OFF

OFF
T-US
“United States” means all of the states.
EPA ‘6 – EPA, US Environmental Protection Agency Terminology Reference System, 2-1-2006,
http://iaspub.epa.gov/trs/trs_proc_qry.alphabet?p_term_nm=U
United States When used in the geographic sense, means all of the States. Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics :
Commercial Chemical Control Rules Term Detail

Violation---the jobs are decided by local tribal governments---the jobs aren’t in ALL the
states, and the government doesn’t increase its redistribution.
Vote neg for limits and ground---justifies international jobs and spikes process DAs to
jobs guarantee.
ASPEC is a voter---unpredictable for the neg since we can’t determine the agent---that
skews fairness and education by causing late breaking debates that favor the aff.
 OFF
The 1AC’s simulation of solving ethical crises ushers in interpassivity, turning case.
Vote negative—this is a gateway argument about how we debate. If they win their
simulation is productive, the rest of the 1NC applies. We will not make cross-
applications from other flows to prove the link.

Adorno 72 (Leading member of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, The Culture Industry, Published 2001, p 198-203, gendered
language under erasure//shree)

We older representatives of that for which the name Frankfurt School has established itself have recently had the reproach of resignation
leveled against us. We had, it is stated, developed elements of a critical theory of society, but we were not prepared to draw the practical
consequences from this theory. We neither designed programmes for action nor did we support the actions of those who felt themselves
inspired by critical theory. I shall sidestep the question whether this demand can be made at all upon theoretical thinkers who always remain to
a certain degree sensitive and by no means unshakable instruments. The task assigned such individuals within a society characterized by the
division of labour might indeed by questionable; they themselves might well be deformed by it. But they have also been formed by it. And there
is no way in which they can repeal that which they have become merely through an act of their own will. I should not want to deny the impulse
of subjective weakness inherent in the confinement to theory. The objection raised against us can be stated approximately in these words; a
person who is in the present hour doubts the possibility of radical change in society and who for that reason neither takes part in
nor recommends spectacular, violent action is guilty of resignation. He does not consider the vision of change which he once held
capable of realization; indeed, he actually had no true desire to see it realized in the first place. In leaving conditions as they are, he offers his
tacit approval of them. Distance from praxis is disreputable in the eyes of everyone. Anyone who does not take immediate action and who is
not willing to get his hands dirty is the subject of suspicion; it is felt that his antipathy toward such action was not
legitimate, and further that his view has even been distorted by the privileges he enjoys. Distrust of those who distrust praxis extends
from those on the opposite side, who repeat the old slogan, ‘We’ve had enough of talking’ all the way to the objective spirit
of advertising, which propagates the picture – it’s called Leitbild or ‘image as motif’ – of the actively involved human being, no matter whether
his activity lies in the realm of economics or athletics. One should take part. Whoever restricts himself to thinking but does not get involved is
weak, cowardly and virtually a traitor. This hostile cliché on the intellectual is to be encountered with deep roots within that branch of the
opposition that is in turn reviled as intellectual without any awareness thereof on their part. Thinking activists answer; among the things to be
changed is that very separation of theory and praxis. Praxis is essential if we are ever to be liberated from the domination of practical people
and practical ideals. The trouble with this view is that it results in the prohibition of thinking. Very little is needed to turn the
resistance against repression repressively against those who – little as they might wish to glorify their state of being – do not desert the
standpoint that they have come to occupy. The often-evoked unity of theory and praxis has a tendency to give way to the predominance of
praxis. Numerous views define theory itself as a form of repression – as though praxis did not stand in a far more direct relationship to
repression. For Marx, the dogma of this unity was animated by the immanent possibility of action which even then was not to be realized.
Today it is rather the opposite situation that prevails. One clings to action because of the impossibility of action. But Marx himself reveals a
concealed wound in this regard. He no doubt delivered the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach in such an authoritarian fashion because he was not at
all sure of it himself. In his youth he had demanded the ‘ruthless criticism of everything that exists’. Now he mocked criticism. But his famous
joke about the Young Hegelians, his coinage “critical criticism’, was a dud and went up in smoke as nothing but a tautology. The forced
precedence of praxis brought the criticism which Marx himself practiced to an irrational halt. In Russia and in the orthodoxy of other countries,
the malicious mockery of critical criticism became the instrument that permitted the status quo to establish itself in such horrifying fashion. The
only meaning that praxis retained was this: increased production of the means of production. The only criticism still tolerated was that people
were not working hard enough. This demonstrates how easily the subordination of theory to praxis results in the support of renewed
repression. Repressive intolerance toward a thought not immediately accompanied by instructions for action
is founded in fear. Unmanipulated thought and the position that allows nothing to be deduced from this thought must be feared because
that which cannot be admitted is perfectly clear: this thought is right. An aged bourgeois mechanism with which the men of the Enlightenment
of the eighteenth century were very familiar displays itself anew but unchanged: suffering caused by a negative condition – in this case by
obstructed reality – turns into anger toward the person who expresses it. Thought, enlightenment conscious of itself, threatens to disenchant
pseudo-reality within which, according to Habermas’ formulation, activism moves. This activism
is tolerated only because it is
viewed as pseudo-activity. Pseudo-activity is allied with pseudo-reality in the design of a subjective position ; an
 that overplays itself and fires itself up for the sake of its own publicity without admitting to what degree
activity
it serves as a substitute for satisfaction, thus elevating itself to an end in itself. All those behind bars are despondent
in their desire to be released. In such situations one no longer thinks or thinks only in fictive postulates. Within absolutized praxis, only reaction
is possible and for this reason the reaction is false. Only thinking could offer an escape, and then only that thinking , the results of
which are not prescribed – as is so frequently the case in those discussions in which it is predetermined who is right and which therefore do not
advance the cause – but rather degenerate without fail into tactics. When the doors are barricaded, it is doubly important that
thought not be interrupted. It is rather the task of thought to analyse the reasons behind this situation and to draw the
consequences from these reasons. It is the responsibility of thought not to accept the situation as finite. If there is any chance of
changing the situation, it is only through undiminished insight . The leap into praxis will not cure thought from
resignation as long as it is paid for with the secret knowledge that this course is simply not the right one. Generally speaking, pseudo-
activity is the attempt to preserve enclaves of immediacy in the midst of a thoroughly mediated and
obdurate society. This process is rationalized through the acceptance of any small change as one step on
the long way toward total change. The unfortunate model for pseudo-activity is the ‘do-it-yourself’ syndrome – activities that do
that which has long been done better through the means of industrial production and which arouse in unfree individuals, hampered in their
spontaneity, the confident feeling that they are of central concern. The nonsense of the ‘do-it-yourself’ approach to the production of material
goods and in the making of many repairs is equally obvious. However, it is not total. In view of the reduction of so-called services – sometimes
superfluous in terms of technical standards – measures taken by a private person fulfill a semi-rational purpose. In politics, however, the ‘do-it-
yourself’ attitude is not of quite the same character. The society that confronts human beings in such an impenetrable manner is these humans
themselves. Confidence in the limited action of small groups is reminiscent of the spontaneity which atrophies beneath the encrusted totality
and without which this totality cannot be transformed into something different. The administered world has a tendency to strangle all
spontaneity or at least to channel it into pseudo-activity. This, however, is not achieved so totally without difficulty as the agents of the
administered world would like to imagine. Nonetheless, spontaneity is not to be absolutized – just as little as it is to be separated from the
objective situation and idolized in the same manner as is the administered world itself. Otherwise the axe will break down the next door in the
house – a process which never spares the carpenter – and the riot squad will appear on the spot. Political acts of violence can also sink to the
level of pseudo-activity, resulting in mere theatre. It is hardly a wonder that the ideal of direct action and propaganda glorifying the deed have
been resurrected, upon the heels of the willing integration of formerly progressive organizations that, in all lands of the earth, manifest the
character of that against which they were once directed. This process, however, has not weakened the criticism of anarchism, the return of
which is the return of the ghost. The impatience toward theory manifested in this return does nothing to advance thought beyond itself. Theory
falls behind the thought which it forgets. For the individual, life is made easier through capitulation to the collective with which he identifies. He
is spared the cognition of his impotence; within the circle of their own company, the few become many. It is this act – not unconfused thinking
– which is resignation. No transparent relation prevails between the interests of the ego and the collective to which it assigns itself. The ego
must abrogate itself, if it is to share in the predestination of the collective. Explicitly a remnant of the Kantian categorical
imperative
manifests itself: your signature is required. The feeling of a new security is purchased with the sacrifice of autonomous thinking.
The consolation that thought within the context of collective action is an improvement proves deceptive: thinking, employed only as the
instrument of action, is blunted in the same manner as all instrumental reason. At the present moment, no higher form of society is concretely
visible: for that reason, anything that seems in easy reach is regressive. According to Freud, however, whoever regresses has not achieved the
goal of his drives. Objectively viewed, reformation is renunciation, even if it considers itself the opposite and innocently propagates the
pleasure principle. In contrast, the uncompromisingly critical thinker, who neither superscribes his conscience nor
permits himself to be terrorized into action, is in truth the one who does not give up. Furthermore, thinking is not the
spiritual reproduction of that which exists. As long as thinking is not interrupted, it has a firm grasp upon possibility. Its insatiable quality, the
resistance against petty satiety, rejects the foolish wisdom of resignation. The Utopian impulse in thinking is all the stronger,
the less it objectifies itself as Utopia – a further form of regression – whereby it sabotages its own realization. Open thinking points beyond
itself. For its part, such thinking takes a position as a figuation of praxis which is more closely related to a praxis truly involved in change than in
a position of mere obedience for the sake of praxis. Beyond all specialized and particular content, thinking is actually and above all the force of
resistance, alienated from resistance only with great effort. This emphatic concept of thinking is by no means secure; no security is granted it by
existing conditions nor by the ends yet to be attained nor by any type of organized force. Whatever was once thought, however, can be
suppressed; it can be forgotten and can even vanish. But it cannot be denied that something of it survives. For thinking has the momentum of
the general. What has been cogently thought must be thought in some other place and by other people. This confidence accompanies even the
loneliest and most impotent thought. Whoever thinks is without anger in all criticism: 1 thinking sublimates anger. Because
the thinking
person does not have to inflict anger upon himself, he furthermore has no desire to inflict it upon others. The
happiness visible to the eye of a thinker is the happiness of mankind. The universal tendency toward suppression goes against thought as such.
Such thought is happiness, even where unhappiness prevails; thought
achieves happiness in the expression of
unhappiness. Whoever refuses to permit this thought to be taken from him has not resigned.
 OFF
COURTS CP
The United States federal judiciary ought to hold that Constitutional guarantees
compel enforcement of [a federal jobs guarantee for American Indian Nations].

Constitutionalizing economic rights spills over to narrow judicial deferral AND avoids
politics---breaks down the political question doctrine.
Rotem Litinski, 11-30-2019, BA in PoliSci from Berkeley, "Economic Rights: Are They Justiciable, and
Should They Be?," American Bar Association,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/

economic-justice/economic-rights--are-they-justiciable--and-should-they-be-/, b

Many have questioned whether it is constitutionally acceptable for a court to assess the progressive realization
of economic rights,
which would require the actions of several mechanisms in concert. Because the responsibility of constructing and
enforcing laws belongs to the legislative and the executive branches, respectively, judicial enforcement of
economic rights might be misconstrued as a denigration of the checks and balances system. On the other hand, judicial
review necessitates that courts evaluate the consistency of legislation and government action with constitutional ideals, aspirations, and
obligations. Ensuring the human rights of individuals to shelter, food, and basic economic stability, foundational to the realization of their
human dignity, is well within those constitutional bounds. Regardless, U.S. courts often gag themselves by denying their
power to constitutionalize socioeconomic rights.

Due to their unelected status, the role and expanse of the courts is constantly in question. But it is this status that
insulates judges from the public, enabling them to protect individuals and groups while exercising
objectivity. There is an institutional bias toward preserving the public good over individual rights because the latter creates a risk that may
conflict with a public interest, a risk that public officials want to minimize. Whereas public officials may base decisions off
public approval, insulated judges are distanced from public sentiments and can remain consistent in their values and
decisions. These factors establish the credibility needed to exercise powerful judicial review.

Economic Rights as Derivatives of Constitutional Provisions

In practice, democratic constitutions often compel

the court to gag itself to counteract judicial overextension and
relegate jurisdiction to the State. The court has an obligation—similar to the positive duties imposed on the State—to
intervene if unconstitutional legislation unreasonably infringes on the basic rights and liberties of individuals to functionally engage
in society. This obligation is as rooted in human rights and economic justice as it is in the Constitution.

PQD blocks norm development for drone warfare.

Hafetz ’17 [Jonathan; January 6; Professor of Law at Seton Hall University, J.D. from Yale University, M.
Phil. From Oxford University, B.A. from Amherst College; Just Security, “The Troubling Application of the
Political Question Doctrine to Congressional Force Authorizations,”
https://www.justsecurity.org/36021/troubling-application-political-question-doctrine-congressional-
force-authorizations/]

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on Nov. 21 dismissed the suit brought by U.S. Army Captain Nathan Michael Smith
challenging the legality of the military campaign against ISIS under Operation Inherent Resolve. The opinion by Judge
Colleen Kollar-Kotelly rejecting the suit on political question grounds is troubling. (Judge Kollar-Kotelly also denied Smith had
standing based on his claim that continuing to fight in an unauthorized military action against ISIS would violate his oath to support and defend
the Constitution). The Obama administration’s release last month of its Report on the Legal and Policy Frameworks Guiding and Limiting the
United States’ Use of Military Force and Related National Security Considerations (“Framework Report”), while admirable in several respects
(see Marty Lederman’s comprehensive summary), crystalizes concerns about the potential ramifications of the political question ruling in Smith
v Obama.

In Smith, the plaintiff maintained that neither the 2001 nor 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)—the former enacted for al
Qaeda and the Taliban, the latter for Iraq—constituted authorization for military action against ISIS. Such action, the plaintiff therefore argued,
was unlawful under the 60-day time limit imposed by the War Powers Resolution. The district court
held that the suit presented a
nonjusticiable political question because the issues raised were primarily ones committed to the political branches of government
and because the court lacked judicially manageable standards. This holding, as Michael Glennon has argued here, and Marty has argued here,
here, and here, misconstrues and misapplies the political question doctrine. In short, a suit asking a court to interpret the scope and meaning of
a congressional force statute—and, particularly, what entities it applies to—presents a legal question squarely within the province and ability of
the judiciary to decide.

Smith’s suit, in the court’s view, would have failed anyway for lack of standing. But the
court’s political question ruling sweeps
more widely and if followed, would bar suit by future plaintiffs raising similar merits claims even where
they unquestionably had standing. Those future plaintiffs could include, for example, individuals detained
by the United States or harmed by U.S. drone strikes (including family members of individuals killed in such strikes). The ruling would
foreclose those persons from claiming that the U.S. action was illegal if it were predicated on their connection to ISIS or to another group that
fell outside current force authorizations.

The Obama administration’s Framework Report underscores these concerns, particularly as executive power is handed to a Trump
administration that could jettison existing policy constraints while further enlarging America’s forever war against terrorist groups.

The Framework Report highlights several broader trends. First, itreinforces that the U.S. armed conflict against al Qaeda
and the Taliban seems only to expand, not contract, with time. Since 2001, it has extended to other groups,
whether because they fall under the al Qaeda umbrella (like ISIS) or are deemed associated forces (as al-Shabaab recently was).

Second, the Report underscores that, under the current framework, the president generally has authority—even if he does not exercise it—to
detain and target individuals based solely on their purported membership in a military group covered by the 2001 AUMF. That authority thus
permits status-based detention or targeting, without resort to claims of self-defense.

Third, the Report reinforces that additional restrictions on this broad legal authority exist only as a matter of policy. As such, they may be
discarded by the next administration. Further, the policies themselves—which apply heightened requirements for using lethal force outside
areas of active hostilities—have proven susceptible to workarounds in practice (See the valuable New York Times reporting by Charlie Savage,
Eric Schmitt, and Mark Mazzetti on how in Somalia the U.S. military has avoided limitations in the May 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance
through assertions of an independent power of collective self-defense, which includes assistance to U.S. partners on the ground).

Courts remain an important check on elastic counterterrorism powers. This check will become even
more important in a Trump administration that expansively interprets existing—or future—force
authorizations while disregarding restraints. In the past, suits challenging particular drone strikes—both ex-ante and
ex-post—have been dismissed on threshold justiciability grounds. Smith, however, is the first decision to hold that the central
underlying question—the meaning and scope of executive power under a congressional force authorization—is itself a political
question. As Smith explained “Plaintiff asks the Court to second-guess the Executive’s application of these statutes to specific facts on the
ground in an ongoing combat mission halfway around the world” (emphasis in original). Smith’s rationale would prevent other challenges to the
application of force authorizations not only to ISIS, but also to other, yet unidentified, groups.

Extinction---miscalculated AND intentional nuclear war.

Boyle ’13 [Michael; 2013; Professor of Political Science at La Salle University, former Lecture in
International Relations and Research Fellow in the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political
Violence; International Affairs, “The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare,” vol. 89]
The race for drones
An important, but overlooked, strategic consequence of the Obama administration’s embrace of drones is that it has generated a
new and dangerous arms race for this technology. At present, the use of lethal drones is seen as acceptable to US policy-
makers because no other state possesses the ability to make highly sophisticated drones with the range, surveillance capability and lethality of
those currently manufactured by the United States. Yet therest of the world is not far behind. At least 76 countries
have acquired UAV technology, including Russia, China, Pakistan and India.120 China is reported to have at least 25
separate drone systems currently in development.121 At present, there are 680 drone programmes in the world, an
increase of over 400 since 2005.122 Many states and non-state actors hostile to the United States have begun to
dabble in drone technology. Iran has created its own drone, dubbed the ‘Ambassador of Death’, which has a range of up to 600
miles.123 Iran has also allegedly supplied the Assad regime in Syria with drone technology.124 Hezbollah launched an Iranian-made drone into
Israeli territory, where it was shot down by the Israeli air force in October 2012.125

A global arms race for drone technology is already under way. According to one estimate, global spending on
drones is likely to be more than US$94 billion by 2021.126 One factor that is facilitating the spread of drones (particularly
non-lethal drones) is their cost relative to other military purchases. The top-of-the line Predator or Reaper model costs approximately US$10.5
million each, compared to the US$150 million price tag of a single F-22 fighter jet.127 At that price, drone technology is already within the
reach of most developed militaries, many of which will seek to buy drones from the US or another supplier. With
demand growing, a
number of states, including China and Israel, have begun the aggressive selling of drones, including attack drones, and
Russia may also be moving into this market.128 Because of concerns that export restrictions are harming US competitiveness in the drones
market, the Pentagon has granted approval for drone exports to 66 governments and is currently being lobbied to authorize sales to even
more.129 The Obama administration has already authorized the sale of drones to the UK and Italy, but Pakistan, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have
been refused drone technology by congressional restrictions.130 It is only a matter of time before another supplier steps in to offer the drone
technology to countries prohibited by export controls from buying US drones. According to a study by the Teal Group, the US will account for 62
per cent of research and development spending and 55 per cent of procurement spending on drones by 2022.131 As the market expands, with
new buyers and sellers, America’s ability to control the sale of drone technology will be diminished. It is likely that the US will retain a
substantial qualitative advantage in drone technology for some time, but even that will fade as more suppliers offer drones that can match US
capabilities.

The emergence of this arms race for drones raises at least five long-term strategic consequences, not all of which
are favourable to the United States over the long term. First, it is now obvious that other states will use drones in ways that are inconsistent
with US interests. One reason why the US has been so keen to use drone technology in Pakistan and Yemen is that at present it retains a
substantial advantage in high-quality attack drones. Many of the other states now capable of employing drones of near-equivalent technology
—for example, the UK and Israel—are considered allies. But this situation is quickly changing as other leading geopolitical players, such as
Russia and China, are beginning rapidly to develop and deploy drones for their own purposes. While its own technology still lags behind that of
the US, Russia has spent huge sums on purchasing drones and has recently sought to buy the Israeli-made Eitan drone capable of surveillance
and firing air-to-surface missiles.132 China has begun to develop UAVs for reconnaissance and combat and has several new drones capable of
long-range surveillance and attack under development.133 China is also planning to use unmanned surveillance drones to allow it to monitor
the disputed East China Sea Islands, which are currently under dispute with Japan and Taiwan.134 Both Russia and China will pursue this
technology and develop their own drone suppliers which will sell to the highest bidder, presumably with fewer export controls than those
imposed by the US Congress. Once both governments have equivalent or near-equivalent levels of drone technology to the United States, they
will be similarly tempted to use it for surveillance or attack in the way the US has done. Thus, through its own over-reliance on drones in places
such as Pakistan and Yemen, the US may be hastening the arrival of a world where its qualitative advantages in drone technology are eclipsed
and where this technology will be used and sold by rival Great Powers whose interests do not mirror its own.

A second consequence of the spread of drones is that many

of the traditional concepts which have underwritten
stability in the international system will be radically reshaped by drone technology. For example, much of
the stability among the Great Powers in the international system is driven by deterrence, specifically nuclear
deterrence.135 Deterrence operates with informal rules of the game and tacit bargains that govern what states, particularly those holding
nuclear weapons, may and may not do to one another.136 While it is widely understood that nuclear-capable states will conduct aerial
surveillance and spy on one another, overt
military confrontations between nuclear powers are rare because they
are assumed to be costly and prone to escalation. One open question is whether these states will exercise
the same level of restraint with drone surveillance, which is unmanned, low cost, and possibly deniable.
States may be more willing to engage in drone overflights which test the resolve of their rivals, or engage in ‘salami tactics’ to see
what kind of drone-led incursion, if any, will motivate a response.137 This may have been Hezbollah’s logic in sending a drone into Israeli
airspace in October 2012, possibly to relay information on Israel’s nuclear capabilities.138 After the incursion, both Hezbollah and Iran boasted
that the drone incident demonstrated their military capabilities.139 One could imagine two rival states—for example, India and Pakistan—
deploying drones to test each other’s capability and resolve, with untold consequences if such a probe were misinterpreted by the other as an
attack. As drones get physically smaller and more precise, and as they develop a greater flying range, the temptation to use them to spy on a
rival’s nuclear programme or military installations might prove too strong to resist. If this were to happen, drones might gradually erode
the deterrent relationships that exist between nuclear powers, thus magnifying the risks of a spiral of conflict
between them.
 OFF
STATES CP:
TEXT: The 50 states and all relevant territories should:
- substantially increase fiscal redistribution in the United States by adopting a
[jobs guarantee for American Indian Nations.]
- increase funding to tribal nations for education
- Increase funding to tribal nations for healthcare
- condition their cooperation with federal initiatives on federal [adoption of a
federal jobs guarantee for American Indian Nations.]

The counterplan solves and ensures follow-on---state participation from the outset is
key.
Nathan Newman 21, writer and professor who teaches criminal justice and sociology at CUNY. "Reset
Labor Markets With a Local Half-Time Job Guarantee" September 21.
https://www.thenation.com/article/economy/half-time-job-gaurantee/tnamp/ //pipk

In the wake of the Covid recession, state and local governments have the chance to remake local labor markets—
and public assistance—by adopting a policy guaranteeing half-time employment at $15 an hour for every
resident.
Despite the hype of supposed proliferating job openings, long experience shows that even if we approach rates of nominal “full employment” again, such statistics
will inevitably ignore higher unemployment rates for Black, Latino, formerly incarcerated, and many other workers. In a Covid-based recession where women in
particular have struggled to return to previous levels of employment, a job guarantee may be critical to restore real employment
alternatives for everyone who wants a job.

So why only a half-time job guarantee?

Because any state or local government will inevitably struggle with the costs of launching such a program, guaranteeing
half-time jobs will be
far more economically feasible. And because of the perversity of welfare benefit phaseouts, a half-time
work guarantee will deliver much of the income of full-time employment, particularly for parents with
kids. As importantly, a half-time program addresses some of the political and social challenges even
progressive critics of job guarantees highlight, since it would give recipients time to care for their
children, pursue education, or seek additional part-time work in fields where they eventually want to
gain full-time, better-paying permanent employment.
Such local job guarantee programs would build on federal proposals in recent years by Bernie Sanders, Cory Booker, proponents of the Green New Deal, and policy
centers like the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the Center for American Progress, and the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College—all pushing federal
programs to ensure that anyone wanting a job is guaranteed one by the government.

While no federal job guarantee program looks likely to be approved in the current congressional
session, the federal dollars flowing to states and local governments from the American Rescue Plan Act and Biden’s projected
“Build Back Better” program create an opportunity for some states and local governments to pilot local versions that could be models

for a future federal policy.

Such federal funding will help offset the substantial initial costs of a job guarantee program —which in time, as
multiple studies of job investment programs show, will substantially offset those initial costs . By raising the

long-term income of participants, a job guarantee will stimulate the overall economy and increases local
tax revenues. Higher job participation also tends to reduce other government spending, by improving
school outcomes of participants’ children and reducing criminal justice costs .
Beyond supporting participants themselves, a key goal of a job guarantee is to expand overall worker power in the economy to demand higher wages. Reducing the
desperation of the unemployed will strengthen individual and collective bargaining in all local industries; the resulting higher wages and
consumption in turn will stimulate local economies and tax revenue.

Plank 2 solves federal follow-on – revives uncooperative federalism.

Bloomberg ’21 [Scott; September 17; Associate Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law;
Social Science Research Network, “Frenemy Federalism,” Draft Manuscript, p. 2-40]
i. Uncooperative Federalism

Dean Heather Gerken and Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen have categorized state legalization of marijuana as an instance of uncooperative
federalism.108 In their influential 2009 essay, Uncooperative Federalism, Gerken and Bulman-Pozen observe that scholars had traditionally
conceived of our system of federalism through one of two lenses. Under
the “state autonomy” model of federalism, the
states and the federal government are dual sovereigns who act as autonomous rivals, allowing states to
act as dissenters to federal policies they deem undesirable. 109 In contrast, under the “cooperative federalism” approach, the
states are like agents or servants of the federal government, dutifully carrying out a federal program to achieve a shared objective.110

Uncooperative federalism presents a third type of relationship between the states and the federal government, one that
recognizes a principal’s or master’s dependence on their agents or servants, and the concomitant power of an
embedded agent or servant to push back against their superior. 111 Sometimes, the states do not dutifully
cooperate in administering a federal program, but actively seek to change or undermine that program.
They are uncooperative.
Gerken and Bulman-Pozen identify three categories of state actions that constitute uncooperative federalism. The first is “licensed” dissent,
which occurs when “Congress explicitly contemplates that states will deviate from federal norms in implementing federal policy, but states take
that invitation in a direction the federal government may not anticipate.”112 State efforts to catalyze federal welfare reform provide an
example. In the 1980s, states such as Wisconsin and Michigan utilized a waiver provision of the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children
welfare program (“AFDC”) to “recast an entitlement for poor families struggling to raise children into a temporary grant for recipients who
would quickly move into the private workforce.”113 Departing from the existing federal policy, the states began enacting welfare-to-work
requirements that required welfare recipients to actively seek employment and terminated AFDC benefits after a set period of time.114
These uncooperative states largely succeeded in changing federal welfare law when Congress passed the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.115

The second form of uncooperative federalism occurs when states exploit gaps in federal regulatory schemes. In such cases,
“the federal government does not contemplate state variation but states have sufficient discretion that they find ways to
contest federal policy.”116 Gerken and Bulman-Pozen offer California’s efforts to regulate air pollution more stringently than the EPA
as an example of this strain of uncooperative federalism. The state has successfully exploited a narrow exception to the
Clean Air Act’s preemption provision to drive federal emissions standards for decades.117

The third, and “strongest,” form of uncooperative federalism is civil disobedience, where states “simply refuse to comply with
the national program or otherwise obstruct it.”118 Gerken and Bulman-Pozen cite state pushback to the Patriot Act as an
example. After Congress passed the Act, several states enacted resolutions that prohibited their agencies from assisting the federal government
in enforcing the Act.119 This
uncooperative action had real effect, as “the federal government relies on the
states for enforcement assistance.”120
In early 2009, the federal-state relationship regarding marijuana fit within the uncooperative federalism framework, falling into the civil
disobedience bucket.121 At that point, thirteen states had legalized medical marijuana, a costly blow to the federal government due to its
dependence on the states for assistance in enforcing marijuana prohibition.122 The DEA, meanwhile, was “actively working to undermine the
decriminalization efforts underway in California, the state with the most nationally visible decriminalization policy.”123 Indeed, federal
prosecutions of individual medical marijuana users and marijuana businesses in California were commonplace in the early 2000s.124

ii. Increased Federal Cooperation

There is a great deal more cooperation in the federal-state marijuana relationship than there was when Gerken and Bulman-Pozen originally
described it as uncooperative federalism. Since 2009, dozens more states have legalized medical marijuana and many have also legalized the
drug for recreational use. In
conjunction with these state policy changes, the federal government’s policy
changed as well: It became far more cooperative with the states.

Though the federal government indisputably has the constitutional authority to prosecute marijuana businesses
and users operating in states where marijuana is legal, over the years it has agreed – expressly at times and tacitly at others – to allow
those businesses and users to avoid prosecution. This form of federal cooperation began with a series of DOJ memoranda instructing U.S.
Attorneys not to prosecute marijuana businesses and users acting in compliance with state law.

In 2009, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden issued a policy memorandum to U.S. Attorneys titled “Investigations and Prosecutions in States
Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana.”125 The “Ogden Memo,” as it has become known, instructed U.S. Attorneys in states that legalized
medical marijuana to deprioritize the enforcement of federal marijuana law against individuals who use medical marijuana in compliance with
state law.126 As a result, the federal government stopped prosecuting medical marijuana users unless the user failed to comply with
state law in a manner that implicated one of several “potential federal interest[s]” listed in the Ogden Memo.127

Nationalization of law enforcement inhibits counterterror.

Matt Mayer 12, Visiting fellow at the Heritage Foundation, author of Homeland Security and
Federalism: Protecting America from Outside of the Beltway; The Heritage Foundation, 3/26/2012,
“Federalism Allows Law Enforcement to Determine Counterterrorism Policies That Work Best,”
https://www.heritage.org/terrorism/report/federalism-allows-law-enforcement-determine-
counterterrorism-policies-work-best

With an increase in the national response to terrorism, many people believe the principle of federalism has little
utility today or that states do not have much to contribute in counterterrorism policy or activity. When it
comes to domestic security, however, federalism is more relevant than ever, and the states have a vital role
to play in counterterrorism. Local law enforcement agencies have the flexibility and authority to design
counterterrorism programs that best fit their respective jurisdictions. With that flexibility and authority, our cities are more
secure.

One-Size-Fits-All Usually Fits Few Well

The 10th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution simply states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Those 28 words confirm that states possess the
ability to tailor policies that best address the issues they confront. Because of the various demographic differences
among the states, a one-size-fits-all policy may not work or may not work most effectively and efficiently in a particular
state.

When the federal government nationalizes an inherently state or local issue, it ensures that whatever policy it produces
will fail to solve the problems. We know from the welfare reforms in the 1990s that a policy solution in one state may not work well in another
state, which demonstrated the importance of states maintaining the flexibility and authority to tackle issues as they see fit. A robust policy
competition among the states will enable America to find out what works and what does not. Domestic counterterrorism policy is no different.

Each Community Presents Unique Challenges Requiring Unique Solutions

America, thankfully, does not have a national police force. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has authority over federal
crimes, including terrorism, and exercises its authority by investigating and arresting suspected terrorists. With only 15,000 agents for the
entire United States, the FBI lacks the resources to protect every American city. Because of this inherent limitation, outside of constitutional
and legislative protections, America’s
law enforcement community is not covered by a one-size-fits-all policy
on how best to protect U.S. cities.

State and local law enforcement entities are not displaced by federal authorities (except in some very narrow areas
of national control) and instead retain their inherent sovereign authority to design counterterrorism programs that are
tailored to the needs of each community. These needs are typically defined by demographics, risk assessments,
community norms, and other factors unique to each jurisdiction. The ideal outcome for Americans is one where there
is strong cooperation and true partnering between the FBI and other federal law enforcement agencies and state and local law enforcement
entities. We are getting closer to that ideal with each passing year.

Terror entombs the globe.

Louis Beres 19, Associate Professor of Political Science at Purdue University, Ph.D. who has lectured
and published extensively on the subject of nuclear terrorism; Routledge, 7/09/2019, “Terrorism And
Global Security: The Nuclear Threat--Second Edition, Completely Revised And Updated,” no. 2]

Nuclear terrorism could even spark full-scale nuclear war between states. Such war could involve the entire
spectrum of nuclear conflict possibilities, ranging from a. nuclear attack upon a nonnuclear state to systemwide nuclear war. How
might such far-reaching consequences of nuclear terrorism come about? Perhaps the most likely way would involve a terrorist
nuclear assault against a state by terrorists "hosted" in another state. For example, consider the following scenario:
Early in the 1980s, Israel and her Arab state neighbors finally stand ready to conclude a comprehensive, multilateral peace
settlement. With a bilateral treaty between Israel and Egypt already several years old, only the interests of the Palestinians—as
defined by the PLO— seem to have been left out. On the eve of the proposed signing of the peace agreement, half a dozen crude
nuclear explosives in the one kiloton range detonate in as many Israeli cities. Public grief in Israel over the many thousand dead and
maimed is matched only by the outcry for revenge. Inresponse to the public mood, the government of Israel
initiates selected strikes against terrorist strongholds in Lebanon, whereupon the Lebanese government and its
allies retaliate against Israel. Before long, the entire region is ablaze, conflict has escalated to nuclear
forms, and all countries in the area have suffered unprecedented destruction.

Of course, such a scenario is fraught with the makings of even wider destruction. How would the United States
react to the situation in the Middle East? What would be the Soviet response? It is certainly conceivable that a chain reaction of
interstate nuclear conflict could ensue, one that would ultimately involve the superpowers or even every
nuclear weapon state on the planet.
What, exactly, would this mean? Whether the terms of assessment be statistical or human, the consequences of nuclear war require an entirely
new paradigm of death. Only such a paradigm would allow us a proper framework for absorbing the vision of near-total obliteration and the
outer limits of human destructiveness. Any
nuclear war would have effectively permanent and irreversible
consequences. Whatever the actual extent of injuries and fatalities, it would entomb the spirit of the entire species in a
planetary casket strewn with shorn bodies and imbecile imaginations.
 OFF
POLITICS DA
Israeli-Saudi normalization deal is likely now.
Middle East Monitor 9-11. "Israel says holding talks with Palestinians to advance Saudi
normalisation deal". 9-11-2023. https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230911-israel-says-holding-
talks-with-palestinians-to-advance-saudi-normalisation-deal/

Israel is holding talks with Palestinians as part of efforts to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia, the
country’s National Security Adviser said Monday, Anadolu Agency reports.

“I have been conducting a dialogue with them [Palestinian authorities] in the name of the Prime Minister for eight months,” Tzachi Hanegbi said
in statements cited by The Times of Israel newspaper.

“The conversations are taking place as part of the five-way dialogue with Jordan, Egypt and the US,”
Hanegbi added at a conference at Reichman University in Herzliya.

“We are trying to reach agreements on security matters, so they will take responsibility for the matters that touch on their
lives, Area A and so that the IDF (army) won’t have to enter refugee camps in Jenin and Nablus instead of them,” he said.

Regarding the chances of reaching a deal to normalise Israeli-Saudi ties, Hanegbi said that an
agreement is “likely to take place”.
There was no comment from the Palestinian or Saudi authorities on the Israeli statements.

Last month, Hanegbi cited

“significant progress” in talks with Saudi Arabia and the US on reaching a
normalization deal between Tel Aviv and Riyadh.

Israeli officials have talked on several occasions about an imminent normalisation deal with Saudi
Arabia.
Saudi Arabia does not have diplomatic relations with Israel and opposes normalisation with Tel Aviv until it ends the decades-long Israeli
occupation of the Palestinian Territories.

Six Arab countries have diplomatic ties with Israel, starting with Egypt in 1979, Jordan in 1994, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain in
September 2020, and then Sudan and Morocco later that year.

FJG costs pc
Lowrey 18 Annie, The Atlantic, “A Promise So Big, Democrats Aren’t Sure How to Keep It,” May 11,
2018 https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05/the-democratic-party-wants-to-end-
unemployment/560153/ dmr

There is also the cost. “It would take a level of funding for which we would have to very much alter our fiscal
outlook,” Jared Bernstein, who was former Vice President Joe Biden’s chief economist and is now at CBPP, told me. Small pilot programs
aimed at stopping recidivism might pay for themselves. But a true jobs guarantee would cost something like $400 to $700 billion a year now,
and vastly more during a downturn. There
are other sticky questions. How much should these jobs pay, and what
kind of benefits should they provide? Would a jobs guarantee foment inflation? What would a jobs
guarantee do to our understanding of the interplay between inflation, employment, and growth
anyway? Would the government get rid of unemployment insurance? Would the jobs be permanent? If not, is that
really a guarantee that ends joblessness, once and for all? If so, would that sap the country of some of the ingenuity of its private workforce?
What share of the economy would be involved in care work? How much would that represent a
movement from uncompensated, kitchen-table care work to compensated, workplace care work? For
some Democratic policy wonks, the trade-offs in both economic and political capital seem the most
salient. What do you give up by implementing a jobs guarantee? What comes first: a public option for
health insurance, or a major jobs plan, or an expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, or a universal child
allowance, or a major educational debt-relief plan, or postal banking—all of which are ideas being pushed by
Democratic presidential aspirants right now? “How much in life do you spend money on the last mile?” Gene Sperling, who was the director of
the National Economic Council under Obama, asked me. “There are big, long-term unemployment problems, right? That’s complicated. Those
are people who need a lot of help. They need a lot of support. Is that really the issue, or is the issue that the working poor are not making
enough money to support their families? If you’re going to spend a trillion dollars on something huge …There’s an element here of people not
thinking about what they’re actually trying to do.” In a technocratic sense, perhaps. But the technocratic problems that a jobs guarantee poses
are not impossible to solve. There are good models. RecycleForce, for instance, cuts the recidivism rate of recently incarcerated individuals to
26 percent, versus a national rate of 64 percent, Keesling told me. And it saves the taxpayer $1.20 for every dollar invested. Surveys show that
similar jobs programs have raised both earnings and employment rates for their participants, and also “decreased family public benefit receipt,
raised school outcomes among the children of workers, boosted workers’ school completion, lowered criminal-justice system involvement
among both workers and their children, improved psychological well-being, and reduced longer-term poverty,” a survey by the Georgetown
Law Center on Poverty and Inequality found. “There may be additional positive effects, such as increased child-support payments and improved
health.” Scaling up transitional jobs initiatives would be a good start, then. “There’s nothing resembling an entitlement that supports a person
coming home from prison right now,” Sam Schaeffer, the executive director of the Center for Employment Opportunities, a New York-based
nonprofit that provides jobs and training to the formerly incarcerated in 20 cities, told me. “To really tackle this challenge, there should be
some unifying mechanism, with a mix of workforce programs, anti-poverty programs, nutrition assistance, housing, and more. We’ll pay $82
billion a year to incarcerate people. We don’t make anything like a similar investment on reentry.” There are also models stemming from TANF-
EF. JobsNOW! in San Francisco offers a tiered program to help workers with different levels of readiness for a paid job. One tier pays
participants while they enroll in job-readiness or vocational training, or a high-school diploma program. It also pays participants to do relatively
low-skill work at a nonprofit. Finally, there is a wage-subsidy program, aimed at individuals with work experience. On top of that, the program
provides case management and wraparound services, helping ensure that participants have Medicaid and food stamps. All in all, it has
increased its 20,000 participants’ earnings by an average of 55 percent, and three in four no longer need cash assistance two-and-a-half years
after exiting the program. The evidence for what works is out there, and the need especially great in certain communities and with certain
individuals. Starting with pilots and scaling them up, as Booker wants to do, makes sense. So does Khanna’s model of directing state and local
governments to figure out what works for them, as TANF-EF did. So does Sanders’s idea of having “hundreds” of public-works initiatives. For all
the blue-sky thinking and talk of a national, public-jobs guarantee, Democratic
policymakers do seem to be taking the idea
seriously, but not literally, to borrow a phrase. The idea is to indicate to the country that they want to tackle the biggest
challenges with the biggest solutions—not to figure out every detail, pay for every dollar, appeal to every voter, and pass a policy bar their
colleagues on the other side of the aisle have shown no interest in. That gives Democrats room to experiment. “This is not a panacea to solve
the jobs problem. It has to be attacked in multiple ways,” Khanna told me. “I would argue that this is a first, serious proposal that by my own
admission I would say is not intended to be perfect.” It avoids putting them in the position of negotiating themselves down. “I see it as really
opening the Overton Window in a way that is a quite useful for this debate,” Bernstein said. “I’m not in the business of negotiating with myself
at this point. Let’s let all the good ideas blossom.” It
vaults over the need to figure out the most difficult parts of the
legislation, like how much or how to pay for such a proposal. “I’m not gonna presume how we pay for it,” Tanden said. “I
do think the Republican tax plan indicates how little Republicans care about deficits when it comes to taxes. I’m not saying that we won’t care
about this. But obviously it makes that an easier conversation.” It also acknowledges that Republicans
are unlikely to get on
board with big Democratic ideas, freeing liberals to think bigger. “We live in the era of tribalism,” Tanden told me. “It’s
hard to think through a proposal if Republicans feel like doing any deal with Democrats is noxious. Ipso
facto, when a Democrat proposes something, they cannot support it because it’s the Democrats have
creating it. That does not allow for compromise.”

Key to dollar heg.

Rubab Zahra 23. MPhil in Mass Communication from Islamic International University, Islamabad. "Can
Saudi Arabia normalise ties with Israel?". Middle East Monitor. 8-9-2023.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230809-can-saudi-arabia-normalise-ties-with-israel/

Israel wants to normalise ties with Saudi Arabia. The motivations behind this intriguing development are far from one-
dimensional, as they involve economic aspirations, geopolitical dynamics and the thorny issue of Palestine.

At the heart of Israel’s pursuit lies the allure of Saudi Arabia’s flourishing economy . Filled with riches and
boasting a robust economic landscape, Saudi Arabia presents a promising potential partner for Israel. In an interview with Bloomberg in
Washington on Monday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seemed optimistic about normalising ties with Saudi Arabia. He hinted at
building an economic corridor to Europe with Saudis. This corridor would encompass energy, transport and communication sectors to stimulate
trade and economic growth between the continents.

But before the normalisation, an underlying issue must be taken into consideration: Palestine. Critics argue
that any progress in relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia should only come after a resolution to the ongoing Palestine-Israel conflict. The
Israeli premier, however, has a different position on this. In the interview, he rejected the view that the issue of Palestine could cause any kind
of problem in forming ties with Riyadh.

Meanwhile, theUS seems to differ on this matter. It insists that the interests of Palestinians should be a significant
element of the talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Why is the US so invested in this situation? The answer lies in economic concerns:
the stability of the US dollar is at stake. If Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) were to announce that oil could be
traded in currencies other than the dollar, it could trigger a domino effect, shaking the very
foundation of the dollar’s supremacy.

This is why the US is eager to bolster economic ties with Saudi Arabia, leveraging its burgeoning
economy and vast resources to safeguard its own economic interests. Saudi Arabia has a lot of money to throw
away, and the US wants to make the most of this. But for that to happen, the US must be in Saudi Arabia’s
good books. And to be in the good books of MBS, it is pushing Israel to behave itself for a while.

Dollar heg solves war, specifically NoKo and Iran. And solves global public goods,
climate change and disease.
Joshua Zoffer 20. Investor at Cove Hill Partners, Fellow at New America, JD Candidate at Yale
University Law School, AB from Harvard University. “To End Forever War, Keep the Dollar Globally
Dominant,” The New Republic, https://newrepublic.com/article/156417/end-forever-war-keep-dollar-
globally-dominant
In early 2016, Obama Treasury Secretary Jack Lew cautioned that the dollar’s dominance as a global currency rested, in part, on the U.S.
government’s reluctance to fully weaponize it. If foreign markets and governments “feel that we will deploy sanctions without sufficient
justification or for inappropriate reasons,” he warned, “we should not be surprised if they look for ways to avoid doing business in the United
States or in U.S. dollars.” Lew’s case stemmed from the more fundamental view that the dollar’s international role is “a source of
tremendous strength for our economy, a benefit for U.S. companies and a driver of U.S. global leadership”—in other words,
a role worth keeping. This view is emblematic of American financial governance since the Second World War. U.S. economic analysts,
especially at the Treasury, have jealously guarded the dollar’s role and the many benefits it offers: the ability to run large deficits at low cost
and disproportionate influence over the structure of the global economy, among others. Yet in their recent article in The New Republic, David
Adler and Daniel Bessner argue the U.S. should abandon these advantages. In their view, the dollar’s role has encouraged
American militarism and should be relinquished to curb such behavior. Dollar hegemony is not without
cost, but to renounce it would be a profound mistake. Adler and Bessner’s view neglects the sizable economic
benefits the dollar’s role confers on the U.S., as well as its possible use as an antidote to military
adventurism. It ignores the enormous good that can be done with deficit spending, much of which has
gone to the American military but could instead fund progressive programs. And it elides the inability of
the U.S. and its global trading partners to shift away from dollar dominance without creating worldwide
financial distress. Adler and Bessner are right that the U.S. has misused its privilege, but Washington should not abandon it; rather,
American leaders should seek to transform it. Generations of American policymakers have been right to protect the dollar’s key currency role
for economic reasons. Most notably, dollar hegemony affords the U.S. the ability to run large and prolonged budget and balance-of-payments
deficits. The dollar represents 62 percent of allocated foreign exchange reserves, is used to invoice and settle roughly half of world trade, and
accounts for 42 percent of global payments. Because governments, banks, and businesses worldwide need lots of dollars, the world market
always stands ready to absorb new U.S.-dollar-denominated debt without charging higher interest rates. Adler and Bessner correctly point out
that the rest of the world considers the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency to be an “exorbitant privilege,” a term coined in the 1960s
by then French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard D’Estaing. The ability to spend beyond its means has enabled the U.S. to fund its impressive
military might, whether one views that power as the fountainhead of Pax Americana or the source of illegitimate military adventurism. But
these economic benefits go beyond just deficits. The demand for dollars also pushes up the dollar’s value against other currencies, enhancing
American purchasing power and offering consumers access to imports on the cheap. The dollar’s role also means American firms rarely need to
do business in foreign currencies, reducing transaction costs and exchange-rate risks. More broadly, America’s central economic role gives it
outsize influence at crucial moments. At the height of the financial crisis that began in 2008, the Federal Reserve was able to inject vital liquidity
into the global financial system by selectively offering dollar swap lines to trusted foreign central banks. Dollar hegemony enabled the U.S. to
act swiftly, effectively, and on its own terms. In addition, the
dollar’s role offers a potent alternative to kinetic military
action as a means of pursuing foreign policy objectives. The dollar’s broad use means access to dollar
liquidity—which in turn requires access to the U.S. financial system—is essential for foreign governments and businesses. For
foreign banks, especially, being cut off from dollar access is essentially a death sentence. That makes
sanctions that do so a powerful tool in the international arena. In 2005, for example, the U.S. used the dollar
to strike a devastating blow against North Korea without firing a single shot or even formally enacting sanctions. Using
authority provided by Section 311 of the Patriot Act, the Department of the Treasury crippled Banco Delta Asia, a bank accused of facilitating
illegal activity by the North Korean government, by merely threatening to cut off its access to the American financial system. Deposit outflows
began within days; within weeks the bank was placed under government administration to avoid a full collapse. Pyongyang was hit hard, as
other banks ceased their business with it to avoid meeting the same fate. Similarly, though the Trump administration has worked hard to
undo it, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran to limit the development of nuclear weapons was
made possible, in part, by painful dollar sanctions that brought Iran to the table. Far from being a
proximate cause of military conflict, the dollar’s central global role has often been used to contain
adversaries without military intervention. Still, skeptics are right to point out that the dollar’s role has indirectly funded
American interventionism and that dollar sanctions have been overused, provoking the ire of American allies. But these facts suggest we should
use our dollar power to forge a more progressive U.S. order, not abandon the advantage altogether. America’s exorbitant privilege need
not fund warships and missiles: The same low-interest borrowing could be used to fund a new universal health care
system, expand access to higher education, or pursue any number of large-scale social policy objectives, including financing
global public goods that no other country or consortium of countries is prepared to fund, such as climate
change mitigation.
Framing
 1NC – Framing – Short
Case filters framing – scope is governed by material effects of the plan. Any defense
takes out root cause and means sweeping structural violence args don’t zero the DA.
That means the counterplan solves framing. No ev assumes comparing the net benefit
to deficits. The 2AC must explicitly contextualize framing to deficits – anything else
wrecks block strategy, it’s based on the 2AC.
No conjunctive fallacy. Authors don’t assume debate, where dropped arguments are
true. This also assumes independent events, but use conditional probability – each
link achieves key conditions of our authors for the next. Else, it links to them, since
they must prove the aff event chain.
1. Pragmatism is a link not a turn. It relies on the rhetorical register of reform, which has historically
been deployed to promise Native people and take even more away. From manifest destiny to the new
deal, the federal government historically expands its wealth on the back of Indigenous labor. Their
Bender evidence agrees — Obama also promised tribal jobs, but never delivered. They cannot FIAT
through a federal government that has disavowed indigenous life for generations. This turns case - the
plan becomes a basis for pork barrel spending, as per our DA evidence, which is a mask for republicans
policies like the border wall that net hurt indigenous life — straight turns their framing.

2. Subject position. Be highly suspect of Rowland Hall’s disembodied advocacy. They read indigenous
soft left affs on every topic, using a curriculum that trades indigenous thought for the ballot. What
would they do if an indigenous person entered this Zoom, and said they disagreed? It’s proven by their
appeals to authority when asked basic solvency questions — IE that the tribal leaders would simply
decide projects. Who are those leaders? Who recognizes them? What jobs get picked? Their vague idea
that “oh, the natives can figure it out” IS the imposition of indigenous labor by the State, that PROVES
how disembodied politics simply LEAVES the details to groups affected and ACTS like they wanted it.
They will say “X group wants it” which is a recognition politics equivalent to “but my minority friend said
so” — acting like we are doing them a big favor IS the problem

Utilitarianism is good and opposite of the logic of racism---universal ethics counters

violence because it doesn’t make a value statement on subject---alternatives are
worse.
John Sweeney 18, Bowdoin Globalist, Why the Left Should Forget about Fairness, 2-27,
https://bowdoinglobalist.com/2018/02/27/why-the-left-should-forget-about-fairness/ DOA: 8-31-18,
y2k
Oprah might say that such a good is relative to our identity. Many people may agree, as they cheer her on when she speaks about living or speaking “your truth.”
But we should not be concerned with my truth or your truth; rather, we should focus on the truth . The
left should attempt to move away
from the accommodation of moral relativism toward a pursuit of moral objectivity based
on reason. Ascribing objectivity or scientific properties to morality strikes some people as presumptuous. In
actuality, all that objective morality implies is that we have reason to prefer some moral theories over
others and that we are right in saying that there are some things that we ought to do more than we
ought to do other things. Much of the right’s political platform relies on the “moral truths” of Judeo-Christianity and the existence of natural rights.
Although these principles are often paraded as objective truths, the particular religious dogmas or natural rights to which people subscribe do not find their basis in
something as universal as reason. Most often they result from cultural myth or tradition, as people who wish to codify customs into inalienable or divine ethics
spread their narrative. These stories frequently overlook reason or evidence and even attempt to undermine it in favor of faith. This is a terrible
mistake. Without the universal principle of reason, people simply
further internalize their sociocultural intuitions, sinking further into their given social norms, religious
teachings, and stereotypes about others. Such thinking (or lack of thinking) has been largely responsible
for enduring racism, sexism, speciesism, and the like, which have caused immeasurable suffering to conscious
minds. Not only is ignoring reason undesirable; it is also impossible. If one were to disagree with this assertion, one would have to
offer their own reason when asked why. Reason is our language of argumentation and thought (which is not to say that it is always best
to be purely reasonable; we are not unfounded in our adoption of irrational dispositions at times). In reconstructing itself, the American left should embrace reason.
This is more controversial than it might sound. It implies that the left confine itself to producing results that will improve conscious life, not fairness, unreasoned
religious instructions, or vague principles such as equality or individuality. We must somehow navigate the landscape of the well-being
of conscious entities; we must traverse the peaks and valleys between endless suffering and infinite joy. The
left can realign itself with reality by forging this consequentialist path, standing against suffering and pursuing
happiness. This objective morality is no more than an aggregation of subjective ones, seeking to maximize desirable
feelings and minimize undesirable ones. Experiencing desirable feelings is subjective , yet we have objective reason to
believe that these experiences exist and carry value (whereas we could not say the same thing about natural rights, free will, or religious
afterlife). This universal perspective does not discriminate and encompasses all conscious creatures. Henry Sidgwick explains
how this theory can lead us to greater unity: “the good of any one individual is of no more
importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other; unless that is, there are special grounds
for believing that more good is likely to be realised in the one case than in the other.” This should be the guiding maxim of the left. Applying
consequentialism to a movement like Black Lives Matter makes both easier to conceptualize.
Since the taking and harming of black lives is a disproportionate problem, we have special grounds for
proclaiming “Black Lives Matter” rather than simply saying “All Lives Matter”. Such social movements need to be revised, as
many Americans find them inherently divisive. Indeed, fifty-seven percent of Americans have a negative view of Black Lives Matter movement. By incorporating
Sidgwick’s exception for functionality into his general claim that the good of every individual is of equal importance, the left can at once hope to tackle the political
problems that are most pressing and remind us of our ultimate equal importance. Emphasis on particular lives, just like the government invention
of rights, may be important means to maximizing happiness, but they are not declarations of innate
value. By presenting these means as tools for the pursuit of happiness, the left can focus on the very concrete goal
of improving sentient lives while fulfilling the most often ignored promise of our founders (“the pursuit of happiness” is often treated as a vague accessory
to life and liberty). Consequentialism can also be an antidote to elitism, when we consider, as philosopher Jeremy Bentham
did, that “the question is not Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? Why should the law refuse its protection to
any sensitive being?” Bentham was talking about the problem of animal suffering, but the claim implicates all conscious life. A consequentialist framework
would further some current objectives and create others for the left. We have already considered implications for how we talk about and act upon issues of criminal
and racial justice. The consequentialist view also reconceives wealth as a means to flourishing rather than a deserved end reflecting a person’s worth (this mentality
is so deeply ingrained in our culture that we often refer to future earnings as “our money” and any disruptive change to the system of wealth distribution, which is
more than anything else responsible for our earnings, as a kind of theft). Psychologist Daniel Kahneman and economist Angus Deaton have famously found that
positive correlations between individual income and happiness fail to appear at incomes above $75,000 a year. Considering this, although traditional
consequentialism grants equality no innate value, practical applications of the theory would almost certainly be more egalitarian than the current policies of the
political left. It would still be beneficial to have some wealth variation to facilitate incentives to contribute actively and positively to society, but the retention of
wealth based on a primordial claim to it would cease to be a compelling rationalization of wealth inequality. A reexamination of moral values based on happiness
should not confine itself to concern for any one species. Accordingly, the suffering that we inflict on billions of non-human animals every year (bundled with the
economic inefficiency and environmental degradation that results from creating non-human animal products for human consumption) through meat production,
non-human animal testing, and other harmful practices should be considered a major political problem. Extending concern to what some may consider a fringe issue
may seem like a political impossibility. However, a growing number of people support all animal rights, as a third of Americans believe that non-human animals
deserve the same rights and forty-four percent of Americans now oppose any medical testing on animals as humans. Furthermore, to ignore mass suffering of any
kind denotes moral inconsistency. Humans tend to devalue the lives of those who are not like us, through racism, sexism, religious discrimination, and speciesism.
All of these forms of bias are predicated on a deeply ingrained suspicion of others, a ruinous evolutionary remnant from a time when our base tribal allegiances
were beneficial for our survival. The left has a chance to advocate for those among us who are most vulnerable: those who are unable to “speak their truth” to us.
And doing so, contrary to popular belief, would not be political suicide. The most extreme caricatures of the left almost always hone in on its relativistic tendencies.
The term “snowflake” is a response to the moral declaration of feelings, not facts. Accusations of “pie in the sky” policies, overly-sentimental approaches, and
idealistic reasoning presume that the left is in some sense creating a reality for its political project instead of creating a political project for reality. Indiscriminate
charges of racism and ad hominem attacks on political opponents fire up the liberal base yet defy the rules of rational engagement and alienate people whose
political leanings depend on slight philosophical differences, shaped and reinforced by their biology and culture. The prevailing mentality on the left seems to be
that Trump supporters do not deserve our consideration, open-minds, or reasoned conversations. Most Americans do not believe that the Democratic Party’s
supposed inclusion extends to them. A recent Gallup poll found that the Republican Party’s favorability has stayed steady at thirty-nine percent since Trump’s
presidential victory, while the Democratic Party’s favorability has dropped from forty-five percent to forty percent in that same time period. Perhaps the public
senses hypocrisy. At the Democratic National Convention in July of 2016, Michelle Obama delivered a mantra for the anti-Trump left that many found inspiring:
“when they go low, we go high.” In the fall, with less than a month left until the day that Donald Trump won the election for President of the United States (and with
Hillary Clinton’s victory presumed to be a foregone conclusion), debate moderator Chris Wallace asked Donald Trump if he would be willing to accept the results of
the upcoming presidential election. Trump declared that he would tell us at the time, which Hillary Clinton called “horrifying.” Yet despite the left’s attempts to take
the moral high-ground in anticipation of a resounding victory in the US 2016 Presidential Election, once Trump’s presidency became a reality, many on the left
abandoned such high hopes and principles. It seems the left should not have been so quick to demand the unconditional acceptance of the election results; ever
since Trump’s victory, those on the left (and across the entire political spectrum) have tried to delegitimize Trump’s position by claiming that Russian interference is
somehow responsible for his victory. This may be true, but it has become, like many of Trump’s political peculiarities, too much of a distraction. A Washington Post
poll has found that more Americans believe the Democratic Party only stands against Trump than believe that the Democratic Party stands for something, by a
margin of fifty-two percent to thirty-seven percent. The left still seems nostalgic for Obama’s sense of hope, even though they have been unable to craft their own
inspirational theme. Far too many liberals are ready to follow Bill Maher’s declaration: “when they go low, you go lower.” But politics are still about hope, not
despair. The left has just failed to present a unified and promising message. We are in the midst of a cultural realignment; massive shifts are inevitable. The choice
that Democrats and those on the left now have is whether or not they will direct these changes toward consequences that maximize well-being. Politics
can guide, limit, or ignore us on our journey through the moral landscape. Most of the left remains blinded like deer in
headlights, either nonplussed by the prevailing partisan atrocity or naively fixated on the unfairness of their present situation. While the
left may continue to stumble through the darkness, their vision obscured by concern for fairness, we must not forget: there is a moral
compass ready to help guide us toward the pursuit of happiness. For the moment, it remains buried
beneath our accommodationist ethics. But we shouldn’t be afraid to uncover it.

Defer to consequentialist utilitarianism.

Baum & Barrett ’18 (Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most
Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184)

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken

literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way
catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event
causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would
be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be
catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten
million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson
1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory
of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that
drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term
“existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all
these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was
perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear
war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would
presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would
be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan,
the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming
humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species.
Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the
evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans
may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are,
then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion
more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse
will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An
open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living
for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g.
Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of
500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng
1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs
from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives
estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion
chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500
trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life . Or,
preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global
catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the
expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner
2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world
population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of
preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars
(Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even
using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to
being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global
catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to
count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected
to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the
stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard
riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit
significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause
permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives
are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than
others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great
debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should
value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is
crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not
be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the
right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position
that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of
Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created
equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of
ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which
member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless
of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or
a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts. 3. Challenges To Analyzing GCR Given the goal of reducing GCR, one must
know what the risks are and how they can be reduced. This requires diving into the details of the risks themselves—details that we largely skip
in this paper—but it also requires attention to a few analytical challenges. The first challenge is the largely unprecedented nature of global
catastrophes. Simply put, modern human civilization has never before ended. There have been several recent global catastrophes of some
significance, the World Wars and the 1918 flu among them, but these clearly did not knock civilization out. Earlier catastrophes, including the
prehistoric mass extinction events, the Toba volcanic eruption, and even the Black Death plague, all occurred before modern civilization existed.
The GCR analyst is thus left to study risks of events that are in some way untested or unproven. But the
lack of historical precedent
does not necessarily imply a lack of ongoing risk. Indeed, the biggest mistake of naïve GCR analysis is to
posit that, because no global catastrophe has previously occurred, therefore none will occur. This
mistake comes in at least three forms. The first and most obviously false form is to claim that unprecedented events never occur.
In our world of social and technological innovation, it is easy to see that this claim is false. But accounting for it in risk analysis still requires
some care. One approach is to use what is known in probability theory as zero-failure data (Hanley 1983; Bailey 1997; Quigley and Revie 2011).
Suppose that no catastrophe has occurred over n prior time periods—for example, there has been no nuclear war in the 65 years since two
countries have had nuclear weapons. (The second country to build nuclear weapons was the Soviet Union, in 1949.) It can thus be said that
there have been zero failures of nuclear deterrence in 65 cases. An approximate upper bound can then be estimated for the probability p of
nuclear deterrence failure, i.e. the probability of nuclear war, occurring within an upcoming year. Specifically, p lies within the interval [0, u]
with (1 – α) confidence, where u = 1 – α(1/n) gives the upper limit of the confidence interval. Thus for 95% confidence (α = 0.05), u = 1-
0.05(1/65) = 0.05, meaning that there is a 95% chance that the probability of nuclear war within an upcoming year is somewhere between 0
and 0.05. Note that this calculation assumes (perhaps erroneously) that the 65 non-failures are independent random trials and that p is
approximately constant over time, but it nonetheless provides a starting point for estimating the probability of unprecedented events. Barrett
et al. (2013) uses a similar approach as part of a validation check of a broader risk analysis of U.S.-Russia nuclear war. The second form of the
mistake is to posit that the ongoing existence of human civilization proves that global catastrophes will not occur. It is true that civilization’s
continued existence despite some past threats should provide some comfort, but it should only provide some comfort. Consider this: if a global
catastrophe had previously occurred, nobody would still be around to ponder the matter (at least for catastrophes causing human extinction).
The fact of being able to observe one’s continued survival is contingent upon having survived. While it is easy to see that this is a mistake, it is
harder to correct for it. Again, it requires careful application of probability theory, correcting for what is known as an observation selection
effect (Bostrom 2002b, Ćirković 4 et al. 2010). The basic idea is to build the existence of the observer into probability estimates for catastrophes
that would eliminate future observers. The result is probability estimates unbiased by the observer’s existence, with global catastrophe
probability estimates typically revised upwards. The third form of the mistake is to posit that, because humanity has survived previous
catastrophes, or risks of catastrophes, therefore it will survive future ones. This mistake is especially pervasive in discussions of nuclear war.
People sometimes observe that no nuclear war has ever occurred and cite this as evidence to conclude
that therefore nuclear deterrence and the fear of mutually assured destruction will indefinitely continue
to keep the world safe (for discussion see Sagan and Waltz 2013). But there have been several near misses, from
the 1962 Cuban missile crisis to the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident, and there is no guarantee that
nuclear war will be avoided into the distant future. Similarly, just because no pandemic has ever killed
the majority of people (Black Death killed about 22%), or just because early predictions about the rise of artificial
intelligence proved false (they expected human-level AI within decades that have long since come and gone; see Crevier 1993;
McCorduck 2004), it does not necessarily follow that no pandemics would be so lethal, or that AI cannot
reach the lofty heights of the early predictions. Careful risk analysis can correct for the third form by looking
at the full sequences of events that would lead to particular global catastrophes. For example, nuclear
weapons in the United States are launched following a sequence of decisions by increasingly high ranking officials,
ultimately including the President. This decision sequence can be built into a risk model, with model parameters
estimated from historical data on how often each step in the decision sequence has been reached (Barrett
et al. 2013). The more often near misses have occurred, and the nearer the misses were, the higher the
probability of an eventual “hit” in the form of a nuclear war. The same analytic structure can be
applied to other GCRs.

Any moral theory must prioritize reducing existential risk.

Plummer, PhD, 15 (Theron, Philosophy @St. Andrews
http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/)
There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe
there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is
very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe,
such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we –
whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try
to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an
impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little
disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they
would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the
familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There
are so
many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the
world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a
wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of
creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is
strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and
very high quality lives. You
might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a
tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of
outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists . But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is
the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not
the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention
take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.”
Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with
promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce
existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more
surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the
impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons
to reduce existential risk. Even
egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to
reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only,
it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would
maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her
bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong
the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are
not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an
act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of
well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could
derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly
imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being,
in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to
ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce
existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what
makes our lives go well

would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain
vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So
obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very
strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it
reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts?
I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only
consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who
disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is
correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is
correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce
existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future
people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most
important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could
exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent
dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives . It’s
possible they’ll be miserable.
It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at
least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally
plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there
are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others
have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And
even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well
for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from
extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek
Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live
during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We
shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few
centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through
this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our
selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)
 1NC – Indig Violence
Discourse doesn’t shape reality
Balzacq 5, Namar University Political Science and IR Prof (“The Three Faces of Securitization: Political
Agency, Audience and Context,” )
However, despite important insights, this position remains highly disputable. The reason behind this
qualification is not hard to understand. With great trepidation my contention is that one of the main
distinctions we need to take into account while examining securitization is that between 'institutional'
and 'brute' threats. In its attempts to follow a more radical approach to security problems wherein
threats are institutional, that is, mere products of communicative relations between agents, the CS has
neglected the importance of 'external or brute threats', that is, threats that do not depend on language
mediation to be what they are - hazards for human life. In methodological terms, however, any
framework over-emphasizing either institutional or brute threat risks losing sight of important aspects of
a multifaceted phenomenon. Indeed, securitization, as suggested earlier, is successful when the
securitizing agent and the audience reach a common structured perception of an ominous development.
In this scheme, there is no security problem except through the language game. Therefore, how
problems are 'out there' is exclusively contingent upon how we linguistically depict them. This is not
always true. For one, language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of
it. Moreover, it is not theoretically useful nor is it empirically credible to hold that what we say about a
problem would determine its essence. For instance, what I say about a typhoon would not change its
essence. The consequence of this position, which would require a deeper articulation, is that some
security problems are the attribute of the development itself. In short, threats are not only institutional;
some of them can actually wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of
language. Analyzing security problems then becomes a matter of understanding how external contexts,
including external objective developments, affect securitization. Thus, far from being a departure from
constructivist approaches to security, external developments are central to it.

The system isn’t perfect---but gains in health outcomes for Natives is undeniable
Trahant 11 (Mark, member of Idaho's Shoshone-Bannock Tribe and former president of the Native
American Journalists Association fellow at Kaisier, Huffpost writer, “Measuring the Progress in Native
Health - Life Expectancy for Native Americans”
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-trahant/measuring-the-progress-in_b_562274.html)
Has the Indian Health Service been an effective, government-run delivery system? Consider this from a White
House memo: “While there has been improvements in health status of Indians in the past 15 years, a loss of momentum can further slow the
already sluggish rate of approach to parity. Increased momentum in health delivery and sanitation as insured by this bill speed the rate of
closing the existing gap in age at death.” In other words progress
is slow. But Dr. Ted Marrs wrote the memo on April 26, 1976, and the
subject was about the original Indian Health Care Improvement Act. “In
1974 the average age at death of Indians and
Alaskan natives was 48.3. For white U.S. citizens the average age of death was 72.3. For others, the average age was
62.7.” Dr. Marrs wrote that the “bottom line” was an unavoidable connection between “equity and morality” when there is a more than twenty
year differential in age at death between Indians and non-Indians. So what do the numbers look like now? The most
recent Indian
Health Service data on general mortality statistics is about a decade old now. But it showed that the twenty-
year differential has been reduced to a difference of less than five years. “**The American Indian Alaska Native life
expectancy at birth (both sexes) for the IHS service area population was 72.3 years,” according to the recent IHS report: Compare that with the
average life expectancy for all U.S. races, 76.9 years. But even those numbers reflect grave regional disparities within the Indian health system.
An American Indian in the Aberdeen area has a life expectancy of 66.8 years - or more than ten years behind the U.S. average. I’d love to go
back through the raw data from 1976. It would be interesting to see what kind of progress that life expectancy number reflects even in
Aberdeen. Clearly there were regional improvements, but how much? What worked? To me this is the context that should be required in more
of our data. We cannot look at what works - and what needs investment - in the Indian health care system unless we at least have a sense of
the long view. This is not to say that the system is perfect or without serious problems that need fixing. In
March, for example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention released its report on the : United States, 2004-2008. (Important note: The
CDC’s definition of American Indian is broader than the IHS standard.) “In general, compared to other groups, non-Hispanic AIAN adults are
more likely to have poorer health, unmet medical needs due to cost, diabetes, trouble hearing, activity limitations, and to have experienced
feelings of psychological distress in the past 30 days,” the report said. The bottom line: The native community “faces many health challenges as
reflected in their higher rates of risky behaviors, poorer health status and health conditions, and lower utilization of health services.” That’s
really not news. But there are other items in the CDC report worth more thought and exploration. For example: Unlike another recent
government report, this one counts clients of IHS as insured. That data shows nearly 40 percent of AIAN has private insurance; another 41
percent with public insurance (IHS, Medicare, Medicaid and the Children’s health insurance program) and 19 percent are uninsured. That
compares to the Hispanic population where the last two numbers are almost reversed, 40 percent unemployed and 14 percent with public
insurance. What does this mean? It means that American Indians and Alaska Natives have basic access to care. The CDC
says 84 percent have a “usual place for health care.” That compares to 86 percent for white Americans, 85 percent for African Americans and
72 percent for Hispanics. The numbers show most of us have regular contact with our medical team. And we are living longer. The CDC
reports, “The AIAN population has a life expectancy at birth that is 2.4 years less than that of all U.S. populations combined.” There’s not parity
with the general population, not by a long shot, because of the chronic nature of so many diseases that afflict Indian Country. But one measure,
“closing the existing gap in age at death,” has certainly been improving over the four decades.

How new hires are used matters more than the amount---aff doesn’t change systemic
issues in the education system.
Lips & Watkins ‘8
[Dan Lips, Senior Policy Analyst & Shanea Watkins, Former Policy Analyst in Empirical Studies, Does
Spending More on Education Improve Academic Achievement?, Heritage Foundation, September 8,
2008. http://www.heritage.org/education/report/does-spending-more-education-improve-academic-
achievement] [ellipses in original] (NSB) (***NCC Packet***)
Despite the lack of consistent findings, leading researchers in the area acknowledge that any effect of
per-pupil expenditures on academic outcomes depends on how the money is spent, not on how much
money is spent. According to Hanushek:
Few people…would recommend just dumping extra resources into existing schools. America has…
followed that program for several decades, with no sign that student performance has improved.… …
The issue is getting productive uses from current and added spending. The existing evidence simply
indicates that the typical school system today does not use resources well (at least if promoting student
achievement is their purpose).[19]

Who is indigenous, and who can get jobs? That creates a double bind---either anyone
can get a job, which gets coopted by White people---or they use blood testing to
determine authentic indigeneity, which is bad.
Archuleta ‘5 (Elizabeth Archuleta(Professor of English at University of Utah), Refiguring Indian Blood through Poetry, Photography,
and Performance Art Studies in American Indian Literatures, Volume 17, Number 4, Winter 2005, pp. 1-26)
that makes sense. It’s in the blood, in the dynamic. The daughter realizes, A halfbreed woman can hardly
do anything else but attack herself, her blood attacks itself. (56) She believes, “There are historical reasons for
this [the blood attack- ing itself]” (56). While the daughter positions her mother’s illness in a historical context, she also implies that
her mother has learned to hate herself, which explains why she “can hardly do anything else but attack herself.”
The history of white–Indian relations is written in the blood of the mother’s body, exhibiting itself as
physical illness and dysfunction. The narrator unites illness and history through blood whose “Indian”
side inevitably attacks a foreign intruder, meaning the white, Euramerican blood contained in her mother’s
body, a foreign blood that has colonized and assumed power over the “Indian coun- try” that is her
mother’s body. The dominant culture’s construction of and American Indians’ tendency to adopt
“authentic” Indian iden- tity based on blood quantum standards leave the mother unable to
“make peace / being Indian and white” (56). Her racially mixed body no longer signifies clearly
within either system of identification, which leaves a question about how her being is
constituted. Conflict- ing definitions of self render her invisible, because, she says, her blood’s
varied strains “cancel each other out. / Leaving no one in the place” (56). No one accepts her as
white or as Indian, leaving her to feel that she is “attacked by everyone,” and thus, her body
becomes “conquered, occupied, destroyed / by her own blood’s diverse strains” (56). The
rhetoric the mother uses to describe her illness grounds it in historical violence and social
injustice against American Indians; yet, she still blames herself for circumstances beyond her
control. The poem’s framing of blood quantum also focuses on metaphors of invasion and attack. Using the language of war and
colonization provides the daughter with a model for helping her understand the devastation her mother
has experienced as a mixed-blood woman. Her mother’s body cannot make peace with itself, a statement reflect-
ing Indigenous peoples’ ongoing struggles with the United States. At the same time, her use of war metaphors also serves
a political func- tion. To say that her mother’s body is conquered, occupied, and de- stroyed implies that enemies with
battle plans and strategies for vic- tory must exist, which begs the question, Who is the enemy and what are their plans? In the United
States’ attempt to rid itself of Indians, Washington bureaucrats devised and legally codified blood
quantum standards as a psychological strategy for relocating inside Indian bodies the legal, physical, and
politics wars between Indians and the federal government. Allen’s narrator has no answers for resolving the problem of
blood quantum. She merely shrugs her shoulders and says, Well, world. What’s to be done? We just wait and see what will happen next. (56) By
framing blood quantum through dialogue, analogical matrices, and metaphors, Allen’s poem demonstrates an alternative to the al- ready
recognized and studied cultural frameworks for interpreting and understanding mixed-race identities among American Indians.

Narrativizing a settler-native antagonism reinforces colonial violence – assumes

economic migrants are settlers, justifies disposability based on connection to land –
atomizes resistance
Sharma 15—Director, International Cultural Studies Program, University of Hawai’i Manoa (Nandita, “Strategic Anti-Essentialism:
Decolonizing Decolonization,” Sylvia Wynter: Being Human as Praxis, Chapter 7, pg 170-180, dml) [“nos”=Latin for “we”/“us”]

Emerging in the post–World War II era, indigeneity

is a relatively recent mode of representation, one that
encompasses very diverse people across the Americas, indeed across the world, often under a single, shared
subjective understanding of being the “first” to live in any particular place.22 Being indigenous is a form of co-
identification among people who previously did not see any connection with one another. It is also a way of laying claim to particular lands (or,
more accurately, territories) on the basis of having (or having once had) specialized knowledge of that place. Yet, this
mode of
representation, however new or potentially expansive, remains particularistic. Indigeneity is a form of subjectivity
that emerged because of the devastation wrought in the aftermath of 1492. Moreover, it is a form of subjectivity that interpellates people into
efforts to gain national sovereignty within the global system of national states. Indigenous, then, as a mode of representation includes the often
unacknowledged elision between native as a colonial state category of subjugation and indigenous as a category of resistance.

Indigenous conceptualized as such retains two interrelated problems that ensure that the kinds of unequal
relationships organized in the aftermath of 1492 are reproduced. First, by denying the social constitution of the
category of indigenous, it disavows people’s now-long history of connectivity **across (and sometimes
against) this category. Because this connectivity challenges the particularistic nature of indigeneity,
recognition of interrelationality is itself represented as a threat. Second, by continuing to limit the criteria
of membership of each nos, each is unable to accept as co-specifics those who are rendered as always-
already oppositional others. Indeed, in making any particularistic nos, the significance of omitting certain
others cannot be underestimated.
The category of indigenous, thus, does a sort of political work. It produces a particular nos (and thus a
particular Other-to-indigenous nos).23 For some (though certainly not all) of those currently constituted as indigenous, it seems
that one of the consequences of the enormously uneven Columbian exchange is the denunciation of the process of exchange itself. Today, the
movement of life, plants, humans, and other animals is often cited as the cause for the devastation wrought on their native equivalent.24
Rather than focus on the hierarchical and exploitative relations of the Columbian exchange, some assume that the cause of the problem was /
is mobility itself. Within
such a worldview, that which moves is consequently denounced as inherently
polluting, and, in an idiom that is gaining in popularity, movement and migration are posited as inherently
colonizing.

An understanding of mobility as always colonizing is evident in the expansion of the term “settler
colonist” to include all those deemed nonnative in any given space. Recently, within both indigenous studies and
social movements for indigenous rights, the historical distinctions between the voyages of Columbus (and other colonizers)
and those of slaves who survived the Middle Passage, indentured workers recruited in the wake of slavery’s abolition, and present-
day migrants captured in a variety of state categories ranging from illegal to immigrant, have been collapsed. All, it is claimed,
are agents of colonialism. It seems, then, that as there has been an expansion in the subjective understanding of people as
indigenous, there has been a subsequent expansion in their other. Put differently, within some indigenous systems of
belonging, all past and present people constituted as migrants are situated as colonizers.
In our present “great age” of migration, how did “colonizer” become a meaningful way to describe people who move across space?25 Indeed,
how did “colonizer” come to be an increasingly dominant mode of representing indigenous people’s others, others who were once understood
as cocolonized people or, at least, not as an oppositional other? Is there a relationship between these particularistic modes of representation
and the false separation and hierarchical ranking of different but related experiences of colonization, such as the processes of expropriation and
people’s displacement across space?

The answers to these questions lie within the logics of autochthonous systems of representation and the ways in which claims to indigeneity
bring to life discourses of alienness or foreignness. Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff argue, by “elevating to a first-principle the
ineffable interests and connections, at once material and moral, that flow from ‘native’ rootedness, and special
rights, in a place of birth,” autochthonous discourses place those constituted as natives at the top of a
hierarchy of the exploited, oppressed, and colonized and insist on the centrality of the claims of
natives for the realization of either decolonization or justice.26 Within the negative duality of natives and nonnatives
that such discourses put into play, origins (and, in some contexts, claims of original, versus later, human discovery or inhabitation)
become the key determinant of who belongs in any given space today—and who does not.
The quintessential alien or foreigner within autochthonous discourses is the figure of the migrant. This is because the hegemonic understanding
of what it means to be a migrant in today’s world is one where migration is seen as movement away from one’s native land. Thus, migrants
come to stand as the ultimate nonnative. Such a move works to shift the focus from a dialectics of colonialism—
where the key historical dynamic is one of expropriation and exploitation, and the key relationship is one between
the colonizers and the colonized—to one where the dichotomy between native and nonnative becomes central
to both analysis and politics. Patrick Wolfe, a historian of Australia, captures this perspective well in his claim that
“the fundamental social divide is not the color line. It is not ethnicity, minority status, or even class. The primary line is the one
distinguishing Natives from settlers—that is, from everyone else. Only the Native is not a settler. Only the
Native is truly local. Only the Native will free the Native. One is either native or not.”27

From such an autochthonous perspective, being native is both spatially and temporally dependent. Temporally, migrants may be identified as
natives at some point in time and in some given space, but once having moved away from the spaces where such representations may be
claimed, they become nonnatives. Spatially, migrants remain native but only to the places they no longer live in. Thus, some argue that
migrants can continue to claim native rights to places they have moved from if they are able to show genealogical descendance from those with
native status in that space.28 Candace Fujikane, in dismissing Asian claims to belong in the United States, puts it this way: “Indigenous people
are differentiated from settlers by their genealogical, familial relationship with specific land bases that are ancestors to them. One is either
indigenous to a particular land base or one is not. Asian Americans are undeniably settlers in the United States because we cannot claim any
genealogy to the land we occupy, no matter how many lifetimes Asian settlers work on the land, or how many Asian immigrants have been
killed through racist persecution and hate crimes, or how brutal the political or colonial regimes that occasioned Asians’ exodus from their
homelands.”29

In this logic, indigeneity is racialized/ethnicized, and in the process, land—or more accurately, territory—is as
well. Natives, it is assumed, belong in “their” native land and only there. Further, who can be recognized as
native is dependent upon ancestry, thereby adding blood to the discourse of soil. Descent becomes of further
importance in this distinction, for many indigenous people are, of course, also Asian (and European and African and so on) as well as vice versa.
It is one’s ability to claim some indigenous ancestor that can allow one to be seen as indigenous today.
While such claims can be social and not biological, many indigenous groups, following from certain governments’
own categorical recognition of indigeneity, rely on some form of blood quantum rule that requires a minimal indigenous
lineage. Not surprisingly, such criteria for belonging (and for the rights and entitlements of membership) have not always
worked for those subordinated through other axes of oppression and exploitation. Thus, many women
have found that their claims to native status are often the first to be discounted.30

In this, thereis an ironic historical continuity of autochthonous ideas and practices of belonging and the underlying
logics of the colonial (and, in some places, postcolonial) state. Indeed, the meaning of native was one that was used
to distinguish the colonized from the colonizer so that the natives could be represented as less human
and, therefore, as legitimately colonized. Being native, then, was a signifier of being colonized and the ultimate signifier of
abjectness. Nativeness as a mode of representation, then, was designed to institutionalize the new racist
orders implemented by different colonial empires. Importantly, all colonized people were variously identified as “the”
natives in order to signal their lack of membership in the propter nos of the colonizers.31
In the post–World War II era of postcolonialism, when, through much struggle, colonial empires were removed from the list of legitimate forms of political rule, the right to claim rights within and to any given space came,
increasingly, to be seen as belonging to “the” natives. After all, we were told, the anticolonial project was often posited as fighting for the rule of the natives for the natives. Not surprisingly, then, the battle over resources and over
place has, thus, increasingly become one about the meaning of nativeness.

In this way, autochthonous modes of belonging are significant in advancing particular nationalized regimes of rights, for the national subject is often defined through an exclusive racialized / ethnicized criteria through which
political rights and rights to property, especially social property rights in land and natural resources, are to be apportioned within any claimed national space. Contemporary, postcolonial forms of racism are often based on ideas of
autochthony. All those who are said to have migrated to the places where they live (or who cannot prove their prior inhabitance) are increasingly viewed as agents of (instead of co- victims of) colonial projects. The ruling ideology
of nationalism has provided an explanation for belonging and has come to be a key way to distinguish between who is properly native to any given place and who is not. Today, the rhetoric of autochthony is evident throughout the
world, including diverse sites in Europe, southern Africa, Central Africa, Latin America, North America, and the Pacific. Significantly, such a discourse spans the political spectrum from the Right to the Left. Here, I focus on the
emergence of autochthonous discourses in indigenous nationalist politics (engaged in by both natives and nonnatives) in the territories claimed by Canada and the United States, with a particular focus on the Hawaiian archipelago,
where this discourse is well rehearsed.

The position that all migrants are settler colonists has been advanced in a number of recent scholarly works in Canada and the United States. In the context of Hawai’i, it has been argued that “Asians” in Hawai’i (most of whom are
the descendants of contractually indentured plantation laborers who began arriving in the mid- 1800s) are “settler colonists,” active in the colonization of native Hawaiians due to their nonnative status.32 The main distinction
between the two groups, they argue, is that native Hawaiian claims are based on rights of national sovereignty over “their land, water, and other economic and legal rights,” while Asians, because they are not native, have no right
to make such claims.33

In a Canadian context, Bonita Lawrence’s and Enakshi Dua’s article “Decolonizing Antiracism” (2005) in Social Justice makes some of the same arguments made by the contributors to the special issue of Amerasia Journal on “Asian
Settler Colonialism in Hawai’i.”34 Like them, Lawrence and Dua also focus on those nonnatives who are nonwhite. They contend that the antiracist praxis of nonwhites has “contribute[d] to the active colonization of Aboriginal
peoples.”35 Indeed, they contend that “antiracism is premised on an ongoing colonial project” and on “a colonizing social formation.”36 Postcolonial critiques of national liberation strategies, social constructivist critiques of the
naturalness of races or nations, and arguments against ethnic absolutism, such as those made by Stuart Hall, become, for them, examples of how antiracism is a colonial practice.37 Lawrence and Dua maintain that these kinds of
analyses colonize indigenous people by “contribut[ing] to the ongoing delegitimization of Indigenous nationhood.”38

In these essays, then, critiques of nationalisms or of the naturalization of social categories are tantamount to attacks against indigenous people. It is in such assertions that we can find the ideological character of autochthonous
discourses. In arguing for the theoretical and political centrality of nativeness, there is an effort to depoliticize native nationalisms. By insisting that any critique of nationalism is tantamount to a colonial practice, the nationalist
assumptions and politics of native nationalisms are taken out of the realm of that which can be contested. Consequently, native nationalisms are posited as the only strategy for decolonization.

It is precisely the nationalism inherent within autochthonous discourses that helps to explain not only why all nonnatives are conceptualized as colonizers but also why the (varied) critics of nationalism (or those who argue for the
social basis for ideas of race and ethnic purity, or those who uncover a politics of solidarity across such lines) are also colonizers. Negatively racialized persons, in this logic of nationalized self- determinacy, are relegated to being
mere minorities of various nations and their existing or hoped- for national sovereign states. Thus, because they are not a people / nation as defined by hegemonic doctrines of self- determinancy, Asians, for example, in Hawai’i, or
elsewhere in the United States and Canada, are represented as not- colonized and, therefore, in the dualistic mode of autochthonous representations, as colonizers.

Within autochthonous discourses one can only be colonized if they “belong” or are indigenous to that space
itself. In this view, the colonization that people experience supposedly ends once one moves away from the
colony (or, now, the postcolony). Instead, these migrants come to be represented as colonizers. Because a key
aspect of the subjective understanding of indigenous is being a colonized person, only other colonized
persons can be seen to be co-specifics. Neither those constituted as migrants nor their struggles can be
perceived as part of anticolonial struggles. As such, they cannot be included as commensurate human
beings within any colonial or postcolonial space.
Speaking for Others is colonial when it converges with competitive careerism –
“advocacy” on behalf of natives is racist paternalism, many of whom refuse the notion
they are colonized
Marker 3 – Associate Professor of Educational Studies at the University of British Columbia (Michael, “Indigenous voice, community, and
epistemic violence: the ethnographer’s “interests” and what “interests” the ethnographer,” May-June 2003, Qualitative Studies in Education
16(3):361-375, accessed 12-18-14 //Bozzles the Bozz-Dawg Bozz Bozz)

A number of anthropologists and critical theorists have responded to calls for a more reflexive
listening to the Native voice by positioning themselves in a dubious advocacy role with regard to
Indigenous community issues. We are subjected to a new version of the old pudding sometimes named
collaborative, or dialogic, methodologies. However, this stance is too often a continuation of the neoliberal
goal of offering support to oppressed minorities without challenging the power and cultural position
of dominant groups. Laura Nader (1974) challenged anthropology to “study up”three decades ago. Unheeded, this is still the
most fruitful, imaginative, and transformative way to listen to the Indigenous voice, to “ask many
‘common sense’questions in reverse. Instead of asking why some people are poor, we would ask why
other people are so affluent? . . . Anthropologists might indeed ask themselves whether the entirety of field work does not depend
upon a certain power relationship in favor of the anthropologist, and whether indeed such dominant subordinate relationships may not be
affecting the kinds of theories we are weaving”(p. 289). Aanishinabe scholar and activist Winona La Duke, in talking about her tribal
community’s struggles, focused on the invisibility of the histories of power and privilege and how Americans have glamorized wealth: “We quite
often do not ask how they got to be rich. We don’t ask if they paid fair wages to people who worked in their plants, or if they got rich stealing
someone else’s land, or stealing someone else’s natural resources”(speech at Western Washington University, December 6, 2001). Eric Wolf
(1999), in exploring the anthropology of power, offers a broader but nonetheless useful prescription: “Seeking answers to such questions,
however, also requires us to go beyond the ethnographic present – the moment in which the ethnographer collects and records his
observations –to locate the object of our study in time. It is not the events of history we are after, but the processes that underlie and shape
such events”(p. 8). The processes are, of course, much larger than what goes on in the day-to-day life of an Indigenous community. It is unlikely
that anthropology will take on a general interest in the culture of power. The discipline has too much invested in the power of “culture.” Sherry
B. Ortner (1994) concluded an essay on changes in anthropological theory by observing that “practice has qualities related to the hard times of
today; pragmatism, maximization of advantage, ‘every man,’as the saying goes, ‘for himself’”(p. 403 ).
Anthropologists have
developed a set of conceptual tools for dissecting the Indigenous identity and voice, but just like the
proverbial high school biology exercise, the pieces of the frog strewn about the lab table do not contain
the meaning of the frog. And, like the dissecting tools of the biology lab, the anthropologist’s tools work
best toward purposes that are directly connected to its history and development as a colonial
enterprise. “Empowering”or “advocating” for Indigenous communities is a suspiciously ethnocentric
and patronizing goal. Many Indigenous groups would find the language itself offensive and
presumptuous since they maintain that they were never conquered and hence have never relinquished their
“power.”Nevertheless, it remains a popular methodological orientation because it retains the utility of
anthropology’s fundamental dissecting tools, which are oriented toward analysis of a cultural subaltern .
Anthropologists have been generally reluctant to pack up their toolboxes and go off seeking information on cultures of power. Describing
identity formation, cultural transmission, voice, authority, and social organization among corporate executives, government officials, and
privileged upper class families taxes and problematizes anthropological tools and methods. For
too many researchers, it is more
fun and rewarding –not to mention safer –to imagine themselves “adopted” by a tribe and
“collaborating” to help solve some problem that the tribe has. What if the tribe’s “problem”is that too many useless
studies have been conducted without any analysis of structures that have distorted and dislocated their community from the traditional values
which hold people together? Micaela di Leonardo (1998) has stated the problem clearly: “American anthropology, as we shall see –despite the
vigorous and careful efforts of some –relies on an implicit and therefore entirely untheorized, American ‘home’. Its metropolitan gaze misses its
own reflection”(p. 16). It is useless to support subaltern groups without concomitantly exposing and destabilizing the hegemonic forces that
continue to oppress them, just as it is useless to listen to the Native voice without paying attention to the countervailing voices of power and
privilege. Gregory Bateson (1972) put it in basic language: “Tools are for purposes and anything which blocks purpose is a hindrance”(p. 49).