1NC

1
T---Increase

Interp---‘increase’ means expanding preexisting FR in the topic areas---that means JG

pilot programs.
Buckley ’6 [Jeremiah S, Joseph M. Kolar; November 13; partners at Buckley Kolar LLP; Westlaw, Brief
of Amici Curiae for “Mortgage Insurance Companies of America and Consumer Mortgage Coalition,” WL
3309503]

First, the court said that the ordinary meaning of the word “increase” is “to make something greater,” which it believed should not “be limited
to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.” 435 F.3d at 1091. Yet the
definition
offered by the Ninth Circuit compels the opposite conclusion. Because “increase” means “to make
something greater,” there must necessarily have been an existing premium, to which Edo's actual premium may be
compared, to determine whether an *26 “increase” occurred. Congress could have provided that “adverse action” in
the insurance context means charging an amount greater than the optimal premium, but instead chose to define adverse action in terms of
an “increase.” That definitional choice must be respected, not ignored. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392-93
n.10 (1979) (“[a] definition which declares what a term ‘means' … excludes any meaning that is not stated”).

Next, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Insurance Prong includes the words “existing or applied for,” Congress intended that an
“increase in any charge” for insurance must “apply to all insurance transactions - from an initial policy of insurance to a renewal of a long-held
policy.” 435 F.3d at 1091. This interpretation reads the words “existing or applied for” in isolation. Other types of adverse action described in
the Insurance Prong apply only to situations where a consumer had an existing policy of insurance, such as a “cancellation,” “reduction,” or
“change” in insurance. Each of these forms of adverse action presupposes an already-existing policy, and under usual
canons of statutory construction the term “increase” also should be construed to apply to increases of
an already-existing policy. See Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (“a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it”) (citation
omitted).

Violation---they implement a jobs guarantee for the GND which is NOT materially
solvent now---voter for limits and ground---allows the aff to construed advantages
disconnected by literature which kills fairness and clash.
 2
CP---ADV

Text: The United States federal government should adopt a Green New Deal jobs
guarantee.
Deficit spending solves without taxation.
Jackson Mejia 22, PhD student in economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology studying
macroeconomics and public finance; and Brian Albrecht, Chief Economist of the International Center for
Law and Economics and has a PhD in Economics from the University of Minnesota, April 2022, “On Price
Stability with a Job Guarantee,” https://www.jacksonmejia.com/papers/Mejia_Albrecht_MMT_web.pdf,
ghs—gc

most macroeconomists, MMT economists express concern with maintaining a stable price level and full
Like
employment when assessing policy.3 What makes their policy recommendations unique is that they recommend a JG program
not only to achieve full employment but also to stabilize the price level. The JG, operated by the government
through federal agencies, would unconditionally offer a guaranteed job to all who want one at a fixed nominal wage (Wray 1998c; Mitchell
2017; Tcherneva 2020).

There are two

different models of how a job guarantee program might work. The first would call for something
akin to the New Deal’s Works Progress Administration and entailcentralized administration and decision-making. The
second, worked out in detail by Tcherneva (2012, 2018), calls for centralized spending grants to states, municipalities,
and various NGOs and non-profits, which would then make their own decisions at a decentralized level. According to advocates of
the program, the JG would primarily work to produce public goods, particularly in (green) community investment or community art (Forstater
2006; Tcherneva 2018, 2020). Tcherneva (2018) describes the MMT proposal as allowing for guaranteed jobs in
the arts, building green infrastructure, performing child and elder care, and food desert relief . More
specifically, Tcherneva (2018, p. 21) gives examples of typical jobs:

I. “A local artist collective employs painters, actors, musicians, and stagehands to run year-round productions
for the community. They organize school outreach programs, run summer camps, and offer free art and music classes
and literacythrough-the-arts courses for special needs youth. They collaborate with local schools in offering art enrichment
programs.”
II. “A former coal mining community experiences city blight, mass unemployment, and a high
incidence of health problems. The JG organizes a comprehensive program for restoring the natural
environment using the abandoned coal mine, based on existing best practices.”

Hence JG output will typically go unpriced since the program will tend toward producing public goods.
Neoclassical economists may stress the need to finance such a program after looking at the government’s intertemporal budget constraint.
Financing does not present a difficulty to MMT economists, mainly because, in their conception, governments
with sovereign currencies can afford anything; their only constraint is an inflation constraint (Mosler 1997;
Wray 1998b; Bell 2000; Mitchell, Wray, and Watts 2019). A government can "afford" anything that does not generate inflation by printing
money. Therefore, even
though the size of the JG may shift endogenously as conditions in the labor market change, the
government can afford it. To grasp the fiscal magnitude of the program, Tymoigne (2014, p. 526) argues that a JG program would cost
somewhere between 2 percent to 5 percent of GNP for an economy that faces unemployment rates around 4 percent in booms and 11 percent
in busts.

While one could advocate for the JG merely because of its social safety net property, MMT economists
emphasize its ability to
stabilize prices. Mosler (1997, p. 168) argues, "In addition to eliminating involuntary unemployment, the [JG]
policy can be shown to provide price stability" (emphasis added). Mitchell (2017, p. 60) agrees, writing that a JG "would
provide a macroeconomic stability framework designed to deliver full employment and price stability" (emphasis
added).4 Indeed, MMT economists pitch the JG explicitly as an inflation management tool to replace the
Phillips-curve-based non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) system employed by central banks
today.
 3
DA---IRS

IRS modernization will succeed now based on careful sequencing that avoids
distractions [like new “social programs”]. That restores IRS credibility.
Elder 23, tax professional at Caplin & Drysdale (Niles, “High Hopes for IRS Funding Boost,” Talking Tax
Podcast, transcribed by Brett Bricker and AI)//BB
So last week, you may recall we heard from some Bloomberg tax reporters about what the IRS has on its to do list for 2023. We're going to stay
on that theme this week. But this time we'll be hearing not from journalists, but from a tax professional. Niles elder is a member at the firm
Caplin and Drysdale past chair of a committee at the ABA tax section, and a fellow at the American College of tax counsel, he's keeping a close
eye on the $80 billion infusion of cash that the IRS will be receiving, and what that will mean for taxpayers, Elbert spoke
with Bloomberg taxes, Jeff Leon about how the new aggressively funded IRS will behave in 2023, he gets to what he thinks will happen in a
bit, but first announced talks about what he hopes will happen, you know, what we want, particularly, you know, I think those of us who, you
know, spend our lives dealing with the services that they're able to stick to their core mission, and not get sidetracked

as they have in recent years by having to administer social programs , you

know, there was the PPP loans, child tax credit payments, etcetera. That's my hopes, what might actually happen, the first thing that,
you know, I would expect to see at the service is hiring, the ranks of the IRS top to bottom are severely depleted, you don't have
enough revenue agents, you don't have enough appeals officers, you don't have enough revenue officers, you don't have enough special
agents. And you certainly don't have enough, you know, customerservice personnel that's impacted every aspect of the
agency. IRS knows this. They've been begging for funds for many years now. So that's the first thing, you
know, part and parcel, Jeff, with hiring comes training. I don't know exactly what the numbers are. But there's been a
significant depletion of seasoned IRS employees who were working with, you know, the agency for many years, they're gone.
So, you know, I would certainly anticipate there's going to be a lot of that happening in 2023. In addition to that, the IRS has been beaten over
the head, about, you know, the lack of customer service, almost at every level, you know, they're processing issues, there have been just pure
communication issues. It's incredibly difficult, unfortunately, to get in touch, you know, with a customer service rep when you have a problem.
And then along with that, you've probably heard, because it's certainly no secret that there's a tremendous backlog of unprocessed tax returns.
And so the service, you know, in order to sort of get back on its feet needs to take care of those unprocessed returns. Yeah, so there's a lot of
things that are going on right there. So what do you feel is the mindsets at the IRS right now, especially with the promise of new money and
stuff like that? I mean, how do you feel that they're approaching things now? Well, again, this goes back to the beginning, my hope versus
wants, Jeff, now, I say this, you know, fully well, knowing right now you have an Acting Commissioner, Chuck Reddick, who was the former
commissioner stepped down in November, we have, you know, an Acting Commissioner. And you know, just in terms, at least in my experience,
in terms of trying to run a large organization, and, you know, the politics that come into play, particularly with respect to this government
agency, it will certainly help to get a confirmed Commissioner. But still, since you don't know how long you know, it might take to get
confirmation to go through the organization, I would certainly suspect is doing a substantial amount of strategic planning. It is a tremendous
amount of money. And you've got to figure out how to get the most bang for your buck. So you can't rush into
anything. I am hoping that they are doing substantial strategic planning, and part and parcel with you know, trenches
trying to figure out how to get the most bang for your buck is how also to get the best talent possible. And one of the
downsides, you know, to having obviously to administer a government agency is that you can be
challenged in terms of the the resources and the funds that you have available to bring in the talent that you would want
it Jeff, it is paramount. We hear about it every day on TV on radio. There's so much contention about, you know, the way the IRS
operates, if you want to tamp that down so that the service can focus on its core mission. That And the service needs to show
competency. They need to be able to get particularly the politicians in Congress to back down. Now, that is
a very high hurdle, to be sure. But that's what they need to do. And they can do it by showing competency. I mean, again,
because of the political issues that are going on, on Capitol Hill, you know, there are already efforts to undercut the annual budget. And, you
know, there's the direct way of attacking it, by passing laws that, you know, would reduce that funding, but there's a sort of the indirect way of
doing it, which is, you know, by just underfunding in the, you know, annual budget. So, you know, they're
gonna have to make sure
that they're showing that this, you know, this amount of money that's been allocated to them, is used as
effectively as possible. And yes, most definitely, it'll be interesting to see what happens in the coming year, especially when it comes to
money when it comes to what's the what happens next, and what is going on with Congress as well. But I'm taking a step back from the IRS,
looking at the tax world a little bit more broadly, what do you feel will be the big tax trends in 2023? You know, I think it's probably, you know,
going to be very much driven by what the IRS, you know, decides to do, we're looking at, you know, in an economy that potentially, you know,
goes into recession, when that happens, you know, it certainly impacts, you know, the way the tax system functions, you know, then isn't
necessarily, although I can't say that, you know, tax planning ever necessarily stops, if people aren't looking to, you know, try and find a way to
offset or reduce your income or gains, then, you know, tax planning itself, can, you know, ratchet down, you know, there's not an insignificant
amount of litigation, you know, that's going on right now, that may have some impact on various aspects of the tax system. And take, for
instance, say, you know, taxation or reporting of offshore assets. There's a big case at the Supreme Court right now, this is Bitner case, where
the court is going to have to decide in the case of a non willful violation of the F bar rules, what the appropriate, you know, penalty is going to
be is also a lot of litigation going on, in the area of the Administrative Procedure Act, the IRS tends to do a lot of regulation by notice, as
opposed to actually issuing, you know, regulations that, you know, might be required by statute. So, I mean, I think that's going to be something
we haven't seen. They're always tax cases in a tax court. You know, it's fairly busy. But I'm not sure that we've seen the volume of significant,
you know, cases, I think that we're seeing right now that, you know, would we have a real impact on the way the tax system operates? Crypto,
notwithstanding the fact that cryptocurrencies have taken a bit of a hit, I would say probably over the last six months, it certainly seems that
they're here to stay. More and more businesses are, you know, accepting of them, more and more investors are using or acquiring. And so, you
know, is the current treatment that cryptocurrencies property? Is that really going to be the long term position? If it changes, then you have to
shift gears? So, those are certainly trends that I think we're going to see, you know, in 2023, that, you know, are going to be important to large
numbers of taxpayers, and, you know, they're important to taxpayers are certainly going to be important to the government, you know, as well,
looking towards the New Year and everything like that. Is there anything else that you'd like to mention that maybe we haven't covered? Well, I
mean, I think, you know, we can talk just about enforcement. For a moment, Jeff enforcement is incredibly important aspect
of the tax system. I may be a tax lawyer, I may be a controversial or I may defend people who didn't pay their taxes. It doesn't mean I
don't believe that everybody should pay their fair share, so that the system properly operates now, there are certain steps the
service has to take before it really is fully functioning. So you know what we're going to see in what's going to hit the news
particularly the tax break, it's going to be things like the conservation easement cases, or captive insurance arrangements or promoter examine
nations which go hand in hand with one another, the service is going to want to make, you know headlines where it can't with crypto related
type criminal cases. And, again, they've been pushing for a while employment tax cases, and I don't expect there's going to be, you know, any
let down, they're going back to, again, my theme of Hope versus wants, it would be nice to see the service in a real way, move back towards
domestic legal source type tax cases, we're talking about scams, embezzlement, just sort of garden variety fraud, because you don't see a lot of
that, and when it goes unchecked, you know, people will do what they will do, they will continue to go after, you know, tax preparers in
criminal cases. Because, you know, for every tax preparer who's investigated, prosecuted, and ended up going to prison, there are 1000s, often
1000s and 1000s of individual taxpayers, who no longer have, you know, a means of under paying their taxes, offshore enforcement remains a
priority, I think we'll still see a fair bit of that. And then, you know, there are a number of other things that, you know, the service really has to
move on to because, you know, for every aggressive tax strategy that they're dealing with, now, there are, you know, several others that are
still, you know, sort of flying under the radar that first got to find and then they've got to find a way to address it, they're looking at multiple
pension plans, and we're looking at Puerto Rico act 22 cases and, you know, a more than a handful of other, you know, aggressive, you know,
planning structures. And so, you know, we're gonna see them make efforts, but, you know, in the, in the concept

of, you walkbefore you run, they've got to get the hiring done. They've got to get the training
done. They've got to clean up their act, and then, you know, they can move into other areas, and,
you know, try and, you know, bring the IRS and the system along. That was Caplin, and Drysdale is Niles Elber. Speaking
with Bloomberg tax reporter Jeff Lyon. And that's it for today's podcast. You can find up to the newest and latest tax and accounting
developments at our website news dot Bloomberg tax.com. That website once again is news that Bloomberg tax.com. Today's talking tax was
produced by myself, David Schultz. Rachel Daigle is our editor and executive producer is Josh block from Washington. I'm David Schultz. Thanks
for listening.

Progressive taxation on the wealthy wreck the IRS

Kiel and Eisenger 18, *covers business and consumer finance for ProPublica, **senior editor at
ProPublica (Paul and Jesse, “The IRS Tried to Take on the Ultrawealthy. It Didn’t Go Well. Ten years ago,
the tax agency formed a special team to unravel the complex tax-lowering strategies of the nation’s
wealthiest people. But with big money — and Congress — arrayed against the team, it never had a
chance.” ProPublica, https://www.propublica.org/article/ultrawealthy-taxes-irs-internal-revenue-
service-global-high-wealth-audits)//BB
In 2009, the IRS had formed a crack team of specialists to unravel the tax dodges of the ultrawealthy . In an
age of widening inequality, with a concentration of wealth not seen since the Gilded Age, the rich were evading taxes through ever more

sophisticated maneuvers. The IRS commissioner aimed to stanch the country’s losses with what he proclaimed would be “a
game-changing strategy.” In short order, Charles Rettig, then a high-powered tax lawyer and today President Donald Trump’s IRS commissioner,
warned that the squad was conducting “the audits from hell.” If Trump were being audited, Rettig wrote during the presidential campaign, this is the elite team that
would do it. The wealth team embarked on a contentious audit of Schaeffler in 2012, eventually determining that he owed
about $1.2 billion in unpaid taxes and penalties. But after seven years of grinding bureaucratic combat, the IRS abandoned its campaign. The agency informed
Schaeffler’s lawyers it was willing to accept just tens of millions, according to a person familiar with the audit. How did a case that consumed so many years of
effort, with a team of its finest experts working on a signature mission, produce such a piddling result for the IRS? The
Schaeffler case offers a rare
window into just how challenging it is to take on the ultrawealthy. For starters, they can devote seemingly
limitless resources to hiring the best legal and accounting talent. Such taxpayers tend not to steamroll tax laws; they
employ complex, highly refined strategies that seek to stretch the tax code to their advantage. It can
take years for IRS investigators just to understand a transaction and deem it to be a violation. Once that
happens, the IRS team has to contend with battalions of high-priced lawyers and accountants that often
outnumber and outgun even the agency’s elite SWAT team. “We are nowhere near a circumstance where the IRS could launch

the types of audits we need to tackle sophisticated taxpayers in a complicated world ,” said Steven Rosenthal, who
used to represent wealthy taxpayers and is now a senior fellow at the Tax Policy Center, a joint venture of the Urban Institute and Brookings Institution. Because the
audits are private — IRS officials can go to prison if they divulge taxpayer information — details of the often epic paper battles between the rich and the tax
collectors are sparse, with little in the public record. Attorneys are also loath to talk about their clients’ taxes, and most wealthy people strive to keep their financial
affairs under wraps. Such disputes almost always settle out of court. But ProPublica was able to reconstruct the key points in the Schaeffler case. The billionaire’s
lawyers and accountants first crafted a transaction of unusual complexity, one so novel that they acknowledged, even as they planned it, that it was likely to be
challenged by the IRS. Then Schaeffler deployed teams of professionals to battle the IRS on multiple fronts. They denied that he owed any money, arguing the
agency fundamentally misunderstood the tax issues. Schaeffler’s representatives complained to top officials at the agency; they challenged document requests in
court. At various times, IRS auditors felt Schaeffler’s side was purposely stalling. But in the end, Schaeffler’s
team emerged almost
completely victorious. His experience was telling. The IRS’ new approach to taking on the superwealthy
has been stymied. The wealthy’s lobbyists immediately pushed to defang the new team . And soon after
the group was formed, Republicans in Congress began slashing the agency’s budget. As a result, the team
didn’t receive the resources it was promised. Thousands of IRS employees left from every corner of the
agency, especially ones with expertise in complex audits, the kinds of specialists the agency hoped would staff the new elite unit.
The agency had planned to assign 242 examiners to the group by 2012, according to a report by the IRS’ inspector general. But by 2014, it had only 96 auditors. By
last year, the number had fallen to 58. The wealth squad never came close to having the impact its proponents
envisaged. As Robert Gardner, a 39-year veteran of the IRS who often interacted with the team as a top official at the agency’s tax whistleblower office, put it,
“From the minute it went live, it was dead on arrival.” Most people picture IRS officials as all-knowing and fearsome. But when it comes
to understanding how the superwealthy move their money around, IRS auditors historically have been more like high school physics teachers trying to operate the
Large Hadron Collider. That began to change in the early 2000s, after Congress and the agency uncovered widespread use of abusive tax shelters by the rich. The
discovery led to criminal charges, and settlements by major accounting firms. By the end of the decade, the IRS had determined that millions of Americans had
secret bank accounts abroad. The agency managed to crack open Switzerland’s banking secrecy, and it recouped billions in lost tax revenue. The IRS came to realize
it was not properly auditing the ultrawealthy. Multimillionaires frequently don’t have easily visible income. They often have trusts, foundations, limited liability
companies, complex partnerships and overseas operations, all woven together to lower their tax bills. When IRS auditors examined their finances, they typically
looked narrowly. They might scrutinize just one return for one entity and examine, say, a year’s gifts or income. Belatedly attempting to confront improper tax
avoidance, the IRS formed what was officially called the Global High Wealth Industry Group in 2009. “The genesis was: If you think of an incredibly wealthy family,
their web of entities somehow gives them a remarkably low effective tax rate,” said former IRS Commissioner Steven Miller, who was one of those responsible for
creating the wealth squad. “We hadn’t really been looking at it all together, and shame on us.” The IRS located the group within the division that audits the biggest
companies in recognition of the fact that the finances of the 1 percent resemble those of multinational corporations more than those of the average rich person.
The vision was clear, as Doug Shulman, a George W. Bush appointee who remained to helm the agency under the Obama administration, explained in a 2009
speech: “We want to better understand the entire economic picture of the enterprise controlled by the wealthy individual.” It’s particularly important
to audit the wealthy well, and not simply because that’s where the money is. That’s where the cheating
is, too. Studies show that the wealthiest are more likely to avoid paying taxes. The top 0.5 percent in income account for fully a fifth of all the underreported
income, according to a 2010 study by the IRS’ Andrew Johns and the University of Michigan’s Joel Slemrod. Adjusted for inflation, that’s more than $50 billion each
year in unpaid taxes. The plans for the wealth squad seemed like a step forward. In a few years, the group would be staffed with several hundred auditors. A team
of examiners would tackle each audit, not just one or two agents, as was more typical in the past. The new group would draw from the IRS’ best of the best. That
was crucial because IRS auditors have a long-standing reputation, at least among the practitioners who represent deep-pocketed taxpayers, as hapless and
overmatched. The agents can fritter away years, tax lawyers say, auditing transactions they don’t grasp. “In private practice, we played whack-a-mole,” said
Rosenthal, of the Tax Policy Center. “The IRS felt a transaction was suspect but couldn’t figure out why, so it would raise an issue and we’d whack it and they would
raise another and we’d whack it. The IRS was ill-equipped.” The Global High Wealth Group was supposed to change that. Indeed, with all the
fanfare at the outset, tax practitioners began to worry on behalf of their clientele. “The impression was it was
all going to be specialists in fields,
highly trained. The IRS would assemble teams with the exact right expertise to target these issues ,” Chicago-based

tax attorney Jenny Johnson said. The new group’s first moves spurred resistance. The team sent wide-ranging requests for information
seeking details about their targets’ entire empires. Taxpayers with more than $10 million in income or assets received a dozen pages of initial requests, with the
promise of many more to follow. The agency sought years of details on every entity it could tie to the subject of the audits. In past audits, that initial overture had
been limited to one or two pages, with narrowly tailored requests. Here, a typical request sought information on a vast array of issues. One example: a list of any
U.S. or foreign entity in which the taxpayer held an “at least a 20 percent” interest, including any “hybrid instruments” that could be turned into a 20 percent or
more ownership share. The taxpayer would then have to identify “each and every current and former officer, trustee, and manager” from the entity’s inception.
Taxpayers who received such requests recoiled. Attacking the core idea that Shulman had said would animate the audits, their attorneys and accountants argued
the examinations sought too much information, creating an onerous burden. The audits “proceeded into a proctology exam, unearthing every aspect of their lives,”
said Mark Allison, a prominent tax attorney for Caplin & Drysdale who has represented taxpayers undergoing Global High Wealth audits. “It was extraordinarily
intrusive. Not surprisingly, these people tend to be private and are not used to sharing.” Tax practitioners took their concerns directly to
the agency, at American Bar Association conferences and during the ABA’s regular private meetings with top IRS officials. “Part of our approach was to have
private sit-downs to raise issues and concerns,” said Allison, who has served in top roles in the ABA’s tax division for years. We were “telling them this was too
much, unwieldy and therefore unfair.” Allison said he told high-ranking IRS officials, “You need to rein in these audit teams.” For years, politicians have

hammered the IRS for its supposed abuse of taxpayers. Congress created a “Taxpayer Bill of Rights” in the mid-1990s. Today, the IRS often refers to its
work as “customer service.” One result of constant congressional scrutiny is that senior IRS officials are willing to meet with top tax lawyers and address their
concerns. “There was help there. They stuck their necks out for me,” Allison said. The IRS publicly retreated. Speaking at a Washington, D.C., Bar
Association event in February 2013, a top IRS official, James Fee, conceded the demands were too detailed and long, telling the gathering that the agency has “taken
strides to make sure it doesn’t happen again.” The
Global High Wealth group began to limit its initial document requests. The
lobbying campaign, combined with the lack of funding for the group, took its toll . One report estimated that the
wealth team had audited only around a dozen wealthy taxpayers in its first two and a half years. In a September 2015 report, the
IRS’ inspector general said the agency had failed to establish the team as a “standalone” group “capable of conducting all of its own examinations.” The group didn’t
have steady leadership, with three directors in its first five years. When it did audit the ultrawealthy, more than 40 percent of the reviews resulted in no additional
taxes. The inspector general also criticized the IRS broadly — not just its high-wealth team — for not focusing enough on the richest taxpayers. In 2010, the IRS as a
whole audited over 32,000 millionaires. By 2018, that number had fallen to just over 16,000, according to data compiled by Syracuse University. Audits of the
wealthiest Americans have collapsed 52 percent since 2011, falling more substantially than audits of the middle class and the poor. Almost half of audits of the
wealthy were of taxpayers making $200,000 to $399,000. Those audits brought in $605 per audit hour worked. Exams of those making over $5 million, by contrast,
brought in more than $4,500 an hour. The
IRS didn’t even have the resources to pursue millionaires who had been hit
with a hefty tax bill and simply stiffed Uncle Sam. It “appeared to no longer emphasize the collection of delinquent
accounts of global high wealth taxpayers,” a 2017 inspector general report said.

Strong and credible IRS is key to democracy.

Anson and Kane 22, *associate professor in the department of political science at the University of
Maryland Baltimore County, **assistant professor at the Center for Global Affairs at New York University
(“Everyone loves to hate the IRS. That’s a problem. Our research found ways to increase public support
for funding the agency,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/22/irs-
underfunded-messaging-republicans-democrats/)//BB

With the 2022 tax season now officially over, many taxpayers are facing an unusual problem. TheInternal Revenue Service, the U.S.
federal tax collection agency, has warned filers of significant delays in processing federal tax refunds because of ongoing
funding and personnel cutbacks at the agency. While most Americans rarely give much thought to the IRS, this
year’s even slower customer service is likely to cause widespread dissatisfaction. Lukewarm public support for
the IRS is nothing new. But research finds that continuing negative attitudes toward the agency could exacerbate a
second ongoing problem: a steep decline in the IRS’s ability to enforce the tax code and collect revenue from
tax cheats. Two things might boost public support for the IRS: information about its underfunding and appeals to Republicans’ and
Democrats’ core values. That increased support might push Congress to invest in the U.S. central tax authority. Here’s what our research says.
Why support for the IRS matters Political scientists find that a lack of support for central tax agencies is
remarkably bad for democracy. The IRS plays a key role in supporting what social scientists call “state
capacity,” or the U.S. ability to run a functioning government. Without the IRS collecting taxes and
enforcing the tax code, the U.S. federal government would very quickly collapse into total dysfunction.
Public support for state capacity is to democratic modeling. Solves great power war.
Magsamen 18, et al, Center for American Progress vice president (Kelly, Max Bergmann, CAP senior
fellow, Michael Fuchs, CAP senior fellow, and Trevor Sutton, CAP fellow, “The Case for a Democratic
Values-Based U.S. Foreign Policy,” Center for American Progress,
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2018/09/05/457451/securing-democratic-
world/)//BB
Reviving America’s strategic position in the world in the wake of President Donald Trump will require a foreign policy that both firmly embraces democratic values and systematically pushes
back against authoritarian competitors such as Russia and China. The Trump presidency has already severely undercut the United States’ global standing, causing immense harm to the nation’s

Allies are losing faith in American leadership while illiberal regimes are
strategic position, credibility, and moral authority.

growing in number, stature, and audacity. Trump’s rise reflects a pre-existing deterioration in the vitality
of democratic systems, a global phenomenon which his presidency has now turned into a crisis . The damage
cannot be reversed simply by electing a different president or reverting to previous foreign policy approaches. Instead, the United States must adopt bold new

policies to regain the advantage in great power competition and help vulnerable democracies, including
its own, resist authoritarian influence and strengthen a growing global democratic community . This report
explains why a democratic values-based foreign policy is the right choice for the United States on both a strategic and moral level. It also offers specific policy recommendations as a roadmap

democracy is under strain in America and

for how the next administration could pursue a democratic values-based foreign policy. Today,

threatened across the globe. The spread of democratic governance, which for decades seemed all but
inevitable, has stalled and now faces serious setbacks. Across the democratic world, ordinary people
have lost trust in their institutions of government and delivered stunning rebukes to their political
establishments. These setbacks have also emboldened authoritarian regimes. Russia, China, and other illiberal states have
sought to exploit the openness of democratic societies for their geopolitical advantage and have put forward an alternative autocratic model for politics and economic development that

security, prosperity, and strength depend on the survival and success of

undermines liberal democratic values. America’s enduring

democracy—both at home and abroad—as well as on the resilience of institutions, rules, and norms that
protect the liberal democratic values on which the United States’ global standing is built . Yet at the very moment
when liberal democracy faces its greatest ideological challenge since the Cold War, President Trump has chosen to reject America’s historic role as leader of the world’s democracies. He has
treated democratic allies as ideological foes and murderous dictators as respected friends and equals while stoking nativist and isolationist impulses among the American people. President
Trump has also systematically denigrated democratic values and norms at home through unprecedented attacks on the press, the independent judiciary, and law enforcement, as well as
political purges of civil servants.1 While U.S. democratic institutions have shown resilience in the face of his challenges, it is already clear that some of the damage Trump does will outlast his
presidency. The critical question today is whether the United States after Trump will summon the resolve to lead, protect, and expand the world’s democracies or stand by and suffer the
consequences as autocracy and illiberalism crack the foundations of the American-led global system. Advancing a values-based foreign policy after Trump will inevitably invite a vigorous
debate over how—or even whether—values should factor into U.S. foreign policy. Critics will likely point to America’s prior foreign policy errors and shortcomings, for example, the use of
democracy promotion aims to justify misguided foreign policies such as the invasion of Iraq; the broader U.S. failure to promote democracy in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring;
and Cold War-era support for dictators who sided against the Soviet Union. Critics may also point to the urgency of domestic challenges relative to foreign policy ones or fear of U.S.
overextension abroad to argue that a values-based foreign policy is unwise or simply not possible. This report takes these critiques seriously. However, in reflecting on the stakes for U.S.
leadership, present and future, it arrives at the conclusion that an American foreign policy shorn of American values would ultimately deliver less security and prosperity at home, while making

an approach that embraces America’s core democratic

U.S. leadership in the world less sustainable and impactful. This report asserts that

values will allow the United States to compete more effectively with authoritarian powers such as
China and Russia and will deliver better results for the country in the long haul. To address setbacks abroad, the United States will need to pursue a new foreign policy that
systematically puts liberal democratic values at the center of its engagement with the world. This will require more than just lip service. It will entail a
meaningful, sustained shift in how the United States conducts its foreign relations, launched with quick and decisive action and sustained with persistence and strategic vision. A democratic
values-based foreign policy strategy is rooted in faith in democratic self-government, not just as being better than all the alternatives but also as a value in and of itself. Such a foreign policy
will also advance U.S. national interests. America’s presence as a prosperous, multi-ethnic, free democratic society poses a challenge to autocrats through the model it sets. Instead of taking
this power for granted, it is time for America to cultivate it. At the heart of such an effort should be a realignment of American foreign policy to meet the challenge posed by resurgent
illiberalism. This can be done by forging stronger cooperation among democratic states, including in the defense of democracies under assault and the expansion of the global democratic

In both the short- and long-term, the United States will need to take the following steps: Restore
space.

democratic values and norms at home. Work with democratic allies to design and implement a counter-authoritarian playbook to push back against the
encroachment on and abuse of the open systems of democratic states. Build stronger international networks of democracies to create a global democratic bulwark. Privilege U.S. relationships
with democracies, and reflect this in U.S. policy decisions and spending. Strengthen international support mechanisms for populations nonviolently mobilizing for democracy around the world,
while more systematically pressuring countries to uphold human rights and adhere to international law. Reorienting U.S. foreign policy toward a values-based approach will require

the best way to advance democracy

policymakers to take the long view, recognize the intrinsic strength of democratic governance, and acknowledge that

worldwide is through the example set by successful democracies. Critically, it will also require U.S. leaders to heed the lessons of
history by recognizing that the most effective way to promote and sustain democracy is supporting and encouraging democratic institutions and movements, rather than employing coercive
measures. The United States has numerous tools to vigorously defend its values and advance democracy without seeking to impose it using force. Some may fear that a values-based foreign
policy would come at the expense of traditional U.S. interests. But that critique misdiagnoses and underestimates the geopolitical challenge to U.S. interests that a rising illiberal tide presents.
American interests will be far more difficult to secure if liberal democracy is supplanted as the pre-eminent and most sought-after political system. There will inevitably be times when U.S.
interests will necessitate partnering with nondemocratic regimes. Still, a principled but pragmatic approach can do both: cooperate selectively with such regimes on matters of vital national
interest while also recognizing that the greatest strategic gains to U.S. security and prosperity will rest on the success of other democracies and that America’s staying power and strategic
resilience will depend on investing in them. The challenge: A democracy crisis at home and abroad For most of the past 50 years, the world has witnessed the dramatic spread of democratic
governance throughout the globe. Between 1970 and 2010, the number of democratic states nearly tripled, with transitions to democracy stretching from the southern cone of South America
to West Africa, Southeast Asia, and the former Soviet bloc.2 By 2000, more than half the world’s population lived under a democratic government for the first time in recorded history.3 This
democratic wave brought a host of political and social rights to hundreds of millions of people and coincided with a historic decline in the incidence of interstate wars.4 The ascendance of
democracy globally and the emergence of an increasingly robust set of international rules and institutions fostered a prevailing assumption that a more democratic world was here to stay:
Democratic states would prosper and more autocratic states would transition to democracy. But this optimism about democracy has waned due to a number of varying and reinforcing trends.
First, democracies have experienced setbacks. Many countries once held up as examples of democratic progress—such as Poland, Turkey, and Venezuela—have experienced a deterioration in
rule of law and electoral competitiveness.5 In other countries, such as Thailand and Egypt, democratically elected governments were overthrown by force. Meanwhile, across the Middle East,
the democratic promise of the Arab Spring faltered in the face of violent repression. During this same period, illiberal and insular populist movements became resurgent in many established
democracies, weakening international cooperation among democratic states and imperiling many of the achievements of the postwar era. These movements occurred most notably in the
European Union, where a Center for American Progress and American Enterprise Institute study found that “in the past decade, such parties have moved from the margins of Europe’s political
landscape to its core.”6 A key feature of this illiberal resurgence has been elected leaders’ use of strongman tactics to undermine democratic institutions and norms. In Turkey, President Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan has gained increasing control over the political, economic, and military aspects of the Turkish state.7 In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has used xenophobic rhetoric and
crony capitalism to erode political checks and balances and consolidate power.8 Poland’s current leaders and others have followed Orbán’s playbook, attacking the independence of the
country’s media and judiciary and campaigning on an exclusionary vison of Polish society.9 President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, meanwhile, has flaunted his disdain for the rule of law
and human rights as he pursues a campaign of mass violence against drug users and dealers, which has included state sponsorship of extrajudicial killings.10 In all of these cases, attacks on
democratic institutions and norms have been carried out by democratically elected leaders themselves.11 Even in the United States, President Donald Trump is showing signs of authoritarian
envy, regularly criticizing the media, the judiciary, and law enforcement, while openly admiring some of the world’s most brutal dictators. As Trump said of Kim Jong Un, who rules over a
totalitarian dictatorship where people are thrown into labor camps for criticizing the government: “He’s the head of the country, and I mean he’s the strong head. … Don’t let anyone think
anything different. He speaks and his people sit up at attention. I want my people to do the same.”12 These trends do not mean in any way that democracy is a lost cause or that the global tilt
toward illiberalism is irreversible. Demand for democratic change and greater civil and political rights remains a potent force that transcends culture and geography, as recent events in
countries as diverse as Burkina Faso, Armenia, and Malaysia illustrate.13 But these positive developments do not negate the democratic backsliding that has occurred elsewhere. Across the

world, democracy faces an uncertain future. Second, confidence in democratic politics has waned, even in states with long traditions of
representative government. In the past two decades, democracies have struggled to deliver economic results for their people. Even democracies that have experienced rapid growth have too
often seen it disproportionally benefit small elites or specific regions, while causing significant disruption elsewhere in society.14 The Great Recession of 2008 and years of painfully slow
recovery helped fuel a sharp decline in trust in government institutions across the democratic world.15 Stagnation and deepening inequality, coupled with demographic change and political
dysfunction, have created fertile ground for distrust, division, and demagoguery that illiberal populist parties have exploited. These groups draw on xenophobic and racist messaging but also
resentment at economic stagnation and elite capture of supposedly democratic institutions. In some cases, they have also made both subtle and overt appeals to authoritarian modes of
governance.16 The United States has not been immune to this democratic malaise. Americans today distrust their government in greater numbers than at any point in modern U.S. history,
including the height of the Vietnam War and during the Watergate scandal.17 Two of the most significant drivers of distrust have been the rise of unfettered special interest spending to distort

These
U.S. politics and the political paralysis that has arisen from the growth of counter-majoritarian practices such as gerrymandering and abuse of the legislative filibuster.18

problems have fed a widespread perception that the U.S. political system no longer represents the
interests of ordinary Americans nor does it address grave challenges such as inequality, racial injustice, and opioid addiction. Such failures, compounded by foreign
policy failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, have contributed to a profound loss of faith in American institutions that Donald Trump effectively channeled in his bid for the presidency. Third,

illiberal and authoritarian regimes have sought to encourage and exploit the crisis of confidence in democratic
states in order to weaken them from within, assert the superiority of their own models, and attack the foundations of the post-Cold War geopolitical order. Of these revisionist states, Russia

Moscow has launched

has been the most overt and aggressive in its challenge to liberal democracy. Despite a stagnating economy and shrinking population,

ambitious measures to reestablish a sphere of influence in nearby countries, fueled right- and left-wing populist movements across Europe and
North America, and sowed confusion and discord among the democratic citizenries of EU states and NATO members, including America.19 The tools it has deployed in this campaign include
disinformation operations using both traditional and social media; targeted use of corruption to cultivate political proxies; cyberespionage aimed at influencing electoral outcomes; covert

Russian tactics constitute a new authoritarian

funding of insurgent political movements; and exploitation of neighbors’ energy insecurity.20 Together,

playbook to which the United States and other democratic powers have yet to develop an effective response.21 If Russia has been the boldest challenger, the most serious long-term
external threat to democratic governance comes from China. Beijing has been—and will almost certainly remain—an essential partner of the United States in solving major global challenges,
from climate change to nonproliferation. But as China amasses power, too often it has put its newfound capabilities and immense resources behind a model of political and economic
development and interstate cooperation that neither requires nor encourages liberal democratic values.22 In fact, China’s full-throated assertion of narrow national interests in areas such as

internet governance, free speech, trade, and human rights often actively undermines democratic values.23 China has also sought to use economic
coercion to undermine U.S. security alliances and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region and erode cohesion among EU member states.24 Meanwhile, Beijing has
used its economic and growing military might to immunize itself from the consequences of flouting long-standing international principles such as freedom of navigation.25 Tragically, these
developments coincide with President Trump’s abandonment of America’s commitments to global leadership, including the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate agreement, and the Trans-
Pacific Partnership. Fourth, the institutions, rules, and norms that underpin the liberal international order have not lived up to expectations, providing space for illiberal and undemocratic
states to seize the advantage. The global and regional organizations established since World War II were built to protect and encourage liberal values, including universal human rights and
rules-based international conduct. But these institutions largely reflect the world of 1945 and have not been adequately updated to recognize the massive shifts in global economic and
political power. Today, many of these institutions are losing the capacity to perform their basic missions because of inherent structural flaws, outdated mechanisms, and deliberate efforts by
world powers to undermine or circumvent them. The U.N. Security Council is rarely able to meaningfully respond to gross abuses of human rights or even outright aggression.26 The United
States and other democracies face growing challenges in upholding international rules or solving big problems such as chemical weapons use in Syria, ethnic cleansing in Myanmar, China’s
violations of international law in the South China Sea, and Russia’s use of gray-zone tactics in Ukraine. The World Trade Organization has likewise struggled to address abuses of its trade rules
by states such as China.27 Without more effective and coordinated efforts to push back against these abuses and transgressions, authoritarian governments will continue to probe the
boundaries of international rules and norms in ways contrary to both U.S. values and interests. Fifth, economic globalization has exposed autocratic systems to democratic values, but it has
also exposed democratic systems to autocratic influence. As the globalization of the world economy accelerated in the 1990s, experts assumed that integration would result in a more liberal
future.28 Authoritarian states, once closed, would be opened up and exposed to the practices and values of liberal democratic states. Gradually, these autocratic states would begin to take on
more liberal characteristics, accelerating the trend toward greater democratization. But globalization has proved to be a two-way street. Liberal states have also been exposed to the influence
of authoritarian states. Foreign investment from autocratic regimes has served as a vehicle to influence their recipients, most notably in the form of Russian cultivation of political actors across
Eastern Europe.29 The corrupt and uncompetitive inducements of autocrats have at times proved a more attractive path than more transparent business and investment practices favored by
democracies.30 The immense wealth concentration in autocratic states—and liberal ones as well—has spawned a complex transnational network of illicit finance that has distorted both
developed and developing economies.31 Lastly, the Trump administration is now undermining the democratic values and international rules the United States has traditionally sought to
uphold. Although the challenges facing global democracy have been building for many years, they have accelerated since 2016 in part because of the policies and rhetoric of the current
occupant of the Oval Office. In a remarkably short period of time, President Trump has taken dramatic steps to abandon America’s long-standing moral leadership in the world. President
Trump’s first secretary of state publicly declared that the United States would not prioritize human rights.32 The Trump administration has vigorously attacked America’s democratic allies
while showing an affinity for autocrats and dictators.33 On an almost daily basis, the president makes clear his disregard for many long-standing norms of American government, such as
separation of personal and public interests and respect for the autonomy of the judiciary and law enforcement. While in the past American foreign policy has been prone to charges of
hypocrisy—such as claiming to uphold democracy while backing autocrats—the Trump administration has abandoned any pretense of concern for democratic values. This sharp shift in
America’s approach to the world under President Trump has been immensely destabilizing in ways that are only beginning to become clear.34 The answer: A democratic values-based foreign
policy Donald Trump is hardly the only skeptic of a democratic values-based foreign policy. A range of policymakers and scholars of foreign policy, including some progressives, have argued
that the United States should de-prioritize the promotion of democratic values in its foreign policy. Some make the argument that the United States needs to take a more hardheaded and
transactional approach to advance its security and economic interests. However, this report argues that not only are these false choices but that the United States should see democratic

America’s liberal democratic values have been key to

values as a U.S. comparative advantage—and not a weakness—in global competition.

building, enhancing, and sustaining America’s geopolitical power. With the global backsliding of democracy and the rise of alternative
authoritarian models, it is ever more urgent to rediscover the power of core American values to secure U.S. interests in the long term. A democratic values-based foreign policy is worth

Compared with
pursuing for three key reasons. First, it will advance long-term U.S. economic and security interests abroad and create a safer and more prosperous world.

authoritarian regimes, democracies are less likely to go to war against each other, less likely to ally
against the United States, less likely to sponsor terrorism, less likely to experience famine or produce
refugees, and more likely to adopt market economies and form economic partnerships with other
democracies.35 Since liberal democracies tend to share values rooted in rule of law, fair competition, and transparency, they are natural partners in
promoting the stable, prosperous, open, and peaceful international environment that the United States
ought to cultivate through its foreign policy. It is true that the process of democratization can be long and uneven and can sometimes produce destabilizing
and aggressive state behavior. However, mature and established democracies are more stable, peaceful, and prosperous,

and more full-fledged democracies mean more economic and security benefits for the United States .36
Furthermore, the global system of democratic alliances, institutions, and norms the United States helped

create and lead after World War II has improved material conditions and brought peace and prosperity
to hundreds of millions of people across the world. Bolstering that democratic system and the democratic values that underpin it will ensure that
future generations can also enjoy the fruits of democracy and a liberal world. Second, this kind of foreign policy will help secure an American advantage in great power competition by
advancing a compelling alternative and strengthening the global democratic bulwark. Although the challenge posed by illiberal regimes today has evolved since the Cold War, there are still
lessons to be drawn from that era. One of the most significant factors in the collapse of the Soviet Union was the powerful example and contrast set by flourishing democratic societies in the
United States and Europe. Today, one of America’s greatest strategic assets is its global network of democratic allies and partners. The power of that democratic network, even underutilized as
it is today, stands in stark contrast to what today’s illiberal and authoritarian regimes can offer: namely, political order purchased at the cost of extreme corruption, xenophobia, oligarchy, and

the United States,

arbitrary use of state power. To succeed, any approach to countering the authoritarian playbook must present a compelling alternative. This means that

must demonstrate that liberal democracy represents the best path to deliver
alongside its democratic allies and partners,

inclusive prosperity, rule of law, and a just and equal society to a country’s citizens .
 4
DA---McCarthy

McCarthy’s is surviving the impeachment fights, but he needs to step carefully and
avoid introducing controversial legislation to appease the far right.
Emily Brooks 9-5, covers politics in the House of Representatives for The Hill and has a degree in
political science from the University of New Mexico, 9-5-2023, Hill, "McCarthy faces political minefield
on Biden impeachment," https://thehill.com/homenews/house/4183851-mccarthy-faces-political-
minefield-on-biden-impeachment/, anita

Former President Trump, with whom McCarthy has kept a good relationship, is exerting public pressure
to pursue impeachment without a long inquiry. So are voters in the GOP base, Republicans say. But moderate members of his
conference question whether there is enough evidence to launch an inquiry, and there is the chance that any impeachment effort could
backfire politically.

“The political situation is extremely fraught for McCarthy,” said Matthew Green, a politics professor at the Catholic
University of America.

“The way I see impeachment is that it is a way for McCarthy to kind of throw some red meat to his right
wing and to members of the Freedom Caucus in particular, to keep them happy and to try to keep his
difficult party coalition together,” Green said.

McCarthy has repeatedly said that he will not pursue impeachment for “political purposes,” instead arguing
that it is a “natural step forward” following a stream of information released by House GOP investigators over the summer about
the Biden family’s foreign business dealings.

A job guarantee pisses off both sides.

Triggs 20 [Adam Triggs is a director within Accenture Strategy, a Visiting Fellow in the Crawford School
at the Australian National University, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Brookings Institution, 8-24-2020,
Inside Story, "Is a job guarantee the answer?,", https://insidestory.org.au/is-a-job-guarantee-the-
answer/, Accessed 8-27-2023] dedeepya
This strikes me as a tall order. Governments are pretty good at one-size-fits-all. But when we want something more tailored and individualised,
we usually leave it to markets, where the role of government is to shape incentives and top up incomes. It’s hard
to think of examples
where the government has successfully delivered tailored, individualised solutions to the public on a
large scale. The government’s response to Covid-19 is a case in point.

This brings us to the political challenge. Advocates

of a job guarantee are the first to acknowledge that it occupies
a difficult space in politics. Many on the political left see it as work-for-the-dole on steroids: a right-
wing, neoliberal conspiracy to undermine and destroy the safety net by stealth. Many on the political
right see it as nothing more than rank socialism: a massive expansion of government and the
abandonment of free markets.

Perhaps these attitudes will change. But the fact that neither
side of politics is currently willing to champion an idea
that has been around for generations suggests a job guarantee’s political feasibility is far from
guaranteed.
Loss of McCarthy leverage forces him to capitulate to conservatives in spending fights
to preserve his speakership---that activates the ‘penny plan.’
David Sivak 6/23, Congress & Campaigns Editor at the Washington Examiner, “Congress and Biden
barrel toward fall showdown over Washington spending,” Washington Examiner, 6/23/23,
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/house/congress-president-joebiden-fall-showdown-
washington-spending

A $120 billion disagreement over federal spending threatens to send Washington hurtling toward a
government shutdown later this year, even as lawmakers race to pass their annual appropriations bills.

For a moment, it seemed as though Congress might avoid the kind of last-minute stalemates that have come to
define the appropriations process. Lawmakers had pledged to move the 12 annual bills individually after years of catchall packages that often
included extraneous measures and what critics consider bloated federal spending.

More importantly, Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-CA), leveraging a June deadline to raise the nation's borrowing limit, struck a deal with
President Joe Biden that effectively keeps the current level of nondefense spending in place. The compromise allowed House Republicans,
holding a narrow majority, to argue they had curbed federal spending, while the Biden administration and Democrats, in control of the Senate,
could claim they curbed larger GOP-sought cuts.

Yet no sooner had the country avoided default, raising the nation's debt ceiling to allow for more borrowing, than lawmakers faced a
new showdown.

A small group of conservatives staged a revolt over McCarthy's compromise with the White House, grinding
business on the House floor to a halt. The speaker, as a promise he made to win the gavel in January, pressed Biden to roll back spending to
2022 levels but walked away with far more modest cuts.

Members of the Freedom Caucus, who hold outsize influence in the House given Republicans' five-seat majority, were left fuming. Caucus
members and allied House conservatives even entertained the idea of holding a "no confidence" vote on McCarthy's speakership.

They relented from their blockade, however, after McCarthy agreed to draft spending bills at 2022 levels.
The top lines he and Biden agreed to would be a ceiling, not a floor, said Appropriations Chairwoman Kay Granger (R-TX) three days later as the
House nailed down spending levels for each of the 12 bills it will pass in the coming months.

Yet it quickly became apparent that McCarthy had traded one headache for another. Democrats accused him of
"reneging" on his deal with Biden, while centrist Republicans grumbled more loudly than ever about his acquiescence to members of the
Freedom Caucus.

“Do you think any of us would have made a deal if we thought your number was the deal? What kind of deal is that? What kind of respect for
yourselves is that?” Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-MD), a senior Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee, chided Republicans earlier this
month.

The Senate is enduring far less drama as it crafts its own appropriations bills ahead of a Sept. 30 deadline to fund the federal government. In
fact, Senate Appropriations Chairwoman Patty Murray (D-WA) and the panel's top Republican, Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME), have pledged to work
on a bipartisan basis.

Yet they know any respite in legislative drama over spending will be brief. They have committed to crafting
their spending bills at the levels established in the debt ceiling deal, setting Congress up for a House versus
Senate clash.

The two chambers have agreed to spare defense, veterans care, and homeland security from budget cuts, but
conservatives want to slash the rest of the discretionary budget. Granger doled out top lines that cut some appropriations bills by
more than a third relative to 2023 levels.

The result: a yawning, $119 billion gap between the House and Senate budget plans.
Deep reductions are a nonstarter for Democrats, who control the White House and Senate. Even some centrist Republicans in the House will be
reluctant to go along with McCarthy's plan.

Lawmakers, perhaps with the exception of the Freedom Caucus, fundamentally understand that to avert a shutdown starting Oct. 1, it will take
another bipartisan compromise such as that seen in the debt ceiling fight.

“You cannot pass appropriations bills without them being both bipartisan and bicameral. The president will not sign,” Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT),
the top Democrat on the House Appropriations Committee, told reporters earlier this month.

“So, I think this

notion that you can deal with 2022 levels, that appears to have been a part of this secret
deal, you then may be looking at guaranteeing a shutdown,” added DeLauro, who led the Appropriations Committee
from 2021-23.

Yet some House conservatives are already shrugging at the prospect of a shutdown. Rep. Byron Donalds (R-FL) said this month he's happy to
shutter Washington for weeks if it means reining in federal spending.

For now, Senate appropriators are keeping their heads down. On June 21, they gave each of the 12 Appropriations subcommittees their
spending allocation levels for the coming fiscal year. The full Appropriations Committee also amended and rewrote, or "marked up," two of the
dozen federal spending bills, for military construction and agriculture.

"I'm focused on getting our job done right now," Murray told the Washington Examiner.

The push is notable — the full Senate has not passed an individual appropriations bill since 2019. Murray and Collins's predecessors, who
retired at the end of the last Congress, preferred to cut behemoth spending bills outside of the committee process.

Collins told the Washington Examiner she hopes the return to some semblance of normalcy will ease tensions for conservatives, who seethed at
what they viewed as years of backroom deals that excluded input from the rank and file.

She plans to have the "vast majority" of bills reported out of committee before the August recess.

The House Appropriations Committee has already approved funding for agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Veterans Affairs.

But the entire process has appropriators irked since the cuts are too severe for Democrats to stomach. To compensate, Granger is eyeing
billions in funds Congress previously allocated but never spent, despite warnings from conservatives that the clawbacks are no substitute for
lower discretionary spending.

Rep. Pete Aguilar (D-CA), a member of Appropriations and the No. 3 Democrat in the House, worried aloud that the House would end up
short-changed in the process.

"We are completely ceding the appropriations process to the Senate at this point," Aguilar told reporters this month. "The Senate is the only
entity that is marking up to the agreed-upon numbers."

He predicted the House would eventually wind up voting on whatever the Senate produces.

That vote may not come in the fall. If history is any guide, lawmakers will extend government funding to late
December, teeing up a now-familiar scramble to avert a shutdown before the Christmas recess.

The stakes are not nearly so high as in the debt ceiling fight. There's mostly a political cost, usually shouldered by Republicans, to pay when the
government shuts down.

But Congressis incentivized to reach a deal by a provision in the debt ceiling compromise that forces a
1%, across-the-board cut if lawmakers fail to act by the end of the year.

Crushes readiness
Caroline Coudriet 5/31, staff at Roll Call, “Hawks worry about defense caps in debt limit deal,” Roll
Call, 5/31/23, https://rollcall.com/2023/05/31/hawks-worry-about-defense-caps-in-debt-limit-deal/

A debt limit compromise that would cap defense spending for the next two years is aggravating congressional defense hawks
who want the Pentagon to get a significant funding boost.
Many Republicans in particular have spent months arguing that the Biden administration’s proposed $842 billion for the Defense Department in
fiscal 2024 shortchanges the Pentagon at a time of widespread concern about China’s military ambitions.

Now, they’re being asked to vote for a bill that would stave off a catastrophic debt limit breach but lock in the defense spending level that
Biden proposed.

“We're accepting Biden's defense budget, which is actually a cut,” said Rep. Michael Waltz, R-Fla., in a Fox News interview, suggesting that the 3
percent increase in the deal would amount to a cut in practice given inflation rates. Waltz, chairman of the House Armed
Services Readiness Subcommittee, vowed to vote against the bill.

“That's cutting submarines,” he added. “That's cutting ships while you have a massive military buildup
from China. We can't do this on the backs of our troops.”
The 99-page debt limit compromise bill, which was released Sunday night, would limit overall national security spending in fiscal 2024 to $886
billion. That would be a roughly 3 percent increase from current levels, aligning with President Joe Biden’s request for defense spending overall
(which includes both the Defense Department and a smaller allocation for nuclear-related spending at the Energy Department and other
security programs).

In fiscal 2025, defense spending would be capped at $895 billion, just a 1 percent increase from the previous year.

That level is likely “manageable” for the department, Byron Callan, a defense analyst with Capital Alpha Partners, wrote in a Tuesday message
to investors, though he noted “underlying cost growth pressures” stemming from inflation and — possibly — “some defense program
performance.”

Still, those
cuts will be hard to swallow for lawmakers who think significant spending increases are needed
to deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific region, especially with some military experts warning that China could
try to annex Taiwan by force as early as 2027.

“The Biden defense budget takes the Navy from 298 ships to 291, at a time when Chinais going to increase their navy by
almost a third,” said Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., during an interview with Fox News. “I look forward to the details, but if you send me the
Biden defense budget to the United States Senate and declare it fully funds the military, you will have a hard time with me.”

Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has “strong feelings” about the measure, his
spokesperson said Tuesday, but did not elaborate further. Wicker has pushed for a defense budget equaling five percent of the nation’s GDP.

Rep. Ken Calvert, R-Calif., chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, said in a statement Tuesday in support of the bill that the
caps would provide an opportunity to streamline the defense budget.

“I believe we can meet those goals by cutting funding for misguided Defense Department priorities that aren’t related to national security,
optimizing the workforce, and creating incentives for disruption to create competition and lower costs,” he said.

Defense-minded Democrats, meanwhile, are generally more supportive of the compromise agreement. Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., said in an
interview Tuesday that he backed Biden's Pentagon spending proposal and would likely vote for the debt limit compromise.

The two-year spending plan will provide critical stability for the military, he said. Defense and industry officials have repeatedly urged Congress
to pass appropriations bills on time and avoid continuing resolutions.

"Being able to plan, being able to know that you're going to have money and how much money you're going to have is like 90% of the battle
here," he said. "It's a good budget deal. It gives us predictability for two years, which is incredibly important for the Department of Defense."

Rep. Seth Moulton, D-Mass., who serves on the House Armed Services Committee, said in a statement he will be voting for the bill despite his
concerns about defense investments.

“Despite their age-old chicken hawk bluster, Kevin McCarthy and the Republicans have succeeded in cutting the
defense budget once you factor in inflation,” he said in a statement. “The real question is whether we will use this opportunity
to make the politically difficult cuts we need to modernize our military or if we will continue playing parochial politics with our defense dollars.”

The deal’s impacts

The $886 billion cap for defense spending in fiscal 2024 will change the trajectory of the annual defense authorization bill, which the House’s
defense panels are aiming to mark up in June, though an official schedule hasn’t yet been released.
If it goes through, the debt ceiling bill will force some tough decisions upon lawmakers of both parties who have in recent years signed off on
hefty increases to the Pentagon’s budget.

Todd Harrison, Metrea Strategic Insights managing director, wrote in an email that the
overarching deal will “set a different
tone” for negotiations this year — essentially creating “a zero-sum game in terms of adds and cuts” as
lawmakers mark to a “fixed budget target.”

If defense hawks want to expand procurement, they’ll likely need to accept reductions in operations and
maintenance or research and development, said Travis Sharp, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments think
tank and officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve.

“With the agreement in place, Congress will be more limited in its ability to add funding for procurement,” he
said. “If Congress wanted to trim R&D spending to free up funds for procurement, they would have to act slightly differently than they’ve been
acting over the last 10 years.”

Supplemental spending bills could emerge as an avenue to spend money on defense outside of the budget caps, Sharp said, particularly
when it comes to Ukraine aid. Since supplemental packages don’t count towards the total defense spending limit, savvy lawmakers
could try to include defense spending priorities with connections to Ukraine in those bills.

With current Ukraine aid on pace to run out before the fall, the Defense Department is expected to seek
additional military funds for Kyiv in the coming months.

Key to contain rising revisionist powers---extinction.

Matthew Kroenig & Christian Trotti 20, Matthew Kroenig & Christian Trotti, “Modernization as a
Promoter of International Security,” Nuclear Modernization in the 21st Century, edited by Aiden Warren
and Philip M. Baxter, 1st ed., Routledge, 02/17/2020, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.4324/9780429435829

Does nuclear modernization promote international security? All the major

powers are currently modernizing their strategic
nuclear arsenals, and scholars and policymakers are debating the effect of such modernization on
international politics. Some argue that nuclear weapons deter a great power war and, therefore, nuclear
modernization will contribute to international stability.1 Others claim that modernization programs are
fundamentally destabilizing; nuclear weapons are the deadliest weapons ever invented and their continued possession will
eventually result in a catastrophic nuclear attack.2

This chapter introduces a third answer to the above question: it depends.

The modernization programs of the United States and its democratic allies at the core of the international
system tend to promote international security. On the other hand, the nuclear modernization programs of
revisionist autocratic powers intent on challenging the international system tend to threaten global
peace and stability. Thus, not all modernization programs are created equal. It is ultimately the
underlying geopolitical conditions, and not solely the capabilities themselves, which determine the extent
to which modernization programs promote or diminish international security.

Since 1945, the United States has

been the leader of a rules-based international order that has brought the world
unprecedented levels of peace, prosperity, and freedom.3 U.S. nuclear weapons have provided the security
backbone of that order by deterring major power conflict in Europe and Asia.4 Additionally, U.S. extended
nuclear security guarantees have protected the entire free world and dissuaded many capable states
from developing independent nuclear capabilities. The modernization of U.S. nuclear weapons will
therefore continue to reinforce these major sources of geopolitical peace and stability.
Alternatively, Russia, China, and North Korea are opposed to major elements of the existing international system and seek in varying ways to
disrupt or displace it. Given their revisionist geopolitical objectives, nuclear modernization in these countries tends to threaten international
peace and stability.

Geopolitical intentions guide nuclear strategy, which in turn informs modernization programs. It is therefore essential to account for a state’s
position within the international system when evaluating the likely effects of nuclear modernization on international stability.

The rest of this essay proceeds in four parts. First, it explains why U.S. nuclear weapons serve as unique guarantor of international security in
the postwar world order. Second, it argues that the United States must modernize its aging nuclear capabilities in order to sustain its
longstanding role in promoting global security. Third, it addresses the ways in which revisionist powers seek to use their nuclear modernization
programs for destabilizing ends. Fourth, it briefly considers the role of other nations’ nuclear forces, including: Britain, France, India, Israel, and
Pakistan. Finally, it concludes with implications for scholarship and for policy.

The U.S.-led, rules-based international order

Following the end of World War II, the United States and its victorious allies built the international system in which we reside today.5 Like past
hegemons, the United States ordered an international system to suit its interests. Unlike past hegemons, however, Washington did not seek to
rule through formal empire. Rather, it sought to reproduce a variant of its rules-based domestic political system for the global system. This
rules-based international order possesses multiple components. First, Washington and its allies established a wide range of international
institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, to encourage multilateral solutions to a wide variety of challenges. Second, it sought to correct the protectionism of the
interwar years by creating an open economic system defined by the free flow of trade and capital across borders. Third, the United States and
its democratic allies have promoted freedom, human rights, and good governance abroad. Lastly, Washington employed its unmatched military
might to provide the underlying stability and security which has allowed the overall system to function.

While the system is imperfect and the United States has sometimes disobeyed the rules it helped to write, the rules-based
order has nevertheless produced remarkable results. Humanity has been blessed by the absence of
great power war for over seventy years. Global standards of living are much higher today than seven decades ago.6
And by the mid-2000s, more people were living under democratic governments than at any time in world
history.7

As the world’s most powerful state and the architect of this system, the United States advanced and
defended this order through a variety of economic, diplomatic, and military means. An underappreciated but
central pillar of this rules-based order, however, has been the U.S. nuclear arsenal. U.S. nuclear weapons have provided the
backbone for the underlying security element of the global system.

U.S. nuclear weapons and great power peace

U.S. nuclear weapons contribute to global stability by deterring great power war. U.S. nuclear weapons have deterred revisionist
autocratic powers, such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War and Russia, China, and North Korea today, from attacking U.S. allies in Europe
and Asia.

Scholars have long appreciated the role of nuclear weapons in deterring war and contributing to the long period of great power peace. Indeed,
much social science scholarship credits the nuclear revolution with transforming international politics and making large-scale war among the
major powers unthinkable.8

What much of this literature ignores, however, is the unique role played by American nuclear weapons. Unlike other nuclear powers that seek
to deter attacks on themselves only, the United States aims to deter attacks against the entire free world.9 The United States extends
deterrence to over thirty formal treaty allies, including twenty-eight members of NATO, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and arguably others. The
U.S. policy of extended
deterrence provides geopolitical stability in Europe and Asia, the two most
important geostrategic regions on the planet and the home of all the major nuclear powers.

As a status quo power and leader of the international system, the United States has had little interest in or
incentive to use military force to revise the territorial status quo in Europe or Asia. Following the end of World War II,
for example, the United States’ immediate goal was in setting up independent governments in defeated countries, allowing free elections, and
returning home.10

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had an explicit goal of spreading Marxist revolutions to other nations in Europe and around the world. It
established puppet states under Moscow’s control in the territories it occupied in Eastern Europe. It employed military force, in Hungary in
1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, in order to force these states to remain in the Soviet camp. The Soviet Union also attempted to use military
coercion in a failed bid to wrest control of Berlin from the West in a series of crises during the late 1950s and 1960s. In Asia, Moscow gave the
green light to North Korea to invade its Southern neighbor and initiate the Korean War.11 These are only the major examples of Soviet
militarized revisionism during the Cold War.

In the face of this threat from the Red Army, the United States remained in Europe at the behest of its allies to deter Russian invasion. In order
to counter the Soviet Union’s conventional superiority in Europe, the United States and NATO relied heavily on nuclear deterrence.12 U.S.
nuclear weapons and the requisite resolve to defend allies were critical to forcing Moscow’s submission in the Berlin Crises and to deterring
war in Europe. In addition, the United States became more deeply involved in Asia, intervening militarily in Korea and in the Taiwan Straits to
prevent communist forces from invading or threatening their neighbors.13 In sum, during the Cold War in Europe and Asia, the Soviet Union’s
foreign policy was largely oriented toward revising the status quo, while the United States generally employed force, including nuclear
deterrence, in order to uphold it.

Similarly today, Russia,

China, and North Korea express their displeasure with the territorial status quo in
their respective regions.14 Russian President Vladimir Putin refers to the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the
greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 21st century” and longs to re-establish a “greater-Russia.” 15 He
has been clear about his interest in re-establishing a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and he has already
invaded two of his neighbors, Georgia and Ukraine. China has also declared a long-term intention to redraw the
map of Asia to incorporate Taiwan and it has begun taking contested territory in the South China Sea
through military coercion and gray-zone tactics. North Korea has engaged in repeated bouts of aggression
against South Korea and Seoul’s American ally over the decades. It initiated the Korean War and seized the U.S.S. Pueblo during
the Cold War. In recent years, Pyongyang has sunk a South Korean warship and shelled a South Korean island.

U.S. democratic allies in Europe and Asia consistently call upon the United States to maintain a robust nuclear strategy and posture in order to
deter possible aggression from these autocratic and revisionist powers. For example, when U.S. President Obama considered the adoption of a
nuclear No First Use Policy at the end of his term, U.S. allies resisted.16 Largely in response to allied demands, the United States agreed to keep
the nuclear option on the table to deter conventional aggression. It has also developed nuclear capabilities, including the supplemental, low-
yield capabilities called for in the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, with the explicit goal of extending deterrence and reassuring allies.17

Therefore, it is true that nuclear weapons have deterred great power war for over seventy years, but it is important to consider whose potential
aggression has been deterred. If
nuclear weapons were to be un-invented or nuclear deterrence to fail , any
ensuing aggression would most likely be conducted, not by the United States, but by Moscow, Beijing, or
Pyongyang against their regional neighbors. It is specifically U.S. nuclear weapons that are the most important element for
keeping the peace in Europe and Asia.

U.S. nuclear weapons and nonproliferation

The United States has also contributed to the security of the rules-based international system by halting the spread of the world’s most
dangerous weapons. Once again, in this domain, U.S. nuclear weapons have been central to these efforts.

As the most powerful state in the international system and the leader of the rules-based order, the United States possesses a strong interest in
preventing other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons.18 Washington played a unique role in establishing the major institutions of the
nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).19 Some theorists, like Kenneth Waltz,
argue that horizontal proliferation yields greater systemic stability and that Washington could benefit from slow and selective nuclear
proliferation, but there are many risks to the spread of nuclear weapons, especially for the world system’s leader.20 Accordingly, this
“proliferation optimism” argument has never found favor in the corridors of power.21

To support its goal of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to allied states, the United States has provided these states with extended
deterrence. Washington struck a bargain with allies: refrain from building your own nuclear weapons and we will protect you with U.S. nuclear
weapons. As stated above, the United States currently extends its nuclear umbrella to over thirty formal treaty allies and arguably others.
Without these efforts at extending deterrence to assure allies, it is likely that at least several other U.S. allies would possess independent
nuclear capabilities today. U.S. assurance efforts were essential to eliminating nuclear weapons ambitions in West Germany in the early days of
the Cold War, and South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s.22 Studies employing statistical analysis have shown that, “States receiving security
guarantees from nuclear-armed superpower allies are only 22 percent as likely to explore nuclear weapons as those who do not, 13 percent as
likely to pursue them, and 15 percent as likely to acquire them in a given year, conditional on their not having done so previously.”23

To make this extended deterrent guarantee more credible, Washington sometimes goes so far as to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on the
territory of its allies. This forward-deployed American nuclear power has been referred to as a wedding ring to its allies, providing a visible
symbol of America’s security commitment.24 An empirical study on the link between forward-deployed nuclear weapons and nonproliferation
found that forward-deployed nuclear weapons have a perfect track record in preventing nuclear proliferation. Never has a country with U.S.
nuclear weapons on its soil developed independent nuclear capabilities.25

To be sure, U.S. attempts at nonproliferation have occasionally failed. In the early stages of the Cold War, U.S. allies Britain and France chose to
build independent nuclear arsenals, despite Washington’s preferences to the contrary. Still, the small number of nuclear-armed states today is
a fantastic achievement relative to pessimistic proliferation expectations of the mid-twentieth century. And it is very likely that there would be
many more nuclear powers in the world today without U.S. efforts at extended deterrence and assurance.

U.S. nuclear security guarantees remain critical in the current security environment to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. With newfound
questions about America’s commitment to the security of its allies, there are renewed discussions in Berlin about whether Germany should
consider building its own nuclear weapons.26 A majority of the public in South Korea support Seoul going nuclear under uncertain
conditions.27 And analysts predict that a weakening of the U.S. nuclear umbrella could lead to proliferation among U.S. allies, including Japan,
Poland, and perhaps other states.28

In contrast, other nuclear-armed powers have played a less central role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Indeed, these revisionist
and autocratic states have occasionally gone so far as to use their nuclear capabilities to intentionally export the bomb to other states, fueling
the spread of nuclear weapons.29 For example, the Soviet Union aided China in developing a nuclear program from 1958 to 1960 to increase
the power of the communist bloc relative to the United States. Russia considered exporting a uranium enrichment plant to Iran in 1995 before
Washington intervened and pressured them to cancel the transaction. China aided Pakistan due to mutual rivalry with India. Beijing also
transferred sensitive nuclear technology to Iran, Algeria, and other countries as well. While Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan created a
proliferation network which enabled North Korea, Iran, and Libya to acquire sensitive nuclear technology as part of constructing an alliance of
“strategic defiance” against the United States and its allies.30 In recent years, Pyongyang has become a nuclear exporter, helping Syria to build
a heavy-water reactor before it was destroyed in an Israeli air strike in 2007. All of these countries remain at risk of exporting sensitive nuclear
technology in the future, intentionally fueling proliferation in a bid to advance their revisionist aims.

Some have argued that by possessing a robust nuclear arsenal, the United States instigates the spread of nuclear weapons to additional
countries, but this is incorrect. They aver that the continued maintenance of an American nuclear arsenal sets a dangerous precedent,
undermines the NPT, and encourages other countries to build nuclear weapons. These arguments are plausible at a superficial level, but closer
investigation reveals that they are unfounded.31 States build nuclear weapons for a wide range of security, economic, and normative reasons,
but aping the behavior of the United States is not among them. Moreover, there is no correlation between the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal
and the probability that other states explore, pursue, or acquire nuclear weapons.32

In sum, U.S. nuclear weapons also contribute to the security of the rules-based system by reinforcing the nonproliferation regime and
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

The imperative of U.S. nuclear modernization

United States’ nuclear weapons

have provided for international security and stability for the past three-
quarters of a century, but, if they are to continue to play that role in the future, then they must be
modernized.
The U.S. strategic nuclear forces consist of a triad of delivery vehicles: 1) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) deployed on ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs); 2) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); and 3) strategic bombers (including the B-2 and B-52) carrying
gravity bombs and airlaunched cruise missiles (ALCMs).

These capabilities are aging, however, and must be updated. The OHIO-class SSBNs entered service in the 1980s and 1990s and
were originally designed for a 30-year service life. Their service life has already been drawn out to 42 years and further extension is
impossible.33 There are only so many times a submarine can withstand the intense pressures of submerging and resurfacing, and relying on
these old boats puts the life of the crew at risk.

For the land-based leg, the Minuteman III ICBMs were first deployed in 1970, and they were meant to have a 10-year service life. This service
life has been extended multiple times, but the United States cannot continue to rely on this capability beyond 2030.34

Turning to the air leg of the triad, U.S. ALCMs are now 25 years past their expected design life.35 The United States also needs to ensure that its
stealth bombers can continue to penetrate current and future enemy air defense systems.

Beyond the delivery systems, the underlying nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system is also three
decades old and is vulnerable to new space and cyber threats.36 Lastly, the warheads themselves are aging, as many
were built in 1976, 1978, 1980, and 1988. These warheads require life extension programs for continued survival.37
In sum, U.S. nuclear weapons were built at the end of the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s. If you drive a car, it is likely that it was not built in
the 1970s or 1980s. And, if it was, then it is not likely very reliable. As long as the United States possesses a nuclear deterrent, it must ensure
that it is safe, effective, and reliable. This can only be achieved with modernized capabilities.38

In 2010, then-U.S. President Barack Obama laid out a plan to modernize America’s aging nuclear arsenal over the next thirty years. He called for
modernizing each leg of the nuclear triad. In 2031, the new Columbia-class SSBN will begin to replace the Ohio fleet, while the Department of
Defense will research a potential replacement to the D5 SLBM.39 The Department of Defense has also launched the Ground-Based Strategic
Deterrent (GBSD) program to modernize 450 ICBM launch facilities and field 400 new ICBMs to replace the Minuteman III, beginning in 2029.40
Meanwhile, in order to improve the survivability of the air-based leg in the face of sophisticated enemy air defenses, the U.S. will replace the B-
2A with the new B-21 Raider stealth bomber in the mid-2020s. It is also replacing the ALCM with the long-range standoff (LRSO) weapon, and it
is modernizing the B61 gravity bomb.41 Simultaneously, the Department of Defense is planning NC3 advancements for improved command and
control, as well as coordination with the Department of Energy to extend the service life of the warheads.42

President Trump decided to continue with Obama’s modernization plans in his Nuclear Posture Review, released in 2018.43 In addition, the
Trump administration called for capability “supplements” to deal with the threat of Russian nuclear “de-escalation” strikes.44 These low-yield
nuclear weapons include installing a low-yield warhead on a small number of SLBMs and the resurrection of a nuclear sea-launched cruise
missile.

These modernization plans have strong bipartisan support with senior defense officials on both sides of the aisle attesting
to the need for these capabilities.45 Nevertheless,
some analysts have questioned the desirability and feasibility of
U.S. nuclear modernization.46 Some have argued that U.S. nuclear modernization is too expensive. The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) estimates that the cost of nuclear modernization over the next thirty years will come to over $1 trillion. Critics argue that this is
unaffordable and this money could be better spent on other priorities. While $1 trillion is certainly a large number, to put it in perspective, it
comes to roughly 5–7% of the U.S. defense budget. Is 5% too much to spend on nuclear weapons? Several recent U.S. secretaries of defense
have claimed that nuclear deterrence is the most important mission of the U.S. Department of Defense. So, put another way, is 5% too much to
spend on the organization’s highest priority mission? Reasonable people can disagree, but to many this seems to be a good value. Indeed,
nuclear weapons have traditionally been prized because they are more economical than conventional weapons.47 As Obama’s Secretary of
Defense Ash Carter pithily put it, “nuclear weapons don’t actually cost that much.”48

Other critics of U.S. modernization plans charge that building a new generation of nuclear weapons will fuel an
arms race with Russia and China.49 But this is incorrect. Russia and China are already modernizing their
forces, and this is occurring irrespective of decisions made in Washington. Indeed, Russia is finishing a
modernization cycle and is building new, exotic nuclear weapons, such as a nuclear submarine drone,
that have never been contemplated in Washington. When Secretary Carter was asked if U.S. nuclear modernization was
stimulating an arms race, he replied, “we know they aren’t having that effect, because the evidence is to the contrary.”50
Moreover, U.S. modernization may actually dissuade arms races, as potential rivals realize they have little
hope of achieving nuclear parity with or superiority over the technologically-sophisticated United States.
Finally, some claim that U.S. nuclear modernization plans are inconsistent with its commitments under the NPT to work toward eventual
nuclear disarmament. According to this argument, U.S. modernization will cause nuclear proliferation, but this is also incorrect.51 President
Obama took good faith steps toward reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, but, as he did so, Russia, China, and North Korea went in the
opposite direction, expanding and modernizing their arsenals. Disarmament advocates often harangue Washington, London, and Paris because
they know these democracies will listen to their complaints, but they are barking up the wrong tree. If they want to make progress on
disarmament, the real obstacle is Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang. If other nations up nuclear weapons, Washington
would almost certainly join them. So long as these other nations have nuclear weapons, however, the United States
needs to possess a robust nuclear deterrent. Moreover, as argued above, doing so reinforces global nonproliferation, by giving U.S.
allies the incentive to forego independent nuclear arsenals. Meanwhile, the United States continues to make progress toward nuclear
disarmament in other ways with new initiatives to “create the conditions” for future disarmament.52

In sum, U.S. nuclear modernization is necessary for the continued effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent. Moreover, such measures are affordable and consistent with America’s longstanding disarmament goals.
The threat posed by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear modernization

Not all modernization programs are created equal. The effect of a state’s nuclear modernization on international security depends upon that
state’s objectives and strategy, in accordance with its broader geopolitical disposition. Russia, China, and North Korea are revisionist states
dissatisfied with the prevailing status quo. Their broader strategies seek to disrupt or displace the U.S.-led order, and thus their defense
capabilities, including nuclear weapons, are oriented toward these destabilizing objectives. Nuclear modernization programs in Moscow,
Beijing, and Pyongyang, therefore, tend to undermine international security and stability.

Russia

Russia seeks to disrupt the rules-based international order.53 Under President Putin, Russia has sought to reassert itself
as a global great power and to ensure that any major international security issue cannot be decided without Russia at the table. In addition, it
seeks to carve out a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe at the expense of the security and sovereignty of its neighbors. It
views the spread of the U.S. alliance system and of democratic forms of government as a fundamental
threat to the existence of its regime.54 Consequently, it seeks to exploit Western vulnerabilities in order
to divide democratic nations within themselves and against each other. To achieve these objectives, Russia employs a “hybrid”
or “new-generation warfare” military strategy that combines activities across the full spectrum of conflict, from
information operations at the low end to nuclear coercion at the high end.55

The nuclear component of this broader grand strategy is designed to deter NATO from intervening in
Russia’s sphere of influence, to coerce neighboring states, and to divide NATO allies against each other.56 In recent years , Russia
has increased reliance on nuclear weapons in its strategy.57 Russian leaders have made explicit nuclear threats and have
postured and exercised nuclear forces in ways we have not seen since the Cold War. During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, for example,
Russian President Vladimir Putin said that “Russia is one of the leading nuclear powers,” and that “it is best not to mess with us.”58 He also
put nuclear weapons on alert and moved them into Kaliningrad and Crimea. The message was clear: if
the West interferes with Russia’s attempts to use force against its neighbors, the result could be nuclear catastrophe.

The most dangerous component of Russian nuclear strategy is the so-called “escalate-to-de-escalate” doctrine.59 This is simply
the idea, widely acknowledged by Russian experts, that Russia will rely on nuclear weapons, including limited
nuclear strikes, to offset the conventional superiority of the United States and NATO. This strategy sounds
reasonable enough if it were only a defensive strategy to defend the Russian homeland from invasion. The concern is that,
like in Ukraine, it will be used as a nuclear backstop to bolster future conventional aggression. Russia
could invade a NATO member and then use threats of early nuclear escalation to deter a unified NATO
response. Short of invasion, it can continue to use the threat for quotidian nuclear coercion of NATO
members over foreign policy decisions of which it disapproves, such as regional states hosting NATO military capabilities.

To support this strategy, Russia is modernizing its nuclear arsenal. It is currently finishing a modernization cycle of its
strategic nuclear forces. The Kremlin is building a new generation of non-strategic nuclear weapons, expanding its
asymmetric advantages over NATO in this space, and giving credibility to its “escalate-to-de-escalate” approach.60 Finally, it is developing
exotic nuclear weapons, including nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicles, nuclear-powered nuclear cruise missiles, and nuclear-armed
submarine drones.61 The latter is designed as a system of pure terror to hold at risk Western port cities with the threat of a stealthy, large-
yield, and highly radioactive strategic attack. These weapons contribute to Russia’s strategic goals of weakening and terrorizing the free world
and, as such, they undermine global security and stability.

China

While Russia is the more dangerous near-term threat, China is the greater threat to the global order over the long
term. Russia can only disrupt the rules-based order, but China may seek to displace it. China endeavors to gradually replace the
United States as the global hegemon by 2049.62 The effort begins regionally in Asia where Beijing seeks to expel the United States as a
regional power and establish itself as the region’s hegemon. Globally, China is expanding its political and economic influence in every region of
the world through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Made in China 2025 plans.63 Its state-led capitalist approach seeks to prey on the rules-
based economic order at the expense of open market democracies. It is also consciously or unconsciously exporting this state-led capitalist
model and seeking to make the world safe for autocracy. Therefore, the rise of China is a profound threat to the rules-based order.

China supports this strategy with an ambitious military modernization program. In East Asia, its anti-access/area
denial (A2/AD) approach seeks to undermine U.S. power projection capabilities and enable China to pursue
territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, while providing coercive leverage vis-à-vis other regional actors.64
In recent years, the balance of power in Asia has shifted and many question the ability of the United States to defend
longstanding allies.65 China is also expanding its global military footprint with overseas bases and military exercises in other
world regions.

China is also building nuclear forces designed to contribute to these revisionist aims. While China claims to
desire only a “lean and effective” deterrent, it has gradually expanded and modernized its forces in recent years.66 Beijing is clearly attempting
to develop a greater ability to hold the U.S. homeland at risk, to increase U.S. vulnerability to a large-scale nuclear exchange, and to deter U.S.
military action, including in defense of its allies. In the past decade alone, the number of Chinese strategic nuclear weapons that could reach the
continental United States has more than doubled. And U.S. intelligence has recently estimated publicly that China’s nuclear arsenal will at least
double again in the coming decade.67 In addition to its strategic forces, China possesses a large stockpile of medium- and intermediate-range
missiles that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons.68 These capabilities contribute to China’s A2/AD strategy and could be used to blunt
U.S. and allied military forces in their attempts to defend against possible Chinese aggression. While China espouses a formal nuclear No First
Use Policy, Chinese experts acknowledge that there is a narrow range of contingencies, such as a major war with the United States in East Asia,
in which China might very well use nuclear weapons first. In the future, China
may leverage its substantial resources to
sprint to nuclear parity, potentially igniting an arms race with the United States and undermining U.S. extended
deterrence and assurance in Asia.
North Korea

Relative to the Russian and Chinese great powers above, the rogue North Korean regime is not as threatening to the very fabric of the current
international order. Still, North Korea’s nuclear program is a challenge to the rules-based order. Pyongyang has flagrantly violated the
nonproliferation regime and its weapons threaten the security of the free world.

Scholars debate North Korean goals. Some argue that North Korea only wants to defend its brutal totalitarian regime from external
intervention; others maintain that Pyongyang is pursing the more aggressive and revisionist goal of eventually reuniting the Korean peninsula
under its own rule.69 Regardless, North Korean behavior threatens almost every aspect of the rules-based order. It has repeatedly engaged in
armed aggression against its neighbors from initiating the Korean War in the 1950s to sinking a South Korean warship in the 2010s. It cheats on
global economic rules engaging in currency counterfeiting and black market smuggling activities. It also conducts massive human rights abuses
at home.

North Korea’s military strategy seeks to retain the capability to deter external invasion and, if necessary, to fight a full-scale war on the Korean
Peninsula. North Korean nuclear capabilities contribute to these goals. It is publicly estimated that North Korea has the ability to deliver close-
range, short-range, and medium-range missiles to U.S. allies and bases in Asia, while possessing enough fissile material to build between 30 and
60 nuclear warheads.70 In addition, it is on the verge of developing an ICBM capability to hold the U.S. homeland at risk with the threat of
nuclear war.71

While some hope that the international community may be able to negotiate the denuclearization of North Korea, it seems more likely that
North Korea will remain a nuclear power for the foreseeable future. If North Korea’s nuclear modernization continues, it will possess a more
reliable means of threatening nuclear war against the United States and its allies at the core of the rules-based order. North Korean
nuclear weapons may also act as a shield to external intervention, deterring the United States and incentivizing
Pyongyang’s aggression against South Korea or Japan. North Korea’s nuclear weapons may also weaken U.S. extended nuclear deterrence and
assurance, possibly persuading Tokyo and Seoul to reconsider their nuclear options. More broadly, North Korean possession of nuclear
weapons undermines the NPT. North Korea may decide to once again export dangerous nuclear or missile technology. Pyongyang’s nuclear
possession may create a dangerous precedent as other nonnuclear nations hope to follow the same path of cheating on the NPT, building
nuclear weapons, and ultimately being welcomed as de facto members of the nuclear club.

In sum, Russia, China, and North Korea are autocratic, revisionist challengers to the rules-based international order.
As such, their nuclear programs threaten core pillars of the system of global stability and security that has
reigned for the past several decades. In short, Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear modernization
programs undermine global stability and security.
The role of other nations’ nuclear forces

To this point, we have reviewed the effect of the modernization programs of the United States and its adversaries, but what about the nuclear
programs of other nations? This list of nuclear-armed powers includes America’s nuclear-armed allies, Britain and France, and the three
nuclear-armed states outside of the NPT framework: Israel, India, and Pakistan.

Like the United States, Britain and France have been status quo actors at the core of the Western liberal order since the end of World War II.
Therefore, British and French nuclear weapons have, on balance, done more to reinforce, rather than undermine, sources of global stability.
These allied nuclear forces have bolstered the capabilities of the Western alliance, thereby increasing its credibility and demonstrating alliance
burden-sharing. Britain and France can deter direct attacks on their homeland. Nuclear weapons in these two nations also complicate Russia’s
nuclear targeting and make it possible that Russia will suffer a nuclear attack even if it succeeds in de-coupling America’s nuclear weapons from
the security of Europe.

However, British and French nuclear weapons have not had a comparable effect on global security. Due to America’s global power projection
capabilities and its vast international commitments, U.S. nuclear weapons have been more influential in underwriting European and global
stability. As Albert Wohlstetter argued decades ago, at the end of the day, the nuclear balance in Europe rests primarily on U.S. and Russian
nuclear arsenals.72

Moreover, while the United States was working hard to stop nuclear proliferation, France had a troubling history of using its nuclear capabilities
to fuel horizontal proliferation. During the Cold War, France provided sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear states, such as Israel and
Pakistan.73 Fortunately, France’s nonproliferation policies have greatly improved since that time.

Britain and France are also undergoing their own nuclear modernization efforts and these capabilities will continue to make positive
contributions to nuclear deterrence in Europe. It is ultimately the United States, however, which will continue to bear the greatest
responsibility for using its nuclear weapons to deter great power war and halt the spread of the world’s deadliest weapons.

India, Pakistan, and Israel are three states that never signed the NPT and then went on to build nuclear weapons. Unlike the other nuclear-
armed states reviewed above, these states sit at the periphery of the U.S.-led global order. None of these states are formal U.S. allies, but they
are not sworn enemies either. Washington, therefore, does not have a formal obligation to extend nuclear deterrence to these states and these
states are not mentioned in the U.S. NPR as possible targets for U.S. nuclear weapons.

Israel is a democracy and a close, although not formal, American security partner. The United States failed in its bid to prevent Israel from
developing nuclear weapons in the 1960s. Israel was, however, the repeated victim of conventional aggression by its conventionally superior
and autocratic Arab neighbors in the past and its nuclear program has deterred subsequent invasions and generally contributed to Middle
Eastern stability. Unlike Iran’s advancing nuclear program today, Israel’s nuclear weapons did not spur other regional states to develop their
own nuclear weapons in response.

Nuclear programs in India and Pakistan are also contrary to the global nonproliferation order due to their acquisition outside of the NPT
framework and because of a series of subsequent, dangerous nuclear crises in South Asia. The United States has maintained good relations with
both India and Pakistan, but the orientation of these states may be shifting in this new era of great power competition. The Chinese-Pakistani
strategic partnership seems to be deepening. And India is cooperating more closely with the United States and its democratic allies in Asia as a
counterbalance to China’s growing power. If these trends continue, India’s nuclear forces may increasingly serve on balance to reinforce the
sources of stability in the prevailing global order. While we can hope that Pakistan does not use its nuclear forces to complement China’s
revisionist ambitions.

Still, the existence of three nuclear powers outside of the NPT framework is somewhat problematic for efforts to develop a global, rules-based
nonproliferation regime and there have been discussions in Washington about how best to mainstream these programs into the broader rules-
based nuclear order.

Conclusion

Does nuclear modernization promote international security? This chapter argues that it depends. Previous scholarship hasfocused
too narrowly on whether the technology itself is inherently stabilizing or destabilizing, but we argue that we can
only make sense of the technology when it is situated within its proper geopolitical context. Different actors with
different goals use the same technology in different ways. The status-quo-oriented United States has sought to create, advance, and
defend the rules-based international order that has governed the global system since 1945. Thus, its nuclear modernization program
tends to promote this overall system of international stability and security.

Several autocratic revisionistactors, on the other hand, are threatened by this rules-based system and
believe that it does not reflect their interests and priorities. Russia, China, and North Korea are
autocracies that are dissatisfied with significant aspects of the reigning order. Accordingly, they are
pursuing strategies to revise the international status quo. Their military postures are oriented toward
disrupting the current global order, and it is therefore likely that their nuclear modernization programs will
diminish international security and stability.
This argument has scholarly and policy implications. Scholars should move beyond abstract discussions about whether nuclear weapons (or
modernization programs) are stabilizing or not and focus more on the important variation caused by the strategies of weapons possessors.
States use nuclear weapons in different ways and this has implications for how nuclear weapons affect international politics. Current political
science models seek to understand the likely effects of nuclear acquisition in Iran, for example, by conducting quantitative analysis of all
instances of past proliferation.74 But aggregated data that contains information about U.S., British, and French behavior with nuclear weapons
will likely be misleading in attempting to understand how a nuclear Iran will act. Like the revisionist autocracies reviewed above, Iran is another
power with a foreign policy objective of resisting the United States and the prevailing international order. It is likely, therefore, that China or
North Korea are more accurate models for imagining the behavior of a future nuclear-armed Iran.

In the realm of policy implications, we conclude that the United States must follow through on its modernization plans. U.S.
nuclear weapons play a unique role in protecting the free world and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The
vast majority of states in the international system have a strong interest in the continued salutary effects of a robust U.S. nuclear deterrent.
 5
CP---States

The fifty states and all relevant sub-national actors should:

- implement a Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income regime, and
- adopt a Green New Deal jobs guarantee.
State level implementation of the Green New Deal is already underway---proves state
capacity and federal spill up.
Brecher 2020 – Jeremny Brecher is a historian, author, and co-founder of the Labor Network for
Sustainability, “States of Change: What the Green New Deal Can Learn from the New Deal,” December
6th 2020, Common Dreams, Climate Emergency,
https://www.commondreams.org/views/2020/12/06/states-change-what-green-new-deal-can-learn-
new-deal

THE GREEN NEW DEAL AND THE STATES

The Green New Deal first broke into prominence as a national program to create millions of jobs and address
economic inequality by rebuilding the American economy on a climate-safe basis. The core themes of the GND were embodied in a resolution
submitted by Rep. Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez and Sen. Ed Markey which proposed a broad vision to transform America. It called for "a new
national, social, industrial, and economic mobilization on a scale not seen since World War II and the New Deal era." Such a mobilization
provides "a historic opportunity to create millions of good, high-wage jobs, virtually eliminate poverty in the United States, provide
unprecedented levels of prosperity and economic security for all U.S. persons, and counteract systemic injustices."

Long before any national implementation of the GND, extensive mobilization has begun for the GND at
the state level. A special section in Popular Science laid out Green New Deal-style legislative proposals in every one of the fifty states.
Fifteen states and territories have taken legislative or executive action to move toward a 100 percent
clean energy future. This includes 10 states, along with Washington, D.C., and Puerto Rico, that have passed
legislation to implement 100 percent clean electricity policies and economy-wide greenhouse gas
pollution-reduction programs. State coalitions like Illinois Clean Jobs and New York Renews have passed legislation
that foreshadows GND principles and policies. A national Green New Deal Network supports "local and
state-based organizations across the country" to "integrate the Green New Deal into their organizing"
and "pass Green New Deal-inspired legislation at the local and state level."

Even before a national GND is in place, states are laying the groundwork for GND programs. They are
amplifying actions like the Black Lives Matter demonstrations and the strikes by teachers for safe Covid-19 policies to incorporate them in state
policy. They are supporting
the national movement for climate justice. And they are starting state-level "Little
Green New Deals." As the original New Deal demonstrated, a national movement of reform can realize some of its
most significant achievements at a state level.

Taxing GILTI generates billions---state uniformity prevents evasion

Shanske 21 [Darien Shanske; Ph.D. from UC Berkeley in Rhetoric, clerk for Judge Pierre N. Leval of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; 2021; “HOW THE STATES CAN TAX SHIFTED
CORPORATE PROFITS: AN APPLICATION OF STRATEGIC CONFORMITY”;
https://southerncalifornialawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Shanske.pdf]

Improving the taxation of the profits of multinational corporations—the topic of this Article—represents a
reform that would be efficient, progressive and relatively straightforward to administer. Not only
would such a reform thus represent good tax policy, but it would also raise significant revenue. And, if
substantial revenue, efficiency, progressivity and administrability are not sufficiently motivating, then I will also add that it would be particularly
appropriate to make these changes during the pandemic so as to raise revenue from those best able to pay during the current crisis. To be sure,
the argument that states can and should tax multinational corporations (“MNCs”) more has the whiff of paradox. After all, there is general
consensus that no nation-state is currently taxing MNCs very effectively and, further, that subnational governments are in an even worse
position to do so. This is because MNCs can exploit the mobility of capital even more easily between parts of the same country. Nevertheless, I
will argue that the American
states find themselves in a particularly strong position to do better at taxing
MNCs and this is in part precisely because of the missteps made at the federal level. I will briefly explain. The
federal tax law passed in December 2017, known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”), includes a number of new antiabuse rules meant to
combat income stripping. Income stripping occurs when a profitable corporation engages in tax planning techniques (more on these shortly) so
that profits that are taxed in a relatively high-tax jurisdiction, like the United States, are formally earned in a low or no-tax jurisdiction. One
important new antiabuse rule is called the Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (or “GILTI”) regime. The
essence of how the GILTI rules work is by identifying foreign assets that are unusually profitable by
means of a formula and then subjecting those excess profits to U.S. tax on the theory that they were not really
earned abroad, but shifted out of the United States. The size of the income shifting problem is in dispute, but there is broad consensus
that it is a large problem and one that is not going to be much improved by the new federal laws meant to
combat it.5 Current respected estimates of the amount of income shifted out of the United States to low
tax jurisdictions are about $300 billion per year, with the federal government projected to lose about
$100 billion per year.6 The Penn Wharton Budget Model has found that the amount of income available to be taxed by
the states if they tax GILTI to be in the same range (about $200 billion in 2020). Based on that $200
billion estimate, states could raise $15 billion in new revenue if they applied a 7% rate (about the current average).7 This
would represent about a 30% increase in state corporate revenue.8 That is a lot of money. It is also important to keep in
mind that states could borrow against a new revenue stream like GILTI in order to help pay for the
immediate crisis. For the over forty states with a corporate income tax, the real question is why would they not raise this
revenue from mobile capital and protect their tax base. Of course, representatives of MNCs have argued over and over
that they should not and indeed that states cannot conform to GILTI.10 To date, these representatives have been successful in convincing
almost all the states—even blue states, even blue states that could have really used the revenue before the current crises (I am looking at you,
Illinois).11 Yet note that in many cases, states have not acted one way or the other and that states are still considering the issue.12 Even states
that have affirmatively chosen not to tax GILTI can change their minds in light of recent events. Accordingly, I will argue at length in this Article
(and have argued briefly elsewhere),13 that the states should and could conform to GILTI. Or, to be more precise,
the states should strategically conform because, as we will see, the states should not conform to every aspect of GILTI as applied
at the federal level.14 Strategic conformity means that the state should conform in ways that make the state
versions of the law more effective at combating income stripping than the federal law on which it is based. Though I
cannot prove it, I suspect that the ferocity with which the industry has fought state conformity to GILTI is related to a similar
assessment about the possible effectiveness of state GILTI regimes as compared to the federal regime.
 6
CP---Tetlock

The United States federal government ought to submit a Green New Deal jobs
guarantee financed by a wealth tax to a contracted team of “super-forecasters”. The
United States federal government should commission a Semi-Structured Analogy over
[a Green New Deal jobs guarantee financed by a wealth tax] to determine the best
policy implementation strategy. The United States federal judiciary should establish
that the above Semi-Structured Analogy should be the standard for governmental
decision making.

The CP implements strategic forecasts through Structured Analogies – they’re quick

and inexpensive and ensure broader forecasting on future policies
Savio and Nikolopoulos 13 - Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Bangor
Business School, Bangor University (Nicholas D. and Konstantinos, “A strategic forecasting framework for
governmental decision-making and planning,” Science Direct, April-June 2013,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0169207011001336, Accessed 4-4-22, LASA-
AH)

The importance of decision-making for planning and strategy is supported by logic and is refuted only by
the boldest of specialists. Research has shown that better strategic decisions are made when decision-makers
are given some kind of support for such a task (Miller & Cardinal, 1994; Yoo & Digman, 1987). A series of studies have
highlighted the fact that decision-making for strategic planning requires detailed study , since such tasks can be viewed
as complex problems involving multiple variables and parameters which can be modelled and solved using management science techniques
(Bryson, 2004; Miller & Cardinal, 1994; Wagle, 1971). Although this applies to strategic planning in both the private and public sectors, as they
have much in common, the
latter is more susceptible to the influence of the political forces which act on the
organisation’s objective (Rondinelli, 1976). Furthermore, it is argued that forecasts play an important role in the larger
decision-making process that is strategic planning (Bryson, 2004). It is difficult to deny the close relationship between
forecasting and planning, as the former is often seen as a fundamental instrument for the latter. It has been argued and recognised that these
two activities are too similar not to be considered simultaneously, and that it would be beneficial to integrate them appropriately (Jain, 1993;
Makridakis, 1996, 1981; Makridakis, Hogarth, & Gaba, 2009). For long-range, strategic planning in particular, forecasts
are argued to be the key to making the correct, informed decisions which will ensure success (Makridakis,
1996; Makridakis & Wheelwright, 1973). Thus, forecasters and planners should strive to work together more closely
in order to ensure that planners know where these predictions are coming from and that the forecasts
are being fully capitalised upon (Jain, 1993). Since the early 1970s, it has been believed widely that over the long horizons which are
involved in strategic planning, judgmental forecasts are the most valuable. This study follows this argument, in that strategic forecasts
can aid in governmental decision-making when a strategy is being defined for policy implementation,
and should therefore be used in such a process. As there can be several alternative approaches with different characteristics
and costs for achieving a given goal, this is not a straightforward decision. This paper proposes that effectiveness predictions of the
rivalling strategies, termed Policy Implementation Strategies (Savio & Nikolopoulos, 2009a), be made,
and that these forecasts be used to shortlist potentially effective candidates for further investment
and analysis. It will be seen that the resource-intensiveness of current approaches for assessing a strategy’s effectiveness, such as Cost-
Benefit Analysis or Impact Assessment, does not allow for an extensive analysis of all possible alternatives because of budgetary constraints.
Hence, it is proposed that a judgmental approach based on the use of Structured Analogies be used for making
these effectiveness predictions, as they are relatively quick and inexpensive to implement. Such an
approach is considered ideal for such a screening phase, as it provides a means of performing an
extensive analysis of all possible strategic solutions whilst making a considerable saving of both time and
money, as well as allowing the possibility of discarding any unpromising strategies before further resources are invested in them. In order to
test this approach, which is a new application of such methods, an experiment was conducted with experts, the results of which are presented
here.

Forecasting solves great power war – newest ev

Atanasov et al., 2022, “Improving Judgments of Existential Risk: Better Forecasts, Questions,
Explanations,Policies”,https://www.researchgate.net/publication/357667792_Improving_Judgments_of_Existential_Risk_Bette
r_Forecasts_Questions_Explanations_Policies

This proposal lays

out a multi-method plan for generating accurate answers to probative questions
bearing on existential risks to our species (“X-risks”). Implementing this plan will be a big job. It will require a
new generation of forecasting tournaments that preserve rigorous accountability for short-term accuracy while
experimenting with innovations for advancing long-term debates prone to stall out because we lack reliable ways to weigh
clashing claims. Consider one of the gloomiest scenarios that futurists have conjured for the 21st century, one blending several
suspected drivers of X-risk (Ord, 2020). Humanity doesn’t realize it yet, but we are stumbling along a path
toward a Great Power war in the 2030s, a biological-and-nuclear conflagration that, amplified
by automated weapons systems, will kill at least 600 million, roughly 10x the death toll of
World War II. First-generation forecasting tournaments could help by doing what they do well: chart the ebb
and flow of probability judgments of short-run, objectively verifiable events that are potential
precursors of long-run X-risks. But that will only be helpful if the events on our radar screen are actual precursors and
imply actionable risk-mitigation strategies (Tetlock, 2017). To reduce reliance on happenstance—and move
from prediction to preemption—the next generation of tournaments must explicitly incentivize
people to do three things that first-generation tournaments are ill-equipped to do : (a) identify
early-warning indicators in a noisy, distraction-laden world; (b) craft insightful explanations that
assist policymakers in spotting lead indicators and discounting distractions; (c) give louder voices in
policy debates to high-value contributors at each phase of the knowledge-production cycle. Of course, we are not implying that
prediction is easy. Anticipating World War III a decade out would be impressive. But it would be poor form to celebrate
anticipating an avertable trainwreck. And moving from prediction to preemption adds formidable challenges. Designers of
second-generation tournaments will need to supplement traditional objective accuracy metrics with new sets of intersubjective
metrics aimed at fuzzier targets: skill at crafting creative forecasting questions, explanations, and policy solutions. We address
these challenges as well as objections to the entire enterprise. One supposedly killer objection is that we live in a Gray-to-Black-
Swan world in which long-range accuracy falls fast to chance—so why invest in foresight? Far from lethal, though, this objection
is constructive. It prods us to update expectations about how far it is feasible to see into the future—and explore how timely
and accurate forecasts need to be for informing risk-mitigation decisions before “it’s too late.” Previous forecasting
tournaments suggest the
heroes of X-risk exercises are less likely to be long-view visionaries than
they are short-range belief updaters whose judgments guide timely smaller-scale policy
adjustments. Across a surprising range of environments, X-risk tournaments are good bets to deliver value even with
moderately myopic forecasters.
 Inequality ADV
1. Economic decline doesn’t cause war.
Walt ’20 [Stephen; 5/13/20; Professor of International Relations at Harvard University; " Will a Global
Depression Trigger Another World War?" https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-
depression-economy-world-war/]

On balance, however, Ido not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to
have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there
would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since
the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the
economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war,
they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”

Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory . As
John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it
will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a
quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would
win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as
possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W.
Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.

The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s
economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply,
and with a reasonable probability of success.

Third, and most important, the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain. For this
reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced
that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends
and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every
war between Great Powers
[between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of
most wars fought since then.

The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or
peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19
pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the
probability of war very much, especially in the short term.

2. Inequality has zero effect on war

Gal Ariely 15, senior lecturer in the Department of Politics & Government, Ben-Gurion University of
the Negev, PhD from the University of Haifa’s School of Political Sciences, “Does National Identification
Always Lead to Chauvinism? A Cross-national Analysis of Contextual Explanations,” Globalizations, 2015,
https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/43980028/Ariely_Globalizations_2015.pdf?
AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1515397197&Signature=78lnbbHNRVjhLgOKyRPK
m%2BK8M1o%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename
%3DDoes_National_Identification_Always_Lead.pdf
With respect to internal explanations,the effects of income inequality and ethnic diversity are presented in Table 3. Models 3.1 and 3.2
indicate that neither directly affects chauvinism. H4 is therefore not supported. The results suggest, however, that both have a
negative effect on the national-identification slopes. Contrary to our expectations, countries with higher
levels of economic and ethnic division appear to exhibit a weaker relation between national identification
and chauvinism. While these findings might seem to contradict H5, the pattern was caused by outliers. After excluding South Africa—the most
unequal and ethnic diverse country in our sample—the effect of ethnic diversity is not even of borderline significance. After excluding Chile—the most

unequal country in our sample—the interaction effects for economic inequality were also far from significant .
The results, therefore, do not support H5.21¶ Conclusions¶ During the historic phone call between President Obama and Iranian President Sheikh Hasan Rouhani in September 2013, the latter
stated that his country’s nuclear program ‘represents Iran’s national dignity’.22 This declaration reflects the common perception that Iran’s nuclear program mobilizes Iranians in support of
resisting further national humiliation at the hands of foreigners (Moshirzadeh, 2007). This reflects the important role national feelings play in the contemporary international arena. Evidence
from other examples—such as the Israeli-Palestine conflict—indicates that national identity serves as a key factor in conflict resolution. The prominence of national feelings is not limited to the
Middle East, their effect on public attitudes towards international issues, and conflicts also being manifest in the West (Billig, 1995; Kinder & Kam, 2010).¶ It is thus hardly surprising that

scholars seeking to develop a better understanding of conflicts adopt a social-psychology perspective,

replacing the deterministic view that identification with one’s in-group necessarily leads to antagonism
towards out-groups with an examination of the broader social context. In line with this approach, the present paper focuses on the
way in which political and social contexts encourage chauvinistic views towards the international arena and how they affect the relation between national identification and chauvinism.¶
Integrating various social and psychological theories, we investigated two external contextual explanations (globalization and conflict) and an internal explanation (social division). Employing
cross-national survey data, we examined the relation between national identification and chauvinism across 33 countries. The findings indicate that a positive relationship exists between
national identification and chauvinism across most of the countries, although the level differs from country to country. Using a multilevel regression analysis, we tested to see whether
globalization, conflict, and social division correlate with this variation. The results indicate that social and political contexts are related to chauvinism and the ways national identifi- cation and
chauvinism are linked. Although a closer relation exists between national identification and chauvinism in more globalized countries, globalization failed to explain the variation in chauvinism
itself. These findings support the notion that globalization highlights the importance of national identity (Calhoun, 2007; Castells, 2011). While those sections of globalized societies that are
attached to their country also tend to resist international cooperation and endorse hostile views, the complexity of the phenomenon—as evinced by the divergent findings of previous studies
(e.g. Jung, 2008; Norris & Inglehart, 2009)—calls for further research of this interpretation. The fact that the current study is cross-sectional must also be taken into account, the findings
adducing the relation but not the causal relations between the variables. In contrast to experimental studies, the present design is similarly limited in its ability to offer a robust control for
alternative explanations.¶ Another external factor found to be relevant—to a certain degree—was conflict. Countries that suffered large numbers of deaths in conflicts and mobilized resources
and personnel exhibited higher levels of chauvinism. When other indices for conflict were used, however, these results were not replicated. A possible explanation for this finding lies in the
inherent limitation in the way in which conflicts are measured across various countries. Measuring international conflicts is a challenging task (Anderton & Carter, 2011). While the ways of
measuring conflict were chosen because they reflect different dimensions of conflict in order to be representative of a wide range of countries, the problem of comparability cannot be
ignored. An alternative explanation may derive from the fact that only deaths from conflict and resources/personnel mobilization are sufficiently significant to contribute to chauvinism. The
limitations of our measurements of conflict and research design mean that this idea must remain speculative, however. In addition, it is important to emphasize that the sample of countries is

Contrary to what the divisionary theory

also limited as many countries are not involved in conflict and there is also limited variation in the types of conflicts.¶

of national mobilization would lead us to expect, neither economic inequality nor ethnic diversity were
related to chauvinism or affected the relation between national identification and chauvinism. This finding
might also be explained by the limitation of the current research design. The number of countries included in the ISSP 2003 National Identity Module being relatively small and the sample only
covering countries with available survey data, the results relate solely to this specific sample of countries. Across another set of countries, social division might play a far more significant role.
Another explanation might be the meaning given to national identification and chauvinism across the countries. While evidence exists for the comparability of the scales across most of the
countries, the divergent meaning probably attributed to them in Germany, the United States, and Israel might form an additional limitation.

3. Diversionary wars are fake – media scapegoating works better than armed
conflict to generate political support.
Ilai Z Saltzman 23, Ilai Saltzman is the Israel Institute Visiting Assistant Professor of Israel Studies,
2/13/23, “Diversionary Words: Trump, China and the COVID-19 Pandemic”,
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-023-00235-x#Sec1, DOA 6/29/23/Bwitkov
On the face of it, there is nothing Diversionary Wars and naming and shaming campaigns have in common. The former involves launching
armed conflict to distract from a domestic crisis or bolster leaders’ perceived competence whereas the latter relates to exposing violations of
human rights and international law and their perpetrators. A
closer look, however, reveals leaders may weaponize
naming and shaming practices to scapegoat and deflect attention away from internal challenges, boost
their popularity, and display competence while avoiding the costly and risky use of military force. In fact,
such a discursive diversionary war of words serves the same functions as the traditional diversionary
war but without using military power, and with substantially less cost and risk (Carter 2020).
This study calls for the widening of the policy menu embattled leaders may choose from when facing domestic unrest as well as the inclusion of
deflective rhetorical and discursive forms of public diplomacy such as speeches, written statements, and messaging through social media to
shift the public’s attention away from the crisis and bolster the appearance of leaders’ competence. Integrating nonviolent practices into the
Diversionary War theory’s analytical framework not only enables a better understanding of leaders’ deflective policy menu but can also account
for the first step in an escalating interaction that may eventually lead to armed conflict. As such, we should conceptualize diversionary
measures as an escalating range of strategies available to leaders when facing domestic unrest which builds on the existing menu but
supplements it with the communicative war of words option (see Fig. 1).

Donald Trump did not choose to engage in armed conflict against China to distract attention from the
crisis COVID-19 posed to his administration, or to boost his prospects to win the upcoming presidential
elections given the potential risk and cost in blood and treasure. Furthermore, he did not want to endanger the Sino-
American trade agreement signed in early 2020 which was considered critical for American economic prosperity and his reelection prospects.
Less dramatic options such as domestic political repression, foreign intervention, and muddling through were either excessive or irrelevant.
Reflecting the logic of the discursive war of words framework, Trump needed to engage in China-bashing to rally his base and blame Beijing for
American hardships as well as to exhibit his competence as the commander-in-chief for political self-preservation purposes. The rhetorical
naming, shaming, and scapegoating of China was adequate given the level of domestic unrest Trump was facing amid the pandemic and its
devastating socio-economic effects; his forceful removal from office was not imminent, and no military or civilian takeover was in the making.

It was a political concern of a magnitude that only necessitated a low-risk and low-cost diversionary rhetorical campaign, and the widespread
use of social media proved to be a crucial part of this strategy. Considering
the trajectory of current socio-technological
trends, novel social media platforms will play an even greater strategic role in leaders’ efforts to
achieve domestic and international political objectives when facing challenges at home and abroad.
These new global public squares will eventually take over traditional media platforms, remake the toolbox and playbook of public diplomacy,
and transform the diversionary war of words into an even more appealing option for embattled leaders who are unable or unwilling to use
military force.

Trump’s diversionary policies did not get him reelected but they were certainly used as distractive, galvanizing, and performative mechanisms
throughout the presidential campaign. Despite the lack of success in this particular case, the theoretical merit of incorporating a discursive form
of diversionary war into the menu of policy responses to domestic unrest should not be impacted. What
matters is the explanatory
power and external validity of this model, as also evident from China’s war of words against the Trump
administration which suggests this is a prevalent practice. French journalist Émile de Girardin once remarked “the
power of words is immense. A well-chosen word has often sufficed to stop a flying army, to change defeat into victory, and to save an empire.”
Words can also be used to name, shame, and scapegoat an easily available patsy to deflect criticism, bolster public support, and show the
competence of an embattled leader.
 Climate ADV
1. Skill mismatches and logistical hurdles.
Bhandari, PhD candidate, 19
(Third Way. 3-25-2019, Former Senior Policy Advisor, Economic Programhttps://www.thirdway.org/memo/what-is-the-federal-jobs-guarantee-
and-what-are-people-saying-about-it )

#1: It solves a different problem. Right now there are over seven million open jobs and six million unemployed
people. Yet, many of these jobs are going unfilled. Why? Many people don’t have the right mix of skills or
training. New jobs are often in different places than old ones. Childcare and transportation are often prohibitively
expensive. And others struggle with opioid addiction and other conditions. And yet, a federal jobs
guarantee doesn’t address any of this. Even during economic downturns, there are better and far more efficient
ways to help workers and communities such as targeted public works programs, hiring credits for employers, temporary tax cuts
for working families, extended unemployment insurance, and money to shore up state and local budgets.

2. GND makes environmental damage worse---shift, mismanagement, land.

Loris, MA, 19
(Nicolas, Deputy Director of the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies and Herbert and Joyce Morgan fellow at The Heritage
Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/environment/commentary/its-not-just-about-cost-the-green-new-deal-bad-environmental-policy-too,
11-15)

We're not hearing much about the "Green New Deal" these days, but it's still a priority for some candidates, as anyone who's attended a recent
Bernie Sanders rally can attest. Criticism
of the GND tends to center on cost and rightly so. It would be extremely expensive.
Researchers estimate it
would take more than $5 trillion just to switch from coal, nuclear and natural gas to 100% renewables.
But even if you set economic concerns aside, an ironic fact remains: In the United States and around the world, the
central-planning policies at the heart of the GND have a horrible track record for the environment.
Governments in countries such as Venezuela and China (or in the past like the Soviet Union and Cuba) either routinely
mismanage and waste resources, or ramp up production with little to no accountability for environmental damage that comes
with it. The absence of price signals reduces the incentive to be more efficient and do more with less. In
addition, the absence of property rights reduces the incentive to conserve and gives government-controlled
industries a free pass to pollute without compensating or protecting its citizens. The G reen New Deal would
massively expand the size and scope of the federal government's control over activities best left to the private
sector. It would empower the feds to change and control how people produce and consume energy, harvest crops, raise livestock, build
homes, drive cars and manufacture goods. Secondly, the Green New Deal would result in a number of unintended consequences. For instance,
policies that limit coal, oil and natural gas production in the United States will not stop the global consumption
of these natural resources. Production will merely shift to places where the environmental standards are not as
rigorous, making the planet worse off. Moreover, it's not as if wind, solar and battery technologies
magically appear. Companies still have to mine the resources, manufacture the product and deal with
the waste streams. There are challenges to disposing potentially toxic lithium-ion batteries and solar panels,
or even wind turbine blades that are difficult and expensive to transport and crush at landfills. While these are solvable problems, they're
seldom discussed by GND proponents. There would also be massive land use changes required to expand
renewable power. Ben Zycher at the American Enterprise Institute estimates that land use necessary to meet a 100% renewable
target would require 115 million acres, which is 15% larger than the land area of California.
 3. Ocean acidification is fake
Paul Driessen 15, Senior Policy Advisor with the Committee For A Constructive Tomorrow and Center
for the Defense of Free Enterprise, previously worked at the Sierra Club and the Department of the
Interior/US Senate, BA in Geology and Field Ecology from Lawrence University, JD from the University of
Denver College of Law, and Accreditation in Public Relations from the Public Relations Society of
America, “Climate Hype Exposed”, p. Google Books

Human carbon dioxide emissions are making oceans more acidic. This is a ridiculous statement –
another attempt to replace exaggerated, disproven climate scares with a new panic. Earth’s oceans
have never been acidic; they are alkaline, by a wide margin. It is impossible for their vast volumes of
water to become acidic from mankind’s fossil fuel combustion: that is, to drop from their current pH of
8.1 into the acidic realm of 7.0 on this logarithmic scale. (Most rainwater is pH 5.6.) What has been
observed in recent years is a decline of about 0.034 pH unit on a 14-point scale. At this rate, marine
scientists say (and assuming human CO2 emissions continue at their current rate, which is highly
unlikely, since energy technologies change greatly over time) it would take some 700 years for the
oceans to become even minimally acidic. The effects of any pH (potential of hydrogen) changes on
marine life are hard to determine, since most organisms are quite resilient and have adapted to
numerous seawater and other changes for countless millennia. But the impacts will certainly not be
cataclysmic.13

4. Even extreme warming won’t cause extinction.

Ord ’20 [Dr. Toby; 2020; Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University, DPhil in Philosophy
from the University of Oxford; Hachette Books, “The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of
Humanity,” p. 110-112]

But the purpose of this chapter is finding and assessing threats that pose a direct existential risk to humanity. Even
at such extreme
levels of warming, it is difficult to see exactly how climate change could do so . Major effects of climate change
include reduced agricultural yields, sea level rises, water scarcity, increased tropical diseases, ocean
acidification and the collapse of the Gulf Stream. While extremely important when assessing the overall risks of climate
change, none of these threaten extinction or irrevocable collapse.

Crops are very sensitive to reductions in temperature (due to frosts), but less sensitive to increases. By all appearances we
would still have food to support civilization.85 Even if sea levels rose hundreds of meters (over centuries), most of
the Earth’s land area would remain. Similarly, while some areas might conceivably become uninhabitable due to water scarcity,
other areas will have increased rainfall. More areas may become susceptible to tropical diseases, but we need only look
to the tropics to see civilization flourish despite this. The main effect of a collapse of the system of Atlantic Ocean currents that
includes the Gulf Stream is a 2°C cooling of Europe—something that poses no permanent threat to global civilization.

From an existential risk perspective, a more serious concern

is that the high temperatures (and the rapidity of their change)
might cause a large loss of biodiversity and subsequent ecosystem collapse . While the pathway is not entirely
clear, a large enough collapse of ecosystems across the globe could perhaps threaten human extinction. The idea that climate change could
cause widespread extinctions has some good theoretical support.86 Yet
the evidence is mixed. For when we look at many
of the past cases of extremely high global temperatures or extremely rapid warming we don’t see a
corresponding loss of biodiversity.87
[FOOTNOTE]
We don’t see such biodiversity loss in the 12°C warmer climate of the early Eocene, nor the rapid
global change of the PETM, nor in rapid regional changes of climate. Willis et al. (2010) state: “We argue that
although the underlying mechanisms responsible for these past changes in climate were very different (i.e. natural processes rather than
anthropogenic), the rates and magnitude of climate change are similar to those predicted for the future
and therefore potentially relevant to understanding future biotic response. What emerges from these
past records is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems
and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another, but there is very little evidence for broad-
scale extinctions due to a warming world.” There are similar conclusions in Botkin et al. (2007), Dawson et
al. (2011), Hof et al. (2011) and Willis & MacDonald (2011). The best evidence of warming causing extinction may be from the end-
Permian mass extinction, which may have been associated with large-scale warming (see note 91 to this chapter).

[END FOOTNOTE]

So the most important known effect of climate change from the perspective of direct existential risk is
probably the most obvious: heat stress. We need an environment cooler than our body temperature to be able to rid ourselves of waste
heat and stay alive. More precisely, we need to be able to lose heat by sweating, which depends on the humidity as well as the temperature.

A landmark paper by Steven Sherwood and Matthew Huber showed that with sufficient warming there would be parts of the world whose
temperature and humidity combine to exceed the level where humans could survive without air conditioning.88 With 12°C of warming, a very
large land area—where more than half of all people currently live and where much of our food is grown—would exceed this level at some point
during a typical year. Sherwood and Huber suggest that such areas would be uninhabitable. This may not quite be true (particularly if air
conditioning is possible during the hottest months), but their habitability is at least in question.

However, substantial regions would also remain below this threshold. Even with an extreme 20°C of
warming there would be many coastal areas (and some elevated regions) that would have no days
above the temperature/humidity threshold.89 So there would remain large areas in which humanity
and civilization could continue. A world with 20°C of warming would be an unparalleled human and environmental tragedy, forcing
mass migration and perhaps starvation too. This is reason enough to do our utmost to prevent anything like that from ever happening.
However, our present task is identifying existential risks to humanity and it is hard to see how any realistic level of heat
stress could pose such a risk. So the runaway and moist greenhouse effects remain the only known mechanisms through which
climate change could directly cause our extinction or irrevocable collapse.

This doesn’t rule out unknown mechanisms. We are considering large changes to the Earth that may even be unprecedented in size or speed. It
wouldn’t be astonishing if that directly led to our permanent ruin. The best argument against such unknown mechanisms is probably that the
PETM did not lead to a mass extinction, despite temperatures rapidly rising about 5°C, to reach a level 14°C above pre-industrial
temperatures.90 But this is tempered by the imprecision of paleoclimate data, the sparsity of the fossil record, the smaller size of mammals at
the time (making them more heat-tolerant), and a reluctance to rely on a single example. Most importantly, anthropogenic warming could be
over a hundred times faster than warming during the PETM, and rapid warming has been suggested as a contributing factor in the end-Permian
mass extinction, in which 96 percent of species went extinct.91 In the end, we can say little more than that direct existential risk
from climate change appears very small, but cannot yet be ruled out.

5. Unilateral US action has no impact on climate change.

Loris, MA, 19
(Nicolas, Deputy Director of the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies and Herbert and Joyce Morgan fellow at The Heritage
Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/environment/report/the-green-new-deal-raw-deal-american-taxpayers-energy-consumers-and-the-
economy, 2-25)

Ineffectiveness. No matter where one stands on the urgency to combat climate change, the Green New Deal policies would be
ineffective in combatting climate change. In fact, the U.S. could cut its carbon dioxide emissions 100
percent and it would not make a difference in global warming. Using the same climate sensitivity (the
warming effect of a doubling of carbon dioxide emissions) as the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assumes in its
modeling, the world would only be less than 0.2 degree Celsius cooler by 2100.30
 Models are false.
6.

Dr. Amber Kerr et al. 19, Energy and Resources PhD at the University of California-Berkeley, known
agroecologist, former coordinator of the USDA California Climate Hub; Dr. Daniel Swain, Climate Science
PhD at UCLA, climate scientist, a research fellow at the National Center for Atmospheric Research; Dr.
Andrew King, Earth Sciences PhD, Climate Extremes Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne; Dr.
Peter Kalmus, Physics PhD at the University of Colombia, climate scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Lab;
Professor Richard Betts, Chair in Climate Impacts at the University of Exeter, a lead author on the Fourth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Working Group 1; Dr.
William Huiskamp, Paleoclimatology PhD at the Climate Change Research Center, climate scientist at the
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research; 6/4/2019, “Claim that human civilization could end in 30
years is speculative, not supported with evidence,” https://climatefeedback.org/evaluation/iflscience-
story-on-speculative-report-provides-little-scientific-context-james-felton/

There is no scientific basis to suggest that climate breakdown will “annihilate intelligent life” (by which I
assume the report authors mean human extinction) by 2050.
However, climate breakdown does pose a grave threat to civilization as we know it, and the potential for mass suffering on a scale perhaps never before
encountered by humankind. This should be enough reason for action without any need for exaggeration or misrepresentation!

A “Hothouse Earth” scenario plays out that sees Earth’s temperatures doomed to rise by a further 1°C (1.8°F) even if we stopped emissions
immediately.

Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:

This word choice perhaps reveals a bias on the part of the author of the article. A temperature can’t be doomed. And while I certainly do not encourage false
optimism, assuming that humanity is doomed is lazy and counterproductive.

Fifty-five percent of the global population are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions beyond that which humans can survive

Richard Betts, Professor, Met Office Hadley Centre & University of Exeter:

This is clearly from Mora et al (2017) although the report does not include a citation of the paper as the source of that statement. The way it is written here (and in
the report) is misleading because it gives the impression that everyone dies in those conditions. That is not actually how Mora et al define “deadly heat”---they
merely looked for heatwaves when somebody died (not everybody) and then used that as the definition of a “deadly” heatwave.

North America suffers extreme weather events including wildfires, drought, and heatwaves. Monsoons in China fail, the great rivers of Asia virtually dry
up, and rainfall in central America falls by half.

Andrew King, Research fellow, University of Melbourne:

Projections of extreme events such as these are very difficult to make and vary greatly between different
climate models.
Deadly heat conditions across West Africa persist for over 100 days a year

Peter Kalmus, Data Scientist, Jet Propulsion Laboratory:

The deadly heat projections (this, and the one from the previous paragraph) come from Mora et al (2017)1.

It should be clarified that “deadly heat” here means heat and humidity beyond a two-dimension threshold where at least one person in the region subject to that
heat and humidity dies (i.e., not everyone instantly dies). That said, in my opinion, the projections in Mora et al are conservative and the methods of Mora et al are
sound. I did not check the claims in this report against Mora et al but I have no reason to think they are in error.

1- Mora et al (2017) Global risk of deadly heat, Nature Climate Change

The knock-on consequences affect national security, as the scale of the challenges involved, such as pandemic disease outbreaks, are overwhelming.
Armed conflicts over resources may become a reality, and have the potential to escalate into nuclear war. In the worst case scenario, a scale of
destruction the authors say is beyond their capacity to model, there is a ‘high likelihood of human civilization coming to an end’.

Willem Huiskamp, Postdoctoral research fellow, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research:

This is a highly questionable conclusion. The reference provided in the report is for the “Global Catastrophic Risks 2018” report from the “Global Challenges
Foundation” and not peer-reviewed literature. (It is worth noting that this latter report also provides no peer-reviewed evidence to support this claim).
Furthermore, if it is apparently beyond our capability to model these impacts, how can they assign a ‘high likelihood’ to this outcome?

While it is true that warming of this magnitude would be catastrophic, making claims such as this without evidence serves only to undermine the trust the public will
have in the science.

Daniel Swain, Researcher, UCLA, and Research Fellow, National Center for Atmospheric Research:

It seems that the

eye-catching headline-level claims in the report stem almost entirely from these knock-on
effects, which the authors themselves admit are “beyond their capacity to model.” Thus, from a scientific
perspective, the purported “high likelihood of civilization coming to an end by 2050” is essentially personal
speculation on the part of the report’s authors, rather than a clear conclusion drawn from rigorous assessment of
the available evidence.
 2NC
1. Binding forecasts are key – closely followed predictions result in better Structured
Analogies
Savio and Nikolopoulos 13 - Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Bangor
Business School, Bangor University (Nicholas D. and Konstantinos, “A strategic forecasting framework for
governmental decision-making and planning,” Science Direct, April-June 2013,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0169207011001336, Accessed 4-4-22, LASA-
AH)

In conclusion, the
results of this experiment suggest that the structured use of analogies does improve the
accuracy of PIS effectiveness forecasts when compared to unaided judgment. The results also show that when
an expert is able to frame the problem appropriately and has enough knowledge to recall analogies to
the target PIS (thereby generating a correct SA interval prediction), the accuracy of his or her s-SA predictions will
improve. In addition, the results indicate that the more closely the participants follow the SA prediction, the
better their s-SA predictions will be. 7. Conclusions and further research In this paper we have taken the position that
strategic forecasts are important in governmental decision-making when strategies are being defined for
policy implementation, and therefore that they should be used for such a purpose. It has been seen that this is
an important decision, as there can often be several different alternatives for achieving the same goal, but with differing characteristics and
costs. For this reason it was proposed that effectiveness
predictions of the rivalling strategies, termed policy
implementation strategies, be made and used to shortlist potentially effective candidates for further
investment and analysis. Current approaches such as CBA and IA do not allow for such a screening and
intuitive analysis process due to budgetary constraints, as they are often time-consuming and costly.
Hence, it was proposed that a judgmental approach based on the use of structured analogies be used for making these effectiveness
predictions, as such methods would be relatively quick and inexpensive to implement. Such an approach was considered ideal for a strategic
screening process, as it provides
a means of performing an extensive analysis of all possible strategic solutions
whilst economising on valuable resources, as well as allowing for the possibility of discarding any
unpromising strategies so that no more is invested in them. In order to test this approach, which is a new application for
methods of this kind, an experiment was conducted using experts from governmental bodies, think tanks and academic institutions. The results
of this study suggest that the structured use of analogies does improve the accuracy of the PIS effectiveness forecasts when compared to
unaided judgment. The results also reveal that when an expert is able to frame the problem appropriately and has
enough knowledge to recall analogies to the target PIS, this will have a positive effect on the forecast
accuracy. In addition, the results of the experiments showed that the more closely the forecasters obeyed the SA
prediction, the better their predictions were. Naturally, this is only one of the first steps in this line of research, and although
the results reported here are encouraging, more results of this kind must be found in order to establish such a structured analogies approach as
an effective method for producing PIS effectiveness predictions. The proposed methods need to be explored in a series of policies which affect
various aspects of the economy and the society. The fact that three case studies are examined in this study may in some way restrict the
generalisation of the results to policies which have characteristics similar to the ones examined. Furthermore, the whole approach should be
tested in a ‘live’ case, meaning a newly-proposed policy, where the results (and thus the accuracy of the PIS effectiveness forecasts) will not be
known immediately but will emerge some time after the implementation of the policy. It would also be interesting to see whether the approach
could be improved yet further through some modifications of the s-SA presented above. For example, on the basis of the results found here,
the accuracy improved when the forecasters obeyed their SA predictions, and their sSA predictions improved in turn. Thus, perhaps it would be
worthwhile specifying to forecasters that their interval forecast (step 4 in Table 2) should be the outcome interval of their most similar analogy.
Furthermore, previous research in the use of structured analogies has found that the
forecast accuracy improved when more
analogies were recalled (Green & Armstrong, 2007). In that case, it would be interesting to see what the
effect on the forecast accuracy would be if experts were allowed to work in groups, thereby pooling
their analogies in an interaction group or Delphi group fashion. Finally, if the latter is the procedure to be adopted, IT
should play a vital role in the design of future experiments, as an internet-based Delphi approach, for example, could be used to facilitate the
interaction between the

2. Previous forecasts inform future forecasts – prior implementation of previous

forecasts is key to effective implementation of future predictions
Savio and Nikolopoulos 10 - Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Bangor
Business School, Bangor University (Nicholas D. and Konstantinos, “Forecasting the Effectiveness of
Policy Implementation Strategies,” T and F Online, 1-11-10,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01900690903241765, Accessed 4-4-22, LASA-AH)

Current Practice at an EU and UK level Savio and Nikolopoulos (2009) write that governmental analysts commonly use
proportionate analysis (EC Impact Assessment Guidelines (2009)) when faced with such a forecasting
task. That is to say, the potential impact of the PIS will determine the level of effort in quantification and cost invested into the process.
Generally, when quantitative data are available and when the situation is of a complexity worthwhile modeling, an econometric model is used.
In the absence of such data or in a situation too complex to model and so such an effort isn’t warranted, judgmental approaches (including
unaided judgment, the Delphi technique, panel groups, and forecasting by analogies (FBA)) are used. The
exact procedure used by
the EC and the UK Government for eliciting and assessing expertise is poorly documented, if at all. No
literature describing any sort of formal method for doing so has been found. All that is certain is that
when such expertise is called upon, it’s done so in an unstructured manner (Savio & Nikolopoulos (2009)), leading
to many limitations (Lee et al. (2007), Green and Armstrong (2007)). A structured approach to the use of expert judgment
could capitalize fully on the judge’s experience while minimizing their biases (Savio & Nikolopoulos (2009)). It is
argued that an attractive prospect for forecasting PIS effectiveness is through the use of analogies as
relevant information could be taken from PISs from the past under similar circumstances and used for
the benefit of the target situation (Savio & Nikolopoulos (2009)). Experts in the area, who deal with (or are exposed to
and are hence familiar with) PISs on a regular basis will inevitably (subconsciously) construct a “mental
database” in which they store different strategies together with their characteristics (targets, incentives, costs,
etc). For many of these stored PISs, the database will also contain information on whether the strategy was
successful or not, and to what degree (i.e., PIS effectiveness). Such a database would put them in a
position to, given a new PISs with certain characteristics, generate forecasts on aspects such as
effectiveness. In other words, their previous knowledge has served to “train” their minds and
theoretically, by associating these analogous cases to a target case, this will enable them to produce
better predictions (in comparison to the “un-trained” mind of a non-expert).

4. Binding forecasting is key to spillover---solves security.

J. Peter Scoblic and Philip E. Tetlock 20. J. Peter Scoblic is Co-Founder of Event Horizon Strategies, a
Senior Fellow in the International Security Program at New America, and a Fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy
School. Philip E. Tetlock is Leonore Annenberg University Professor at the University of Pennsylvania, Co-
Founder of Good Judgment, and a co-author of Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction. “A
Better Crystal Ball The Right Way to Think About the Future”.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-10-13/better-crystal-ball

The greatest barrier to a clearer vision of the future is not philosophical but organizational : the
potential of combining scenario planning with probabilistic forecasting means nothing if it is not
implemented . On occasion, the intelligence community has used forecasting tournaments to inform its
estimates, but that is only a first step. Policymakers and consumers of intelligence are the ones who must understand
the importance of forecasts and incorporate them into their decisions . Too often, operational demands—the daily
business of organizations, from weighty decisions to the mundane—fix attention on the current moment.

Overcoming the tyranny of the present requires high-level action and broad, sustained effort. Leaders
across the U.S. government must cultivate the cognitive habits of top forecasters throughout their
organizations , while also institutionalizing the imaginative processes of scenario planners. The country’s prosperity, its
security , and, ultimately, its power all depend on policymakers’ ability to envision long-term futures, anticipate short-term
developments, and use both projections
to inform everything from the budget to grand strategy . Giving the future
short shrift only shortchanges the United States.

Improving decision making solves extinction and outweighs

Whittlestone 17 Jess Whittlestone Published September 2017, "When powerful people make dumb choices it hurts us all. Here’s how
to fix it.," 80,000 Hours, https://80000hours.org/problem-profiles/improving-institutional-decision-making/

Summary Governments and other important institutions frequently have to make complex, high-stakes
decisions based on the judgement calls of just a handful of people. There’s reason to believe that human judgements
can be flawed in a number of ways, but can be substantially improved using more systematic processes and techniques. Improving the
quality of decision-making in important institutions could improve our ability to solve almost all other
problems. It could also help society’s ability to identify “unknown unknowns” – problems we haven’t even
thought of yet – and to mitigate all global catastrophic risks, which we believe are really important. There are very few people
explicitly trying to improve the decisions of important institutions, which suggests extra work could be particularly valuable. This seems like a
very promising option if you have a strong personal fit for the kind of research required to develop new ways of improving decision-making, or
if you’re well-placed to work in influential institutions and test out what we already know. It’s also a good option if you’re currently unsure
about what specific problems are most pressing, since improved decision-making can be applied to almost any area. Our overall view
Recommended This is among the most pressing problems to work on. Scale We think work to improve
institutional decisionmaking has the potential for a large positive impact , by potentially leading to much more
effective allocation of resources by governments, faster progress on some of the world’s most pressing problems, and reduced risks of conflict
or global catastrophe via better intelligence. We estimate that making institutional decisionmaking near-optimal would increase the expected
value of the future by between 0.1% and 1%. Neglectedness This issue is moderately neglected. Current spending is unknown.
There are ~100–1,000 people working on it full time, depending on how you count. A much larger number of researchers and consultancies
work on improving decisionmaking broadly, but relatively few focus on robustly testing the most promising techniques, or implementing proven
strategies in the highest leverage areas. Solvability Making progress on improving institutional decisionmaking seems
moderately tractable. There are already techniques that we have strong evidence can improve decisionmaking, and past track records
suggest more research funding directed to the best researchers in this area could yield additional insights quite quickly. However, it’s currently
unclear how easy it will be to get improved decisionmaking practices implemented in crucial institutions, and this second step could turn out to
be a large challenge. We expect that doubling the effort directed toward optimising institutional decisionmaking would take us around 1% of
the way there.

Strategic foresight solves a laundry list of existential risks

Scoblic 21 - a Senior Fellow with the International Security Program at New America, where he
researches strategic foresight (J. Peter, “We can’t prevent tomorrow’s catastrophes unless we imagine
them today,” 3-18-21, https://global.upenn.edu/perryworldhouse/news/we-cant-prevent-tomorrows-
catastrophes-unless-we-imagine-them-today)
The Trump administration may be gone, but Trumpian chaos persists. Which is why, before he took office, Joe Biden repeatedly emphasized his
intention to battle multiple crises simultaneously: a “health crisis,” an “economic crisis,” a “racial justice crisis” and a “climate crisis.” In his
inaugural address, the president said, “This is our historic moment of crisis and challenge.” And if a crisis is a situation that demands immediate
action, it is true: We must act immediately on all of these things. But if an emergency isn’t resolvable in the short term, it can be
counterproductive to characterize it as one. It is not — or not only — a crisis. It is a condition. The distinction is not trivial :
We deal with
the critical differently than we deal with the chronic. Crises focus us on the present, demanding swift
action, while conditions force us to look to the future because they require strategy sustained over time.
The pandemic, the economy, the climate and racial strife are both crises and conditions, demanding not
just short-term management but long-term rethinking — operations and planning, response and
anticipation, acting in the present and thinking of the future. The U.S. government is horrible at this sort of temporal
ambidexterity. Policymakers tend to see the present and the future as locked in a zero-sum time war, where attention to “later” reduces
attention to “now,” and vice versa. The present almost always wins, because the gains from success — and the costs of failure — are immediate
and concrete. By contrast, the consequences of not adequately managing the future are far-off, uncertain and abstract (and often a problem for
another administration). Crises only magnify this dynamic, making the present loom even larger than usual. To its credit, the Biden
administration has linked fast action to broader goals: The president’s interim national security strategy and early executive orders emphasize
climate change, and his pandemic response includes long-term investments in public health infrastructure. As it puts out fires, the Biden team is
also rethinking fire safety. Which is good. Unless the next crisis has nothing to do with fire. If
the events of the past year have
demonstrated anything, it is the uncertainty of the future. Which means that, for Biden to succeed,
simply having a strategy will not suffice. Even in calmer times, the future rarely holds still for our plans,
and in a dynamic environment (see: 2021), there is every chance that unimagined problems will arise,
that our current challenges will have unexpected effects and that our solutions will have unintended
consequences. In such an environment we need more than strategy. We need strategic foresight.
Strategic foresight — which I study as a researcher and practice as a consultant — involves envisioning alternative futures to
better sense, shape and adapt to the one that is emerging. It is a flexible way of managing uncertainty .
Tools like scenario planning are used widely, if inconsistently, in business and government, yet the White House does not have a
dedicated strategic-foresight function. Even though it is rapidly making high-stakes, difficult-to-reverse
decisions that will have long-term effects, the U.S. government has no coordinated mechanism for
imagining what those effects might be. If we don’t change that, we’ll always be battling surprise with spontaneity. By contrast,
when we spend more time asking, “What if?,” we can spend less time asking, “What now?” In Washington, the urgent has long been the enemy
of the important, and simply getting policymakers to think about the long term — let alone to grapple with its inherent uncertainty — is a
nearly insurmountable challenge. There are too many forces, from the tempo of the electoral cycle to the tyranny of the inbox to the crush of
social media, conspiring to prioritize the present. But the costs are increasingly stark. Infrastructure Week may have been a joke during the
Trump administration, but there is nothing funny about our perennial failure to shore up the physical foundations of the economy, from roads
to railways to power lines — an underinvestment that will cost trillions in lost productivity over the coming years. That neglect was on stark
display just weeks ago as Texas and other states succumbed to blackouts, paralysis and dirty drinking water because of a winter storm.
Extreme weather events are themselves related to the government’s failure to address climate change,
perhaps the epitome of short-termism. The plunge in funding for basic science research is another
shortcoming. Today, the federal government spends less on research and development than it has in six decades. Given the
contribution that scientific discovery makes to economic growth — the National Institutes of Health’s
Human Genome Project has generated $178 for every dollar spent on it (or nearly $1 trillion in economic
growth) — the country will have shortchanged generations of Americans. This myopia has national
security implications. China may soon overtake the United States in investment in emerging
technologies — from artificial intelligence to battery storage to quantum computing. Although business has
made up for the research shortfall to some extent, the Council on Foreign Relations notes that “ only the government can make the
type of investments in basic science that ignite discoveries; such investments are too big and risky for
any single private enterprise to undertake.” This absence of long-term thinking on national security is
ironic given the field’s pretensions to “grand strategy,” wasteful given the $1.25 trillion we spend each
year on defense and bizarrely persistent given that practitioners have recognized the dangers of short-
termism since the opening days of the Cold War. In 1947, George C. Marshall established the policy planning staff as a
separate entity within the State Department, enjoining its first director, legendary Sovietologist George Kennan, to “avoid trivia.” As Dean
Acheson would later recall, the office’s goal was to look “beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current
battle; far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline what should be done to meet or anticipate them.”
The impact is linear---even small forecasting differences prevent war.
J. Peter Scoblic and Philip E. Tetlock 16. Scoblic, Fellow in the international security program at New
America. "We didn’t see Donald Trump coming. But we could have.". Washington Post. 2-12-2016.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/we-didnt-see-donald-trump-coming-but-we-could-have/
2016/02/12/46ece26a-d0db-11e5-abc9-ea152f0b9561_story.html
The answer lies in measuring a forecaster’s performance over many predictions. Do the things you say will happen 5 percent of the time
actually happen about that often? Do you assign high probabilities to events that happen and low probabilities to those that don’t, as opposed
to playing it safe with middle-of-the-road predictions? By answering these questions, we
can find out whose forecasts are
generally the most accurate — even if we can’t say they were “right” — and use the results to refine our beliefs and
plan for the future.

Individuals, businesses and policymakers often face choices involving competing priorities and limited resources.
Probabilistic predictions, especially from forecasters who have proved their accuracy over time, can enable better
decisions , and even small improvements in predictive ability can mark the difference between danger and
security, recession and growth , war and peace . Imagine that the intelligence community had been more circumspect in
2002, saying there was a 75 percent chance that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction (and a 25 percent chance
it did not) instead of bluntly stating, “Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons.” Would Congress still have authorized
the use of force? No one knows for sure, but lawmakers might have been more cautious. Decreasing the odds of multi-

trillion-dollar mistakes is not something to sniff at.

What about supposed black swans, though? It’s true that judging the accuracy of forecasts involving extremely unlikely events is harder,
because they could take decades or even millennia to play out. But there are still standards we can use to benchmark those odds, especially
compared with other unlikely events. So even
if we can’t assign an objective probability to an alien invasion, we can
presumably say it’s less likely than, say, war with Russia and prepare accordingly.

A purely black swan is, by definition, a completely unforeseeable event, and there are relatively few of those. The
9/11 attacks are
often cited as an example, but there were many data points suggesting that al-Qaeda wanted to attack the
United States and that terrorists might use airplanes as weapons. (Tom Clancy had even published a book in which a
pilot intentionally crashes a jetliner into the Capitol.) As the 9/11 Commission Report put it, the attacks “were a shock, but they
should not have come as a surprise.”

Likewise, the intelligence community considered the

possibility of the Soviets placing missiles in Cuba, of Islamists
overthrowing the shah of Iran and of the Soviet Union collapsing under the weight of communism. That does not mean
that its forecasts were accurate! But if these scenarios were imaginable , then they were predictable in a ballpark
probabilistic sense. And the accuracy of those predictions could have been used to refine the intelligence community’s
models of the world.

Prediction is not positivism: We need to be humble about what we know and what we don’t know — and always remember that a probability is
just that. There are limits to our foresight, but better prediction can reduce the uncertainty that erodes confidence
in the future . Trump is wrong: America doesn’t need to be made great again. But prediction just might make it better.

Inflation is wrong.
Louisa Connors 17, Research Fellow with the Centre of Full Employment and Equity (CofFEE) at the
University of Newcastle; and William Mitchell, Director and Professor at the Centre of Full Employment
and Equity, University of Newcastle Australia, 6/14/17, “Framing Modern Monetary Theory,” Journal of
Post Keynesian Economics, Volume 40, Issue 2, jchen

All spending (private or public) is inflationary if it drives nominal aggregate demand faster than the real
capacity of the economy to absorb it. Increased government spending is not inflationary if there are idle
real resources that can be brought back into productive use (e.g., unemployment).

Related fallacies include the claims that issuing bonds to the central bank, the so-called printing money option, devalues the
currency, whereas issuing bonds to the private sector reduces the inflation risk of deficits. Neither claim is
true. First, there is no difference in the inflation risk attached to a particular level of net public spending
when the government matches its deficit with bond issuance relative to a situation where it issues no
debt, that is, invests directly. Bond purchases reflect portfolio decisions regarding how private wealth is held. If the funds that we
used for bond purchases were spent on goods and services as an alternative, then the fiscal deficit
would be lower as a result. Second, the provision of credit by the central bank (in return for treasury bonds) will
only be inflationary if there is no fiscal space (see Fallacy 7).

Hyperinflation examples such as Germany in the 1920s and modern-day Zimbabwe do not support the claim that
deficits cause inflation. In both cases, there were major reductions in the supply capacity of the economy
prior to the inflation episode.

MMT JG is able to control and prevent inflation

Celia Green 19 is a philosopher and psychologist, best known for her pioneering research on
perceptual phenomena such as lucid dreams, and for philosophical and social commentaries such as The
Human Evasion, 10/16/2019, “Modern Monetary Theory and the job guarantee: A new way of thinking
for the social sector”

https://www.powertopersuade.org.au/blog/modern-monetary-theory-and-the-job-guarantee-a-new-
way-of-thinking-for-the-social-sector/14/10/2019 // IS

One of the key ideas emanating from an MMT perspective, is a job guarantee policy funded through government spending. All
people unable to gain employment through the private sector would be provided with a guaranteed job at the prevailing minimum wage.
Unlike other strategies for job creation this is
the only one that would ensure full employment with the social and
public health benefits that flow as a consequence. There are also benefits to the private sector of preventing the creation of
groups of people and communities where long-term unemployment is endemic which leads to significant costs in supporting the re-entry into
the workforce of such groups when the economy picks up.

Opponents to such an idea often raise the idea of the costs of such a program, but from an MMT
perspective, there is no financial barrier from a deficit perspective given a sovereign currency issuing government faces no such
problem. The balance lies in ensuring that inflation is kept under control. The authors of the MMT
Macroeconomics textbook outline how a job guarantee that focuses on the unemployed and pays the minimum
wage will not be in competition with labour from the private sector and would thus be unlikely to trigger
wage demands that could drive inflation.

Another risk
to inflation would be that spending on the jobs guarantee could put too much money into the
economy relative to the ability of the economy to absorb that spending, which again would drive inflation.
However the appropriate use of taxation can reduce private sector consumption to ensure that inflation
is managed. Thus through prudent spending and taxation policy both full employment and low inflation can be met.
1NR
 1NR R1---LASA BS
Wealth tax evasion kills solvency for inequality---can’t solve globally due to tax
havens.
Paul Buchheit 2017, Doctorate is in Computer Science (University of IL, 1991). He was a full-time
professor for Chicago City Colleges, and part-time for the Master’s Program at Northwestern University.
Published author and an accomplished and well-known progressive journalist and writer., “Disposable
Americans: Extreme Capitalism and the Case for a Guaranteed Income”, pg 130-131

Extreme Inequality Is Getting Even More Extreme

The 20 richest Americans now own more wealth than the bottom half of the U.S. population .6 As of 2014, our
country had the fourth-highest degree of wealth inequality in the world, trailing only Russia, Ukraine, and Lebanon.7 American individuals or
families, including Bill Gates, the Koch brothers and the Walton siblings, each own approximately one-thousandth of our nation’s $86 trillion in
total wealth.8

As inequality grows, America’s infrastructure is falling into a state of dangerous disrepair.9 Attempts to save money by changing the water
source for Flint, Michigan resulted in the lead poisoning of thousands of children, and the Centers for Disease Control estimates that over a
half-million children nationwide are suffering from some degree of lead poisoning.10 Yet in 2012, Congress cut the funding for lead programs
by nearly half.11

Instead of paying taxes to help address our infrastructure problems, the wealthiest Americans have
formed, according to the New York Times, an “income defense industry” to shelter their riches, with “a high-
priced phalanx of lawyers, estate planners, lobbyists and anti-tax activists who exploit and defend a
dizzying array of tax maneuvers, virtually none of them available to taxpayers of more modest means.”12

Extreme inequality, and the tax avoidance that contributes to it, is even worse on a global scale.13
According to Oxfam, just 62 of the world’s richest individuals now own as much wealth as the poorest half of the world, about 3.6 billion
people.14 The
recently published Panama Papers reveal that greed and tax cheating are indeed universal
phenomena.15

Higher tax liabilities heighten evasion---that wastes IRS resources

Pomerleau 21, a climate policy analyst at the Niskanen Center. Her areas of research include policy
development for carbon taxes. She has previously worked in public policy at the Cato Institute and the
American Council on Renewable Energy. Most recently, she has worked as a business strategy
consultant. Shuting has an MPP in environmental and energy policy from Georgetown University’s
McCourt School of Public Policy (Shuting, “Administrative Costs of a Carbon Tax,”
https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Jan28-Administrative-Costs-of-Carbon-
Tax.pdf)//BB

Other features of the tax code can indirectly impact administrative costs. For example, higher tax rates
and overall tax burdens can indirectly increase administrative costs. Larger tax liabilities and higher tax
rates create more incentives for taxpayers to evade paying tax and require the government to allocate
resources to reducing tax evasion.15
Required job qualification and program size remain as core issues with a job
guarantee.
Annie Lowrey 17, American journalist who writes on politics and economic policy for The Atlantic, 5-
18-17, “Should the Government Guarantee Everyone a Job?,”
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/05/should-the-government-guarantee-everyone-
a-job/527208/ // KG

Of course, there might be less salutary effects as well, and the CAP proposal leaves a number of questions unanswered. For
example, the report suggests turning the current pool of unemployed, displaced, and discouraged workers into teachers’ aides, EMTs, and elder-care assistants. But
those are jobs
that require a considerable amount of training and skill, and are generally long-term careers
rather than temporary gigs. They might not be the right ones for a public-jobs program aimed at
disaffected workers, in other words. Moreover, those would not be easy job categories to expand in the event
of a recession. Demand for health-, elder-, and child-care workers is mostly based on the country’s demography, after all, and again, those jobs require
training. Supplying streets with crossing guards, cleaning up highways and national parks: Those more menial tasks might be better suited for a public jobs program,
but are not mentioned.

On top of that, the report seems to underestimate the cost of overhead and infrastructure—the program
would need to be physically
present in every zip code of this vast country, and the Washington has not run anything like this since
the Great Depression. The fact that most government-sponsored worker-retraining programs perform abysmally goes unmentioned, too.
The money might be better spent on a combination of targeted help for the long-term jobless, targeted help for distressed communities, targeted help for displaced
workers, and targeted help to connect young people to the labor force, along with policies like infrastructure investment and expanded labor protections. But the

report does not break out an estimated dollar-for-dollar impact of a jobs guarantee, or competing
proposals. Moreover, it does not discuss how a jobs guarantee might change the Federal Reserve’s mandate
to seek maximum employment along with price stability. (One question: Would the Fed allow higher interest rates that would cool
off private-employment growth in a world with a jobs guarantee?)

Specifically---nationalizes industries which kills worker skill training.

Max Gulker 18, Senior Fellow with the Reason Foundation. Gulker holds a PhD in economics from
Stanford University and a BA in economics from the University of Michigan, 10-18-18, “The Job
Guarantee: A Critical Analysis,” Section 4,
https://www.aier.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/JobGuarantee_0.pdf // KG
The immediate result of more pay and benefits for the working poor is something everyone would like

to see, all else equal. But

the process would divert workers from the places in the economy where they are
most productive to a labyrinthine bureaucracy, where even finding enough work to assign would be a challenge. This could greatly
weaken the productivity of the overall economy, potentially leading to declines in output and even greater job loss.

Contrary to the stated goal of not competing with the private sector, some industries could become entirely nationalized. For
example, 875,000

home health aides and 1.3 million teachers’ aides currently employed by the private and public sectors earn less on average than proposed job- guarantee wages.
One might myopically say

these workers deserve a raise, but turning these industries from conventional jobs into tasks assigned on demand would almost certainly result in poorer service to
the young and elderly.

6.2 Impact on Worker Incentives

Neither the CBPP nor Levy report has established how the work under a federal job guarantee would
help build the workers’ human capital. In fact,
the very existence of the program might strongly disincentivize workers from going out and acquiring
the skills that lead to real, value-enhancing job creation in the labor market. By forcing workers mostly at the low end of
the skills distribution to work by mandate and earn a fixed wage, a worker would have to derive enough

value from education or other human capital acquisition to leapfrog ten million or more other workers.
It would cost about $330 billion to send ten million workers currently counted among the U-6 unemployed for full trade school degrees,27 a fraction of the cost of

a single year of a federal job guarantee. While we do not support such blanket solutions of any kind, this number puts in perspective the benefits to investing in,
rather than simply sustaining, people.

Job creation requires skills most unemployed individuals don’t have.

John Carney 13, Covers Wall Street and finance for CNBC.com, where he runs NetNet, the go-to blog
to get the low-down and the high jinks of Wall Street, 9-13-13, “The Trouble with a Job Guarantee,”
https://www.cnbc.com/2012/01/04/the-trouble-with-a-job-guarantee.html // KG

The jobs created under the Job Guarantee are specifically not supposed to compete with the private
sector, which means that they supply goods and services for which there is not a market demand. The total output of the economy might increase, but much of
this output is non-productive—that is, it doesn’t actually improve our lives.
Now some people will say that this is fetishizing the market. Aren’t there things that improve our lives other than what the market will pay for? I don’t want to
argue that there are not. I do not think, for instance, that these days we could pay for the Sistine Chapel but our lives are greatly improved by its existence. The
problem is that there is no reason at all to think that people laboring in Job Guarantee positions will supply meaningful improvements rather than holes in the
ground.

The Job Guarantee folks seem to think that there are plenty of meaningful jobs that aren’t getting done but that could be done by the unemployed. I don’t think this
is correct. In fact, I cannot really think of many at all. Sometimes things like caring for the elderly or constructing bridges and roads are nominated as candidates.
But these are not jobs that can be done just by anyone. They require a certain sort of person with a
certain set of skills. Most jobs do.

So the Job Guarantee actually

falls prey to that old problem of the distribution of labor. Unless the skills,
talents and dispositions of the unemployed miraculously match the jobs the government would like
done, it doesn’t actually work much better than the “full employment” monetary policy.

Inevitable privatization causes labor market disruptions and corruption.

Max Gulker 18, Senior Fellow with the Reason Foundation. Gulker holds a PhD in economics from
Stanford University and a BA in economics from the University of Michigan, 10-18-18, “The Job
Guarantee: A Critical Analysis,” Section 4,
https://www.aier.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/JobGuarantee_0.pdf // KG

6.3 Rent-Seeking and Corruption

A federal job guarantee, no matter how well intentioned, would also serve as a magnet for corruption and corporate influence
peddling. Especially when administered on a local level, the opportunities for corruption become vast and difficult to monitor. For example, one need not be
particularly imaginative to see opportunities for a local building contractor to get free labor by giving kickbacks to officials in charge of placing enrollees in jobs.

Corporations and other interest groups do not have to resort to corruption per se to gain control of the millions of subsidized laborers in a job guarantee. Rent-

seeking, where corporations or other incumbent interests compete for influence over government

to further their own objectives, is a well-known phenomenon.28

For example, the regional manager for Walmart might get in touch with a local government about the condition of its store’s parking lot and the grounds around it.
Sales have been falling, and this expense might tip the decision to move to a new location in the next town. Couldn’t the town provide some of its laborers to
improve the look of the store’s grounds?
Where there is free labor to be had, private businesses come knocking. Both with and without breaking
the law, influence peddling would be an inevitable consequence of a job guarantee.

No warming---even the IPCC thinks the commonly cited worst case is highly unlikely
AND every model is ruined by systemic upward bias.
Wade ’21 [Robert H.; 2021; Professor of Global Political Economy at the London School of Economics,
DPhil and MPhil in Social Anthropology from Sussex University, Master’s in Economics from Victoria
University, BA in Economics from Otago University; Global Policy Journal, “What is the Harm in
Forecasting Catastrophe Due to Man-Made Global Warming?,”
https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/22/07/2021/what-harm-forecasting-catastrophe-due-man-
made-global-warming]
Upward Bias in Temperature Forecasting Models

The prospect of a coming catastrophe for humanity and the biosphere rests heavily on outputs of
climate forecasting models. But as David Legates and co-authors argue, these models “exhibit a strong
exaggeration in their results even when narrowly adopting atmospheric carbon dioxide as the sole
driver of climate responses…. [General circulation models, such as those of the IPCC, the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change] have consistently overestimated the climate sensitivity to rising atmospheric carbon dioxide.”

Ross McKitrick (2020) begins his assessment, “Two

new peer-reviewed papers from independent teams confirm
that climate models overstate atmospheric warming, and the problem [of overstatement] has gotten
worse over time, not better”. One of the papers (by McKitrick and John Christy) examined 38 models, the other, 48 models, used by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the various US “National Assessments”, the EPA’s “Endangerment Finding”, and more.

McKitrick continues, “Both papers looked at ‘hindcasts’, which are reconstructions of recent historical
temperatures in response to observed greenhouse gas emissions and other changes (eg aerosols and solar forcing). Across the two papers
it emerges that the models overshoot historical warming from the near-surface through the upper troposphere, in the tropics and
globally.” The study based on 48 models for 1998 to 2014 found that they warm on average 4 to 5 times faster than the
observations.

McKitrick concludes, “modelling the climate is

incredibly difficult, and no one faults the scientific community for finding it a tough
problem to solve. But we are all living with the consequences of climate
modelers stubbornly using generation after
generation of models that exhibit too much surface and tropospheric warming, in addition to running
grossly exaggerated forcing scenarios (eg RCP8.5).

“[W]hen the models get the tropical troposphere wrong, it drives potential errors in many other features of the
model atmosphere. Even if the original problem was confined to excess warming in the tropical mid-troposphere, it has now expanded into a
more pervasive warm bias throughout the global troposphere.

“If the discrepancies in the troposphere were evenly split across models between excess warming
and cooling we
could chalk it up to noise and uncertainty. But that is not the case: it’s all excess warming…. That’s bias,
not uncertainty, and until the modelling community finds a way to fix it, the economics and policy making community are justified in assuming
future warming projects are overstated, potentially by a great deal….”

The strong upward bias in temperature forecasts relative to observations compromise the models’
forecasting impacts on ecosystems, including agriculture, by exaggerating the probability of catastrophic effects.

The IPCC makes projections of future global temperatures to the end of century based on various models. They range from a
low of 1.4 C to a high of 5.6 C over pre-industrial temperature (roughly 1900). The wide range makes them almost
meaningless. The IPCC explains that the wide range results from uncertainty about the magnitude of the feedback between warming and
increased rates of evaporation – and David Seckler adds, also about the effects of evaporation on clouds and precipitation. (5)

It is astonishing to learn that the climate models miss a critical component of the climate system -- the hydrological cycle, and specifically
clouds, which the IPCC calls the “wild card” in the climate system.

The IPCC’s Worst Case Scenario is commonly used as the Business as Usual without a Radical Policy Action’
Scenario
The IPCC’s Assessment Report 5 (AR5), published in 2014, presented a range of forecasts of global climate out to 2050 and 2100, based on
The most extreme –
different assumptions about radiative forcing (a measure of how much of the sun’s energy the atmosphere traps).
the worst case – was
called Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 8.5. It assumes ominous reversals
in several basic, long-standing trends, all heading in the extremely wrong direction to 2100:

 high population growth to reach more than 12 billion people

 slow technology development
 coal consumption increases by 500 % between 2005 and 2100 (no account taken of supply constraints)
 slow GDP growth
 fast rise in world poverty
 high energy use
 high GHG emissions.
 temperature forecast: 5 C rise between 2005 and 2100.

RCP 8.5’s vision is horrifying, as worst-case scenarios should be.

A whole wave of literature, in peer-reviewed journals as well as in media, even by IPCC authors, has
since presented this worst-case as either “the most likely case” or “the baseline case – business as usual without policy action”.
This misleading assumption provoked a recent paper in Nature subtitled: “Stop using the worst-case scenario for climate warming as the
most likely outcome” (see also, Chrobak, 2020).

Adaptation is guaranteed, zeroing the impact.

Lomborg ’21 [Dr. Bjorn; 2021; President of the Copenhagen Consensus Center, Former Director of the
Danish Government's Environmental Assessment Institute, PhD in Political Science at the University of
Copenhagen, M.A. in Political Science at the University of Aarhus, BA from the University of Georgia;
Wall Street Journal, “Climate Change Calls for Adaptation, Not Panic,”
https://www.wsj.com/articles/climate-change-adaptation-panic-exaggerating-disaster-11634760376]

It’s easy to construct climate disasters. You just find a current, disconcerting trend and project it into
the future, while ignoring everything humanity could do to adapt. For instance, one widely reported study
found that heat waves could kill thousands more Americans by the end of the century if global warming continues apace—but only if you
assume people won’t use more air conditioning. Yes, the climate is likely to change, but so is human behavior in
response.

Adaptation doesn’t make the cost of global warming go away entirely, but it does reduce it
dramatically. Higher temperatures will shrink harvests if farmers keep growing the same crops, but they’re likely to adapt by
growing other varieties or different plants altogether. Corn production in North America has shifted away from the
Southeast toward the Upper Midwest, where farmers take advantage of longer growing seasons and less-frequent extreme heat. When sea
levels rise, governments build defenses—like the levees, flood walls and drainage systems that protected
New Orleans from much of Hurricane Ida’s ferocity this year.
Nonetheless, many in the media push unrealistic projections of climate catastrophes, while ignoring
adaptation. A new study documents how the biggest bias in studies on the rise of sea levels is their
tendency to ignore human adaptation, exaggerating flood risks in 2100 by as much as 1,300 times. It is also
evident in the breathless tone of most reporting: The Washington Post frets that sea level rise could “make 187 million people homeless,” CNN
fears an “underwater future,” and USA Today agonizes over tens of trillions of dollars in projected annual flood damage. All three rely on
studies that implausibly assume no society across the world will make any adaptation whatever for the rest of the
century. This isn’t reporting but scaremongering.

You can see how far from reality these sorts of projections are in one heavily cited study, depicted in the graph nearby If you assume no society
will adapt to any sea-level rise between now and 2100, you’ll find that vast areas of the world will be routinely flooded, causing $55 trillion in
damage annually in 2100 (expressed in 2005 dollars), or about 5% of global gross domestic product. But as the study emphasizes, “ in reality,
societies are likely to adapt.”

By raising the height of dikes, the study shows that humanity can negate almost all that terrible projected damage by
2100. Only 15,000 people would be flooded every year, which is a remarkable improvement compared with the 3.4 million people flooded in
2000. The total cost of damage, investments in new dikes, and maintenance costs of existing dikes will fall sixfold between now and 2100 to
0.008% of world GDP.

Adaptation is much more effective than climate regulations at staving off flood risks. Compare the two types of policies in isolation. Without any
climate mitigation to help, dikes would still safeguard more than 99.99% of the flood victims you’d see if global warming continued on current
trends. Instead of 187 million people flooded in 2100, there would be only 15,000. Climate policy achieves much less on its own. Without
adaptation, even stringent regulations that keep the global temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius would reduce the number of flood victims
only down to 85 million a year by the end of the century.

Stringent climate policy still has only a mild effect when used in concert with dikes: Instead of the 15,000 flood victims you’d get with only
adaptation, you’d have 10,000. And getting there would cost hundreds of trillions of dollars, which is hardly mitigated by the $40 billion drop in
total flood damage and dike costs climate regulations would achieve. As I’ve explained in these pages before, this kind of policy has a high
human cost: the tens of millions of people pricey climate regulations relegate to poverty.

You don’t have to portend doom to take climate change seriously. Ignoring the benefits of adaptation may make for
better headlines, but it badly misinforms readers.

4. GND eliminates price signals and causes tragedy of the commons

Roberts, MA Yale, et al., 20
(James M., Nicolas Loris, MA, Kevin Dayaratna, PhD, Principal Statistician, Data Scientist, and Research Fellow
https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/IB5099_0.pdf , 8-7)

As Heritage analysts have reported, governments

in countries such as Venezuela and China routinely mismanage and
waste resources or ramp up production with little to no accountability for the environmental damage that comes
with it. The absence of price signals reduces the incentive to be more efficient and do more with less. In
addition, the absence of property rights reduces the incentive to conserve and gives government-
controlled industries a free pass to pollute without compensating or protecting its citizens.13 Venezuela consistently ranks at
the bottom of the annual review of 180 countries in The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. 14 While China ranks higher than
Venezuela in the Index, its better performance is attributable, in part, to manipulation of data by the communist dictatorship in Beijing.
Interventions by governments in an economy’s price-setting system and the weakening of property rights and the rule of law through
corruption and governmental incompetence are key factors in the Index’s analysis. The EU is not China or Venezuela, but the
more the EU
taxes, regulates, and spends through GND-like policies, the more Brussels will erode the economic
freedoms of Europeans. By shrinking the EU’s economy by potentially tens of trillions of dollars, the GND
will cause lower levels of prosperity and leave Europeans with fewer resources to deal with whatever
environmental challenges come their way.