrative personnel had become difficult to discern, and this infringement
apparently constituted a major point in the accusations levied against the kadi
of Eyyiibeli.

COMPLAINTS AGAINST LOWER-LEVEL UI.F.MA

Among the complaints against locally-based ulema, a petition from the

villagers of Arguncuk against a sheik and teacher (miiderris) in the Ko§k
Medrese of Kayseri (1056/1(>46-47) is particularly illuminating. 3 The peasants
accused the Kayseri scholar of damming the watercourse which irrigated their
fields and gardens, and in this context, referred to their opponent as a
mutegallibe or tyrant. This tsrm is worth retaining, because in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, ii was commonly employed whenever regional
powerholders (ayan) were mentioned in a derogatory sense. If the term
mutegallibe did in fact originate in the peasants' petition, which seems
probable, this must have been the expression familiar even to country people
living in the middle of the seventeenth century. From the indications given by
our text, a mutegallibe was a person who against all ancient custom, and
against the prescriptions of the .¡eriat, proposed to take away what the
villagers had always considered to be their right. For good measure this sheik,

' M D 78, p. 684, no. 1778 (1018/1609-10).

2
' O n the siirsat and the fashion in which it was collected compare Liitfi Giiçer, XVI ve XVII
Asirlarda Osmanh imparatorlugunda Hububat Meselesi ve Hububattan Al'inan Vergiler
(Istanbul, 1964), pp. 93-114. For a document recording negotiations leading to a reduction in
siirsat assessments compare M. Çegatay Uluçay, XVII. Asirda Saruhan'da Eskiyalik ve Halk
Hareketleri (Istanbul, 1944), p. 196
3
M D 91, p. 8, no. 25 (1056/1646-47).
52 COPING WITH THE S T ATE

teacher, mutegallibe and village tyrant deliberately distorted official statements

to back up his spurious claims 1 .

Alliances with 'bandits', most probably unemployed mercenaries, also

became the focus of accusations against teachers in religious schools
(muderris). An example from the later sixteenth century (1003/1594-95)
involves a muderris and two senior students (dani^mend) from the busy
market town of Nazi 11 i in the Anatolian province of Aydin 2 . These three men
were accused of keeping a garden in which wine was consumed. In the text of
the accusation, the official ranks of the accused are mentioned, as it were, in
quotation marks (...naminda olan). In fact the latters 1 contacts certainly
reached beyond the circle of religious scholars. For when the local kadi
attempted to close down what he considered a wineshop, the accused were able
to assemble a large number of armed 'bandits' whose relationship to the
principal actors is not clarified, but simply alluded to by the expression 'those
who followed their |the accused's] lead' (kendii havalarina tabi). This latter
wording, in the documents of the time, was always used in a less than
complimentary fashion. One may speculate that these 'bandits' were the
customers of the garden cum wineshop, some of them possibly irregular
soldiers. The encounter deteriorated into a fight, in which the kadi was insulted
and wounded. Against the Nazilli wine-bibbers, the local kadi attempted to
build a counter-coalition. We hear of the intervention of a kadi in charge of the
neighbouring district of (,'ine, and of testimonies concerning the bad character
of the accused, which had been issued by two muderris from outside Nazilli.
A simple case of 'drunk and disorderly', when looked at more closely, seems to
indicate a measure of factionalism among the Aydin ulema.

Such an interpretation is made more likely by the context of the early

1600s, when the rebellions of medrese students analyzed by Akdag had died
down but not completely disappeared 3 . In fact, certain complaints against local
ulema call the accused a former suhte (rebellious student) w h o had by no
means given up his rebellious ways and continued to protect bandits. Such
accusations were for instance levied against an adjunct kadi (naib) from the
district.of §ebinkarahisar in the Anatolian Northeast 4 . The latter supposedly
continued to maintain contacts not only with the suhte but with bandits
(e$kiya) as well, w h o m he supplied with food. Some of the naib's
confederates were called ehl-i o r / a n d must therefore have been members of
governmental services. Presumably, some of them were influential people, for
a number of sultanic rescripts, previously issued against the substitute kadi,

' a study concerning the use of spurious or falsified documents during this period has not yet
been undertaken, but might y eld worthwhile results.
2
M D 73, p. 171, no. 401 (1003/1594-95).
^Akdag, ( 'dab. Isvanlan, pp. 107-8.
4
M D 78. p. 552. no. 1416 I ¡(¡18/1609-10).
 POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG TAXPAYERS 53

had not been sufficient to dislodge him. The naib is described as a man of
violence, feared by the people of the locality, w h o s e a g g r e s s i o n s and
depredations could barely be controlled even with support from Istanbul.

This f o r m e r suhte was by no means the only a d j u n c t kadi against

w h o m local people expressed dissatisfaction. Quite to the contrary, the
Miihimme registers contain a sizeable number of complaints directed at these
lowest-ranking members of the judicial hierarchy 1 . Adjunct kadis were often
local men, who remained in office for long periods of time, while kadis only
officiated for a year or two. Therefore despite official disapproval of long
tenures, adjunct kadis were often able to build a local power base which they
might use for personal gain and manipulate the officially appointed judge.

From the frequency cf complaints against naibs., one may conclude that
the Ottoman administration af the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had not
yet developed an administrative structure that reached d o w n lower than the
fairly extensive district (kaza) administered by a kadi. However, the building
of an administrative structure reaching individual villages or tribes continued
relentlessly f r o m the fifteenth into the twentieth century. T h e long-term
tendency to increase the number of kazas, which can be traced through the
various tax registers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, formed part of
this effort to build a m o r e effective state structure. Attempts to limit the
influence of locally-based substitute kadis should be regarded in the s a m e
context, and thus the complaints against them must have been welcome to the
Ottoman administration f r o m a political point of view. Unfortunately, we
have no evidence which would allow us to decide whether complaints of this
type were officially encouraged or even solicited. But possibilities for such an
interplay certainly e x i s t e d , and s o m e ol the c o m p l a i n t s may be less
'spontaneous' than they appear at first glance.

COMPLAINTS AGAINST TAXPAYERS:

PRESENTING THE OPPONENT

In the civil war years which immediately preceded and followed the year
1600, complaints against public officials were more dramatic and of more
immediate interest to the modern researcher than most complaints against
taxpaying reaya. S o m e of the latter, however, also present features which
shed light upon relations beiween the reaya and the Ottoman administration.
A text dated 1003/1594-95 deals with a complaint by settled villagers against
nomads, in response to a petition by the adjunct kadi of Malatya. 2 Complaints

• s e e for instance M D 78, p. 416, m . 1069 (1022/1613-14).

2
M D 73, p. 95, no. 218 (1003/1594-95); M D 73, p. 94, no. 217 (1003/1594-95).
54 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

of this kind were common enough. Members of the cemaat-i Selmanli w h o

were known to the villagers by name and who therefore must have been
frequent visitors to the area, had remained in the village for three days. 1 The
tribesmen, who were armed with swords and arrows, had taken the peasants'
grain and flour, and in addition killed two men. In response, the villagers did
not rest content with the ordinary procedure of complaint in the kadi's court,
but also arranged for the services of mediators, namely a family of descendants
of the Prophet Muhammed (sadat). These sadat, who possessed tax collection
rights (malikdne) in the village affected, and in neighbouring localities as
well, may have been associated with the wealthy Malatya foundation, the
Zaviye-i Kubra 2 . In their complaint, the sadat asserted that the nomads were
not only habitual robbers, who molested villagers on their way back and forth
from their summer pastures, but also hardened heretics who insulted the
memory of the first caliphs and hated the Sunni community. We have no way
of judging whether the accusation was true or not; Kizilba§ tribesmen were
certainly common enough in central Anatolia to make it appear convincing 3 .
But it is remarkable that the sadat introduced this matter into what would
otherwise have been a routine conflict. Moreover, the descendants of the
Prophet intervened in a dispute which concerned them only in an indirect
fashion. Probably the villagers called in the sadat as their patrons, and since
the memory of the brutal repression of Kizilba§ uprisings must still have been
quite fresh, the sadat regarded this as an opportunity to present their
opponents as appropriate targets for the wrath of a Sunni ruler.

Other complaints against taxpaying subjects make us conscious of the

difficulty, in a twentieth-century perspective, of distinguishing robbers from
rebels. A rescript dated 1046/1636-37 shows that Divan officials of the time
would not have understood this problem, since for them, by definition every
taxpayer who refused to perform his obligations toward the Ottoman ruling
establishment was by definition a robber 4 . In response to a complaint from a
timar-holder, a villager named Ramazan f r o m the forested and inaccessible
subprovince of Bolu is described by Divan officials as a §erir ve §aki
(mischief maker and robber). It is probable that this was also the term applied
to him by his sipahi. Ramazan, although he was a taxpaying subject as his
father had been before him, had for ten years evaded the payment of the reaya
taxes to which he was liable according to Ottoman sultanic law (kanun) and

' T h i s cemaal has not been located in the tax register ( l a h r i r ) of Malatya published by Refet
Yinanv and Mesut Elibiiyuk (eds.), Kanuni Devri Malatya Tahrir Defterleri (1560) (Ankara,
1983). T h e village from which the complaint was issued, along with another settlement molested
by the nomads, could be identified; in o n e instance the identification is certain, in the other at
least probable (pp. 144, 147). The reading of the cemaal name remains problematic.
^Mentioned in Yinan9 and Klibiiyuk (eds.) Malatya, p. 37.
3
O n this issue compare Colir H. Imber, "The Persecution of the Ottoman Shi'ites According to
the miihimme defterleri, 1565-1585." Der Islam, 56, 2 (1979), 245-273.
4
M D 87. p. 32, no. 88 (1046.' 636-37).
 POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG TAXPAYERS 55

the official entry in the tax register. Nor was he alone in his defiance, for the
complaint mentions one other villager and, more surprisingly, a kadi as his
accomplices. While the tirnar-holder was on campaign, these three raided the
sipahi's house. We have no idea how the case appeared to Ramazan and his
friends. The long period of ¡:ime during which these men were able to elude
their sipahi makes it seem likely that they had sympathizers among the local
peasantry; after all, the famous 'noble robber' Koroglu was reputed active in
this area during the same period 1 . But whether Ramazan and his associates
possessed any features of the social bandit, or were at least attributed these
features by their fellow villagers, must remain undecided.

Our text is also of ¡merest because it shows that the complainant had
very limited authority in the village which he supposedly administered. This
was a problem which he shared with other iwzar-holders of the time. Inflation
and peasant flight during the Celali rebellions had reduced the sipahis' income,
and constant compaigns in Iraq during the reign of Sultan Murad IV had made
it difficult for them to retain control of 'their' villages. 2 A 'rescript for the
rectification of abuses' is concerned with this problem (1058/1648). Addressed
to the governor-general and the kadis of the province of Anadolu, this text
states that the reaya had lost respect for the timar-holders, and no longer
regarded them as their masters. 3 Not that the villagers referred to here
necessarily stopped paying their tithes and other standard dues {a§ar-i §eriye
ve rusum-i orfiye). But the} apparently were of the opinion that once these
taxes had been paid, they could refuse to let the sipahis, remain in their
villages even as guests. The text then went on to assert that this position was
completely unjustified, and that the reaya owed the sipahi submission as
their lawful lord and master. Not only were they to perform specific services
for the sipahi, such as extending hospitality to him for three days (it remains
unclear v/hether this applied to the village as a whole, or to every single
f a m i l y ) . 4 But more menacing to the position of the reaya as independent
peasants was the injunction that they should always be at the sipahi's beck
and call, and could not attend to their own business without having first
received permission from him. Moreover the right of the sipahi to have a
piece of land worked by the reaya for his own benefit, which had been
abolished in the sixteenth century, was formally reinstituted, and peasants who
refused a service that had been demanded from them were threatened with
punishment. If the injunctions of this rescript had all been conscientiously

' P e r t e v Naili Boratav, Koroglu Destarli, 2. ed. (Istanbul, 1983), pp. 96 9 7 mentions certain
features of this epos which make a connection to the Celali milieu appear probable.
2
B r u c e McGowan, Economic Life in Ottoman Europe, Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for
Land 1600-1800 (Cambridge E n g l , Paris, 1981), pp. 43-67 gives a comprehensive account of
the difficulties besetting seventeenth-century /¡mar-holders.
3
l n a l c i k , "Adaletnameler", pp. 135-6.
4
Halil Inaici k, The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600 (London, 1973), p. 110.
56 C O I ' I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

implemented, a Gutshernchaft on the Eastern European model might have

been the result, and the course of Ottoman rural history would have been
totally c h a n g e d . 1 As it is, the rescript of 1648, whose genesis remains
unknown as does the story of its subsequent non-application, shows that in
certain parts of Anatolia during the Celali rebellions and their immediate
aftermath, there was considerable tension between villagers and fimar-holders.

B A R G A I N I N G C O U N T E R S : T H E T H R E A T O F

M I G R A T I O N

Given the conflicts inherent in early seventeenth-century Ottoman

society, reaya who wished the central administration to take cognizance of
their grievances needed to show that they possessed a certain degree of power.
This power might be de facto, or they might be able to claim a legal basis for
some of their moves. As an instance of petitioners showing their de facto
strength, one might analyze the threat, fairly common in petitions of the
time, to take flight if such and such an abuse was not rectified 2 . There was a
practical basis for such a threat. With the beginning of the seventeenth
century, secular stagnation and decline had taken the place of the population
increase of the preceding century 3 . As a result, vacant land was once again
abundant, while villagers settling in towns also might find ways of at least
temporarily lightening thei • tax burdens.

But even though peasant flight was a widespread phenomenon, to state

the intention of leaving, in a petition submitted to the authorities, was
problematic in a seventeenth-century Ottoman context. Sixteenth-century
provincial regulations (kanunname) generally specified that villagers were not
permitted to leave their fields without the permission of the timar-holder,
administrator of crown lands or trustee of pious foundations under whose
control their village happened to be. 4 Thus when reaya threatened to decamp,
they were in a sense delving the authorities simply by putting their intention
into writing. However even though we know of quite a few instances of such
defiance, Ottoman authorities, at least in their written responses, preferred to
not take up the challenge. Instead they addressed or at least pretended to address
themselves to the grievana which the petitioners articulated.

' S e e M c G o w a n , Economic IJ:< . p. 7 3 o n the role of the O t t o m a n s t a t e in p r e v e n t i n g s u c h a

development.
2
S e e f o r e x a m p l e M D 7 8 , p. 6X5, no. 1780 ( 1 0 1 8 / 1 6 0 9 - 1 0 ) ; M D 8 4 , p. 10, n o . 18 ( 1 0 3 8 / 1 6 2 8 -
2 9 ) ; M D 7 8 , p. 2 8 5 no. 7 5 2 (1018M 6 0 9 - 1 0 ) .
•^Compare M c G o w a n . Economu ',ife in Ottoman Europe, p. 8 6 .
^ T h e kanun of t h e K o c a c i k y i i r i k l e r i p u b l i s h e d by O m e r Liitfi B a r k a n , XV. ve XVI Asirlarda
Osmanh imparatorlugunda Zirai Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esaslan ( I s t a n b u l , 1 9 4 3 ) , p. 2 6 4
e x p r e s s e s t h i s p r i n c i p l e v e r y g r a p h i c a l l y , a l b e i t in a n e g a t i v e f a s h i o n . W h e n ytirtik l e a v e a
p l a c e t h e y h a v e h i t h e r t o c u l t i v a u d , t h e timar-holder c a n n o t f o r c e t h e m to r e t u r n ; f o r a s yiiruk,
t h e y a r e n o t tied t o a n y o n e p l a c e O b v i o u s l y the p o s i t i o n w a s d i f f e r e n t in t h e c a s e of p e a s a n t s .
 POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG TAXPAYERS 57

This state of affairs should not be taken to mean that the seventeenth-
century Ottoman administration was indifferent to widespread migration of
reaya, quite to the contrary. Particularly during the reign of Murad IV (1623
1640), there was a broad drive to resettle peasants and townsmen in their
province:) of origin, which they had been forced to abandon due to the chaotic
conditions resulting from the Celali uprisings. 1 But this drive could not have
scored even limited and partial successes, if it had not been accompanied by an
amnesty for the moves which had preceded it. In fact, even the kanunnames of
the sixteenth century, while allowing timar-holders and other local
administrators long timespans during which they might reclaim absconding
peasants, had not specified any major penalties for the fugitives. 2 The
disruption of work and living patterns which resulted from forced resettlement
must however have been one of the more serious penalties that could be
inflicted on a family. 3

Given the de facto mobility of the reaya, the Ottoman administration

may well have considered that the Sultan's legitimacy was best maintained if
the challenge to his authority was ignored, and flight of the reaya was
regarded as an indicator of distress and not as defiance. On the other hand,
Anatolian reaya were not slow to use their bargaining advantage, particularly
during the years which followed Kuyucu Murad Pa§a's repression of the major
Celali leaders. In 1022/1613-14 and again in the reign of Murad IV, rescripts
were promulgated that ordered the reaya who had fled their villages to return
to their places of origin. Communities tried to negotiate the conditions of
their return, which in certain cases they undertook most unwillingly. In some
instances, traces of these negotiations survive in the rescripts of protection
which the villagers were given. Thus peasants might claim that they were
indebted and that their creditors, by threatening to seize the wherewithal of
production, were making it all but impossible for them to resume a normal
village life. 4 Settlers were accordingly granted a moratorium during which
they might reestablish the bases of agricultural production. In another
instance, Armenian peasants from a village near Divrigi complained of two of
their fellow villagers and co-religionists, whose illegal oppression had already
caused one hundred and twenty reaya to flee the area. 5 'Now that my |the
Sultan's] rescript has been promulgated ordering all those who had previously
fled to return to their former places of residence' a strategic moment had
arrived, which permitted the villagers to press home their point. After all, the

'Suraiya Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production
in Urban Setting (Cambridge Engl., 1984), pp. 272-287.
Inalcik, Tne Ottoman Empire, p i l l .
% r a n d D. A n d r e a s y a n , "CelaliU rden Kaçan Halkin Gerì Gönderilmesi," in: Ismail Hakki
Uzimçarçili'ya Armagan (Ankara, 1976), pp. 45-54.
4
M D 78, p. 254, no. 666 (1018/I6C9-I0).
5
M D 7 8 , p. 422, no. 1082 (1018/1(09-10).
58 C O I' 1 N G W I T H THE STATE

disturbances caused by the two village strongmen prevented the peasants from
stabilizing their villages. Again the background to the negotiations was the
fact that the reaya were mobile, and that the official Ottoman policy of
establishing stable agricultural settlements could only succeed if the peasants
were offered inducements and guarantees. Whenever there were two opposing
factions in the village, as seems to have been the case among the Armenians
of Divrigi, the mobility of the peasants might constitute a strategic advantage
to the stronger and more numerous of the two factions. For this latter faction
decided whether a newly reestablished village would survive, or else be
abandoned again within a brief timespan.

BARGAINING COUNTERS: KEEPING OFFICIALS

OUT OF VILLAGES

Another tactic to which aggrieved peasants might have recourse was to

bar provincial governors and their men from entering their villages. In this
instance, they could claim to have the law on their side, for between 1584 and
1590, Sultan Murad III had forbidden the devir, that is the descent of
provincial officials and their retinues upon villagers to collect taxes or
investigate alleged crimes. Village militias were authorized to prevent the
entry of the governors' mercenaries, if need be by force. 1 This rescript was a
product of desperation, even though attempts to limit the devir had already
been undertaken in Kani ni's times. 2 Attempts to collect revenue by ad hoc
methods were seen to lead to the dispersal of villages, and therefore to the
long-term ruin of the tax base. On the other hand, to disallow provincial
governors and their men entry into the villages made tax collection difficult if
not impossible, quite apart from the fact that village militias might easily
come to resemble their opponents the mercenary bands. 3 Thus the devir was
soon reinstituted, with certain face-saving limitations which may or may not
have been significant in practice. But villagers were inclined to remember the
original abolition, and attempted to use it as the basis for negotiation. This
tactic had certain chances of success since the Ottoman central administration,
presumably in order to maintain intact the image of the Sultan as a protector
of the reaya, was disinclined to admit that the prohibition of devir had been
totally abrogated. Which types of devir were permissible and which ones were
not, thus remained a subject for political bargaining.

*Akdag, Celali ¡syanlan, pp. 1501T.

^ìnalcik. "Adaletnàmeler," p. n !.
^Akdag, Celali ìsyanlari, pp. 1 V)-2.
 POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG TAXPAYHRS 59

A rescript dated 1003/1594-5 describes the kind of village

administration c o m m o n at the time, and the alternative which Sultan Murad
III and his advisers had hoped to institute. 1 From this text we learn that certain
mercenaries had obtained positions as commanders (suba$i, suba^i kethudasi)
with a succession of provincial governors, and had farmed local revenues,
committing themselves to the payment of large sums of money. In order to
recoup their outlays, they then instigated provincial governors to engage in all
sorts of oppressive practices. T o end this abuse of authority, governors were
now forbidden to send their men to the villages; when investigations became
necessary, these were to be performed by substitute kadis, accompanied by
three or four men only. A s to the reinstitution of the devir, we may refer to a
text f r o m 1018/1609-1610, f r o m which we learn that a certain Ridvan ( S 'avus,
active in the district of Dernirci (sub-province of Saruhan) had incited the
reaya to resist tours of inspection on the part of local tax collectors
(voyvodas).2 This m o v e m e n t was roundly condemned, even though Ridvan
f a v u § and the Dernirci villagers had previously been able to acquire a sultanic
rescript supporting their cause; in all likelihood this rescript had been based
upon Murad Ill's prohibition of devir. Inspection tours once every three
months were explicitly authorized; it is probable that Kuyucu Murad Pa§a's
victory over the Celali K a l e n d e r o g l u in 1608 had c o n v i n c e d Ottoman
administrators that it was now safe to reinstitute previous patterns of rule. 3

H o w e v e r d i f f e r e n t arrangements by which devir might be avoided

nonetheless are also recorded in the Miihimme registers. Thus in 1056/1646-
4 7 villagers of Siravolos on i:he Aegean coast had agreed to a yearly payment
of one hundred thousand akge to the sultan's kitchen, on condition that they
would not be asked to provide irregular soldiers for the governor's service, and
the devir remained f o r b i d d e n . 4 This exemption was disregarded by certain
governors, whereupon the villagers had it confirmed; whether this second
attempt at e n f o r c e m e n t was more succesful remains unknown. Much more
problematic were negotiations which took place in the sub-povince of Bolu
about 1046/1636-37. 5 Here villagers and tribesmen of the districts of Bolu,
Dodurga, Samakov, Ova, U us and Bartin protested the tax-collecting tours
which the governor's commanders undertook once every three months. Large
groups of people participated in this protest; unfortunately, the rescript does
not describe the way in which they were convoked and organized. T his activity
the Ottoman administration declared illegitimate. A sultanic rescript was
invoked, to w h i c h at present I have not been able to find any
further references, and which stated that throughout the empire, all manner of

1
M D 73, p. 193 no. 450 (1003/1594-95).
2
M D 7 8 , p. 554, no. 1421 (1018/16(19-10).
3
William Giiswold, The Great Anat ilian Rebellion, 1591-1611 (Berlin, 1983), p. 187ff.
4
M D 91. p. 37, no. 112 (1056/1646-7).
5
M D 87, p. 36, no. 98 (1046/1636 7).
60 C O P ' NG WITH THE STATE

assemblies (dernek ve cemiyet) were prohibited. On the other hand, the

sultanic rescript invoked by the rebellious reaya, and which might be
summarized in the phrase 'prohibition of devir' was not formally abrogated;
quite to the contrary, the principle itself was even confirmed. However the
revenue interests of governors were considered to take precedence, and thus the
Ottoman administration took away with one hand what it had just granted
with the other.

PRESENTING THE S U E T AN T O PETITIONERS AND

OFFICIALS

The social historian dealing with Ottoman rescripts is mainly

concerned with the beginning sections of these texts, in which Divan officials
presented the facts of the case as they saw them. On the other hand, the second
section (introduced by the famous phrase buyurdum ki T have ordered') seems
much less interesting. Often provincial administrators were merely enjoined to
make sure that the case, if it did not fall under the fifteen-year statute of
limitations, was properly investigated in court. 1 In other instances,
particularly when previous rescripts had already decided the matter, the Sultan's
orders might consist of a simple injunction to respect his command. 2
However in quite a few cases, a more elaborate justification of the Sultan's
position was attempted. Whether these phrases were principally directed at the
complainants, or were intended to keep up the morale of Ottoman bureaucrats,
is often difficult to determine. But in a study concerning the relations between
rulers and ruled, both these aspects are worth investigating.

We will analyze a rescript dealing with complaints against a former

governor of the sub-province of Teke in south-western Anatolia, who had been
involved in local intrigue and proven himself quite unable to cope with the
problems of the area (981/1573-74. 3 ) According to the beginning section of
the rescript, the kadi of Antalya, who should have conducted the investigation
against the governor, also came in for his share of blame. 'Petitions were
submitted to my Imperial Stirrup that complaints had been proferred against
Hasan Bey, governor of I eke. An investigation was ordered and commenced
according to my noble command. A large number of poor people (jukara) and
other tax-paying subjects appeared to demand their rights in court. Taxpayers
from my Imperial crown lands and other tax-collecting officials (iimera ve
iimmal) also came forward; some of them demanded payment of back taxes,

' S e e for example M D 73, p. 150, no. 349 (1003/1594-95).

2
M D 80, p. 518, no. 1222 (1024/1615).
3
M D 23, p. 304, no. 694 (981; I S73-74).
 P O L I T I C A L ACTIVITY A M O N G T A X P A Y E R S 61

100,0000 \akge\ in some cases and even more in others. 1 (But] the kadi of
Antalya took the aforementioned governor's money [i.e. allowed himself to be
bribed] and permitted [the governor's] suba$is to escape. Later he had some of
the complainants arrested and executed by night. Others he robbed of large
sums of money and committed many grievous injustices. In this [current|
year, more than 200 people were killed, but no retribution was exacted'.

In this confused situation—the province of Teke was always difficult to

govern, since it contained a sizeable nomad population with Shi'i-Kizilba§
sympathies—the Ottoman administration attempted to secure its revenues and
at the same time maintain the image of the Sultan as the protector of his tax-
paying subjects. The text does, not indicate that the author(s) were aware of a
possible contradiction between these two aims. For this double purpose, the
clauses following the 'buyurdum hi' proved a useful vehicle. The ordinary,
standard command to the kadis, namely to hear the case if it did not fall under
the statute of limitations and -eport the results to the central authorities, was
expanded by clauses specific to the case at the hand. The rescript was addressed
to the kadis of Antalya and Teke, which probably meant that the accused judge
was no longer in office.

The addressees were to try both Hasan Bey and the former kadi, and
above all things, make sure that the latter paid their debts to the fisc. Only
after the claims of the Sultan had been satisfied—and this clause probably
included the demands of lowe'-level tax-officials as well—were the claims of
private persons to be taken into consideration. This was standard procedure;
but since there were many complainants against the accused, and the sums of
money under dispute were sizeable by the standards of a poor and outlying
province, the principle seemed worth a reminder. Once accounts had been
settled, the ruler wished to learn in detail what crimes the two administrators
had committed. The image of the Sultan repressing corruption while at the
same time protecting the interests of the fisc formed part and parcel of
Ottoman official ideology.

C O N C L U S I O N

The rebellious taxpayers of Bolu had tried to make their claims heard
by assembling in large groups. But since research into the political behaviour
of Ottoman taxpayers is still very much in its beginnings, we do not know-
how frequent actions of this type may have been. It is also much too early to
establish a 'repertoire' of contentious acts performed by Anatolian villagers and

' T h e word jukara ('the poor') often means 'dervishes', but in the present context, it probably
qualifies the following term 'reaya' m i a n i n g 'taxpayers'. 'Mal-i miri' has been translated as 'back
taxes', because most 'state property 1 probably consisted of uncollected dues.
62 c o r N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

t o w n s m e n , of the kind that Charles Tilly and his c o l l a b o r a t o r s have

established for France and early industrial England. 1 H o w e v e r such acts
undoubtedly existed, and our understanding of them will increase as analysis
progresses.

At the present stage, it is important to maintain a critical distance f r o m

our source materials, which were always written by Ottoman officials. The
latter, however, cannot be regarded as impartial recorders. T o the contrary, they
were the addressees of the taxpayers' petitions, and therefore parties with a
stake in the game. Officials were themselves the causes of many collective
protests. Certainly the o f f i c i a l s d r a f t i n g the rescripts c o n t a i n e d in the
Mtihimme registers had interests which did not always coincide with those of
the provincial administrators against whom most protests were directed. But
even so, there were intercsls common to Ottoman officialdom as a whole, and
caution is in order.

Other aspects of the negotiation process and the underlying socio-

political conflicts remind us of the phenomena investigated by Charles Tilly
and before him, by scholar; such as Albert Soboul, George Rude and Richard
C o b b in their studies of collective behaviour in late eighteenth and early
2
nineteenth-century Europe T o begin with, the assumption that the ruler was
willing to aid the poor tax paying subjects, and was not party to the exactions
of his officials, is familial both from Ottoman and early modern European
contexts. H o w e v e r while such assumptions were totally unrealistic where
rulers such as Louis XIII and Louis X I V were c o n c e r n e d , Murad Ill's
experiments in the conduct of local administration do make it comprehensible
that Ottoman provincials ' h o u l d have believed that the Sultan was on their
side.

On the other hand, ihc petitions examined here demonstrate that there
existed considerable tension between provincial governors, their mercenaries,
certain kadis and /wwr-holders on the one hand, and taxpaying peasants on the
other. In these disputes, the problem was excessive taxation. Certainly this
should not be taken to mean that the Anatolian civil wars of the years around
1600 were peasant rebellions in the twentieth-century meaning of the word.
Scholars working on this problem today, particularly Halil inalcik, assume
that the Celali rebellions were uprisings of irregular soldiers trying to find

' C h a r l e s Tilly, "War and Peasan Rebellion in Seventeenth Century France," in: Charles Tilly,
As Sociology Meets History (New York. 1972).
^Albert Soboul, The Sans Culottes: The Popular Movement and Revolutionary Government
1793-1794, tr. Remy I. Hall (New York, 1972); George Rude', The Crowd in the French
Revolution (New York, 1959): G e o r g e Rudé, The Crowd in History, A Study of Popular
Disturbances in France and England 1730-1848 (London 1981): Richard Cobb, The Police and
the People, French Popular Pro:est 1789-1820 (London, Oxford, 1970); Richard Cobb, Paris
and its Provinces 1792-1809 (London. New York, Toronto, 1975).
 POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG TAXPAYERS 63

t h e m s e l v e s a p o s i t i o n in t h e O t t o m a n state a p p a r a t u s , a n d that p e a s a n t
c o n c e r n s in the n a r r o w e r s e n s e of t h e w o r d w e r e of no i m p o r t a n c e in this
c o n t e x t . 1 B u t it s e e m s that y o u n g peasants left the villages in large n u m b e r s
b e c a u s e there w a s c o n f l i c t with the tax-collector, a n d w e s h o u l d not be t o o
hasty in m a k i n g the O t t o m a n village into a utopia of social h a r m o n y .

Orice again, a c o m p a r i s o n with early m o d e r n France m a y prove helpful.

C h a r l e s Tilly has p o i n t e d o u t that s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y F r e n c h provincial
rebellions were not p e a s a n t rebellions in the m o d e r n sense e i t h e r . 2 The m a j o r
targets of these well-researched and much debated rebellions w e r e the agents of
the centralizing state, not individual landlords. E v e n if the a m o u n t of class
t e n s i o n b e t w e e n F r e n c h p e a s a n t s and local f e u d a l lords s h o u l d not be
m i n i m i z e d , c o n f l i c t s between peasants and landlords, w h i c h alone constitute
p e a s a n t u p r i s i n g s in the t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y s e n s e of the t e r m , w e r e by n o
m e a n s d o m i n a n t . 3 B u t in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as in F r a n c e , the a b s e n c e of
anti-landlord uprisings does not m e a n that there w e r e no t e n s i o n s b e t w e e n
revenue takers and taxpayers. T h e villagers regarded the agents of the central
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n as the principal threat to their livelihoods. T h i s m a k e s good
sense in the Anatolian context, where there w e r e f e w large l a n d h o l d e r s b e f o r e
t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y . B u t c o n f l i c t s with r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e central
administration w e r e f r e q u e n t , and if the adaletname of 1648 is any guide in
the matter, there w a s e v e n a time w h e n the right of the peasant to operate his
f a r m without day-to-day interference f r o m his íówar-holder w a s u n d e r official
attack.

T h e rebellions of scventeenth-century provincial F r a n c e are of interest

in yet a n o t h e r context. T h e y w e r e directed against taxes levied by the central
state, w h i c h w e r e m a i n l y intended to f i n a n c e war, or, to use C h a r l e s Tilly's
e x p r e s s i o n , 'state m a k i n g ' . 4 In a d d i t i o n , t h e y s o m e t i m e s f o c u s s e d on the
r e v e n u e f a r m e r s w h o w e r e t h e m a j o r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of ' c a p i t a l i s m ' in
s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y F r a n c e . 5 In the O t t o m a n context, f i n a n c i n g wars a l s o
played a key role in i n c r e a s i n g d e m a n d f o r taxes. So in this respect, the
situation w a s quite c o m p a r a b l e to that prevailing in France. Less obvious is

Halil inalcik, 'Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire 1600-1700' Archivum
Ottomanicum, VI (1980), 283-337; Suraiya Faroqhi, 'Political Tensions in the Anatolian
Countryside around 1600. An Attempt at Interpretation,' in Tiirkische Miszellen, Robert
Anhegger Festschrift, Armagam, Mélanges (Istanbul, 1987), pp. 117-130, reprinted in this
volume.
2
Tilly, "War and Peasant Rebellion " pp. 109- 111.
^However there has been much delate on this issue, particularly between Boris Porchnev, Les
soulèvements populaires en Frarce au XVIIe siècle (Paris, 1972) and Roland Mous'nier,
Peasant Uprisings in Seventeenth-Century France, Russia and China, tr. Brian Pearce (London,
1971). For a summary of the debate, compare the contribution by Le Roy Ladurie cited in note
34.
^Tillv, "War and Peasant Rebellion." rp. 114.
c
'Tilly, "War and Peasant Rebellion," p. 121.
64 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

the role of capitalism. Although Mustafa Akdag has attempted to make the
impact of European capitalism responsible for the socio-economic crisis of the
years around 1600, and thereby indirectly for the Celali uprisings, the
connections he has tried to establish are not very c o n v i n c i n g . ' European
exports of grain and raw materials should have caused problems for town
dwellers, particularly artisans. On the other hand, villagers selling produce to
exporting merchants should, if they were lucky, have received slightly higher
prices than they would have d o n e if they had sold in the m o r e strictly
controlled domestic market. However most of the recruits to the rebel armies
were of village and noL of artisan background. Thus it would seem that the
villagers and townsmen whose actions we can perceive through the Muhimme
documents were reacting against the load placed upon them by Ottoman state
building. Certainly it must be admitted that the costs of state-building were
enhanced by the 'price revolution 1 brought about in part due to the importation
of European silver. But on the whole 'capitalism' was involved only in a
secondary fashion, namely in so far as the revenue farmers w h o occupied such
a prominent place in both France and the Ottoman Empire can be regarded as
capitalists.

T o summarize what is known about the participants in the Anatolian

military rebellions, which reached their first peak between 1590 and 1608, but
c o n t i n u e d spasmodically t h r o u g h o u t the seventeenth c e n t u r y , w e might
suggest the following: in the past it had been assumed that young peasants
unable to marry and establish themselves because of overpopulation, left their
villages and sought s e n ice as mercenaries or attempted careers in the teaching
and judicial services. 2 This explanation has now increasingly been cast into
doubt, partly because it seems probable that 'overpopulation' occurred at most
in a f e w limited districts of A n a t o l i a . 3 At the s a m e time pre-industrial
populations are now k r o w n to adjust to demographic increase in a variety of
w a y s . In many historical situations, a g r o w i n g p o p u l a t i o n does not
necessarily lead to the cultivation of ever more marginal lands, and the
mechanical model of a population being pushed out of the village by its own
increase has largely been abandoned. 4 As an alternative, it seems realistic to
assume that increased taxation and the violence associated with tax collection

' C o m p a r e also Omer Liitl i Barkan. "The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning
Point in the Economic Histoiy of the Near East," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 6
(1975), 3-28. For the d i s c u s n o n of these issues, see Holm Sundhaussen, "Die "Preisrevolution"
im Osmanischen Reich während der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts." Importierte "oder
"intern verursachte Inflation". (Zu einer T h e s e Ö. L. Barkans)," Südost Forschungen, XEI1
^1983), 169-181.
"Akdag, Celali Isyanlari. p >>8ff.
•^Michael Cook, Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia 1450 1600 (London, 1972).
4
H u r i Islamoglu-inan, "Oit osmanische Landwirtschaft im Anatolien des 16. Jahrhunderts:
Stagnation o d e r regionale E n t w i c k l u n g , " Jahrbuch zur Geschichte und Gesellschaft des
Vorderen und Mittleren Or ents (Jahrbuch für Vergleichende Sozialforschung) (1985-1986),
165-214.
 POLITICAL ACTIVITY AMONG TAXPAYERS 65

made village life unattractive to many peasants. The petitions of the period are
quite conclusive in this respect. Petitioners complained a great deal about
overtaxation and oppression by provincial administrators, and said nothing at
all about land fragmentation, sinking agricultural wages and other symptoms
of overpopulation. Thus it would seem that the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth-century exodus from the villages was a political phenomenon, and
not a consequence of demog -aphic growth.

Confronted with this state of affairs, the ruler's position was

ambiguous. Protection of the reaya constituted the basic obligation for the
Sultan, as the reaya paid the taxes without which the state would have
collapsed. 1 To discuss the matter on a more mundane level: once the devir had
become the chief complaint of Anatolian reaya, and Murad III had toyed with
the idea of its total abolition, it became very difficult for later rulers to rescind
his orders, for that would have detracted from the Sultan's legitimacy as a
protector of the reaya. On the other hand, the ruler, in spite of dire threats
against officials who oppressed the taxpayers, ultimately depended upon
Ottoman officialdom as a whole. This was clearly expressed in certain
rescripts: governors and military commanders, who fought the rulers' wars,
must be assured of receiving the revenues assigned to them. 2 Since these
revenues could not be ensured without devir, devir must continue and be
legalized. It is still to early to tell whether these manoeuverings contributed
toward undermining the legitimacy of certain seventeenth-century Ottoman
rulers.

P O S T S C R I P T

After this article had gone to press, I located two further relevant
studies: Halil inalcik, "§ikayet Hakki: 'Arz-i Hal ve 'Arz-i Mahzar'lar,"
Osmanli Arafirmalari, 7-8 (1988), 33-54 and Linda Darling, "The Ottoman
Finance Department and the Assessment and Collection of the Cizye and
Avariz Taxes, 1560-1660", unpublished PhD dissertation, Chicago, 1990, p.
215 ff.

'For a discussion of the manner in which sixteenth-century Ottoman authors formulated this
idea, compare Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, p. 262.
2
M D 87, p. 36, no. 98 (1046/1636-i7).
 SAINTHOOD AS A MEANS OF
SELF-DEFENSE IN SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY OTTOMAN ANATOLIA

In the closing decade of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the
seventeenth, the steppe villages of central Anatolia lost many of their
inhabitants. A substantial share of these settlements were abandoned for long
periods of time or disappeared altogether. A d o c u m e n t f r o m the year
1 0 9 8 / 1 6 8 6 - 8 7 i n f o r m s us that the settled villages of the districts of
Hacibekta§, Siileymanli-i kebir, and Siileymanh-i sagir (sancak of Kir§ehir)
had been abandoned altogether, with the sole exception of a single village,
presumably Hacibekta^. 1 In the same way, the district of H a y m a n a (to the
west of Ankara), which in spite of limited rainfall had contained a fair number
of villages according to the sixteenth-century tax registers, was almost
exclusively nomad territory by the second half of the eighteenth century. 2
Wolf Hutteroth and his student Volker Hohfeld have emphasized how the flat
and more easily accessible parts of central Anatolia remained largely void of
permanent settlement until the middle of the nineteenth century. 3 Thus the
years around 1600, at least where central Anatolia is concerned, thoroughly
merited their name of "The Great Flight" (Biiyiik Ka^gun). 4

A s the persistence of Hacibekta§ as a settlement indicates, however,

villages that contained the tttrbe and zaviye of a saint had a much better
chance of survival than villages in which these elements of stability were
lacking. In the present paper, I will explore the ways and means by which the
existence of ttirbe and zaviye might help a settlement to survive in the face of
often f o r m i d a b l e difficulties. W h e n interpreting the role of zaviyes and
zaviyedar families, I will use anthropological studies concerning the role of
holy men in rural areas of the modern Middle East. Obviously, the attempt to
bring together historical and anthropological data is beset with a number of
difficulties. Since dervish orders in Turkey were officially closed down in
1925, the authors of recent anthropological studies of western and central
Anatolia had very little opportunity to take the activities of holy men into

' o s m a n l i Ar§ivi Istanbul (until recently Ba^bakanlik Ar§ivi), section Kami] Kepeci 5271, p. 31.
2
T a p u Kadastro Ar§ivi Ankara, Kuyudu kadime section, No. 21, passim.
^Wolf Diether Hutteroth, Türkei, Wissenschaftliche Länderkunden, No. 21 (Darmstadt, 1982).
p. 309. Volker Höhfeld, Anatolische Kleinstädte, Anlage, Verlegung und Wachstumsrichtung seit
dem 19. Jahrhundert, Erlanger Geographische Arbeiten, Sonderband 6 (Erlangen, 1977).
^ M u s t a f a A k d a g , Celäli Isyanlart '1550-1603), Ankara Üniversitesi, Dil ve Tarih-Co«rafya
Fakültesi Yayinlan, Sayi 144 (Ankara, 1963), p. 251.
68 ( ' ( • P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

account. The only available study is that by Martinus van Bruinessen, and that
deals with eastern Anatolia, an area very indifferently covered by seventeenth-
century documentation. Therefore, twentieth-century data are largely derived
from work on places like Lebanon, Egypt, or Morocco, 1 social settings which
differ profoundly from Anatolia. Moreover, even if nineteenth- and twentieth-
century data had been available to a much greater extent than is actually the
case, the problem would be only half solved. For zaviyes and zaviyedars
must have functioned somewhat differently when peasants produced merely for
subsistence and taxes. In a countryside penetrated by roads and railways, and
subject to the fluctuations of the world market social relations were inevitably
transformed. In spite of all these objections, anthropological data can still
provide valid indicators and help us interpret the available evidence. Given the
scarcity of studies on the seventeenth century, it seems unreasonable to
neglect them.

In order to avoid possible m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s , it is necessary to

introduce a caveat: if the present paper dwells on the political role of sheiks
and dervishes, this is not to deny that these men (and sometimes, at least in
the Anatolian context, women) 2 saw themselves — and were understood by
their contemporaries — as playing a primarily spiritual role. 3 But the same is
true of religious leaders the world over, which does not prevent them f r o m
acting also in a political context; one need only cite the example of medieval
European monks. Thus the present article simply deals with a single aspect of
a many-faceted reality.

T H R E E D I F F E R E N T T Y P E S O F S A I N T S

Following the lead of social anthropologists, the f o l l o w i n g types of

zaviyedars are considered in the present study: (1) the saints w h o guarded
tribal frontiers, mediated in disputes, and as late as the 1950s intervened in the
selection of tribal chiefs in the High Atlas; (2) the sheikly lineages of certain
Sunni villages in Lebanon, w h o received visitors on a large scale, possessed
religious prestige, and in certain situations stood up to the local landholders,
while at the same time depending heavily upon the latters 1 purse for

' M a r t i n u s v a n B r u i n e s s e n , Ay,ha. Shaikh and State in Kurdistan ( N . p . , n.d) (the G e r m a n v e r s i o n

is m o r e e a s i l y a c c c s s i b l e : Aqha, Scheich und Staat in Kurdistan, ( B e r l i n , 1989). E r n e s t G e l l n e r ,
Saints of the Atlas, T h e N a t u r e of H u m a n S o c i e t y S e r i e s ( L o n d o n , 1 9 6 9 ) ; M i c h a e l G i l s e n a n ,
" A g a i n s t P a t r o n - C l i e n t R e l a t i o n s , " in Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, ed. Ernest
G e l l n e r and J o h n W a t e r b u r y ( L o n d o n , 1 9 7 7 ) , pp. 1 6 7 - 1 8 2 ; I t h a n k M s . N ü k h e t S i r m a n f o r
p o i n t i n g o u t this v o l u m e to m e . A m a i R a s s a m , " A l - t a b a ' i y y a : P o w e r , P a t r o n a g e a n d M a r g i n a l
G r o u p s in N o r t h e r n Iraq," ibid., pp. 157-166.
2
Ö m e r Liitfi B a r k a n , " O s m a n l i i m p a r a t o r l u g u n d a bir i s k ä n v e k o l o n i z a s y o n m e t o d u o l a r a k
v a k i f l a r v e t e m l i k l e r , " Vaktflar Derisi. 2 (1942), 279-386.
^ C o m p a r e in t h i s c o n t e x t V i n c e n t C o r n e l l , " T h e L o g i c of A n a l o g y a n d t h e R o l e of the S u f i
S h a y k h in P o s t - M a r i n i d M o r o x o , " International Journal of Middle East Studies, 15 ( 1 9 8 3 ) , 69.
 S A I N T H O O D AS A M E A N S O F S E L F- D E F E N S E 69

ceremonial expenses; (3) the sadat lineages of northern Iraq, who lived lives
not very different f r o m other landholding families, except for the fact they
were more concerned about ritual purity than their neighbours; 1 (4) and the
Nak§bendi and Kadiri zaviyedars of eastern Anatolia, who gained a political
role they had not previously possessed in the course of the fierce tribal
conflicts that followed the Ottoman elimination of east Anatolian beyliks
during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839). 2

At first glance, the "saints of the Atlas" appear scarcely relevant to the
problem at hand, given the differences between Berber tribal society and
seventeenth-century Anatolia. In the list of services performed by the Berber
zaviyedars to the society surrounding them, however, Gellner mentions items
familiar f r o m Anatolia as well, such as the protection of travelers, the
facilitation of intertribal trade, and the sponsoring of religious festivals. Kven
more importantly, by the miracles and supposedly Koranic decisions which
the Moroccan zaviyedars provided in local disputes, they strengthened the
villagers' identification with Islam, albeit a provincial and slightly heterodox
variety of this religion. 3

In this context, Gellner attempts an historical reconstruction of how

the saintly lineage of Zaviya Ahansal became established in local society. In
Gellner's interpretation, the zaviyedars may be descended f r o m a missionary
w h o adapted to local beliefs and customs, or else f r o m a locally established
pre-Islamic Berber saintly lineage that became islamized and thereby continued
to exercise influence. 4 For the Anatolian setting, the second alternative does
not seem relevant, but the first suggestion fits in very nicely with Irène
Mélikoff's hypothesis concerning the Bektashis. 5 According to Mélikoff, the
Bektashis had attempted to induce Anatolian tribesmen to abandon the many
shamanisl beliefs to which they were still attached, thereby bringing these
heterodox nomads and semiromads into the fold of Sunni Islam. In order to be
understood and accepted by their flock, however, the Bektashis were inclined to
adapt and reinterpret many of the beliefs current among the tribesmen, so that
an originally Sunni order was transformed into a heterodox one. Thus it would
seem that parallels between Anatolian zaviyedars and the saints of the Atlas
are not as rare as might appear at first glance. Moreover, it can be assumed
that during the political and financial crisis of the early seventeenth century,
the impact of the Ottoman administration upon the central Anatolian steppe
was weakened, and tribesmen became more autonomous than they had been
previously. If this is true, then there may have been further parallels between

' kassarn, "Power," p. 166.

^Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh ana State, pp. 289-291.
3
Gellner, Saints, pp. 78, 300.
4
I b i d „ p. 299.
c
Irène Mélikoff, "Le problème kizi:ba§," Turcica 6 (1975), 49-67.
70 COPING WITH THE STATE

the zaviyedars of Zawiya Ahansal and their counterparts from, for instance,
Hacibekta§, than we can recapture today. The question cannot be decided
without closer investigation.

I will now consider the case of the sheikly lineages of the Akkar region
that have been studied by Michael Gilsenan. Akkar is also a fairly remote area,
but instead of being ruler-less like the Berber mountains, the area is dominated
by families of large landowners. The latter, known as beys, control the labour
of a poor peasantry. In certain locations, there are also families with religious
prestige, often presumed to be descended from the Prophet Muhammad; these
families may or may not be the dominant lineages of their locality. A
significant part of their prestige is derived from the fact that the sheik can
oppose his authority to the brute force wielded by the bey. When analyzing
the situation more closely, Gilsenan found that in some villages, the sheiks
replace rather than confront the beys, while in many other cases, the
opposition sheik-bev, after an initial confrontation, turns into a de facto
alliance. Many sheiks are supported by beys, either through direct gifts or
through leases of land a: low rates. The beys' gifts rarely enable the sheiks to
become rich in their own right, but simply allow them to sustain the
hospitality demanded of them. It would seem, however, that certain sheikly
families independently own the wealth needed to claim high status. Sheiks of
this type are independent of the bey, but in their own villages they act like
beys, with whom they combine to form the local ruling class. It goes without
saying that their religious prestige is correspondingly diminished.

Amal Rassam's account of Mosul notables and their clients in northern

Iraq has certain features in common with Gilsenan's analysis of interclass
relations in Akkar, while differing profoundly in other respects. Again we find
notable families recogni /.ed as descendants of the Prophet, and like their Akkar
counterparts these notables acted as patrons to their sharecroppers and former
sharecroppers. Specifically, the notables provided hospitality to the peasants,
housing them in the family compound whenever they visited Mosul and
taking their widows and orphans into their homes as servants or retainers. The
relationship was easily legitimized in religious terms, since the peasants,
extremist Shi 'is, acknowledged the superior religious status of their notable
"protectors." On the other hand, the sadat nobles of Mosul largely shared the
beliefs of their peasants, and approached the relationship in a spirit of
noblesse oblige.

With respect 10 the stability of the patronage tie, Rassam's

interpretation of the Mosul situation differs noticeably from that suggested by
Gilsenan. From her account, it would seem that patronage ties break down
principally in cases in which patrons and clients do not share a common
value system. As long as these common values survive, however, horizontal
 SAINTHOOD AS A MEANS OF. S ELF - D E F EN S E 71

solidarities do not threaten the vertical relations characteristic of patronage.

Ties between different types of notables and the latter's capacity for concerted
action, that is, phenomena we might describe as class struggle from above, do
not figure in Rassam's account, though they occupy a prominent place in
Gilsenan's. In the Iraqi setting, each notable family seems to have confronted
government and clients more or less on its own.

Concerning the Naksbendi network that rapidly expanded in early

nineteenth-century eastern Anatolia and northern Iraq, Van Bruinessen makes a
number of remarks that may equally apply to western and central Anatolia
during the seventeenth century. First of all, he notes that the first generation
of Nak§bendi sheikhs, who followed the institution of the order in this region
by Mevlana Halid, were not particularly politicized, but that the degree of their
political involvement increased with the tribal feuds that followed the
abolition of the semi-independent emirates. This is a reasonable assumption in
the case of seventeenth-century western and central Anatolia as well: the Celali
rebellions and the immigration of nomadic tribes from eastern Anatolia led to
the breakdown of central control in many parts of Anatolia. It is likely that
under such conditions even sheiks whose main concerns were otherworldly
were pushed into political activity by the necessity of protecting themselves
and their followers. Moreove r, the consolidation of the Bektashi order, which
took place sometime between 1550 and 1650, may owe something to the
atmosphere of rebellion and civil war that prevailed in Anatolia during those
years. 1

Seen from a different perspective, the sheik and sadat families analyzed
in the accounts of Gellner, Gilsenan, Rassam, and Van Bruinessen may be
compared to Anatolian zaxiyedars of the time when ayan families were
prominent in the countryside. 2 Even the heads of major Anatolian zaviyes,
however, such as the dergah of Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi, were never in a
position to compete with important ayan, even though in certain localities
members of a given sheikly lineage might constitute the most prominent
residents. It is probable that the more important zaviyedars acted as small-
scale ayan on their own account, without necessarily maintaining close
relations with the secular ayan. Thus I suspect that Anatolian zaviyedars
resembled the sadat of Mosul more than the sheikly families of Akkar.
Certain Anatolian zaviyes possessed affiliated peasants who claimed to be
descended from the founding saint. These peasants may have constituted the
power base for a particularly enterprising zaviyedar, who probably regarded
them as his clients.

'compare Turcica, 6 (1975), in which various contributors have dealt with different aspects of
this problem.
"Suraiya Faroqhi, "XVI-XVIII. Yuzyillarda Anadolu'da §eyh Aileleri," in Turkiye iktisat Tarihi
Semineri, Metinler iarlqmalar, ed Osman Okyar and Unal Nalbantoelu (Ankara 1975) np
197-230.
72 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T K

It is well to keep in mind the large number of political conflicts in

which the more ambitious sheiks, such as the zaviyedars of Hacibekta§, for
example, were involved. A zaviyedar trying to cement his political position
was likely to arouse a great deal of hostility and quite literally took his life in
his hands. This is consonant with Gilsenan's observations, for he records
sheikly families engaged in blood feuds against peasants of the area in which
they were established. 1 In spite of all this, both central Anatolian and Akkar
sheiks were only marginally involved in physical confrontations. After all, the
social scene Gilsenan describes included specialists of violence in the service
of the beys, and the major Anatolian ayan also possessed their retinues of
armed men. In contrast the sheikly families in Akkar and in central Anatolia
were not known for the size of their private armies. But compared to the Atlas
saints who abstained n o t ' o n l y from f e u d i n g but even f r o m litigation, the
sheikly families of Anatolia were not exactly peaceful people.

T H E S T A T U S OF Z A V I Y E D A R S IN T H E
A N A T O L I A N C O U N T R Y S I D E

O t t o m a n dervishes had been closely involved with the Turkish

settlement of Anatolia and Rumeli; this matter has been extensively treated by
O m e r Liitfi Barkan and Cengiz Orhonlu and need not be taken up again here. 2
Once a zaviye was established and had become the nucleus of a settlement, the
zaviyedars might receive certain tax exemptions, mainly for themselves but
in certain cases for the village as a whole. T h e zaviyedars' position was
strengthened if they could claim to be "no one's raiyet," which many of them
were able to do. For such a claim, if accepted by the O t t o m a n central
administration, mean! that the zaviyedar might be considered as part of the
ruling group, even though often only as a marginal member. 3 From the point
of view of the O t t o m a n administration, the crucial characteristic of the
zaviyedars was that the) kept open house for travelers and thereby contributed
to the safety of the roads. T h e y were probably assimilated, according to
circumstances, either lo the muafve miisellem reaya who repaired bridges and
served as passguards. or to the minor timar holders, w h o in the event of a
campaign were left behind to perform police duties. A small supply of arms

'Gilsenan, "Against Patron i lient Relations," p. 173.

^ B a r k a n , "Vakiflar," p. 28—304; C e n g i z O r h o n l u , Osmanli imparatorlugunda Derbend
Tefkilatt, Istanbul Üniversiu a Hdebiyat Fakiiltesi Y a y i n l a n , No. 1209 (Istanbul, 1967), pp. 21-
31.
•^Compare Suraiya Faroqhi. " The Peasants of Saideli in the Late Sixteenth Century," Archivum
Ottomanicum, 8 (1983), 229. a n d C o r n e l l Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman
Empire, The Historian Musuh'a 'Áli (1541-1600), Princeton Studies on the Near East (Princeton,
1986). p. 20.
 S A I N T H O O D AS M E A N S OF SELF-DEFENSE 7.3

was probably kept at least in the more exposed zaviyes, and the enemies of a
given sheik might even complain that he made common cause with robbers. 1

W h i l e Anatolian sheiks had made a niche for t h e m s e l v e s in the

Ottoman administrative system, their saintly qualities, in the narrower sense
of "saintly," were apparently much less emphasized in seventeenth-century
Anatolia than in twentieth-century Morocco. Certainly the lineage of a major
zaviyedar, such as that of :he sheik of Hacibekta§, was a matter worth
recording even in the eyes of a sophisticated urban intellectual like Mustafa
Ali. 2 But the importance of a zaviyedar lineage, at least in the eyes of the
Ottoman officials w h o produced the sources w e all must use, lay in its
function as a protector of travelers, and not in any intrinsic holiness.

ZAVIYEDARS DEFENDING THEIR OWN

PRIVILEGES

T h e sheiks of Anatolian zaviyes, living in an environment where the

impact of the state made itself felt at every turn, had no particular qualms
about defending their rights and privileges by litigation in the courts, or even
by direct complaints to the Sultan's Divan. A s early as the sixteenth century,
even members of the Bektashi order of dervishes, which during this period was
o f t e n viewed with s o m e disapproval in official circles, m i g h t lodge a
complaint if they had been set upon by robbers. 3 At the beginning of the
eighteenth century, we again encounter a similar case, namely, when Sheik
Elvan of Hacibekta§ accused an inhabitant of the village of robbery and
d i s t u r b a n c e of the peace, thereby obtaining his banishment to C y p r u s . 4
Litigating sheiks constituted a permanent feature of Anatolian society.

Under such circumstan:es one would expect dervish sheiks with good
contacts in Istanbul to lobby with conspicuous success on behalf of their
privileges, and that is in fact what did happen. T o name but one example: in
the tiny town of Karahisar-i §irkf (§ebinkarahisar), the descendants of Sheik
Haci Piri were in possession of an exemption document of the traditional type
issued ever since the early centuries of the Ottoman Empire. 5 A c c o r d i n g
to this document, the sheik's descendants were absolved from a wide variety of

' M u s t a f a Ali, Kunh ul-Ahbar, Istanbul Cniversitesi Kiituphanesi TY 5959, fol. 16b. I owe this
reference to Prof. Abdiilbaki Golpinarli; adini rahmetle ve minnetle anariz.
^Osmanli Argivi, Miihimme Defterleri (hereafter MD) 78, p. 81, no. 22 (1018/1609-10).
3
M D 73, p. 467, no. 1031 (1003/1594-95).
4
MD 115, p. 4 1 4 (1119/1707-08). I thank Professor Halil Sahillioglu for pointing out this
document to me.
5
I M D 79, p. 67, no. 89 (1019/1610-11). Compare the articles by Paul Wittek, "Zu einigen
fruhosmanischen Urkunden (I-VII)," reprinted in La formation de l'empire Ottoman, ed. V. L
Ménage (London, 1982).
74 ('i) P I N G WITH THE STATE

exactions, including aid to official couriers and to w o r k m e n employed ori

fortress repair. Moreover, members of the sheikly lineage were exempt f r o m
the irregular taxes k n o w n as avariz-i divaniye and tekalif-i orfiye.,
particularly since one of Haci Piri's descendants had obtained a position as
preacher in a local mosque. Tax exemptions, however, particularly of modest
semirural sheiks such as Haci Piri and his grandsons, were not always easy to
enforce, and by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the family was:
confronted with demands for avariz, grain deliveries to troops marching to the'
eastern frontier (niizuli, and tekalif-i orfiye. T h e family fought back. Pointing
to the fact that their exemption had been entered into the tax register and was
thereby legalized beyond any possible doubt, they complained to the Divan
and received a confirmation of their privileges. Sheik Haci Piri's descendants,
were simply d e f e n d i n g their own t a x - e x e m p t position. It is not k n o w n
whether they controlled vakif lands, or whether the exemption granted then-
affected the position of local inhabitants w h o tried to make a living from the:
poor and rocky soil of §ebinkarahisar. In other instances, however, it is
obvious that by defending his own rights to the taxes of a given village, a
zaviyedar might also be defending peasants against arbitrary taxation.

A sultanic rescript solicited by the administrators of the M e v l a n a

Celaleddin foundations and addressed to the kadi of Larende (Karaman), as well
as to a palace gavwj resident in this town, shows the difficulty of keeping
alive the settlement of Selerek. 1 T h e village had lost a n u m b e r of families:
because of death and m i g r a t i o n . A p p a r e n t l y the a d m i n i s t r a t o r s of the
foundations of Mevlana Celaleddin R u m i had attempted to resettle the village.
The latter administrators were concerned with Selerek because Selerek supplied
income to the foundat on of Mader-i Mevlana in Larende, controlled by the
same family as the main tekke in Konya. But certain provincial administrators:
had i m p o s e d taxes (largely illegal) upon the hapless p e a s a n t s , thereby
endangering both the continued existence of the village and the income of the
zaviyedar. In response to a complaint, the central administration prohibited
the practice. At least for the time being, this should have safeguarded the
continued existence of the village.

Other seventeenth-century dervishes were equally willing to resume the:

role once played by their fourteenth- and fiftecnth-century predecessors in
settling abandoned wastelands throughout the empire. Thus in the middle of
the seventeenth century, Sheik Kasim D e d e of Kayseri had undertaken a
project of this type. 2 He had been granted the abandoned village of Incesu iri
addition to another less important place against payment of a modest yearly

' o n S e l e r e k in O t t o m a n f o u n d a t i o n d o c u m e n t s , c o m p a r e I b r a h i m H a k k i K o n y a l i , Abide v<?

Kitàbelerì ile Karaman Turi hi, Ermenek ve Mut Abideleri ( I s t a n b u l , 1 9 6 7 ) , pp. 2 3 7 , 2 5 5 . F o r t h e
f o u n d a t i o n a d m i n i s t r a t o r ' s i r t e r v e n t i o n , s e e MD 7 9 , p. 3 6 1 , n o . 9 1 3 ( 1 0 1 9 / 1 6 1 0 - 1 1 ) .
^ O s m a n l i Argivi, s e c t i o n M i i l i y e d e n m i i d e v v e r 9 8 4 1 , p. 136 ( 1 0 6 5 / 1 6 5 4 - 5 5 ) .
 S A I N T H O O D AS A M E A N S O F S E L F - D E F E N S E 75

tax. In order to merit this privilege, Kasim Dede had induced villagers to settle
on the abandoned site. Apparently this newly gained prosperity roused the
covetousness of a certain Kara Said, who in the confusion of the Ip§ir Pa§a
uprising was able to take over the settlement by promising payment of a
much higher tax. But Kasim Dede protested against the infringement of his
privilege. His complaint was accepted, and the villages were returned to him.
presumably against p a y m e n t of the tax originally agreed upon. In mid-
seventeenth-century Anatolia highly taxed village sites were easily abandoned
because of the low density of population and the ready availability of
uncultivated land. Thus Kasim Dede's complaint safeguarded not only his own
interests, but the continued existence of the village as well.

In the troubled times of the Celali rebellions, s o m e zaviyedars

attempted to protect their position not by their trust in, and loyalty to, the
Ottoman central administration, but by coming to an understanding with the
rebels. Sometimes their sympathy for the insurgents might be expressed by
simple laissez-faire. Thus when the adherents of a pretended Shah Ismail,
mostly tribesmen f r o m the Malatya area, appeared b e f o r e the tekke of
Hacibekta§, the official document recording the encounter apparently mentions
only t h e f a c t that the visitors s l a u g h t e r e d a n i m a l s in s a c r i f i c e . 1 No
participation by sheik or dervishes is mentioned, although one can assume
that the latter acquiesced - - whether gladly or yielding to a force majeure
remains an open question. Other sheiks were willing to go further, however,
A rescript f r o m the year 1018/1609-10 relays the accusations levied against a
certain Sheik Bekta§, of the village zaviye of Mahmudhisar near I l g i n / When
the rebel chief known as Tt.vil (the Tall One) occupied the area, 3 many local
inhabitants fled, but Sheik F!ekta§ stayed on to receive the Celali leader. If the
accusations against Sheik Bekta§ had any foundation, he seems to have
enriched himself by association with the rebel leader, at least by receiving a
share of Tavil's booty, bul possibly also by direct participation in Tavil's
raids. Moreover, the sheik's accusers apparently wished to imply that in one
way or another he had encouraged Tavil to form an independent state. At least
it is tempting to place this interpretation upon the remark that a sheik allied
with Tavil, and at the s a m e time appointing a hatip, infringed upon the
sultan's privileges under the protection of a known rebel. This suggests that
Sheik Bekta§ had created a Friday mosque and appointed a preacher to deliver
the Friday homily, for the appointment of such prcachers w a s considered a
prerogative of the sultan. 4

' Akdag, Celali isyanlari, p. 119.

2
MD 78, p. 81, no. 212 (1018/1609-10).
• On Tavil compare William Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion, 1000-1020/159/ 1611,
Islamkundlichc Untersuchungen, S3 (Berlin, 1983), see index.
4
O n the appointment of all hmips- directly by the sultan compare Hans G e o r g Majer, "Ulcma
und 'kleinere Religionsdiener' in ;inem Defter der Jahre vor 1683," in Osmanistische Studien
zur Wirtschafts- und SozJudgenrhichte, In memoriam: Vanco Boskov, ed. H. G. Maier
(Wiesbaden, 1986), p. 107.
76 ( O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

In the short run, Sheik Bekta§, his zaviye, and his associates benefited
from his association with Tavil. During these same years, Sheik Bekta§ also
documented the standing of his lineage by having an elaborate filiation record
(§ecere) prepared, in which Sheik Bekta§'s ancestor Dedigi Sultan claimed
descent f r o m the Prophet and even managed a connection with the Angel
G a b r i e l . 1 But what the effects were in the long run, that is, after Tavil had
vacated the area, remains unknown. In any case, the zaviye survived, and if
Sheik Bekta§ had embarked upon his political activities with that particular
aim in mind, he can be considered successful.

T H E S H E I K AS M E D I A T O R

The sheiks studied so far turned to the Ottoman central administration

or to a successful rebel chief mainly on their own behalf. If the administrators
of Mevlana Celaleddin's foundation or Sheik Bekta§ of M a h m u d h i s a r were
concerned about the late of villagers living in their sphere of operations, v:
was presumably because their own revenues were affected. In any case, this is
the impression one gets f r o m the documents; but I may be misinterpreting
Sheik Bekta§'s motive After all, his activities are known only f r o m a hostile
account, and it is possible that his c o m m i t m e n t to his native village w a s
stronger than the available documentation suggests.

Some sheikly figures were willing to openly confront the powers that
be on behalf of overtaxed peasants. A dervish sheik explicitly taking upon
himself the role of protector of the reaya is documented in a sultanic rescript
f r o m the early sevenieenth century, addressed to the kadi of Denizli and to a
tax-collecting pasha active in the area. Sheik Ali of Denizli, follower of the
Halveti sheik Mevlana Hasan, 2 had embarked upon a career as a preacher and
spiritual guide. He had assembled a number of dervishes about him, but was,
perhaps characteristically, described as not being affiliated with any established
zaviye. In the troubles years of the Celali rebellions, Sheik Ali had decided
that it was his function to protect the taxpaying subjects and free citizens of
the Ottoman slate (reaya ve beraya) from "violence and the governor's men"
(ziilm ve ehl-i drf). In ihis, he was able to base himself upon an unassailable

' Z e k i Oral, "Turgut Ogullar , Eserleri, Vakfiyelcri," Vahflar Dergisi, 3 (1956), 47.
2
MD 79, p. 323, no. 815 ( 1019/1610-11). On Sheik Hasan, who became posing in of the Halveti
dervish lodge of Koca Mustafa Pa§a in Istanbul in 989/1581-82, compare Hans Joachim
Kissling, "Aus der Geschichte des Chalvetijje Ordens," reprinted in Dissertationen Orientales ei
Balcanicae Collectae, I, D.i. Derwischtum (Munich, 1986), p. 158 and Table 2. The Halvetis of
the later sixteenth century were f a m o u s for their missionary activities, compare Nathalie
Clayer. Mystiques, État <*• Société, Les Halvetis Jans l'aire balkanique de la fin du XVe siècle à
nos jours (Leiden, 1994)
 S A I N T H O O D AS A M E A N S O F S E L F - D E F E N S E 77

document, namely, an adaletname, detailed and commented upon (mufassal

ve me§ruh).'

One of the local men of violence whom the sheik confronted was a tax
collector (voyvoda) in charge of the crown lands in the Denizli area, which
had been assigned to certai i viziers. According to his own account, Sheik Ali
had admonished the voyvoda to protect the taxpayers according to thi;
provisions of the adaletname. Whether he had done anything more, such as
encourage the taxpayers to resist the voyvoda's exactions, for instance, the
text does not reveal. The \oyvoda fought back, accusing Sheik Ali and his
dervishes of some unspecified crime, for which the penalty was to be the
galleys, or at the very leasi banishment to Cyprus. It would seem that Sheik
Ali's spiritual guide Mevlana Hasan or his dervishes used their influence in
Istanbul on behalf of the Denizli sheik, for the latter received a rescript
protecting him from the voyvoda's accusations. Apparently a formal court
case was not considered necessary; the text simply states that if Sheik Ali had
given a truthful account of his activities, he was to be protected from the
machinations of the voyvoda.

VILLAGERS IN SELF-DEFENSE

Sometimes the villagers associated with a sheik or zaviye might

choose not to wait for the intervention of a sheik or zaviyedar, but might
prefer to take the initiative into their own hands. A good example concerns the
large village (today a small town) of (§erefli) Ko9hisar, near the Tuz Golii. 2
Though this settlement is located in the most arid part of Anatolia, in the
seventeenth century it was of considerable importance; salt was produced ori
the shores of the lake and :ransported to Ankara in carts. 3 As in most other
parts of the country, the Celali uprisings had taken their toll and many of the
inhabitants had died or fled. But by 1027/1617-18 a certain degree of recovery
was visible. Possibly, the fact that the inhabitants of Koghisar were
recognized as pass-guards "derbentgi) furthered the process of resettlement,
particularly since the villagers were explicitly permitted to fortify Ko^hisar.
To be sure, the fortifications were of the simple kind which many villages of
the central Anatolian steppe had put up at this time, probably largely made ol
earth and without a proper masonry wall. 4 But since the central administration

' O n adaletnames compare Halil Jnalcik, "Adaietnameler," Belgeler, 2, nos. 3-4 (1965), 49-145.
2
MD 82, p. 76, no. 170; p. 74 (both texts (1027/1617-18).
3
MD (Zeyl) 8, p. 22 (1016/1607-08).
^ T h e text speaks of a "bedensiz havlu." New Redhouse Turkish-English Dictionary (Istanbul.
J 986) gives the meaning of beden as "castle wall," and of havlu~ (avlu) as "courtyard." Since a
courtyard is defined by the fact that it is enclosed (compare the more "High Ottoman" term
muhavvata), a bedensiz. havlu is presumably an enclosed area without strong walls. Since
Ko9hisar v/as a derbenl, the enclosure should have been usable for d e f e n s e at least against
small bands of robbers. I assume that the walls of the settlement were made largely of earth.
78 COPING WITH THH STATE

apparently believed that only towns should be fortified and that villages
remain open settlements, for a village to gain the officially recognized
protection of a wall constituted a substantial privilege.

The inhabitants of Ko^hisar derived their claim to special status from

the fact that in this village was born Sheik Mahmud Usktidan (950/1543-
1038/1628), the principal organizer of the Celvetiye branch of the Bayramiye
dervish order. 1 This sheik was famous for the diary in which he recorded his
own spiritual experiences and the impact of his teacher Pir Uftade, and he was
still alive at the time of the Ko§hisar petition. It is probable that he had used
his influence at the Ottoman court to procure an exemption from all tekalif-i
drfiye taxes for his fellow villagers.

The local governor ( s a n c a k b e y i ) , a certain Hlisrev Bey, had no

intention of honouring the villagers' exemption. Even though the sultan's
order was officially read out to him in court, he insisted on his demands for
food for himself and his men. The result was a physical confrontation right in
the courtroom. Hiisrev Bey drew his sword and wounded or killed some of the
Ko§hisar inhabitants; later he and his men assaulted several villagers near the
saltpans, threatening them with death if they did not pay up. As a result, the
governor came away with 170 guru§ of the villagers' money and a considerable
supply of foodstuffs.

In spite of the violence the villagers were not easily intimidated, and
they took their case to Istanbul. Apparently Sheik Mahmud Usktidari was not
directly involved in i f e matter, for if that had been the case, the sultanic
rescript issued to the p-ovincial governor (beylerbeyi) of Karaman on behalf
of the people of Koghisar would probably have mentioned the fact. Eiven so,
the local court was ordered to examine the matter, to establish exactly what
the local governor had taken and what the villagers were to receive in damages.

Such court cases, as problematic as their outcome might appear at first

glance, were sometimes effective; although in the absence of the Koghisar
court records, we know nothing of the outcome in this particular incident. In
addition, Hiisrev Bey's immediate superior, the provincial governor of
Karaman, was ordered to prevent recurrences of such an event and to enforce
the exemption edict.

At the same time, however, Hiisrev Bey was treated with leniency,
given the fact that he lad transgressed not only a sultanic ferman officially
communicated to him in court, but also the prescriptions of the adaletnames

' O n M a h m u d Üsküdari. co.npare Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, Scheich Üftade, der Begründer

des Gelvetijje Ordens (Mu lieh. 1961); see also J. Spencer T r i m i n g h a m . The Sufi Orders in
Islam (London, 1971), p. 7X.
 SAINTHOOD AS A M E A N S OF S ELF- DEPENS H 79

in w h i c h rulers of t h e e a r l y s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y had laid d o w n their

understanding of good government. T h e r e is no reference to dismissal f r o m his
post, m u c h less to p u n i s h m e n t . If he was still in K o c h i s a r at t h e time the
rescript w a s issued, which in view of the governors' generally short tenure of
o f f i c e is d o u b t f u l , t h e n t h e w o r s t that m i g h t h a v e h a p p e n e d to h i m is a
reprimand, and possibly s o m e w h a t stricter supervision in the future.

C O N C L U S I O N : S H E I K S A N D L E G I T I M A T I O N

In trying to d r a w s o m e c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m the d o c u m e n t e d activities of

seventeenth-century A n a t o l i a n zaviyedars, and c o m p a r e their behavior to that
o b s e r v e d in t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y sheikly f a m i l i e s , w h a t first strikes the e y e are
the d i f f e r e n c e s f r o m t h e " M o r o c c a n m o d e l " described by Gellner. A n a t o l i a n
zaviyedars t o o k t h e i r o p p o n e n t s to c o u r t , c o m p l a i n e d a b o u t t h e m to t h e
D i v a n , and in certain cases d e m a n d e d that their e n e m i e s be banished f r o m t h e
locality in which they f u n c t i o n e d as zaviyedars. Others m i g h t take the side of
r o b b e r s a n d rebels, or in a n y c a s e be a c c u s e d of such activities by their
opponents. A t the very least Anatolian zaviyedars w e r e considered c a p a b l e of
d e f e n d i n g their positions in this m a n n e r . Certainly contexts existed in w h i c h
an A n a t o l i a n zaviyedar was e x p e c t e d to be p e a c e f u l . In spite of t h e e x a m p l e
m e n t i o n e d a b o v e , it w a s c o n s i d e r e d a n o m a l o u s f o r zaviyedars to e n g a g e in
r o b b e r y a c c o m p a n i e d by a r m e d r e t a i n e r s . T h i s a c t i v i t y , a l t h o u g h also
considered reprehensible in provincial g o v e r n o r s and ayan, was nonetheless
extremely widespread a m o n g the latter and had c o m e to be accepted m o r e or
less as a f a c t of life. O n the other h a n d , even t h e legend of an essentially
pacific saint such as Haci Bekta§ acknowledged that u n d e r certain
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , it m i g h t be G o d ' s c o m m a n d to slay t h e w i c k e d . 1 Certain
A n a t o l i a n saints w e r e basically military f i g u r e s such as S e y y i d 'Ali Sultan,
also k n o w n as Kizil Deli. The latter ended his career as the f o u n d e r of a zaviye
a n d w a s t h e r e f o r e r e c o g n i z e d as s o m e t h i n g of a saint, e v e n t h o u g h his
principal interest in life s e e n s to h a v e been w a r . 2 T h u s it would a p p e a r that
the ethos of the warrior derv.sh, so characteristic of the early O t t o m a n Empire,
h a d n o t d i s a p p e a r e d by the s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y . A s a r e s u l t A n a t o l i a n
zaviyedars often s h o w e d an ambiguous attitude toward the use of violence.

T h e difference in behavior between Anatolian and M o r o c c a n zaviyedars

is p r o b a b l y c o n n e c t e d with the very d i f f e r e n t social f u n c t i o n s of these t w o
g r o u p s . O n the o n e h a n d , (he rebellions and civil wars of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h
century in Anatolia m u s t have fostered the growth of dervish networks, as

l
Manakih-i Haci Bekta^-i Veli 'Vi.'ayet-name,' ed. Abdiilbaki Golpinarli (Istanbul, 1958), p. 55.
On his legend see Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "La Vita de Seyyid 'Ali Sultan et la conquête
de la Thrace par les Turcs," in Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh International Congress of
Orientalists, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 13-19 August 1967 (Wiesbaden, 1971), pp. 275-276.
80 (OPING WITH THE STATE

people turned to religion in search of a stability hard to find in the secular

w o r l d . 1 On the other hand, even in the worst years of the Celali rebellions,
and in remote places such as Mahmudhisar, the impact of the Ottoman state,
though much reduced, never became weak enough to permit the development
of the segmentary society that Gellner observed in certain parts of Morocco.
Anatolian zaviyedars of the seventeenth century, at least in the regions
considered here, functioned as members of a centralized bureaucratic state, even
when they decided to c o n f r o n t individual officials, or in rare cases, the
Ottoman state itself.

If these a s s u m p t i o n s a r e valid, the model c o n s t r u c t e d by Van

Bruinessen wbuld also explain why Anatolian zaviyedars of the seventeenth
century never achieved the position of worldly power Van Bruinessen ascribes
to a nineteenth-century figure such as Sheik Ubeydullah of the Sadat-i NehrT.2
For while there was immigration of nomadic tribes into seventeenth-century
central and western Anatolia, the area was never so fully dominated by tribes
as certain sections of eastern Anatolia — or for that matter, as all of Anatolia
had been following the collapse of Seljuk rule. At the s a m e time, Van
Bruinessen assumes that a high degree of tribalization made it comparatively
easy for some sheiks to convert spiritual power into secular power. Thus,
even though seventeenth-century western and central Anatolia were indeed
slipping from central control, the process was not nearly far enough advanced
to provide a favourable milieu for the assumption of political power by
sheikly families.

Quite possibK the continuing presence of a bureaucratic state also

explains why so man\ Anatolian sheiks of the seventeenth century had only a
very limited spiritual reputation. T h e Ottoman administration's disregard for
the pretensions of "holy men" to any particular holiness may have discouraged
p e o p l e f r o m c l a i m i n g such qualities. T h i s is perhaps why Abdtilbaki
Golpinarli found so few sheiks of visible mystic c o m m i t m e n t among the
Mevlevis of this period.^

One is tempted to view the zaviyedars of Anatolia as miniature ayan

who collected peasant laxes in return for services to travelers — services from
which the peasants, who presumably traveled rarely, benefited but little. But
this may not be quite fair; apart f r o m the fact that holiness is a quality not
easily recorded in bureaucratic documents, even very pedestrian sheiks might
have had an importanl role to play in legitimation, both in the more narrowly
religious sector and in .he political one.

' Gellner, Saints, pp. 41 fl

^Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, pp. 328-329.
-'Abdtilbaki Golpinarli. Mt vlàna'dan Sonra Mevlevtlik (Istanbul, 1953), p. 152, makes this
statement for the period after the fifteenth century in general. For an unedifying story from the
seventeenth century, compare pp. 163-164.
 SAINTHOOD AS A MEANS OF SELF-DEFENSE 81

Regarding legitimation in the religious field, it has to be kept in mind

that sixty or seventy years after the persecution of the Kizilba§, heterodoxy
was still widespread among the villagers and tribesmen of seventeenth-century
central Anatolia. In this context, it is not without significance that the
dervishes of the Dedigi zaviye in Doganhisar, which seems to have revered the
same founder as the zaviye of Sheik Bekta§, were at one time accused of
fomenting heresy. 1 Moreover, the Bektashi order in the seventeenth century
was still busily absorbing dervishes whose Sunni beliefs were open to
question. 2 Even the urban arid aristocratic Mevlevis in the seventeenth century
had been marginalized to an extent rare both in the earlier and later periods, as
their dances had been prohibited under the influence of Sheik Vani, and their
zaviyes were therefore unaole to function in the accustomcd manner. 3 The
position of many Anatolian dervish sheiks on the margins of Sunni orthodox
society enabled them to legitimize the practices of their more or less heterodox
adherents. In turn, this legitimizing function permitted the zaviyes to
transcend the purely administrative function the Ottoman administration had
assigned to them, and thereby to retain something of a spiritual role.

When it comes to ths question of legitimation in the political sector,

Sheik Ali of Denizli and the many activist dervishes whose activities have
gone unrecorded had an even more important role to play. Gilsenan has warned
us against taking too seriously the role of the "sheik standing up against an
evil holder of secular powe:'," 4 for at least where twentieth-century Akkar is
concerned, Gilsenan regards this image as ideological and possessing little
correspondence to real life. Certainly my evaluation of the mediator Sheik
Ali's activities is somewhat problematic. Only his own version of the story is
provided in the rescript which constitutes the only source on his supposed
mediation—§eyhin kerameii kendinden menkul} But if it had been easy for
the sheik to live in peace with the voyvoda, perhaps after briefly "teaching
this overbearing tax collector a lesson," it is doubtful that he would have
chosen the long and, in spite of his Istanbul contacts, expensive and risky way
of a complaint to the Divar. Thus it can be assumed that at least in certain
cases, sheiks did in fact try to protect the taxpaying subjects against
oppression by tax-gatherers find provincial governors.

In addition, it is worth noting that as far as political legitimation

is concerned, Sheik Ali had a double role to play. On the one hand,
he formulated the aspirations of the taxpaying subjects and gave them status

]
MD 40, p. 224, no. 501 (987/1579-80).
2
C<mipare Fuat Kopriilu, Turk Hah: Edebiyati Ansiklapedisi, fasc. 1 Aba-Abdal (Istanbul, 1935),

Golpinarli. Mevlevilik, p. 167.

^Gilsenan, "Against Patron-Client Relationships," pp. 172 ff.
5
"The sheik's miracles have been recounted by himself [onlyl" (Turkish proverb).
82 C O D I N G W I T H T H E S T A T H

through his mediation. On the other hand, his action served to uphold the
prestige of the sultan, who was thereby viewed, in a manner common to many
preindustrial societies, as innocent of the oppressive machinations of his
advisers. 1 As the power promulgating the adaletname, which formed the legal
basis for Sheik Ali's resistance, the sultan emerged from the affair with
renewed prestige. One may even surmise that Sheik Ali's use of the
adaletname was a consciously adopted strategy to ensure that he receive a
favourable hearing in Istanbul. These considerations indicate that the social
environment in which a seventeenth-century dervish sheik needed to move was
one of struggle between taxpaying subjects and the administrative apparatus,
with certain sultans putting forth claims to a role as arbiter. Such a situation,
with the different demands for legitimation inherent in it, all but invited the
intervention of men like Sheik Ali. Clearly, if he had not existed, it would
have been necessary to i avent him.

' o n this motif, which in se\entcenth-century France often took the shape of "Vive le Roi sans
gabelle," compare Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, "Révoltes paysannes et histoire sociale," in
Histoire économique et sociale de la France, vol. 1, sec. 2, Paysannerie et croissance (Paris,
1977), p. 831. Assumptions of this kind were c o m m o n enough, even in G e r m a n y during the
Nazi years, for Brecht to refer to them in one of his poems.
 TOWN OFFICIALS, 77M4A-HOLDERS,
AND TAXATION:
THE LATE SIXTEENTH-CENTURY CRISIS
AS SEEN FROM gORUM

On a general level, we know about the unrest and rebellion that

followed the remarkable growth in Anatolian population which has been
recorded in the tax registers of the years before 1580. Mustafa A k d a g has
devoted memorable pages to the desolation of the Anatolian countryside, after
the inhabitants had fled the exactions of robbers, and equally of the
g o v e r n m e n t troops sent oul to suppress brigandage 1 . Wolf Hiitteroth has
located scores of settlements that were abandoned during those difficult years,
and only resettled during the population expansion of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, or e v e i remaining e m p t y to the present d a y 2 . Ozer
Ergenf's work on Ankara and Konya also contains much information on the
manner in which the inhabitants of these cities reorganised their affairs so as
to cope with the attacks of roving Celali b a n d s 3 . M o s t recently, Huri
islamoglu-Inan has suggested interesting hypotheses concerning the manner in
which the peasants of Anatolia, in the £ o r u m region as well as elsewhere,
may have coped with an une> pected growth in their numbers 4 .

However, apart f r o m E r g e n ^ s work on Ankara and Konya, all these

studies deal with fairly large areas. As a result, the interplay between different
local officials, their relationship with the Ottoman central administration, and
the manner in which taxes were levied at the local level, have rarely been
studied in any detail. However for the survival or disappearance of a village, as
for the moderate prosperity or else rapid decline of a town, such matters were
obviously of crucial importance when rival bands of armed men were scouring

' M u s t a f a A k d a g , Celali isyanlari 1550-¡603, A. Ü. Dil ve Tarih Cografya Fakiiltesi Yayinlan

144 (Ankara, 1963).
^Wolf Diether Hütteroth, Ländlicne Siedlungen im südlichen Inneranatolìen in den letzten
vierhundert Jahren, Göttinger Geographische Abhandlungen (Göttingen, 1968).
3
Ö z e r Ergen?'s thesis: «1580-1596 Yillari Arasinda Ankara ve Konya §ehirlerinin Mukayescli
incelenmesi Yoluyla Osmanli §ehirlerinin Kurumlari ve Sosyo-Bkonomik Yapisi Üzerine bir
D e n e m e » (Ankara, 1973) has been published only in 1995: Osmanli Klasik Dimenìi Kent
Tarihciligine Katki: XVI. Yiizyilda Ankara ve Konya (Ankara, 1995) See also «XVII. Yuz.yil
Ba§larinda Ankara'nin Yerle§im Durumu Üzerine Bazi Bilgiler», Osmanli Ara§ firmatari - The
Journal of Ottoman Studies, I ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 8 5 - 1 0 8 a n d « O s m a n l i § e h i r l e r i n d e k i Yonetim
Kurumlarimn Niteligi Üzerinde ß.izi Dü§iinceler», in VIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi Konvreyp
Sunulan Bildiriler, / / ( A n k a r a , 1981), 1265-1274.
4
H u r i islamoglu-inan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire, Agrarian Power Relations and
Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia during the Sixteenth Century (Leiden
1994).
84 COPING WITH THE STATE

the countryside. However, Ozer Krgeng, the only author who has studied these
questions, concerns himself with what were, by the standards of the time,
rather large cities. In places like Ankara or Konya, with their interregional
trade connections, interaction with the agricultural hinterland was perhaps not
less close, but much less well documented, than in a semi-rural market town.
Thus the impact of the civil wars known as the Celali rebellions on the
Anatolian countryside can be made particularly visible by a micro-level study
of a settlement such as £ o r u m .

Studies of villages and small towns constitute a device originally

developed by anthropologists, who at least in the beginning were mainly
concerned with the slowly changing patterns of life in communities based
upon hunting, gathering, or primitive a g r i c u l t u r e 1 . But m o r e recently,
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s have b e c o m e c o n c e r n e d with c o m m u n i t i e s a f f e c t e d by
externally based disruption of their traditional ways; while at the same time,
historians have discovered the 'village study' and the light it may shed upon
the social history of a region and even of an entire country 2 . N o w m a n y
historical villages or small towns which have been well enough documented
to make an in-depth study appear worthwhile, owe this prominence to the fact
that they were confronte d with some kind of catastrophe. W e would know very
little about the thirteenth and fourteenth century peasants in the r e m o t e
Pyrenees village of Montaillou, if it hadn't been for the fact that their Cathar
beliefs m a d e the peasants a target f o r the u n w e l c o m e attentions of the
Inquisition.

T h u s both anthropologists and historians have recently shown an

increasing interest in the impact of 'externally-generated' events, often of a
catastrophic nature, upon the life of a rural or small-town community. For the
p u r p o s e s of the present study, we may regard the Celali u p r i s i n g s as
'externally generated'. Doubtlessly, certain robbers and rebels w e r e local men,
and population pressure may — or may not — have forced them into a life of
brigandage 3 . But the political and economic difficulties of the Ottoman central
administration, which led to f r e q u e n t c h a n g e s of local administrative
personnel, and roving bands of 'masterless men' infesting the countryside,
certainly did not originate in (Jorum, Osmancik or tskilip.

'For one example among n a n y , c o m p a r e R a y m o n d Firth, Primitive Polynesian Economy

( L o n d o n , 1 9 3 9 , 2 n d ed. Wft.').
E m m a n u e l L e R o y Ladurie Montaillou, Villane occitan de 1294 à 1324 (Paris, 1 9 7 5 ) .
\ ) n Ihc b a c k g r o u n d of this m o v e m e n t c o m p a r e A k d a g , Celali ìsyanlan, passim.
 T O W N O F F I C I A L S , TIMAR-HOLDERS, AND TAXATION 85

As the main source f o r the present investigation, w e have used a record

b o o k of the kadi of g o r u m , dated 1 0 0 4 - 0 5 / 1 5 9 5 - 9 7 ; it was k e p t by kadi
M e h m e d f r o m Ak§ehir, and later by his successor M u s l i h e d d i n 1 . N o other
sixteenth or even seventeenth century record book is available f o r the f o r u m
area, w h i c h m a k e s it i m p o s s i b l e to u s e the d o c u m e n t as the basis f o r a
diachronic study. H o w e v e r , the register itself is remarkably rich with respect
t o the n u m b e r and variety of d o c u m e n t e d cases. F r o m a d i v o r c e suit to a
c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t a provincial g o v e r n o r r e f u s i n g to pay his debts, f r o m
accusations of theft to the arrangements necessary f o r the wintering of camels
b e l o n g i n g to the O t t o m a n state, this broad d o c u m e n t a t i o n p e r m i t s us t o
recontruct certain aspects of the life of a provincial Anatolian t o w n during a
d i f f i c u l t period in its existence. N o w it is well k n o w n that f o r the sixteenth
century in general, and f o r small towns in particular, kadi registers are rather a
scarce commodity. T h e r e f o r e this register, f r o m which certain documents w e r e
published under the auspices of the f o r u m People's H o u s e in the 1940s 2 , but
which has not attracted the scholarly attention it deserves, seems worth a more
detailed analysis.

THE SETTING: POPULATION, CRAFTS, AND

TRADE IN LATE SIXTEENTH CENTURY gORUM

As in most parts of Anatolia, population in the town and

administrative district of g o r u m increased considerably in the c o u r s e of the
sixteenth century. In the early years of Kanuni Suleyman's reign (1520-1530),
the district of g o r u m , including the town, held 5 1 6 4 taxpayers, that is a total
population ranging between 15,500 and 2 1 , 0 0 0 3 . A count of t a x p a y e r s
undertaken in 1576-77 showed a population of 6505 taxpayers, or roughly

T h e research upon which this article is based was made possible by a generous grant f r o m the
municipality of f o r u m . Moreover a microfilm of the kadi register in question — the original
being kept in the f o r u m Library under the call number 1741/2 (from now on: f .K.) was turned
over to the library of Middle East Technical University in Ankara, where the present research
was undertaken. I thank both the municipality and the officials of the Turkish Ministry of
C u l t u r e and T o u r i s m f o r their help and interest. In the study prepared f o r the f o r u m
municipality, the emphasis was upon explaining the growth of the town, and the factors which
stimulated or prevented its development. On the other hand, the present article is concerned
with the townsmens' and peasants' response to a major regional crisis.
T h e register consists of 2 0 0 folios, or 4 0 0 pages, every page containing 4 - 9 documents.
H o w e v e r , the first few pages hold mainly e x t r a n e o u s materials, such as an incomplete
alphabetical list of Ottoman judicial districts (kaza). In a few instances, the pagination on the
microfilm could not be properly read and had to be reconstructed; I apologize to the reader for
any errors that may have ensued.
2
A S a separately paginated supplement to the journal Qorumlu (1939-1943). One of the few
scholars to concern himself with this register has been Mustafa Akdag.
-^Bajbakanhk Ar^ivi, Istanbul section T a p u Tahrir 387, p. 389ff. For methods of estimating total
population when only the number of taxpayers (= adult males) is known, compare Leila Erder.
«The Measurement of Preindustria! Population Changes: T h e Ottoman Empire f r o m the 15th to
the 17th Century», Middle Eastern Studies, XI, 3 (1975), 284-301.
86 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

19,500-26,000 inhabitants 1 . But the disturbances of the last decades of the

sixteenth century do not seem to have caused a noticeable decline iri
population, at least not before 1596-97. In 1590, the population of this kaza
was reckoned as 1015 avarizhane, and in 1595-96, this figure was reduced to
one thousand. Since one avarizhane corresponded to about 10-15 taxpayers 2 ,
the taxpaying population of (Jorum should, in the closing years of the
sixteenth century, have stood at 10,000-15,000 taxpayers, or 30,000-60,000
people. All these figures are subject to caution, since we do not know whether
the limits of the (Jorum kaza as used f o r d e t e r m i n i n g the n u m b e r of
avarizhane units were the same as those upon which the earlier counts were
based. However, since a number of minor kazas occur in the avariz lists but
not in the Ottoman tax registers (tahrir), w e may assume that the avariz lists
provide reasonably full coverage. Thus to say the very least, the population of
(Jorum and its district was reasonably intact at the end of the sixteenth
century, and a continued increase between 1576-77 and 1590 is a distinct
possibility.

For the town of Quorum itself, we possess only one figure for the entire
second half of the sixteenth century. According to the tax register of 1576-77,
there were 2983 taxpay ers registered in the city proper. Seventeen hundred and
fifty a m o n g them were married and heads of families. In accordance with
established conventions, we shall regard a family as consisting of f i v e
people 3 . Therefore Iht- town of (Jorum should have just reached the level of
10,000 inhabitants. What happened in later decades is not known, since the
avariz lists do not permit us to separate the town from its rural hinterland.
T h e Ottoman traveler Evliya (Jelebi, w h o visited (Jorum in the middle of the
seventeenth century, claims a figure of 4 3 0 0 houses for the t o w n 4 , which
should correspond to a population of about 17,000-22,000 people. However,
Evliya not infrequently records figures that are way above those given by the
late sixteenth centurx lax registers, and given the trials and tribulations of the
i n t e r v e n i n g period, ihis figure should be regarded with considerable
reservations.

h'apu ve Kadastro Argivi. \ n k a r a (TK), no. 38, p. 7ff. In this context compare also Islamoglu
¡nan, State and Peasant.
^ F o r the avarizhane count of 1590 c o m p a r e Liitfi G i i f e r , XVI-XVII Asirlarda Osmanli
ìmparatorlugunda Hububut Meselesi ve Hububattan Alinan Vergiler, Istanbul Universitesi
Yayinlanndan No 1075. iktisat Fakiiltesi No. 152 (Istanbul, 1984), p. 161-162.
For the avarizhane list ol 1596-97, compare f K , p. 187b. According to Ba$bakanhk Argivi,
section Maliyeden m u d e w c r No. 7527, p. 103 (1055/1645-46) an avarizhane consisted of 10
taxpayers (nefer), but larger units were not unknown.
^ O n the estimating of population figures f r o m tahrir data see Ó m e r Liifti Barkan, «Tarihi
Demografi Ara§tirmalari \ c Osmanli Tarihi», Tiirkiyat Mecmuasi, X (1951-53), 1-27.
4
F,vliya Cclebi, SeyahuUumfsi, 10 vols (Istanbul. 1314/1896-7 to 1938). vol. 2, p. 4 0 7 412.
 TOWN OFFICIALS, TÌMAR HOLDERS, AND TAXATION 87

From the kadi's register of 1595-97, f o r u m appears to have been a

purely local centre, with little involvement in interregional trade. In this
context, it is noteworthy that Amasya, the nearest city of s o m e interregional
importance, is mentioned a very few times, while barring error, the name of
Ankara does not occur at all. On the other hand, over a hundred villages are
mentioned in the f o r u m kadi's register, and the business structures (covered
market, khan) which the town did possess 1 , must have been essentially geared
toward local trade.

Craft production was not inconsiderable, as can be j u d g e d f r o m the

existence of at least eighteen gar§is, or shop-lined s t r e e t s 2 . T h e crafts
represented were mainly those to be expected in a semi-rural market town,
such as grocers, hoofsmiths, blacksmiths, tailors, saddle-makers and fodder
merchants. However the existence of a bakers' indicated the presence of
people who had become accustomed to the 'citified' consumption of oven-
baked bread. A gar§i of the tielva-makers attested to the presence of consumers
who could permit themselves the occasional purchase of sweetmeats, while
the distinction between a silk mercers' ( k a z a z ) and a cotton goods gar$i
indicated that certain townsmen could afford a standard in clothing beyond the
ordinary 'home-spun'. Moreover, f o r u m possessed a goldsmiths' gar$i, which
s h o w s that the use of j e w e l r y among the t o w n s m e n was not altogether
u n k n o w n . Taken together, the number of shops paying rent to a pious
foundation was about one hundred. How many shops were owned by private
persons is unknown, but if we assume that the average number of shops to a
gar§i was about ten to twelve, the total number of shops can be estimated as
about two hundred, probably rather more than less. In addition, the covered
market (bedestan) should have housed at least thirty to fifty shops, which
were probably rented by the more substantial merchants 3 .

Commercial activity in Ottoman Anatolia could not be carried on

without a supply of money, but it would appear that the latter was often
difficult to obtain. Out of t h r t y - f o u r sales of private houses documented in the
kadi's register, five were explicitly sold because the owner was heavily in debt,
and it can be assumed that in reality, the share of such sales made out of dire
need w a s even higher. Moreover houses and shops were relatively cheap
compared to daily necessities: the yearly allowance made to an orphan for what
must have been minimal subsistence needs amounted to 720 akge, while a

' F o r a reference to the covered market, of which not a trace remains today, compare
Ba$hakanhk Ar$ivi, Miihimme Dei'teri (MD) 40, p. 31, no. 63 (987/1579-80).
2
F o r a listing of foundation-held shops in the different fur^is see TK 583, f. 131 b ff (1576-77).
" In most rural households, bread was baked over an open fire. For the kinds of merchants doing
business in the bedestan, see Halil Inalcik, «The Hub of the City: The Bedesten of Istanbul»
International Journal of Turkish St Mies, I, 1 (1979-80), 1-17.
88 C O P I N G W I T H T H H S T A T E

house could be purchased for 2000-2500 akgex. According to official price

lists, 1.28 kg of mutton or goats ' meat was priced at 5 - 6 akge, while the
price of different types of helva was 9 - 1 0 akge per unit of 1.28 k g 2 . T h e
relative cheapness of real estate such as houses and shops when compared to
foodstuffs probably should be interpreted as a sign of economic difficulties.
We are dealing with a time period when certain people were forced to sell their
house or shop, due to what by the standards of larger cities, would have been
considered rather trifling debts.

In this context, il is necessary to point out a phenomenon which has

already been observed with respect to other Anatolian towns; namely that the
value of the akge in (,\>rum, as expressed in fractions of an Ottoman gold
coin, did not coincide with the mutations of the currency that occurred in late-
sixteenth century Istanbul. As O m e r Liitfi Barkan has established, in the
Ottoman capital between 1550 and 1566, 6 0 akge made up one Ottoman gold
c o i n 3 ; by 1584-86, the akge had been devalued to the point that 120 akge
were exchanged for the same unit. Approximately ten years later, in 1595-97,
the value of the Ottoman gold coin in Edirne still stood at 120 akge, but after
a couple of months, before the end of the year 1597, it had risen to 125 akge.
T h u s there seems to have existed a reasonable correspondence between the
exchange rates practiced in Istanbul and Edirne. But that was not at all true for
Ankara, where as late as 1592, a gold coin was held to be equivalent to 60
akge4. Only in 1593 did higher values of 120 and 135 akge respectively find
their way into the register, which would imply a time lag of about seven
years. Moreover, this gap was even greater where (Jorum was concerned, for
even in 1595-97, eight instances of an Ottoman gold coin valued at 60 akge
were recorded, while only in two cases was the equivalent employed close to
120 akge. Thus the time lag between Istanbul and £ o r u m should have been
about ten years 5 .

At this stage, one can only speculate about the reasons for such a phase
d i f f e r e n c e . André R a y m o n d has pointed out that in C a i r o d u r i n g the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ready money was consistently rare, and

' T h i s constitutes the average derived from about thirty transactions recorded in the registers.
2
g f i , f . 189a.
3
O n the Ottoman monetary s\ stem of this period, compare Halil Sahillioglu, «XVII. A s n n Ilk
Yarisinda Istanbul'da Tedav iildeki Sikkelcrin Raici», Bel^eler, 1, 2 (1964), 227-234; Omer Liitfi
Barkan, «Edirne Askeri K a s s i m ' i n a Ait Tereke Defterleri (1545-1659)» Belgeler, III (1966),
1-479; On the Ottoman monet irv system of this period compare Omer Lutfi Barkan, «The Price
Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the E c o n o m i c History of the Near
East», International Journal o'Middle East Studies, 6 (1975), 3-28; Halil Sahillioglu, «Osmanli
Para Tarihinde Dunya Para u Maden Hareketlerinin Yeri (1300-1750)», Oeli^me Dergisi, ozel
sayisi (1978-79), 1-38.
^ O z e r Ergen£, «XVI. Ytizyilin Sonunda Osmanli Parasi Uzerine Y a p d a n I§lemlere Iligkin Bazi
Belgeler», Geli^me Dergisi. d'.el sayisi (1978-79), 86-97.
5
S c c for example ('K, f. 99.i 03a, 1 lb. 65a, 82a, 89a, 10!a.
 T O W N O F F I C I A L S . TÌMA R-HOLDERS, AND TAXATION 89

as a result, coins w e r e rated higher than their intrinsic v a l u e w o u l d h a v e

w a r r a n t e d 1 . A similar scarcity of cash a p p e a r s to h a v e p r e v a i l e d in late
sixteenth-century f o r u m , so that o n e might expect similar results. H o w e v e r ,
there w a s o n e i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the t w o cities. In the c a s e of
C a i r o , the O t t o m a n admini stration g e n e r a l l y legislated a rate of e x c h a n g e
b e t w e e n the para and o n e of the standard gold coins ( b u n d u q i ) which w a s
m o r e f a v o u r a b l e to the para than t h e latter's intrinsic v a l u e w o u l d have
w a r r a n t e d . In the c a s e of y o r u m , e x a c t l y the o p p o s i t e situation o b t a i n e d .
Since people f o u n d it d i f f i c u l t to procure cash of any kind, they insisted upon
the c u s t o m a r y rate of e x c h a n g e , n a m e l y 6 0 akge for o n e O t t o m a n gold coin.
In this context, it is probably of significance that o n e of the t w o instances in
which a rate of a b o u t 120 akge to o n e gold coin w a s r e c o r d e d , c o n c c r n e d
p a y m e n t s to a tax f a r m e r w o r k i n g for the O t t o m a n central administration.

A t the s a m e time, t h e s e remarks should not be interpreted to mean thai

the peasants of f o r u m , and by extension m a y b e e v e n those of Anatolia, were
living in an e c o n o m y w i t h o u t c a s h . S t u d i e s of v a r i o u s central A n a t o l i a n
regions h a v e s h o w n that sixteenth c e n t u r y peasants, w h e n e v e r t h e y rented a
piece of state-owned land f r o m their local administrator, paid their entry fines
(.resm-i tapu) in c a s h 2 . In the district of f o r u m , the situation w a s in no way
d i f f e r e n t U n d e r these circumstances, w e m a y c o n c l u d e that at least the better-
off p e a s a n t s w e r e a b l e to a c c u m u l a t e a p p r e c i a b l e reserves in c o i n , since the
entry f i n e d e m a n d e d f o r a substantial holding ranged b e t w e e n t w o and three
thousand akge. B u t by :he s a m e t o k e n , t h e s e silver p i e c e s patiently
a c c u m u l a t e d o v e r the y e a r s w e r e w i t h d r a w n f r o m circulation, and must have
contributed toward the overall scarcity of cash.

URBAN DECISION MAKERS:

THE TOWNSMEN VS. A PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR

H o w a t o w n of sixteenth-century A n a t o l i a survived a d i f f i c u l t period in

its existence d e p e n d e d parti) upon the policies determined in Istanbul, but on a
day-to-day level, the action of local elites m u s t h a v e been decisive. T o locate
the men w h o may h a v e f o r m e d a part of this d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g group, we h a v e
e x a m i n e d the p e o p l e w h o held public o f f i c e d u r i n g the years in which o u r
register w a s in use. This p r o c e d u r e leaves us with a margin f o r error, since it
is s o m e t i m e s d i f f i c u l t to d e t e r m i n e which o f f i c e s c o n v e y e d or reflected real
influence in the c o m m u n i t y . For s o m e of these o f f i c e s may have been a chore

' A n d r é Raymond, Artisans et commerçants da Caire au XVIIIe siècle 2 vols (Damascus

1973), vol. 1,40-52. ' "
2
For the Ankara area compare: Suraiya Faroqhi, «Land Transfer, Land Disputes and askeri
Holdings (1592-1600)», in: Memorial Omer Lütfi Barkan, ed. Robert Mantran, Bibliothèque de
l'Institut Français d'Études Anatolicnnes d'Istanbul, XXVIII (Paris, 1980), 87-99.
90 c'OPING WITH THE STATE

that devolved upon the more modest inhabitants, and may well have been
considered a burden rather than an honour. However, even if there remains a
zone of doubt, the crucial figures stand out in the kadi's register with
reasonable clarity.

Throughout the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire, the sancakbeyi or

provincial governor was responsible for commanding the i i m a r - h o l d i n g
cavalry of his province in wartime, and for safeguarding the flow of taxes at
all times. Since the kadi was concerned mainly with the affairs of the civilian
population and had little to do with army business in the narrower sense of the
word, the sancakbeyi appears in the kadi's registers mainly as an official in
charge of police functions, and as a coordinator of various dues-collecting
activities. The police functions of the sancakbeyi were most visible when he
undertook an armed inspection tour of his province; only often his men were
dreaded quite as much as the robbers whom they were supposed to repress.

About the misdeeds of the sancakbeyi's men when in action, we are

informed through a court case which the inhabitants of the town opened
against a former governor 1 . It appears that this governor, a certain Cafer bey,
had collected 2400 kile of barley, 700 cartloads of straw and 700 cartloads of
firewood from the nearby villages, without, as was all too frequent in such
cases, paying the owners a single akge for their trouble. However, the
inhabitants of Corum took their complaint to Istanbul, where the Ottoman
government, during those most crucial years of the Celali rebellions, was
generally inclined to take the side of the ordinary subjects against provincial
administrators. As a result, the inhabitants of £ o r u m , represented by their
¡ehir kethtidasi Yusuf b. Maksud, were granted a ferman in which the kadi
was ordered to make sure that the governor paid all debts which could
satisfactorily be establi >hed in a court of law. Only by this time, the governor
had been transferred o Kayseri, so that one of his associates, a certain
Allahkulu Bey, had to answer on his behalf. This time, the inhabitants of
Qorum were represented by the §ehir kethtidasi and by a Palace favu$, about
the nature of whose association with the town we unfortunately know almost
nothing.

The case for tin inhabitants of (^orum rested upon the claim that the
former govenor had acknowledged his obligations before he left for Kayseri,
and that he had ordered Allahkulu Bey, as his legal representative, to pay his
debts. Allahkulu acknowledged the full amount of his superior's debt, but
strenuously denied tha he had ever accepted responsibility for its payment.
However his opponenis were able to bring two witnesses to support their
claim, and the court considered that Allahkulu was to be held responsible.

' T h i s text has been p u b l i s h e d in the d o c u m e n t a r y a p p e n d i x of the j o u r n a l Qorumlu, p. 1 18-119.

 TOWN OFFICIALS, TÌMAR HOLDERS, AND TAXATION 91

Then came the lengthy process of extracting payment: The former governor
sent some money and a horse from Kayseri, but a more important amount was
found locally by Allahkulu. When the case was entered into the kadi's register,
44,800 akge of the original debt of 62,000 akge had been paid, that is almost
three quarters; unfortunately we do not know what became of the remainder.

Even so however, this court case allows a number of interesting

observations: first of all, in this small to medium-sized town, cohesion
among the principal inhabitants was strong enough that they could find the
necessary means to send a representative to Istanbul. Moreover, the latter
could make the powerful 'friends at court' needed to push a case against a
probably well-connected governor to its successful conclusion. Secondly, it
emerges that the kadi's court was by no means a 'paper tiger': One can guess
that some real pressure was needed before the former governor and his
henchman could be induced to pay up 1 . Thus we can guess that informal
bonds a m o n g townsmen were stronger than the weak d e v e l o p m e n t of
'municipal' institutions would lead us to expect. Certainly in this particular
case the townsmen had the support of the Sultan's administration. But this
support was at best latent. It had to be mobilized, and this the townsmen
proved perfectly capable of achieving.

U R B A N D E C I S I O N - M A K E R S :
O F F I C I A L S IN T O W N A N D D I S T R I C T

Among the town officials, the suba§i and the muhtesip were concerned
with day-to-day police affairs. It would appear that these two officials were
responsible to the provincial governor. In any case the revenues which they
collected in the course of their tenure of office formed part of the income
assigned to the provincal governor 2 , so that suba^i and muhtesip were
financially accountable to the sancakbeyi. Moreover the suba^i sometimes
accompanied the sancakbeyi on his inspection tours, a state of affairs that
gave rise to some criticism. Within the town itself, the suba$i might
intervene in a wide variety of cases: We find him summarily banishing a man
who had made himself unpopular among his fellow townsmen by making
false or at any rate unprovable accusations 3 . He also concerned himself with a
case of counterfeit money and equally with a dispute involving the theft
of domestic animals from a nearby village. From all this, it would appear that

This would agree with the observations made by Ronald Jennings. «Women in Early 17th
Century Ottoman Judicial Records - the Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri», Journal of the
Economic and Social History of the Orient, XVIII, 1 (1975), 62 about the Ottoman court's
actively upholding the rights of WOIKII.
'orumlu, documentary appendix, p. 117.
3
C K , f. 7a.
92 (OPING WITH THE STATE

the suba$i acted as a liaison officer between the sancakbeyi and the kadi's
court; for the cases mentioned could not be concluded without appealing to
this latter institution at one stage or another of the proceedings.

Compared to the suba^i, the muhtesip was much less active. In the
Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century, it was the muhtesip's responsibility
to intervene when complaints were lodged against tradesmen. But the
muhtesip of f o r u m was negligent in this matter. Or else the townsmen had
developed other channels for dealing with problems of this type, for no
proceedings against tradesmen on account of bad workmanship have found
their way into the register. Nor does the muhtesip seem to have been very
active in fixing prices, that other responsibility of this office. Only a few
items, mainly foodstuffs, were assigned an officially determined price during
these years 1 . Thus the muhtesip appears mainly as a tax farmer, who promised
at the beginning of his tenure of office to turn over a specified sum to the
sancakbeyi, and who kept the remainder as his own profit. Even so, the
muhtesip must have had some kind of role in the town; for one candidate to
the office was not approved by the local notables, and had to give up his
candidature 2 ; unfortunately the document in question does not tell us what
motivated this rejection.

Far more important was the role of the town kethiida; however, the
register tells us nothing about the manner in which he was appointed. In the
period covered by our register, this office was held by Yusuf b. Maksud.
Possibly this man's aciivity was a result of his personal ambition rather than
of his official responsibilities; under these circumstances, it is all the more
regrettable that we do not know anything about his further career. We find him
representing the townsmen of f o r u m in their court case against the former
sancakbeyi Cafer Hey; on a more mundane level, Yusuf b. Maksud was
involved in the administration of a local pious foundation, and attempted to
find a tenant for one of the f o r u m khans 3 . Needless to say, when it came to
selecting a new muhtesip, Yusuf b. Maksud was on the relevant committee.

If the town kethiida may well have been the most active of the city
officiaLs, the kadi was the most prestigious among them. Mustafa Akdag's
observations concerning the tensions between provincial governors and kadis
seem to have applied lo f o r u m as well 4 . From the inhabitants' point of view,
and probably also from that of the Ottoman central government, there were
advantages to this tension, for these two major administrative officials thus

' Ç K , f. 189a.
2
Ç K , f. 74b.
3
ÇK,f. I lib.
^Akdag, Celait iswnlan, p. 117 stresses mainly the negative impact of this dispute on the public
peace, since the kadis tende J to encourage those w h o rebelled against the sancakbeyi.
 T O W N O F F I C I A L S , TIM AR HOLDERS, AND TAXATION 93

kept e a c h o t h e r in check. W h e n the g o v e r n o r C a f e r B e y r e f u s e d to heed the

Sultan's prohibitions a n d insisted on m a k i n g f r e q u e n t 'inspection tours', the
peasants' c o m p l a i n t s on this score were readily f o r w a r d e d to Istanbul by the
k a d i 1 . M o r e o v e r t h e s e tensions must h a v e permitted urban n o t a b l e s to play
their o w n political g a m e b e t w e e n the t w o d i g n i t a r i e s ; it is p r o b a b l e that
p e o p l e s u c h as Y u s u f b. M a k s u d w e r e not s l o w to avail t h e m s e l v e s of a
c h a n c e of this kind.

K a d i s in f o r u m and the s u r r o u n d i n g t o w n s s e e m to h a v e generally

been m e n of substance. W h e n M e h m e d E f e n d i b e g a n his period of o f f i c e in
f o r u m , he not o n l y p u r c h a s e d t w o h o u s e s , b u t a l s o s p e n t t h e by local
s t a n d a r d s very c o n s i d e r a b l e s u m of 10,000 akge upon the p u r c h a s e of a
g a r d e n 2 . We get a clear notion of the worldly possessions of a kadi in the rural
district of S o r g u n , b e c a u s e his t w o residences, o n e in Sorgun a n d another in
O s m a n c i k , w e r e p l u n d e r e d by a w e l l - k n o w n r o b b e r c h i e f t a i n 3 . T h e kadi of
Sorgun c l a i m e d to h a v e lost three camels, t w o horses, and a slave, apart f r o m
valuable c h i n a w a r e and several thousand guru§—the latter a m a j o r f o r t u n e in
this c a s h - p o o r e n v i r o n m e n t . E v e n if a l l o w a n c e is m a d e f o r possible
e x a g g e r a t i o n — t h e r o b b e r had been arrested a n d the kadi of S o r g u n w a s
c l a m o u r i n g for his execution — the kadi in question was clearly rooted in the
area, a n d the possessor of a very substantial fortune.

This question of local roots leads us to s o m e interesting observations:

it a p p e a r s that in the late sixteenth century, quite a f e w of the kadis holding
o f f i c e in t h e area w e r e m e n f r o m northeastern A n a t o l i a . C e r t a i n l y not all of
t h e m ; K a d i M e h m e d E f e n d , f o r instance, is expressly described as c o m i n g
f r o m Ak§ehir. B u t Hayriinnas E f e n d i , w h o had in the past been kadi of f o r u m
and Sivas, maintained close c o n n e c t i o n s with f o r u m a f t e r his term of o f f i c e
w a s o v e r 4 . A l o n g with o t h e r kadis or f o r m e r kadis, he f i g u r e d a m o n g the
official witnesses to s o m e of the m o r e important court cases w h i c h occurred in
f o r u m d u r i n g the 1590s. A s has been m e n t i o n e d p r e v i o u s l y , V e l i y e d d i n
E f e n d i , kadi of S o r g u n , possessed p r o p e r t y in O s m a n c i k . W h a t the cursus
honorum may h a v e been f o r such local ulema is difficult to unravel in view of
the m e a g r e data at our disposal; but the question is w o r t h a c l o s e r
investigation.

A m o n g the o f f i c i a l s a c t i v c in f o r u m , o n e of the m o r e p r o m i n e n t
figures was the fortress commander or dizdar. Apart from his
military f u n c t i o n s , the lattei also s o m e t i m e s acted as a tax collector. At the
end of the sixteenth century the O t t o m a n war treasury was replenished by the

' Qorumlu, documentary appendix, p. 122.

2
C K , p . 106b.
orumlu, documentary appendix, p. 4 0 .
f. 1 2 4 b and e l s e w h e r e .
94 C (I P I N G WITH THE STATE

contributions from minor timar-holders, who were required to pay over one
year's income from their tax grants, in return for which they were excused
from participation in the Austrian campaign. At this occasion, the dizdar of
f o r u m collected the contributions from the i/mar-holders in the area 1 . While
the sum of money collected was not really very large when compared with
Ottoman campaign expenses, this role of the fortress commander emphasized
his ascendency over the timar-holders in the area. Moreover the prestigious
role of the fortress commander was further enhanced by the fact that he
organized saltpeter collection on the part of retired timar-holders and their sons
who had never received a tax grant. If these lower-level sipahis and
sipahizades collected the saltpeter demanded from them by the Ottoman
military administration, they were able to keep up their tax-exempt status
without actually going on campaign. Since this privilege depended upon the
dizdar's testifying that the services in question had been satisfactorily
performed, he must have been one of the men that local «'/war-holders were
careful not to alienate'-. Thus the impact of the f o r u m commander should
have reached far beyond the limits of the small fortress which had been given
in his charge.

R U R A L D E C I S I O N M A K E R S : T H E TIMAR-
H O L D E R S

It has been generally agreed upon that the later sixteenth century was
the peiod in which the timar as an institution entered on a decline 3 . From a
military point of view. he increasing use of gunpowder and artillery made the
services of a numerous cavalry appear increasingly obsolete. Moreover the
Ottoman Treasury's need for ready cash, connected, among other things, with
the 'price revolution of the sixteenth century' encouraged the administration to
convert vacant timars i ito tax farms. However, the decline or else the relative
stability of the timar-holders' impact was also dependent on factors connected
with the locality in u t i c h they resided. In certain parts of Anatolia, timar-
holders were still qui.e active as late as the eighteenth century, and the
institution itself was not abolished until the administrative reorganization of
the nineteenth centur\, he so-called Tanzimat.

In this context, the documents contained in the f o r u m kadi's register

provide some valuable information. Even upon cursory investigation, we
find indications of the limar holders' continuing impact. Thus Mirza b. Bali,

'<;:K i . 6 5 a , 146b.
orumlu, d o c u m e n t a r y a p p e n d i x , p. 128.
• ^ M u s t a f a A k d a g , « T i m a r R e j i m i n i n B o z u l u § u » , Ankara Universitesi Dil ve Tarih Cogrqfya
FakUllesi Dergisi. 4 ( 1 9 4 5 ) 4 1 9 - 4 3 1 . M u s t a f a C e z a r , Osmanli Tarihinde. Leventler, I s t a n b u l
O u z e l S a n a t l a r A k a d e m i s i Y l y m l a r i N o . 2 8 ( I s t a n b u l , 1 9 6 5 ) , p. 1 5 1 - 1 6 9 .
 T O W N O F F I C I A L S , TIMAR-HOLDERS, AND TAXATION 95

sipahi of the village of Cogan in the kaza of Zunnunabad, was able to secure
the return of a peasant family that had left the village without permission 1 ; in
seventeenth century Kayseri for instance, most pleas of this kind were to be
rejected by the court 2 . Obviously, we cannot generalize from a single case, but
the fact that the register conlains no instances of former peasants having their
residence in f o r u m recognized by the court is surely of some significance.

Moreover, the right of approval (or prohibition), when members of the

taxpaying population wishec to transfer their rights of usufruct with respect to
state-owned fields, was still solidly in the sipahi's hands. In this one register,
at least twenty documents refer to such a permission being given by a sipahi
or other administrator in charge of Ottoman state-owned lands. This
permission could be explicitly granted by a special document (temessiik), or
else be implied by the fact that the responsible administrator accepted a fee for
the transfer (resm-i tapu). Bven so, the register also contains a number of
cases (at least eight) in which possession was transferred from one taxpayer to
the other without the respansible official's intervention. However, these
instances can more or less be explained as 'special cases'. In three instances,
the sale in question was the so-called bey bi'l-vefa, that is the seller reserved
the right to return the purchase price and take back the goods he had sold 3 .
Whatever the original reason may have been for developing this form of sale,
in the Ottoman context of t i e late sixteenth century, it was often connected
with a loan; namely the security — which supposedly had been sold — was
returned to the seller/ debtor once the original debt had been repaid. One may
assume that in these tempo-ary alienations, the permission of the sipahi or
other responsible office holcer was not considered indispensible. In one other
case, the rule was acknowledged in principle even though it had just been
broken in practice, namely v/hen Kadi Mehmed recorded in his register that a
certain landholder had acquired a field without previously obtaining the
permission of the responsible official 4 . One further case must have been all
but unique in late sixteenth century f o r u m , namely a peasant donating lands
to his adult daughter 5 . Since the transaction was entered into the register, it
was obviously not a clandestine one, and the piece of land in question was
explicitly described as a field (tarla), not as a garden or vineyard which might
have constituted private property. Whether the field had a special status which
allowed its alienation in this manner is not recorded. Conceivably it might

' C K , f. 33b.
2
Suraiya Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production
in an Urban Setting 1520-1650 (Cambridge, Engl, 1984), p. 270.
^Joseph Schacht, An introduction to Islamic IMW (London, 1984), p. 78.
\:K, f . 23b.
f. 112b. On the limited right of peasant women to hold state-owned lands compare Omer
Lütfi Barkan, «Türk Toprak H i k u k u Tarihinde T a n z i m a t ve 1274 (1858) Tarihli Ara/.i
Kanunnamesi» repr. in: Omer Liitli Barkan, Türkiye Toprak Meselesi, Toplu Eserler (Istanbul,
1980), vol. I, p. 312IT.
96 COPING WITH THH STATE

even been situated on former garden or vineyard land, which had not reverted to
the crown when it was converted to field agriculture. In another instance where
the property was transferred without reference to the sipahi or other
responsible public official, it is quite possible that what was being alienated
was the standing crop, and not the land itself 1 . Thus it seems that in the
Corum area there was no incipient transfer of fields into private property, a
development which could however be observed occasionally in late sixteenth
and early seventeenth century Kayseri, and was to take on greater importance
as the seventeenth century wore on 2 .

Only in a minor, terminological fashion did the inhabitants of Qorum

occasionally deviate from the norms which their great compatriot Ebusuud
Efendi had laid down half a century earlier 3 . While Ebusuud and his sovereign
Kanuni Suleyman had insisted upon the notion that a transfer of usufruct
against payment did not constitute a sale, the scribes of the Quorum court
occasionally took the opposite view. Quite apart from the cases of bey bi'l-
vefa mentioned above, the transfer of a field was sometimes called a bey,
instead of the officially approved term tefviz4. In the view of the Corum
scribes, the right of possession (hakk-i karar) was something that could be
bought and sold (bey). But that was as yet a minor infringement of the
regulations which made up the 'classical' Ottoman land system.

Much more remarkable was the frequency with which a i/mar-holder

abandoned the right to collect the taxes of the current year against payment of
a lump sum, either because he needed ready money at once or because he was
not in a position to organize collection himself. Occasionally, such 'sales' as
they were called, might be surrounded by elaborate precautions, as when a
sipahi sold the income of his timar before it was collectible, and the purchaser
required that a third party stand surety for him 5 .

A step further toward alienation of timars against payment of money

was taken when not only the current revenues, but the title to the tax grant
itself formed part of the transaction. This happened in at least three cases.
Thus the Palace gaviiIsmail had paid out 68 guru$ on behalf of the timar
holder Alp Bey, and had taken the latter's appointment document as security 6 ;
when Alp Bey had paid his debt, the document was returned to him. Even
more puzzling is the case of a sipahi who possessed a timar, registered value

' g c . f. 149b.
^Faroqhi, Towns, p. 263-2b">
3
O n Ebusuud Efendi's explanation of the Ottoman land system - - he was a native of Iskilip —
compare Barkan, «Turk Toprak Hukuk», p. 299ff.
^For example f. 31a.
5
g K . f. 62a.
' Y k . f. 53b.
 TOWN O F F I C I A L S , T/Af/IK-HOLDKRS, AND TAXATION 97

2 0 3 0 akge, and was given a horse worth a thousand akge and a mud of wheat
for the other thousand 1 , presumably in exchange for one year's revenues. Five
months after the original transaction, the sipahi appeared in court. He declared
that he w a s surrendering the title to his timar, and h a n d e d over his
appointment papers to his partner in the previous transaction. N o further
compensation is mentioned, and the background of the transaction remains
obscure. According to a third document which once more involved the sipahi
Alp Bey, a timar worth 3600 akge in book value was traded against 136 guru$
in cash and a horse worth 15 guruf-. It is hard to envisage that the people who
had thus acquired the documents belonging to an impecunious sipahi could
really have gone to Istanbul and have themselves invested with the offices in
q u e s t i o n . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , o n e might p r e s u m e that the t r a n s f e r of the
a p p o i n t m e n t d o c u m e n t simply meant to ensure that the sipahi did not
disappear, on campaign or elsewhere, before he had paid his debts.

One source of financial e m b a r a s s m e n t for the more modest timar-

holders was the bedel akgesi the timar-holders' contribution to the Ottoman
campaign chest which has already been mentioned in another context. What is
more, the sipahi's difficulties could be passed on to the peasants inhabiting
his tax grant; for in cases when the f o r m e r could not be found, the Sultan's
rescript specified that the peasants were to pay on his behalf 3 . In principle of
course, villagers were to subtract their outlay on behalf of the timar-holder
f r o m future dues — this was :he reason for entering such transactions into the
kadi's register in the first place. Thus the legal representative of a certain
sipahi admitted that while t i e peasants of the village of Bukdik owed the
ft'/rcar-holder 29 guru§ in dues for the past two years, they had paid 20 guru$ in
bedel akgesi on the latter's behalf. Thus the original debt had been reduced to
9 guru§4. But recovery of such outlays was not always easy, as demonstrated
by an account of a court case between the villagers of Kiikiirt and their timar-
holder, who resided in the town of f o r u m 5 . Though the peasants could show a
receipt for the bedel akgesi, the sipahi was able to discover a flaw of some
kind in their legal position. In the end, the peasants were induced to accept a
compromise. They were given a horse and a f e w sheep, and in exchange
abandoned all further claims against the sipahi', since nothing is known about
the real value of these animals, it is hard to tell how the peasants' purses were
affected by the transaction.

• f K . f. 7 0 a .
2
g K , f. 5 3 b .
3
C K , f. 8 3 b .
^ ( J K , f. 6 1 a . T h e n a m e of the v i l l a g e c o u l d not be r e a d w i t h c e r t a i n t y .
5
C K , f. 8 3 a .
98 COPING WITH THE STATE

Peasant-ii/M/zi conflict of an even more serious kind was brought to

the attention of the (, orum court when a peasant woman named §ehirbanu
initiated a case against Omer, sipahi of the village of Tut 1 . The family's legal
position was delicate: §ehirbanu and her family laid claim to certain fields that
had belonged to the boy's grandfather on behalf of the child, although most
legal authorities of the time did not consider a grandson closely enough related
to claim precedence over outsiders. Since the sipahi apparently wanted to oust
the family, he kept the little boy prisoner in the house of one of his retainers.
When the matter was finally brought up in court, the sipahi's legal
representative claimed that permission for the child's arrest had first been
obtained from a local kadi's deputy. This the latter staunchly denied — as well
he might, for when the little boy was produced in court with a chain around
his neck, the scribe's indignation expressed itself in the words 'and the
aforementioned... was not even eight or nine years old'... But more revealing
were the sipahi's words when, as must be assumed, he was put under some
pressure in the course of the courtroom session. He admitted that he had had
the little boy imprisoned, but attempted to justify himself by saying that as a
timar-holder, he was due to go on campaign and therefore needed money. The
stress put upon the institution of the timar by the rising prices of the late
sixteenth century could not have been expressed in a more graphic manner.

THE A L I E N A T I O N OF P R O P R I E T A R Y TAXATION
RIGHTS (MAMKANE)

As has been known since Omer Liitfi Barkan's celebrated article,

Corum lay within the area in which many villages paid their taxes according
to the malikdne-divani system 2 . This meant that a double tithe was levied.
One of the tithes wa< collected by the state, and could be either directly
appropriated or turned over to a sipahi. The other tithe, however, was the
private property of one or more persons, or served a pious foundation as a
source of revenue. Barkan has assumed that the malikdne system was
originally devised to ensure the loyalty of the families who had owned the soil
prior to the Ottoman conquest, and who would have been alienated by outright
dispossession. As pri\ate property, the malikdne shares were split up among
an increasingly large number of heirs, and were ultimately frittered away,
except where the institution of the pious foundation served to perpetuate them.
In the later sixteenth century, the process was already reasonably far advanced,
but the tax registers of the 1580s still conscientiously record all the people
who could lay claim to an often minute fraction of the original malikdne
share.

' Q K , f. 61 a/b. Compare Barkan, «Tiirk Toprak Hukuku», p. 312-313.

2
O m e r Liitfi Barkan, «l'iirk-islam Toprak H u k u k u Tatbikatinin O s m a n l i i m p a r a t o r l u g u n d a
Aldigi ijekiller: Malikàne-1 'ivanì Sistemi», repr. in: Omer Liitfi Barkan, Toplu Eserler (Istanbul,
1980), vol. 1, 151-208. O r malikàne in the Qorum area compare Islamoglu-inan, State and
Peasant.
 TOWN OFFICIALS, TIM A R - H O L D E R S , AND TAXATION 99

In the kadi register cf f o r u m , the word malikane is used but rarely.

But from the context the presence of this type of property holding is obvious.
We find quite a few cases in which the holder of what must have been a share
in a malikane disposed of the revenues which this privilege procured him.
When the guardian of Zaim Cafer's minor sons sold the children's rights to
villages and farmsteads, we can assume that the text was referring to a
malikdne[, for rights to collect peasant taxes formed part of the object sold.
The children seemingly had inherited considerable debts, and that was the
reason why their guardian alienated their patrimony. Another case of
permanent alienation involved a certain Mustafa f e l e b i from the locally
prominent family of §adi Bey 2 . Mustafa f e l e b i had inherited not only
malikane shares, but he also shared with certain major pious foundations the
rare privilege of being able to collect a number of divani taxes. However, we
find him ceding these taxation rights against payment of 7150 akge to a
Palace gavu§. At the same time, this Palace gavu§ also purchased other
malikane rights in Pa§akoy, and thus seems to have been well on the way
toward establishing himself as a locally influential personage in place of the
older family.

In other cases, malikane shares and similar rights were not

permanently alienated, but turned over for long periods of time against
payment of a lump sum of money. An interesting case involved Cafer f e l e b i
b. Nurullah from a family of local notables, who due to his descendance (ber
vech-i evladiyet) had inherited the right to peasant taxes and mill dues in the
districts of f o r u m , Alaca and Zile 3 . Now he ceded these rights for a period of
sixty years against payment of 50,000 akge. Again the purchaser was a Palace
fflvttj, thus vindicating Mustafa Akdag's remark that these men frequently
used their official status to btild up a position in the places to which they had
been appointed, and which were often their areas of origin as well 4 . Most
interesting however, is the manner in which Cafer f elebi proposed to employ
the important sum of money »vhich had thus come into his possession. Thirty
thousand akge were paid over in the shape of 300 vakiye of coffee (385 kg) 5 ,
and a further 8000 akge in form of a mule —which must have been a
magnificent aimal, given the (act that local horses often enough fetched only a
few thousand akge. It is probable that Cafer f e l e b i intended to take up
the coffee trade. A coffee-house was already flourishing in f o r u m during those

' f K . f . 177b.
f. 62b.
3
C K , f. 86b.
^Akdag, Celcilt isyanlari, p. 14£.
5
T h c vakiye equivalent used here was taken from Walter Hinz, Islamische Masse unci
Gewichte umgerechnet ins metrische System, in: Handbuch der Orientalistik, Erg. band 1, Heft
1 (Leiden, 1955), p. 24. For new and vital information on the Ottoman system of weights and
measurements in general, and on the vakiye-okka in particular, see Halil Inalcik. «Introduction
to Ottoman Metrology», Turcica, XV (1983), 311-342.
100 COPING WITH THE STATE

y e a r s ' , and the Palace ('«v/ij's contacts in the capital were probably useful in
purchasing the coffee itself. It would appear that in a time of increasing cash
flow, certain members of old-established families were trying to keep up their
social position by investing in trade.

More frequent than these long-term alienations were instances of people

with taxation rights who turned over the dues for a single year to an outsider.
The motives for such a transaction could vary, and the documents usually d o
not permit us to disentangle them. In the case of pious foundations, it was
frequently the attempt to save the expense of salaried collectors. A s far as the
f o r u m district was concerned, the Mevlevi dervish convent of A m a s y a was
particularly active in the tax-farming business. In one case we hear that the
villagers of a settlement named Eymir had gotten together and farmed their
own taxes, which they proposed to deliver to Amasya in due course; but this
solution, doubtlessly beneficial to the villagers in times of economic strain,
was abandoned when an outsider offered the Mevlevis a larger sum of money 2 .
In a second case, it may have been the convenience of sharing out money
rather than grain a m o n g several people invested with the right of tax
collection in the same village, that p r o m p t e d the administration of the
A m a s y a Mevlevi convent to favour this solution 3 . Given the frequency of
shared o w n e r s h i p in malikane rights, f a r m i n g them out against a sum of
money must have been commonplace.

But in other instances, it was economic pressure, rather than revenue-

maximizing or convenience, which caused people to alienate their taxation
rights. This becomes obvious f r o m a document concerning a member of the
dervish lineage of Abdal Ata, that controlled a well-known lodge located neat
f o r u m 4 . The latter-da\ descendant of Abdal Ata admitted selling his share in
the 1004/1595-96 peasant taxes of a nearby village because of debt. In other
cases, political pressures may have played a part. When the Palace gavu$
A h m e d was in the course of acquiring a long-term right to village dues in the
area of Zile and Alaca. he also bought out the rights of a second minor holder
of taxation privileges, for the time being only for the year 1004/1595-96 5 . It
is very possible that the greater and the smaller deal were somehow connected.

'gc, f. 84b.
2
QK, f. 93a.
3
fK, f. 80b.
4
CK, f. 42a.
YK I. 85a.
 T O W N O F F I C I A L S , TIM A R - H O L D E R S , A N D T A X A T I O N 101

MIDDLEMEN AND TAX FARMERS

In local p a r l a n c e , a n a n w h o collected taxes on behalf of another was

s o m e t i m e s k n o w n as the latter's §ihne. T h u s w e find a certain §adi B e y b.
M i r z a e n g a g e d in a court case to prove that the heirs of his f o r m e r §ihne still
o w e d h i m grain t a x e s f r o m the past t w o y e a r s 1 . In a n o t h e r c a s e , villagers
a c c u s e d by a military m a n of holding back taxes, testified to t h e e f f e c t that
they had already paid o v e r the r e l e v a n t grain to the latter's j i h n e 2 . T h u s it
would a p p e a r that the §ihni? w a s either a salaried collector or a person w h o
f a r m e d taxation rights w i t h o u t necessarily t a k i n g o v e r the m a r k e t i n g of the
crop. B y contrast, ordinary :axfarmers (miiltezim) generally delivered m o n e y ,
and t h e r e f o r e sold the agricultural products they collected. In both the cases
outlined here, the taxes to be delivered w e r e expressed in kind rather than in
money.

Certain tax f a r m i n g contracts registered under the h e a d i n g 'her vech-i

maktu' a l s o i n v o l v e d deliveries of grain. T h r o u g h contracts of this sort, the
person e n d o w e d with t h e right of tax collection attempted to protect himself
a g a i n s t f l u c t u a t i o n s of t h e h a r v e s t . T h e s e f l u c t u a t i o n s h a d immediate
repercussions upon the a m o u n t of taxes collected, as the m a i n agricultural tax
(tithe, o$iir) w a s proportional to the size of t h e harvest. T h u s the f a m i l y of
§adi Bey b. M i r z a , w h o s e ancestors a p p e a r to h a v e been the malikane owners
of the village of f a y k o y w h i c h they had c o n v e r t e d into a f o u n d a t i o n , had
c o n c l u d e d a long-term contract. As a result they w e r e to r e c e i v e 2 3 mud of
grain every y e a r 3 . But t h e typical t a x f a r m i n g contract was h o w e v e r , at least on
p a p e r , e x p r e s s e d in t e r m s of cash. W h e n Haci M i r z a , a d m i n i s t r a t o r of the
c r o w n lands of f o r u m , sold the right to collect tithes in grain, o n i o n s and
other vegetables to the Palace mtiteferrika M u s t a f a A g a , a p a y m e n t of 4 0 , 0 0 0
akge w a s s t i p u l a t e d 4 . But in an e n v i r o n m e n t in which c a s h w a s not very
a b u n d a n t , part of M u s t a f a Aga's d e b t to the state was actually discharged by
turning over a horse.

Certain tax-farming contracts were registered under the familiar heading

of iltizam. T h u s a kadi o u t of o f f i c e , w h o w a s struggling to pay his debts to
the O t t o m a n state, referred to an iltizam which he possessed in a village in the
district of K a r a h i s a r i 5 . In this case, it is n o t clearly e x p r e s s e d f r o m w h a t
institution the kadi had acquired his iltizam, but it is probable that the village
in question was located on crown lands, and that the central f i n a n c e o f f i c e w a s
involved.

' g K , f. 84a.
2
CK, f. 80s,
3
CK, f. 75a.
4
C K . f. 99a.
5
C K , f . 156b.
102 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T H

At the same time, it seems that the Ottoman administration was doing
its best to limit the proliferation of t a x - f a r m i n g contracts. This can be
surmised from an imperial rescript addressed to the kadi of £ o r u m , which
informs us that certain villages belonging to the crown lands of the district
had been alienated to third parties. However the Ottoman administration had
decided to treat these villages as having escheated ( m e v k u f ) , and a person was
especially appointed to collect the taxes paid by the peasants living in these
settlements 1 . One must assume that the villages in question had been alienated
under some kind of tax-farming contract, but it is impossible to tell why the
Ottoman administration had decided to consider the contract invalid. W h a t
makes the whole matter difficult to evaluate is that escheated sources of
revenue could be farmed out under a separate heading. From the scanty
material at our disposal. Ihe underlying conflicts between different tax farmers
can only be guessed at, but they cannot be analyzed in any meaningful
fashion.

T H E T A X L O A D O F 1 0 0 4 - 0 5 / 1 5 9 5 - 7

In the preceding sections, we have discussed the manner in which

'regular' Ottoman peasa.it taxes were collected, i.e. those which had been
entered into the tax register or tahrir2. H o w e v e r as it is well known, the
Ottoman state derived a considerable share of its revenues f r o m taxes that were
in principle 'irregular', that is collected according to need, and not necessarily
every year. Originally some of these taxes, known as avartz-i divaniye, were
to be levied only in vvaitime 3 . But levies of this kind became increasingly
frequent, and in the se\ e iteenth and eighteenth centuries, the avariz registers
had become a basic tool of Ottoman administration, comparable to the tahrir
of the 'classical' period.

Avariz-taxes have been studied f r o m various points of view: Ltitfi

Gii?er has concerned himself with the role of grain deliveries within this
framework 4 , while Bruce McGowan has used avariz records as a source for the
history of Balkan population 5 . However in the present context, we will look
at the matter f r o m the point of view of the inhabitants of Corurn anc[ the
surrounding villages. For a campaign year such as 1004/1595-96, we will
discuss the deliveries in money and in kind, in addition to the labour services

' ç K . f . 170a.
^ F o r a c o n c i s e o v e r v i e w o v e r ihe ' c l a s s i c a l ' s y s t e m of O t t o m a n rural t a x a t i o n , s e e Halil I n a l c i k ,
The Ottoman Empire, The C'Indicai Age 1300-1600 ( L o n d o n , 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 1 0 7 - 1 1 3 .
-^See the a r t i c l e 'avariz' by O m e r L ü t f i B a r k a n in islam Ansiklopedisi.
4
G i i ç c r , Hubuhat Meselesi, p. S7ff.
-"Bruce M e Govvan, Economa Life iti Ottoman Europe, Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for
iMnd 1600-1X00 ( C a m b r i d g e . 1981 ), p. 8 0 - 1 2 0 .
 T O W N O F F I C I A L S , TIMAR HOLDERS, AND TAXATION 103

that t h e O t t o m a n state d e m a n d e d f r o m a c o m m u n i t y of a p p r o x i m a t e l y ten

thousand inhabitants and its rural hinterland. W h i c h social groups w e r e called
u p o n , a n d h o w did they react to the S u l t a n ' s tax c o l l e c t o r s ? T o a n s w e r a
question of this type, the kad registers are of particular value, as they reflect
both taxes levied and collection procedures as they appeared at the grassroots
level, rather than the global view as it presented itself to officials in Istanbul.

A s has previously been m e n t i o n e d , sipahis with small tax a s s i g n m e n t s

w e r e e x c u s e d f r o m participat o n in the c a m p a i g n against p a y m e n t of a year's
revenue. F r o m the T r e a s u r y ' s point of view, there was a d o u b l e a d v a n t a g e to
this arrangement: an appreciable sum of cash entered the c o f f e r s of the central
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , w h i l e guard d u t i e s 1 , which w e r e indispensible a n y h o w in a
y e a r of w i d e s p r e a d unrest, were assured by sipahis w h o s e revenues w e r e too
small for participation in a c a m p a i g n . M o r e o v e r , in c a s e t h e c e n t r a l
administration's orders could be more or less faithfully applied, the arragemcnt
did not place an additional load upon the dues-paying peasantry.

O n the o t h e r h a n d , the presence of c a m e l s b e l o n g i n g to the O t t o m a n

state, w h i c h the t a x p a y e r s w e r e expected to f e e d , constituted an a p p r e c i a b l e
s o u r c e of e x p e n s e s . In t h e y e a r 1 0 0 4 / 1 5 9 5 - 9 6 , o v e r t w o h u n d r e d c a m e l s
wintered in the f o r u m area and for their f o d d e r , local administrators acquired
3 0 0 0 kile of barley and 3 0 0 0 sacks of s t r a w 2 . Deliveries w e r e paid for: an
istanbul (22.3 k g ) of barley cost the T r e a s u r y 10 akge, w h i l e the sacks of
straw were valued at 1 akge apiece. H o w e v e r it is probable that these prices
lay below what an ordinary c u s t o m e r would h a v e had to pay, even at officially
fixed prices (narh). According to the register of prices promulgated in Istanbul
in 1009/1600, a kile of barley before the m o s t recent coinage r e f o r m had cost
38 akge3. In the court c a s e between the inhabitants of f o r u m and their f o r m e r
g o v e r n o r , ihe kadi had valued a kile of barley at 2 6 akge, but in this latter
c a s e n o t the kile of Istanbul was i n t e n d e d , but rather a local unit w h o s e
e q u i v a l e n t r e m a i n s u n k n o w n 4 . T h u s w e can a s s u m e that at the very least, a
couple of thousand akge w e r e indirectly contributed by the inhabitants of the
f o r u m district in t h e c o u r s e of this t r a n s a c t i o n . A s to the straw, 1 vakiye
(1.28 kg) of this f o d d e r cost an akge in Istanbul b e f o r e the c o i n a g e reform of
1600; w e h a v e no w a y of k n o w i n g h o w m a n y vakiye m a d e u p a sack, but
there is little d o u b t that the inhabitants of the f o r u m district also lost m o n e y
under this latter heading.

' A k d a g , Celält hyanlan, p. 154 attributes the relative quiet of this campaign year to the
presence of these guardsmen.
CK, f. 129b. Equivalent according to Hinz, Islamische Masse und Gewichte, p. 41.
• Mübahat Kütükoglu, «1009 (1600) tarihli narh defterine göre Istanbul'da cesitli esya ve hizmet
fiatlari», Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi, 9 ( D 7 8 ) , 24.
4
C K , f . 19a.
104 (OPING W I T H THE STAT K

A relatively e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e b u r d e n c a u s e d by t h e s e
deliveries w a s assured by the rule that e v e n people w h o w e r e e x e m p t f r o m
avaru-taxes had to c o n t r i b u t e w h e n d e l i v e r i e s w e r e not d e m a n d e d without
c o m p e n s a t i o n , but w e r e b e i n g p a i d f o r by t h e T r e a s u r y . A s a r e s u l t ,
i n h a b i t a n t s of c r o w n lands, p e o p l e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r raising f a l c o n s f o r the
Palace, and p e a s a n t s w o r k i n g in rice f i e l d s b e l o n g i n g to the O t t o m a n state,
w h o w e r e all e x e m p t f r o m avariz dues, had to participate in the deliveries 1 .
F r o m the c o m p l a i n t s of p e o p l e e x e m p t f r o m avariz t a x e s all o v e r the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e , w e gain the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t a v a n z - e x e m p t i o n s were
f r e q u e n t l y violated; and the d e l i v e r i e s of v a r i o u s f o o d s t u f f s f o r a r m y and
P a l a c e , against a m o r e or less s y m b o l i c p a y m e n t , m u s t o f t e n h a v e been a
method for circumventing these privileges.

It seems that the deliveries of f o d d e r f o r the O t t o m a n state c a m e l s w e r e

supplemented by other d e m a n d s f o r h o n e y , edible fats, rice, bread and w h e a t ,
but the d o c u m e n t that refers to t h e m is very v a g u e and contains no specific
i n f o r m a t i o n 2 . W e k n o w a little m o r e a b o u t the delivery of 1000 kantar of
ship's biscuit for the O t t o m a n fleet. T h e w h e a t needed f o r this p u r p o s e was to
be secured by the administrators of c r o w n land. It w a s p r e s u m e d that the latter
would usually h a v e e n o u g h w h e a t in their storehouses to m a k e recourse to the
t a x p a y e r u n n e c e s s a r y 3 . O n l y w h e r e this w a s not the c a s e , w h e a t w a s to be
purchased at officially promulgated prices. T o coordinate these e f f o r t s w a s the
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the kadi; it can be a s s u m e d that he a l s o m a d e sure that
bakers' ovens, and possibly even the o v e n s in the h o u s e s of private citizens,
were placed in the service of the Ottoman war effort.

S o m e w h a t more detail is k n o w n about the deliveries of butterfat to the

Sultan's kitchen. T h i s was again an obligatory sale, coordinated this t i m e not
by t h e kadi, but by o l f i c i a l s in c h a r g e of t h e Sultan's pantry. A d o c u m e n t
a l l o w s us s o m e i n s i g h t i n t o t h e m e c h a n i s m by w h i c h t h e p r i c e was
d e t e r m i n e d . T h e £ o r u i n notables ( a y a n ve e§raf) c a m e t o g e t h e r and decided
that while the official price for butterfat lay at 16 akge the vakiye, respect f o r
t h e Sultan m a d e it n e c e s s a r y to p r o p o s e a r e b a t e of 2 - 3 akge*. T h u s the
Sultan's pantry w a s to p u r c h a s e b u t t e r f a t at 14 akge the vakiye, or 11 akge
p e r k i l o g r a m . A p p a r e n t l y this a r r a n g e m e n t g a v e rise to w h a t m i g h t be
c o n s i d e r e d a 'black market' situation; f o r t h e register r e c o r d e d that butterfat
b e c a m e scarce in town, and it w a s duly f o r b i d d e n to t a k e it out of C o r u m .
H o w e v e r that did noi deter certain inhabitants f r o m m a k i n g the attempt, and
w h i l e w e k n o w the n a m e s of those that got caught, no record r e m a i n s of those

' g K . f . 129b.
2
QC,f. 154b.
3
CK, f. 25b.
4
CK. f. 24a.
 T O W N O F F I C I A L S , Ti M A R - H O L D E R S , A N D T A X A T I O N 105

that s u c c e e d e d 1 . Villagers also tried to e v a d e their obligations in a small-scale

f a s h i o n ; thus w e h e a r of d e l i v e r i e s w e i g h i n g a f e w vakiye less than the
stipulated a m o u n t 2 .

A p a r t f r o m f o o d s t u f f s , there w e r e a l s o the d e m a n d s of the fleet f o r

timber to be c o n t e n d e d with. T h i s c o n c e r n e d t h e villagers of the hilly areas at
a reasonable distance f r o m the Black Sea; the f o r u m district in the n a r r o w e r
sense of the w o r d being open steppe. Deliveries w e r e to be m a d e to the navy
arsenal at Sinop, and to the m o r e conveniently located port of S a m s u n , f o r the
construction of galleys and broad sturdy boats suitable for the transportation of
h o r s e s 3 . T h e register g i v e s n o i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t the q u a n t i t y of t i m b e r
d e m a n d e d ; but w h a t e v e r it w a s , the villagers of the M i h m a d s e l a m area w e r e
not v e r y w i l l i n g c o n t r i b u t o r s . If the c o m p l a i n t s of a certain Ali Suba§i,
official in charge of the t i m b e r levy, are to be believed, he and his m e n w e r e
physically set upon. In f r o n t of the kadi of f o r u m , the villagers denied having
d o n e s u c h a t h i n g ; but they had legal r e a s o n s for r e f u s i n g to d e l i v e r t h e
timber.

In a d d i t i o n to m o n e y a n d g o o d s , t h e O t t o m a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a l s o
d e m a n d e d personal s e r v i c e s as c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the war e f f o r t . O n e of t h e
m a j o r d e m a n d s w a s f o r r o w e r s to s e r v e on the galleys of the navy. W h i l e
c o n d e m n e d c r i m i n a l s and prisoners of w a r w e r e e m p l o y e d on a s i g n i f i c a n t
scale, in w a r t i m e t h e r e w a s n e e d f o r e x t r a r o w e r s , a n d m o r e o v e r the
e m p l o y m e n t of f r e e r o w e r s w a s p r o b a b l y c o n s i d e r e d as a c o u n t e r m e a s u r e
a g a i n s t p o s s i b l e r e v o l t s o n the p a r t of g a l l e y slaves^. A s a base f o r the
recruiting of galley r o w e r s , the O t t o m a n administration e m p l o y e d the avariz
registers. In 1 0 0 3 - 1 0 0 4 / 1 5 9 4 - 9 6 every g r o u p of twelve avariz 'houses' was
r e q u i r e d to f u r n i s h o n e r o w e r 5 . A s the district of f o r u m c o n s i s t e d of a
thousand such 'houses', a c o i t i n g e n t of eighty-three men w a s d e m a n d e d . T h e
kadi of f o r u m , a l o n g w i t h an o f f i c i a l d i s p a t c h e d f o r this p u r p o s e f r o m
Istanbul, was to select the men and take care that they were strong e n o u g h to
perform the heavy duties of z galley rower.

T h i s service also had a financial side; f o r in principle, the inhabitants

of every district w e r e responsible f o r paying the wages of the m e n that they
sent to serve in the navy. A p a r t f r o m their m o n t h l y wages, these rowers were
paid a b o n u s of 8 0 - 1 5 5 akge upon their arrival in Istanbul, which was also

• g K . f . 19b.
2
C X /; 2 5 a
- \ : K , ff. 21a, 189a.
4
I s m a i l Hakki Uzun9ar§ili, Osmanli Devleti'nin Merkez ve Bahriye Te^kilati Türk Tarih
Kurumu Yayinlarindan VIII, 16 (Ankara, 1948), p. 482f.
5
C K , f. 187b.
106 ( ( P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

the responsibility of '.he inhabitants of the f o r u m district 1 . For the time

being, the officials were only to collect enough money to pay the rowers
wages for one month; it must be assumed that the sums needed to pay the
men over the remaining months of the campaign season were to be demanded
at a later date.

While the register does not report any reactions on the part of the
prospective rowers and their families, the craftsmen of f o r u m very much
disliked the idea of sending some of their number to serve as orducus2. This
service involved accompanying the army on campaign; the orducus, supported
by the contributions of their colleagues who had staid at home, were to set up
shop in the camp itself. In this manner, visits on the part of the soldiers tc
the towns and villages through which they passed could be minimized, and
military discipline more easily maintained. When the document preserved in
the f o r u m register was written down, the question of financial contributions
to the businesses of the orducus had not yet been broached. Thus the question
under discussion was, for the time being, limited to the number of people who
were to be sent by the f o r u m craftsmen. The official in charge, a certain
Ibrahim favu§, demanded that every esna/(probably, here used in the sense
of 'guild') contribute one man. On the other hand, the assembled craftsmen
(ehl-i sukdan her kim varsa) claimed through their spokesmen that Ihey haci
never sent more than three orducus in the past, and proposed to send the same:
number this time as well.

Most remarkab e in such a context is the fact that the guild officials:
(,kethuda, yigitba$i) did not intervene in this discussion. Apparently the men
who met in the kadi's court to hear Ibrahim favu§'s demands were ordinary
craftsmen, as many as could be assembled at short notice. Their spokesmen
were a baker, a cook, ind a grocer, that is members of the three guilds most
obviously affected b> the order to send orducus. Therefore it seems that the'
often acrimonious discussions between different guilds about the number of
men to be sent by each organization, which can frequently be observed in
Anatolian towns, were largely absent from late sixteenth-century f o r u m . At
least as long as the taN collector was in town, perfect harmony seems to have
reigned among the guildsmen.

' ç K , f . 130b- 131a.

2 ç K , f. 188a ff. On ardic i service compare Miinir Aktepe, Patrona ¡svanì (1730/, Istanbul
Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakiilicsi Yayinlari No. 8 0 8 (Istanbul, 1958), p. 35ff.
 T O W N O F F I C I A L S , TiMAR-HOLDF;RS, AND TAXATION 107

CONCLUSION

An exact computation of the taxes, deliveries and services demanded by

the Ottoman central administration in these war years (1003-05/1594-97) is
not possible, given the fragmentary material at our disposal. However divided
by an urban population of ten thousand inhabitants, the sums of money which
can be computed do not seem exorbitantly large. At the same time, the
reactions of the peasants of Mihmadselam or of the Çorum craftsmen show
that the demands were in fact being felt as a burden. There are several ways in
which this situation can be explained. First of all, the demands for unspecified
quantities of foodstuffs, which because of their indeterminate character have
only briefly been touched upon, may in fact have constituted a major load
upon the taxpayer. Secondly, the 'invisible' costs of collection may have
raised what were originally moderate demands to an intolerable level. In
addition, the devastation of the countryside by rebels and soldiers must have
left peasants and townsmen with little beyond the basic necessities of life.
Moreover, it must be kept in mind that avariz taxes constituted
supplementary payments ovsr and above the dues recorded in the tax register
(tahrir), and therefore were s upported only with difficulty.

In such circumstances, what was the role of local administrators? Did

they only represent the Ottoman central administration vis-à-vis the taxpayer,
or did the reverse also occur? Mustafa Akdag has commented on situations in
which the kadis voiced the demands of local notables', and we have seen that
at least in northeastern Anatolia, kadis apparently rotated within a limited
region, and therefore were bound to have quite a few local ties. However the
main spokesman of the inhabitants of Çorum — or at least of the wealthier
ones among them — was not the kadi, but the town kethiida. At the present
stage, it is hard to say whether this was due to the personal dynamism of
Yusuf b. Maksud, or whether the activities and responsibilities of the town
kethiida had become more or less institutionalized. Only further monographs
on Anatolian towns at different stages or their development will clarify our
understanding in this respect

At the same time, we find that the inhabitants of Çorum had

considerable cohesion as a community, and that it was primarily in resisting
the demands of state officials that they showed this cohesion. Without any
visible institutional underpinnings at least in the initial stages, the townsmen
were able to organize their spokesman's trip to Istanbul, mobilize support
against their former governor, and then see the case through the courts. Once
the issue had been broughl to the attention of officials in the capital, the
petitioners must of course have benefited from the distrust against provincial

'Akdag, Celâlîisyanlari, p. 118.

108 COPING WITH THE S T AT E

governors which formed part, of governmental policy during those years, in

which the adaletnames were being promulgated 1 . Since the central
administration had accepted the view that unjustified inspection tours and
unauthorized contributions from townsmen and peasants were the main reason
for continued unrest in Anatolia, the inhabitants of Çorum could count upon
official support for their claims against the governor. But if the inhabitants
had lived in a town deeply divided by diverging loyalties to guilds and quarters,
their petition could never have gotten to the point where access to high-level
government officials became possible.

In this context one must note that the guilds in late sixteenth-century
Çorum were not very active organizations. Even in cases that normally should
have come within the purview of the guilds, such as the selection and
equipment of orducus, we find a few spokesmen without specified status in
the guild negotiating with the official in charge of conducting the levy. Given
our lack of information on the way in which small town politics in Anatolia
were conducted, it is hard to say whether this lack of activity on the part of
guilds was part of a broader pattern, or linked to chance circumstances peculiar
to Çorum. Be that as il may, it appears that urban solidarity, at least among
the wealthier inhabitants of a town, could function even if guild activity was
at a low level. What informal relationships made such a process possible is a
question which again can only be solved after additional urban monographs
have been undertaken.

Where the countryside immediately outside of Çorum was concerned,

the timar system retained its traditional force vis-à-vis the villagers. The
sipahi could recall peasants who had migrated from 'his' village and property
transactions were still firmly under his control. However, the incipient crisis
of the institution was expressed in the large number of financial transactions
surrounding the timar. Cases of debt in which the appointment document was
handed over to the creditor as security, or even turned over to third persons
against a money payment, can be cited as evidence thai the financial crisis of
the later sixteenth century had touched even the more outlying parts of
Ottoman Anatolia. One might play down the importance of these more
extreme cases, as, aftei all, isolated events, but the frequency of timar-holders
turning over one year's revenues to middlemen certainly did not bode well for
the stability of the insiitution.

Increasing demand for ready cash on the part of tax collectors — and iri
consequence, of peasants and townsmen as well — was not apparently
counterbalanced by an increasing supply of silver. Gold coins were apparently
not as rare as might ha"c been expected, and even ordinary citizens sometimes

'Halil Inalcik, «Adâlctnâim 1er», Heb-der, II. 3-4(1965), 49-145.

 T O W N O F F I C I A L S , 77 A t f / i ß - H O L D E R S, A N D T A X A T I O N 109

e x p r e s s e d the prices of g o o d s which they b o u g h t and sold in O t t o m a n gold

p i e c e s 1 . But silver c o i n s w^re often d i f f i c u l t to find. At least this seems the
most obvious explanation why the inhabitants of f o r u m should h a v e rejected
the rates of e x c h a n g e that w i r e current in Istanbul, or in any c a s e delayed their
application as m u c h as possible. M o r e o v e r similar conditions prevailed in late
s i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y A n k a r a , even t h o u g h c o m m e r c i a l and o t h e r c o n n e c t i o n s
between the t w o t o w n s s e e m to h a v e been rather slight. Future research will
have to show whether this pattern was valid throughout Anatolia.

In addition, it has been shown that certain features of urban politics in

f o r u m r e s e m b l e t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s that O z e r E r g e n ^ has m a d e f o r late
sixteenth-centuiy A n k a r a 2 . It appears that the notables of A n k a r a found ways
and m e a n s of m a k i n g their wishes k n o w n , a n d of realizing p r o j e c t s to which
they attached particular importance, such as f o r e x a m p l e the construction of a
city wall. T h u s it can be c o n c l u d e d that urban cohesion in both t o w n s w a s
stronger than has long been believed. W o r k i n g mainly f r o m Balkan e x a m p l e s ,
Stoianovich had o n c e c o n c l u d e d that in the eighteenth c e n t u r y , m a n y t o w n s
gained f o r t h e m s e l v e s a sphere of action in which the O t t o m a n administration
but rarely i n t e r f e r e d 3 . It s e e m s that in ccntral Anatolia, a parallel situation
d e v e l o p e d in the second half of the sixteenth c e n t u r y — if in fact, it hadn't
existed all along.

l
C K , f. 10b.
Ergen?, «Yonetim Kurumlarinin Niteligi», 1270.
3
T r a i a n Stoianovich, « M o d e l and Mirror of the P r e - M o d e r n Balkan C i t y » , in: La ville
halkaniquc XVe-XIXe ss., Studia Balcanica, 3 (1970), 83-1 IO.
 POLITICAL TENSIONS IN THE
ANATOLIAN COUNTRYSIDE AROUND 1600.
AN ATTEMPT AT INTERPRETATION

In his study of rural society in late seventeenth century Piemont,

Giovanni L,evi has started out from the assumption that peasants and notables
did not passively accept the emerging absolutist state that was 'handed down'
to t h e m f r o m T u r i n o . ' Quite to the contrary, the different strata of rural
society entered into various kinds of alliances either a m o n g themselves, or
with outside nobles and townsmen. A s a result of these strategies, country
dwellers m o d i f i e d the i m p a c t of the absolutist state in the Piemont
countryside. N o w the assumption that local initiative may under certain
circumstances be effective against a strongly organized central power is first
and foremost part of a certain kind of world view, and only at a later stage may
be reformulated in the shape of a scholarly hypothesis. For lack of a better
name, one might call this way of regarding society as 'social democrat'. Such
an approach is characterized by an interest in social activities which took place
outside of the state apparatus, and not infrequently were directed against either
the state or else individual members of the ruling class. Thus one can easily
identify the themes which have attracted the interest of scholars wishing to
study 'society minus the state 1 : One might name the carnevalistic struggle of
the Romans artisans against the local bourgeoisie during the French wars of
religion 2 , the defiant stance of a sixteenth-century Friaul miller attempting to
explain how the world might have c o m e into being without the intervention
of G o d 3 , or the above-mentioned family strategies of notables, sharecroppers
and peasants in the North Italian countryside. Similarly an anthropologist
such as Eric Wolf has e m p i a s i z e d the active participation in historical
processes by people who lived in kin-ordered societies and either possessed no
state at all, or else only a weakly developed one. 4

T h e r e exist other reasons for l u m p i n g together G i o v a n n i Levi,

Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Carlo Ginzburg and Eric Wolf under the heading
of a'social-democrat world view', - whether the scholars in question would

'Giovanni Levi. Das immaterielle Erbe, Eine häuerliche Welt an der Schwelle zur Moderne, tr.
Karl F. H a u b e r a n d Ulrich Hausmann, Berlin, 1986.
E m m a n u e l Le Roy Ladurie, Le Cernaval de Romans, De la Chandeleur au mercredi des
Cendres 1579-1580, Paris, 1979.
' C a r l o Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller, tr. J.
and A. Tedeschi, London, 1982.
4
E r i c Wolf, Europe and the People without History, Berkeley, Los Angeles, I^ondon, 1982.
112 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

agree to this categorization is of course quite a different matter. These;

researchers all reject the view that "traditional' European society was a
harmonious society. Moreover they would seem to question the view that
such social conflicts as occurred were solely due to factional struggles among
members of the ruling groups, or else to regional rebellions against an
emerging centralized state. 1 Thus even though their relationships to the ideas
of Marx may differ, these scholars share a common sympathy for the 'tribute
payers' as opposed to the 'tribute takers' 2 . Scholars of this kind may occupy
important positions in academe, but would usually define themselves as
outsiders of one kind or another in the Italian, French or American university
establishments. At the same time, this critical stance may account to some
extent for the appeal of their work outside of their own countries and
specialities.

E X P L A I N I N G O T T O M A N R E B E L L I O N S OE T H E
P E R I O D A R O I ND 16 0 0 : A K D A G ' S M O D E L

Where Ottoman studies are concerned, this kind of approach is rarely

encountered. Not that there are no scholars willing to take an interest in the
way of life of the Ottoman 'lower orders'. But these people have usually been
obliged to pursue their studies outside the academic establishment. As a result
the work of people like Huseyin Avni §anda or Ismail Cem Ipekfi has
generally been more journalistic than scholarly 3 . As one of the few academic
researchers whose interest was primarily in Ottoman society as opposed to the
Ottoman state, one might name Mustafa Akdag 4 . But it is characteristic that
while some of his assumptions have been sharply criticized, there have not
been many further attempts to unravel the working of Anatolian rural society,
and its complex relationship with the Ottoman state.

Akdag's hypotheses may be summarized as follows: In sixteenth-

century Anatolia, population pressure made it impossible for many young
peasants to acquire a farmstead and a wife. As a result they were pushed out of

' For proponents of such \ u ws compare Jacques Heers, Le clan familial au moyen age, Etude
sur les structures politiquev et societies ties milieux urhains, Paris, 1974 and Roiand Mousnier,
Peasant Uprisings in Seven fenili Century France, Russia and China, tr. Brian Pearce, London,
1971.
2
F o r this expression compatv Wolf. People without History, p. 79-88.
3
Hiisey»n Avni § a n d a , l<i 'iya ve Koylii, Istanbul, 1970. ismail Ceni Ìpek?i, Tiirkiye'de
Gerikalmqligin Tarihi, lstan >ul, 1970.
^ M u s t a f a Akdag, Celàlì h -anlari (1550-1603), A n k a r a Universitesi Dil ve T a r i h - C o g r a f y a
Fakultcsi Yayinlari No. 141. Ankara, 1963. Mustafa A k d a g , Turkiye'nin Ìktisadì ve Intimai
Tarihi, Ankara Universitesi Oil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakiiltesi Yayinlari No. 131, 2 vols., Ankara,
1959, 1971, vol. 2 I453-I5W. For recent work on the relationship between peasant society and
the state see Huri Islamoglu-lnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire, Agrarian Power
Relations and Regional E, < •wmic Development in Ottoman Anatolia during the 16th Century
(Leiden, 1994).
 POLITICAL TENSIONS IN T H E A N A T O L I A N 113

the village community to seek service in the Ottoman state apparatus, either
as aspirant ulema (students in theological schools or medreses) or as
mercenaries. In both cases they constituted an element of disorder in the
Ottoman system, because the state apparatus was unable to absorb them. This
problem became acute particularly after the empire had ceased to expand on a
major scale and was plagued by a series of difficulties ultimately due to
European expansion.

The problem posed by these 'surplus villagers' was aggravated by the

measures which the Ottoman state took against them at a time when students
and mercenaries began to roam the countryside as marauders. Where the
students were concerned, there was a seemingly unmotivated changeover from
outright repression (asip kesme) to attempts at cooptation of a limited number
of senior students. The latter were officially regarded as the 'representatives' of
the medrese students and expected to hold their constituents in check.
However cooptation was bound to fail, as the most the Ottoman state was
willing to offer provincial students was a peasant farmstead, while the students
had spent years of study exactly to escape their peasant status. On the other
hand, repressive policies were also only partially effective. This was largely
due to the fact that the Ottoman provincial administration was built upon the
principle of balancing provincial governors and their henchmen against the
kadis, who were not only judges, but also all-round administrative officials.
Themselves graduates of the medrese, local kadis were bound to sympathize
with the students, while the kadi's position as de-facto representatives of local
notables tended to pit their against the provincial governors sent from
Istanbul. Under these circumstances, the struggle went on for decades, and
Akdag does not give any explanation for the end of the student uprisings
toward about 1600, unless it be widespread exhaustion and hopelessness
among the rebels.

Much more serious, from the Ottoman state's point of view, were the
activities of mercenary soldiers 1 . Akdag has pointed out, and later studies have
confirmed his observation, that in the second half of the sixteenth century, the
Ottoman central administration increasingly expected provincial governors to
furnish their own 'forces of law and order'. However, the tenures of provincial
governors were short, and the forces recruited by one such functionary were
not usually taken over by his successor. As a result, masterless bands roamed
the countryside and behaved very much like the brigands they had originally

On this issue, the major study is now Halil Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the
Ottoman Empire 1600-1700," Archixum Ottomanicum VI, 1980, 283-337, reprinted in: Studies
in Ottoman Social and Economic History, L o n d o n , 1985, no. V. M u s t a f a A k d a g , "Timar
Rejiminin Bozulugu," Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cograjya FakUltesi Dergisi, III, 4, 1945,
428-429 discusses the military importance of the irregular soldiers known as sarica and sekban
but makes no reference to their use of gunpowder. Metin Kunt, The Sultan's Servants, The
Transformation of Ottoman Provincid Government 15501650, New York, 1983, p. 85 ff.
114 ( O P I N G W I T H THE S T A T E

been hired to repress Or else a deposed governor might be pressured into

rebelling, because the mercenaries making up his retinue were trying to retain
their jobs. This situation explains the frequency of rebellions in the later
sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth century, and also the fact that the
rebel chiefs did not usually try to set up a separate state, but simply wished to
receive or retain a position of military command.

Again Akdag avoids the question how the Celali rebellions — this is
the name by which these uprisings were known — c a m e to an end, if indeed
they ever ended at all before the eighteenth century 1 . Obviously, to terminate
the uprisings, the central government would have had to muster e n o u g h
military power to eliminate the rebels, which the financial crisis and foreign
wars of the period rendered rather difficult. Moreover to avoid a resumption of
the process once the current rebels had been defeated, it was necessary (1) to
change the current methods of recruitment into the armed forces (2) to make
life in the village less undesirable, or else coercion of peasants more stringent,
so that discontented peasants would or could no longer join armed bands. This
should have meant a major restructuring both of Ottoman state and society,
and the work of Halil Inalcik suggests that such a rebuilding was not achieved,
at least not in the course of the seventeenth century 2 . One might surmise that
in the eighteenth century, free-wheeling musketeers became less common, as
many of them were absorbed by the households of powerful notables ( a y a n ) .
But that is a problem yet to be examined.

' P O P U L A T I O N P R E S S U R E ' A N D T H E C E L A L l
R E B E L L I O N S A L A C K OF C O N N E C T I O N ?

A m o n g the elements of the A k d a g model, the role of population

pressure in propelling peasants outside of the village has been most seriously
questioned. C e r t a i n h , M. A. Cook has come up with qualified support for the
thesis that population pressure was leading to a fragmentation of holdings, a
process which should ultimately have forced the tenants of all-too exiguous
plots to leave their villages 3 . On the other hand, Huri Islamoglu-inan is of the
opinion that population pressure did not push Anatolian peasants out of their
villages, but that the pull exercised by m o r e remunerative and adventurous
careers as mercenaries was quite sufficient to induce young peasants to

William Griswold, The Ureal Anatolian Rebellion, 1000-1020/1591 -1611, Islamkundliche

Untersuchungen Bd 83, Birlin. 1983, emphasizes the role of Kuyucu Murad Pa§a in defeating
the rebels (p. 209 and elsewhere). But a cursory reading of Evliya f e l e b i shows that brigands
known as Celalis were roaming Anatolia well after the middle of the 17th century.
2
t n a i c i k , "Military and 1 iscal Transformation," passim, discusses various organizational
changes, but certainly not an overhauling of the entire state structure.
^Michael A. Cook, Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia 1450-1600, London Oriental Series
vol. 27, London, 1972, p I'lff.
 P O L I T I C A L T E N S I O N S IN THE A N A T O L I A N 115

abandon their fathers' farmsteads'. Huri ¡slamoglu-lnan thus suggests that the
crisis in the Anatolian countryside was sparked off by political rather than by
economic processes. However from her point of view, the whole issue is
marginal, as she is mainly concerned with the mechanisms by which the
Anatolian family farm managed to survive down to the present day, and avoid
elimination by engrossing landlords. Seen from that angle, the fate of people
forced to leave their farms arid villages, and who by virtue of that fact ceased
to be peasants, is of secondary importance only.

G U N P O W D E R A N D N O M A D I S M

Approaching the problem from quite a different viewpoint, Halil

Inalcik has equally minimized the role of socio-economic crisis in sparking off
the military rebellions so frequently encountered in Anatolia during the late
sixteenth and throughout the; seventeenth century 2 . In his view, it is largely
the Ottoman state's demand for soldiers able to wield firearms that led to the
organization of units of 'free-floating' mercenaries. Whenever their
depredations became intolerable, these mercenary bands were combatted by
militias which the Ottoman state raised among the peasantry. Of course, this
model does not explain why the Ottoman state, given the disruption caused by
these musket-wielding mercenaries, did not pursue alternative solutions.
Among the alternatives coming to mind, one might name the conversion of
still existing timars from cavalry service to service with firearms, or else the
demand that provincial ayan supply the Ottoman central administration with a
previously agreed-upon and generally sizeable number of musketeers. Thus in
inalcik's model, it is the Ottoman state's way of functioning that accounts for
the occurrence of military rebellions. However, there is no attempt to explain
why the Ottoman polity functioned as it did. From Inalctk's previous studies
it would seem likely that for him the position of the Ottoman state with
respect to the routes of world trade determined its solvency or lack of same 3 .
Seen from this angle, fluctuations in population and agricultural production
would be of much less importance.

Huricihan Islamoglu (Inan), "Dynamics of Agricultural Production, Population Growth and

Urban Development: A Case Study of Areas in North-central Anatolia, 1520-1575", Ph diss.,
University of Wisconsin, Madison Wise, and "Osmanische Landwirtschaft im Anatolien des 16^
J a h r h u n d e r t s : S t a g n a t i o n o d e r r e g i o n a l e s W a c h s t u m ? , " Jahrbuch zur Geschichte und
Gesellschaft des Vorderen und Mittleren Orients (1985-1986), 165-214. I am grateful to the
author for allowing me to see this study prior to publication.
2
Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation," p. 286-287.
3
I n this context, it is surely significant that Halil Inalcik in The Ottoman Empire The Classical
Age 1300 to 1600 tr. N o r m a n Itzkowitz and Colin Imber, London, 1973, p. 121-164 dwells at
considerable length on the control of trade routes, while the section on rural society deals with
the administrative f r a m e w o r k rather :han with agricultural production.
116 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

A different explanation of military rebellions, this time in a Rumelian

setting, has been proposed by Fikret Adanir. In his attempt to explain the
activities of the Balkan brigands known as 'hayduk'x, Adanir suggests that the
hayduks were not peasants driven from their villages by a conflict with a
locally powerful personage. Still less would Adanir endorse the view that
pressures applied by the Ottoman state forced Balkan peasants to leave their
villages and adopt the brief and dangerous careers of highway robbers. Nor
does Adanir consider hayduks as in any way 'proto-nationalists'. In his view,
these freebooters were mainly pastoralists, who had been caught up in the
constant warfare of the Ottoman-Hapsburg border areas, and who were
unwilling to give up that type of existence even when they lived in areas other
than frontier zones. Now it is known that in the seventeenth century, sizeable
numbers of nomads immigrated into the western and central provinces from
eastern Anatolia, and Ottoman documents from this period frequently refer to
the firret ve §akavet, that is the depredations of nomadic herdsmen 2 . On the
other hand, few documents have so far been located that give any information
about the recruitment of musketeers, and the material that we do have does not
indicate that the members of irregular military units operating in Anatolia
were necessarily migratory herdsmen. As a result, it does not seem appropriate
to ascribe all or even most Anatolian military rebellions to the activities, of
nomads and semi-nomads.

T H E D E S I R I O F RE AY A T O T U R N A S K E R 1

Inalcik has suggested yet another motivation for the Anatolian

rebellions, namely the will of Anatolian-Turkish subjects to recapture some of
the military and political privileges which they had lost to the Sultan's servile
retainers, the kul\ This loss had occurred particularly since the time that
Mehmed the Conqueror replaced the Anatolian-Turkish aristocracy by
functionaries of slave origin in the highest o f f i c e s of the Ottoman
administration 4 . Now the notion that Anatolian-Turkish reaya should have
wished to share i n the privileges of the Sultan's askeri is in itself very
probable, particukrly since the nasihatname authors of this period dwell
with special emphasis on the necessity of keeping the reaya outside of the

' F i k r e t Adanir, "Heiilu<.kentum und osmanische Herrschaft. Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte der

Diskussion um das frui' neuzeitliche Räuberunvvesen in Südosteuropa," Südost-Forschungen
XLI, 1982,43-116.
2
A h m e t Refik, Anadnlh'da Türk A^iretleri (966-1200), Anadolu'da ya§ayan Türk afireileri
hakkmda Divam Hünun in mühimme defterlerinde mukayyet hükümleri havidir, Istanbul, 1930,
pp. 12, 17 and elsewhcn .
•'inalcik, "Military and I seal Transformation," p. 284.
^Inalcik, The Ottoman /•. npire, p. 77.
 POLITICAL TENSIONS IN T H E ANATOLIAN 117

governmental a p p a r a t u s 1 . One must certainly keep in mind that the

nasihatname authors were by no means impartial observers of the social
realities around them, but expressed the biases of the 'haves' against the 'have-
nots' 2 . But even so, the nasihatname writers would scarcely have dwelt on
this topic quite as much as they did, if they had not been confronted with real
examples of social mobility from the group of 'tribute payers' into that of the
'tribute takers'.

THE ROLE OF C O N J U N C T U R E

One might amplify :his view concerning the antagonism between

'haves' and 'have-nots' ir Ottoman society, by pointing to various
possibilities of explanation in terms of natural, economic, or political
conjuncture. After all, the Sultan's kul were established at the levers of power
mainly between 1451 and 1481. On the other hand, resistance against the
ascendancy of the kul seems to have come out into the open only after about
1570. Why did the resentment of the reaya against the kul, which must have
been of long standing, flare up particularly during those years? Griswold has
suggested an environmental explanation by pointing to the sequence of bad-
weather years and resulting harvest failures, which around 1600 befell not only
the Ottoman domains but the Mediterranean at large 3 . Of course, this
explanation presupposes that the rebelling soldiers were peasants driven off the
land by harvest failures (rather than by population pressure, as Akdag would
have it). Thus one would expect that this kind of environmental conjuncture
cannot be fitted into islamog u-tnan's or inalcik's system of explanation. More
importantly, systematic dendrochronological and other investigations
concerning the Anatolian cl mate of the early modern period are not as yet
very far advanced, and therefore it seems more prudent to defer ecologially
based explanations for the time being.

Another kind of conjuncture is economic. As an example for the

explanation of a revolution in terms of economic conjuncture, one might
point to the work of Ernest Librousse and others concerning French economic
development preceding the revolution of 1789-1795 4 . From these studies, it

' Y a ç a r Yücel ed., Kitâb-i miistetâb, Osmanli devlet düzenine ait metinler I, Ankara Üniversitcsi
Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakiiltesi Yayinlari 216, Ankara, 1974, p. XIX.
2
R i f a ' a t A b o u - E I - H a j , Formation of the Ottoman State: the Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to
Eighteenth Century, Albany, 1991.
^Griswold, Anatolian Rebellions, p. 238-9. Griswold is commendably cautious in the formulation
of this hypothesis.
4
F o r a recent v e r s i o n , see Ernest L a b r o u s s e , "En survol sur l ' o u v r a g e ; d y n a m i s m e s
économiques, dynamismes sociaux, dynamismes mentaux," in: Histoire économique et sociale
de la France ed. Fernand Braudel, Ernest Labrousse, 4 vols, Paris, 1970 ff, vol II Des derniers
temps de l'âge seigneurial aux preludes de l'âge industriel (1660-17X9).
118 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

would seem that long-term e c o n o m i c growth cut short by a spectacular

downturn is likely to lead to unrest and rebellion, since the growth period has
led to rising expectations which are cut short by the crisis. Merwan Buheyri
has attempted to apply a similar model to the 1858 peasant rebellion of
Lebanese Kisrawan 1 . Even though a lack of data makes such an explanation
rather speculative where the Ottoman realm of the sixteenth century is
concerned, such speculation may still have its virtues. It would seem that
before about 1570 or 1580, Ottoman textile industries were prosperous, and
marketing activities were increasing in many parts of the Empire 2 . Public
construction was also booming, even though such activities may not always
be indicative of economic prosperity 3 . Moreover, the slow rate of devaluation
of the akge before 1S70 would indicate a fairly well-balanced exchequer,
particularly when viewed in contrast to the violent zigzag curves which in
later periods reflect Ottoman monetary history 4 . Thus one might suggest that
quite a few sectors of the Ottoman e c o n o m y were in f a c t reasonably
prosperous until about 1570. From then onward, there occurred increasing
difficulties in the realm of state finances, which affected the economy in the
shape of inflation through debasement of the currency. Moreover, pure silver
also declined in value, as American treasure entered the Ottoman realm. A t the
same time, population increase which outstripped possibilities of agricultural
growth equally contributed toward making the price increase of the period into
a dramatic and extremely disruptive 'price revolution'.

Both Barkan and Akdag have stressed the connection between inflation
and military rebellion 5 . T h e connection is obvious in the case of urban
janissaries, who attempted to defend the purchasing power of their pay by
demanding the heads of the viziers responsible for the devaluation of the akge.
But even though less- visible than in the case of provincial soldiers w h o s e
marauding and rebellions made up the Celali revolts, the connection is present
nonetheless. A f t e r all, the O t t o m a n central administration increasingly
demanded that provincial governors supply their own soldiers, as financial
stringency made it difficult to pay these units out of the central state budget.
T h u s if we wish to explain why Anatolian soldiers of reaya background
selected especially the years between 1570 and 1680 to demand admission into

'Marvvan Buheyri, "The Peasant Revolt of 1858 in Mount Lebanon: Rising Expectations,
Economic Malaise and the Incentive to Arm", Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the
Middle East, ed. Tarif Khaüdi. Beirut, 1984, p. 291-302.
2
inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, p. 140-62.
3
O n this issue compare Robert S. Lopez, Harry A Miskimim, " The Economic Depression of the
Renaissance," Economit History Review, 2nd series XIV, 1961-62, 408-426 and the discussion
aroused by this article.
4
H a l i l Sahillioglu, "Osmanli l'ara Tarihinde Diinya Para ve Maden Hareketlerinin Yeri (1300-
1750)" Turkiye ìktisat Torini Uterine Ara$ltrmalar, Gelarne Dergisi special issue (1978), 1-38.
O m e r Liitfi "Barkan, "The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the
Economic History of the N^ar East," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 6. 1, 1975, 3.
-'Barkan, "Price Revoluti«!." p. 27-28, Akdag Turkiye ¡ktisadtve intimai Tarihi, p. 386 ff.
 POLITICAL TENSIONS IN T H E A N A T O L I A N 119

the askeri, we can point to the (probable) long-term prosperity of the years
before 1570 and the downturn which followed, as at least a contributing factor.

However, apart from environmental and economic conjunctures, there

is the political conjuncture to be considered. At present, the researchers who
have dealt with the Ottoman ruling group and specificially with the
bureaucracy are in violent disagreement about the proper manner of
interpreting the changes which they have observed for the later sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries. Whether the Palace increased its influence over the
provincial bureaucracy, as Metin Kunt has suggested 1 , or largely lost it, as
Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj is convinced that it did 2 , are matters not yet settled.
Certainly, the overall 'drift' of Ottoman history during this period makes
Abou-Bl-Haj's interpretation seem more convincing than its rival. But that is
not necessarily a strong argument; for observations that cannot easily be fitted
into an overall system may turn out to be fruitful at later stages of our
research.

If there was in fact a political conjuncture that favoured the comparative

autonomy of provincial governors, this would of course explain why the
reaya of Anatolia, newly equipped with firearms, should have clustered around
these governors when they attempted to enter the kul establishment. However
one has to beware of a possible tautology, as one might equally say that
provincial governors were favoured by the fact that the Ottoman
administration needed their armed retainers. At present, our knowledge of how
a provincial governor operated during these difficult years is still insufficient.
Only a number of good monographs on the uses and abuses of provincial
administration will help us understand this question 3 .

SOCIAL CONFLICT IN ANATOLIA AROUND 1600

Conjunctural explanations are important, but without a knowledge of

the long-term relationship between social forces in a given society, they
remain insufficient. It would appear that the researcher dealing with the
Anatolian rebellions of the years before and after 1600 has to cope with two
separate but interrelated problems: why were military rebellions frequent
during this period? Why were peasant uprisings, such as can be observed in
early modern Europe, Japan or China, extremely rare? One can of course take
the view that these two phenomena bear no relation to one another; in such a

'Kunt, The Sultan's Servants, p. 95-9-5.

2
Rifa'at Aboil El-Haj, "Review of The Sultan's Servants: Transformation of Ottoman Provincial
Government '550-/650" Osmanli Ara^tirmalan, VI 1986, 221-246.
' For a first example see Metin Kunt, Bir Osmanli Valisinìn Yillik Gelir Gideri, Diyarbaktr
1670-71, Bo|azÌ9Ì Universitesi Yaymlari No. 162, Istanbul, 1981.
120 C O P I N G W I T H T H K S T A T E

case one will ordinarily assume that in the Ottoman state of the pre-Tanzimaf
period, there existed a kind of pre-established harmony between tribute-payers
and tribute-takers. Now it is true that basic views concerning society are
scarcely more a m e n a b l e to rational discussion than religious d o g m a ; and
usually basic visions of society are imposed upon people by a varying
mixture of violence and non-rational persuasion, rather than by scholarly
disputations. Under these circumstances, it seems only fair to state that the
present author does assume that there existed a potential conflict between
tribute payers and tribute takers in the Ottoman Empire. W h a t needs to be
explained is the form it took, that is military rebellions rather than peasant
uprisings. In the present author's view, valid explanations are rendered
impossible if one starts f r o m the premise 'contented peasants-discontented
military men', particularly when the reasons for the peasants' hypothetical
contentment remain unexamined.

Peasant discontent expressed itself most frequently in connection with

taxes; the Miihimme registers of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries are full of references to such complaints, particularly where the
irregular taxes collected by local administrators are involved 1 . It was not
u n c o m m o n for Anatolian villagers to r e f u s e agents of the provincial
administration entry into their territory. Moreover at the height of the Celali
rebellions, the Ottoman Sultans were so much concerned about permanent
erosion of the tax base and appropriation of all taxable surplusses by local
administrators, thai ihese peasant m o v e m e n t s might even receive moral
support from Istanbul 2 . Under these circumstances one is not surprised to see
that certain villagers availed themselves of the opportunity to beat up tax
collectors, with the local court either unable or unwilling to identify the
culprits 3 .

At least as significant as these physical gestures of defiance are some of

the verbal expressions which inhabitants of the provinces used when referring
to an undesirable m e m b e r of their community. This person was generally
accused of approaching provincial administrators and their men (ehl-i orfi,
with the aim of denigrating fellow t o w n s m e n or villagers in order to gain
a d v a n t a g e s for himself. T h e accusation occurs very f r e q u e n t l y in the
Miihimme registers of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 4 .
At times one almost gains the impression that the sheer fact that a reaya

' F o r graphic examples compare Halil inalcik, "Adaletnameler," Belgeler, II, 3-4, 1965, 70. See
also Inalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation," p. 315 on bargaining with respect to the
avariz taxes.
^Inalcik, "Adaletnameler 1 80.
•*For an example of such a ease, compare the £ o r u m kadi register of 1595-7 in the City Libra-y
of Chorum (ff 21, 189 a).
^ A cursory reading of llu late 16th-early 17th century Miihimme Defterleri will yield many
examples of this kind.
 POLITICAL TENSIONS IN T H E ANATOLIAN 121

approached one of the eh I- orf was sufficient for the former's neighbours to
suspect his motives. It is equally remarkable that much less stigma was
attached to relations with a kadi. In many instances, the kadi seems to have
been viewed as a mediator between the Ottoman administration and the
taxpayers. On the other hand, provincial governors and their henchmen, in the
years before and after 1600, were apparently regarded as completely alien to the
townsmen and villagers of Anatolia, and contact with them was to be avoided
as much as possible 1 .

BACK TO DEMOGRAI'HICAL FACTORS?

Why did the bad feeling between reaya and ehl-i orf around 1600 not
erupt in peasant rebellions along the European or Chinese model? T o the
present author, the main reason seems to be the comparative ease with which
a discontented peasant could escape his village and his peasant condition. Even
though in theory, the sipahi in charge of collecting the taxes due from a given
village could demand the return of fugitive peasants 2 , it does not seem as if, at
least in the seventeenth century, the kadi's court was overly anxious to help
him in his undertaking 3 . A peasant w h o joined the retinue of a provincial
governor as a mercenary obviously was even better protected f r o m any
attempts to bring him back to the village. In that sense, one can agree with
Inalcik and islamoglu-inan when they deny that social conflicts on the village
level were the reason for the Celali rebellions. If peasants had not been able to
escape their condition and remove themselves into the military, the towns, and
possibly even the protection of semi-nomadic tribes, the result would have
been not the military revolts that we actually encounter, but peasant rebellions
against the state and its servitors.

When evaluating the relative importance of 'pull' and 'push' factors that
caused reaya to leave their villages, we are brought back to a much discussed
issue, namely whether for the last quarter of the sixteenth century Anatolia
should be considered 'overpopulated' in relation to its agricultural resources.
Economic historians have agreed on certain criteria by which one can
recognize rural overpopulation in preindustrial societies: decline in real wages
f o r part-time or f u l l - t i m e w a g e w o r k in agriculture or rural crafts,
fragmentation of holdings and the cultivation of lands known to be of
poor quality 4 . Our information on rural wagework in late sixteenth and early

' F o r Akdag's commens upon this matter see Celali¡syanlari, p. 117 and elsewhere.
%na!cifc, The Ottoman Empire, p. I I I .
3
SuraiyaFaroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production
in an Urban Setting Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization, Cambridge, 1984, p. 270.
4
F o r a detailed discussion of these criteria compare Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, The Peasants
of Languedoc, tr. John Day, Urbana 111, 1974, p. 98-131, 246-250.
122 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

seventeenth century Anatolia is too f r a g m e n t a r y for us to j u d g e whether there

w a s any decline in real wages. M o r e o v e r , w e do not as y e t possess a sufficient
n u m b e r of regional m o n o g r a p h s to j u d g e w h e t h e r in the last quarter of t h e
sixteenth century, poor quality lands w e r e in f a c t being taken under cultivation
with increasing f r e q u e n c y . But it appears that in the sixteenth century, the ricn
agricultural lands of the C u k u r o v a were almost devoid of p e r m a n e n t settlement
and used only in the winter by s e m i - n o m a d i c tribes possessing no m o r e than a
rudimentary a g r i c u l t u r e ' . Certainly malaria was o n e of the causes f o r this type
of land use, but o n e can a s s u m e that if population p r e s s u r e h a d really been
strong, there would have been a c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t to drain and cultivate the
lowlands.

T h u s there remains o n e m a j o r t y p e of e v i d e n c e for possible population

pressure, and that is the f r a g m e n t a t i o n of holdings. W e h a v e already observed
that t h e two a u t h o r s w h o h a v e studied this p h e n o m e n o n , n a m e l y M i c h a e l
C o o k and Huri Islamoglu-Inan, disagree a b o u t its f r e q u e n c y . C o o k considers it
reasonably w i d e s p r e a d 2 w h i l e I s l a m o g l u - I n a n is inclined to regard it as
3
marginal . In the K o n y a - A k § e h i r region studied by the present author, villages
h a v e been encountered that in t h e t i m e of M e h m e d the C o n q u e r o r contained
a b o u t sixty taxpayers, the majority possessing a full f a r m s t e a d ( g i f t ) 4 . A b o u t
o n e hundred and t w e n t y years later, the n u m b e r of t a x - p a y i n g villagers had
g r o w n to o v e r three hundred, n o n e of w h o m held a full f a r m s t e a d . Those
villagers best s u p p l i e d with land p o s s e s s e d a h a l f - f a r m s t e a d ( n i m gift), the
o t h e r s even less that that. It is possible to d i s a g r e e a b o u t the implications of
p h e n o m e n a of this type, but o n e m a y r e a s o n a b l y hold t h e o p i n i o n that in
certain areas, there w e r e p o c k e t s of d e n s e s e t t l e m e n t w h e r e population w a s
b e g i n n i n g to press hard upon resources. B u t that does not necessarily m e a n
that Anatolia as a w h o l e w a s 'overpopulated" with respect to the agricultural
possibilities of the t i m e .

T h i s hypothesis m a y be tested if w e c o m p a r e t h e late nineteenth a n d

early twentienth-ceinury p o p u l a t i o n of t h o s e A n a t o l i a n d i s t r i c t s whose
d e m o g r a p h i c history has b e e n e x a m i n e d , w i t h t h e i r sixteenth-century
counterparts. Even though we c a n n o t as y e t put together a population m a p of
late sixteenth century A n a t o l i a , w e d o p o s s e s s e n o u g h r e g i o n a l studies to
m a k e a comparison between the t w o periods worthwhile. W e k n o w that during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Anatolia in general did not

' M u s t a f a Soysal, Die Sh-ulungs-md Landschaftsentwicklung der Cukurova, Mit besonderer

Berücksichtigung der Yu';:i<ir-Ehene, Erlanger Geographische Arbeiten, Erlangen, 1976, p. 9-
47.
2
C o o k , Population Pressur >. p. 23-24 and elsewhere.
•hslamoglu-Inan, "Osmamsche Landwirtschaft."
^Ömiir Bakirer, Suraiya I aroqhi, "Dedigi Dede ve Tekkeleri," Belleten, XXXIX, 155, 1975. [>.
463.
 POLITICAL TENSIONS IN T H E A N A T O L I A N 123

s u f f e r f r o m overpopulation, even though there had been substantial population

growth in the s e c o n d half of the nineteenth century. O n the o t h e r hand, apart
f r o m a f e w railroads, the technical conditions of agriculture w e r e substantially
the s a m e as they h a d b e e n towards the e n d of t h e sixteenth c e n t u r y . T h u s
unless w e find areas w h o s e population w a s considerably d e n s e r at the end of
t h e s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h a n it w a s to be a b o u t 1900, it d o e s n o t s e e m
reasonable to s p e a k of A n a t o l i a n o v e r p o p u l a t i o n . H o p e f u l l y this matter will
be resolved in the near f u t u r e

A n o t h e r a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t late s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y overpopulation,
particularly in the s o u t h e r n part of A n a t o l i a , has been f o r m u l a t e d by Ronald
J e n n i n g s 1 . He c o m m e n t s upon the fact that the O t t o m a n administration, w h e n
attempting to settle A n a t o l i a n s on Cyprus, e n c o u n t e r e d enough resistance that
c r i m i n a l s had to be d r a f t e d l or the purpose. O n the other h a n d , p e o p l e with
good c o n n e c t i o n s in I s t a n b u l , such as t h e relatives of M i m a r S i n a n in the
K a y s e r i village of A g i r n a s . used t h e s e c o n t a c t s to gain e x e m p t i o n f r o m
deportation 2 . Certainly unsettled conditions on the island must h a v e acted as a
deterrent. But J e n n i n g s correctly remarks that if population pressure had been
really severe, a large n u m b e r of people would h a v e volunteered in the hope of
settling ori fertile lands, particularly since they w e r e offered tax e x e m p t i o n s as
an i n d u c e m e n t . H e t h e r e f o r e concludes that there was no population pressure
in s o u t h e r n A n a t o l i a a t t h e t i m e t h e C y p r u s s e t t l e m e n t p r o j e c t was
undertaken.

CONCLUSION

Of c o u r s e t h e a b s e n c e of population pressure should n o t be taken to

m e a n that; there w a s n o p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h , f o r t h e sixteenth c e n t u r y tax
registers show that this g r o w t h was in fact substantial. But f o r o u r a r g u m e n t ,
it is n o t p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h but p o p u l a t i o n pressure that counts, for
population pressure limited ttie peasants' options, f o r c e d them to w o r k harder
and must have therefore increased their discontent.

H o w e v e r m o r e i m p o r t a n t even than t h e sheer fact of population growth

was t h e m a n n e r in w h i c h O t t o m a n society of A n a t o l i a tried to c o p e with
increased numbers. Huri islarnoglu-inan has suggested that Anatolian peasants
w e r e not deprived of their land, b e c a u s e tribute takers c o n s i d e r e d it m o r e
a d v a n t a g e o u s to appropriate marketable surplusses, leaving the land in the

' R o n a l d Jennings, Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean World
1571-1640, New York, 1993, p. 221.
2
S e e Ibrahim Hakki Konyali, Mimar Koca Sinan, Istanbul, 1948, p. 107 for a reference to the
fact that Mimar Sinan had his relatives in Agirnas exempted from deportation to Cyprus.
124 COPING WITH THE STATE

possession of the t i l k r 1 . But possibly even more important was the fact that
population pressure in the village never became so severe that peasants were
forced to accept just any conditions to get hold of a piece of land. This in turn
was due to the fact that the Anatolian peasant of the years around 1600 could
escape his peasant status with relative ease. It would almost appear that
Anatolian peasants, who must have largely been the descendants of nomads
settled only a few generations back, had not forgotten their traditions of
mobility. At the same time, state service in the case of mercenaries, and
towns in the case of many other migrants, offered the migrating villager a
livelihood, even though it was sometimes precarious enough that it had to be
supplemented by robbery. This situation might explain why around 1600,
military rebels ranged all over Anatolia, and yet there was nothing that might
be called a peasant uprising.

' islamoglu-inan, " O s m a n i c h e Landwirtschaft.".

 SEEKING WISDOM IN CHINA:
AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE SENSE OF
THE C'ELALI REBELLIONS

In the second half of the sixteenth century, many Mediterranean regions

were infested with bandits; Catalonia is a well-known example, and southern
Italy another. 1 Banditry was also common in Anatolia, but here it shaded off
into rebellion. The most successful bandit leaders, known as the Great Celalis,
crossed the peninsula from east to west, laid siege to major cities, and even
captured some of them 2 . By these campaigns, the commanders of irregular
troops attempted to obtain governorships for themselves and recognized
military status for their followers; in certain instances they even succeeded.
Throughout the seventeenth century, uprisings of this type recurred frequently.
Only now the leaders were not low-level military men as had been normal at
the end of the sixteenth century, but established provincial governors who
rebelled in order to stay in office. Or else these governors engaged in power
struggles with the janissaries, who were profoundly entrenched in Istanbul
politics. Down to the very end of the seventeenth century the Ottoman central
government was kept busy putting down military rebellions. In the last
quarter of the seventeenth century, at a time of major foreign war, the rebels
were again mercenaries attempting to achieve recognition as regular,
permanently employed soldie rs, and the central administration mobilized local
militias to defeat them3.

Thus irregular soldiers, mercenaries hired by provincial governors and

their underlings played a key role in Ottoman and particularly Anatolian
politics between about 1580 and 1700. There has been some discussion about
the timing of and reasons for mercenary ascendancy in the Ottoman Empire.
One researcher has suggested that the uprisings of medrese students which
punctuated the 1570's and I580's should be regarded as part of the same
complex 4 . He also assumes .hat mercenaries first came into their own in the
campaigns which Kanuni Stiieyman's sons waged against one another as they
struggled for the succession to the ageing monarch 5 . However it seems that
medrese students never were able to muster enough strength to seriously
threaten the political establishment, even though their movements caused the

'BrandeJ (1966), vol. 2, pp. 83-94.

2 A k d a g (1963).
3 inalcik (1980).
4 A k d a g (1963), pp. 85-108.
5 A k d a g (1963), pp. 78-79.
126 (OPING WITH THE STATE

Ottoman ccntral administration much concern. The latter probably was

motivated less by a possible military threat than by the fact that student
rebelliousness indicated disaffection within the ulema hierarchy, one of the
pillars of the Ottoman state. For this reason, the medrese uprisings in my
view do not form part of the Celali rebellions proper, even though they
contributed to the climate of insecurity characteristic of this period. Moreover
during the lifetime of Siileyman the Lawgiver, the banditry of the princes'
mercenaries remained just that, and apparently did not develop into rebellions
independent of the princes' political aims. So 1 would suggest we begin the
period of rebellious mercenaries in the 1580's, perhaps with 1584, when a
campaign of repression against the medrese students resulted in generalized
violence all over Anatolia 1 .

Even more problematic is the question at what time the age of

mercenary rebellions came to an end. I would suggest that this happened
around 1700, during the reconstruction period following the end of the
Hapsburg-Ottoman war. At this time the Ottoman central administration made
a valiant attempt to contain banditry and ensure the safety of the roads 2 . But
our knowledge of Anatolian history in the early eighteenth century being what
it is, this is no more than a suggestion. Previous authors dealing with the
Celalis have ended their accounts in 1603, when the rebellions had reached a
culmination point, or else with the victory of Grand Vizier Kuyucu Murad
Pa§a over the rebels in 1608 3 . The links of the Celali rebellions to later
mercenary uprisings Iherefore remained outside their purview. But today the
Celali rebellions appear to be merely a stage in a much more long-term
process, and it is quite possible that further research will make us extend the
period of mercenary rebellions by yet a few decades into the eighteenth
century.

Concerning the reasons why there were so many mercenaries seeking

admission into the Ottoman ruling establishment, there are at present two
rival explanations. The older one, propounded by the late Mustafa Akdag,
claimed that politically induced pressure on scarce resources forced many
young peasants to remain single, and these unattached young men were
inclined to take to the roads either as wandering medrese students or as
mercenaries 4 . This explanation is not without difficulty, as it presupposes
widespread population pressure. But there is little evidence for such pressure
in sixteenth-centurj Anatolia, even though in a few urbanized and

' A k d a g (1963). p. 12511

2
O r h o n l u (1967), p. 73.
3
A k d a g (1963): Griswok! 11983).
4
A k d a g ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p . 47.
 SEEKING WISDOM IN CHINA 127

commercialized areas such as Rum or Aydin, there existed the beginnings of a

trend in this direction 1 .

Another school of thought holds that the 'pull' rather than the 'push'
factor was decisive when young peasants took to the roads. Life in the city or
in the army was perceived as less harsh than unremitting toil on the land in a
difficult and insecure environment, and the peasant wishing to leave his
village easily found employment elsewhere 2 . Thus banditry and rebellions of
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries should not be regarded as
peasant rebellions, for the rebels were mercenaries with no desire whatsoever
to return to the village 3 . In the eyes of scholars adhering to this second model,
the uprisings of this period were not connected with the villagers' discontents.
Or at best the connection was indirect, as peasants were forced to fortify their
villages and establish local mi itias to guard against predatory mercenaries,
former peasants who had left the countryside a few years previously.

ANTAGONISM BETWEEN TAXPAYERS AND

REVENUE COLLECTORS

Now it is certainly true that many Anatolian peasants possessed

alternatives to rebellion. Geographical mobility was great, given vast
expanses of low-density settlement 4 . Migration among villagers and even
townsmen was widespread. This doubtlessly served as a safety valve, for as we
know from rural history the world over, peasants will not rebel as long as
other, less risky alternatives are available.

However, I think that we should look not only at alternatives open to

disaffected villagers, but also at probable reasons for peasant discontent. I
would suggest that high rates of taxation in a none-too productive agricultural
environment constituted the principal problem. Confrontations between
peasants and revenue takers were widespread, and the latter had the force of a
highly organized early-modern state behind them 5 . This does not make the
Celali rebellions into peasant movements, for by the conventional definition,
peasant rebellions are directed against landowners, and the latter, while not
altogether inexistent, were not a major force in Anatolia during this period. 6
Quarrels over taxation however caused many peasants to seek an alternative

' C o o k (1972), p. 44; Ronald Jennings, Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the
Mediterranean World, 1571-1640, New York, 1993, p. 221.
Inaicik (1980), for background information compare Islamoglu-Inan (1991), pp. 43-45.
3
A k d a g (1963), p. 250.
4
Faroqhi (1984), pp. 267-287.
5
Faroqhi (1986).
^Tilly (1981), pp. 109-112.
128 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

livelihood as soldiers or t o w n s m e n ; at the height of the Celali rebellions,

excessive revenue d e m a n d s induced m a n y villagers to try keeping the
governors and their men as far away as possible from their settlements. 1 In the
kadi registers of the time, we possess a vivid record of these disputes, in
which violence was a prominent feature. 2 I would agree with those scholars
w h o see the reason for the Celali rebellions not in d e m o g r a p h i c but in
political factors. After all, it was a political fact that many peasants found it
difficult to feed their families, because of the loss of resources which they paid
in taxes and dues to the governing class. 3

N A T U R A L C A T A S T R O P H E A N D H U M A N A G E N C Y

Recently a number of scholars dealing with this period have suggested

climatic factors as the or at least a major reason behind the Celali rebellions 4 .
Bad harvests due lo the onset of the seventeenth ccntury 'Little Ice Age' are
regarded as the motive that prompted peasants to leave their villages. For the
1590's, this assertion has some validity, at least in the short run, for we know
that during this decade, the entire Mediterranean region was overwhelmed by
harvest failures. Bui at present w e do not possess any solid information on
climatic change in the Eastern Mediterannean during the early modern period. 5
Moreover we know that the 'Little Ice Age' in Europe was marked by cool
rainy summers and cold winters 6 . A shortening of the growing season could
be calamitous in Russia or S w e d e n , where it prevented the grain f r o m
ripening. An excess of rain produced major harvest deficits in Western Europe,
where the grain might rot before it was ready to be harvested. But in Anatolia
wheat ripens earl> in the year, so that a growing season shortened by a few
days or even weeks does not endanger the harvest, and moreover rain is an
advantage and not a disadvantage to the cultivator. This should not be taken to
mean that Anatolia experienced n o bad harvests d u r i n g the seventeenth
century. But at present we possess neither rainfall data nor serial evidence
about good and bad harvests, and it is a very dubious procedure to explain one
unknown through another. 7

' A k d a g ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 171 I n a l c i k 11965), F a r o q h i ( 1 9 9 2 ) .

2
Faroqhi (1986).
3
F o r e a r l y m o d e r n F r a n c e , t h i s p o i n t is w e l l m a d e by T i l l y ( 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 1 1 4 f f . 1 t h i n k t h a t it is
e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e t o the O t t o m a n E m p i r e of the 16th a n d 17th c e n t u r i e s .
4
G r i s w o l d ( 1 9 8 3 ) , p p . 2 3 8 - 2 4 0 ; G e r b e r ( 1 9 8 8 ) , p. 132IÏ.
5
P e t e r K u n i h o l m ' s w o r k in p r o g r e s s on A n a t o l i a n d e n d r o c h r o n o l o g y u l t i m a t e l y s h o u l d p r o d u c e
s o m e i n f o r m a t i o n on c l i m a t i c f l u c t u a t i o n d u r i n g the 16th a n d 17th c e n t u r i e s .
6
L e Roy L a d u r i e ( 1 9 8 3 ! . vol. 1, p. 157ff.
7
S o m e i n f o r m a t i o n o n I: te 16th c e n t u r y h a r v e s t f a i l u r e , c u l l c d f r o m the M i i h i m m e R e g i s t e r s ,
c a n be f o u n d in G i i ç e r 11 364), pp. 3 - 1 2 .
 SEEKING WISDOM IN CHINA 129

But even if we had better evidence on climatic deterioration, it would

still be a good idea to keep in rnind the discussions among European medieval
historians concerning the effects of natural calamities, be they climatic
disasters or plague epidemics. Guy Bois has shown that population in
fifteenth-century Normandy declined to its nadir not at the time of the worst
plague epidemics, but considerably later, and he has explained this
phenomenon by the wars among revenue takers who were forced to share a
steadily diminishing amount of revenue.' Now it is very likely that wars were
also responsible for the economic crisis observed in Anatolia during the first
half of the seventeenth century. 2 In any event, the wars are there for everyone
to see, whiile we still need to prove the special frequency of climate-induced
harvest failures after about 1600. I would suggest that no sustained climatic
crisis was needed to send populations and revenue on a downward spiral. Even
a comparatively short-term cr sis, probably at the end of the sixteenth century,
could have done the trick, given the multitude of revenue takers competing for
peasant taxes. 3

SLICING UP A DIMINISHING CAKE

At first glance, we might assume that in a centralized state such as the

Ottoman, peasants were better protected from this kind of competition among
revenue takers than in early fifteenth-century France, with its myriad
seigneurs, and two kings battling for supremacy. But in the second half of the
sixteenth century, Ottoman Anatolia also had its fair share of competing
revenue takers. The central administration was at this time hard-pressed by war
at the Hapsburg and Iranian fronts, and increasingly demanded that provincial
governors finance their own administrations. 4 Therefore these dignitaries, who
often paid substantial sums to the central treasury in order to secure
appointment, and remained in any given post for only short periods of time,
came to compete for taxes on crops which could be harvested only once a year.
Confusion about rights to revenue often resulted from the fact that a governor
took up a new post before he had collected the dues accruing to him in his
previous assignment, so that the outgoing governor's local representative was
still in the process of collecting back taxes while his successor already staked

^Bois (1976). pp. 359-365.

2
O n the destruction resulting from the first phase of the Celali rebellions, see A k d a e (1963) pd
1F
250-257. '
This argument has been constructed as an analogy to a point made by ecologists: If a short-
term drought wipes out a plant which needs a specific amount of precipitation, and no seeds
survive, the plant will disappear permanently f r o m the environment in question, even if rainfall
later returns to normal.
4
K u n t (1981), p. 27 contains an account of the — by 16th century standards - enormous
financial resources of a 17th century governor.
130 ' OPING WITH THE ST ATK

out claims of his own. 1 Moreover many provincial appointments were made
for hard cash, and it happened quite often that two persons were granted one
and the same position. All this competiton among revenue takers generated
enormous pressure on the peasantry.

A CHINESE ANALOGY

At the same time, the a m o u n t of revenue available for distribution

among the various revenue collectors dwindled dramatically, as peasants
abandoned their villages, and quite a few harvests were lost due to political
disturbances. This downward spiral increased competition between revenue
collectors both legal and illegal, and corresponds well to the French processes
analyzed by Guy Bois. However, the closest analogy to the Celali rebellions
which I have been able to uncover to date is found not in Western Europe, but
in China between the; fall of the Qing ( M a n c h u ) dynasty in 1911 and the
success of the Communist revolution in I949. 2

Not being a historian of China, I cannot offer a well-argued explanation

for this extraordinary correspondence, although I would guess that it was the
result of political crisis in large-scale empires based on agricultural taxation
and control of long distance trade routes. Both empires possessed highly
developed and intricately structured bureaucracies at the central level, while
local administration was in the hands of much less specialized officials: timar-
holders, kadis and t a \ farmers in the Ottoman case, gentry in the Chinese. In
both cases, entry into the state apparatus was not exclusively a matter of
birth, and could become an aspiration for ambitious c o m m o n e r s . Many other
factors must have been relevant as well. Hopefully the rough-and-ready
observations made in this article will stimulate more specialized research.

Historians who remember Marc Bloch's reflection on the comparative

method in history will feel uncomfortable with the present proceeding, as the
comparative method is regarded as most fruitful in the case of societies whose
social structures resemble one another. Bloch himself has done much of his
comparative work on medieval England and France. 3 When the social and
political structures in question arc too dissimilar, we are always in danger of
comparing phenomena which even though they superficially resemble one
another, have totally different roles to play in the respective systems of which
they form a part. Rather than attempting a comparison, I will therefore limit

' p a r o q h i (1988).
^ B i l l i n g s l e y ( 1 9 8 8 ) h a s been m y principal s o u r c e .
3
B I o c h ( 1 9 6 7 ) . I a m i n d e b t e d to the c r i t i c i s m of E n g i n A k a r l i (St. L o u i s M i s s o u r i ) f o r an e a r l i e r
d r a f t of t h i s p a p e r , a n d h o p e t h a t l a t e r r e s e a r c h w i l l y i e l d a n e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e s u r p r i s i n g
a n a l o g i e s b e t w e e n early I 'th c e n t u r y A n a t o l i a n a n d e a r l y 2 0 t h c e n t u r y C h i n e s e b a n d i t s .
 SEEKING WISDOM IN CHINA 131

myself to the 'importation' of a model developed by historians of eighteenth to

twentieth-century China, where sources are comparatively abundant, to the
sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire. In the latter case, w e possess f e w sources,
which moreover reflect o n l y a single point of v i e w , namely that of non-
rebelling members of the Ottoman political class. After all, the importation of
historical paradigms, usually from Europe, has a long history in Ottoman
studies. I hope that this procedure will aid us in making sense of the still
fairly obscure history of the Celali uprisings.

On the Chinese scene as described by Phil Billingsley, w e find almost

every feature that ever c a m e up in d i s c u s s i o n s of the Celali rebellions.
Population expansion since the eighteenth century had created a surplus of
landless young men unable to marry; this inability, putative in the Anatolian
case, was quite real in China since female infanticide was widespread. The
natural catastrophes postulated by recent historians of the Celali rebellions are
again well-documented in twentieth-century China, with its droughts, floods
and wholesale changes of river courses. 1 At the same time, w e also find the
features w h i c h figure s o prominently in the explanation of the Celali
rebellions currently in favour. Military commanders raised armies and waged
war against one another. Armies consisted of young peasants uprooted from
the soil, w h o were rarely paid and miserably fed (if at all). Many deserted and
joined the brigands; this kind of recruitment was particularly important as
deserters p o s s e s s e d arms and a certain amount of military experience.
However, a brigand's life was at least as insecure as that of a soldier, and a
captured bandit was liable to be executed. Therefore Chinese bandits, just like
Ottoman freelance mercenaries of the seventeenth century, tried with all their
might to get accepted into the armed forces, the rank and file as soldiers, and
commanders as commissioned officers. However former bandits turned soldiers
were anything but secure within the regular army, being liable to severe
punishment: in the event of even slight misfortune on the battlefield. Therefore
renewed desertion easily mighi. start the cycle all over again. 2

Seen from the peasants' point of view, w e also find s o m e remarkable

parallels. Anatolian villagers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
defended themselves against brigands by setting up militias known as the ¡7
erleri? In case the Ottoman government ordered a 'general mobilization'
(.nefir-i dm) against rebellious mercenaries or brigands, the actual fighting was
the responsibility of village militias. 4 However, certain village militias turned
to banditry themselves, and a glance at the situation in North China can help

1
Perry (1980) largely builds her explanation of banditry upon ecological factors. See also
Billingsley (1988), p. 78.
^Billingsley (1988), pp. 150-215.
3
A k d a g (1963), p. 61.
4
l n a l c i k (1980), pp. 301-311.
132 ( ' ( » F I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

us understand this d e v e l o p m e n t . In times of scarcity, and particularly in

regions frequently affected by natural disasters, predatory behaviour was the
most appropriate means of survival, and in such cases, banditry might be
taken up by whole communities. 1 In certain Manchurian villages during the
first half of the twentielh century, banditry was regarded as a kind of service to
the community, and young villagers were obliged to participate, regardless of
their own preferences. W e know almost nothing about the functioning of the
Anatolian il erleri. but they may have worked out things in a manner
reminiscent of their Chinese counterparts.

Another f e a t u r e by which the Anatolian countryside of the Celali

rebellions reminds us of nineteenth and early twentieth-century China is the
omnipresence of rural fortifications. In the seventeenth century, a provincial
governor under orders from Sultan Murad IV destroyed more than a hundred
such fortifications in the small and sparsely settled subprovince of Kir§ehir
alone. S o m e of these forts were held by villagers and served a defensive
purpose, but in certain instances, bandits took over and used the fort as a
starting point f o r their raids, a p h e n o m e n o n not unknown in North China
either. But as far as 1 can tell, the whole institution of the village fort (in
China several villages might band together to establish one) was all but
unknown in early modern Europe. 2

In m a n y regions the world over, banditry is a phenomenon

characteristic of peripheral areas. Frontiers between states c o m e to m i n e
immediately, but in China, provincial borders were equally dangerous. Several
scholars have dwelt on the irregularly shaped and therefore particularly bandit
prone border area between the provinces of Shandong, An-hvei, Kvantung and
H o n a n . 3 In the O t t o m a n Rmpire and its successor states of Greece and
Bulgaria, border banditry equally was widespread and has been set up as a
model for Balkan banditry as a whole. 4 In Balkan banditry, peasants played a
subsidiary role at best; the key figures were shepherds, often transhumants and
sometimes nomads. However border banditry is of limited help when we try to
explain conditions prevailing in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Anatolia, al
least in the western and central parts of the peninsula. 5 Local administrative
boundaries certain!} inhibited pursuit in the Anatolian setting as well, and
higher officials, w h o s e holdings were endowed with a kind of immunity
(serbest timar) possessed a reputation for sheltering brigands. But borders

' P e r r y ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Billingsle> ( 1988), p. 17.

Z
F a r o q h i ( 1 9 8 4 ) , p. 2 7 3 ; R i l l i n g s l e y ( 1 9 8 8 ) , p. 188.
3
P e r r y ( 1 9 8 0 ) , B i l i i n g s l e y 11988), p p . 18-19.
4
A S f a r as t h e B a l k a n s are c o n c e r n e d , A d a n i r ( 1 9 8 2 ) h a s p r o p o s e d a c o n v i n c i n g a l t e r n a t i v e to
H o b s b a w n ( 1 9 6 9 , r e p u b l . 1981). S e e a l s o K o l i o p o u l o s ( 1 9 8 7 ) .
5
F o r the s e m i - i n d e p e n d e m p r i n c i p a l i t i e s of e a s t e r n A n a t o l i a , w h e r e b r i g a n d a g e w a s a m a j e r
f e a t u r e , c o m p a r e V a n B r u i n e s s e n ( 1 9 8 9 ) . pp. 1 9 0 - 2 4 4 .
 S E E K I N G W I S D O M IN C H I N A 133

were a minor contributing factor at best. In sixteenth and seventeenth-century

Anatolia they were not nearly as important as they were to become in
nineteenth and twentieth-century Thessaly or Macedonia, where shepherd-
bandits were instrumentalized by succeeding Greek governments in order to
prise away territories from the Ottoman Empire.

F R O M R O B B E R B A N D TO B A N D I T A R M Y

While bandits of the Greek highlands were a product of these specific

frontier conditions and did not usually operate very far from their native
habitats, the Anatolian brigand chiefs who became famous in the course of the
Celali rebellions ranged much more widely. Kalenderoglu besieged Ankara,
capturing the lower part of the town, and occupied Bursa. He finally fell from
power after losing a battle in the vicinity of Mara?. 1 Other bandit chiefs could
boast comparable itineraries and their achievements were surpassed only by the
marches undertaken by Chinese bandit-rebels such as Bai Lang, (1911-1914),
who took an army of thousands through the provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu,
in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to secure a new base of operations in
S i c h u a n . 2 In his work on Chinese bandits of the Republican period,
Billingsley has given an impressive account of what happened when gangs
stopped operating from their home villages. Once dissociated from these
bases, predators no longer were tied by the rule that 'no rabbit eats the grass
outside its own burrow', that is, they were no longer obliged to conform to
the expectations of their fellow villagers that they rob from the rich to succour
the poor. These rules had restrained the behaviour of many bandits, since a
gang with a limited radius of operations was easily betrayed once it made too
many enemies on its home tcritory. 3 However in the 1920's and 1930's large
bands formed, and these bandit armies, which consisted of robbers and/or
deserters, increasingly tried to obtain integration into the regular army. In this
case bandits' bargaining power increased with the amount of havoc they
wrought, since widespread cestruction jeopardized future taxes. The more
destructive a band, the greater the likelihood that the authorities would try to
neutralize it by assigning i: an official role. Moreover the members of
militarized bands generally had lost interest in a return to normal village life,
an aspiration common among locally-based gangs. This fact also tended to
increase the soldier-bandits' brutality vis a vis peasants and their propensity to
destroy houses and crops.

'Griswold (1983), pp. 136-137, 178, 187.

^Billingsley (1988), pp. 183-186.
3
Billingsley (1988), pp. 205-215, but compare also Hobsbawm (1969, republ. 1981), p. 46ff.
 134 C () P I N G W I T H T H H S T A T E

Militarized bandit gangs were likely to attack walled towns and cities,
while village-based brigands operated exclusively in the open countryside. The
commanders of militarized gangs aimed at getting a rapid response out of the
central government. As the capture and plundering of an important town or
city caused a much greater scandal than depredations in the country, attacking
major settlements was more adequate to their purposes. Moreover militarized
bands, even if of limited strength, stood a much better chance of success in
such an undertaking than village-based ones. For even if their armaments were
not well adapted to the siege of fortified towns, soldier-bandits often found it
easy to make contact with the garrisons or other inhabitants of the towns they
wished to take. Quite frequently bandits were let into a city by the very
soldiers whose o f f i c e it was to defend it. At the s a m e time, a strategy
involving the occupation of major towns and cities meant that the bandits
needed to form larger gangs and adopt a more highly developed military
organization. G r o w i n g militarization m a d e possible a m o r e a m b i t i o u s
strategy, while such a strategy demanded increased militarization. 1

These observations sound rather like a déjà vu to any historian familiar

with the Celali rebellions. In the Anatolian case as well, w e are confronted
with two levels of banditry. 'Ordinary' attacks on caravans and villages were
often perpetrated by nomads, semi-nomads and locally based gangs, although
even caravan robbers without visible 'political' aims s o m e t i m e s built up
effective organization on the regional level. 2 But in the years before and after
1600, the 'Great Celali' chiefs such as Kalenderoglu, Cennetoglu and tutti
quanti developed activities and ambitions that far surpassed this level. 3 A t a
certain stage in their rebellions the leaders of these bands were willing to
accept legitimation b j incorporation into the Ottoman army. Sources arc too
sparse for us to determine whether this had been their aim f r o m the beginning.
B u t the political a m b i t i o n s of such men must have been a p p a r e n t to
contemporaries, or else certain Ottoman historians would not have claimed
that the rebel Kara Yazici intended to set up an independent principality. 4
Whether the accusation was true or not is irrelevant in the present context. But
it could only be made if the Celali leader in question was not content with the
status of an 'ordinary' bandit, and like his t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y Chinese
counterparts, attempted to legitimize his position by forcing his way into the
military apparatus of the Ottoman state, or possibly into that of some other
state, as yet to be foundt d.

® Billingsley ( 1 9 8 8 ) , p. 2 0 6 .
2
F a r o q h i ( 1 9 8 4 ) , p. 6 7 f f .
3
A k d a g ( 1 9 6 3 ) , pp. 1 9 0 - 2 4 3 . * i r i s w o l d ( 1 9 8 3 ) , passim.
4
A k d a g ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p p . 2 4 5 - 2 4 6 ; G r i s w o l d ( 1 9 8 3 ) , p. 1 2 0 f . A k d a g d o e s n o t b e l i e v e t h a t t h e s e
i n t e n t i o n s , if they e v e r e x i s t e d , s h o u l d be t a k e n s e r i o u s l y .
 S E E K I N G W I S D O M IN C H I N A 135

If Chinese soldier-bandits improved their bargaining position by

wreaking as much destruction as they could, it seems reasonable to test the
presence of this motif in late sixteenth and early seventeenth-century Ottoman
Anatolia as well. That destruction was in fact extensive is documented in
many different records concerning a variety of regions. Trade declined so
steeply that in Konya, the administrative centre of the province of Karaman,
the covered market was permitted to fall in ruins, while Amasya and Kayseri
lost half their inhabitants between 1580 and 1640. In the plain south of
Konya, many villages which had been prosperous and well-populated at the
time of the last Karaman tax register (1583) were no more than abandoned
sites at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Only villages located in hilly
regions, where opportunities for defence were better, managed to survive. 1 It is
generally assumed that this pattern of differential shrinkage was caused by the
depredations of brigands and tax collectors alike. The extensive migrations of
people who in the recent past had been settled peasants — (and not nomad
herdsmen) also constitute indirect but significant evidence of rural devastation.
People from Divrigi settled in northwestern Anatolia, only a few kilometres
from Istanbul, while villagers from the Kemah area fled to the capital itself, to
say nothing of Christians from the Trabzon district escaping to the Crimea. 2
Recent researchers have perhaps spent too much time and energy explaining
that the Celali rebellions were not peasant uprisings, and have neglected to
point out how widespread was rural destruction. Once the rebellions were well
under way, bandit attacks and ruined villages were major reasons why young
peasants attempted to escape and become soldiers.

In addition, attacks oil walled cities were quite often undertaken by

Celali leaders. During the closing years of the sixteenth century, Ankara was
one of Anatolia's major urban centres, and supported a prosperous mohair
industry. 3 This wealth may have tempted Celali chiefs, and after two attacks
in which the lower city was devastated, wealthy residents took the initiative to
build a wall surrounding t h ; entire built-up area, which was not at all a
common feature among Ottoman cities. This wall was still in place a century
later. 4 But smaller towns without the resources needed for such an undertaking
suffered even worse; as an exemple, one might mention Tosya, whose covered
market was sacked. The danger that people within the city might betray its
defences to a passing Celali band was taken seriously in the sixteenth-century
Ottoman Empire as well, and to guard against such an eventuality, the
inhabitants of Istanbul were requested to stand surety for one other's
behaviour. 5

'.Jennings (1976); Faroqhi (1984), p. 27; Hutteroth (1968), pp. 184-185.

Z
Andreasyan (1976).
3
E r g e n ? (1975).
^ C o m p a r e the often reproduced engiaving from Pitton de Tournefort (1718).
5
Griswold (1983), p. 179.
136 (OPING W IT H T H E STA T E

Thus the second stage of banditry can be observed both in late sixteenth
and early seventeenth-century Anatolia and in China during the first half of the
twentieth century. Warfare became general and bands could now operate
without a p e r m a n e n t base in a rural area. T h i s parallel strengthens
Billingsley's claim that increasing militarization, attacks upon 'difficult'
targets such as walled cities, steadily increasing levels of destruction,
loosening of brigands' ties with their home bases, and a search for political
legitimation go together. 1 The identification of such a complex is particularly
valuable to the Ottoman historian, as recent work on military rebellion
identifies the mercenaries' search for political legitimization (i.e., their desire
to be incorporated into the regular army) as the central feature of these
uprisings. 2 I would therefore suggest that Billingsley's 'soldier-bandit' model
is applicable to the Celali uprisings as well.

INTKGRATION WITHIN A CELALI BAND:

WHY NO COSSACKS APPEARED IN ANATOLIA

It was always a critical stage in the history of a robber band when it

attempted to make the transition from the 'localized' stage to that of the 'bandit
army', incorporating armed men in their thousands and occasionally tens of
thousands. The major Celali chiefs of the period around 1600 must have made
this transition o l t e a e n o u g h , while the rebellious pashas of the later
seventeenth centurv at times controlled ready-made armies and thus were spared
s o m e of the problems involved in forming a cohesive unit out of distinct
bands. 3 However e\ en certain provincial governors must have experienced the
problem, since we know that some of them hired a large number of bands ori a
short-term basis. Integrating these separate units into an army devoted to the
interests of the employing pasha cannot have been an easy task. 4

From the literature on non-Ottoman bandits, two possible models of

band integration suggest themselves. The first of these can be derived f r o m a
recent study of sixteenth century Cossack rebellions. Here we are confronted
with bands of men who fled the central Polish territories with their rigid social
structure to take up a roving life in the thinly settled Ukranian borderlands,
where they spent some of their time fighting the Tatars and raiding Ottoman
t o w n s and villages along the Black Sea littoral. 5 M a n y C o s s a c k c h i e f s
belonged to the Polish gentry, who because of impoverishment or personal

' B i l l i n g s l e y ( 1 9 8 8 ) p. 1 9 , - 1 9 6 , 2 0 5 - 2 1 5 .
2
i n a l c i k ( 1 9 8 0 ) , p. 2 9 7 f t '
3
l n a l c i k ( 1 9 8 0 ) , p. 29511, K u n t ( 1981).
4
K u n t ( 1 9 8 1 ) . It is p r o b a b l e t h a t the w o r k of i n t e g r a t i o n w a s a c h i e v e d b e f o r e the r e b e l l i o n
began.
5
S t o k l ( 1 9 5 3 ) a n d G o r d o n ( 1983), p. 6 I f f .
 S E E K I N G W I S D O M IN C H I N A 137

disputes had chosen to live in the borderlands, and aimed at becoming landed
proprietors. T o achieve this, they assembled bands o f mercenaries around
them. B u t since in a thinly settled territory a chief was nothing without his
men, the latter retained considerable decision-making power; a contract for
mercenary service in principle had to be acceptable to the men as well as to
their commanders. 1 In the long run, tensions developed between leaders and
followers; for as the Ukranian borderlands became more densely settled, leaders
turned into serf-holding gentry, a limited elite o f registered Cossacks into
mercenaries officially recognized as such, while the remaining band members
were pushed back into serfdom. 2

From the peasants' point of view however, it seems to have scarcely

mattered that most Cossack leaders were unsympathetic to their aspirations,
and if they had any political views at all, were concerned about the privileges
o f the Cossacks in the narrowest sense of the term. O n c e a major Cossack
rebellion was underway, whic h under the prevailing conditions could only be
directed against a magnate arid major serf-holder, large numbers o f peasants
swelled the ranks o f the rebelling Cossacks. F o r the latter, making use o f
these peasants necessitated a rethinking of their entire military strategy. Large
peasant-Cossack armies could no longer 'melt away' after a defeat as the
original Cossack units had be<;n accustomed to do, and peasants who joined a
rebellion on the spur of the moment lacked the military skills of professional
soldiers. 3 Y e t peasant armies lad potential strengths as well as weaknesses, as
is known to students of twentieth-century rural revolutions. 4 But at least in
the sixteenth century these strengths were not exploited, and most Cossack
leaders saw their peasant adherents as a liability pure and simple, to be
sloughed o f f as soon as an opportunity presented itself.

Even though sixteenth century rural Anatolia was in turmoil, with

young peasants joining the bandits or else local militias for the defence of
their villages, we do not observe the 'dragnet' effect characteristic of late
sixteenth-century Cossack rebellions. B y contrast, the c o a l e s c i n g of pre-
existing bands into bandit armies seems to have been the dominant mode in
Anatolia. 'LJnmilitarized' Anatolian peasants probably stayed away from the
Celali bands because they were not threatened by an immediate loss of legal
status as were their Ukranian counterparts. Therefore Anatolian peasants did
not need to gamble for 'total victory' as Ukranians did, albeit without lasting
s u c c e s s . 5 Moreover Anatolian peasants were not confronted with a 'closing
of the frontier'; if anything, the crisis years around 1600 resulted in population

l
Gordon (1983), p. 86.
^Gordon (1983), p. 89ff.
^Gordon (1983), p. 182ff.
4 W o l f ( 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 294ff.
•'Gordon (1983), p. 182.
 138 i () P I N G W I T H THK STAT E

decline, making life styles normally characteristic of the frontier prevalent in

the interior as well. 1

This situation may explain why in those cases in which we can deduce
or guess where the sympathies of Anatolian peasants lay, the latter did not
regard the bandits as their champions. When peasants had any opportunity lo
express their opinions, they appear to have regarded both the mercenaries of
the pashas and the independent Celali bands as threatening their precarious
livelihoods, as potential disasters, to be kept away f r o m the village if at all
possible. 2 However to a certain extent, this impression may be due to a bias
in our sources. W e possess almost no evidence on the Celalis that is not more
or less official. At least as long as the latter had not been pacified and sent off
to the frontiers to fight the infidel, they were regarded as the enemies of the
Ottoman state, and ordinary people would scarcely voice their sympathies for
these bandit rebels when talking to officials. But in its turn, this argument :s
only valid to a limited extent. Villagers might be intimidated by the
depredations committed by provincial governors and their retinues, but this did
not mean that they were too frightened to complain. Quite to the contrary,
they frequently denounced rapacious governors and their mercenaries to the
Sultan's Council. 3 Thus it is probable that Ottoman d o c u m e n t s sometimes
reflect provincial reality more faithfully than their official character might lead
one to expect, and if there had been widespread village sympathy for the
Celalis, this feeling probably would have been reflected in at least a limited
number of the surviving texts.

A FURTHER MODEL OF BAND FORMATION

Rather than attracting large n u m b e r s of p r e v i o u s l y unorganized

peasants, a band ma\ grow into a 'bandit army' by attracting other bands into
its orbit. Particular!) after succeeding in a major c o u p , the prestige of a
f a m o u s leader often causes less successful bandit c h i e f s to o f f e r their
submission and services. 4 These offers arc frequently welcome, at least until
the band reaches a critical size and needs to change its strategy, turning f r o m a
gang into a bandit i rmy. But when forced to abandon his home base, a
h i t h e r t o successful leader may well h a v e second t h o u g h t s a b o u t the
advisability of such a course, and be wary of accepting new supporters. When
separate gangs join to f o r m an army, individual bands retain a d e g r e e
of separate identity, formerly independent leaders coming to act as subchiefs.

' A k d a g ( 1 9 6 3 ) , pp. 2 5 0 1:<1.

2
Faroqhi (1992).
3
Faroqhi (1992).
4
B i l l i n g s l e y ( 1 9 8 8 ) , p. I.-I .
 S E E K I N G W I S D O M IN C H I N A 139

These separate identities of the original gangs may well cause serious
difficulties to the paramount chief, for when a band runs into trouble,
subchiefs may well decide to abandon their leader. Or else a provincial
governor or general in charge of bandit suppression may take it upon himself
to attract lower-level rebel chiefs by offering amnesties, integration into the
regular forces or money, if they are willing to capture or murder their leaders.
Since most bandit chiefs have limited political demands and no desire to
change the social order in which they operate, quite a few leaders have been
betrayed in this fashion, and with the death of the paramount chief, the bandit
army usually dissolves. 1

This model probably has some relevance to the Ottoman context as

well. Although the suppression strategies of the Ottoman state have been
little studied, we know that Celali chiefs sometimes were appointed to
positions of command in the army, usually on the Hapsburg frontiers, where
they were removed from their Anatolian (or in some cases, Syrian) power
bases. 2 It would be of interest to know which people were singled out for such
treatment, and only micro-level studies will show whether the Ottoman
administration ever attempted to dissolve the major bandit armies into their
component parts.

Large units need a hierarchy of command and formalized rules of

conduct iri order to function. In twentieth-century China certain bands produced
written rules of conduct by which band members were expected to abide,
complete with penalties for infringement. 3 Thus a 'model' code evolved, which
newly-formed bands might take over ready-made. This practice also reflects the
bureaucratic organization of Chinese society, as well as the twentieth-century
spread of literacy. By contrast, in the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire,
bureaucratization largely was limited to the upper echelons of government,
while bandits were probably all illiterate, and at times openly expressed their
hostility to the representatives of literate, town-based administration. Thus it
is unlikely that Celali bands had written rules, and as to the unwritten ones,
they remain unknown; for the Ottoman administration, the ail-but exclusive
source of our documentatioi, was quite indifferent to the details of Celali
mores and morale.

'Billingsley (1988), p. 101.

2
A k d a g (1963), p. 214, Griswold (1983), p. 152-153.
^Billingsley (1988), p. 114.
140 COPING WITH THE STATE

'SOLDIER BANDIT'S' OR REBELS WITHOUT

LEGITIMACY

In spite of the deficiency of the available sources, we still can try to

reconstruct the motivations of robbers and rebels, using scattered sentences
attributed to them in various official documents. This is a risky business,
because there is no guarantee that quotes attributed to bandits and rebels are
accurate; moreover the few words quoted and the equally few gestures which
have been described, invariably have been torn out of the context which alone
made them meaningful. But since the Celali and mercenary rebellions cannot
be understood without some idea of the principal actors' attitudes, even a
tentative account is better than none at all.

Remarkably enough, very few Celalis ever invoked heterodox religious

beliefs as a motivation for rebellion. 1 Yet in late sixteenth-century Anatolia,
many people, among both the nomads and the settled population , professed
heterodox religious beliefs and displayed remarkable loyality to the Safavid
cause. 2 The Safavid rulers were regarded by many Kizilba§ tribesmen as
religious leaders. Quite a few Anatolian Kizilba§ were even willing to risk
execution by accepting investiture with the insignia of the Safavi order, or
else a military confrontation with Ottoman state power when protecting
heterodox dervishes.' This lack of religious legitimization contrasts with the
Chinese 'sectarian upr isings', particularly the so-called White Lotus rebellions
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The latter demonstrate that a
coherent world view in which a positive value was placed upon rebellion,
delegitimizcd the ruling group both on a central and a provincial level 4
Peasants, rural craftsmen, members of the minorities and other people outside
of the Chinese ruling elite could claim a religious and political role within a
sectarian world view, which they would have had trouble justifying in a purely
secular context, without support from 'on high'.

Mustafa Akdag has studied cases in which religious beliefs were in fact
used to justify rebellion. The latter do not belong into the context of Kizilba§
and tribal uprisings, hut rather form part of the medrese students' rebellions. 5
Poor ulema in spe periodically left their studies to preach in villages, and the
alms collected on these tours enabled them to continue their preparations for
the religious career. However begging in groups easily shaded off into banditry
and even rebellion, p articularly since career prospects for provincial scholars
without influential family connections were rather bleak. At the same time the

' A k d a g ( 1 9 6 3 ) , pp. 2 4 3 2 4 4 : J a n s k v ( 1 9 6 4 ) .
2
A k d a g ( 1 9 6 3 ) , p. 119 m e n t i o n s this e v e n t in a f o o t n o t e .
3
S o h r w e i d e (1965): Imhei (1979).
4
N a q u i n (1981).
5
A k d a g ( l 9 6 3 ) , pp. 8 5 - l l M .
 SEEKING WISDOM IN CHINA 141

students could justify many of their activities in terms of religious practice.

After all, the acquisition of religious knowledge was considered an ornament
to any human being. Poor scholars possessed a legitimate claim upon the
community, quite apart from the fact that certain provincial judges, teachers
and foundation administrators may have come from similar backgrounds and
sympathized with the students. So in addition to the heterodox Kizilba§
religious legitimation, the Celali rebels were familiar with a 'mainstream'
Sunni variant of rebellious behaviour, since student-bandits were quite
widespread in late sixteenth-century Anatolia.

However the Celali rebels never took up this variety of religious

legitimation either. In one of tne very few instances in which captured bandits
or rebels supposedly speak about their motives, we find explicit hostility vis d
vis the religious establishment. 1 The leader of a bandit gang captured in the
Corum district some time before 1003/1594-95 was engaged in a feud with a
local kadi, and at least some of his more spectacular crimes can be attributed
to this dispute. Twice the banc its attacked the house of the kadi, killing one of
his servitors and robbing U s possesisons. But more significantly, the
attackers found the judge's 'Imam-i azam taci' — presumably this headgear,
named after the founder of ihe Hanefi law school, symbolized the kadi's
standing as a member of the ulema — and hacked it to pieces with their
swords. They also declared that if the kadi had been present in person, he
would have been treated in the same fashion. Hostility toward the world of the
ulema is also apparent from the behaviour of the band members just before
they were finally captured. The robbers had been tracked down by a band of
soldiers in the service of the Ottoman central administration, who invoked the
§eriat when they called for the bandits' surrender. The response was a
slighting reference to both the soldiers and the §eriat. This means that the
bandits were openly contemptuous of the religious establishment. Or else the
kadi whom they had attacked sought to make sure thay they were severely
punished, and had a highly-coloured account of the event inserted into the
register.

A single document of :his type does not permit broad generalization.

But still we can conclude that in late sixteenth-century Anatolia, three different
types of rebellion occurred side by side. Students rebelled to secure themselves
employment upon graduation, while soldiers of peasant background fought to
gain admittance to the privileged askeri. Persecution of Kizilba§ continued
intermittently, and it is not easy to say where their 'normal' religious practice
ended and rebellious activity began. 2 However the transformation of the
Safavid monarchy into a stabilized albeit Shi'i state under Shah Abbas made

' Faroqhi (1994), reprinted in the present volume.

2
Faroqhi (1984), p. 66.
142 (.'OPING WITH T HE STAT E

h e t e r o d o x Anatolian t r i b e s m e n seem less t h r e a t e n i n g to the Ottoman

government, as the Ki/.ilba§ tribes were marginalized by a growing central
bureaucracy in Isfahan. 1

Ottoman official policy toward Anatolian heretics changed f r o m whole-

sale eradication to an often grudging accommodation. Janissary sympathies for
certain heterodox laviyes and their s h e i k s p r o b a b l y facilitated this
a c c o m m o d a t i o n , while the s y m p a t h i e s of certain ulema f o r rebellious
medrese students encouraged revolts. 2 Uprisings with a religious legitimation
of whatever type became less frequent in Anatolia after about 1600, while the
rebellions of mercenaries and their battles against the regular soldiers, the kul,
apparently were not justified in religious terms.

On the other hand, religious disputes, with rebellion never very far
f r o m the surface, did occur in Istanbul throughout the seventeenth century.
Sultan Murad IV at times allied himself with the Kadizadeliler; the latter were
hostile against all practices for which there was no precedent either in the
Koran or the Sunna, and frequently c a m e to blows with the adherents of
dervish orders, whom they regarded as heretics. 3 T h e s e disagreements were
fought out in full public view and must have been as familiar to the irregular
soldiers of the seventeenth century as Kizilba§ or student rebellions had been
to their sixteenth-century predecessors. Yet we do not possess any evidence of
mercenary rebellions in which the ideological d i f f e r e n c e s between the
Kadizadeliler and their dervish competitors were taken up in any shape or
f o r m . T h e r e f o r e we can reasonably conclude that the mercenary soldiers
f o r m i n g the key element in Anatolian rebellions of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries did not seek for a religiously tinged ideology to justify
their uprisings. In this they differed not only f r o m t r i b e s m e n , medrese
s t u d e n t s and Istanbul t o w n s m e n , but also f r o m their main rivals the
janissaries, for whom tics both to the ulema and to the heterodox Bektashi
dervishes played a significant role. 4 If a legitimizing religious ideology
constituted a source of strength to rebellious commoners both in the Chinese
and Ottoman contexts, the deficiency of bandit rebels on this score to some
extent may explain why Ottoman bandit armies never mustered sufficient
adherents to overthrow the central government.

'Roemer (1985).
2
Akdag(1963), p. 117.
3
Golptnarli (1953), pp. KiOIT.; Zilfi (1986).
4
Uzuii9ar?ih (1943-44), \.i . I, pp. 148-150; Abou-EI-Haj (1984), pp. 27ff.
 S E E K I N G W I S D O M IN C H I N A 143

C O N C L U S I O N

Halil Inalcik has interpreted the seventeenth-century rebellions as

attempts on the part of Anatolian taxpayers to share in the privileges of the
Sultan's kul.x This bid for power was possible because the Ottoman state had
never been able to disarm the subject population, in spite of frequent attempts
to do so. Irregular soldiers of subject status could not hope to be elevated to
the regular corps unless they obtained political support in high places; thus
the rebellions also involved an attempt on the part of Ottoman irregulars to
gain a modicum of control over the political centre. Certain pashas were
willing to side with the mercenaries and represent the latter's interests in
Istanbul. 2 But as a working hypothesis I would assume that such alliances
were comparatively fragile. Most of the mercenaries were not permanently
stationed in the capital, which limited their capacity to put pressure on their
allies within the Ottoman establishment. In addition mercenaries did not
possess even a limited degree of political legitimacy. As a result, alliances
frequently had to be renegotiated, and this state of affairs added to the
instability of seventeenth and eighteenth-century Ottoman politics.

Ottoman mercenaries' inability to form stable alliances with other

groups of the population may be regarded as a corrollary to their lack of a
legitimizing ideology. In Ottoman society the political position of the Sultan
was dependent not only upon success in war, but also on his munificence as a
builder of mosques, schools and soup kitchens, as well as his success in
protecting Mecca pilgrims. 3 In this fashion the Ottoman rulers, who could not
claim descent from the Prophe t Muhammad or the conquerors of the Turco-
Tatar tradition, had managed to establish a solid foundation of legitimacy,
while guildsmen, Kizilba§ nomads and even janissaries developed their own
links to sacred figures. 4 In comparison the mercenaries were able to build only
a makeshift identity, which easily could be denounced as religiously and
politically illegitimate.

This lack of a special discourse legitimizing the claims of mercenaries

also may be connected with the fluidity of the latters' organization. Students
of medieval Islamic history have claimed that organizational links were weak
in all islamicate societies. Abbasid political tradition prevented the formation
of ties between local communities, and the religious law did not recognize the
existence of intermediate bodies between the individual Muslim, (at least in so
far as he was a male) and the community of believers as a whole. 5 Be that as

'inalcik (1980), pp. 297-298.

2
Inalcik (1980), pp. 298ff.
3
O n the larger issue of Ottoman legitimacy, see Islamoglu-inan (1987), pp. 18-21.
Fleischer (1986), pp. 272-292.
5
F o r a discussion of these views Lapidus (1967), pp. 1-8.
144 (OPING WITH IHK STATE

it may for the pre-Otioman period, in Ottoman times the ulema, dervishes,
craft guilds, and above all the privileged military and administrative officials
(kul) were organized in strong and often intricately structured corps, which
commanded the loyalties of their members in addition to promoting their
material interests. Here again we find the mercenaries recruited from the
subject population at a disadvantage. They possessed no recognized cursus
honorum as the ulema did, nor were they attached to long-lived institutions
such as mosques and other pious foundations, which the ulema administered
and from which they derived sustenance and prestige. These social ties, and not
merely the blandishments a Sultan or vizier could offer, explain the frequent
changes of heart to be observed in ulema who temporarily had thrown in their
lot with rebellious mercenaries. Nor did groups of mercenaries possess social
foci such as dervish lodges. Yet the latter were of great importance in the life
of the countryside, as they brought together peasants and nomads. Certain
dervishes ensured a flow of communication from the provinces to the central
government which was not necessarily controlled by provincial administrators,
and, last but not least, constituted a centre for the social life of the urban
leisure class. At best the mercenaries congregated in coffeehouses and taverns;
the consumption of alcoholic drinks often was regarded as a regrettable but
ineradicable habit of mercenaries, which further contributed to the tendency of
established Ottomans to regard the irregulars as "non-respectable" people. 1
Evliya Çelebi at times indicates his sympathies for the dramatic incidents and
sudden turns of fate which characterized the lives of mercenary commanders. 2
But their men, even though at times they shook the seventeenth-century
establishment to its foundations, were not considered worthy of similar
attention.

Even less could Ottoman irregulars claim affiliation with an ocak, this
originally military corps which by the eighteenth century, had turned into a
militia and permitted janissaries, canoniers, sappers and others a modest share
in the exercise of state power. Moreover the ocaks provided their members
with food and the unmarried among them with lodgings in the barracks.
Against payment of a fee, the ocaks even made sure that the heirs of a
deceased soldier or militiaman could collect his estate. 3 By contrast mercenary
bands were loosely structured, possessed leaders but no stable hierarchy, and
none of the privileges that made Ottoman artisans join the military corps in
their tens of thousands.

' Faroqhi (1992).

2
E v l i y a g e l e b i ( 1 3 1 4 / 1 8 9 6 9 7 to 1938) s e e p a r t i c u l a r l y v o l s . 2 a n d 3. M r s . J o y c e M a t t h e w s h a s
d e a l t with this issue in an u n p u b l i s h e d m a s t e r ' s t h e s i s , w h i c h I h a v e not s e e n .
3
l J z u n ? a r § i l i ( 1 9 4 3 - 4 4 ) . m . I. pp. 2 8 5 - 3 2 0 .
 SEEKING WISDOM IN CHINA 145

W e thus should regard the late sixteenth or seventeenth-century

Ottoman mercenaries as outsiders to settled society. They had left — or been
pushed out of — the v i l l a g e s and lost whatever security f a m i l y and
neighbourhood ties might give a countryman. But they had not managed to
enter any of the organizations that structured the lives of Ottoman townsmen,
to say nothing of the outer fringes of the state apparatus o c c u p i e d by
janissaries and other soldiers regarded as 'Servitors of the Porte'. Their frantic
struggle to enter the constituted corps, by m a s s i v e devastation of the
countryside if necessary, can be explained o n l y if ail the dangers of their
outcast position are taken into consideration.

This paper was drafted while at Washington University, St. Louis, on a

Rockefeller Grant. I thank Cornell Fleischer for his kind assistance.

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—, ( 1 9 8 0 ) . " M i l i t a n and Fiscal T r a n s f o r m a t i o n in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , 1600-
1700", Archivum Ottomanicum, VI, 2 8 3 - 3 3 7 .
i s l a t n o g l u - i n a n , Huri led.) ( 1 9 8 7 ) . The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy
( C a m b r i d g e , Paris C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press a n d M a i s o n d e s S c i e n c e s d e
l'Homme).
—, H u r i c i h a n ( 1 9 9 1 ) Osmanli imparatorlugunda Devlet ve Köylü (Istanbul:
íleti$im Y a y i n l i i n i .
J a n s k y , Herbert ( 1 9 6 4 ) . " Z e i t g e s c h i c h t l i c h e s in den Liedern des Bektaifi-Dichtcrs
Pir Sultan A b d a l " . Der Islam, 39, 130-142.
J e n n i n g s , Ronald ( u n p u b l i s h e d ) . " P o p u l a t i o n T r a n s f e r s and O t t o m a n Policy." T h i s
text is part of a larger m a n u s c r i p t on 16th-17th century O t t o m a n C y p r u s .
K o l i o p o u l o s , J o h n S (1987). Brigands with a Cause. Brigandage and Irredentism
in Modern Greer, 1821-1912 ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press).
 SEEKING WISDOM IN CHINA 147

Kunt, I. Metin (1981). Bir Osmanli Valisinin Gelir-Gideri, Diyarbekir 1670-71

(Istanbul: Bogaziçi Üniversitesi).
Lapidus, Isa M. (1967). Muslim Cities in the later Middle Ages (Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press).
Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel (1983). Histoire du climat depuis l'an mil (Paris:
Champs-Flammarion).
Naquin, Susan (1981). Shantung Rebellion: The Wang Lun Uprising of 1774 (New
Haven Conn.: Yale University Press).
Orhonlu, Cengiz (1967). Osmanli imparatorlugunda Derbend Teçkilati (Istanbul:
It! Ed. Fak. Yayinlari).
Perry, Elizabeth (1980). Rebely and Revolutionaries in North China 1845 1945
(Stanford Cal.: Stanford Univ. Press).
Pitton de Tournefort, M. (17 8). Relation d'un voyage au Levant..., 2 vols.
(Amsterdam).
Roemer, Hans Robert (1985). "Die turkmenischen Qizilbas, Gründer und Opfer der
safawidischen Theokratie", Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen
Gesellschaft, 135, 2, 228-240.
Sohrweide, Hanna (1965). "Der Sieg der Safawiden in Persien und seine
Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert", Der Islam, 41,
95-223.
Tilly, Charles (1981). As Sociology Meets History (New York, London: Academic
Press).
Uzunçar§ih, Ismail Hakki (1943-44). Osmanli Devleti Teçkilatindan Kapukulu
Ocaklari (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu).
Wolf, Eric R. (1973). Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York: Harper
and Row).
Zilfi, Madeline (1986). "The Kadizadelis: Discordant Revivalism in Seventeenth-
Century Istanbul", Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 45, 4, 251-269.
 BLACK SLAVES AND FREEDMEN
C E L E B R A T I N G (AYDIN, 1576)

Ottoman slavery during the last two decades or so has become a

fashionable topic. This may be an indirect consequence of the multitude of
studies on the transatlantic slave trade and slavery in the Americas. Studies of
modern slavery have made an impact upon researchers dealing with the «slave
societies» of classical Greece and Rome, and in the same context, non-
European slavery has also aroused interest. Specialists on classical antiquity
such as Sir Moses Finley and Keith Hopkins have stressed the affinities
between slave-holding in Athens, Rome, the Caribbean, Brazil and the
southern United States, and singled out these five European-American
societies as the only cases in human history in which the wealth of the elite
was to a significant degree underwritten by the labour of slaves. 1 This is not
exactly a comfortable truth, and quite a few researchers dealing with the East
African slave trade have concentrated less on the trade itself, than on
nineteenth-century British efforts to end it. At the same time, the apologetic
statement that slavery was not an exclusively European institution is often
implied though not necessarily spelt out by historians discussing European
slavery.

Another reason for Hie interest in Ottoman slavery is the fact that
quantitative history, based largely but not exclusively upon archival
documents, has become a major concern in post World War II historiography
of the Ottoman Empire. Quantitative studies may of course be focused on elite
groups. But in the long run, researchers with an interest in such studies will
concern themselves, if not w ith the very sparsely documented peasants and
nomads of the Ottoman realms, then at least with urban dwellers outside of
the political elite. In various countries formerly belonging to the Ottoman
Empire, the kadi registers of many major and a few minor towns have
survived. As the kadi registers reflect local transactions, something can be
learned about women and slaves, who were not taxpayers and therefore are
generally ignored in documents prepared by the Ottoman central government.
Thus quantitative history and «history from below» have been combined, and

' m . I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern ideology ( H a r m o n d s w o r t h , Penguin B o o k s Ltd.,

1983), p. 9 — Keith Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves, Sociological Studies in Roman History,
vol. 1 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 9.
150 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

we now know a great deal more about Ottoman slaves than would have
seemed possible only a few years ago 1 .

Information provided in the kadi registers is standardized, and this

makes a quantitative approach worthwhile. Sales and manumission records
provide the names of masters and slaves, sometimes information about the
area from which the slave had been imported, and often the price for which
he/she changed hands. From the name it is possible to judge whether the slav e
had become a Muslim. In addition, arrangements by which a slave was assured
his/her freedom in exchange for specific services were also recorded in sizeable
numbers, thus allowing us to gauge the importance of slaves as part of the
workforce in cities such as Bursa or Cairo. Moreover the manner in which
slave sales were effected, and the affairs of slave dealers, can equally be traced
with the help of sales and manumission records 2 .

While these questions are fundamental, important lacunae remain. Thus

we cannot at present say very much about the religious practices of Ottoman
slaves, a topic which has been well covered where R o m a n antiquity is
c o n c e r n e d 3 . And yet studies on the religious practices of Roman slaves are
based upon funerary and cultic inscriptions, while the rough equivalents in the
Ottoman context, namely records pertaining to pious foundations, have only
marginally interested the historians of slavery 4 . Nor do w e know anything
coherent about the relations between masters and slaves, or between slaves of
the same origin living and working in one and the same area. Tantalizing
glimpses of fleeing slaves indicate the existence, in certain times and at certai n
places, of networks that a f f o r d e d slaves shelter before they embarked on
the long journey homeward 5 . But where problems of this kind are concerned,

' C o m p a r e : Lucette Valcnsi, «Esclavage chrétien et esclavage noir à Tunis au XVIII e siècle»,
Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations, 22 (1967), 1267-1288; Otto Meinardus, «The Upper
Egyptian Practice of the Making of Eunuchs in the XVIIIth and XIX Century (sic)», Zeitschrift
ßr Ethnologie, 94, 1 (1969), 47-58; Alan Fisher, «The Sale of Slaves in the Ottoman Empire:
Markets and State Taxes on Slave Sales», Bogaziçl Üniversitesi Hümaniter Bilimler Dergisi, VI
(1978), 149-174; Terence Walz, Trade between Egypt and Bilad as- Sudan (Cairo, I F A O ,
1978); Halil Sahillioglu, «Onbeçinci Yiizyilin Sonu ile Onaltinci Yiizyilin Ba§inda Bursa'da
Kölelerin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Hayattaki Yeri», TUrkiye iktisat Tarihi Üzerine Araçtirmalar,
ODTÜ Gelq me Dergisi (1979-1980 özel sayisi), 67-138; Ehud Toledano, The Ottoman Slave
Trade and its Suppression: 1840-1890 (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982); E h u d
Toledano, «The Imperial Eunuchs of Istanbul: From A f r i c a to the Heart of Islam», Middle
Eastern Studies, 3 (1984), 379-390; Ronald Jennings, «Black Slaves and Free Blacks in Ottoman
Cyprus, 1590-1640», Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, X X X ( 1 9 8 7 ) ,
286-302; Judith E. Tucker, Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt ( C a m b r i d g e , C a m b r i d g e
University Press, 1985). pp. 164-193.
^Compare Sahillioglu, «Onbeçinci Yiizyilin Sonu», and Walz, Trade, passim.
3
F r a n z Börner, Untersuchungen über die Lage der Sklaven in Griechenland und in Rom
(Mainz, Verlag der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, 1957).
4
F o r an exception c o m p a r e Omer Lütfi Barkan and Ekrem Hakki Ayverdi (eds.), Istanbul
Vaktflart Tahrîr Defteri, 9 U (1546) Târîhli (Istanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1970), pp. XXV-XXVII.
5
F o r a case involving a women's c o n v e n t in Athens compare: B a j b a k a n l i k Ar§ivi, Istanbul,
Mühimme Defterleri ( M O i 48, p. 121, n" 323 (990/1582).
 BLACK SLAVES AND FREEDMEN 151

records will always remain insufficient for quantitative study, and we will have
to rely on the analysis of individual cases on which we happen to possess
documentation.

THE FACTS OF THE CASE

One such case concerns the province of Aydin in western Anatolia and
was recorded on the last day of Zilkade 983/1 March 1576 1 . The bey and kadis
of Aydin were informed that Black slaves and freedmen were in the habit of
holding assemblies. From a m c n g the participants, they elected a bey, a kadi
and a kethuda. Under the leadership of these «officiais» they then engaged in
three days of that was probably revelry of some kind (fish u fesad). Overt
hostility was expressed against those Africans who refused to participate, and
against slave owners who did not permit their slaves to attend. Apart from
other iniquitous acts contrary to the ¡¡eriat, participants in these revels had
allegedly murdered several ocal Muslims and stolen sheep and other
foodstuffs. Now the time of the festivities, if that term adequately describes
the situation, was again approaching, and the Sultan ordered the provincial
governor and kadis officiating in the area to put pressure on free Blacks and
slaveholders: the former were to refrain from assembling and remain quiet
(kendii hallerinde olalar) while the owners of slaves were not to permit the
latter to participate in the festivities. Those w h o disobeyed were threatened
with the galleys, and a copy of the rescript was entrusted to a certain miiderris
Mehmed, presumably for remittance to the addressees.

FESTIVITIES AMONG OTTOMAN BLACKS

Special festivities of Black people occasionally have been reported for

modern Turkey as well. Pertev Naili Boratav in two articles has recorded data
concerning the «fumigation» of sick people for the purpose of healing (which
does not concern us in the present context) as well as a number of accounts on
the so-called «Festival of the Calf» in Izmir and Istanbul 2 . The festival was no
longer celebrated in 1949, but the extant accounts indicate that it had been
popular in the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) and possibly during
the early years of the Republic as well. Before the actual celebration began,
money was collected and the gifts of wealthy people were especially taken
note of. A calf was then purchased (and in Izmir two goats as well). The goats
were slaughtered and eaten first, while the calf was decorated and paraded about
the streets, before its turn came to be sacrificed and eaten.

' m D 27, p. 306, n° 31 (983/1576).

2
P e r t e v Naili Boratav, «The Negro in Turkish Folklore», Journal of American Folklore, 6 4
(1951), 83-88; Pertev Naili Boratav, «Les Noirs dans le folklore turc et le folklore des Noirs de
Turquie», Journal de la Société des Africanistes, XXVIII (1958), 7-23.
152 C O )' 1 N G W I T H THE STATE

The duration of the celebrations varied according to different witnesses:

Mr. Avni Sap claimed that the celebrations lasted for four weeks, while the
feast described by Boralav's other chief informant Havva Nine (surname
unknown) seems to have lasted for only a week. Moreover, Mr. Sap gave a
definite date for the festival, namely late July and August, while Havva Nine
claimed that no definite date existed, except that the festival was always
celebrated after Hidrellez Day had marked the beginning of summer.

Mr. Sap's and Havva Nine's accounts also differ in that the former
attributes a role in these festivities to the godiya, a kind of healer, while
Havva Nine mentions this personage only in connection with private healing
rituals. Havva Nine also remembered a communal celebration in the autumn,
which she only described quite briefly and of which the other informants
reported nothing.

While the Izmir celebrations of the African community do not seem to

have attracted much attention from literate people, those taking place in
Istanbul have occasionally been committed to writing. Boratav has collected a
number of descriptions concerning the «Calf Festival» 1 . A different kind of
celebration has been recorded by the novelist and short-story writer Aziz
Nesin. In his autobiography, first published in 1966 but reflecting Istanbul
conditions during the 1910s and 1920s, Aziz Nesin records a ceremony of
Black women, which T urkish women attended as spectators 2 . This feast was
celebrated outside the city- during the month of May, and the Istanbul women
attending it prepared food as for a picnic. The African women who actively
participated in the celebration danced in groups, emitting sounds which the
author, who presumabl) was admitted to the ceremonies because he was still
very young, found rather astonishing. Later some began to scream and ululate,
finally going into a trance, and disappeared one by one into the surrounding
woods. After a while they returned with aromatic herbs, some of which were
sold as medicine and ethers burned to give off a pleasing smell. T h e
ceremony, which may have had some connection with the healing rituals
described by Havva Nine, ended toward the late afternoon.

The last account i f a Black community festival on Ottoman territory

that I have been able to locate is due to the British traveller J a m e s
Richardson 3 . This account concerns the town of Ghadames, to the southwest

' Boratav, «Les Noirs», pp. 14 If.

2
A z i z Nesin, Boyle Gelmi* H'ivle Gitmez (Ankara, Bilgi Yayinevi, third amended edition,
1972).
F a r n e s Richardson, Travels in . lie Great Desert of Sahara in the years of IH45 and IH46, 2 vols
(London, Richard Bentley, 1848). Compare vol. 1, pp. 101-102, 223-224, 279-280, 302; vol. 2,
pp. 39-40, 377-380. I owe this efcrence to Allan G. B. Fisher and Humphrey J. Fisher, Slavery
and Muslim Society in Afrk a. The Institution in Saharan and Sudanic Africa and the Trans-
Saharan Trade (Garden City N v . Doubleday & C o m p a n y , 1971).
 B L A C K S L A V E S A N D F R E E D M E N 153

of Trablus (Lybia), which down to the 1820s constituted one of the main
stopping points of the caravans importing Black slaves into Tunisia and
Tripolitania 1 . Richardson, who visited the area in 1845 and 1846, mentions
the existence of a sheik of the Black slaves in Ghadames who, though a slave
himself, was held responsible for the good behaviour of the other slaves in the
city. If the account of the «shaykh of the slaves» himself is to be believed, the
latter's moral authority must have been considerable, but he does not seem to
have played any role in the slave festivities of Ghadames. A m o n g the latter,
Richardson mentions a celebration of the «Night of Power», when the descent
of the Koran f r o m heaven was commemorated by a sequence of dances and
plays known locally as «the playing of the slaves». A m o n g the festivities,
Richardson describes in some detail a circular dance performed by male slaves
only. T h e latter d a n c e d around a leader, w h o w h e n the t e m p o of the
p e r f o r m a n c e had quickened, was overthrown by the excited participants.
Afterwards couples danced, but Richardson's account of this section of the
festival is much more cursory.

Another slave festival witnessed by Richardson in Ghadames involved

visits to the cemetery. A f t e r an initial phase of singing and dancing in the
market place, the dead were visited, at which stage the women participants
burnt «the incense of bekhour >2. The slave cemetery was segregated f r o m the
ccmetery of the free; after the v isit had been concluded, the slaves repaired «to
a garden, allotted to them, where they danced, sung, and forgot their slavery» 3 .
S o m e slaves had been able to borrow matchlock guns, which they fired into
the air. Richardson comments on the colourful clothes and ornaments of the
slave women participating in this festivity, j u s t as he had noted the finery of
the male dancers w h o performed on the Night of Power. Apparently spectators
were admitted to both these festivals. Richardson does not mention that his
own presence, along with that of his Black servitor, aroused comment, while
he explicitly states that some of the G h a d a m e s townsmen c a m e out to the
garden to watch the slaves dancing. A further commemoration of the dead took
place only a few days later: this one began with a slow ceremonial dance
performed in the middle of the business district {suk) and in which both men
and w o m e n in their best finery participated. Matchlocks w e r e carried,
presumably by the male dancers, while the women again bore incense. The
dance was f o l l o w e d by a visit to the tombs. In this context Richardson,
probably echoing remarks made to him by some of the Ghadames spectators,
commented on the limited understanding which the slaves possessed of Islam,
and the syncretism of Islamic and pagan beliefs which characterized the
religion of the local slaves.

' l i h é l i i a C h a t e r , Dépendance et mutations précoloniales. La régence de Tunis de 1815 à

1857 (Tunis, Publications de l'Université de Tunis, 1984), p. 142.
^Richardson, Travels, vol. I, p. 279.
' Richardson, Travels, vol. I, p. 280.
154 ( O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

In the desert town of Ghat, Richardson also witnessed a festival, al

which the slaves of the town, along with a privileged few from a slave caravan
in transit, danced and sang «until midnight» in the public squares of the
town 1 . Unfortunately Richardson does not record any details of this ceremony
and only comments on opportunities for communication between recently
arrived and long-established slaves, which were provided by the context of the
festival.

The richness of ceremonial life among the slaves of Ghadames is

striking, particularly if one takes into account that Richardson, as an outsider,
probably witnessed and recorded only the more public events. We may assume
that in Ghadames slaves from many different parts of Central Africa were
brought together, and that the slaves were able to learn dances and ceremonies
from one another. It is also noticeable that slave owners in Ghadames
acquiesced in these festivities not only by giving the slaves leave to attend,
but also by lending them matchlocks and possibly finery. Nor do the
authorities of the town seem to have intervened in any way, which is notable
since two of the celebrations began in the business district, that is in the most
public part of town.

A N A T T E M P T A T I N T E R P R E T A T I O N

The evidence assembled here is remarkable mainly for its diversity.

Even if we exclude the autumn festival of the Izmir Black community and the
celebrations of Ghat due to poor documentation, and private healing rituals
because we arc not at present concerned with the curing of disease, we are still
faced with a variety of celebrations. Apart from the noisy and violent
festivities which w e n held in sixteenth-century Aydin and whose purpose
remains unknown, there were the spring festival of the African women of
Istanbul, the «Festival of the Calf» in Istanbul and Izmir — which seems to
have incorporated certain features of the Kurban Bayrami (Feast of Sacrifices)
— two separate feasts of the dead in Ghadames, and the dance by which
Ghadames slaves celebrated the Night of Power.

This diversity, in the timing and purpose of African celebrations,

though disappointing from our perspective, is not in itself surprising. Black
slaves arrived from very different parts of the sub-Saharan belt of Central
Africa, from the Chad region by way of Sinnar and Darfur, to mention but the
best known regions of origin 2 . Slave traders were not usually much interested

' R i c h a r d s o n , Travels, vol J . p. 39.

2
R e x S. O ' F a h e y , « S l a v e r y ind the S l a v e Trade in D â r F u r » , Journal of African History, X I V , 1
( 1 9 7 3 ) , 2 9 - 4 3 . O n s i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y r e l a t i o n s of t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e t o C e n t r a l A f r i c a ,
c o m p a r e B. G . M a r t i n . « K i n e m . B o r n u a n d t h e F a z z â n : N o t e s o n t h e P o l i t i c a l H i s t o r y of a
T r a d e R o u t e » , Journal of African History, X , 1 ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 15-27.
 B L A C K S L A V E S A N D F R E E D M E N 155

in the exact tribal affiliation of the slaves they marketed, so that not much is
known on that score 1 . Given the situation, it is very probable that Black
slaves in any given area developed f o r m s of sociability which did not
necessarily correspond to the customs of any documented Central African
group, and moreover the historically oriented secondary literature does not tell
us much about slave festivities in Central Africa 2 . But it is worth noting that
in sixteenth-century Aydin and also in the nineteenth and twentieth-century
Ottoman Empire, Black slaves and ex-slaves associated among themselves to
the point of developing their own festive rituals. Apart f r o m the rather
different case of European captives who remained Christians, Africans seem to
be the only group of slaves for whom common festivities are recorded.

It appears that the Aydin festivity had been invented by Africans who
had been resident in the Ottoman Empire for some time, and were familiar
with its political structure. Bey, kadi and kethiida were encountered in
Ottoman Eigypt as well as in Anatolia, but even kadis were not necessarily
familiar figures in Muslim parts of the Sudan before the eighteenth century 3 .
Moreover we can guess that the form of the festivity had been devised by
people who knew urban environments. The title of bey presumably alludes to
the provincial governor, kadis; were present mainly though not exclusively in
towns, and the title of kethiida brings to mind guild officials or spokesmen of
religious and ethnic groups, who would most likely be found in urban
settings.

Concerning the timing of the sixteenth-century Aydin festival, it is

apparent that the celebrations, possibly held in more than one locality of the
province, took place at regular intervals. We can only guess, but not assert
with any degree of certainty, that they were annual. If the festival had in any
way been associated with the Muslim calendar, it is probable that the rescript
would have mentioned this fact, since a religious background would have made
rambunctious celebrations seem even more reprehensible. Since in early
March the date of the festival was said to be approaching, we may guess that
the event took place in the spring, possibly in May, like the women's
celebration in 1920s Istanbul. However, Aziz Nesin's account makes it seem
as if the latter only lasted for a day, and not for three days as the celebrations
in Aydin. But it is of course possible that being a young child at the time,

' W a l z , Trade, p. 176, note 5. Compare Jennings, «Black Slaves» for a few exceptions to this
rule.
2
See however Edmond Bernus, Suzanne Bcrnus, «L'évolution de la condition servile chez les
touaregs sahéliens», in Claude Meillassoux (éd.), L'esclavage en Afrique précoloniale (Paris,
François M a s p é r o , 1975), p. 3 9 on the m a n n e r in which slaves and m a s t e r s separately
celebrated the end of the Ramazan fest.
• Rex S. O'Fahey, «The Office of qadi in Dâr Fur. A Preliminary Inquiry», Bulletin of the School
of Oriental and African Studies, X L , 1 (1977), 110-124. On a probably nineteenth-century
Ottoman official known as the kadi o ' t h e Blacks, compare Boratav. «Les Noirs», p. 13.
156 COPING WITH THE STATE

the author only remembered the day which he witnessed personally. Certainly,
where timing was involved, the sixteenth-century Aydin celebrations had
nothing in common with the four weeks of merrymaking attested by Mr.
Avni Sap for twentieth-century Izmir.

ACTING OUT SOCIAL TENSIONS

Until further documentation is f o u n d , w e c a n n o t determine what

induced the African residents of sixteenth-century Aydin to appoint «rulers» to
preside over their festivities. The only instance even remotely parallel, since
the sheik of the slaves in Ghadames does not fit into the picture, is the case of
the godiya of Izmir according to the account of Mr. Sap. But the godiya

apparently possessed religious/magical powers which the rescript of 1576 does

not assign to «bey», and «kethiida» of the Aydin slaves and freedmen. What
makes these figures so intriguing is the fact that «kings», «abbots» and
«queens» presiding over a festive crowd also belong into the carnival universe
of medieval and earl) modern Europe 1 . Those «reinages» often contained an
element of protest against the powerful of the day, even though at the same
time, they constituted an opportunity for the reassertion of the traditional
order. In the Aydin celebration, elements of protest seem to have been present
as well: the power of the group against outsiders was asserted, by reprisals
against slave owners who kept their slaves f r o m attending the festival, and
against freedmen who refused to participate. It may be guessed that foodstuffs
and particularly s h e e p were stolen f r o m those wealthy t o w n s m e n and
landowners who refused to provide something for the slaves' festival when
asked to do so. Moreover it is conceivable that in such a setting, quarrels with
fatal results occasionally ensued.

Apparently the attitude of slave owners and governing authorities in

Aydin was far removed f r o m the mildly contemptuous tolerance reported by
Richardson for 1840s Ghadames. W e d o not know exactly w h o brought the
assemblies of the A u i i n slaves and freedmen to the notice of the authorities in
Istanbul, nor can we j u d g e the veracity of the accusations m a d e . Quite
possibly the miiderris M e h m e d , who was to take the Ottoman government's
orders back to Aydin, had originally been sent to the capital to bring the
matter to the attention of the authorities. H e may have undertaken his journey
either on behalf of certain victims of slave attacks, or by slave o w n e r s
perturbed by the situation in general. But even if the accusations that he
preferred were wildly exaggerated, it is apparent that the — presumably not
very numerous — gioup of Black slaves and freedmen in Aydin generated
much more tension than the much larger numbers of slaves inhabiting 1840s
Ghadames.

' c o m p a r e Natalie L. Davis, «La règle à l'envers», in Natalie Z. D a v i s , Les cultures du peuple.
Rituels, savoirs et resistali,-e* au 16e siècle (Paris, A u b i e r - M o n t a i g n e , 1979), pp. 1 5 9 - 2 0 9 .
 BLACK SLAVES AND FREEDMEN 157

The rescript of 1576 is remarkable not only for the assertions which it
makes, but also for what it does not say. O n e may take it for granted that at
least the m o r e r e c e n t arrivals a m o n g the A y d i n slaves w e r e as yet
incompletely islamized, while during the period in question, it was customary
to accuse as heretics all sorts of people considered undesirable for a variety of
reasons. Moreover in the festi vities of Africans, women tended to play a fairly
prominent role, a feature which should have particularly facilitated heresy
accusations. Given the limilations of our knowledge, the absence of such
accusations is not easily explained.

One hypothesis which comes to mind is that the slaves of Aydin were
all but exclusively male, so that the dances of the Africans did not arouse as
much c o m m e n t as they would otherwise have done. However a largely male
group of slaves would probably not have been employed in domestic service,
but may have served on f a r m s ( g i f t l i k s ) belonging to personages powerful in
the Ottoman central adminiscration. The existence of slaves on such giftliks,
has been documented for the regions of Istanbul and Edirne, and in view of the
close links of the Aydin region with the Ottoman capital, a limited number of
agricultural slaves may have been present in the latter area as well 1 .

Organizational coherence is necessary to elect «officials» and to put

pressure on recalcitrant g r o i p members. This coherence should have been
easier to achieve if small groups of slaves were left to their own devices at
least for part of the year, than if they were placed, singly or in groups of two
or three, under the p e r m a n e r t supervision of their masters. Given the large
number of minor towns in Aydin, service on such a farm would not preclude
the familiarity with urban-based political institutions postulated earlier. But of
course at present this explanation remains a mere hypothesis.

CONCLUSION

From the methodological point of view, it appears that Ottoman

slavery, and other social phenomena as well, may benefit from a combination
of qualitative and quantitative analyses. A t present, given the paucity of
sources, neither type of analysis can be very sophisticated. But comparative
evidence, particularly f r o m anthropological work on Central African slavery,
will in the Iong run help us use to best advantage the limited documentation

'Omer Liitfi Barkan, «Edirne Askerf Kassami'na Ait Tereke Defterleri», Belgeler, III, 5-6
(1966), p. 239 and elsewhere.
158 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

at o u r d i s p o s a l . R e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e h i s t o r i c a l e n v i r o n m e n t in w h i c h slaves

f u n c t i o n e d i s m o r e in l i n e w i t h « t r a d i t i o n a l » h i s t o r i a n s ' p r e o c c u p a t i o n s . By

c o m b i n i n g these different approaches, w e will ultimately be able to construct

a social history o f «ordinary p e o p l e » l i v i n g in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , and m o v e

a w a y f r o m e x c l u s i v e p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h the O t t o m a n state apparatus1.

A f t e r this manuscript had gone to press, friendly colleagues pointed out further evidence
c o n c e r n i n g Ottoman slaves and w o m e n ' s festivities. For Börte Sagaster, Im Harem von
Istanbul, Osmanisch türkische Frauenkultur im 19. Jahrhundert (Rissen, E. C. Verlag. 1989), I
thank Prof. Petra Kappel t (Hamburg). Ms Maren Fittschen M A informed m e that Re§at Nuri
Güntekin, Miskinler Tekkesi (Istanbul, various publ. and dates) contains a good description of
the Festival of the Calf. To Dr. Heidi Stein (Leipzig) I o w e a description of a ceremony current
among Tunisian Jewish women at the beginning of this century, which involved a collective
trancc with the intention of curing the sick: Albert M e m m i , Die Salzsäule (Leipzig, 1978) p.
144ff.
 COUNTERFEITING IN ANKARA

Although thieves, robbers, murderers, arsonists and counterfeiters are

known to a wide variety of human societies, the conditions under which
crimes are committed are quite specific. This observation lies behind the (pre-
perestroika) debates on how lo write a convincing detective story in a central-
European socialist setting. Historians who have studied the abandonment of
new-born babies in seventeenth-century France, or arson in nineteenth-century
rural Bavaria also know that specific crimes are characteristic for certain
periods and/or s o c i e t i e s . 1 All societies using money will produce
counterfeiters. And yet the motivations and conditions of work of a
conterfeiter active in Ankara around 1600, manipulating silver wire and dies,
will differ from those of his/her late-twentieth-century counterpart, who uses a
photocopying machine. Thus the aim pursued here is comparable to that of a
police procedural by M a j Sjöwall and Per Wahlöö, namely to describe
tensions within a society using the account of a crime as a starting point. 2

TWO CASES

The story was recorded in the kadi registers of Ankara in Muharrem

1008/July-August 1599. 3 In those summer days, a group of people from the
quarter of Sabuni, who preferred to remain nameless, appeared before the court
to complain about their neighbour, the dyer Abdi b. Murad, whom they
accused of manufacturing counterfeit coins. The authorities responded with a
full-dress investigation. A s the governor was not in town, his lieutenant
Ibrahim (^elebi b. Mustafa took over, while the kadi of Ankara was
represented by Mevlana Mehmed, w h o taught in a theological school
(müderris). The commission moved fast, and surprised Abdi at home. From
under the floor planks of his house appeared the contents of a silversmith's
(or counterfeiter's) workshop: an anvil, two hammers, a silver vessel, a

' G ü n t e r Ebert, Männer die im Keller husten. Ansichten zur Kriminalliteratur. (Bcrlin/GDR: Das
Neue Berlin, 1987), pp. 102ff., attempts to pinpoint socially revealing crimes in the pre-1989
G D R . That the author is too optimistic and omits a whole range of relevant crimes is beside the
point here; important is the posing cf the question. On the widespread abandoning of infants in
early-modern France, see Pierre Chaunu and Richard Gascon, Histoire economique et sociale
de la France, vol. 1.1. (Paris: Presses Universitäres, 1977), p. 422. On arson in late-nineteenth-
century rural Bavaria and the arsonists' motivations see Regina Schulzc, "Feuer im Dorf," in
Räuber, Volk und Obrigkeit, Studien zur Kriminalität in Deutschland seit dem 18 Jahrhundert
ed. Heinz Reif (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1984), pp. 100-52.
2
T h e detective stories of M a j Sjöwall and Per Wahlöö are explicit in describing the frustrations
of both policemen and down-and-outs in Stockholm during the late 1960s and 1970s. Compare
The Laughing Policeman, trans. Alan Blair (New York: Vintage Books, 1977).
•^Ankara Kadi Registers (henceforth A K R ) 6, p. 88, n. 526.
 160 COPING WITH THE STATE

goldsmith's tongs, a wooden implement for pulling wire, a bellows, a copper

mold, a slab of wood and some alum. Abdi tried to explain away the evidence
by claiming to have received the incriminating items f r o m a gypsy living in
the neighbouring province of Kutahya. But a continuation of the search
yielded a still-hot goldsmith's furnace, hidden in an earthen pot, in addition to
manipulated silver coins (guru§).

Upon this discovery, Abdi accused his wife, and when the searchers
asked where he had hidden the gold coins which they presumed he had
counterfeited, he denied any knowledge of such a thing. His wife was duly
questioned, but she only insisted that he did not share his secrets with her. She
did point out, however, that Abdi employed an apprentice to pull the silver
wire for him; moreover she thought that he might have thrown incriminating
evidence down the well. A search for the apprentice yielded no results, as the
boy had fled, and the searchers did not think it worthwhile to dredge the well.
But Abdi apparently had plenty of enemies among his neighbours, who now
volunteered the information that he had been suspected of counterfeiting and
searched three or four times already. But Abdi had always managed to slip
through the fingers of the law. Although the neighbours accused him of being
a hardened counterfeiter, they had to admit that they never actually had seen
him manufacture fake coins. Then the searchers publicly exhibited the c u l p r t
together with the suspicious objects in his possession; the items in question
were laid out in front of his door, and he was asked to confirm that they had
been found in his house. 1 This Abdi freely admitted, referring to the testimony
of his neighbours who had previously asserted the same thing.

Upon demand of the deputy governor, all this information was entered
into the kadi registers. In fact, in the extant register there are t w o entries
concerning this issue, separated by fifty unrelated items. Since the second
version contains some details absent f r o m the first, it probably w a s written to
incorporate the testimony of witnesses who previously had been overlooked,
and to correct errors in formulation. 2 Abdi's wife, previously anonymous, was
now called Baci b. Boyaci Dede, the gypsy f r o m K u t a h y a province was
described as coming from the district of §eyhli, and the incriminating material
now included some unfinished akges and low-grade ( z u y u j ) silver pieces. What
happened afterwards remains unknown; and we can only guess whether Abdi
managed to save himself vet again, or whether this was the definitive end of
his career as a counlei feiter, and maybe even of his life.

' S i m i l a r d e m o n s t r a t i o n s w.-rc c o m m o n on T u r k i s h t e l e v i s i o n d u r i n g the 1 9 7 0 s a n d 1980s.

2
A K R 6, n. 576.
 C O U N T E R F E I T I N G 161

When interpreting his story, we can use a similar record from Bursa,
which is almost contemporary (§evval 1010/April 1602). 1 In this case a man
apprehended while in possession of diverse false coins, claimed to have
received them from a certain Ruhi Hiiseyin, who lived in the house of Mansur
in Bursa's tgneci quarter. When Mansur's house was searched, the owner
apparently had fled, but his wife and son were apprehended, and counterfeit
coins found. In addition there were a mold or die destined for the manufacture
of guru§, a hammer, a press a file, tongs, dividers and (presumably steel)
pens. In this incident, the accusation came from the head of the local mint, in
the presence of a legally trained person sent by the kadi of Bursa; the
governor's men were not in evidence.

W H Y C O U N T E R F E I T ?

During the last decades of the sixteenth and the beginning of the
seventeenth centuries, counterfeiting was particularly lucrative. The currency
was depreciating, coins of different weights and alloys circulated and money
was in high demand, 2 even as the purchasing power of the Ottoman coinage
declined, partly because large quantities of silver f r o m American mines had
reached the eastern Mediterranean, driving up the prices of goods. Population
increase also had a role to play, as the demand for food grew faster than
agricultural production, and velocity of circulation increased as much of the
imported silver rapidly was drawn off to pay for silks, spices and Indian cotton
textiles. At the same time, official devaluation halved the silver content of the
akge in 1585-86, and yet failed to stabilize the value of the currency. While
holders of previously minted coins were required to exchange them for the
newest issues, many people must have been wary of accepting bad money for
good. Thus the market was flooded with substandard coins, while good-quality
money was hidden away. In ali likelihood, quite a few counterfeiters plied their
trade undisturbed, for many coins issued by regular mints were of poor quality
and thus difficult to distinguísn from the counterfeit coins.

' ß e k i r Sitki Baykal, "Osmanli ìmparatorlugunda XVII. ve XVIII. Yiizyillar Boyunca Para
Düzeniyle ilgili Belgeier," Beigeler. Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi 13.17 (1988): 87-116. T h e
document in question is on pp. 88-89.
2
O n the late sixteenth-century inflation compare Omer Liitfi Barkan, "The Price Revolution of
the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East," international
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 6 (1975): 3-28; Holm Sundhausen, "Die 'Preisrevolution' im
osmanischen Reich während der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrunderts: 'Importierte' oder intern
verursachte Inflation? (Zu einer T h e s e Ö. L. Barkans)," Südost-Forschungen 42 (1983): 169-
81; Cernai Kafadar, "Les troubles monétaires de la fin du X V I e siècle et la prise de conscience
ottomane du déclin," Annales ESC 46.2 (1991): 381-400; and Çevket P a m u k , "Money in the
Ottoman Empire, 1326 to 1914," in The Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire, ed.
Halil Inalcik ivith Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 947-
162 ( O P I N G W I T H T H E S I A T E

Money was in high demand during this period, as the economy was
increasingly monetized and taxes were demanded in good quality silver and
gold coin. This demand explains why Anatolian townsmen eagerly sought for
ways of investing their cash, and gaining interest on loans. 1 Losses inflicted
on taxpayers by official demand for good quality coin further increased the
demand for money. Taxpayers paid premiums to obtain officially acceptable
coins, and engaged in further market transactions to earn the money needed for
the premiums. Moreover, throughout most of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries the Ottoman government used the copper currency which circulated
in everyday transactions as a source of revenue. While the treasury did not
accept copper in payment for taxes, the service of exchanging akge for copper
was farmed out to the highest bidder, w h o proceeded to collect silver coins
f r o m the public in exchange for the divisionary currency. 2 T h e metallic value
of these copper coins lay considerably below that of the akge and guru$ which
taxpayers were forced to relinquish. T h e effect was the same as in the case of
the premium on good-quality coins; market transactions and the velocity of
money circulation increased, creating additional inflationary pressures. 3

Taxation contributed to the market orientation of the economy in yet

another fashion, which has been discussed by Indianist historians but to date
largely ignored by Ottomanists. 4 The Ottoman central government demanded a
large amount of cash f r o m the provinces even when the timar system still
functioned, and more so after tax farming supplanted the timars. Most regions
of the Ottoman Empire possessed no local supplies of silver, and even the
Rumelian mines became unprofitable due to the competition f r o m cheaper
American metal. They were closed down one by one. 5 This deficiency meant
that foreign trade was the ultimate source of the silver provincial populations
paid into the administration's coffers; but many regions had little contact with
foreign merchants. Thus within a short time, all hoarded coins and jewelry
would have found their way to Istanbul, if there had been no means of earning
money through internal trade. Villagers supplied passing caravans, wove
cotton cloth for urban m e r c h a n t s and sent their children to t o w n as
wage labourers, while townsmen by definition were oriented toward the market

' Halil Inalcik, "Capital For n a t i o n in the Ottoman Empire," The Journal of Economic History, 19
(1969): 97-140, particularl> pp. 135ff.
2
C ü n e y t Öl?er, Nakqh Osmanli Mangirlan, The Ornamental Copper Coinage of the Ottoman
Empire (Istanbul: n. p., 1975), pp. 9ff.
^Kafadar, "Troubles monetaires," p. 388.
4
C . A. Bayly, Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British
Expansion, I770-IX70 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 63ff.
% a l i l Sahillioglu, "Osmanli Para Tarihinde Diinya Para ve M a d e n Hareketinin Yeri (1300-
1750)," Tiirkiye iktisat Tarihi Üzerine Ara^tirmalar, GeU§me Dergisi öz.el saytsi (1978), pp. 1-
38, particularly p. 14.
 C O U VTER F EIT IN G 163

e c o n o m y . 1 Indirectly, the goods and services produced in this m a n n e r benefited

the inhabitants of Istanbul and particularly m e m b e r s of the O t t o m a n central
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , b e c a u s e the latter held the largest supplies of c a s h . T h u s an
increase in m o n e y also m e a n t an increase in trade, both foreign and internal, as
provincials hard pressed f o r cash " b o u g h t b a c k " the m o n e y which they had
sent to Istanbul in p r e v i o u s years.

Quite possibly c o u n t e r f e i t e r s such as A b d i or Ruhi Hiiseyin m a d e a

p r o f i t f r o m c o i n s that w e r e only slightly b e l o w standard. In c o n d i t i o n s of
s c a r c i t y t h e tax c o l l e c t o r w o u l d a c c e p t s u c h akge or guru$, and the
counterfeiters could collect t h ; p r e m i u m w h i c h taxpayers needed to pay for
good quality coins. But even low grade falsifications apparently f o u n d takers,
for o t h e r w i s e the large-scale importation of poor quality European coins into
the seventeenth-century Ottoman Bmpire would remain inexplicable.2
Ottoman t o w n s m e n m u s t h a v e realized, at least a f t e r having been cheated o n c e
or twice, that they w e r e d e a l i n g with p o u r quality coin. T h e s e coins f o u n d
takers because taxation-induced monetization had produced a veritable m o n e y
f a m i n e , and the c o i n s m a n u f a c t u r e d by A b d i and others like h i m satisfied
d e m a n d as well as counterfeit European coins.

LOCAL MINTS, THE AUTHORITIES AND

COUNTERFEITING

T h e O t t o m a n central a d m i n i s t r a t i o n u n d e r s t o o d that t a x p a y e r s had

trouble procuring cash. W h e n in 1 0 3 5 / 1 6 2 6 a m i n t w a s reopened in A n k a r a ,
the s u l t a n i c r e s c r i p t c o m m a n d i n g its institution e x p l a i n e d that recently a
currency reform had been decreed, with better quality akges taking the place of
the o l d . 3 This w a s o n e of t h e periodic a t t e m p t s , f u t i l e in the long run, to slop
currency depreciation. But taxpayers could not acquire the new coins, and the
old o n e s c o n t i n u e d to circuíale. In the late sixteenth c e n t u r y , it took a b o u t
a d e c a d e b e f o r e e x c h a n g e rates practiced in A n k a r a f o l l o w e d t h o s e current
in Istanbul, only 4 5 0 kilometers a w a y . 4 Local m e r c h a n t s responded to this

' S u r a i y a Faroqhi, "Sixteenth-Century Periodic Markets in Various Anatolian Sancaks: Içel,

Hamid, Karahisar-i Sahib, Kütahya, Àydin and M e n t e j e , " Journal of the Economic and Social
History of the Orimi 22 (1979): 32-80
2
Robert M a n t r a n , Istanbul duns ,a seconde moitié du XVIle siècle, Essai d'histoire
institutionelle, économique et sociali'. Bibliothèque archéologique et historique de l'Institut
Français d'Archéologie d'Istanbul (Pans:Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962), pp. 2 6 I f f .
^Baykal, "Para," pp. 94-97. On the scarcity of money see Inalcik, "Capital Formation," p. 107. A
mint had operated in A n k a r a during :he sixteenth century (compare Anton C. Schaendlinger,
Usmanische Numismatik. Von den Anfängen des Osmanischen Reiches his :u seiner Auflösung
1922 ¡Braunschweig: Klinghardt & B a r m a n , 1973|, p. 30).
4
Ö z e r Ergenç, "XVI Yüzyilin Sonlarinda Osmanli Parasi Üzerinde Yapilan Îçlemlerc îliçkin
Bazi Bilgiler," Tiirkiye Iktisat Tarihi Ùzerine Ara^tirmalar, Gelisme Dergisi <>:el savisi (1978)
pp. 86-97.
164 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

scarcity of cash by scouring neighbouring provinces for coin. 1 They must

have had a large number of competitors, and those traders able to offer a local
speciality for which there was a high and steady demand were able to attract
coin to their home towns Ankara merchants probably had an edge over their
competitors, since the mohair cloth woven f r o m the hair of central-Anatolian
goats was popular a m o n g wealthy O t t o m a n s , and also f o u n d a market in
Poland, France and other European countries. 2 But the A n k a r a merchants'
successes were bound to increase the scarcity of cash elsewhere, and the
institution of the mint aimed at ensuring a more equitable distribution of
coins.

This aim probably was not achieved. In all likelihood the mints were
officially assigned only a limited quantity of silver, since much of the
European silver entering the Ottoman Empire was drawn off to India and Iran. 3
Therefore money could be minted only if merchants and others brought silver
to the mint, and those who collected old akge& f r o m other provinces were, if
anything, encouraged by ihe existence of this establishment.

In addition, supervision being m o r e difficult in the provinces, mints

outside Istanbul frequently turned out debased coin, thereby making it easier
for counterfeiters like Abdi b. Murad to circulate the product of their
w o r k s h o p s . 4 Thus the reopening of the A n k a r a mint in 1626 ran counter to
the trend of the seventeenth century, when provincial mints were closed down
one by one, and Ottoman subjects were forced to make payments largely in
foreign coins. The Ankara establishment probably did not continue to operate
for very long either.

If provincial mints turned out substandard coins, their officials at least

had a pecuniary interest in preventing the counterfeiting of coin by private
enterprise. It is not a matter of chance that the Bursa counterfeiters and mint
o f f i c i a l s competed for scanty resources of silver. M i n t e m p l o y e e s w e r e
supposed to collect old and substandard akges for reminting, and also had the
right to search merchants coming to do business in Ankara. 5 If the latter did
not spend their money i n goods, mint officials were supposed to forcibly
e x c h a n g e their silver against newly minted akges; u n m i n t e d silver was
measured by the geki, equal to 100 dirhem (worth 880 akges at the official
rate of 1626). People wishing to dispose of silver vessels also were required to

' t i a y k a l , "Para," p. 9 4 .
2
O z e r E r g c n ç , " 1 6 0 0 - 1 6 1 5 Yillari A r a s i n d a A n k a r a I k t i s a d i T a r i h i n e A i t A r a § t i r m a l a r , " in
Turkiye iktisat Tarihi Semineri. Metinlcr Tartq malar. 8-10 Haziran 1973, ed. O s m a n O k v a r and
Unal N a l b a n t o g l u ( A n k a r a : H a i e l t e p e U n i v e r s i t e s i , 1 9 7 5 ) , p p . 1 4 5 - 6 3 , p a r t i c u l a r l y p p . 1 5 5 - 6 0 .
3
K a f a d a r , " T r o u b l e s m o n é t a i r e ." p. 3 8 4 .
^ S a h i l l i o g l u , "Para," p. 16.
' B a y k a l , "Para," p. 9 6 .
 C O U N T E R F E I T I N G 165

sell only to mint officials, a ruling which must have forced silversmiths to
pay heavy bribes or else close up shop. 1 Counterfeiters could not coerce as
could mint officials; but they probably offered better prices to the owners of
silver. Therefore the "seekers of silver" ( g i i m i i § arayicisi), who were supposed
to ferret out counterfeiters as part of their official duties, and whose salaries
presumably came from mint revenue, had a personal stake in the apprehension
of counterfeiters.

M A N U F A C T U R I N G C O U N T E R F E I T COIN

Ottoman coins of the early-modern period were manufactured manually,

and the process employed rather resembled those current in contemporary
Europe. Alter the metal had been melted to the required degree of fineness,
small pieces were cast and then hammered until they reached the necessary
thickness.' 1 As the silver or copper piece thus obtained was too large for a
coin, it was cut into shape with scissors, the traces of which remain visible
on many coins. Then the metal was cleansed by firing, and a subsequent bath
in sulphuric acid caused the copper to evacuate the surface of the future coin.
This process explains why coins normally have a higher degree of fineness
close to the surface. Afterwards the silver or copper pieces were weighed; those
that were found too light were melted down, while the over-heavy pieces were
filed to the required weight. At the last stage of the process, the pieces of
metal were turned into coins by stamping them with dies. In most cases, the
coin surface showed calligraphy only, although a few Ottoman rulers had
coins decorated with animal images. Down to the late seventeenth century,
dies were cut individually by hand.

The lists of implements found in Abdi b. Murad's workshop show that

he used a different technique. Silver wire played an important role, as our
counterfeiter increased the risk of exposure by employing a boy to pull the
wire for him. He probably manufactured the coin legends out of silver wire,
which he then fastened to the heated metal surface by hammering. In addition
Abdi b. Murad possessed a kalib, either a die or a mold for casting. If the
latter, Abdi must have inscribed the inside of the mold with the mirror image
of the legend. The Bursa counterfeiter Ruhi Hiiseyin possessed a "double
mold" (gifte kalib) intended for a guru§, presumably to apply the legend to the

These regulations closely resemble their predecessors f r o m the period of M e h m e d the

Conqueror (1451-81); however the latter's edicts allowed for fixed quantities of silver which
jewelers were permitted to acquire, a concession not found in the edicts of the seventeenth
century (Robert Anhegger and Hal l inalcjk (eds), Ka mmame-i sultani ber-muceb-i 'orf-i
'osmani. II. Mehmed ve II. Bayezicl Divirlerine ait Yasakname ve Kanunnameler (Ankara- Turk
Tarih Kurumu, 1956), pp. 5, 9, 13, 14 and 16.
2
Schaendlinger, Osmanische Numismatik, pp. 13-14, gives an account of the technical side of
Ottoman minting.
166 COPING WITH THE STATE

recto and verso sides of' the coin simultaneously. Why Abdi should have
preferred the application of silver wire remains a mystery; possibly the
manufacture of the dies required higher temperatures than he could obtain in
his small goldsmith's forge.

SOCIAL R E LA [ ' I O N S

In both the stories of Abdi b. Murad and Ruhi Hiiseyin, relations

between family members, apprentices and neighbours played a crucial role.
Abdi b. Murad employed an apprentice as a helper in his clandestine business.
Since he kept his counterfeiter's implements in his house and not in his
workshop, the apprentice must have been admitted to his home. This was not
unusual; the legend of the dervish saint Piri Baba of Merzifon, which was
recorded in the seventeenth century, also describes an apprentice running
errands for his master's wife, and presumably living in his master's house. 1
But since Abdi b. Murad's apprentice took flight before he could be
questioned, we do not know how he would have defended himself, or what he
knew about his master's business.

In both the Bursa and the Ankara cases, women were mentioned. In
Bursa it was Fatma. wife of Mansur, the owner of the house where Ruhi
Hiiseyin lived, who was arrested along with her son Hasan. In Ankara it was
Abdi's wife Baci b. Boyaci Dede; Abdi obviously had married the daughter of a
fellow craftsman. Abdi made a feeble attempt to defend himself by claiming
that his wife was responsible for the counterfeit coins. Perhaps she had
assisted him; one docs gain the impression that her labours were not limited
to her household responsibilities. Fatma said nothing the investigators found
worth recording.

In his desperate attempt to escape conviction as a counterfeiter, Abdi b.

Murad also accused a gypsy from the province of Kutahya. Since the gypsies
of this period have been little studied, the only accessible source concerning
them is the kanunname-i kibtiyan dealing with the Balkans and compiled in
937/1530. 2 As a legal text, this kanunname of course tells us more about the
aims and assumptions of the Ottoman bureaucracy than about the gypsies
themselves. The Rumelian gypsies of this period were partly Muslims and
partly unbelievers (kafir). We do not know whether by the latter term, the
compiler meant Christians or else people practicing the ancient beliefs of the
Romanies. But while seventeenth-century Dutch authorities tended to repulse

' S u r a i y a Faroqhi, "The I ii'c Story of an Urban Saint in the Ottoman Empire, Piri Baba of
Merzifor," Tarih Dergisi 3 ( 1 9 7 9 ) : 653-678, particularly p. 670.
^ O m e r Lfltl'i Barkan (ed.). XV ve XVlinci Asirlarda Osrnanh Imparatorlugunda Zirui
Ekonominin Hukukl ve Matt Esaslan (Istanbul: Istanbul University, 1943), pp. 249-50.
 C O U N T E R F E I T I N G 167

gypsies who wished to be baptized, Ottoman officials drafted rules to ensure

that Islamized gypsies remained Muslims; those who persisted in roaming
about in the company of non-Muslims were to be punished, and pay the
higher taxes demanded from non-Muslims. 1 Legally the migration of gypsies
was restricted to the district (kadilik) in which they were registered, and
individuals or families were not allowed to leave the group (cemaat) of which
they officially formed a part. This regulation not only ensured the punctual
payment of taxes, but probably also was intended as a control measure, since
the compilers of the kanunname took a dim view of the virtue of gypsy
women. However incredible in Abdi's particular case, his accusation against
the gypsy of Kiitahya made sense in the framework of assumptions
documented by the kanimnami.

The counterfeiter's accomplices are minor figures in our story. Much

more prominent were the — unfortunately anonymous — people of the
neighbourhood. Inhabitants of Abdi's town quarter first brought his case to the
attention of the authorities, and participated as witnesses in the production of
the report extant in the kadi's registers. They also contributed information
about Abdi, suggesting that he was a hardened and habitual criminal. No one
came forward to testify in his favour, possibly indicating fear of the
authorities. Or else the unfortunate dyer was not very popular. In the Bursa
case, the neighbours were less in evidence, as prosecution was initiated by the
mint official. However witnesses who probably lived in the neighbourhood
were recruited for the searchin g of Mansur's house.

Neighbours were obliged to interest themselves in Abdi's doings

because otherwise they might have been held responsible for them. 2 If a crime
had been committed in a town quarter, the inhabitants had to find the criminal
or pay damages. Hosts were responsible for their guests in the same manner.
In difficult times, for instance when an attack by robbers or rebels was
imminent, all residents of a town quarter might be obliged to formally vouch
for one another, and those people unable to find sureties would be forced to
leave the place. 3 Even when no formal guarantee was involved, however,
collective responsibility lec some people intensely to scrutinize their
neighbours' doings. Thus the people complaining about Abdi b. Murad knew
that the searchers eventually would find counterfeit coins, and timed their
denunciation accordingly. Since coins were not visible to the casual observer.

Barkan, Zirat Ekonominin Hukuki ve Mali Esaslari, p. 250. On Dutch reactions see Simon
Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden
Age (London, Collins, 1987), pp. 595-96.
- U r i e l Heyd, Studies in Old Ottomcn Criminal Law, cd. V. L. Menage (Oxford- Clarendon
Press, 1973), pp. 238ff.
3
O z e r Ergem;, "Osmanli §ehrindel.i 'Mahalle'nin I§lev ve Nitelikleri Uzerine," Osmanh
Ara^tirmalari 4 (1984): 69-78, gives a comprehensive overview of relations within and among
Ottoman town quarters, based upon t f e AKR.
168 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S T A T E

some of Abdi's neighbours must have taken the trouble to question his
apprentice or peer into his courtyard. We already know that they also claimed
that Abdi had been apprehended three or four times but always had managed to
save his skin. If true, this would point to the counterfeiter's good relations
with some of the more powerful men in the city; and, since those who
consorted with the governor and his men had a bad reputation in sixteenth and
seventeenth-century Anatolia, such an association may explain the neighbours'
contempt for Abdi. 1

As Ottoman kadi registers rarely relate a judgment, it is hard to say

whether this general blackening of Abdi's character had any effect. In the
Ottoman court proceedings, the question of whether the accused was a first
offender or else a hardened criminal was sometimes brought up, and must have
been significant when determining the penalty. Thus in a case recorded in the
register of (¡brum in 1004-5/1595-97, a thief who had been caught red-handed
produced a number of witnesses to show that he had not been known as a thief
in the past. 2 Given his bad reputation, Abdi must have been in deep trouble,
and his protectors, if any, had their work cut out for them.

P E N A L T I E S

In the absence of evidence concerning Abdi's fate, we can only trace

what should have happened to him according to the Ottoman criminal law as
codified in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Laws concerning minting and
mints dated back to [he reign of Mehmed the Conqueror, and decreed that
counterfeiters were to be executed. 3 Since Abdi denied the accusation arid there
were no witnesses, ii is difficult to say whether a kadi's court would have
found him guilty of this crime. At the very least, though, he should have been
punished for the possession of instruments suitable for counterfeiting, for the
penal code of Suleyman the Lawgiver, compiled by the niganci and historian
Celalzade Mustafa Pa^a, recognized such possession as a separate crime.
However the code does not specify the "severe punishment" to be meted out in
such cases. 4 Possibly Abdi was not tried by the Ankara kadi's court at ail, but
sent to Istanbul, so his case could be decided in the Sultan's Council. In the
late seventeenth and cur y eighteenth centuries counterfeiters were sometimes

' S u r a i y a Faroqhi, "Politic;,! Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanic
Legitimation (1570-1650).' 'ournai of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, X X X I V
(1992), 1-39, reprinted in thi> volume,
f o r u m Kadi Sicili n. 1, lu-atcd in the f o r u m Kiitüphanesi, f o r u m . I used a microfilm made for
Middle Bast Technical Um\ -rsitv. Ankara. Compare f. 56a (according to variant pagination f.
45b).
•'Anhegger and Inalcik. Kuuumiame, pp. 5 and 9. However, lesser penalties were also inflicted
(compare Heyd, Studies, p 270).
4
H e y d , Studies, pp. 83 and L I .
 C O U N T E R F E I T I N G 169

imprisoned in a fortress. 1 But we know so little about crime and repression in

the e a r l y - m o d e r n O t t o m a n E m p i r e that it is impossible to g a u g e the
likelihood of Abdi's escaping execution.

C O N C L U S I O N

A cursory reading of sultanic decrees and kadi registers dating from the
years around 1600 suggests that robbery by real or alleged servitors of the
state was the most socially visible, and possibly also the most frequent, crime
of the period. Irregular soldiers attacked private homes, stole what they could
carry and destroyed what they could not. Others descended upon hapless
villages and demanded a host of legal or illegal contributions, often misusing
the fines which constituted an important part of the Ottoman system of
penalties. 2 Historians have stressed that war-making and state-making in early-
modern Europe show many features we associate with organized crime; and in
this respect as well as many others, the Ottoman polity was an early-modern
state. 3

Y o u n g Anatolian villagers of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth

c e n t u r i e s had little d i f f i c u l t y in o b t a i n i n g a musket and j o i n i n g t h e
mercenaries; but this response to official spoliation was not available to —
a m o n g others — older t o w n s m e n . 4 Admittedly most townspeople were less
likely than villagers to be robbed by provincial dignitaries' mercenaries, unless
they traveled, or experienced an occupation of their city by a large group of
irregulars. Nevertheless, "some rob you with a shotgun, some with a fountain
pen," and as townspeople were more involved than villagers in the money
economy, they particularly were victimized by the monetary instability and
price increases of the times. Under these circumstances quite a few responded
by attempting to manipulate the currency, even if they did not actually
counterfeit. The filing of coins certainly was a mass phenomenon. Seen from
this point of view, the activities of Abdi b. Murad or Ruhi Hiiseyin indicate
the social tensions of their period, just as the smuggling of narcotics or the
use of violence against foreign immigrants show up the fault lines of our own
society.

' N e § e Erim, "Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Kalebendlik Cezasi ve S u s a n n Siniflandirilmasi

Üzerine bir Deneme," Osmanli Ara;- tirmalari 4 (1984): 79-88.
2
Halil inaicik, "Adäletnämeler, Belgier 2.3-4 (1965): 49-145, particularly pp. 75-84.
' Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Bringing the State Back
In, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and T h e d a Skocpol (Cambridge- C a m b r i d g e
University Press, 1985), pp. 169-91.
4
H a l i l Inaicik, "Military and Fiscal T r a n s f o r m a t i o n in the Ottoman E m p i r e , 1600-1700 "
Archivimi Ottoniamomi 6(1980): 283-337, see partiularly pp. 292-95.
 THE LIFE AND DEATH
OF OUTLAWS IN gORUM

Ever)' reader of detecti m stories has come to associate particular crimes

and methods of investigation with particular places and periods. Sherlock
Holmes collects scientific clues in foggy gaslit London, to protect himself and
others from the machinations of the criminal mastermind Professor Moriarty.
Agatha Christie's Hercule Potrot puts to work his little grey cells to discover
a vicious murderer in a peaceful country house, not usually a professional
criminal but an ordinary person tempted by financial gain. And Robert van
Gulik's Judge Dee remains faithful to the tradition of the Chinese detective
story by solving all his cases in a virtuoso courtroom finale. 1

And what about the Ottomans? Our knowledge of Ottoman criminals

and low life is as yet very limited, even though the kadis' records of provincial
cities, the Registers of Important Affairs and the Complaints Registers all
contain references to criminal cases. 2 But since only the kadis's records were
put together locally, and all other materials compiled in Istanbul, we possess
evidence largely on cases considered important enough to be brought before
the Sultan's Council (divan-1 humayun). Even the kadis' records contain
significant gaps; rarely were the crimes recorded here committed in the
countryside, even though the vast majority of the Ottoman population lived in
villages. Among the townsmen, the crimes which found their way into the
judges' registers also were surprisingly few in number. Even if we assume that
Ottoman subjects were unusually law-abiding, the crime rate calculated on the
basis of the kadi registers appears impossibly low.

There is however one type of crime on which we do possess ample

documentation, namely highway robbery. Particularly the Registers of
Important Affairs are full of sultanic rescripts responding to the complaints of
governors, kadis and ordinary Ottoman subjects concerning the lack of safety
on the public roads. 3 The problem was of long standing, and by far antedated
the turbulent years before and after 1600, which contemporaries and modern
historians alike have regarded as the heyday of banditry. For even in the
reign of Selim the Grim, who prided himself on scaring bandits off the roads,

'On the history of detective stories, compare Symons (1975).

^Compare Binark el alii (1992). Th s work contains a listing of Muhimme Defterleri, §ikayet
Defterleri and their 18th century successors the Ahkam Defterleri.
• O n literary traditions concerning a noble robber, probably active around 1600, compare the
article "Koro^hlu" in FJ, 2nd edition (Pertev Naili Boratav).
 172 COPING WITH THE STATE

robbers threatened anyone who ventured outside the confines of his/her town. 1
Nomads of the central Anatolian dry steppe eked out a meagre livelihood by
attacking travellers, and badly-paid low-level officials, medrese students, and
even pass guards, were all at one time or another accused of highway robbery. 2
But the principal culprits were mercenaries in and out of employment, the so
called levend. On the basis of this word and the term for robber (e$kiya) a
new composite expression was formed and entered the Ottoman vocabularly:
levend e$kiyasi.

Levend e§kiyasi, with more or less dubious claims to the status of

soldiers, were widespread between 1570 and the early 1700s. The steadily
increasing cost of warfare induced the Ottoman central administration to make
provincial governors recruit their own mercenary forces, who did not form pari
of the regular military establishment. 3 Such people found themselves without
employment whenever a governor was deposed, or whenever their employer
considered that he would be better served by a rival band of mercenaries. 4 In
addition, even though armies operating on the H a p s b u r g frontiers w e r e
supported largely from Rumelian districts, and armies deployed against Iran by
levies on the province of Diyarbakir, the wars on remote frontiers still resulted
in a considerable coming and going of soldiers. 5 It was unavoidable that some
of these deserted or were left behind and thus found themselves without a
legitimate source of livelihood. All these men often tried to make a living by
banditry.

T HE S ETT IN G

On the face of it, the Chorum area offered mediocre opportunities to

prospective robbers. What regional traffic there was followed the route from
A n k a r a to A m a s y a by' way of £ o r u m , which Busbecq and D e r n s c h w a m
travelled when Siileyman the Lawgiver held court in A m a s y a . 6 But by the
closing years of the sixteenth century, Sultans and princes no longer resided in
A m a s y a , and the cits suffered seriously both from its demise as a political
centre and from disruption of the trade routes by outlaws and rebellious
mercenaries. Between 1576 and 1642, the town lost one half of its population,
and even the Great Mosque founded by Sultan Bayezid II no longer had much

' O r a l p r e s e n t a t i o n b y C o r n e l l F l e i s c h e r at the s y m p o s i u m " L e g a l i s m a n d P o l i t i c a l L e g i t i m a t i o n

in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e and ihe Early T u r k i s h R e p u b l i c , ca. 1 5 0 0 - 1 9 4 0 " ( B o c h u m , 1988).
2
A k d a g ( 1 9 6 3 ) . C e z a r ( l % . S ) , O r h o n l u ( 1 9 6 7 ) , p. 8 8 .
3
lnalcik (1980).
4
Kunt(1981).
• V i n k e l ( 1 9 8 8 ) , vol. 1, p. 42'T.. K i i t ü k o g l u ( 1 9 6 2 ) , p. 3 0 f f .
^ B u s b e c q ( 1 7 4 4 ) , p p . 5 8 - " v D e r n s c h w a m ( 1 9 2 3 ) , p. 151ff.
 O U T L A W S IN Ç O R U M 173

of a congregation. 1 The normal terminus of the Ankara-forum-Amasya route

would have been Samsun on the Black Sea. But Samsun was also in profound
crisis, and little remained of its fifteenth-century commercial importance. 2 The
town survived as a mere fortress where Ottoman garrisons tried to protect the
area from Cossack raids — albeit with limited success. Traffic on (forum's
main route was therefore limited; the rich silk caravans from Iran to Bursa and
Istanbul passed a few kilometres to the north, and f o r u m remained a
commercial backwater.

There was however some local trade, f o r u m possessed several khans in

which cotton , edible fats and grain could be stored. Clarified butter was traded,
and seems to have been a local product. But at the end of the sixteenth
century, large quantities of this comestible were demanded for the Sultan's
larder, causing bottlenecks in the town's own supply. 3 For potential robbers it
made no immediate difference whether the butter they stole was intended for
sale in the market or for delivery to the Sultan. A dealer in edible fats did in
fact complain to the court that he had been robbed on the road. In the long run
however, attacking the Sultan's officials was dangerous, as they were in a
much better position than merchants to get the culprit apprehended.

Opportunities for theft and robbery were not lacking within the town of
f o r u m either. One of the residents of a local khan complained of thieves who
had entered the place and robbed him, while thefts in markets and shopping
streets were also on record. But the latter were usually perpetrated by one or
two men only. Gangs of robbers found better opportunities in the open
countryside. They might demand ransom in food, fodder and money,
threatening to burn down a v i l a g e if they were not satisfied. Attacks on
women and boys also were a source of complaint. 4 In the case of boys, it is
often impossible to tell who was kidnapped, and who came along of his own
free will. Some of the boys originally taken by force later may have come to
enjoy the roving life of outlaws But for most of the peasants, bandit attacks
threatened the very survival of the village. The only recourse was to take
refuge in a fortified enclosure. But fortresses of all kinds seem to have been
less common in the region of f o r u m than some kilometres further south, near
Kir§ehir, and moreover flight to a place of safety, including the town itself,

'Jennings (1976); Faroqhi (1984), p. 273.

2
Faroqhi (1984). pp. 106-107.
3
T h i s information comes f r o m the one surviving sixteenth-century register of Ç o r u m , kept in the
Çorum Public Library. In the following notes, it will be referred to as Ç D . T h e register has two
paginations, but the page numbers are often illegible. T h e information referred to here is found
on fol. 33b (25a ff. according to the alternative method of pagination). In most cases there is a
difference of ten between the two paginations.
4
Ç D fol. 129b, Çorumlu document appendix, pp. 34-35.
174 COPING WITH THE STATE

was only possible given advance warning. 1 Robbing peasant villages therefore
constituted a favourite activity of bandits operating in the £ o r u m area.

THE ROBBERS

From among all the robbers of this troubled period, I have singled out
a group of obscure men w h o attacked the inhabitants of the £ o r u m , Sorgun
and Osmancik districts for an unspecified period of time, before they were
captured about 1004/ i 595-96. The reason for this particular choice is quite
fortuitous: It so happens that the one surviving pre-nineteenth century kadi
register of £ o r u m contains sixteen documents concerning the trial of these
bandits, and this comparatively a m p l e d o c u m e n t a t i o n constitutes a rare
bonanza. 2 All the available documents resulted from court proceedings againsl
the bandits, who where headed by a chief named Canfedaoglu. The trial ended
with their execution in 1595-96. Our documentation must be used critically
and with caution, for the entire account has been written by the bandits' sworn
enemies. Even in the very few instances in which the bandits are supposedly
quoted verbatim, it is quite possible that their statements were distorted, either
with malice aforethought or else unintentionally.

From the couit records we learn that C a n f e d a o g l u was merely a

nickname, and that the robber c h i e f s real name was Ta§demur b. Ishak. He
was a Turkmen from t i e village of Altundegin in the district of Yeni 11.3 Yeni
Il's inhabitants were largely nomads, but Ta§demiir was not reported to be a
m e m b e r of a tribal unit; probably his kin had settled one or two generations
previously. Why he adopted the name of Canfedaoglu is not stated; but one of
the members of his band, an older man, was known as Canfeda. Canfedaoglu
may have adopted this nickname in d e f e r e n c e to his old companion, or he
really may have claimed to be the older man's son.

A slightly different account of Canfedaoglu's identity is found in a

second court record. Here he is called Gediz Mehmed, f r o m the village of Halil
Fakihlti, and there is no reference to Altundegin. 4 In the presence of Canfeda,
witnesses from Halil Fakihlu were asked whether the older bandit was really
the robber chief's father. T h e villagers answered that they did not k n o w ;
Canfeda had a son who had left the village, and later the older man claimed

' Faroqhi ( 1984), p. 2 7 3 .

2
Ç D f o l . 1 2 7 a - 1 3 2 a , foi. : 6 1 a , 165a. T h e s e d o c u m e n t s w e r e p u b l i s h e d in the d o c u m e n t a r y
appendix to the review ÇnntnUu, published by the Ç o r u m Halkevi. C o m p a r e Çorumlu, document
appendix, pp. 2 8 - 4 7 .
3
Ç D fol. 127b, Çorumlu J o . u m e n t appendix, pp. 4 2 - 4 3 .
4
Ç D f o l . 127a. Çorumlu d o c u m e n t a p p e n d i x , p. 2 9 . O n Çoruin d u r i n g the sixteenth century
c o m p a r e Faroqhi ( 1 9 8 6 ) . in d.). i s l a m o g l u - i n a n ( 1 9 9 1 ) and Bulduk ( 1 9 9 2 ) .
 OUTLAWS IN gORUM 175

that his offspring had returned. Upon further questioning Canfeda admitted
having been present when his presumed son stole a few hundred sheep. Thus
the second story does not help us decide whether Mehmed was really Canfcda's
son or not. This vagueness concerning the relationship between the two men
is in itself remarkable, as Ottomans were normally identified by reference to
their fathers, and adoption all but unknown. However the villagers probably
found a court session in the presence of an out-of-town kadi and a high-level
military man rather intimidating, and may have been wary of revealing village
secrets to outsiders. Be that as it may, the environment in which Canfedaoglu
presumably grew up can be guessed at, whatever his exact origin. The
villagers of both Altundegin and Halil Fakihlii were probably of recent
vintage, many of them bred sheep as a sideline, and for an apprentice robber,
sheep rustling must have been a useful preparation.

Canfedaoglu claimed ta be a sipahi oglani, that is a member of the

salaried cavalry in the service of the Porte, who had joined up for the
Demirkapi campaign. He may be referring to the Caucasus war of 1578. 1
Canfedaoglu advertised his identity as a sipahi oglani by parading the red and
yellow flags of the corps, as was widely practised both by robbers and real
mercenaries.

When a member of the sipahi oglani, Canfedaoglu supposedly had

belonged to the sag ulufeciler, 13. boliik, with a daily pay of twelve akce.
and an appointment document from a certain Cafer Pa§a, about whom nothing
else is known. A f t e r his arrest, certain military men on the central
government's pay list (kapikullari) conceded that the bandit chief had once
been a soldier. But he had supposedly ceased to participate in campaigns many
years ago. The matter was then referred to Istanbul, and in due course the
f o r u m court was notified that Canfedaoglu's name could not be found in the
mukabele registers of his corps. 2 He was therefore denied the privileges of a
recognized military man, namely referral of his case to Istanbul and judgment
by the aga of his corps. Instead he was to be treated as an ordinary robber, to
be tried and sentenced locally. But it is quite possible that at one point in his
life, he had participated in a Caucasus war; for one of his many enemies in an
unguarded moment referred tc him as a §irvan kulu, another reference to an
Iranian campaign. 3

Canfedaoglu seems to have made Sorgun the centre of his operations,

and the men who were captured with him, including his associate Canfeda, all
came from the area. Sorgun, a district in the province of Rum at this time was

forumlu document appendix, p. 2 8 , 3 0 - 3 1 ; Kiitukoglu (1962)

' ( J D fol. 127a, 128a, p 37ff
%X> fol. 161 a, £orumlu document appendix, p. 45. In other texts, Canfedaoglu lays claim to
only 19 ak(e.
fol. 150b, (¿orumlu document appendix, pp. 42-43.
176 (.'OPING WITH THE STATE

completely rural, and the members of Canfedaoglu's band were probably

former tribesmen recently settled on the land. At the beginning of the
sixteenth century, this area had been largely tribal, and only during the
population expansion of the following decades did rural settlement really take
root. 1

Canfedaoglu's activities within the district of Sorgun may have

something to do with his alleged service to a former governor, for in his
defence he claimed that he had been collecting revenues on behalf of 'the
beylerbeyiThis claim is not in itself improbable, as the 'justice decrees'
(adaletname) of the period frequently refer to the inspection tours of
governors, which they normally undertook in the company of mercenaries.
Mercenaries even toured the countryside on their own, for provincial governors
frequently went on campaign, or were assigned to distant posts. Often they
still had revenues outstanding when they were recalled, and had the money due
to them collected by their men, who little supervised as they were, might
easily take to a life of banditry. At the very time that Canfedaoglu and his
men were being sentenced, a second important case was tried in the Corum
court, which revolved around the revenues that a former governor had illegally
collected from local residents. The circumstances under which grain and fodder
were carried off by bona-fide officials may not have been so very different from
the forays of Canfedaoglu and his men. But whoever the beylerbeyi may have
been, he preferred to remain anonymous after the bandits had been captured —
if indeed he was a real person, and not merely an invention of Canfedaoglu's,
by now desperately trying to save his neck. 3

If Canfedaoglu's possible patron thus remains a shadowy figure, the

bandit chief had quite i few enemies, and these very real people in positions of
power. Four ebnayi sipahiyan, presumably with their names properly recorded
in the mukabele registers, denounced Canfedaoglu as a fugitive from the
colours, who for the past twelve or thirteen years, had not participated in any
campaign. The military men also declared that Canfedaoglu had lied when he
claimed that he still had eight ulufes in Istanbul but had not gone to collect
them. Presumably Canfedaoglu had claimed to be on active service, with back
pay still owing him. The wrath of these soldiers must have been due to
previous brushes of Canfedaoglu with the forces of law and order. Apparently
the capture that led to his execution had been preceded by an arrest in Sivas,
but Canfedaoglu had managed to escape from confinement while
local authorities wrote to Istanbul for instructions. In a special declaration, the

' i s l a m o g l u - i n a n ( 1 9 9 1 ) . p. 6 8 .
2
Ç D fol. 128a, Çorumlu d o c u m e n t a p p e n d i x , p. 3 1 .
^ i n a l c i k ( 1 9 6 5 ) ; F a r o q h i 11986).
 OUTLAWS IN ÇORU M 177

soldiers even threatened to take the matter into their own hands unless the
bandit chief was severely punished. 1

FIGHTING A KADI

Even more dangerous for Canfedaoglu was the enmity of certain local
ulema. In part, this enmity might be called structural: by claiming to be a
military man, Canfedaoglu placed himself in opposition to the kadi and his
court. Ottoman provincial administration of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries was set up in such a manner that the kadi could not enforce his
judgements without the help af a governor and his subordinate commanders
(suba$i). Iri his turn the governor needed legitimation as a 'just' official, which
only the kadi could provide. 2 Both officials reported to the Sultan's Council
independently, and thus supervised one another. Many kadis appear to have
regarded the governor's mercenaries as a threat to good order in their districts,
particularly since they were often summoned by the local inhabitants to pass
on complaints about the lawless behaviour of the soldiery.

But there are more specific reasons why the Coram robbers faced an
extremely hostile court. One of the gang's principal enemies was Veliyeddin
Efendi, in the recent past, and possibly at the very time of the trial, kadi of
Sorgun. This judge owned a second house in Osmancik, a small town on the
Istanbul-Erzurum caravan route, where the latter crosses the Kizilirmak on an
elaborate stone bridge. 3 Canfedaoglu and his men had twice attacked a house
belonging to Veliyeddin. By accident or design, in both instances they picked
a time at which the kadi was ; bscnt. We do not know what prompted the first
attack; but it may have been the simple fact that Veliyeddin was phantastically
wealthy by local standards, ""hereupon the kadi presented his colleague of
Corum with a list of the items which had been stolen from his Sorgun house.
Or maybe at least in one instance 'liberated' is the correct word, for it is quite
possible that the slave who supposedly had been kidnapped by the robbers in
fact had followed them of his Dwn free will. Another former slave of the kadi,
who had stayed on as a free servitor, attempted to defend his employer's
possessions and was killed in he attempt.

This story shows that Veliyeddin could afford to feed at least two
servants. In addition, the kadi claimed to have lost three horses and three
camels. One can only surmise what a provincial kadi did with a stable full of

' ÇD in). 129a, Çorumlu document appendix, p. 33.

2
A k d a g (1963), p. 117; Heyd (1973). pp. 219-221 discuss the structural tensions between kadis
and military-administrative personnel
3
Ç D fol. 127a, Çorumlu document appendix, p. 29. On the bridge in Osmancik, compare Oulnan
(1975), pp. 112-115.
 178 COPING WITH THB STATE

expensive animals. To the central Anatolian villager of the time, horses were
an all but inaccessible luxury, and camels also were expensive to breed and
keep. Possibly the kadi of Sorgun invested in the transport business, renting
horses and camels to travellers on the Ankara-Amasya and Istanbul-Erzurum
routes; the presence of these animals also explains why he needed at least two
permanent servitors.

The kadi of Sorgun was economically active, possibly a transportation

entrepreneur, or else a moneylender. Surprising is the amount of money he
kept in his house. In his complaint against the robbers, the kadi claimed to
have lost several thousand guru$\ in late sixteenth-century £orum a house
could be purchased for a few hundred of these coins, though camels, textiles
and horses were relatively more expensive. If the kadi, as the archenemy of
Canfedaoglu and his men, did not wildly exaggerate his losses, we may
wonder about the reasons which induced him to keep so much money in his
house instead of investing it. Many wealthy men of this period put their
capital to work, invesling in trade or lending out money at interest. 1 Finding a
suitable business enterprise must have been more difficult in Sorgun than in
Bursa or Istanbul. Bui we also may surmise that the kadi of Sorgun, who after
the end of his tenure travelled to Istanbul to seek further appointment, kept
ready money around the house in case he needed it to secure the necessary
'influence'. 2 In that case he may have planned to write to his former slave, the
one who was killed by Canfedaoglu's band, and this servitor then would have
remitted the money through a trusted caravan merchant.

Veliyeddin's second residence, located in Osmancik, was appointed in a

manner consonant with his wealth, or else some of the items which he kept
there may have been t r ade goods. When Veliyeddin Efendi was in Istanbul and
the bandits attacked this residence as well, they found two baskets filled with
fabrics and Iranian t'avence, in addition to a supply of dried meat, raisins and a
whole load of clarified butter. 3 The haul also included a good horse and a gun.
The latter may seem a somewhat surprising possession in the hands of a
civilian official. Bui Veliyeddin Efendi obviously had made enemies, and in
spite of the attempt of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Ottoman
administrations to limit the spread of muskets, the latter seem to have been
available to whoe\er really wanted them. As a kadi Veliyeddin Efendi
possessed a sizeable number of contacts, both in £ o r u m and in Istanbul.
Chorum, Sorgun and Osmancik all were provincial districts, and ulema
appointed to the position of kadi in such places of minor importance
possessed very few chances of reaching the upper echelons of the ulema

' Inalcik (1969).

^ O n the a p p o i n t m e n t p r o i e d u r e s of p r o v i n c i a l k a d i s s e e U z u n s a r f i l i ( 1 9 6 5 ) , p. 8 7 f f . S e e a l s o
C D f o l . 30a, b, Q>rumlu. d o c u m e n t a p p e n d i x , p. 4 0 .
fol. 3 0 a , b, <y'orumh/ c i o c u m c n t a p p e n d i x , p. 4 0 .
 OUTLAWS IN Ç O R UM 179

hierarchy. Some of them managed to obtain successive appointments within a

single region, in this case central Anatolia, and when out of office, continued
to reside in the area. It is possible that f o r m e r kadis unable to secure further
official employment deputized for active kadis as naibs.1 In any case, a freshly
appointed kadi with little local information often might find f o r m e r confrères
to advise him, but w h o also expected their own business to be taken care of
with particular expediency. Veliyeddin Efendi seems to have formed part of
this local judicial network.

In addition the kadi had contacts in Istanbul as well, as he travelled to

the capital to seek new appointment. But he also used his contacts to push his
complaint against Canfedaoglu and his men through the appropriate offices,
and in §aban 1004/March-April 1596 secured a rescript which ordered the kadi
of Çorum to hear the case. A t another occasion, probably somewhat later, he
secured a rescript that Canfedaoglu was to be executed if he had killed anyone.
Veliyeddin must have been a personage of acumen and resources; unfortunately
we have no information whatsoever on the identity of his friends and backers.

THE BANDITS' VIEWPOINT

The kadi of Sorgun does not tell us why and how the bandit chief came
to regard him as a personal enemy. Canfedaoglu claimed to have been robbed
by Veliyeddin Efendi while in Sorgun, losing s o m e silk in the process.
Unfortunately, he does not tell us when this happened. 2 But in addition, the
kadi may have aroused the bandit's wrath by not meekly accepting his losses,
but taking the matter to Istanbul. This prompted a gesture of defiance on the
part of the bandit chief, n a m e y the dramatic attack on the kadi's house in
Osmancik. T h e bandits got hold of a 'Hazret-i Imam-i A z a m taci' a type of
headgear that symbolized Veliyeddin's status as a doctor of Hanefi law, and
hacked it to pieces. 3 Moreover Canfedaoglu declared that if the owner of the
tac had been present, he would have suffered the same fate. Originally the
robber chief had also planned to set fire to the kadi's house. But some of the
townsmen pointed out that he risked burning down the whole town, and were
able to make him desist. But Veliyeddin Efendi still had his revenge; for
though it seems that nobody had been killed or wounded in this second attack,
Canfedaoglu was sentenced to death a second time.

' O n naibs compare the article "Mahkama" in EI, 2nd edition (by Halil Inalcik).
2
Ç D fol. 30a, b, Çorumlu document appendix, pp. 40-41.
3
I thank A h m e t Karamustafa (Washington University, St. Louis) for discussing this problem
with me and making valuable suggestioas.
180 COPING WITH T HH ST AT E

T h e robber chief apparently tried to present his feud against Veliyeddin

Efendi as a semi-official procedure, for o n e of the texts refers to his attempted
'arrest and investigation' ( h a p i s ve t e f t i f ) of his e n e m y the kadi. N o w a tefti§
w a s a p u n i t i v e e x p e d i t i o n by a g o v e r n o r in c h a r g e of a p r o v i n c e o r
subprovince, or by his s u b o r d i n a t e c o m m a n d e r s (suba$i). Although
C a n f e d a o g l u n e v e r held provincial o f f i c e , he s e e m s t o h a v e seen himself in
this role. 1 T h i s was p r o b a b y facilitated by the fact that he did h a v e a f o r m e r
suba$i of the (Jorum district in his band, a certain Ferhad, w h o w a s c a p t u r e d
along with him.

T h e s e g e s t u r e s , h o w e v e r f u t i l e in practical t e r m s , are s i g n i f i c a n t
because they s h o w that C a n f e d a o g l u and his m e n had a vision of w h a t they
w e r e doing, b e y o n d the simple c o n c e r n s of food and p l u n d e r . T h e starting
point may h a v e been a personal f e u d , as bandits the world o v e r were p u s h e d
o u t of their villages for this very r e a s o n . B u t by c l a i m i n g to be e n g a g e d in
o f f i c i a l p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s t an u n j u s t k a d i , C a n f e d a o g l u a c c e p t e d t h e
f r a m e w o r k of the O t t o m a n state, and a t t e m p t e d to d e r i v e s o m e l e g i t i m a c y
f r o m this s o u r c e . H o w e v e r his a t t e m p t w a s a c o m p l e t e f a i l u r e . W h i i e
C a n f e d a o g l u ' s claim to be a military m a n w a s at least c o n s i d e r e d w o r t h y of
refutation on the part of the authorities, his attempt to m a k e his f e u d appear as
part of an official proceeding only met with c o n t e m p t u o u s silence.

It is difficult to d e t e r m i n e w h a t particular point the bandits intended to

m a k e by the destruction of the kadi's h e a d g e a r . In O t t o m a n society to t h e
T a n z i m a t and b e y o n d , and in a m o d i f i e d f a s h i o n , in p r e s e n t day T u r k i s h
society as well, h e a d g e a r s y m b o l i z e s a person's place in society. 2 Ulema and
m a j o r state officials wore special kinds of turbans (kavuk and sank), while the
tac w a s mainly c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of d e r v i s h orders. Y e t the r e f e r e n c e to A b u
H a n i f a , the Imam-i A/.am, m a k e s it clear that this particular piece of h e a d g e a r
must h a v e belonged to the world of the ulema and not to that of the dervishes.
B y h a c k i n g it to pieces, the bandits p r e s u m a b l y denied V e l i y e d d i n E f e n d i ' s
legitmacy as a m e m b e r of the ulema. It is less certain that they also i n t e n d e d
to m a k e a statemeni against ulema in general. Given the tension b e t w e e n t h e
latter a n d military p e r s o n n e l in t h e p r o v i n c e s , s u c h an i n t e n t i o n is n o t
inconceivable. Kadis often w e r e able to pose as the (real or alleged) protectors
of the Sultan's s u b j e w s and to pen disparaging remarks a b o u t the b e h a v i o u r of
governors, suba^is and their military retainers. T h e latter w e r e often regarded
as marginal to r e s p e c t a b l e s o c i e t y ; r a m b u n c t i o u s , e v e r spoiling for a f i g h t ,
unpredictable, and i m o r r e g i b l e w i n e bibbers. It is therefore quite probable that

' ( ) n the teftis see H e y d ( 1973), pp. 2 2 8 - 2 2 9 a n d Y i l m a z , N e u m a n n ( 1 9 9 3 ) . C o m p a r e Ç D f o l .

161a, Çorumlu document a p p e n d i x , p. 44.
2 KOÇU (1969), p. 162f. and passim c o n t a i n s a great deal of i n f o r m a t i o n on h e a d g e a r
 OUTLAWS IN g O R UM 181

the targets of all this vituperation harboured less than friendly feelings against
the ulema as a group. 1

This becomes even more probable when we look at the account of the
bandits' capture. When the military men confronting them invited Canfedaoglu
and his men to give themselves up, invoking the §eriat, the response
supposedly was: "Dahi bir siz ve bir de §eriatiniz mi varmi§?" 2 The sense of
this remark seems to have been a slighting reference both to the capturing
soldiers and to the §eriat. We lack a study of Ottoman swearing and
swearwords during this period; so it is difficult to say how serious the insult
was, and to what extent the slighting reference to the §eriat was intended to be
taken seriously. It is quite possible that remarks of this kind were not meant
as an outright challenge lo religion, any more than the innumerable
swearwords which came out of the mouths of sixteenth and seventcenth-
century European mercenaries. But it still makes sense to assume an
atmosphere of widespread diffuse hostility to the ulema a m o n g Ottoman
irregulars of the time.

TRIAL AND EXECUTION

We do not know for how long Canfedaoglu remained at large after his
second attack upon Veliyeddin, since neither the date of the Osmancik raid nor
that of his capture are known. However it is probable that soldiers were sent
out to arrest him because of Veliyeddin's persistent complaints. Moreover the
latter found an ally in the administrator in charge of crown lands assigned to
the Valide Sultan, for several villages which Canfedaoglu had plundered paid
their dues to the powerful Safiye Sultan. 3 Villagers in charge of a lowly
rtmar-holder, who was frequently absent on campaign and had little money to
spare, found it more difficult to bring their complaints to the attention of the
central administration than those w h o were attached to powerful pious
foundations or crown lands. Canfedaoglu was summoned to court by the
soldiers, but decided to resist. After four people had been wounded, the brigand
chief and twelve of his men were taken. They were confined in the castle of
(Torum, a small but solid structure that survives down to the present day.

The court case which +'ollowed was a long drawn-out and complicated
affair, and resulted in a command f r o m the Ottoman Sultan to execute
Canfedaoglu. 4 At an earlier stage, proceedings against the robber chief had

'Faroq/ii (¡992).
^QD fol. 128a, Qorumlu document appendix, p. 30.
3
f D fol. 129b, 130a, Qorumlu document appendix, p. 35. On the Valide Sultan compare Peircc
(1993). Safiye Sultan became the Valide in Cemazi I 1003/January 1595.
QD fol. 161.1, Qorumlu document appendix, pp. 44-45.
182 OPING WITH THE S T ATH

been started in Sivas. Since the kadi registers of Sivas for this period have
been lost, we only know of a complaint lodged in Istanbul by the governor-
general of Rum. Presumably the driving force behind the whole affair was
again Kadi Veliyeddin, for it was the attack on one of his houses that was
reported to Istanbul The Sultan's Council ordered the kadis of Sivas and
Gelmugad to hear the case, and the governor-general to assist them. If
Canfedaoglu was found to be a robber and murderer, he was to be executed. To
serve as evidence against Canfedaoglu, a copy of this sultanic rescript was
expedited to f o r u m , and the kadi of Sivas Hayriinnas Efendi attested that the
copy conformed to the original. Canfedaoglu and his men thereby had become
people with a notorious criminal past, and in the event of a second conviction,
liable to severe punishment.

In the f o r u m trial, a crowd of different people accused Canfedaoglu and

the other members of his band of spoliation, attacks upon women and the
kidnapping of boys. In the robbery of Kadi Veliyeddin's house, homicide was
also involved. Among the plaintiffs, we find officials such as the
administrator of the Valide Sultan's estate and the commander of Palace
cavalry in charge of the robbers' arrest. But the majority were ordinary
peasants and small traders. Quite typical was the complaint of Ismail b. Ali
from the village of Aliki/Ali bey in the vicinity of Coram. 1 He declared that
Canfedaoglu had originally planned to spend time in the latter village, but in
the end pitched camp in another settlement close by. However he sent several
of his men over to Ismail's village to collect supplies. Most of the villagers
were able to flee in time, but the plaintiff was caught, and attempted to get off
by paying a few guriq. However the robbers claimed to be offended by the
small amount of money offered and beat him up. They also plundered other
houses and raped women, but Ismail b. Ali does not mention the names of
any victims apart from himself. In the end they came away with 20 guru§ and
10 keyl of barley. From the deposition of the plaintiff's witnesses, two
visitors from another village, it seems that this was a prestation the brigands
deigned to accept, in exchange for leaving the other villagers in peace.

It was the responsibility of the court to set up a full list of the crimes
perpetrated by Canledaoglu and his men, and establish the amounts of
compensation money the victims were entitled to. Thirty separate crimes were
considered proven, and Ismail b. Ali and his fellow villagers were among the
claimants awarded damages, even though we do not know the exact amount. 2
The total compensation payment amounted to 72,000 akge. However
this payment only covered the attacks on Kadi Veliyeddin's house and the

' Ç D fol. 129b, Çorumlu document appendix, pp. 34-35.

2
Ç D fol. 131b, Çorumlu document appendix, p. 46 merely says that all creditors received a sum
of money proportionate ta the size of the debt owed to them.
 OUTLAWS IN CORUM 183

spoliation of villages in the immediate vicinity of f o r u m , such as Sekerbey,

Yogunpelil. and Bayat. Damages inflicted upon villagers in the Sivas area,
where Canfedaoglu allegedly had been active as well, were not taken into
consideration. Given the magnitude of his losses and the weight of his
political influence, the lion's share of the 72,000 akge in question was
probably awarded to the kadi of Sorgun, but our document shows the
plaintiffs, large and small, acting in common. The compensation hearings
were held in the presence of Canfedaoglu and his men, who admitted some of
the attacks and spoliations but denied others.

In the end, the compensation arrangements turned out to be quite

meaningless, for the bandits were as poor as church mice or else managed to
convey that impression. Canfedaoglu testified that 50 gold pieces, 30 guru§
and an unspecified number of akge had been carried off by some of his men
when they escaped capture. He also admitted the ownership of a box and a
purse which he had buried in a village near the place where he was arrested,
and which supposedly contained some gold, silver and a sword. 1 However the
buried treasure never emerged, and the property secured after his arrest was
minimal: two horses, two muskets, and a few clothes and personal objects.
Canfedaoglu did not apparently own land or sheep in his native village. The
protocol tells us nothing about the personal possessions of the band members
arrested along with Canfedaoglu. This is not quite easy to explain, as there
were several crimes at which the robber chief had not been personally present,
but which had been committed by his underlings. The only explanation that I
can think (if is that the band members sold their horses and arms to keep
themselves in food during the ninety days of their detention; Canfedaoglu
admitted that he had disposed of some of his property for this purpose, and
also to pay his debts. But that still leaves us with the problem why
Canfedaoglu's clothes and personal effects were sold, presumably after his
death, to pay the compensation money, while this did not happen in the other
cases. Be that as it may, the sale produced only 10,380 akge which the
claimants divided among themselves. It was a meager compensation.

At the next stage, a group of respected local inhabitants, along with

others of more modest social station, demanded the execution of the bandits.
Not suprisingly, the representative of the kadi of Sorgun took a prominent
role in the proceedings; after all, Kadi Veliyeddin presumably had friends
among the local ulema.2 The kadi pronounced the death sentence against
twelve men, including the brigand chief himself and the former suba$i Ferhad.
The old bandit Canfeda is not mentioned, probably he had died in jail. Our
last piece of evidence is a record of execution, concerning five of the men

' g D fol. 130b-131b, gorumlu document appendix, pp. 37-39.

fol. 130b-131b. Q>rumlu document appendix, p. 39.
184 COPING WITH THK STATE

including Ferhad. What happened to the other seven remains unknown,

although it is likely that they met a similar end. The list is undated, but the
executions probably took place about §aban 1004/April 1596, the date at
which the death sentences were recorded in the kadi's register. 1

CONCLUSION

Canfedaoglu does not seem to have possessed any close social ties in
the vicinity of Corum, even though he originated from a nearby district, where
living conditions were roughly comparable. His probably recent nomadic
background must have made it easy for him to adopt the life of a wandering
military man, and occasional brigandage belonged to the life style of
Anatolian nomads as well. It is not likely however that Canfedaoglu's
activities should be interpreted as a sign of profound hostility between riomads
and settled villagers, ¿ven though most of Canfedaoglu's victims were
peasants. In the steppes of central Anatolia, the dividing line between the two
groups was often blurred, and Canfedaoglu's identity as a real or spurious
military man was more important than the nomadic past of his forebears.

If the available documents reflect reality, Canfedaoglu's downfall was

brought about by his feud with Kadi Veliyeddin Efendi. Even though the
Sultan's Council, the governor-general of Rum and high-ranking officers of
the Porte cavalry all played a major role in his arrest and execution, it was
Veliyeddin Efendi that mobilized the authorities against his enemy. In part,
this was the outcome of the dualistic structure of Ottoman privincial
administration; the kadi represented the $eriat and claimed to defend Ottoman
taxpaying subjects against exactions on the part of the military. Whether the
latter were regularly employed or freelancers made only a limited amount of
difference. Canfedaoglu's gestures of defiance against ¡¡eriat and ulema surely
must be interpreted in this context. Seen from this angle, Canfedaoglu and his
men were both actois in and victims of a political c o n f l i c t whose
ramifications remained unknown to them.

But apart from this structural factor, Canfedaoglu and his fellow
brigands may also be viewed within a specific political conjuncture. The
closing years of the sixteenth century witnessed a long and indecisive war on
the Hapsburg frontier, conflict with Iran and civil war in many parts of
Anatolia, as the rebel armies of Kalenderoglu, Kara Yazici and others
threatened Ottoman control over the A n a t o l i a n p r o v i n c e s . 2 Under
these circumstances, Sultans Murad III and Mehmed III were concerned about

' Ç D fol. 132a, Çorumlu d o c u m e n t a p p e n d i x , p. 4 7 .

2
C . r i s w o l d ( 1 9 8 3 ) , p. 157ft
 O U T L A W S IN Ç O R I I M 185

retaining the loyalty of the remaining reaya by projecting an image of

imperial justice. On a more mundane plane, it became important to protect the
tax-paying capacity of the peasants by preventing illegal exactions wherever
possible. It is certainly not due to mere chance that in the very year of
Canfedaoglu's trial and execution, the kadi of f o r u m yielded to the pressure of
the town's wealthier inhabitants and forced a former governor to pay back at
least some of the grain and money collected as illegal exactions. 1 On a general
level, it is true that most bandits manage to remain active for only a limited
period; the majority get caught and sentenced within only a short span of
time. 2 But Canfedaoglu and his men might have remained at large a while
longer if they had not chosen to commit their depredations at a time when
bandit repression ranked high on the Ottoman administration's political
agenda.

We do not know what prompted Canfedaoglu to leave the military life

which he had probably led for some time. He must have been a reasonably
successful commander, as his band at certain times in its history numbered
from eighty to ninety horsemen. If his story of service to a provincial
governor is even half-way true, tie must have belonged to the large number of
mercenary commanders who offered their services to Ottoman provincial
administrators, hired and fired as occasion arose. Canfedaoglu seems to have
been one of those 'soldier-brigands', also familiar to historians of modern
China, who sought security and status within the army, and yet were unable
to maintain themselves in official service, even if by chance they managed to
enter it. 3 As former brigands they remained marginal men, to be used as
cannon fodder on the Caucasus front, or else pushed back into brigandage until
they met their end on a gallows near f o r u m . There was nothing about
Canfedaoglu and his men to remind us of the 'noble robber', and it is unlikely
that their adventures were often recounted by the a.^ik of f o r u m , Sorgun or
Osmancik. 4

'Faroqhi (1986).
2
H o b s b a w m ( 1 9 8 1 ) , p. 55.
3
Billingsley (1988), p. 200ff.
^ H o b s b a w m (1981), pp. 127-134 discus nes the symbolic role of bandit heroes.
186 C O P I N G WITH THE STAI' K

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History, X I X , 9"' 140.
— , (1980): Militar) and fiscal t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , 1600-1700.
In: Archivum Otti manicum, VI, 2 8 3 - 3 3 7 .
i s l a m o g l u - i n a n , H u i i j i h a n ( 1 9 9 1 ) : Osmanli imparatorlugunda devlet ve köylü
(Istanbul: Heldin Yaymlari).
 O UT L A W S IN g O R U M 187

Jennings, Ronald (1976): Urban population in Anatolia in the sixteenth century:

A study of Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon and Erzurum. In: International
Journal of Middle East Studies, 7, 21 -57.
K05U, R e j a t Ekrem (1969): Türk giyim ku§am ve süslenme sözlügü (Ankara:
Siirnerbank Yaymlari).
Kunt, Metin (1981): Bir Osmanh mlisinin yillik gelir-gideri, Diyarbekir 1670-71
(Istanbul: Bogaziii (Jniversitesi).
Kütükoglu, Bekir (1962): Osmanh-iran siyasi münasebetleri, I, 1578-1590
(Istanbul: IÜ Edebiyal Fakültesi Yayinlari).
Yilmaz, Fikret and Christopl" Neumann (1993): Die "Inspektion der
Ungerechtigkeiten" und die Kontrolle der Lokalverwaltung im Osmanischen
Reich (16. Jh.). In: Periplus, 3, 15-30.
Orhonlu, Cengiz (1967): Osmanh Imparatorlugunda derbend te$kilati (Istanbul: IÜ
Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayinlari).
Peirce, Leslie (1993): The Imperial Harem, Women and Sovereignty in the
Ottoman Empire (Oxford, London...: Oxford University Press).
Symons, Julian (1975): Bloody murder, from the detective story to the crime
novel: a history (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books).
U/.un^arjili, Ismail Hakki (1965): Osmanh devletinin ilmiye te§kilati (Ankara:
Türk Tarih Kurumu).
 RÄUBER, REBELLEN UND OBRIGKEIT
IM OSMA NISCHEN ANATOLIEN

In vielen vorindustriellen Gesellschaften (und m a n c h m a l selbst in

industriellen) ist es schwierig zu bestimmen, wer ein Räuber und wer ein
Rebell ist. Viele mit Steuern und Diensten überlastete Bauern unterstützten
Räuber nicht nur aus Angst vor Überfällen oder aus verwandtschaftlicher
Solidarität, sondern auch, um damit gegen ihr eigenes schweres Leben zu
protestieren. Allerdings war der edle Räuber, der Robin Hood, der den Reichen
etwas abnahm, um die Armen zu beschenken, eher ein Wunschbild, dem in der
W i r k l i c h k e i t k a u m ein R ä u b e r auf längere Zeit e n t s p r e c h e n konnte1.
Geldmangel, die Pressionen neu hinzugestoßener Bandenmitglieder oder auch
die Notwendigkeit, außerhalb der Heimatgegend in einem feindlichen Milieu
zu agieren, zwangen die Anführer fast aller Räuberbanden, auch arme Leute zu
überfallen oder sich f ü r die 2,iele von Reichen und Notabein einspannen zu
lassen. Auf längere Sicht konnte sich das rächen, denn ein Bandenchef, der in
seinem Milieu nicht mehr akzeptiert war, wurde oft genug ermordet oder an die
jeweilige Staatsmacht ausgeliefert 2 .

Andererseits sahen Fürsten, Sultane und ihre Amtsträger alle Rebellen

als Räuber und Verbrecher. Iri den offiziellen Dokumenten, die jedenfalls im
osmanischen Bereich unsere einzige Quelle bilden — kein R ä u b e r hat
Memoiren hinterlassen —, bezeichnet das Wort $aki (PI. e$kiya) Leute, die
rauben, um davon zu leben, aber auch M e n s c h e n , deren Ü b e r f ä l l e ein
politisches Ziel haben. Wir heutigen Historiker können versuchen, R a u b und
Rebellion voneinander zu trennen, aber es gibt umfangreiche Grauzonen, in
denen die Unterscheidung ste:s strittig bleiben wird. Übrigens sind nicht nur
manche Räuberhauptleute potentielle Politiker, sondern viele Heerführer und
Herrscher — und gerade die erfolgreichsten unter ihnen — können als Vertreter
organisierten V e r b r e c h e n s interpretiert w e r d e n 3 . Für das frühneuzeitliche
Europa haben amerikanische Historiker diesen Aspekt herausgearbeitet, so daß
Wallenstein, aber auch L u d w i g XIV m i t s a m t seinen Steuerpächtern und
Finanzdirektoren als Schutzgelderpresser und Bandenchefs erscheinen.

' E r i c Hobsbawm, Bandits, New Yori 1972.

9
Zur Kritik an Hobsbawms Modell vgl. Anton Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village. 1860-1960,
A study of violent peasant entrepreneurs, Prospect Heights 1988, und Phil Billingslcy, Bandits in
Republican China, Stanford 1988.
• Frederic Lane, "Economic Consequences of Organized Violence", The Journal of Economic
History, XVIII, 1958, S. 401-417; Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized
Crime", in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rneschemeyer, Theda Skocpol (Hrsg.), Brinnins the State
back in, Cambridge 1985, S. 169-191.
 190 ('(PING WITH THE STATE

Im Folgenden werden wir uns mit der 'Berührungsfläche' zwischen der

osmanischen Zentralregierung und den kleinen Leuten in der Provinz befassen,
die in den amtlichen Quellen als e$kiya erscheinen. Dabei werden wir uns mit
den politischen Taktiken befassen, mit denen die osmanische Regierung diesen
e$kiya das Leben erschweren wollte, und mit den Folgen, die sich aus dieser
Politik ergaben.

DIE HERAUSFORDERUNG DER

STRAßENRÄUBEREI IM FRÜHEN 18.
JAHRHUNDER1

Unser Hauptinteresse gilt dem frühen 18. Jahrhundert, einer Periode, die
bis heute nur wenig erforscht ist. Dabei ist diese Zeit recht interessant, weil
die osmanische Regierung damals versuchte, die Provinzen wieder unter
Kontrolle zu b e k o m m e n , die ihr im Verlauf des osmanisch-habsburgischen
Krieges von 1683-99 weitgehend entglitten waren. Während dieses Krieges, der
mit der Belagerung Wiens begann und mit dem zeitweiligen Verlust der
Schlüsselfestung Belgrad endete, war für Verwaltungsaufgaben, die nicht direkt
mit dem Krieg zusammenhingen, kaum Geld vorhanden gewesen. Selbst auf
der politisch w i c h t i g e n Pilgerstraße nach M e k k a kam es zu größeren
Überfällen durch Beduinen, die mit ihren aus dem Staatsschatz gezahlten
Subsidien unzufrieden waren. Da diese bereits seit Jahrhunderten gezahlten
Subsidien in gewisser Weise die Beduinen dafür entschädigten, daß sie die
Pilger in Ruhe ließen mid ihnen manchmal Lebensmittel verkauften, bedeutete
der R ü c k g a n g der i x m a n i s c h e n P r ä s e n z ein e r h ö h t e s R i s i k o f ü r alle
Reisenden. 1 Aber auch ruf den anderen Hauptstraßen des Osmanischen Reiches
war durch die langjährige Abwesenheit von Janitscharen und
Militärlehensinhabern, die auch als Polizei fungierten, eine große Zahl von
Überfällen zu verzeichnen.

Nach dem Friedensschluß von Karlowitz und besonders nach dem Sieg
über Venedig 1715 stand nun die o s m a n i s c h e Z e n t r a l r e g i e r u n g vor der
Aufgabe, die Sicherheil auf den Hauptverkehrsstraßen wieder auf ein nach den
damaligen Maßstäben akzeptables Niveau zu bringen. Dies war wichtig wegen
des Karawanenhandels, von dem die wirtschaftlichen Zentren des Reiches
a b h ä n g i g waren; so war etwa die Krise von A l e p p o im 18. Jahrhundert
mitbedingt durch die 1 'usicherheit der Zufahrtswege. 2 Aber daneben stand auch
die Legitimität des Osmanensultans auf dem Spiel, der sich besonders seit
1517, als Mekka und Medina Bestandteile des Reiches geworden waren, immer

' K a r l B a r b i r , Ottoman RuL- n Damasats, 1 7 0 8 - 1 7 5 8 , P r i n c e t o n , N J 1980.

^ R o b e r t P a r i s , Histoire du < mimerei' de Marseille, Bd. V De 1660 à 17X9, P a r i s 1957, h r s g . v.
G a s t o n R a m b e r t , S. 4 1 2 - 4 1 <
 RÄUBER, REBELLEN UND OBRIGKEIT 191

als Schutzherr der Pilger dargestellt hatte. 1 Die z u n e h m e n d e Unsicherheit auf

den S t r a ß e n Syriens und A n a t o l i e n s stellte d e s h a l b auch im 'ideologischen'
Bereich f ü r die osmanische Zentralmacht eine große Herausforderung dar.

U m d i e Straßenräuberei unter Kontrolle zu bringen, w u r d e n schon seit

langem praktizierte politische Maßnahmen nun mit erhöhter Intensität
a n g e w e n d e t . S o w a r es seit d e m 15. und 16. J a h r h u n d e r t ü b l i c h g e w e s e n ,
Dörfer, die in der N ä h e gefährlicher Pässe und Straßenstrecken gelegen waren,
f ü r die Sicherheit der Reisenden verantwortlich zu m a c h e n . 2 A l s Gegenleistung
w a r e n die D o r f b e w o h n e r v o n v e r s c h i e d e n e n S t e u e r n b e f r e i t , m u ß t e n a b e r
diejenigen R e i s e n d e n entschädigen, die im Bereich ihrer Z u s t ä n d i g k e i t O p f e r
eines Raubüberfalles geworden waren. Trotz dieses Risikos waren die
Privilegien der Paßwächter oft recht begehrt. Neben der steuerlichen
Entlastung dürften dabei auch die Gelder, die m a n von den Reisenden auf m e h r
o d e r w e n i g e r l e g a l e m W e g e i n z i e h e n k o n n t e , e i n e g e w i s s e R o l l e gespielt
haben. Im Extremfall g a b es sogar Paßwächter, d i e sich selbst an Räubereien
beteiligten.

D i e s e P a ß w ä c h t e r w u r d e n im f r ü h e n 18. J a h r h u n d e r t r e o r g a n i s i e r t ;
j e d e n f a l l s s t a m m e n viele B e l e g e über K o m m a n d a n t e n , B e w a f f n u n g und f e s t e
Dienstpflichten aus dieser Z e i t . 3 A u c h konnten die P a ß w ä c h t e r sich j e t z t wohl
h ä u f i g e r auf befestigte Plätze stützen. D e n n entlang der V e r b i n d u n g Istanbul-
D a m a s k u s , ü b e r d i e Pilger v o n A n a t o l i e n u n d d e m B a l k a n n a c h M e k k a
gelangten und die a u c h f ü r den Handel sehr w i c h t i g war, w u r d e n zahlreiche
R a s t h ä u s e r e r r i c h t e t 4 . D i e s e bestanden j e w e i l s aus e i n e m von Ställen und
A u f e n t h a l t s r ä u m e n für Reiseride u m g e b e n e n H o f ; der einzige Z u g a n g war ein
T o r , das nachts versperrt w u r d e . Die fensterlosen A u ß e n m a u e r n erlaubten es,
diese R a s t h ä u s e r a u c h als k l e n c Festungen zu benutzen, in deren Schutz sich
notfalls auch die Bevölkerung der umliegenden Dörfer flüchten konnte.
Deshalb wurden solche Rasthäuser, han genannt, manchmal zu
Siedlungskernen; die zentralanatolisehen Kleinstädte Argithani und Kadinhani
tragen noch heute die N a m e n der hans, aus denen sie entstanden sind.

DIE BÜRGSCHAFT

Daneben wurden aber auch die Untertanen verpflichtet, sich gegenseitig

f ü r das Wohlverhalten ihrer Nachbarn zu verbürgen. Im islamischen Recht war

' S u r a i y a Faroqhi, Herrscher Uber Mekka, Die Geschichte der Pilgerfahrt München Zurich
1990. S. 75ff.
2
Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Derhend Teçkilâti, Istanbul 1967.
3
Ibid., S. 72.
4
J e a n Sauvaget, "Les caravanséraili syriens du hadidi de Constantinople"
r Ars lslamica IV
{1 cm\ c iw n i
192 COPING WITH r HK STAT E

die B ü r g s c h a f t entwickelt worden, um die Eintreibung von Schulden zu

erleichtern. Dabei unterscheiden die Rechtsgelehrten zwei Formen: einmal die
sogenannte Garantie zur Person, und zweitens die Bürgschaft f ü r die Schuld
eines Dritten im eigentlichen Sinne. Im ersteren Fall verpflichtete sich der
Bürge nur, das Erscheinen des Schuldners vor Gericht zu bewerkstelligen;
gelang ihm das nicht, mußte er selber mit einer Verhaftung rechnen. In beiden
Fällen war die Bürgschaft eine freiwillig übernommene Verpflichtung. 1

Im osmanischen Reich war diese Form der Schuldbürgschaft durchaus

bekannt; belegt ist sie insbesondere bei Bewerbungen um die Funktion eines
Steuerpächters. Als Mißbrauch kam es vor, daß l.eute gegen ihren Willen oder
gar ohne ihr Wissen als Bürgen für einen Steuerpächter genannt wurden. Die
osmanische Finan/verwaltung war hauptsächlich darüber besorgt, daß Bürgen
dieser Art zur Zahlung nicht in der Lage sein mochten und verbot deshalb
solche Manipulationen. Aber es gab auch eigentliche Kollektivhaftung. So
wurde bis ins späte 17. Jahrhundert die Kopfsteuer von Nichtmuslimen, die
ihren angestammten Wohnort verlassen hatten, von den übrigen Bewohnern
der Dörfer oder Stadtteile eingezogen, in denen die Flüchtlinge registriert
w a r e n . 2 Ä h n l i c h v e r f u h r man bei der avariz-i divaniye genannten
Kriegssteuer, die von besonders zu diesem Zweck eingeteilten Gruppen von
Haushalten erhoben wurde. Wenn sich die Zahl der Steuerpflichtigen erhöhte,
war diese Regelung erträglich. Aber im Falle, daß die Bevölkerung durch
Mißernten oder Seuchen zurückging, wie das im 17. Jahrhundert vielerorts
geschah, hatte sie katastrophale Folgen. Die dezimierte B e v ö k e r u n g sollte
auch noch f ü r die Steuern der Geflüchteten a u f k o m m e n , und wurde dadurch
ihrerseits in die Flucht getrieben. Oft f a n d e n harte A u s e i n a n d e r s e t z u n g e n
zwischen verschiedenen Gruppen von Steuerpflichtigen statt: wenn etwa eine
solvente Familie aus dem Dorf in die Stadt zog, b e s c h w e r t e n sich die
D o r f b e w o h n e r und verlangten ihre Rückkehr. A b e r die neuen Nachbarn
verteidigten die Zu/.ügler nötigenfalls durch ein Z e u g n i s vor Gericht, das
diesen das Bleiben ermöglichte. 3

Andere Kollektivhaftungen gab es im strafrechtlichen Bereich. Wenn in

einem Dorf oder Stadviertel ein Mensch getötet wurde und der Schuldige nicht
zu finden war, mußten die Bewohner des Dorfes oder Viertels gemeinsam f ü r
die anfallenden Geldbußen aufkommen. In den Privilegien, die der osmanische
Sultan an auswärtige Kaufleute vergab, den sogenannten Kapitulationen, fand
sich z u w e i l e n ein P a s s u s , der die B e s u c h e r a u s d r ü c k l i c h von dieser
Verpflichtung ausnahm. 4 Deswegen setzten die Bewohner von Städten und

' Vgl. das Stichwort "Kal.ila" in der Encyclopedia of Islam 2 (El1, Y. U n a n t de Bellefonds).
2 2
V g l . El Stichwort "dji/.va" (Halil inalcik).
' S u r a i y a Faroqhi, Towns und Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production
in an Urban Setting, Cambridge 1984, S. 270.
^Nicolaus Bicgman, The f'urko Ragusan Relationship, Den Haag 1967.
 RÄUBER, REBELLEN UND OBRIGKEIT 193

stadtnahen Dörfern nach einem Unglücksfall oft ein Protokoll auf, in dem der
Hergang durch Zeugenaussagen belegt wurde. 1 Entscheidend war dabei ein
Passus, daß etwa ein Handwerker freiwillig in einen Brunnen gestiegen und zu
diesem Risiko nicht gezwungen worden war, oder daß ein Kind selber vor den
Wagen gelaufen war, von dern es dann überfahren wurde. Auf diese Weise
wurde die Haftung der Umwohnenden ausgeschlossen. Daß trotzdem mit dieser
Regelung viel Mißbrauch getrieben wurde, ist aus Dokumenten des späten 16.
und frühen 17. Jahrhunderts zu ersehen. So bezichtigte die Zentralverwaltung
ihre eigenen Amtsträger in der Provinz, das Bußgeld für Mord und Totschlag
einzuziehen, wenn 'jemand auf iem Gelände des Dorfes in der Kälte erfroren ist
oder dadurch zu Tode kommt, daß er von einem Baum fällt oder im Wasser
ertrinkt'. 2

Unter diesen Umständen beobachtete ein Nachbar den anderen und oft
fanden Anschuldigungen, die auf Stadt- oder Dorfklatsch beruhten, sogar ihren
Weg in die offiziellen Register des zuständigen Kadiamts. Auch schätzten es
die meisten Leute nicht, wenn ihr Dorf oder Viertel von 'Auswärtigen'
aufgesucht wurde, denn diese waren der örtlichen Sozialkontrolle nicht
unterworfen. Besonders junge unverheiratete Männer waren schlecht
angesehen. In größeren Städten gab es oft eigene 'Behausungen f ü r
Junggesellen', wahrscheinlich von äußerst bescheidener Qualität. Vom
Standpunkt der Ansässigen aus gesehen, hatte diese Regelung den Vorteil, daß
die Zuzügler von den übrigen Stadtbewohnern ferngehalten wurden, bis sie
entweder abgezogen oder durch Heirat seßhaft und 'respektabel' geworden
waren.

Trotzdem gab es Durchgangsverkehr und Zuwanderung, aber von den

Auswärtigen wurde gern die Stellung eines Bürgen verlangt. Wenn z.B. von
Kaufleuten beschäftigte Kameltreiber oder von Landbesitzern kurzzeitig
eingestellte Erntearbeiter eine intakte Tribalstruktur besaßen, konnte man sich
an den Ältesten der Gruppe halten. Dieser hatte u.a. dafür zu sorgen, daß bei
einem Unfall oder einer Klage die Männer, für die er verantwortlich zeichnete,
vor Gericht erschienen. Ein Beispiel soll dies verdeutlichen: im Osmanischen
Reich wanderten bis ins 19. Jahrhundert hinein größere Gruppen von Albanern
in die Ebenen, um dort Arbeit zu suchen. Im Saloniki des 18. Jahrhunderts
taten diese Dienst in den Häusern der Wohlhabenden, wobei sie gelegentlich
die Fehden ihrer Arbeitgeber auf der Straße ausfochten. Schon um 1600 finden
wir sie als Landarbeiter in der Umgebung Istanbuls, oder als Wächter in den
Weinbergen Nordwestanatoliens. 3 Da es öfter zu Zwischenfällen kam, wurde
den Grundbesitzern der Gegend nachdrücklich befohlen, keine Albaner ohne

^Faroqhi, Towns, S. 281.

2
Halil tnalcik, "Adäletnämeler", Belgeier, II, 3-4 (1965), S. 49-142,. Mustafa Cezar, Osmanh
Tarihinde Levendler, Istanbul 1965.
^Faroqhi, Towns, S.271.
194 COPING WITH THE STATE

Bürgen einzustellen. 1 eider wissen wir nicht, ob der Gruppenälteste für seine
Männer gerade zu stehen hatte, ob diese füreinander bürgten oder o b der
Grundbesitzer einen nicht zur Gruppe gehörigen Bürgen fand. Auch wissen wir
nicht, um was f ü r eine Bürgschaft es sich handelte. Es ist denkbar, daß der
Bürge f ü r den Schaden a u f k o m m e n mußte, den die landfremden (und sicher
meist bewaffneten) Arbeiter anrichten konnten. Aber wahrscheinlicher ist, daß
er nur ihr eventuelles Erscheinen vor Gericht garantierte.

Diese Regelung hatte sicherlich zur Folge, daß Leute, die etwa als
notorische Raufbolde einen schlechten Ruf hatten, keinen Bürgen fanden und
in ihre Berge zurückkehren mußten. Aber auch eingesessene Stadtbewohner
konnten in die ü i g e geraten, einen Bürgen zu benötigen. U m 1600 rebellierten
in Anatolien größere Söldnertruppen und zogen plündernd durchs Land. Selbst
Bursa, eines der wirtschaftlichen Zentren des Reiches, wurde zeitweise von
ihnen besetzt. Zwar waren diese Banden mit Feuerwaffen ausgerüstet, aber es
sieht nicht danach aus, als hätten sie sich größerer Städte i m m e r mit.
W a f f e n g e w a l t bemächtigt. H ä u f i g kam es wohl vor, d a ß eine Gruppe von
Stadtbewohnern selbst den Rebellen die Tore öffnete; galt es doch, durch eine:
Einigung die meist kaum befestigte Unterstadt vor der P l ü n d e r u n g und
Zerstörung zu bewahren. 1 U m solche Absprachen zu unterbinden, wurde iri
m a n c h e n Städten verlangt, d a ß die B e w o h n e r sich gegenseitig f ü r die
Zuverlässigkeit iher Nachbarn verbürgten. Auch in diesem Falle wissen wir
wenig über die Modalitaten; so wäre es wichtig zu wissen, was mit den Leuten
geschah, die keine Bürgen fanden, falls so etwas überhaupt vorgekommen ist.
Mußten sie die Stadt verlassen, und handelte es sich um eine Verbannung auf
Dauer oder nur für die Zeit der akuten Krise?

BÜRGSCHAFT! N 'NEUEN STILS'

Seit den letzten J a h r e n des 17. J a h r h u n d e r t s , und h ä u f i g e r im

achtzehnten, taucht eine neue Variante der Bürgschaft auf. B e w o h n e r eines
Dorfes, dem ein Räuber oder Rebell entstammte, mußten in Gegenwart des
Kadis feierlich versprechen, daß sie ihn den Behörden ausliefern würden, wann
i m m e r er sich in seinem H e i m a t o r t blicken ließe. W e n n sie d i e s e m
Versprechen nicht nachkämen, verpflichteten sie sich, eine Geldsumme an den
Staatsschatz oder die Küchenverwaltung des Sultanspalastes zu zahlen. Diese

' F ü r eine Darstellung solcher Angriffe vgl. Mustafa Akdag, Celäli isyanlan 1550-1603,
Ankara 1963, S. 190-250. Die städtischen Notabein dieser Periode wurden behandelt von Özer
Ergenc, "Osmanli Klasik Dönemindeki 'E§raf ve Ayan' iizerine bazi Bilgiler", Osmanh
Ara$tirmalari, 3 (1982). S i 05-118.
 R Ä U B E R , R E B E L L E N U N D O B R I G K E I T 195

Verpflichtung wird in den Quellen nezir genannt. 1 Meist handelt es sich bei
dem versprochenen Geld um 1000-2500 guru$; das entsprach etwa dem
gesamten Nachlaß eines sehr wohlhabenden Bursaer Stadtbewohners dieser
Zeit. Da die Dörfer meist klein waren, dürfte, falls das Geld ausbezahlt werden
mußte, auf jede Familie eine Summe in der Größenordnung von 50-100 guru$
entfallen sein. In der Umgebung von Bursa, wo die Verdientmöglichkeiten
sicherlich größer waren als in der anatolischen Steppe, belief sich aber der
Nachlaß eines Dorfbewohners nur auf wenige hundert guru§.2 Deshalb dürfte
die Zahlung einer solchen Summe außerhalb der gewöhnlichen Steuern für
viele Familien den Verlust der Ersparnisse, Verschuldung, Not und Elend
bedeutet haben.

Und das Geld wurde tatsächlich verlangt. Wir kennen Sultansbefehle, in

denen verkündet wird, daß dieses oder jenes Dorf sich nicht an seine
Versprechen gehalten habe und damit die früher zugesagte S u m m e fällig
geworden sei. 3 In einem Fall wurde der von den Dorfbewohnern zu zahlende
Betrag einem eigens beauftragten Amtsträger übergeben, der diesen an den
Staatsschatz abzuführen hatte. 4 Nur gelegentlich ließ der Sultan Gnade vor
Recht ergehen: so wurde den Bewohnern eines Dorfes, die einen gesuchten
Räuber oder Rebellen trotz einer vorher eingegangenen Verpflichtung nicht
ausgeliefert hatten, gestattet, eine zweite Verpflichtung einzugehen. 5 Ob sie
diese Konzeission durch Geschenke an hohe Amtsträger oder durch eine andere
Art von Protektion erreicht hatien, ist leider nicht überliefert.

D O R F L E U T E , K A D I S U N D G O U V E R N E U R E

Um zu verstehen, wie sich diese Bürgschaften auf das Leben der

Dorfleute auswirkten, werden wir uns jetzt einige Beispielfälle näher ansehen.
Die Geschichten spielten sich in dem westanatolischen Bezirk (,'al, in der

Die El enthält kein Stichwort 'Nezir'; dafür aber findet sich eines in Mehmet Zeki Pakalin,
Osmanli Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlügii, Istanbul 1971. Hier legt der Autor die Bedeutung
des Begriffs im Koran und im islamischen Recht dar. Dort hatte nezir keinen politischen Sinn,
sondern bedeutete ganz allgemein cie Erklärung, das Subjekt der Handlung gelobte, eine
erlaubte, aber normalerweise nicht verpflichtende Handlung zu begehen. Die Gläubigen
wurden von Theologen häufig davor gewarnt, 'unnötige" Verpflichtungen einzugehen. Aber
wer sich einmal verpflichtet habe, müsse darauf achten, daß er/sie seiner/ihrer Verpflichtung
auch wirklich nachkäme.
2
Das ergibt sich aus einer Durchsicht der Bursaer Kadiamtsregister No. B160 und B162 aus
den Jahren 1734-37. Diese Register befinden sich in der Nationalbibliothek von Ankara. Bei
dem gurua handelt es sich um einen Sammelbegriff für hochwertige Silbermünzen oft
ausländischer
-1 Herkunft.
• Osmanli Ar§ivi Sektion Maliyeden Müdevver (MM) 4017, S. 329. Dieses Register enthält fast
nur nezir-Aa^eJegenheiten. Laut mündlicher A u s k u n f t M e h m e t G e n ? s (Tarih BölUmü,
Marmara Universitesi) soll es auch au ; dem späteren 18. Jahrhundert solche Register geben
MM 4017, S. 329.
5
M M 4017, S. 391-2. Der Text enthalt keinen Hinweis darauf, daß die zuerst versprochenen
5000 guru$ gezahlt worden seien. Ich vermute deshalb, daß sie erlassen worden sind.
196 COPING WITH T HH STATE

P r o v i n z K ü t a h y a , ab. Der Bezirk liegt auf der G r e n z e z w i s c h e n d e m

Ägäisgebiet mit seinem Mittelmeerklima und der zentralanatolischen Steppe
mit ihren heißen Sommern, kalten Wintern und spärlichen Regenfällen. In der
Steppe lebten die Bauern vom Weizen- und Gerstenanbau; wegen der geringen
N i e d e r s c h l ä g e mußten die Felder j e d e s zweite Jahr unbestellt bleiben.
Gartenbau existierte hauptsächlich in der Nähe der Städte. Wahrscheinlich aßen
die Dorfleute einiges G e m ü s e als Zubrot und gelegentlich Käse und Joghurt,
wenn sie diese Lebensmittel von N o m a d e n , die in der G e g e n d ihre
Sommerweiden besaßen, erstehen konnten. Beherrschend war die
S u b s i s t e n z w i r t s c h a f t ; mit d e m M a r k t trat man in V e r b i n d u n g , wenn
durchreisende Karawanen eine N a c h f r a g e nach Lebensmitteln schufen. Das
Geld, das auf diese Weise verdient wurde, dürfte hauptsächlich zur Zahlung von
Steuern und Abgaben gedient haben.

Bevölkerungsdaten des Bezirks ("al sind für das frühe 18. Jahrhundert
noch nicht bekannt geworden. Aber wahrscheinlich war bei dem Absinken der
Bevölkerung im 17. Jahrhundert, die sich für mehrere Regionen Anatoliens
nachweisen läßt, auch in C.'al seit dem 16. Jahrhundert die Zahl der Bauern und
Dörfer gesunken.1 Denn meistens verließen die Menschen die
Steppenrandgebiete, wo der Getreideanbau wenig ertragreich war, und zogen in
die Umgebung größerer Städte. Besonders die Gegend von Izmir mit ihrem
günstigeren Klima und besseren V e r m a r k t u n g s m ö g l i c h k e i t e n zog viele
Migranten an, während etwa die Steppe westlich von A n k a r a , die im 16.
Jahrhundert durchaus auch landwirtschaftlich genutzt wurde, im achtzehnten
fast keine dörfliche Besiedlung aufwies. Neben wirtschaftlichen Erwägungen
spielten bei diesen Migrationen auch Sicherheitsprobleme eine Rolle: in den
Kbenen, die für Räuber und Steuereinnehmer leicht zu erreichen waren, hielten
sich weniger Dörfer als im unwegsamen, hügeligen Gelände. 2 D a aber durch
diese Migrationen die von der Landwirtschaft zu erhebenden Steuern drastisch
absanken, versuchte die osmanische Zentrale, durch Strafexpeditionen und
kollektive Bürgschaften den Räubern das soziale Umfeld zu nehmen. Die
Übergriffe der Steuereinnehmer ließen sich allerdings nicht unterbinden.

Im Bezirk £al war ein Kadi namens Muharrem Efendi erschlagen sowie
ein Gericht überfallen und angezündet worden. Neben dem ermordeten Kadi ist
noch von drei weiteren Opfern die Rede, von denen zwei am Ort des Überfalls
selbst verstarben und ein dritter unweit des Menderes (Mäander)-Flusses zu
Tode kam. Überfälle auf Gerichte sind seit dem späten 16. Jahrhundert in
Anatolien öfter belegt, sicherlich weil die Kadis zu den wohlhabenderen Ixuten

' B r u c e McGowan, Economic Life in Ottoman Europe, Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for
Land 1600-1800 Cambridge. Paris 1981, S. 113.
^ W o l f - D i e t h e r Hüttcruth. Ländliche Siedlungen im südlichen Anatolien in den letzten
vierhundert Jahren, Göttinnen 1969, S. 174-185.
 RÄUBER, REBELLEN UND OBRIGKEIT 197

der jeweiligen Gegend gehörten. 1 Zwar war das Gehalt, das den Kadis von der
Zentralverwaltung gezahlt wurde, gering. Aber diese lebten offiziell von den
Gebühren, die ihnen die B e w o h n e r ihres Gerichtsbezirks f ü r verschiedene
Leistungen zu zahlen hatten. Wenn die Kadis etwa eine Erbschaft nach den
Regeln des islamischen Rechts verteilten, stand ihnen ein kleiner Anteil zu. 2
Inoffiziell gelang es manchen, diesen Anteil zu vergrößern, etwa indem sie in
Fällen, in denen ihr Eingreifen weder von den Erben gewünscht wurde noch
rechtlich zwingend vorgeschrieben war, ihre Dienste a u f d r ä n g t e n . Auch
konnten sie hohe Gebühren erheben, wenn f ü r einen Streitfall ein Dokument
über eine vorher in ihren Registern niedergelegte Vereinbarung benötigt wurde,
denn die Kadiamtsregister fungierten zugleich als Notariatsbücher.

Mit solchen Forderungen konnte man sich leicht Feinde machen. Aber
das konnte auch einem gewissenhaften Richter passieren, wenn nämlich seine
Urteile einflußreichen Prozeßparteien mißfielen. A n g r i f f e auf den Kadi waren
umso naherliegender, als diesem keine Polizeigewalt zur Verfügung stand; die
Verhaftung eines widerspenstigen Angeklagten war Sache von Soldaten, die zu
diesem Zweck vom Gouverneur abgestellt worden waren. Ein Angriff auf den
Kadi konnte deshalb höchstens von seinen eigenen Bediensteten oder von den
wenigen vorhandenen Gerichtsdienern abgewehrt werden.

Im Alltagsleben gab es zwischen dem Kadi und dem Provinzgouverneur

oft genug Reibungen. Diese resultierten daraus, daß der Kadi nicht nur als
Richter und Notar fungierte, sondern auch bei der Eintreibung von Steuern
eine Rolle spielte. Damit abei reichten seine Befugnisse in die eigentliche
Verwaltung hinein, und wichtige Sultansbefehle ergingen sowohl an die
G o u v e r n e u r e als a u c h an die Kadis. Die beiden Instanzen berichteten
unabhängig voneinander an der, Rat des Sultans, und ihre Rivalität erleichterte
den Zentralbehörden die Kontrolle über die lokale Verwaltung.

Überdies unterschied sich der E r f a h r u n g s h o r i z o n t von Kadis und

Gouverneuren: die ersteren hatten eine gelehrte Ausbildung absolviert, die auf
der K e n n t n i s des A r a b i s c h e r a u f b a u t e , T h e o l o g i e und religiöses Recht
umfaßte. Zumindest die höherrangigen Kadis hatten diese Fächer auch in
Vorlesungen an die folgende Generation weitergegeben. Dagegen hatten die
Gouverneure und die ihnen unterstellten K o m m a n d a n t e n meist Dienst im
H a u s h a l t e i n e s h ö h e r e n A m t s t r ä g e r s getan und manchmal sogar im
Sultanspalast selbst gedient. Es handelte sich also um sehr unterschiedliche
soziale Milieus, was die strukturell v o r g e g e b e n e n K o n f l i k t e sicherlich
verschärfte.

Suraiya Faroqhi, "Political Activity imong Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanic
Legitimation", Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, X X X V (1992), S. 1-39
diskutiert Protestformen osmanischer Untertanen. T h o m a s Scheben, Verwaltungsreformen der
frühen Tanzimatzeit, Gesetz, Maßnahmen, Auswirkungen, Frankfurt, Bern 1991, diskutiert
Probleme der Verbrechensbekämpfung im frühen 19. Jahrhundert.
2
A k d a g X e l ä l l 117 ff., 165 ff.
198 (OPING WITH THE S T ATE

Man muß deshalb davon ausgehen, daß manche A n g r i f f e auf Kadis

durch wirkliche oder angebliche Soldaten sich der wohlwollenden Duldung
durch den jeweiligen Gouverneur erfreuten, der sich einer lästigen Kontrolle
entledigen wollte. Aber es konnte sich auch ein Kadi mit Räubern oder
Rebellen zusammentun, die mit dem Gouverneur im Krieg lagen. So geschah
es in einem Dorf in dem uns schon bekannten Bezirk f a l : 1 Als sich ein
Mann, von dem wir nur den Vaternamen wissen (Sohn des Haci Oruc) gegen
den Gouverneur Eyyüb Pa§a erhob, schloß er sich mit einem Kadi zusammen,
der allerdings kurz vor oder nach diesem Ereignis seinen Posten verlor.

DIE BÜRGEN VON QAL

Die osmanische Verwaltung ging davon aus, daß bei j e n e m Überfall auf
das Gericht von f a l die Bewohner zweier Dörfer als Gruppe beteiligt gewesen
waren. Schließlich war der Haupttäter Deli Ali, Sohn des Hüseyin Deli, von
200 mit Musketen bewaffneten Leuten begleitet gewesen, die zum großen Teil
aus diesen zwei Dörfern stammten. Die entsprechende Information kam von
den B e w o h n e r n sechs anderer, sicherlich n a h e g e l e g e n e r D ö r f e r . 2 Diese
beschuldigten ihre Nachbarn einer permanenten Neigung zu Raubiiberfällen.
Auch hätten die Angeschuldigten schon 1700-01, also schon einige Zeit vor
dem nicht näher datierbaren Überfall auf das Gericht von £ a l , das Haus eines
lokalen Verwalters (voyvoda) attackiert. Danach hatten die B e w o h n e r der
beiden Dörfer versprechen müssen, künftig nach dem religiösen Recht zu
leben, den örtlichen Amtsträgern zu gehorchen und eventuelle Räuber an die
osmanische Verwaltung auszuliefern. Im Fall, daß die B e w o h n e r der beiden
Dörfer sich nicht an dieses Versprechen hielten, sollte das eine Dorf 1500 und
das zweite 1000 gurus an den Staatsschatz zahlen. Nach dem Überfall auf das
Gericht galt die S u m m e als verwirkt und wurde eingetrieben. Aber damit
waren die D o r f b e w o h n e r dem langen A r m des osmanischen Fiskus noch
keineswegs entkommen, denn 1708 sollten sie aufs neue die Zahlung einer
G e l d s u m m e versprechen, falls sie sich nicht in Z u k u n f t als g e h o r s a m e
Untertanen verhielten.

Im Falle eines anderen Dorfes (Kayalar, ebenfalls in Bezirk £ a l ) lagen

keine früheren Bürgschaften vor. 3 Nur kamen drei Mitglieder von Deli Alis
Bande aus diesem Ort. und die Einwohner erklärten, die Beschuldigten hätten
einen Tag vor der A n k u n f t ihrer Häscher das Weite gesucht. Das k a m die
Dorfbewohner teuer zu stehen; denn jetzt mußten sie versprechen, daß sie 1000
g u r u j zahlen würden, l'tills die Gesuchten wieder bei ihnen auftauchten und sie

^ M - w n , S. 2 3 3 .
2
M M 4 0 1 7 , S. 3 2 9 . D i e n e i s t e n g e n a n n t e n S i e d l u n g e n l a s s e n sich a u f m o d e r n e n K a r t e n n i c h t
lokalisieren.
3
M M 4 0 1 7 , S. 3 3 0 .
 RÄUBER, REBELLEN UND OBRIGKEIT 199

diese nicht auslieferten. Noch viel mehr Geld wurde von den Bewohnern des
Dorfes Orta verlangt; diese mußten sich, bei sonst ähnlicher Sachlage, gar zur
Zahlung von 5000 guru$ verpflichten. 1 Der Grund für diese Differenz ist
unbekannt: in beiden Fällen sprechen die erhaltenen Texte von keinerlei
Mitschuld der Dorfbewohner. Zwar wurden im Falle von Kayalar nur drei
Personen gesucht, während es: n Orta acht waren, aber ob das der Grund für die
unterschiedliche Belastung war, wissen wir nicht. Es wäre ebenfalls denkbar,
daß größeren und verhältnismäßig wohlhabenden Siedlungen mehr abverlangt
wurde als kleineren und ärmeren.

Allerdings veranlaßte die Höhe der Bestrafung, die ihnen drohte, die
Dorfbewohner nicht dazu, ihre an der Bande Deli Alis beteiligten Verwandten
oder Nachbarn an die Behörden auszuliefern. Denn nur fünf Tage nach dem vor
Gericht abgegebenen Versprechen erschienen die Bandenmitglieder in ihren
Häusern und hielten sich, mehr oder weniger unangefochten, dort einige Tage
auf. Dann dürften sie vor dem Nahen eines lokalen Verwalters geflohen sein.
Aber obwohl dieser den Dorfleuten für ihre 'Komplizität' mit den
Bandenmitgliedern schwere Vorwürfe machte, scheint er doch auf die sofortige
Eintreibung des Geldes verzichtet zu haben. Vielmehr wurde den Dorfleuten
erlaubt, sich nochmals gegenüber dem Staat zu verpflichten, wobei sie wieder
5000 guru§ versprechen mußten. Ob die beiden Versprechen sich zu 10000
guru$ summierten, oder ob eines das andere ablöste, läßt sich aus den
vorhandenen Akten nicht ersehen.

Überdies begegnet uns auch eine Kollektivbürgschaft von 31 Dörfern,

zu denen noch weitere, namentlich nicht genannte Siedlungen hinzukamen;
wahrscheinlich handelte es sich um die gesamte Bevölkerung des Bezirks. 2 In
diesem Falte ist von keinem bestimmten Betrag die Rede, sondern lediglich
von einer angemessenen Summe (nezir-i misli). Zur Zeit wissen wir noch
nicht, was das genau zu bedeuten hat. Sollte die Summe erst in späteren
Verhandlungen festgesetzt werden, handelte es sich also um eine Art
Vorabkommen? Oder behielt sich die Zentralregierung das Recht vor, die
Summe im nachhinein zu bestimmen, wodurch sich das ohnehin große Risiko
für die Bevölkerung ins Unermeßliche gesteigert haben dürfte? Daß die Risiken
die Dorfbewohner willfährig machen sollten, legt die Praxis späterer Jahre
nahe. Denn in einem Fall, der nur wenige Jahre jünger ist als der hier
analysierte, mußten die Bewohner einer größeren Zahl von Dörfern, wiederum
im Bezirk (Jal, sich nicht nur für die eigenen unmittelbaren Nachbarn
verbürgen und dafür jeweils h indert guru$ riskieren, sondern es wurde ihnen
abverlangt, daß sich alle Mitglieder einer Gruppe wechselseitig füreinander

*MM 4017, S. 331.

2
M M 4017, S. 333.
200 COPING WITH THH STAT E

v e r b ü r g t e n . 1 Dadurch kam eine Gesamtbürgschaft von 25000 guru$

zusammen, und dieser Betrag stellte ein Vielfaches der Summe dar, die ein
osmanischerProvinz.bewohner jemals verdienen konnte.

Bei den bisher genannten Räubern und Rebellen scheint es sich um

ganz 'gewöhnliche' I.eute gehandelt zu haben. Kaum einer trug einen Titel, aus
dem sich eine gehobene soziale Position hätte ablesen lassen können. Nur bei
dem Anführer läßt der Beiname 'Deli' auf eine mögliche militärische
Vergangenheit schließen, denn neben der auch heute noch geläufigen
Bedeutung 'verrückt 1 , konnte das Wort auch für einen nicht den regulären
Truppen angehörenden Soldaten verwendet werden. Andererseits war der Vater
dieses Anführers ein dede, also entweder ein älterer und angesehener Derwisch
oder ein religiöser Ältester der in dieser Gegend verbreiteten Alevis, einer für
die Sunniten heterodoxen Sekte. Aber im Dorf Saray, etwas weiter entfernt
von Cal und im Bezirk des heutigen Denizli, treffen wir auf einen als
Sympathisanten Deli Alis beschuldigten Halil Kethüda. 2 Leider ist dieser Titel
vieldeutig; in tribalen Gruppen wurde er manchen Ältesten beigelegt, aber
auch Stadtviertel oder von Staats wegen anerkannte religiöse Gruppen ließen
sich oft in Verhandlungen von einem kethüda vertreten. Auch in
Handwerkerszünften trug einer der Verantwortlichen diesen Titel, und da Saray
ein größeres Dorf mit Textilindustrie war, ist nicht auszuschließen, daß ein
Handwerker an dem Überfall beteiligt war. Wie dem auch sei, jedenfalls
handelte es sich in dem hier untersuchten Fall um eine Repressionsmaßnahme
gegenüber gewöhnlichen Untertanen, nicht etwa gegenüber rebellischen
Söldnern oder Provinzmagnaten.

GEHORSAMH 1 NTERTANEN?

Kollektivbürgschaften, wie sie hier beschrieben wurden, finden sich oft

in Verbindung mit anderen Maßnahmen, etwa der Einsammlung von
Feuerwaffen. 3 Verbote letzterer Art hatten im 18. Jahrhundert bereits eine
längere Geschichte. Denn schon während der schweren Unruhen des 17.
Jahrhunderts hatte die osmanische Zentralverwaltung immer wieder versucht,
den Untertanen die Feuerwaffen abzunehmen, wenn es sich schon nicht
verhindern ließ, daß sich etwa Reisende oder Nomaden mit blanken Waffen

' M M 4 0 1 7 . S . 337.
2
V g l . d a s S t i c h w o r t "Keikh.ida" in EI1 ( C e n g i z O r h o n l u u n d G a b r i e l Baer).
^ H a l i l i n a l c i k , " T h e S o c i o - P o l i t i c a l E f f e c t s of the D i f f u s i o n of F i r e - A r m s in t h e M i d d l e E a s t " in
V . J . P a r r y u n d M . E . Y a p p ( H r s g . ) , War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, L o n d o n
1975, S. 1 9 5 - 2 1 7 . M t i c t e b a Ilgiirel, " O s m a n l i I m p a r a t o r l u g u n d a A t e j l i S i l a h l a n n Y a y i l i ^ i , Tarih
Dergisi, 3 2 ( 1 9 7 9 ) , S. 301 3 1 8 . R o n a l d J e n n i n g s , " F i r e a r m s , B a n d i t s a n d G u n C o n t r o l : S o m e
e v i d e n c e of O t t o m a n policv t o w a r d f i r e a r m s in t h e p o s s e s s i o n of reaya, f r o m j u d i c i a l r e c o r d s of
K a y s e r i , 1 6 0 0 - 1 6 2 7 " , Ard'uvum Ottomanicum, VI ( 1 9 8 0 ) , S. 3 3 9 - 3 5 8 .
 RÄUBER, R E H E L L EN UND OBRIGKEIT 201

versahen. 1 Jedoch erwiesen sich generelle Verbote von Feuerwaffen immer

wieder als wirkungslos: im 17. Jahrhundert besaßen viele ehrbare
Familienväter eine Muskete. Doch im Falle von Unruhen und / oder Räuberei
wurden die betreffenden Dorfbewohner oft dazu verpflichtet, ihre Feuerwaffen
abzuliefern und auch in Zukunft keine zu besitzen. 2 In einer Umgebung, in der
Musketen und Pistolen häufig vorkamen und nicht allzu teuer waren, dürfte es
allerdings schwer gewesen sein, alle Dorfbewohner zur Einhaltung des Verbots
zu veranlassen. Und daraus ergab sich dann ein Anlaß für lokale Verwalter, den
Bruch des gegebenen Versprechens zu deklarieren und die Zahlung der
ausgelohten Summe einzufordern.

Daß die osmanische Zentralregierung sich damit abgefunden hatte, daß

ihre Untertanen zumindest blanke Waffen besaßen, wird deutlich aus den
Versprechungen, die manche; Dörfer abgeben mußten, wenn der Staat sie zu
einer Kollektivhaftung heranzog: Wenn die Bauern nämlich gelobten, sie
würden Räuber und Rebellea fassen und an die Regierung ausliefern, dann
präzisierten sie oft, daß sie im Falle des Widerstands den Räubern die Köpfe
abschneiden würden. 3 Aber hier konnten die Dorfbewohner leicht in eine Falle
tappen, wenn sie nämlich in einer früheren Kollektivbürgschaft versprochen
hatten, keine Feuerwaffen zu besitzen. Denn mit einigen rostigen Schwertern
und Lanzen war einem gefährlichen Räuber oder Rebellen wohl kaum
beizukommen.

Auch muß man sich die Frage stellen, ob die Kollektivverpflichtung

nicht als ein Anlaß gesehen wurde, der notorisch leeren Staatskasse zu einer
Extraeinnahme zu verhelfen. Im Augenblick scheint es aber nicht, als sei diese
Erwägung vorrangig gewesen, denn zwei ausführliche Monographien über die
osmanischen Staatsfinanzen des 18. Jahrhunderts verzeichnen in ihren
R e g i s t e r n das S t i c h w o r t 'nezir' n i c h t . 4 Wären die sich aus
Kollektivverpflichtungen ergebenden Zahlungen wirklich zu einem wichtigen
Aktivposten im Staatsbudget geworden, hätte das Gegenteil der Fall sein
müssen. A uch fällt auf, dai3 der hier bearbeitete Registerband gleich mehrere
Jahrzehnte: umfaßt. Diese Tatsache spricht ebenfalls gegen die Annahme, die
Zahlungen wegen gebrochener Kollektivverpflichtungen seien so häufig
gewesen, daß sie zu einem wesentlichen Posten in den Staatsfinanzen wurden;
in diesem Fall hätte nämlich die Zahl der vorhandenen Register weitaus größer
sein müssen. Anders mag es um das Budget der Palastküche gestanden haben,
der manche Zahlungen aus Kollektivverpflichtungen zugewiesen wurden. Denn

' W a n d e r a r b e i t e r beantragten und erhielten zuweilen Sultansbefehle, in d e n e n ihnen das

Waffentragen ausdrücklich gestatte' wurde.
2
M M 4 0 1 7 , S. 336-337.
4017, S. 330-331.
4
A h m e t T a b a k o g l u , Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanh Maliyesi, Istanbul 1985. Y a v u z
Cezar. Osmanh Maliyesinde Bunalim ve Degisim Dönemi, Istanbul 1986.
202 C O P I N G W I T H T H E S I A T E

obwohl die Palastkiicne f ü r die Hofhaltung des Sultans zu sorgen hatte, waren
ihre Ausgaben doch mit denen des allgemeinen Staatssäckels nicht zu
vergleichen. Zahlungen von einigen tausend oder zehntausend guru§ könnten
dort sehr wohl ins G e w i c h t gefallen sein. Aber die Rechnungsbücher der
Sultansküche sind noch wenig erschlossen. 1

Somit dürfte wohl für die osmanische Zentral Verwaltung die H o f f n u n g

im Vordergrund gestanden haben, daß sie die Gruppendynamik innerhalb von
Dörfern und Nomadengemeinschaften für die Erhaltung ihrer Herrschaft würde
einsetzen können. In den dünnbesiedelten Regionen Anatoliens gab es nur
wenige Polizeikräfte, und der Konformitätsdruck von Familie, Stadtviertel und
Dorf hatte schon immer den Gehorsam der Untertanen mitgcsichert. A u c h
wenn ein Delikt einmal begangen war, war die Meinung von Familie und Dorf
nicht unwichtig. Manchmal wollte nämlich das Gericht wissen, was f ü r einen
L e u m u n d der Tätei in seinem H e i m a t d o r f b e s a ß , d ü r f t e also diesen
Gesichtspunkt bei der Z u m e s s u n g der Strafe berücksichtigt haben. 2 A u c h
Räuber und Rebellen waren damit der Gruppendynamik ihrer Heimatgemeinde
ausgesetzt. Aber der Konformitätsdruck bewirkte nicht nur Unterwerfung. W i e
in anderen vorindustriellen Staaten gab es auch im O s m a n i s c h e n Reich
Subgruppen, von denen die Beduinen wohl die bekanntesten sind, in deren
Lebensform die Räuberei ihren festen Platz hatte. In diesen Dörfern und
Gruppen waren j u n g e Männer einem Konformitätsdruck ausgesetzt, sich zu
gegebener Zeit an Raubüberfällen zu beteiligen, ohne den sie sich wohl kaum
in dieser Weise betätigt hätten.

Im Zentralanaiolien des frühen 18. Jahrhunderts scheint es zumindest

nach A n n a h m e der osmanischen Verwaltung ebenfalls Dörfer gegeben zu
haben, in denen ein Konformitätsdruck in Richtung auf Räuberei und/oder
Rebellion existierte. Zum Beleg einer solchen Behauptung beriefen sich die
zuständigen A m t s t r ä g e r e t w a auf die A u s s a g e von R e p r ä s e n t a n t e n d e r
N a c h b a r d ö r f e r . 3 Bei einer Bewertung solcher Aussagen ist allerdings zu
berücksichtigen, daß Feindschaft zwischen Nachbarsiedlungen häufig war, z.B.
wegen Flurstreitigkeiicn, Vichdiebstählen oder entführten Bräuten. Überdies
w e i ß man nicht, w i e v i e l e S u g g e s t i v f r a g e n und a u c h handgreiflichere
Druckmittel benutzt w urden, um die erwünschten Aussagen zu erhalten.

' E i n i g e solcher K ü c h c n . i b r e c h n u n g e n w u r d e n ediert von O m e r I.ütfi B a r k a n , "Istanbul

Saraylarina Ait Muhasebe Defterleri", Beigeler, IX, 13 (1979), S. 1-380.
2
S o l c h ein Fall ist belegt im f o r u m Kadi sicili von 1595/97, das sich in der Stadtbibliothek von
Corum befindet. Das Register hat zwei Paginierungen; vgl. Bl. 45b bwz. 56a.
^ L e i d e r gibt es keine H h w e i s e darauf, wieso bestimmte Männer a u s g e w ä h l t w u r d e n , um
S u l t a n s b e f e h l e e n t g e g e n z u n e h m e n bzw. im N a m e n ihres D o r f e s ihre N a c h b a r n auf ein
bestimmtes Verhalten zu verpflichten. Die Zahl der Männer, die ihr Dorf in dieser W e i s e
vertraten, variierte j e nach den Umständen.
 RÄUBER, REBELLEN UND OBRIGKEIT 203

Waren die osmanischen Behörden freilich erst zu der Überzeugung

gekommen, ein ganzes Dorf' bestünde aus Räubern oder Rebellen, dann wurde
es leichter, die Kollektivstrafe, die sich aus der Kollektivhaftung ergeben
konnte, zu rechtfertigen. Zwar erörtern die bis jetzt bekannten administrativen
Dokumente die Frage nicht, wie denn die mögliche Bestrafung Unschuldiger
rechtlich zu beurteilen sei. Doch dürfte den Richtern, die in dem auf dem
Grundsatz individueller Verantwortlichkeit aufgebauten muslimischen Recht
ausgebildet waren, dieses Problem durchaus aufgefallen sein. Bis jetzt kenne
ich allerdings nur die eine Stellungnahme eines osmanischen Chronisten aus
dem mittleren 19. Jahrhundert, der die Kollektivhaftung unter Berufung auf die
Witwen (die Haushaltsvorstande sein konnten, aber bei einer Entscheidung
über Räuberei/ Rebellion wohl kaum mitzureden hatten) entschieden ablehnt. 1

Die Absichten der osmanischen Zentralregierung lassen sich aber auch

noch mit Hilfe eines anderen Indizes erhellen (die Reaktionen der betroffenen
Dorfbewohner werden uns wohl immer weitgehend unzugänglich bleiben). In
manchen Kollektivverpflichtungen finden sich Klauseln, in denen die
Dorfbewohner versprachen, den lokalen und Provinzverwaltern zu gehorchen
und ihre Steuern zu zahlen.- Dies weist darauf hin; daß es sich bei den
Verpflichtungen nicht nur um ein Mittel der Bekämpfung von Straßenräuberei
handelte, sondern um einen Versuch, ganz allgemein Herrschaft zu
zementieren. Anders formuliert, die osmanischen Amtsträger versuchten, die
Untertanen dazu zu veranlassen, die Unterordnung unter den Staatsapparat
anzuerkennen. Denn es gab durchaus Untertanen, die keineswegs der Meinung
waren, daß sie - bei aller möglichen Hochachtung vor dem fernen Sultan - den
lokalen Verwaltern irgendwelchen Respekt schuldeten, sofern sie nur ihre
Steuern und Abgaben bezahlten. 3 Gegen solche Haltungen wollte die
osmanische Regierung auch n i t dem Instrument der Kollektivverpflichtung
angehen. Ob diese Maßnahme auf längere Sicht größere praktische Bedeutung
besaß, muß allerdings dahingestellt sein.

Aber vielleicht ist das gar nicht so wichtig. Schwerer wiegt die
Tatsache, daß hier ein strukturell bestimmter Dauerkonflikt zwischen den
Dorfbewohnern und der osmanischen Verwaltung sichtbar wird. Offene
Bauernaufstände, oder auch lur Aufstände, an denen Bauern maßgeblich
beteiligt waren, sind im osmanischen Reich eher rar. Dagegen sind
Rebellionen von beschäftigungslosen Soldaten und Nomaden ganz und gar
keine Seltenheit. Aus dieser Sachlage haben nun manche Forscher
geschlossen, daß die Verhältnisse auf dem Dorfe meistens so waren, daß sich
kein unmittelbarer Anlaß zum Aufstand ergab, oder daß das religiös bestimmte

'Pakalin, Osmanli Tarih Deyimleri, Stichwort 'Nezir akfasi'.

2
M M 4017, S. 336-337.
- Der Text ist veröffentlicht worden von Inalcik, "Adäletnämeler". S. 135-136.
204 (OPING WITH THE STAT K

Prestige des Sultans so groß war, daß der Gedanke an Rebellion gar nicht
a u f k a m . Aber neuere Forschungen haben gezeigt, daß rurale Bevölkerungen
nur unter ganz bestimmten Bedingungen rebellieren, aber auch andere 'sanftere'
Mittel kennen, um ihre Unzufriedenheit mit den Verhältnissen auszudrücken.
Das Erzählen von Geschichten, die von M u n d zu M u n d gehen und die
jeweiligen Herrschenden von ihrer weniger eindrucksvollen Seite zeigen, ist in
diesem Zusammenhang nicht unwichtig.1 Allerlei Formen des
Langsamarbeitens und Ressourcenverbergens gehören gleichfalls dazu, ebenso
wie die stillschweigende Unterstützung von Räubern und Rebellen. Diese
Strategien waren den Dorfbewohnern des Bezirks £al nicht weniger vertraut als
den L a n d b e v ö l k e r u n g e n des 20. J a h r h u n d e r t s . D a g e g e n v e r s u c h t e der
osmanische Staat anzukämpfen, u.a. dadurch, daß er seine Untertanen unter
Einsatz ihrer gesamten Habe für das Wohlverhalten ihrer Nachbarn haften ließ.

' j a m e s Scott, Weapons of the Weak, Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, New Haven,
London 1985.
 ROBBERY ON THE HAJJ ROAD
AND POLITICAL ALLEGIANCE IN
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE (1560-1680)

In 1578-79, the Council of the reigning Ottoman Sultan, at that time

Murad III., had to deal with the complaint of five men f r o m D a m a s c u s .
Unfortunately, the single record of this affair that we possess only mentions
their f i r s t names, n a m e l y C e m a l e d d i n , A h m e d , A l a e d d i n , Ibrahim and
Mehmed. 1 These men claimed that their camel driver had led them into a trap.
Several of their companions had been murdered, while they, the plaintiffs, had
been lucky to escape with their lives. However they had all lost some of their
property, and now the five plaintiffs demanded, also in the name of other
persons who had suffered damages, that justice be done. In reply, the Sultan's
Council ordered the matter to be investigated in the court of the kadi of
Damascus. As was usual in such cases, the relevant rescript was also addressed
to the governor of Damascus province; the latter obviously was expected to
help expedite the matter.

Rive years later, in 1583, the governor of Damascus, the kadi of that
city and the kadi of Karalar had to deal with a very similar complaint. (By
Karalar, the authors of the rescript seem to have intended the fairly vast desert
region whose administrative centre was located in the little town of Kara, to
the northeast of D a m a s c u s ) 2 . In this case the complaint originated with the
kadi of Kara himself, who c aimed that two townsmen, M e h m e d b. Mansur
and his brother H i z i r , were k n o w n to supply robbers p r e y i n g on the
pilgrimage caravan with food, and to put them up in their house. Moreover
the two brothers sold muskets and gunpowder to local rebels, and if they were
not stopped, the people of the area were likely to take flight. Again the
Ottoman central administration ordered the governor and kadi of Damascus to
intervene, and to m a k e sure that this d a n g e r to the pilgrims w a s duly
eliminated.

' M u h i m m e D e f t e r l e r i ( M D ) 3 5 , p. 9:5, n o . 2 2 9 ( 9 8 6 / 1 5 7 8 - 7 9 ) .
2
M D 4 9 , p . 10, no. 4 1 ( 9 9 1 / 1 5 8 3 ) .