PRINCIPLE AND STATE POLICIES
Facts
Section 1: The Philippines is
a Democratic and
Republican State.
Sovereignty Resides in the
People and all Government
Authority Emanates from
Them
1. Villavicencio v. Lukban,
supra
Section 2: The Philippines
renounces war as an
instrument of National
Policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of
international law as part od
the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice,
Remarks Issue
Respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, for the best of
all reasons, to exterminate vise, ordered the segregated district for
women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in
the City of Manila, closed. The women were kept confined to their
houses in the district by the police. At about midnight of October 25, the
police, acting pursuant to the orders from the chief of the police and Justo
Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into
patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers
―Corregidor and ―Negros. They had no knowledge that they were
destined for a life in Mindanao. The two steamers with their unwilling
passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25, 1918.
Ruling
(1) Whether or not the act of the
Mayor of the City of Manila is
constitutional.
(2) Whether or not the petitioner
is found in contempt of court.
(1) The Supreme Court condemned the mayor‘s act.
Respondent‘s intention to suppress the social evil
was commutable. But his methods were unlawful.
The fundamental rights of life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness, considered as individual
possessions, are secured by those maxims of
constitutional law which are the monuments
showing the victorious progress of the race in
securing to men the blessings of civilization under
the reign of just and equal laws, so that, in the
famous language of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights,
the government of the commonwealth may be
―government of laws and not of men.
(2) Yes, petitioner is found in contempt of court and
shall pay into into the office of the clerk of the
Supreme Court within five days the sum of one
hundred pesos (P100).
Contempt of court on the ff grounds:
(1) They could have produced the bodies of the
persons according to the command of the writ; or
(2) they could have shown by affidavit that on
account of sickness or infirmity those persons could
not safely be brought before the court; or
(2) they could have presented affidavits to show that
the parties in question or their attorney waived the
right to be present.
freedom, cooperation and
amity with all nations.
2. Kuroda v. Jalandoni, 83 Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese
PHIL 171 (1949) Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces
- failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to
commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant
civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the
laws and customs of war"
3. Agustin v. Edu 88 SCRA Petitioner: Leovillo C. Agustin, owner of Volkswagen Beetle Car,
195 (1997) Model 13035.
This is a petition questioning the validity of a Letter of Instruction No.
229 providing for an early warning device mandatory for motor vehicles.
It is assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative to the
constitutional guarantee of due process in as far as the rules and
regulations for its implementation are concerned
4. Ichong v. Hernandez 101 RA 1180 – An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was enacted to
1. Whether or not Executive
Order No. 68 is constitutional
2. Whether or not the US is a
party of interest to this case
3. Whether or not Atty. Melville
S. Hussey and Robert Port is
allowed to practice law profession
in the philippines.
Whether or not the assailed Letter
of Instruction is invalid and
violated constitutional guarantees
of due process.
Whether or not the Act is
1. The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No.
68, creating the National War Crimes Office and
prescribing rules on the trial of accused war
criminals, is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec
3,Article 2 of the Constitution which states that “The
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of
the nation.”
2. The United States is a party of interest because the
country and its people have been equally, if not
greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the
petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive
Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special
military tribunal and that the rules as to the parties
and representation are not governed by the rules of
court but by the very provisions of this special law.
3. The court ruled that the appointment of the two
American attorneys is not violative of our national
sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that the U.S.
which has submitted the vindication of crimes
against her government and her people to a tribunal
of our nation should be allowed representation in
the trial of those very crimes. The lest that we could
do in the spirit of comity is to allow this
representation in said trial.
No, the LOI is valid. The assailed Letter of
Instruction No, 229 was a valid exercise of police
power and therewas no unlawful delegation of
legislative power on the part of the respondent.
As identified, police power is a state authority to
enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare.
In this case, the particular exercise of police power
was clearly intendedto promote public safety. In
addition, the UN and the Vienna Convention, both
ratified by the Philippine Government recommended
the enactment of local legislation for the installation
of road safety signs and devices. The Constitution
provides that the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land. It is not for this country to
repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its
word.
The equal protection of the law clause is against
PHIL 115 (1957) nationalize the retail trade business in the Philippines. The law prohibits
persons not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned
by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the
retail trade and other prohibitions and regulations.
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending
that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law.
SolGen content that the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police
power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the
interest of national economic survival.
5. Gonzales v. Hechanova 9 Executive Secretary Hechanova authorized the importation of foreign
SCRA 230 (1963) rice to be purchased from private sources.
Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and
Corn Planters Association, filed a petition questioning said act because
Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends Republic Act
No. 2207 — explicitly prohibits the importation of foreign rice by the
Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.
Hechanova countered that the importation is authorized by the
President for military stock pile purposes (the president is duty-bound to
prepare for the challenge of threats of war or emergency without waiting
for special authority). He also contends that there is no prohibition on
importation made by the “Government itself”. He also further that the
Government has already entered into 2 contracts with Vietnam and
Burma;
unconstitutional because it denies undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
alien residents the equal well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
protection of the laws. inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which is to operate.
It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is
not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those
who do not.
1. Does Gonzales have sufficient 1. Yes. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice
interest to file the case? and corn, RA 3452 declares that "the policy of the
Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these
basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers,
growers, producers and landowners in the
Philippines who wish to dispose of their products at
a price that will afford them a fair and just return for
their labor and capital investment. ... ." Pursuant to
this provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice
land of substantial proportion, is entitled to a chance
to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to
buy abroad. Also subjected to tax.
2. Whether exhaustion of 2. No. The principle requiring the previous
administrative remedies is exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
required in this case applicable where the question in dispute is purely a
legal one", or where the controverted act is "patently
illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction, or where the respondent is a
department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego of
the President bear the implied or assumed approval
of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or
where there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention. The case at bar fails
under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the
general rule.
3. What is the nature of the 3. The parties to said contracts do not appear to
government contracts with have regarded the same as executive agreements.
Vietnam and Burma? Are they But, even assuming that said contracts may properly
valid? considered as executive agreements, the same are
unlawful, as well as null and void, from a

4. May an international agreement
be invalidated by our courts?
6. In Re: Garcia 2 SCRA Petitioner: Arturo Efren Garcia WON he is entitled to practice the
984 (1961) Applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines w/o law profession in the Philippines
submitting to the required bar examinations. w/o submitting to the required
bar examination as stated under
Avers that: He is a Filipino citizen, taken and finished law in Spain and the provision of the Treaty of
practiced his law profession, license, ‘Licenciado En Derecho. Academic Degrees and the
Exercise in Professions between
the Philippines and Spain.
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being
inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts
Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may,
under the American constitutional system enter into
executive agreements without previous legislative
authority, he may not, by executive agreement, enter
into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes
enacted prior thereto.
4.Yes. The Constitution of the Philippines has clearly
settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in Section
2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may
not be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise,
reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or
writ of error as the law or the rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior
courts in — (1) All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in
question". In other words, our Constitution
authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only
when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also,
when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
The court resolved to DENY the profession on the
following grounds:
1. The provision of the Treaty on Academic Degreen
and the Ecercise of Profession between the Republic
of the Philippines and the Spanish State cannot be
invoked by applicant.
2. The nationals of both countries who have
obtained diploma on the contracting states, shall be
deemed competent to exercise said professions in
the territory of the other, subject to the laws and
regulations of the latter.
It is clear that treaty invoked by applicant are made
expressly subject to tge laws and regulations of the
contracting State.
3. Treaty (could not have been intended to modify
the laws and regulations governing admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines)
the Executive Department may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law
in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or
supplement such rules being reserved only to the
 Congress of the Philippines.

Section 4: The prime duty of

the government is to serve
and protect the peopole.
The Government may call
upon the people to defend
the state and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required,
under conditions provided
by law, to render personal
military or civil service.
7. People v. Lagman 66 Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa: charged with a violation of Section Sentenced by the CFI to one WON the national defense law is The national defense law, so far as it establishes
PHIL 13 (1938) 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1 known as National Defense Law. month and one day unconstitutional. cumpulsory military service, and does not go against
imprisonment, with costs. constitutional provision, but is on the contrary, in
Appellants willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the military faithful compliance therewith.
service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the
fact they had been required to do so. What justifies cumpulsory military service is the
defense of the state, whether actual or whether in
Notified to appear before the Acceptance Board. preparation to make it more effective, in case of
need.

The circumstances of the appellants does not excuse

Section 6: The Separation of
Church and State shall ve
inviolable.
8. Aglipay v. Ruiz 64 PHIL
201 (1937)
them from their duty to present themselves in the
acceptance board, there’s room for proper pecuniary
allowance.
Mons Gregorio Aglipay, head of Phil. Independent Church: filed for Is there a violation of principle of There is no violation of the principle of separation of
writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from separation of church and state? church and state. The issuance and sale of the
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third stamps in question maybe said to be separably
International Eucharistic Congress. linked with an event of a religious character, the
resulting propaganda, if any, received by the
Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila government (to promote tourism).
that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Note: Act No. 4052
Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church.

Section 10: The State shall

promote social justice in all
phases of national
development.
Section 11: The State values
the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full
respect of human rights.
9. Calalang v. Williams 70
PHIL 726 (1940)
Maximo Calalng, a private citizen, petition for a writ of prohibition against Note: It is contended by the
respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic petitioner that Commonwealth
Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, Act No. 548 by which the
as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Director of Public Works, with
Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting the approval of the Secretary
Chief of Police of Manila. of Public Works and
Communications, is authorized
The petition stems from the prohibition of animal-drawn vehicles to promulgate rules and
from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de regulations for the regulation
la Barca to Dasmarinas Street, from 7:30 AM to 12:30 PM and from and control of the
1:30 PM to 5:30 PM; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad use of and traffic on national
crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street, from 7 AM to 11 PM., for a roads and streets is
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to unconstitutional because it
traffic. And that as a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not able constitutes an undue
to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the delegation of legislative power.
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Whether or not the petitoner’s
claims on infringement of social
justice is correct.
No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but
thehumanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so thatjustice
in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated. Socialjustice means
the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government ofmeasures calculated
to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society.
The Writ of Prohibition Prayed for is hereby denied,
with costs against the petitioner.

Furthermore, the petitioner claims that such infringes upon the

10. Almeda v. Court of
Appeals 78 SCRA 194
(1977)
11. Ondoy v. Ignacio 97
SCRA 611 (1980)
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure
the well-being and economic security of all the people.
Eulogio Gonzales is an agricultural share tenant of Glicerio, Sinfroso, The Agrarian Court rendered WON respondent Eulogio No. Under the new Constitution, property ownership
Susana, Maria, Sebastian, Rufina, Bienvenido, Besmark and Cesar, all judgment authorizing the Gonzales have validly exercised is impressed with social function. Property use must
surnamed Angeles, on their 46, 529 square land in respondent tenant to redeem his right of redemption over his not only be for the benefit of the owner but of
the land for 24,000 deposited tenanted agricultural land. society as well. The state, in the promotion of social
September 30, 1968: the landowners sold the lot to spouses Almeda with the Clerk of Court within justice may “regulate the acquisition, ownership,
without first informing the tenants of the sale. The tenants then filed a 15 days from receipt of use, enjoyment and disposition of private property,
complaint for the redemption of the land pursuant to Secs 11 and 22 of decision. Agrarian Court and equitably diffuse property.. ownership and
the Code of Agrarian Reforms with the Court of Agrarian Relations at Lipa dismissed the petitioner’s profits”. One governmental policy of recent date
City. case and the petitioners filed project emancipation of tenants from the bondage of
for appeal in the. the soil and the transfer to them of the ownership of
In answering the complaint, the petitioner spouses state that before the the land.
execution of the deed of sale, Glicerio Angeles and his nephew Cesar
Angeles first offered the sale of the land to Gonzales, but the latter had Nevertheless, while the code secures to the tenant-
money. The respondent instead personally went to the house of the farmer right of redemption, the exercise thereof
petitioners and asked them to buy the land for the fear that someone else must be in accordance with the law in order to be
might buy the land would take him as a tenant. At the hearing of the case, valid.
the parties waived their right to present evidence and instead
simultaneously filed a memorandum upon which the decision would be Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is hereby held not to
based. have validly exercised his right of redemption
over his tenanted agricultural land.
Ondoy, a fisherman, was indisputably drowned while employed in the The hearing officer WON the claim for compensation Yes. There is evidence, direct and categorical, to the
fishing enterprise of Ignacio. In the hearing for the claim for summarily ignored the latter be granted effect that the
compensation filed by petitioner, Ignacio submitted affidavits executed affidavit, and dismissed the deceased was drowned while in the actual
by the chief engineer and oiler of the fishing vessel to the effect that claim for lack of merit performance of his with work with said shipping
Ondoy, undeniably a member of the working force of the ship, was in that enterprise. Even without such evidence, the
ship, but after being invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, petitioner could have relied on the presumption of

12. Salonga v. Farrales 165
SCRA 359 (1981)
Section 12: The State
recognizes sanctity of the
family life and shall protect
and strengthen family as a
basic and autonomous
social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of
the mother and the life of
the unborn from
concepcion. The natural
and primary right of and
duty of the parents in the
reading of the youth for
civic efficiency and the
development of moral
and thereafter was found dead. On the other hand, the affidavit of the
chief- mate of the fishing enterprise stated that:
"sometime in October 1968
while xxx Ondoy xxx was in the actual performance of his work with [the]
fishing enterprise, he was drowned and [he] died on October 22, 1968.
That the deceased died in (the] line of duty.'
Respondent Farrales is the owner of a parcel of residential land in
Olongapo City. Petitioner Salonga already had possession of a portion of
the land prior to its acquisition as a lessee, on which she had built a
home. Farrales then launched an ejectment case against Salonga and
other lessees due to non-payment of rent. The verdict was in Farrales'
favor.
When the ruling was upheld and carried out on appeal, the ejectment
lawsuit was then only brought against Salonga. In the interim, Farrales
sold to the other lessees the portions of land that they each occupy.
Farrales continuously declined Salonga's offers to buy the subject
acreage, despite repeated requests.
To force Farrales to sell to
him, Salonga filed an action
for particular performance,
but it was rejected. She now
makes reference to Art. I1.
Sec. 6 of the 1973
Constitution's social justice
provisions in this appeal.
WON constitutional provision on
social justice applicable in this
case.
compensability under the [Workmen's
Compensation Act once it is shown that the death or
disability arose in the course of employment, with
the burden of overthrowing it being cast on
the person resisting the claim.
The affidavit to the effect that the deceased left the
vessel for a drinking spree certainly cannot meet the
standard reguired to negate the force of the
presumption of compensability.
This court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to
the award, merely adheres to the interpretation
uninterruptedly followed by this Court in resolving
all doubts in favor of the claimant. The principle of
social justice is in this sphere strengthened and
vitalized. As between a laborer, xxx and the
employer xxx, the law has reason to demand from
the atter stricter compliance, Social justice in these
cases is not equality but protection.
No. It must be remembered that social justice cannot
be invoked to trample on the rights of property
owners who under the Constitution and laws are
also entitled to protection.
The social justice consecrated in our Constitution
was not intended to take away rights from a person
and give them to another who is not entitled thereto.
Evidently, the plea for social justice cannot nullify
the law on obligations and contracts, and is
therefore, beyond the power of Courts to grant.
Social justice cannot be invoked to trample rights of
property owners nor can it nullify a law on
obligations and contracts.
character shall receive the
support of the government.

Section 13: The state

recognizes the vital role of
the youth in nation building
and shall promote and
protect their pyhsical,
moral, spiritual, intellectual
and social well-being, It
shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism,
and encourage their
involvement in public and
civic affairs.

Section 19: The State shall

develop self-reliant,
independent national
economy controlled by
Filipinos.
13. Meyer v. Nebraska 262 Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted in the district court for WON the statute as construed and YES. While this court has not attempted to define
US 390 Hamilton county, Nebraska, under an information which charged that on applied unreasonably infringes with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term
May 25, 1920, while an instructor in Zion Parochial School he unlawfully the liberty guaranteed to the has received much consideration and some of the
taught the subject of reading in the German language to Raymond plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth included things have been definitely stated. Without
Parpart, a child of 10 years, who had no attained and successfully passed Amendment. doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
the eighth grade. The information is based upon 'An act relating to the restraint but also the right of the individual to
teaching of foreign languages in the state of Nebraska,' approved April 9, contract, to engage in any of the common
1919 occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.

The state argues that the purpose of the statute is to

encourage the English language to be thenative
tongue of all children raised in the state.
Nonetheless, the protection of the
Constitutionextends to those who speak other
languages. Education is a fundamental liberty
interest that must beprotected, and mere knowledge
of the German language cannot be reasonably
regarded as harmful

The judgment of the court belo must be reversed

and the cause remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
14. Pierce v. Society of The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 required parents or guardians to WON the Act violate the liberty of YES. The unanimous Court held that "the
Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925) send children between the ages of eight and sixteen to public school in parents to direct the education of fundamental liberty upon which all governments in
 the district where the children resided. The Society of Sisters was an their children? this Union repose excludes any general power of the
Oregon corporation which facilitated care for orphans, educated youths, State to standardize its children by forcing them to
and established and maintained academies or schools. This case was accept instruction from public teachers only."
decided together with Pierce v. Hill Military Academy.
15. People v. Ritter 194 On or about Oct. 10, 1986, Heinrich Stefan Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez Whether or not he should be Yes, acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt:
SCRA 690 & Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room in Olongapo City. Ritter acquitted on grounds of
masturbated Ramirez and fingered Rosario Baluyot. The following reasonable doubt or acquitted (1) Ordered to pay P30,000 as moral & exemplary
morning, Ritter gave Ramirez & Rosario 200 on grounds of rape with homicide. damage
& 300 pesos. Rosario told Ramirez that Ritter inserted something in her (2) Immediately expel with prejudice to re-entry
vagina and into the country.
it was not yet removed.
The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to
On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario being ogled by people because morals, good customs, public order or public policy
of Rosario's bloodied skirt. He took pity on her condition and brought her (see Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the
to Olongapo General Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to extract the foreign appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them
object by means of forcep but failed despite several attempts because the with money. We can not overstress the
said object was deeply embedded in the vaginal canal and was covered responsibility for proper behaviour of all adults in
by tissues. Her abdomen was enlarged, tender & the Philippines,
distended, a symptom of peritonitis. On May 20, 1987 Rosario was including the appellant towards young children. The
pronounced sexual exploitation committed
dead. by the appellant should not and can not be
condoned. Thus, considering the
Maria Burgos Turla, the grandmother filed a case of rape with homicide circumstances of the case, we are awarding damages
at City Fiscal to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot
Olongapo. On March 29, 1989 the court finds the accused GUILTY beyond in the amount of P30,000.
reasonable doubt for the crime of rape with homicide as defined and
penalized in Art. 335 No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. And finally, the Court deplores the lack of criminal
laws which will adequately protect street children
from exploitation by pedophiles, pimps, and,
perhaps, their
own parents or guardians who profit from the sale
of young bodies. The provisions
on statutory rape and other related offenses were
never intended for the relatively
recent influx of pedophiles taking advantage of
rampant poverty among the forgotten segments of
our society.
16. Dept. of Education v. Roberto Rey San Diego is a Zoology graduate of the University of the East Judge Teresita Dizon- (1) Whether the three-flunk rule is (1) YES. The subject of the challenged regulation is
San Diego 180 SCRA who wanted to pursue medical studies. However, he had taken the NMAT Capulong of RTC Valenzuela a legitimate exercise of police certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is
for a total of three (3) times already and failed in each try. When he tried granted his petition and power. the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to
to take the NMAT the fourth time, his application was denied based on declared the three-flunk rule insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated
MECS Order No. 12, s. 1972, which institutionalized the three-flunk rule, invalid. (2) Whether the three-flunk rule by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily
or that any college graduate who has failed the NMAT for three times is violates the constitutional entrust their lives and health.
no longer eligible to take it. Hence, the instant petition by guarantees of academic freedome,
DECS. due process, and equal protection? (2) NO
San Diego filed a petition before the RTC of Valenzuela to challenge the
three-flunk rule, saying that the same was a violation of his academic Ratio: The NMAT is a constitutionally sanctioned
freedom and his right to have quality education. In his amended petition, measure intended to limit the admission to medical
he said the rule was violative of due process and equal protection. schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical

17. Virtuoso v. Mun. Judge
82 SCRA 191
Section 16: The state shall
protect and advance the
right of the people to a
balanced and healthful
ecolofy in accord with the
rhtyhm and harmony of
nature
18. Oposa v. Factoran 224
SCRA 792 (1993)
San Diego was allowed to take the NMAT a fourth time subject to the
outcome of his petition.
Petitioner Francisco Jr., filed for an application for habeas corpus to
the Supreme court against respondent Judge Mariveles on the grounds
(1)that the preliminary investigation conducted which was the basis for
the warrant arrest issued against him was constitutionally deficient
(3) failed to meet the strict standard required by the Constitutionto
ascertain whether there was a probable cause and
(4) the bail posted against the petitioner was excessive and baseless
following the alleged robbery of the petitioner of a TV set which was
equated to 16,000₱
As response to the excessive bail alleged by the petitioner, respondent
judge asserted that the amount was in accordance to the amount set by
the Revised Bail Bond Guide but thenreduced the amount to 8,000.₱
Petitioner’s counsel argued that this was a clear violation of the
constitution and that the rights of the petitioner, who at that time was a
17 year old minor and should be protected by the Child and Youth
Welfare Code and should be released in recognizance.
Principal petitioner, all minors, and represented by their parents filed
a class suit against Sec. Fulgeciano S.Factoran, Jr. (former DENR
Secretary).
 concerns nothing less than self-preservation and
The civil case prays for judgment to be rendered ordering defendant,
hisagents, representatives and other personsacting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing timber licenseagreements in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
(1) Whether the procedure by
respondent Judge in ascertaining
the existence of probable cause
was constitutionally deficient?
(2) Whether the respondent judge
erred in the posting of the bail
against the petitioner?
1. WON petitioners has a legal
standing in filing of class suit?
2. WON the issuance of the Timber
License Agreements (TLAs)
violate the petitioners right to a
balanced and healthful ecology,
and therefore the same should be
education.
It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the
State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health. The three-
flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools
and ultimately the medical profession from the
intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the respondent court dated January 13,
1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private
respondent. It is so ordered.
(1) YES. It is important to recognize the fact that the
petitioner was a17 year old during the commission
of the crime, pursuant to section 191 of Presidential
Decree No. 603. Therefore, regardless of the
existence of the question of probable cause, the
petitioner should be granted in order to uphold the
constitutional mandate of The State recognizes the
vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall
promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-
being
(2) NO.- The court had ruled to wit: “Where,
however, the right to bail exists, it should not be
rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is
excessive.
1. Yes. The said provisions of the Constitution,
although found under the Declaration ofPrinciples
and State Policies, confer enforceable rights as it
self-perpetuation. The rightto a balanced and
healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty
to refrain from impairing the environment.
Moreover, their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the
 orapproving new timber licenseagreements. cancelled? concept of intergenerational responsibility in sofar
as theright to a balanced and healthful ecology isc
oncerned. The right of the petitioners is also as clear
as the DENR.

2. the Court found the statements under the

introductory affirmative allegations,as well as the
specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF
ACTION, to be adequate enough to show prima facie,
the claimed violation of their rights. The cancellation
maythus be granted, wholly or partly. COURT

PETITION IS GRANTED

19. LLDA v.CA 231 SCRA March 8, 1991: Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Court of Appeals, in a WON the LLDA have the power 1. YES. The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850,
292 (1994) Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint 2 with decision1 promulgated on and authority to issue a "cease and as amended, instead of conferring upon the LLDA
the Laguna Lake Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of January 29, 1993 ruled that desist" order under Republic Act the means of directly enforcing such orders, has
the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, the LLDA has no power and No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, provided under its Section 4 (d) the power to
Caloocan City. authority to issue a cease on the basis of the facts presented institute "necessary legal proceeding against any
and desist order enjoining in this case, enjoining the dumping person who shall commence to implement or
November 15, 1991: the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, the dumping of garbage in of garbage in Tala Estate, continue implementation of any project, plan or
monitoring and test sampling of the leachate 3 that seeps from said Barangay Camarin, Tala Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City. program within the Laguna de Bay region without
dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River Estate, Caloocan City. The previous clearance from the LLDA."
Findings: the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open LLDA now seeks, in this
dumpsite at the Camarin area without securing petition, a review of the
decision of the Court of Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the
(1) Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Appeals. LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the
Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake
(2) clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850 region, whether by the government or the private
amended sector, insofar as the implementation of these
projects is concerned.

PETITION IS GRANTED.

Section 19: The state shall

develop a self-reliant and
independent national
economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos
20. Garcia v. Board of Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon This is a petition to annul and 1. WON the foreign investors has 1. Neither under the 1987 Constitution nor in the
Investments 191 SCRA 288 Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a group of Taiwanese investors, set aside the decision of the the right of final choice of plant Omnibus Investments Code is there such a 'right
(1990) was granted by the BOI for the transfer of its proposed plant from Board of Investments site. of final choice.' In the first place, the investor's
‘naptha only’ to ‘naptha and/or liquefied petroleum gas. (BOI)/Department of Trade choice is subject to processing and approval or
and Industry (DTI) approving 2. WON it constitutes a grave disapproval by the BOI (Art. 7, Chapter II, Omnibus
Reason for transfer: insurgency and unstable situation, and the presence the transfer of the site of the abuse of discretion for the BOI to Investments Code). By submitting its application and
in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) owned by Phil. proposed petrochemical plant yield to the wishes of the investor amended application to the BOI for approval, the
SHELL Corp. from Bataan to Batangas and w/o considering the national investor recognizes the sovereign prerogative of our
the shift of feedstock for that interest. Government, through the BOI, to approve or
 February 1989: BPC applied to BOI to have its plant site transferred
from Bataan to Batangas.
Section 21: The state shall
promote comprehensive
rural development and
agrarian reform
21. Ass. of Small BACKGROUND: Recognizing the need to address the imbalance in the
Landowners in the Phils. V. distribution of land among the people,
Sec. of the DAR 175 SCRA
343 (1989) The State enacted the following laws:
 R.A. No. 3844, the Agricultural Land Reform Code
 P.D. No. 27, which provided for the compulsory acquisition of
private lands for distribution among tenant- farmers & to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners.
 E.O. No. 228, which declared full landownership in favor of
beneficiaries of PD 27, & provided the valuation of still unvalued
lands covered bv the decree as we as the manner of pavment.
 P.P. No. 131, which instituted a comprehensive agrarian retorm
 E.O. No. 229, which provided the mechanics for its
implementation.
 R.A. No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
G.R. 79777 - This petition raises the constitutionality of PD 27, EO 228,
EO 229 & RA 6657.
The case involved a 9-ha riceland worked by 4 tenants & owned by
petitioner Manaay; & a 5-ha riceland
worked by 4 tenants & owned by petitioner Hermano.
The said tenants were declared full owners of the lands by virtue or EU
228, as qualified tarmers under PD27.
Petitioners are questioning the atorementioned
statutes on ground as or separation or powers, due process, equal
protection & the consttutionallimitation
that no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.
G. R. 79310 - This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of PP
131 & EO 229.
plant from naphtha only to
naphtha and/or liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG).
Whether or not the case at bar
involves a traditional exercise of
the power of eminent domain
where only a specific property of
relatively limited area is sought to
be taken by the State from its
owner for a
specific and perhaps local
purpose.
disapprove the same after determining whether its
proposed project will be feasible, desirable and
beneficial to our country. By asking that his
opposition to the LPC's amended application be
heard by the BOI, the petitioner likewise
acknowledges that the BOI, not the investor, has the
last word or the "final choice" on the matter.
2. Yes. The SC found that the BOI have committed
grave abuse of discretion and ordered the original
application BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and
the product naptha as feedstock maintained.
(1) The SC clarified that the case at bar deals with a
revolutionary kind of expropriation. Such
expropriation affects
all private agricultural lands whenever found and of
whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the
maximum retention limits allowed their owners. It is
intended to benefit not only a particular community
or of a small segment of the population but of the
entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our society,
from the impoverished
Tarmerto the and-sutted owner.
(2) such a program will involve not mere millions of
pesos. Considering the vast areas of land subject to
expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate
that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far
more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially
appropriated.
(3) We assume that the framers of the Constitution
were aware of this difficulty when they called for
agrarian reform as a top priority project or the
government. It is a part or this assumption that
when they envisioned theexpropriation that would
be needed. They also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in
the orthodox wav but a less conventionalit more
practical method. There can be no doubt that thy
ware of the tinancial limitations of the government
and had no illusions that there would be enough
money to pay in cash and in full for the lands they
wanted to be distributed among the farmers.
(4) We may theretore assume that their intention
 H. was to allow such manner of payment as is now
Petitioners herein are landowners & sugar planters in the Victorias Mill provided for by
District; while co-petitioner Planter S the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the
Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of planter-members. balance (if the owner cannot be paid fully with
money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just
Petitioners claim that the power to compensation, with other things of value. We may
provide for a CARP as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress & also suppose that what they had in mind was a
not the President similar scheme of payment as that prescribed in P.D.
No. 27. which was the law in force at the time they
G R 70711 deliberated on the new Charter and with which they
Petitioner alleges that his rights to due process and just compensation presumably agreed in principle
were violated when his landholding
was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.

When he filed a protest for the error, his

petition was denied without hearing. Petitioner contends that the
issuance of E0 228 and E0 229 shortly
before Congress convened Is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating
the doctrine or separation or
Powers.

G.R. 78742
Petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by PD 2/ to
owners of rice & corn lands not
exceeding 7-ha as long as thev are cultivatine or intend to cultivate the
same.

Their lands do not exceed the

statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating
such lands. PD 316, promulgated in
implementation of PD 27, provides that no tenant-farmer in agricultural
lands primarily devoted to rice and
corn shall be ejected or removed until the rights of tenant-tarmers and
landowners have been determined.

Petitioners contend that thev cannot eject their tenants since the Dept. of
Agrarian Reform have yet to ISSUE
the implementing rules. Hence, they are requesting that the Court issue a
writ of mandamus to compel the
public respondent to issue the said rules
Section 22: The state
recognizes and promotes
the rights of indigenous
cultural communities
within the framework of
national unity and
development.
22. The City Govt. of Baguio pursuance of the final Decision in G.R. No. 180206- petitioner issued the The Court of Appeals (CA) Whether the respondent should be The court ruled in affirmative.
City v. Atty. Brain Masweng subject demolition advicesfor the enforcement of Demolition Order No. affirmed the injunctive writ cited in contempt of court for
et. Al. Feb. 4, 2009 33, Series of 2005 against Alexander Ampaguey, Sr.et.al; Demolition issued by the NCIP-CAR issuing the subject The said orders clearly contravene the court’s ruling

Section 25: The state shall
ensure the autonomy of
local governments
23. Basco v. Pagcor 197
SCRA 52 (1991)
Order No. 83, Series of 1999 against Julio Daluyen, Sr., et.al, all in Busol
Watershed,Baguio City (filed a petition for injunction).
Respondent in his capacity as the Regional Hearing Officer of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region
(NCIP-CAR) issued the following separate temporary restraining orders
and writs of preliminary injunction in both cases orders:
(1)72-Hour Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order
dated July 31, 2009 and Writ ofPreliminary Injunction4 in NCIP Case No.
31-CAR-09; and
(2)72-Hour Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order
dated July 31, 2009 and Writ ofPreliminary Injunction7 in NCIP Case No.
29-CAR-09.
Hence, this petition asserting that the restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction wereissued in willful disregard, disobedience,
defiance and resistance of this Court’s Decision in G.R. No.180206 which
dismissed the previous injunction case
The PH Amusement and Gaming Corp. was created by PD 1067-A and
granted a franchise under PD 1067-B. Subsequently, under PD 1869, the
Government enabled it to regulate and centralize all games of chance
authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under declared
policy. But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the
instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR Charter — PD 1869,
because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and
because of the following issues:
against the demolition orders.
The case was then elevated to
this Court in G.R. No. 180206
entitled, "City Government of
Baguio City v. Masweng
temporaryrestraining orders and
writs of preliminary injunction.
(1) WON it waived the Manila City
gov't's right to impose taxes and
license fees, which is recognized
by law.
(2) WON it has intruded into the
LGUs' right to impose local taxes
and license fees, and thus contrary
to the principle of local autonomy
enshrined in the Constitution.
(2) WON it violates the equal
protection clause as it allows some
in G.R. No. 180206 that Elvin Gumangan, et.al.
who are owners of houses and structures covered by
the demolition orders issued by petitioner are not
entitled to the injunctive relief previously granted by
respondent.
The court finds that petitioners and private
respondents present the very same arguments and
counter-arguments with respect to the writ of
injunction against the fencing of the Busol
Watershed Reservation. The same legal issues are
thus being litigated in G.R. No.180206 and in the
case at bar,except that different writs of injunction
are being assailed.
(1) No. The fact that PAGCOR, under its charter, is
exempt from paying tax of any kind is not violative
of the principle of local autonomy. LGUs' have no
inherent right to impose taxes. LGUs' power to tax
must always yield to a legislative act which is
superior having been passed by the state itself which
has the inherent power to tax. The charter of LGUs is
subject to control by Congress as they are mere
creatures of Congress. Congress, therefore, has the
power of control over LGUs. And if Congress can
grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even
take back the power.
(2) No. LGUs' right to impose license fees on
"gambling", has long been revoked. As early as 1975,
the power of local governments to regulate gambling
thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was
withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested
exclusively on the National Government.
Furthermore, LGUs' have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the gov't such as PAGCOR which
exercises governmental functions of regulating
gambling activities.
(3) No. The clause does not preclude classification
of individuals who may be accorded different

24. Limbonas v. Mangelin Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the
170 SCRA 786 (1989) Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao
(Assembly).
October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of
the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a
consultation/dialogue with local government officials.
Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members
through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in
November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of
Congress.
However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in
defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his
position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null
and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly.
Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution
from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership
therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the
Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question
which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly,"
for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become
"moot and academic" because of its resolution.
gambling acts but also prohibits
other gaming acts.
(4) WON it violates the Cory
gov't's policy of being away from
monopolistic and crony economy,
and toward free enterprise and
privatization.
1. Whether or not the expulsion of
the petitioner (pending litigation)
has made the case moot and
academic.
2. Are the so-called autonomous
governments of Mindanao subject
to the jurisdiction of the national
courts? In other words, what is the
extent of self-government given to
the two autonomous governments
of Region 9 and 12?
treatment under the law as long as the classification
is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not
have to operate in equal force on all persons or
things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of
the Constitution. The Constitution does not require
situations which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the same.
(4) No. The judiciary does not settle policy issues.
The Court can only declare what the law is and not
what the law should be. Under our system of
government, policy issues are within the domain of
the political branches of government and of the
people themselves as the repository of all state
power. On the issue of monopoly, the same is not
necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state
must still decide whether public interest demands
that monopolies be "regulated" or prohibited. Again,
this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to
decide. The judiciary can only intervene when there
are violations of the statutes passed by Congress
regulating or prohibiting monopolies.
1. The Court does not agree that the case is moot
and academic simply by reason of the expulsion
resolution that was issued. If the expulsion was
done purposely to make the petition moot and
academic, it will not make it academic. On the
ground of due process, the Court hold that the
expulsion is without force and effect. First, there is
no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an
investigation. It also does not appear that the
petitioner had been made aware that he was
charged with graft and corruption before his
colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was
accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations.
As it stands, the charges now are leveled amount to
mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.
Thus, the Court ordered reinstatement of the
petitioner.
2. According to the Supreme Court, an examination
of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades
us to believe that they were never meant to exercise
autonomy through decentralization of power. The
Presidential Decree, in the first place, mandates that
“the President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.”
 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their
legislative arm, is made to dischage chiefly
administrative services. Thus, the SC assumes
jurisdiction.
Section 28: Subject to
reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the state
adopts and implements a
policy of full public
disclosure of all its
transactions involving
public interest.
25. Legaspi v. Civil Service The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information on Whether or not petitioner may The court held that when the question is one of
Commision 150 SCRA 530 matters of public concern in a special civil action for mandamus invoke his constitutional right to public right and the object of the mandamus is to
(1987) against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service information in the case at bar. procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health people are regarded as the real party in interest
Department of Cebu City. The standing of the petitioner was challenged and the relator at whose instigation the
by the Solicitor General of being devoid of legal right to be informed of proceedings are instituted need not show that he
the civil service eligibilities of government employees for failure of has any legal or special interest in the result, it
petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the information sought. being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws. The
Constitution provides the guarantee of adopting
policy of full public disclosure subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the
manner of examining the public records by the
government agency in custody thereof. But the
constitutional guarantee to information on
matters of public concern is not absolute. Under
the Constitution, access to official records, papers,
etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided
by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law
may therefore exempt certain types of information
from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security.

The court delves into determining whether the

26. Valmonte v. De Villa
As part of the duty to maintain peace and order, the National Capital
(1) What constitutes a reasonable
information sought for by the petitioner is of public
interest. All appointments in the Civil Service
Commission are made according to merit and fitness
while a public office is a public trust. Public
employees therefore are accountable to the people
even as to their eligibilities to their positions in the
government. The court also noted that the
information on the result of the CSC eligibility
examination is released to the public therefore the
request of petitioner is one that is not unusual or
unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has
the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person
occupying government positions.
(1) The constitutional right against unreasonable
170 SCRA 256 (1989) Region District Command (NCRDC) installed checkpoints in various parts search? searches and seizures is a personal right invocable
of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. only by those whose rights have been infringed, or
threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in
residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety any particular case is purely a judicial question,
being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the determinable from a consideration of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and circumstances involved.
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially
at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court Petitioner Valmonte’s general allegation to the effect
order. that he had been stopped and searched without a
search warrant by the military manning the
checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which amount to a violation
of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is
not sufficient to enable the Court to determine
whether there was a violation of Valmonte’s right
against unlawful search and seizure.

Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those

which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any
fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.

(2) Whether checkpoints violate
the right against searches and/or
seizures without search warrant
or court order in violation of the
Constitution.
(2) The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in
Valenzuela may be considered as a security measure
to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing effective territorial defense and
maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the
public.

The petition is DISMISSED.

27. Aquino-Sarmiento v. February 1989, petitioner MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO, Petitioner therefore seeks the
Morato 203 SCRA herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and nullification of 1) MTRCB
515(1991) Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that Resolution No. 88-1-25 which
she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting allows the Chairman of the
slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the Board to unilaterally
movies and television productions. downgrade a film (already)
reviewed especially those
It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified which are controversial and 2)
accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-
Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in 89 (dated July 27, 1989)
judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting declaring as strictly
slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and confidential, private and
completely private and personal personal a) the decision of a
reviewing committee which
February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of previously reviewed a certain
the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In film and b) the individual
said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their voting slips of the members of
individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the the committee that reviewed
WON Resolution No. 10-89 is valid
Private has been defined as "belonging to or
concerning, an individual person, company, or
interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or
belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or
community at large" (People v. Powell, 274 NW 372
[1937]). May the decisions of respondent Board and
the individual members concerned, arrived at in an
official capacity, be considered private? Certainly
not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986)
creating the respondent classification board, there is
no doubt that its very existence is public is character;
it is an office created to serve public interest. It being
the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to
privacy.
The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting
in his private capacity and not to a governmental

28. The Province of North
Cotabato v. Govt. of the R.P.
Peace Panel, Oct. 18, 2008.
same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman.
Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine
the voting slips.
However, it was only much later, i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent
Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential,
private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and
the voting slips of the members.
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP –
MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the
petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the
complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon.
They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court
issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
the film.
(1) WON the constitutionality and
the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;
(2) WON respondents violate
constitutional and statutory
provisions on public consultation
and the right to information when
they negotiated and later initialed
the MOA-AD; and
agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the
discharge of public duties.
instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89
and 88-1-25 issued by the respondent Board are
hereby declared null and void.
(1) Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The
failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected
constitutes a departure by respondents from their
mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the
mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution. Any alleged violation of the
Constitution by any branch of government is a
proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which
are of paramount public interest or of
transcendental importance, the Court grants the
petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in
keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v.
Macapagal- Arroyo.
(2) Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave
violation of the Constitution involved in the matters
of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy
of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991).
The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public
concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the State, which directly
affects the lives of the public at large.