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Diasporas and conflict societies: Conflict

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contributors to stability and development?
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DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2011.572453
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Diasporas and conflict societies: conflict entrepreneurs, competing interests

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Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff
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interests or contributors to stability and development?', Conflict, Security & Development, 11: 2, 115 — 143
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Analysis
Diasporas and conflict
societies: conflict
entrepreneurs, competing
interests or contributors to
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stability and development?

This paper summarises our state of knowledge of diasporas in conflict/post-conflict

regarding diaspora engagement in conflict interventions, and based on a more careful
socieities. It presents a map of possible case-by-case analysis, using the provided map
diaspora contributions and their specific as a starting point. Such analyses can inform
potential positive and negative impacts in decisions of when to tolerate, unencumbered,
societies experiencing or recovering from diaspora engagement; when to facilitate or
conflict. Following a discussion of diasporas support such engagement; and when to
and their motivations for engagement in their consider strategic partnering with diaspora
places of origin, the paper reviews the specific efforts.By mapping potential positive and
remittance, philanthropy, human capital and negative influences of diasporas, the paper
policy influence contributions, both positive establishes why a more nuanced
and negative, that diasporas may make. Policy understanding of diasporas and peace and
implications include the need more conflict is so important to policy and practice
systematically to include considerations for a more peaceful world.
Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff is Professor of Public Administration and International Affairs at the George
Washington University, and co-Director of GW’s Diaspora Research Programme, a multidisciplinary research
programme on diasporas, identity, policy and development. She has advised and provided training on diaspora
engagement for a range of governments and institutions.
ISSN 1467-8802 print/ISSN 1478-1174 online/11/020115-29 q 2011 Conflict, Security and Development Group
DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2011.572453
116 Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff
Worldwide, conflicts abound1 and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

Development (OECD) member countries are spending billions of dollars for post-conflict
reconstruction and development.2 These conflicts produce many refugees and are the
cause for much migration.3 But what are the consequences of this migration, elective or
otherwise, for post-conflict stability and development? Are diasporas conflict
entrepreneurs, seeking to stimulate, support and sustain the conflict in their homelands?
Are they an additional competing interest in the reconstruction of war-torn societies,
further complicating legitimacy and political compromises? Or are they contributors to
stability, sustained peace and development? Nationalist and/or factionalist interests do not
necessarily translate into destructive contributions. The very affinity that may result in
supporting conflict, also lends itself to reconstruction and development. Particularly in

post-conflict scenarios, tapping the diaspora may at once be necessary and unavoidable,
given the drive among some diasporans to insert themselves into the rebuilding process.
Diasporas are immigrants who maintain a connection, psychological or material, to
their place of origin. Since diasporans may identify with a ‘homeland’ that does not
correspond to a country, it is sometimes more appropriate to refer to place of origin (PO)
as opposed to country of origin (COO). This is particularly so in conflict contexts where
state boundaries may be contested. Diasporans may create communities of identity, where
members reinforce in each other their links to the PO culture and associated values. Case
studies and anecdotal evidence support the notion that in diaspora, diasporans may
become more ‘national’ or ‘ethnic’ than their compatriots who remain in the PO.4
Analyses of the role of diasporas in security and conflict have concentrated on their
support for insurgencies and their contribution to political instability.5 These analyses
tend to essentialise diasporas, ignoring their varied composition and resulting motivations
and activities. A nascent but growing body of literature seeks to balance the scorecard by
focusing on diasporas’ potential contributions to peace, security and post-conflict
reconstruction.6 Much of this research tends to ignore the fact that diasporas are one of
many interest groups and do not necessarily merit privileging in the design of peace and
reconstruction policies and programmes. Following a more specific discussion of the state
of research concerning diasporas and conflict, for these contexts, this paper outlines
diaspora motivation; reviews diasporans’ potential engagements with the country of
origin, both positive and negative; and identifies policy implications. By mapping
potential positive and negative influences of diasporas, this paper establishes why a more
Diasporas and conflict societies 117
nuanced understanding of diasporas and peace and conflict is so important to policy and
practice for a more peaceful world.
Research on diasporas and conflict

This article is a partial response to weaknesses in the current research and understanding
of diasporas’ engagement in peace-building and conflict in their countries of origin. These
perceived weaknesses derive both from a survey analysis and a review of relevant research,
policy and practice.
A 2009 survey, conducted by the GW Diaspora Research Programme and the Nordic
Africa Institute, queried informed analysts, researchers, policy-makers and practitioners

regarding their perceptions of the current progress, data needs and new frontiers of
diaspora research, policy and practice.7 Of the seven pillars of diaspora engagement
identified (i.e., humanitarianism, development, economic investment, conflict/peace-
building, politics, knowledge transfer and cultural identity/diffusion), research, knowledge
and practice concerning diaspora engagement for peace-building and conflict were
assessed as the weakest. Specifically, respondents indicated current research in this area was
least capable to meaningfully inform policy-making.
Further analysis of the survey results, coupled with an analytic review of literature to
date, identified the following weaknesses of current research: not asking the right
questions, the absence of incentives to do so and the nature of diaspora research itself.
First, most of the disciplines that focus on diaspora studies tend not to emphasise related
policy and practice. Second, with relatively new subject-matter, lead journals and research
funders may be risk-averse, fearing jeopardising their reputations by supporting subjects
with limited corroborating literature. Finally, the range of issues demanding research
attention means that the little diaspora research that does occur gets spread very thin.
The resulting knowledge base concerning diaspora engagement is limited in its
generaliseability. It consists primarily of selected in-depth case studies, many of which are
narrowly focused and apply a range of methods, thus precluding effective comparative
study; a more limited number of similarly targeted survey research products—again for
selected case studies; and policy and project reports that are often inadequately informed
by the broader context of diaspora engagement research and experience (as indicated by
the perpetuation of assumptions and resulting biases). As many researchers have
traditionally emphasised commitment to a limited number of case studies over time, there
are few attempts to consolidate our knowledge from these cases—both from research and
practice, and our analyses too often result in reinventing the proverbial wheel.
This article assesses the bigger picture of diaspora engagement in conflict societies,
integrating and consolidating the findings of a range of case studies, project documents
and empirical practices and situating these in the broader theoretical literature concerning
diaspora engagement. The analysis is necessarily limited by the weakness of our state of
knowledge; therefore, rather than stating unequivocally what diasporas are expected to do,
this broad brush identifies their potential actions. The resulting framework can be used as
an assessment guide and a set of hypotheses for policy-makers and researchers respectively.
Diaspora interventions in peace and conflict: theory

and findings
Theory surrounding the role of diasporas in international affairs is nascent. Shain and
Barth use constructivism to investigate diasporans’ identities, motives and preferences;
and liberalism to explain their resulting actions.8 This paper adopts a similar approach.
Situating diasporas in the international relations theories most pertinent to diasporas and
PO conflict—international politics and security—is somewhat problematic.9 Adamson
explores how diasporas are challenging ‘traditional notions of national security’, blurring
the lines between internal and external security and institutions.10 Adamson and
Demetriou assert that the diaspora phenomenon is a function of both ‘non-state political
entrepreneurs’ and state elites, who may use the notion of diaspora to solicit support for
political, material or conflict agendas.11 In this sense, diasporans become important actors
in a ‘boomerang’ effect,12 whereby internal actors use diasporans to voice, promote and
engage what cannot be done within the borders of the COO.13
The international community recognises that sustained peace must account for the
interests of nationals who have left their geographic PO, whether they intend to return or
not. Depending on the nature of the conflict and the make-up of refugee and migration
waves, diasporas may reflect the very factions that led to conflict. Reconciliation may
necessitate their participation in peace-building and reconstruction. Once peace is
established, diasporans become essential from another perspective; they can make
significant contributions to post-conflict reconstruction and development. And their role
may be essential, especially since the track record of donor attention to the long haul of
post-conflict reconstruction is abysmal. In a study of 10 post-conflict countries a pattern
emerged wherein official development assistance spiked in the immediate aftermath,

gradually declined in the subsequent two years, and then fell sharply.14
For better or for worse, diasporans may intervene with direct activities in the PO, or
indirect ones targeted to mediating actors, such as country-of-residence (COR)
governments and international bodies.15 The most noticeable and commonly recognised
diaspora interventions in the PO include: economic remittances, philanthropy, human
capital and political influence, including international advocacy and participation in peace
processes. Even when diasporans are not acting out the most explicitly destructive roles as
conflict entrepreneurs and sustainers, each of the constructive contributions noted above
can have a darker side.
Table I summarises diasporans’ potential positive and negative contributions to PO

conflict, peace and reconstruction and development. The paucity of some categorical
entries should not be taken as an indication of relative importance. The findings are best
understood in the context of related diaspora motivations. Following a discussion of these,
each of the contributions will be discussed in turn.
Diaspora motivations when the homeland is in conflict

Diasporans may be more or less inclined to concern themselves with quality of life16 and
policies vis-à-vis their POs, making reference to a ‘homeland’ problematic. PO crisis—
including conflict—may inspire new or renewed interest among later diaspora
generations, as seen, for example, in Afghanistan.17 Alternatively, diasporans may rely
on their American identity when thoughts of their PO create psychic pain.18 Some argue
the higher the cost to status and security in their adopted country, the greater the
likelihood that the diaspora community as a whole will split and/or fail to mobilise.19
Duration of residence and degree of integration into the COR do not necessarily
determine diasporans’ engagement with the PO. Portes and Zhou argue assimilation may
be segmented, depending upon the opportunities and constraints established by earlier
generations.20 And there is some evidence to suggest that immigrants may embrace
whichever cultural identity (PO versus COR) is more quality of life enhancing.21Guarnizo
and Associates find that the longer a diasporan has been in the COR, the more likely s/he is
to be actively engaged vis-à-vis the PO.22
Diasporans mobilise, in part, to express their identities. The felt need to actively express
and mobilise identity may derive, in part, from various forms of marginalisation (social,
Table I. Map of potential diaspora contributions to peace and conflict1

120
Contribution Potential Positive Potential Negative
Economic Remittances Significant proportion of GDP, especially during Informal transfer systems can be used to support
conflict; may out pace ODA (e.g., Liberia 2007; continuing conflict (e.g., Kosovo).
Kosovo 1998 –1999).
Sustain livelihoods during conflict and providing Charitable contributions using informal systems
a foundation for future economic development may inadvertently support illicit trade, contributing
(e.g., Somalia). to continued violence (e.g., Afghanistan).

May support DDR by supporting alternative Informal systems may profit or be created by conflict
income generation (e.g., Liberia). entrepreneurs (e.g., Tamil rebels (LTTE) in Sri Lanka).
Create financial transfer systems for the above, For combatants, they can be more reliable and less
as well as for other external actors from the controlling of tactics and objectives than state-
international community (e.g., Afghanistan, supported insurgencies (e.g., LTTE, Kurdish guerillas
Liberia, Somalia). in Turkey and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation).
May be transformed from subsistence to May explicitly call for and support factional violence
investment as the conflict subsides (e.g., Liberia). (e.g., Somalia).
Often a sustained source of support for the Proportional advantage of influencing the homeland
long-haul of reconstruction and owing to relatively greater access to wealth and
development, when donor commitments opportunity (e.g., Ethiopia, former Yugoslavia).
wane (e.g., Somalia).
Diasporans are not subject to the consequences of
their financial contributions (e.g., former Yugoslavia,
Sri Lanka).
Insurgency groups may target diasporans for
manipulation and extortion (e.g., Tamils in Canada,
Kurds in Germany).
Allows fungibility of resources that can be applied
to promote or participate in conflict.
Philanthropy Can focus diasporans’ support, making it Can provide a cover for political or conflict
more constructively strategic (e.g., Sudan, objectives, and sometimes mislead contributors
Somalia). (e.g., Tamil organisations and tsunami relief,
Hamas in Lebanon, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt).
Can become a bridge of reconciliation within Can be selective and discriminatory, potentially
diasporas (e.g., Sudan). exacerbating local conflicts (e.g., Somalia).
Can reduce dependencies and create new
opportunities and hope for PO residents
(e.g., Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia).
May represent a significant resource for
needed humanitarian assistance (e.g., Liberia,
Haiti, Somalia, Afghanistan).
Can contribute short- and long-term knowledge
transfer (e.g., Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan).
Informal organisations and efforts may be flexible,
enabling more people to participate (e.g.,
Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia).
May create important intermediaries between
traditional actors, local communities and
diasporas (e.g., Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia).
May demonstrate replicable innovation or efforts
that can be formalized and extended (e.g.,
Afghanistan, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan).
Human Capital May be essential for reconstruction and Can introduce tensions and resentments that retard
development, e.g., for re-staffing government reconstruction or stimulate renewed or re-emerging
Diasporas and conflict societies
and development programmes (e.g., conflict (e.g., Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Afghanistan, Armenia, Iraq, Liberia, DRC, Liberia).
121
Palestinian territories, Somalia).

Table I—continued
122
Contribution Potential Positive Potential Negative
Brings entrepreneurism, knowledge, skills and May create a new political elite and give rise to new
networks (Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Somalia). political tensions (e.g., Iraq, Liberia, Ukraine).
Can replicate pre-conflict stratification of skills,
class, opportunities, and resources (e.g., Afghanistan).
May introduce new tensions between those who

stayed and endured and those who ‘lived comfortably’
(e.g., Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina).
‘Helper’ mentality, possible overestimation of COO
knowledge, and arrogance may create tensions
(e.g., Afghanistan, DRC).
May be an important source for combatant
recruitment (e.g., Kosovo).
Policy/Attitudinal Influence May influence international political opinion May support partisan agendas that will exclude important
for the protection of human rights and groups and stakeholders, fomenting continuing tensions and
political freedoms (e.g., Afghanistan, Copts in possibly conflict; resulting peace agreements may yield further
Egypt, Croatia). exclusion, sowing the seeds for conflict in the future
(e.g., Sikhs, Hindus).
May ‘humanise’COR foreign policy (e.g., The rhetoric of liberal values can be used
Egypt, former Yugoslavia). instrumentally and may mask partisan and exclusive
agendas (e.g., Sri Lanka).
Can yield deeper commitments to development May influence COO politics in ways that sustain
assistance and meeting the MDGs (e.g., Armenia). divisive agendas (e.g., Hindus and Sikhs).
Moderate, bridging groups may emerge to counter Influence may be disproportionate owing to access to
extremist agendas both in the PO and within the wealth and opportunities, potentially skewing
diaspora (e.g., Sudan Civil Society Forum, political elections with results diasporans are not
Somalia). subject to (e.g., Croatian diaspora).
Can support the legitimacy of post-conflict May lobby for policies that hinder sustainable
governments (e.g., Afghanistan, Liberia). peace, sometimes unwittingly (e.g., Kenya, Ethiopia).
May promote reconciliation in the diaspora as a Can lobby based on continued grievance,
demonstration to support reconciliation in the discouraging actors from engaging in peace
COO (e.g., Ethiopia, India, Somalia, Sudan negotiations (e.g., Kosovo, Irish diaspora, Tamil
Civil Society Forum). diaspora).
Can fund and organise cultural mechanisms
specific to conflict resolution (e.g., Somalia).
Can support peace negotiations:
† Locating and communicating with warring
parties, connecting them to international
mediators
† Encouraging them to participate
† Supporting implementation
† Lobbying COR governments to mediate
and support negotiations and implementation
† Inspiring trust in the process
† Providing insight into the conflict and actors
† Suggesting components to peace agreements
† Directly mediating among conflicting parties
(e.g., Afghanistan, Burundi, Darfur, Nepal,
Somalia, Sudan)
Diasporas and conflict societies
1
Cited examples are illustrative only and are limited to examples from cited sources.
123
economic, political or psychic), confusion and a sense that the PO identity will be lost
without proactive expression, or simply in response to social reinforcement and perhaps
pride.23 Some may be motivated by a sense of obligation or guilt, as they seek to reconcile
their preference for the adopted country with their allegiance to a suffering PO.24 Episodic
conflict in the PO can serve to sustain a mobilised collective identity.25 Diasporans may
also ‘harbour grievance’ much longer than COO residents.26 On the other hand, absent a
direct impact from the conflict, and given access to alternative information sources, some
may change their initial orientations towards the PO conflict.27
Diasporans frequently adopt hybrid identities that combine features of the PO and civic
and cultural values of the COR society.28 Hybrid identities inform political considerations
and action agendas vis-à-vis the PO, whether they pertain to potential conflict within the
PO and/or among sub-groups of its society, or human rights, quality of life or partisan
political agendas. For some, liberal values give rise to a belief in basic freedoms and
psychological empowerment, reflecting a belief that these diasporans can effectively work to
advance, protect and embody these rights for themselves and potentially the PO.29Koinova
suggests that the rhetoric of liberal values may also reflect an instrumentalist agenda on the
part of diaspora organisations seeking to reinforce their sovereignty aims vis-à-vis the PO.30
When a diasporas’ PO is embroiled in conflict, for some, PO identity can increase stress
and a sense of marginalisation in the COR.31 The effect is compounded when the diaspora
is a result of forced migration. Efforts to proactively promote and recreate particular origin
identities may be more acute in the absence of a physical homeland;32 under these
circumstances, diasporans may maintain stronger links with their compatriots in the PO.33
Assessing the merits of resulting diaspora contributions is necessarily subjective. As is so
often heard, one person’s terrorist is another one’s freedom fighter. For some, migration is
a tactic intended to enable political influence or even armed mobilisation targeted to the
PO. As Koslowski notes, sometimes exit is necessary in order to have a voice in the politics
of one’s country.34
Beyond identity expression, diasporans may be more explicitly self-interested. They may
mobilise to maintain and acquire power resources, such as: economic, social (social status
based on social roles or on complying with socially valued criteria), political (ability to
influence the exercise of authority), moral (perceived legitimacy of actions), informational
and physical (i.e., coercion or violence, depending on perceived legitimacy of applied
physical force) resources.35 They may intervene to protect their quality of life in the
adopted country. Deriving from cultural obligations, diasporans face a great deal of social
pressure from family and home communities to continue to provide financial and other
forms of support.36 For example, on Somalinet, an online discussion forum of the Somali
diaspora, members seek to reconcile their preference for the adopted country with their
allegiance to a suffering PO, with all the guilt and self-interest (e.g., PEACE & Your
POCKET: Good for your $$$$) this may entail.37
To summarise, diasporas form around shared identity constructs associated with the
PO. Diasporans’ intervention in the PO depends on interests and obligations rooted in the
COR as well as the PO. However, the degree of a diasporan’s integration into the COR
society is not the sole determinant of whether or not or the extent to which one engages on
behalf of the PO. Motivations to influence or contribute (constructively or destructively)
to the PO include socio-cultural obligations, guilt and grievance; and power, influence and
violence that may have even inspired migration. For some, PO conflict and humanitarian
emergencies inspire new or renewed interest and action on behalf of the PO; for others, the
resulting psychic pain can lead diasporans to seek further integration into the COR society.
Diasporans may feel compelled to express their PO identity and engage in related activities
due to a sense of marginalisation in the COR society, rooted in a psychological need to be a
part of a collective identity. Diasporan collective identities may combine features of both
the PO and COR cultures, including liberal values that may inform agendas vis-à-vis the
PO. Diasporans also may mobilise to influence the PO in order to acquire power resources,
and these behaviors may manifest in a range of actions, from violence to meaningful
contributions to peace, stability and quality of life. Finally, diasporans may have an interest
in promoting peace, stability and development in the PO in order to reduce PO family and
community dependencies.
Diaspora interventions in peace and conflict

Following is a detailed discussion of current knowledge of diasporas’ potential
contributions to conflict societies, including remittances, philanthropy, human capital
and policy/attitudinal influence.
Remittances
Remittances significantly outpace global overseas development assistance.38Beyond their

impressive volume, less studied and understood are their impacts in countries embroiled
in or recovering from conflict. That remittances are essential to sustaining livelihoods
during conflict is well known. According to the OECD, in 2007, remittances to Liberia
equaled its GDP;39during Kosovo’s civil war (1998 – 99), remittances accounted for 45 per
cent of annual domestic revenues.40 However, their contribution to peace-building,
reconstruction and post-conflict development requires more research and analysis.
Remittances ‘alter the local balance of economic, political and military power’.41
By sustaining livelihoods and basic services during conflict, diaspora remittances may
represent a foundation upon which peace and development can be expanded. In Somalia,
remittances support 40 per cent of urban household incomes42 and have: driven the
development of financial service mechanisms and communication technologies,43
expanded trade,44 and supported education investments throughout Somalia’s long
conflict.45 Importantly, remittances may be the only factor preventing disarmed and
demobilised combatants from re-engaging in violence, especially when jobs may be scarce
in the immediate aftermath of conflict.46 During conflict, diasporans may not question the
need for remittances; but as the PO transitions towards peace, they may be more likely to
ask for justifications for requests and to evaluate each one accordingly.47
Since conflict countries have hampered or nonexistent institutions, most financial
transfers occur through the informal sector. These systems are often important conduits for
external actors—including businesses and development agencies. They can be used to
promote quality of life and economic growth just as easily as they might support violence.
Resources that travel through these systems—even if intended for household/family
remittances, philanthropy or investment—support the purchase of material goods that
are transferred, and these may include weapons. Profits through the system may also
support conflict entrepreneurs. Hawaladars (informal money transferers) who are
themselves conflict entrepreneurs may also arise.
Byman and Associates contend diasporas are likely to become a growing concern for
their support to insurgencies as they are more reliable funding sources than states and,
unlike states, they do not seek to control insurgencies, only to support them.48 Diaspora
resources may at least partially replace the funds previously accessible through Cold War
politics.49 In the 74 active insurgencies between 1991 and 2001, Byman and Associates
found refugees to account for 21 per cent of outside support, and diasporas (immigrants
who are settled in foreign countries) to account for 19 per cent of such assistance.50 For
example, the Kosovo Liberation Army established an international ‘Homeland Calling’
fund.51 Horst’s study of Norway-based Somalis revealed that during the course of a single
conflict, money raised from the diaspora could range from $500,000 at the lowest sub-clan
levels, to as high as $5 million at the clan level.52 Collier’s and Hoeffler’s initial findings are
no surprise then: after five years of post-conflict peace, the presence of a large diaspora
increases the likelihood of renewed conflict in the COO sixfold.53 The initial Collier-
Hoeffler model suggests the reasons are financial.54 Diasporans’ frequent residency in
relatively wealthier societies than the PO, inclusive of income earning opportunities, gives
them a proportional advantage in supporting their policy agendas of choice,55 which may
include initiating, fomenting continued or renewing violence. Furthermore, diasporans
are not directly subject to the consequences of their influence in the COO,56 including the
immediate costs of conflict.
While in some cases they may initiate insurgency support, diasporans also have become
targets of manipulation and solicitation from PO insurgents. In some cases, they even may
be coerced into supporting continuing conflict, as has been documented among the Tamil
diaspora in Canada,57 and the Kurds in Germany.58 By contributing to PO-oriented
charities diasporans may unwittingly support conflict in the PO. As a result, some of these
charities have been placed on terrorist watchlists, disbanded and/or had their assets frozen.
Disasters may at once inspire diaspora charitable giving and provide opportunities for
insurgency fundraising. Tamil organisations collecting money for tsunami relief are
thought to have used the resources to acquire weapons for the LTTE.59
Diaspora remittances can be significant to both peace and conflict. As Horst notes, even
when they are not supporting violence, they are ‘part of a larger economy of war’.60Their
significance in determining outcomes depends on the specific context of that war.
Regardless of surface impressions, assessing the intentions of remitters is subjective and
highly complex, as the examples of charity conduits attest. Horst provides an opposite
example, where a seemingly obvious attempt to support violence actually may have been
meant to support peace.61 One of her research subjects confirmed that his Somali sub-clan
purchased three armoured vehicles with the support of diaspora remittances. The context
he described included a nearby clan, better equipped than the remitter’s sub-clan, who had
threatened an attack. In the end, this attack never materialised. Acccording to Horst, the
remitter saw this as a consequence of the armoured vehicle purchase, ‘so rather than seeing
this purchase as contributing to conflict, he actually perceived it as crucial in guaranteeing
stability’.62
The ultimate impact of remittances depends not only on the senders’ intentions, but on
recipients’ as well. Remittances provide for fungibility. By potentially freeing up other
resources, they enable recipients to engage in additional activities and investments, which
may include promoting or participating in conflict.
Philanthropy
In war-torn societies, the motives for diaspora philanthropy may be solely philanthropic,
combined with aspirations for peace, or provide a cover for political and conflict objectives
(as above). Salih Kaki from the Sudan Civil Society Forum explains diaspora philanthropy
for peace as progress on a learning curve. She confirms why diasporas remain politically
involved in their war-torn POs—they identify themselves as ‘victims of the politics back
home’—and suggests that tactics may be changing as diasporas gain a better understanding
of how to meet their ultimate objectives:‘it is our realisation now that as diaspora we can be
more effective in promoting peace in our homeland if we stop relating to the situation back
home mainly through political channels’.63 Similarly, some Somali diasporans have come
to believe humanitarian or development support to their PO is the best or the only way to
support lasting peace and stability,64 including ‘productive investments that create a new
middle class with clear interests in peace or [ . . . ] focusing on educating the new
generation into a different mindset while creating opportunities for them’.65
Challenging conditions in the PO may foster greater philanthropic interest within the
diaspora. In response to traditional humanitarian need, one Pakistani diaspora organisation
in Britain raised $25 million for relief in the aftermath of the 2005 Kashmir earthquake.66 PO
crisis may also inspire renewed interest among later diaspora generations. For example, the
end of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan spawned the creation of new diaspora
organisations to support its reconstruction,67 and mobilised many second generation
Afghan-Americans for the first time.68 Some support may derive from small-scale, informal
efforts. After conflict a proportion of financial remittances may be transitioned to
remittances in-kind in order to support humanitarian aims, seed microenterprises or
pursue rebuilding and development projects, in part to reduce dependencies.69
Diaspora philanthropy organisations can provide simple and flexible ways for diasporans
to contribute skills and resources to philanthropic efforts. Afghans4Tomorrow is a vehicle
for members of the Afghan-American diaspora to take leave and vacation time from their
jobs in order to go to Afghanistan and make contributions of time, energy and expertise to
the rebuilding effort.70 Especially important in fragile contexts, these organisations can act
as intermediaries between traditional development actors and diasporas and local
communities, for example, identifying needs and priorities of local communities and
communicating those to donor organisations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and diasporans to solicit funding and expertise; and diaspora organisations may
demonstrate innovative programmes and approaches that can be replicated and/or used to
advocate for traditional actor administrative and programmatic efforts and reforms.71 For
example, Somali women in Mogadishu organised an education and livelihood project for
young combatants. The project was financially adopted by diaspora Somalis in Norway.
After raising approximately $10,000 and engaging in significant lobbying to government
agencies and NGOs, the Norwegian Government began funding the project.72 Smaller, ad
hoc, efforts include ‘Edward’ who provided $800 to rebuild the road and three bridges
connecting his home village in Liberia to Monrovia. He subsequently provided an

additional $500 for chainsaws and training to start a lumber business.73
Diaspora philanthropy can be used as a tool to advance political and conflict agendas.
Diasporans may use philanthropy to seek political office. For example, prior to the 2005
Liberian Presidential election, several of the diasporan candidates founded their own
nonprofits, including those aimed at supporting orphanages, schools and training and
microenterprise. Conflict entrepreneurs may combine violent and non-violent tactics as they
seek to tap the resources of transnational networks,74 as demonstrated by some transnational
charities that ultimately support networks for violence. Examples of mixed tactics include
Hamas in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Individual diasporans may also
use philanthropy to enhance their reputations and connections in the PO.
Diaspora philanthropy can also have unintended consequences. It can be selective and
discriminatory in its application, both regionally and among demographic groups, hence
exacerbating conflict. In Somalia, the unequal distribution of resources is an important
structural factor in conflict. Though support may be intended to create stability, it may
actually provide greater fodder for conflict.75 Even in peaceful times, remittances and
philanthropy can be polarising.76
Human capital77
Diaspora populations are one of the most fruitful sources for human capital for
reconstruction and development. Human capital contributions may take the form of
repatriation or shorter-term philanthropic support. Diaspora human capital is often
necessary to staff and re-staff government and development programmes. For example, in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the filling of specific government and development positions is/was
solicited from among diasporans with the requisite expertise; similar recruitment occurred
in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.78 International organisations and their
contractors look to diaspora populations to staff their reconstruction projects and
programmes.79 Through the private sector, diasporans bring their entrepreneurism,
knowledge and skills, sometimes as the first to invest in post-conflict countries, whether
due to perceived ethnic advantage, a more informed risk analysis or altruism.80
Furthermore, diasporans can combine cultural/language knowledge and local networks
with skills, knowledge and networks from abroad.
Migrants are more likely to return (permanently or temporarily) if they have permanent
legal status in the COR, which is particularly important in post-conflict situations where
residential standing may be based on temporary legal status. If diasporans knew they could
come and go with impunity, they might be more inclined to investigate options for return,
as well as support from abroad. Interestingly, Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
lobbied the US Government to grant permanent residence to the many Liberians residing
there, or at least to extend their Temporary Protective Status. Permanent return may not be
necessary or realistic; for many diasporans, temporary, virtual and circular options may be
more palatable and welcomed options.
Diaspora participation may be essential for the expertise that is needed, but may also
pose challenges to security and legitimacy. Resulting tensions and resentments can retard
reconstruction or, at worst, stimulate continued or re-emerging conflict. A review of post-
conflict state-building confirms that the repatriation of diasporans can lead to the
emergence of a new political elite, which can give rise to new political tensions.81
Diasporans’ presence alone can reintroduce and/or worsen existing ethnic tension,
potentially replicating pre-conflict stratification of skills and class, and consequent
opportunity and resources. Those who return can introduce new divisions and
resentments among those who stayed and endured and those who enjoyed perceived
luxuries while others suffered.82 New inequities may also be introduced through incentive
payments for repatriation or temporary skills transfer.83 Returning diasporans (temporary
or longer-term) may also inspire resentments simply by virtue of a ‘helper’ mentality,
which can be perceived as condescension. Diasporans’ perceived relationship to the PO
may inspire hubris, with inaccurate assumptions about local culture and systems.
Depending on the length of their separation from the PO, they may be more or less
effective at navigating political and cultural systems and reading associated cues.
Of perhaps greater concern are diaspora activities that may directly and more
immediately impact conflict. Most notably, diasporas are an important source of
combatant recruitment. Among the better known examples are the efforts of the Kosovo
Liberation Army to recruit from the diaspora.84
Policy/attitudinal influence
Diaspora communities may be explicitly maintained and mobilised for the purpose of
influencing international public opinion and building political support for human rights
and political freedoms and also for particular partisan agendas. Those who reside in
relatively open and democratic societies can capitalise on newfound freedoms to do so.85
One of the largest contributions diasporas make to insurgencies is through diplomatic

pressures.86 Sometimes the seemingly simple aim of keeping the ethnic identity alive
combines with more political aims to create and sustain an ethnic homeland.87
Shain contends that diasporas can both ‘humanise’ and ‘Americanise’ US foreign policy,
combating isolationist tendencies, on the grounds of American values of freedom and
democracy.88 In doing so, they can contribute meaningfully to the quality of life in their
POs (e.g., through lobbying for foreign assistance and/or informing policy and
programmes). For example, diaspora lobbying has increased US foreign assistance to
COOs and is rumoured to lead to their selection for specialised aid programming.
Diaspora advocacy also highlights human rights abuses and seeks to engage the US
Government in negotiations with COO governments.89
Assessing the potential opportunity or risk of diaspora advocacy efforts can be
challenging. Sometimes partisan interests are at play under the guise of inclusive and
democratic platforms.90 As interest groups, diaspora nationalist movements can
influence COO politics, fostering instability and supporting continuing conflict, as
documented, for example, among Sikhs and Hindus in diaspora.91 Even when one
subset of a diaspora promotes an extremist agenda in the COO, another subset may
arise to counter it.92
Diasporas are important political constituents in COO political processes, including
post-conflict constitutional processes. For example, significant efforts were made to
include the Afghan diaspora, primarily in Germany and North America, in the drafting of
the Afghanistan Constitution in 2002; broad participation from the diaspora also was
sought for providing feedback on the draft.93 Diasporas as interest groups can assist in
reconstituting legitimacy for post-conflict governments. Campaigning for the 2005

Liberian elections was probably more intense in the United States than in Liberia itself.94
Through $4 million in contributions to Franjo Tudjman’s campaign the Croatian diaspora
earned 12 of the 120 parliamentary seats.95
Diasporas also advocate for peace. In diaspora, ethnic groups who share a
geographically defined homeland may mobilise around a unified diaspora identity in
order to promote peace in their POs. For example, the Sudanese diaspora in Europe
organised across ethnic lines for a peace tour to demonstrate that peace across ethnic lines
and based on an overarching Sudanese identity is possible. Such efforts create multiple
loyalties and mutual dependencies, and these new identities increase the degree of trust
across category boundaries. The Somali96 and US-based Ethiopian diasporas have also
pursued reconciliation within the diaspora, in the latter case with the assistance of a
facilitator.97 In Somalia, in addition to conflict, diaspora remittances support cultural
mechanisms specific to conflict resolution.98 On the other hand, diaspora direct
participation in conflict resolution in the COO can inadvertently lead to disastrous
outcomes when potentially ‘out of touch’ diasporans lobby for policies that hinder
sustainable peace, for example, focusing on retribution and blame.
Diasporas can make meaningful contributions to peace negotiations.99 They can assist
mediators to locate warring parties;100 they may pressure these groups and leaders to
participate in peace negotiations; and they may lobby the governments in their countries
of residence to engage in and/or facilitate negotiations, as in the case of Ireland.101
Diaspora participation can inspire trust and confidence for conflicting groups and
international facilitators alike, in part, by providing insights into the conflict and the
actors.102 In both Darfur and Nepal, diaspora networks issued joint statements identifying
possible options for inclusion in peace agreements; in Burundi and Sudan, diasporas have
supported the implementation of peace agreements.103 Diasporans may participate in
third-party mediation, albeit not as entirely neutral parties.104 This was the case, for
example, for Somalia and Afghanistan,105 and Ugandans in London.106
Policy implications
A range of contingencies should be considered when assessing diasporans’ contributions—
positive and negative—to COO peace, conflict and reconstruction. As a starting point, it is
imperative that diasporas are understood not as a monolithic actor with unwavering
exclusive interests. The same diaspora has potential to make a range of contributions to the
COO—constructive, destructive, as well as unintended. Assuming, as some of the
literature does, that conflict-generated diasporas are likely or even will engage in conflict
generating behaviour in the COO solely by virtue of the fact that they have experienced
trauma,107 ignores the importance of opportunity structures to engage, varied motives and
considerations concerning quality of life in the place of residence, and the possibility that
extreme trauma may be as likely to discourage conflict-promoting behaviour as to
encourage it owing to conflict fatigue. The Irish-American diaspora demonstrates the
extent to which interests within a diaspora can be highly varied and even the most
intransigent may change over time.108
Understanding and responding to diasporans’ potential roles as conflict interest groups

and entrepreneurs requires attention to the COR society as well.109 The COR policy
environment can produce incentives and disincentives for diaspora participation in both
peace and conflict. Structural integration is likely more important to prevent diaspora
participation in COO conflict than is social integration.110 By extension, COR policy-
makers can focus on welcoming diaspora identity expression, and encouraging skill
building and utilisation of the tools of mobilisation that are consistent with liberal values,
as reflected in formal mechanisms available in the COR.111
Bigombe and Associates conclude their discussion of policies for building post-conflict
peace with a recommendation to enforce new legislation to regulate diaspora
organisations, as they note, ‘the successful management of the behaviour of the diaspora
may contribute more to peace than any other policy intervention’.112 What this
‘management of behaviour’ might look like is left unspecified, and the very notion raises
important considerations of how such management can contribute to trust-building and
enhance psychological identification with the COR society, including the liberal values it
may represent. What incentives would such managed diasporans have, for example, to
partner with the COR government in its efforts to contribute to peace and reconciliation
and post-conflict reconstruction and development? Adamson confirms the risk that
linking migration and security may lead states to over-react. As an example, she points to
‘the negative impact that surveillance activities have had on alienating Muslims and other
populations within the United States’.113
Diaspora contributions are subject to interpretation and may yield unintended
consequences. As noted above, one person’s terrorist is another one’s freedom fighter.
Some groups may claim to be working for peace yet be perceived as fomenting conflict.114
With respect to remittances, their importance in supporting conflict depends on the

broader war economy, and the intentions of remittance-sending diasporans cannot be
gauged even when they seem obvious on the surface, as seen with charity on the one hand
and the purchase of military equipment on the other. Regarding philanthropy, we know it
can be used as a means to enhance reputation and connections to the PO, including for
those who are seeking political office; the potential impacts, positive or negative cannot be
assumed.
Human capital contributions may require facilitating conditions, such as permanent
legal status in the COR, and may require crafting temporary, virtual or circular options.
Policy-makers need to consider the tradeoffs between expertise and ethnic representation
in re-staffing government in order to avoid creating or continuing class and ethnic

tensions; and need to take care that incentive payments for return and knowledge transfer
avoid or at least minimise introducing new tensions. Policies and programmes should
also consider that those with desired technical skills may no longer be knowledgeable
about COO conditions and may be unlikely to participate given their lifestyles in the
COR.
With respect to political and attitudinal influence, sometimes keeping the PO alive
may contribute to political and conflict aims even if this is not the intention of those
who engage in identity-related activities, and partisan aims can be hidden under the
guise of inclusive and democratic platforms. Diasporas are also divided in their political
agendas and moderate, bridging groups may emerge to counter extremist agendas.115
While diaspora participation in peace agreements and constitutional processes may be
necessary to ensure sustained peace and stability, diasporans may not know enough
about the COO and its conflict to understand the most peace-sustaining policy options.
To prevent continued destabilisation, diasporas should be included early in the
negotiation of peace agreements. While settlements would be more difficult to reach,
they might prove longer lasting, especially if accompanied by targeted public relations
campaigns in CORs.116
Many diaspora contributions occur without the intervention of third parties. Given
their potential importance, increasingly third parties, such as donors, COR governments
and NGOs, are creating policies and programmes to incentivise and enhance the
effectiveness of these contributions. Some areas of contribution may require more
intervention than others. Engaging diasporas in peace negotiations may require support,
first, to organise the diaspora and, then, to facilitate their own reconciliation. Third parties
may be required to ensure participating diaspora groups do not crowd out minority or
otherwise less powerful groups from within the diaspora. Third parties can also be helpful
in supporting the costs of repatriation, and especially for short- or long-term knowledge
transfer. NGOs can engage the diaspora business community to facilitate diaspora
investment and promote an enabling environment for business in fragile and conflict
countries.117 Such efforts can benefit from the support of donor organisations.118
Elsewhere, this author has elaborated a broader framework for an enabling environment to
support diaspora contributions to COO development.119
Conclusions
Collier’s and Hoeffler’s finding with respect to the presence of large diasporas and renewed
conflict in the COO has been used to support a myopic stereotype that diasporas are to be
feared, with policies developed accordingly.120 Despite the confirmation of their findings
in 2004, in 2008, Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom found surprisingly contradictory
results.121 Surprising, they note, because there is still significant evidence of diaspora
funding of COO conflict. Nevertheless, their more recent analysis finds that doubling the
size of diasporas may reduce the likelihood of conflict renewal from 40 per cent to 32.8 per
cent.122 The authors also find a strong relationship between per capita income at the end
of conflict and the likelihood of renewed conflict. They infer from these findings the need
for the international community to intervene more intensively in the post-conflict
economy.
These findings regarding post-conflict income suggest at least a partial explanation for
their findings with respect to diasporas. The very remittances that have heretofore been
assumed to support conflict may, in fact, be sustaining livelihoods in ways that better
prepare populations for peace. Diasporans, particularly those based in industrialised
countries such as the United States, may be well-poised to contribute to post-conflict
reconstruction, either in the form of investment, philanthropy and/or the transition from
sustenance remittances to the promotion of sustained autonomy.123
Collier’s and Hoeffler’s (and Söderbom’s) contradictory findings suggest a crucial need
for deeper analysis of diaspora COO engagement. Diasporas are not monolithic, and hold
the potential for a range of contributions that may be quite significant for both peace and
conflict. Beyond Adamson’s call for new, global strategies for managing transnational
security threats—including those posed by diasporas—the ‘complex, contradictory and
diffuse ways’ diasporas impact on peace and security more broadly need to be accounted
for in policies and programmes for peace, stability and post-conflict reconstruction and
development.124Many policy-makers do not really know what to make of diasporas and so
in addition to succumbing to exaggerated negative stereotypes, diasporas may be included
somewhat willy-nilly in discussions of policy options, but without much analysis or
acknowledgement of the complexity of the phenomenon.125This, despite early recognition
that conflict and its resolution cannot be understood using identity groups and nation
states as the sole units of analysis.126
Alternatively, considerations of diasporas may be left out of policy discussions
altogether. For example, in the OECD’s report, Concepts and Dilemmas of State Building
in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, diasporas are not mentioned even once.
According to the report, ‘fragility arises primarily from weaknesses in the dynamic
political process through which citizens’ expectations of the state and state expectations
of citizens are reconciled and brought into equilibrium with the state’s capacity to deliver
services’.127 Just as the diaspora phenomenon raises questions about traditional
conceptions of national security and the nation state, so, too, does it challenge our
conception of the social contract in modern times. Who is the state and who are its
citizens? Whose expectations from both perspectives need to be met in order to support
resilience? As the above discussion elaborates, diasporas can ease demands on the state as
well as seek to undermine or displace it. Because of their significant potential impact on
peace, security, reconstruction and development, it is shocking that frameworks for
international engagement in fragile, conflict and post-conflict states continue to ignore
them.
The potential contributions of diasporas to conflict, peace and post-conflict
reconstruction are varied and significant. While diasporas have been a factor in
stakeholder and conflict analyses for sometime, they have not been a major focus of
analyses for rebuilding and development, excepting the repatriation of refugees and
political and government leadership. In addition to diasporas’ negative contributions to
peace and security, this article has described the potential constructive contributions
diasporas make through remittances, philanthropy, human capital, and political/attitu-
dinal influence. Even these contributions are not without risk. The simple answer to this
paper’s title question is ‘yes’. Diasporas are at once conflict entrepreneurs, competing
interests and contributors to peace and development. Diasporas are extremely
heterogenous both in terms of their perceptions and constructions of PO identity, their
relative interest in the PO and the directions of that interest (including constructive or
destructive). Careful analyses of these communities, their resources, power and interests
are necessary not only to capitalise on potential advantages but also to mitigate risks.
Accordingly, we need to develop better analytic frameworks for accounting for
diasporas’ potential contributions (positive and negative) generally, and with respect to
specific COO conflicts. Policy-makers can already begin to consider the more complete
range of potential diaspora contributions drawing on research to date, including the
findings summarised in Table I. A better understanding of diasporas’ potential
contributions—particularly on a country-by-country and diaspora-by-diaspora basis—
will enable post-conflict governments and the international community to know when it
may be appropriate to support extant diaspora efforts and when simply to get out of the
way. For example, remittances to war-torn societies and the informal systems that support
them may require some security oversight but their support to maintaining livelihoods,
disarmament and demobilisation, and setting the stage for post-conflict reconstruction
suggests these systems should not be unduly harassed. In some cases, beyond facilitating
diaspora contributions, it may be prudent for post-conflict governments and development
actors to more proactively partner with diaspora groups and organisations. These
organisations can provide important intermediary functions for peace negotiations and
constitutional processes, and for linking development needs and investment opportunities
to qualified and interested diasporans.
Diasporans represent a range of motivations and associated behaviour vis-à-vis the
COO. They are not necessarily subject to the direct consequences of their behaviours. And
in some instances their intentions may be politically motivated and/or divisive and conflict
inspiring/sustaining. Even well-intended constructive contributions may yield unintended
consequences. The extent of their influence may be disproportionate to local decision-
making processes owing to their relative access to wealth and opportunities. In short,
diasporas are one interest group among many who seek to influence local conditions and
should not necessarily be privileged in the design of policies and programmes for conflict,
reconstruction and development.
Peace-building requires both material and attitudinal contributions of both local and
external actors over the long haul.128Diasporas’ participation in these processes is
necessary to negotiating sustained peace, laying the groundwork for post-conflict
reconstruction and sustaining the resources (material, skills and knowledge, and
international influence) necessary to long-term recovery and development. They are

neither exclusively saints nor sinners but their significance to these processes and
outcomes cannot be ignored.
Endnotes
1. Since the end of World War II, 236 armed conflicts have 8. Shain and Barth, ‘Diasporas and International
been recorded worldwide, with 126 of those occurring Relations Theory’.
since the end of the Cold War alone (Harbom et al., 9. See Koslowski, ‘International Migration and the
‘Dyadic Dimensions’). In 2007, 34 of these conflicts Globalization of Domestic Politics’.
were active. From 2002 to 2007 alone, 118 non-state 10. Adamson, ‘Globalization’, 32.
conflicts occurred; these are conflicts involving rebel 11. Adamson and Demetriou, ‘Remapping the Boundaries’.
groups, or ethnic and/or religious communities. 12. Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders.
2. According to the OECD, in 2007 member countries 13. See Lyons, ‘Conflict-Generated Diasporas’ on Ethiopia;
spent $37.2 billion on 48 fragile and conflict-affected and Koinova, ‘Can Conflict-Generated Diasporas be
states, with 50 per cent of that reaching only five Moderate Actors’ on Lebanon.
countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, and 14. Schwartz et al., ‘The Private Sector’s Role’.
Sudan) (OECD, ‘Ensuring Fragile States’, 2). 15. See Ostergaard-Nielsen, ‘The Politics of Migrants’
3. By the end of 2007, conflicts had generated over 14 Transnational Political Practices’; Horst, ‘The Transna-
million refugees and asylum seekers and 21 million tional Political Engagements of Refugees’.
internally displaced people; worldwide, over 8.5 million 16. I use the phrase quality of life to refer to the typical
refugees have been warehoused for 10 years or more outcomes of economic development. This may include
(USCR, World Refugee Survey). In the United States but not be limited to supporting basic needs as well as
alone, between 1980 and 2007, over 2.3 million refugees improving important development outcomes such as
arrived (USOIS, 2007 Yearbook). health and education.
4. See, for example, Brinkerhoff, Digital Diasporas. 17. See Kerlin, ‘Organizational Responses’; Brinkerhoff,
5. See, for example, Byman et al., Trends in Outside ‘Digital Diasporas and International Development’.
Support; King and Melvin, ‘Diaspora Politics’; Cohen, 18. Friedman, Cultural Identity.
‘Diasporas and the Nation State’. 19. See Esman, ‘Diasporas and International Relations’.
6. For an overview, see Brinkerhoff, Diasporas and 20. Portes and Zhou, ‘The New Second Generation’.
Development. 21. See, for example, Waters, Black Identities.
7. Brinkerhoff and Riddle, ‘Diaspora Research, Policy, and 22. Guarnizo et al., ‘Assimilation and Transnationalism’.
Practice’. The online survey (15 September – 15 23. Brinkerhoff, Digital Diasporas.
November 2008) was accessed by over 106 individuals, 24. See Brinkerhoff, ‘Digital Diasporas and Conflict
not all of whom completed the entire survey. We Prevention’.
solicited participation through the GW Diaspora 25. Koinova, ‘Can Conflict-Generated Diasporas be
Research Programme listserv; authors publishing in Moderate Actors’.
Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies since its 26. Bigombe et al., ‘Policies for Building Post-Conflict Peace’,
inception; invitations and dissemination requests to 333; see also Lyons, ‘Conflict-Generated Diasporas’.
key personnel from research institutes with pro- 27. Baser and Swain, ‘Diasporas as Peacemakers’.
grammes related to diasporas and development, across 28. Brinkerhoff, Digital Diasporas.
the United States, Europe and Canada; and through a 29. Ibid.
snowball sample. Approximately 73 per cent of 30. Koinova, ‘Can Conflict-Generated Diasporas be
respondents were based in developed countries, almost Moderate Actors’; see also Shain, Marketing the
evenly split between North America (mostly the United American Creed Abroad.
States) and Europe; of the approximately 27 per cent of 31. See, for example, Esman, ‘Diasporas and International
respondents from developing countries, 20 developing Relations’; Cohen, ‘Diasporas and the Nation-State’.
countries were represented. Given the sample size, we 32. See Koslowski, ‘International Migration and the
cannot assume that the findings are reliable; they are Globalization of Domestic Politics’.
nevertheless suggestive of a knowledgeable population. 33. Sheffer, Diaspora Politics.
34. Koslowski, ‘International Migration and the Globaliza- 68. Brinkerhoff, ‘Digital Diasporas and International
tion of Domestic Politics’. Development’.
35. Uphoff, ‘Analytical Issues in Measuring Empowerment’. 69. See Lubkemann, ‘Remittance Relief ’.
36. Hammond, ‘Obliged to Give’. 70. Brinkerhoff, ‘Digital Diasporas and International
37. Brinkerhoff, ‘Digital Diasporas and Conflict Prevention’. Development’.
38. See World Bank, Global Economic Prospects; IFAD, 71. Ibid.; Brinkerhoff, ‘Diaspora Philanthropy’.
Sending Money Home. 72. Horst, ‘The Transnational Political Engagements of
39. OECD, ‘Ensuring Fragile States’. Refugees’.
40. Demmers, ‘New Wars and Diasporas’. 73. Lubkemann, ‘Remittance Relief ’.
41. Horst, ‘The Transnational Political Engagements of 74. Adamson, ‘Globalization’.
Refugees’, 320. 75. Horst and Gaas, ‘Diaspora Organizations from the
42. Kulaksiz and Purdekova, ‘Somali Remittance Sector’. Horn of Africa’.
43. Maimbo et al., ‘Financial Sector Development in 76. See for example, Gardner, Global Migrants, Local Lives.
Somalia’. 77. Portions of this section draw from Brinkerhoff,
44. Nenova and Harford, ‘Anarchy and Invention’. ‘Exploring the Role of Diasporas in Rebuilding
45. Lindley, ‘The Influence of Migration’. Governance’.

46. See Lubkemann, ‘Remittance Relief ’. 78. See, for example, King and Melvin, ‘Diaspora Politics’.
47. See Ibid. on Liberia. 79. See, for example, Brinkerhoff and Taddesse, ‘Recruiting
48. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support. Notable cases from the Diaspora’.
include support to the Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka, 80. See Gillespie et al., ‘Palestinian Interest in Homeland
Kurdish guerrillas in Turkey, and the Palestinian Investment’.
Liberation Organisation. The Irish Republican Army 81. Chesterman et al., Making States Work.
is a well-known demonstration of diasporas’ role in 82. See, for example, IOM, World Migration 2005.
sustaining conflict. 83. See, for example, Black, ‘Return and Reconstruction in
49. Adamson, ‘Globalization’. Bosnia-Herzegovina’.
50. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support. 84. See, for example, Adamson, ‘Crossing Borders’.
51. Adamson, ‘Globalization’; ‘Crossing Borders’. 85. Wayland, ‘Ethnonationalist Networks’; Koslowski,
52. Horst, ‘The Transnational Political Engagements of ‘International Migration and the Globalization of
Refugees’. Domestic Politics’.
53. Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievances in Civil 86. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support.
War’; Collier et al., ‘Post Conflict Risks’, revisits these 87. On the Kurds, see Koslowski, ‘International Migration
findings. and the Globalization of Domestic Politics’.
54. Bigombe et al., ‘Policies for Building Post-Conflict 88. Shain, Marketing the American Creed Abroad.
Peace’. 89. See Brainard and Brinkerhoff, ‘Sovereignty Under
55. See also Koslowski, ‘International Migration and the Seige’ on Copts in Egypt.
Globalization of Domestic Politics’. 90. See Mohamoud, Mobilising African Diaspora.
56. See, for example, Ibid. 91. Biswas, ‘Nationalism by Proxy’.
57. Human Rights Watch, ‘Funding the “Final War”’. 92. See, for example, Biswas, ‘Negotiating the Nation’.
58. Adamson, ‘Globalization’. 93. Brinkerhoff, ‘Digital Diasporas and International
59. Vertovec, ‘The Political Importance of Diasporas’. Development’.
60. Horst, ‘The Transnational Political Engagements of 94. See Lubkemann, ‘Where in the World is Liberia?’.
Refugees’, 322. 95. Djuric, ‘The Croatian Diaspora in North America’;
61. Ibid. quoted in Demmers, ‘New Wars and Diasporas’.
62. Ibid., 331. 96. Kleist, ‘Mobilising “The Diaspora”’; Horst, ‘The
63. Quoted in Mohamoud, Mobilising African Diaspora, 28. Transnational Political Engagements of Refugees’.
64. Horst, ‘The Transnational Political Engagements of 97. See Lyons et al., The Ethiopian Extended Dialogue.
Refugees’; Kleist, ‘Mobilising “The Diaspora”’. 98. Horst, ‘The Transnational Political Engagements of
65. Horst, ‘The Transnational Political Engagements of Refugees’.
Refugees’, 334. 99. See Zunzer, ‘Diaspora Communities and Civil Conflict
66. Özerdem, ‘The Mountain Tsunami’. Transformation’; PILPG, Engaging Diaspora Commu-
67. Kerlin, ‘Organizational Responses to Homeland Crises’. nities in Peace Processes.
100. Baser and Swain, ‘Diasporas as Peacemakers’.

101. Cochrane, ‘Irish-America’.
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Diasporas and conflict societies: Conflict

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Diasporas and conflict societies: conflict entrepreneurs, competing interests

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stability and development?

This paper summarises our state of knowledge of diasporas in conflict/post-conflict

Worldwide, conflicts abound1 and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and

supporting conflict, also lends itself to reconstruction and development. Particularly in

Research on diasporas and conflict

Africa Institute, queried informed analysts, researchers, policy-makers and practitioners

Diaspora interventions in peace and conflict: theory

emerged wherein official development assistance spiked in the immediate aftermath,

Table I summarises diasporans’ potential positive and negative contributions to PO

Diaspora motivations when the homeland is in conflict

Table I. Map of potential diaspora contributions to peace and conflict1

Contribution Potential Positive Potential Negative

(e.g., Somalia). to continued violence (e.g., Afghanistan).

Palestinian territories, Somalia).

Contribution Potential Positive Potential Negative

May introduce new tensions between those who

Diaspora interventions in peace and conflict

Remittances significantly outpace global overseas development assistance.38Beyond their

connecting his home village in Liberia to Monrovia. He subsequently provided an

One of the largest contributions diasporas make to insurgencies is through diplomatic

reconstituting legitimacy for post-conflict governments. Campaigning for the 2005

Understanding and responding to diasporans’ potential roles as conflict interest groups

With respect to remittances, their importance in supporting conflict depends on the

in re-staffing government in order to avoid creating or continuing class and ethnic

international influence) necessary to long-term recovery and development. They are

45. Lindley, ‘The Influence of Migration’. Governance’.

100. Baser and Swain, ‘Diasporas as Peacemakers’.

Peace’. Mobilization, and Networks of Violence’. Cambridge

‘Greed and Grievances’. Third Party Mediation in Homeland Conflicts’. Inter-

109. See, for example, Demmers, ‘New Wars and Diasporas’.

Post-Conflict Peace’. Review 21(2), 177– 199.

Horn of Africa’. International Journal of Theory and Research 8(1), 67–88.

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