Clatsop District ATtorney Versus One-Party Consent Law Oregon Eng Docs 1-25

my-
' 4'"
u '1
",k'
, "-1121.
'I'»1
. ..:-..u2.._w
:2 "'114
.. '
,J .2. "1
'
,
V'
-41
7W 772 49'5""?7'7"
g:
:2?
" mi}
4227421 12217
7'
22 2 22212 202722277722 771+ iii;
_
b14047" [39711719449044
3': 3143*Jggdw "42714
2-
CUWJJ 79/114,10777:2
' 422277 §%~/2/fl4
:
9711714
144 12127297 9/707 9/707 7\Q-
'
2224 9745 £774
1A
2,2222, 22222222: 222722127112'. 3,.
Eznzszanv ,-
(2214133232223 73207 '0 4021222 452277724
4/734qu.1

5274.2 2924 C4 4- 1K4 "ow 1472702971 227/1720" :4;
9272/4 LIFfl'Ofit/ '73'/ 0'7 7.. 9W'7L'74/ jO
22442;, 14/ 4217 / 10W 20,) 427/27/ 17441
i
"5242/24/22 12247.7 22C:14/22/2707 2272294247 f}
1/ /; 2421/7 [77774 7114491407 (/4
"VG/fl? 9'07 g,
A42; 7%) SK
MW
a.
w. -W
.__, .
.9 ~_~
.5
m
3
.W .._._-. ---_ W.
_.
g,
33
~>.
i663?7302 (7267 "M
203973 WQKfQO "3393 7/27/0273
"
7/53"?)
~w
97W97/72/2279 .3-
3337a»::3: 3f
_3
'3'
@337
3/ 3/773,"
27 "Q3923;
4:343 ,3 , .
-.2 r
37/33/33 2" 9/" '33:"
{WWW/3.379337% 9339/? " 996/
3. .' ,3
39 U 2/:3' )9 964,5,
3/ "(0/ "/5273: [Ax/4531 +19£3€23
3:7
1/?
b/cflq 5743/ 2.237%" /7_;/ 293% 37317333377 3'?/C
[$3,333,
®
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
Verified Correct Copy of Original 8/28/2023._
FOR THE COUNTY OF CLATSOP
$3 C ZS
fiJC I 0 29
Veolom
Petitioner/Plaintiff
CaseNo:
CERTIFICATE
32 .2 3 L7!
and OF SERVICE
fl/i-«v-Ix fies: («Q/hora Sine.
c) Respondent/Defendant
I am the El Petitioner/ Plaintiff espondent/ Defendant in this case.
Icertifythaton (date) f" ' 2'55 Z f'flprovidedatrue copy of (list each

document) 63 L9 {[94
\
via 3: ([22 72 r/ firm/1. '
40m
K
Le 141% OF Rah/um" C/Gl/{Vru (PH/141% 5

75;}
\/
preview
J
v. LIISJV S'kflI-e/Mi
/ I
61/} (Nee?
4 / 7-
paqfl
to the U Petitioner [:1 Respondent El Attorney for in the above
case by placing the document(s) in the:
Hands of the ElPetitioner El Respondent [:1 Attorneyfor C /'\ 715

01p
9/4 657(4ch
A féS'vo/p
\
at (address): C III" ow .
7L /' 94/ /' %' Q
or [I United States mail in a sealed envelope with postage paid addressed to (address):
I hereby declare that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge
and belief. I understand they are made for use as evidence in court and I am
subject to penalty for perjury.
" '2/5 _
'
Date Signature
M K L 9 w \
/-'/
. .~
PrintName
F0 gm )2 45mm I
01R 97 /0 2
ContactAddress City, State, ZIP
Contact Phone Email Address

/3, M93
/
fiWW% W? "
J
H
£202 9 5w
W,
E
5%
MW
a
/%
WW mfleM/
{'7 My
mmW7'fl/V WW
WXfl¢W
WWWVfl/V"
/MW WWW
MW%% flaw/J
fld
M /w' W7/W
fim
WW
"WW/WWW
WW W m l
"V? mix/47%
Mdfl/
$W «We
MZL%( '//W
/4
/M
"@W% W/fi *
"Jim
W
WWW
'
WWW
g0; «733"7/95WWfi57§Ky Mé/
A)
W AX €fi¢
3/54, a; 0/87010
CaseNo: 23CK132?7
Petitionler/Plaintiff CERTIFICATE
and OF SERVICE
"7;, r4 K1996 Lemar"? {"5
Re sp 0nd ent/ Defendfit
i Z3
I am the El Petitioner/Plaintiff espondent/Defendant in this case.
Icertifythaton (date) g" / 2? .Iprovidedatrueco yofaisteach

document) "/12,
W Sand] fli M1 c? / MOM", 9'35
of ADM MWgee/O/
7T8}? of 744A é/'em'o'fl
(er/ma
{Narm9n7
to the El Respondent El Attorneyfor in the above
gfiktitioner
case by placing the do cument(s) in the:
.yHands
of the DPetitioner El Respondent El Attorneyfor
at (address):
C/fi fsoap M
or Cl United States mail in a sealed envelope with postage paid addressed to (address):
$7e/3'2-3
Date 774/63
Signature
fi
Print Name

P Corre ctC
~'
Lita-J ?'bJ
[V\'/¢J97vu
_V
77("m fWG/l'75"fjb0/ ,0
474/!bJ-W M7
N 71""ugh
_, I,
T"
55,1077" J, a77M
"79):" Vin/{NW}; 19W
E Z7/m 19
707%7 J Z: :5"! 4
«74 #74 )9
'V WWW/fl 0% m: wzd
.9 fl 0/, {VI/ W/ 9 Lf/y (3
.5 "Java/Jr, U.' fl
W 7' 9"" 39
w 2W «my;
(2/
b/ O'fiy' (1} 7m»&
07L 707J06/
fi'mw "In, ZV)J7BWJ7
")? W747 fwgfryizféwy
/[v£7/'/ 74.x w an
W
Io a"?! Tnl:#4
a7;
'?'ul
WM w w LV.'/'7w [4714 /0
rfifxvyg v~
' we've/l
7""! WW 4W ywwg flLL
«(W/ea W! Q7L/fl'70laflgjfl M'7MWY3.
gifl/ab%2b+
@7L 37? MC)'nVc7(/n5-
\4/ 5W/10w A!)[w7)
a/vsfi'W 72M
wow/d"
My «swag/v) XML/U.71'W MW?"'7 2' 7'1
fié 7yWLjz/flfi/ ".' f/flayf
°MQ 53% /0 4//"by W ""7
7,":
WW" "71
WM 5%? ("7""4'7'1'"
"7%
7'7"?"5'0 GZWh/Q W 7473/ ""7 atC "'7
@9202 (1297/10 hbzg'zyg SC
KW
2"
7/? jgfll'fgwj
qfiflz 70ka gig?
7 WWW/X9- fw/é f&
2/22 g] ~36: wwwg
/?Jm v m mww 291,440 Wfi'éw"?
dl/'n%a'"7; " %Mzfl flj
"kW/7
'7 '7'/M2M
'/Q
flak", é fg'lXfl fin°4)a'7 /y? j
f / W g g 71/ nO'W / Z («nib/Jaw
55m "gym/j: W2/
(31¢ 779Mé7/1.W
Mm $17 "77%
71¢? gym,
'
j I'm/Warm
#7
7flbG/téé/b 7/7'0
.7ébw'g/W/7 7/
/ éjgabvl 4
gm 4%; L/M 47' {/"b1bl3
74""7-bséfi 7V
$5M 701;?)
~Z' firs/ad /0 7 gay
{Eta/Z; (1/ 74"?" 4 "/W/L'bggk
/7/'JM/9°1'
47%;?
297""
v gig/M
j
WWW /WM "é/v'v'é<37
z / ' " 'J @I/c/
r977'7 M4 /
" flew fMWJ/M
'7'? K/WW?
07 fl
e w WE?
f w W 9':
7%
"WW7 Wm f9z3/a9'w
/ mw 15¢; 9
%W l/ f 7 7'7 fflflfib
A , f'fl'fla '"
(fl/v
J%WwWJbOw/u?/9 or m» 7%?
/\ 'W 9% WW .fl
~ZZQ'Z 2,
/w9&/a,r ("6/ [V'I/Jbzaj
£57m 7m'5g
[hwy-aw
fW fJI/Z) 1391706/ b'lwfizgfi/
my 414
'flL'jL / /7' gim" /£7_Z
:2)
joy 70:
2'fif/y (3/7 4v,7/b'/VC7WI C? WJCDZP
Jlff 6%
"'77 a? J' a gwjaw 9'7/(0'44
/ WJ$ M
M, M m/
/o/ We a]; "/0 ""7
V,
J Mae 27
y" "WW J7/ "7'1
I
"Vi/77% Q" Cmflw
"7W/rwv,'
Wm Xag' %
FWnggfl/o "#271" 700
m! wow "W
"3;
7/20"" "77" M "2:: ;;:7(Q'7 flay"!
/0 /'b
?\ 1746"" WM
g7'7wfl/W 2/ 7
fl
%:lb '70P"? £7
1/"? 7J6 5W Z/m 7L"!
.
gum/"W /g/m/27
WM"
W /0 WWW
'mzb/ M)?<¢/Jgn/W97 {EM/{2. mfif
/z/'/1'7 W5
7/.
«M M
7L ("f/ii W'VWCWWJD 97° 3(30<:4\:7
fa? 2:119
xv/gJ o7:
is
$21%:9%ZE.6CWWd/fjfi
béfigapbt'g
£4.17};
7147/",'41 yaw/279",
0.1L 2%
7U:7'7QZ W '0 54}
Lg 7% ,f :3 W"
'470J0 Dfl)76797(é/1Cj
m&/"\ WWW/fl
PI'Wg'f'W/WW s. 1211,?
fl"
7W9 M M ?' "W" 7" a
My m
Q #777 7 407mm;
4° 27,?
Gym"
22717411"! A,
"70:92,le WOW"?77 W7C, with
4 5'17/
WSSb
ffW o/q/J/a/ VWfl/éj
7%, rm]?
(TX 7/ £7
07722 7N " 76?
',9W%y
Navy/yxa [W
{:7}? /fl/IW/Z:m/
"91'7lgpA/o "7/, [rm/l wZ/h, bygr' fl/L
L3 23)wit) ,74/
/ 1m 71):) 2/11,"
0520 Val/OJ flat/b
%77'7 937/2 fl w%
\f $77v7 w 7 mo 50f,
gm 7'1
27/ W?
524%}? V WV JW
74b wzfijév"??? 97M §Va~lbvf WmC
D J/iJ a)
S'WW/lw 77Lm
W571 /9zf§l?7 b
Ju d/10%}w
fi/mé'bw /
fly", ZQ/Z775 IOW
BMI'W VJJ ,
in
M J
{3'1
fwb'? MM? 7b 'w G75}?
"'9, J '19:,1/19
WWJ .. j/QSE
fi/Wffl/é gm \l
{Zr Jéoyayj W%a
"WV/w 7'0 fig
M "7 Vi
70)
fiwwor/W v+fmflw¢§
379/?» w ajnfJOD /07/ @»£
/ 22/'4
{#91,'J
71'1
mg 7
W
<9 Jbgyo S'b/V' f). "fly/W 5 ;w a
#7712 $37
{5706/ (174 fiM/'lf
g. 5'17 f7 15"" WP/a
WWW m7 2'31
07L
wag/£77": 5?
Sf/Ka' W (/a?7/ !//9M
W f]; §/>7
391% #7"?
EW 7% Ne 7/
7w / '7'"?
WW0 '1//'/M
(7114/7) «(w/«7;:
(TWWggbfl 9:7 Wflbéfl
I
kpw'VZ/vxfl
rM'fi"'./7l 7 {W
g/M
"7/" /'WWW m! "70""
61%
JQ 7H0; J/
var/4 h 7Ll/Vfl/
AJ/vn ib/V'
3'77/
VI /2'5§bJ
¢W%§ Wu 24/ Q/fl
Mil/a0! C/fl
v27? %Z/"W Ly
"/
wz/ WW;
W64 /{>///67
LL19 J0
5? mvm
\{C b6)? ?1 03'
flX'aé 7/4
flM/ygfkfl 29
77§>%%fi
ykyb W\'S§@ a7'7""7 "40/1
p
'° §J M m QM
7 + j"
7 J0 (Vj'os'y @7120
_|
€17 IL/'& fUJ'AU 4/1471
w/VflJb/OI/tblj m/
(WM/77 5"]
WWWygfl' \J
WS/ VB'/'6 37'
77/ 10W fi/'N'V M30
TW
/,
flaw/W 0/7/9075
flO/V' %W
M/V) 2'?
307/ WA
MW)? /"'40 U MLVI 5'2'0/5
fa
5 "7'97
4? (wow 7L0'l/l
79/- W"
10/29
715 2701410
077W"
7%
I 2 /\ Iéugg'
sz/ww//""~'""""') w :9
w avv/WE"WJ W. / 7f
"DYWO/ EV/ 746.459!»
"J2?!
WM ww/M: "2,,
77/"??550 Eva/7W /7Jb?\'7"
J
(my z/Wm[/7145
flag
£04 2'67 {IFOC/ "7'
J °L67Q>Uxwwv§gp
"77137
7""'37717 4v\7zfl
@flg7'7/p"?
t
"77-4
M
g,i"'7'7"'"(" 9MW
fied Co
7'/ 7D" 7" #0457 5' W WWI/mar?

_V
0% 7LVL49M
{/4 @97129/0 71% f/ flarl)
0
W "V?" m":
.E
Jl/y WA «'va
6/" /'7 my 9-} Cflmy/ 974
V774 fiw/flzay/a la
M9 0.70 51.
"IL 7'6 Mgfljcfl 74f
W" W59
' 4U) M )0' )UJ flu;
(A70
j/O
'5 JyJJfiVt/t- 9'79? (UJCJMQ 3')"
//3M
'a'Jbf/V}? 7 W W0/3V/'f/'é E's/9%
va'COW/gj.
?7(ra7/M9<j 710 7WM'45V'W WW 2W
/~ a0 M77\\.'\2'
/ y M) bJ a Vjbfiy ,0
07L
9/5"? {film 3'77 c/O)L7L
mfg/A 329 14.0) W||-A§JO '3:
0,495",
/
Wig/3%)) .4\, \A\w~f_,49§\)log
u: EVAUV 77f %@
@m/é Won/'2 Wag-743°
27¢) A {2' MN MW 2W7L3P2
SW 1W 1': 7W
,Vw'J/Lg
"iv/"'70"? 1"" "6% 7" a
I]
Yiflflfl "0/ Wbjfl €Z'91
9770/4463": p.130; /W 932%
{9?917/'12 /\& aw"
rt<7 1%NJD / Q+Jfl€3
l- [JV/1'7 'fflmb I7l§
"W thfl
074 797 W" \VWJ 27
W'@v&27JCB /fizfvfwfj W/G'
W1 vwn ml La
4% 22010
x507
'JW'DQJJ 7LU/ 71/70'47L $,"# 06 Wm
"7071""W *7 Rwy 1"?ij
M'
WW
/
\WW/'V/V'J fhibj") WM
7W8 73""ng gal/"fig", Jfi
WW f¢rfl«2'A 7"
774/ 7777' "70 75M
\
7mm {'H
" '" "TM
77M"? 3/4"": W77 'Jg'v'
1%
/7W"W
[27%be MN7UOzlu:f9 )A
MW
Z:§//LW
7'9 ""7017 yUfiL§ZM 4077/a
Q7L
.
F 4507/) ""7 V
377'" "<1 7 /\ \
\
7100 77M"
(/9770 W
flb€§b
W537
w 707/ m Maj
2W ""7"" W94" Mg70 QM:
929m 1' 7:7» of:
.400! ("p/Dbcow/l .
M6
Mme g jg
amt/2473f; 214/9
awn/43,1
W wguv #5 ya":
W7 7Lw Mu
W "5' «5'7 Mbmj MV' 7'93
3' -'5 79
9 M497 I)";
w 7M
7L/9LQ7AMm/pg/gwr/f/f'V /M+,,:,I/6fi;
15,,
fiMC/aa'afl 277/170 fl\,/ 79'],ij
,
>74;
MW 219575
M ""9
7"" "WW/0
S3
??:2"? 7:03"m7" WW/vv'ocs§a7/0Jd Q
JWM fog/107
wxo
\Aééff'hL a+bJ 7%\7 Mia/ma +3
wéfb
~I~
26ng
7L/ Wpg
Ewb%/Q\,fl
fix Wan/1 gSi/ W997
fiajbOJau
§, Wnuull WOXb-é ,.
7nd,» Cir
7Q Wm9/97lég'l7/w 375
97(149'73 8737 W)If/flw MJj
70mg
"Dwarf/"WM" @
2:1":3:
0'." ()1
137% §)4/I»6f7no[a'//IO
23]? 4'3'9/bw 39% gum/~92?
fly/MN?"
m1 ~v<1v
21W
W
out
«7xv'ma9g'o+ Nfl/Oj We} 4"
*Eawozw 2?" "0+
S'fw'om'épf gmwz'éflaJ '}b@?2j\\/'I
#WM 6', mg Z
7.9%7\'n/10a 4MIJ>/aas
A'BT'AVJ
b "96: "NS Q)
E'WWM "HSWQQ
a/KJWI/fi)? [/0
(7'43"; /713/
lb'lrL/77b/7 7(A7 7146M
JJ)/z%/ (474 2/70 7kg? 32/V7 Iw§ 7/b
7/kaaav
W»7WWJ W'JW
707/419 SQ my d ,
726/0
2? (97/4
:d/iZ/faw
53
/ law/'9} 4M 29
fibV/flg/ I27
E 47L. / f/\ C
'74'44'3/9
7/
/ W Q90 WJ W7
WWO .,
;/, 1;,
0'53"?"
v? 3J3
Wajary//W
f0 W/bgg
V
S: >/bjay
000') fi we?)
Wmfl; \é/flguéymW V
flay/2 "M '97""? a/7;"5" "f" K: 7W .
(7/\75Wfl by!
47L
ism/'0 "fig «vi/Mi) "Kw/lg
7:77; {VII/f/JO?
/591 {aw v,) WW4? «havoc/ya
7b 2 517
"WW? WW 'flMngf ?" 774,7 3:41;?/ "
2,10730 /
W wfové W V 3/2
"M o / "'7' 72/)
v 5...) F W7 53"" 5777'
/ (:2 5b?"
W (437%
27; fgi/Q% ?0'Vu\)é
v7", m? L", wa/Vl
6/ Ham/u W
"214,4 €62
w'l-«éayg/ y/vx 1/79}]L§XbW
/®7¢é
51,7
éwoa' /Jim
5.0M 1 fJbO? {II/#'MQ vim
flM'} "WA m /0/>7(VV¢>'A&J/ &// law
1474/ W 44(1u'Jglr
M M./55?590 lryan Lf'lbég y
A)JQ\IWI7 M
(32-1/0 (/54be Wvon)//,/ /hMI""C//a 3Aw7
0!
ct Cop
//.)® JW/9 474 9"9U/ITL/'OJAQ

NH 3/")?
(9/) $3 {21/
+00 07L Jfi'v Jllb/LM/W
99/04
(
mwvv/ ff \oétl
é/fij "2500/ W S/'W [who )0 Sb/W
WV! #9 ""7 f0 fuy'l/Q
Sr/
5" f1
7W
9/"
g7wg wosg 74W lop;
Wrath/021'
Mb 5» Ma\)/\ W05
Ig'xb/QM/IO? /'o'3 97+;
ao'I/x
"Tlt'éfit gflw
filmfi. 'd'j'7§MJ7Lb/a-\f 7L®
07% "7' "5H4"
07' )
\ "My
'/ 9Ww'g 5'93
arr/1
Orr/1W W5 7Lb£73f
h# B'ADV f cot/M29?)
AWVVbfl/Wb 0"
J0 or /1 06 kl. 7%
4177(2) m/ozaaf W74)»7
*0
to 32» WW7
[W/IX};
J7(9",: /% W)" (/1 7 5WJ/ 7//
asaw 5"
f§b\lb£o
7M" 0/" '7"
L7
9:'
u.vsa\7"",'"'x'v°3 $17) f0 w/y ffL 4f;
'd'7smx7'7&f WH My? 5% "37/" 7'70
mm 7/bJO )M/
m/
mo/mwy/o §§r/MV/ '0 vLé'
1"
'9vWJ«L
GlwgfW/Q 1' '7'
37!}/0%'~<an)
~Lv$Mc7n ""3 W 7W
(WWWf /" ""4
4""//"? WW5 ("n/UH (VJ/WV"? /
gfi 7"L
WV/x'lo Ml'xg WW7/w fw jog»;
\/'JO \WVb
Q/jtJn
33/
$7'9V7M W?
jGJJWJ l/LIO
37; /a
7L/'YSI\ M4
a": "47'" MM
rm
WV" Wfla' )0
f2? /f7°/da/
"VF/\
M/ Mb @7106'1
W\
31 WO'Jé 1/
947/"
7(0'07j
{MW/k
war
07' 7b,?
Jbf f0
Vb" w/J J
W?
"\79 .J 719
WM ,AU
"'7
VowWW7 WWJN/ U/' g: 2'6!
{Hf/«ewe? 67c; )77/ ,17M7
WW6") &(71> /0J7LW
S'Jzaflflgfb 74 1 '7W/Lba40/1a
{v/z/Wa 7"fVW49l'Ay/77
Dunn/190.? fa E/W? 7,427 97M aft/"3:10
yv'zfi/Jb «\IJg 7L phmj/Q
12:7J0? %/L49 "77/14
4'? 7L/'0 $77.5v/ 39
°£JI/o fl/A'Z
€767"
WE 07L W/gsa/W677 M'j
'ZI
75"
(M 7'7"
/""7 F"
'0 m;
Vafllé&fll€
67%? M0
2&4 M %6'W4 «NV/0W0
ml varA &§
@241
JQMWV
2453249 bfle 7QJW<
7
gym/"7' .
k)
CI," W/ m:
fax/037%,;
[/6va @'fl'xub a";
S37 g/L/43J VGV :44)"; C»
amCp/QKMM 4"
W may! W/W
2:1
we puma/1:4? 3'1
"149/ 0 Mdg
[0 7L y
,7 //o
f l/Z/OZ "13070 2T b?
/z~U/6(7VQ ,7 §\'
/"//72~' :1: "mi/W fJWW WOW Q1?E
WW V' /"
7L WW3
but? Xfl077b'r/k'Zj
"/0 W
+14 $77wa
€50,729 X9
\ffv\'p/bM/i 074 2wgsnlo
0/5 WW" {II
BJOW a/Hoy WAG? EH/
{Laom J: (/1301, glow WM-r/'bj
Q/M 75/10 73Jb§fl
7th fng zyfg/
'
Wwg|lio 7th?)
@ WM ti":'/j@dap&&
/7
OJV'A
V0 V VWVA #0
/ "JV/I:
[A 'r/7/'df
jg?!\ll/'a~/'l Gflfl1angsf
'7sz {,'l7// "737M
/'JdoJ/Q 97 n07;
[7/
J 1 5 f s'aV w\-I@Av
271 074
/7/b1"5
W 1) MW? L7H,7
§W635532mmog QUAD? /' 2r
S/'OMWVIW bay/"W
71/"7'? 07/ Sill/Vt/zfib
39
KW fagxfojcj) Q?
>5" ""527 \'MnI/MW)
g/0
74"!"70536
Cygfi fl}! flaw/4077f: 2's»? ,}
37:9
"WW 7% w j w
7+
9/?
'2" fWOO/ FIN!"
73/922 2"?
Wfl /f»"4?/O /W (we/W7
/
7&0
;W,I7.b/ "V
gun/77270]
{56V
W" L/flwb'
w -h
@Wg/m Wicca M?
/b7LM/zw: 474,,M
w,/bw7 <'
5
740'
r fléa S'ggfica/r)\'gQz'/,m/Ztgg
WW" "$20 7 W .
3/ éwaj 5.
/"6; ,"Vf'us'wsdf vaflm1§ ID
/\'lai JAG) 'A/aflan
15M;
fay {M)J§/3Q7L]L
'L'LflW"? 3W4? ab U1
W 4;
<30
'26?)ng (ff/(WyéI/b ajf/C'CJ?J
7
j jm'w;
"7'"?ij m") Inf
eriif ed Correct Cop
"77"" 7937/" 'l/Uuwwij {nfflyl/

V1! 3417 V/ 92770?
:57
gmyul
779/) S" 0/)/ %"'9 {Q urn/MW
/6'M CW
fidfikcf
"1:40:09 Sb a? [U7L0:470JJ
Avaf/Wf m"(
/wwg0/J:: :7, WWW 7/0 §\4fi3/
flz a? 77"" 729/? Wjbé
(fanfiZSW Waf'u1v7j U4
AdJJ {3/195}
"m5 @5/10; flay/V].
[7/ 7"" 60%
M "7an" J0
f7 $19 ZJGV
Wioyaja/ /M\'s\/a'/\': V"
few/"404.710 /0 W719
10
anwW j
/b)/,§/ éflfl/dé /?
( [Wilma/L6 {'1}
70g
"4,;[547'ga/'ug
ngfl /p\'/OfkraJ)
@74ny M w"
"Wm '~'2"'17 "92/4277?"
"WW/77*57M
r/éé/A
W. 3/0/1fo
/a:>0 aézo 0 )2b{
(fly/DP /? fwfM/vrf
/ mjneffj/
9/29/340/
WflaA 5'437/0/7 97/21/1477
cmy
fl"? L1+ngl7
/afw/D L149? M197 /' 2" fl/
5']! S2 04 8/2 C7 .1 f/
2L M! 934""?7
Qua/Iv? S\L/
L4"
(guié/LWVJé/aj
'JW .,
S\'¢/
7+ ya W§2'JC/}/
%"0\'"&10" W7 % W M
p7 i? "f
f: 779afi'
>' 7Z§Uub9
Caujaflf' 9§W7L?U
MQA cmvfi
C
Amt/331,, °> Maw '97J'J'G7
'23 wag / /0
Sim/m
g} %M3\'!7
4W fvnéjb futbtf
b7/vQ/%Z umk' flan/('3';
<1»; fl"? 7W}
y/bM/ mu vsx'W'Uf if
f/fi' (win/6d? /b{
rm [way/W 7'0
// [Zia/b/arJJI' .; 2% 37w
rfl<§4' H)"
"7741]"1 J
ifs WM&
2544 ("an W63J sfw 5:7
$07 jg 96'
: ?a¢7\L@/):Ld f/bag]
W 717 www WW»?
"/0 fifb14\'a /"A'ID
Mg_/7le;W)'J9 {11f '7
{(A' W667 /7Ub
(A0 Mia /
{2/65
C: fiJu-s'gbééb
'7
pm?" 97 7'5'/7"°/7
14g 2
17/0/24 97% b'"s'""\""5x'W "wafl/
J '4
A/LAGC?
Vs'QJ
"53/0/00
»
«1 w
W03/0M
3%}mcu <1 "@jjjav\7m\'d93)lll7 "Mil/V
'
MC "x' fm' #bf?
: *m/v"l'/\4 "H
)
l G
b
"E _
'01 le ggy"? b J9
>
7 (7Lwo 3 ] 3'
J
3 n) 10
ffiaa; 7L 7??';\/
(
5\q%:/7Vh,)v\'w'l"9
( / l?
WW? @4919? 4573714,? "7""
M 7L Sq\lbé}é' W)7<
V Mb' ,
J
"77%
W Wmf M fb'w'IWXva7§\.:
2' \)
. a
jW/V 471 / J ifaJ b
% gnu} w\qp§\I/0 4'
am) flMv/aag/ 31% //&y /7"{%
LOG "7L "/'/
97777 WV'WU J 4/1 Wa/'g
95 7 L7 97%
7/ 7 7 (
5
ray/pug
Wan/U u [7 'ws x
IX a 5 #:71ij
// 1
350.2(7/7 /'7 We? S''W
/r NM) 7//flb5$b mf
470
Q7" /»ibW/9
7zfl@9b Mag/J? "3'";
10
M/b 7W7SCU'fldb
a»,7IJ/m 1y
#0777 "My 773
"0'7"""7?"
Q
,2"
7N3 '7Wézk 1% m/4/\ 715300,!
2'1
j //W 2/1/7555?" 71/2,; aqu/{ff Wfi/ée
fiflMlZ7Ab/fl7
ég jig 'fb7% off/7M6? avail/l 0'),
S/W'Hééy/3 57% #0
~750/2/W7 (lbw I
PW"/\Jd5' [lg/90y T'JC/OlJ/élb
/5/!¢/J7A?'J 2%."
3'?/&WI % fjflgp 71/74 I
WIN/LCM 7L5v\)\oLV 7am)og/\ KM;
731/ '1'an
\7LG "\'fw/Q)'/\ [PW/)9
Jo
*0
MAC): fl' .Hn'oésk
/@ afiN/W ,, Ma
""WWA P""*5
0% W7) my Mn
W ggfl 90 Jb/"vw\J§ 10
my
7/?J7i5" (297/7 fkl'LH (jiffy 07L any"?!
\"\I (M'JJU?/ A}:
97M 9' 'lJ/ibL/IW"3] W
,7!" I/JW} 4U)'£WJ'7/\I/Vq
rfiuaf / (\fT/GCfiEJ fSj'
7am"; 97L ["04 Yfiy'AJS "WWM 0M
3/7
a w j WM I
WW /""" 271a" (v\74/@Jjn§
6? mum/any?
2w Cv'lf'YZ'l/flfl
£1 k7é/oa/W
'h'
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON:
"
FOR THE COUNTY OF CLATS OP
Verified Correct Copy of Original 7l31/2023._
?;'73JU 3,
9%
9.
Case N 0
0/ 5M7014 27:3 "(ELI-Z C?
y
Petition'er/Plaintiff CERTIFICATE
and OFSERYIQ _..._.,_._..
Zn 7
[MoreDefendant'
WW7 £052Respondent/
I am the El Petitioner/Plaintiff Defendant in this case.
I certifythat on (date) g ) '7' '3

'7'éfispondent/' ,Iprovidedatrue copy of (list each
document) Le 'H' w" \/
'3 -37
q 3} >
to the El Petitioner El Respondent C '6' B0 D14 01/4;thea ve
64>
I?Q\ttorneyfor
Wands of the EIPetitioner El Respondent I] Attorney for

at(address): C lm+r
(i/r
.0 D DA 5%
'7-3!
Date
'1 3
Signature
WK 0
P- nt N ame
(Al/l \ R\ Le iw/j
fflgcy m, 45A>Na
Contact Address City, State, ZIP
0K 97:03
t
777777777775 277377112377
wlsmtfl 774+
7777 77777777
de
imp/Vb; V77 V1772}? )Mw'é€

_V
7M~5 Q7
77/ 7 7""? 77/7'
727773 5777772777 WM
"/47": M9
LCD/V 0 0,
E7 77777777 7777777 7747777
7%
7W5 w H)
MD
"
7777777777 7"
"2/407:7%,:
) 67 737"?" 77777767
7"
[M 7:777777)'7
7
776 flhéé
77 7
"77:7 77777
7 77 ¢/""SS
5777 7777777 577777 <7
W?/'
nwéé
/119 we 250
Z7 '
, 73/ 5W (7 0777/,fl/
a
WWW
U {:2bZ/LVC" :
6202
AWE
71'?
777 777w? $077 'I\ g!
D 27/77/77747/ Il/nzogsic
/{"'b/ 7/10 rink/ins Ufl KM
77mm 777777777 77 77777777777 Maj
77 wa/OM
77/277770/0
/ [Io/2'75 W7, /707b.) /W
I 7779 7 7
/7. 77
vzru/vo W7 /WN]
'67 5/); 7777/21/77
Ufi/ /Mj m/gfg
"by/7w
(7
77 . u/
@ 097 77 77 7 f0 fé
,
75%:9/7y/%52/::(3 f" 7""
way/fig 77" W 7% Wm
$24"79 ; rW '7'
W ?/9"m"'" w w 609v\'7
13/1/91} 14/1
97294 b/0 l'n/
_§/\ %
gf/bay 7W "4 77/ 7"" WW7 v n
#9" ,,
/ "ji""v//fl103
Wfi%j')A {'7
" V;'///£b7tg
"3'2/07M 742120!
"Mil/{3x10 W17 (#3ij "/1 f299v37
Vaflg We'TWW/'A V"7/'/\:17L
7/3735va [b
x 7lbg? 71,17
~A
ZV7£991FUII
17'7""
7am?
[VJ/72L? [gut/(9
%9L7£u@2 [wflx/KS /27<I4b/l /}U/\
W W 7"" WW7
?Mfi'/*"7¢7 7")"
/ A'é/g Nd
5/104 7pc my {,7 oayflflfl
V/V fl~l7//W
of»; w/ 941272 {ff/7M6 {70"571/2/(9
0
52.27
% ky
L0
"me/W34
fl " #5
7/1a"m? ?Z
7 VFW/f W15
fw'i ulIWbpflxkf/L
/M)'/\1472/
azé {7/171/0)' f3.»
L7//),)/ r/Z7 L 5'52
Ly
[fifib 7Q
7 M/om'am
7ga/fl #27 #W b
71b wmy [ml/f/AMSSb yaw/Bi
'%}Jtpfl7'7
97L 2,0/9
My gill/yr? /W1y6@
Minn/W
7M V}'5/m0 741394; (1,7274;
@Qfgajf']
/b9fl7 'v/w/ S '70
JWU/+b 719 (11¢pr
rifI ed Correct Copy
W/ M WWW M WWW
"HS 17'9""! 71/099217
/3[fl/Ju//u33f £19099.) W"
WW, Z?
éflamfln 7lgq:j71 30/4!
ylwbmefi /"0??7 /@ /A A7 (f
70?
91 MUM/"'7 7'7)ny
M) C 057M
/Wz75;b
jj//OJ + 77L2q/
:aéf'P/(A (a (WM/10?
Mew J27
jny/WijW//7:WWWZWWWC 245
.'
vnmmM 9715 [Maya
""297
g"? 77 W2 film/J
;{ MW" ("Q/*7
4M6 "'7' f W7 (jW37
7/17
5/" "77/ij %/flw§$/D 3'77
"'4;
77 MM S/W/C/ fW/J fag/77
MMMU "MM MW M/MM
W977
ungaWlJ
ljjbae/'jqu VvhHo '6'?
5:222] /1
915mm WWW \m7fl )/
_,
%fiJ/%W2Wvl9;
fi'w'ff W'owM7/5 nJ/o /Lb J?
[ /./b WMW 7ZWWVL-7
by/W'M/ wbaw7// Va] 5'70
%
l/l/(Jfff
"W MM M 2'?
7522/ f9") 7% "0")
1W"
779M/ WWW/MW 5/5/90 f"0?97\'7
4/11,
flab/wagza, /y #l 2102/
l0// ('2'3/
'7'Dufla/ /M7f/m//U 2%."?
n74 aka/77X 7444/ #'7
7106?
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023.
fiq'ra mZ Oreaen
CaseNO' ZECRZSQ?71
Petitioner/ Plaintiff CER'I'IFICATE
and OF SERVICE
m/flflfo £052; [Dram/.3
Resp ondent/ Defendant 2:7
I am the El in this case.
Petitioner/PlaintifffiRespondent/Defendant
Icertifythaton (date) fl)
\
,/
,é
/z3 flo 074%? o
,Iprovidedatruecopyofaisteach
4' Gmfi'wm <6
document) [6&7 "£10 Peru/l so

A
CNN-2 L: 9+,gAr-l-I'C1QJ o r;
Qfasec727)y
,
Wain/WV) 14/20 r? Cam/67659643 'lcvbloqr WWW/bi , liq/190V

i
8 Mai) z'iVétwfcrr'p'l' , "907L540 $9, fee W64 WEN/13,20}? 5/

0 S '14,;30 5VWW+W7 '
rework (23 /
to the Petitioner E] Respondeht El Attorney for in the above
case y placing the do cument(s) in the:
Hands of the DPetitioner El Respondent D Attorneyfor C [R l' So

W )0 {24'
at (address):
and belief. I understand they are made for use as evidence in court and I an
<
/0
Date Signature
7%
EV.
PrintName
P O
Contact Address
120x (L City, State, ZIP
Asiaqu 019 97/03
503 "#438 227) L'Mq'fflanqi fl»? ounmufcm
ContactPhone [
Email Address & / j
eMQ
(deorrec
\J m 'V/
f) +\Z /{{7/€ 2040
9/}L1/J/'jfl7
Lu 05 WW'flM 36/07
M.
(7m M57 //m.7§ /§/i/\?7
ufl re cum/9
701149 74% 3/5299) g/ all
k7
19g 9/5/qu WoflA"A/én
?
49/)-éb/i /02é£b v19
77""
Jb
{WJOL/ 917/','/'7U//'c7l ug .3
1M 5 14,; 1M] yf/V 7 b Jfi'fl /"7 ("'7'
"'6' 4% f
2uvwfl/vw 3503/9} (17/ giw/orl
W7mm 4 5/
a/ Hwy Wv'Wf/
WW //7%/
7/5¥& Wif "30%
We! om
'WZDS/D
wolf/{am
fi'gil'm 271'
//,'M
.59
{2/9
£202 LI 130
MUE©§E>D 1/1
/19£?7 flwklufl'
Cfu/l'j Qgwyifl
(/2/ WMW
W0\IULIJ€
g0 [w CK
31/42/1
7127 "W "7%
(it/x767
K629zja>g¢ "7Q?
929$ 1/ ["0
%?%W6 WV %b &7 fiWW75
l
27/2 SwxyTfl
hwy.) 710 WWMSIW?
,vmawn
a/VQV f7"/' 7' "70 /W
m077gf/010/7LLWA70L#XU\LZ/
%
$1
07fl3v:
"9 7J/'Vw
"7www %W%wV
m w;
WWW /
gbfiW W
'7"? %~% fW7§W
A0
Q //7 [753/7
10 /wqz/;7/ Way/.6} 'djb/
"fly/"7 flflf'"Nd/,4
WC,
6
g, 92,? W0? Mag
477m; J10
971 W/M'Q/ '4/ "M7 fl/flm/f M f») /0ulo
W' irvwzz
*"W%/"J SWVWMW
[70$ "L/ M W?
/79?'W 6 oc/m'mfl/
ybjfl Vijbjfl VFW/WM if/w/QJ/fl WVfl
~m~
NEWSGATHERING
finimal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden

of 0rugmalJp/17/2
he Animal Legal Defense Fund and other organizations challenged Idaho Code Ann. § 18
042, known as an "aggag" statute, as...
Animal Legal Defense Fund and other organizations challenged Idaho Code Ann. § 18-7042,
<Elhe
$nown as an "aggag" statute, as unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
She US. Constitution. ifmiigflidtifcrimifigiiiés audio and video recordingmat agiiéiilhi'f?f5billfi§§§$l_i§f
as District Court for the District of ldaho struck.9,an thalawjlfhe Reporters Cor'iifiittee and 22:
:fnedia organiiations filed an 811116118 brief in the U.S Court of~Appeals for the Ninth Circuit i'rf
isupport of Plaintiffs-Appellees. The brief argues that journalists and whistleblowers who serve as
their sources have improved food safety and agriculture facility conditions through the years by
exposing violations. Idaho's "aggag" statue infringes upon the First Amendment rights of those
seeking to disseminate information to the public about food safety, the treatment of animals, and
environmental concerns. Amici also stress the unconstitutionality of the law under the First
Amendment as a content-based restriction on speech that cannot overcome strict scrutiny.
ALDF v. Wasden
Whwny L; flitir'uw'u u u "@965"

may wnaussa waged;
dices". lea-17$;
aéégasséLg Listyk:
Keep up With 0a work by sighting UD to receive our montfify tie We'll send you updates about the cases
we're domg journaiésts, news organizations, and documentary filmmakers working to keep you informed.
Emaii'
SUBSCRIBE
r? :rmn , m ":"w\- wwmw We

No. 15-35960
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANIIVIAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, et a1.,
PlaintzflsAppellees,
v.
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN,
DefendantAppellant.
United States District Court, District of Idaho

Honorable B. Lynn Winmill
Case No .: 1:14-cv-00104-BLW
BRIEF OF AMICI C URIAE THE REPORTERS COMIVIITTEE FOR

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND 22 MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS
IN SUPPORT OF PLAIN TIFFS-APPELLEES
Bruce D. Brown (bbrown@rcfp.org)

Counsel 0fRecord
Gregg P. Les lie
Michael J. Lambert
REP ORTERS COIMTT'EE FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
1156 15th St. NW, Suite 1250
Washington, DC 20005
Telephone: (202) 795-9300
Facsimile: (202) 795-9310
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pa
TABLE 0F CONTENTS 1
TABLE 0E AUTHORITIES
RULE 29(C)(5) CERTIFICATION 1
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS 1
SOURCE OE AUTHORITY TO FILE BRIEF 4

A
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMCI CURIAE

INTRODUCTION 6
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 6
ARGUMENT 7
I. Idaho's "ag-gag" statute infiinges on the First
Amendment rights ofjournalists who want to inforrn the
public about food safety 7
A. Investigations by journalists into agriculture
facilities have long played a Vital role in ensuring
food safety 9
B. Idaho's "ag gag" statute chills fiiture investigations

into the agriculture industry 12
H. The First Amendment protects speech on matters of

public concern by subjecting restrictions to strict scrutiny,
which is not satisfied by this statute l3
A. Speech on matters of public concern in which the
public has a right to know, including through audio
and Video recordings, warrants the highest degree
of protection 13
B. Idaho's "ag-gag" statute is a content-based

restriction on speech that does not survive strict
scrutiny 17
CONCLUSION 23
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES 23
l
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continues!)
Page
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP.

P. 32(a)(7)(C) AND CIRCUIT RULE 32-1 FOR CASE
NUMBER 15-35960 24
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 25
APPENDDI A: STATEMENTS OF ]NTEREST 26

APPENDIX B 30
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page's}
Cases
ACLU ofIllinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012) 14
Cit)» ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) 17
Cit)» of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) 15
Conniek v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) 15
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. , 472 U.S. 749
(1985) 14
ETW Corp. v.Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003) 14
Garrison v. State 0fLa., 379 U.S. 64 (1964) 17
Grosjean v. American Press Ca, 297 U.S. 233 (1936) 8
Klena'ienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) 16
Martin v. City ofStruthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) 16
MiamiHerald Pub. Co. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)

v.
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) 8
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm 'r ofRevenue,

460 U.S. 575 (1983) 8
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) 13, 20

NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) 15
New York Times Co. V. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 15
R.A. V. v.Cit)! ofSt. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1982) 17
Reed v. Town ofGilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) 18, 19

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) 8
Spelson v. CBS, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. 111. 1984) 15
Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) 17
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) 20

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) 22
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continueci)
P_ag_9.(§)
Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. , 425
U.S. 748 (1976) 16
Wieman v. Updegrafi', 344 U.S. 183 (1952) 13
Statutes
Idaho Code Ann. § 18-4801 (2014) 19
Idaho Code Ann. § 18-7008 (2014) 19
Idaho Code Ann. § 18-7011 (2014) 19
Idaho Code Ann. § 187042 (2014) passim

Idaho Code Ann. § 9-338 (2011) 22
Other Authorities
113 Cong. Rec. 2128386 (1967) 10
2001 Investigative Reporting, The Pulitzer Prizes,

www.pu1itzer.org/archives/6487 11
2 0] 0
Explanatory Reporting, The Pulitzer Prizes,

http J/www.pu1itzer.org/archives/S 819 11
Continuing Problems in USDA 's Enforcement of the Humane Methods

of SlaughterAct: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic
Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov 't Reform, 111th
Cong. (2010) 12
Food Safety, Agriculture Fact Book, US DA (20012002),

http J/www.us da. gov/factbook/chapter9htm 19
James Diedriclg The Jungle, Encyclopedia of Chicago (Janice L. Reift',

Ann Durkin Keating, & James R. Grossman, eds. 2005),
available at
http 'J/www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/679.html 9
James O'Shea, Raking the Muck, Chi. Trib., May 21, 2006, available
at http'J/bit.1y/18TWTjR 9
iV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)
Pagegsz
The 2008 Pulitzer Prize Winners.' Investigative Reporting, The Pulitzer

Prizes, http J/wwwpulitzer.org/citation/ZOOS-Investigative
Reporting 1 1
Wallace F. Janssen, The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels, Food
and Drug Admin,
http J/www. fda. gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Overviews/
ucm056044.htrn (last updated Dec. 14, 2011) (originally
published inFDA Consumer, June 1981) 9
V
RULE 29(Ci(5) CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5), amicz' states that no party' s counsel
authored this brief in Whole or in part; no party or party's counsel contributed
money that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief; and no person

other than the amicz', their members, or their counsel
contrlbuted money that
was intended to filnd preparing or submitting the brief.
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS

The parties to this amicus brief are: The Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press, American Society of News Editors, Association of Alternative
Newsmedia, California Newspaper Publishers Association, Californians Aware,
Dow Jones & Company, Inc., The E.W. Scripps Company, First Look Media
Works, Inc., Freedom of the Press Foundation, Idaho Press Club, The Idaho
Statesman, International Documentary Assn., Investigative Reporting Workshop at
American University, The Media Consortium, MPA

The Association of
Magazine Media, The National Press Club, National Press Photographers
Association, Online News Associatior1, PEN American Center, Radio Television
Digital News Association, Society of Professional Journalists, Student Press Law
Center, and Tully Center for Free Speech.
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1, amicz' disclose as follows:
1
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is an unincorporated
association of reporters and editors with no parent corporation and no stock.
American Society of News Editors is a private, non-stock corporation that
has no parent.
Association of Alternative Newsmedia has no parent corporation and does
not issue any stock.
California Newspaper Publishers Association is a mutual benefit corporation
organized under state law for the purpose of promoting and preserving the
newspaper industry in California.
Californians Aware is a nonprofit organization with no parent corporation
and no stock.
Dow Jones is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in
New York. News Corporation, a publicly held company, is the indirect parent
corporation of Dow Jones. Ruby Newco, LLC, a subsidiary of News Corporation
and a non-publicly held company, is the direct parent of Dow Jones. No publicly
held company directly owns 10% or more of the stock of Dow Jones.
The E.W. Scripps Company is a publicly traded company with no parent
company. No individual stockholder owns more than 10% of its stock.

First Look Media Works, Inc. is a non-profit non-stock corporation
organized under the laws of Delaware. No publicly-held corporation holds an
interest of 10% or more in First Look Media Works, Inc.
Freedom of the Press Foundation does not have a parent corporation, and no
publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of the stock of the organization.
The Idaho Press Club is a not-forprofit corporation that has no parent
company and issues no stock.
The Idaho Statesman Publishing, LLC (The Idaho Statesman) is owned by
The McClatchy Company which has no parent corporation but is publicly traded
on the NYSE under the ticker symbol MNI. Contrarius Investment Management
Limited owns 10% or more of the stock of The McClatchy Company.
The International Documentary Association is an non-forprofit organization
with no parent corporation and no stock.
The Investigative Reporting Workshop is a privately funded, nonprofit news
organization affiliated with the American University School of Communication in
Washington. It issues no stock.
The Media Consortium has no parent corporation and no stock.
MPA
The Association of Magazine Media has no parent companies, and
no publicly held company owns more than 10% of its stock.
3
The National Press Club is a not-forprofit corporation that has no parent
company and issues no stock.
National Press Photographers Association is a 501(c)(6) nonprofit
organization with no parent company. It issues no stock and does not own any of
the party's or amicus' stock.
Online News Association is a notforprofit organization. It has no parent
corporation, and no publicly traded corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.
PEN American Center has no parent or affiliate corporation.
Radio Television Digital News Association is a nonprofit organization that
has no parent company and issues no stock.
Society of Professional Journalists is a non-stock corporation with no parent
company.
Student Press Law Center is a 501(c)(3) not-forprofit corporation that has
no parent and issues no stock.
The Tully Center for Free Speechis a subsidiary of Syracuse University.
SOURCE OF AUTHORITY TO FILE BRIEF

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. 29(a), all parties to this appeal have given consent
for amicz' to file this brief. See also Ninth Circuit Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 29-3.
4
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OFAMICICURIAE
Amicz', all of whom are engaged in news gathering or represent the interests
ofjournalists and publishers, have an interest in ensuring that reliable resources are
available to them so that they may gather the news in a way that benefits the public
and serves as a watchdog on the agriculture industry.
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is joined in this brief by
American Society of News Editors, Association of Alternative Newsmedia,
California Newspaper Publishers Association, Californians Aware, Dow Jones &
Company, Inc., The E.W. Scripps Company, First Look Media Works, Inc.,
Freedom of the Press Foundation, Idaho Press Club, The Idaho Statesman,
International Documentary As sn., Investigative Reporting Workshop at American
University, The Media Consortium, MPA The Association of Magazine Media,

The National Press Club, National Press Photographers Association, Online News
Association, PEN American Center, Radio Television Digital News Association,
Society of Professional Journalists, Student Press Law Center, and Tully Center for
Free Speech. Descriptions of all parties to this brief are given more fully in
Appendix A.
5
INTRODUCTION
Amicz', filing in support of PlaintiffsAppellees Animal Legal Defense Fund,
et a1. ("ALDF") urge this Court to affirm the district court's order granting
ALDF' s motion for summary judgment. The district court properly found Idaho
Code Ann. § 18-7042, known as Idaho's "ag-gag" statute, unconstitutional under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Amici write to
stress the First Amendment concerns of the news media if the statute is allowed to
remain in effect.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
By criminalizing audio and Video recording at agriculture facilities, the
Idaho "aggag" statute weakens food safety while stifling flee speech. Journalists
and the whistleblowers who serve as their sources have long been credited with
advancing the safety of the food the public consumes, and while federal
inspections have drastically improved the safety of food in the past century,
problems within the inspection system leave a gap in food safety that journalists
and others have filled. The Idaho statute poses a substantial risk of criminalizing
lawful
and constitutionally protected newsgathering activity and chilling the
very journalism that has previously led to positive changes and a healthier food
supply.
6
Amicz' also emphasize the importance of protecting speech of public concern
criminalized by the statute. The public has a right to receive pertinent information
about the treatment of animals, the environmental impact of the agriculture
industry, and the safety of employees and the public food supply.
Furthermore, Idaho's "aggag" statute is a content-based restriction that does
not survive strict scrutiny. The law targets speech based on its communicative
content namely, recording the "conduct of an agricultural production facility' s

operations." Idaho Code Ann. § 18-7042(1)(d) (2014). The state'sproffered
interests of protecting property rights are not compelling, and the law is not
narrowly tailored. Thus, as the district court correctly concluded, Idaho's "ag-gag"
statute should be struck down as unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
ARGUMENT
I. Idaho's "ag-gag" statute infringes on the First Amendment rights
of journalists who want to inform the public about food safety.
Idaho's "aggag" statute conflicts with the principle that the First
Amendment protects
and even encourages
the press to act as a watchdog and
chalbnge the status quo. The Idaho statute criminalizes journalistic actions that
have previously led to positive social change and chills the same type of
investigative reporting in the future.
As the U.S. Supreme Court has found, "[t]he Constitution specifically
selected the press . . . to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs."
7
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966). The Founders envisioned the press as
a means to fieely challenge authority Without government restraint. See Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protections given speech and press
was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the brining about of
political and social changes desired by the people"); MinneapolisStar & Tribune
C0. v. Minnesota Comm 'r ofRevenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (quoting Grosjean
v. American Press Co, 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)) (An "'untrammeled press [is] a
vital source of public information,' . . . and an informed public is the essence of
working democracy"). Quoting Thomas Jefferson, the Court wrote that "[where]
the press is fiee, and every man able to read, all is safe." Miami Herald Pub. Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 260 (1974). Further, "any other system that would
supplant private control of the press with the heavy hand of government intrusion
would make the government the censor of what the people may read and know."
Id.
The Idaho statute does specifically what the Court warns against
it grants
the government control over the press and censors information to be disseminated
to the public. Criminalizing journalism on food and agriculture safety limits the
press from investigating and questioning the food industry. Where it should be
extending the leash, the Idaho government instead muzzles the watchdog.
A. Investigations by journalists into agriculture facilities have

long played a vital role in ensuring food safety.
The watchdog role of the press in protecting the public' s interest in a s afe
food supply and the conditions under which that food is produced has along and
time-honored history. Upton Sinclair's famous 1906 expose' on Chicago's
slaughterhouses, The Jungle, and his contemporaries' works were among the early
works of investigative journalism. See James O' Shea, Raking the Muck, Chi.
Trib., May 21, 2006, available at http J/bit.ly/18TwTjR. Although his novel is
centered around a fictitious Lithuanian immigrant, Sinclair conducted extensive
research, interviewing health inspectors and workers and going undercover into the
meatpacking facilities to witness the unsanitary conditions firsthand. James
Diedrick, TheJungle, Encyclopedia of Chicago (Janice L. Reiff, Ann Durkjn
Keating, & James R. Grossman, eds. 2005), available at http J/wwwencyclopedia.
chicagohistory.orgpages/679html. Sinclair's work is credited with aiding passage
of the Pure Food and Drug Act and Meat Inspection Act, both enacted in 1906,
which instituted vigorous reforms in the meatpacking industry. Id. ; see also
Walhce F. J anssen, The Stow» 0f the Laws Behind the Labels, Food and Drug
Admin, http J/www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/I-Iistory/Overviews/
ucm056044.htm (last updated Dec. 14, 2011) (originally published in FDA
Consumer, June 1981) ("A single chapter in Upton Sinclair's novel, The Jungle,
precipitated legislation expanding federal meat regulation to provide continuous
9
inspection of all red meats for interstate distribution, a far more rigorous type of
control than that provided by the pure food bill").
The type of reform that followed publication of The Jungle has repeated
itself numerous times in the century that followed. In the late 1960s, Nick Kotz,
reporter for the Minneapolis Tribune, wrote a series of stories revealing
widespread unsanitary conditions in the country's meatpacking plants. 113 Cong.
Rec. 21283-86 (1967). His investigative reporting contributed to the passage of
the Meat Inspection Act of 1967, which extended the reach of federal regulation to
cover not only meat that crossed state borders but all slaughterhouses and meat-
processing facilities in the United States. Id. at 21283. During a congressional
session leading to the passage of the Act, Sen. Walter Mondale thanked Kotz for
bringing the issue to Congress' s attention, saying "the press must take a major
share of the credit for action in this area." Id.
Kotz and a number of journalists since have won Pulitzer Prizes for their
reporting on such issues. Tony Horwitz of The Wall Street Journal won the prize
in 1995 for stories about working conditions for low-wage workers, including an
article on the dangers facing workers at poultry facilities that he reported on while
employed at two such places. See The 1995 Prize Winner in National Reporting,
http 'j/wwwpulitzer.org/winners/tony-horwitz. Michael Moss of the New York
Times won in 2010 for calling into question the effectiveness of injecting ammonia
10
into beef to remove E. coli See 2 01 OExplanaz'oryReporting, The Pulitzer
Prizes, http'J/Www.pulitzer.org/archives/8819. Numerous others

such as David
Willman with the Los Angeles Times, who reported on the missteps of the Food
and Drug Administration in approving the diabetes pill Rezulin

have won
Pulitzer Prizes for their investigative reporting on consumer safety and federal
regulatory oversight. See 2001 Investigative Reporting, The Pulitzer Prizes,
www.pu1itzer.org/archives/648 7; The 2008 Pulitzer Prize Winners.' Investigative
Reporting, The Pulitzer Prizes, http 'J/Www.pulitzer.org/citation/ZOO8-
Investigative-Reporting (awarding the prize to the Chicago Tribune staff for
reporting on "faulty governmental regulation of toys, car seats and cribs, resulting
in tie extensive recall of hazardous products and congressional action to tighten
supervision" and New York Times reporters "for their stories on toxic ingredients in
medicine and other everyday products imported fi'om China, leading to
crackdowns by American and Chinese officials").
The govemment's inspection system itself is often flawed, which makes
independent observation and verification even more important. At times
inspection teams are short staffed, and inspectors can be undermined by their
supervisors or choose to turn a blind eye to problems. See generally Continuing
Problems in USDA 's Enforcement of the Humane Methods of SlaughterAct.'
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight
11
& Gov't Reform, 111th Cong. (2010). USDA inspector Dean Wyatt repeatedly
reported abuses in a Vermont facility he observed, and rather than taking action
against the plant, his supervisors demoted and reprimanded him. Id. at 38-39.
They told him "to drastically reduce the amount of time [he] spent on humane
handling enforcement because [he] was finding too many problems." Id. at 38.
Many of the people and organizations at the center of unveiling problems
within the food industry were eventually praised by government bodies. The
White House invited reporter Nick Kotz to Washington, D.C., for his investigative
journalism that led to the passage of the Meat Inspection Act of 1967. O' Shea,
supra. However, by passing the "ag-gag" statute, the Idaho legislators have
punished rather than praised those seeking to uncover issues in the food and
agriculture industry.
B. Idaho's "ag gag" statute chills future investigations into the

agriculture industry.
The Idaho statute is certain to have a chilling effect on fiiture speech.
Because of the law, journalists who pursue the types of investigations that lead to
beneficial changes in the food industry will have to be excessively cautious in their
actions for fear they will be jailed or fined for doing their jobs. If they take steps to
ensure they do not violate this broad law in any way, they will miss the story that
should be told. The limits this places on news gathering is an improper restriction
on speech and diminishes the marketplace of ideas. See Wieman v. Updegrafl, 344
12
U.S. 183,
195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (writhlg that when the
government deters First Amendment protected expression, the government "has an
unmistakable tendency to chill that flee play of the spirit" of others). Idaho's
statute closes off the "breathing space" the First Amendment needs to survive.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
Journalistic scrutiny of agricultural production facilities can only lead to
better food safety. Silencing the speech ofjournalists and the whistleblowers who
act as their sources with the threat of criminal conviction leaves a federal
inspection system fiaught with its own problems as the lone watchdog over the
food the public consumes. Idaho' s statute should be struck down because the
government must not discourage journalists fiom providing the same searching
examination of the food industry that has resulted in safer food to the nation for
over 100 years.
II. The First Amendment protects speech on matters of public

concern by subjecting restrictions to strict scrutiny, which is not
satisfied by this statute.
A. Speech on matters of public concern in which the public has

a right to know, including through audio and video
recordings, warrants the highest degree of protection.
Idaho legislators apparently misunderstand the purpose ofjournalists and
other organizations investigating agriculture operations. During a committee
hearing, an Idaho Senator compared those seeking to uncover issues witliin the
13
agriculture industry to terrorists, saying the bill was "the way you combatyour
enemies." ER 5. In reality, investigative journalists share the same concerns as the
state representatives
making sure the American people can safely consume food
placed on their dinner tables. In order to guarantee that food safety news reaches
the public, the law must safeguard the capturing, dissemination, and receipt of this
valuable information.
The creation of audio and video recordings is entitled to First Amendment
protection. See ACLU 0fIllinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012)
("The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included
within the First Amendment's guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary
of the right to disseminate the resulting recording"); ETW Corp. v. Jz'reh Publ 'g,
Ina, 332 F.3d 915, 924 (6th Cir. 2003) ("The protection of the First Amendment is
not limited to written 0r spoken words, but includes other mediums of expression,
including music, pictures, films, photographs, paintings, drawings, engravings,
prints, and sculptures").
By barrirlg journalists and their sources from scrutinizing the agriculture
industry through audio or video recordings, Idaho Code Ann. § 18-7042 restricts
speech of public concern fiom entering the marketplace of ideas. Speech of public
concern lies "at the heart of the First Amendment," Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Ina, 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985), and occupies the "highest
14
of the hierarchy of First Amendment values," NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
rung
Ca, 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982). Courts protect speech on matters of public concern
because "freedom to discuss public affairs and public officials is unquestionably
. . . the kind of speech the First Amendment was primarily designed to keep Within
the area of free discussion." New York Times C0. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 296-
97 (1964). Speech of public concern is speech that can "be fairly considered as
relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community" or
when it is a "subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public."
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); Cit}; 0f San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S.
77, 84 (2004).
In this case, the Idaho "aggag" statute squarely suppresses speech relating
to topics of universal importance

the safety of employees and the public food
supply, the treatment of animals, and the impact of the agriculture industry on the
environment. The agriculture industry affects the health of consumers through the
safety of the food it produces and the health of employees through workplace
conditions. Discussion of public health is clearly valuable speech protected under
the First Amendment. See Spelson v. CBS, Ina, 581 F. Supp. 1195, 1206 (N.D. Ill.
1984) ("There may be no more serious or critical issue extant today than the health
of human beings. Given the frailty of human existence, any controversy on the
subject must be afforded wide open discussion and criticism so that individuals
15
may make well educated health care choices."). There is also significant
community concern regarding the treatment of animals and how the agriculture
industry affects the environment. Idaho' s attempt to gag these areas of substantial
public interest violates the First Amendment's commitment to encouraging speech
on matters of public concern.
The U.S. Supreme Court has found that the public has a heightened and
independent First Amendment right to receive information, independent of the
speech interests of journalists and other advocates. "[W]here a speaker exists, as is
the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to
its recipients both." Va. State Bd. ofPharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976). Virginia Pharmacy explained that this precept was
"clear fiom the decided cases," id. , such as Klendienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
76263 (1972), where again the Court referred to a broadly accepted right to
"receive information and ideas," and Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943), where the Court wrote:
The authors of the First Amendment knew that novel and

unconventional ideas might disturb the complacent, but they choseto
encourage a freedom which they believed essential if vigorous
enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance. This
fieedom embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily
protects the right to receive it.
Martin, 319 U.S. at 143 (internal citations omitted). Where petitioners have a
constitutionally protected interest in communicating with the public, the public has
16
a corresponding constitutional interest in receiving the communications in order to
fillly realize its own political fieedoms. See Garrison v. State 0fLa. , 379 U.S. 64,
74-75 (1964) ("[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than selfexpression; it
is the essence of self-government").
Because members of the public cannot themselves monitor all of the
production facilities that produce their food, they rely on investigative journalists,
food safety organizations, federal regulators, and Whistleblowers to inform them
about the safety of the food they eat. The government should not be allowed to use
a statute to censor speech about such an important topic under the First
Amendment. Under Idaho's "aggag" statue, these journalistic investigations and
publications would be nearly nonexistent, and public knowledge of and debate on
this important matter of concern would be stunted.
B. Idaho's "ag-gag" statute is a content-based restriction on

speech that does not survive strict scrutiny.
Content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional
under the First Amendment. Cit}; ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 47
(1986). Governments are prohibited fiom restricting speech based on its content
because content-based laws threaten to "manipulate the public debate through
coercion rather than persuasion," Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
641 (1994), and permit governments to "drive certain ideas or viewpoints fiom the
marketplace." RA. V. v. Cit}; of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1982). Content-based
17
laws are only constitutional if they survive strict scrutiny, which requires the laws
to be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. Reed v. Town of
Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
In Reed, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the town of Gilbert' s sign
code because it was a content-based regulation. The Court defmed content-based
regulations as "those that target speech based on its communicative content." Id.
It noted that:
This commonsense meaning of the phrase "content based" requires a

court to consider whether a regulation of speech"on its face" draws
distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys. Some facial
distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regulated
speech by paiticular subject matter, and others are more subtle,
defining regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are
distinctions drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, and,
therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.
Id. at 2227.
It is clear Idaho's "aggag" statute directly regulates the content of speech.
Using the U.S. Supreme Court's definition fiom Reed, Idaho's "aggag" statute is
content based because it regulates speech "by particular subject matter"
namely,
"conduct of an agricultural production facility's operations." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at
2227; Idaho CodeAnn. § 18-7042(1)(d). While the law prohibits speech
concerning the operations of an agricultural production facility, the law says
nothing about other speech at agricultural production facilities. For example, as
the district court explained, recording a private conversation between an
18
agricultural production facility owner and a spouse would not Violate the law,
While recording animal abuse, a topic of significant public importance, would
ViolaIe the law. ER 15. Thus, Idaho's "aggag" law is a contentbased regulation
because it "target[s] speechbased on its communicative content." Reed, 135 S. Ct.
at 2226. Accordingly, in order to survive a constitutional challenge, the law must
be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests. Id. at 2222.
The Idaho government asserts the "ag-gag" statute "protects against
unwarranted intrusions on legitimate property interests." Def Br. at 17. However,
with respect to the privacy interests of agricultural producers, the government has
already done the calculation and decided that food safety requires some intrusion
into production facilities. Plant operations are highly scrutinized by the federal
government, with inspectors regularly visiting the premises, observing operations,
testing meat products, and examining livestock. See Food Safety, Agriculture Fact
Book, USDA (20012002), http://www.usda.gov/factbook/chapter9.ht1n.
Additionally, the owners and operators of agriculture plants are already
protected by laws of general applicability fiom activities that are truly designed to
interfere with their operations. Idaho has trespass, conversion, fiaud, and
defamation laws sufficient to protect these interests and address acts by individuals
or organizations that overstep legal bounds. Idaho Code Ann. §§ 18-7008, 18-
7011, 184801 (2014).
l9
Even assuming Idaho's asserted state interest provides some public benefit,
it does not meet the high bar required of content-based law. Content-based
regulations have generally been permitted in only a few specifically identified
categories of speech, including (1) advocacy intended, and likely, to incite
imminent lawless action; (2) obscenity; (3) defamation; (4) speech integral to
criminal conduct; (5) fighting words; (6) child pornography; (7) fiaud; (8) true
threats; and (9) speech that presents a grave and imminent threat the government
has the power to prevent. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012)
(citations omitted). Idaho' s proffered interest of protecting property rights
certainly does not fall into any of those categories.
No matter the state interest asserted, Idaho's ag gag statute is not narrowly
tailored to be the least restrictive means of achieving these interests. A blanket gag
on all image and audio recording of agricultural operations is overly broad and
unnecessaiy, criminalizing a number of constitutionally protected news gathering
activities. Though a law may have some valid applications, the court must
consider whether it may be overbroad as applied in any given situation, infi'inging
on otherwise protected speech. As the Supreme Court has recognized, we must be
aware of "the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment fieedoms, the
existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application."
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 43233 (1963). Idaho's "ag-gag" statute is
20
of precisely that. A plain reading of the
susceptible statute suggests it criminalizes
the recording of crops being sprayed by pesticides, Idaho Code Ann. § 18
7042(2)(a)(iii); empty fields being plowed in preparation for planting, § 18-
7042(2)(a)(ii); an old barn being repaired, § 18-7042(2)(a)(i) ("maintenance and
repair of an agricultural production facility"); and perhaps even a home gardener
planting tomatoes in his yard, § 18-7042(2)(a)(iv) (all "planting" and "growing").
An "[a]gricultura1 production facility" is essentially defined as any place where
"agricultural production" takes place

even public land. § 18-7042(2)(b).
The statute prohibits anyone fiom entering "an agricultural production
facility" and making an audio or video recording "Without the facility owner's
express consen ." § 18-7042(1)(d). There are plenty of scenarios Where journalists
enter property and record with implied consent or with the consent of someone
who is not the owner, and they should not be criminally penalized for it. Under the
statute, it is a crime for a reporter to record an interview with an employee,
potentially even a manager, of a facility

whether it be a meat-processing plant, a
beekeeping facility, or a plant nursery

because the manager gave consent, but
the owner did not. See id. Likewise, it is a crime for a news crew to film the
owner spreading seeds in an open field while standing on the edge of the land,
even if the owner gave implied consent by willingly answering questions after
knowing he was being filmed. See id.
21
It is equally of concern that the statute criminalizes "obtain[ing] records of
an agricultural production facility by force, threat, misrepresentation or trespass,"§
187042(1)(b), and the statute includes publicly owned operations in the definition
of an "agricultural production facility," § 18-7042(2)(b). This means someone
who seeks to obtain public records under the state's public records act could
apparently be criminally prosecuted if he is accused of misrepresenting himself,
perhaps by telling an agency he wants to use the information for personal use but
then publishes it onhis blog. Yet the intent of the requester generally should not
matter under Idaho's statute, and officials are, in fact, prohibited fiom making any
"inquiry" of the requesters except in limited circumstances. Idaho Code Ann. § 9-
338(5) (2011).
Even if not intended to reach constitutionally-protected newsgathen'ng, the
validity of an overreaching statute cannot be saved by the assumption

or even
the promise
that the government will enforce it narrowly. As the Supreme
Court held in its case concerning the distribution of videos depicting animal
cruelty: "[T]he First Amendment protects against the Government; it does not
leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige. We would not uphold an unconstitutional
statute merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly." United
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010). Idaho's statute cannot be upheld, even
if the government asserted it would tailor its use of the statute and would not
22
prosecute journalists and their sources for engaging in newsgathering and
dissemination.
Ultimately, Idaho's "aggag" statute is unconstitutional as a content-based
restriction not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amicz' curiae respectfully urge this Court to
uphold the district court's ruling.
Respectftu submitted,
s/ Bruce D. Brown
Bruce D. Brown
Counsel 0f record for amicus curiae
Gregg P. Leslie
Michael J. Lambert
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

Undersigned counsel is unaware of any related cases pending in this Court.
Dated: June 27, 2016

s/ Bruce D. Brown
Bruce D. Brown
Counsel 0fRecord for amicus curiae
the Press
23
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO FED. R.
APP. P. 32(a)(7)(Ci AND CRCUIT RULE 32-1 FOR CASE

NUMBER 15-35960
I certify that this brief complies with the length limits set forth at Ninth
Circuit Rule 32-1. The brief' s type size and type face comply with Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(5) and (6). Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(C), the attached brief is
proportionally spaced, has a typeface of l4 points or more, and contains 3,963
words.
s/ Bruce D. Brown
Bruce D. Brown
Counsel 0fRecord for am z'cus curiae
the Press
24
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Ihereby certify that on June 27, 2016, an electronic copy of the foregoing
Brief was filed with the Clerk of Court for the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and delivered by operation of the CM/ECF system to the counsel
of record.
s/ Bruce D. Brown
Bruce D. Brown
Counsel 0fRecord for amicus curiae
the Press
25
APPENDIX A: STATEMENTS OF INTEREST
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is a voluntary,

unincorporated association of reporters and editors that works to defend the First
Amendment rights and fieedom of information interests of the news media. The
Reporters Committee has provided assistance and research in First Amendment
and Freedom of Information Act litigation since 1970.
With some 500 members, American Society of News Editors ("ASNE") is

an organization that includes directing editors of daily newspapers throughout the
Amen'cas. ASNE changed its name in April 2009 to American Society of News
Editors and approved broadening its membership to editors of online news
providers and academic leaders. Founded in 1922 as American Society of
Newspaper Editors, ASNE is active in a number of areas of interest to top editors
with priorities on improving fieedom of information, diversity, readership and the
credibility of newspapers.
Association of Alternative Newsmedia ("AAN") is a not-for-profit trade

association for 130 alternative newspapers in North America, including weekly
papers like The Village Voice and Washington City Paper. AAN newspapers and
their websites provide an editorial alternative to the mainstream press. AAN
members have a total weekly circulation of seven million and a reach of over 25
million readers.
The California Newspaper Publishers Association ("CNPA") is a nonprofit

trade association representing the interests of over 1300 daily, weekly and student
newspapers and newspaper websites throughout California.
Californians Aware is a nonpartisan nonprofit corporation organized under

the laws of California and eligible for tax exempt contrlbutions as a 501(c)(3)
charity pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code. Its mission is to foster the
improvement of, compliance with and public understanding and use of, the
California Public Records Act and other guarantees of the public's rights to find
out what citizens need to know to be truly self-governing, and to share what they
know and believe without fear or loss.
Dow Jones & Company, Inc., a global provider of news and business
information, is the publisher of The Wall Street Journal, Barron's, MarketWatch,
Dow Jones Newswires, and other publications. Dow Jones maintains one of the
world's largest newsgathering operations, with more than 1,800 journalists in
26
nearly fifty countries publishing news in several different languages. Dow Jones
also provides information services, including Dow Jones Factiva, Dow Jones Risk
& Compliance, and Dow Jones VentureSource. Dow Jones is a News Corporation
company.
The E.W. Scripps Company serves audiences and businesses through

television, radio and digital media brands, with 33 television stations in 24
markets. Scripps also owns 34 radio stations in eight markets, as well as local and
national digital journalism and information businesses, including mobile video
news service Newsy and weather app developer WeatherSphere. Scripps owns and
operates an award-winning investigative reporting newsroom in Washington, D.C.
and serves as the long-time steward of the nation's largest, most successful and
longest-running educational program, the Scripps National Spelling Bee.
First Look Media Works, Inc. is a new nonprofit digital media venture that
produces The Intercept, a digital magazine focused on national security reporting.
Freedom of the Press Foundation is a non-profit organization that supports

and defends public-interest journalism focused on transparency and accountability.
The organization works to preserve and strengthen First and Fourth Amendment
rights guaranteed to the press through a variety of avenues, including public
advocacy, legal advocacy, the promotion of digital security tools, and crowd-
funding.
The Idaho Press Club is a statewide association of working journalists fiom

all media whose mission is to promote excellence in journalism, fieedom of
expression and fieedom of information.
The Idaho Statesman is the most widely read newspaper in the state of
Idaho.
The International Documentary Association (IDA) is dedicated to building

and serving the needs of a thriving documentary culture. Through its programs, the
IDA provides resources, creates community, and defends rights and fieedoms for
documentary artists, activists, and journalists.
The Investigative Reporting Workshop, a project of the Schoolof

Communication (SOC) at American University, is a nonprofit, professional
newsroom. The Workshop publishes in-depth stories at
investigativereportingworkshop.org about government and corporate
27
accountability, ranging Widely fi'om the environment and health to national

security and the economy.
The Media Consortimn is a network of the country's leading, progressive,

independent media outlets. Our mission is to amplify independent media's voice,
increase our collective clout, leverage our current audience and reach new ones.
MPA The Association of Magazine Media, ("MPA") is the largest industry

association for magazine publishers. The MPA, established in 1919, represents

over 175 domestic magazine media companies with more than 900 magazine titles.
The MPA represents the interests of weekly, monthly and quarterly publications
that producetitles on topics that cover politics, religion, sports, industry, and
Virtually every other interest, avocation or pastime enjoyed by Americans. The
MPA has a long history of advocating on First Amendment issues.
The National Press Club is the world's leading professional organization for
journalists. Founded in 1908, the Club has 3,100 members representing most major
news organizations. The Club defends a flee press worldwide. Each year, the Club
holds over 2,000 events, including news conferences, luncheons and panels, and
more than 250,000 guests come through its doors.
The National Press Photographers Association ("NPPA") is a 501(c)(6) non-

profit organization dedicated to the advancement of visual journalism in its
creation, editing and distribution. NPPA's approximately 7,000 members include
television and still photographers, editors, students and representatives of
businesses that serve the Visual journalism industry. Since its founding in 1946, the
NPPA has vigorously promoted the constitutional rights ofjournalists as well as
fieedom of the press in all its forms, especially as it relates to visual journalism.
The submission of this brief was duly authorized by Mickey H. Osterreicher, its
General Counsel.
Online News Association ("ONA") is the world's largest association of

online journalists. ONA's mission is to inspire innovation and excellence among
journalists to better serve the public. ONA' s more than 2,000 members include
news writers, producers, designers, editors, bloggers, technologists, photographers,
academics, students and others who produce news for the Internet or other digital
delivery systems. ONA hosts the annual Online News Association conference and
administers the Online Journalism Awards. ONA is dedicated to advancing the
interests of digital journalists and the public generally by encouraging editorial
28
integrity and independence, journalistic excellence and fieedom 0f expression and

access.
PEN American Center is a non-profit association of writers that includes

poets, playwrights, essayists, novelists, editors, screenwriters, journalists, literary
agents, and translators ("PEN"). PEN has approximately 4,300 members and is
affiliated with PEN International, the global writers' organization with 144 centers
in more than 100 countries in Europe, Asia, Afiica, Australia, and the Americas.
PEN International was founded in 1921, in the aftermath of the First World War,
by leading European and American writers who believed that the international
exchange of ideas was the only way to prevent disastrous conflicts born of
isolation and extreme nationalism. Today, PEN works along with the other
chapters of PEN International to advance literature and protect the fieedom of the
written word wherever it is imperiled. It advocates for writers all over the world.
Radio Television Digital News Association ("RTDNA") is the world's

largmt and only professional organization devoted exclusively to electronic
journalism. RTDNA is made up of news directors, news associates, educators and
students in radio, television, cable and electronic media in more than 30 countries.
RTDNA is committed to encouraging excellence in the electronic journalism
industry and upholding First Amendment fieedoms.
Society of Professional Journalists ("SPJ") is dedicated to improving and

protecting journalism. It is the nation's largest and most broad-based journalism
organization, dedicated to encouraging the fiee practice ofjournalism and
stimulating high standards of ethical behavior. Foundedin 1909 as Sigma Delta
Chi, SPJ promotes the flee flow of information vital to a well-informed citizenry,
works to inspire and educate the next generation ofjournalists and protects First
Amendment guarantees of fieedom of speech and press.
Student Press Law Center ("SPLC") is a no nprofit, nonpartisan organization

which, since 1974, has been the nation's only legal assistance agency devoted
exclusively to educating high schooland college journalists about the rights and
responsibilities embodied in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. SPLC provides fiee legal assistance, information and educational materials
for student journalists on a variety of legal topics.
The Tully Center for Free Speechbegan in Fall, 2006, at Syracuse

University's S.I. Newhouse Schoolof Public Communications, one of the nation's
premier schools of mass communications.
29
APPENDIXB
Kevin M. Goldberg David M. Giles

Fletcher, Heald & Hildreth, PLC Vice President]
1300 N. 17th St, 11th Floor Deputy General Counsel
Arlington, VA 22209 The E.W. Scripps Company
Counselfor American Societjz ofNews 312 Walnut St., Suite 2800
Editors Cincinnati, OH 45202
Kevin M. Goldberg Lynn Oberlander

Fletcher, Heald & Hildreth, PLC General Counsel, Media Operations
1300 N. 17th St., 11th Floor First Look Media Works, Inc.
Arlington, VA 22209 18th Floor
Counselfor Association ofAlternative 114 Fifth Avenue
Newsmedia New York, NY 10011
Jim Ewert, General Counsel Marcia Hofinann

Nikki Moore, Legal Counsel Counselfor Freedom of the Press
California Newspaper Publishers Foundation
Association 25 Taylor Street
2701 K St. San Francisco, CA 94012
Sacramento, CA 95816
Terry Francke Juan Cornejo

General Counsel The McClatchy Company
Californians Aware 2100 Q Street
2218 Homewood Way Sacramento, CA 95816
Carmichael, CA 95608 Counselfor The Idaho Statesman
Jason P. Conti James Cregan

Jacob P. Goldstein Executive Vice President
Dow Jones & Company, Inc. MPA The Association of Magazine

1211 Avenue of the Americas Media

New York, NY 10036 1211 Connecticut Ave. NW Suite 610
Counselfor Dow Jones & Company, Washington, DC 20036
Inc.
30
Charles D. Tobin Katherine Glenn Bass

Holland & Knight LLP 588 Broadway, Suite 303
800 17th Street, NW New York, NY 10012
Suite 1100 Kathleen A. Kirby
Washington, DC 20006 Wiley Rein LLP
Counselfor The National Press Club 1776 K St., NW
Counselfor Radio Television Digital
News Association
Mickey H. Osterreicher Bruce W. Sanford

1100 M&T Center, 3 Fountain Plaza, Mark I. Bailen
Buffalo, NY 14203 James Romoser
Counselfor National Press Baker & Ho stetler LLP
PhotographersAssociation 1050 Connecticut Ave., NW
Suite 1100
Counselfor Societjx ofProfessional
Journalists
Laura R. Handman Frank D. LoMonte

Alison Schary Student Press Law Center
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP 1101 Wilson Blvd., Suite 1100
1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Arlington, VA 22209
Suite 800
Thomas R. Burke
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP
Suite 800
500 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
Counselfor 0n Zine News Association
31
Verified Correct Co py of Original 10/17/2023. Case: 15-35960. 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318. DktEntry: 92-1, Page 1 of 56
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND; No. 15-35960

PEOPLE FOR THE ETHICAL
TREATMENT 0F ANIMALS INC; D.C. No.
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 1:14-cv-00104-
OF IDAHO; CENTER FOR FOOD BLW
SAFETY; FARM SANCTUARY; RIVER'S
WISH ANIMAL SANCTUARY;
WESTERN WATERSI-IEDS PROJECT; OPINION
SANDPOINT VEGETARIANS; IDAHO
CONCERNED AREA RESIDENTS FOR
THE ENVIRONMENT; IDAHO HISPANIC
CAUCUS INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH
AND EDUCATION; COUNTERPUNCH;
FARM FORWARD; WILL POTIER;
JAMES MCWILLIAMS; MONTE
HICKMAN; BLAIR KOCH; DANIEL
HAUFF,
PlaintififS-Appellees,
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN, in his

official capacity as Attorney General
of Idaho,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17!2023._ Case: 15-35960. 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318. DktEntry: 92-1, Page 2 of 56
2 ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND V. WASDEN
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted May 12, 2017

Seattle, Washington
Filed January 4, 2018
Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Richard C. Tallman,

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge McKeown;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Bea
SUMMARY'
Civil Rights
The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the
district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the
Animal Legal Defense Fund and vacated in part the district
court's permanent injunction against enforcement of Idaho's
Interference with Agricultural Production law, Idaho Code
§ 18-7042.
The Interference with Agricultural Production law was

enacted after a disturbing secretly-filmed expose of
operations at an Idaho dairy farm went live on the intemet.
The statutetargeted at undercover investigation of
agricultural operationsbroadly criminalizes making
'
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court stafi' for the convenience of the reader.
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17!2023._ Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318. DktEntry: 92-1, Page 3 of 56
ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND V. WASDE'N 3
misrepresentations to access an agricultural production

facility as well as making audio and video recordings of the
facility without the owner's consent.
The panel held that Idaho's criminalization of

misrepresentations to enter a production facility, §18-
7042(1)(a), could not survive First Amendment scrutiny.
The panel held that the subsection criminalized innocent
behavior, was staggeringly overbroad, and that the purpose
of the statute was, in large part, targeted at speech and
investigative journalists. The panel also struck down the
statute's subsection which banned audio and video
recordings of a production facility's operations, §18-
7042(1)(d). The panel held that the Recordings Clause
regulated speech protected by the First Amendment and was
a classic example of a content-based restriction that could
not survive strict scrutiny.
The panel held that § 18-7042(1)(b)which

criminalizes obtaining records of an agricultural production
facility by misrepresentationprotected against a legally
cognizable harm associated with a false statement and
therefore survived constitutional scrutiny under United
States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012). Finally, the panel
upheld the constitutionality of § 18-7042(l)(c), which
criminalizes obtaining employment by misrepresentation
with the intent to cause economic or other injury. The panel
rejected plaintiffs' argument that the statute would reach "a
person who overstates her education or experience to get a
job for which she otherwise would not have qualified,
whether the person is an undercover investigator or not,"
because in such a case, the law's requisite intent to injure
would not be satisfied.
Dissenting in part and concurring in part, Judge Bea

stated that subsection § l8-7042(1)(a), pertaining to the
Verified Correct Co py of Original 10/17l2023. Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318. DktEntry: 92-1. Page 4 of 56
criminalization of misrepresentations to enter a production

facility, should survive First Amendment review. Judge Bea
would hold that the ability to hold property or to exercise
control of it requires recogiition by courts of the owner's
right to exclusive possession of the landthe right to
exclude anyone from entry, at any time, and for any reason
at all or indeed for no reason.
COUNSEL
Carl Jefi'rey Withroe (argued) and Clay R. Smith, Deputy

Attorneys General; Steven L. Olsen, Chief of Civil
Litigation; Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Office
of the Attorney General, Boise, Idaho; for Defendant-
Appellant.
Justin F. Marceau (argued), Of Counsel, Animal Legal

Defense Fund, Denver, Colorado; Matthew Liebman,
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Cotati, California; Alan K.
Chen, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law, Denver,
Colorado; Matthew Strugar, PETA Foundation, Los
Angeles, California; Leslie A. Brueckner, Oakland,
California; Paige M. Tomaselli and Cristina R. Stella, Center
for Food Safety, San Francisco, California; Richard Alan
Eppink, American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho
Foundation, Boise, Idaho; Maria Andrade, Boise, Idaho; for
PlaintiffsAppellees.
James J.Pizzirusso and Sarah R. LaFreniere, Hausfeld,

Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Plant Based Foods
Association.
Verified Correct Co py of Original 10I17l2023.
Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018. ID: 10712318. DktEntry: 92-1, Page 5 of 56
ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND V. WASDEN 5
Marty Durand and James Piotrowski, Hexzfeld & Piotrowski

PLLC, Boise, Idaho, for Amici Curiae Idaho Building
Trades Council and Idaho AFL-CIO.
Sarah L. Nash, Government Accountability Project Food

Integrity Campaign, Washington, D.C.; Craig H. Durham,
Ferguson Durham PLLC, Boise, Idaho; for Amicus Curiae
Government Accountability Project.
R. Bruce Rich and Jonathan Bloom, Weil Gotshal & Manges

LLP, New York, New York, for Amici Curiae Association
of American Publishers, American Booksellers for Free
Expression, Authors Guild Inc., Freedom to Read
Foundation, and Media Coalition Foundation.
Hannah Connor, Center for Biological Diversity,

Washington, D.C.; Tarah Heinzen, Food & Water Watch,
Washington, D.C.; for Amici Curiae Center for Biological
Diversity and Food & Water Watch.
David A. Schulz, Media Freedom & Information Access

Clinic, New York, New York; Jonathan M. Manes, New
Haven, Connecticut; for Amici Curiae Abrams Institute for
Freedom of Expression and Scholars of First Amendment
and Information Law.
Bruce D. Brown, Gregg P. Leslie, and Michael J. Lambert,

Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Washington,
D.C., for Amici Curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press and 22 Media Organizations.
Deepak Gupta, Gupta Wessler PLLC, Washington, D.C., for

Amicus Curiae Erwin Chemerinsky.
Verified Correct Co py of Original 10/17I2023. Case: 15-35960. 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318. DktEntry: 92-1, Page 6 0f 56
Andrew P. Bridges, Alexis I. Caloza, and Kathleen Lu,

Fenwick & West LLP, San Francisco, California, for
Amicus Curiae United Farm Workers of America. Geofl'rey
J. McConnell, McConnell Wagner Sykes & Stacey PLLC,
Boise, Idaho, for Amicus Curiae Susannah W. Pollvogt,
Scholar of the Law of Unconstitutional Animus.
Shayana Kadidal, Center for Constitutional Rights, New

York, New York, for Amici Curiae Professors Brooke
Kroeger and Ted Conover.
Mahesha P. Subbaraman, Subbaraman PLLC, Minneapolis,

Minnesota, for Amici Curiae Food Law & Policy Scholars.
OPINION
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
Investigative journalism has long been a fixture in the

American press, particularly with regard to food safety} In
the early 1900s, Upton Sinclair highlighted conditions in the
meat-packing industry in The Jungle, a novel based on his
time working incognito in a packing plant.' This case also
originates in the agricultural sectora secretly-filmed
exposé of the operation of an Idaho dairy farm. By all
accounts, the video was disturbing: dairy workers were
shown dragging a cow across the ground by a chain attached
1
See Brooke Kroeger, Undercover Reporting: An American
Tradition, IRE J. 20 (Spring 2014).
Upton Sinclair, The Jungle (Dover Thrifl eds., Dover Publications

1
2001) (1906).
Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 92-1, Page 7 of 56
to her neck; twisting cows' tails to inflict excruciating pain;

and repeatedly beating, kicking, and jumping on cows to
force them to move.3
After the film went live on the Internet, both the court of
public opinion and the Idaho legislature responded, with the
latter eventually enacting the Interference with
Agricultural Production law. Idaho Code § 18-7042. That
legislationtargeted at undercover investigation of
agricultural operationsbroadly criminalizes making
misrepresentations to access an agricultural production
facility as well as making audio and video recordings of the
facility without the owner's consent. Statutes of this genre
dubbed by some as Ag-Gag lawshave been passed in
several western states.'
This appeal highlights the tension between journalists'

claimed First Amendment right to engage in undercover
investigations and the state's effort to protect privacy and
property rights in the agricultural industry. Idaho challenges
the district court's determination that four subsections of the
statute§ 187042(1)(a)~(d)are unconstitutional on First
Amendment and Equal Protection grounds. The Animal
3
Mercy for Animals, Burger King CrueltyVideo Exposes Horrific
Aninial Abuse at a Burger Kmg Daily Supplier', YouTube (Oct. 9, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lN_YcWOuqu&oref=https
%3 A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fwatch%3 Fv%3 D1N_YcWOuVq
k&has_verified=l .
4
See Rita-Marie Cain Reid & Amber L. Kingery, PuttingA Gag on
Farm Whistleblowers. The Right to Lie and the Right to Remain Silent
Confi'ont State Agricultural Protectionism, 11 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 31,
3536 (Spring 2015) (Montana, Kansas, North Dakota); Lewis Bollard,
AgGag. The Unconstitutionaligl of Lmvs Restricting Undercovel'
Investigations on Farms, 42 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10960,
10963-66 (Oct. 2012) (Iowa, Utah).
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023. Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 92-1, Page 8 of 56
League Defense Fund and various other animal rights

organizations (collectively "ALDF") urge us to uphold the
district court's injunction against enforcement of the statute,
arguing that the law criminalizes whistleblower activity and
undercover investigative reportinga form of speech that
has brought about important and widespread change to the
food industry, an arena at the forefront of public interest.
Our analysis is framed by the Supreme Court's decision

in United States v. Alvarez, which addressed the First
Amendment and false speech. 567 U.S. 709 (2012). We
conclude that Idaho's criminalization of misrepresentations
to enter a production facility, § 18-7042(1)(a), and ban on
audio and video recordings of a production facility's
operations, § 18-7042(1)(d), cover protected speech under
the First Amendment and cannot survive constitutional
scrutiny. In contrast, in accord with Alvarez, Idaho's
criminalization of misrepresentations to obtain records and
secure employment are not protected speech under the First
Amendment and do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
§ 18-7042(1)(b)(c). Thus, we affirm in part and reverse in
part the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor
of ALDF and vacate in part its permanent injunction against
enforcement of the statute.
We are sensitive to joumalists' constitutional right to

investigate and publish expose's on the agricultural industry.
Matters related to food safety and animal cruelty are of
significant public importance. However, the First
Amendment right to gather news within legal bounds does
not exempt journalists from laws of general applicability.
For this reason, we uphold the provisions that fall within
constitutional parameters, but strike down those limitations
that impinge on protected speech.
Background
The Investigation
In 2012, an animal rights activist went undercover to get

a job at an Idahodairy farm and then secretly filmed ongoing
animal abuse there. Mercy for Animals, an animal rights
group, publicly released p01tions of the Video, drawing
national attention. The dairy fann owner responded to the
video by firing the abusive employees who were caught on
camera, instituting operational protocols, and conducting an
animal welfare audit at the farm. Local law enforcement
authorities launched an investigation that culminated in the
conviction of one of the employees for animal cruelty. After
the video's release, the dairy farm owner and his family
received multiple threats.
Idaho's Interference with Agricultural Production

Statute
In February 2014, Idaho enacted a law criminalizing

"interference with agricultural production" to protect Idaho
farmers. See Idaho Code § 18-7042. Relevant here, a person
commits the crime of interference with agricultural
production if the person knowingly:
(a) Is not employed by an agricultural

production facility and enters an agricultural
facility by force, threat, misrepresentation or
trespass;
(b) Obtains records of an agricultural

production facility by force, threat,
misrepresentation or trespass;
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023._ Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 92-1, Page 10 of 56
10 ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND v. WASDEN
(c) Obtains employment with an

agricultural facility by force, threat, or
misrepresentation with the intent to cause
economic or other injury to the facility's
operations, livestock, crops, owners,
personnel, equipment, buildings, premises,
business interests or customers; [or]
(d) Enters an agricultural production

facility that is not open to the public and,
without the facility owner's express consent
or pursuant to judicial process or statutory
authorization, makes audio or video
recordings of the conduct of an agricultural
production facility's operations[.]5
Idaho Code § 18-7042(1)(a)(d).
For purposes of this statute, the term "agricultural

production" broadly covers "activities associated with the
production of agricultural products for food, fiber, fuel and
other lawful uses," and other activities such as "[p]reparing
land for agricultural production" and "[h]andling or applying
3'6
pesticides. . . Id. § l8-7042(2)(a). The term "agricultural
5
The statute also criminalizes physical damage to an agricultural
production facility's operations, Idaho Code § 18-7042(1)(e), but that
provision has not been challenged in this case.
6
In full, the law defines "agricultural production" to mean
"activities associated with the production of agricultural products for
food, fiber, fuel and other lawful uses," including but not limited to:
"construction, expansion, use, maintenance and repair of an agricultural
production facility; preparing land for agricultural production; handling
or applying pesticides, herbicides or other chemicals, compounds or
substances labeled for insects, pests, crops, weeds, water or soil;
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023. Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntl'y: 92-1, Page 11 Of 56
ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND V. WASDEN 1 1
production facility" is broad and covers "any structure or

land, whether privately or publicly owned, leased or
operated, that is being used for agricultural production." Id.
§ 18-7042(2)(b).
Interference with agricultural production is a

misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in prison or a fine
not in excess of $5,000, or both. Id. § 187042(3). A person
convicted of this crime must pay restitution to the victim in
an amount of twice the damage resulting from violation of
the statute. Id. § 187042(4). This damages payment
includes avictim's "economic loss[es]." Id. § 195304.
The legislative history reveals a complex series of

motivations behind the statute. The bill was drafted by the
Idaho Dairymen's Association, a trade organization
representing Idaho's dairy industry. When the Association's
lawyer addressed legislators, he stated that one goal of the
bill was "to protect Idaho farmers from wrongful
interference. . . . Idaho farmers live and work spread out
across the land where they're uniquely vulnerable to
interference by wrongful conduct" Another goal was to
shield the agricultural industry from undercover
planting, irrigating, growing, fertilizing, harvesting or producing

agricultural, horticultural, floricultural and viticultural crops, fiuits and
vegetable products, field grains, seeds, hay, sod and nursery stock, and
other plants, plant products, plant byproducts, plant waste and plant
compost; breeding, hatching, raising, producing, feeding and keeping
livestock, dairy animals, swine, furbearing animals, poultry, eggs, fish
and other aquatic species, and other animals, animal products and animal
byproducts, animal waste, animal compost, and bees, bee products and
bee byproducts; processing and packaging agricultural products,
including the processing and packaging of agricultural products into food
and other agricultural commodities; [and] manufacturing animal feed."
Idaho Code § 18-7042(2)(a).
Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 921, Page 12 0f 56
investigators who expose the industry to the "court of public

opinion," which destroys farmers' reputations, results in
death threats, and causes loss of customers.
At the time of the passage of this legislation, Idaho

already had a law relating to interference with agricultural
researchwhich has not been challengedprohibiting
knowingly damaging or obtaining property at an agricultural
research facility with intent to hinder agricultural research;
obtaining access to an agricultural research facility by
misrepresentation with the intent to perform acts that would
hinder agricultural research; entering an agricultural
research facility with the intent to damage, alter, duplicate or
obtain unauthorized possession of records or property
related to the agricultural research; obtaining control over
records or property of an agricultural research facility with
intent to destroy such property Without authorization of the
facility; and releasing, stealing, or causing death or injury to
an animal at an agricultural research facility. Idaho Code
§ 18-70400). The Idaho Dairymen's Association used this
interference with agricultural research law as the framework
for § 18-7041.
Legislators discussed the bill as protecting against two

types of perceived harm to agricultural producers. First,
lawmakers expressed concern about physical and
operational damage caused by animal rights activists who
gain access to agricultural production facilities. For
example, some legislators discussed concerns about farm
security and privacy. Others voiced concerns about the
intentional destruction of crops, breeding records, and farm
structures.
Lawmakers also discussed damage caused by

investigative reporting: "One of the things that bothers me
a lot about the undercover investigation [at the dairy], and
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023. Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 921, Page 13 of 56
the fact that there's videos, well, we're being tried and
persecuted and prosecuted in the press." Other legislators
used similar language demonstrating hostility toward the
release of these videos, and one supporter of the legislation
dubbed animal rights groups as "terrorists" who "use media
and sensationalism to attempt to steal the integrity of the
producer and their reputation." One legislator stated that the
dairy industry's reason behind the legislation was "[t]hey
could not allow fellow members of the industry to be
persecuted in the court of public opinion." Another
described these videos as used to "publicly crucify a
company" and "as a blackmail tool." Finally, one legislator
indicated that if the video had not been published, she did
not "think this bill would ever have surfaced."
Procedural Background
In March 2014, ALDF filed suit against Lawrence G.

Wasden as Attorney General of Idaho.7 The complaint
alleges that the purpose and effect of the statute "are to stifle
political debate about modern agriculture by
(1) criminalizing all employment-based undercover
investigations; and (2) criminalizing investigative
journalism, whistleblowing by employees, or other
expository efforts that entail images or sounds." ALDF
asserts violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Although ALDF claimed preemption under the False Claims
Act, Food Safety Modernization Act, and Clean Water Act,
ALDF did not address those issues on appeal.
7
ALDF also brought claims against Governor C.L. "Butch" Otter,
but the district court dismissed him as a defendant. His dismissal is not
challenged on appeal.
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023. Case: 1535960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 92-1, Page 14 0f 56
The district court granted ALDF'S motion for summary

judgment on its First Amendment and Equal Protection
claims. The district court concluded that the prohibitions on
misrepresentations in § 18-7042(1)(a)(c) (the
"Misrepresentation Clauses") criminalize speech protected
by the First Amendment because Idaho could not "show the
lies it seeks to prohibit cause any legally cognizable harm."
The court explained that the regulation on audio and video
recordings under § 18-7042(1)(d) (the "Recordings Clause")
covers speech protected by the First Amendment and
discriminates based on content because it criminalizes only
"recordings of the conduct of an agricultural production
facility's operations." The district court further reasoned
that subsections (c) (misrepresentation to gain employment)
and (d) (the Recordings Clause) discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint because they "burden speech critical of the
animal-agriculture industry." Applying strict scrutiny to all
challenged provisions, the district court resolved that even if
the state' s interests in privacy and property were compelling,
the restrictions were neither narrowly tailored nor the least
restrictive means available to protect those interests.
The district court also determined that all four challenged

subsections violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause and fail rational basis review. The
subsections fail on their face because they classify between
whistleblowers in the agricultural industry and
whistleblowers in other industries. The subsections also fail
through their purpose because they were "animated by an
improper animus toward animal welfare groups and other
undercover investigators in the agricultural industry" and
"further[] no other legitimate or rational purpose." The court
noted that there was "abundant evidence that the law was
enacted with the discriminatory purpose of silencing animal
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023. Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 92-1. Page 15 0f 56
rights activists who conduct undercover investigations in the

agricultural industry."
The district court deemed moot ALDF's remaining

claims and permanently enjoined enforcement of the
challenged subsections. Idaho appeals the district court's
grant of summary judgment, which we review de novo.
Roberts v. Continental Ins. C0., 770 F.2d 853, 855 (9th Cir.
1985).
Analysis
I. The Misrepresentation Clauses: Idaho Code
§ 18-7042(1)(a)(c)
Subsections (a), (b) and (c) criminalize

misrepresentations used to gain entry to agricultural
production facilities, obtain records, and, under certain
circumstances, secure employment. Relevant here, a person
commits the crime of interference with agricultural
production if the person knowingly:
(a) Is not employed by an agricultural

production facility and enters an agricultural
facility by force, threat, misrepresentation or
trespass;
(b) Obtains records of an agricultural

production facility by force, threat,
misrepresentation or trespass; [or]
(c) Obtains employment with an

agricultural facility by force, threat, or
misrepresentation with the intent to cause
economic or other injury to the facility's
operations, livestock, crops, owners,
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023. Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 921, Page 16 Of 56
personnel, equipment, buildings, premises,

business interests or customers[.]
Idaho Code § 18-7042(1)(a)(c) (emphasis added).
Idaho argues that the "misrepresentation" component of

these provisions regulates conduct induced by false
statements of fact. ALDF counters that the subsections
regulate pure speech, effectively prohibiting investigative
reporters from accessing agricultural production facilities
and therefore blocking reporters' access to material for
journalistic expose's.
The First Amendment, applied to states through the

Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits laws "abridging the
freedom of speech." U.S. Const., amend I. Our first task is
to determine whether the misrepresentations prohibited in
the Idaho statute constitute speech protected by the First
Amendment. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund &
Educ. Fund Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985). If the
government's actions do not implicate speech protected by
the First Amendment, we "need go no further." Id.
In Alvarez, the Supreme Court examined the Stolen

Valor Act, 18 U.S.C. § 704 ("the Act"), a statute
criminalizing false claims that the speaker had received the
Congressional Medal of Honor. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion (joined by the Chief
Justice and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor), as well as
Justice Breyer's concurring opinion (joined by Justice
Kagan), concluded that the Act's flat prohibition of such lies
constituted an impermissible restriction on speech protected
by the First Amendment. Id. at 72930 (plurality opinion);
id. at 739 (Breyer, J., concurring). In deciding that lying
about receiving the Medal of Honor, without more, is
protected speech, the plurality and concurrence "reject[ed]
the notion that false speech should be in a general category

that is presumptively unprotected." Id. at 722 (plurality
opinion); accord id. at 73132 (Breyer, 1., concurring).
However, neither the plurality nor the concurrence in

Alvarez held that false statements are always protected under
the First Amendment. Instead, as the plurality outlines, false
speech may be criminalized if made "for the purpose of
material gain" or "material advantage," or if such speech
inflicts a "legally cognizable harm." Id. at 723, 719. The
concurring justices agreed: statutes that criminalize falsities
typically require proof of specific or tangible harm. Id. at
73436. We thus focus our attention on misrepresentations
of the type singled out by the Courtfalse statements made
for material gain or advantage or that inflict harm.
A. Idaho Code §18~7042(1)(a): Entry by

Misrepresentation
Subsection (a) criminalizes entry into an agricultural

production facility "by force, threat, misrepresentation or
trespass." Notably, ALDF challenges only the
"misrepresentation" prong of this subsections And, as we
note below, Idaho can easily address the problematic term
by simply excising "misrepresentation" from this
subsection. Thus, entry by force, threat or trespass would
continue to be a criminal violation.
8
The same is true of subsections (b) and (c); ALDF challenges only
the misrepresentation prongs. In its opening brief, Idaho limits the
definition of a "misrepresentation" to an affirmative misrepresentation
not an omission: "[t]his means that the representations must be
affirmative; omissions are insufficient. And they must be knowingly
false. Mistakes or opinions will not support a prosecution."
Guided by Alvarez, we conclude that subsection (a)'s

misrepresentation provision regulates speech protected by
the First Amendment. The targeted speecha false
statement made in order to access an agricultural production
facilitycannot on its face be characterized as "made to
effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable
considerations." Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (plurality
opinion). Nor can the misrepresentation provision be
characterized as simply proscribing conduct. Like the
statute in Alvarez, subsection (a) "seeks to control and
suppress all false statements [related to access] in almost
limitless times and settings. And it does so entirely without
regard to whether the lie was made for the purpose of
material gain." Id. at 72223 (plurality opinion). Unlike
lying to obtain records or gain employmentwhich are
associated with a material benefit to the speakerlying to
gain entry merely allows the speaker to cross the threshold
of another's property, including property that is generally
open to the public. The hazard of this subsection is that it
criminalizes innocent behavior, that the overbreadth of this
subsection's coverage is staggering, and that the purpose of
the statute was, in large part, targeted at speech and
investigative journalists.
Idaho's argument that "the material gain to the person

telling the lie is the entry to the property," is not supported
by any authority and does not establish how entry onto the
property and material gain are coextensive. Under the
statute, any misrepresentation to gain entry could net a
criminal prosecution. Take, for example, a teenager who
wants to impress his friends by obtaining a highly sought
after reservation at an exclusive pop-up restaurant that is
open to the public. If he were to call the restaurant and
finagle a reservation in the name of his mother, a well-
known journalist, that would be a misrepresentation. If the
restaurant offers up a reservation on the basis of the mother's

notoriety, granting a "license" to enter the premises and sit
at a table, the teenager would be subject to punishment of up
to one year in prison, a fine not to exceed $5,000, or both.
The teenager risks this potential despite the fact that he

might leave before ordering, be discovered and removed by
the manager, or his friends might not be impressed at all. In
those instances, he would not receive even the secondary
benefits of having gained access. In fact, all our teenager
would have to do is enter the restaurant and he could be
arrested because he gave a false name to the maitre d' on the
phone. This entry alone does not constitute a material gain,
and without more, the lie is pure speech?
Or the lunch could go off without a hitch. The restaurant

is none the wiser, it gets paid for the meal, and loses nothing,
but the teenager could still be subject to prosecution. Once
again, the lie is pure speech.
The teenager does not necessarily even gain protection

from trespass liability. Idaho's criminal trespass law
prohibits "[e]ntering without permission of the owner or the
9
We disagree with the district court's suggestion that the only harm
from gaining access to property by misrepresentation "would arise, say,
from the publication of a story about the facility." Such reasoning is
problematic because it assumes, among other things, that a publication
about the facility will necessarily harm the facility. At issue here is the
speech to gain entry to the facility, not the journalistic creation or
speculative harm that may "arise" afier entry. Focusing on such
speculative harm sweeps in too many scenarios in which a person
entering the property causes no harm to the property or its owner. This
approach also places a value judgment on the reporting itself and
undermines the First Amendment right to critique and criticize.
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023. Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, lD: 10712318, DktEntry: 92-1, Page 20 of 56
owner's agent, upon the real property of another" but limits

its application to property posted with "No Trespassing"
signs that meet certain parameters. Idaho Code
§ 187008(9). Thus, even if the dissent is correct that the
teenager receives a license that would not otherwise have
been granted, since in some circumstances the teenager may
have entered the restaurant with no permission without
trespassing, he gains little to nothing from his
1°
misrepresentation.
Two earlier cases involving investigative reporters and

trespass in the First Amendment context foreshadowed the
decision in Alvarez, albeit in slightly different scenarios.
The Fourth Circuit in Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Ina, 194 F.3d 505 (1999), and the Seventh Circuit in
Desm'ck v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc, 44 F.3d
1345 (1995), examined whether plaintiffs in a civil action
could maintain a trespass claim against journalists for
misrepresenting their identities. Both courts invalidated the
trespass claim predicated on the misrepresentations because
"the entry was not invasive in the sense of infringing the kind
of interest of the plaintiffs that the law of trespass protects;
it was not an interference with the ownership or possession
of land." Desnz'ck, 44 F.3d at 1353; Food Lion, 194 F.3d at
518 ("[I]f we turned successful resume fraud into trespass,
we would not be protecting the interest underlying the tort of
trespassthe ownership and peaceable possession of
1°
The dissent's citation to Green v Beaver State Contractors, Inc.,
472 P.2d 307, 307 (Idaho 1970) is misplaced. This is not the case of the
hapless teenager and has nothing to do with the First Amendment and
entry upon property. Rather, it is a civil contract matter and the
questionlefi unansweredwas whether there were any civil damages
for trespass by a contractor who traversed land without authorization.
land.")." Put differently, "consent toan entry is often given

legal effect even though the entrant has intentions that if
known to the owner of the property would cause him for . . .
lawful reasons to revoke his consent" because that entry does
not infringe upon the specific interests trespass seeks to
protect. Desm'ck, 44 F.3d at 1351. This language is
prescient in its tracking of Alvarez's reasoning: some lies
quite simply do not inflict any material or legal harm on the
deceived party. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 71819 (plurality
opinion); see also id. at 736 (Breyer, J ., concurring) (statutes
properly prohibiting false statements are those with
"limitations of context, or requirements of proof of injury"
to narrow the prohibition to "a subset of lies Where specific
harrn is more likely to occur" and not "where harm is
unlikely or the need for the prohibition is small").
Re-Visiting our teenager, we have already established

that he is not guilty of ordinary criminal trespass in the
absence of a "No Trespassing" sign. However, as with a
journalist or even a curiosity seeker who dissembles to get
access to the property, under the challenged Idaho law, the
teenager would be subject to criminal prosecution for
nothing more than what can only be characterized as a fib.
Thus, the misrepresentation provision of subsection (a)
regulates protected speech while "target[ing] falsity and
nothing more." Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719 (plurality opinion).
Such regulation is subject to the "most exacting scrutiny."
Id. at 724 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 642 (1994)). Idaho's chosen restriction on speech must
11
On another claim, the Fourth Circuit determined that the reporters
"committed trespass by breaching their duty of loyalty" as employees of
Food Lion. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 518. Idaho did not raise any similar
arguments here and, therefore, this portion of the Fourth Circuit's
holding is inapposite to our decision.
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023. Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 92-1, Page 22 Of 56
be "actually necessary" to achieve a compelling government

interest, and there must be a "direct causal link between the
restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented." Id. at
725. Subsection (a) cannot survive this high bar.
Even assuming Idaho has a compelling interest in

regulating property rights and protecting its farm industry,
criminalizing access to property by misrepresentation is not
"actually necessary" to protect those rights. If, as Idaho
argues, its real concern is trespass, then Idaho already has a
prohibition against trespass that does not implicate speech in
any way. If instead, as a number of the legislators made clear
and the dairy lobby underscored, the statute was intended to
quash investigative reporting on agricultural production
facilities, then the speech aspect of the statute prohibiting
misrepresentations is even more problematic. The focus of
the statute to avoid the "court of public opinion" and
treatment of investigative videos as "blackmail" cannot be
squared with a content-neutral trespass law.
It is troubling that criminalization of these

misrepresentations opens the door to selective
prosecutionsfor example, pursuing the case of a journalist
who produces a 60 Mnutes segment about animal cruelty
versus letting the misrepresentation go unchecked in the case
of the teenager. As Justice Breyer aptly noted in his
concurrence,
the pervasiveness of false statements, made

for better or for worse motives, made
thoughtlessly or deliberately, made with or
without accompanying harm, provides a
weapon to a government broadly empowered
to prosecute falsity without more. And those
who are unpopular may fear that the
government will use that weapon selectively,
ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND v. WASDEN 23
say, by prosecuting a [politically unpopular

individual who makes false claims], while
ignoring members of other political groups
who might make similar false claims.
Id. at 734. In this case, the targeted groupjoumalists and

investigative reporterscould also face enhanced penalties.
Violating Idaho's criminal trespass statute could result in up
to six months in prison, a fine not in excess of $1,000, or
both, see Idaho Code § 18-7011(1), whereas the penalty
under the agricultural protection provision, § 18-7042, could
be up to one year in prison, a fine not in excess of $5,000, or
both.
We are also unsettled by the sheer breadth of this

subsection given the definitions of "agricultural production
facility" and "agricultural production." Id. § 18-7042(2)(a),
(b). Applying these definitions, the subsection reaches
misrepresentations not only in the context of a large-scale
dairy facility or cattle feedlot, but also grocery stores, garden
nurseries, restaurants that have an herb garden or grow their
own produce, llama farms that produce wool for weaving,
beekeepers, a chicken coop in the backyard, a field
producing crops for ethanol, and hardware stores, to name a
few. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 722 (plurality opinion)
(criticizing the Act for having "sweeping, quite
unprecedented reach").
The subsection's reach is particularly worrisome

because many of the covered entities are, unlike large-scale
dairy facilities, places of business that are open to the public.
Imagine a situation in which an Albertsons grocery store
opens early to the first one hundred affinity cardholders to
visit the new, spectacular food court. Given the expansive
definition of "agricultural production," the Albertsons store
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023. Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, lD: 10712318, DktEntry: 92-1. Page 24 of 56
would be covered under the statute as a facility where

agricultural products are "process[cd] and package[ed] . . .
into food." An enterprising person with no Albertsons card,
but representing otherwise, or even someone using a friend's
Albertsons card, falls prey to the statute simply because he
wants to see the food-court extravaganza. Under subsection
(a), our protagonist would be guilty of a misdemeanor and
could be punished by up to one year in prison, a fine not in
excess of $5,000, or bothnot to mention a potential
restitution award. Idaho Code § 18-70426), (4). The same
can be said for a restaurant critic who goes undercover,
claiming to be a repeat customer in order to get a prime table
from which to review the restaurant's food, service, and
ambiance. In these scenarios, the statute punishes speech
where there is no fraud, no gain, and no valuable
consideration.
The limitation that a misrepresentation must be

"knowing[]" does not eliminate the threat posed by this
subsection's staggering reach. The fact that the subsection
regulates speech related to property far beyond a classic
agricultural facility would invariably result in the chilling of
lawful speech. Indeed, "a speaker might still be worried
about being prosecuted for a careless false statement, even
if he does not have the intent required to render him liable."
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 736 (Breyer, J ., concurring) (applying
intermediate scrutiny).
Nor is this subsection the "least restrictive means among

available, effective alternatives." Ashcrofi v. ACLU, 542
U.S. 656, 666 (2004). We see no reason, and Idaho has not
offered any, why the state could not narrow the subsection
by requiring specific intent or by limiting criminal liability
to statements that cause a particular harm. Idaho did exactly
that with subsection (c), which covers misrepresentation
"with the intent to cause economic or other injury." It is no

surprise that after the Supreme Court's decision in Alvai'ez,
Congress amended the Stolen Valor Act to criminalize only
those "[w]hoever, with intent to obtain money, property, or
other" tangible benefit, fraudulently hold[] oneself out to be
a recipient" of a qualifying medal. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b)
(2013) (emphasis added). Such a limitation would still
effectuate agricultural production facility owners' property
rights while complying with Alvarez's relatively
straightforward First Amendment requirements.
The reach of subsection (a) is so broad that it gives rise

to suspicion that it may have been enacted with an
impermissible purpose. See Elena Kagan, Private Speech,
Public Purpose' The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 455 (1996)
("At a certain pointwhen the asserted interest is
insubstantial or when it does not fit the scope of the
challenged regulationthe usual presumption of proper
purpose topples; there is reason, then, to think that the law,
though content neutral, has been tainted by impermissible
purpose"). Our suspicion is not eased after reading the
legislative history. The record reflects that the statute was
partly motivated to protect members of the agricultural
industry from "persecut[ion] in the court of public opinion,"
and journalists who use exposés to "publicly crucify a
company." Although, for Equal Protection Clause purposes,
we need not decide whether animus motivated this
subsection, we do not ignore that a vocal number of
supporters were less concerned with the protection of
property than they were about protecting a target group from
critical speech, which adds to our skepticism that the
provision survives the "exacting scrutiny" required under
Alvarez. See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal, 468
U.S. 364, 387 n.18 (1984) (expressing skepticism about the
motivation behind a bill when some supporters were

concerned with protecting themselves from critical speech).
In the same vein, if intermediate scrutiny is the standard,

as Justice Breyer advocates in Alvarez, then this subsection
would still fail. Subsection (a) criminalizes speech that
inflicts no "specific harm" on property owners, "ranges very
broadly," and risks significantly chilling speech that is not
covered under the statute. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 73637
(Breyer J., concurring). Additionally, it is "possible
substantially to achieve the Government's objective in less
burdensome ways" with "a more finely tailored statute." Id.
at 737. Even under intermediate scrutiny, the subsection
"works disproportionate constitutional harm." Id. at 739.
There is, of course, an easy fix to this First Amendment

problem: simply strike the word "misrepresentation" from
the subsections. Idaho explicitly invites this result in its
discussion of the statute's severability clause, and ALDF's
surgical challenge indirectly endorses this remedy. Under
Idaho law, an invalid portion of a statute may be severed
where "part of a statute . . . is unconstitutional and yet is not
an integral or indispensable part of the measure." Voyles v.
Citj) ofNampa, 548 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Idaho 1976). Because
the proscription on misrepresentations is neither integral nor
indispensable to the subsection's goal of protecting property
rights, the offending term "misrepresentation" should be
stricken, leaving the remainder of the subsection intact. In
light of this resolution, we need not analyze subsection (a)
under the Equal Protection Clause.
Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntI'y: 92-1, Page 27 of 56
B. Idaho Code § 18-7042(1)(b): Obtaining Records

by Misrepresentation
Subsection (b)which criminalizes obtaining records of

an agricultural production facility by misrepresentationlzm
protects against a "legally cognizable harm associated with
a false statement" and therefore survives constitutional
scrutiny under Alvarez. 567 U.S. at 719. Alvarez highlights
that a false statement made in association with a legally
cognizable harm or for the purpose of material gain is not
protected. Id. at 719, 723. Unlike false statements made to
enter property, false statements made to actually acquire
agricultural production facility records inflict a property
harm upon the owner, and may also bestow a material gain
on the acquirer.
This subsection is aimed at conductobtaining

recordsthat has long been prohibited in Idaho. For
decades, Idaho has lawfiJlly proscribed similar types of
conduct that infringe on property rigits. For example, Idaho
criminalizes conversion, which involves "any distinct act of
dominion wrongfully exerted over another's personal
property in denial or inconsistent with his rights therein."
Wiseman v. Schafi'er, 768 P.2d 800, 803 (Idaho 1989)
(citation omitted); see also Idaho Code §§18-2403(3),
18-7001(1). Idaho also criminalizes theft by false pretenses,
which involves "a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding
of another's property" by conduct constituting "obtaining
property, money or labor under false pretenses." Idaho Code
§ 18-2403(2); State v. Larsen, 286 P.2d 646, 648 (Idaho
12
We read the statute to cover records obtained fiom the agricultural
production facility and not as implicating records obtained via Idaho's
Public Records Act, Idaho Code § 74-101 et seq., or other lawful
avenues.
1955) (citation omitted) ("[a] false pretense may consist in

any act, word, symbol, or token calculated and intended to
deceive"). Larceny, which involves the "fraudulent
obtaining of personal property, and carrying that property
away with the intent permanently to deprive the owner
thereof," is also prohibited. State v. Jesser, 501 P.2d 727,
736 & n.29 (Idaho 1972). Criminalizing the obtaining of
records by misrepresentation is one of a variety of Idaho
statutes that protect property rights. Obtaining an
agricultural production facility's records by
misrepresentation inflicts a "legally cognizable harm" by
impairing an agricultural production facility owner's ability
to control who can assert dominion over, and take possession
of, his property. Additionally, obtaining records through
misrepresentation may also infringe on other rights by, for
example, exposing proprietary formulas, trade secrets, or
other confidential business information to unwanted parties.
See Idaho Code § 48-801 et seq. (prohibiting
misappropriation of trade secrets).
The legislative history illustrates how such conduct has

harmed, and threatens to harm, agricultural production
facility owners. For example, legislators expressed general
concern about damage to breeding papers, and one legislator
noted an instance in which the breeding papers of a mink
ranch were "tossed" into a "pile," "damag[ing] the whole
operation." The agricultural industry also expressed concern
about the theft of facility records, particularly when such
theft leads to the release of a facility's proprietary and
confidential information, including divulging locations of
genetically engineered crops or valuable research documents
for sale to competitors. Although some legislators wanted
to silence investigative journalists reporting on the
agricultural industry, the full legislative history shows that a
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023. Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 92-1, Page 29 0f 56
ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND v. WASDEN 29
legitimate purpose for enacting the subsection was to prevent

harrn from damaged or stolen records.
Obtaining records may also bestow a "material gain" on

the speaker. See Alvarez, 5 67 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion).
The records may contain confidential information, such as
breeding histories of animals and livestock, and other
proprietary research and development information valuable
to those in the industry. Once disclosed, this information
may lose its confidential or proprietary research status.
Acquiring records by misrepresentation results in

something definitively more than does entry onto landit
wreaks actual and potential harm on a facility and bestows
material gain on the fibber. So unlike subsection (a),
subsection (b) does not regulate constitutionally protected
speech, and does not run afoul of the First Amendment."
Nor does subsection (b) violate the Equal Protection

Clause. The district court determined that the statute was
"animated by an improper animus toward animal welfare
groups and other undercover investigators in the agricultural
industry" and could not survive rational basis review. We
agree that animus was one of the motivating factors but
disagree as to the conclusion.
Legislation is generally presumed to be valid and will be

sustained under the Equal Protection Clause "if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). However, neither "a
13
Because we determine that subsections (b) and (c) do not burden
speech protected by the First Amendment, the subsections do not
discriminate on the basis of the fundamental right to speech.
bare . desire to harm a politically unpopular group" nor

. .
"negative attitude[s]" or "fears" about that group constitute

a legitimate government interest for the purpose of this
review. Id. at 448. When a law exhibits a desire to harm an
unpopular group, courts will often apply a "more searching"
application of rational basis review. Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also
Cleburne, 473 at 44850; US. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 53538 (1973). When the politically
unpopular group is not a traditionally suspect class, a court
may strike down the challenged statute under the Equal
Protection Clause "if the statute serves no legitimate
governmental purpose and if impermissible animus toward
an unpopular group prompted the statute's enactmen ."
'
Mountain Water C0. v. Mont. Dep't of Pub. Serv.
Regulation, 919 F.2d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis
added); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
We invoke searching scrutiny here. Although animus

towards particular speech by reporters and activists was one
factor driving Idaho's decision to pass the statute, to strike
down the law, we must also determine whether the law
serves "no legitimate governmental purpose." Mountain
Water C0,, 919 F.2d at 598. The overall purpose of § 18-
7042 is to protect agricultural production facilities fiom
interference by wrongfill conduct. As noted, the legislative
history relevant to subsection (b) describes situations in
which agricultural production facilities have been, or may
be, harmed as a result of a misrepresentation leading to the
acquisition of records. Idaho's desire to protect against harm
relating to an agricultural production facility's most
sensitive informationaffecting both property rights and
privacy interestsis a legitimate government interest. It
also bears noting that the penalty provisions for falsely
obtaining records under this statute are in line with the
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023._ Case: 1535960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 921, Page 31 Of 56
penalties in Idaho's other statutes relating to records and

property offenses. See, e.g., Idaho Code §§ 182403(2)(d),
18-2407, 18-2408 (theft by false promise); 18-7001
(malicious injury to property); 48-803 (misappropriation of
trade secrets). Subsection (b) does not offend the Equal
Protection Clause because it does not rest exclusively on an
"irrational prejudice" against journalists and activists.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
C. Idaho Code § 18-7042(1)(c): Obtaining

Employment by Misrepresentation
Subsection (c) criminalizes knowingly "[o]btain[ing]

employment with an agricultural production facility by . . .
misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other
injury" to the facility's operations, property, or personnel.
Almost as though the Idaho legislature drafted this provision
with Alvarez by its side, this subsection follows the Supreme
Court's guidance as to what constitutes a lie made for
material gain. Indeed, the plurality in Alvarez explicitly
stated that "[w]here false claims are made to effect a fraud
or secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say oflers
of employment, it is well established that the Government
may restrict speech without affronting the First
Amendment." 567 U.S. at 723 (emphasis added). The
misrepresentations criminalized in subsection (c) fall
squarely into this category of speech.
Additionally, subsection (c) limits criminal liability to

only those who gain employment by misrepresentation and
who have the intent to cause economic or other injury to the
agricultural production facility, which further cabins the
prohibition's scope. Given this clear limitation, we disagree
with ALDF that the statute would reach "a person who
overstates her education or experience to get a job for which
she otherwise would not have qualified, whether the person
is an undercover investigator or not," because the requisite

intent to injure would not be satisfied. On the other hand,
this subsection would apply to an employee hired with an
intent to harm the employer, which, as Idaho points out, is a
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is
implied in all employment agreements in Idaho. Jenkins v.
Boise Cascade C0rp., 108 P.3d 380, 38990 (Idaho 2005);
cf Shackelford v. Shirley, 948 F.2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1991)
("[T]hreats made with specific intent to injure and focused
on a particular individual easily fall into that category of
speech deserving of no first amendment protection").
Although it may be true that "[t]he goal of undercover

employment-based investigations is not to 'secure moneys
or other valuable considerations' for the investigator, but
rather to expose threats to the public," ALDF ignores that the
Supreme Court singled out offers of employment and that
these undercover investigators are nonetheless paid by the
agricultural production facility as part of their employment.
Of course, this does not mean that every investigative
reporter hired under false pretenses intends to harm the
employer. That is a critical element that requires proof.
We are also not persuaded by ALDF's arguments that the

statute was enacted solely to suppress a specific subject
matter or viewpoint. See R.A. V. v. City ofSt. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 384 (1992). We reject ALDF's argument that the
statute's restitution clause is a way to punish journalists and
whistleblowers for printing expose's, because we do not
interpret the restitution clause to include reputational and
publication damages. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
The restitution clause requires a court to order a

defendant "to make restitution to the victim of the offense
. in an amount
equal to twice the value of the damage
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023._ Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 921, Page 33 of 56
ANHVIAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND V. WASDEN 33
resulting from the violation" of the statute. Idaho Code

§§ 18-7042(4), 19-5304. Restitution is made for the
"economic loss" to the Victim. Idaho Code § 19-5304(1)(a).
This includes "the value of property taken, destroyed,
broken, or otherwise harmed, lost wages, and direct out-of-
pocket losses or expenses, such as medical expenses
resulting from the criminal conduc ." Id. It does not include
"less tangible damage such as pain and suffering, wrongful
death or emotional distress." Id.
That the statute excludes "less tangible damage" such as

emotional distress indicates that reputational damages would
not be considered an "economic loss," and we are not aware
of a case suggesting otherwise. Rather, Idaho case law
defines "economic loss" as "tangible out-ofpocket loss"
which the victim "actually suffers." State v. Straub, 292
P.3d 273, 280 (Idaho 2013). The restitution clause focuses
on actual, quantifiable economic loss as opposed to abstract
damages such as reputational harm. See id. In the absence
of Idaho case law to the contrary, we read the statute's
restitution clause as excluding reputational and publication
damages." See Bergel' v. Cit}! 0f Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029,
1046 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) ("[W]here an
unconstitutionally broad statute is readily subject to a
narrowing construction that would eliminate its
constitutional deficiencies, we accept that construction")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
1"
On a more basic level, we cannot see how the restitution provision
is inevitably viewpoint based. Restitution is pegged to economic loss,
not to the view expressed, which could be a positive puff piece or a
negative critique. The issue is documented loss, not viewpoint.
34 ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND v. WASDEN
The district court erred by granting summary judgment

on this ground.
For the same reasons as provided in our analysis of

subsection (b), subsection (c) does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause because it serves a "legitimate
governmental purpose." Mountain Water C0., 919 F.2d at
598. The same property and privacy concerns apply here
employees have access to limited areas of an agricultural
production facility and other confidential information that
may lead to destruction or serious harmand Idaho has a
legitimate governmental purpose in restricting such
employmentseeking misrepresentations. This result
follows from Alvarez. By establishing that
misrepresentations to "secure . . . offers of employment"
may be restricted, the Court implicitly recognized that a
government interest exists in restricting such speech.
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723. Thus, this subsection has a
legitimate governmental purpose beyond an "irrational
prejudice" against journalists and activists. City of
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
II. The Recordings ClauseIdaho Code

§ 18-7042(1)(d)
We now turn to the Recordings Clause, which prohibits

a person from entering a private agricultural production
facility and, without express consent from the facility owner,
making audio or video recordings of the "conduct of an
agricultural production facility's operations." Idaho Code
§ l8-7042(1)(d). The Recordings Clause regulates speech
protected by the First Amendment and is a classic example
of a content-based restriction that cannot survive strict
scrutiny.
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023._ Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 921, Page 35 0f 56
We easily dispose of Idaho's claim that the act of

creating an audiovisual recording is not speech protected by
the First Amendment. This argument is akin to saying that
even though a book is protected by the First Amendment, the
process of writing the book is not. Audiovisual recordings
are protected by the First Amendment as recognized
"organ[s] of public opinion" and as a "significant medium
for the communication of ideas." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (extending First
Amendment protection to movies). Indeed, "[W]e live,
relate, work, and decide in a world where image capture
from life is routine, and captured images are part of ongoing
discourse, both public and private." Seth F. Kreimer,
Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment.'
Memory, Discourse, and the Right t0 Record, 159 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 335, 337 (Jan. 2011).
It is no surprise that we have recognized that there is a

"First Amendment right to film matters of public interest."
Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995).
It defies common sense to disaggregate the creation of the
video from the video or audio recording itself. The act of
recording is itself an inherently expressive activity;
decisions about content, composition, lighting, volume, and
angles, among others, are expressive in the same way as the
written word or a musical score.
Rejecting an argument remarkably similar to Idaho's

pitch here, we observed that
neither the Supreme Court nor [the Ninth

Circuit] has ever drawn a distinction between
the process of creating a form of pure speech
(such as writing or painting) and the product
of these processes (the essay or artwork) in
terms of the First Amendment protection
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023. Case: 1535960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 921, Page 36 0f 56
afforded. . The process of expression

. .
through a medium has never been thought so

distinct from the expression itself that we
could disaggregate Picasso from his brushes
and canvas, or that we could value Beethoven
without the benefit of strings and woodwinds.
In other words, we have never seriously
questioned that the processes of writing
words down on paper, painting a picture, and
playing an instrument are purely expressive
activities entitled to full First Amendment
protection.
Anderson v. Cit)! of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 106l

62 (9th Cir. 2010) (determining that the tattooing process is
purely expressive activity protected by the First
Amendment); see also ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595
(7th Cir. 2012) ("The act of making an audio or audiovisual
recording is necessarily included within the First
Amendment's guarantee of speech"); Fields v. Cit)» 0f
Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2017) ("The First
Amendment protects actual photos, videos, and recordings .
. . and for this
protection to have meaning the Amendment
must also protect the act of creating that material.")
(emphasis added). Because the recording process is itself
expressive and is "inextricably intertwined" with the
resulting recording, the creation of audiovisual recordings is
speech entitled to First Amendment protection as purely
expressive activity. See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1062.
The Recordings Clause prohibits the recording of a

defined topic"the conduct of an agricultural production
facility's operations." This provision is an "obvious"
example of a content-based regulation of speech because it
"defin[es] regulated speech by particular subject matter."
Reed v. Town ofGilbeI't, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015); see

also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (a
statute was content-based when it prohibited "visual [and]
auditory depiction[s] . . . depending on whether they depict
conduct in which a living animal is intentionally harmed"
(alterations in original)). A regulation is content-based when
it draws a distinction "on its face" regarding the message the
speaker conveys or "when the purpose and justification for
the law are content based." Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228. The
Recordings Clause checks both boxes. It would permit
filming a vineyard's art collection but not the winemaking
operation. Likewise, a Videographer could record an after-
hours birthday party among coworkers, a farmer's antique
car collection, or a historic maple tree but not the animal
abuse, feedlot operation, or slaughterhouse conditions.
Problematically, Idaho has effectively eliminated the

subject matter of any audio and visual recordings of
agricultural operations made without consent and has
therefore "prohibit[ed] public discussion of an entire topic."
In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, 863 F.3d 1110, 1122 (9th Cir. 2017)
(internal quotation marks omitted). And, because the
Recordings Clause prohibits the filming of agricultural
"operations" but nothing else, its application explicitly
pivots on the content of the recording; in other words, only
by viewing the recording can the Idaho authorities make a
determination about criminal liability. See League of
Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 383 (a statute is content-based
when "enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the
content of the message" to determine whether it complies
with the statute). Here, the statute depends not just on
"where they say" the message but alsocritically"on
What they say." McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531
(2014).
38 ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FIJ'ND V. WASDEN
As a content-based regulation, the Recordings Clause is

constitutional only if it withstands strict scrutiny, meaning it
"is necessary to serve a compelling state interest" and "is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators 'Ass 'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Strict
scrutiny is "an exacting test" requiring "some pressing
public necessity, some essential value that has to be
preserved; and even then the law must restrict as little speech
as possible to serve the goal." Turner, 512 U.S. at 680. As
with the Misrepresentation Clauses, Idaho asserts that the
Recordings Clause protects both property and privacy
interests. Even assuming a compelling government interest,
Idaho has not satisfied the narrow tailoring requirement
because the statute is both under-inclusive and over
inclusive.
Prohibiting only "audio or video recordings," but saying

nothing about photographs, is suspiciously under-inclusive.
Cit)» ofLadue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 ("[T]hat a regulation
of speech may be impermissibly underinclusive is firmly
grounded in basic First Amendment principles"). Why the
making of audio and video recordings of operations would
implicate property or privacy harms, but photographs of the
same content would not, is a mystery. This distinction defies
the old adage that "a picture is worth a thousand words."
Nor has Idaho explained how limiting the filming of

operations, but nothing else, effectuates its interests better
than eliminating all audio and video recordings at
agricultural production facilities. Presumably, for example,
an unauthorized recording of the agricultural production
facility's buildings would still implicate Idaho's concerns
about property, and the unauthorized filming of an employee
birthday party would implicate concerns about privacy.
Without some legitimate explanation, we are left to conclude
that Idaho is singling out for suppression one mode of

speechaudio and video recordings of agricultural
operationsto keep controversy and suspect practices out of
the public eye. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2229 (content-based laws
lend themselves to use for "invidious, thought-control
purposes"). The district court aptly noted that "[t]he
recording prohibition gives agricultural facility owners veto
power, allowing owners to decide what can and cannot be
recorded, effectively turning them into state-backed censors
able to silence unfavorable speech about their facilities."
The Recordings Clause is also over-inclusive and

suppresses more speech than necessary to further Idaho's
stated goals of protecting property and privacy. See Lone
Star Security and Video, Inc. v. City ofLos Angeles, 827 F.3d
1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2016). Because there are "various other
laws at [Idaho's] disposal that would allow it to achieve its
stated interests while burdening little or no speech," the law
is not narrowly tailored. Comite de Jornalei'os de Redondo
Beach v. City ofRedondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 949 (9th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (applying intermediate scrutiny). For
example, agricultural production facility owners can
vindicate their rights through tort laws against theft of trade
secrets and invasion of privacy. Idaho Code § 48801 et seq.
(prohibiting misappropriation of trade secrets); Taylor v.
KT. V.B., Inc., 525 P.2d 984, 985 (Idaho 1974) (outlining the
invasion of privacy torts). To the extent the legislators
expressed concern that fabricated recordings of animal abuse
would invade privacy rights, the victims can turn to
defamation actions for recourse. Even still, as Alvarez points
out, "[t]he remedy for speech that is false is speech that is
true"and not, as Idaho would like, the suppression of that
speech. 567 U.S. at 727.
For these reasons, the Recordings Clause cannot survive

First Amendment scrutiny and is therefore unconstitutional.
In light of this result, we need not analyze the Recordings
Clause under the Equal Protection Clause.
In sum, we affirm the district court's grant of summary

judgment with respect to §§ 18-7042(1)(a) and (d). We
reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment with
respect to §§ 18-7042(l)(b) and (c). The permanent
injunction should be modified accordingly.
AF FIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
BEA, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in

part:
The majority apparently believes that unconsented entryl

upon land is not a "legally cognizable harm" where it
"merely allows the speaker to cross the threshold of
another's property." But as a matter of the applicable Idaho
law, such an unconsented entry constitutes a common law
trespass, which is a legally cognizable harmone from
which damages are presumed to flow naturally. Taysom v.
1
Fraud or misrepresentation vitiates consent. Green v. Beaver' State
Contractors, Ina, 472 P.2d 307, 307 (Idaho 1970) (finding trespass
where defendant obtained permission to cross plaintiff s land by
misrepresentation); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 173 (1965); see also
id, cmt. b ("A conscious misrepresentation as to the purpose for which
admittance to the land is sought, may be a fiaudulent misrepresentation
of a material fact").
ANII\/[AL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND V. WASDEN 41
Taysoni, 349 P.2d 556, 560 (Idaho 1960) ("Nominal damage

need not be proved, but naturally flows from a wrongfill
entry").
I dissent because I would hold that the "ability to hold

property or to exercise control of it" requires recognition by
courts of the owner's right to exclusive possession of the
landthe right to exclude anyone from entry, at any time,
and for any reason at all or indeed for no reason? The
majority brushes aside this longstanding principle of
property in concluding that entry by misrepresentation "does
not infringe upon the specific interests trespass seeks to
protect." The majority's result contradicts the "universally
held" principle that the "right to exclude" is "a fundamental
element of the property right." Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 17980 (1979). Whilst the majority
opinion relies on outofcircuit cases which seemingly limit
a landowner's rights} but which are distinguishable, I
choose to rely on the law of Idaho and the common-law right
of property, ages old.
"There is nothing which so generally strikes the

imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the
right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual
in the universe." 2 William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *2. For centuries, Anglo-American
2
In a society governed by the Rule of Law, exceptions to the right
of the owner to exclusive possession of his land can be made by due
process of law, such as court orders and oflicial acts.
3
The majority cites Desm'ck v. Am. Broad Cost, Inc , 44 F.3d 1345
(7th Cir. 1995), and Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc , 194 F.3d
505, 517 (4th Cir. 1999)).
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023. Case: 1535960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntI'y: 92-1, Page 42 Of 56
law has affirmed this central feature of propertythe right

to exclude othersin the "general rule" that "our law holds
the property of every man so sacred, that no man can set his
foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave." Florida
v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013) (alteration and internal
quotation omitted) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils.
K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (KB. 1765), "a case
'undoubtedly familiar' to 'every American statesman' at the
time of the Founding"). The Supreme Court of the United
States has repeatedly held that "as to property reserved by its
owner for private use, 'the right to exclude others is "one of
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property.""' See, e. g, Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm 'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987)
(quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp,
458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (alteration omitted». I therefore
dissent from the majority opinion as to subsection (a) of the
Idaho statute at issue. I otherwise concur in the majority
opinion.
The majority analyzes this case under United States v.

Alvarez, in which the Supreme Court invalidated under the
First Amendment the Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C. § 704, a
federal statute which made criminal false claims that the
speaker had received the Congressional Medal of Honor.
567 U.S. 709 (2012). At the outset, it is important to note
that subsection (a) of the Idaho statute at issue in this case
differs from the version of the Stolen Valor Act at issue in
Alvarez in at least one crucial aspect: Whereas the Stolen
Valor Act prohibited the act of lying about a particular
subject (receipt of military decorations or medals), 18
U.S.C. § 704, subsection (a) of Idaho's statute prohibits the
act of entering a particular type of property ("agricultural
production facilities") by particular means (including
Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntryZ 921, Page 43 0f 56
"misrepresentation"), Idaho Code § 18-7042(1)(a).4 By the

plain meaning of the statute, liability attaches only to those
who "enter[]" an agricultural production facility through
lying, not to any and all who tell lies to agricultural facility
owners or to the public about such owners. Id. In other
words, subsection (a) of the Idaho statute does not prohibit
"pure speech." Although under Alvarez a liewithout
"more"is pure speech,5 the Idaho statute is directed at
something "more": the conduct of knowingly entering an
agricultural facility through the use of a lie. The use of the
term "enters" is a clear invocation of the standards and
interests of the law of trespass." This provision no more
4
Idaho Code § 18-7042 provides that a person commits the
misdemeanor crime of "interference with agricultural production" if the
person "knowingly" "(a) [i]s not employed by an agricultural production
facility and enters an agricultural production facility by force, threat,
misrepresentation, or trespass" (emphasis added).
5
In Alvarez, the Supreme Court explicitly distinguished cases of
"defamation, fi'aud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated
with a false statement" from cases that confront "a measure, like the
Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and nothing more." 567 U.S. at 719
(emphasis added).
6
"One who intentionally enters land in the possession of another is
subject to liability to the possessor for a trespass, although his presence
on the land causes no harm to the land, its possessor, or to any thing or
person in whose security the possessor has a legally protected interest."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 163 (1965) (emphasis added). The term
"enters land" is defined "to include, not only coming upon land, but also
remaining on it, and, in addition, to include the presence upon the land
of a third person or thing which the actor has caused to be or to remain
there." Id. § 158.
Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 92-1, Page 44 0f 56
regulates pure speech than do prohibitions on larceny by

trick or false pretenses.7
Therefore, I don't see how Alvarez is applicable, or that

a First Amendment analysis is at all necessary to subsection
(a) of the subject Idaho statute. See Pickup v. Brown, 740
F.3d 1208, 1230 (9th Cir. 2014)8 ("[A]n act that 'symbolizes
nothing,' even if employing language, is not 'an act of
communication' that transforms conduct into First
Amendment speech." (quoting Nevada Comm 'n on Ethics v.
Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 12627 (2011»).9 Here, as in
7
For example, in Idaho "[t]hefi includes a wrongful taking,
obtaining or withholding of another's property . . . committed . . . [b]y
deception . . . [or] [b]y conduct heretofore defined or known as. . .
common law larceny by trick . . . . [or] obtaining property, money or
labor under false pretenses." Idaho Code § 18-2403; see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 1708 ("Whoever . . . by fiaud or deception obtains . . . fiom or out of
any mail, post office, or station thereof, letter box, mail receptacle . . . or
other authorized depository . . . any article or thing contained therein . . .
[s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years,
or both.").
s
In Pickup, the plaintiffs brought a First Amendment challenge to
California Senate Bill 1172 ("SB 1172"), which banned state-licensed
mental health providers fiom engaging in "sexual orientation change
efforts" with patients under 18 years of age. 740 F.3d at 1221. The
district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of
the law and California appealed. Id. at 1222. This court engaged in
plenary review, id, upheld SB 1172, id. at 1236, and reversed the grant
of the preliminary injunction, id The panel found that SB 1 172 regulated
professional conduct, rather than speech, by banning a certain form of
treatment, and so was "subject to deferential review just as are other
regulations of the practice of medicine." Id at 122931.
9
In Carrigan, the petitioner, the Nevada Commission on Ethics,
investigated respondent Carrigan under Nevada's "Ethics in
Government" law, which required public officials to recuse themselves
Pickup and Carrigan, a common law trespass "symbolizes

nothing." It seems plain to me that Idaho's political
branches could enact a general criminal trespass law that
includes in its definition of "trespass" entry obtained by
fraud or misrepresentation. Cf. Rowe v. Cit); ofPocatello,
218 P.2d 695, 701 (Idaho 1950) ("[T]he city could ban the
practice of uninvited intrusion upon private residences . . .
The city could . . . merely declare it a misdemeanor."); Idaho
Code § 18-2403 (prohibiting theft by deception, trick, or
false pretenses). If that is so, I see nothing to prevent Idaho
legislators from extending such protection only to certain
types of properties, such as nuclear facilities, see 10 C.F.R.
§ 160.3 (prohibiting trespass on "facilities, installations, and
real property subject to the jurisdiction . . . of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission"). The relative importance of
nuclear facilities and "agricultural production facilities" is in
the eyes of the beholder, or, in this case, the Idaho state
legislature.
Even assuming that Alvarez is applicable here,

subsection (a) survives First Amendment review under
Alvarez. As the majority recognizes, false speech may be
criminalized if made "for the purpose of material gain" or
fiom voting on or advocating a vote on matters in which a reasonable

person would be materially affected by their private interests. 564 U.S.
at 11920. The Commission concluded that Carrigan violated the law
by voting to approve a hotel/casino project in which his campaign
manager was involved. Id. at 120. The Nevada Supreme Court found
the ethics law overbroad, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Id. at 121. The Court held that a legislator's vote is "nonsymbolic
conduct" and reversed. Id. at 127, 129. "[T]he act of voting symbolizes
nothing. It discloses, to be sure, that the legislator wishes (for whatever
reason) that the proposition on the floor be adopted, just as a physical
assault discloses that the attacker dislikes the victim. But neither . . . is
an act of communication." Id at 12627.
"material advantage," or if it inflicts a "legally cognizable

harm." Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719, 723 (plurality opinion).
Similarly, in his concurrence with Justice Kennedy's
plurality opinion in Alvarez, Justice Breyer distinguished the
Stolen Valor Act from presumptively constitutional statutes,
such as those prohibiting fraud, impersonation, trademark
infringement etc., which prohibit "a subset of lies where
specific harm is more likely to occur." Id. at 73436 (Breyer,
J ., concurring) (emphasis added). To the extent that
subsection (a) prohibits misrepresentations as well as
"
entries, I have no difficulty concluding that "enter[ing the
property of another "by . . . misrepresentation" inflicts a
"legally cognizable harm," Alvarez, 567 at 719, is done for
the purpose of material gain, id at 723, and involves "a
subset of lies" where the "specific harm" of trespass "is more
likely to occur," id at 736 (Breyer, J ., concurring).
The state of Idaho has long recognized that a violation of

a property owner's exclusive dominion over his land is a
legally cognizable harm. See Marshall v. Niagara Springs
Orchard C0, 125 P. 208, 212 (Idaho 1912) ("[I]t is the
appellant's right by reason of his ownership of the land to
have exclusive possession of said land." (emphasis added»;
see also Walter E. Wilhite Revocable Living Tr. v. Nw.
Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 916 P.2d 1264, 1274 (Idaho
1996) ("Trespass is a tort against possession committed
when one, without permission, interferes with another's
exclusive right to possession of the property." (emphasis
added)); Idaho Code § 22-2402 (defining "landowner" to
mean "[a] person with an interest in a parcel of land such that
the person has the right to exclude others from possession of
the parcel").
The majority's proposal to count as a "legally co gnizable

harm" only those trespasses that violate Idaho's criminal
Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 92-1, Page 47 Of 56
code is thus foreclosed by the contrary substantive law of

Idaho and other common law jurisdictions. "One who
intentionally enters land in the possession of another is
subject to liability to the possessor for a trespass, although
his presence on the land causes no harm to the land, its
possessor, or to any thing or person in Whose security the
possessor has a legally protected interest." Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 163 (1965). To vindicate his right of
exclusive dominion, a landowner may recover nominal
damages for trespasseven absent evidence of any physical
or pecuniary injurybecause "[n]omina1 damage need not
be proved, but naturally flows from a wrongful entry."
Taysom v. Taysom, 349 P.2d 556, 560 (Idaho 1960); see also
Nelson v. Holdaway Land & Cattle C0., 691 P.2d 796, 799
(Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (owner was entitled to recover
nominal damages for trespass "even though no actual
damages were proven"). Furthermore, a landowner has a
general right to exclude others from his lands by reasonable
force, under certain circumstances. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 77 ( 1965). Generally speaking, a landowner can use
such reasonable force to defend "his exclusive possession of
land" from others for any reason at all, even "personal
dislike or hostility to the other." See id. cmt. c; Rowe v. Cit)»
of Pocatello, 218 P.2d 695, 700 (Idaho 1950) ("A man's
house is still his castle. He may exclude whom he chooses").
In fact, no less an authority than the Supreme Court of

Idaho has found an actionable trespass where the defendant
used a misrepresentation to gain access to the plaintiff's
property and the defendant merely crossed the property. In
Green v. Beaver State Contractors, Inc., the contractor went
to plaintiff Lula M. Green and sought permission to enter
and remove "lava rock" fiom her land. 472 P.2d 307, 307
(Idaho 1970). The contractor offered to pay $1 plus 5 cents
"per yard of rock removed" from Green's land, and she
Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 921, Page 48 0f 56
agreed. Id. at 30708. In reality, however, the contractor

removed rock only from land adjoining Green's land and
was merely using Green's land as a means of access to obtain
the rock from the third party, thus avoiding any obligation to
pay Green for "rock removed." Id. at 308. "In view of the
circumstances," namely the "misrepresentation . . . by [the
contractor]," the Idaho Supreme Court found a common-law
trespass and remanded the case for a determination of
Green's damages. Id. at 310. Therefore, the Supreme Court
of Idaho has recognized that employing misrepresentation to
gain entry inflicts a legally cognizable harm, even if the
invader entered "merely . . . to cross the threshold of
another's property."
In the case of Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.,

563 N.W.2d 154 (Wisc. 1997), the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin affirrned the value of the right to exclude even
more emphatically. It affirrned an eyepopping award of
punitive damages for the precise sort of "mere" threshold-
crossing that the majority pooh-poohs here. In that case, the
defendant, Steenberg Homes, had sold a mobile home to a
neighbor of the Jacques, who were retired farmers. It
determined that "the easiest route" to deliver the mobile
home would be to cut across the Jacques' land. Id. at 157.
The "only alternative" was to haul the mobile home through
a sharply-curved private road which was covered in seven
feet of snow at the time. Id. Understandably, Steenberg saw
a material advantage in "merely . . . cross[ing] the threshold"
of the Jacques' property. The Jacques refused permission to
haul the mobile home across their land, but Steenberg did so
anyway. Id. at 1575 8. The jury awarded nominal damages
of $1 and punitive damages of $100,000, id at 158, and the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, upheld the award in full. Id.
at 166. Not only did the jury properly award nominal
damages because "[t]he law infers some damage from every
direct entry upon the land of another," id at 160 (quoting

Prossel' and Keeton 0n Torts, § 13 (5th ed. 1984)), the jury
also properly awarded punitive damages to vindicate the
strong interest of individual landowners and of society in
protecting private property from trespass, icl.
The Idaho trespass statute cited in the majority opinion

is not relevant. The majority cites Idaho Code § 18-7008(9)
for the proposition that only lands posted with "No
Trespassing" signs can be trespassed upon under Idaho law.
But while the cited statute so limits actions seeking criminal
penalties for "willful and intentional[]" trespass, it does not
otherwise override or eliminate common law trespass in
Idaho." Nor does Idaho Code § 6202, which provides for
treble damages in civil actions for "willful and intentiona1[]"
trespass and also requires posted "No Trespassing" signs:
[T]he Idaho statutes governing trespass only

apply when the trespass is shown to have
been wilfiil and intentional, and the wronged
party seeks treble damages therefor, as
authorized by Section 6-202. In all other
circumstances, the common law principles
relating to trespass actions apply. The court is
unaware of any recent Idaho cases to the
contrary, and the 1976 amendments to the
1°
"The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or
inconsistent with, the constitution or laws of the United States, in all
cases not provided for in these compiled laws, is the rule of decision in
all courts of this state." Idaho Code § 73-116. "[C]hanges in the
common law by the adoption of a statute may not be presumed, nor may
such changes be accomplished by legislation of doubtful implication.
Indus Indem. C0 v Columbia Basin Steel & Iron Inc., 93 Idaho 719,
723 (Idaho 1970).
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023._ Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 92-1, Page 50 Of 56
statutes did nothing to alter this interpretation
Mock v. Potlatch C0rp., 786 F. Supp. 1545, 1548 (D. Idaho

1992) (citing Menasha Woodenware C0. v. Spokane Int'l.
Ry., 115 P. 22 (Idaho 1911)).11 Thus, the "imaginations" and
"affections" of Idahoans are not so different from those of
greater mankind. See Blackstone, supra. Unauthorized
entry upon the land of another is common-law trespass in
Idaho and thus a legally cognizable harm."
The majority also argues, based on two out-ofcircuit

cases, that not all misrepresentations necessarily vitiate
consent to entry. The majority cites Desm'ck v. Am. Broad
Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345 (7th Cir. 1995), and Food Lion, Inc.
v. Capital Cities/ABC, Ina, 194 F.3d 505, 517 (4th Cir.
1999). Both Desm'ck and Food Lion note, in discussing the
common law of various other jurisdictions, that there is no
11
In Menus/1a, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant went on its
lands and cut and removed timber. 115 P. at 23. The trial court awarded
treble damages and the defendant appealed. Id at 24. The Supreme
Court of Idaho reversed the award of statutory treble damages. Id at 24
25. The court read a willfulness requirement into the statute and reversed
the award because there was no allegation that the trespass was willful.
Id. at 2425. In so doing, however, the court noted that the complaint
was "good as an action at common law, entitling the plaintiff to his actual
damage," but simply did not meet the statutory requirements for trebled
damages. Id. at 25. Rather, the court concluded that "the damages
recoverable at common law would afford an adequate reparation." Id
The court therefore reduced the judgment to provide only actual damages
and affirmed the judgment, so modified. Id.
12
Nowhere does Alvarez hold that a "legally co gnizable harm" must
also be a crime. In fact, Alvarez points to classic common law injuries
"defamation," "fiaud," and "invasion of privacy"as examples of
"legally cognizable harms." 567 U.S. at 719.
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17l2023._
Case: 15-35960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 92-1, Page 51 Of 56
consensus on this issue. Food Lion, Ina, 194 F.3d at 517

("[T]he various jurisdictions and authorities in this country
are not of one mind in dealing with the issue"); Desnick, 44
F.3d at 135253 (noting diversity of results in entry-by-
misrepresentation cases and proposing a new ruleof
undisclosed originto reconcile them); see also
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 173 cmt. b (1965)
(providing that "[a] conscious misrepresentation as to the
purpose for which admittance to the land is sought, may be
a fraudulent misrepresentation of a material fact" which
vitiates consent pursuant to Restatement (Second) of Torts
§892B). As relevant here, however, the law of Idaho is
contrary to the Desm'ck and Food Lion decisions. See
Beaver State Contractors, Ina, 472 P.2d at 310 (finding
trespass where defendant entered and crossed the owner's
property by misrepresentation). Even if entries such as those
at issue in Desm'ck or Food Lion (or Beaver State) neither
damage the premises nor "disrupt" the owner's activities
thereon, wrongful entry is nonetheless a "legally cognizable
harm" per se. Taysom, 349 P.2d at 560 ("Nominal damage
. . . naturally flows from a
wrongful entry").
Furthermore, there is no suggestion in either Desm'ck or

Food Lion that the First Amendment prohibits a state court
or state legislature from establishing a different rule
eliminating consent to enter land when the consent is
procured by fraud. Cf Illinois, ex rel. Madigan v.
Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 624 (2003)
("Consistent with our precedent and the First Amendment,
States may maintain fiaud actions when fundraisers make
false or misleading representations designed to deceive
donors about how their donations will be used"); State v.
Jesser, 501 P.2d 727, 737 n.29 (Idaho 1972) ("It has long
been settled that fraud vitiates the consent of the victim to
the taking of his property by agreement, and that,
consequently, the taking is a constructive trespass upon

possession . . . ."); Idaho Code § 18-2403 (prohibiting theft
by deception, trick, or false pretenses). If the problem with
subsection (a) is that it enacts something different from the
substantive law of trespass advocated by a Seventh Circuit
or Fourth Circuit panel, any suggestion that those panels
have hit upon a "better rule" should be directed to the Idaho
legislature. It is Idaho law that governs what constitutes
valid consent for a license sufficient to avoid a trespass on
Idaho land.
Subsection (a) is also limited to lies which are likely to

cause a "specific harm," as Justice Breyer's Alvarez
concurrence would require. Justice Breyer distinguished the
Stolen Valor Act, which prohibited "falsity and nothing
more," from various other statutes which prohibit certain
false or deceptive communications which cause or are likely
to cause a "specific harm." Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 73436
(Breyer, J., concurring). For example, (l) fraud statutes
require "actual injury," (2) defamation statutes require a
reputational harm, (3) intentional infliction of emotional
distress liability requires an "emotional, dignitary, or
privacy-related" harm, (4) statutes dealing with perjury or
lying to government officials are "typically limited to
circumstances where a lie is likely to . . . interfer[e] with the
functioning of a government department," (5) impersonation
statutes focus "may require" a showing that someone was
deceived into following a course of action he would not have
pursued but for the deceitful conduct, and (6) trademark
infringement statutes are focused on infringement which
causes confusion among consumers about the source of a
product, and thereby dilutes the value of a trademark.
Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 73436 (Breyer, J., concurring). The
"specific harm" requirement thus mandates that a
prohibition on lies be limited to or "focused on" lies which
are "more likely" to cause a discrete and identifiable type of

harm. That is, a generalized prohibition on telling lies about
consumer products is overbroad, while a prohibition on lies
which are likely to trick consumers into buying a product
they would not otherwise buy is not. Unlike the Stolen Valor
Act, subsection (a) is limited to lies which are likely to cause
a specific harm: invasion of and onto land, or the harm to
property owners' right to exclude others. In fact, in this
analysis, subsection (a) is even better than Justice Breyer's
trademark infringement and impersonation examples
because the specific harm must occur for liability to attach,
rather than just be "more likely" to occur.
Conversely, when one obtains permission to enter onto

the land of another, he obtains a material gain: a license to
enter. The resulting license is a legally cognizable interest
or privilege. See Restatement (First) of Property § 512
(1944) ("[T]he word 'license' indicates the legal interest
arising from a consent"). It confers the ability to do lawfully
that which the law otherwise forbids and punishes as
trespass. Shultz v. Atkins, 554 P.2d 948, 953 (Idaho 1976)
("[A]n essential element of a license . . . [is] the right to use
land in the possession of another."). Take the example,
suggested by the Maj ority's opinion, of the teenager who lies
to get a reservation at an exclusive restaurant. The majority
admits that the teenager gains something (entry to the
restaurant) but concludes, without explanation," that "[t]his
entry alone does not constitute a material gain." No material
'3
Because the majority does not explain how it reaches this
conclusion, I assume it is my colleagues' own appraisal of the
restaurant's menu.
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023._ Case: 1535960, 01/04/2018, ID: 10712318, DktEntry: 92-1, Page 54 of 56
gain to the teenager? However one defines "material"" and

"gain?" it seems a stretch to say the teenager stands to
obtain neither at the restaurant. The majority must imagine
the lad served thin gruel indeed for him to have received
nothing of "substance," leaving him with a sense of not
"getting something" as a result of hoodwinking the maitre
d'hétel.
Furthermore, if the teenager takes a seat in the restaurant

with permission procured by fraud, he commits trespass and
is liable for at least nominal damages. But if he obtains
consent, he is able to gain lawful (albeit limited) use of
another's landa discrete, legally cognizable advantage"
that he did not have before consent was given. If nothing
else, he gains a suspension of the owner's right to expel him
from the restaurant by force. See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 77 (1965).
The majority's restaurant analogy merely evades the

crucial inquiries under Alvarez. First, "entry alone" is a
1"
Material: "1. of matter; of substance . . . physical: a material object
. .of the body or bodily needs, satisfactions . . . corporeal . . . ."
. 2. a.
MATERIAL, Webster's New World College Dictionary (5th ed. 2014).
15
Gain: "1. An increase; addition . . . 2. the act of getting something
. . . ." GAIN, Webster's New World College Dictionary (5th ed. 2014).
16
Furthermore, as an empirical matter, it is not self-evidently true
that interfering only with the right to exclude does not appropriate
anything of material value. See Jonathan Klick & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to Exclude. An Empirical
Assessment, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917 (2017) (finding, based on an
empirical analysis of the effect of legislation that recognized a "right to
roam" in England and Wales on property values, that "even so-called
slight intrusions on owners' exclusion right in favor of more public
access . . . come at a real cost to owners").
legally cognizable harm under Idaho law; that is why under

Idaho law aggrieved landowners, subjected to a trespass,
need not prove unjust enrichment or any other form of
damages. Taysom, 349 P.2d at 560. Legally cognizable
harmnot some unknown quantum of physical damage or
economic harm to be determined by courts ex post, on a case-
by-case basisis what Alvarez requires. Alvarez, 567 U.S.
at 719 (plurality opinion). Second, although "entry alone"
may seem insignificant to the majority, it was apparently
significant to the Beaver State contractor who took the
shortcut across Ms. Green's land. See supra at 4748. And
in the majority's hypothetical, it is apparently significant to
restauranteurs who offer their in-demand tables to "well-
known journalists" but not to journalists' teenage sons.
Indeed, the teenager does cause economic harm in the
majority's hypothetical: When he secures one of a limited
number of reservations, he takes a valuable table off of the
market and puts it to a perhaps economically sub-optimal use
(his own). That is, unless his journalist mother has been
splendid as to an allowance. Third, the majority's
hypothetical does not present a case of entry "by
misrepresentation." The maftre d 'ho'tel must recognize that
the teenager is not his famous journalist mother when the
teenager arrives at the restaurant; if he seats the teenager
anyway, then the restaurant consents to the entry and the
teenager does not violate the Idaho statute. Finally, the
majority concludes that the teenager's lie is "pure speech."
"Nothing but speech," yes; but a lie is seldom "pure."
Nonetheless, the Idaho statute criminalizes entries, not lies.
See supra, at 43.
The majority seems to be concemedunderstandably

that the Idaho law's punishments for such trespasses are
Draconian or unwise ("the teenager would be subject to
punishment of up to one year in prison, a fine not to exceed
$5,000, or both."). But that concern has nothing to do with

whether entry-by-misrepresentation inflicts a legally
cognizable harm or provides a material gainwhich is to
say that it has nothing to do with the Alvarez analysis. That
the Idaho statute may take a heavy-handed approach to
punishing certain trespasses is a policy argument against the
Idaho statute, and that argument should be addressed to
Idaho's legislators and voters.
The misconception of the ancient right at stakethe

right of an owner of real property to exclude all others from
his propertyis where the majority goes wrong, as our
holding as to subsection (b) demonstrates. Applying Alvarez
to subsection (b), the majority finds that "[o]btaining an
agricultural production facility's records by
misrepresentation inflicts a 'legally cognizable harm' by
impairing an agricultural production facility owner's ability
to control who can assert dominion over, and take possession
of, his property." Quite right. The farmer's records are his
property. So is his land his property. Subsection (a) is
constitutional for precisely the same reason: Entering an
agricultural production facility by misrepresentation inflicts
a "legally cognizable harm" by "impairing an agricultural
production facility owner's ability to control who can assert
dominion over . . . his [real] property." There is no
meaningful legal distinction between the two subsections
under Alvarez, and neither is unconstitutional.
I respectfully dissent.
'
F13
11'
FORTHE COUNTYOF CLATSOP 2§23 BLT '7 Pr"? 3. 2'

'
Case No: C/\ '9 .
ALA/b 19 [[1 O r2700 7
Petitioner/ Plaintiff CERTI'EICA1151

and OF SERVICE
Maura
0
Rog/e ngore {by
Respondent/Deferfdant
\7
I am the El Petitioner/Plaintiff EIRespondent/ D efendant in this case.
I certify that on (date) )0 2

3,1provided a true copy of (list each
document) oft/(04
{9&qu Mobon'low MS, SWIGI z/pei lifi-Q/y alpou l'
"063' $111qu LQ'll'l-Q gr WQSolyk Elgar/9mg],
r/lrmkvs (Bide-P 'l' Oupi'mwm Awamql Laqal Dace/3432 éVMmD'rg/
FVnO/
to the etitioner E] Respondent E] Attorneyfor § Jr 4 "it

a;
in the above fl '1
3%
Hands of the DPetitioner [:1 Respondent E] Attorney for DA g 9' Q WI)
(1'
at (address):
or E] United States mail in a sealed envelope with postage paid addressed to (address):
(o
Date
l
'7
2;? Signature
PrintName
WW R L m
j
EZ/
?D
ContactAddress
em \2 As'l'efa
City, State, ZIP
on 97/03
RE©EDVED Io~f7xag (a
I
OCT 17 2023
93 CR2; 297'"
01 4/ (""7'5/ By'
7/ 4/ M} 544/4
""76"";
Cowéem/'
0(/ M47
7/4
:: 8 "ma/v; f5,
"4,9447 Aw
MS 540/4 We
0%: j/lzlc {1/07 MQ/l'nj
('14
[5 /'<}/)0/9\/V5 Jon/noun;
WI'CZQ/j V? 474/4757;
(I'/(/€5 7/} £715 167/)4'9'
frokCf'G-vfl
04/1 Inn/'19"? [4 79907
Aqmssmfl qéw5a/ Corfu/til, /
444/ «ex/M7411,
f7 ['5 m undid/444404 (14/5490
.0/4 soujhf'
flng C'qsfl (/n 0E5 14 SVO/Q/
7Z4
froseuk v SCLW4// r€//€/,/~
(9V / c//e [o (/4/ [~45
44,45; 0K3 /é
544/4 WWW/ m/
07f C 1:
6/3472
/jr' W/fi5f/m1'7
J
Qxlp/omrz/ém')
{['to/ n@/' [mo/A (WW7L {1,7h7é
fr.
cane-794,0? /¢\"\
0"« f'MZQ'eC/ rm OMS/514% 240
GIT} 762V?
a/rflcu//
ag/uZCqLc 710
Av/p W nod/C6 (3:
("Z/f
60445,? 17/" (MIL/"ad! w/ 5/483»
a; gkgwn é}
#q/50F [@4440 #16 MéfLq// qnfiounq/f;
m1
13
Ml 6214 a/(nc/MOZZ/f W 6(5 62/944752? '28"
jar-PWM/
leulfilo
04/ [4'1C« M4 541/ 011

5/9/64A
é}
ff
Z/L LIOL
,3 yum/2%)" [444 /7/c7/50// Wrwlefi/M

m] A
710 [46 pm" 9505/1/40 ZZD/O/é o
flflg. flrq/(/ 5W JR gov/J Vménskz4/

flulj MO
/§ jflaj'jnaflg 5'17 JIO
Mfljyb/fl//p
g/DJ/x'uflj 3/7/233J 47L
"O",
79 m J {V227j/WI/a/7/Z'ij
W25? f/W /bfll7
_
/
17%; [0
égx 2/9/1717
64""? 10M) [@2w/72r/71s1'7/W
46/0
W7
"albfi "/015'57/ 0'1
E. fl3/JJflXg '
wg/fl/azmeyzwa "V
#'abimyp
"fly/741:) féc/'1b420
gar )9 KW 'J
My MW? f\iz/7[ [L4"§7Lb\('f\l
gum 5b {bM
ijflfl/WQ'jZ II jolqflggn/pw "H
121/)
{D 7.
mas 5'7/ $210 /)"')
95/!
%' (77717;; 9/471
W/p/Mg /0a7/Jy7iajcfl
Elf/VI
(M0
071 [pf/VICE
>//Djfl L7uiagé] 1M1?)
U'} 531(4'4/ 2/0114); C; [OAS SL7,
7yon/3 (2/1 \jLQ
719M /o'1/g jg)? Jib/7 ngnyflM/l
/W/2JC('/WI/K93 /
'1" 53"] f0
.u;6>);()>v)/w)'¢l?{'1 317,717 "279475
71X/MD W w "My bug?
L: jWb-'Ajmé'é '9?!"
17 S47
7%; f6? foyfflgazj g)\/)
.J'b;?0,é7§ Jog/W]?
Scy £144? ba/aj/filo f'l/a 3717507
/om19
9117 Wang
2? 02¢ "WM/1
§W5jyb5fl7?b
'20'07'
J
{/7
G)
p
tC
/7 71.0
76%! 70
[lo/\b 77 "W"
?b
[u 1)
JIWf 529) 71a:
94Wd« Wl/A
{914'} #02
x "3
/ ..
N'Dj
a/ilag /'0 fly
F" W7 y W" W 2. Jam MM
7
Mi7'23 32/?
€071 7f/7lk715
"H fa
*
ho 20%) Mfl 2/ (LIL fisk'
/.
(«L4 34,4177.)
"if dag -'
'f/ 'C/ {/W 7U
/7M7>'WMQ g 17
3 \'J Z
[ml/n4 .flwj'j'y wé (3/;
%/0\'""12:(O[A
7; 7?
{D
07L "/0 P /)
é/zAré >6? W
?4h7 7K7)7M
/7fl6yf /fld7'7 20/10? «4/
W 7'9 "'7'0'7'
07/ "W 0'
WWW ( U
} M2" /10 W" g 7'
7% 7
manila7 01/}
/W7 /'
57/!"
/10
WJZ/ «ii? [{XWAIJ W'07
may bM/é'Wfi/ él'wflg'u/
?/'\I/ 3/0
497119¢g
Mlle/7.2
afcu d!
4;) WU/b Wave/o
5347192/2"; 71mm: /0ub
' 33'
7'
WW"?
My eye/73 57/ "77'7"? (27 [WNW/J)
,{7 'J ¢//#6'7
oéy/o/J "H
/% a4; 2/317)
9'; 5/11
L7 gm)),40/@J
um w we 9? 27'
f ?' fl W? K/fl07§
23 /w
WW}? g»yg)7k76fl
"717/9/0/tfi 752g
(4
wva/L/ 7/0 MLfbP/bA)~fi17/v7}Wff/
9' /7 mom 7;
/ J 0 /'J 7
#6? fl/ jg
/2'§ Jgn?b
"500(5/8"
[ll/\J
Jfl/L 9,9
"EM.'W I'M/9 //r\7§
;\ [J
calf/in Ynez
70w
/§ may: /§/"bL4//!()(
5'5)?ij my
:5 5"? [271% /;/nab/5
/27)9'/?fl0{ ,10 JMfijdwLmM/af
El flaw/Llama
WII7/V1 79/7
71/'74Wi 70
75/22:;
5&7
zippy-aw 5M7»/57/ (7/
MW, [7247 "WK/$71
/§1/béb ("Ff/47:7 F/
7%? 7 «7777 MW Mw
W" 'WWMOZ/ WWW: 7"?"
,J/g/IC/ M)27/ypn 4/2711; 9/]?
fig, -W'W t?
775/ 6/4 $10M
971%." 7729 /Wu7o~wwz7
w Mm JD £8n g
pram/ {31/
c/
fl/Zawrlug
C/u /q WYQ/Vpfl/'J /flfflUL/W7 "W j
1
76; .4
nj/ Dflbg 997,07, _) 77M} jy/fj'wLJ
(40/1
/y/277271/17 Wya/gL W4sgbjb7WIB~ 6757")
"OZ7224/ 79) //w s'rsw 0M.77/39~'/'
c/g/o/«b/w
la
32/77/313, 07L
/'797y)a/ [flaw/Zap,"
Correct Co
lgJ/JSOC/Ya
20713
WWW" y'a
jjmfiocl/ [Km/«1:7? Amfl a7L
710
WJb7 WjL J/flUflflJé77b? WU\'W"J3
Wba/V'
EWI/vmmy fwb jg 7ZWHWHQ'W
{agave/W fay /Wofl'flf§ "kW/["6 ""7
W a" Sfiwlflt
//ym 07/10 K
My"??? A 9
w /W 4 air/a7
%< W77 '9
/fM5"'9/"%2'?/'"9M
mw w
I 7%.
13.3"
~%
/' /
fl.Cf 42 07px;
VJ) H9) //
/by/Mfacfl C274 var/v27 "L?
fiéffiwfl'flfl
)0 b
fag/1 716? [Mafia/qgagojé'
/97Lb>gn
www%/wvw/wm 07M my are/)0 7'" ""57
Wj $53/mWJ/J/ Q/
W fwbm 71,014
W r? of
//~)7(/1'7'2'§0\/</
C73 07/4 JOQ/b/j W71 .7/0 2%]
23/9) wagq/[14 '(Aftwe?
af/:0 7'44
{20/0 53'7% "1,477
6M3 "/7"
'5'"
/5/ '70 7'"
7 W a 777 w
1/1/) a5 flag/m 4/1
I
%/%@M f/
a} 931 ijWflfa2'j?fisz
5:7
//béfl7 é/p/t/O?
3993
Wflw
MW) 8 )IocL rug ""7 f0
/('";'7+
(V fl/a/WJ $7597"
2§w/)7705./0
<Zal/017 CW
mm/bjchj "my
4'"
fffibf/A
WWWW /
MM]: // Mf/l& 7""77 #7777";
N [7
32071:»"f
L757
Wflmx'xyM /::7W'/
/€Z/WWU/
M 7777074 2'77 97 /77j"7
"TM/7 7' 7317 72/
'7'" "f"
N M77 97 MW'W'DW
00'7" 7
Wad mp/w fay 7/2/9/fi/
,gj/Ifi'u
flW
J3 j/a flfVavu
/%fi§2uggm
IMP/42 '7 jg g xg o 'mu l/ W /
/ L (7 /27W'S\U
8/
777 WW 67.7 7/«77 ,7: ~77
'V "a; 7mm 4477/ (755/ Z/
$3970
M45965? '1 Wed flow/o
Wfl/éfM/Mfid
Ve rified Correct Copy
7W
710 117% ofu3\ L/(I/'Q/M/ flbfipjwr
71/1717Li
$13
Q// ""922" /Jf§74nmug f/Wr/flf/fl")
/
v/mq
Wdb927 7U]? 7W?" Wag/1 3711071
{f/fil/fl") MIMyy/JVJLMZO («MLJW
'
W/j/
I
(/zj. §)\ JIK/D'a+ €7/i\

W/mflavij
WM W WW
/"%j7"fl 1 4%
JWWD ZS
§Zwajj » i7i:'""'/C\
wflt/hfl' 1'
7a/byg mam/M
710a f/W
W/ W'b/vzwfl/z Wfl flip
7b
7b JM\'S§b//}7<//
AVVQIWWLU" [AJ%/nb§§(7
W 1?
WW af 21?? MW"
1;) 9/7/14]
/7M!7 ngb/ewo/JQ w/X'IM
[/0777
'
/0' W"'? /O
galflyap/o Wwiywgfu;
6W "9/" "WM
«may SN} W "7""
Gar/D 0/1/ Sb/vz (W741 \py<nruz
Y%
gf.<flw
[WW/{W14 +7y aa/wu 9% v/fb
@
J0 14/61 [[9
/A/\
; 21w
m'jb / jé/'yny5/
29'y
_Verified Correct Cop
yéSivu >MWfl/ibfi7$
\)\
/S'47J 29'7/'0
7%?443 @7177 l/Zib/ré/ fifl/71fl a" ?"
"7% "i! W 1/1/07
W7W //M "WW "W I 4f
Qr 54%
"'W//7%§ 7/"
"W"? [K JO yaw J.) ZLM/cT/dA
(/97/17471 [ml/o
Q74
bd wafwgfi/U "747,214
/0\/ (WW/{M
2*f/D/fl4'137 2r
7'
vflgj/gd MW? Sbor
512§77g /}7§b/\/} 31b]
mg 9771 WW é/7god W, 7:69
fflc'yb 0 /? H
9713/1/01447) /'7LZ%JM '
«'57 5%» 70 k) Sb 7[ DD7L
eflg'fiaf 0% Wig/J37"
£9
794
94» m'v7 J0 'g/Zf/
g/ppfi/ /me7vty1,
3771 07L fpafv/w f'w
fl)? a~jt9mlo "b /r§'/be
§l 0
#fmkL 71¢? [ml/92;? May
/'0J
rb/BJ é'/bfl5{b§ WC? wa\gsg}g:>7
/227
S. 929 A5 5 7'
/ f "70/9 7" 68'6/ar )7"? 7X53
3,1 72C 0 A, W Mng 9?
/(V>)£wb/Jb 'Jnfojol'
EnftfaJajm 41/04/3w5
jug/aun/
/0 /flifl'/a'§90 jax?
MgbW 3
SLWiy/fl//4*3 )B'Sfl fMfwo/ LQ/«j
WW7
2202 Mm 4W9W§
921
449/3 mm 7,: #9 W? WW
5W W3 "'14
W /'w 955Jé<d<i
)M "W [Lu af
V'P/bM/l f/fly/vl. /Oa'/0//Jb
947M m4
1791b? fa/Aggw 07M
72Mfl6'wf27/010J
ma]
yiJ czf /bfg
WWybUVa/MI af/Hzi/gn/y 00'
film JZV'J/vpyfl W]? "Hyman/j (Hf/V]
(W WW/y/
wij/b IA)'\/I; 07/ 7,73,),1'71/70
4%" 7/3"" "'7, J" 0757/10
WEN/"72 aflwg/I
-§L/m [WI/I
1/1/17] 7L
a/LW/Z/ {kip/1 r7"? [Vg'W/JV
Z'Zbllx£JC//b
meg t7 f-Pa'JéaJ
"7% #37 .1
WM a'g/xlzj
74' 7/ / s'w\bgb 749/07/W
mm mm
u).
27/19wl 537
WW 2177.0 fil
"'F/RZ'UQ
"My 7MJ?J
9715/0aM7/b W 1° "W
7% f M? 9 W" gfl/'gf.'
yaa'Sflofl
@W7flw7mwwmb7/
w/)
ieodCr ectcoop
//(mn/[9)(w g/fivqbgf 70 if). ~77

>/
777"" NW 7 "SW/j 1193' 7707
MA 7mm NJ:
777%
M
7am 773: 7777""
van/6027.7 W /
gflm eff/6'7 7777 "2/"? I 1mg
MJM/i 3407797; f/MM
é/9< WW 7W W75:?
77"""07 I. 77/7? v' Siam ,Mb
7w 5 70
br/my/ Wéufi 70
779/77 179%
//97% mi 707»
M7 777777
7"" '7 7777/7
4m 07/ [976% Z/HSjJf]
WELD/w" {7747/} 924
bc/ w" W
{ab/9 f/W/W y
L
MfJb/(f/Xafi W /7 bcjb Mjfluéln/a:
0W}
)Wflfib gSSp'VLi/I/Vl /,JZ
6771
7957'V'J7Z39 79n/7x} QjL
r
%VWJ7§/0 awfl
3 ,9}; 977
/ 7&7 my fjd
7
Km
{van} lav/
dg/zrxz/gzymd f0
(7/b
/2 7L/flf§§b {WW
4/5577" a" [5107/ [/77627W§/<9
I
UNI?
2W
7L9
H/nL
fjflf %
JIO
7A
d7
LA/HM W7
. W)
AMI/a7)
//n@ 77hr}
a'S'CbJb flya'S "7
71/7;
bfg "if LI
WW%AWVV%{
{29 TZ
WW/lg /IW
LJL/ 409 ék
(3C? \ 7L5
xymb/ WWW/W b71317u/1 WM
\
M@%@
"W219" wwa/a
(/7 $WW g0 7°" 7\
19 529 Win/V5 W\'5fl9 WWW?
/%\'7 3/6/53 %¢@7/Q?7é\xnx nfl
WW WW7 W W442 6%
"m
"(WWW "W
7717/29 "'7;
7""7/7/ {Vt/69,712,5/179g7 2'50'771/1171
Q7b'ké/
Lung/j {Myand/ "/fi'M
fmlo fwy/aj C (I
don/5515' Q 7,7/b5fl fl
'
D/bjfl
9547)
@
'
E
='.:';{:'_"
'
FORTHE COUNTYOF CLATSOP 25323 0f}!

17 Pl? 3:
2!
5% mp Oreeon
Petitioner/Plaintiff
caseNO' C/U'QH-EQCKZfiL/fl
CER'tripplcflljj~
and OF SERVICE
Moi/IA
0
Qog/e Len/rare {ha
Respondent/Deferfdant
I am the Cl Petitioner/Plaintiff DRespondent/ Defendant in this case.
I certifythaton (date) )0 '7 3

,Iprovidedatrue copy of (hst each
MDHW+°(W "75 540'" I/La'i 14141-94 GLOW}-
m Sam
document) Oralrn {DG'W'P'Q'Q
LAM .4.» wqscfm cifiacu.m¢$ év
Arvn'Cl/S Bite? 'l'
OVOiMW Awimal Lflqal DAfiQ/nse Fvnd/
' i
' q9
to the etitioner El Respondent D Attorney for S "l ax "F 'C in the above
DA g %
fi Hands of the DPetitioner El Respondent E] Attorneyfor
Q'fl'fl'
at (address):
or I] United States mail in a sealed envelope with postage paid addressed to (address):
and belief. I understand they are made for use as evidence in court and I an
(047 "9/3
Date
Wflé'w
Signature
WW i1 L 31/ m
/a
Print Name
90
ContactAddress
@2955 \Z 46% a
Clty, State ZIP /©OZ 97/03
Correct Coopy
MW)
J53" '7Lw2/é716Z, flf
/7' "(gt/to?
€'J/Il
7 M
my) we My bfigc/ Mp7 (/VW']
37f
fb
mega/0 um,/% afl<f')\u'('{afi
ofgggb"dff";
MOW Abj mv7 llzgsbm
Sfflgm/l? 77M
/1,57w§'/2920
4V! (27
W M 74"/1
1/3"
!4; Ma
% £7%a"9:j w
c
W; W QTCW
W/Ma-M MWW)"
n/'My z/o/a/bfarm 3%}an "7L
fiLJb/D JL F
bemyj
73sm
3/":% Jrrngbwv WWW" WTU
ifflzw [lo/07f] LhLM /'Oa/él 7) '39"be
1/"?:7:
MIL/fl [DMZ GA %§N%Q.faM1/\\ CD
"7'7"
.Kg
2, 4
17?, >331%.
[wax-fig/
J
"E234 1.1130
///@'7>'7\2
- BWQDEIE
Q7"? Jog/ 7) jbgc/
£1 '§/~o/
10/15/23, 12:17 PM Alleged domestic violence victim in Mass vcharged with recording (ex-boyfriend
\_) .u
$2:
O
hie
30540
l
Alerts & Closmgs in Your Area Sign Up to Get Future Alerts ( 2 /2 > II
N
.E
"5
.27
"6
>i
D.
O
o
'5
2
3
o
'5
.9
s:
Advertisement
Alleged domestic violence victim in Massachusetts charged

with recording ex-boyfriend
DA drops charge after questions from 5 investigates
Updated: 6:33 PM EDT Jul 12, 2023
Infinite Scroll Enabled
R'%':Kl
atV,
'I
Karen Anderson & Kevin Rothstein
We
[film'r "'1
'k'E-HW"
1/6
httpszllwww.wcvb.com/a:ticle/alleged-domestic-violenoc-victimchargedwith-recordingexmassachusettsl44520592
10/15/2, 12:17 PM Alleged domestic violence victim in Mass. charged with recording exboyfn'end
WOBURN, Mass. A Massachusetts woman faced years behind bars after secretly recording her ex-
boyfriend
a man who was charged with abusing her
after she was charged with violating the state's
which forbids recording people without their consent.
"wiretapping law,
mect GDpy of Origin$10#7/202
's an issue 5 investigates first exposed more than a year ago -

one that prompted calls for a change in
e law, which was intended to target organized crime.
Advertisement
ut those calls did nothing to help Sarah Myatt, who, until 5 Investigates began asking questions, had
een headed to a trial Friday in Woburn District Court for a charge that carries a maximum penalty of five
erifie%Co
ars in prison.
:V
itjust felt like such a betrayal and then that l'm not protected," she said.
Myatt said she went from being a victim to a potential felon because she was trying to secretly record her
ex-boyfriend, David Nunes. The recording was made in January 2022 as Sarah called police in fear, she
said, for her life.
"What were you most afraid of when you made that recording?" 5 lnvestigates' Karen Anderson asked.
"That he was going to kill me before the cops got out there and run and just stage it like it was a suicide.
And then my mom and my kids, my family, would maybe think that that's what happened," she replied.
"And how did that make you feel?" Anderson asked.
"Helpless," Myatt replied. "Really helpless and desperate."
Woburn police charged Nunes for making threats that night and charged him again in February and
March with violating a restraining order and more threats, four domestic violencerelated charges in all.
The charges were dismissed last August, but while those charges were pending, Nunes filed his own
complaint alleging he was the victim of illegal wiretapping, a charge that carries a maximum penalty of
five years in prison. Nunes' attorney declined to comment.
After Nunes filed an application for

and the Middlesex County DA's office arraigned her.
a criminal complaint, an assistant clerk magistrate
x
httpgllwww wcvb.com/am"ole/alleged-domestic-violence-victim-chargedwith-recording-exmassachusettsl44520592 2I6

10/15/23. 12:17 PM Alleged domestic violence victim in Mass. charged with recording exboyfricnd
"When you heard that you were being charged with illegal wiretapping, what went through your mind?"
asked.
Anderson
10/182023.
h, my God, can't believe this. Am l going to prison? How is he a Victim?" she said.
l
'l
1
7'5"?
{t
l:
"h
it
ii
3'5
,J
Hearst Owned
Sarah Myatt was charged with wiretapping after recording her allegedly abusive ex-boyfriend.
After she was charged, Sarah says she was too afraid to testify against Nunes, so that's why the charges
against him were dismissed.
l fr' I"
x
I
On Wednesday, after 5 lnvestigates' asked the DA for a comment, a spokesperson said

x I
what's known as a nolle prosequi, a filing by prosecutors to dismiss the case.
3/6
https:l/www.wcvb.com/articlc/alleged-domestic-vi0]ence-victimcharged-with-recording-cx-mmachusetts/M520592
10/ 15/23, 12:17 PM Alleged domestic violence victim in Mass. charged with recording exboyfriend
"When evaluating cases, the background circumstances and facts are always a consideration," the
statement said. "Given the background and circumstances in this matter, as well as the substance of the
we have exercised our prosecutorial discretion and filed a nolle prosequi. That filing ends this
«evidence,
N
gase."
"3410/17 l
he statement also noted that the DA's office and the defense attorney had agreed to resolve the case
@py of gig
ith pretrial probation, not a conviction, but thejudge in the case rejected the deal.
yatt's trial had been scheduled to start Friday, a terrifying prospect for her.
Verified Correct
When you think about your case headed to trial, how does that make you feel?" Anderson asked.
Mortified and victimized all over again," she said. "Because who did harm?" I
lt's similar to another case 5 Investigates reported last year involving a South Shore mother who, afraid
of her husband, secretly recorded him, only to see herself charged.
That case prompted the woman's state senator, Sen. Patrick M. O'Connor, RWeymouth, to file a bill
earlier this year that, if passed, would allow secret recordings in cases involving "threats, harassment or
other crimes" in certain circumstances.
Mass. bill would allow domestic violence victims to secretly record their
abusers
"Since 1968, the wiretap laws here in the Commonwealth have not changed. Our technology and ability
to document and communicate have not kept up with times. Allowing victims of domestic violence and
abuse to record their abusers should not be criminalized because ofthese outdated laws. filed l
legislation this session that would update our antiquated laws, so instances like this do not happen to
individuals trying to protect themselves or their families. Me and my office will continue to stand by
victims by supporting change in the wiretap law in instances where domestic violence is involved,"
O'Connor said in a statement.
X
Myatt said her case was evidence the law should be passed.
https:I/www.wcvb.com]attic]elallegeddomestic-Violencevictim-chargcdwithrecordingex-massachusettsl44520592 416
10/ 15/23, 12:17 PM Alleged domestic violence victim in Mass. charged with recording exboyfriend
"I think that's necessary. l think that that needs to be a law. There has to be more protections for victims
of abuse," she said.
TEJP PICKS
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10/1
Teacher to run in Baltimore for 50th marathon High school senior looking at millions of
in 50th state dollars in college scholarship offers
Videos show rare annular 'ring of fire' solar Movies that have delayed theatrical debut
eclipse cutting across the sky due to Taylor Swift Eras Tour movie
5/6
https:I/www.wcvb.cornlarticle/allcgeddomestic-violence-victim-charged-with-recording-ex-massachuseusl44520592
10/15/23, 12: 17 PM Alleged domestic violence victim in Mass. charged with recording exboyfriend
https:I/www.wcvb.com/articlelalleged-domestic-violencevictimcharged-with-recordingexmassachusens/M520592 6/6
fl/flfi'ifi 112117 W
'
filtcmfllaflfimralhlm, dhrmsthetfinmdlzdlungcs~f€hxnn1mnWealth Magazine \\-.
\ N.
a "yr" 17mg ..__ amgfi~ -
ama 1.: w
x
k' . Lg "'1';
\ .:
. 1
'
«s \n
\
_
N '
K x
'
O
N 'fi, .fi "
)
x,"
5""
"xxx"xiii "@er
:Jks
"In. ":0,
I: Eta; .' "uxkfi'axfl :és'ufi
'
»\:"\ an]: -4,,
flask".
a V_
' u.'
\-
N):
\ a
4% »
'Utv' '
V.
rrrrr {1'
K
E "
"fix '1N.:'l"vl
j""\f'x ":31.
'
v.
.E Sm '
.27 "\.4 w:
I- 1
\
o ,
"'1
R
u ' . tr.
o t
>
a. '\~ '
0 '
0 'r.'
+- '
o , . \.
'
2 . "\. ~
*
h x,
'\
\
o x
O '3.
'5 " \7-
a:
E5 4'>~ ~
x
.
' ,
'*
\ \'
.
__
a,
>
>
x"
t
I "x v
'f
'N
. ..
., "v.v\.
_
\.
"\t
\ 4"
4t
i... .. __ __.. 4 .5... x. _ '9
A voice recording app on a cell phone. (Photo by Shira Schoenberg)
COURTS I CRIMINAL JUSTICE
She recorded her abuser,

then she faced charges
Senator seeks to update wiretapping law
SHIRA SCHOENBERG jul 5, 2022
THE WOMAN'S HUSBAND pushed her down on her bed and placed a pillow
over her face. He threatened her and the couple's young child, according to court
findings granting the woman a restraining order.
1/5
http3'llcommonwealthmagazine.orglcriminal-justicc/sherecordcd-hervabuserthenshe-facedchargm/
493/
10/ 15/23, 12: 17 PM k9" She recorded her abuser, then she faced charges CommonWealth Magazine
-
The woman, Who lives on the South Shore, recorded her husband without his
consent, taping phone conversations and conversations inside their home using an
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023_
'app on her phone. She says, according to court documents, that it was an attempt
to protect herself and her child from his aggression.
Stay informed with our

Daily Download newsletter,
a roundup of the day's best ?F
political coverage.
The husband went to a magistrate and applied for a criminal complaint against her
for illegally recording him. Under Massachusetts state law, both parties must
consent for a conversation to be recorded. A clerkmagistrate in Plymouth District
Court found probable cause that the woman committed a crime, and she faced
criminal charges for wiretapping.
It was up to prosecutors whether to move forward with the charges. Tara

Miltimore, a spokesperson for the Cape and Islands District Attorney's office,
which prosecuted the case because of a conflict of interest at the Plymouth District
Attornevs office, said prosecutors recently reached an agreement with the woman
that after six months on probation, the charges would be dropped.
As the Legislature considers whether to update the state's wiretapping statute, the
woman, who is not being named because she is a victim of domestic Violence,
wants legislators to consider a carveout that would protect Victims of domestic
Violence from being prosecuted for recording their abuser.
She has been talking to Sen. Patrick O'Connor, a Weymouth Republican, who said
he hopes a carveout from prosecution for domestic Violence victims can be added
to one of the public safety bills lawmakers are currently considering. O'Connor said
the state's wiretapping law is outdated. "It seems to be only working right now to
https:llcommonwealthmagazine.org!criminal~justice/she-rccordedher-abuser-thenshefaced-chargesl 2/5
10/ 15/23, 12:17 PM She recorded her abuser, then she faced charges CommonWmlth Magazine
-
penalize people who more than likely shouldn't have been [penalized]," O'Connor
J
said. "If a person records something like that, it's traumatic enough that something
Verified Correct Copy of Original 10I17/2023
like that is happening. Then to be penalized for that is very difficult. I can't even
imagine the struggle that that must bring on top of being a survivor of domestic
violence."
O'Connor said he would like to see the law take into consideration when someone
is recording another person to obtain proof of wrongdoing. "There should be some
streamlined understanding between the courts and the general laws as far as what
may cross the line and what doesn't cross the line," O'Connor said.
.,._,
a"3%.
#1:»...
'
,. '5,»
. ,' ,
'1" '1 I
'
'
"5..."; .J i , ~13.
w '
. .
i
; A.
3 . ,
» . .
2,
..t", '
.\'2. x
. a"
,~
z
\
' H'
" i (*1- "mu-ii
Sen. Patrick O'Connor, a Weymouth Republican
Toni Troop, a spokesperson for the antidomestic violence coalition Jane Doe Inc.,
said she has occasionally heard of this issue arising, but the coalition has not yet
explored it thoroughly enough to take a position.
The state's wiretap statute has already been subject to some scrutiny, but mainly
because of how it applies to the police, not private citizens. Currently, law
enforcement can only use wiretaps to prosecute crimes related to organized crime.
Gov. Charlie Baker proposed expanding the wiretapping statute to other serious
3/5
https:I/commonwealthinagazineorg/criminal-justice/she-recorded-herabuserthensheFfaced-charges/
10/15/23, 12:17 PM She recorded her abusex', then she faced charges CommonWealth Magazine
-
crimes, like murder, rape, and possession of explosive devices. The Judiciary
Committee recently sent Baker's bill to study, effectively killing it for this legislative
session.
rified Correct Copy of Original 10l17/2023.
"Generally, there was pretty strong opposition to expanding the wiretapping law
from a lot of civil liberties groups," said Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Jamie
Eldridge.
Both House Judiciary Committee Chair Michael Day and a Baker spokesperson
noted that Baker's bill focused exclusively On law enforcement, not on the section
of the law that requires two party consent for private citizens to record private
g, communications.
Baker's office would not comment on the specifics of this case or the proposed
policy of exempting domestic violence Victims from prosecution under the
wiretapping law.
One bill that is still pending is one Baker filed to expand the use of "dangerousness
hearings," where a judge decides whether someone can be held in jail pre-trial
because they pose a danger. Baker's bill would apply dangerousness hearings to
more offenses, including more cases involving domestic violence. Baker has been
holding events with domestic violence survivors to push for the bill's passage.
O'Connor said he hopes a change in law could be added to either the governor's
dangerousness bill or the wiretapping bill, whichever one moves forward. "The fact
that we still have these wiretap laws in place that can be used against victims of
domestic Violence but can't be used against actual criminals is because of how
antiquated the wiretapping laws are," O'Connor said.
Tagged in: domestic violence
https-llcommonwealthmagazine.org/criminal-justice/she-recorded-her-abuserthenshe-facedcharges/ 4/5
10/15/23, 12:20 PM Wendy Murphy Don't punish women who secretly record abusers
OPINION OPINION COLUMNISTS
Wendy Murphy: Don't punish

women who secretly record
abusers
31*
u
\
,. ..
1" .x ,
'3' N M
-\.
a
J ,~.r \
32"
-1 m
4 ..
n
[H
.. < 455"?
,, .w'v w
331.; I w p
,-
J ..._
,
w
1MV
u h.
m
'J
"
,.
'
'I'«
M .14
.-
'{I
A 11.
ED
me
.W"
m
.4
u
u
; <
m, r; ... .
r?"
3"
é' m
' r J
\A .4
ma» a1
r
H 1
.,
.,
5a., a
.. .3-
Women's rights are human rights A scene from a past protest in Boston. (Herald file
photo.)
By WENDY MURPHY I
. PUBLISHED: July 15, 2022 at 6:44 pm. UPDATED: July 15, 2022 at 6:44 I
pm.
https:llwww.bostonherald_com12022/07l 15/wendy-murphy-dontpunish-womenwhosecretlyrecord-abusersl 1/3

Domestic violence is rarely addressed effectively by the courts. A woman calls the
cops and they arrest the guy, but then the prosecutor and judge let him go. A
growing number of victims are fighting back and doing everything they can to
keep themselves and their children safe, even if they have to violate the law.
One Massachusetts woman was so frightened of her husband after he suffocated

her, she secretly recorded him, and brought the recordings to court. She got a
restraining order, and the guy was charged with multiple serious crimes.
Soon after, the victim got notice that she, too, was being charged with a crime
because her husband went to a magistrate and asked him to charge her with
violating the so-cafled wiretap law which forbids secret audio recordings. The
victim didn't know the law. She only knew that she feared for her life, and she
wanted to make sure there was evidence of her husband's abuse in case she ended
up dead.
Disuict Attorney Tim Cruz should be ashamed of himself for letting the charges
stick. He should have declined to pursue the charges the same way the Middlesex
District Attorney did when state Senator Jim Marm'lli was charged by a magistrate
for committing sex crimes against a consfituent. Instead, thanks to Cruz, a
domestic violence victim now has a criminal record. Remember this when he
runs for reelection.
In Massachusetts, a person can secretly record video but not audio, so long as it
does not capture private images like taking a shower. If an audio recording is
made illegally by a cop, the evidence cannot be used in court. If a private citizen
does it, evidence CAN be used in court, but the citizen could face criminal charges
like the woman in Plymouth County, though the charge is a minor misdemeanor.
A woman should welcome a misdemeanor charge if it means saving her life.
Wiretap law's'protect privacy rights and prevent extortion, but they need
exceptions that allow people to record evidence related to violence and abuse.
Many states have such exceptions; Massachusetts does not. California, for
example, allows for secret recordings "for the purpose of obtaining evidence
reasonably believed to relate to the commission of any felony involving
violence against the person ..."
https:llwww. bostonherald.con1l2022l07l 1Slwendy-murplry-dontpunish-women-whosecretlyrecord-abusers/ 2/3

10/15/23. 1220 PM Wendy Murphy: Don't punish women who secretly recotd abusers
A bill now pending at the State House, proposed by Gov. Charlie Baker, seeks to
amend the wiretap law to protect cops when they make secret recordings after
getting a warrant, but it would do nothing for domestic violence victims. Baker
should add language that would allow domestic violence victims to make secret
recordings because women have to be their own cops behind closed doors.
Domestic violence is at once prolific and invisible. Even in lofty suburbs where
driveways are filled with Volvos, domestic violence is the most common violent
crime, by far. Audio and video recordings are the most reliable fonn of evidence,
which is Why the public demanded that cops Wear recording devices on their
uniforms. Women should not be punished for gathering similarly reliable proof of
domestic violence.
The number of women killed by men is on the rise. Last year there were 15
domestic violence homicides in Massachusetts, a 66% increase over the prior year.
This year the numb er is on tack to be even higher.
Studies show that effective prosecutions and harsher punishments for abusers
reduce recidivism and save women's lives. Women need better tools for achieving
justice, especially these days when some "defund the police" advocates are asking
lawmakers to decrirninalize domesfic violence altogether and treat violence in the
home as a mental health issue rather than the serious felony that it is.
Encouraging women to make secret recordings of violence in their homes won't

solve the problem of domesfic violence overnight, but itwill help.
Deterring domestic violence is good for everyone. It keeps men out of prison and
saves women's lives. Charlie Baker should want his legacy to include fewer dead
Women.
Wendy Murphy 1's a Jamier and Vicu'rns' rights advocate.
2022 July 15
3/3
https: llwww. bostonherald. com/2022/ 07/ 15/wendy-murphydont-punishwomen-whosecretlyrecord-abusers/
fiq'ra 0111
Ore?" case" $302250???
Petitioner/ Plaintiff CERTIFICATE
and OF SERVICE
Mflflfo flOSg [Dmg,/e
Respond ent/ DefendantSP7
I am the El Defendant In this case.
/é
/Z3
I certifythatPetitioner/Plaintiffk/Respondent/
on (date)
WWW!) of
53' 5444' W'MQ
each
copy (11st
,Iprovidedatrue
document) [g#€V¢@/DPerla/'SK'J"\
jfci'rr-el; +3Mcflfl£ on prmgu/er
W/ro re clam/e (Ia/um) 'igrboq/ (Na Ve/W, i-iwbo/
i
€'""'"- q'moiww iv Ran/54 5/ fl/ov, 3

0 s \
[h4m56f'
0,4 9,30 p'i'éI
Fifw'i'w'j reports (23 20;?/
to the Petitioner I] Respondeht E] Attorney for in the above
case y placing the document(s) in the:
C [Q i'
)0 {)4-
Hands of the EIPetitioner E] Respondent El Attorneyfor S19
W
at (address):
or E1 United States mail in a sealed envelope with postage paid addressed to (address):
@fl?
subj ect to penalty for perjury.
/0 ' ,/é~ZE
Date Signature
8/.
PrintName
P
ContactAddress
0 gm (Z City, State ZIP
Agiuwtq Oi? 97/03
503 #ég 22275 Vuwn
Contact Phone a
Email Address 607""? j1VMq/'<3'V'\
:V3 (/4fi;75¢1~7/'
E©§DWED $90", fl, 7/
(7/
4;"! 'V' flax/J

E
ED
R
'
W" '4 1:?
7' Ic"
By
UCTT 7 2023
M 5, 5@/
j/
{'4'\.
71¢;
gig fi/J/mg/
{mm
/ M/LyfL'éy
j?!7mm 6 15/ in (7&4 fZ/w
/€2z5)m A: (/7
//
/z
M/
/ / flu/é / [fife/«>2»:
/
L4Qj7igw { fi x [5rs
74/
.1
7/
'7fig7/flw7?U/IVI
/"/5; /
(2;?
1w
-
39M
W 'f f' Ji
/
l g / 0 .é'
é,
I / 7'3'
c: 67/1?
' 1'21191'9'7'7
{Cliff/$9 '
MM} M77
Adj
/
4624'1W/
"'7: 0!-
a! V [1
C/L'
2711/9/71
dijrgau; fiif
Lfl/Qni/i.
'
1/13 / 43:4717'7IM""
//
/ '9/
742"],
1'21'V
'1
"I
bani/bi/A/fi/ S
//
1/49; 7/)
V) 0:34 (53/
g/(Uzi
416)");
fluca/4 {ne(37'
'1'L g0WW£'\/
(/i'SCVfgiVWiflU
7%
.
7ZJ/Lvd /7(/ '1£ f3{} f; ; Adyf;

Ma
(ff/2 .755'45/
1'1
5 (75/01262/
(5/4'3'7 Z/ g1"!
m7 t)7 [(A7
I
,7 i f(/09
:
A CCW
C [/EZV,/€/ five.» Alan/(£6)
V" (1/
W7?
[77/11/(7'
'.
,/ .25
ra/j/L/cazf/
eu1\0,10 Kdoo 1391103 pauue/F
flu
C b0]
56/ 6//
W43"
/
7
? WW //
/°7'//17 /¢{M
5/,
Afl/éyn
,,,,
can»:
:74
(n (79/4
6.;11J/Z
4;
\J"
Ififlmwf'") 42.
xi 613
117019 V1147
K/élw/ r¢a< wy/i/ Mun 721.9%?

"95/72
..£.Q,V2'~1V*m
l
/
'SZOZ/L L/Ol
2/ /
7145 q]
j/7/9" y fl m / 5 .4 31/1. C.)
flaw/pow (éJF/fl m/
7&6 WU; Céflsmw/éfi
fill??? (7,/~m,,771(r'/
5' 1'
I70
$373779
76% 427/:737774347577'42
(bl/1477
rafl 717 (m
7553 mz£t92714777
(1'4:-
7/0 /J//I
/J/0/7L1/€/'1b/ 8'/7;£7/
2:777!
WED/0%? (fl {L7
{3/6
fl"; («7709/ //y(// 5 87
dig/If 7f?
f/ 6L)!"
0/ C;/ Ki"?
/¢777/g/l7
jv/
7 73/973
5'2,5//7
29f 9 76C /fl,»'7b£5>l,7l
72') / :77" €377 S'MWO/j K'VV
Jigif/5' //;7gr,77/§%9 WM
;f/ 4.917797/1
757,777; 707 (9
(/16?
7
Va 171'I'Ji779/7/
74/77) ?\I/ LE7,"WV/fl (A7'n am
7.50/15???" 9/4
gwflc/fm"; 4
4v," 7/(}/ /:7\.(D
471
(£47,,flfléjérj
boozy/
(2% emf/J
)flzflx'agg/bjp 73/7/Jgc) bit4.9/'7'l J7L m/7/
gig/9:7! 7'57
éfiz 9"" "5"" W71 /
W8 dg gjk
.,7%9'¢777'7ZA,2
/ m7 92MI }
77/ M
1/! f
t?
/ 3""L'57'VC
'/
7/J9" 5,77 //
7771
"V77 1,'2'?) ft?
J 7,
fjflswfiygb
I?" ;; %gw /"ji/7
/M,6) /7,/zi7§/7/f; "Mg
"no"? @DZflfl/fl)
(27L 277%;
21%,; Jg'ga
"7/717'44 77,?"
L" 'L/0/7/77}?
{723
'J/'f
WW 71%?1'0 (3/4
//7$2277:
9/ W303 W/ /?myd1
/ ) f/(Mdj/ Q/aC/f
$14 77
75 '7/ Wyfl7ffi7 /4771/m7/27:7/71
<722L1f'j22,74
"2191641
(7 "77/" firs/"'3
27/3/ 5/22/2247 £421 [(17,
?7
57m fi/Qg/Zy/L)
{A #172729"
515'
{7"0" 12'; fit? ""775 2/" /' ("W/j )3
J:
{21/
1:9 a)?" @937
4:7
/7?_%MW7
fl { 247/222
",7; :2 5 27,7 77
5/221 37
£/) 'maW 5,;
92. 7'
P /21 if
222127
157/0/2/7127 "2/ 2:52 f"Wzéao/ gig
WWW/W
{p/W
/'
JMM 2222
1:jg2"j/; fix
" JO /fiz/
i / ¢/fl€/J6/b
I
My}???
/L
K751492529)
1974/
"V" 6222,27 25227
77'2""
"Q7?"'C7 70
9725222227 «23 442'2'72'2172J
5'); 2/77/7220 W277
W) (4/227 7 227222777
1/27? /27 r'
/5C by '2" 05/
2/07/
:5/7
gZ i ff/y 7/7
31429 I" [1,4
/ //W ,/ l%/k7/[:J
't'fl §///;/_; (PK/fig}?
6/2/7755; //Wyrr{/7MIZ;K2/
(7'32 g (7722222/4/7/
'31 71223-2,/z/§w/27/M 727
gfg J/ 7/:20?2]157
7/J/9b5491'0 W/ .2:
"77/
"7:W
W V" /"""'"7' 2" 2-2 ,2,
27 6/07/22;
2.22» 2972.
222w
227 €371
Dflaw ///27
av] /0'L/(71/57"
//7{<§>'
517/ /.//
//%7//}/3 (mg/V "IX/"H
92 33227/4 i/ 14/]?
I'm/214945,! pl/j'flal jig/71 7(;(7/ZP?";L2 (3» WWW/:4?"
/,; "(KL/f, 01;"
avg/403%
I." l/'v'fl/ £4! Lf/luy
.797? 5'
E329 €33 5% 7"""7M/2
"(J/1?],
(If/W sill/7"
I! (""0
fflJc/jj/W? /¢75//:2/
WI / 31/;A7 1'
fflxigf," fifi'flzflj #
41/ 2557 3',/
fly" 743
[77
-fl/n? "if"?
77 /' 9&7
"€231?be g WI
'1' GW/
{F417; a] W; A;
(f/l:/?5J//)j
§. f/ L' (Ci/J
7"! W 169219
n 13' 7 WM uvyy/f/I
5/5"" /0/ / [1/2/
'; 5/ /
~\7[ GHQ 3/3233)
'/§
M2} §|<
9<; @770 7 [9/ flat]!
(2,7! "152] 27/604
6/
q/mqfil' J/M/Lffifll/i'] M/:
/O¢:@ T/nyf/ /WF:./ul
//"'V7?
Mime 'Zw Mg}? [ afgbg» Call/21¢".
//72C; L/
"2'5 0/46/ /' w'b @/ z/'7/'7 //&'55'/7€7;Z,
QM)»;
74/3719
//OL7Z 715V/ )lrzf/
LgOSJ"/7/0W ("f/ijf'
v we" W75
féi""<zf M/ fl M7
77,17 Wkly?"
5/005; fa)
fwd/548m LC?! "fly?""lf/ [#ng
727/ ?#
"12/19.?
7/0 /7
xM/ZJ/Mgfly 'I)
V WefilrW'WJ/II
0'77]:
792:7 31/3}
Qgfyl/W.) f/(y W /';'?:7H"/3
'%VL/£7//Il7/
5;l/:~Q7 747 i/owzy 49va
4: Wfiyéd/fi/JW
gzfi'WWY/Iélé
J? /4 3'
'7"
/ W
'/ p17
f" [7% ML
[73")77"?
".71 7/50'7/ r)
7727/
j'Wc/K'rp/a WSW/1&7)
fflugfitrw
URI g! "f
f/ gm] 33/60" I:
.§7( 717 [m [7,4,] my
571
/y
fé/fi/é??'1/ fl/Lgiiezjfl
cm Me 717%? 2%;1 a/S
WWKDJ/ 07/ /
I /l'j
20
"/[U'ZIZU'W'JI
2p (AM/,7
1%?
Yul/flag? 4'3} 7/"
?/ Kimmy/75m §bfizféi%g
/ ] fl? f L43/ '5
/
7747?}! ,.....
fag? X71 "719/4392
'1
+//?/ ,3 z)?
W 5):? 4?
71%
Sr". my [Ll/JO Véfi/j
1;: L0 7/" /57 {Kay 6527)
jfl§ 'b#§
(WK/5M;flgwlf bmfl'fl
La" a/jflf j 0%
-95
/677( 07L &'/'/0 ,271
"v5", 57' 57%!
7'; (/9? 79
Ely/Q air) (fl/lg
1 g% [3.16:é/7 €373:
lz/ y?
/7[
V21)!!! 7:73?
M f/flg/X/i
7/159 $91
3'"?
@ //§v'
f j
/'77. A?
«7
(/3775?
w)
it} 5;// L07]?
If
CV;~,_//Z~_/ 3045/7/11,
"v (,2 '//%22//:z;/J<J
7;? 7,,7 2,0;
7471,?
)g
w/'7'- 2,7547?
I! 9747
Verified Correct Copy
r7274"?! #757 /(£[

'20 .1144 f!
/ 1&7/1'67 /"ll/l x"
7447
Q
Rj
/ 3 ,1 2; [la 7 J/
/>7
g ,2 {Ur/(T7.¢Dz77/V]
"W 0
0% 0%
(Kl/1:7;
/
*0 /70/7
7007 77 z, L449
Q; "I «040/
77%
maxi/0.;/L¢/fi/W
.97 /0Jaf
(NW //\/a7;
' ,.
fl
W/ 2371/0/11
Afllyg/Pf
mpg/1W C /1'Vl7"'/C7/§§ 777/,
54/
[V // nipggy Mb)
é/fl/ fl/7 p/rx/ //7\,4:I/L
7'7 WNW/'4
99/771"
[17//'§ (rm/0675' 7/1/79/i/1
"7m / n0! 17/1,
149/014";
(TM/6) 271/07
/¢,fZ/5/ f/jvf Jihad
gy/Laé
70' wig/0g
(/37 W'Zfll/Q/i/7 40)
DiMaC/bWN/7Z
/7%02 074W? gb/Jfy ~7:202/10/,C[i
9/77102017/070709 mat" may 7m
977/0
/777'7/7/J 777W
7777 7777 77% 7%
O
ZEC/ZZS
lm Ore 0V1
Petitioner/ Plaintiff
CaseNo
CERTIFICATE
and OF SERVICE
Mflflo [6052; [DMy,/e
Resp ondent/ Defendant5:17
I am the I] Petitioner/ Defendant 1n this case.
Icertifythaton (date)
Plaintifffi/Respondent/
[0
\ ,é
/fl3 flWOJLWO é; 64$ "U'mq
/ ,Iprovidedatruecopy of(listeach
document) /€#€W' #0 P011" SO
"\
CNN L, 9+ 3/4f'h (la; 0 r7 prase (/7le
WOW" 14/110 [8 CW9( aha/4M.) Harbour W6i Ve'i, lieu/bow
ehq'i') z'l'réim5cr' moiew
/.
1% av" Q/ fl/Ov,
0 3 130 p'i'é
1
WWW";
7L0
rem/+5 (23 in3.11/20»?

to the Petitioner t] Respondeht El Attorney for the above
case y placing the document(s) in the:

Hands of the [:lPetitioner E] Respondent C [Q i~ S [9
)0 {94'
W
[:1 Attorneyfor
at (address):
or [1 United States mail in a sealed envelope with postage paid addressed to (address):
/0
Date
' /é~ 23 _
Slgnature
%/ (L'fl/ '_././
Print Name
m K L 5m?
P 0 gm (2, fishy/Sq 019 C77/223
City, State, ZIP
/
ContactAddress
50}
Contact Phone
L/éi? £227) VUHNA
Email Address
fa?
fl enji jun/tau
(Er-m
"/2/91/0 Sammy?
F/Jubmao 24771 K7LM/IQW/
$70 Va'A'jfl
_Verified Corre ct Cop
21/ W 862% /0Mb fir/sonjJJ') S'I

E2: 7L0 bulb/WV
figsocxfb/v FWVf/bj
0'39; y/Ié'
73""6 7394195'0 gzw M4 W\-
9
/I&'\7 7L0 Pfléfl/g H7
3:07/93
WW firm/0,7 1
0% 1'9 1/y-A/IDSJn
£15119
977/;sz 1WAC-I
L4
9'1 1%"? Djvwl/JSU U 7M;
5149/
flfi/ u: 9/Ag3/ (5 /v:/:7:L-'W
79??
"WV?! 3 9/:7/5/ flwb "#4709
'0) MOW/'2' 7/WD@"/I {11/71
ova/fbz /v7{ c/gay
120410 "X'V'JOW
14/7 /79 9114/ HCNI
'91" fl/ /
9"" 1?; W
5/5520 M VL0K739011J193
7/91»: 1M
5- '9'! 5: 5W; 191/3
/ A ?J/'/ 7"""9
k)
7111:1221
,0
3%/) 919:) 7f1'M 5'7/vmp'71w'0
074 /:/{/O/
'E/W/VI fm/ //(,M )7 7L/\@ /ymn7 i
J c}/@) [Z1119
g G 5 m
11 W1 [176/ 1% 10 11 19);?
9 90 0/ 7m
. 77+ wufizw 471 713/4
............... .4... Z
'8
£202 8 0
130 b
(gb/'Q3 6/05 f6?
fl]
45
97//11:9
Maggy "9117/1 Jyg/d jbyfl
6
2145123401
©£ézgzyagz filS'SND Hmvafi rum/Vi
WWWWWWWWWW we? 71mm
"gm/S f")?
vJIoD Zuiaé/f
//OJb/:/gm
{z mdéwuv [W71 WWW
{Jeff/307
may» farm
594745
M ,}_Su_)a
49330
wjoJIg/jaafi/Kfl 07"
\j/idyD/j WES??? '4"?ij
'Qfl/flfly W €21A 1
¥o AJY'G
§%>\l/a'\/UIW'L/
7h/ /?bg1< 77L\/VN
537; W W 6W Va'fl'fobbfl
W27)C/9'70 Lf/j!b
/7Z
371W 5""
/V1
W/;:Mw,/:9§)P
//'O'71/ O71
W 3/0}: ,M 260/10
'7 '7 1A
Val/47% 7M/L/
9/297" 7579/
f/fla? Z" W?
"74' WWW/7""
'7/5'7? W90
67/
MAG Sig/WW?
W f3 "/0 Sfaufw 7,47%
7M? 7/ 77 "who
W 7/17/7
5' @4725
7/77/7747? 77 up)
3/,A\\')7/
(Ala) 5 WWW/79'9 7/I/Vp77'b
M:%0/
J? "4 937,7 Q w
z<7 m/é/aj 7W i' 7
:7 an Mb go
390,171
@gyjafl/I/Wfi/lgl/o
("W7 \0' $U/'9 K
W M63799 WmG//3¢7L
9'77 m jMW
MHZ/L 77% 7/
W77V (57/174
[MW/bu) >/ 7/1667?
Mg 31W} [WW7
"/0774
227
yzwvlbo/ya:[VJ/7w {cub/W [ca/«@fmrjcéj
"W53 W0 a);
5/3!
b/'/X?' aéJ/x 71/! 67 8"» )0 74/193
//"° /JS '10
""77 l
7'7""? +9 1708 Q7
wiaw-IW'J75'J/I) 47(7175 J3
77
/@0/U\J 3M7 7Lbeyjj:
J1?! 1470);}43")
7150(1)?
[f 9
a4!
a/£MA&'J
77 T
73
9M 7 7777"
777% W W v"
9J5?
7bsuveofl$aug
7WWJ
MWIVI 9/?
{J5723/),0/77 "'10)
W IWM $6
jg 74Wb&#5 €3/bJQ 73/5
ffl/Ofiuf 26¢?
@4710%?d EW
ectC
3' 5
"d7 far/@135"
g33778313:='77f 7 star-gnu +W'M
"52/13/07 Z
72:52? M
@W'Z5/55 W"777772 17/51:"7L
2/0£7457m7" 571 M797
7." /Wo
<9 swaw 2M
yez'f 77
' M17
7WJya 7
;Z;'.77:dd fog/.05 "777/7 M 1:
b 7/79/M) 95 fax/WI? //
gw'l/wa'74 7A6
£31291 "1' 37"! %
545%
farfiyuflfl 4/07 [pl/a? -//@M
[(7
"4303 77363 5799/
g 47' 5324757 /S'7¢/ 0
ZW
$4.; b 0/77, %/I? 7/1'721 ///\
514/37}J/W03 /2>/C'z/\9' /
jag ,75) 8/'40
fags $4 wo7/L/n/yb ngb/by [7/40/
age/b M10 S'b aim/S741
<31 4/2371:an M a
140W 7L a/b7§£€/%
§//~' I 'flfdyl WAG/M
"'3
unz 4,
r"! 9g {lg/g 7
043's 4 val/aw[/ryiu?bfgfQmyy
391/] lo/ncan/i 71"
3;)
Q75
_%/70/flo
mad/756% 71/ Sb
M/wf 7,2, /J 20/
17 /J/?05 f 5
Z/ no; (07' 220071a
50
1/ :07 J f
3/Vfl0
M{1 /;TM/:)g%ig?":3
"5 Off/waga/ gw'alL/h)9'iA/\
77'" 5/555' /d
)772. 0% Mg
{9709/6/77} away/$1.5m
105555555215 755 am $52 7/773 5/
CD Jéézgfimé WWW \LL
"<' "L/>' "Amwa?
E"'Z~'z-~cz/ fwd/457327"Ja
v <__\ 7'J'GM n"/'JJS
:KTI'l OWL 0
% \CQE
Viv/Zaav'jji' arvo Auaswd 677
<9 1° a W fidufi Zz
J {Luoéu
+J§JJA3 a4) w0e'9gmf
bcgg W
fi\figwj» {73 "709/75/ [Law ("45 f/zf
\Zvég )1 0"
0 'Z Q'Z
.5 glut 00);!) 0'5
5'9/
"HE/L'a'J/fno L, wQ/Djl'fby 713.49,)
J76- F 9 "
010$ a DJ
0/
S'IO'Z-g Ff 05} 770$
f'T°\'F/'""7+«Al? '4 I
p.
I
$9 bDGAr'J' $1 OZ
{'gg/'zhd 07
7/0 07,
L," "fl a)?»
S (I
\
Q; 0 :
95'1 b)
«Ed0 3}
WW / 143i%
{IHfl
MK a
VVE):"
vswj'4W "6W /;7W:/'1 I 01
MJ 4/ '
;u0\L]/bM0/.> /
/a< ("x' 7/o/ 2/0
\
.\3b; v\a
,
Lmin? )bfi/'J?A waw%:¥/uffig
.
JrViv/
DH)» flMb/f/Od '15») Joyb/
A130 AbW ('6' V7 ' '"
' ' ' ' '
'gga/ $07 wf 'F'aj
f"/a/fl'VV' " ""iyfljry l
' ?""% +°N' Mil "a W1 m i? a» ?@001
-
~=
2 y 500% +39:
TWA 2rd WAcLaJIZD '
fifi '
fJD 33L? bjbg 7/, 9/ I
(«J/1p]: Wyatjs) J 7L
/)1 9 + r705
a bx 33.42% ?"W
Wart/:5 3% 6067/5
DJbas a3 / adj @196}
7L0/\/
[M g/93231," r7wag £6101
'md "3% ""0
27/3"ng {€f/m4/ta? '° 'MWW 76 10/
"W'fw/s hw/
fl'JWa iaolfl/O'" °:?/° J3} AW'L'EnJbJ
(JSWYDW/g) 'uflo
fifiaéfid LJb/nDbW GA '
/ /
[a in 'afhfl l)
5'0 1% "'55"
359Z 7917733!
bklifixdéwgfjéi 70'4""{14 .13ow 198%)!
1'" w sw L/la'oaf'
b 0+ 5.71553
q_\7 f6?!
W l .7417
\ {537577096
5 gb ]
Yg/T 2153 _..
1: f "/07 V719.'§
1: W7 S ,1
7/1"" 7193/8 nab/o r
9 (.1
$1.
( Yon/QC s7» KW,
76dfl D SAMbvV 7001/ Wfl¢?/ /5/I'{5fl
"V1923
Z {idy'l'
» 4L 5!
76? QZUJQ Z "/WS 7% 7"" "7% M "'08
M7 "H"
Lt'w at I'Abofla/
l fvaJE'a/f
Wém 74' / /0M 71% WM\1
rig/bf
34%; 4h //b
7'\Vl/I\H410
5V1blM/IZ/
717% [fa/"M/MWM'V'V'J $&/
/' no?) 7
WM
7L
'\3 060'17Lb7/7/3'9» 1%)
M|I/0w10 "04/ I /'0
ham/(y 4% [gaze/VI
/W\Z/ a' g Mbn )9
'
I/o'fla
Wtlf b7L/ 10
9/
16/ \'
814/? WW0 (79'17/W u/d)7[ )0}
Mb
{AOWJdbta-
\
31M 52221164 ,1
J vb 2 A" (7
'_
I /0 / u/) vb)
' M
(70(7'H0WW/'j
#5
[9917/71] M
0/9
M'lfwvnra (
vaHJ'?
+J'"'V'§ flm (:01:
9' "/I"
who flag 0;
W fflé7'ufl 2207'" 07%|
5
[lzllwnnuM/op
W fa §m\'/' 135%..
w w Mb)
74W 7337"" /62
9 ab
gym <71?
M 7"?
/,7/,,7]4 j/'fi
S
"7 "777" Jags/3
"74
M'rf Lafaf If}; "-
/
/ 0' jg]
P ¢g+vla
PWJOWTp\u/\Iogltco éfJ/'fj 4
@ My? étvjéz W97 MdLIJafln? 3
b1/'M5 +£43.13"
Vb aJ/ag
£3035#
a'gsm'bja JOC{
1107L5'fl ba/fifilu/'Wj/O "5/ZZ
53'" "f5 {gnwo/O/L/
l'wLwUl/aag/
XCaCySV'Z/J 7;m9['\ a
H
: 1&745 Xvi/é") m/SfWb/%/Cfl
(/"MSéiboj
/TH/bid:/I/) "Zarwéflr'uadé)
éa/m'gLa/ogogWéJf
. Q
iiiw
WW7W
M
M 7/9 a WWWa ?
_,._=
'6» WJW (79? 7/('A6/9W
07£§1H;:t3'f7/
05
WWP1W [J
Vj
ganflUjr /u07;
Iéj/l/V
a! énvi'jag [)
I$Aa-A'U/]
17st?"ufl W5 araSW'W/'j
5/275 571'9'J751'/f bJb WJ fiflWfi
'6/ g\l
14 1: 45/1 «47L
3/7,,
"IV/F"5W7? Swing/1V5 /Z
7m i7)
LA»
/ 43] é»,
y/Ml/fls g/ks 7 CY 4
)0]
ar
2:: flow/EM
g JV jo/QJjM/o )? 7g/ 1;]:
0011'? \7/ J0 flaw/5 LI ""/"de
S" ]' 1 +'7z'all/ab
my //aL/$/9_L/
44/356)"
"aw/3 IH/
5M1? K {S
KNEW W"'\7 '0' W
76'
bi 'E )(Jgm :scjay
'4 av? jay/v: S#OG;74
WWyflwg SbzA/b fl/
k 775
57km 3 "ta/"if 31%
jZzzwlvfw
13 (16113237!
twp/"2'45 (D
Secc964
\
22m VOCH/w gm
MIN/MW
Li's/0f
#477144 gAA/DHI
\ $i/1/3
iwmfw"
{\V'C/
I
WTM
{/Ffifl @qzzVfQ'Vl'flf
{07y "15m
W"
15
A1 \
fi/V'
\Q/mr
p.30; (em/9V9"
SWM If at 'H-L
BOT/3:1: VS Sfrak +CL9V1Q0
(M
#wmm K"714%; \
_'€ZOZ/£IOL IBU!5!JO 1° M103 139" 0:) palms/\

New/(ff?
J¢04\
o/f/r'SI/Vfi
50/0" SW
gm
FféQ/S '\
43%fv%wAWWL
u]: whey
('5de Mom) 7L9\'/]LM/9)
'/\
211
Kjwy amfo 0?
(77 mISXfvliar57
m7 swfl'fl WWW]?
VVN/I Waywfiqg
W777 M9
mg/vol/ 10,174)!
W8 WWW WWWW/J
M?WWW P"? "WU
92/
{MBK7ZZJ/
wax/W W" T
W7
/'€o)pw6/0(\'<( 2" Wtfku Wit/1;
o \a; Ark)
~%wwwwWM%+VMV%3 * §M0$\'Jl
C #3
D'JHJ'LWWFLJ-fg V19
awvmjmvn§$ gfi§§7f7b3fi
"h
L/aflo& quQDUS
WSQVSbj
VW?flW%Wfl
>x/7mfin "I"?
M<CMb§JHflb+i
<_( MN 'aw'wpflaifliw
\DJDQJ .5 n L "0'44! U/
'Q'L
Abzezvp 2'2
J
§&'/a/ My 7M
l
_Verified Correct Cop
9'}
/ M/D/ MA
W/M'S /7/}
I
2M"7' Swf/MJ My
s/Iy 7g/07NS
Lo WW W 7g
L/l/Q (7An/1/4L1'IL/
f]
M7 CT/ m'
W570
"7""7 M0)
W563/
( '0')
PM aw
I 37?
WWS
.
C
a' W67
M // 01']
'37" M /Q
\ ;
"Ta?
v M g:;;%
7\ OMw')
k7'1/\/w'/i
0/1
SW 97"" j
WW 2"" slag"
[a I/Wé/'7377Z
£61 £1 yogi
3 l'aLQ 0p_ ©F€¢70W

CaseNo: 23CR23 7? L/
Petitioner/Plaintiff CERTIFICATE
and OF SERVICE
m "" *' V\ Lax-Wat
Respondent/Defendant
9%)
K3
I am the D Petitioner/Plaintiff espondent/ Defendant in this case.
I certify that on (date) I 0' 3' § ,Iprovided a true copy of (list each
document) Pam
Com/n19 5
ear/3w»
.'
l/u
Hoe: l'llg Cr.' s :5 L9 717"?
VI
"ulnar
Q( 7"1' W l, MV/IQ 1/ M
to the El Petitioner El Respondent El Attorney for in the above

i
wands
of the ElPetitioner El Respondent El Attorneyfor D/l' 5 0'; «(1' Ck
at (address):
or D United States mail in a sealed envelope with postage paid addressed to (address):
andbelief. I understand they are made for use as evidence in court and I am
{Dara}
Date ammo/7K
Signatfire
Mflql (g 7)
Print Name 7
V0
Contacthddress
60x x7 Améwflq
City, State, ZIP
, 0/2 97/03
60?)" "93'2175 cm
Contact Phone Email Address Ma/jem7ZQ/Ql'hqc/
.27,
(a? 33219 a?) 7,/0"WV"727777
'1"? mm} {UK/77 OLA 27'7")" fl9f77072i67
WWI "We 7'29 '50 70:7HWSO // '77&. )éM'/W?"F
J77 "001,! 3)) M10 ")6" 0}
$737717 «71 SW
wmfl4'A3' Jarvl/px71w63W'Hyrjéyv
WWW" 77 777 C?) 7%
7Q 303
7 a7 ~/~ 97''7 /%7;7
797
757 77(7) d/flv/mfljfw)DS'J/D yum/VOW 7/5'7/24 :37
7,5270 4A/3waqi €27 fly/'02?)
07/1" 7771' 57/7/17) (gs/72C
/07fi)///'9 77974749
2/7 may
7%/ 57%317/
anal/17y?! 7(g'.'171j5"<7 71/7)
Wamflg %ull.:l )) rgJb7?
/::9/bj/Owb
7 777
7777 7 27777 77
e; 74,40 7397
(73/77/79 772p 747773949
L@
fif7 7,
'fB
2:11: 7/33 "A?
_i£/£9' V793 (éf' 43/] (Z)
.2in z}
7'73577/7/ 7777/7 7%. "77 7 @
(yd/(J KW /Z/€(:7:M/'§
£72 14,2774, /C'
«VII/W57?) 7,,
um?
W7 7'77" H 7'
gym/7,977.0 2my /.%7M7 75'57C'f
74%! "926/;
ff P
Am CEZOEZ
G)
_Verified Correct Co
73"? wa'H/MJflYg
cyé WW»?
A '4'.' \Z:
$1: cry/Lr;3/I#
7%
5",}
gjlfflf 6'75" fV/M Jo? Jbfl {NM
bum)
'93,?) 49% amt/14:97/3/'4
"7%"? 3/75
.J'Jg'
.
If] WJyVQ
17/MW
w
74 "WW/"4v" 0+ /'""'"' m:
var/Lag ,(a/Vl #7741
1/57 72mm flaw/757} «0L!
MJ§I,AQJC/ anipbA/l,
7/957Lm-0')
fab )gJX
77f {11,74'7ZI';
f/ na/M
La7j'4174/ WMfl 1% 97
Jay/7 aJi'd
SEQ/21% ("All
(my gym/May 9."? 7/"9'94' My
ng/vflflS a; M7
52'flA", v; («FM
mm7i's 7ZJ0.%>(3 7/ /J/
"I? l[/1
2.0/5 7y/U";y 71/747919 Mfisybw
gal/W417"?! :7"
"I
Ty"771 67/ %) 3\
uj/ G's/b )2 2/" {'67,} :1
417.4079 j?
'2 Z~ 5' 'o Amez wage-L
8/30/23, 7:15 PM Gmail Helmet John letter
-
:t'i'ic' mary rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com>
«S
N
Belmet
'9
John letter
0)
mary rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com> 30 August 2023 at 19:12
py of Origin
'
mary rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com>
0
30 the legal and medical authorities of
gaston'a oregon. ijohn
ENedell do attest that
go the best of my knowledge ms mary eng isa legal and dedicated member of
.a_:our community and she deserves a lot better. aug 30 2023 @
hour.
'3'19
>
to the legal and medical authorities of

astoria oregon. ijohn
wedell do attest that
to the best of my knowledge ms mary eng isa legal and dedicated member of
our community and she deserves a lot better. aug 30 2023 @
19 hour.
https: ll mail. googlecom/ mail] u/Ol ?il(=3eOc39d4a7&view=pt&search=all&pcrmnsgid=msgx r-2837584356619562934&simpl=msg-a:r-28Ii7584356619562934 l/ 1

Eric Winters, OSB 983790
eric@ericwintel's.c0111
Eric C. Winters, Attorney
30710 SW Magnolia Ave
Wilsonville OR 97070
(503) 754-9096
Benjamin Barr, pro hac vice pending

ben@barrklein.con1
BARR & KLEIN PLLC
444 N. Michigan Avenue Ste. 1200
Chicago, Illinois 6061 1
(202) 595-4671
Stephen R. Klein, pro hac vice pending

stexre@bawklein.com
BARR & KLEINPLLC
1629 K St NW Ste. 300
(202) 804-6676
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
PORTLAND DIVISION
PROJECT VERITAS, Case No.2

'
PROJECT VERITAS ACTION FUND,
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
Plaintiffs, DECLARATORY AND 1N JIJN CTIVE RELIEF
V.
MICHAEL SCHMIDT, in his official

capacity as Multnomah County District
Attorney,
ELLEN ROSENBLUM, in her official
capacity as Oregon Attorney General,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs Project Veritas and Project Veritas Action Fund respectfully bring this action for
declaratory and injunctive relief, and complain as follows:
l. Project Veritas ("PV") and Project Veritas Action Fund ("PVA") are national media
organizations that engage almost exclusively in undercover investigative journalism.
2 Because Oregon maintains an unconstitutional recording law, PV, PVA and their
journalists are prohibited fiom exercising their First Amendment rights to engage in
undercover newsgathering by recording their conversations with others without
"specifically inform[ing]" them that the conversation is being obtained. See O.R.S. §
165.540(l)(c).
Plaintiffs' reports have garnered national attention, with many garnering hundreds of
thousands of views and some receiving over ten million views. Their stories are often
reported by other news outlets. Through their undercover journalism, PV and PVA are able
to educate and inform the public about newsworthy topics of public concern and
government accountability.
4 PV and PVA's undercover newsgathering and reporting could result in criminal charges if
undertaken in Oregon. Plaintiffs would focus their efforts on several projects Within the
state related to government oversight and investigating protest movements, but are
restrained by an overbroad statute prohibiting most secret and open recording of oral
communications. See O.R.S. § 165.540.
Based on past experience, PV and PVA have found that announcing their recording efforts
has caused individuals to refilse to talk or to even distort their story. PV and PVA have
uncovered newsworthy matters to report through open and secretive recording of
conversations, often in areas held open to the public such as voting places, sidewalks, and
2 Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

hotel lobbies. Without using these techniques, Plaintiffs are unable to exercise their First
Amendment rights to engage in undercovei' newsgathering and journalism in Oregon.
6. Across the United States, First Amendment interests in free speech and a free press have
provided ample protection to investigate and report issues of public concern. This
protection includes preventing recording laws from going beyond the legitimate protection
of individual privacy. Decisions in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
have curtailed such abuses on a case-bycase basis. See, e. g. , Fordyce v. City 0fSeattle, 55
F.3d 43 6, 439 (9th Cir. 1995) (there is a "First Amendment right to film matters of public
interest"); Anderson v. Cit); of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 106162 (9th Cir. 2010)
(acts leading to expression are protected under the First Amendment); Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1204 (9th Cir. 2018) (Idaho law making it illegal
to record agricultural operations without consent prohibited the discussion of an entire
topic and was unconstitutional). Section 165.540 cannot be reconciled with this precedent
and the First Amendment.
7. At this moment in American history, many citizens are concerned about disruptive
protesting, racial relations, and police accountability. PV and PVA require injunctive and
declaratory relief so that they may investigate these issues in Portland, learn the truth about
these matters, and report them to the public. Only one method allows them to exercise their
First Amendment rights safely and effectively: secret recording or, at the very least,
obtaining conversations without specifically informing all participants.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

8. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because Plaintiffs' claims arise
under the First and Fourteentli Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. This

Court also has jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 220102,
and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
9. This Court has jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees, in its discretion, in this action. 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b).
10. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1)(2) because Defendants reside
in the District of Oregon and all of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims
occurred in this division.
PARTIES
11. Project Veritas is a nonprofit corporation organized under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code. It is headquartered in Mamaroneck, New York.
l2. Project Veritas Action Fund is a nonprofit corporation organized under section 501(c)(4)
of the Internal Revenue Code. It is headquartered in Mamaroneck, New York.
l3. Defendant Michael Schmidt is the District Attorney of Multnomah County, Oregon.
District attorneys are empowered to prosecute all penalties and forfeitures to the state that
may occur in their county. O.R.S. § 8.680.
14. Defendant Ellen Rosenblum is the Oregon Attorney General, whose office is located in
Salem, Oregon. The Attorney General may "appear, commence, prosecute, or defend any
action, suit, matter, cause or proceeding in any court when requested by any state officer,
board, or commission . . . ." O.R.S. § 180.060(1)(d). The Attorney General "shall consult
with, advise, and direct the district attorneys in all criminal causes and matters relating to
state affairs in their respective counties." O.R.S. §180.060(8).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Operation of Oregon Recording Law
15. Oregon law usually requires all persons Who are party to a conversation to be "specifically
informed" for individuals to legally obtainthat is, recordoral communications. See
O.R.S. §§ 165.540,165.535(1).
16. Oregon law allows individuals to record without notifying a police officer provided: (a)
the officer is performing his official duties, (b) the recording is made openly and in plain
View of the participants, (c) the conversation is audible by normal unaided hearing, and (d)
the person recording is in a lawfully located position. O.R.S. § 165 .540(5)(b).
17. Oregon law also permits individuals to record others without specifically informing them
provided that the recording device is unconcealed during: (a) "public or semipublic
meetings such as hearings before governmental or quasi-governmental bodies, trials, press
conferences, public speeches, rallies and sporting or other events," (b) regularly "scheduled
classes or similar educational activities in public or private institutions," or (c) private
"meetings or conferences if all others involved knew or reasonably should have known that
the recording was being made." O.R.S. § l65.540(6).
18. Oregon law almost never permits the secret audio recording of in-person conversations,
though it permits secret audio recording for electronic communications so long as the
recording person is a party to that conversation. Cf. O.R.S. § 165.540(1)(c) with O.R.S. §
165.540(1)(a). In rare exceptions, Oregon law allows for secret audio recording, most
notably during a felony that endangers human life. O.R.S. § 165 .540(5)(a).

law punishes anyone who may "obtain" a conversation or "use" or "divulge" a
19. Oregon
conversation that was obtained by another in violation of the law. O.R.S. § 165.540(1)(d),
(e).
Project Veritas and Project Veritas Action Fund's Newsgathering
20. PV and PVA rely primarily on secret audiovisual recording to obtain stories of public
interest about corruption, fraud, waste, and abuse. Whenevei' feasible, PV and PVA use
secret audiovisual recording to capture the most accurate recollection of events. In certain
circumstances, when equipment is unavailable or in a rushed setting, PV or PVA rely upon
open audiovisual recording to capture stories. In either instance, their journalists never
"specifically inform[]" individuals they are recording.
21. PV and PVA have found that announcing their recording efforts has caused individuals to
refuse to talk or to change their story. James 0 'Keej'e Confronts Mayor ofDetroit 's Oflz'ce
Over Voter Fraud, YOUTUBE, Aug. 3, 2016,
https://wvvw.voutube.com/watch?v= 9tHaNqRpK0 (at 2:56

James O'Keefe to Detroit
Chief Lawyer Melvin Butch Hollowell: "My camerarnan is outside. Would I have your
permission for him to come in and get an interview?" Hollowell: "No."; at 4:25, after
threatening O'Keefe with criminal prosecution for publishing video: James O'Keefe: "Do
you mind if I take some notes on this?" Hollowell: "Yeah." James O'Keefe: "0k, great."
Hollowell: "No, I saidI do mind"); James 0 'Keej'e CONFRONTS NYT Exec Editoz' Dean
Baquet, YOUTUBE, Oct. 31, 2017, https://www.voutube.com/watch?\7=nkavfoClDA
(starting at 1:27, James O'Keefe confronts Dean Baquet, James O'Keefe: "You're not
going to say a word to me, are you?" "Baquet: "No."); James 0 'Keefe CONFRONTS Jake
Tapper over #Me TooCNN video, YouTube, Oct. 24, 2019,

hubs://www.voutube.c0m/watch?v=PvqVoBmdVGs (James O'Keefe, at 0:43, confronts
Jake Tapper about a sexual harassment allegation where Tapper states "you should call the
PR department," James O'Keefe: "I did, we made 75 calls Jake").
22. PV and PVA's undercover newsgathering techniques involve recording conversations
using "device[s], contrivance[s], machine[s] or apparatus[es]." See O.R.S. §§ 165.5350),
165.540(l)(c).
23. PV and PVA do not engage in and have no intent to engage in eavesdroppingthat is, the
interception of private oral communications when a reporter is not a party to the
communications. See O.R.S. §§ 165.543, 133.721(5), 133.721(7).
24. PV and PVA's undercover newsgathering techniques would subject them to misdemeanor
prosecution under Oregon law for obtaining the whole or part of a conversation. O.R.S. §
165.540(8). This includes imprisonment for up to 364 days or a fine of up to $6,250 as a
Class Amisdemeanor. O.R.S. §§ 161.615, 161.635.
25. PV and PVA's newsgathering and reporting would also subject them to misdemeanor
prosecution under Oregon law for divulging or using recorded communications. O.R.S. §
165.540(1)(e).
26. PV and PVA's newsgathering and reporting may also trigger accomplice liability and
conspiracy charges for working with reporters or third parties to produce a story. O.R.S.
§§ 161.150 (accomplice liability); 161.450 (conspiracy applies to Class A misdemeanors).
27. Because of the reach of the law, PV and PVA are chilled from exercising their First
Amendment rights to engage in newsgathering and reporting in Oregon. But for the
presence of O.R.S. § 165.540, PV and PVA would engage in several journalism projects
in the state immediately and in years to come.

Project Veritas and Project Veritas Action Fund's Past and Future Investigations
28. But for Oregon recording law, PVA would investigate allegations of corruption at the
offices of the Oregon Public Records Advocate and the Public Records Advisory Council.
In 2019, Oregon's Public Records Advocate resigned due to alleged pressure from or
mismanagement by Governor Kate Brown. But for section 165 .540, PVA would
investigate this issue and secretly record interactions with the Advocate, his staff, and
members of the PRA Council in: (a) open-air cafes in Portland, (b) public parks, (c) on
sidewalks, and (d) in other public areas. If secret recording is not achievable, it would
utilize open recording in these same circumstances. Specifically, the project would
examine whether the Advocate and Council operate impartially or with pressure from the
Governor. These methods of newsgathering are all illegal under section 165.540.
29. But for Oregon recording law, PV would focus its investigations in Oregon on the dramatic
rise in Violent protests in Portland between the police and members of Antifa and other
fringe groups. Some newspaper reports suggest that Portland police have been ordered to
stand down and to not engage protestors, even when they act violently or damage property.
This investigation involves four distinct sets of reporting activities:
a. PV would secretly record interactions between the police and protestors to observe
and report whether usual policing functions are occmring in Portland.
b. PV would secretly record discussions between PV journalists and the police to
gather candid police perspectives on the causes of the protests and investigate issues
that may not be known by the public.

PV would secretly
c. record discussions between PV journalists and protestors to
gather protestors' perspectives about the causes of the protests, to learn about
instances of police abuse, and to investigate any anti-police animus.
d. In less dangerous situations or when the situation does not pennit for ease of secret
recording, PV would openly record discussions with protestors but without
specifically informing everyone in the conversation of the recording.
30. Because protests and even ordinary public life in Portland have proven dangerous to
reporters, PV fears that the safety and even lives of its journalists would be endangered if
it were to record conversations openly and in plain View, or "specifically inform[]"
participants that they are being recorded. Outside of organized rallies, PV would seek to
do most of its secret recording on public sidewalks, public parks, or in other areas held
open to the public. But all of these methods are illegal under section 165.540.
31. As investigations often turn up unknown new leads and information, PV and PVA would
investigate where stories take them and openly and secretly record other government
officials and ordinary citizens throughout Oregon. The details of these leads and
developments cannot be known in advance. The methods of investigation, however, are all
plainly illegal under section 165.540.
32. PVA has engaged in a variety of protest investigations in the past. On August 11, 2017, it
had undercover journalists secretly record the happenings and protests at the infamous
"Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. See Exhibit 1. On August 12, 2017, a
PVA journalist openly recorded another rally in Atlanta, Georgia, but retreated due to
concerns about police harassment. See ial; Exhibit 2. Due to section 165.540, the parties
cannot similarly investigate protests, their causes, and underlying issues in Portland.

PVA has engaged in a variety of investigations into political corruption by officeholders
33.
or political campaign workers. For example, in this year's presidential primaries, various
campaign workers for a presidential candidate revealed controversial stances, and tied them
to the candidate and his campaign. #Expose2020 Part III: 2nd Bernie Stafi'kr "I'll straight
up get armed" "Guillotine the rich ", YOUTUBE, J an. 21, 2020,
https://Voutu.be/lml{8AiZrEcY. In 2018, in a contentious general election, various staff for
a gubernatorial candidate confirmed the candidate's more controversial views and efforts
to conceal them. Gillum Staffer Says Voters "not for them to know" promises won't
happen,' FL "f***ed" cracker state", YOUTUBE, Oct. 31, 2018,
https://voutu.be/di3WRRHRWIE. In the 2016 cycle, in a harbinger of PVA's current
investigations, PVA secret recording captured efforts of campaign staff to cause violence
at rallies of the opposing candidate. Rigging the Election Video I: Clinton Campaign and
-
DNC Incite Violence at Trump Rallies, YOUTUBE, Oct. 17, 2016,
https://voutu.be/SluJGHulkzY. PVA has also captured campaign finance violations, and
foreign interference in American elections. Australian Labor Party Assisting Democratic
US Campaigns in Violation of Campaign Finance Laws, YOUTUBE, Feb. 25, 2016,
https://voutu.be/p7kPtWszU4; see also In the Matter of Bernie 2016 and Susan Jackson
in her official capacity as treasurer, Conciliation Agreement, F EC (MUR 7035), Feb. 4,
201 8, https://htvprodmedia. s3 .amazonaws.com/files/sanders-fec-agreement
1519771765.pdf. Similarly, PV has enaged in a variety of investigations over the years,
including examinations of government officials' conduct at the Maryland Attorney
General's Office as well as undercover work exposing the group 120 plotting violence at
presidential innagural events. httpszl/wwwproiectveritas.com/investigations/.
10 Verified Complaint for Declaratmy and Injunctive Relief

34. PV recently investigated Rose City Antifa and its propensity toward Violence in Portland.
Though filmed in 2018, PV released an Antifa Video in the summer of 2020. Antifa.'
"Practice things like an eye gouge, it takes very little pressure 1'0 injul'e someone 's eyes,"
Project Veritas, June 4, 2020, https://www.n1'oiectveritas.com/newslantifa-practice-things-
likeaneveqouge-ittakes-Verv-littlenressure-to/. Notably, this Video investigation
proved it was of public interest, garnering over l million Views on YouTube and over 3.8
million views on Twitter. Indeed, Project Veritas's two releases, #EXPOSEANTIFA and
#DefiJndAntifa have received roughly 10,000,000 Views combined. In 2016, PV examined
the Oregon public school system, its learning program, and potential manipulation for
political gain. Oregon Sec. of State Candidate Caught Using Students for Political Gain
on Camera, Project Veritas, May l6, 2016, https://wmv.proiectveritas.com/video/oregon
secstate-candidate-using-snidents-for-political-gainon-cam/. All of these were published
with concern that litigation might commence against it. PV would investigate more
subjects in 2020 and years to come, but not until it is legal to openly and secretly record in
Oregon.
35. To date, PVA cautiously engaged in one project in Oregon: an investigation into Governor
Kate Brown and allegations of campaign finance violations in 2018. #SecretsAna'Lies:
Oregon Governor Kate Brown, Fmr Campaign Manger Details "Graft & Corruption",
YOUTUBE, Oct. 8, 2018, https:/'/voutu.be/uOJCUnq11398. However, all secret recording in
this matter was undertaken out-of-state. PVA would record and engage in newsgathering
in Oregon in 2020 and years to come, but not until it is legal to openly and secretly record.
36. PV and PVA each have a program in which they elicit information from insiders within a
company or political campaign to provide newsworthy information that they may publish.
ll Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

In 2019, Project Veritas released a story obtained by an insider at CNN. This included
recordings of conference calls from CNN's president, Jeff Zucker, who instructed his
network that "impeachment [of President Trump] is the story" in a context more suggestive
of advocating for impeachment rather than reporting on its development. Expose CNN,
Part I .' CNN Insider Blows Whistle 0n Network President JeflZuckei' 's Personal Vendetta
Against POTUS, PV, Oct. 14, 2019,
httns::"/www.proiectveritas.com/news/exposecnnpart1/.
37. Both parties would operate their insiders program in Oregon. Were they able to commence
this program, PV and PVA would solicit items of newsworthy concern in Oregon and
publish items of public interest they collect. But receipt of secret recordings and publication
from third parties are illegal under section 165 .540(1)(d) and (1)(e).
38. Undercover investigative journalism employing surreptitious recording is the primary
method through which PV and PVA are able to uncover newsworthy matters concerning
government fraud, abuses in the political process, and other issues of public concern. They
never specifically inform subjects about recording because subjects will not share truthfiil,
or, at least, candid information when notice is provided. Similarly, PV and PVA rarely
record openly because subjects change their behavior and recollections when they detect a
recording device. Because of this, PV and PVA require injunctive and declaratory relief to
remedy their First Amendment rights.
COUNT I
Oregon Revised Statute Sections 165.540(5)(b), 165.540(6), and 165.540(1)(c)

Unconstitutionally Favor Some Recording of Police but Disfavor All Other Recording
39. Under Oregon law, an individual may openly record the police in particular circumstances.
However, that same person may not openly record the conversations of city council

members, school board members, or any other government actors Without specifically
notifying them. O.R.S. § 165.540(5)(b).
40. Oregon law offers police officers robust authority to secretly record the public, such as
during the use of a taser or "Electro-Muscular Disruption Technology" device, while
denying the public the same right to secretly record the exact same circumstances. O.R.S.
§ 165.540(5)(d)(B), (5)(e).
41. O.R.S. § 165.540(6) operates as a grant of government permission to openly record certain
public events without requiring subjects be "specifically informed." In similar other public
settings not favored by government, subjects must be "specifically informed" about
recording.
42. Because audiovisual recording is protected by the First Amendment, government actions
that favor the recording of particular subjects and events while disfavoring others invokes
content and Viewpoint discrimination and the suppression of protected newsgathering.
Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 64243 (1994). Differential
treatment of recording for different actors can act as "effectively as a censor to check
critical comment." Minneapolis Star & Tribune C0. v. Minnesota Commissioner of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983). Here, Oregon law singles out a specific subject matter
that may be openly recordedpolice on the beatand forbids similar recording of other
government agents engaging in official acts or ordinary citizens without notice, making
this differential treatment unconstitutional. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155,
15657 (2015); see also Barr v. Am. Ass 'n of Political Consultants, Inc, 140 S. Ct. 2335,
2347 (2020). The law also opens up government-favored events, like press conferences,
and allows for open recording, but does not recognize a similar right in other public areas

where more critical newsgathering is likely to occur, such as on a crowded sidewalk or
light rail.
43. Oregon law enacts an impermissible divide by allowing the open recording of the police
without specifically informing them but forbidding any recording of other government
actors without notification. It grants journalists a similar right to record staged events
preferred by the government without notice, but forbids it in other public places. The law
cannot be said to advance an interest in privacy since it selectively bans unnotified
recording at other public places disfavored by the government. Because of this, sections
165.540(5)(b), 165.540(6), and 165.540(1)(c) are unconstitutional on their face and as
applied to Plaintiffs, necessitating injunctive and declaratory relief.
COUNT II
Oregon Revised Statute Section 165.540(1)(c) Violates the First Amendment by Prohibiting
Secret Audio Recording Almost All of the Time
44. Section 165.540(1)(c) acts as general rule forbidding the secret audio recording of any
conversation unless all parties to it are specifically informed. This violates the First
Amendment by denying journalists and others not before this Court the ability to record
news or information and distribute it for public consumption. See Wasden, 878 F.3d at
120305 (requirement to obtain consent before recording violated the First Amendment);
Anderson v. Cit}; of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 106162 (9th Cir. 2010); Martin v.
Gross, 340 F .Supp.3d 87, 109 (D. Mass. 2018) (ban on secret audio recording violates the
First Amendment).
45. The constitutional damage done by section 165 .540(1)(c) is only magnified by the
exemptions and maze of government manipulation of information previously described in
this complaint. The net effect of Oregon law is to manipulate the marketplace of ideas,

allowing police to secretly record people being tasered, but making it illegal for people to
secretly record the police tasering themor, no less importantly, harassing them, harassing
others, ignoring their duties, or other malfeasance.
46. While Oregon law offers very limited opportunities to openly record, the law is
suspiciously under and over inclusive. It is under inclusive because it allows the
nonconsensual recording of one set of subjects: the police, while denying a similar right to
record other government actors. It is overinclusive because it maintains a nearly all-out ban
for nearly all forms of secret recording, even in situations that are entirely open to the
public, or Without an expectation of privacy. See O.R.S. § 165.5408) (permitting secret
recording in one's own home). This damages First Amendment rights to engage in news
and information gathering in public places using a technology that is effective and keeps
reporters safe.
47. By denying the right to record secretly in nearly blanket fashion, Oregon bans the most
effective means of gathering the news. This goes too far because the law attempts to
prohibit recording conversations that are not privatethose voluntarily disclosed to the
world at large. Oregon law also puts citizen journalists in physical jeopardy given the
proclivity of both police officers and protestors to engage in violence during heated times.
PV and PVA require the ability to record secretly such that their journalists will not be
placed in harm's way.
48. Section § l65.540(1)(c) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Plaintiffs by
forbidding recording and reporting about important items of public interest in Oregon. This
necessitates injunctive and declaratory relief.
COUNT III

Oregon Revised Statute 165.540(1)(d) and (e) Violate the First Amendment by
Impermissibly Punishing Publishers of Information

1. State action to punish the publication of truthflil information "seldom can satisfy
constitutional standards." Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Ca, 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979).
Government is without authority to punish journalists who obtain, then publish, truthflil
information concerning a matter of public significance. Id. at 103.
2. Where journalists play "no part in the illegal interception," the First Amendment forecloses
government from punishing publication of intercepted material. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.s. 514, 52526 (2001).
Because section 165.540(1)(d) and (1)(e) allow the Defendants to punish journalists for
DJ
publishing truthflil information obtained from others where the journalists played no part
in the interception of that information, these provisions are invalid on their face and as
applied to Plaintiff. PV and PVA require injunctive and declaratory relief so that they may
run their insiders program in Oregon and publish items of newsworthy impact for the
public.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, PV and PVA pray for the following relief:
1. A declaratory judgment that Oregon Revised Statutes section 165.540 is
unconstitutional on its face or that Oregon Revised Statutes sections 165.540(1)(c), (d), (e) are
unconstitutional as applied to PV and PVA.
2. Preliminary and permanent injunctive relief pursuant to 42 United States Code
section 1983 against enforcement of Oregon Revised Statutes section 165.540 against activity that
constitutes the secret audio recording of conversations and the obtaining, use, or divulging of
communications obtained from others by publishers who played no part in their interception.

Plaintiffs' reasonable costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Act or
3.
any applicable statute or authority, and further relief this Court may grant in its discretion. 42
U.S.C. § 1988.
4. Any other relief that the Court deems just and appropriate.
Respectfully submitted,
PROJECT VERITAS & PROJECT VERITAS

ACTION FUND,
By its attorneys,
/s/Eric Winters
Eric Winters, OSB 983790
eric@ericwintel's.coni
Eric C. Winters, Attorney
30710 SW Magnolia Ave
Wilsonville OR 97070
(503) 754-9096
Benjamin Barr*
ben@lia11'klei11.001n
BARR & KLEN PLLC
444 N. Michigan Avenue Ste. 1200
Chicago, Illinois 6061 1
(202) 595-4671
Stephen R. K1ein*
ste\Fe<@barrklei11.com
BARR & KLEIN PLLC
1629 K St NW Ste. 300
(202) 804-6676
*admz'ssz'on pro hac vice pending
August 24, 2020

PROJECT VERITAS
__________.________ AND PROJECT VERITAS ACTION FUND VERIFICATIONS
I, James O'Keefe III, declare as follows:

1. I am President of Project Veritas and Project Veritas Action Fund.
2. Project Veritas and Project Veritas Action Fund are headquartered in

I Mamaroneck, New York. Their mailing address is 1214 West Boston Post Road
#148, and #156, respectively, Mamaroneck, NY 10543.
3. I have personal knowledge of Project Veritas and Project Veritas Action Fund's
activities, including those set out in this Verified Complaint, and if called upon to
testify I would competently testify as to the matters stated herein.
4. I verify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America
that the factual statements contained i sVerified Complaint c coming my
existing and proposed activitie are "e true correct.
Executed on August 21$t,2020.
Jame '/Keefe III
8 i. .
8/31/23, 2'29AM techdirt: A wiretapping charge against a South Fayette High School student who recorded two classmates bullying hirn has been dropped by the .
techdirt: A wiretapping charge against a South Fayette High

15 minutes ago
School student who recorded two classmates bullying him has
been dropped by the Allegheny County District Attorney's
Office.
Fg'lally, Somerme Acts Like An Adult: District Attorney Drops Charges

A ainst Bullied Teen Who Recorded His Tomlentors
Correct Co
from the andto-thinlc,-this-all~couldhave-been-prevented dept

Fri, Apt" iSti's 2L 05:33pin Tim Cushing {httpsz/lwww.techdirt.com/user/capitalisliontamerl]
\\)
-
a
"k.
1'
South Fayette School in Pennsylvania, along with a complicit criminal justice system, recently made
\
.fi
:
headlines with its groundbreaking anti-bullying program, which apparently deters bullying
'35!
V
'19, by punishing bullied students [https://vwvw.techdirt.com/amales/20140411/16314926883/buliied-

studentrecords-bullies-gets-threatened-with-felany-citerges-vioiating-wiretapping-law.shtml] .
Here's a short recap:

{mpg/AWN"
.techdirt.com
A bullied student used an iPad to make an audio recording of other students abusing him. He brought
I?
this to school administration who a) called in a police officer (after being advised by its legal team
s&topic=lega
lissues]
that this might be a violation of the state's wiretapping law) and b) deleted the recording.
Legal lssu
[httpsz/l
The police officer, unable to actually bring a felony charge against the minor, settled for disorderly
hd.rt.com/? conduct. This charge brought him before a judge, who first stated her firm belief in the school's
satop'°::3:;i inability to do wrong before finding him guilty.
Throughout the entire debacle, not a single person involved even considered the possibility that the student had
committed no crime or the fact that he had followed all of the school's prescribed steps for reporting bullying
incidents. Instead, the desire to punish someone was obliged every step of the way.
Finally, someone within the justice system has chosen to act like an adult, [http://benswann.com/victory-student-
charged-after-recording-hisown-bullies-wili-nolongerhave-case-pursued-by-district-attorneyl] rather than a bunch of
clique-y, vindictive children.
Stanfield (the student) had announced that he and his attorney would file an appeal to that ruling but
his fight may already be coming to an end. Today, Benswann. com has been told by Stanfield's attorney
that the District Attorney will allow the appeal to go forward but will no longer pursue this case.
More specifically, both the wiretapping charge (which was apparently still brought despite the involved officer's
statement otherwise) and the disorderly conduct charge (which the judge found the student guilty of) were dropped
[http://vmw.wtae.com/news/south-fayette-student-tofiglit-wiretapping-charge-forrecording-buliying/255075'l 0] .
A wiretapping charge against a South Fayette High School student who recorded two classmates bullying
him has been dropped by the Allegheny County District Attorney's Office.
Mike Manko, a spokesman for District Attorney Stephen Zappala, said Judge Robert Gallo signed an order
Thursday to withdraw the citation against 15-year-old Christian Stanfield.
"No one in our office who is authorized to give advice on wiretap issues or school conduct issues was
ever contacted in this matter. We have made multiple attempts to contact the officer who wrote the
1/3
httpsllbraingarbagedystopie blogspot.conflZOB/OS/techdirtwiretapping-chargeagainsLhlnil
8131/3, 2:29 AM techdirt: A wiretapping charge against a South Fayeue High School student who recorded two classmalm bullying him has been dropped by the
" Manko said in a written statement. "We do not
citation and (the) results have been unsuccessful,
"
believe this behavior rises to the level of a citation.
Odd that a police officer wouldn't talk to a district attorney. Unless, of course, a little bit of hindsight made him
his every move fell between vindictive and buffoonish. Lt. Murka, who apparently considered both
re§ize
wiaetapping and disorderly conduct to be appropriate "remedies" for a bullied student recording his tormentors,
segns to have recused himself from the public eye. Manko, speaking for the DA, hits the heart of the issue one
sirfle sentence that any of those involved could have deployed to call an end to this ridiculous situation before it
erged up in front of a judge: "We do not believe this behavior rises t0 the level of a citation.'
>
Thg- school has now gone on record to declare it's everyone else who's wrong
:
[h%3:l/wwwaavpxtconi/news/newe/local/dadrop-charge-student-who-videoed-bullies/nfbfp/}
_Verified Corre
The South Fayette Township School District wishes to address recent reports in the local and national
media concerning a student of the South Fayette Township School District. It is to be noted that certain
information being disseminated by the media is inaccurate and/ or incomplete.
Rather than clear up what exactly was "inaccurate and/or incomplete" about the reporting, it instead has chosen to
hide behind "confidentiality."
The School District is legally precluded from commenting specifically in regard to these reports as the
issue involves a confidential student matter.
Considering the story has been all over the news, it seems a bit weak to claim the matter is still "confidential." It
would seem it could comment on any of the specifics already in the public domain. The story has gone nationwide, so
it's disingenuous to pretend it's still a "confidential" matter.
While it's nice that the DA has dropped the charges and allowed the student to proceed through school without
criminal charges hanging over his head, one wonders if this same outcome would have forthcoming without the
attendant public outcry. Any adult can start acting like one with enough public shaming. But the application of a
little common sense would have averted this incident completely.
A bit more troubling is one of the suggestions that escaped the lips of a local politician who showed up to the teen's
"not a criminal" celebration.
State lawmaker Jesse White joined the rally, telling Stanfield he wants to name a law after him. He said
it would close the loophole in the wiretapping law and allow victims of bullying to record it as proof for
police and school officials.
His opportunistic heart's in the right place, but naming laws after people often indicates the new law is a bad one.
This isn't an issue where a new law will fix things. This is an issue where no one in this chain of events showing the
courage (and common sense) to stand up and ask why they were punishing a bullied kid for recording bullies.
Filed Under: bullying {https://www.techdirt.com/tag/bullying/j , recording [https://w'.rvw.techdirt.com/tag/recording/J , students

[https://www.techdirt.com/tag/students/] , wiretapping {https://www.techdirt.corr1/tag/wiretapping/]
https:l/braingarbagedystopie.blogspot.com/ZOB/O8ltechdin-wiretapping-chargeragainst.htrril 2/3
Verified Correct Copy of Original 9/6/2023.
'4
58.. >323.
=53 :o3m_mmm
5330: 5:0 5 cam: Egan. 2:

2 >m~o1_m am 3%. .
. .
2% a :5 o=_< 28m 165.: s.
243' mam 5 $3 a 18%

32:533.
,
<mmfim1am<. mm msm m3 arm ..
53:33 am a Em mimics.
:8" umou_m 3 swag m3 0: m3
.
£83 2mm."
o:
2.5 2%.. 2m?
:fl 1.; infirm)...
we: 3on 3.4 8%:22

ES. ,5 ,
23mm 3% ; <8 8: .
g,»
9/5/B, 9:33 AM Gmail BCR23294; Monday's hearing
-
mary rose Ienore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com>
$CR23294; Monday's hearing

9
mry rose Ienore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com> 19 August 2023 at 09:06

Katie Danen <Katie.Danen@ojd.state.or.us>, Alexander Thomas <athomas@clatsopcounty.gov>
1%
u-ln regards to
PC
3.3 "candor towards the tn'bunal"
>
gvill the judge be notified
o
fifi contradictory email 51922 from erin carlsen praising me, promising to prevent further "encounters or dealings with
@sarch", telling me i am welcome and valued
o
Eontradicting a handwritten document most likely "back-dated" to the date 5-19-22 calling me "high or out of my mind"
support osarch orak's demonization agenda and submitted to the DA in the discovery packet?
filo
if indeed, erin carlsen has submitted back-dated documents, i do not want her to be in trouble for falsifying evidence to the
courts or police, but i do find that to be a serious issue afiecting my defense and the legitimacy of this action.
please see my submissions from 8-17-23 in regards this issue in a list of documents i wanted to highlight to all parties.
will the tribunal be notified that osarch orak was threatening me with false allegations and a false prosecution based on
lies in the recording,
and that his attempt to threaten to lie to authorities was hanging over my head for over a yearand could be construed
to constitute an act of extortion, to silence me about his sexual innuendo to the homeless women?
o R P C,
i
worry that if these credibility issues are not promptly discussed with the tribunal, the OQRP'm/ay be in violation:
RULE 3.3 CANDOR TOWARD THE TRIBUNAL (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of fact or law
to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; (2) fail
to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the
position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; (3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. lf a
lawyer, the lawyer's client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know
of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if permitted, disclosure to the tribunal. A
lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer
reasonably believes is false; (4) conceal or fail to disclose to a tribunal that which the lawyer is required by law to reveal;
or (5) engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to these Rules. (b) A lawyer who represents a client in an
adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or
fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if permitted, disclosure
to the tribunal. (c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, but in no
event require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
[Quoted text hidden]
https: Il mail. google.com/ mail/u] 0/ ?ik:3 e0039d4a7&view=pt&search=all&permns gid=msg-a: r72934584271759563B&simpl=msga:r7293458427175956323 l/ 1

9/5/3, 9:29AM Gmail (no subject)
-
{"3"} mary rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com>

_|
M
N .
gm
'D
subject)
mikessica Klein <jessica@harbomw.org> 31 August 2023 at 18:35
Hi Mary,
>
§ Thank you so much for reaching out about this. I want to let
you know that we would absolutely
*gwaive a no-contact provision for The Harbor. That was not something anyone has discussed with
gus, and it's not something we would want to implement or enforce. You are most welcome to
0continue to utilize The Harbor's services and resources. Please let me know if you need any of this
erlf d
.2in writing, and l would be happy to put together a letter for you on The Harbor's letterhead.
>Il'm sorry you're going through this experience. Please don't hesitate to reach out if you need
emotional support, resources, or referrals.
Jessica Klein (they/she/we) Why I Pronourrs iviatter

Deputy Director
Clatsop-Nehalem Land Landback l
Office: (503) 325-3426

Mailing: PO Box 1342, Astoria, OR 97103
24-hour Support Line: (503) 325-5735

Linea de apoyo las 24-horas en Espafiol: (855) 938-0584
harbom w. org
fiM'Hérbor
We're partnering with SafeNighI to support survivors in need of emergency shelter. You can help by
downloading the app and selecting The Harbor to get started
From: mary rose lenore eng <mahyengi@gmaii.com>

Sent: Thursday, August 31, 2023 4:48 PM
To: Jessica Klein <jessrca@harbomw org>
Subject:
https:llmail. google.com/maillu/O/?ik=3eOc39d4a7&view=pt&search=all&perrnnsgid=msg-f: 1T/5797145923903638&simpl=msg-f: 177579714598903638 1l 1

_
.
0% aMW I
CaseNo: '2 ; CR Z; Z? 3/
"< r/mlc
Petitioner/ Plaintiff CERTIFICATE
and OF SERVICE
Marc" (as/C Lemar-C. €07-
,/ Respondent/ Defendant'
I am the El Petitioner/Plaintiff espondent/Defendant in this case.
I certlfythat on (date) C7 '15" 2 7 Iprovidedatrue copy of (lzst each

document) /€/4é4 14mm A/p/mp/ Join . l/E'r .L/'crs C0m0/ai' a 7L
7020]
*CCLIJN 7L a/fi'oflz an BUZZ/ED Bandy/b: :Eaoc/ lemeqf
149v Mam c/ASc/I'lm MM /,
'hqA [Le/4,"
cm a ,'ssve (irnn"/ re
('3
to the
PC 3 3
Petitioner El
) RM
Respondent E] Attorney for
{ff/Wu Hruréor J'rec-lv/ live/dug /VC.
in the above
'
|\Hands of the'MPetitioner El Respondent El Attorneyfor Cl'4 {rap DA- S/'Q KC
at(address): C la is 0P Ci ( Cu,' 7'- (6 ur' 7L
or E] United States mail in a sealed envelope with postage paid addressed to (address):
and belief. I understand they are made for use as evidence 1n court and I am
9~5
Date
*
23 Signature
fl/ZJW'
"7 fl I I L r g J" V?
PrintName
)9? flax /2 Ask».~§ 0K 9/7/03

303 L/ég£22175
13CK231'ffl
(D
747 P.2d 345 (1987)

304 Or. 455
STATE of Oregon, Respondent 0n Review, (54-1 F' 7 J

v.
Michael David LISSY, Petitioner On Review.

RECCEEDVEEJ
CC 10-8408136: CA A35041: SC 834184.
AUG 2 8 2023
Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc. By'
Argued and Submitted October 7, 1987.

DeCIded December 15, 1987.
Stephen J. Williams, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner
346
34$ on review. V\fith him on the petition was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.
Terry Ann Leggert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review.
With her were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.
JONES, Justice.
Defendant appealed his conviction for aggravated murder to the Court of Appeals,
assigning as error the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress certain recorded
telephone conversations between defendant and others and the recorded out-of-court
statements of a co-conspirator, David V\fi|son. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's
conviction. State v. Lissv 85 Or. App. 484, 737 P.2d 617 (1987). We affirm the decision
of the Court of Appeals.
Defendant relies upon two points for reversal:
Telephone calls are wire communication. The obtaining of wire communications

"[|.]
must be through orders that confirm [sic] to ORS 133.724. As this was not done in the
present case, the telephone conversations should be suppressed.

"[ll.] The police obtained evidence through electronic surveillance orders pursuant to
ORS 133.726. Any evidence obtained by this route should be suppressed as ORS
133.726 is unconstitutional by being less restrictive than the federal standards imposed
by Title l|| of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street [sic] Act of 1968."
We take the facts from the Court of Appeals' opinion and defendant's brief. Defendant's
wife, Kathryn Martini-Lissy, was found dead in room 305 at the Valley River Inn in
Eugene on June 6, 1984. She had been strangled to death during the previous evening.
There was evidence that she had been raped.
As the investigation of the murder proceeded, police suspicion began to focus on

defendant. Prior to the murder, defendant frequently hired prostitutes and told one of
them, Molly Griggs, that he wanted a woman strangled and raped. Later, Griggs read a
newspaper account of the killing and immediately suspected defendant. She called the
police and agreed to help them in their investigation. At the request of the police, she
made three telephone calls to defendant, which were recorded by the police with her
consent. In those calls, Griggs told defendant that she suspected he was involved in the
murder and attempted to get money from him to allow her to leave town.
Another prostitute, Tina LaPIante, who had been selling sex to defendant on a regular
basis, reported to the police, after consulting her attorney, that defendant told her he
wanted a woman raped and murdered and offered her $500 if she could find a hit man.
LaPIante agreed to look around for a killer for hire. LaPIante met David VWson at a drug
party. VWson told her that he was willing to do the job. She arranged a meeting between
defendant and Wilson. After that initial meeting, defendant told LaPIante that Wilson
agreed to commit the murder for $5,000. On June 5, 1984, Wilson entered the victim's
room at the Valley River Inn in Eugene, gagged her, raped her and then strangled her to
death.
LaPIante was subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury. She retained an attorney and
was granted immunity for her cooperation. She agreed to engage defendant and VWson
in conversations, and to allow the police to tape phone calls with defendant and give her
a "wire up" for a face-to-face recorded conversation with VWson. Defendant does not
contest the voluntariness of LaPIante's consent to make the calls. She told the police
that defendant had offered Wilson an additional $25,000 if he would admit to everything
and say that defendant had nothing to do with it. The additional money was to come
from the insurance proceeds.
On October 8, 1984, LaPlante placed a telephone call to defendant at his parent's home
on the coast. The conversation was taperecorded by the police with the consent of
LaPlante. LaPlante and defendant discussed the plans to pay Wilson for taking
47
347 the "fall." Defendant described how VWson would get the $25,000 plus interest.
LaPlante arranged a meeting with Wilson in Portland on October 11, 1984. During that
meeting she was equipped with a "body wire," and the police were stationed in the
vicinity. The police had obtained a court order from a circuit courtjudge for recording the
conversation regarding the murder. VWson and LaPlante discussed details of the crime.
VWson indicated he had taken the victim's necklace, credit cards, checks, etc. from the
room. He described what the victim had said to him, prior to the murder. He described in
graphic detail how he had murdered the victim. They discussed the arrangements for
payment, and the story VWson was to give the police to protect defendant. LaPlante
agreed to arrange a meeting between Wilson and defendant to go over the details.
Wilson was arrested shortly after this conversation. LaPlante agreed to call defendant on
the 12th of October. This call was also taperecorded. She informed defendant that
VWson had been arrested. Defendant advised LaPlante to "hang tough 'cause there's
always a chance in court of beating it."
Shortly thereafter, defendant was arrested. David VWson was called during the Motion in
Limine hearing, with counsel, and through his counsel asserted his Fifth Amendment
right not to testify in defendant's trial.
Defendant's motion to suppress the recorded conversations between defendant and
Griggs, defendant and LaPlante, and V\filson and LaPlante was denied by the trial judge,
and the recordings were introduced in evidence at trial and played to the jury. Both
Griggs and LaPlante testified for the state and described the circumstances of the
conversations.
Defendant contended on appeal to the Court of Appeals that all of the recorded
conversations should have been suppressed, because the telephone calls had been
recorded without a court order and the recording of the conversation between LaPlante
and Wilson was not properly authorized; he also contended that the admission of
Wilson's statements contained in the recording of his conversation with LaPlante was
not permissible under the Oregon Evidence Code and that their admission violated his
right to confront the witnesses against him. In his petition for review to this court,
defendant abandons his objections under the Oregon Evidence Codem and asserts two
grounds for reversal set out above.
Defendant argues that the police's recording of his conversatlons with Griggs and
LaPlante and between LaPlante and Wilson violates Oregon statutory wiretap law.
The first question we address is whether the legislature intended ORS 133.7249] and
165.540(1)(a)@ to allow the
"34:3 police to record telephone conversations when one party consents to the recording.
Read alone, ORS 165.540(1)(a) clearly exempts as a criminal offense that which
would be illegal under chapter 165. Because defendant does not contest that both
Griggs and LaPlante gave consent and were participants in the taped communications,
the only question before this court is whether ORS 165.540(1)(a) exempts from the
restrictions of chapter 133 recorded telephone conversations where one party consents
to the police's recording of the communication.
The legislature enacted statutes that set forth the procedure for obtaining court orders
for conducting wiretaps under ORS chapter 133, while the exemption (with consent of
one party) for taping telephone conversations is found in chapter 165. Thus, the
legislature created an exception from criminal sanction under chapter 165 to acts which
are othenNise illegal under that chapter, but did not enact an exception, other than by
warrant, for interceptions under chapter 133.
These statutes can be read as unrelated to each other or to conflict if it is assumed that,
because ORS 133.724 makes no mention of consent and makes no mention of ORS
165.540, the provisions of ORS 133.724 are to exist independent of the provisions in
chapter 165. That is, there is a conflict if chapter 165 merely provides criminal sanctions
and exceptions from sanctions, leaving ORS 133.724 otherwise efficacious. Simply
stated, the language of the statutes does not resolve the issue before us, nor does prior
caselaw interpreting these statutes.
In State v. Underwood, 293 Or. 389, 648 P.2d 847 (1982), this court interpreted these
statutes and allowed evidence of a police officer's taped conversation with a defendant.
The issue in Unden/vood was:
"whether an undercover police officer's recording of a telephone conversation between

himself and a suspect constitutes an interception which is subject to suppression
because it was not obtained under court order. The state contends that the various
provisions relating to interception of communications, codified in Chapters 133, 165 and
41, which were passed as parts of the same act, must be read together to determine
what constitutes an 'unlawful interception' subject to suppression for failure to obtain a
court order. Since parties are exempt from criminal liability, the state's position is that
communications to which an officer is a party are not 'unlawful interceptions,' and need
not be authorized by court order. Defendant contends that the provisions of ORS
Chapter 133 concerning interception of communications must themselves be read as a

whole, and that those provisions conflict unless party communications are subject to
* * *"
suppression if obtained without a court order. 293 Or. at 391 648 P.2d 847
(footnote omitted).
This court held that no interception occurred, finding that a reading of the interception
statutes as a whole makes it clear that no interception occurs when one party records a
telephone communication.
Thus, this court has interpreted these wiretap statutes as inapplicable to a conversation
between a police officer and a defendant. But Underwood does not answer the further
question of the legality of recording a conversation between a consenting third party and
a defendant when the police are listening and recording the conversation. Dictum in
Unden/vood would indicate that such a procedure would be an interception.
"Our result is supported by the following interpretation of the term 'interception' in Billeci
V. United States, 87 App DC 274, 184 F2d 394, 24 ALR 2d 881 (1950):
'We think that interception of a phone call necessarily involves the idea that a speaker
thinks he is talking to one person whereas in fact a third person is listening.'" 293 Or. at
393, 648 P.2d 847.
We assume that the recorded conversations in this case falls within the prohibitions of
ORS 133.724 et seq. Because the statutory language of ORS chapter 133 or 165 does
not resolve the issue before us, we must turn to the legislative history of those statutes
to determine if the exemptions in ORS 165.540 are applicable to chapter 133 and allow
the police's recording of conversations between two non-police parties
360
*350 where the police have obtained the consent of one of the parties.
ORS 165.540(1)(a) remains in its originally enacted form. The legislative history
supports the conclusion that ORS 165.540(1)(a) was intended to allow anyone, including
a police officer, to tape record a telephone conversation, if one party to the telephone
conversation consents.
A review of the legislative history shows that when the legislature adopted the
prohibitions contained in ORS 165.540, the intent was to curtail wiretapping, except
under limited circumstances, but not to prohibit recording telephone conversations with
one-party consent. In other words, the legislature intended to exempt taping or obtaining
telephone conversations by third parties where one party consents from the prohibited
activity described in ORS chapters 133 and 165.
To demonstrate the legislative intent of this state's wiretap statutes to permit recording
telephone conversations with one-party consent without a warrant, we start with the
legislature's first effort and bring the statutes to their present form. In 1955, Senate Bill
165 was introduced in the Oregon legislature and subsequently passed in amended
form. In its unamended form the bill prohibited a person from obtaining a telephone
conversation when the person was not a participant in the conversation. The proponents
of the bill were concerned about the increasing use of wiretaps, and the bill was intended
to stop the practice by making it a criminal offense. After debate about the feasibility of a
blanket prohibition, amendments were proposed which would allow a wiretap with a
court order, and the obtaining of a telecommunication when "consent is given by at least
one participant." (First Senate Amendments to SB 165.) The consent language used
above is the language that is presently in the statute. This change was made after
testimony concerning many problems with the biII, but no specific reference was made to
the reason for the consent provision.
The procedures for obtaining a court-ordered wiretap were originally part of ORS
141.720 (later renumbered 133.725, now 133.724). The combined effect of ORS
133.724 and 165.540(1)(a) made it a crime to wiretap without a court order, but
specifically excluded the obtaining of telephone conversations, with one-party consent,

from the criminal provisions.
The 1959 legislature expanded the activity made illegal under ORS 165.540 to include
tape recording of face-toface conversations. The changes were originally contained in
Senate Bill 215. ln its first form, the bill proposed amending ORS 165.540(1)(a) to state
that a person could not record a telecommunication unless "express" consent was given
by "all participants." During the testimony on the bill, Senator Corbett questioned why the
term "all participants" was stricken from SB 215 and why in the amendment only one
participant need consent. One reason given for allowing one-party consent to remain in
ORS 165.540(1)(a) was to continue to permit the use of that procedure in criminal
investigations. Alexander Brown, City Attorney of Portland, gave the example of a police
officer listening in on ransom calls in a kidnapping case, as a reason why the oneparty
consent exception to the prohibition on listening to a telephone conversation was
necessary. Minutes, Senate Judiciary Committee (April 16, 1959).
Senate Bill 215 subsequently was replaced by SB 531, which deleted the proposed
changes to ORS 165.540(1)(a) and left the exception for one-person consent of
telephone tape recording intact. Senate Bill 531 did incorporate the language from SB
215 concerning face-to-face recordation of conversations, including the requirement that
all participants consent. This became ORS 165.540(1)(c)}91 and is the language of the
present statute.
351
*351 In 1961, the legislature allowed an exception to the face-to-face recording, to permit
the police to use body wires in investigation of drug cases. Or. Laws 1961, ch. 460, § 1.
No change was made or proposed to the consent provisions in ORS 165.540(1)(a).
The 1979 legislature made some major changes to Oregon's wiretap statutes to bring
them into compliance with federal law. The legislation was proposed after an interim
committee studied the problem. The committee discussed the inconsistency between
ORS 165.540(1)(a) and (c), stating:
"Under ORS 165.540(1)(a), interception or recording of either a telecommunication or

radio communication requires the consent of only one of the parties to the
communication. Under ORS 165.540(1)(a), however, before a faceto-face conversation
can be intercepted or recorded all participants must be 'specifically informed that their
conversation is being obtained.' This latter prohibition on recording of face-to-face
conversations means that a person who tape records a public meeting, public speech or
classroom lecture without 'specifically informing' all participants that the discussion is
being taped is guilty of a Class C felony." interim Committee Report, pp 32-33 (emphasis
added).
To resolve the problem presented by this inconsistency, the committee proposed that
face-to-face tape recording be allowed with the consent of one person. This was
originally part of Senate Bills 1 and 484. However, the Judiciary Committee dropped this
part of the bill, because it was too controversial. Minutes, Hearing Senate Judiciary
Committee (June 19, 1979
Statement of Ms. Godwin); Minutes, House Judiciary
Committee (June 30, 1979
Statement of Mr. Kelly). Senate Bill 484 passed in
amended form with many changes to the procedures for obtaining wiretapping orders,
but retained ORS 165.540(1)(a) and (c) without change.
In sum, the legislature chose not to allow recordation of face-to-face conversations with
one person's consent, but the legislature did not restrict the taping or recording of
telephone conversations by anyone when one party consents.
ln 1983, the legislature reviewed the recordation of conversations, enlarged the crimes
for which the police could record face-toface conversations to all felonies, and included
a requirement that the police first get a court order. These changes are now codified in
ORS 165.540(5)(a)L51 and 133726.91 Again, the provisions required
359.
all participants to consent to recording face-to-face conversations unless there is a

court order to allow otherwise, but they left recording oneparty consent telephone
conversations unchanged.
From the above, we conclude that the police listening with Griggs' and LaPlante's
consent to the telephone communications between Griggs and defendant and between
LaPlante and defendant was not in violation of state statute.
We now address the issue of the face-to-face wire recorded conversation between
LaPlante and Wilson.
Defendant contends that the statements of V\filson that were made in his conversation
with LaPlante and recorded by her should have been suppressed, because the court
order allowing the recording of that conversation was obtained under ORS 133.726 and
that statute is unconstitutional by being less restrictive than the federal standards
imposed by Title lll of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. ORS
* * *
133.726 requires a court order "for the obtaining of any conversation under ORS
165.540(5)(a)." Defendant's argument is that the order should have complied wrth the
stricter requirements of ORS 133.724 in order to comply with the federal law. We agree
with the Court of Appeals that even if he is correct in that contention, the federal law
does not require a court order when one of the participants consents. Section 2511 of
the federal statute contains a number of exceptions, including:
"It shall not be unlawful under this chapterfor a person acting under color of law to
intercept a wire or oral communication, where such person is a party to the

communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception." 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
ORS 165.540(5)(a) and 133.726 provide a stricter, not less restrictive, standard for
recording face-to-face conversations. The Oregon statutes require a court order unless
all parties consent, the federal statutes do not when one of the parties consents. ORS
165.540(5)(a) provides:
"The prohibitions in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this sectionFl] do not apply to a
law enforcement officer who uses a listening or recording device, machine or apparatus
pursuant to a court order issued under ORS 133.726 to obtain a conversation between
the officer or someone under direct supervision of the officer and a person whom the
officer has reasonable cause to believe has committed, or is engaged in committing, a
felony, so long as any officer who records a conversation does not intentionally fail to
record and preserve the conversation in its entirety. However, the court order shall not
be necessary under this paragraph if exigent circumstances make it unreasonable to
obtain the order." (Emphasis added.)
l0
The police had obtained a circuit court order under ORS 133.726 to record this
conversation between LaPIante and VWson. Accordingly, the taped conversation
between LaPIante and VWson was not suppressible for the reasons argued by
defendant.
The decisions of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court are affirmed.
[11 We comment that the Court of Appeals was correct in disposmg of these issues.
[g1 ORS 133.724 provrdes:
"(1) An ex parte order for the Interception of wrre or oral communications may be issued by any crrcurt court judge
upon written application made upon oath or affirmation of the indiVidual who is the district attomey for the county
in which the order is sought. The application shall include
(a) The name of the district attorney making the application and the authority of the district attorney to make the
application,
(b) The identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making the application and the officer authorizmg
the application,
(c) A statement demonstrating that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an indiwdual is committing, has
committed or is about to commit, a particular felony or murder, kidnapping, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion or
other crime dangerous to life and punishable as a felony, or any conspiracy to commit any of the foregomg
crimes;
(d) A statement of the details, if known, of the particular crime alleged under paragraph (c) of this subsection;
(e) A particular description of the nature and location of the faculties from which or the place where the wire or
oral communication is to be intercepted, if known,
(f) A particular description of the type of Wire or oral communication sought to be intercepted,
(g) The identity of the person, if known, suspected of committing the crime and whose wire or oral
communications are to be intercepted;
(h) A full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed
or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or are likely to be too dangerous,
(i) A statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be maintained. If the nature of the
investigation is such that the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when the described
type of wire or oral communication has been first obtained, a description of facts establishing probable cause to
believe that additional communications of the same type Will occur thereafter,
(j) A statement as to whether any prior application has been made to intercept Wire or oral communications from
the same person and, if such prior application eXIsts, a statement of the current status of that application, and
(k) Where the application is for the extenSIon of an eXisting order, a statement setting forth the results thus far
obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results.
l/
"(2) The judge may require the applicant to furnish further testimony or documentary eVIdence In support of the
appllcation
"(3) Upon examination of such application and eVIdence the judge may enter an ex parte order, as requested or
as modified, authorizrng or approving Interception or wrre or oral communications wrthin the state If the Judge
determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that.
(a) There is probable cause for belief that an individual Is committing. has committed or is about to commit a
particular crime described in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section.
(b) There is probable cause for belief that particular communications concernlng that crime wrll be obtained
through such Interception;
(c) Normal Investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to
succeed if tried or are likely to be too dangerous, and
(d) There is probable cause for belief that the faCilities from which, or the place where, the wire or oral
communications to be Intercepted are being used, or about to be used, in connection With the commissmn of that
crlme are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by the indiVIdual suspected.
"(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any Wire or oral communication shall speCIfy'
(a) The identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted,
(b) The nature and location of the communications facilities as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept
is granted;
(c) A particular description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the
particular crime to which it relates;
(d) The identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications and of the person author'zrng the
application,
(e) The period of time during which such Interception is authorized, including a statement as to whether or not the
Interception shall automatically termInate when the described communIcation has been first obtained, and
(f) The name of the applicant, date of issuance, and the signature and title of the issumg judge.
"(5) No order entered pursuant to this section shall authorize or approve the Interception of any Wire or oral
communication for any period longer than Is necessary to achieve the objective of authorization, nor in any event
longer than 30 days. ExtenSIons of any order may be granted, but only when application for an extensron is made
in accordance w1th paragraph (k) of subsection (1) of this section and the court makes the findings required by
subsection (3) of this section. The perIod of extenSIon shall be no longer than the authonzing judge deems
necessary to achieve the purpose for which It is granted and In no event for longer than 30 days Every order and
extenSIon thereof shall contain a prOVISIon that the authorization to Intercept shall be executed as soon as
practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communicatIons not othenNIse
subject to interception, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorIzed objective, or in any event in 30
days.
"(6) Whenever an order authorIZIng InterceptIon is entered pursuant to this section, the order may requrre reports
to be made to the judge who Issued the order showrng what progress has been made toward achievement of the
[Z
authorlzed objectlve and the need for continued interception. Such reports shall be made at such Intervals as the
judge may require."
[g1 ORS 165.540(1)(a) prowdes
"Except as othenmse provrded in ORS 133.724 or subsections (2) to (6) of this section, no person shall:
(a) Obtain or attempt to obtain the whole or any part of a telecommunication or a radio commumcafion to which
such person Is not a partICIpant, by means of any device. contrivance, machine or apparatus, whether electrical,
mechanical. manual or otherwrse, unless consent is given by at least one partrcrpant."
[g] ORS 165.540(1)(c) provndes.
"Except as othenivise provrded in ORS 133.724 or subsections (2) to (6) of this section, no person shall
(c) Obtain or attempt to obtain the whole or any part of a conversation by means of any device, contrivance,
machine or apparatus. whether electrical, mechanical, manual or othenlvise, if all partlmpants In the conversation
"
are not specifically infomed that their conversation is being obtained
L5] ORS 165 540(5)(a) Is set forth In section ll of the text, 304 Or. at 468, 747 P 2d at 352.
[61 ORS 133.726 prOVIdeS'
"(1) An ex parte order for the obtaining of any conversation in any county of this state under ORS 165.540(5)(a)
may be issued by anyjudge as defined in ORS 133.525 upon written application made upon oath or affirmation
of the district attorney for the county in which the order is sought or upon the oath or affirmation of any peace
officer. The application shall include
(a) The name of the applicant and the applicant's authority to make the application,
(b) A statement demonstrating that there is reasonable cause to believe that a person whose conversation is to
be obtained is engaged in committing or has committed a particular felony and that the obtaining of the
conversation Will yield eVidence thereof, and
(c) The identity of the person, if known, suspected of committing the crime and whose conversation is to be
obtained.
"(2) The judge may reqUIre the applicant to furnish further testimony or documentary evidence in support of the
application.
"(3) Upon examination of the application and eVIdence, the Judge may enter an ex parte order, as requested or as
modified, authorizmg or approvmg obtaining of conversations Within the state if the Judge determines on the baSis
of the facts submitted by the applicant that.
(a) There is reasonable cause to believe that a person is engaged in committing or has committed a particular
felony, and
(b) There is reasonable cause to believe that conversations to be obtained will contain evidence concerning that
Grime
/5
"(4) An order authonzmg or approvmg the obtaining of conversations under ORS 165.540(5)(a) shall specify'
(a) The identity of the person, if known, whose conversation is to be obtained.
(b) A statement of the particular cnme to whlch the conversation Is expected to relate;
(c) The agency authorlzed under the order to obtain the conversation,
(d) The name and office of the applicant and the Signature and title of the Issuing Judge; and
(e) A penod of time after which the order shali expire."
L7_1 See note 4, ante.
httpszllscholar.qooolecom/scholar case70ase=15763489636072289995&o=ors+165.540&hl
=en&as sdt=6 38
f'l'nfi o! Cas e No. .'Lgc-g ZDZgL/.. i r"

@1/4230'»\
Petitidner/Plaintiff CERTIFICATE
and OF SERVICE
fl/l-xv'fi dries/c Umore "Ema.
d Respondent/Defendant
I am the El D efendant in this case.
on (date) 2%
I certify thatPetitioner/Plaintifjflllespondent/
"' 'Z iLIprovided a true copy of (list each
document) 6 L9 #94 7/7; j: 06,? ' /.e 0/ "Crow-Q. _
Le #9; 01E {Zea/Um"! 140m (VG/ewe: (AV 14.01 5

(I?) Ofe'imo
J
V. LI'SJV genre/mi Cur}
/ C'fl
I'
'-'
-1 / 7.
p40,;
to the [:1 Petitioner [:1 Respondent E! Attorney for in the above
Hands of the EIPetitioner El Respondent D Attorneyfor C /" 745

by?
9/4 0/;{149
at (address): C, II)" u/ . 7L ,1 94/ /' P Q /o;
730/43
or Cl United States mail in a sealed envelope withpostage paid addressed to (address):
a
Date
2% "L0>
Signature
%%£ 3&5. '
flfl K i
l .-
C s
PrintName
F0 gm )2
'
79R 97 /0 2

"4'79" WW W" MW @W'" 3' ,
,W ,4
fil/br/[b/Jefij
'
I32; if ?
27/?
M/bvljbfilg,/ 71"," "If 2'7?"
£32477 }
:17 "W 97 W3"
/0:
29?4%3W, hWW"?, 277 "07/" W ?'
Wl
2/14:
79%MK {f Mail/J 2'9}? /D/é','7j 97p
fg/ X'% 4/ 7""""'g" 9"" W9 «"75
"/2 "f1 57; "7W?
"WW 3%")!2'3 (W
("fol/Z Jy {£76 WJ}6
f;%V/DQm%Z«)7zw ma/f/MWJug
zit/"5,7132% W
M}[M9/fl Wyfifilb 7/QZ
2/4/00" SIf'JJ's'ZZ/M ZW2 KW" WW"
7""sz '7
/% 32m .x
/'
/
,WW WW w z/W w nWM QWW gd
7:95 Wfaw'far/
{(4
ja w w 2/ 7
"9 7% W29
mm at
g: WM ? "fiffl97(l/Wo/V1Ufl 7L0
512M954?
SfiVIIJGP/f'g 7917/47); 00635%§79
I/M?)
/W" Maggi")? ébwfl "LI
""1
6 flab/WV ,?w9\/V
L'?/?WWJG'/'"% W w WWW/3,7; /m,?,/,dm
a? 0:5
VQ 3745'5 /'9 35 7977/37
My 7" ""1
arm/wflfl 715W§ W W
WWW"
A/wZt 7}
10 6%
¢967£fi gy/vrf/mvsé'b" rap/mi K
9 »/\<3 JJ
9177'
'WW: 74,A/4,~71MQ :
5% fig [9
I"
"o79xar fa ZUWW/IS /'Ib7[?0
7:,I7/W
I 7'! WNW" J 'Wfi'W" 6f
/""P 4'09! bun/t /
Y$:'M%3g9/
y "76047 fm fflfiwly
(éyf/zow alfl dag/77
/on/fffi/ WW" 7579i" Maya;
Ayflllw WW
Aézzzypgf 567* L! ,5
ect Cop
7/07"? WW 7 Wfi/ez My
'fig' 9
C'Ai'gf/éjg)
ng WW"? 2469/].
WM J"
.uvz/Mgrfb 4,27%, 7%: W
4/02 272;
fléwfiJ/WW /"47 %//'70§3'10
"39 7'5 M7 575/121 "Va/L4! (9
Eflé? fgymf 704/44
31
557;?46219/ Maia/g /{427z:71¢/ 57% if
"mi? 22724222222, (fa/7
'4 W
EW "MW 56W 0% /7?7'\'""" 9%
"a
0&7fi' 51M W 74%7'" /"7§39
W'El?wfefg»vsrl/v wkfl
A)!
Wng/Qad 71.2? Mfl'redfl (1% (Z/Zucr I
9%?
/® 9HS'9JN g0
727L/nv5512
£444 J0?
#Wfawétz,«%r/L§fow,§éwy 1/227
@5777
MW
fléw W"
W: "7%: 7b
7W 7""? W 3:
4674?? h 5'93 m
,j JVI"/§S?€/OW {WK/7537M flflbgg /
742% 015,43!
/BZ\'V?7@:'M0W gfiaflaslI/'yfl W/Zb
W79a4' Woc/gj 77b??? 'CZC/7V "10% AISLF
'22»?245 72mg #"l' waM vuw/W fay W
"0 ""1
"ff/97"?" WW 7770" SEE/MK?
22 "/flv'6myfl97wy 71/727 by
"'
S'W' 7a.: 6* 7W "if :7:
WJ'yjfi? "WW/'0
WW WW» 9% 9% MW? 1
5W2" :2 >9
77/5"! 79./ faxyfiJ
nil/V"?
J/y %@u fa]; /:Z
Wg; Ti'Qy/W Mme/7L "(film
'0
yafw! WfiWS
@4an We 7""2' $7" 071
I W WW
M
9""'VM/J'? w *"v7'/@"/~:/> 2/671 I
4;: Yf'IM
fi /z lé/'W /V jj ! fc/Wafwg;
ssszm,
s/IW 'raé zfi/ 707m);
VLé? '7//7V7Cj
W :7 aggb/ébl'a/
'/%W 7?
070 sass/7% W732 WW7 i;
74mm 750w /4//) QM]; [Md
{yfl7gfgdfié' 2 ?;
3:9 /a7?""5w"7
Kai/V701]! /V?0Jw<? 4,')//$Z{b
flow?" % 7'
(325/
7/" W
flaw-észy 4549,4574: 5);: 7L flaws!
J7 /awa
£7
7797""
(WW/""5 93- "W44;fs? $5s's'sfi$9Msaw/aw M M
5?!ng iv!.70 71/ 1:
4/ "s"
s". as WW" fag/finals
gas/Vs" u/lfiw "b
f;M/g
Km 23")?!" /(7&79 a éJZaV
was
"as aaswasa "am/7742'" Mws 24/29
"a"?
ssmaws' W /ss7saa W77 /a
gas n'béSZ)
%/
WWW #w 37%
way «a'ss's gafl/l
flaws/g sea/v;
7% filmy/1') /0M£@ MO
W'UDT "as"? a"
4,1579%
afas was/fl 7% Was"
0/
"6W5" as $742] g'JM'a'QDX
ay%
W74 's"/fifgar "mass 4w wswsx'ss/s "saw
.; M/faLC/ZQ
Qfi7myflf gig/fig
1,), Fwy?)rfl sag/aw flaw/22mg «2'7 Kasai?
WWW
wviéfff 71-6 mol§4nza§§wdl
Myygfl»? Wya ya)a§
4%"???MW //'a'§'§/s7g//o Mmxfi lswlL/glj/t
way.7;-
(M?
~13 (ffflfl 7/],
Q'Zm'fiw /27(//7/b5577 3'7
W? 0/0)??? 7'77; 7A0 §\»;é7@o% f/a'NH
Wm 2, 99 7 WM
M «fig/A gaff/1y
W07 %4
J 2 5" fag/49]" ffl/M
a! r
M
M
"am/74% WWW f0
C(W
if yaw/Cy We" /W 725/06"5 70
217%012642t/fi??7#
W )fl /w [/Qflfl //'7002
W W W
$14M
573570" 77/7? WW1"W "
47/
"W7 00%1'"
g'wvlo/{o #7/14 7:4! /477'5b
Z/Wjg
é;I //
4W 7% (u'lJ/K/
/5/154g44 mwfl/M ..
ylar! lg film 940/ 7
WMJg" M 2}
157/51/0
"La ,/ 40w /'//i<§7§
W7 5'79
{M jf Wj if!
/0 M19 //
7%"7 (gt/amaaJ /zéfiw My
a'wf/WQ
Wflvwéw/wW Min/m
u/I /0%)} /JM@
W9? M7/
,, warm! WWW Mfl H z
7771,
aft/245,1? M4
y4,s *fl'fbW'ff [
W/bafnzyy 0%;
0% W W ?/
gyvjyyw/aay
7
wifl'w/Zubx/W
/'7"'7°/ 77/ W
b
W7 Wffiééu/ ff,"
m
£V7'Izm%§ 94957 j"1%
40/"'7LM5/9/
"3" 7/792//' /fl
(771,711
eryv'5 ma"???
y
51;
,//%%"%
"4" 7% @/ we "Z/
W "7"
\Z/
497
F")77/752:)7f %Z/?7/§b %
" 07A /W
lW Wr'gyD4fi
K773 WM may 2191
9")! /;7?%5 373711,?
@ W 771/553 [J/WDX/gflf/
WW5- WJ 6%"(/fl 33' /7\2147€ $1 71/262
.75? 9231,!
I
_l 74%év'z/
y/VE/flc,7lmj>
j qu/ /yw277
J QQflvffl-ii M)'7 \zF/M C7]??'/6
2/2
wfloys" 27;" 1161/ 71. '/ ,[&JI%M \7
a}? 25/2475 2252;92
WWW 4;" VFW/U23 % /99'\'VLZ£
\«gafidW? JJV5 SW? K319
70/9
W My
ifw W /102/g / fl'
"Zm fiD/z/j (Mi
E fW
€"Z"2/*/"2§7 "7 / 1'
flflw/ fray? 71/
"@c/ (/ y yVM/A'D7fl5 2%
426("6'? 22% %0 7£Wufl/¢W'y%
é'b/ W'7Lf77
"692% jflfl/ fay/"63¢" «99555
[3% d/'
94W fl'7/"Z
Gav/I'M 07.; 1/675 KWfif-é?
ifi/Swbfio 4% W7 "Mb
7 % r wx 47 "7 ; W
771293? {74/8314745/'5/
[Ev/£1 "? éJ/aflf/ fa 5%"
W4 W #67 f
/m/'"«'/°I "#0 EQ/flw
5% W'Ké79'f 2107767"? f'flWé/j
//m0////79 £7
"you im/ (30 /0\'/\\'/'
/¢7
99% yng1*fw70,/"[/0W?7 7733/1
WM W /fi@?y 31/7 éq}; col/3g V/g"flvflj
gyms/(fl a? 71%" 2g;
97 fixtgs-
21/Wfim "<7 Wflz
7""27/M2J7LW4'9
/a27/7@ 97774 799/ I 53%
9/24": "Md?
('71-6W/1M CW") f'lj#
97/ 95791495
740 g
_.
S 0w 7L j
W797 W/Mia/"3 'fw/jWé/éb/Pfi 7%]
9%?
0%g jM/ajy 7Lb0:997')77
JWQMW
7737fifWf/ 2/);
"W MM 5 flW("©7&MMUJ
"E77717"?!
W2 m 1' a /, "7
7% 29 29
25w my;
<7"ong A?"
J '/
70% //71 {:an$9:/ A";
a! IVA/Cf [W /bvviar7 33%.
J 7090?? l/owflfljb
7L fl6?27 aha; Wajwfiafl
7Z/Mx7é/flJZZI/Nflfl
f gm]ffiflZ/g/ K735 Mfl
WWW WW?
'fmw? Qf ?A7"vwfl
QVQvL/'a'flwi {27/14
m\)>§'MDM/7 37? W/Vl/yfjjfl77fl
9%] 07/
Jak'Jfl/ [18/
72'7M
yfi/W 31/3 /\'7L'0(/7 M
H 37/
JYQ'
/W'l%/
127/
/:;/7,'0
VIA/",3 "/W' big/1A3 Ute/if mg
74%;? Md %U"'M g7@%é (jg/M «L
W).fi,§
1/37 9Jfl7 07;; gé/Mfl"
gy/Cj,'/L /%
Qj/l 7X6/2J 5'
/UW
S'W6 9729/79)
2/?j/7éW/3
%0%J§ '3///yb ETD/WM Wfl/fi
73/4be Wfl wa-
M: C/W'V 0% "gt/bum af/
£93!
2/ fflf "WM Wz'tfég/'QII
5079/5» 07M
'7z5W%2/Jf?b7u@%/ fi'fiflmflg wag fl) 246%:1
J ab 529
_Verified Cor
ZZbMfl/OU alipu {/35}

LI (0 9 {7M
g (/VOWLCfigJ /\)}T7LM/J '2'771
®7L
74/77 3,"
g/wawm/
gag kf/masgb
E wa'pbZ/ figZ/Wfl
g
/3'9012¢vro/X3
faC/b) 07L gflg y"?
vf/W wr
M197 Q7 7b2/Jg 7L€A /0\'bS Z'f/
w ye m» w W
'1' JO WM?
{Mia WW 1 7%:
£444
20% /')M)'P:74'V 99'73)? W9
fly; I
1)
71c éfw' flfi/'Wé
vflafO/y' 4g
071
VIN/6'??? may
aft/47% W
/wg
'fli/flwfb WW W W
'fWW'fWfiL k7 #0 ""7 7"?
rev»?
7?
aiflS mjj/fl
/Wk'47 Ly fwygv /W"/v
13519.) 7/6}? w
ffff 3177/ We f
w" ngi/flwa'Savxdy 31/ flfiwéf5:74 //2'M /V137
#5
/917<27<'7l§3¢/ 43%W/L Wybfivwv/ %W/
on" /b€ S'f'
Z /?9\;.S7a?53 "av/Love; j
Eye? 1;.J2'5'M'fi
tCo
«m 10 6'17"
7A (9) 774 (W
W/V $233 W47
mwwlr Wavg W?
77W 7"""0
_.
74%»e/a/a QZAM/Wfm'jé/Qjj
W/ 0?; Z
f/fl/JVQW)
fi fl fi 7/5/19qu rWév/vfl %L'L
QZA WWI/p
:WJbfl/yaj $17
1W)77207g? QJIWWQ/y [X70120
\ M71
Zém'vwp f; ("'7/4'?J&/
Qawnmw LAW W
uwgfiuflb
WWW W M J"
fggvéfiv/M 7/7447? j/bm7tf'6 jm/ //
7\;5/44@ 4/? 9&9
W I
7"""4Z7'" CWW
£4
WW 9'47""? W
Z
\
W WYZMVWV
W/ 7W§
7'?" W [Em/f £471;
6'
M/Ou\w 77¢"? Wf'7[\1u
: g7 79"}
5U /U'A7o 4'1)"ka (7%
2/ WW ' 2/
7
WWW
+7 3""771
4WH7/WW7WS /o&~n%2§b
fl
«WWW
'W 75WWW7zJ/b29'.)
Wflyaf
[W
wM%L6> %3'@J'1%
QafM3/ flow?
/%7 %/c/ W WWW
W
W /W WWW W W
Lip/142'7 U
Qfl(«/'VQ% V'fléVg'7 /an/ W/uq/
S/Izgpx/A jflS %}fl
{WWW .{u'g A5 7" #3797
%b 2""? 314*" W/flm
gym
:3
WB'W WW?!
WA J0
emf/W
kw? We?
/W/L/M§§b
_Verified
572'" 44'1"""97'7'9 Wm M" M "7%

«(g/2f {VII/(9'9
WWW gnjf)'F 1
m \r/vmfi "61(7' 701'W1%U:
1/ 17/;7/ng
OWQWLWMK/fgiV/fg 3:39;:
«Ely/aw 771%? My W a y m/:w ;v 5 (3/
677,57
,fl>/%/ My"??? 6/
(77w
j J
fl"? W7 47/
"my M [xi/U1
W
Iowa/"0
aw 5y r77é7wfifl
J wj'sésb/Vbxf §7va75
jut/611027975
W "fl
Q"
/?'324J@(/2ut 97'
WWW /" MW
2'1
M ,vsvv/WW /4}VW
éfzbaf M/2 W?
, Wryjm "1'"
é%1?2 /Z b5. fl
s/g: awe/JV;
Ezra/0:13;; 2970);; 51/9479/
w af xf kgfi fl m m
07A
"figaf 0/
J:
41 74MB",
WWG 95' «w why/w 7/079 :2
2914/1973 (/2;
{WW/3Q M//0%/sg'7m
WW 5/0 M #317:71777 2%
5:2" W m
" W {WW/fl W g; ,5
I
9 W5) n 3:4
"/9 S'7 WW
CW [3/
3' S" 05' /O}0
film/"W
E32417?
(memayb
g
5'7 i707; 2'75]?
é,
MbJ 9'16afi/(js m $27M Fig 36/2703}? 7/LJ0
yflG/Wfl/'y 7w
EWW "2/272
M {ii/MHZ
275' f/(EZ wry/fly)"
/f§97M27)
i/ WWW wag/WW
m 4r g/nd/y :Wbw
7 £9?!
a? J [J /" WM 2520/2159;
if?! 77?;
(/k
jm M/
'7 Wfl§§%71W
f: 1. 5'20? 2154
/9b'/19
MW
Maj 7:
5:7
fire/057V §§//:Jfl
Wflbgfl
M)
"WW/""7 fi'MQ
m
16
z" :ifizngW Wmi
fvflflfl? dig/d!
970/",,
aran "1' W {m/JamV VH0:
/9 / [ma/
:M/W/ 27w"!
6w :jzSM/QQ?[7 WM avg WW5 7 7]
,M 4v NVWWU/é? xmjy W JJI ijG)
yflVMaJfl_7LM/i/\a,c0/ f/ WMWS Wifi'W
4. {WM
61/ 7L1
5/47 M7 J6 '2]1
F995 W/flg
W7 I») //'7,\"@$ was/fl?) '-
07690u§
0 (/1
37' {(37 WuM
W965 J f 0'0
1470/ Z]:
3 9/499755 A/fi/j/ %/"
4 ,17kame
"WW/WW 30'/79W 5
"" f2? b
L1
9/9/m/ WM 5 119/
J
0'6' 93/23
jé 'f
QZ"
f W'Igfl Wig/27W /§/bbs/Mb4
773/6761
"@314" Z W'7/W
g" / (222%5L7/0u/4
Mmré' Jfl'é' V.' 94,20 fwd
g; /W/@7 gfléfl (/JW 302447
74n0?b 7/)
£71771 W'z/6/
Mb
W;S
"baggy (/1/2'7/9 ""13
m W :MwfilAAA/"Ad
"\ MA W5
3337:9333 z-A/
WAX/£72"flit/W3 W) 4 L7H WW'0
Gigi/6% @331/075
{W ,43 J36 fiwaf/
M/flS /b7 J 3%23/
//Z.Z@Z
AA 7:) 919"
W WM a:
3%<A:r<:jyb -5 SM
WM "fi'mw' %/'7/ :2
73 A'AAAM 50/
Aim 1/ iii/(W/
"36:37 273 3273/33/33!
/0 P'V'Jé DAV/CW"
G?
33/"? flog MOW/J
"7Lb1fl'137137'LQ/V
j
(I "WW/'39 L4\/Jg g/o\,/199¢JL7&MQ
71% WA ,, 'f%»w70 S32JJW7M¢
(% W "WW w ¢ 2»/ lo {27/447
_0 /)g/a'l/
.3
%W@:/7'f/f 5k, CM
10(70
"ff/375%) fjmb /W/Z7l\/;
\Q/ioia' 09m
MWJEWJ
5'77""? "Jaw
%L W my W M03" 03
"W MAM/1939 7M
/
"7w" 7//\>/
9717"
Wflgwwvm4gw
"WW 7W
/: Wjiflaj7fl 77 7957/7
# AWZ "752/? 7/7yg
'7"
"7""MM WWW m (WWW? {"4 37/
My
m» 4/, WM/f Z717
L/Wfféwyjm
J 3:7 "7W0 WWW
Mfijj %?§6/3 (M'lwcyj
[DA/pg :j/OM 4w MW.
71% W ./ Q71
7 XOMJ
mam'/67'g/63b/'1'J§Wp 37 W'IW
¢ms>gb // 7127111 79/f7 719/3/ "17
@9/59/(9
(«1 [/7 gJbW
Wfi/MjQ/77~W
TM MA?"
W779 ##UQ
W %
ESQ/W /f"7"'7%\ CZ/fi
JEEM/Ioa //7§/. W/ "WWW?
10/1/19- Wla (5:12;? 967%!
19/914 /
7ifl®§b
Q7L /au2:>
?A@/(/IM{, g//fl7!a'o/éw/
733W,
V'Q yjfl§53fl fifl/OQ'V/
'
7iflTW/fifiy 733W]
C;7L $$5('IVW0H
fi#3&/'1/9
(fl §€l7 (/1/ b W )4}
6* if "KM7":
71 H MM
71% f"? 7'7 g
K Kwb Maj 7W 277W]?
21H 7
/¢<MI/¢b7 i "j fobj
J u'"'
l! , 7G'Vl/l't'l 9 M\[
ilfaamQgéfbn/J %{ {319 WM?
'zx'gée/M W274 7771(ng /0W10 gal/7
577 éJI/WW/fi 6%
WJC/ J0 U~V/7
'0 21
">3'7/rm WI} 77 WJbMW
g/WWGJ/ j vbéiLBS/U'D7b 3gb?
$29M 7112:
fJ/V'ng
fWW JAG? W 7L?
'Wfib'ijI/vj
dbvl/ 6bVZ/'J {WWJ jay jzpgyk7
\J.
>7 V/O'j 7/1
WEE/7143+? 700 §W,7LD\"¢/) {w\(7LM?B§@JJ
'4
'7370910
VJWS 221 A \L
77% 1:54 Wang/447209
'WynaafifaJJ/O'V'? a'gfflf
"7/3167 1
g3; 5M, M/Wfl/ 85%
f 4~,7L)vsJ/0
"
"7
7779/7777 W 27777
/77%7;7
é/u/flm "H 127mm VaZLi/M' @7571";
7M
V? B'W/
Wg/O/Q'W LZKWW
7% fi/W' 7/ 77% 7W4
7/ 777%
(9% JL/Q/JM
3% WWQ/ Q7; 17/089
MISS/7&7
VTUM/f
517/101 WHY/"1 W3 majl "77%
v
7% jogs 7757/
kwcxfiflM/W/ 77
/ W0 ["74
W77 ¢ /7 "7W7? MW
Mm §6%/W17
W%0 %fl/6'//027/(7)I2/ 777 4W/%
WWW /7777/7/ 7W" #5753
77% M7" #77 710M
ff? 'fffifl/Q
ilk Q 0
Ml" r0 @6/ 7Lg|§
74mg7'7LV'xmjlcy/7/b13
%Wf27/\7
Stm/ QWJSDWI
6mg afl/ WW
{WW/33f 3/1/2627 WW?
wmyflg
die/834947 VIEW/WSW; /0 gwva my"
"€554" ZVWU170JQ w? )5! f/flgyfi.
07L f/W/
gwfowx'v'JaJ 7'0 l/"yOWfS V1747 WA& /0
/
5b W57
51%;(7 a: b1,y?0\'fia~ ("\"Wk'fgg
:7
foo
wan/79»? 7Lwzmm¢7w mflv/
égrflud'wg
mid? 7L'3'7/V'l
297 f/flofll /0u/wu\u</}/ 7"»
WWW/I" w" 1/ w 7%" i
"470mm w W Mm NU
S'f'fl/'Vé'zkzmc? 7A0 64/771»? 0171 "Ff/"U"
me «w {W 7% W?"
wafl£~
S;*%'/ (17/4
3;me W 70 yfvlyodgygj 37bW
WM w WW M45
WWW mmjafw-f/ag /" rcfl K«f
'(vyvjo_29J
SMI7Lo/rao X} «175M Mo/ W5
517% 4:9
2/39": 020m
afb/5\/gQ/-a'y 0% ryay/zywm277
"Wp'V/b (2/. 7gnww} (W197 try/«Q3, jag
r/w,70M9?J 774'? fa'z'é 4""?71'W 0?;
Eryn??? SWWZQXi/fi f2) Mag/M?WUJ ZWH
w Jm 9%
w
M Ije/ WW
5,1727%:07
flit/zofizjw 294/ny 7»\7xww74532fl5
$4 arc/4gb fa SLVUMQJ 27F"! WU"?
'
C43 7 UW
3')
orrect Cop
BL gym)
("48/ [/JVIG'X}?
£I7M 47 2?? WW? /'0
/¢b/MJ$7 7 /W
/ b
#507 /0"% 41/0 Ano/ {W0 27m
1/ 2%"
(HM
"' W "W
/\C3 07L
/'{
%@M I 0/7 21/1???
7f
f/T
:1 MIN/J f/NM
>'
{fly/"bf" w fl? 77W
.
ASS \Ma'gb
)»
a If '
yWKWLTWUfiSQ ajbpeflFIO
@M 5"}? Wax! j$\',/W6/
VHF"! {4/},
I
J}? '9 Sh WA
I] )3 9710?/W2N3'7°
87/1337? j'j/k/O KW 37W§89101
CD 074M?
a" W0 6/
/7 7
f \f WMWWJU
k0?
fibfl /v/§v70§ajfl f9 rye/"L flHL
4» « W0 '9
away/w 9719/? fjmtrb' 47M"
'" )7
"/1700! (27; #7
4'"./2MM/ #5577
//J/'4O/
fly? Q71,
aw-w! fa '//Wéful
gem/m/
21fl5§47
[1'6 1/25/an r22 W? #z' 27%
Y/J/'G'7
7U
W17
{3/ 7< /7'7
@ [/OM' C/"fpflavJ
CaseNo: 23C/223297
Iéflfié O/fl/P/ow
and OF SERVICE
May/7,
Kai! Abnofé {/6
Respondent/ Defendant
I am the El Petitioner/ Plaintiff espondent/Defendant in this case.
Icertifythaton (date) g " / 3/ 23 Iprovidedatrue copy of (11st each

document) g" /7" 9'3 LCM 7% jug/2,62,
Ana/I 047(50/4' prfifi" Lil
fligfl/Mj
y
to the Petitioner El Respondent E] Attorney for in the above
Wands
of the DPetitioner El Respondent El Attorneyfor C /4/; (b )0 [>4
at (address):
or [:1 United States mail in a sealed envelope with postage paid addressed to (address):
I hereby declare that the above statements are true to the best of Thy knowledge
Date
%'/3'23 Signature
IWfléx/ '
Print Name

7/10/2023 9:08 AM
23CR23294

2
4
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff, AMENDED INFORMATION
vs. Court No. 23CR23294
MARY ROSE LENORE ENG DA No. 0067212

Defendant.
7
The defendant is accused by Ron Brown. District Attorney for the County of Clatsop, by this Amended
Information, ofthe crime(s) of:
Count l: INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS (Class A Misdemeanor; ORS l65.540(a)) FPC#:

10
Count 2: INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS (Class A Misdemeanor; ORS l65.540(e)) FPC#:
11 committed as follows;
12 COUNT l
The defendant. on or about March l3. 2023. in Clatsop County, Oregon. did unlawfully and knowingly obtain the whole
or a pan of telecommunication or radio communication by means of a device, contrivance, machine or apparatus, towit:
l3
an electronic recording device, the defendant not being a participant or having consent of any participant to the said
telecommunication or radio communication. ;
l4
COUNT 7
15 The defendant, on or about March l3, 2023, in C latsop County, Oregon, did unlawfully and knowingly use. attempt to
use or divulge to others, a conversation. telecommunication or radio communication obtained by means of a device,
16 contrivance, machine or apparatus, towit: an electronic recording device, the defendant not being a participant or having
consent of any participant to the said telecommunication or radio communication. ;
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
l
lNFORMATlON
C Iatsop County District Attorney

74 9 C ummercial Street
P.0. Bax I49
Astoria. Oregon 97103 (503) 325-8581
1 said act of defendant being contrary to the Statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of
the State of Oregon. The State declares its intention to treat any misdemeanor named herein as a crime. By the below
2
signature, the Deputy District Attorney certifies that under the penalties described in ORS 133.992, there are sufficient
3 grounds to believe and the Deputy District Attorney does believe that the defendant named in the information committed
the offense(s) specified in the information.
4
DATED: July 6, 2023
RON BROWN
6 DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR CLATSOP COUNTY, OREGON
7
BY: fl/I "(MM
Alexander A Thomas. OSB 222324
Deputy District Attorney
athomas@clatsopcounty. gov
10 Trial Attorney: Alexander A Thomas, OSB No. 222324

Arresting Agency Case #z ATP A20230708
11 DA No.: 0067212
lDENTlFlERS; F/W Ht: 5'04 Wt: 125 Hair: BRO Eyes: GRN
12 DOB: 07/25/1977 Control #1
13
l4
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
2
INFORMATION
C latsop Count); District Attorney

74 9 C 0mmercial Street
P.0. Box I49
Astoria, Oregon 97103 (503) 325-8581
1
'
.
' T ' '

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 0F THE STATE 0E OREGdN
2
F :3
FOR THE COUNTY OF CLATSOP 2323 8 EH 9:
5
1+3
TRIAL COURT J'xfiifiihib it

STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff', INFORM
ATION;
5 VS' Court NO. 930K a3}? q 65
MARY ROSE LENORE ENG DA No. 0067212

Defendant.
_
7
The defendant is accused by Ron Brown, District Attorney for the County of Clatsop, by this Information,
8 of the crime(s) of:
9 Count 1: INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS (Class A Misdemeanor; ORS 165.540) FPC#:
10 committed as follows;
COUNT 1
The defendant, on or about March 13, 2023, in Clatsop County, Oregon, did unlawfully and knowingly obtain the whole
11
or a part Oftelecommunication or radio communication by means of a device, contrivance, machine or apparatus, towit:
an electronic recording device, the defendant not being a participant or having consent of any participant to the said
12 telecommunication or radio communication. ;
13 said act of defendant being contrary to the Statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity Of
the State of Oregon. The State declares its intention to treat any misdemeanor named herein as a crime. By the below
14
signature, the Deputy District Attorney certifies that under the penalties described in ORS 133.992, there are sufficient
15 grounds to believe and the Deputy District Attorney does believe that the defendant named in the information
committed the Offense(s) specified in the information.
l6
DATED: May 17, 2023
17
RON BROWN
DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR CLATSOP COUNTY, OREGON
18
l9 BY: fl/(i! WIM

Alexander A Thomas, OSB 222324
20 Deputy District Attorney
athomas@clatsopcounty. gov
21
Case proceeding to: D Grand Jury D Preliminary Hearing
22
Trial Attorney: Alexander A Thomas, OSB No. 222324
23 Arresting Agency Case #z ATP A20230708
DA No.: 0067212
24 IDENTIFIERS: F/W Ht: 5'04 Wt: 125 Hair: BRO Eyes: GRN
DOB: 07/25/1977 Control #:
1 -
INFORMATION
Clatsap County District Attorne}!

749 Commercial Street
P. 0. Box I49
Astoria, Oregon 97103 (503) 325-8581
"1,7..01 Man-7y "é!
>12; agfl
/'0/! JpO'
g/oaaer-nUUg
2:
'v
".3
[slat/{AS
if
'JJyz/mdm7 W/Qp/qan 'p Jcy

Q
('4
\Yve
"a? 211,09]
L7")
Jbs'y 7" "0'9 (up
.fl-JJ W 295(10ng Anita/5 @9
{V'17057/7L #9 Ll..'%/j 49d"$.SI
"LL :3 0') ("WWW/o? (bf/*V
Jr's:
gmqufi 75% 9
a? k? 1/ / ll
'71:; @
7/ M/"27'°'""'"" "FM/l "(7/7?
40%;)7".'3 79 504,;
5"
$3211 /bA/1(§L_ "IOA'AIJCj/QJ_7 gave/{ox
Silo/W 93'
_,
3T7 7i 7/!p fw jév «J (74 7w
Mfigii'flf' m
war/W M M ,«a 3 WW»)
s'pvuflé?"4 1014?
1.-
J/ J'écfi/"JV 07L 340\=f1'409\'
"94 7m 77! 7,,v15 [77/1wa
3flb17 it"? "W xw'ewz
'75" 4%va "39//*3"""3
/"""" w. M f ' WMF
'( (#715? 0/9 j/IM
[SE/"£20,197.qu 774m
75
Mrs /"L~W? j'?'"79 39:7407 'o'uzc7§fl@
«"77 <7
film/24!? ?
'2 "5'39
WA
/:??~5'5'/
a) fab/7d
37 veg/0
ylmI,/fl'?OC/l [arable
/$57 Jl/g
~14) #1400447
Kfigj' £11,"
Haj/7LbJb/93U W 'A
'
AéZizaggz W 334')? w/aéeyy f6) Vi;
"WWW hg"'/)
{EH
J05 3'3 {W
w 2:
/
W M way-wf:v ww
31:}!3'7373J'i.é31
Is;
60:2 5a 5mg 2m ..
zgygvsygggg
6W (.2
"2.1 mg} 4/
4"? 79W
Verified Correct Co
QZ
6772Wg
fl/Wv/éafl
(m;
QZ'ZOZ E €11"?
'f' a
74"") W "'1
W6721/;U/1
W63 3"" :)Ld"'?J
L7?" 0%
. OJ'" 'HJM
l'. LL29
P»
6"
P; 1+ )\
mm '3 1:! b» {\W+
,ngj (if! fi\,J/\/i )\
'74"? 6-? ?/);C;
/)9f wf" J/zjq'u $7]
M7'7l
:2:
/[9 5.5970 r'""'"""' I; M ("/97/9
W4 27%
7' H 5-77 if wy
4:12:0{99/1 [F94
/,(;'7_ pry/5'3
21(21" "wwfl $74M" "7'"
2" "\ '31
APAO
[I
W1
Pauli/:4; \_.
6'6 :/j0 b 7af/7j N '15
Maw; é")
Cvtaaoq/ W 4" ,'Jfi/ 'v/O HJJD
7170'; Jaw
"'0
Z" "6"" "85/ ""3 "'3? /'?/355@
X'Pi'é'cg
VQI++~mz>l>ar0
x4 52y $2,225?
Kimberiy Stotts
Fron1: Stac,
Sent: S: '25 3023. HA
To: ixer' Hansen imam"
Subject:
Kenn) Ihc Hmiwr ma} gixg' .wu (ht LUM \hnuidci hcmuxc h Dun't H and jmt dn Mm wu can H
{he} dk' mu "21m (0 cuupcmzc doubt 2f the i) '\ \x all do mummy \\ uh 1! 11m mu.
i
(ici ()mhwk in." if H

8/ 17/8, 12:18 PM Gmail (no subject)
-
:16) cu gym/w?
f Org are/17 @23._
o subject)
in Carlsen <erinbeaconclubhouse@gmail.com> 19 May 2022 at 11.40
:
: Sarah Brown <sbrown@clubhouse-intl.org>
6Hi Mary,
>.
8T hank you for taking the time to write and to communicate your concerns with me.
ct
{in reading your email, l see that most of these issues deal with Filling Empty Bellies and the participants/staff downstairs,

Snot the Beacon Clubhouse. lt can be confusing because we share a building, but we are entirely separate programs
uoperating on different floors and with different missions and goals. Osarch, while he is the Executive Director of LiFEBoat
ESeNices, Beacon's auspice organization, he does not oversee any aspect of the Clubhouse. Safety is my top concern for
Bthe members of Beacon Clubhouse which is why we keep our door locked at all times and we do not allow people to
wander through the Clubhouse, or walk in off the street; it is also why we have a separate, locked bathroom and why the -
separation needs to be enforced. The bathrooms are clearly marked (Beacon Clubhouse and Filling Empty Bellies) and
there are keys inside the Beacon Clubhouse for members to access Beacon's bathroom.
George was excluded from Beacon Clubhouse for entering the Clubhouse high, for aggressive behavior inside the
Clubhouse and outside of the Clubhouse towards other members, and for destroying Clubhouse property. From what l
understand, he has not been excluded from the Filling Empty Bellies meal program, so those meals are available to him 5
days a week at noon. You have never been excluded from Beacon Clubhouse, apologize if that was ever
l
miscommunicated at any point.
Due to the fact that l didn't witness any of the events that you describe taking place on Beacon premises, cannot speak
|
to them, except that l can continue to make sure that you don't have further encounters or dealings with Osarch. The
event taking place between Quentin and the man on the street is another situation that l cannot speak to because l did not
witness it, and Quentin has a different version of what took place. can facilitate you and Quentin communicating further
|
about it, or l can help facilitate you two being at the Clubhouse at different times so that you are not triggered.
do know that exclusions taking place at Filling Empty Bellies occur when participants act in ways that are threatening or
l
disruptive to other people's lives. As you've expressed in this email, safety is important to you, and exclusions take place
so that people can feel a sense of safety there.
Lastly, very much appreciate the support and community that Clubhouse International provides Beacon, but Clubhouse
|
lntemational does not have jurisdiction over local Clubhouses. Each Clubhouse is independently run and financed. l
appreciate Sarah's time in all of this, but it is definitely best practice to communicate concerns directly to your local
Clubhouse. Please feel free to reach out, call, or come talk to me in person.
l admire your passion Mary, and l have always enjoyed our intelligent and thoughtprovoking conversations.
|
hope this finds you well,
En'n
1/1
https:l/mail.google com/maillul0/?ik=3 cOc39d4a7&view=pt&search:all&permrmgrd=msg-f 17332810872033629Q.6&simpl=msgf_1733281087203362926
%
E1FE30a1: 59W31'335
Cifith¥1n'g "17011131161 Date 313%
"Verified Correct Copy of O ginal 8/17/20 3.
1'
v 0 L
1.." 1 13
iidffitfi
,.
'1
cl"
T113131 Qf'VBUChEF;
'Hiaurs'
D £1.1{3111th3y 23:
{at £65.38: 30 days}
¥¥EgndBY'F?iday 1
r?m_'3pm
I Intewiéw'ffiofi
"(iéiifegéfid1njgf3éfik'St'affingfi
Emezgency
i 32131133
a 1113 ' 1131 11dudcs
11113 121
'
i1 ,1, ~-.
2 pai 5
rs 11113511113 2 91111131313101.1112. 1
1 1 c3
'2 1311;311:113 1111111: 51111111
191321.111 111111'1
"'
Y!
12151115
{1
'
"1'21;
0111111111111111111152'11153 :11
'3 Mu'au-
1'
x
{CH
.1
-
'11 J
18w :11;r'~1'1; 1,
£~x.u«mg
1.
1
~
II
1
~.
1
211:52:-
1,
50111;,
3.3T"!.
,
-1
'
'2'"1,
,1
'i
2
'3
r"
3
1113
111311
1ft -1
1:51106».
'
1
l'
' 32" " '
«1
' ' E
(1'
2
1 q
l
.3)
I
2 '
l
1 1 1
Q
'1'
1
1
i 1
2 1
1
5
"
.
1.
1161:9111"an 13311131131
1
1.
(315115111119 StaftiNcfiuntear 51111113111111
8/17/73. 12:40 PM Gmail (no subject)

A0 0V M
k"
{T} a {j
'
«5|
§
(50 subject)
co
JEssica Klein <jessica@harbomw. org> 19 August 2022 at 16:31

_
Tm mary rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail. com>, Info <info@harbomw. org>

Maritza Romero <maritza@harbrnw. org>
0'):
git/law,
U
°l'hank you so much for trusting us with this information, and for advocating for vulnerable survivors
an our community. I m going to take some time to review the emails you sent and will be' In touch
gearly next week to see how we can help.
§°lease don't hesitate to reach out if you think of anything else you 'd like us to look over before we
connect next week. You can send it directly to me or use theI -II W:::.III email account.
..
1"
Take very good care,
Harbor Logo
>
'
From: mary rose lenore eng <

'
:4 ,
Sent: August 19, 2022 3:45 PM

To: lnfo<
Friday, a. .:>
Subject: Fwd:
mary eng
503 468 2275
i am not okay with osarch orak using sexual innuendo against homeless women
or kicking them out for reporting assault
Forwarded message
From: mary rose lenore eng <I:'. I; Iitggjgtwzevl crIzI. >

e.
:_,
Date: Fri, Aug 19,2022 at 3:11 PM

Subject: Fwd.
To: Nicole <II 123' "I'm-'30:»):"31I' is"! .>, Katie Frankowicz < "fa" Ii<r;~v'm<;.:§)ti:«, 1.
wafer" >, Erick Bengel
< _
. - Bales
Forwarded
:

From: NAMI Oregon <I .214; gsI .; :{I}:I=:: 'iii7z.1_)"'_,v>

message
Date. Thu, Aug 18,2022 at 3. 27 PM
Subject. Re.
To: mary rose lenore eng <2 mm: I: ".1 '22:: I
>
174l€34$6543781536&dsqt=1&simp1=msgfi 174163436543781536 1/12

httpszllmail.google.com/mail]ulO/?ik=3e0c39d4a7&view=pt&seamh=all&permrmgid=msgE
8/17IB, 12:40 PM Gmail (no subject)
-
Cc: Steve Elzie <9: <

;:>, Sarah Brown < annawrf
. '3': '1: :.~':'>, En'n Carlsen
<' 7
>x Kim \Mniermute <' 1' >,
<.' ":2": rm: ;I.::>, {-w >, <m 11::16'3: :2; : 7*, 43>,
< >) < >' < _ '>) < "'>
_|
M
S . .
NAM! has no connection With the Clubhouse as of a year ago.
QAII

E
fThanks,
N
.E _
gMlchelle
of Or
Thu, Aug 18,2022 at 12 OO PM mary rose Ienore eng < > wrote
Cop5
n _ 7
Thank You Disability Rights Oregon for reviewing the lack of ADA access and the disability discrimination at Beacon
Clubhouse!
Verified Correct
sara brown has been my point of contact at clubhouse international.
police reports pertaining to the beacon member quentin (possible alias nicholas) assault in march may reflect me

calling police for medical distress from the victim homeless dwayne.
when i wrote erin carlsen about osarch orak using the sexual innuendoo "blue balls" around homeless women and men
-he had the same officer carrera who responded to quentin's assault-
contact me to tell me osarch was excluding me as a punishment for reporting sexual harassment and other assaults.
iemailed officer hansen with a quick summary of the basis for my exclusion: whistleblowing sexual innuendo, drugs,
crimes, etc.
iwas encouraged to file a police report about the "blue balls" harassment, but since i was not the direct victim, and the
homeless are not willing to be starved by osarch as the price to pay for whistleblowing the harassment, so far as know, i
other whistleblowers only get kicked out and leave town, when they cross him.
future clatsop judge "kirk wintennute" is the board president for beacon.
i requested a meeting to talk about my reportor a revocation of retaliatory exclusion.
he sent me an email with repeated unfair false allegations, contradicting erin carlsen's satatemen of knowing "you are
not like that" about osarch's delusional accusations of
"impersonating" his tyrannical power structure dynamic, when i was seeking clothing for the homeless.
i had prior knowledge helly hansen donated coats due to my experience with 2016201 7 homeless scene prior to erin
and osarch getting into it.
i had
persoanlly donated clothing myself In 2017 and was used to nonheirarchical homeless aid in the style of Food
Not Bombs who i had helped with since 1998 in Nashville, los Angeles, and Portland.
there is no reason why i would ever want to impersonate an organize an organization that is concealing sexual
harassment, or promoting misogyny and discrimination, and it was hard for me to understand osarch's paranoia, which
is why i spoke to erin about it.
she said that people pretend to by filling empty bellies to get free pizza.
she said she knows i am not like that.
as a food not bombs particrpant, i picked up donations and they practice friendly non-stressful donation recruitment. call
the bakery. do you have bread. it is not that difficult.
it was clear osarch was targeting me as i had seen him target others.
it was clear he would try to drive me out of his organization from the way he treated me so harshly and condescendingly
behind erin's back.
it was not clear to me that erin cartsen would allow him to treat me this way, bc my rapport with her was good.
other people have noticed that osarch picks on people erin likesmuch as some controlling abusive partners seek to
cut off contact with the outside world to isolate their target.
for that reason, it puts people like me in a dangerous position, bc i naturally enjoy conversing with activists.
https //mail.google.comlmaillu/Ol?ik=3cOc39d4a7&vicw=pt&search=all&permrnsgid=msgf: 174164286543782536&dsqt=l&simpl=msg-fi 1741634736543782536 2/12

8/17/23, 12:40 PM Gmail (no subject)

my offer was to help convey coats to the methodist shelter or the commercial day center, or even more importantly: to
the people who are kicked out of either day or night shelter, due to the draconian 86 system whereby osarch kicks out
homeless people denying them food or meals. i told the lady at helly hansen i am especially concerned about the
"falling thru the cracks" demographic and could personally run donations to them, as i already do.
some people get kicked out of the night shelter. so then they cant access those clothes.
if there are police reports associated homeless liason officer hansen may know how to get them.
i never
suspected describing Gender Based \fiolence & sexual abuse leading to my PTSD around abusive men, and
why that makes it uncomfortable for me to get harassed or cornered, would lead to me being excluded.
ifeel very horrified that i would trust erin carlsen wrth this deeply sensitive information, and that she would further
traumatize me by discriminating against me as a person with PTSD made worse by gender based violence.
all this aside, i very much admire feeding and clothing the homeless.
i do not understand why Beacon Clubhouse could notjust apologize and move on. or tell me thanks for your insight. no
one is perfect.
i feel like they have lashed out at one of their biggest supporters.
another person i spoke to, a black veteran, told me he was also cornered and scolded and kicked out by osarch.
the clubhouse model cannot withstand this type of adverse discrimination.
until we have Housing First, the homeless need major help, and l view erin and osarch as completely HEROIC for
movrng this forward.
the fact that have have serious concerns about tone and operational difficulties and treatment of homeless women, and
the drug sceneshould not make me outcast and a pariah.
one homeless woman was kicked out AFTER i tn'ed to advocate for her sexual aswufl.
her attacker was not.
think about it.
difficult place.
starvmg homeless women, who are already vulnerable puts them in an extremely
there needs to be a way to take in input, without cutting the telephone line.
the staircase is brutally unfair to anyone in a wheelchair.
we all know that.
PTSD from severe gender based violence is harder to see than wheelchair discrirrination, but it is a very real disability.
invisible.
people should feel better from a Clubhouse, not worse.
thank you for looking into it
so far NO ONE is granting me any meeting for mediation.

erin carlsen only wrote me thati am welcome.
it was her partner who had the police call me for a trespass. this is a horrible defamatory act,
which humiliates me and
tamishes my name, as the police know me to be an honorable, honest, hardworking person.
the thing that i think really "got their goat" is that the homeless and beacon clients CONFIDE in me,
bc as an advocate i
could move their case forward, and help improve things.

in that sense, by becoming a quasi-class representative for anonymous whistleblowers-i
had to be "eliminated."
until the people who care about the homeless start working together in a more posfiive wayi
see the infighting to slow
progress. but he unfairly
osarch is a very hard workervery reliable, very steady. he does not get enough praise and recognition.
treats us. MANY people feel bad because of the way he treats us.
it sends the message, that Ciatsop County doesnt care.
it is unacceptable to treat people less than civily in a

hospitality is a degree program, and in the South where grew up,
i
hospitality context.
3/12
l741634286543782$6&dsqt=1&simp1=msgf: 174163436543781536
https:/ / mail. google.coml mail] u/ OI ?ik£c0r39d4a7&vicw=pt&search=all&permnsgid=msgfi
-
feeding the homeless or the mentally ill is a hospitality job, and human kindness is what people hunger for MORE than
food.
that includes respect, of the disabled, and women.
due to his personality typeit seems to me he needs guidance to smooth out the harsh edgesmuch as a receptionist
does for people behind the scenes.

there is no shame in different people having different talents.
workaholics trying to do everything is not okay.

now that so many homeless and beacon clients are discriminated againstthe appearace of a functional org may
convince some people.
however-the huge disaffected population of Osarch's "86 club" of "excluded former clients" is now a REAL PROBLEM.
who will feed them?

i
propose
"filling 86'ed empty bellies" an idea i brought up around Christmas, when i spoke to one of the people he was starving as
a punishment for the night b4 Christmas eve.
it bothered me greatly.
i wrote the
newspaper.
how can you get grant money to sen/e the people, when so many people are denied sen/ice?
how can we be sure the starvation diet exclusions are fair?
even serial killers awaiting trial are not punished with starvation.
that would be considered inhumane.
why is it okay around the homeless?
what makes starving them okay?
kirk wintennute wont even tell me who is on the board of directors, to whom he repeated false character attacks on me
to deflect from the "blue balls innuendo" issue.
personally, i could move past this.

not all sexual assault survrvors Vlnll feel comfortable, given that much abuse of power. ls clatsop
going to let it slide, as
they slide chn's duffy of seaside meals on wheels assaulting me in 2017.
probably.
will i try to hold them accountable.
sure.
in the event become homeless look forward to the Starvation Dlet offered
i i
by osarch orak's "filling empty bellies"
as a punishment for standing up for homeless women.
i have lost confidence in the "clubhouse" concept at this point, until a resolution of these matters happens, in a
hopefully
safe format for arbitration.
On Thu, Aug 18,2022 at 10:38 AlVl Steve Elzie <1: 3 -

4:» 5*
:2; .'> wrote:
Hi Mary-
Thank you for providing this. In our call, you mentioned that you received an email
excluding you from Beacon as well as a police report. Do you have a copy of that
email as well as the report?
Also please let me know if you've heard anything back from Clubhouse international.
As mentioned during the call, am not sure

l if DRO will be able to assist, but l would
l
like to gather this information before we make any decision or close

your file.
In the meantime, you may be able to file a BOLl complaint
regarding discrimination
related to a public accommodation, information about which is available online
httpszl/mail. google.con1/ maillu/Ol?ik=3e0§9d4a7&vicw=pt&search=afl&permlmgid=msgfi

1741634286543782536&dsqt=1&simp1=msg-fi 1741 63136543782536 4/12
8117/3, 12:40 PM Gmail (no subject)
-
"
Verified Correct Copy of Original 8/17/2023. at
Best,
Steve
On Fri, Aug 5, 2022 at 9:42 AM maty rose lenore eng <' 1."
' we": ',::,r:'> wrote:
thanks sony its a long letter
it was nice speaking with you
larger national mental health nonprofit "Clubhouse lntemational" is attempting to set up a meeting with me and the
Beacon Clubhouse director
i don't know if it will happen
caution: this letter discusses also traumatic language used surrounding racism
Forwarded message
>
- --
From: mary rose lenore eng <': Is (flare: *
Date: Thu, May 19,2022 at 10:16 AM

Subject'
To: Erin Carlsen <"It': 1'23: : : .7:- >, Sarah Brown < '
:5- ~>
This is just taking me forever to get this email together it has faced many edits and additions apologize if it's l
with you
confusing I'm going to send it to Sarah at the Clubhouse lntemational to confirm l am communicating
about my safety concerns and out of fear that your email may be checked or deleted by a third party.
assault dwayne on
hey! thanks for our phone discussion after i witnessed beacon house member nIcholas/quintin
the sidewalk, knocking him to the ground in March
ifelt scared when i saw him on the sidewalk outside your organization today. another time i have asked him not to
speak to me on the streets.
i have never found the right time or place to register another concern.
three separate homeless people, including two women and one male, told me separately of an incident with
osarch
downstairs.
using the term "blue balls" about chocolates he was delivering to the
i was pretty shocked he would say it around the women, but its still not okay around the men either.
the male told me this type of sexual innuendo is even more prevalent from him around just the men.
that is a
have heard Ozark use the bword when talking about business matters up in the Beacon House and
l
to me to to insinuate that deserved to be
trigger word for me because my rapist used the B word prior raping try l
word for victims of misogyny.

raped. not everybody knows that that's a very triggering
offered or
His second confrontation of me happened on the beacon premises and there has been no apology
clearing of the air energy to make me feel safe there again.
lt happened by the art table and l was shaking and flew into a severe PTSD reaction
from the way he treated me
and tone and the way he pursued me until he got me cornered after l
and spoke to me in a disrespectful derogatory
got out of the
first downstairs at the homeless meal area when he tried to lure me in to Corner me in his
attempt
office.
details to relate.
i noticed a little bit of strangely inappropriate talk in spring 2021 but couldnt remember enough
enuf abuse, i dont have the
iwanted to be a presence to help make a place safe for women. now that i have taken
will much anymore.
People who have been verbally abusive to me include
Jules who is sometimes nice and sometimes aggressrve.
5/ 12
1741634%543782536&dsqt=1&simpl=1nsg-fz1741634286543782536
https/ / mail. google.coml mail/u] OI ?ik=3e0c39d4&7&view=pt&seaxch=all&pcrmnsgid=msg-fi
-
Jonathan who called me the nword the h-o word the w h o r e word and was engaged in violent brawling.
l have witnessed sexual harassment.

Iwitnessed a lot of screaming. I've broken up fights and i've tried to mitigate the mood swings as much as can as
I
a service to you and respect to your operation.
I've seen a person demand a knife to commit suicide on the street outside. i later found out that was a Victim of
domestic violence whose abuser i watched being beaten up the day before by men who like to beat up on woman
heaters.
l was also
subjected to nonconsensual unsolicited touching on my neck by a man who further terrified Me by
victim-blaming me when l told him not to touch my neck and that it reminds me of my rapist strangling me. at a later
time l think l can tell you who that is and it would shock you l feel very afraid of him and told him not to speak to
me again after he verbally abused me when l confronted him on his nonconsensual behavior of a threatening kind.
lfirst met monkey as he was trying to assault George l found out recently that he and Kayla were involved in
brutally beefing a transgendered Latino veteran victim who then had to flee to California to heal for 2 months after
the traumatizing incrdent of being beaten on the way out of the American Legion.
People have been told have pushed drugs on George include Chris monkey Griffin Jack and Cody have
l l
confronted all of them besides Cody. Chris actually says he would never sell drugs to George knowing he has a
terminal illness. appreciate this. he was recently booked on failure to register as a sex offender.
|
He has a swastika tattoo and is also a holocaust denier. He is a former meth trafficker according to his own words.
Recently someone named Moses was in for strangulation hope he didn't hurt mama raine if he's the same Moses
l
Additionally the guy calling himself Malachi use swastikas l found that offensive on a kayak paddle he had he
attacked numerous homeless people with a metal pipe and curb stomp sierra. l feel sad that Matt punched a tooth
out of Sierra's face. l feel sad that Jimmy who is in jail punched Sierra. Jimmy also punch to srerra when she was
getting out ofa porta potty. Jimmy relatively stalked George and made me quite uncomfortable by following him
home frequently assumed to push drugs or stake out his property George's head a lot of property loss due to the
|
people he tolerates.
Bradley put a hole in shayna's head by knocking it into a gate and I've been told he uses the nword
Griffin lured her into his van and tried to rip her clothes off while she was unconscious and he smashed her phone
when she confronted him on the sexual assault.
l've seen numerous homeless people attack my gay Latino friend who was also targeted in the restroom by
Osarch.
women ang glbt will avoid such organizations bc they are notoriously places where we are preyed on.
kenny hansen interviewed the seaside meals on wheels sexual attacker chris duffy who attacked me in 2017. chris
duffy, the attacker, called it "wrestling and tussling." shockingly seaside parks district would rather stick up for a
violent sexual predator, and CCA keeps advertising his program.
i felt very demoralized

by being sexualized and demeaned by the city of seaside, and all my talents fell by the
wayside bc of one pest and h'5 supporters.
so it has been hard for me to attempt to get close to other institutions or feel safe again.
when osarch tried to invite me into his downstairs office to chew me out about my good faith effort to
help the
homeless by calling a company that donated clothing back in 2016 and 2017 when i was the
attending original
filling empty bellies i was in no way trying to "preempt" or "impersonate" any organization.
l was
trying to help THE HOMELESS!
thank you for asking that do not be chewed out any more, especially by men.
i
when i was chewed out upstairs, due to his first attempt being foiled by an
incoming phone call, the chew out
happened in the beacon house.
https:/lmail.google.coml maillu/O/?ik=3eO<39d4a7&view=pt&search=all&penmmgid=msgf:
174184286543782536&dsqt=1&simpl=msgfi 1741634286543782536 6/12
8/ 17/3, 12:40 PM Gmail (no subject)

Due to multiple people complaining to me about his blue balls comment and other situations that made them feel
sexually harassed l feel hesitant about his training on sexual harassment.
By trying to recruit clothes4 hoped to counteract negativity and succeed with a building solidarity atlitude
O. has got to understand that trying to lure a woman into his office with a confrontational gesture and sarcastic
body language to exert a power trip over a woman to intimidate me and punish me for honest charitable activities is
intimidating and scary. he did this on a day when you were not there to catch him. he would not behave this way
around you.
Many times l observed him threaten the homeless with permanent exclusion if they so much as gave a snack to
someone he excluded. l even gently asked him well who do you mean l don't know who you mean that we are not
allowed to give a snack.
One witness of the innuendo said l should report Osarchs inappropriate verbiage to clatsop Behavioral Health.
lt is unclear to me as a beacon participant if an exclusion for feeding an empty belly that has been excluded by the
boss is an infraction so severe that he could terminate my access to all activities or only to filling empty bellies. it
also is more hurtful if homeless people lose their meals because l can go home and cook rice.
l feel that it is unfair that l can

delicately walk on eggshells around the directors ego and maintain my standing
while other people who do not have a home have less ability to do so.
When tried to help with the clothing Drive

l
r
actually expected praise and joy, not negativity. so i felt pretty injured that my contribution was not perceived as a
positive act of good will.
Maybe even expected oven/vhelming gratefulness so was really overwhelmd with the oven/vhelming negativity.
l l
l
identify a lot with that gloomy mood and that's a part of why l try to cheer things up a bit with incense with knitting
with good humor with good manners with smiles wrth kindness those are the things the human beings really need l
don't currently have the strength to face so many violent people and so many people who've said harsh and cruel
things or done harsh and cruel things at this moment but when l was in the mindset to help l was trying to take the
pressure off you guys to reduce the tension.
when osarch comes downstairs to threaten the people eating downstairs with exclusion if they so much as give a
snack to one of his excluded peopleit makes people visibly uncomfortable.
ive been seeing this since december and it makes me uncomfortable too.
how do we know who not to feed? can there be a list with all faces, nicknames, etc. out of respect for pn'vacy i do
not ask people's names, and i dont see how we could be faulted for accidentally filling an empty belly of an
excluded person.
it puts us in the position of enforcing starvation as a punishmentwhen we dont even know what the person did
and some of us may feel that starvation is not EVER humane.
Some of us are trained to view power hierarchies as illegitimate. some of us are trained in consensus committee
group teamwork so the top down power hierarchy is coming as a shock to some of us more familiar with the food
not bombs type model of non authoritarian non hierarchical power structure.
l am familiar with the 2016-2017 lncamation of this organization that was specifically opposed in their 5013c filing
to excluding people the founder worked very hard to mitigate and smooth personality differences stagger meals
and help the people get fed no one is excluded.
when i called beacon house after g.'s dad's death surrounding his breakdown, i was shocked that my attempt to
reach a trauma-informed type support servicewas then met with an exclusion based on my subjective relay of
information, it made me feel that osarch had some kind of prejudice against me or george.
lt is not normally considered fair to accept one person's hearsay without giving a person a fair chance to explain
what's going on in their life. l did not like you guys putting me in a position that they felt l was ganging up on him or
7/ 12
httpS'llmail.google.coml maiUu/0/?ik=3 e069d4a7&view=pt&.seamhmll&permnng'd=msgfi 174134286543781'B6&dsqt=1&simp1=msgfi 1741634286543782536
SIN/B, 12:40 PM Gmail (no subject)

in any way trying to hurt him.

to reduce his
l
repeatedly had to explain to him called you for help not to hurt him not to get him excluded not
i
services not to cutoff his source of food.

i wanted to speak to you, but osarch answered the phone.
the two weeks you guys demanded he be excluded, l watched his health plummet and he lost weightas your
meals were his only main source of real food.
after two weeks of starvationof course his mental health worsened.
on a follow up call,
osarch told rne its not my job to take care of g., on the phone.
idon't accept that as true. i View it as personal.
when osarch cornered me, after eliminating g., who provides me a protective presence, on a day when you were
not there to moderate osarch's behaviori felt more vulnerable.
some of the homeless who bully me, wont do it as badly in front of g.

g. is kind of like my therapy animal-i am lost without him and we suffer a lot facing his terminal illness.
i felt extra vulnerablebc if Beacon had been more inclusive and compassionate to george-i would not be so
easy to target.
i become suspicious when my partner is attacked first, soi can be attacked next.
g. mistakenly assumed i was out to get him or trying to "get him banned" so by banning him preemptively based
on a concerned family member's attempt to GAIN SUPPORT, not socially isolate someone in painit pushed us
into a deeper well of grieving and pain and Isolation when we needed kindness or care.
when i tried to reintegrate in october due to both of our housing managers threatening our housingit was
because i wanted to know what the service would be likeespecially if either of us became homeless.
lwas very worried that aggressive homeless or drug dealing associated with the homeless facility would hurt
George if he regained access to the beacon
Multiple incidences on the block and around the corner involved different homeless people beating upon or
financially abusing George
He has been extorted for as much as $200 recently possibly twice in addition to normal drug trade from people
who are your clients.
l
purposely am trying to protect him from your organizations at this point because he cannot afford to supply
cigarettes to the entire homeless community of Astoria Oregon he is currently financially wrecked by his own
generosity he is a very kind person he's even given $100 to a homeless person. think a good compromise would
l
be that even though panhandling is viewed as a free speech issue in America you could ask your guests as a
courtesy not too aggressively Panhandle Beacon participants not too aggressively Panhandle people with pensions
not to Panhandle for cigarettes and that any generosity that comes should flow freely and naturally without any
element of coercion pressure or danger.
think all your guests need to be instructed that sexual harassment is not welcome or tolerated from guests to each
|
other and that any violence is especially not tolerated especially of a genderbased violence kind or of a
threatening kind.
l'm pretty shocked that a homeless man has gone out of his way to harass me about being a survivor of sexual
violence and attempted murder. he essentially said l put myself in dangerous situations that he would ask a lot of
questions but it might make me upset why didn't say something when said fight flight or freeze he said l was
| |
being condescending he said shouldn't judge meth until try it. He asked for beer money he repeatedly stood up
l l
for men who are violent to women in the homeless community and then sure enough he was violent to me by
intimidating me with his hand around my neck.
I am sorry for any trouble we have caused you.

if there is no mechanism for reporting sexual harassment or civil rights discriminationor people feel that they will
be threatened with exclusion tfthey do so-the culture fosters more abuse.
httpszl / mail. google.coml mail/ulO/ ?ik=3¢0<89d4a7&vicw=pt&seaxch=all&permnts gidzmsg-t': 1741634286543782$6&dsqt=1&simpl=1nsg-fi 1741634286543782536 8/ 12

8/17IB. 12.40 PM Gmail (no subject)
-
A homeless woman pointed this out to me that if the director of filling empty bellies is cracking crude sexual jokes it
contributes to the culture of homeless women constantly being sexually assaulted and harassed.
after some of the fights i witnessed, as well as verbal abuse i have taken from some of the homeless, i feel very
challenged and stressed out by the atmosphere.
a little boy was actually lynched in my hometown, so the use of this "lynch mob" language is very upsetting.
i have had repetitive ideation about this early childhood traumatic memory since hearing
this comment, and then
pondering its significance.
it is definitely triggering.
i do not know if anyone is actually being threatened with homicidal violence, and if so, do these threats of lynching
extend to people who eat at your organizations?
if it is only metaphorical, i think that language may be problematic.
i fear that jumping to conclusions that all the business owners are homicidal racistsputs
us in a weird position in
seeking your services.
will that cause any of us or them additional harm?

i consider myself majorly anti-racistbut ifi voice a concern, will be labeled a part of a lynch mob?
i
i saw a homeless man ask osarch to punch you in the throat as you got into the car one day. that type of violent
threat i find hard to take.
i do not think of that as a joke. he is one of the many charismatic and
flawed individuals you serve.
He told me he stabbed three people in prison.
he suffered from hearing roy rant about hitler. i tried to express solidarity with him about feeling persecuted as a
when he did a nazi salute for a picture.
jewish person. one day i stood up to roy and told him that's inappropriate
the term "lynch mob" has a way of silencing valid concerns from women who have real concerns about their safety.
in a sense, if they can just be slurred as racrsts, then it silences them. which is effectively pitting racism v.
sexism to
enforce misogyny culture.
all forms of oppression must be overcome, racism, and sexism both of them.
on what basis the exclusions roll, l wonder how fair they are. some people who are known to be violent
are always
welcome. sometimes it seems like the exclusions are more of a personality problem based.
a black
for sure, i have a huge amount of trauma, from growing up in the south, knowrng real racists were lynching
child in my neighborhood. so i am glad nicole bales captured that moment of the bootleg of the city homelessness
meeting, bc it evokes a lot of pain.
i hear that pain.
but i don't want to make things worse

i have not had a chance to ask community members
who are black how they feel about that language. it might be
good to know how they feel and if that makes them more or less likely to want to engage in services.
l'm very sorry that you have been targeted with personal harassment so significant that anyone
would deem these
to me some of the early stalking you guys experienced. it is
words appropriate someone l ran into explained
continue on that kind of targeting l don't want to minimize that pain
serious and severe and you are brave to facing
l just want to remind you how painful the lynching metaphor
is.
feel that as a person experiencing white privilege and having abhorrent offensive ancestors who owned
l
personally offense.
slaves l am deeply opposed to coopting the language of lynching for any other purpose than its historical
and do not know if he is
Of course l am opposed to any particular racialized harassment against your partner l
how resonant of crimes against black and African-American

aware of how severe that metaphor is, particularly
if so l am deeply sorry because l do not know what it's like to
people it is, and if that is how much pain he is in and a Mob
walk in his shoes butl do not feel as a non-bipoc person l can actually go around calling people Lynch
casually.
It feels like misappropriation and hurtful to the legacy of civil rights activists l cherish.
it also dawned on me that a part of why l am triggered by that term

is it is related to a suicide or homicide death by
could have been a Murder by her exhusband.
hanging a close friend of mine experienced which l feared
slursthe epithets.
ihave been offended by the racist words i hear from some of your clientsthe misogynythe
The hitler moustache.
9I 12
l741634$6543782536&dsqt:1&simp1=msgf: 1741634286543782536
httpsl I mail. googlc.coml mail] u/ 0/ ?ik=3e0c39d4a7&view=pt&seaxch=all&pennmsgid=msgfi
8/17IB, 12:40 PM Gmail (no subject)

one idea i have is to have a separate facility for women, so that women can eat in a place where they don't have to
interact with men who have assaulted them, or sexually assaulted them, or verbally abused them.
even though it is just a thoughti think it could be a great expansion.
|was shaken when l found out Osarch cornered a homosexual man in the restroom and kicked him out for
primping in a mirror. your restroom situation is confusing even for people who know what's going on with the key
concept. it doesn't feel safe for anyone and not everybody feels safe in unisex restrooms whether locked or
unlocked especially if anyone is getting cornered l definitely never want to be cornered in the restroom for any
reason whatsoever.
additionally, for referencei had kind of like a female stalker at filling empty bellies In 20167 who regularly
threatened to break my glasses, curb stomp my teeth out on the sidewalk«or put a fist in my face. one day she
chased me into traffic.
later she told me she was doing better.
i man/elled at how corri buck really worked to deesclate tensions and FEED EVERYBODY.
every time osarch brags about some new person he is excludingi began to remember that the OLD filling empty
bellies was not into exclusions.
i found this old idea : "FlLLlNG EMP'l'Y BELLlES, FlXES MEALS FOR THE HOMELESS OR ANYONE lN NEED
OFA MEAL, NO ONE lS EXCLUDED."
i wish FEB could get back to its roots, bc the fear that is induced
by so many exclusions, may actually be
contributing to the behavioral dysfunction.
Several people I've known have been bottling up their concerns because they don't know where and how to safely
make their concerns known without facing the severe retaliation of Osarchs wrath and exclusion. why is there no
middle way to listen to people where they are without being confrontational rude personal and categorically
excluding people for having a viewpoint?
the power to deny food to people, effectively is like a psychological terror hanging over people's heads.
i never mentioned
my concern over the lack of wheelchair access-it was a huge fear point for me that contributed
to our avoidance.
i
hope that there will one day be better facility where handicapped access is considered.
My PTSD is actually so severe disability access sometimes pertains to me as when my PTSD flares to an extreme
extent stairs are no longer a viable option because my knees go horribly weak.
i dont know ifr could remember all these points if we spoke in person.
thank you for receiving this message.
i don't need all the answers,
ijvst feel like bottling all this up indefinitely isn't helpful either
when the homeless vented to me about the blue balls commenti know they were counting on me to do
something, to make this right. i am so sorry it has taken me so long to tell you. i am like them, afraid to jeopardize
my services. so ideally, people should have a gnevance process that feels welcoming enough that people could
trust there is a way to reach out safely.
you might ask around about what other types of innuendo are used.
maybe some kind of sexual harassment education or training could help.

a lot of the women especially are facing constant violence, threats, assaults on the streets.
they need a place to
feel safe.
the men face threats too, and not all of them are cool with this type of langauge.
you know i have a huge amount of respect for what you are doing, so it is difficult to enunciate this all.
5-1122
further notei wrote this perhaps a couple of weeks ago, and did not feel safe enough to send it. it was
causing me a lot of distress. i feel like have processed it enough to click send.
i
a apologize for the deeply disturbing nature of these subjects, and if in

any way this message is troubling, please
feel free to block my email, or request not write.
i
was the person who filmed the offensrve confederate flag at the 2017 aston'a regatta
parade, launching the media
i
scandaL
please know i write this letter in the spirit of anti-racism, anti oppression, and anti sexism.
the last time i saw dre--i codd not bear to bring up the lynching comment
metaphoras we both grew up in the
southr knew he would especially feel a huge amount of pain and history in that
language. i do not know what his
opinion would be, but i fear speaking about it could drastically demoralize him or rurn his day.
https:// mail.googlc.con1l mail/u/Ol ?ik=3e0c39d4a7&viempt&search=all&permmgid=msgf: 1741
6343654378M&dsqt=1&simp1=msg-fi 1741634286543782536 10/ 12
8117/2, 12:40 PM Gmail (no subject)
-
making an organization with cuttural sensitivity may include looking at how that language affects all members.
one thing i realized toois that having lost a friend to suicide by hanging in 2016, this trauma was dredged up by
this language.
being a strangulation survivor, it also evokes real physical injury i took in such crimes i suffered.
additionally a homeless man put his hand around my neck without my permission or consent recently, and when i
confronted him about it, he mocked me.
ifi mention this i do not want to be demeaned, or called a lynch mob, etc.
the neck is an extremely sensitive part of the body.
if the language was used metaphorically, it has a huge risk of traumatizing survivors of strangulation type crimes.
iabsolutely do not want anyone, including your workers to ever be threatened with violence. if the use of "lynch
mob" was very literal, or referring to a specific threatit is very confusing and scary to know how severe the
threats are if no one is telling us. are we in danger too?
Who are the perpetrators?
one thing i observe is that uneducated people speak in violent ways. i noticed that when coming out to this region
in 2013.
i do not like rough talk in any way at all, or defend it.
On Sun, Apr 17, 2022 at 3:40 PM En'n Carlsen <n' '25. r,accxwtfgd:c.rz2t~:\§;:;' :::;r::> wrote:
Hi Mary,
Absolutely.
Happy Easter!
Erin
On Sat, Apr 16, 2022, 7.40 PM mary rose lenore eng :3 < .
> wrote:
Hey just
l noticed the beacon website has that photo that got removed from the Facebook header
l don't mean to be too much trouble but could you ask your web designer fix the website not to use that picture
for marketing purposes
so sorry
Steve Elzie - This is Disability Rights Oregon logo, which features three circles in
Future Leaders of Disability green and blue font above the words disability, rights, oregon stacked
one on top of the other.
Rights Fellow
Pronouns: He/His/Him
Phone: (503) 243-2081 ext.
228
Fax: (503) 2431 738
Email:
Help us shape Disability Rights Oregon's future goals

and priorities by completing
,. l 1. . 12' «L:
, :m'x'H'S-u
«
Ayudenos a dar forma a las metas y prioridades futures de

Disability Rights Oregon
rellenando :1» «.1 -1
l741634$6543782$6&flsqt=1&simp1=nsgf2 1741634365437m536 11/12

https:llmail.googlc.comlmail/ulO/'Zik'fieOc39d4a7&vicw=pt&searchqll&permnsgid=msgfi
-
Legal & Confidentiality Notice:

Communication of information by, in, to, or through this email and your receipt or use of it (1) is not provided
in the course of and does not create or constitute an attomey-client relationship, and (2) is not intended to convey or constitute
and may contain
legal advice from a qualified attorney. This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s)
confidential and privileged information. Any unauthorized review, forwarding, printing, copying, distributing, or use of this
information is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you received this message in error, or have reason to believe you are
'
not
authorized to receive it, please promptly delete this message and notify the sender by email. Thank you
https: l/mail. goo gle.coml mail] ulOl ?ik=3e069d4a7&view=pt&search=all&pcmamsgid=msgfi 1741634286543782$6&dsqb 1&simpl=msgt': 1741634286543782536 12I12
JflCUmII/W7L@
Reported Br -
f'r/EL ((14 /.§C»'W
IL'ZFV'
Title/Role. [3/0 27/
1,.1,
DI ,«e C
Date of Report:
JCZ/L'Z/
I,
0,/ Z, fl madam x:
incident information
Date oflncident [K
c/
/ (l: 1 021-
Empioyee Name: 03/4 ,rd; [A Ofgé
Emoioyee Rotex'fitle' EK'WJM /.7',z~€ j), PFC h/v' dz: 1/! Ff /30(L//,§'Z Viz/(ff
Locatiori- {furl}, 01:1 /0 L/O Cg M1 M" (.1 (.1. 57' ,
/ *7 //(/;_j ':
/} "
._
(iCU/i C [bub/LC" L25 1

_ ..
L/LL/D
g// / LL/\g
Program/gi, 77/
infident Description (incfuding an\' events ieading to, or immediateiy foliowzng, the iflCidEflt)'
1m'
"
"* M "1 Qflk. Mxiu' I ww/ :3;

W ('1 m L'UL" "hfy a.) r fix
(;y_,,905 ("'3' flu I,"
jiyf/
'
(/11 m Zilfit'ig L
Cj/LLQZFIU )1 j?
J
'7"
_
P'Vf ("ix/f LAX/U

~
f: f" SI: )«S'é PIE: 1/.» v,

C:- - 1') {£6 m-C
7H7 n
o
Y/L
'
AUHS (,lj' gin/1' 0%: flLL'IVd/

[5 g , , I J'
r7
V 'LA»
'1
f] [f kQT- .
"J ,( e
(-
c"-
{Cr}
.
(TL/~11:
7' {\ ("
\
[VJ/E / 2125.0
V,
((- DI'G (LP/(77L?

up d f0
if /.
I)! ['3/ '
_
I" 1') (H/ 0"A f 'ALkfll'

é.' ,/\,
ELLLI i; _:/;.\£»I_:§___/ )9! /\__:(___{1€'€
qr'snru'z?
.
r..\//
_
{1,4 '
..l w-Il
/' L. . l. A! (/ um. '
I
FOR PUBLICATION

PROJECT VERITAS; PROJECT No.223 5271

VERITAS ACTION FUND,
D.C. N0. 3:20-CV-
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 01435-MO
V
OPINION
MICHAEL SCHMIDT, in his official
capacity as Multnomah County
District Attorney; ELLEN
ROSENBLUM, in her official
capacity as Oregon Attorney General,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon
Michael W. Mosman, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 7, 2022

Pasadena, California
Filed July 3, 2023
Before: Carlos T. Bea, Sandra S. Ikuta, and Morgan

Christen, Circuit Judges.
2 PROJECT VERITAS V. SCI-MIDT
Opinion by Judge Ikuta;

Dissent by Judge Christen
SUMMARY *
Civil Rights / First Amendment
The panel reversed the district court's dismissal of a

complaint challenging, as an unconstitutional restriction of
protected speech, Section 165.540(1)(c) of the Oregon
Revised Code, which generally prohibits unannounced
recordings of conversations, subject to several exceptions.
Section 165.540(1)(c) of the Oregon Revised Statutes
provides that a person may not obtain or attempt to obtain
the Whole or any part of a conversation by means of any
device if not all participants in the conversation are
specifically informed that their conversation is being
obtained. The law provides two exceptions relevant to this
appeal: (l) section 165 .540(1)(c) does not apply to a person
who records a conversation during a felony that endangers
human life, Or. Rev. Stat § 165.540(5)(a); and (2) section
165.540(l)(c) allows a person to record a conversation in
which a law enforcement officer is a participant if the
recording is made while the officer is performing official
duties and meets other criteria. Plaintiff Project Veritas, a
non-profit media organization that engages in undercover
investigative journalism, states that it documents matters of
*
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
PROJECT VERITAS V. SCHMIDT 3
public concern by making unannounced audiovisual

recordings of conversations, often in places open to the
public.
Applying Animal Legal Def Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d
1184 (9th Cir. 2018), the panel held that section
165.540(1)(c) regulates protected speech (unannounced
audiovisual recording) and is content based because it
distinguishes between particular topics by restricting some
subject matters (e.g., a state executive officer's official
activities) and not others (e.g., a police officer's official
activities). As a content-based restriction, the rule fails strict
scrutiny review because the law is not narrowly tailored to
achieving a compelling governmental interest in protecting
conversational privacy with respect to each activity Within
the proscription's scope, which necessarily includes its
regulation of protected speech in places open to the public.
Thus, citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971),
and Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717 (2000), the panel
held that Oregon does not have a compelling interest in
protecting individuals' conversational privacy from other
individuals' protected speech in places open to the public,
even if that protected speech consists of creating audio or
visual recordings of other people. The panel fithher
determined that section 165.540(1)(c) burdens more speech
than is necessary to achieve its stated interest and there were
other ways for Oregon to achieve its interests of protecting
conversational privacy. Finally, addressing the dissent, the
panel determined that severing the exceptions that made the
general prohibition content based and extending the general
prohibition to those protected First Amendment activities,
would create significant constitutional issues rather than
cure them. Because section 165.540(1)(c) is not a valid
4 PROJECT VERITAS V. SCHMIDT
time, place, or manner restriction, it cannot be saved by

striking the two exceptions at issue here.
Dissenting, Judge Christen stated that because the
majority does not dispute that the State has a significant
interest in protecting the privacy of Oregonians who engage
in conversations without notice that their comments are
being recorded, the court's analysis should be
straightforward. First, principles of federalism require that
the panel begin from a premise of reluctance to strike down
a state statute. Next, following Supreme Court precedent,
the panel should sever the two statutory exceptions that
Project Veritas challenges, apply intermediate scrutiny to the
content-neutral remainder, recognize that the statute is well-
tailored to meet Oregon's significant interest, and uphold
section l65.540(1)(c) as a reasonable time, place, or manner
restriction. Judge Christen stated that the purpose Oregon
advances is its significant interest in protecting participants
from having their oral conversations recorded Without their
knowledge. The majority recasts the State's interest as one
in "protecting people's conversational privacy from the
speech of other individuals." That reframing of the
legislature's purpose serves as the springboard for the
majority's reliance on an inapplicable line of Supreme Court
authority that pertains to state action aimed at protecting
people from unwanted commercial or political speech, not
protection from speech-gathering activities like Project
Veritas's, which are qualitatively different because they
appropriate the speech of others.
COUNSEL
Benjamin Barr (argued), Barr & Klein PLLC, Bull Valley,

Illinois; Stephen Klein, Barr & Klein PLLC, Washington,
D.C.; for PlaintiffsAppellants.
Philip M. Thoennes (argued), Assistant Attorney General;
Michael A. Casper, Senior Assistant Attorney General;
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General; Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General of Oregon; Office of the Oregon Attorney
General; Salem, Oregon; for Defendants-Appellees.
OPINION
IKUTA, Circuit Judge:
Oregon law generally prohibits unannounced recordings

of conversations, subject to several exceptions. We
conclude that Oregon's law is a content-based restriction that
violates the First Amendment right to free speech and is
therefore invalid on its face.
I
A
Section l65.540(1)(c) of the Oregon Revised Statutes
provides: "[A] person may not . . [o]btain or attempt to
.
obtain the Whole or any part of a conversation by means of

any device . . if not all participants in the conversation are
.
specifically informed that their conversation is being

obtained." Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(1)(c).1 The statute

defines "[c]onversation" as "the transmission between two
or more persons of an oral communication which is not a
telecommunication or a radio communication, and includes
a communication occurring through a Video conferencing
program." Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.5350). Because this section
explicitly applies to the recording of a Video conference and
bars individuals from obtaining a conversation "by means of
any device," it applies to both audio and video recordings of
a conversation. Indeed, the Oregon courts have interpreted
the statute as applicable to Video recordings of conversations
and other conduct? See State v. Copeland, 522 P.3d 909,
91112 (Or. Ct. App. 2022) (applying section 165.540(l)(c)
to "the video and audio recording of [a] shooting taken by
the Victim on his body camera").3
Oregon is one of a few outliers in enforcing such a broad prohibition

1
on unannounced recordings of conversations. Only five states, including

Oregon, prohibit individuals fiom making recordings without providing
notice to or obtaining the consent of the recording's subjects in a place
open to the public where the subjects lack a reasonable expectation of
privacy. See Appendix A.
2
Because both the statutory text and judicial opinions confirIn that
section 165.540(1)(c) applies to video recordings of conversations, the
dissent's assertion that "the statute does not sweep in . . . video
recordings" is incorrect. Dissent at 59.
Contrary to the dissent's argument that section 165.540(1)(c) applies
3
only to oral communications, Dissent at 48 n.6, Copeland did not

differentiate between the Video recording of a "heated discussion," 522
P.3d at 911, and the Video recording of a shooting, id. at 912 (noting that
"[t]he state sought to introduce the Video and audio recording of the
shooting taken by the victim on his body camera").
PROJECT VERITAS V. SCWIDT 7
This general rule is subject to numerous exceptions. See

Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(2)(7), (9).4 Two are relevant here.
First, section 165 .540(1)(c) does not apply to a "person who
records a conversation during a felony that endangers human
life." Id. § 165.540(5)(a). This exception applies even if the
recording "was initiated before the felony began."
Copeland, 522 P.3d at 912. Second, section 165.540(1)(c)
allows "[a] person [to] record[] a conversation in which a
law enforcement officer is a participant" if the recording is
"made while the officer is performing official duties" and
meets other criteria.5 Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(5)(b). The
Oregon courts have not yet interpreted this exception.
4
The statute provides that section 165 .540(1)(c) does not apply to: (1)
"subscribers or members of their family who perform the acts prohibited
in [§ 165.540(1)] in their homes," Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(3); (2)
"[p]ublic officials in charge of and at jails, police premises," and "other
penal or correctional institutions," id. § 165.5 40(2)(a)(B); or (3) persons
who use unconcealed recording devices to "intercept oral
communications that are part of" specified "[p]ublic or semipublic
meetings," "[r]egularly scheduled classes or similar educational
activities in public or private institutions," or "[p]rivate meetings or
conferences if all [participants] knew or reasonably should have known
that the recording was being made," id. § 165.540(6).
5
The exception from section 165.540(1)(c) applies only if:
(A) The recording is made While the officer is performing

official duties;
(B) The recording is made openly and in plain View of the
participants in the conversation;
(C) The conversation being recorded is audible to the
person by normal unaided hearing; and
The general rule in section 165.540(1)(c) and the 'wvo

relevant exceptions to the rule evolved over a lengthy period
of time. According to the Oregon Supreme Court, the state
legislature first enacted section 165.540(1)(a) in 1955 "to
allow the police to record telephone conversations When one
party consents to the recording." State v. Lissy, 747 P.2d
345, 34749, 347 n.3 (Or. 1987). In 1959, the legislature
amended section 165.540 to add section 165.540(1)(c),
which prohibited tape recording of face-to-face
conversations without all participants' consent. Id. at 350 &
n.4. Twenty years later, in 1979, some legislators attempted
to amend this provision because of concerns "that a person
who tape records a public meeting, public speech or
classroom lecture without 'specifically informing' all
participants that the discussion is being taped is guilty of a
Class C felony." Id. at 351 (citation omitted). This effort to
amend the law failed. See id.
But in 1989, legislators succeeded in making an

exception to section 165 .540(1)(c) for felonies endangering
human life, resulting in section 165 .540(5)(a). Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 165.540(5)(a) (1989). According to the legislative history
of this amendment, the change was made to enable police
officers to use a body Wire to record a "situation [that]
involves [a] felony where drugs are involved or human life
is endangered" without first obtaining a court order. A-
Engrossed H.B. 2252, 65th Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1 (Or.
1989); see also Or. H.R. Stafi'Measure Summary, H.B. 2252,
(D) The person [recording] is in a place where the person

lawfully may be.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(5)(b). "Law enforcement officer" is generally
defined as a person authorized to enforce criminal laws. Id.
§§ 133.726(11);165.540(10)(b).
65th Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 1989) ("This measure would

eliminate the requirement that police officers obtain prior
court approval before using a 'body Wire' where felony drug
offenses or life-endangering felonies are being
committed"); Hearing 0n HB. 225 0, 2251, 2252 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime & Corrs. 0f the H. Comm. 0n the
Judiciary, 65th Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1112 (Or. 1989)
(statement of Cap. Will Hingston, Or. State Sheriffs' Ass'n)
(stating that section 165.540 "causes a great deal of concern
for officer safety and informant safety during a narcotics
transaction" because "there is little consistency in obtaining
a court order for a body Wire before a transaction goes
down," and the "amendment will afford officers in their
performance a great deal more safety and rapid support when
doing a narcotics transaction").
In 2015, the legislature added another exception to
section 165.540(1)(c) to allow a person to record a
conversation in which a law enforcement officer is a
participant, resulting in section 165.540(5)(b). Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 165.540(5)(b) (2015). According to testimony by the
ACLU submitted to the state judiciary committee in support
of this amendment, this change was necessary because
otherwise the statute was "inconsistent with the vast and
developing consensus among courts and legal scholars
confirming that the right to record on-duty police is
constitutionally protected." Hearing 0n HB. 2704 Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 78th Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1
(Or. 2015) (testimony of Kimberly McCullough, ACLU
Leg. Dir.). The ACLU further testified that "because it is
common knowledge that the public has a right to record on-
duty police, people all over Oregon are unintentionally
violating Oregon's eavesdropping statute when they openly
record without a warning." Hearing on HB. 2704 A Before
the S. Comm. 0n theJudiciary, 78th Assemb., Reg. Sess. 1

(Or. 2015) (testimony of Kimberly McCullough, ACLU
Leg. Din).
B
Project Veritas is a non-profit media organization that
engages in undercover investigative journalism. Project
Veritas stated that it documents matters of public concern by
making unannounced audiovisual recordings of
conversations, often in places open to the public. In the past,
Project Veritas journalists have used undercover recordings
to document the "Unite the Right" rally in Charlottesville,
Virginia, to record campaign workers for presidential
candidates, to capture the efforts of campaign staff to stir up
violence at rallies of the opposing candidate, and to
interview the staff for a gubernatorial candidate who
confirmed the candidate's more controversial views and
efforts to conceal them.
Project Veritas stated that it would conduct similar

investigations in Oregon but for Oregon's prohibition on
unannounced in-person audiovisual recordings. Among
other things, Project Veritas alleged it would investigate
corruption at the state agency responsible for enforcing
Oregon's public records law by recording undercover
interviews with officers and staff in locations open to the
public, like restaurants, parks, and sidewalks. In addition,
Project Veritas alleged it would investigate the "rise in
violent protests in Portland between the police and members
of Antifa and other" groups by secretly recording
interactions between police officers and protesters. Project
Veritas would also send undercover journalists into groups
of police and protesters to engage them in conversation and
record their candid remarks. Outside of organized rallies,
PROJECT VERITAS V. SCHMIDT 1 1
Project Veritas would "do most of its [undercover] recording

on public sidewalks, public parks," or in other areas held open
to the public." Project Veritas alleged that the safety and
even lives of its journalists would be endangered if they were
to record conversations openly and in plain View or to inform
participants that they are being recorded.
Project Veritas sued the Oregon Attorney General, Ellen
Rosenblum, and the District Attorney of Multnomah
County, Oregon, Michael Schmidt (collectively, Oregon),
challenging section 165.540 as an unconstitutional
restriction of protected speech. Project Veritas's complaint
alleged that because section 165.540 favored recording some
subjects, but disfavored others, the differential treatment
rendered section 165.540(1)(c) and its exceptions
unconstitutional. For instance, the complaint alleged that
under Oregon law, an individual could record the police in
particular circumstances, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 165 .540(5)(b),
and make a "secret audio recording" during a felony that
endangers human life, see id § 165.540(5)(a), but "may not
openly record the conversations of city council members,
school board members, or any other government actors
without specifically notifying them," see id. § 165.540(5)(b).
Project Veritas sought to enjoin defendants from enforcing
section l65.540(l)(c) and to obtain a declaratory judgment
that the law is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to
Project Veritas.
Oregon moved to dismiss the complaint. The district
court partially granted the motion, and the parties agreed to
dismiss the remaining claims with prejudice.6 Project

Veritas timely appealed.
II
We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a
complaint for failure to state a claim. See In re Cutera Sec.
Ling, 610 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2010). "[W]e have an
independent obligation to ensure that we have subject matter
jurisdiction," which includes a determination that Project
Veritas has standing to bring its pre-enforcement claim.
Airline Serv. Providers Ass'rz v. L.A. World Airports, 873
F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2017).
Project Veritas's allegations are sufficient to establish

standing for a First Amendment pre-enforcement claim.
Under Article III of the Constitution, plaintiffs must
establish "the irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing," by showing that they suffered an injury in fact,
that there is "a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of," and that it is likely that "the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision." Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56061 (1992) (citations and
quotation marks omitted). "Because constitutional
challenges based on the First Amendment present unique
standing considerations, plaintiffs may establish an injury in
fact without first suffering a direct injury from the
challenged restriction." Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775,
785 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). In a pie-enforcement
Project Veritas's complaint challenged sections 165.540(1)(c) (making

6
unannounced recordings), 165.540(1)(d) (obtaining such recordings

from others), and 165.540(1)(e) (distributing such recordings). The
district court denied Oregon's motion to dismiss with respect to Project
Veritas's section 165.540(1)(d) and (1)(e) claims, but the parties later
agreed to dismiss those claims with prejudice.
challenge, plaintiffs can show injury in fact by establishing

that (1) they intend to Violate the law; and (2) have shown a
reasonable likelihood that the government Will enforce the
statute against them. Id.
For purposes of this pre-enforcement challenge, Project

Veritas makes a clear showing of injury in fact. First, Project
Veritas alleged that but for section 165.540(1)(c), it would
make unannounced recordings of conversations in a manner
that would Violate the general prohibition and not fall within
an exception, and described in great detail the persons,
conversations, and events it would like to record. See supra
p. 101 1. For its part, Oregon has prosecuted individuals for
violating section l65.540(1)(c) in the past7 and does not state
that it would refrain from prosecuting Project Veritas for
creating such recordings, if the recordings were made in
Violation of the law. Finally, Project Veritas alleged a causal
connection between the challenged statute and its inability
to carry on its undercover journalistic endeavors and that it
is likely that its injury will be redressed by a favorable
decisions
We reject Oregon's arguments that we lack jurisdiction
because Project Veritas asserts an as-applied challenge
which is not ripe. Project Veritas's claim is properly
construed as a facial challenge to section 165.540. "A facial
challenge is an attack on a statute itself as opposed to a
7
See, eg, State v. Nefi', 265 P.3d 62, 63 (Or. Ct. App. 2011); State v.
Depeche, 255 P.3d 502, 50304 (Or. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Bichsel,
790 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Knobel, 777 P.2d 985,
987 (1989).
8
Because we conclude that section l65.540(1)(c) is facially
unconstitutional, we do not evaluate Project Veritas's alternative
challenge that the statute is overbroad.
particular application," Citjz 0f Los Angeles v. Patel, 576

U.S. 409, 415 (2015), While "[a]n as-applied challenge
contends that the law is unconstitutional as applied to the
litigant's particular speech activity, even though the law may
be capable of valid application to others," Foti v. Cit}; 0f
Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998). Here,
Project Veritas attacks the statute itself as an
unconstitutional regulation of unannounced recordings of
nearly all conversations held in places open to the public
not only those conversations that Project Veritas seeks to
record.9
III
The First Amendment, applicable to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "Congress shall
make no law . . abridging the freedom of speech." U.S.
.
CONST. amend I. "While the First Amendment literally

forbids the abridgment only of speech, the Supreme Court
has long recognized that its protection does not end at the
spoken or written word." United States v. Swisher, 811 F.3d
299, 310 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (citation and quotation
marks omitted). We have recognized there is no material
"distinction between the process of creating a form of pure
speech (such as writing or painting) and the product of these
processes (the essay or artwork) in terms of the First
Amendment protection afforded." Anderson v. Cit)» 0f
Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010).
Indeed, "we have never seriously questioned that the
processes of writing words down on paper, painting a
9
Because we must analyze section 165 .540(l)(c) with respect to the full
scope of its prohibition, it is irrelevant that "Project Veritas seeks to
record only in public places" or "avers only that most of its recording
will occur in public places." Dissent at 49.
picture, and playing an instrument are purely expressive

activities entitled to full First Amendment protection." Id.
at 1062.
A
Here, the state law at issue regulates individuals' conduct
in making an audio or video recording. Under our case law,
such conduct qualifies as speech entitled to the protection of
the First Amendment. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v.
Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 120304 (9th Cir. 2018).
Wasden involved "a secretlyfilmed expose' of the
operation of an Idaho dairy farm," which showed dairy
workers who "dragg[ed] a cow across the ground by a chain
attached to her neck; twist[ed] cows' tails to inflict
excruciating pain; and repeatedly beat[], kick[ed], and
jump[ed] on cows to force them to move." Id. at 1189. This
2012 expose' distributed by an animal rights group, Mercy
for Animals, resulted in the Idaho legislature enacting a
statute targeting undercover investigation of agricultural
operations, which criminalized, among other things, "a
person from entering a private agricultural production
facility and, without express consent from the facility owner,
making audio or video recordings of the 'conduct of an
agricultural production facility's operations.'" Id. at 1203
(citation omitted). The statute defined its scope broadly and
did not exclude audio or Video recordings of conversations.
See id In enacting the law, members of the Idaho legislature
"discussed the bill as protecting against two types of
perceived harm to agricultural producers," specifically:
"concerns about farm security and privacy" and concerns
about damage caused by investigative reporting itself. Id at
1192. One legislator "described the[] Videos as used . . .
'publicly [to] crucify a company' and 'as a blackmail tool."'

Id.
After noting the "tension between journalists' claimed

First Amendment right to engage in undercover
investigations and the state's effort to protect privacy and
property rights," icl. at 1190, we held that the animal rights
activist's conductcreating an unannounced recording
Was constitutionally protected First Amendment speech, id.
at 120304. Wasden reached this conclusion in two steps.
First, Wasden extended our prior ruling that "there is 'a

First Amendment right to filnz matters of public interest,"
id. at 1203 (emphasis added) (citing Fordyce v. Cizj/ of
Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995), to hold that "[t]he
act of recording is itselj' an inherently expressive activity"
protected by the First Amendment, id. (emphasis added).
We reasoned that audio and video recordings require
"decisions about content, composition," and the like, which
decisions are just as expressive as "the written word or a
musical score" ultimately disseminated to the public. Id.
"Because the recording process is itself expressive and is
'inextricably intertwined' with the resulting recording, the
creation of audiovisual recordings is speech entitled to First
Amendment protection as purely expressive activity." Id. at
1204 (citation omitted).
Second, given that the act of recording is protected

speech, Wasden held that the statute's prohibition of
recording "the conduct of an agricultural production
facility's operations" without "express consent from the
facility owner" constituted a regulation of a form of
protected speech, which triggered First Amendment

scrutiny. Id. at 120304.")
Applying Wasden's conclusion here, section
165 .540(1)(c) prohibits making audio and Visual recordings
unless all participants in the conversation are informed of the
recording. Under Wasden, the recording itself is protected
speech, and therefore the Oregon statute constitutes a
regulation of protected speech. We conclude that section
l65.540(l)(c) triggers First Amendment scrutiny.
B
Because we must determine the constitutionality of
section l65.540(1)(c) under the First Amendment, we next
turn to the question whether it is content based or content
neutral. See Reed v. Town 0f Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163
(2015). A law is content based if it "single[s] out any topic
or subject matter for differential treatmen ." Cit); of Austin
v. Reagan Nat'l Ad. of Austin, LLC, 142 S. Ct. 1464, 1472
(2022).
1°
Wasden's conclusion is consistent with our sister circuits, which have
held that creation of audio and video recordings constitutes First
Amendment-protected speech. See, e. g, People for the Ethical
Treatment ofAnimals, Inc. v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Fed 'n, Inc.,
60 F .4th 815, 82123 (4th Cir. 2023) (rejecting argument that the
creation of unauthorized recordings of "images or sound occurring
within an employer's premises" as part of undercover investigations
conducted by PETA to publicize animal cruelty was not speech protected
by the First Amendment); Am. CL. Union ofIllinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d
583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012) ("The act of making an audio or visual recording
is necessarily included within the First Amendment's guarantee of
speech and press rights"); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332,
1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that "[t]he First Amendment protects the
. . . right to record matters of
public interest").
Wasden again guides our analysis. After holding that the

creation of audio and Video recordings was speech entitled
to full First Amendment protection, Wasden held that the
Idaho statute at issue in that case, which required the facility
owner's consent to make unannounced recordings of "the
conduct of an agricultural production facility's operations,"
was "an 'obVious' example of a content-based regulation of
speech because it 'defin[es] regulated speech by particular
subject matter." 878 F.3d at 1204 (citing Reed, 576 U.S. at
163). We gave two reasons for this conclusion. First, the
statute drew "a distinction 'on its face' regarding the
message the speaker conveys." Id. (citing Reed, 576 U.S. at
165). Specifically, it "would permit filming a Vineyard's art
collection but not the winemaking operation." Id.
"Likewise, a Videographer could record an after-hours
birthday party among co-workers, a farmer's antique car
collection, or a historic maple tree but not the animal abuse,
feedlot operation, or slaughterhouse conditions." Id.
Second, we reasoned that "only by Viewing the recording can
the [state] authorities make a determination about criminal
liability" because the application of the exception "explicitly
pivots on the content of the recording." Id.
Our second rationale (that a law regulating the act of
making specified recordings is content based if state
authorities cannot apply the law without viewing or listening
to the particular recording at issue) requires some further
examination. After we decided Wasden, the Supreme Court
rejected a per se rule "that a regulation cannot be content
neutral if it requires reading the [speech] at issue." Cit)» 0f
Austin, 142 S. Ct. at 1471. Instead, Cit)» of Austin held that
location-based rules, such as a rule differentiating between
signs on a premise that advertise an onsite business from
signs that advertise some off-site matter, are not content

based, even though city authorities had to review the sign's
message to apply the rule. Id. at 1472. When arule is merely
a "location-based and content-agnostic on/off-premises
distinction," it does not "sing1[e] out specific subject matter
for differential treatment." Id. at 1475 (citation omitted).
Instead, the sign's message merely "informs the sign's
relative location." Id. at 1473. But as the Court clarified,
this exception for location-based rules does not affect the
Court's longstanding holding that "regulations that
discriminate based on the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed . . . are content based." Id. at 1474
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
Wasden did not address a location-based rule akin to an
"on/off-premises distinction," but considered a rule that
singled out "specific subject matter for differential
treatment" and discriminated based on "the topic discussed
or the idea or message expressed." Id. at 147475. As a
result, Cit); ofAustin's analysis does not conflict with our
holding in Wasden, which remains binding. See Miller v.
Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
three-judge panel is bound by precedent unless it "is clearly
irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening
higher authority"). Therefore, we continue to consider
whether a law "pivots on the content of the recording,"
Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1204, in determining whether the law
discriminates on the basis of "the topic discussed or the idea
or message expressed" and is, therefore, content based, Cit)»
0fAustin, 142 S. Ct. at 1474 (citing Reed, 576 U.S. at 171).
Applying Wasden here, section 165.540 is a content
based restriction on speech. On its face, section
165.540(1)(c) and its exceptions draw a distinction between
topics. The speech regulated by section 165.540(1)(c) is the
act of making a recording, which means that the activity

captured by a recording constitutes the content or subject
matter of that speech. Because the rules imposed by section
165.540 vary depending on the activity being recorded, the
statute clearly draws content-based distinctions under
Wasden. The law's applicability plainly "pivots on the
content of the recording"namely, What the recording
captures. Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1204. For example, the law
applies no restrictions to recording law enforcement officials
engaged in their official duties, see Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 165.540(5)(b), but prohibits recording other government
officials performing official duties unless they are informed
that their conversation is being recorded. Similarly, the
statute distinguishes between recording felonies
endangering human lives, id. § 165.540(5)(a), and recording
similar conduct during the commission of a misdemeanor.
These distinctions are "obvious" examples of a content-
based regulation of speech because they "define regulated
speech by particular subject matter." Wasden, 878 F.3d at
1204 (cleaned up) (citation omitted). In addition, state
"authorities [can] make a determination about criminal
liability" under the law "only by Viewing the recording." Id.
This serves as further evidence that the applicability of
section 165.540(1)(c) pivots on the content of the recording,
thereby demonstrating that the law is content based.
2
Oregon argues that section 165.540(1)(c)'s general

prohibition on the act of making unannounced recordings is
a content-neutral speech regulation for two reasons. Neither
is persuasive.
Oregon first argues that the statute is content neutral

because the statute's exceptions are not based on the words
PROJECT VERITAS v. SCHMIDT 21
spoken and recorded, and therefore state authorities do not

have to listen to and analyze the recording to determine
Whether an exception applies. We disagree. The statute at
issue in Wasa'en did not distinguish based on the words
spoken in a recording, but we nevertheless held that it was
content based because it discriminated on the basis of subj ect
matter to be recorded. 878 F.3d at 1204. For the same
reason, it is the statute's differential treatment of recordings
based on their subject matter (e.g., whether the speaker's
recording obtains the conversation of Oregon police officers
or Oregon executive officers) that makes the statute content
based, not the words exchanged in the conversation.
Second, Oregon argues that we can consider section

165.540(l)(c) as a stand-alone provision, and ignore the
exceptions to the general prohibition. But this approach is
foreclosed by binding precedent. To start, it is well
established that when a court evaluates the constitutionality
of a general prohibition, it must consider any exceptions to
the general rule. "[A] rule [is] content-based when it
establishes a general ban on speech, but maintains
exceptions for speech on certain subjects." Glendale
Assocs., Ltd v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 1145, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003).
Stated differently, where exceptions to a restriction of
protected speech "are based on content, the restriction itself
is based on content." Nat'l Ad C0. v. City OfOrange, 861
F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted); see also
Barr v. Am. Ass 'n 0fPol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335,
2347 (2020) (plurality opinion) (holding that a prohibition of
robocalls was content based due to its exception for
robocalls collecting government held debts); Foti, 146 F.3d
at 636 (holding that an ordinance's general ban of "all signs
on all public property" was content based due to its
"exemptions for open house signs and safety, traffic, and

public informational signs").11
Moreover, any exception to a general restriction on
protected speecheven if the exception applies to speech
that our case law has recognized as receiving First
Amendment protection, like recording police officers
performing official duties in public, see F0rdyce, 55 F.3d at
439; Askins v. U.S. Dep't ofHomeland Sec., 899 F.3d 1035,
1044 (9th Cir. 2018)necessarily renders the restriction
content based. The Supreme Court analyzed a similar
situation in Reed, where the challenged state law generally
restricted the display of outdoor signs without a permit, but
exempted signs that had ideological and political messages,
which implicate speech that case law has recognized as
receiving First Amendment protection. 576 U.S. at 16465.
Despite these exceptions, the Court held that the law as a
whole was content based and subject to strict scrutiny,
"regardless of the government's benign motive, content-
neutral justification, or lack of 'animus toward the ideas
'11
The district court concluded that the law enforcement exception did
not render section 165.540(1)(c) content based because recordings of
"conversations where a law enforcement officer is a speaker" is
"government speech," which "is generally not subject to First
Amendment challenges." Oregon does not rely on this argument, and
we conclude the government speech doctrine is not applicable here.
Although the Supreme Court has held that a government entity's
expression of its own views does not violate the speech rights of
individuals who disagree, see Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S.
460, 467 (2009), this case does not involve a suit against the government
for expressing its views. Rather, it involves a statute that impinges on a
private individual's speech by restricting the ability to record public
officials. The individual engaging in the speech being regulated is the
private party that makes the recordingnot the government. Therefore,
the government speech doctrine is inapposite.
contained' in the regulated speech." Id. at 165 (citation

omitted). Therefore, under this precedent, we must analyze
both the general prohibition and the exceptions as one
regulatory regime. Doing so makes clear that section
165.540 is a content-based regulation of speech."
C
Because we conclude that section l65.540(l)(c) and its
exceptions constitute a content-based speech restriction, we
can uphold the statute only if it survives strict scrutiny. See
Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1204. Strict scrutiny requires the
government to show that the speech restriction is "narrowly
tailored to address the State's compelling governmental
interests." Victory Processing, LLC v. Fox, 937 F.3d 1218,
1229 (9th Cir. 2019). Under strict scrutiny, the challenged
law must be constitutional with respect to "each activity
within the proscription's scope." Berger v. Cit); of Seattle,
569 F.3d 1029, 1053 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988)). It does not matter that a narrower
restriction on speech activities could have been justified by
the government's interest. See Watchtower Bible & Tract
Soc'J/ ofN. Y., Inc. v. Village ofStratton, 536 U.S. 150, 168
(2002). For instance, a law that generally prohibits
canvassers fiom engaging in door-to-door advocacy Without
a permit is facially unconstitutional. Ia'. Although the
government's "interest in preventing fraud could adequately
support the ordinance insofar as it applies to commercial
transactions and the solicitation of fiJnds," the interest in
fraud prevention does not justify the ordinance insofar as it
12
The dissent concedes that the statutory exceptions to the general ban
on unannounced recordings render section 165.540 content based.
Dissent at 50.
applies "to [Jehovah Witnesses who offer religious

literature], to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for
unpopular causes." Id.
In Wasden, we applied strict scrutiny to the content-
based Idaho statute. 878 F.3d at 1204. We assumed that
Idaho's asserted interest in protecting both property and
privacy interests in an agricultural production facility was a
compelling government interest, see id, but concluded that
Idaho had not satisfied the narrow tailoring requirement
because, among other reasons, there were "various other
laws at Idaho's disposal that would allow it to achieve its
stated interests While burdening little or no speech," id. at
1205 (cleaned up) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
"For example, agricultural production facility owners can
vindicate their rights through tort laws against theft of trade
secrets and invasion of privacy." Id. And, as another
example, "[t]o the extent the legislators expressed concern
that fabricated recordings of animal abuse would invade
privacy rights, the victims can turn to defamation actions for
recourse." Id. Further, we explained, "'the remedy for
speech that is false is speech that is true'and not, as Idaho
would like, the suppression of that speech." Id. (cleaned up)
(citation omitted). Therefore, we struck down Idaho's ban
on creating audio and visual recordings as failing to survive
First Amendment scrutiny. Id.
Applying strict scrutiny to section l65.540(1)(c) in light

of these precedents, we must consider whether that section
is constitutional with respect to "each activity within the
proscription's scope," Berger, 569 F.3d at 1053, which
necessarily includes its regulation of protected speech in
places open to the public, see supra pp. l4 n.9, 2324.
We first consider the nature of Oregon's interest here. At

the outset, Oregon does not assert it has a compelling
interest, but argues only that it has a significant
governmental interest in protecting individuals'
conversational privacy. In analyzing this interest, we are
bound by Wasden's conclusion that "[t]he act of recording is
itself an inherently expressive activity" that merits First
Amendment protection. 878 F.3d at 1203. Therefore,
prohibiting a speaker's creation of unannounced recordings
in public places to protect the privacy of people engaged in
conversation in those places is the equivalent of prohibiting
protesters' or buskers' speech in public places for the same
purpose. See Berger, 569 F.3d at 1054. Thus, we must
analyze Oregon's interest in conversational privacy as
protecting people's conversational privacy from the speech
of other individuals, even in places open to the public.
In general, the government does not have a compelling
interest in protecting individual privacy aga'mst unwanted
communications (including the "speech" comprised of
recording others) in areas open to the public unless the
audience's "substantial privacy interests are being invaded
in an essentially intolerable manner." Cohen v. California,
403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S.
703, 717 (2000) (recognizing that the government's interest
in protecting privacy "varies widely in different settings").
Courts have recognized such a compelling interest only
when patients seeking medical care are bombarded by "the
cacophony of political protests" and individuals at their
homes are confronted with unwanted speech. Hill, 530 U.S.
at 716. The government's interest in protecting the public's
privacy from unwanted speech (including recordings of
'6'
people's conversations) 1s far less important" for
individuals engaging in recreational, social, or commercial

activities in places open to the public, such as "strolling
through Central Par ," id., or "waiting in line or having
lunch outdoors in a public park," Berger, 569 F.3d at 1054.
Indeed, we have held that the government does not even
have a "significant interest in protecting [individuals] from
unpopular speech" Where those who constitute the intended
audience are commercial patrons of "a place of public
entertainment." Kuba v. IA Agric. Ass 'n, 387 F.3d 850, 861
n.10 (9th Cir. 2004). Applying this framework here, Oregon
does not have a compelling interest in protecting individuals'
conversational privacy from other individuals' protected
speech in places open to the public, even if that protected
speech consists of creating audio or Visual recordings of
other people.
Nor is Oregon's rule narrowly tailored to be "the least

restrictive or least intrusive means of' achieving the
government's interest in conversational privacy, as required
to pass strict scrutiny review. Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 79899 & n.6 (1989). Under strict scrutiny, a
speech restriction must "target[] and eliminate[] no more
than the exact source of the 'eVil' it seeks to remedy."
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485 (citation omitted). A law is not
narrowly tailored if it restricts "speech that do [es] not cause
the types of problems that motivated the [law]." Comiz'e de
Journaleros de Redondo Beach v. Cit); ofRedondo Beach,
657 F.3d 936, 948 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). In addition, a
law is not narrowly tailored if it is over-inclusive because it
suppresses more speech than is necessary to further
Oregon's goal of protecting people's conversational privacy.
See Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1205.
Applying this test, we conclude that section 165.540

burdens more protected speech than is necessary to achieve
its stated interest. See id. The law regulates protected speech
to avoid impinging on people's conversational privacy. But
in public places, speech does not intrude on privacy unless it
intrudes in "an essentially intolerable manner." See Berger,
569 F.3d at 1056 (holding that a statute prohibiting "passive
and unthreatening acts" such as offering a handbill or
displaying a sign, even if the communications were
unwanted, was not narrowly tailored under intermediate
scrutiny). As the Supreme Court has explained, "it is
difficult, indeed, to justify a prohibition on all uninvited
approaches . . . regardless of how peaceful the contact may
be, without burdening more speech than necessary to prevent
intimidation." Madsen v. Women 's Health Center, Ina, 512
U.S. 753, 774 (1994). Section 165.540(1)(c) does not
distinguish between "passive and unthreatening" acts and
intolerable intrusions. Under our case law, that does not
constitute narrow tailoring.
Moreover, where speech occurs in places open to the

public, the privacy interest of other individuals in those
public areas is implicated only if and where the speech is
unwanted. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 716; Berger, 569 F.3d at
1056. Yet section 165.540(1)(c) does not distinguish
between wanted and unwanted speech (including wanted or
unwanted recordings)" For example, protesters
demonstrating in favor of their political views may have no
objection to unannounced recordings of conversations,
which would provide more publicity about their goals and
13
For its part, the dissent apparently assumes without explanation that
all unannounced recordings are unwanted speech and all announced
recordings are welcomed speech. Dissent at 5 361.
28 PROJECT VERITAs V. SCLHVHDT
beliefs. While some people may desire privacy for a

conversation held in places open to the public, such instances
cannot justify Oregon's Wholesale restriction on protected
speech (i.e., recordings) in public areas. See Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. at 799 (stating that a speech restriction
"may not regulate expression in such a manner that a
substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to
advance its goals").
The dissent argues that Berger and its progeny are
inapplicable to section 165.540(l)(c) because "state action
aimed at protecting people from unwanted commercial or
political speech" is "qualitatively different" than state action
protecting people "from speech-gathering activities like
Project Veritas's . .because they appropriate the speech of
.
others." Dissent at 45. According to the dissent, the sort of

speech that includes the "appropriation of another person's
speech" (i.e., recordings) is qualitatively more burdensome
than other types of speech that might intrude on a person's
privacy. Dissent at 64.
This position is foreclosed by Wasden, Which did not
accord any special attention to the privacy interests of people
Whose speech might be recorded. Rather, Wasden held that
a state law prohibiting audio or video recordings of the
conduct of an agricultural production facility's operations,
which necessarily would include conversations, directions,
and other forms of oral communications, "suppresse[d] more
speech than necessary to further Idaho's stated goals of
protecting property and privacy." 878 F.3d at 1205.
Wasden's analysis of recordings under the same framework
applicable to other sorts of protected speech is consistent
with precedent: for example, under our case law, we analyze
expressive conduct that merits First Amendment protection
as symbolic speech in the same manner as we analyze oral
communications. See Swisher, 811 F.3d at 318 ("Content-

based prohibitions of speech and symbolic speech are
analyzed under the same framework.").14
as in Wasden, the rule is not narrowly tailored
Finally,
because "there are various other laws at [Oregon's] disposal
that would allow it to achieve its stated interests while
burdening little or no speech." 878 F.3d at 1205 (citation
and quotation marks omitted). Individuals whose
conversation is captured in public by unannounced
recordings "can vindicate their rights" through an invasion
of privacy tort. See, e. g. , Humphers v. First Interstate Bank
of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527, 53132 (Or. 1985) (en banc)
(noting that Oregon has recognized the common law privacy
torts of appropriation, offensive publication of private facts,
and intrusion upon exclusion); State v. Lien, 441 P.3d 185,
193 (Or. 2019) ("Tortious invasion of privacy is one of the
limited number of torts in Oregon in which a plaintiff may
be awarded damages consisting solely of mental suffering
caused by the violation"); Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Cos,
712 P.2d 803, 814 (Or. 1986) (explaining instances where a
television program airing photographs of an accident victim
could give rise to a tortious invasion of privacy claim);
14
The dissent's reliance on Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), for the argument that
speech involving the creation of a recording that captures people's
speech "implicates the 'principle of autonomy to control one's own
speech'" is misplaced. Dissent at 5758. Hurley held that the First
Amendment prohibits the state from forcing a speaker to incorporate a
message that the speaker does not want to convey. See id. at 559, 581.
To the extent Hurley has any bearing on this case, it supports our View
that a law raises serious constitutional issues if it prohibits a speaker from
conveying the message the speaker wants to conveycandid responses
to issues of controversyby making unannounced recordings.
McLain v. Boise Cascade C0rp., 533 P.2d 343, 34546 (Or.

1975) (holding that unannounced recordings of the plaintiff
"engaged in various activities on his property outside his
horne" were not actionable as invasion of privacy torts
because the recordings "were done in such an unobtrusive
manner that plaintiff was not aware that he was being
watched and filmed" and the plaintiff "could have been
observed by . . . [a] passerby"). Or if the recording is
fabricated, "the Victims can turn to defamation actions for
recourse." Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1205; see also Neumann v.
Liles, 369 P.3d 1117, 112021 (Or. 2016)."
3
We conclude that section 165.540(1)(c) regulates

protected speech (unannounced audiovisual recording), and
is content based because it distinguishes between particular
topics by restricting some subject matters (e.g., a state
executive officer's official activities) and not others (e.g., a
police officer's official activities). As a content-based
restriction, the rule fails strict scrutiny review because the
law is not narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling
governmental interest in protecting conversational privacy
with respect to "each activity within the proscription's
scope," Berger, 569 F.3d at 1053, and there are other ways
15
The dissent's concern regarding "deepfakes" is overblown. Dissent at
5657, 72 n.16. As we explained in Wasden, victims of such fabrications
can vindicate their rights through tort actions. See 878 F.3d at 1205.
Moreover, deepfakes are not a problem unique to unannounced
recordings. Such "deepfakes" can be created just as easily with
announced recordings. As the dissent states, all one needs is "audio and
video of the person to be modeled" to create a "deepfake." Dissent at
5657, 72 n.16.
for Oregon to achieve its interests, see Wasden, 878 F.3d at

1205.
IV
The dissent agrees with our holding that section
165.540(1)(c) and its exceptions constitute a content-based
speech restriction that fails strict scrutiny review. Dissent at
50, 63. This should end our analysis.
Instead, the dissent argues that section 165.540(1)(c)'s
general prohibition should be analyzed as a stand-alone
provision that, by itself, is a constitutional content-neutral
speech restriction. Dissent at 5354. To reach that
conclusion, the dissent relies exclusively on its argument
that the court should offer Oregon a remedy of severability.
Dissent at 5053. Oregon chose not to make this argument
to the district court or to our court. But we briefly address it
here. Cf Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d
at 951 n.10 (declining to sever a subsection of a challenged
statute "[b]ecause the City ha[d] [forfeited] any argument
regarding severability by failing to raise it in its briefs or at
oral argument").16
A
"Severability is of course a matter of state law." Leavitt
v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996). To determine whether
a state statute is severable, we are bound by state statutes and
state court opinions. See Sam Francis Found v. Christies,
Ina, 784 F.3d 1320, 1325 (9th Cir. 2015) (en bane).
16
The dissent cites several Supreme Court cases decided before we
issued Comite de Jornaleros. Dissent at 5152, 52 n.7. But we are
bound by our precedent unless it is irreconcilable with a subsequent
higher authority. See Mllel*, 335 F.3d at 893.
The Oregon Supreme Court addressed the "nature of

severability" in State v. Dilts, 103 P.3d 95, 99 (Or. 2004) (en
bane)" According to the Oregon Supreme Court, the
relevant statute, "[section] 174.040[,] governs decisions
regarding severability." Id. This statute provides that "it is
the legislative intent, in the enactment of any statute, that if
any part of the statute is held unconstitutional, the remaining
parts shall remain in force" unless an exception applies."
The exceptions to this presumption (that the legislature
would prefer an unconstitutional part of a statute to be
severed and the rest to remain in force) include
circumstances where "parts of the statute are so
interconnected that it appears likely that the remaining parts
would not have been enacted without the unconstitutional
part, or . . . [it] the remaining parts are incomplete and cannot
be executed in accordance with legislative intent." Outdoor
17
Dilts provided a generally applicable analysis of Oregon severability
law. Nothing in the opinion suggests that this analysis would be different
if a party proposed severing the unconstitutional portion of a civil statute,
rather than a criminal statute. But see Dissent at 65.
18
Section 174.040 of the Oregon Revised Statutes provides in full:
It shall be considered that it is the legislative intent, in the
enactment of any statute, that if any part of the statute is
held unconstitutional, the remaining parts shall remain in
force unless:
(1) The statute provides otherwise;
(2) The remaining parts are so essentially and
inseparably connected With and dependent upon
the unconstitutional part that it is apparent that the
remaining parts would not have been enacted
without the unconstitutional part; or
(3) The remaining parts, standing alone, are
incomplete and incapable of being executed in
accordance with the legislative intent.
Media Dimensions, Inc. v. Dep't 0f Transp., 132 P.3d 5, 18

(Or. 2006).
Based on this statute, and Oregon Supreme Court cases,
severability analysis applies "when part of a statute is held
to be unconstitutional." Dilts, 103 P.3d at 99. Under such
circumstances, a court must consider "whether that part of
the statute can be severed and the remaining parts of the
statute saved." Id. Namely, under this framework, a court
must make two determinations. First, it must conclude that
part of the statute is unconstitutional. Second, it must
conclude that the rest of the statute can be "saved," meaning
it would be deemed constitutional, if the unconstitutional
part were severed. "When a party contends the entire act is
unconstitutional," then "severability is not germane until the
constitutional claim is . . . resolved." Bernstein Bros. v.
Dep'z' ofRevenue, 661 P.2d 537, 539 (Or. 1983).
As a general rule, under Dilts and section 174.040, a
court's threshold determination is whether a part of the
statute is unconstitutional. Indeed, Dilts rejected Oregon's
severability argument in that case because no party alleged
that the specific provision the state proposed to sever was
unconstitutional. 103 P.3d at 99. Nevertheless, when a
statute raises First Amendment concerns because it is
content based, the Oregon Supreme Court has considered
whether to sever a portion of the statute that singles out a
topic or subject matter for differential treatment, even if that
portion is not itself unconstitutional. See Outdoor Media
Dimensions, Inc., 132 P.3d at l9.
In this context, Outdoor Media Dimensions considered a
state statute that "requir[ed] a permit for a sign whose
message does not relate to the premises on which the sign is
located while providing an exemption for a sign whose
message does relate to the premises on which the sign is

located." Id. at 7. The court first held that by exempting on
premises signs from the permit requirement, the statute was,
"on its face, an impermissible restriction on the content of
speech" in Violation of the Oregon constitution. Id. at 18.
Turning to the issue of severability, the court explained that
to remedy the constitutional Violation it could either
invalidate the permit requirement or sever the exception for
onpremises signs. Id. at 19. The court determined that
"faced with that choice, the legislature would not have been
willing to extend the [statute's] permit and fee requirements
to . . . on-premises signs," and, therefore, the court held that
"the appropriate remedy" was to invalidate the permit
requirement. Id.
B
l
Under Outdoor Media, we may consider whether
severing the exceptions to section 165 .540(1)(c) would
"save" that section's general prohibition, even though the
exceptions are not themselves unconstitutional. Assuming
that section 165.540(1)(c), considered by itself, is content
neutral, it can be "saved" as constitutional if it qualifies as a
valid time, place, or manner restriction. Such a restriction
must (1) be content neutral, (2) survive intermediate scrutiny
review, and (3) "leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information." Hoye v. Cit); 0f
Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 844 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791); see also Regan v. Time,
Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984). Assuming that section
165.540(1)(c) would be content neutral if it were a stand-
alone provision and would survive intermediate scrutiny
review, we conclude it does not satisfy the third requirement.
PROJECT VERITAs V. SCHMIDT 35
"[A] regulation that forecloses an entire medium of

public expression across the landscape of a particular
community or setting fails to leave open ample alternatives."
United Bhd 0f Carpenters & Joiners 0f Am. Loc. 586 v.
NLRB, 540 F.3d 957, 969 (9th Cir. 2008). Regulations may
not hamper a speaker's preferred mode of communication to
such an extent that they compromise or stifle the speaker's
message. See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 48790
(2014). Alternatives that are "less effective media for
communicating the [speaker's] message . . . . are far from
satisfactory." Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Townshzp of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977). "[F]ree speech
protections extend to the right to choose a particular means
or avenue of speech in lieu of other avenues." United Bhd,
540 F.3d at 969 (cleaned up) (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Thus, While the "[g]overnment may regulate the
manner of speech in a content-neutral way," the government
"may not infiinge on an individual's right to select the means
of speech." Foti, 146 F.3d at 64142.
For example, in City ofLadue v. Gilleo, the Supreme
Court held that an ordinance that prohibited displaying signs
in front of one's residence did not leave open ample
alternative channels of communication. 512 U.S. 43, 56
(1994). In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court
rejected the city's argument that the law left open ample
alternative channels of communication because "residents
remain free to convey their desired messages by other
means, such as hand-held signs, letters, handbills, flyers,
telephone calls, newspaper advertisements, bumper stickers,
speeches, and neighborhood or community meetings." Id.
(citation and quotation marks omitted). In doing so, the
Supreme Court explained that "[d]isp1aying a sign from
one's own residence often carries a message quite distinct
36 PROJECT VERITAs V. SCHMIDT
forrn placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the

same text or picture by other means." Id. Indeed, it is
"[p]recise1y because of their location [that] such signs
provide information about the identity of the speaker." Id.
(quotation marks omitted). To illustrate, the Supreme Court
noted that "[a] sign advocating 'Peace in the Gulf in the
front lawn of a retired general or decorated war veteran may
provoke a different reaction than the same sign in a 10-year-
old child's bedroom Window or the same message on a
bumper sticker of a passing automobile." Id. Likewise,
"[a]n espousal of socialism may carry different implications
when displayed on the grounds of a stately mansion than
when pasted on a factory wall or an ambulatory sandwich
board." Id. at 5657. Moreover, the intention behind
placing a sign at one's residence may be "to reach neighbors,
an audience that could not be reached nearly as well by other
means." Id. at 57 (emphasis omitted). In some instances,
barring a means of speech effectively eliminates a message.
For speakers "of modest means or limited mobility, a yard
or window sign may have no practical substitute." Id. And
for others, "the added costs in money or time of taking out a
newspaper advertisement, handing out leaflets on the street,
or standing in front of one's house with a handheld sign may
make the difference between participating and not
participating in some public debate." Id.
In light of this understanding of what case law requires
for a speech restriction to leave open ample alternative
channels for communication, it is clear that section
165.540(l)(c) does not meet the mark. It functions as "an
absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression"the
creation of unannounced audiovisual recordings. United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). Though section
l65.540(1)(c) allows individuals to record conversations
where participants are "specifically informed that their

conversation is being obtained," such notification would
effectively destroy the intended content of the recording.
The subject matter of unannounced recordings is the
subjects' candid responses to issues of controversy. Because
the protected speech is the recording of subjects' unfiltered
responses, see Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1204, a rule that requires
the person creating the recording to provide notice
extinguishes that speech. In other words, creating
announced recordings is not an adequate alternative channel
of speech for creating unannounced recordings."
Nor does after-the-fact reporting of an undercover
interview or encounter provide an adequate alternative
method of communication. Audiovisual recording is a
unique medium of communication. It captures in real time
both the sounds and sights of an event, making it more
trustworthy and persuasiveand thus having vastly greater
impactthan post-hoe written or oral accounts. See Fields
v. Cit)» ofPhiladelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017)
(noting that audiovisual recordings "corroborate[] or lay[]
aside subjective impressions for objective facts"); Am. CL.
Union 0fIllinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 5 83, 595, 607 (7th Cir.
2012) (stating that the "selfauthenticating character" of
audiovisual recordings "makes it highly unlikely that other
methods could be considered reasonably adequate
substitutes"). Indeed, the Supreme Court recognized the
importance of audiovisual recording as corroborating or
disproving testimony in Scott v. Harris. Even on summary
19
In fact, the dissent expressly acknowledges these attributes, which are
unique to unannounced recordings. Dissent at 55. But by recognizing
that unannounced recordings are unique, the dissent has necessarily
conceded that other forms of media are inadequate substitutes.
judgment when "courts are required to View the facts and

draw reasonable inferences 'in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the [summary judgment] motion,"' the court
must rely on "the record of a Videotape capturing the events
in question," when it "clearly contradicts the version of the
story told by" the nonmoving party. 550 U.S. 372, 378
(2007) (citation omitted). Audiovisual recordings are also
unique because they can readily be disseminated to a wider
audience when incorporated into news programming. See
Fields, 862 F.3d at 359 ("Recordings also facilitate
discussion because of the ease in which they can be widely
distributed via different forms of media"); Am. CL. Union
0f Illinois, 679 F.3d at 607 (noting that audiovisual
recordings are "powerful methods of . . . disseminating
news and information"). Accordingly, section 165.540(1)(c)
does not leave open alternative channels to real-time,
unannounced audiovisual recordings. And we therefore
conclude that section 165.540(1)(c) (if read as a stand-alone
provision, without exceptions) is not a valid time, place, or
manner restriction.
In opposing this analysis, and arguing that section
165.540(1)(c) leaves open ample alternative channels of
communication, the dissent reframes the medium of public
expression sought by Project Veritas at a high level of
generality. According to the dissent, the relevant medium of
communication is not the unannounced recordings that
capture candid responses, but rather "investigative
journalism" generally. Dissent at 6163. At this high level
of generality, the dissent insists section 165.540 does not
prevent Project Veritas from engaging in investigative
journalism of some sort. And it claims that we previously
held that restricting unannounced recording does not
foreclose the medium of investigative journalism. See
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).

Dissent at 5556, 62 & n.11, 65.
We disagree With this analysis. First, the dissent again
fails to recognize the implications of Wasden. Under
Wasden, the creation of an unannounced recording of a
subject's unguarded conduct (which would include any
statements made in the course of such conduct) is itself a
form of protected speech and constitutes "a significant
medium" of public expression. 878 F.3d at 1203 (citation
and quotation marks omitted). As explained above, section
165 .540(1)(c) does not leave ample alternative channels for
Project Veritas's mode of speech. Thus, the dissent's
argument that section 165.540(1)(c) does not foreclose
investigative journalism as a journalistic approach misses
the mark. At some level of generality, "art" can be made
Without a paint brushbut neither sculpture nor architecture
is a substitute for painting.
Moreover, the dissent's reliance on Dietemann is

misplaced. Dissent at 5556, 62 & n.11, 65 . In Dietemann,
two journalists used a ruse to gain entry to the plaintiff' s
home and then surreptitiously photographed and recorded
him without consent. 449 F .2d at 24546. We held that the
plaintiff could state a claim for invasion of privacy under
California law because the conduct occurred inside the
plaintiffs home, id. at 248, and because the First
Amendment did not "accord newsmen immunity fitom torts
or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering,"
ia'. at 249. But Dietemann has no bearing on the question
whether a rule prohibiting unannounced recordings in public
places fails to leave open ample alternative channels of
communication.
For this reason, the dissent's argument that a parade of

horribles will result from our analysissuch as the
invalidation of "eavesdropping statutes"is not well-taken.
Dissent at 73. As explained, see supra Section III.A., the
threshold question is Whether the challenged law restricts
First Amendment protected speech. Under Wasden, the
creation of an unannounced recording is speech protected by
the First Amendment. But we are not aware of any cases
holding that eavesdropping (without more) is protected
speech. Therefore, the First Amendment would not
constitute grounds to invalidate a statute prohibiting that
conduct. Moreover, we analyzed section 165 .540(1)(c) as a
prohibition of First Amendment protected speech in public
places. See supra Section III.C. Our analysis of the state's
asserted governmental interest and whether its restriction on
speech is narrowly tailored would necessarily be different in
the context of eavesdropping, where an individual's
heightened privacy interests in his own home are at stake.
Nothing we have said today impugns the well-established
rule that the First Amendment does not "accord [a speaker]
immunity from torts or crimes committed" in service of his
speech. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.20
2
Because we conclude that section 165.540(1)(c) is not a

valid time, place, or manner restriction, it cannot be "saved"
by striking the two exceptions at issue here. Therefore,
20
The dissent argues that our conclusion that section 165.540(1)(c) is not
a valid time, place, or manner restriction, means that the Oregon
legislature is "in a catch-22." Dissent at 69. But a judicial determination
that a statute is unconstitutional does not put the legislature in a catch22
situation; rather, it merely tells the legislature that its enactment has
impermissibly infringed on the First Amendment rights of its citizens.
"severability is not germane." Bernstein Bros., 661 P.2d at

539. Further, under Outdoor Media Dimensions, we also
conclude that the Oregon legislature would not intend the
exceptions to be severed, because when Oregon courts
analyze severability, they "assum[e] that the legislature
prefers to avoid enacting a bill that raises serious questions
of constitutionality." State v. Borowski, 220 P.3d 100, 109
(Or. Ct. App. 2009).
If the exceptions were removed, section l65.540(l)(c)
would raise serious constitutional issues. This section would
prohibit the unannounced recording of police officers
performing their official duties or a felony endangering
human life. But we have consistently and repeatedly held
that "[t]he First Amendment protects the right to photograph
and [to] record matters of public interest," Askins, 899 F.3d
at 1044, which includes the right to "observ[e]
government[al] operation[s]," Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d
1196, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017), and the commission of a crime,
see Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1291
92 (9th Cir. 2014). Requiring a citizen to inform all parties
involved to capture governmental officials' performance of
official duties in public places, for example, would
substantially impede this speech right by foreclosing a major
avenue for citizens to "[g]ather[] information about
government officials in a[n unaltered] form that can readily
be disseminated to others," despite the fact that this type of
speech "serves a cardinal First Amendment interest in
protecting and promoting 'the free discussion of
governmental affairs." Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82
(lst Cir. 2011) (citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966)). Further, an announced recording of a felony in
progress would not only tend to reduce the opportunity to
capture such evidence, but also tend to imperil the person
recording. Given the impetus for this exception was to

enable police officers to make unannounced recordings of
felony drug transactions and felonies endangering human
life Without first obtaining a court order, see supra pp. 89,
the legislature would not choose to endanger police by
eliminating this exception to the general rule.
The dissent suggests that removing the exceptions from
the general prohibition in section l65.540(1)(c) would not
raise constitutional issues because a court would likely deem
section l65.540(1)(c) unconstitutional as applied to an
individual who filmed police or other matters of public
interest in public places. Dissent at 6869. But such a
conclusion merely acknowledges that the general
prohibition itself raises serious constitutional issues.
Therefore, severing the exceptions that make the general
prohibition content based, and extending the general
prohibition to these protected First Amendment activities,
would create significant constitutional issues rather than
cure them. Under Outdoor Media, we must presume that the
Oregon legislature would not retain such a law."
21
The dissent argues that the legislature would want to retain section
165.540(1)(c) as a stand-alone provision, even if the exception in section
165 .540(5)(b) for recording police officers were severed, because the
general prohibition in section 165.540(1)(c) "was freestanding for fifty-
six years before the legislature adopted the exception that allows the
recording of law enforcement officers performing official duties in
public." Dissent at 51; see also Dissent at 6768. This evinces a
misunderstanding of the relevant legislative history. The legislature
adopted section 165.540(1)(c) long before Fordyce made clear that such
a general prohibition on filming matters of public concern raises serious
constitutional questions. See 55 F.3d at 439. Following Fordyce and
subsequent opinions reiterating this rule, the legislature added the
exception in section 165.540(5)(b)likely to eliminate this
constitutional concern. (Unfortunately, the addition of this exception
***
Reading section 165.540(1)(c) as a whole, we conclude

that it is a content-based speech restriction that cannot
survive strict scrutiny because Oregon has not asserted a
compelling government interest and because the statute is
not narrowly tailored. The statute is also not a valid time,
place, or manner restriction because it does not leave open
ample alternative channels for communication. Applying
Oregon law, we may not sever the exceptions because
severing them would not render section 165 .540(1)(c)
constitutional. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute is
facially unconstitutional.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

"The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the
unrestrained right to gather information." Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
When it adopted Oregon Revised Statutes

section 165 .540(1)(c), the Oregon legislature required that
notice must be given before inperson oral conversations
may be recorded. With this statute, the legislature ensured
rendered section 165.540 a contentbased speech restriction, which

created a different First Amendment issue.) Given that the Oregon
legislature already evinced its intent to avoid the constitutional questions
raised when section l65.540(l)(c) was a standalone provision, we must
conclude that the legislature would not sever the exception in section
165.540(5)(b), which would merely bring back to life the same
constitutional issue that the Oregon legislature faced prior to enacting
this exception.
that Oregonians would be free to engage in the "uninhibited

exchange of ideas and information," without fear that their
words could be broadcast beyond their intended audience,
appear on the evening news, or worse, be manipulated and
shared across the internet devoid of relevant context.
Project Veritas engages in undercover investigative

journalism, and it finds Oregon's protection against the
secret recording of oral conversations a hindrance to its
operations. Project Veritas seeks a ruling declaring section
165.540(1)(c) unconstitutional, arguing there is no
distinction between hearing a conversation and secretly
recording it'. Because the majority does not dispute that the
State has a significant interest in protecting the privacy of
Oregonians who engage in conversations without notice that
their comments are being recorded, our court's analysis
should be straightforward. First, principles of federalism
require that we begin from a premise of reluctance to strike
down a state statute. Next, following Supreme Court
precedent, we should sever the two statutory exceptions that
Project Veritas challenges, apply intermediate scrutiny to the
content-neutral remainder, recognize that the statute is well-
tailored to meet Oregon's significant interest, and uphold
section 165.540(1)(c) as a reasonable time, place, or manner
restriction.
The majority takes a very different path. It begins by
straining to avoid the conclusion that the two exceptions to
section 540(1)(c)'s notice requirement that Project Veritas
challenges are severable. From there, the majority concludes
that severance is inappropriate by implausibly speculating
that the Oregon legislaturewhich the majority faults for
1
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 (2001) (citation omitted).
_Verified Correct Copy of Original 8117I2023.
overzealously protecting privacywould have preferred to

jettison all of section 540(1)(c) rather than striking the two
exceptions.
My colleagues do not contest that Oregon has a
significant interest in protecting people fiom unannounced
recordings of in-person conversations, but they rewrite the
State's articulated purpose. The purpose Oregon advances
is its significant interest in protecting participants from
having their oral conversations recorded without their
knowledge. The majority recasts the State's interest as one
in "protecting people's conversational privacy flom the
Speech of other individuals." Slip Op. at 25. (emphasis
added). That reframing of the legislature's purpose serves
as the springboard for the majority's reliance on an
inapplicable line of Supreme Court authority that pertains to
state action aimed at protecting people from unwanted
commercial or political speech; not protection from speech-
gathering activities like Project Veritas's, which are
qualitatively different because they appropriate the speech
of others.
The majority glosses over this important distinction, and
in the end, it declares that all of section 165.540(1)(c) is
unconstitutional by concluding that the State's ban on
unannounced recordings leaves no adequate alternative
channel of communication. This final rationale is contrary
to the reasoning of our own court, which has explained that
"hidden mechanical contrivances are [not] 'indispensable
tools' of newsgathering. Investigative reporting is an
ancient art; its successful practice long antecedes the
invention of miniature cameras and electronic devices."
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
Because modern technology now allows voice recordings to
be manipulated and disseminated worldwide with a few
Verified Correct Co py of Original 8/17I2023.
keystrokes and clicks, the protection afforded by section

165.540(1)(c) is more important than ever.
For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I.
In 1955, the Oregon legislature enacted what is now
section 165.540 of the Oregon Revised Statutes, a
wiretapping law that requires the consent of one party before
a telecommunication or a radio communication may be
recorded in Oregon. See State v. Lissy, 747 P.2d 345, 350
(1987); Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(1)(a) (1955)? The
legislature amended section 165.540 in 1959 to require that
anyone wishing to record an in-person conversation must
first specifically inform all participants.3 Lissy, 747 P.2d at
350 & n.4. "[T]he primary concern underlying [§]
165.540(1)(0) was the protection of participants in
conversations from being recorded without their
knowledge." State v. Nefi 265 P.3d 62, 66 (Or. Ct. App.
2011). The 1959 amendment was codified as
2
The original wiretapping statute provided, in relevant part, that a person
may not "[o]btain or attempt to obtain the whole or any part of a
telecommunication or a radio communication to which such person is
not a participant, by means of any device, contrivance, machine or
apparatus, whether electrical, mechanical, manual or otherwise, unless
consent is given by at least one participan ." Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 165.540(1)(a) (1955).
3
The section was later amended to include face-to-face conversations
conducted via video conference. Compare Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(6)(a)
(2022), with Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(6)(a) (2019). My use of the term
"in-person conversation" encompasses the audio portion of
conversations conducted by video conference.
_Verified Correct Copy of Original 8/17/2023.
section 165.540(1)(c) of the Oregon Revised Statutes, and it

is the focus of Project Veritas's appeal.'
Two exceptions to Oregon's ban on recording inperson
oral conversations are at issue. The first, adopted by the
legislature in 1989, allows the unannounced recording of "a
conversation during a felony that endangers human life."
Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(5)(a) (1989). The second
exception, adopted in 2015, permits the unannounced
recording of "a conversation in which a law enforcement
ofiicer is a participant," provided that certain conditions are
met. Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(5)(b) (2015).5 As to this
exception, the majority recognizes that our own court has
squarely held that the right to record law enforcement
officers performing official duties in public is protected by
the First Amendment. See Fordyce v. City ofSeattle, 55 F.3d
436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995); Askins v. U.S. Dep't ofHomeland
Sea, 899 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2018). The majority
takes the position that federal law also protects recording
during a felony that endangers human life. Assuming the
exceptions to section 540(1)(c) are indeed co-extensive with
4
Section l65.540(1)(c) provides that no person may "[o]btain or attempt
to obtain the whole or any part of a conversation by means of any device,
contrivance, machine or apparatus, whether electrical, mechanical,
manual or otherwise, if all participants in the conversation are not
specifically informed that their conversation is being obtained." Or. Rev.
Stat. § l65.540(1)(c) (1961). The term "conversation," is defined to
include only "oral communications." Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.535(1).
Specifically, the officer must be "performing official duties," the

5
recording must be made "openly and in plain view," the conversation

must be "audible to the person by normal unaided hearing," and the
person recording must be "in a place where the person lawfully may be."
Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(5)(b).
Verified Correct Co py of Original 8/17/2023.
conduct protected by the federal constitution, the exceptions

do not change the speech that is permitted in Oregon.
II.
Project Veritas challenges section 165.540(1)(c)'s

requirement that a participant must give notice before
recording an in-person conversation in Oregon. This
provision applies to unannounced recordings of
"conversations," which, as explained, are defined to include
only "oral communications." Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 165.535(1),
165.540(1)(c) (emphasis added). Project Veritas proposes to
investigate the Oregon Public Records Advocate and Public
Records Advisory Council by conducting surreptitious or
unannounced recordings of conversations in areas open to
the public, including cafes, parks, and sidewalks. Project
Veritas also proposes to investigate violent protests in
Portland by: (1) secretly recording conversations between
police and protestors; (2) secretly recording conversations
6
The majority asserts that section 165.540(1)(c) applies to both audio
and video recordings. It supports this statement with the observation that
the statute "bars individuals fiom obtaining a conversation 'by means of
any device," Slip Op. at 6 & n.3 (quoting State v. Copeland, 522 P.3d
909, 91112 (Or. Ct. App. 2022)), and the observation that the term
"conversation" is defined to include both in-person oral communications
and those conducted via video conference. Neither observation changes
that the statute expressly requires notification only before recording an
oral communication. A video recording that does not include an
accompanying audio recording of an oral communication is not subject
to the statute. The majority resists the result of the clear statutory
language by arguing Copeland did not differentiate between a video of a
"heated discussion" and a video of a shooting. Slip Op. at 6 n.3. But
that case concerned a video that captured both a conversation and a
shooting, and nothing in that opinion implies that section 165.540(1)(c)
would apply to a video that did not capture an oral communication. See
Copeland, 522 P.3d at 91213.
PROJECT VERITAS V. SCI-MDT 49
Verified Correct Co py of Original 8/17/2023.
between its journalists and police; (3) secretly recording

conversations between its journalists and protestors; and (4)
openly recording conversations with protestors without
providing notice of the recording. The majority repeatedly
suggests that Project Veritas seeks to record only in public
places, but Project Veritas avers only that most of its
recording will occur in public places. It does not identify the
other venues that it has in mind.
Project Veritas acknowledges the validity of Oregon's

prohibition on "eavesdropping," and explicitly disavows any
intention of eavesdropping. As Oregon defines that term,
this means Project Veritas will not intercept wire or oral
communications to which Project Veritas is not a party,
without the consent of the participants. Or. Rev. Stat.
§165.543(l). Instead, Project Veritas plans to record
conversations in which its reporters participate by using
concealed recording devices and not giving notice that the
conversations are being recorded. Project Veritas argues
that such recording is protected speech under the First
Amendment and that the other participants in these
conversations have only a "limited," "tenuous," and
"minimal" privacy interest in not having their speech
recorded.
A.
In defining the scope of First Amendment protection, our
precedent draws no distinction between the process of
creating speech and speech itself. Anderson v. City of
Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 106162 (9th Cir. 2010).
We have explained that "[b]ecause the recording process is
itself expressive and is 'inextricably intertwined' with the
resulting recording, the creation of audiovisual recordings is
speech entitled to First Amendment protection as purely
expressive activity." Animal Legal Def Fund v. Wasden,

878 F.3d 1184, 1204 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson, 621
F,3d at 1062) (reasoning that the act of creating a recording
is itself expressive, much like writing a book or painting a
picture). But unlike writing a book 0r painting a picture,
recording a conversation involves the appropriation of
others' speech. To be clear, I agree that Project Veritas's act
of creating a recording is protected speech, but it is important
to recognize that the type of speech Project Veritas plans to
engage inunannounced inperson recordings of oral
conversationsinfringes upon other speakers" competing
interest in conversational privacy. That competing interest
plays a critical role when we assess whether the State's time,
place, or manner restriction is reasonable and sufficiently
tailored to the State's significant interest.
Project Veritas argues that the dangerous-felony

exception and the lawenforcement exception are both
content based, rendering all of section 165.540(1)(c) content
based. For purposes of this analysis, I assume this is correct.
Content-based restrictions on speech are subject to strict
scrutiny, Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1204, and Oregon does not
argue that section 165.540(1)(c) can satisfy that heightened
standard. But even assuming that section 165.540(l)(c) fails
strict scrutiny if the two challenged exceptions are
considered, the question we should ask next is whether the
two statutory exceptions are severable.
B.
The Supreme Court recently reiterated in Barr v.
American Ass'n 0f Political Consultants, Inc. [AAPC], 140
S. Ct. 2335 (2020), that when confronted with an exception
that renders a restriction on speech impermissibly content
based, we apply ordinary severability principles, starting
with a "strong presumption of severability" that dates back

to the Marshall Court. Id. at 2350; see Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. C0. Acct. Oversight Ed, 561 U.S. 477, 508 (2010).
"The Court's presumption of severability . allows courts
. .
to avoid judicial policymaking or defacto judicial legislation

in determining just how much of the remainder of a statute
should be invalidated." AAPC, 140 S. Ct. at 2351. The
presumption of severability applies with particular force
Where, as here, the legislature "added an unconstitutional
amendment to a prior law. In those cases, the Court has
treated the original, pre-amendment statute as the 'Valid
expression of the legislative intent."' Id. at 2353 (quoting
Frost v. Corp. Comm 'n 0f Okla, 278 U.S. 515, 52627
(1929)). We need not guess at Whether the Oregon
legislature intended its previously enacted protection for in
person conversations to exist independently, because
section 165.540(1)(c) was a freestanding provision for thirty
years before the legislature adopted the dangerous-felony
exception, and it was freestanding for fifty-six years before
the legislature adopted the exception that allows the
recording of law enforcement officers performing official
duties in public. As the majority points out, the Oregon
legislature's statutory scheme is among the nation's
strongest protections for conversational privacy. Slip Op. at
6 n.1. What the majority overlooks is that this makes it
particularly implausible that the legislature intended
Oregon's entire conversational privacy statute to be struck
down rather than have the two challenged exceptions
severed. The majority suggests that it addresses severability
only because I rely on it, Slip Op. at 31, but the Supreme
Court has made clear that striking down a statute before
considering severability is not an option.
We have an obligation to consider severability regardless

of whether litigants raise it.7 Principles of federalism make
it particularly important that we apply a surgical approach in
this case and sever any constitutionally suspect provisions,
because we are a federal court treading on a state statute.
The majority acknowledges that the "[s]everability [of a
state statutory provision] isof course a matter of state law,"
Leavitz' v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996) (per curiam),
and both Oregon statutory law and Oregon Supreme Court
precedent require us to apply a presumption in favor of
severability, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 174.040; Outdoor Media
Dimensions, Inc. v. Dep 't of Transp., 132 P.3d 5, 18 (Or.
2006). Specifically, Oregon Revised Statutes
section 174.040 provides:
It shall be considered that it is the legislative

intent, in the enactment of any statute, that if
any part of the statute is held
unconstitutional, the remaining parts shall
remain in force unless:
(1) The statute provides otherwise;
7
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 186 (1992) ("Having
determined that the take title provision exceeds the powers of Congress,
we must consider whether it is severable from the rest of the Act."
(emphasis added»; accord Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc, 472 U.S.
491, 507 (1985) (rejecting appellees' argument that appellants had
forfeited the severability issue before our circuit and concluding that our
circuit should have considered severability before striking down a state
statute); see Brief for All Appellees at 44, Brockett, 472 U.S. 491 (Nos.
84-28, 84-143), 1984 WL 565782, at *44; see also Nat'l Ass'nfor Gun
Rights, Inc. v. Mangan, 933 F.3d 1102, 1122 (9th Cir. 2019) (addressing
severability sua sponte even though neither litigant addressed it on
appeal or in the district court).
(2) The remaining parts are so

essentially and inseparably
connected with and dependent
upon the unconstitutional part
that it is apparent that the
remaining parts would not have
been enacted without the
unconstitutional part; or
(3) The remaining parts, standing

alone, are incomplete and
incapable of being executed in
accordance with the legislative
intent.
In Outdoor Media Dimensions, the Oregon Supreme

Court explained that "[o]rdinarily, When one part of a statute
is found unconstitutional, this court's practice (and the
legislature's stated preference) is to sever the offending part
and save the remainder of the statute, unless the legislature '
has directed otherwise, unless the parts of the statute are so

interconnected that it appears likely that the remaining parts
would not have been enacted without the unconstitutional
part, or unless the remaining parts are incomplete and cannot
be executed in accordance with legislative intent." 132 P.3d
at 18. None of Oregon's exceptions to the presumption of
severability apply here, so we should sever the two
exceptions Project Veritas challenges and evaluate the
constitutionality of the remaining notice requirement.
C.
No one disputes that section 165.540(1)(c) is content
neutral if the two challenged exceptions are severed, so
intermediate scrutiny applies. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). To survive intermediate

scrutiny, a time, place, or manner restriction on speech must
be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information." Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. ley.
for Creative Non- Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). The
narrowtailoring requirement does not mean that the
government's restriction on speech must be the "least
restrictive or least intrusive means" of serving the state's
interest, but the government cannot "regulate expression in
such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on
speech does not serve to advance its goals." Id. at 79899.
1.
Oregon's attorney general argues that section

165.540(1)(c)'s restriction on recording in-person
conversations is justified by Oregon's significant interest in
ensuring that Oregonians know whether their conversations
are being recorded. This is unquestionably a significant state
interest. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[p]rivacy
of communication is an important interest" and that
restrictions protecting this interest can "encourag[e] the
uninhibited exchange of ideas and information among
private parties." Bartm'cki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532
(2001) (citation omitted). The Court has also recognized that
"the fear of public disclosure of private conversations might
well have a chilling effect on private speech." Id. at 533;
accord Am. CL Union 0f Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 605
(7th Cir. 2012) ("[Conversational privacy] is easily an
important governinental interest").
Project Veritas does not dispute this point. Indeed, it
acknowledges that "[p]rivacy is an important governmental
interest that eavesdropping and wiretapping prohibitions are

narrowly tailored to protect." Nevertheless, Project Veritas
argues that if one of its undercover reporters consents to
having an in-person conversation recorded, the other party
to the conversation has only a "limited," "tenuous," and
"minimal" privacy interest in not being recorded. To reach
this implausible conclusion, Project Veritas begins from the
assertion that "[a]n audio recording by a party is little more
than a more accurate record of what one party is already, in
the overwhelming majority of circumstances, entitled to
share in a free society." In other words, in Project Veritas's
View, having one's oral communication secretly recorded
imposes no greater burden on privacy than merely having the
same comments heardnever mind that recorded comments
can be forwarded to vast audiences, posted on the internet in
perpetuity, selectively edited, presented devoid of context,
or manipulated using modern technology.
Project Veritas's premise is emphatically wrong. In

Dietemann, we reasoned:
One who invites another to his home or office

takes a risk that the visitor may not be what
he seems, and that the visitor may repeat all
he hears and observes when he leaves. But
he does not and should not be required to take
the risk that what is heard and seen will be
transmitted by photograph or recording, or in
our modern world, in full living color and hi-
fi to the public at large or to any segment of
it that the Visitor may select. A different rule
could have a most pernicious effect upon the
dignity of man and it would surely lead to
guarded conversations and conduct Where

candor is most valued . . . .
449 F.2d at 249. This rationale is not limited to

conversations Within private residences, nor does Project
Veritas represent that it intends to limit its unannounced
recordings to public places, despite the majority's
suggestions to the contrary. Ironically, Project Veritas
argues that "audiovisual recordings are uniquely reliable and
powerful methods of preserving and disseminating news and
information," (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted), but sees no contradiction in its assertion that
turning these "uniquely reliable and powerful methods" on
private conversations poses no threat to privacy.
The secret recording of speech is far more destructive to
one's privacy than merely having oral communications
heard and repeated. Recorded speech can be stored
indefinitely, disseminated widely, and Viewed
repeatedly. In the age of the internet and generative artificial
intelligence (AI), surreptitious recording of in-person
conversations risks massive and ongoing invasions of
privacy. Today, anyone can access and learn how to use AI-
powered generative adversarial networks to create
convincing audio or video "deepfakes" that make people
appear to say or do things they never actually did.8 With
these tools, "the only practical constraint on one's ability to
produce a deepfake [is] access to training materialsthat is,
8
Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deepfakes and the New
Disinformation War, Foreign Affairs (Dec. 11, 2018),
1/
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/ZO18-121 deepfakes-
and-newdisinformation-war [https://perma.cc/TW6Z-Q97D].
audio and Video of the person to be modeled." Id. The

importance of the right to have notice before one's oral
communications are recorded cannot be overstated because
technology now allows recordings to be selectively edited,
manipulated, and shared across the internet in a matter of
seconds.
Project Veritas acknowledges the privacy interest at

stake in Oregon's ban on eavesdropping, yet it denies that
the same privacy interests are at stake in Oregon's ban on
secret recording of inperson conversations. This position is
unsupportable. The privacy interest implicated by secret
recordings of in-person conversations is grounded in the
same concerns as the privacy interest implicated by
eavesdropping; in both circumstances, a person's oral
communications are shared with an unintended audience and
the speaker loses the ability to knowingly choose to speak,
or not speak, based upon that audience.
There is no question that journalists perform a vital role

in our society and their ability to engage in speech is entitled
to constitutional protection, but Project Veritas's speech is
not the only speech implicated by the issues in this appeal.
By striking down Oregon's carefully crafted statute, the
court denies Project Veritas's interviewees the opportunity
to knowingly choose not to participate in the recordings
Project Veritas plans to create. Respectfully, the majority
overlooks that secret recordings can incorporate and
disseminate oral comments in ways the original speaker did
9
The majority argues this concern about deepfakes is overblown because
a person' svoice can also be captured through announced recording. This
misses the critical point: once a person has notice that her conversation
will be recorded, she can choose not only what to say, but also whether
to speak at all.
not intend, and that this implicates the "principle of

autonomy to control one's own speech." See Hurley v. Irish-
Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. 0fBos., 515 U.S. 557,
574 (1995). As the Supreme Court has explained, "The First
Amendment securely protects the freedom to make0r
decline to makeone's own speech; it bears less heavily
when speakers assert the right t0 make other people's
speeches" Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003)
(emphasis added) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to
a copyright extension); see also Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)
(recognizing, along with the freedom to express one's Views
publicly, the "concomitant freedom not to speak publicly"
(quoting Est. of Hemingway v. Random House, Ina, 244
N.E.2d 250, 255 (N.Y. 1968))).
Project Veritas stresses that its clandestinely recorded
conversations Will be held mostly in public places like cafes
or parks. But the State has a significant interest in preventing
the secret recording of private conversations even when
those conversations occur in public or semipublic locations.
Everyday experiences tell us that "private talk in public
places is common." Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 606 (citation
omitted). In many circumstances, even if a conversation
may be heard or overheard by multiple people, the State
maintains a significant interest in preventing its recording.
For example, the State of Oregon points out that this interest
is most obvious in multiparty gatherings that welcome
members of the public yet expect that attendees will not
make secret recordings of each other, such as twelve-step
groups, bible study, and religious services. Our society
respects those boundaries. Oregon has a significant interest
in preventing unannounced recordings of oral in-person
conversations.
2.
The next question is Whether section 165.540(1)(c) is

narrowly tailored to that interest. I conclude it is. By
requiring that participants in a conversation be informed
before it is recordedbut not requiring that they consent to
the recordingthe statute infringes as little as possible on
the process Project Veritas intends to use to create its speech,
while still protecting the interviewees' right to knowingly
participate in Project Veritas's speechor not. Once a
person is on notice that she will be recorded, recording does
not Violate any privacy interest. Keeping the Oregon
legislature's actual purpose in mind, the statute is
exceptionally well tailored to ensuring that Oregonians'
conversations will not be recorded without their knowledge.
Consistent with that interest, the statute does not sweep in
photography or Video recordingsbut rather applies only to
recordings of oral communications."
There are some settings in which people cannot
reasonably expect not to have their oral statements recorded,
and the Oregon legislature crafted its statute to account for
those situations:
The prohibitions in subsection (l)(c) of this

section do not apply to persons who intercept
or attempt to intercept oral communications
that are part of any of the following
Although "private talk in public places is common," Alvarez, 679 F.3d

1°
at 606 (citation omitted), and people may reasonably expect, even in

public places, that their private conversations will not be recorded, a
person cannot reasonably expect that his visual image will not be
captured in public.
proceedings, if the person uses an

unconcealed recording device . . . :
(A) Public or semipublic meetings such as

hearings before governmental or
quasigovernmental bodies, trials,
press conferences, public speeches,
rallies and sporting or other events;
(B) Regularly scheduled classes or

similar educational activities in
public or private institutions; or
(C) Private meetings or conferences if all
others involved knew or reasonably
should have known that the recording
was being made.
Or. Rev. Stat. §l65.540(6)(a). The exceptions in section

l65.540(6)(a) permit Project Veritas to openly record at
public protests as it proposes to do. Project Veritas points
out that this exception does not render section 540(1)(c)
perfectly tailored to Oregon's stated purpose. For example,
the law prohibits recording "a loud argument on the street, a
political provocateur on a crowded subway, [or] a drunk,
hate-filled conversation in a parking lot," even though the
participants in such conversations lack any expectation that
their words will not be recorded. Section 165.540(l)(c)'s
notice requirement may be overbroad as applied to these
fringe cases, but far from demonstrating that a "substantial
portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance
[Oregon's] goals," Ward, 491 U.S. at 799, Project Veritas's
resort to these niche examples illustrates that the bulk of
Oregon's protection against secret audio recording is
targeted at achieving the State's significant interest. Nothing
more is required to meet intermediate scrutiny's tailoring

requirement.
3.
Section 165.540(1)(c) also leaves open ample alternative

channels of communication for Project Veritas to engage in
investigative journalism and to communicate its message. It
is well-settled that an alternative channel need not be ideal,
but merely adequate. See Hefion v. Int 'l Soc 'y for Krishna
Consciousness, Ina, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981); Reynolds v.
Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 232 n.5 (4th Cir. 2015) ("The
available alternatives need not be the speaker's first or best
choice or provide the same audience or impact for the
speech." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted»;
Weinberg v. Cit}; of Chicago, 310 F .3d 1029, 1041 (7th Cir.
2002) ("An adequate alternative does not have to be the
speaker's first choice"). A restriction runs afoul of the
"alternative channels" requirement if it eliminates the only
method of communication by which speakers can convey
their message to a particular audience. See, e. g, Bay Area
Peace Navy v. United States, 914 F.2d 1224, 122930 (9th
Cir. 1990). But a regulation does not fail intermediate
scrutiny merely because the other available channels of
communication would convey the same message somewhat
less conveniently or effectively. See, e. g, Santa Monica
Nativigz Scenes Comm. v. City of Santa Monica, 784 F.3d
1286, 129899 (9th Cir. 2015); One World One Fam. Now
v. City & Count); ofHonolulu, 76 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir.
1996)
"We have observed that the Supreme Court generally
will not strike down a governmental action for failure to
leave open ample alternative channels of communication
unless the government enactment will foreclose an entire
62 PROJECT VERITAS V. SCI-MIDT
medium of public expression across the landscape of a

particular community or setting." Menotz'i v. Cit); 0f Seattle,
409 F.3d 1113, 1138 (9th Cir. 2005) (alteration accepted)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Project
Veritas has no colorable argument that it would be unable to
gather information to engage in investigative journalism, to
communicate its message "across the landscape of a
particular community or setting," or to reach a particular
audience if it cannot secretly record in-person oral
interviews. Indeed, we made clear in Dietemann that
restricting surreptitious recording does not foreclose an
entire medium." 449 F.2d at 249.
Project Veritas retains ample alternative means of

engaging in investigative journalism and expressing its
message. It can employ all the tools of traditional
investigative reporting, including but not limited to talking
with whistleblowers and other inside sources, crowd-
sourcing information, researching public records, taking
photographs and recording Videos that do not capture oral
conversations, and using Oregon's freedomofinformation
laws. See, eg, Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 192311431, 192.610
.695. It can also openly record during public and semi-
public meetings and events, Or. Rev. Stat.
§ l65.540(6)(a)(A), and, in other settings, provide notice
that it is recording without announcing that it is engaging in
investigative journalism. These many approaches to
11
The majority protests that Dietemann addressed whether the First
Amendment barred state tort liability for invasion of privacy, but my
colleagues do not try to explain why Dietemann's observations about the
nature and history of investigative reporting are not applicable here.
traditional investigative reporting satisfy the alternative-

channels requirement.
III.
Rather than taking the straightforward path that this case
calls for, the majority strikes down all of section
165.540(l)(c) by making several unjustified leaps. First, the
majority decides that the two content-based exceptions
Project Veritas challenges cannot be severed because, it
reasons, the exceptions themselves are not unconstitutional
and severing them would raise other constitutional
questions. Despite strong indications to the contrary, the
majority next decides that the Oregon legislature would
rather strike down the state's entire statutory protection for
conversational privacy rather than sever the two exceptions.
The majority also errs by invoking case law that addresses
statutes and ordinances adopted to protect others from
unwanted commercial or political speech. Finally, my
colleagues conclude that even if the two exceptions were
severed, section 165 .540(l)(c) would still be
unconstitutional because it fails to leave open ample
alternative channels of communication. The majority makes
several missteps in its analysis.
A.
I agree that section l65.540(l)(c) would not survive
strict scrutiny Viewed as a wholeindeed, Oregon never
argues otherwise. But the State of Oregon specifically
describes Oregon's interest in in this statute as "protecting
Oregonians from having their private conversations
unwittingly made the subject of audio recordings without
their knowledge." See Nefl, 265 P.3d at 66 ("[T]he primary
concern underlying [section] l65.540(1)(c) was the
protection of participants in conversations from being
recorded without their knowledge"). The majority redefines

Oregon's interest, reasoning, because the act of recording a
conversation is protected speech, Oregon's interest is more
accurately stated "as protecting individuals' conversational
privacy from the speech of other individuals, even in places
open to the public." Slip Op. at 25.
The analogy the majority draws, to case law addressing
statutes protecting individuals from the unwanted speech of
others, is flawed. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717 (2000); Berger
v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009) (en
banc); Kuba v. l-A Agric. Association, 387 F.3d 850, 861
n.10 (9th Cir. 2004)). The cases the majority cites involve
restrictions on speech intended to further different interests,
such as preventing the display of profane slogans in a
courtroom (Cohen); limiting abortion protestors' unwanted
approaches toward clinic patients (Hill); shielding park-
goers from obnoxious behavior by street performers
(Berger); and protecting commercial patrons from the
speech of protesters (Kuba). None of the cases cited by the
majority address one speaker's appropriation of another
person's speech, as Project Veritas proposes to do. Our court
gravely missteps by ignoring that this appeal implicates not
only the First Amendment rights of the person creating a
recording, but also the First Amendment rights of those who
do not wish to have their speech recorded.
The majority incorrectly asserts that Wasden forecloses

my analysis. Slip Op. at 28. Wasa'en concerned a video of
cows being abused at an agricultural facility, not a secretly
recorded audio conversation between people. See 878 F.3d
at 118990. Wasa'en cannot bear the weight the majority
places on it because the video in that case did not require the
court to confront a secret audio recording that invaded
conversational privacy and captured the oral

communications of other people. The majority is also
incorrect to suggest that Wasden foreclosed any argument
that unannounced recordings that appropriate others" speech
place a greater burden on privacy than other types of
unwanted expressive conduct. Wasden held that the creation
0f a recording is speech protected by the First Amendment,
see id. at 1203; it did not purport to address whether the
invasion of privacy caused by secret recording of private
conversations is equivalent to the invasion of privacy caused
by being bombarded with unwanted speech in public places.
B.
The majority agrees that Oregon law governs
severability, but it concludes that the dangerous-felony and
lawenforcement exceptions cannot be severed from section
l65.540(1)(c) for three wobbly reasons. First, the majority
decides that even without these exceptions, the statute would
be unconstitutional because it fails to leave open ample
alternative channels. I disagree with this conclusion for
reasons previously explained, and because my colleagues'
rationale contravenes our own court's recognition that
investigative journalism does not require secret recording
devices or hidden cameras. See Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.
The majority also argues that Oregon law does not
permit the two challenged exceptions to be severed because
the exceptions themselves are not unconstitutional. The
majority misreads Oregon law. In particular, its reliance on
State v. Dilts, 103 P.3d 95 (Or. 2004) is sorely misplaced.
There, a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were violated
when a judge imposed a sentence above the state-law
guidelines without providing the defendant an opportunity to
argue the facts justifying an increased sentence to the jury.
Id. at 99. On appeal, the prosecution asked the court to sever

the state-law requirement that the defendant's sentence be
Within the guidelines even though neither party had
challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory guidelines.
Id. In other words, the prosecution asked the court to sever
the requirement not because it rendered the statute
unconstitutional, but because it rendered the defendant's
sentence unconstitutional. It was only in response to the
prosecution's unusual argument that the Oregon Supreme
Court explained it would not sever a statute that neither party
claimed was unconstitutional. Id.
The Oregon Supreme Court makes no bright-line
distinction between exceptions that are themselves
unconstitutional and exceptions that render the remainder of
a statute unconstitutional. For instance, in Outdoor Media
Dimensions, the Oregon Supreme Court evaluated a
multifaceted state statute that regulated highway signs. 132
P.3d at 7. The plaintiffs challenged several of the statute's
provisions, including one that required permits for highway
signs unrelated to the premises but exempted on-premises
signs. Id. at 9. The permit requirement and exemption were
adopted at the same time. See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 377.725,
377.735 (1971). The court concluded that the on-premises
exemption was content based and that it rendered the
permitting requirement unconstitutional, but it upheld the
rest of the statute. Outdoor Media Dimensions, 132 P.3d at
19. Notably, the court did not consider the constitutionality
of the exemptionwhich allowed onpremises signs
without a permitin isolation. Rather, the court concluded
that the "on-premises/offpremises distinction" was
unconstitutional and that severance of that provision was
appropriate. Id; see also Cit); Univ. v. State, Ofi. of Educ.
Pol 'y & Plan, 885 P.2d 701, 703, 70607 (Or. 1994)
(severing an exception that caused an Oregon statute to

discriminate against out-ofstate schools in Violation of the
Commerce Clause).
Turning to the remedy, the Outdoor Media Dimensions

court considered "the same two unpalatable choices that the
legislature would face," namely, Whether to strike only the
exemption from the permitting requirement, and require
permits for "thousands of individuals and businesses"; or to
instead strike the permitting requirement entirely. 132 P.3d
at l9. The court decided the outcome should turn on
legislative intent alone, and ultimately invalidated the entire
permitting requirement because it concluded that the
legislature would not have enacted it without the
simultaneously enacted exemption. Id. Here, by contrast, I
see no viable argument that the Oregon legislature did not
intend the dangerousfelony exception and law-enforcement
exception to be severable, because section 165.540(1)(c)
was operative for decades before these exceptions were
added. See AAPC, 140 S. Ct. at 2353. The legislature did
not direct that the exceptions may not be severed, they are
not interconnected, nor is the remaining part of the statute
incomplete or inoperable without them. Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 165.540.
Finally, the majority argues that Oregon courts would

invalidate all of section 165.540(1)(c), not just the content
based exceptions, because severing those exceptions would
raise other constitutional concerns." To support this
contention, the majority cites State v. Borowski, 220 P.3d
12
The majority also relies on the legislative history of the challenged
exceptions, taking the unusual step of calling out statements made by the
Oregon State Sheriffs' Association and the ACLU to divine legislative
intent. Slip Op. at 910.
100, 109 (Or. Ct. App. 2009), which considered, among

other factors, the legislature's preference to avoid enacting
bills that raise serious questions of constitutionality. But
Borowski, much like Outdoor Media Dimensions, concerned
an exception enacted simultaneously with the challenged
provision. See id. at 109; Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.887 (1999).
Because the Oregon legislature enacted section
l65.540(1)(c) as a stand-alone provision that operated for
decades before it adopted either of the challenged
exceptions, we are not left to wonder Whether the legislature
would enact section 165.540 on its ownit did exactly that
in 1959. See State ex rel. Musa v. Minear, 401 P.2d 36, 39
(Or. 1965) (declaring an amended state statute invalid and
reverting to the preamendment statute).
Failing to sever the two exceptions makes even less
sense When one considers that the majority concedes the
First Amendment protects the right to record law-
enforcement officers in public and the right to make
unannounced recordings during felonies that endanger
human life. See Askins, 899 F.3d at 1044; Obsidian Fin.
Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 129192 (9th Cir. 2014);
Fordyce v. City ofSeattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995).13
13
Other circuits agree. On recording law-enforcement officers, see, for
example, Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 85 (lst Cir. 2011); Fields v. City
ofPhiladelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017); Turner v. Lieutenant
Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 688 (5th Cir. 2017); Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583; Smith
v. City ofCumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). Indeed, the
First Circuit has held that the First Amendment right to record law
enforcement is "clearly established" even for the purposes of qualified
immunity. See Glik, 655 F.3d at 85 ("[A] citizen's right to film
government officials, including law enforcement officers, in the
discharge of their duties in a public space is a basic, Vital, and well-
established liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment"). On
recording crimes, see, for instance, Adventul'e Outdoors, Inc. v.
Because the exceptions to section 540(1)(c) permit conduct

protected by the federal constitution, both exceptions could
be struck Without changing the speech that is permitted in
Oregon. Cf. Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 608 (enjoining Illinois
from enforcing its recording prohibition as applied to open
audio recording of law-enforcement officers engaged in their
official duties in public places). Nevertheless, the majority
concludes that because the Oregon legislature included these
carveouts, Oregon's entire notice requirement must receive
strict scrutiny. The majority's reasoning places the
legislature in a catch-22: the First Amendment requires it to
carve out the two challenged exceptions, but because the
legislature included the carveouts, the majority decides the
entire statute becomes subject to strict scrutiny. We need not
adopt this topsy-turvy approach; we should simply sever the
two challenged exceptions.
C.
Perhaps the weakest link in the majority's opinion is its

conclusion that section l65.540(l)(c) does not leave open
ample alternative channels of communication because it
constitutes an "absolute prohibition on a particular type of
expression," namely "unannounced audiovisual recordings."
Setting aside that the statute does not address video
recording," I disagree that Oregon's ban on unannounced
audio recording eliminates an entire medium of public
expression. The majority cites Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (observing that speech
that "alleged violations of federal gun laws" involved a matter of public
concern); Boule v. Hutton, 328 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that
an article addressing art-market fraud "is certainly protected" under the
First Amendment).
14
See 0r. Rev. Stat. § 165.5350).
Townshzp 0f Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977); Cit); 0f

Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 5657 (1994); McCullen v.
Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 48790 (2014); United Bhd. 0f
Carpenters & Joiners ofAm. Loc. 586 v. NLRB, 540 F.3d
957, 969 (9th Cir. 2008); and Foti v. Cit); ofMenlo Park, 146
F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998) in support of its alternative-
channels holding, but these cases all miss the mark.
In Linmark, the Supreme Court invalidated as content
based a township's ban on "For Sale" signs, which it had
enacted "to stem what it perceive[d] as the flight of White
homeowners from a racially integrated community." 431
U.S. at 86. The Court stressed that the township council was
concerned "with the substance of the information
communicated" by the signs and that the ban was not
"unrelated to the suppression of free expression" Id. at 93,
96 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)). Linmark's language cannot be stretched to imply
that any alternative that is "less effective" than a speaker's
chosen medium is "far from satisfactory." Slip Op. at 35
(quoting Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93). Rather, Linmark
explained that the Court doubted whether the ordinance left
open "ample alternative channels for communication"
because the alternatives were "less effective," and also
because those alternatives "involve[d] more cost and less
autonomy than 'For Sale' signs [and] [we]re less likely to
reach persons not deliberately seeking sales information."
Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93 (internal citations omitted). After
Linmark, the Supreme Court clarified that an alternative
need not be a speaker's first or best choice, but is adequate
if it "permits the more general dissemination of a
message." Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988); see
Hejfion, 452 U.S. at 647 ("[T]he First Amendment does not
guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times
and places or in any manner that may be desired"). Project

Veritas does not argue that alternatives to surreptitious
recording involve more cost, or less autonomy, or otherwise
make their message less likely to reach its intended audience.
Project Veritas's complaint is that Oregon's statute will
impede its ability to gather information.
City 0f Ladue also fails to support Project Veritas's
cause. There, the Supreme Court held that a restriction on
residential signs did not leave open adequate alternative
channels of communication because "[d]isplaying a sign
from one's own residence often carries a message quite
distinct from placing the same sign someplace else, or
conveying the same text or picture by other means." 512
U.S. at 56. Citjz ofLadue emphasized the long-held tradition
of respect for individual liberty in the home and for a
person's ability to speak there. Id. at 58. Here, by contrast,
Project Veritas does not argue that reporting on in-person
oral conversations without surreptitiously obtained audio
recordings would convey a different message, only that its
information gathering would be somewhat less effective, and
there is no comparable tradition of respect for surreptitious
recording. Indeed, surreptitious recording is generally
considered a breach of journalistic ethics except when
certain narrow criteria are met. 15
McCullen is even less applicable.
There, the Court
struck down a statute establishing buffer zones around
abortion clinics because the statute was insufficiently
tailored. The Court did not even reach "whether the Act
15
See, e. g, Radio Television Digital News Ass'n (RTDNA), Guidelines
for Hidden Cameras, https://www.rtdna.org/hidden-cameras
[https://perma.cc/8MQ3-P8A9].
leaves open ample alternative channels of communication."

McCullen, 573 U.S. at 496 n.9.
The majority correctly observes that the First
Amendment's protections "extend to the 'right to choose a
particular means or avenue of speech . . in lieu of other
.
avenues," United Bhd., 540 F.3d at 969 (quoting Fotz', 146

F.3d at 641), but section 165.540(1)(c) governs how, not
whether, Project Veritas can use recording devices. The
statute thus permissibly "regulate[s] the manner of speech in
a content-neutral way," Without "infring[ing] on an
individual's right to select the means of speech." Foti, 146
F.3d at 64142.
The majority and Project Veritas both argue that
recordings are unique in their trustworthiness, "self-
authenticating character," and ease of distribution, ignoring
that surreptitious audio recording is a uniquely effective
means for reporters to gather information precisely because
it is uniquely effective at invading privacy. The very aspects
of surreptitious audio recording that render it distinct from
other modes of communication, such as its discreetness and
its ability to widely disseminate the contents of a
conversation, are the same aspects that render it particularly
16
damaging to privacy.
The majority's alternative-channels analysis is
particularly concerning because it has no obvious limits. My
colleagues suggest that their opinion will be cabined because
16
It is also worth noting that the self-authenticating character of audio
recordings is rapidly eroding as modern technology renders "deepfakes"
ever more accessible and difficult to distinguish from actual recordings.
See generally Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes.' A
Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107
CAL. L. REV. 1753, 175568 (2019).
they View section 165.540(1)(c) as an outlier among other

states' limitations on recording conversations. But if it is
enough to show that newsworthy information could be
obtained by a particular method, the majority's rationale
might well apply to Oregon's eavesdropping statute, or to
narrower conversational privacy statutes adopted in other
states. After all, eavesdropping and unannounced recording
in nonpublic locations are also effective methods to gather
information of public concern that cannot be otherwise
obtained. Though the majority disavows the suggestion that
its reasoning could be applied to strike down eavesdropping
statutes, it is hard to see why the forty other states that have
adopted more limited conversational privacy statutes are not
vulnerable in light of today's opinion.
IV.
"[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the
press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report
the news." Cohen v. Cowles Media Ca, 501 U.S. 663, 669
(1991). In this case, we should simply sever the
constitutionally suspect exceptions that Project Veritas
challenges, and uphold the remainder of
section 165.540(1)(c).
74 PROJECT VERITAS V. SCHNIIDT
Appendix A
States allowing recording without providing notice to
or obtaining consent from the recording's subjects when
created in a place where the subjects lack a reasonable
expectation of privacy:
Alabama: Ala. Code §§ 13A-11-30, 13A-1131; Chandler v.
Alabama, 680 So. 2d 1018, 1026 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996)
Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-3001(8), 13-
3005(A)(2), 13-3012(9); Arizona v. Hauss, 688 P.2d 1051,
1056 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984)
Arkansas: Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-16-101(a), (b), 5-60-120(a)
California: Cal. Penal Code § 632; Flanagan v. Flanagan,
27 Cal. 4th 766, 768 (2002); Kearney v. Salomon Smith
Barney, Ina, 39 Cal. 4th 95, 11718 (2006)
Colorado: Colo Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 18-9-301(8), 18-9-
304(1)(a)
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a189a(a)(1);
Connecticut v. Panek, 177 A.3d 1113, 1126 (Conn. 2018)
Delaware: Del Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 2401(13), 2402(a)(1),
(0X4)
District of Columbia: D.C. Code §§ 23541(2), 23-542(a)(1),
(b)(3)
Florida: Fla. Stat. §§ 934.02(2), 934.03(1)(a), (2)(d);
McDonouglz v. FernandezRundle, 862 F.3d 1314, 1319
(11th Cir. 2017); Florida v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272,
1275 (Fla. 1985); Dept. of Ag. & Con. Servs. v. Edwards,
654 S0. 2d 628, 63233 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-60(3), 16-11-62(1), 16-

11-66(a); Suggs v. Georgia, 854 S.E.2d 674, 680 (Ga. 2021)
Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 803-41, 803-42(a)(1), (b)(3)(A);

Hawaii v. Graham, 780 P.2d 1103, 1110 (Haw. 1989)
Idaho: Idaho Code Ann. §§ 18-6701(2), 186702(1)(a),
(2)01)
Illinois: 720111. Comp. Stat. Ann. §§ 5/14-2(a)(1), (2), 5/14-
1(a), (d), (g)
Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. §§ 727.8(2), (3)(a), 808B.1(8),
808B.2(1)(a), (2)(c)
Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6101(a)(4), (f)
Louisiana: La. Stat. Ann. §§ 15:1302(15), 15 :1303(A)(1),
(C)(4); Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov 't, 731
F.3d 488, 495 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2013)
Maine: 15 Me. Rev. Stat. §§ 709(4), (5), 710(1)
Maryland: Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 10-401(13),

10-402(a)(1), (C)(3); Agnew v. Maryland, 197 A.3d 27, 34
35 (Md. 2018)
Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 750.539a, 750.5390,

750.539d(l), Bowens v. Ary, Ina, 794 N.W.2d 842, 84344
(Mich. 2011); Kasper v. Rupprecht, No. 312919, 2014 WL
265542, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2014) (per curiam);
Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675, 684 (Mich. Ct. App.
2003); Sullivan v. Gray, 324 N.W.2d 58, 6061 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982) (per curiam)
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. §§ 626A.01, 626A.02; Minnesota v.
Vaughn, 361 N.W. 2d 54, 5758 (Minn. 1985)
Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-29-5010), 41-29-
531(e), 41-29-533(1); Jackson v. Mississippi, 263 S0. 3d
1003, 1011 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018); Ott v. Mississippi, 722
So. 2d 576, 582 (Miss. 1998)
Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 86283, 86-290(1)(a),

(2)(c); Nebraska v. Biernacki, 465 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Neb.
1991)
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.650; Lane v. Allstate
Ins. C0., 969 P.2d 93 8, 940 (Nev. 1998)
New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 570-A:1(II), 570-

A:2(I)(a); Fischer v. Hooper, 732 A.2d 396, 401 (N.H.
1999); New Hampshire v. Lamontagne, 618 A.2d 849, 851
(NH. 1992)
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:156A-2(b), 2A:156A-
3(a), 2A:156A-4(d)
North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 15A-286(17), 15A-
287(a)(1)
North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code Ann. §§ 12.115-02(1)(a),
(3)(c), 12.1-15-04(5)
Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2933.51(B), 2933.52(A)(1),
(B)(4); Ohio v. Childs, 728 N.E.2d 379, 388 (Ohio 2000)
Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, §§ 176.2(12), 176.3(1),
(2), 176.4(5); KF. v. Oklahoma, 797 P.2d 1006, 1007 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1990)
Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5702, 5703(1),

5704(4); Pennsylvania v. Mason, 247 A.3d 1070, 1081 (Pa.
2021)
Rhode Island: R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 11-35-21(a)(1),
(c)(3), 12-5.1-1(10)
South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-30-10, 17-30-15(2),
17-30-20(1), 173030(C)
South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws §§ 23A-35A-1(6), (10),
23A-35A-20(1), (2); South Dakota v. Owens, 643 N.W.2d
735, 753 (SD. 2002); South Dakota v. Braddock, 452

N.W.2d 785, 788 (S.D. 1990)
Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-601(a)(1)(A), (b)(5),
40-6-303(14)
Texas: Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 16.02(b)(1), (0X4); Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18A.001(19)
Utah: Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23a3(13), 77-23a4(1)(b)(i),
(7)(b)
Virginia: Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-61, 19.2-62(A)(1), (B)(2)
Washington: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9.73.030(1)(b);
Washington v. Roden, 321 P.3d 1183, 1188 (Wash. 2014)
(en bane); Washington v. Kipp, 317 P.3d 1029, 1034 (Wash.
2014) (en bane)
West Virginia: W. Va. Code §§ 62-1D-2(i), 62-1D-3(a)(1),
(e); West Virginia v. Mullens, 650 S.E.2d 169, 187 (W. Va.
2007)
Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 968.27(12), 968.31(1)(a),
(2X0)
Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-3-701(Xi), 7-3-702(a)(i),
(b)(iV)
States prohibiting recording Without providing notice
to or obtaining consent from the recording's subjects
when created in a place where the subjects lack a
reasonable expectation of privacy:
Alaska: Alaska Stat. Ann. §§ 42.20.390(9), 42.20.310(a)(1)
Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 526.010, 526.020
Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272, § 99(B)(2),

(4), (C)(1); Curtatone v. Barsz'ool Sports, Ina, 169 N.E.3d
480, 483 (Mass. 2021)
Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 45-8213(1)(c); Montana v.
DuBray, 77 P.3d 247, 263 (Mont. 2003); Montana v. Lynch,
969 P.2d 920, 922 (Mont. 1998)
Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540(1)(c)

States without laws regarding the recording of in-
person conversations:
Indiana, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, Vermont
CaseNo: ZBCKZE 2'97

57414 a; @1170"?
and OF SERVICE
Mew/'1 (aslljmwe. 2"?
Resp ondent/ Deféndant
I am the El Petitioner/Plaintiff in this case.

WRespondent/Defendant
Icertifythaton (date) 3 / 7 " 2/ 3 .Iprovidedatrue copy of (list each
document) flat/Qrqfibn 0/ 5:; pporA' A 5 90¢ vmé
@" (B F0/'G€ (12/ e/ (€410! fwd? /¢ 51% Q/Um
(Va/"lime; (I/rJL/G/m/I §m4,/ 4..'A/qréoVJrK/e1'n dqoé/e
'1 /' {I'Fb/ "'F QM ' E" Cq/ [3.2 m V Vare'qu : SQL£%..
to the etitioner El Respondent El Attorneyfor in the above
case y placing the do cument(s) in the:
El Hands of the éfi'etitioner El Respondent El Attorneyfor
at (address): C 'I a u , )1 (La/5r 7'49 t/J-«K

C/4/90/0
o
or [3 United States mail in a sealed envelope with postage paid addressedto (address):
Date
Y Uri; 547/6
Signature
2W/
Print Name

14/1/99 7'"
Jaz "(fl "fad/9,20%; /L(/:
4a 5'0]
77bé7l-&3 /w
1137136 ZZSJ b'
#"7 2430C/ 07L 7LGM $1213?
_erified Correct Co
0711,!
dxa
J11 KEPQ§6J
71%;
1,. "1,5733 >431?
gfli VI>/ :2?" _745
,3:le Wfflyio
g/H) ;5j3;72 M415/3Jq g SEC/1%
)3/9
/7/:Dg;j '4'
"9/
fl" ,5}: ('2'(7W 9227 mubfifl',Té/gfl:
7/("'U" '4
Mil 7? W 7]! "0 36 g
owwuao BL , 98'
My") If
1,, \A
/JZr/QJQJTJ 7L/flbf5'ybbfi L453 S" 3
MW '7.
W 7
41/1337 L¢@\
W
-' fw
7{lo/C/Wl 0 f"
M'a'fubfi MU?;/ 3'.) dug? aft/flay
gag/x471 J?
Jim/##S/aiZfz/w/f
VJZMO.: 6V7 QWM/l/ J5
?J29/3?'/9
@' )6 gym
7% L!£\L{_bvhb/JBG
5'6
$171322 "W' my uo£31Q 30 313173,
W3 "B/H' Dal
4'0
"#2236735ng Wjgchat JD
7"" 7L/ mow) 7.7";
I}
11131311511
11711153112 5: O/LZD UQ bdwfsy
-' .
1:11t'111f3'" mxga "Q &
Lug éubW
W9? 99
/u
'0 7 g 7
70
7470195 17th
577::Q07L «@7737 W
"/7" 7'7 777/S :73
7
u?7726 J"?
£7me 14';
37%
/ NQC/KMbJ/
Wau . w)a;w'le?/W:J X
527$
Dav»? BySwa:yV/>g73:7
7/ 77:7 7'77 777
7/ 70 7777777 7 /UE}7'
72/2756? 277C1/3
/>/17/@ Ma?
bié7LO/Zngg'fl6/ 2757/
/g>/;7p;>/; /b7(WWV/3/\O£" Sag/nén
A' b0:
919 Q4.
3:);(77
(>7 7 §/17F::
/\4
"W7J47 %77 M?
5'}?
MMWJni ufglJfibtrfl'j //
! "0776771 UAW/290
#7937770 77/ 77'x77"
55/ng 2/10wa «ow/odflaj zrpwfi'OfS'S/Lpu
/q/ And/rum,» [77274725779
.7 / 7'7Q
fly /C?M%/7W 7
./'fl V7 { W Ufl /W 3-»:
$3]?! kw IO
4/ J'QS; "@fbyggvfijéVK/V
gi/ylJffitd m5 C]?
75W
f
'7
fibVZ / \/,.'7 3:.
b'f'flo/'g 017a WWW/"'2' "£5 0
Vflzzm 49/97le 41? ax'bD
'7?ng 2""? 53273, 7? foflb
74/ / P:79:Jcj
Jyu/ buy/1%VL7LL'7LQ 2?
5" 7L7"! sfu/7de 77L /y f/faMé? 73/5
2-
€13, '7
ma7arm/b nm7377 /93977
64¢! m/ 71% Wfma/
4/7546 7 712g
(/Vlbm/
flflg (/Zég/aiflwgV/Lg'a'3/90? QflaA
7W @5629 WWW
"Va/93W 2w) /1)7/'
7/54297% 7H? «2' 'fWb'éfi/bk
/mg i';€j wd/l/rwW/WXE? 7L450fi9'4
CV" "a "HA/fig)?
Wfim:flI/aJ::é/W" 'fiJQS' 21%" 9U"?
1'7 M67
"A
9/" ,Lkf'ivhfg 715/150
7/4337'2'3 SWM Dbl/9):? 2717/77?"
W7 v'AJag :57 )7Lé'b/
)0
#6"ij 27V) 927M =95,
LEV/5'24] 0/7/ M/7/ 722nm?
XOg Wu
3/2770 WW
my 7LW?§ 7121):. 00/ p u/
m 37' 2/4?7'
\JDU 3745;? _+
757" (a; 22/ WA 2 j #zyyjz
xa-g 373/?
Oél'
gm 'Q7D
V9217??? 1 XQa
w!
19 270926 «972
ay/"bm/ fume) 7L1J/10'7
v 377/124
>7fvxw x???" /7/'J5'$"
"35 2,! 7%
/"27 [25403 2/7/0/
" \X'D WQUJfina/g
"mg/O fut/2
$.72
é/ 747DJM?9%
Hi,
V!
74'1""'fl:7/7"J
07/ VJbEE'J a/u7ya7L 79%
_/1/
9/Z"\!A/Q/7&' "W6"! yoJtafiJfg
fb7ft7'7U/fl
Wu?
/ WV"
[Ma/'7 /4/ 733"; 47%
7/3/23, 2:35 PM 123_1(1).jpeg
i 07 E @ °
El 9' >3- .uil 24%..
We" ' Q'Zx'"

oregoncitizen {cm/1:!2/7
Verified Correct Copy of Original 7/11/20 23
Oregon
. - v»---V.-..v.-

FOlt THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PROI l VlzRITAS: PROJECT N(3.22-3527l

VERITAS ACTION FUND.
D.('. No 3:2(l-C\'-
P/u ill Iii/s,-I/)/u'l/mm'. ill-i35-i\'l()
MK'HAH S('H1\4H)'I'.inhi.\ official

()l'lNl()i\I
S'Csz.
cupuctly at; Mullnnnmh ('mmlv
Dxsh'im Allm'nrv: HJ LN
R( )SINBLUM.
Vein flLQS
In her ul'l'lcml
cnpncnly ()1cng :\um'nc_\' Gum-ml
In 5. 1p] u'llvm
Appczil from the Untied Statics District ('ourl

for the District ul'()i'cg0n
Michael \V M District Judge. Prcsrding
on (0/71
Argued and Suhmiucd December 7. 2022
Pasadena. California
Filccl July 3. 2023
GO? owifi
W
3 $02?
21 likes
oregoncitizen All CREDIT TO @jamesokeet'eiii l!
UV {/2
NlN'TH circuit court of appeals has OVERTURNED the
law that has prohibited recording in the state of
OREGON on the grounds that it violates the ist
amendment. See ail slides from @jamesokeeteiii in
this post for more detail. Oregon Citizens please tag
your friends who need to know and thank
@jamesokeefeiii on the original post in his feed! This
is a BlG win!
Q ®
https/lmail.google.comlmaillu10/ ?q=Iynch#inbox?projectox=1 1/1

7/3/23, 2:34 PM
123_1.jpeg
1'09 B @ ° :a' 95-

"E .utl 23%..
tinting/tam
V C) 6)
Verified Correct Copy of Original 7/11/2023
sg'fgféf
oregonoitizen .
:
Oregon
COUNSI'ZI.
Benjamin Barr (argued). Bznr & KlCll] PLLC'. Bull Valley.

Illinois. Steplten Kletti. Barr & Klein PLLC. Washington.
D.(' . l'or Plznnttl'llzAppcllzmts.
Philip M Thoennes (argued). Asststztitt Attorney (iencral:
Michael A. Casper. Senior Assistant Attorney General.
B (human. SOllL'llOr General: lillett F Roscnhlum.
Attorney General of Oregon. Office ol'the Oregtirt Attorney
General; lL ()tcgttit: l'or Del'entlztnts-l'xppellees.
()I'INI()N
lKll I'A. ('ircutt Judge:

('IL'i'Ult l.n\ 1'L'llk'lll"\ nmlnl'tttx llllllllllltllllLL'tl tetuttitnus
01' mm ermtttnnx whit-Lt to sex L'tltl vascntmnx We
wnclutlt- that t "until: a hm i\-lLUlllClll'h-l'xk'lliL"-lllkl1()lllllill
'a-l-I'k tln- inst \itlclltilllx'lll lllell to lIL'L'
NDL'L'Lil .lllLl is
thctelnte nn tt~ lJLL'
A
Seetxort 165 54tl(t)(c) ot' the Oregon Revised Statutes
proudes "[Aj permit may not . lolbtztin or attempt to
obtain the whole or any part of a conversation by means of
any device . il'not all parncrpants in the e011\ ClSZlllOtt are
.
C? G V -
[It
21 likes
oregoncitizen All CREDIT TO @jamesokeeteéti !!
NINTH Circuit court of appeals has OVERTURNED the
OREGON on the grounds that it violates the tst
amendment. See all slides from @iamesokeefeiii in
httpszllmai]. google.comlmail/ulO/?q=lynch#inbox?projectox=1 1/1

(9'
j) fiw/MC/Qflwflvay 'aef/Iws "VFW-93p
Iaéa
«a
MaDWoo
Mia/WW 523-5». W' "9773/ 7L 7W7{f9/f\'7
W Q71 goajw
2/75 574037) #9973757 My
7nbC/Z I'm/1&7? 0%
2&0? Syd/mmggb fzflflyb
9+? ""9"
3€5C"Z'*'""/"'"~/
75672747 7%an 33412 M U" "WWI/37"
>| ) 7mW772"
gélgémflza SJé'6l m@9 017A WTM/a-J ,
,1071
Layaway#0)] 7vaonJ/7J' [WW 13
Q75 /* /0 flab/ft)
{vjzszg/y) 3023A?!57' 7'77! m'?' @JL' W
NW ""17"?" "F'éa J
./
Yumid w/
W N9
@Jdlflf 77
av' 6/2"? 7v"? W7 2""?
472%
74.5,":
Weary 71g Egg/é
gZ gi'fl/
W6) WS MIA/é)
$7M! 0/
_/ 'f7
:9 24 1) 7%
¢0¥7§JW§~2W c»
<2". C?)
Em; 2'
3g Gib; H
":5325; 2/0 Wék
1/"(ZIQ5/
4/
7/3/3, 11:26AM Gmail lists of MANY people to talk to about osarch omk inappropn'ate language or abuse
-
31 32023;
rm
##Mmf fig
ts of MANY people to talk to about osarch orak inappropriate language or abu5e

messages
nal
@ry rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com> 20 October 2022 at 05:21

"E: Astoria Warming Center <astoriawarmingcenter@gmai|.com>
O
was told osarch orak was punched unconscious by a woman when giving meth to a man in recovery. was he a
8dealer, per se?"
heard also that osarch turned informant on his crime buddies in portland, one person getting locked away for a
gong time, after someone was shot in a burglary.
'5
gnark spurlock said osarch almost raped his girlfriend, kept pulling off her clothes against her will calling it a
trick. mark said he had to beat him up or threaten to to get him away.
Emagic
a woman named shiela was left stranded without a boat pack from the boat osarch abandoned her on a pier. lucy
had to rescue her. she reported verbal aggressiveness and coercive behavior from osarch.
ggCBH worker discriminated. by osarch. knows riggs.

riggsosarch's nephew he is mean to.
riggs: named by gresham police as knowing where the disability dog is that osarch stole from the 57 year old
lady on the way to the hospital.
meth connected people at lifeboat facility:

dealerjack fisher:
says he "smoked drugs" with osarch. he never gets kicked out. predates on my partner.
griffin: shoots meth into women's arms with hypoderemics, almost raped my friend
chris cowan: distributes meth, sex offender
xavier, son of savage, a noted meth traffickeruser of hypodermics, liquid meth, stole laptop(s) from my partner, animal
abuse, pills, predates on my partner.
krissie: stole housekeys from my partner, predates on my partner.
people who verbally abused me:

jimmy, said he'd punch out my face & sexual harassment of mehe also punched sierra and bobby, predates on my
partner.
jules, called me b*tch excessively, street verbal abuse. is sometimes nice to me, especially especially after i started
advocating against osarch's abuse
jonathan, called me "wh*re" n-word B'word c-wordsexual harassment of me, confirms osarch orak uses term "blue
balls"
quentin alexander: street harassment of me after witnessed one of his at least two violent LIFEBOAT ASSAULTS
i
police & his aunt have asked him to leave me alone
stephen, sierra, george, i (and few more people possibly keith)

witnessed
quentin brutally assault homeless man dwayne.
osarch and erin COVERED THIS UP>
stephen knew the victim needed medical. so i called it in.
why should i be kicked out for supporfing a crime victim in medical distress?
stephen assaulted recently at Lifeboat.
cory quint: verbal abuse and harassment on me afleri confronted him on his terrifying move of putting his hand around
my throat which i would NEVER consent to, coercive behavior to me overpowering me, rapey
when i tn'ed to open up the conversation with erin about thisosarch shut me down by trespassing me, for being a crime
victim. i did not EVER give osarch permission to read my email to erin.
https.llmail. googlecoml mail/ u/Ol 7ik=3e0¢89d4a7&view=pt&search=all&permtl1id=threada: r8157959747697609863&simp1=msga:r8159612309l4293991&sirnpl . 1/6
7/3/3, 11:26 AM Gmail lists of MANY people to talk to about osarch orak inappropriate language or abuse

character witness of me regarding osarch orak's unfairness to me:

terry Of the national guard
canner dave who calls me an angel
_|
"blue balls" and more:

§n0re witnesses of osarch's inappropriate sexual innuendo
thnathan confirms osarch orak uses term "blue balls"
sexual harassment of me brandishing a dildo at rne in park, dates monica who works at lifeboatmharasses
Dnonky
people he thinks are my friends
.gteith dingman who also participates In the sexual innuendo, sexual harassment
of me once, felt abused by roy's nazi
Qeferences
garth who worked for osarch, confirms osarch orak uses term "blue balls"
Rand: who said Lifeboat is now 90% males due to osarch's sexual innuendo and being mean to women, harassed me
'
@xcessively at fort george park recently, confirmed osarch's misogyny
§hayna's mom raine

$hayna
also explain the meal denial or skipping over foodosarch does to discriminate
wuscan
:zcasey
Ebobby bucket also comered'In the restroom by osarch orak for one-on-one homophobic bullying, confirms osarch orak
uIses term "blue balls"
previously listed:
jules inappropriate language "all the time"
jose confirms osarch inappropriate
chris crone "he should resign"
vanessa kicked out for voicing concerns, confinns osarch orak uses term "blue balls"
erik
sierraaware of how illegal his civil rights violations are, confirms osarch orak uses term "blue balls" can explain his
meal denial abuse
the retired cop who said we should film osarch when he is doing his crude language-steve almost ages 70he worked
as a seaside cop and a federal marshal may reside in idaho now
patty and steve
cory quint, confirms osarch orak uses term "blue balls" and even worse locker room talk around men
people who have shared with me concerns:

dre who said concisely "sell out"
roy who calls osarch skipping meals for hungry people "the hunger games"
north coast alliance community thrift store lady, describes him as arrogant, recommends i contact attorney general and
the governor due to osarch's extreme criminal record with firearms offenses charged in his burglary, methamphetamine,
theft of the disabled woman's dog, assaulting police
people who say osarch runs it like a rude prison warden:

chris cowan
chris crone
people who have been assaulted at lifeboat:

stephen pushed down staircase and punched
dwayne
people who have been cursed at on the phone by osarch:

cat loyd at the college food bank. she says CCA will have nothing to do with him because of his misconduct and
discriminatory actions.
people who have been treated rudely on the phone by osarch:

TEAM office over osarch trying to control their chowers
people at CCA aware of osarch's abuse:

at least five employees, i have seen a victim complaining to the WHOLE office, they say they get a lot of complaints and
are very aware
https limall. google com/ mail/u/ 0/ ?ik=3e,0c3 9d4a7&viewzpt&search=all&pcrmth1d=thread-a. r8157959747697609863&srmpl=msga:r81596123091433991&simpl. . . 2/6

7/3/3, 11:26 AM Gmail lists of MANY people to talk to about osarch orak inappropriate language or abuse
-
--also understand:
homeless verbally abused or threatened en'n carlsen

i had Issues with how certain
minorities, etc
:acial
Ea" that is falling by the wayside while osarch refuses to have a rational discussionhis seeking to demonize meis in
misrespect of MANY witnesses i have heretofore kept secret.
gIlna
'at
Is very scary to try to trust the AWC with this info.
of
>please do not let osarch kick them out of meals or shelter for witnessing his misconmict.
O.
flatness who were cornered and osarch raised his voice at or spoke to aggressively:
gucy, confirms osarch orak uses term "blue balls" chews her out she will commit sucicide if osarch kicks her out
glarence larkins, confirms osarch orak uses term "blue balls", confronted erin carlsen on her racism to him In kicking him
Lbut
Eadam eastman who was denied meals last christmas
l.
§clarence a former beacon club board memberhas info about a beacon member who killed themself after bad
treatment by osarch
clarence suffered character assasination once erin and osarch turned on him they rmde up attack stuff that was
completely false and mischaracterizing
i heard of a hypothermia death after osarch denied clothing
employees who are now possibly alienated:

Chrissie or Christiesuch a bad falling out she had to send a family member to retrieve her things
Ij quit atter my letter to erin carlsen about osarch's innuendo "blue balls" etc
women who feel like osarch gives uncomfortable flirtatious inappropriate energy to his clients (when he is not
being mean):
Vanessa
me
also osarch tried to do a forced contract with a woman he was starving for a few months.
his treatment of her i consider alarming and predatory. she lost weight drastically during his "starvation" fetish.
osarch when he chooses which women have to starve is very triggering of eating disorder things that might already be
going on.
osarch also harassed patty for her over-weightteasiung her about not trying to md<e her health worse and denying her
sweetsi reported this to clubhouse internationalwho have not certified Beacon Clubhouse.
i heard caring for the coastleft their commercial street address to get away from Lifeboat.
are ADA-noncompliant.
please visit the Lifeboat facility and check out how terrrifyning the stairs are which inherently
i saw an overdosed man dragged up the stairs by a womani have seen elderly slip.
it is very poor planning and no one will speak to me about ADAconcems.
20 October 2022 at 16:58

mary rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail. com>
To. Astoria Warming Center <astoriawarmingcenter@gmail. com>
also speak to sam register and bradley, shayna' s violent abuser about osarch' s inappropriate conduct. ill keep sending
you more names as i think of them of people who confirm the problems.
[Quoted text hIdden]
8 March 2023 at 09:33

3/6
httpS'llmail.google.com/mnillulO/?IL'=3 e0c39d4a7&view=pt&search=all&permthid=threadmr815795974769760988&simpl=msg-a:1815961280914293991&simpl...
7/3/23, 11:26 AM Gmail : lists of MANY people to talk to about osarch orak inappropriate language or abuse
*
To: REEVES Brandon BOLI <Brandon.REEVES@boli.oregon.gov>
Liferboat was trying to take over the shelter (a separate nonprofit)
was asked to become a member of the board
of._O raging/113023.
I'
sarch said he would back out ifi or gigi had anything to do with it
e bullies and discriminates against us for separate reasons
wayne went on to stab a shelter staff after being assaulted at lifeboat, thereby worsening the shelter crisis here
Quoted text hIdden]
Cgrre q$'(§)py
ry rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail. com> 19 March 2023 at 15:15

C:latsop County Communications <communications@clatsopcounty. gov>
e need treatment options and places for women to be safe

f" ed
Forwarded message
EFrom mary rose lenore eng < 7. g
" H ' "'>
>Date: Thu 20 Oct 2022 at 05: 21

Subject: lists of MANY people to talk to about osarch orak inappropriate language or abuse
' ' ' '
TozAstoria Warming Center<« > '
. . .- 2
mary rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com> 18 May 2023 at 09:59

REEVES Brandon * BOLI <brandon.reeves@boli.oregon.gov>
To:
so when the astoria warming shelter funding feel thru due to noncompliance with statistics
osarch orak was

rumored to be trying to make a power grab to take control of the shelter too
he immediately demanded gigi and tracyboth womenresign from their positions as he has pre-esxisting vendetta
and gender discrimination on them
gigi, who works for clatsop behavioral health was a friend of his cousin who knos about his meth dealing life
i have reported his discrim to CBH director
she agrees that when osarch orak pushed out all the womenincluding asking that i never get the position on board of
directors as i was asked by ron maxted who was on the board
the tone turned more discriminatory and male-dominated
teresa barnes the outgoing shelter director who lost the financeat least spoke to me yet appeased osarch's power
grab, telliung me she would defer to his character assassination of me, despite members of her board caring about my
experience.
this chain of events preceded the stabbing at the shelter which shut the shelter down permanently.
Feb 4, 2023 A homeless man was arrested

'74
lTlEfil \u
in. L.
3.31;» i HEW €355,815. fed Ti: Friday night after allegedly stabbing an employee
. .
. -5 at the storia Vt a rmmo ' Center and was taken into
fl
_
. custody agaIn on ..
https:/lwww.daIlyastorian.com > news > local
mm is es
>
httpszllmail.google.com/mail/u/Ol?ik=3e0c39d4a7&viewr~pt&search=all&permthid=threada:r8157959747697609863&simpl=msg-a:r815961280914293991&simpl .. . 4/6
7/3/23, 11:26AM Gmail lists of MANY people to talk to about osarch orak inappropriate language or abuse
-
Feb 4, 2023
They said as 58-year-old Diivayne
Douglas Blair was checking in, he got into an
"T";
r3
"l"t Eét,
"(filial
.
'
arg umentwith the e m p lo y ee overestablished rules
3.
, :
5.5:
{QUIZ} .
and stabbed hIm.
rified CorrecLCopy of Original. 7/11/2
ttps://www kptv.com > 2023/02/04 >

police~
1an checki.
Quoted text hIdden]
rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail. com> 18 May 2023 at 10:03

O
o Kevin Dahlgren <kevindahlgren@gmail. com>
i had a nice 90 minute intake with BOLI
the investigator will expand the discrimination complaint against lifeboat (homeless day center in astoria oregon) to
include gender discrimination as well as disability discrimination "public accommodations" discrimination
Forwarded message
From: mary rose lenore eng < »

; ,,
, >
Date' Sun, 19 Mar 2023 at 15:15
Kevin Dahlgren <kevindahlgren@gmail.com> 18 May 2023 at 10:35

To: mary rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com>
Can you guys hire me yet to come to Astoria for a week? Assess your homeless situation?
Kevin
mary rose lenore eng <maryengi@gmail.com> 18 May 2023 at 10:38

To: Kevin Dahlgren <kevindahlgren@gmail.com>
Hey Kevin Dahlgren great to hear from you listen am just an independent one man show so to speak I'm sending you
I
this kind of info

because I'm a cross between activist and journalistic as well as investigative concern
I would try to help you if you're able to come
have next to no money but essentially feel that I'm doing God's work metaphorically by trying to help the actual
I
professionals bureaucrats and people with power and money to understand the facts
I think we should talk on the phone possibly to see what you mean please call me at 503-468 2275
18 May 2023 at 10:48

To: Kevin Dahlgren <kevindahlgren@gmail.com>
5/6
https://mail.google.comlmaillulO/?ik=360c39d4a7&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thread-a: r81579597476976098638nsimpl=msg-338 159612309142939918zsimpl...
7I3IB, 11:26AM Gmail lists of MANY people to talk to about osarch orak inappropfiate language or abuse
-
I'm thinking there might be a fn'end's property l could find for you to stay or an assonment of fn'ends ideally if you seek to
go into the Lifeboat facility you would want to go without me because I've already burned my cover so to speak but l could
detail you timelines of city council schedules and such and explain the different nonprofits and Facilities who would have
[more information or who you should speak to
gouoted text hidden]
099''na' @11/20
ry rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com> 18 May 2023 at 10:50

: Kevin Dahlgren <kevindahlgren@gmail.com>
nd very truly there are very brave homeless people who might be willing to go on recordl surely would be fine
speaking
u-on record I could take you to some of the enclaves where the encampment occurs or in broken down parts of the tiny City
ere is also an incredibly dangerous homeless camp in Warrenton Oregon behind the Goodwill in the sprawling retail
$ectlon
fiQuoted text hidden]
0
a gone
ry rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com> 18 May 2023' at 10:51

: Kevin Dahlgren <kevindahlgren@gmail.com>
if
$e'a'side alsO has a very da'ng'e'r'ous' homeless enc'a'mp'r'rient'on the Banks o'f a rive'r that frequently floods
[hunted text hidden]
https://mail.google.com/maiU11/0/?ilc:360c39d4a7&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thteada::8l57959747697609863&simpl=msg-a:r815961230914293991&simpl. . . 6/ 6
73/23, 235 PM 123_l(1).jpcg
1'0 55 @ n . n' X- "E .ull 2455..
.I
oregoncitizen
': 6"- zinr/Vf 35/ 7
Oregon
. .,-- .
UNITED ST/\TES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTl-l CIRCUIT
PR().ll-.( "1' VFRI I'AS. PROIH. T Null3527i

Vl-JUTAS ACTION FUND.
D.('. No 3 '3(l-C\ -
l'lmll!i//.\. l/I/u'l/umx'. lll4.'si-i\ll()
OPINION
MK'HAl-l SCHMIDT. In lux 01"qu
mmuh' Mullxmmah ('mmlv
HMHL'I [\llmncv. H l N |
ROS] Nlil UM. In hcruillcml

cnpdcny Ulcyull Allm'ncy (:cncml
/)('/('m/(IIII\. lp/u-llwzx
\i l' linm lhc UllllL'd Slates [)lblllcl ('mul

lur the Uislrlcl ul ()rcgun
Michael W Mosnmn. DlSll'lL'l Judge. Presiding
Argued and Suhmiucd December 7. (l

Pasadena. California
Filed J ul} 3. 2023
CC)? [I]
21 likes
oregoncitizen All CREDIT TO @jamesokeefeiii !!
NINTH circuit court of appeals has OVERTURNED the
amendment. See all slides from @jamesokeeieiii in
is a BIG win!
,0
6
EB
fit
https:llmail.google.com/mail!u/0/?q=lynch#inbox?projector=l l/ 1
7/3/23, 2:34 PM 123_1.jpeg
log 5 @ n . 'fi ->B-

"E ..u| 23%...
v C? G)
.u'lnbtag/tmw
'
oregoncitizen ;
'
Oregon
COUNSl'Ild
Beniumin Barr (argued). Burr & Kleitt PLLC. Bull

lllmois. Stephen Kleiii. Bzirr 8: Klem PLLC. Washington.
l).('.. for l'lzumifix-Appellants.
Philip M 'l'hoennes (argued). AhMSliilil Attorney General:
Michael A. Casper. Senior ./\\Sl\ldnl Attorney (ieneml.
Benjamin (iulmun. Solicitor General; l:llCll l' Roqenblum.
Attorney General oi'Oiegon. Ol'liee ol'lhe Oicg()li Attorney
(:enerul. Salem. Oregon. for Delhlirlziriix-Appellees
()l'lNl()\'
lKlllz\.( ueutl .lutlgc
(heuuu l.r\\ 1'L'Ilk'l.|ll\ lillllill'll\ reumlmus

ol' \Uli\\'i'\.llitlll\ \lll'llL'Ll in \ewml emeplimu We
Ullil lude llMl ( 'iL'i'Ull - l.i\\ |\ .r mnlvnblmnul iuuitimu il|.il
vl'i llu llixi \ruemlmenl liL'lll in he; I»
ilieiehue |ii\.llitl on Its tau,
l
A
Seemm l65 54(ill)(c) oi' the ()iegtiii Revrsed Statutes
proudes "[AI permit may not . lolblmn or attempt to
ohlzun the \\ hole or any part of u com Ci'hilli()ii by means ol'
any (lC\'iCC il'not all parlrcrpants in the com ersauon are
.
QC}? W
21 likes
oregoncitizen Ail CREDIT TO @jamesokeefeiii !!
NINTH Circuit court of appeals has OVERTURNED the
amendment. See all slides from @jamesokeefeiii in
Q tie
httpszllmai].google.comlmaillul0/?q=lynch#inbox?projector-1 1/1
r%9/ 7%W 7W§pm
'4'" £22 t7 S'b
c/cc/nyg,/J//
_Verified Corre ctCop
f X76
%%:n €6§WZ //i 2M§/J
4:: 529440 (27¢
§b
W/ya/ "13 Wé'ybq WU',rI7f)/o
W sr-v
34 fM/swya/ wag/Mm?
?%M;WM5WVWW#W
Log mama/n
gm W
Mijfl
2W mfg //""f£f: ZMj'éw/M'QMM:
£3 1/61
ave;
67/5"iii/"'3 fight/Z
[7L KM W) by
719% J/ O) W17§fj:9
bll/M
{ml/wbédu 70"?
S;77L fx'bm?n§ "3 {'JIJZ/V Z
S; 1W
W
M1:
7':Ujjmf (7/4"?) flay (MGM
L21'1?)
J77 26/ IA
kbtgé .4045]? /€3 371%;
{1339274- 1W???
'0
V, W/
agar-J(y %5
[716W
93M Jet/2f / 7""? 7/
{.4911} g/Q ""\"""'a/'§%'
(w 99 1,11 6/ fig 'Q 2/
U163:
5/007
WW
4.3.113 WE
Gresham Police Department - 1 1
I
:
GO 41 2015-52322
PUBLIC RELEASE ' '
_
(@NERAL OFFEN
OCCURRED DATE! .
mus OFFICERIDEPU'IY NAIIE &
TEE 11E I
08/11/2015 1713 09/09/2015 1030 SMITH, MARK s (22672)
EATIONOF PLACE
INHPENT1._...,
I 5001511
0 . KAISER ROCKWOOD
STARK ST, GRESHAM
'
WWE mamm- BEAT GRID

MHLTNOMAH GR 151 19512
'
FAMILY GANG SPECIAL
H VIOLEICE INVOLVEIIENT STUDY
No
ammmdm
Nfiiaens
CE 41 2015-52322, GO 42 2015-315363, AB 41 2015-52322
" 10m. DAMAGE) onus
RECOVEIIED TOTAL TOTAL
50b.oo
APPROVED APPROVED
STATUS BY 0N
ARREST -
FELONY MCGOWAN, JARED C (40240) 09/19/2015
OFFENSES[H
OFFENSE STATUTE PREIBSE
LARC-OTHER IVPE
Parking/Drop Lot/Garage
BUS
NONE (N0 BIAS)
PERSON ARREST CSTD #1

-
NAIIE(LAST.FIR8I' RACE DOB AGE

MIDDLE) Male UNKNOWN 12/30/1976 38
ORAK, OSARCH JASON
HOHEADDRESS-ST'REEI'. CITY HEGHT EYES
ZI' COLOR
13812 NE GLISAN ST, PORTLAND OR 97230
HOME CELL WORK
PEEONE PHONE PHONE ADDRESS
(503) 709-4451
DRIVEIZSLICENSE soausecumv FOB EI'I'IJIGTI'Y
(5mm Rum UNKNOWN
ARREST DATA
ARREST ARREST
DATE TYPE
11/20/2015 ARREST / BOOK
CHARGES
STATUTE CHARGE BAIL COURT
OR 164.055 OT "53m" DATE
THEFT IOTHER, C FELONY
PERSON-'HCTHW#1
mmamwnnmn RACE DOB AGE
HDDE) Female UNKNOWN 10/20/1957 57
JULY, BALERIA M
HOHEADDESS-STREEI'JHW HEIGHT WEIGHT IHAIR EYES

D COLOR
3601 NE 162ND AVE, Apt. 35, PORTLAND OR 97230
PRINI'ED 0N: 09ID7I2022 PRINTED BY: 8775 Page 118 VERSION: 1807011
CASE
Gresham Police Department I
so 41 2015-52322
PUBLIC RELEASE
|
This is a copy of a Gresham Police Department report released pursuant to the Oregon Public Records
Lafirs. Sensitive or personal information may have been redacted prior to the release of this report.
Infgrmation has been removed that pertains to a person?s right to privacy such as: Driver?s License,
ScBial Security Number, Date of Birth, Account Numbers and Medical Information. Confidential Juvenile
to the public except by court order.
infinnation will not be released
Verified Correct Copy
PEWTED 0N: 091070.03 PRINTED BY: 8775 VERSION: 180703.1

WE
Gresham Police Department '
GO 41 2015-52322
PUBLIC RELEASE
HOME can. WORK
WE PHONE PHONE mass
(503) 7240864
93.1ng UGENSE gemsaeunrrv FOB Emmcrnr
mm
%
UNKNOWN
Verified Correct Copy of Origina
PRINTED 0N: 09/072022 Page" VERSION: _180703.1

PR1N'I'EDBY:8'I7§
"SE
Gresham Police Department 2
-
60 41 2015-52322
PUBLIC RELEASE
Cfiim sun/MARY
Amen DATE!
TIIIE
MARK S (22672)
sggTfl, 09/11/2015 1713
rnjfim 1
SUMMARY:
On 09/11/2015 at about 1657 hrs, Baleria July reported that her companion dog
O
.
had been stolen out of her truck at 19500 SE Stark St. by Osarch Orak.
ACTION TAKEN:
On 09/11/2015 at about 1713 hrs, I was dispatched to the lobby of the Gresham
Police Department, concerning a theft. Upon my arrival, I made contact with
Baleria July and was advised of the situation.
While speaking with Mrs. July, I learned that on 09/09/2015 she had gone to
Rockwood Kaiser building at 19500 SE Stark St. due to some medical issues.
When she learned that she was going to be transported to a hospital by
ambulance, she called her husband William, to come pick up her vehicle and her
dog which was inside of it.
William later responded to the parking lot with Osarch Orak so that he
could drive her vehicle. William then watched as Orak got into her vehicle
with her dog and drove away. After a couple hours, Orak dropped off her
vehicle at her house without the dog. When confronted, Orak just laughed
and walked away.
STATEMENTS:
See above.
EVIDENCE:
None.
ACTION RECOMMENDED:
Refer to detectives for followup.
PRINTED ON: 0207/2022 PRINTED BY: 8775 Page 3/8 VERSION: 180703.1
LARC-OTHER "85
Gresham Police Department {
so 41 2015-52322
PUBLIC RELEASE
AgJfION TAKEN (NARRATIVE)
Aufioa DATEI
H§RIS, JERRY E (RETIRED) (14826) "ME
h 09/25/2015 0754
(g: SPECT #1) ORAK, OSARCH J DE

MENTIONED:
O. Orak, William MIP 02-0363

9320 SE Cooper
Portland 0R. 97266
(C) 503-449-2228
Victim's boyfriend/witness
Hecker, Michael
MIVV 05-17-60
5836 SE Ogden
Portland OR. 07206
503-4813192.
Owner of boat.
Dr. Prapong
Kaiser Medical Clinic
19500 SE Stark
Portland OR.
503-813-2000
Prescribed companion dog for victim.
Deputy Chief Halverson
Astoria PD.
Orak. Riggs Taut
MIP 06-09-94
13812 NE Glisan
Mentioned.
Officer McNeary:
Astoria P.D.
Arrested Osarch Orak in Astoria.
ACTION TAKEN:
|
assigned this case to myself on 09-2515, and began by phoning victim, Baleria July. Ms. July
confirmed that her companion dog had not been returned to her, she wished to pursue
charges, and was willing to testify.
m1. W. m: 11.»... AIR VELNHW- 1W"! 1

"RC mm "5'
so 41 201552322
PUBLIC RELEASE
Ms. July said that they have a friend named Mike who has a boat in Astoria, and she'd heard
that Osarch Orak was possibly staying on it. Ms. July provided rn e with Mike's cell number:
503-481-3192.
Ms. July told rn e that the dog in question was a Blue Pomeranian, named Blue Bear. She
explained that she'd acquired the dog to comply with the instructions from her doctor, who'd
prescribed a companion dog to assist her with mobility. Ms. July's boyfriend. William Orak.
was at her home when called her, so l spoke with him also.
I
William Orak told m e that he is suspect, Osarch Orak's cousin. On the date/time in question,
after learning that Ms. July was being transported to the hospital from the Kaiser clinic,
William asked Osarch to accompany him to the clinic to help retrieve Ms. July's companion
dog.
William Orak said that upon reaching the clinic, Osarch drove his truck with the dog in it while
he drove Ms. July's car. He related that Osarch was following him, and at about 162nd he
noticed that Osarch was no longer behind him. William repeatedly tried calling Osarch, while
looking for him, and received no answer. About 3 hours later William located Osarch at Ms.
July's and asked him where the dog was. William said that Osarch refused to tell him where
the dog was. William provided Osarch's cell number: 503-709-4451.
l then called the cell number Ms. July had provided for Mike. A subject who eventually
identified himself as Mike Hecker answered. Mr. Hecker said that about two weeks ago, he
gave Osarch the key's to his boat because Osarch said he was considering buying it. Mr.
Hecker had heard that Osarch was stying on the boat, but didn't know for sure. Mr. Hecker
said that his boat is docked at the West Basin Moorage in Astoria, but didn't remember what
exact slip.
l located the West Basin Moorage on-line, and phoned there. l learned that Mr. Hacker's boat
was birthed in slip C-49, and the name ofthe boat was 'Catana".
l then phoned Astoria PD and was transferred to Deputy Chief Halverson, who agreed to go to
the West Basin Marina C-49, and try to locate Osarch. About 45 minutes later DC Halverson
called m e back to report that no one was at the vessel, and it didn't appear anyone had been
there recently.
0n 09-25-15/1230 l tried to phone Osarch on his cell. He didn't answer, and l left a message
for him to call me.
0n 09-29-15I0830 upon returning to work, noted an envelope in my mailbox, containing five
I
photos, with hand-written notes on the back of each, explaining the photo. A short time later,
l learned that they were dropped off for m e at GPD by Ms. July. Two photos are of Osarch
Orak, two are of the boat, Catana, and one is ofa subject and a little girl. A few minutes later,
when l spoke with Ms. July, l learned that the subject in the photo with the little girl is Riggs
Orak. Ms. July said that she'd heard that Riggs had got together with Osarch after he'd stolen
her dog in her boyfriend, William Orak's truck.
Iplaced the photos into GPD Evidence.
On 10-09-15 at about 1746 hours, l was notified by Astoria PD that Osarch Orak had been
taken into custody on an outstanding warrant. with an additional pending, Felon ln
Possession Of Firearm charge. Eventually, l was put in phone contact with APD Officer
McNeary, who had Orak in custody. Officer McNeary put Orak on speaker phone so l could
0N: 09mm BY: 8775 Page SIB VERSION: 1W03.1

"RC mm "SE
Gresham Police Department x
so 41 gels52322
PUBLIC RELEASE
visit with him.

l identified myselfto Orak and told him the reason for the interview. Orak
basically denied
any involvement in stealing the dog. and said that the last time he was around the dog was
when he and Willy Orak. were in the same car and the dog was with them. Osarch said that
victim Baleria July is a, drugged up bitch" who is basically lying about about his involvement
in the dog's disappearance. Osarch continually denied any involvement in stealing the dog,
and continued to make derogatory comments about Ms. July, before telling me he wasn't
going to make any additional statements. then terminated the conversation.
I
Immediately following that, l contacted Clatsop County Jail and arranged to be notified when
Orak was extradited to Multnomah County.
On 11-19-15I1030 Clatsop County SIO phoned me to notify m e that Orak was being
transferred to MCSO. 0n 11-20-15/0935 l phoned MCSO Records and confirmed he was still in
custody. Following that l faxed the custody face sheet to them.
ACTION RECOMMENDED:
Case file to D.A. for Grand Jury.
mm 0N: 09mm PRINTED BY: 8775 Pay 6/8 VESION: 180703.1

LARGOTHER "SE
60 41 2015-52322
PUBLIC RELEASE
ATTACHMENT (245227) MISSING PET FLIER

[IMSAGE
Iii-52322
Verified Correct Copy of Original 7l11/2
-\
V»
1. W;
...
\
.55-
"$2:
23;." "555',w'r \l'
9,; (1\J"ll" 45..
€-
r .'
.
'v'. a 1.. ', ". 2*».
:A
4%: q , ~\"
,m
. n? .i
»'x I'>' ,.
.
'~._;§'
E' ,2' \'5 I. '32.
)iy
\S u.
.-
'i '5 .,. 5-,
3'?
'\. a ..
1. "I :2
mg I?"
3.» 7-"
~34 . ,
.5
4'?[A
1',
5';
' t
1m E!
171
l-
1
3'}; .. ~x'. .J
&(¥ 'W
,, 13.. ,
'A
n). WA
.an' .5 g.
u
i: u «U' 14/" [.1 n.
.. ,u
'1'. V" ."

». . a C \
.s I
.
m: r' '- {:5 w
{f
'
hrn' . *w
Du
'14
"x k: .-*r
..
E 7
u
~.
v) ..
I . l'p
m
f
.u' .
2'":
LOST MY DOG ON THE 9'". Sept. HE WAS LAST SEEN RIDING IN A WHITE MAZDA
P/UP AT THE KAISER ROCKWOOD CLINIC. A BALD HEADED MAN WAS DRIVING,
HE GOES BY THE NAME OF "bear." HE IS A BLUE POMERIANAN; HE HAD A BLUE
BARNES ON; HE'S ON MEDICATION; WHITE CHEST; SOME BROWN ON THE LEGS
& WHITE FEETS; VERY FRIENDLY; LOVES TO .6 IVE KISSES. PLEASE HE MUST NOT
EAT FATTY 8:. FRIED FOODS. HIS HAIR SHEDS A LOT AND I' M WORRIED THAT
WHO EVER HAS HIM MAY ABUSE HIM. HE BEGS FOR TABLE FOOD, IT'S OKAY,
BUT NOT FRIED FOODS. PLEASE CONTACT OWNER AT: (503)724-0864, OR
(503)449-2228
PLEASE MY BABY BEAR MISSES ME & FAMILY, AND WE MISS 'HIM SO VERY
MUCH. PLEASE IF ANYONE SEE'S HIM OR YOU THINK IT MAY BE THIS DOG, CALL
US ASAP. YOU'LL BE REWARDED.
PRINTED ON: 09/07/2022 PRINTED BY: 8775 Page 718 VERSION: 1W03.1
WE
GO 41 2015-52322
PUBLIC RELEASE
_|
E
E
a
.E
2'
5
"5
E
O
U
'5
U
E
gI
***
END OF HARDCOPY ***
PRINTED ON: 09/070,022 PRINTED BY: 8775 Pugs 8/8 VESION: 180703.1
Q71) O/\L<D (/'J -Q
"pljwvflbL/é/ rfi'lwbllg
Z7c/b 5-; 76
ffl; 6yébmC/ /7'/(79 ffiy'L/JIOCJ //@
7; SW
17
72??
1*WJa/@ J?
f/yfl
was, max/I an/ /"f 077/50:sz%
S? &
[£9%7 -,
13
4 ??7?) 6/,"
7' .7 _,7,27 JIQ
flaw?
'533760/31
("rag/J51. '/ fl
,w,-'cxc/37%g7 j
7wagg/ "j
ar/MM c7 7/ /7"0/M
0.3"
MM fl'vw 61/ yWWeflffi 2",76"£ZO&/0
/ "JW (/09 W§I%b\'/1§]l&f
"UM/39%;; 7L-Z?# 1.60/15"
CIA/Mkr/ 5" 3/57; J/JQ'J 75W?
7Z0 5"" "UM/J61],
27 W1 i907? 0/74
ywzwfisyg/ ("J/Ab? $4
aawg, waymm9w wjkwd
((7-(7/
[6/3 [IV/19W 772/3400
3.3771 any/06%)
J
"'6? If
Site/{1 7 M/
'g ,M/0/"1s "i
726* 2'
d
2533/ (HIV/7
7é§f "557""91'1/39'6 EM? 2/x
,5
Wafir'fl
# 9/7;
14565533g5* "W" 3;}? :3;
"7/13 \l
(?"4i/? "2/9741; 77%
/;
F 0/
g-
z'fi' -:S"'L.':';'j 13'7031'f2351
,WQWWU?%W3%M©Vng gg/Aé 2/6 Helm???
gym-aw if"2§'zé"£zs'}5
7/ mg/ a?
My .1
«S
N
O
LJ
Astoria Police fight/Jim
E
Efiit: (circle choices) DA CA SCF App
Department City of Astoria
5 COP AC DET FIU
2' JUV PF 555 30th Street
'6 5 Astoria. OR 971 03'
Distribution:
Ogtslde Business: (503) 338-6411
>.
a. Records: (503)338-6433
o Fax: (503) 325-4897
0
'6
o
(D
=
o
Disgose: Yes
\
Incident Report:
CurrentAs or Thursday, December 15. 2022 Related Case:
1
0.1
ofmFe: WARRANT INFORMA'I'ION Reported 10/9/2015 Rcvd 4:37 PM Dispatcher: 53498

THEFTI FIREARM Department Disp Officer: 38543
Felon in Possesion of FIREARM End Clrd McNeary, Christopher
Location: WEND BASIN
CityState: Astoria Apt:
Incident
Summary
People Involved:
Sex I Raoe Date
involvement Name! Address Phone DOB Citation/Charge Officer
_-
I I
\fictim HECKER. Michael Robert THEFTI FIREARM 10/9/2015
McNeaw
_-
I I
\Mtness JOHNSON, Tracy Marie 10/9/2015
_ Mcweaw
I
-- I
\fictim NELSON, Janine May 10/9/2015
McNeaw
Vifitness YELTON. Rick Lee I I _ 10/9/2015
_ _ McNearv
Custody Report:
Involvement RptDate Incident
Juvenile? Name/ Address SexlRace/DOB Offense Citation] WNO
Arrestee ORAK, Osarch Jason I | WARRAN 10/9/2015
ow: - 1120154105
Page 1 of 2
Current As Of Thursday, December 15, 2022
This report is a representation of database information. The original file

has been purged in keeping with Oregon Public Records Laws
Disclose: Yes
_|

Incident Report:
Current As Of: Thursday, December 15, 2022 Related Case:
'9
ORAK, Owen Jason I I ~
THEFT I 10/9/2015
Arfistee
E
DLN: - A20154105
#ArFBtee ORAK, Osarch Jason I I Felon in p 10/9/2015

5
"5
- DLN. - A20154105
>:
6'
Argstee ORAK, Osarch Jason I I UNLAW P 10/9/2015
8
o
:
- DLN- - 1120154105
SE

> |
6:
Page 2 of 2
Current As Of: Thursday, December 15, 2022
This report is .a representation of database informatiovn. Theroriginal file

has been 'o-u'red in keeooin with Ore on Public Records Laws
orrect Copy of Original 7/11/2023.
KIZ
Astoria Police
Dapartment
Incident Report:
Current AS Of 121150022 11 23 51 AM
h.
Wrifiedt
Single Continuation Report
Summary
Investigated a report of a wanted subject staying on a boat at the West End Mooring Basin.
Suspect located and taken into custody on his felony warrant. investigation showed he was in
possession of a concealed, loaded. handgun and a felon. The handgun turned out to be illegally
taken from a sailboat. Suspect charged with Theft l, Felon in Possession of a Firearm, and
Unlawful Possession of a Firearm.
Mentioned
HECKER, Michael Robert -
VICTIM
one e one:
DOB mployer: Emp Phone:
JOHNSON, Trac Marie -

WlTNESS
Phone Cell Phone:

DOB: mployer: Emp Phone.
ORAK, Osarch Jason -

ARRESTEE
Phone: Cell Phone:
DOB; Employer: Emp Phone:
PICKERING, Janine Ma -
VICTIM
one: Uell Phone

DOB Employer: Emp Phone
YELTON, Rick Lee -

WITNESS
Incident: A20154105 Page 1 of 5
DPSST: 38543
Dare:
Incident Report:
py of Original [11/2023.
'
I
Current A3 Of 12/15/2022 11:23'53 AM
one e Hnone
UGII
DOB Employer Emp Phone:
action Taken
én 10/9/2015 at about 1637hrs began investigating l a report of a wanted subject at the West End
flooring Basin in Astoria OR. The subject was identified as Osarch Jason Orak. He had a
fiationwide felony warrant for his arrest. The warrant also had a caution indicator that Orak resisted
firested. i also found that Orak was on felony post prison supervision out of Multnomah County. l
530 ran a criminal history on the subject in order to get a better picture of the type of person would l
be involved With. The subject was a convicted felon. He had been arrested in Oregon about 10
times. Those arrests included resisting arrest, assaulting a police officer, and attempting to assault
a police officer.
met Port Security Officer Ricky Yelton at the West End Mooring Basin with Ofc Koehnke. They
|
were the reporting party. We were told the subject may be staying on a boat at slip C49. The
owner had been called. No one was supposed to be on that boat. According to Port Security's
contact with the owner. We arrived and found the sailboat there secure. inqunred about the i
information. learned that the information about Orak had been developed because he had been
l
seen on the news on TV as one of Portland's wanted subjects. His picture had reportedly been put
on TV and a person had recognized him and reported it to the Port. went and spoke to people on l
the dock at that location. 354 lndustry St, in Astoria, OR.
An employee at NW Wild Products, Tracy M. Johnson. DOB -.

had contact with Orai<_ She
had spoken to Orak recently. Johnson believed Orak was staying on a boat in the mooring basin at"
that location and that he would be returning soon. She also told me that Orak was probably
carrying a handgun She said that he carried it in a black backpack. She said that he had told her
it was in the pack. She said he always had the pack. She also believed the name on the boat at
C49 was the correct one Orak was staying on.
Ofc Koehnke was called away for a car crash. requested sheriff's units respond to assist based
l
on this additional threat. We waited for Orak to arrive. l suspected he had seen the threeapatrol
vehicles in front of the building at that location and deCided not to come. began to clear. Just as l l
was about to leave 354 industry St, Orak arrived at the location.
He matched the description from the warrant and how he had been described by the witness. He
was also carrying the black pack just as was described to me. believed he was probably armed l
With a handgun.
Incident A20154105 Page 2 of 5

DPSST- 38543
Dare:
nal 7/11/2023.
Incident Report:
Current As 0t 12/15/2022 1 1 :23:53 AM
fie deputies had just started walking back to their vehicles. I asked Orak his
name, He sat down
a table. He confirmed who he was and told him he had a warrant and that he was Under arrest.
|
lie asked what the warrant was for. He also got a nervous look on his face and started looking
@ward the avenues of escape. believed he was about to run. l also believed he was armed. His
|
ck had an open compartment and l could see contents. His weapon could be readily accessible.
lfiold him he would know that better than l about the warrant.
U
érak stood up. moved forward and placed my hand on his chest and ordered him to sit back
|
gown. He turned toward the exit point.' I broke contact and drew my taser because of the situation
and his history. l activated the laser and targeted his abdomen. l ordered him to go down to the
ground. He failed to comply. He asked again what he was being charged with. l told him again in
a clear loud voice to get down on the ground or l would use the taser. l called for cover units to
respond. Orak then complied. He got down on the ground.
Dep Duncan from the Clatsop County Sheriffs Office arrived and handcuffed Orak. l explained
Orak his Miranda Rights to him. He said he understood them. l asked if he had a gun in the
backpack. He confirmed he did. lasked if it was loaded. Orak confirmed it was. l asked him what
type of gun it was. He said it was a 9mm.
| had probable cause to believe that the pack that was in the possession of Orak at the time of his
arrest on his felony warrant contained a 9mm handgun that was loaded at the time. have a |
criminal record on Orak that shows him to be a convicted felon. l have no information that shows
Orak has a concealed handgun license. l had probable cause to believe the bag would contain
evidence of the crimes of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm and Felon in Possession of a Firearm.
l believed it will also be a violation of his post prison supervision, a crime as well.
Orak refused consent for me to search the bag.
Orak as transported to the Clatsop County Jail. He told me he did not want to talk about the gun.
He then continued to engage with me in conversation. During which he made a comment about
finding the gun on the boat he was on. l repeatedly told Orak to not speak with me, but he would
then engage in conversation with me.
At the jail l was advised that a Detective Sergeant Harris from the Gresham Police Dept wanted to
speak to me about Orak. was advised that Orak was wanted for Theft I, Theft of a Companion
|
Animal by the detective. He spoke to Orak about the incident on speaker phone, but Orak denied
the incident.
ladvised Orak l was seizing the items in his possession at the time of his arrest. Orak then gave
me permission to search his pants and a shirt that had been attached to the pack he had been
DPSST: 38543
Date:
Incident Report:
[11/2023.
Current As Of 12/15/2022 11:23:53 AM
been
@rrying. He wanted them back. He also gave me permission to search the coat he had
confirmed he was not giving me permission to
@earing because he wanted that as well. He again
checked. found
search the rest of his pack he had been wearing when arrested. The items were
|
a key ring with a key that matched the lock on the sailboat in question we had checked. Based on
info from the owner that no one was supposed to be on the boat, l suspected a burglary. l
g'le
geized the key until l could confirm.
G,
.
5 he other clothing and contents of them were released to Orak.

'U
.2
Ehe bag was secured to have a search warrant applied for based on the probable cause l had that
ft. contained evidence of a crime. lt was placed into an evidence locker at the Astoria Police Dept.
On 10/10/15 l prepared an affidavit and search warrant to be used to get into the Orak's pack. I
sent it to Chief Dep DA Ron Brown for review. He approved it- then contacted Judge Philip
I
Nelson. He was faxed the affidavit and warrant. He then called me back and swore me to the
affidavit. He then signed the paperwork and the warrant and faxed it back to me.
The warrant was served on the pack at APD- l searched the pack In the top section of the pack l
found the pistol. lt was a Ruger P89 9mm Pistol. The serial numbe'r was 305-16932. It was run
through LEDS and clear. The gun had a fully loaded magazine. Upon inspection a live round was
found loaded in the chamber as well. In total there were 13 rounds loaded in the pistol. It was a
fully functional pistol designed to fire 9mm rounds.
The remaining items of the pack were for personal care.
was able to contact the owner of the sailboat in question at slip C49, named the Cantana. His
|
name was Michael Hecker. Hecker advised me that he was married to a family member of Orak's.
He said Orak had asked to buy his boat about a month prior. He said that he had given the keys to
the boat Orak to go and look at it and see if he wanted to buy it. He had not heard from Orak
since. He said that he came to Astoria to check on the boat and see if Orak was going to take over
the boat the weekend prior to this incident. He said Orak was not'around. Hecker confirmed he
had a P89 9mm pistol on the boat. He said there was also a shotgun of some kind as well. Hecker
did not say that Orak could be living on the boat, but he was not concerned that he had been
because he was family. Hecker was advised that Orak had been arrested in possession of his
pistol. Hecker confirmed that Orak had no permission to be in possession or have the pistol at all.
It appears that Orak just moved onto the boat and then stole the pistol once he found it.
Based on this information l had probable cause to believe Orak is a convicted felon. He was found
in possession of a loaded concealed handgun. The handgun was illegally taken from a boat and
did not belong to Orak and he had no permission to have taken.
Incident: A20154105 .
Page 4 of 5
DPSST: 38543
Date:
ginfil 7/11/2023.
Incident Report:
CurrentAs Of: 12/15/2022 11:23:53 AM
5 went to the jail and charged Orak with the additional crimes of Theft l of a Firearm, Felon in
of a Firearm, and Unlawful Possession of a Firearm.
Eossession
a.
Statements
'5
Evidence/Property
U
fiction Recommended
Eonivard the case to the DA's Office and Multnomah Co Community Corrections.
> '
Officer's Signature:
McNeary, Christopher DPSST: 38543

DPSST: 38543
Date: W
rilied Colrect Copy of Original 7/11/2023.
EIZ
Astoria Police
Department
Incident Report:
I
Current As Of 12115/'2022 11 24 21 AM
Single Continuation Report
§ummary
Test Fire of suspect's pistol
Mentioned
HECKER. Michael Robert -
VICTIM
Phone CeII Phone:

DOB: mployer: Emp Phone:
JOHNSON, TraC Marie -

WITNESS
one one:
DOB Employer: Emp Phone:
ORAK, Osarch Jason -

ARRESTEE
one: e one:
DOB: Employer Emp Phone.
PICKERING, Janine Ma
VICTIM
Phone Cell Phone'

DOB: mployer: one
YELTON, Rick Lee -

WITNESS
CeII Phone:
DOB: mployer mp Phone:
Incident: A201541D5 Page l of 2

DPSST. 38543
Da te.
LI 7/11/2023.
Incident Report:
Current As Of? 12/15/2022 1 1:24:22 AM
@tion Taken
6n 10l11l15 at about 0810 hrs. the suspect's pistol, a 9mm Ruger was test fired at the Astoria
@lice Dept's range. The weapon was tested with a functions check frst. All parts moved and
f§nctioned as designed. The pistol was loaded with a live cartridge. The pistol was fired. The
the cartridge. The pistol"Is a fully functional
fistol moved and functioned as designed and fired
fEearm with the ability to fire. Ofc Koehnke of the Astoria Police Dept was present as a witness as
ll.
"é?
fiie fired cartridge was placed into evidence with the pistol. A photo was taken showing the dented
finimer caused by the pistol's firing pin when the trigger was pulled.
Statements
Evidence/Property
Action Recommended
Attach to the original case.
Officer's Signature:
McNeary, Christopher DPSST: 38543

DPSST: 38543
Date: WW
"£71,407 /Z .
j
77 59 655
55:35:;H 550155
"677/33
j5/W4
in m/rrw'IL 6550/
[XX/é Gym
55,555 5% (05555555 3&5???
5A5??? 59% Kine/570% C &: M

{1/5,
EEC/{'4
J1
Rwy/152
55 A? 5555
2 f Q5 55555555
'7
fl/(wé'm,
SV/fzv719;
/
240 95m 5;
I
/ 02/9
(é 5/ 7% '//.~/5_5'57
87/55
J'W'yfl2/62/93
.. -
€5,555,/ 514 4"/

j//? 2 (
/ '74)
63/
:40?
#530552»;
@ Cow/SJ? 4/5/7483
f%
55,156/'5L9
aémgag/Va 4' 57/370
70%
W 7% c2 wqué a
5 5/554
5/
555555/5/5/
@5145
:fl,»
52/555555 AM 555/ 5 7555
é/J/L AWWjffi-V'é
W27" fly yél/bg
@7zémfgr
7%
aflA/I fl/'éj/'3'748'V1 7g)!" C/ifC/fi'm/Hq [My :

fl/flls'n
jéfl $4M"?
3%E
did/Mg 80<fifim7éfigmn
flWéQb§4Q/j J7Z/fl25357,
7/3/2, 956 AM Gmail another assault outside Beacon CLUBHOUSE astoriua, oregon
-
G fl") i} mary rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com>

.
.|
@other assault outsnde Beacon CLUBHOUSE astoriua, oregon

4unessages
h
nfiry rose Ienore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com> 3 July 2022 at 12:37

Carlsen <erinbeaconclubhouse@gmai|.com>, Kirk VVintennute <kirk.wintermute.law@gmail.com>, Sarah Brown
TB'. En'n
<§br0wn@clubhouse-intl.org>, humanservices@co.clatsop.or.us, "Geissler, Jonas (CRT)" <Jonas.Geissler@usdoj.gov>
o.po
>"got a report
tfluenfin aka Nicholas possible last name Alexander
Co ec
assaulted a man
3n a wheelchair, punching him until he bled out of the head on July 1 2022 outside the Beacon Clubhouse
f
fiwrote LlFEBoat board Kirk Wintermute about itbut i guess he is too busy to deal with that
I
the victim in the wheelchair has cognitive disabilities, and may not have understood why nicholas got up in his face,
leaning into his wheelchairto shout at him.
the fact that wheelchairs are not allowed inside down the dangerous staircase, may be why he was out on the sidewalk,
seeking services, as i have seen so many people approach the staircase with their assistive devices and look forlornly
down the non-ADA-compliant staircase.
the report i got is that the wheelchair user defended himself as nicholas Iquentin leaned up to shout at him & order him
around and quentin punched the man in the wheelchair on the head until he bled.
as i stated b4
ido not feel safe or comfortable around quentin's violence.
you have never asked me what i saw when i and at least 6 other witnesses watched quentjn attack the smaller feeble man
in March. i immediately left a voicemail at Beacon to describe the assault.
Quentin pushed his victim by the shoulders but the man held his ground close to the entrance
as a bystander i VERBALLY intervened and told quentin firmly
"you shouldnt push a man around who is smaller than you stop it"
the victim got away about 10-15 feetstanding directly in front of me as i sat knitting with my head near the glass pane
windowto the east of your door
quentin then rapidly approached him, shoving him forcefully with both hands on the shoulders, knocking him completely
down to the pavement, where he rolled in front of me, between me and my partner
my partner was on the street side of the sidewalk, and immediately jumped in to shield the victim, in case quentin returned
to assault his victim some more
as my partner helped to protect the victim
adam eastman was to my right, he tried to jump in drunkenly to attack my partner
so ijumped in between adam eastman and the victim being protected by my partner
telling adam eastman
dont touch g., he's like us, he's a peacemaker, he's just trying to protect the victim.
isaw the victim recently

and told him
that me lodging a complaint about him being assaulted as well as other issues
prompted you to allow your business partner to

https:llrnail.google.com/mail/u/O/?ik=3e0c39d4a7&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thrcad-a:11769315921222530437&simpl=msg-azr-38'7175625738029072&simp1. .. 1/4
7/3/23. 956AM Gmail another assault outside Beacon CLUBHOUSE astofiua, oregon
-
exclude, discriminate, and retaliate against me
for being a witness of a crime

i immediately urged quentin to call the cops on himself
gin agl11g023._
s the victim felt respiratory distressanother witnesses
rged me to call for medical.
hen officer carrera arrived

ct Cppy BIOr
e explained that "nicholas" called himself in for the assault as i had told him to do.
did not witness the recent July 1 assault by quentin on the disabled man in the wheelchair.
git is my belief that you should perform due diligence to gather facts about any assaults that occur near your property, for
gour client safety. assaults against disabled people are especially in non-compliance with ADA. accessibility to ADA-
facilities is a key provision of federal disability law, and as far as i understand it, applies to your organization.
griendly
'Equick remediation and redesign of the lack ofADA-compliant facilities should be a top concern, as well as ending all
V
violence especially against people who are disabled.
it is my understanding after watching the March assault there, that if the victim had been a foot or two further closer to me
when he was knocked to the pavement
he could have caused my head to be pushed back to shatter the glass behind me.
the glass window panes are a present danger so long as any kind of violence is being deployed outside your business.
i was told that quentin was standing in the same location by the same glass when the july 1 assault happened.
i explained to him the day after the March assault outside your nonprofit business, that very much felt endangered by his
i
sudden, random violence, also partly because the of

panes glass behind where people congregate could be shattered.
i would not sit or stand there again and realize how dangerous it is nowespecially if known aggressive violent people
frequent this block.
iwas very glad the victim, did not have an open head injury in the march incident, as he primarily landed on his body,
shoulders and torso, rolling.
as you may knowa filling empty bellies clientslammed a disabled man to the concrete outside your business on
christmas 2021causing him to have a skull fracturehematomaand brain hemorrhage being transported to OHSU on
christmas.
lucky for me, i did not witness this assaultbut i did read police and medical paperwork and speak to many witnesses
including the assailant.
the assailanti have been told suffers from a cognitive delay, and did not know the physical disability conditions
leading his victim to take such a hard fall, and be knocked over
as i stated before, a venue to let these concerns be known, should be hospitable, and nonretaliatory.
so long as you retaliate on clients/formerclients for expressing concerns
you discourage whistleblowing
and silence input.
additionally, as i have asked wintennute with no response, i would like the grounds for my exclusion
IN WRITING
so that i may understand

what exactly you consider that i have done incorrectly
in regards to sharing my concerns via email.
ideally, i would like a restoration of my membership to freely attend or associate as i may feel free to do so, but if you must
continue this exclusion, please put it in wrifing.
http5' ll mail. google.corn/ mall/u] 0/ 7ik£e0C39d4a7&view=pt&search=all&permthid=thread-a: 117693 1592122530437&simp1=msga:r387175625738029072&simp1. . . 2/4

7I3IB, 956AM Gmail another assault outside Beacon CLUBHOUSE astoriua, oregon
-
or, alternatively, we should have a meet up, to discuss how to address my concerns, how future concerns could be deaIt
with in a non-hostile way, and how others could feel empowered to have their voices heard, without the fear of being
silenced, retaliated against, or denied essential services for sharing their input.
'l u n - - n
m Is easy to assume any dlscnmlnation ls personal. I heard you also kicked out one of your only African American
a wonderful man and a veteran. is that tme?
@articipants,
1
Elodge a complaint about kicking him out, and found out about that AFTER you allowed your partner to kick me out,
gespite you, saying i am welcome.
ofgir rgr
it really true that your partner has the power to exclude Beacon members, when he runs the other organization?
doesnt seem fair to your customers, to not even know who is a safe person to write to, who the board is composed of,
the funding is coming from.
3vhere
my understanding that Clatsop county promises to make sure ADA is implemented for grant recipients, so they should
ails
L ow if facilities are non-ADA -accessible as they are currently, or if disabled people are being assaulted, or discriminated
against.
o
'5
fl)
'3 is clearly not wheelchair accessible, unless you allowed wheelchairs to transit thm Beacon clubhouse, and perhaps
Widened the hallways
there would have to be blended dining with wheelchair users and other mobility-impaired people eating upstairs at the
beacon house, for any ADA compliance to be provable.
we should champion the cause of ADAaccess for all!
clearly a reasonable accommodation request should made for many clients you unfa'rly discriminate against, as many of
their issues arise from disabilities due to the homelessness, and constant abuse they suffer.
as i have expressed before, i do not like the misogynistic verbal abuse your clients use to deter female participants.
what can be done, to make a safe space?
the fact that i spoke openly about the drug sellers you welcome to your organization, is not because i have any animosity
at anyone suffering addiction or the poverty that leads to commercial drug trafficking.
very real and present safety concern for people in recovery, and i believe you need to know what is going on,
it is a
including with predatory drug pushing, especially in instances of power imbalance, sexual abuse, or predatory financial
abuse on disabled people.
the issue of nonlocking restrooms at the unisex three stall "homeless" restroom is a constant concern i have heard about
for over six months.
women are forced to use a restroom with men, who repeatedly walk into their private stall on them, with the outside door
removed.
numerous homeless women have described numerous assaults to me, and that they feel uncomfortable using the
restroom with men who abuse them, frequently walking in on them.
the verbal harassment i spoke about was never addfressed.

my concerns about religious harassment against jewish people were also never addressed.
i do not know the best way to interact with people of a neonazi background who are receiving services at your location,
but excluding me for feeling unconfortable at some of the jargon, also seems unfair and discriminatory.
it seems reasonable to me, to ask recipients to not engagte in any hate speech, including misogyny directed at women, or
especially women who are crime victims.
i
just called in one abusive verbal incident at a female crime victim to a probation agent forthe male assailant, who feels
free to verbally abuse his victim at your establishment, due to lack of standards or guidance towards retaliation against
crime victims.
mary rose Ienore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com>

3 July 2022 at 16:42
To: coconicolemaki@gmail.com, Gretchen Allen <gretchen@gba|lencpa.com>
i knew i needed to put it in writing
to ask
15921222530437&simpl=msg-a:r387 17562573802907wsimp1 . . . 3/4
httpszl / mail. google.coml mail/u] 0/ ?ik=3 e003 9d4a7&vicw=pt&search=all&permthid=thread-mrl7693
7/3/3, ESGAM Gmail another assault outside Beacon CLUBHOUSE astoriua, oregon

erin carlsen
to PUT IT IN WRITING
_|
she is allowing osrch to exclude me

§Ivhy
N
EI have waited long enuf after asking kirk winterrnutethe board president of LlFEBoat to either grant me a meeting,
reoke my exclusion, or put grounds for exclusion in writing.
wouldnt be surprised if kirk winterrnute resigns from this org, when he finds out about their toxic practices.
rig
Gas a judge he will need to demonstrate neutralityand will need his time, i would think.
"5[Quoted text hidden]
>
5'
I'fi'ary rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail. com> 21 July 2022 at 15:44
T§z info@clubhouse-intl. org
8
'U
.2
'§______ Fon/varded message -
>From: mary rose lenore eng < > '

\Fju,,3:
I2; 1:
Date: Sun, Jul 3, 2022 at 12. 37 PlVl
Subject: another assault outside Beacon CLUBHOUSE astoriua, oregon
To: Erin Carlsen :=,;-.3.:;'- 3. '3'1'345-32} >, Kirk Wntermute< '
3:;">, Sarah
'
Brown
<'i. >, < > Geissler Jonas (CR'I')
< '
>
mary rose lenore eng <maryeng1@gmail.com> 9 June 2023 at 15:14

To: REEVES Brandon BOLI <brandon.reeves@boli.oregon.gov>, Clatsop County Communications
*
<communications@clatsopcounty.gov>
i
got no response other than a threat letter from osarch orak
that he would take "legal action" against me ifi made any other attempt to contact them to negotiate on behalf of the
vulnerable
--
Fon/varded message -
From marjl rose lenore eng < _ .

3.>
Date: Sun, 3 Jul 2022 at 12:37
Subject: another assault outside Beacon
< EEC'I'J : 2 1: 2:3333, 3:.{,>, < in 3

13M
.' 3s ,
: >,
CLUBHOUSEKirk
To: Erin Carlsen «an ,"::':'!I~< 11>:i23:3;,:~3?1"'3i
astoriua, oregon
WIntermute
<'
>
::I\
Geissler, Jonas (CR'I)<
3. 3 31,:
55%;:
>, Sarah Brown
g 3" g. >
https:llmail.google.com/maiIIulOl?ik_3eOrfi9d4a7&view=pt&scarch=all&permthid=threada: r17693 1592l222530437&simpl=msga:r38'Il75625738029072&31mp1 4/4

3/
1777/17
€7,274 Jkj§dy 79f}! /'/
4:" 77.77777 73% 747 277777 777
Jail
l/WWHXQJJW 2/29 77% Wfl77/77/ZS'177/w
gybg 2?,
53.2, f0
VwiywaJ J7371/q'w,'/9§;/27
éKJywj/oxflo
g; /709 770,04 /672~//0[M7
:3 um'y'égéyffinvf; aw
'"
4%; Hfl'filflm/M g7;
Z- Sail/"3'6
fly 74),;7
/O 7(39729737
'%247z//l75t/
S}! WJ/Zlflajé/ fiyyuz-ws'J/jfijl
7777
7'7 "7777/7777' 7777773 777 ,5
W'fl96/{7 /.777M
gV,7?wf¢gg.J
7/5.? flaunt/fig J.
77777 '7 [77'
7% 77%
fl, 9%
31245,? w;)17p:(:IX/c/Jflfl
Q
71 14:2 flyhwfl/
ya figL M"?g
fizvfia 757(7er???(7
MIMI?!
77' 777:7
fiémtzoc; '6"
<3
5%] 6% 77776
0 7% ELI)!
\yfl, 7; Jmp 7"" .72)
1
"$23? 95532
@7313
gLU3ii:méx/fl% (771?"
W?
517/47 7677 77777?»
JV?.7 7 ,7
by
475
DocuSign Envelope ID: CDS45E26-42B24068-868F-B38737E12060
BUREAQ_@§ LAGR 5: ENIUSTREES
. I
._
gi'kfla 5__g/
N
.t
Case #3
cgMPLAMANT:
Y ENG
P BOX 12
OR 97103
A§TORIA,
o
R§SPONDENT1 Mailing Address:
Li§eboat Services Beacon Clubhouse
d® Beacon Clubhouse Contact: Human Resources PO Box 492
1%0 Commercial St. Aston'a, OR 97103
Agoria, 0R 97103
|
County. Clatsop # of Employees: 1+
ORS 659A.142
V22055 18\ 12.20.2022
I, Mary Eng, under penalty of peljury, do depose and say as follows:
Allegations: I allege discnmination in a place of public accommodation based on my disabilities, in that

Respondent made a distinction, discrimination, or restn'ction and denied me filll and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges.
1. I have one or more disabilities that substantially limit one or more major life activities.
2. In or around February 2021, I was referred by a mental health provider to Respondent, a daycare center
for people sufi'ering from mental illness.
3. In or around February 2022, Respondent owner physically cornered me, yelled at me, and intimidated
me, which caused my disabilities to be triggered. Respondent owner discriminated against me in this
manner even though he knew I suffered from mental health disabilities. Respondent owner intentionally
triggered my disabilities to punish me for trying to raise clothing donations for Respondent's facility.
4. Respondent owner has demonstrated a pattern of cornering and bullying clients that use the services in
his facility when he perceives these clients to be vulnerable, marginalized, or disabled.
5 Respondent owner denies disabled persons resources and equal access to his facility.
6. Respondent owner allows violent clients that use his facility to bully the disabled clients that use his
facility.
I believe Respondent made a distinction, discrimination, or restriction and denied me fiill and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges in a place of public accommodation based on my
disabilities.
Portland Salem Eugene uregonnevlheii (971)673-D?61

Q Bend Medford @ heip@b011.state.or.us as, Ore
Remy mgfztt
1
DocuSlgn Envelope ID: CD645E26-42824068-868F-B3B737E12C60
BUREAU ef LABOR 3: lNflUSTRlEfi

A?
['Z
W!
"
l
fie
I7l11/2023.__é
g I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the above statement is time and correct to the best of my
E'knowledge and belief, and that i understand it is made for use as evidence in m official proceeding.
0
I understanci that the aboxre statement is a public recm'd and that the information herein may be disclosed to
~'5
sum)
c person, at any' time.
U
.. F'
DocuSIgned by
1/4/2023
l
'6Né, MW
8 Yew signatui'e:
k640EF0307c13457 Date:
'5
.2
.5
'I
Portland Salem Eugene eregon.govlhuli (971)6730761

9 Bend Medinrd 6% help@boli.state.or.us & Ore. Re!ayTl'Y:7H
2
L/g Ling/6% £7
4/5799J5'
_Verifled Correct Co
""
WQVJ 0.1
£7
.1
77W" r,
737% gm 0#6
§//w.,> "WW9 31%
3 fix? b a27904"27 bW/a'xfl
35/7 WW [h/'Wé/Q 1?}
W719977217)7/9 'MWW'
M @1275
91' "I
VQZ: Mg/ 'Jy4'7iy0fi/uff} i w' "
5p!
Wv'gfi/fl My 9534219??? Eg
b
_/2'909_:?j4!7 [Eva/£0
\'QDIXQaqrm/TV/prlJ/ abvflfl/pv
34
47 U@ #7 (Jaw
24' 338 z ViW/v'éoj
BUM/76?!" O
ff-ywgof 410/ 05/3")
M0 a5) 0"U'/
f J0 [New 0571M 9%
7
VII/(91.5442 ~°W
gag 614;," l
y'VO/M? 3,73%
~
67
39
5i, wag q; G
["3 Wat/W7 9/ "W
N9 1'}, (NW
m
My? Virgiw'72'"373'a'7
"~21 E. w "9 wéew w WE
{42% a y OS €
MOOBEJQ 0'"? W3 W V:
.4
QQ WQjS '/"'J
u W
gcflé wwwv» 7' J\I)
f
\0
WWW? WW Zfl/A.é Ma »\»y/
"'
r"
zi'éyit'wzg; 1/ 36
Hf}: W
j")
"2:: arm? [W
fly W/ [Ur/W7 6&5; M/
49/123779: (11/ LI/'e
75?"? "j "Maw/71 /%b
W, Ea]! SK) .9
WyméflV,i[D 7% '5
7;}7 /@ My?
/, a; gnu
[vi
% (y f"?11 64%275 fly
.///
// 26% QJWJb/za
3»
fl67§
WMA WV r34» 7a my mg;
9:5
7774 /9vf{7 1524
9;,«7759 //2:70/
% 7Z/WJW '/ 6
3 QC?"
rw@'7''%'
Q7L '4'")7k
24 "77/3 WW?
7 W I"? ?? 4"»"Zfl/09
W 97" WW W
WW WV/vax" 7467/14 70
/M\,JQ 7g\'mM/V0?
577 %b'77[ 747/15 )0
07C 7(Jam/W WM\'W\H/IQ
$Qa'fi'C/S'LW.)
534/0709 34%
4174
074 /@V'??
a»? /20\yz:2c/
W 3/7 075
7""9'7fi" 25>
.19'5
fibw'i/ #0737
27'
'O/A 33W 2'
a,
/?"cfi'/a7
T
' 67717;:
532%4377.7 7L7 / 179)},7931/M
//
S") S'fl /S77 #3;
2/751} 7/571?"- {M},é/J,/9
(5')") ng7 Xvvaffig
VIMarkay'y myoja'?
b (3 a (41,2999
f2/ 7 ii g
I'
W/M WWJ/b
W15) MVIW/Jwga
J/W'ygkd& [4' M!
4:) {/7
30/" J1 70% Jfi
\(f7/ 771
52/)":
§
S.
QQ
0%
¥'Sq/Iflfv éw)l,¢pC'mQ
dC
W\7('8m\, m\I,/j
Sib/M gy/g
572,9?7fl/7 flyav4/zg715 1/7797M/2 fl/ 7;ng 767
Way JJ/ jib/1"Mfl}/S) ffiéj/ 0/7/40
"634/ Chi/727
27 W27 Taflfigj
$1 /0 1 70 g #217
%Da:7 44/ JIWQK/
jgyb {#3071 M]! "7% 071
I?
a 7, wag/71%;?" @4971? "771
WWQ7LM'5
5792M
""4
5/5527 9/;[99711477/
fl?
"4/129
an, 499/471? 7Lbw
%/ ")771'573's/
:2
pg?)/¢7wcz:yf?"
/ y Y MK
KKK WWW K227 M'fjé/Z/
yKKK/K 70 -é
¢KK®«é/K2va«KKy W174
Kay/M
wa/OM gw
>4/K7wsm/wM25 fly
é: "VOL/If 4'22 2? WWI/1
3 '% 677'7 f/ zs'flgao
J/fl/ flay?-"I
éux'é/H7 /® 57M
/W)¢ [93' W7 024/
)/ / 3*lb)
"~-%f/¢27/21M4u 071
{1&3} 585/1111! 715315§b /9/
My jaw
éw'k'ao é?» W/Wm'ufvy IJ
"'
"'"V"""""'"K'"53W KW; W 77:23?
0% 7KK<37 Km
WW w 2
Ky /703
mum/K7 M //« :7
W§K mg; w
kW? "£67
52/44/3367] $29? 792%
3a 42,4231
A) 3'=7 f:7/m'M7grave,M/"fi
"@fi
Cop
yam/5y "225:2? mfwi/ "/7/fl 'fif/'bgi

@ggfiylo) 47/ MR" 977M 7" "/0a"?
"6W" "W "2,142,
%§Qda%g'# "WM 47'
'" "f' a/fp/fl/ 5' ,M Q7l/ fl
Q7/fl6/
6} £6?
%Lb/fl7L0flZ( vm/V' /,}JM>"/'('j
@577
y/fl/ xii/6%)? {m} "L" 'Zi/W'g'gaJJé/Q
>317b'32771 m 01470
/§ W /9 / LA u}
.7LI90/4772) 3'? j!)
g:
Méau $22M/
,
f-ug/g .
Wfiyfg$b 3'" W\I 7 Q71
By my; WT? $4 Q
ZW/ "WW3
"WC/g3"; $1521 L/ W/"fifi
M 14%
5' "Wflfl
"177/ 1,3271%?)
WV/g 3mab/fll471
1§5,04¢Mm73 W in 7P7W)'4'7ADZO 2:77p % Jo'ZZ "
M
$997V<7 517 2'7""? vow/w £4 20
Wm 7% CJ/W 7% W M}
War» 9% /"'?/*"I "Fw WW
W
*5 .Ifo "/2 7';
DJJWVfiwspg-exwaé'
J )0"
Kw/'"J
/Sn7Ha/ISP7€}W swag @1917";
x/w' ""J
[€919 w\:)//U /V73@*2g W /§m'/z7m?;
)9/7oflg/'3JJ 47' "7/? SW 7"
, "M5.
14%;
53/ /.7 %/f/
zw)?//29V'IW3.'J'7 7/bgy/7Q7
3EYXW°TU v71)!"- 5W\'Wfi' WW? jg
W()S' l2 $357714
Jfl@'w@)>(%/fi"fl iffy/7977M
D/Vl/flgdép /4%1 fltnjgfiéV/fi/Zy éé'7x}701d ,
JW'OH
W': / [ WI wax
2727 $8 WQLYL egg 71%
NM}? [77?)97
1/ WDVT/fi\7/\
/?'W"3 W/ '77L/b?%
m77'?\'/')27 gfi
J14; //<7"/'
Jr") 9% 407/
/'\ 2M 37
My
[W
LN».
Sl'l/mfz/ltafif
2572 7&6
{77 /
\'/7
2'7; (7/770 0/
afM/a $9" «b
/ fly
jéy' a 7M
Siam \LZJ 39% )6?
2:7 d7 7L1
7/ /Jm/bl 437"? ngb 47;?
"75/ E737" Mg WM 7;
'j'jvicb73/Z'D'7/M 276?)?
P, b4\rw')-L/ 7/01
7/ lax?
HZ'f'fé/W
$6M
'L'CplWC? 73g);
Q5,JV gb/V) 45' @fl/kZ/
fif°flfl W €u\.§
Mam/q} "W0 Way 2/1 77
m/ [j- 37'
M 4&7
V'VGDV/M"§Q QWW 37 //"/
/% M'q7fip'fij WV'D Q;
6%L4QWIQ/ F
mam/W
.
éflfl/J J a (w
V
Wfi7fl" NJ
WL%*M\' WW5?
\AJVIQ'Qgflx'7
$1173
2/" m
7flz/ d 7937/2/0 /7
j
U27
u,
3y/d 3/7/74 7fl/'Ww /7WWW7
ooooo op
99345;, W)///
'SZOZILLIgguigJwfldgy 257?? j /flW
j§@
WI'WJéfl/I C] W0 wear a;
3J \
dC
f"? / wwxngu
'4
"7
"'"f7' Wm W flW M
gal -'
)4: mu! , .
/0 W7"
m .
[a
\«Z
.
é'flllé 797 7 71
.
$0/2g72a/1 26,
O We
22¢ away '1)
'5
'u/GJC'fl/wf 77/171
gay/r; W7
47/755 '37
.3 €w7A@'//o/ / 3)
Mm? 0.74 «'74
27'
/@ 1' ""7?" WW
fl 37 Q'M/f
c2 39 'fl :5 %?7 51/ {/5
z //7227"M
(7
/7:?OMAQ\5 DO 7M/ZJ/J 5&(/ 74/174
7W "Dippy/LOW?
#17"er 5277 6:
M\/
/0
{1,271 €971?ng
j {sag/lb
2'7
10 V7? 7"?
/fl'4® jflfl?\'v7[, Wfijvx/JL/OT)
/'?b7
/L
/oza/§6/C/ "LL / 707/6"??? 77V"
/&J 5337
fVJDSiJ/b ('44'7373
W g'grm
y!) WW
4;,wg'%?s@d/a/C/ «#17 4/07/94/1W 1'?
74/ MM
'7gK'W7J 97/ 57710147004 [27/ if]!
"7" $1 71b
-.
/
J 1
flS fl/flk")% j M/§\/) ngflg
fag?
2 u c? 520 m/
9 071 /b7/~M
. ,
f7?
(:gmyf/JiW/aé
[7
B/a/W/s
fflwfl79~ {J/ C7 /7m/zza
/"%
:fmléfia/fii/WfiWTW/
7émwfijwfv7" rc' V'
i
Edd/77
71:74\3/ SgaV/WI/W/W {WS%/
fl6@W%}//
'7' [1:9
73/0477
/4')W %W :
m/flyv/
96/57/'4/5 &f70 g/7%7
€7bv'2rfia7é /Wfls5/«
4774 y "3/1/57177/3'3
W'vfil €2V2'vZVK/;d /a%n
{717 9\/7fld "'27/
ro/flJ/D
7W?» @w7aJ fav'wwa F7
Z17
W"
V
W/Wfigmffwwj/wé
W "W" "W
flaw m/
mm /?71 970
3A7 WW 42 2:7/W
1/1/29
}L)':}M )0"30 71/4 Mic/x}
j
W "V'éfwvgga/O;
C97;
gig/raff 9%
fgflww/ 7'0 "/JL-Wj
75/57/77 /9/7?Mj: ,,
5'"; 414277
a
w§
9%")? /a WM
)4
5"?
7/?57 fl
kg; SW :NCI fig/"19697 WW"
(Toop
7 '39?
3/7703337
:27/A/'1/w/'W
7/7WUZG/W WVafiMZ'CJ
_\Ir iif eodC
/7(/
2/ 33
33/3 3/3 33 J
W<§ajzéb 97/ flow
1/
Q f("fl/a f:)/f/9
7777 317775777"
'14]
KW}
flWM/n
90
33333 33333333333
Silv/flx'flwly 071
702W 9/32/3307/ 701357
"'1': fig L4 3 fl»
MO
;V' 74?? 7777 .713'A/r'4/(7L73«?'J.+
JO sac/37w}
'5'3'3W/37L/
mg 4A gwu
a/V/%7fl1/ ,
,
fl /: '32" m/7/
g WI 3%
WWO)? #0 {77/777767
/b/C>// /0JC37
333333333 33/3 33033 3 <7"?"2333./ 1
/mI//// am/ 37%W vol/73¢ L24
53363333303/ 'é/ubm/ 0J9M//'/n
av/éuq' 577 Cbja
{mc'w {a /
"7407/3" 777'
m0
// m Zflflmm7 /
14/10 W3
j
235/
447
7/7777/617/7777
3/ 237/ 22 W37"
jQ %c "'7"
(714,7 Q" /27&/
y/Ulfb 7L94/1755
§' «647'?
72:2
($42
7;,wazp M{a
779/»: 2'7 77%WW" 76
"'7 " '? __
7""
0/0]:
TI'7QC7 Wyfij 57 'W
/ 7WZ7 /'W/6):
/t/Q
"3'6; Maw/"5 )C
0:: 7': ggfi ( MS
7 7 $ " 7 97%;7 gwwa
4/9 7
97"W057777'} :5
/r:y "7391) /?§
7%, ("Q/flaw
7LWM§DZ7/$(7
/:J/wc9c// W9 Jagd {W7?"
vy fl f/ W'67
WE'L'Mb Q7" 7AW7vii§i/
777/7 Vb'zo W/m
5
fflS/'fl /3/'JQ mafia
r3
W
5:734?) Wjv/ QWLC ZUG L~Q J17717/
%L mum g S J?) Ad
25 3/7 fl" 75 JXrfl 9/
M j3 796/ Jygfb/Q W
27% "caA237 //M
ww777/W' W7 "
7"
2:: '4?
bgfiféOWWGQ' «$777 54/?) "\'7
W7 W'W Q /"""///g
537/ 7
)flQJ'G"C/D7L fWV w'y fwé
07L fwk'M %0L/
_Verified Correct Co
J% yfl/Da'gng/j
72%"
5PWWW5%WWW3"
0/7/'4 jQQ/Wafi 7114' C27L
/wo Wyf/M
w/;fzo J
ag/W/ (3}) 30'
a 5M7?
Igngjzg
(L: /
19
«4);
Maya? 7/;g
filly?:L/UW ~ Z3 ?o/'\'J'd ya
Vikibj'jé'J W77 0/
:ya/Mx::aji/ 2;?
WWW WW7 WQVW
flaggiW/g 723/71! W]
M0 flv/W [VI/07 f
Mbw 5'77 I '07
5:55557/ {:52 7M" m: 3
wxwéwaj/ Z WW/77/%5\,7 b 52?
S'bw gbf fWJV/K'
flywééflWWW/Vg 74%
5/3/0st? 75/545"554/13/ V,"
Mg" 77L v4};
70/)?" Wfi&0%
wwvwmfl #13
5Wb #j 0%
S]
w W
lémé 557?«'y WW", "'
(3/
(2; $0?"
717/6
'HM
'0
L'E'M 1/1 M, 71/
I71494/
M 1/43. f} 26??? "CL
/7L
Wuysza 27'"
77/6/
7714
4",) 7/3 27717?
770
27002717? fay '7/7b/ W
IZ/flG/MQ
7/5/w7é; WJJL'
42w\7g/0MV~VM):/Vp {£6 )flVI/b
V27,7 17L
17/ $25.27
"Veg3m W7+ H77 WV%
we Xl'vqc/é
9m
J] Kmart/f 3 W97"
74.}!
A); flmJ
2/
"H WM 7W 24/4?#"
'QJ 157%
JW7WW\'W\VD<\ya/'Q7
mswéém a2 7 aw #6 W
/
7t Vmf/flwx' 'ZW
W [WW 7""741/
'M'o Wfié
5.7:;174/0 "av/217d
fwd/r )Oa'J Z a/L\'€/7b {W737
wxl/
/'1?§G) fdaaay 57L
$7 M7M p/bjfl 7O
W S71 "3377'? 2W/awa m
'27
?J\ "75L! 97 W'sg/dijg
% g/'gfo
3.0
/ Z'Q'fi W5 W W'bj'fl/l/ /1/\
1M5
"my 7A/'f'7 // W1 amp] {2%
W 4'"WO
WE?" s'aw/G
Egg/W @114)? 9wa70 "a W
M] )9 6 07L Jew
f/W fly?
4 ff
$107 20/7/W
/7/ %©'
f2)/:2:afifl/zf/J a? $2»: 1%]??? 20mm
W 17%)7'7] 7g ©7fi
flu fol/1,1 %//
bb fbbff
Xb bib W" bb AMA
)
D7779?
{V gww
arm/7&1)"
67$ Eféx "WOW
//JM (TY/W 77/
997797Wfi7
4A 994" a7Z wafflw
g 7LWJ3$
"W Li]
(hwy/4'0 ajf/ed W%§fl\C flu
}3'€7 0%
WWyW bXV/V/WDD fmfi'flO/{i
"Xv/W 17/ 2X7"
WM 7/57 U W7
\nwyavb WW fa #337 K Wax
WWW "'X
"'
y'éfffl'"
fXf'bZT Xbbbb
94
7%! W////727
1%w/T/P/Wf <57? 3/43}
"57M 24 7/4.?
/a./
E2304
all? 2%
WUUU
[1410}? Kay]
Wag/46» 5MW7L7'27 7 )Mflj/'Q
%1
\
/U jW
71/flf2fl
"25/! {L%c
MM WNW fl"
7%} Q.»
a) 2/7 LIZ; Wéwb'? _/ loJ7
JAI/O7L /&'Ef'§ /ofl(_3
{#waW WW5 WW
Why/2296
1/6/49
'W
27
"4%)??ij 0? 27%
W M
% 7% 0V W\fl@/g7
79
méw rfios'z/Q/Z/g" "/73 £37!
#:rWI/WW/ %
/@ flay 773/7"?
{0:0 S'
3'7 Viv/"J13
awn2m 074
{1.4 5,74 Wfijf'éa/
V6
6' 527" fiW
7%" vs
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT 0F THE STATE 0F OREGON
FOR THE COUNTY 0F CLATSOP
«a
gState of Oregon Case No: 23CR23294'
Plaintiff, n -
E
-
v. CONDITIONALKREQEA'S'E flcfiEMENT
Rose Lenore Eng D THIRD Pfififiéfifi¥ml§l§figfiE\MENT
EMary Defendant.
a
5Charges:
"' Obtain/Attempt to Obtain/ Use Contents of Communications
:W ,
Monitoring Level: E Standard D Enhanced D Intensive
8K I will personally appear in Clatsop County Circuit Court for all scheduled appearances in this and all other cases.
3X I will obey all laws, municipal, county, state and federal, and in circumstances in which state and federal law conflict, obey
state law.
3E I will contact Pretrial Release within two days (5033383777) and follow the direction of the Pretrial Release staff
.5. Inumber
will immediately notify the court and pretrial release staff, in writing, of any
change in my residence/ mailing address/ phone
email
and/or address.
I waive extradition if I am arrested outside of Oregon. This document serves as
my waiver. Initial: m K K
gm I will not leave Oregon without written consent of the court or Pretrial Release
staff, except D residence; U employment.
I will have no direct or indirect contact with the alleged victim(s) or enter onto their Osarch Orak. Lifeboat or
premises:
Maritza Ramero
D I will not possess or have access to firearms, weapons, or ammunition.
D I will have no contact with codefendant(s) without permission of court or Pretrial release staff:
E
I will promptly contact my attorney and keep in regular contact with them.
Attorney Name: C Lane Borg Phone: 503 4623774
D I will not use or possess alcohol or controlled substances without a valid prescription from a licensed prescriber.
D I will not use cannabis without a valid medical registry card.
D I will not enter bars, taverns or liquor stores or other places where alcohol is the primary item of sale, exception:
D I will not drive a motor vehicle without valid license and insurance and will use an IID if required by the court or DMV.
D I will submit to breath, blood, saliva or urine tests at the request of the Court or Pretrial Release staff and pay all costs.
D I will submit to a search of my person or vehicle at the request of the Court or Pretrial Release staff, if there is reasonable
suspicion that I have violated a condition of release.
D I will abide by conditions of probation / parole/ postprison and will report in person immediately upon my release.
D I will maintain contact with and cooperate with my thirdparty supervisor.
D I will be on Electronic Monitoring: D GPS; D Scram; follow all rules and comply with all requirements of the EM program.
D I will comply with all FAPA, stalking protective orders, and other protective orders entered against me.
D I will report to the jail to be booked and released by July 27, 2023.
D I will not possess animals.
D I will comply with the recommendations of the crisis response team (CRT)
D OTHER CONDITIONS:
I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND ALL CONDITIONS MARKED ON THIS FORM. I SWEAR I WILL COMPLY
WITH THEM. I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IF I VIOLATE ANY CONDITION(S) OF THIS RELEASE AGREEMENT,
THE AGREEMENT MAY BE REVOKED, A WARRANT MAY BE ISSUED FOR MY ARREST, AND I MAY BE
PROSECUTED FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT AN D / 0R FAILURE TO APPEAR.
Next Appearance Date: 8/21/2023 at 3:30 CR200
X Defendant is required to personally appear at the next court appearance. Failure to appear is subject to prosecution under
Date
0R3162.19£/122.:)5/X023 {744K QRKZ/
Defendant Signature
PJ,
Mailing Address
{gay /2 -4$@r.\¢0.€77/03
' (503) 755 $12275
Cell Phone Number (Landline if no Cell)
50m 7/2>'//fi77
mflry'5hji@?mav'/-
Email Address/ Date of Birth
Judge Cour'FCler Deputy'Sheriff
07/06/2020 Clatsop, balJV

FOR THE COUNTY 0F CLATSOP
State of Oregon Case No: 23CR23294

Plaintiff,
V. ARRAIGNMENT/ FIRST APPEARANCE ORDER
Hearing Date: 06/13/2023

Mary Rose Lenore Eng Senior Judge Cindee Matyas
Defendant. Prosecutor: Alexander Thomas
Defense Attorney:
Stand-In Attorney:
Interpreter:
Defendant is charged with: ObtainZAttempt to ObtainZUse Contents of Communications
APPEARANCE RELEASE STATUS ATTORNEY

D In Person D In Custody D Court Appointed
D Waived Appearance D Security Release D Retained
D Video D Conditional Release D Waived
D Telephone D Third Party Release D Applying
X Failed to Appear D Matrix Release D Hiring
X Warrant Ordered D Cited to Appear
CHARGING INSTRUMENT ARRAIGNMENT TRULY NAMED
D Provided Copy D Waived Reading D Yes
D Waived Receipt D Waived Advise of Rights D No, correct name is:
D Previously Provided D Advised of Firearms Laws D No, correct date of birth is:
D Advised of Risk of Self-Representation
DEFENDANT PLEADS: RELEASE
D Not Guilty E Security set at: $5,000.00 D Excluded from Release Matrix
D Guilty D Monitored Conditional Release D Book and Release
D N0 Contest D Recognizance Release D Waived 14 Day Rule
D Admits D Third Party Release subject to approval D Waived 60 Day Rule
D Denies D Forced Release converted to Conditional
D Conditional Release approved if the
following conditions are met:
D Other:
N0 CONTACT
D No Contact with Alleged Victim(s):
D Defendant must apply for the DUII Diversion Program within 30 days.
Defendant shall have days t0 file moti0n(s) against pleadings.
FUTURE COURT DATE(S)

Date: Time: Courtroom:
D CasIeIIMIanIagement Conference
D Docket Call
I:| Trial
DI Criminal Status Check
I
6/13/2023 3:26:38 PM
Sr. Judge Cindee S. Matyas

Order
Arraignnlent/ First Appearance-C LT (C D 02/2023)

CLATSOP COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION: Required when requesting to

inspect or receive copies from a Juvenile court case
Attach this completed form to a
“CLATSOP COUNTY STATE COURT FILE OR AUDIO COPY REQUEST FORM”
What is your full legal name? Leslie Espinosa Diaz
What is your relationship to the juvenile? They are a party to a Child Welfare/Dependency matter
Are you or were you a party to the case? Yes No
Are you asking to review/inspect case records? Yes No
Are you asking for copies of case records? Yes No
Are you asking for audio copies of a court hearing? Yes No
List the specific documents you are requesting to either inspect or receive a copy:
Document Name: Inspect Copy
All documents for case #22JU01198

All documents for case #22JU01385
In order to be compliant with state law, court staff will need to review your request and
if necessary seek judicial guidance. Please check the status of your request after two full
business days.
You must present current picture ID if approved to inspect or receive copies of juvenile
case documents.
COURT STAFF USE ONLY:

DATE REQUEST RECEIVED: RECEIVED BY:
FORM OF IDENTIFICATION USED FOR VERIFICATION:
COPY REQUEST FORM ATTACHED? YES NO
REVIEWED & REQUEST IS APPROVED DENIED BY:
07/20/2015, rev. 04/2019 CW|ba

Clatsop District ATtorney Versus One-Party Consent Law Oregon Eng Docs 1-25

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Clatsop District ATtorney Versus One-Party Consent Law Oregon Eng Docs 1-25

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

my-

FOR THE COUNTY OF CLATSOP

I am the El Petitioner/ Plaintiff espondent/ Defendant in this case.

Icertifythaton (date) f" ' 2'55 Z f'ﬂprovidedatrue copy of (list each

Le 141% OF Rah/um" C/Gl/{Vru (PH/141% 5

case by placing the document(s) in the:

Hands of the ElPetitioner El Respondent [:1 Attorneyfor C /'\ 715

Contact Phone Email Address

FOR THE COUNTY OF CLATSOP

Icertifythaton (date) g" / 2? .Iprovidedatrueco yofaisteach

ContactAddress City, State, ZIP

Contact Phone Email Address

7'/ 7D" 7" #0457 5' W WWI/mar?

//.)® JW/9 474 9"9U/ITL/'OJAQ

"77"" 7937/" 'l/Uuwwij {nfﬂyl/

I certifythat on (date) g ) '7' '3

Wands of the EIPetitioner El Respondent I] Attorney for

imp/Vb; V77 V1772}? )Mw'é€

document) [6&7 "£10 Peru/l so

Wain/WV) 14/20 r? Cam/67659643 'lcvbloqr WWW/bi , liq/190V

8 Mai) z'iVétwfcrr'p'l' , "907L540 $9, fee W64 WEN/13,20}? 5/

case y placing the do cument(s) in the:

Hands of the DPetitioner El Respondent D Attorneyfor C [R l' So

ﬁnimal Legal Defense Fund v. Wasden

Whwny L; ﬂitir'uw'u u u "@965"

r? :rmn , m ":"w\- wwmw We

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

ANIIVIAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, et a1.,

United States District Court, District of Idaho

BRIEF OF AMICI C URIAE THE REPORTERS COMIVIITTEE FOR

Bruce D. Brown (bbrown@rcfp.org)

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS 1

SOURCE OE AUTHORITY TO FILE BRIEF 4

STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMCI CURIAE

B. Idaho's "ag gag" statute chills ﬁiture investigations

H. The First Amendment protects speech on matters of

B. Idaho's "ag-gag" statute is a content-based

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO FED. R. APP.

APPENDDI A: STATEMENTS OF ]NTEREST 26

Cit)» ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) 17

Cit)» of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) 15

Conniek v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) 15

Garrison v. State 0fLa., 379 U.S. 64 (1964) 17

Grosjean v. American Press Ca, 297 U.S. 233 (1936) 8

Klena'ienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) 16

Martin v. City ofStruthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) 16

MiamiHerald Pub. Co. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)

Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) 8

Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm 'r ofRevenue,

NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) 13, 20

New York Times Co. V. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 15

R.A. V. v.Cit)! ofSt. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1982) 17

Reed v. Town ofGilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) 18, 19

Spelson v. CBS, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 1195 (N.D. 111. 1984) 15

Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) 17

United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) 20

Wieman v. Updegraﬁ', 344 U.S. 183 (1952) 13

Idaho Code Ann. § 18-7008 (2014) 19

Idaho Code Ann. § 18-7011 (2014) 19

Idaho Code Ann. § 187042 (2014) passim

2001 Investigative Reporting, The Pulitzer Prizes,

Explanatory Reporting, The Pulitzer Prizes,

Continuing Problems in USDA 's Enforcement of the Humane Methods

8 Mai) z'iVétwfcrr'p'l' , "907L540 $9, fee W64 WEN/13,20}? 5/

r? :rmn , m ":"w\- wwmw We

Idaho Code Ann. § 187042 (2014) passim

2001 Investigative Reporting, The Pulitzer Prizes,

Food Safety, Agriculture Fact Book, US DA (20012002),

American University, The Media Consortium, MPA

The Idaho Press Club is a not-forproﬁt corporation that has no parent

The International Documentary Association is an non-forproﬁt organization

The National Press Club is a not-forproﬁt corporation that has no parent

Online News Association is a notforproﬁt organization. It has no parent

Student Press Law Center is a 501(c)(3) not-forproﬁt corporation that has

Furthermore, Idaho's "aggag" statute is a content-based restriction that does