Turkish Studies

ISSN: 1468-3849 (Print) 1743-9663 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftur20

Cypriots in Britain: Diaspora(s) committed to

peace?

Gilles Bertrand

To cite this article: Gilles Bertrand (2004) Cypriots in Britain: Diaspora(s) committed to peace?,
Turkish Studies, 5:2, 93-110, DOI: 10.1080/1468384042000228620

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1468384042000228620

Published online: 25 Jan 2007.

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 Cypriots in Britain: Diaspora(s)
Committed to Peace?

G ILLES BERTRAND
Turkish
10.1080/1468384042000228620
FTUR5205.sgm
1468-3849
Original
Taylor
5202004
14
GillesBertrand
331
gilles.bertrand@club-internet.fr
00000Summer
rue
42 Ordener75018
09
&Studies
Article
Francis
55
(print)/0000-0000
94 2004
Ltd ParisFrance
(online)

Few scholars have studied the extension of the Cyprus question abroad, particularly in Great Brit-
ain, the former colonial power. According to estimates, 170–200,000 Greek Cypriots and British
citizens of Greek Cypriot origin, as well as 60–90,000 Turkish Cypriots and British citizens of
Turkish Cypriot origin live in Great Britain (compared to 640,000 Greek Cypriots and 90–100,000
Turkish Cypriots living in Cyprus). Turkish Cypriots’ and Greek Cypriots’ migration patterns are
different and the communities are now separated in Cyprus. However, do we observe one or two
Cypriot diasporas? While not all of these people mobilize for Cyprus (for or against the status
quo), those who do, advocate ending the partition rather than perpetuating it. Nevertheless, there
are few bi-communal organizations. The debate between nationalists (partitionists) and Cypriotists
(pro-reconciliation) takes place mainly inside each community.

Few scholars have studied the extension of the Cyprus question abroad,
particularly in Great Britain, the former colonial power. According to esti-
mates, 170–200,000 Greek Cypriots and British citizens of Greek Cypriot
origin, as well as 60–90,000 Turkish Cypriots and British citizens of Turk-
ish Cypriot origin live in Great Britain (compared to 640,000 Greek Cypri-
ots and 90-100,000 Turkish Cypriots living in Cyprus). While not all of
these people mobilize for Cyprus—for or against the status quo—those
who do, advocate ending the partition rather than perpetuating it. Turkish
Cypriots in London often live in the same areas as the Greek Cypriots. This
is a situation that has not existed in Cyprus itself since 1974 (when the
island was partitioned). Can it really be said therefore that they are in a
process of creating two completely different communities which belong to
the Greek and the Turkish nations respectively, as claimed by Cypriot
Turkish nationalists? Or are they re-creating the multicultural society that
Cyprus was, but in exile? Are they one or two diaspora(s)? What might be
the consequences for the Cyprus question?

A U T O M A T IC D IA S P O R I C A F F I L I A T I O N I N Q U E S T I O N

The phenomenon of diaspora is now quite well studied in the social

sciences. However, it is a relatively new topic, which only appeared in
English-speaking literature at the end of the 1960s, and not until the 1980s
Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp.93–110
ISSN 1468-3849 print/ISSN 1743-9663 online
DOI: 10.1080/1468384042000228620 © 2004 Taylor & Francis Ltd.
94 TURKISH STUDIES

in French-speaking social science literature. Few agree on a single defini-

tion of the concept. Primordialists dominate the debate, but they disagree
amongst themselves. Some, such as the French geographer Yves Lacoste,1
claim that there is an “orthodox” definition of diaspora, related to the very
first diaspora, that of the Jews. According to this definition, it is possible to
define a national, religious or linguistic minority in a country as a diaspora
if, and only if, this group is larger than the one which remains in the country
of origin—or has resettled there—as in the case of the Armenians or the
Lebanese. Other scholars claim that every migration creates a diaspora.
Robin Cohen explains that there is a British diaspora which forms the larg-
est human group in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the US.2 Jean
Gottmann claims “nearly all countries, small or big, have today their
diaspora.”3 If we adhered to these scholars’ theories, sooner or later, every
human being would belong to a diaspora, at least in “old” countries of
immigration like those of the Americas, Australia and New Zealand or
France!
The main problem with these approaches is that no one is able to explain
why and how diaspora membership (should we say diasporaship?) affects
the behavior and political way of thinking of individuals. Should we
analyze US policy towards the UK with reference to the fact that a “British
diaspora” is ruling the country? Do researchers prefer to rename “migrants”
or “refugees” as a diaspora to be “politically correct” or sophisticated?
What is the real aim of using a concept such as diaspora? In the social
sciences, it means analyzing specific economic, social and political behav-
ior with appropriate tools. The aim is certainly not to put people into cate-
gories from which they will not be allowed to move symbolically, socially,
politically, and even physically (ghettos), as indeed happened in colonial
Africa with tribes and ethnic groups, or, in the US since the 1920s, with
“ethnic groups” such as “Italian-American,” “Greek-American,” and
“African-American.”4 Using such categories is very controversial. In
Africa, scholars claimed to be trying to study and respect everyone’s
culture, and in the US they claimed to be trying to understand the reasons
for the fast/slow/non-integration of immigrants or second-generation
immigrants. However, in reality, using a framework of tribes and ethnic
groups’ helped colonial powers to divide and rule.5 The same primordialist
framework allowed the state and “public opinion” to build misperceptions
of this or that “ethnic group,” for example portraying “Italian-Americans”
as gangsters.
CYPRIOTS IN BRITAIN 95

Primordialists expect every individual in a diaspora in the US with the

same specific cultural, religious and/or national background to behave
along the same lines as and unite with his or her “brothers and sisters,” for
or against the status quo and the governments ruling their countries of
origin (for example, Armenian-Americans about Turkey). These ethnic
groups/diasporas are not supposed to intermarry much with their fellow
Americans. They are supposed to keep their traditions alive and to continue
to speak the language of their parents. In short, they are supposed to belong
to monolithic communities, if not tribes.
The primordialist perspective distorts reality in several ways. First, they
distort the number of actual members of the diaspora/ethnic group. Greek
diasporic organizations claim that there are seven million Greek people or
people of Greek origin in the world (excluding the ten million inhabitants
of Greece). They claim that two million of them are residents and citizens
of the US. But during demonstrations against the recognition of the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) as the “Republic of Mace-
donia” by the United Nations between 1991 and 1995, there were only a
few thousand in the streets of New York City. Greek Cypriot diasporic
organizations claim that 235,000 Greek Cypriots, including those born in
Britain, are residents in the UK. At the annual march to Trafalgar Square
on July 21, 2002, an event that was supposed to be attended by every Greek
Cypriot living in the UK, the author estimated that no more than 4,000
people were present, including children. There is, therefore, a big gap
between the figures on paper and the number of people mobilized in reality.
Why should this be the case?
The answer lies in the second angle of the distortion. People have some
choice, at least most of the time, despite family pressures, racism and
attempts to trap them in a ghettoized identity. In open societies, choice is
supposed to allow people to move from one religious, national or ethnic
identity to another if they originate from a different country. And in prac-
tice they do change since they have to learn to speak another language, go
to a different school and live in a different society with a different culture.
The more open and multicultural the societies are, the more potential there
is for choice, ranging from keeping one’s own identity to forgetting it
entirely. By contrast, in less open societies, people face symbolic or phys-
ical ghettoization, or, at the opposite end, assimilation. Thus ethnicity is
not a once-and-for-all decision, neither in Africa nor in other host coun-
tries, as prominent scholars such as Max Weber or Fredrick Barth have
96 TURKISH STUDIES

emphasized.6 Not all people from the same ethnic/religious background set
up and join diasporic organizations. However, these organizations make
the claim to represent a diaspora. We therefore need an effective definition
of what a diaspora is. To be a migrant is a transitional status, to be a
diaspora member is a far more long term social and political, even
economic status – often lasting for a lifetime and sometimes for genera-
tions. To be a diaspora member is not to be a migrant or a refugee. It is not
a passive status but an active one. According to Elazar Barkan and Marie-
Denise Shelton, “…diaspora is about a choice. At a political level, the
choice is adopted by adopting a voice.”7 Gabriel Sheffer gives a stimulat-
ing and dynamic three-point definition of diaspora:
● the awareness and the claim of a cultural, ethnic or ethno-religious iden-
tity distinct from the national identity of the host society;
● the existence of political, religious or cultural organization(s) represent-
ing the diaspora;
● contacts of various kinds, even virtual, between the diaspora members
and their country of origin.8
A fourth point would be the origin of the migration. Other authors
emphasize the catastrophic origin of the migration. As with the Jews (the
destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem during the failed uprising against
the Roman Empire), the origin must be so great a trauma as to reinforce the
link among the members (who portray themselves as survivors or children
of survivors). One can argue that such a trauma did not exist for the Greek
diaspora until the “Great Catastrophe” (I Megali Katastrophi) the defeat of
the Greek Royal Army in Asia Minor in 1922, the subsequent escape of the
Greek Mikrassiates and, one year later, the “population exchange.” The
important point is: the Greek diaspora, when it rallies in Western Europe,
North America, Australia, and so on rallies around issues related to this
Catastrophe (for example on Greek-Turkish issues), or related to the Civil
War (1946–49) and its consequences (the escape of the Communist Slav-
Macedonians from Greece9) and the Cyprus issue.

THE CAUSE OF EXILE: THE CYPRUS QUESTION

The Cyprus conflict is the main cause of the exile of Cypriots from the
different communities on the island. On the eve of the conflict, 80 percent
of the inhabitants of the island were Greek Cypriots (that is, members of
CYPRIOTS IN BRITAIN 97

the Greek Orthodox Church), and 18 percent were Turkish Cypriots (that
is, Muslims). The remaining two percent were minorities, Armenians,
Maronites and Latins (members of the Roman Catholic Church).
The Cyprus conflict may be analyzed as a clash of nationalisms:
between Greek nationalists claiming the union of the island with Greece
(Enosis) and Turkish nationalists claiming the partition of the island
(Taksim) and union of each part with Greece and Turkey respectively.
Greek Cypriot elites advocated Enosis from the very beginning of the
Greek War of Independence and openly under British rule (1878–1960).
Filled with despair after vague British promises of Enosis during World
Wars I and II, the Greek nationalist Cypriot elite, including the Church,
supported the armed struggle launched in April 1955 by a Cypriot-born
Greek military officer, George Grivas and his organization, EOKA
(National Organization of Cypriot Fighters). But the Greek nationalist
Cypriot elite did not take into account the Turkish Cypriots’ hostility
towards Enosis. The Communist Party, AKEL (Progressive Party of Work-
ing People) was the only cross-community political organization and the
only one to be cautious on this issue. AKEL tried to reassure the Turkish
Cypriots as to the consequences of Enosis on their communal rights.
However, during the Cold War, the Greek nationalist Cypriot elite, the
Church and EOKA were above all anti-Communist. The British army as
occupying power, as well as AKEL members as communists, were targeted
by EOKA, creating a strong push factor for AKEL members’ self-exile.
When the Turkish Cypriots’ opposition to Enosis became obvious, EOKA
attacked them too. Turkish Cypriots went into exile and their nationalist
elite established a militia, the TMT (Turkish Defence Organization)
(1957). TMT was also anti-Communist. Both militias targeted AKEL
members and trade unionists from both communities, threatening their
lives if they did not form separate trade unions, which eventually happened
in 1958.
The ethnic (labeled at that time “intercommunal”) conflict was also
fuelled by the British policy of “Divide and Rule.” The British government,
reluctant to leave Cyprus after having lost Suez, involved the Turkish
government in the matter, despite the fact that Turkey had abandoned any
sovereign rights to Cyprus in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. By bringing
Turkey into the conflict, the British government provoked a major Greek-
Turkish crisis, marked by the infamous riot against the Greek minority of
Istanbul and Izmir (September 6–7, 1955), another very important cause of
98 TURKISH STUDIES

trauma and exile among the entire Greek diaspora. British, Greek and Turk-
ish governments eventually came to an agreement over Cyprus in the
Zurich and London agreements of 1959. The following year, they became
the “Guarantor Powers” of a bi-communal independent Republic.
The reluctant nationalist elites did not collaborate with each other for
long. President Makarios (elected by the Greek Cypriots) wanted to change
the constitution imposed by the “Guarantors” while Vice-President Dr.
Fazıl Küçük (elected by the Turkish Cypriots) threatened to veto any such
move. Moreover, former EOKA fighters were still advocating immediate
Enosis and opposed Makarios’s gradualist strategy. A clash between the
Greek Cypriot police and Turkish Cypriots led the country into civil war,
forcing the majority of the Turkish Cypriots to take refuge in enclaves
controlled by TMT (1964) or to leave the island. Turkish Cypriots were
slaughtered by Greek Cypriot militia members and sometimes persecuted
by TMT members when they refused to obey the orders of the TMT
command, led by Rauf Denktaş. This explains why the Left is better repre-
]csel[di

sented among Turkish Cypriots abroad than the Right (the nationalists).
Eventually, in July 1974, EOKA B, re-formed in the 1960s, backed by
the Greek military Junta, attempted a coup d’état against President Makar-
ios to realize the goal of immediate Enosis. Turkey reacted under the Treaty
of Guaranty. The Turkish army landed in Cyprus, provoking new outbreaks
of violence against the Turkish Cypriots while pro-Junta and pro-Makarios
Greek Cypriots fought each other. The Turkish army divided the island and
created an entity in the north where the Turkish Cypriots took refuge.
About 40,000 Turkish Cypriots had to leave the new southern zone (under
the control of the Government of Cyprus and reduced to Greek Cypriots
and the Christian minorities) while about 200,000 Greek Cypriots were
forced to escape from the new northern zone under Turkish military occu-
pation.

T H E MI G R A T I O N

According to the 2001 Census, 75,763 UK residents were born in Cyprus.

This population seems to have peaked in the late 1980s as the 1991 Census
records 77,436 people born in Cyprus were living in the UK, of whom
50,684 were in Greater London, mainly in Enfield (11,339) and Haringey
(7,798).10 Cypriots numbered 10,343 in 1951, 42,283 in 1961, 59,830 in
1966, and 73,295 in 1971.11
CYPRIOTS IN BRITAIN 99

While “Cypriots immigrated to Britain primarily to obtain stable jobs

and better wages” in the 1930s and the 1940s, they were no more than
“about 1,000 [immigrants] a year”12 in the late 1940s. Indeed, some
emigrated for political reasons (such as the Communists who were in
conflict with the Church).13 With the outbreak of the conflict in 1954,
migration increased to an average of about 3,800 a year.14 Immigrants
included Greek as well as Turkish Cypriots, especially between 1964
and 1974 when the majority of the latter had to live in enclaves. After
the partition, about 12,000 Greek Cypriots as well as 2,000 members of
the Christian minorities left the island, emigrating mainly to the UK.
About 15,000 Turkish Cypriots might have left too, between 1974 and
1976.
The first Cypriot Turkish communities as distinct from those from
Turkey in the UK can be traced to the 1920s. […] The marked
increase in the late 1950s is directly related to the active recruitment
of labour by the British government as well as the conflict between
the communities in Cyprus. […] The next large wave from Cyprus
came in the 1960s after the island became independent. […] The next
large wave came as a result of the 1974 military intervention and
occupation of the island by Turkey which led to mass population
exchanges and migration. Thousands came to Britain but were not
recognized as refugees unlike the Vietnamese who arrived at the
same time. Recognizing the Cypriots as political refugees would have
forced the British government into a political position it was trying to
fudge as one of the guarantor powers in the Cyprus conflict alongside
its NATO ally, the invader, Turkey.15
After 1974, the migration trends from both communities diverged.
Greek Cypriots returned to the island, attracted by the economic boom of
the late 1970s and 1980s. According to the latest estimates, 160,000-
200,000 people of Greek Cypriot origin now live in the United Kingdom.16
It is far more complicated for Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognized only by Turkey, does not publish
statistics on migration. The reasons are political: first, if the TRNC is a
“haven”—if not a “heaven”—for the Turkish Cypriots, why do they want
to escape? Second, the partly-organized migration of Turkish people to the
TRNC, a sensitive issue, is covered by this absence of figures. What
remains, and this is the most important point for the TRNC administration,
100 TURKISH STUDIES

is that the population of their zone is increasing and continues to outnumber

the population of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) controlled-area by a ratio
of 4:1. According to different sources—the RoC, the Council of Europe,
opponents of Rauf Denktaş in the TRNC and sometimes his own
]csel[di

advisors17—60,000 to 90,000 Turkish Cypriots have fled the island since

1974. This would represent half of the Turkish Cypriot total population and
nearly half of the TRNC population. With their descendants, the Turkish
Cypriots abroad would outnumber those remaining in Cyprus. So the Turk-
ish Cypriots living abroad are potentially a very important political force.
The question is do they exist in reality?

DIFFERENT IDENTITIES?

If the migration pattern is different and if the communities are now sepa-
rated in Cyprus, do we observe one or two Cypriot diasporas? From the
onset, it should be stated that there is no clear answer.18 On the one hand,
the differentiation is quite important:
Greek Cypriots often form their identities with references to the
great Greek diaspora, especially when this suits the projection of a
European identity, an identity of a white ethnic group against the
coloured Others. But the Greek identification is never holistic for
the Greek Cypriots, as their Cypriotness is different to the Greek-
ness of the mainland. The map of these identities’ co-existence is
not clearly drawn and the shift might be continuous.19 [emphasis in
the original]
This affiliation with the “great Greek diaspora” may explain why Greek
Cypriots rally around issues as far from the Cyprus question as the crisis
between Greece and FYROM. On other issues, like campaigning to
denounce Turkish claims on the Aegean, Greek Cypriot organizations
share a common concern with other Greek-origin Orthodox people. There
is also reciprocity—other people of Greek-origin (from Greece for exam-
ple) mobilized about Cyprus. Greek Cypriots can also be members of
Greek diasporic organizations in some countries where they are a small
minority among Greek-origin Orthodox people - as in France where Greek
Cypriots are members of the Communauté grecque de Paris et des envi-
rons. This is clearly not the case in the UK where Greek Cypriots outnum-
ber other people of Greek origin by far.
CYPRIOTS IN BRITAIN 101

The main Greek Cypriot diasporic organizations are members of the

Council for Hellenes Abroad (SAE), like EKEKA (Federation of Cypriot
Refugees, 1974), POMAK (World Federation of Overseas Cypriots) and
PSEKA (Global Committee of the Cypriot Struggle), but they act first as
Greek Cypriot organizations. As their names and slogans suggest—espe-
cially PSEKA whose slogan is: “Justice for Cyprus”—they are politically
mainstream. They back the RoC official history of the Cyprus conflict (that
Turkish Cypriots rebelled against the RoC government in 1964) and
support the policy of that government almost unconditionally. It can hardly
be said that these organizations are committed to reconciliation. They back
one side of the story and have few contacts with Turkish Cypriot organiza-
tions or individuals.
These organizations lobby the host countries’ governments as well as
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in a classic way, by letters, street
demonstrations, picketing and events like fund-raising, public meetings,
etc. during electoral campaigns. Their discourses emphasize human rights
issues, such as the Greek Cypriot civilians and soldiers missing since the
Turkish intervention in 1974, and the violation of international law, that is,
the Turkish occupation of Cyprus.20
In the UK, the Greek Cypriot lobby came to prominence during the first
successful New Labour election campaign in 1997. The Labour Party has
openly chosen to target ethnic minorities, like the Democratic Party in the
US. In North London, New Labour triumphed, winning even Michael
Portillo’s former constituency, Enfield. For the 1997 elections, a new
Greek Cypriot organization, Lobby for Cyprus (established in 1993),
openly called for the removal of Members of Parliament (MPs) seen as pro-
Turkish and/or pro-Denktaş, mainly Conservative MPs who were accused
]csel[di

of having bought houses in the occupied area of Cyprus.21 While it is possi-

ble to get 150 MPs to sign a motion on Cyprus, no one of Cypriot origin has
ever been elected MP—though some are local councilors—mainly because
the “community” is very politically divided and acting MPs are already
aware of the Cypriot lobby. A Tory candidate of Greek Cypriot origin was
defeated in 1997 in Haringey by the Labour MP who “has supported the
Cyprus issue for years” according to one interviewee (July 2002), and a
Cypriot-born independent candidate, who challenged the famous Member
of the European Parliament (MEP) Pauline Green (who “has supported the
Cyprus issue for years” too) in the 1999 European elections, was also
defeated.
102 TURKISH STUDIES

No North London Labour MP can miss a Greek Cypriot event, even

when this event is quite nationalist and does little to help reconcile Greek
and Turkish Cypriots. Every year, on July 9, Greek Cypriot organizations
in London celebrate the 1821 uprising in Cyprus. While this celebration
could be regarded as legitimate in itself, it is also used to mobilize Greek
Cypriots against the current situation. The Turkish Cypriots might have
agreed to protest with the Greek Cypriots about the current situation, but
July 9 is a dividing event because it is a purely Greek nationalist event.
Despite this, every year many MPs attend a gathering in a room at the
House of Commons at the invitation of Greek Cypriot organizations.22
Some MPs have even addressed the audience with a few words and, in one
case, an entire speech, in Greek! Few of them, to be sure, are able to speak
Turkish too.
Nationalist mobilization is less effective among Turkish Cypriots,
because their identity is more at stake. Are they Turks, as the official TRNC
discourse says? Are they Cypriots first, as the opposition in Cyprus and in
the diaspora say? Their behavior vis-à-vis Turkish migrants in Britain are
not unique: some Turkish Cypriots choose to identify themselves as Turks
but this is often not the case. The Turkish-speaking media offers contrast-
ing pictures: among the four (free of charge) weekly newspapers circulat-
ing in London, one, Londra Toplum Postası, is run exclusively by Turkish
Cypriots and is clearly leftist, advocating a solution for Cyprus in accor-
dance with UN resolutions; a second, Londra Gazete, is run by both Turk-
ish Cypriots and Turks. It is also leftist but more cautious, and deals less
with Cyprus. The two others, Avrupa and Olay, are mainly run by Turks
and their public is certainly more Turkish (or feels more Turkish rather than
Turkish Cypriot) and they tend to follow the mainstream Turkish press. The
only radio station, London Turkish Radio, is run by Turkish Cypriots but
they follow the official line and consider themselves Turks first.
Turkish Cypriot identity is complex. Until the 1930s, they called/iden-
tified themselves as Muslim. Their identity as Turks was challenged by the
fact that almost all of them were also Greek-speakers—and also because
part of them are descendants of converts. In fact, some of them were not
Turkish-speakers at all.23 According to Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins:

Turkish-Cypriot culture is a culture that has, until very recent

times, been characterized more by its transnational—or, better,
transcultural—connections. As a consequence of a long, and still
CYPRIOTS IN BRITAIN 103

resonant, historical experience—the early confluence of Mediterra-

nean cultures, imperial subordination first to the Ottomans and then
to Great Britain, the modern political and economic migrations—
the Turkish-Cypriot people have been used to cultural encounter
and interaction, and have always had a strong elsewhere orienta-
tion. Today, that historical transnationalism or transculturalism is
considerably damaged and undermined—but it is not entirely eradi-
cated.24

Another main reason for this complex self-identification is the relation-

ship between the Turkish Cypriots, Denktaş’s regime and Turkey. Among
]csel[di

the Turkish Cypriots in the UK, the support for Denktaş’s regime is very
]csel[di

low. The main nationalist party, the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik
Partisi, UBP) has around 40,000 to 50,000 supporters in the UK according
to the chairman of its Solidarity Association, Münir Tatar.25 However, the
Association is not very active. Denktaş’s own political party, the Demo-
]csel[di

cratic Party (DP), has no representative in the UK. The Council of Turkish
Cypriot Organizations (Konsey), dominated by pro-Denktaş people, claims ]csel[di

to have 27 organizations as members, according to Ahmet M. Osam, chair-

man of the political committee of Konsey.26 However, the UBP Solidarity
Association is no longer a part of it. Konsey does not seem to be very
powerful: about 250 people and fewer than five organizations rallied in the
march it organized on July 21 (a Sunday) in London to celebrate the “Turk-
ish Peace Operation” of 1974.27
The very same day, one hour later, more than 4,000 Greek Cypriots and
some Turkish Cypriots marched to Trafalgar Square to commemorate that
same event which they refer to as the “invasion.” The presence of Turkish
Cypriots at the second rally shows that differentiation is an unfinished, if
not reversible, process, as much from the point of view of self-identifica-
tion as from the political point of view. Greek Cypriots in the UK (includ-
ing those who are British-born) themselves emphasize their Cypriot
identity rather than their Greek-Cypriot identity or their Greek identity.
One reason for this is that the Cypriot Left, in particular the Communist
Party (AKEL), is stronger in the UK than in Cyprus itself. The Left advo-
cates re-unification and reconciliation more easily because it did not take
part in the inter-communal conflict, except as either victim or spectator. To
give a last example from the July 21, 2002 march: the author counted 107
RoC flags, but only 18 Greek flags.28
104 TURKISH STUDIES

A SINGLE DIASPORA?

The assumption of a single diaspora is already partly invalidated by the

aforementioned differentiation process. Nevertheless, other elements and
observations do partly validate it. “Turkish and Greek Cypriots freely
associate at work and school, but social visits to each other’s homes are
not common and intermarriage is extremely rare.”29 This observation,
made 20 years ago, is still partly true, but, in fact, inter-communal
socialization has increased since then. Interviewees told me (London:
spring and summer 2002) that the number of intermarriages is increas-
ing. In the absence of statistics, I was given examples of half a dozen
recent cases (often between British-born Cypriots), rather more than the
four intermarriages celebrated in Cyprus in the century before indepen-
dence. The most famous case is Turkay Hadji-Philippou, the chair of the
Turkish Cypriot Community Association (which owns Londra Toplum
Postası) who married a Greek Cypriot and who is well known to both
Parikiaki and Londra Toplum Postası’s readers because she is very
active in the Cypriot community.
Two Cypriot community centers have been established in London.
The most important one is located in Wood Green, in the borough of
Haringey in North London (which is council-subsidized). It was estab-
lished in 1984 in the heart of the most Cypriot-populated area in the UK
at that time. The second center, established in 1989, is located in South-
wark, and is mainly dedicated to social services for the elderly. The
Haringey Cypriot Community Centre (HCCC) is much more active and
plays a significant political role by its very existence, even if its staff
stress that no political activity is allowed there. The two centers follow
the same rule: the chairperson is from one community (Muslim or Chris-
tian including the Armenian, Latin and Maronite minorities) when the
manager is from the other. They are elected by the representatives of the
associations’ members of the center. The centers offer breakfast, lunch
and dinner and pork is not served to respect the Muslim prohibition on
it. Elderly people make up the bulk of those attending meals on week-
days while weekends are busy with family events (circumcision—sünnet
in Turkish—parties, weddings and so on), friends’ parties or social
events. The HCCC also hosts Cypriot associations’ meetings, except for
meetings of political associations. Courses in Greek and in Turkish take
place in the Centre, even if its supporters complain that few people learn
CYPRIOTS IN BRITAIN 105

the language of the other community here. These courses are mainly for
British-born children. But not all of them are very committed to learning
the language of their parents.
Because of these social aspects, the HCCC does not face open criticism
from the nationalist political organizations in London. All those inter-
viewed for this study find it “useful.” Some underlined the role played by
AKEL (the Communist Party) whose representative in London,
Christodoulos Stylianou, plays a significant role in the management of the
Centre. Some nationalists say that coexistence is no longer possible in the
island and that this center is an AKEL political operation. It is not very
difficult to explain the role played by AKEL. It can be explained in two
ways: first by the party’s history (it was established in the UK at the same
time as in Cyprus, in 1941), second by links between its members in the UK
and the Labour Party (of which Haringey is a stronghold), even if the New
Labour is supposed to be closer to EDEK (the Socialist Party), its official
ally inside the Socialist International.

B I-C O M M U N A L O R G A N I Z A T I O N S O R B I - C O MMU N A L
COOPERATION?

The HCCC has 17 member associations, three of which are Turkish

Cypriot, meaning it is not, in fact, only backed by AKEL, but also by vari-
ous organizations from the Left and from the Center-Left. But few of them
are really “bi-communal” (that is, with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
membership).
Other than the HCCC, I found one other bi-communal organization, the
Forum for Friendship and Co-operation between Greek Cypriots and Turk-
ish Cypriots. It was officially established in London in 1997 and its first
chairman was Nikos Trimikliniotis, at that time a PhD. student in Anthro-
pology at Greenwich University and now the director of the Cypriot Labour
Institute in Nicosia. It is mainly a student association. However, AKEL
itself claims to be an all-Cypriot organization. This was openly the case
until 1958: Turkish Cypriots did not conceal the fact that they were
members and a Turkish Desk existed to facilitate the membership needs of
Turkish-speakers. Since 1958, AKEL has claimed to have secret Turkish
Cypriot members, which is probably the case for a few people in Cyprus,
but more so in the UK where 20 percent of the party members are Turkish
106 TURKISH STUDIES

Cypriot, according to Christodoulos Stylianou.30 On the other hand,

AKEL’s current mainstream orientation (backing Tassos Papadopoulos for
example) hardly makes it truly bi-communal.
Two other organizations could claim to be bi-communal, but are not
exactly diasporic groups. Friends of Cyprus (established in London in
1974) have Greek and Turkish Cypriot members. However, the most
prominent members are British MPs and MEPs who form a lobby backing
UN resolutions and plans for Cyprus and the accession of Cyprus to the
European Union (EU). British MEPs play an important role, especially by
inviting Cypriots of all communities in the UK to meet EU officials in
Brussels or Strasbourg.31 Pauline Green (Labour), followed by Mary
Honeyball (Labour), Sarah Ludford (Liberal Democrat) and Theresa Villi-
ers (Conservative) are the most active MEPs on the Cyprus issue. The
Association for Cypriot, Greek and Turkish Cypriot Affairs (ACGTA),
established in the UK in 1992, is a predominantly academic organization
bringing together Cypriot and British scholars, mainly, but not exclu-
sively, for seminars. Nevertheless, its secretary, Zenon Stavrinides, also
backs peace initiatives, sending calls for peace and a solution to the
Cyprus question through ACGTA’s e-mail list. ACGTA plays an impor-
tant role because it is the only organization able to bring together Rauf
Denktaş’s supporters like Ahmet M. Osam (see above) and outspoken
]csel[di

opponents to his regime.

Consequently, we can mostly speak of bi-communal cooperation, that
is, cooperation between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot organizations.
According to interviewees, the main reason why people do not join bi-
communal organizations is the Turkish Cypriots’ concern about being
portrayed as traitors to the community by Rauf Denktaş and his supporters.
]csel[di

But this is surely only one part of the story, since London’s Turkish Cypriot
leftist militants are already portrayed as traitors by Rauf Denktaş. My ]csel[di

hypothesis is as follows: first, that the language barrier plays a significant

role, mainly among the Turkish Cypriot young generation that does not
speak Greek; second, that there is still an ongoing process of rebuilding
confidence among communities, in particular because AKEL in Cyprus has
backed mainstream nationalist policies and politicians such as Tassos
Papadopoulos, a former EOKA leader.
The Turkish Cypriot Left is much more active in the UK than
Denktaş’s supporters, and it seems much more united. Two organizations
]csel[di

are at its core: The Cyprus Turkish Democratic Association (Kıbrıs Türk
CYPRIOTS IN BRITAIN 107

Demokratik Derneğ i, CTDA) and the Republican Turkish Party Solidarity

g[berv]

Association (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi Dayanışma Derneğ i, CTPDD).

]csel[di g[berv]

CTDA is a non-partisan organization composed of leftist parties’ solidar-

ity associations, mainly the CTPDD, and the United Patriotic Movement
Solidarity Association (Yurtsever Birlik Hareketi Dayanışma Derneğ i,
]csel[di g[berv]

YHBDD), as well as other social organizations and individuals. CTDA’s

aim is to promote and support reconciliation and the end of partition in
Cyprus, so it supports the UN plans as well as accession to the EU. The
CTDA conducts a traditional lobby targeting MPs and (mainly but not
solely British) MEPs. It is also in contact with EU institutions to which it
tries to bring the “other” Turkish Cypriot voice. The CTDA has close
contacts with AKEL as well as with the Christian-only National Federa-
tion of Cypriots in Great Britain (NFCGB). Through these channels, the
CTDA is able to provide information to Greek Cypriot organizations
about Turkish Cypriots’ concerns and expectations, from London as well
as from Cyprus. In this sense, Cypriot diasporic organizations by-passed
the “Green Line” which almost totally separated Christian (Greek and
minorities) and Turkish Cypriots, until its opening on April 23, 2003.
The CTPDD also plays a significant role because it is the main Turkish
Cypriot political organization in London, a credible interlocutor for AKEL
with which it has disagreed on some issues (for example the purchase of
air-to-air Russian S-300 missiles by the RoC in 1997 and on the Öcalan
crisis in 1999). İlker Kılıç, the CTPDD’s chairman, is sometimes inter-
[Id]ot

viewed by the Turkish press, for example when he protested against Rauf
Denktaş’s supporters’ call to vote for the Conservative Party in the 1997
]csel[di

British general election. The YHBDD (cited above) seems very active
according to the events it organizes and its members attend but it is a
smaller group, more radical than the CTPDD, so less able to rally a major-
ity of the Turkish Cypriots living in Britain and/or born there. The CTPDD,
YHBDD and CTDA advocate the integration of British-born Turkish
Cypriots into British society and at the same time try to mobilize them. I
interviewed some of their members and they do not consider this to be a
contradiction. They advocate multiculturalism and the possibility of
managing a plural identity (British and Turkish Cypriot or British and
Turkish and Cypriot) in a way very similar to Jürgen Habermas’ “constitu-
tional patriotism.”32
On the Christian/Greek side, the NFCGB is the main non-political
organization able and committed to cooperating with Turkish Cypriot
108 TURKISH STUDIES

organizations. Almost all Christian Cypriot organizations in Britain

belong to the NFCGB with the exception of Lobby for Cyprus. The
NFCGB was established in 1974 and its first chairman was a Maronite,
Homer S. Habibis. His successor is a successful Greek Cypriot business-
man, Haris Sophoclides. Despite his willingness to cooperate and some
success since October 2002, the NFCGB reflects the situation in the
southern zone of Cyprus: the predominance of mainstream moderate
nationalist parties and a feeble nationalist consensus.
Recent developments in Cyprus33 have led to increasing mobilization in
the UK. Thirteen Turkish Cypriot organizations from the Left formed the
“Peace for Cyprus” Platform in January 2003 and, within the same month,
formed a joint Committee with NFCGB representatives. The Committee
then met Lords, MPs and MEPs in the House of Commons on February 4.
Another bi-communal event took place on February 16: an outdoor meet-
ing in North London, including speeches from MEPs and a message from
the mayor of London. A week later, the Turkish Cypriot Platform orga-
nized a meeting at Alexandra Palace with CTP leader Mehmet Ali Talat,
United Cyprus Party leader İzzet İzcan, and Ali Erel, Chamber of
][Idot ][Idot

Commerce chairman and one of the promoters of “The Common Vision of

the Turkish Cypriot Civil Society” declaration (August 2002), advocating
EU accession.

C O N C L U SIO N : T H E C O MP L E X P I C T U R E O F D I A S P O R I C
MO B I L I Z A T I O N S

It is almost impossible to give a simple answer to our rather complicated

questions. What we observe is that, in exile, in a generally open society
such as Britain, people are free to prefer their pre-conflict political affilia-
tions rather than an exclusive national identity (which nationalists often use
as a weapon to force people to join a party or at least to rally to the nation-
alist consensus). However, we also observe that people choose, as in Albert
Hirschman’s theory, three different ways to express their identity: “exit,
voice, and loyalty.”34 Part of them “exit” from their Cypriot identity and
choose their British one, or at least remain silent. Others “voice” against the
status quo in the island and against nationalism. Others express their
“loyalty” to the “communal leaders” (according to UN terminology), and
advocate the separation of the communities, if not the legalization of the
partition.
CYPRIOTS IN BRITAIN 109

NOTES

1. Yves Lacoste, “Géopolitique des Diaspora,” Hérodote, No.53 (1989), pp.3–4.

2. Robin Cohen, Global Diasporas: An Introduction (London: University College London Press,
1997), p.228.
3. Jean Gottmann, “La Généralisation des Diasporas et Ses Conséquences,” in George Preve-
lakis, Les Réseaux des Diasporas (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996), p.22.
4. See Philippe Poutignat et Jocelyne Streiff-Fenart, Théories de L’ethnicité (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1995), p.270.
5. Jean-Loup Amselle et Elikia M’Bokolo (ed.), Au Cœur de L’ethnie (Paris: La Découverte,
1985), p.227.
6. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1978), Vol.1, p.389; Fredrik Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Bound-
aries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969).
7. Elazar Barkan and Marie-Denise Shelton, Borders, Exiles, Diasporas (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1998), p.5.
8. Gabriel Sheffer, “Ethnic Diasporas: A Threat to Their Hosts?” in Myron Weiner (ed.) Inter-
national Migration and Security (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p.263.
9. For an analysis of such mobilization (and counter-mobilization by people originally of Slavic
descent who migrated from Greece to Australia and North America) see Loring Danforth, The
Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1995), p.273.
10. The borough of Haringey was for decades the largest Cypriot area in London, and hence in the
UK. See Fuat Alkan and Susie Constantinides, Cypriots in Haringey (London: Borough of
Haringey’s Council, 1980), p.39.
11. UK Census data.
12. Both quotations from Robin Oakley, “Cypriots in Britain,” The Race Today, Vol.2, No.4,
(1970), p.34.
13. See Peter Loizos, The Heart Grown Bitter: A Chronicle of Cypriot War Refugees (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.219.
14. British Home Office statistics compiled by Janet Bridal and Russell King, “The Changing Distri-
bution of Cypriots in London,” Studi Emigrazione, Vol.19, No.65 (March 1982), pp.93–120.
15. Aydin Mehmet Ali, Turkish Speaking Communities and Education (London: Fatal Publica-
tions, 2001), pp.6–7.
16. Myria Georgiou, “Negotiated Uses, Contested Meanings, Changing Identities: Greek Cypriot
Media Consumption and Ethnic Identity Formations in Northern London” (unpublished PhD.
thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2000), p.20.
17. Sources are: official statements by the RoC, for example Request 25781/94 to the European
Commission of Human Rights (1994); Assemblée Parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe
(Mario Cucó), Rapport sur la Structure Démographique des Communautés Chypriotes, Docu-
ment 6589, 27 avril 1992, p.73; and interviews in the Cypriot or international press as well as
interviews conducted by the author in 1998, 1999 and 2002.
18. But see also Madeleine Demetriou, “Politicizing the Diaspora: Contested Identities Among
the Greek Cypriot Community in Britain” (unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Politics
and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury, 2002), p.289.
19. Georgiou (2000), p.197.
20. During the 13th PSEKA Conference in Washington DC (June 18–20, 2002), a delegate of the
National Federation of Cypriots in the UK, George Hajifanis, made a speech on “Turkey’s
Terrorism vs. Human Rights.” Text reproduced by the London Greek Cypriot weekly news-
paper Parikiaki, July 11, 2002.
21. This recurred in 2001. See their website <http://www.lobbyforcyprus.org> and their own
version of the Cyprus conflict: Cyprus, Origins of the Present Crisis—1950s to 1970s
110 TURKISH STUDIES

(London: Lobby for Cyprus, 2000), p.86. This is a second-generation group. My interview
with two of their members in July 2002 showed a limited knowledge of the conflict (and the
bibliography of their book is poor and outdated) and a very Greek Cypriot mainstream view
on it although they denied any link with Greek Cypriot political parties and emphasized their
independence.
22. In July 2002, 25 MPs from the Labour, Liberal Democrat and the Conservative Parties were
present at the gathering (which the author attended). See: Parikiaki, July 11, 2002.
23. Aydin Mehmet Ali (ed.), Turkish Cypriot Identity in Literature (London: Fatal Publications,
1990), p.230.
24. Asu Aksoy and Kevin Robins, “From Spaces of Identity to Mental Spaces: Lessons from
Turkish-Cypriot Cultural Experience,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol.27, No.4
(Oct. 2001), pp.686–7.
25. Author’s interview with Münir Tatar, London, July 2002.
26. Author’s interview with Ahmet M. Osam, London, July 2002.
27. The author counted people during the march from Marble Arch to the Turkish Embassy.
According to Turkish and Turkish Cypriot journalists covering the march, this figure is more
or less the same every year.
28. In the RoC controlled-area of Cyprus, the RoC flag sometimes flies alone, but usually has a
Greek flag next to it. The author has never seen a TRNC flag flying in the TRNC area without
a Turkish one next to it.
29. Bridal and King (1982), p.100.
30. Author’s interview with Christodoulos Stylianou, London, June 2002.
31. See the report on one of these trips to Brussels in Parikiaki, Nov. 7, 2002.
32. Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1998). On Habermas’s theory in Cyprus see Niyazi Kizilyürek, “Modernity,
Nationalism and the Perspectives of a Cypriot Union,” Cahiers d’Etudes sur la Méditerranée
Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien (CEMOTI), No.34 (July–December 2002), pp.211–30.
33. The opening of the “Green Line” on April 23, 2003, the Annan Plan and negotiations pertain-
ing to it.
34. Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations,
and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).